[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 10 (Friday, January 15, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 3957-3976]
[FR Doc No: 2020-28870]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 232

[Docket No. FRA-2019-0072; Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC82

Amendments to Brake System Safety Standards Governing Operations
Using an Electronic Air Brake Slip System

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA proposes to amend its brake system safety standards to
address operations using an electronic air brake slip (eABS) system,
which is a system that tracks details related to individual freight car
brake tests. The proposed rule would provide an alternative regulatory
framework for railroads to utilize when choosing to use an eABS system,
but would not require railroads to use such a system. The NPRM proposes
to extend the distance certain individual rail cars may travel (from
1,500 to 2,500 miles) without stopping for brake and mechanical tests,
if the cars have a valid eABS record. The NPRM also proposes to allow
railroads to add or remove multiple cars from a train without
conducting additional brake tests, if the train is solely made up of
cars with eABS records.

DATES: Comments are requested no later than March 16, 2021. FRA will
consider comments received after that date to the extent possible
without incurring additional expense or delay.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2019-0072 may
be submitted by going to http://www.regulations.gov and following the
online instructions for submitting comments.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name, docket
number (FRA-2019-0072), and Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking (2130-AC82). All comments received will be posted without
change to https://www.regulations.gov; this includes any personal
information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act information
related to any submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the
online instructions for accessing the docket.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Steven Zuiderveen, Senior Safety
Specialist, Motive & Power Equipment Division, Office of Railroad
Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, RRS-14, West Building 3rd
Floor, Room W35-204, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590,
telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or Jeffrey
Frank, Attorney Adviser, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad
Administration, RCC-10, West Building 3rd Floor, Room W31-201, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>,
email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
    A. Purpose of Regulatory Action
    B. Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action
    C. Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Regulatory Action
II. Background
    A. The Basics of Train and Freight Car Air Brake Systems
    B. Brake Inspection Frequency
    C. Block Swapping
    D. AAR Petition
    E. Technological Improvements
    F. Supporting Data
    G. Safety Improvements
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13771 and DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Energy Impact
    G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    H. Privacy Act

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of Regulatory Action

    In a March 1, 2019, petition (Petition), the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) asked FRA to amend the existing brake system
safety standards (49 CFR part 232) to increase the mileage individual
freight cars are allowed to operate between required brake tests if the
cars have a valid eABS system record.\1\ AAR requested that a car with
a ``valid'' eABS system record \2\ be allowed to move up to 2,500 miles
between brake tests if the car had received a Class I brake test
conducted by a qualified mechanical inspector (QMI), as defined in 49
CFR 232.5, and a freight car inspection performed by a designated
inspector, as defined in 49 CFR 215.11, similar to the existing
requirements for extended haul trains in 49 CFR 232.213. AAR requested
all other cars with eABS system records (i.e., cars with Class I brake
tests not performed by QMIs and/or freight car inspections not
performed by designated inspectors) be allowed to move up to 1,500
miles between required brake tests, as opposed to the currently allowed
limit of 1,000 miles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ FRA has placed the Petition in the public docket for this
rulemaking (Docket No. FRA-2019-0072) available at
www.regulations.gov.
    \2\ AAR defined a ``valid'' eABS as an electronic record
containing a car's identification information; date, time, and
location of the last Class I brake test; the identity and
qualifications of the person(s) who performed the last Class I brake
test; and the mileage until the equipment reaches the limit it is
allowed to travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its Petition, AAR also asked FRA to amend part 232 to remove the
existing restrictions on ``block swapping'' and permit railroads to add
or remove single cars or multiple cars from single or multiple
locations in trains solely made up of cars with eABS system records
without conducting an additional Class I brake test. This rulemaking
responds to AAR's Petition.

B. Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action

    In response to AAR's Petition, this NPRM proposes to amend part 232
to address operations using eABS systems. This proposed rule would
provide an alternative regulatory framework to existing part 232
requirements for railroads utilizing eABS systems. As proposed, an eABS
system would track detailed brake test information for individual rail
cars, including each car's identifying information; identification and
qualification of the person performing the last Class I brake test on
the car; the date, time, and location of that test; the distance the
car can travel before its next brake test; and other information
showing that the car meets the requirements of part 232.\3\ Consistent
with AAR's Petition, FRA proposes that railroads using an eABS system
would only be required to inspect individual cars before these cars
exceed their prescribed mileage limits, whereas currently railroads
must inspect the entire train consist before any car in that train
exceeds its prescribed mileage limit. The alternative regulatory
framework proposed would replace the conditions triggering the Class I,
Class IA, and II inspections of entire trains under Sec. Sec.  232.205,
232.207, and 232.209. However, all other requirements of part 232, as
well as the existing requirements of part 215, would continue to apply
to cars operated under this alternative regulatory framework. For
example, a car operated under proposed Sec.  232.221 must comply with
the off-air limits of Sec.  232.205(a)(3), must not be overdue its
single car air brake test under Sec.  232.305(c), and must have
received a part 215 freight car inspection when placed in a train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ This is similar to the existing requirements of Sec.
232.205(e), which requires railroads to maintain records of brake
tests for entire trains (as opposed to individual cars within those
trains). Existing Sec.  232.205(e) requires brake inspection records
to contain the date, time, and location of a train's Class I brake
test, the identification of the qualified person(s) conducting the
test, and because the record tracks the brake inspections of the
train as a whole, the number of freight cars inspected. See Sec.
232.205(e). However, this record is not required to be retained once
the train reaches its destination. The proposed rule would require
retention of this information for a period of time, allowing for
more detailed insight into the effectiveness of individual brake
tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, consistent with AAR's Petition, for a railroad
operating a train using an eABS system, FRA is proposing to extend the
distance for travel between Class I brake tests from 1,500 miles to
2,500 miles for cars receiving brake tests by QMIs and freight car
inspections by designated inspectors. All other cars would be permitted
to move a maximum distance of 1,000 miles between Class I brake tests.
    Finally, FRA is proposing to exempt trains in which all cars have
valid eABS system records from those requirements to perform a Class I,
Class IA, or Class II brake test that are due to adding or removing
multiple blocks of cars to or from the train. When a train's consist
changes en route, part 232 currently requires effective recordkeeping
and a Class I brake test of the entire train. Under the proposed rule,
a train consisting entirely of cars operating under an eABS system
would undergo a single Class I brake test of the entire

train at its initial terminal. Following set-off or pick-up, only those
cars in the train lacking sufficient mileage to proceed to the
subsequent destination would require a Class I brake test. However, the
requirement to undergo a Class III brake test (brake pipe continuity
test) would continue to apply to the train following each set-out or
pick-up. In other words, under the proposed rule, an eABS system would
create the conditions necessary to permit block swapping, because the
timeliness of inspections would be documented in a manner that ensures
accuracy and reviewability. Therefore, FRA proposes to relieve all cars
operating under an eABS with sufficient remaining mileage from the
requirement to undergo a Class I or Class IA brake test following the
pick-up or set-off of cars.
    FRA is not, however, proposing to amend part 232 to address all
aspects of AAR's Petition. FRA does not propose to extend the maximum
permitted mileage of a car inspected by a qualified person (QP) (who is
not QMI-qualified) from the present 1,000 miles to 1,500 miles as AAR
requests because FRA has not identified sufficient safety data to
justify such an extension. In addition, FRA is proposing to require
railroads to maintain eABS records for one year after creation, rather
than AAR's request to permit records to be overwritten after the next
Class I air brake test. Retention of eABS records for one year will
provide data that can be used to measure compliance with the eABS rule,
and that same data can be used by FRA and railroads to evaluate the
possibility of future regulatory changes allowing additional operation
flexibilities (e.g., the AAR request to extend mileage for equipment
inspected by a QP, as opposed to a QMI).

C. Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Regulatory Action

    FRA analyzed the economic impacts of this NPRM over a 10-year
period, and estimated its cost savings, costs, and benefits. Over the
10-year period of analysis, the total cost savings range from $128.1
million to $259.6 million (using a 3-percent discount rate) and $105.1
million to $217.3 million (using a 7-percent discount rate). The
annualized cost savings range from $15.0 million to $30.4 million
(using a 3-percent discount rate) to $15.0 million to $30.9 million
(using a 7-percent discount rate). The cost savings of this proposed
rule are displayed in the table below.

                                   Net Cost Savings, Low Estimate, in Millions
                                                 [2018 Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Present value   Present value
                     Section                            3%              7%         Annualized 3%   Annualized 7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost Savings..............................          $185.6          $156.6           $21.8           $22.3
Total New Costs.................................            57.5            51.4             6.7             7.3
Net Cost Savings................................           128.1           105.1            15.0            15.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  Net Cost Savings, High Estimate, in Millions
                                                 [2018 Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Present value   Present value                   Annualized 7%
                     Section                            3%              7%         Annualized 3%         *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost Savings..............................          $286.1          $241.4           $33.5           $34.4
Total New Costs.................................            26.4            24.1             3.1             3.4
Net Cost Savings................................           259.6           217.3            30.4            30.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Numbers may not tabulate due to rounding.

II. Background

A. The Basics of Train and Freight Car Air Brake Systems

    Each train air brake system consists of three major parts: A
locomotive brake valve, a brake pipe (also known as a trainline), and
the individual car control valves. The locomotive brake valve adds or
releases air to or from the brake pipe, which is connected by flexible
air hoses between each car, and is sealed at the rear of the train by a
pneumatic end-of-train (EOT) device. The locomotive brake valve's
pressure changes create signals that are received by each car's air
brake system via the brake pipe, and induce application or release of
the brake.
    When the engineer ``sets the brakes,'' the locomotive air brake
valve releases air from the brake pipe, reducing the brake pipe
pressure, causing the brakes to apply. While the air pressure change
usually occurs first at the front of the train, the locomotive may send
a radio signal to the EOT device to command an emergency brake air
pressure reduction from the other end. Similarly, when the brakes are
released, the locomotive brake valve is positioned to pump air back
into the brake pipe and re-stabilize the air pressure. The air brake
system also applies car brakes automatically in an emergency, because a
derailment typically causes a break in the brake pipe that results in a
sudden loss of air pressure, causing an irretrievable, higher pressure
application of the brakes.
    Each individual car's air brake system can be further broken down
into several major components, including an assemblage of car control
valves, air reservoirs, cylinder(s), rigging, beams, and shoes. When a
brake application signal is received by the car's air brake control
valve, it transfers air from the auxiliary reservoir to the brake
cylinder, causing the cylinder's piston to pull the brake rigging (a
series of rods and levers designed to increase the braking ratio), the
brake beam, and then the brake shoe against the wheel to create the
braking action. The degree of brake pipe pressure drop governs the
degree of braking effort. A full-service brake occurs when the control
valve balances all of the auxiliary reservoir air into the cylinder. An
emergency brake application occurs when the brake pipe is reduced
faster than the normal rate, which causes the control valve to add
emergency reservoir air to the auxiliary reservoir air in the cylinder.
This creates 15 percent more braking, and cannot be released by the
locomotive without completely restoring the full pressure in the brake
pipe and reservoirs.
    The control valve also ``charges the train'' by providing
sufficient air to each car's air reservoirs, which then store the

air to maintain a brake application. Because each application reduces
the air in the car reservoirs, and some time must elapse before those
reservoirs are fully recharged, an engineer has a limited number of
brake applications that can be made in a short period of time. Several
brake applications in a short time interval will sharply reduce the
system's braking effectiveness.
    The railroad must charge the train prior to each air brake test,
which may take up to six minutes per empty car air reservoir. However,
numerous cars can be charged simultaneously. Taking simultaneous
charging into account, a fifty-car train can be charged in
approximately twenty minutes, although this time can be longer
depending on factors that affect the integrity of the brake line,
including environmental factors such as temperature and the amount of
brake pipe leakage.
    Today, in addition to the statutorily required air brakes,\4\
railroads use distributed power locomotive units (DPUs) and dynamic
brakes to aid in controlling in-train forces and to provide additional
braking capability. Distributed power units are locomotives that are
physically distributed at intermediate points throughout the length of
a train. These locomotives are remotely controlled from the leading
locomotive. The use of DPUs permits quicker application of air brakes
and localized control of in-train forces. With braking on a
conventional train controlled at the head-end, it can take from several
seconds (on a short train) to more than twenty seconds on a train
exceeding 200 cars for the brake pipe pressure signal to propagate the
length of the train.\5\ Using DPUs, however, brake pipe signals are
initiated at the remote locomotives almost simultaneously with the
command of the lead locomotive, providing a more rapid and uniform air
brake response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 49 U.S.C. 20302.
    \5\ Air brake propagation is at the degraded speed of sound,
accounting for friction due to pipe length and elbows, at
approximately 950 feet per second for emergency braking. AAR
Standard S-469, incorporated at Sec.  232.103(l), states at a
service reduction of 10 psi, the 150th cars will apply at
``nominally 20 seconds or less'' from the application of the first
car (S-469-01 Sec.  5.3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Presently, most mainline locomotives are equipped with dynamic
brakes, a supplementary braking system that can be used to control
train speed without engaging a train's air brakes. Dynamic brakes use
the kinetic energy of a moving train to generate electric current at
the locomotive traction motors. By engaging dynamic brakes, the
normally powered traction motors on a locomotive's axles are changed to
generators, and the power generated is dissipated through resistance
grids, similar to what happens when a motor vehicle driver shifts a
vehicle into a lower gear when descending a steep grade. The primary
benefits of dynamic brakes are the ability to reduce freight car brake
shoe wear and wheel overheating, and to preserve freight car auxiliary
air pressure on long downgrades. Dynamic brakes are also useful to
control in-train forces on continuous (but varying) downhill grades
and, as a result, effective use of a locomotive's dynamic brakes leads
to fuel savings by reducing the need to power or stretch brakes through
grade variations.\6\ Due to these benefits, dynamic braking is often
reflected in railroads' operating rules as the preferred method of
controlling a train, especially in heavy grade territory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ To power or stretch air brakes means to apply locomotive
power against an applied brake.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dynamic brakes, however, cannot be relied upon as a train's primary
braking system for a number of reasons. First, dynamic brakes provide
braking force only on powered locomotive axles and are incapable of
controlling in-train forces in the same way as air brakes in undulating
grade territories. Second, dynamic brakes are effective only within a
certain speed range and have no capability to physically stop and hold
a train. Third, dynamic brakes are not fail-safe, and can fail without
warning. When dynamic brakes fail, all braking force is lost. By
comparison, air brakes are designed to be fail-safe and a loss of air
brake system integrity will result in an emergency brake application.
For these reasons, FRA, by statute and regulation, has long considered
dynamic brakes secondary devices used for supplemental braking, and not
as a safety-critical device. Nonetheless, railroads rely on dynamic
brakes to control train speed and to aid in controlling trains on heavy
grades.
    FRA's regulations do not mandate the use of dynamic brakes, but
require that if the railroad operates a locomotive equipped with
dynamic brakes, the railroad adopt appropriate operating rules and any
locomotive engineer assigned to operate such a locomotive be informed
of the operational status of the dynamic brakes on all units in the
consist at the initial terminal for the train. See Sec.  232.109(j).
Overreliance on dynamic brakes may lead to the inability to stop a
train short of an obstruction or control point, result in very long
trains pushing head-end cars out of the train due to excessive buff
forces, or for an engineer not being able to recover a train from an
overspeed situation.

B. Brake Test Frequency

    Part 232 includes brake system test performance and frequency
requirements. A central premise of Part 232's existing inspection
requirements is that the capability of rail equipment to travel to its
destination is contingent on the condition of the equipment when it
begins operation and on the nature of the equipment's planned
operation. For rail equipment to travel extended distances between
inspections, the condition and planned operation of the equipment must
be thoroughly assessed at the beginning of a train's journey through
high quality inspections.
    The regulations provide for five primary types of brake system
tests: Class I (a complete test of the brake equipment on each car,
which is required to be performed at the location where a train is
originally assembled, when the consist is changed in certain ways, and
when a train is off-air for more than four hours); Class IA (a test
that is less stringent than a Class I inspection and is required every
1,000 miles); Class II (a less detailed test used for cars that have
not received a compliant Class I test that are picked up by a train);
Class III (a test that must be performed any time the brake pipe is
opened to atmosphere on an operating train); and a single car air brake
test (a comprehensive test used to validate the air brake effectiveness
of individual cars every five years or when certain events or
conditions trigger a testing requirement). Each test must be performed
based on different circumstances. For instance, a train must receive a
Class I brake test at its initial terminal and an intermediate test,
such as a Class IA brake test, every 1,000 or, for trains designated as
extended haul trains, 1,500 miles. 49 CFR 232.205, 232.207, 232.213.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ One exception to these mileage limits is for trains
operating with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake
systems. In 2008, FRA issued a final rule that allows such trains to
travel up to 3,500 miles between brake tests. See 49 CFR 232.607(b).
FRA noted that this relief was provided in large part based on the
ECP brake system's self-monitoring and data reporting capabilities--
capabilities not present in traditional air brake systems. Another
exception is granted for a unit or cycle train, which may travel in
a continuous loop up to 3,000 miles, although such trains must
receive a Class IA brake test. 49 CFR 232.205(a)(4). See 85 FR 2494,
2495-2496 (Jan. 15, 2020) for a more detailed discussion of the
different types of brake system tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The frequency of required brake tests also depends on the
qualifications of the person(s) conducting the brake tests. Brake tests
may be performed by either a QP or a QMI. A QP is a person who

has received instruction and training necessary to perform one or more
functions required by part 232. 49 CFR 232.5. In the context of this
rulemaking, a QP generally would be a conductor or a brakeman assigned
to operate a train who has also received training to perform a limited
pre-departure inspection under appendix D to part 215,\8\ and required
brake tests. A QMI, however, is a QP who has received additional
instruction and training that includes ``hands-on'' experience in
``troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance or repair of
specific train brake components and systems for which the person is
assigned responsibility.'' Id. As defined in Sec.  232.5, a QMI must
understand what is required to repair and maintain properly the safety-
critical brake components for which the person is assigned
responsibility. Further, a QMI's primary responsibilities must include
work troubleshooting, inspecting, testing, maintaining or repairing
brake components and systems. A QMI is also typically a designated
inspector under part 215, and in the context of this rulemaking, would
generally be a carman or a machinist.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ An ``Appendix D Inspection'' is an inspection designed to
identify ``imminently hazardous conditions . . . likely to cause an
accident or casualty before a train arrives at its destination.''
These conditions include conditions ``readily discoverable by a
train crew.'' See 49 CFR part 215, appendix D.
    \9\ Section 232.5 defines a QMI as a QP with certain additional
experience and assigned responsibilities. Accordingly, by
definition, a QMI is also a QP. The section-by-section analysis of
proposed Sec.  232.211, below, contains a more detailed discussion
of the differences between QMIs and QPs, but in this NPRM, FRA uses
the term QP to refer only to individuals who do not meet the
additional requirements of a QMI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Part 232 generally requires a train to undergo a brake test every
1,000 miles unless the train has a Class I air brake test performed by
a QMI and an initial terminal part 215 freight car inspection performed
by an inspector designated under Sec.  215.11, and is designated as an
extended haul train under Sec.  232.213. With certain exceptions, if a
train that does not meet the requirements for an extended haul train
(e.g., if a QP performs the train's Class I brake test), part 232
limits the train's movement to 1,000 miles between brake tests.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See fn. 3, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The mileage-based test requirements, which are based, in part, on
historical agreements among all stakeholders (i.e., railroads, labor
organizations, and FRA) and railroad accident/incident data,\11\ serve
an important role in each freight train's safe operation. Together with
other requirements of part 232 designed to ensure the integrity of a
train's brake system throughout its journey, the mileage limits are
designed to ensure that a train's brake system, including all
mechanical components, remains safely intact. 66 FR 4104 (Jan. 17,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See e.g., 66 FR 4104, 4107-4108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Federal statute authorizes FRA to amend the regulations for
installing, inspecting, maintaining, and repairing power and train
brakes only for the purpose of achieving safety. 49 U.S.C. 20302(d)(2).
As such, FRA can increase the mileage permitted between brake tests
only when supported by sufficient data demonstrating that doing so is
in the interest of safety. FRA last addressed the mileage limits
between brake tests in a rulemaking in 2001, and prior to that in a
notice of proposed rulemaking in 1982, adopted as a final rule that
same year. 47 FR 7286 (Feb. 18, 1982); 47 FR 36792 (Aug. 23, 1982); and
66 FR 4104 (Jan. 17, 2001).
    FRA's 2001 final rule permitted ``extended haul trains'' to move up
to 1,500 miles between brake tests, while other trains remained subject
to the 1,000-mile limit. 49 CFR 232.213. To qualify as an extended haul
train under Sec.  232.213, the train must be designated in writing to
FRA, receive at its initial terminal a freight car inspection under
part 215 by an inspector designated under Sec.  215.11 and a Class I
air brake test by a QMI, as defined in Sec.  232.5, and must otherwise
comply with parts 215 and 232. Since 2006, FRA has, in certain
circumstances, granted conditional waivers from the 1,500-mile
limitation.\12\ Such waivers have permitted trains to operate up to
1,800 miles between brake tests provided that the qualifications under
Sec.  232.213 for extended haul trains continue to be met (including
the performance of Class I brake tests by QMIs and part 215 freight car
inspections by designated inspectors). In addition, FRA required the
railroads operating under the waivers to provide certain data,
including data comparing defects identified on trains operating under
the waivers as compared to typical 1,500-mile extended haul trains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See FRA docket numbers FRA-2006-24812, FRA-2014-0070, and
FRA-2015-0036.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Those data, along with the service history of railroads operating
trains under the waivers, demonstrate that trains meeting the existing
requirements for extended haul trains (i.e., Class I brake tests
performed by QMIs and freight car inspections performed by designated
inspectors) can operate at least as safely at longer distances between
brake tests as at distances currently allowed by the regulations.
Generally, the data garnered from these waivers demonstrates that
trains inspected by QMIs and designated inspectors that travel up to
1,800 miles experience the same number of brake anomalies and defects
as extended haul trains limited to 1,500 miles.\13\ The service
history, with no reportable accidents caused by brake systems defects
on trains operating under the waivers providing for extended mileage,
suggests that a train with a thoroughly-inspected brake system is
capable of traveling longer distances than allowed by the regulations
without developing a significant defect en route.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ As an added condition to ensure the safety of operations
conducted under these waivers, FRA required the QMIs inspecting
these waiver trains to have access to wayside detection data to
assist in their inspections. This summary data, which measures
conditions such as wheel impact loads, stiffness of railcar trucks
and bearing temperatures, enables properly trained QMIs to focus
their inspections on areas needing attention. When used as part of a
comprehensive inspection by a QMI, the data provides a greater
opportunity to detect brake and other defects and other potential
areas of concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Allowing trains to move longer distances between Class I brake
tests will reduce the number of tests required to be conducted. As
discussed in Section II.F below, a reduced number of tests may
effectively lower the incidence of employee injuries by reducing
employees' exposure to risks arising from working in close proximity to
movable equipment. Reducing the number of required brake tests may have
additional benefits. These include environmental benefits, as
locomotives will spend less idle time awaiting or undergoing brake
tests, and economic benefits, as railroads may be able to allocate
certain resources more efficiently (e.g., additional labor resources
previously devoted to brake tests are freed up to perform other
duties). Certain reallocations may have the potential to improve
safety, such as through increasing specialization of safety inspection
functions. Reducing the number and frequency of brake tests, however,
makes the quality and comprehensiveness of the remaining tests
critical. As FRA has stated before, for brake equipment to travel
extended distances between brake tests, the conditions and planned
operation of the equipment must be assessed thoroughly at the beginning
of the equipment's journey through high quality inspections. 66 FR at
4117.

C. Block Swapping

    Part 232 currently requires a Class I brake test be performed if
multiple individual cars or blocks of cars are added to or removed from
a train's consist. This is commonly referred to as

``block swapping.'' Existing part 232 permits the addition or removal
of a single car or a solid block of cars from a train without the
performance of a brake test on the entire train. 49 CFR
232.205(a)(5)(i) through (ii). With certain exceptions, however, any
single car or solid block of cars from a single, previous train must
receive a Class I brake test at the location where the car or cars are
added to a train unless the car or cars have ``previously received a
Class I brake test and have remained continuously and consecutively
coupled together with the train line remaining connected,'' and have
not been off-air for more than four hours. 49 CFR 232.205(b). The
rationale underlying this rule is that when cars added to a train are
known to have passed a thorough brake test without a subsequent
opportunity for degradation of their brake systems, there is little
cause for concern that the added cars will cause any significant
reduction in the train's braking effectiveness. However, when cars
without proper brake tests are added to a train, the brake health of
the entire train may become compromised.
    When a Class I air brake test is performed, Sec.  232.205(e)
requires a valid written or electronic record of the brake test. This
record is commonly referred to as a ``brake slip'' and, because a Class
I brake test must be performed at the location where the train is
originally assembled (the ``initial terminal''), it serves as proof
that at the initial terminal for the train, the brake pipe and each of
the individual cars in that train were inspected and found to be
effective. Because the brake slip applies to the train as a whole and
does not track the individual cars in a train, a subsequent change to
the consist renders the initial brake slip inaccurate, often
necessitating handwritten changes in addition to the brake slip. Each
change to a train consist, however, increases the likelihood of an
inaccurate brake slip and decreases the traceability of brake system
tests.
    In the 2001 final rule, FRA discussed the possibility of multiple
consist changes without the requirement for a new Class I brake test.
In that rule, FRA expressed concern that unlimited additions and
removals of cars from trains would blur the distinction between a
limited change in the train's consist and the assembly (or
classification) of an entirely new train. If the distinction between
the original train and new train were blurred, FRA concluded that the
circumstances under which a Class I brake test would be required would
also be blurred, potentially resulting in newly assembled trains never
receiving Class I brake tests. Class I brake tests are intended to be
comprehensive inspections of the brake equipment of each car in an
assembled train and to ensure that a train's brakes are in proper
working condition and capable of traveling to the train's destination
with minimal problems en route. Accordingly, ensuring all equipment in
a train receives a proper Class I brake test is critical. 66 FR 4104 at
4119. FRA concluded that if railroads were allowed to change a train
consist substantially without the requirement for a new brake test,
trains would not be required to receive comprehensive brake tests at
their initial terminal. Second, FRA noted that if cars are permitted to
be moved in and out of trains at will, Class IA brake tests, which rely
upon the mileage of the most restrictive car, would likewise be
impossible to track. Id.

D. AAR Petition

    In its Petition, available in the docket to this rulemaking, AAR
notes its member railroads developed a prototype eABS system to track
brake tests of freight cars, and AAR asserts that the information that
``can be obtained from the eABS exceeds'' the existing regulatory
requirements of part 232. An eABS system electronically tracks detailed
brake test information for individual rail cars and the distance
individual rail cars travel between brake tests. For cars with a valid
eABS, AAR requests that FRA permit each individual freight car to move
the maximum mileage permitted by the qualification of the car's
inspector, regardless of the distance cars may be moved without an
initial (Class I) or intermediate (Class IA) brake test. AAR also
requests that FRA provide flexibility to railroads adding or removing
cars with valid eABS systems in and out of trains made up of solely of
cars with a valid eABS.
    Under the existing requirements, a train's allowed travel distance
is limited to the distance the car in the train with the highest
mileage is allowed to travel before becoming due for its next brake
test. Sec.  232.207(a) (``The most restrictive car or block of cars in
the train shall determine the location of [the Class I or IA brake]
test.''). In its Petition, AAR requests that FRA propose to require an
intermediate brake test not on the entire train, but only on each car
whose mileage exceeds the permitted amount. Adoption of this
recommendation would allow movement up to 1,500 miles between Class I
and Class IA brake tests performed by a QP or up to 2,500 miles between
such tests if each car brake test is conducted by a QMI. AAR also
requests FRA propose that each car operating under an eABS be exempt
from the additional brake tests required when one or more blocks of
cars with valid brake tests are added to or removed from a train (known
as ``block swapping,'' discussed further below).
    In its Petition, AAR posits that eABS systems have the potential to
eliminate the stated safety concerns that form the basis for the block
swapping restriction. According to AAR, a properly designed and
implemented system tracking each car's individual brake test record
would provide increased information accuracy and confidence in tracking
brake tests. AAR asserts that because an eABS system would track brake
test information for each car (as opposed to whole trains),
reclassification of the cars in a train (i.e., changing the position of
individual cars or adding or removing single or multiple cars from a
consist) would no longer hold the potential to result in a railroad
avoiding or delaying brake tests for individual cars. AAR also states
that the ability to block swap cars without the constraints of
additional required brake tests would allow for the movement of a
greater number of cars with fewer train stops, increasing rail network
efficiency and reducing railroad employees' exposure to safety hazards
that may result in injuries from actions related to the performance of
required brake tests, such as climbing cars in order to engage and
disengage handbrakes. In its Petition, AAR also presents proposals and
supporting data regarding eABS systems, information protection, eABS
system integrity maintenance, and availability of records requirements.
A more detailed description of AAR's Petition and the supporting data
provided is included below in the Section-by-Section Analysis. FRA
requests comment on AAR's Petition and on FRA's proposals in this NPRM.

E. Technological Improvements

    FRA has long recognized the relationship between a train brake
system's effectiveness and integrity and the mileage traveled between
brake tests. E.g., 47 FR 7286 (Feb. 18, 1982). Since FRA last addressed
the mileage limits between brake tests in 2001, technological
improvements have increased the reliability of, and monitoring
capability for, key brake system components. As AAR notes in a separate
petition for rulemaking requesting a change in the number of hours a
train may be permitted to remain off-air between brake tests, welded
brake piping and fittings and

ferrule-clamped air hoses (instead of the previously used grip-type
fittings now prohibited by interchange rules) have reduced the severity
of brake pipe leaks in standing trains. FRA Docket Number FRA-2018-
0093. In that same petition, AAR also notes continuous improvements in
car control valves, increased compliance with Federal biannual yard air
systems inspection requirements, and the installation of oil and
contaminant separators in most locomotives to keep compressed air
clean. AAR also asserts that improvements in air leakage reduction
reduce each brake system's exposure to such contaminants, helping to
reduce wear and preserve its effective lifespan.
    According to AAR, improvements in other brake system components
have continued to increase overall brake system lifespan and
reliability. For example, AAR contends that brake shoe composition
improvements have reduced stopping distances, smoothed brake
applications, and reduced brake shoe and car wheel wear. Dynamic and
blended braking, in which applications of the air brake are replaced or
greatly supplemented by motors converting mechanical energy to
electricity, are in widespread use. As a result, AAR contends that
frequency of use of trains' air brake systems, and therefore the long-
term rate of wear on those systems, has been reduced. AAR has provided
additional justification, in the form of a presentation available in
the docket, titled ``QMI versus QP Air Brake Inspections,'' further
detailing both technological improvements and changes to industry
standards to retire obsolete components.
    AAR also notes that wayside detectors implemented along railroad
track include sensors designed to recognize and alert railroads of
conditions associated with mechanical defects. Wayside detectors most
commonly collect information on the physical measurements and impact
load of individual car wheels, and the temperature of individual car
components including wheels, axles, and bearings. High temperatures can
be indicative of a locked or sticking brake, while low temperatures may
indicate that a car's brake system is inoperative.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ For a description of various wayside detector
implementations and their potential uses, see An Implementation
Guide for Wayside Detector Systems, from FRA's Office of Research,
Development, and Technology available at https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/18667/Wayside%20Detector%20Implementation%20Guide.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA notes that although significant advancements have been made to
air brake system technologies in recent years, and many obsolete
components have been retired from the system population, many
components remain essentially unchanged over the years. FRA seeks
comment on the impact technological advancements have had on the
reliability and durability of specific components of train air brake
systems and those systems as a whole. FRA also seeks comment on how any
existing or expected future technological advancements may impact the
proposals in this NPRM.

F. Supporting Data

    The number of accidents caused by brake system failures that FRA
considers to be identifiable through the conduct of brake tests has
historically been a small proportion of all reported accidents,
injuries, and fatalities. Between 1976 and 1980, there were 1,168
accidents identified as attributable to brake-related causes, resulting
in no fatalities and 62 injuries.\15\ 47 FR at 7288 (Feb. 18, 1982). By
comparison, during the same period, there were a total of 50,078
accidents reported to FRA, resulting in 62 fatalities and 5,114
injuries. Id.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Accident reports may be amended for five years from the
initial report, in order to reflect updated information. As a
result, current FRA accident statistics for the period show 1,175
accidents and 63 injuries due to brake-related causes. Although
there was one reported fatality, FRA previously reviewed the report
and concluded that power brake failure was not the primary cause of
the fatality. See 47 FR 7283 at 7288 (Feb. 18, 1982).
    \16\ FRA notes that the 2001 final rule published data on brake-
related incidents from 1994 to 1998 that included brake-related
human-factor caused accidents (e.g., train handling and improper use
of brakes). 66 FR 4108. In developing this proposed rule, which
would impact the frequency and tracking of brake tests, FRA has
assessed only causes considered to be a result of defects that
likely could have been identified by effective brake tests (see
footnote 11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As Table 1 below shows, the number of reportable accidents and
injuries attributable to brake-related causes has declined
significantly over time, while fatalities remain relatively rare.\17\
For example, between 2014 and 2018 the number of accidents attributable
to brake-related causes, and particularly brake-related causes that are
the result of defects that likely could have been identified by
effective brake tests, declined to 158 accidents. Reported injuries
have also declined significantly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The only reported fatalities since 1999 occurred in an
accident in Granite Canyon, Wyoming on October 14, 2018, discussed
below. Although FRA concluded that brake-related component
malfunction was a contributing cause of the accident, additional
causes that could not have been identified by brake testing or pre-
departure inspections also contributed to the accident, including
the failure of an EOT device to activate. Moreover, FRA notes that
the report of 91 injuries during the period of 1994-1998 is
overstated. On reviewing the accident reports from this period, FRA
has concluded that 61 of the reported injuries resulted from human
error that could not have been identified by brake tests. The 61
reported injuries resulted from a single accident, Railroad Accident
No. 295963, that took place on June 17, 1995. The railroad reported
that a flatcar of railroad ties rolled away 5 miles unsecured during
a switching operation and struck an excursion train head-on. During
switching operations, the car air brake system remains uncharged
with air, and securement is by handbrakes or chocks/skates under the
wheels of the car. The proximate cause of the accident was human
error for not properly securing the flatcar.

     Table 1--Accidents Related to Brake Systems Failures Resulting From Defects Potentially Identifiable by
                                                  Inspection 18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Number of
                              Years                                  accidents       Injuries       Fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984-1988.......................................................             318              21               0
1989-1993.......................................................             236              27               0
1994-1998.......................................................             184              91               1
1999-2003.......................................................             198               9               0
2004-2008.......................................................             212               9               0
2009-2013.......................................................             159               0               0
2014-2018.......................................................             158               7               2
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................           1,465             163               3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since 1994, FRA has received fewer than 200 accident reports in
each five-year period attributable to brake-related causes (aside from
2004-2008), and fewer than ten reported injuries.\19\ This amounts to
fewer than 40 accident reports per year and fewer than two reported
injuries per year that are related to causes that could have been
identified in the course of an effective brake test. By contrast, FRA
has typically received between 11,000 and 23,000 accident reports per
year over the same period. Given the relief granted in the 1982 final
rule, and in the 2001 final rule for extended haul trains, the trend of
diminishing brake-caused reportable accidents leads FRA to conclude
that the relief provided by those rules did not adversely impact safety
and the proposed regulatory relief is possible without adversely
impacting safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ For these accident statistics, FRA used the following cause
codes: Air hose uncoupled or burst (E00C and E00L), Hydraulic hose
uncoupled or burst (E01C), Broken brake pipe or connections (E02C
and E02L), Obstructed brake pipe (E03C and E03L), Other brake
component damage (E04C and E04L), Brake valve malfunction/undesired
emergency (E05C and E05L), Brake valve malfunction/stuck brake (E06C
and E06CL), Rigging down or dragging (E07C), Hand brake broken or
defective (E08C and E08L), Other brake defects (E09C and E09L), Hand
brake link and/or connect defect (E0HC and E0HL), and Failure to
release hand brakes on car(s), railroad employee (H019). The numbers
reported above are current as of February 2020. FRA believes
accidents using these cause codes are the result of defects that
could be identified by effective brake tests.
    \19\ Under 49 CFR part 225, railroads are required to report
certain accidents or incidents to FRA including (1) highway-rail
grade crossings accidents, (2) rail equipment accidents resulting in
damages above a current reporting threshold; and (3) death, injury,
and occupational illnesses that arise from an event or exposure
arising from the operation of a railroad that is a discernable cause
of the resulting condition or a significant aggravation to a pre-
existing accident or incident. 49 CFR 225.19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AAR provided data with its Petition that it says demonstrates that
the rate of brake-related or other defects observed in trains that
travel greater than 1,500 miles between brake tests is not greater than
the rate observed for trains that travel less than 1,500 miles between
such tests. This data is from certain operations with trains traveling
up to 1,680 miles and 1,702 miles between brake tests under waivers
granted to Union Pacific Railroad (UP) and BNSF Railway (BNSF),
respectively (see Docket Nos. FRA-2015-0036 and FRA-2006-24812; and
FRA-2019-0072-0001, Appendix B). FRA generally agrees with AAR that
this data shows that the increased mileage allowed under the waivers
does not impact the safe operation of the trains. FRA notes, however,
that both waivers require QMIs to conduct the required brake tests and
designated inspectors to conduct the required freight car inspections
on trains subject to the waivers. Out of 7,827 UP trains operated 1,500
to 1,680 miles between brake inspections between November 2015 and June
2018, there were two reportable accidents, neither of which was caused
by a defect in the air brake system. According to AAR, of 15,480 BNSF
trains operated 1,500 to 1,702 miles between inspections from July 2015
to June 2018, there was only one accident, which was caused by a broken
car axle. FRA recognizes that such accident rates suggest that the
extension of miles traveled between brake tests likely would not
increase the rate of accidents due to causes the brake test would be
expected to detect.
    AAR also provided wayside detection data related to operations
under the BNSF 1,702-mile waiver, and to Canadian National Railway (CN)
operations in Canada. This wayside detection data includes a comparison
of wheel impact load detector anomaly data from trains operating under
the BNSF waiver and traveling over 1,500, but not exceeding 1,702 miles
(waiver trains) versus trains traveling 1,500 miles or less (non-waiver
trains). CN provided data from detectors of stuck brakes (i.e.,
indications of increased wheel temperature due to increased friction).
See Docket No. FRA-2019-0072-0001, Appendix C. The subject CN trains
included trains traveling in Canada for distances between brake testing
exceeding the maximum of 1,702 miles permitted for the longest distance
in a waiver issued for any train in the United States. AAR concluded
that the CN data showed that longer trip miles were associated with
fewer stuck brake defects detected and asserted that, overall, the data
provided suggests that there is little or no correlation between
mileage traveled and additional defects.
    FRA, however, does not reach the same conclusion as AAR based on
the data provided. While wayside detection data provides indications of
possible defects, a QMI follow-up inspection is generally required to
verify that a defect actually exists. Moreover, the accuracy of wayside
detection data would better serve this analysis if AAR could provide a
measurement of false positives/false negatives of wayside detection
indications versus actual defects detected and repaired by QMIs. In
light of these shortcomings, FRA seeks comment on the accuracy and
predictive value of the wayside detection data provided by AAR in
support of its Petition. For example, FRA seeks comment and data on the
extent to which wayside detector indications are already being utilized
to accurately identify and/or predict brake defects. Two railroads are
presently conducting hot/cold wheel wayside detector waivers \20\ that
could provide preliminary information on the efficacy of wayside
detection to provide indications of defects. FRA also seeks comment and
data on potential ways wayside detection data could be factored into
determinations of rail equipment's overall brake health and on
alternative sources of data or methodologies that could be employed

to determine the effect of Class I brake tests on defects more
accurately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ AAR-Union Pacific, at Docket No. FRA-2016-0018; and BNSF
Railway, at Docket No. FRA-2018-0049.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AAR also provided monthly data from 2017 on the number of brake
system-related defects and bad-ordered cars discovered in outbound
inspection data compiled for certain Class I railroad yards in
Birmingham, Alabama; Elkhart, Indiana; Kirk, Indiana; and Symington,
Manitoba, Canada. See Docket Number FRA-2017-0130-0001, Attachment 3.
According to AAR's data, over 500,000 cars were inspected at each yard
in the United States and more than one million cars inspected at the
Canadian yard. Notably, in Canada there is no limit on the miles trains
or individual rail cars may travel between brake inspections.\21\ The
resulting inspection data shows a difference that is not statistically
significant in the defect and bad order rates between the cars found in
the U.S. and Canada. However, this data is of limited use in the
context of this rulemaking because it is not clear whether these
locations are truly representative of the global population of
railcars. FRA believes that comparison of these numbers to a true
national sample of car repair billing records could help to illuminate
the usefulness of this data to the analysis. Alternatively, absent a
true national sample, a smaller sample size could be used provided an
analysis of any potential sampling bias is conducted and provided any
such potential bias is effectively mitigated. In addition, it is also
not clear whether the cars were inspected by QMIs or QPs, or their
Canadian equivalents. FRA requests that AAR provide information
clarifying the distance these trains traveled, the qualifications of
the individual inspectors who inspected the subject equipment, and
either an analysis comparing the existing data to a true national
sample of car repair billing records, or other appropriate analysis
that identifies and mitigates any potential sampling bias.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See Transport Canada, Train Brake Rules, TC O-0-165,
published November 17, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In further support of its Petition, AAR and some of its member
railroads have provided data (available in the docket) purporting to
show no significant difference in the critical incident rate discovered
between inspections conducted by QPs and inspections conducted by QMIs.
FRA disagrees with AAR's findings, because the data does not indicate
how inspections conducted by individuals qualified as QMIs (who are
typically designated mechanical employees) were distinguished from
individuals qualified only as QPs (who are typically train crew
members).\22\ Currently, there is no requirement for railroads to
differentiate between QMI and QP inspections in their records, other
than for extended haul trains and trains operated under certain
waivers, and QMIs meet the regulatory criteria to be designated as QPs.
Accordingly, the methodology described by UP for eliminating QMI
inspections would not have removed from the data any inspections
conducted by more highly-qualified QMIs who were acting in their
capacity as QPs. If a clear delineation between QP and QMI inspections
can be made in this data so that the resulting data does not commingle
the two types of inspections, the data could potentially be more
compelling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See Section II.B. Brake Test Frequency for a more detailed
discussion of the differences between QMIs and QPs. See also the
section-by-section analysis of proposed Sec.  232.211, below, also
contains a discussion of the differences between QMIs and QPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the AAR data is from two unnamed Class I railroads,
one of which AAR indicates operates in the eastern United States while
the other AAR indicates operates in the western United States. FRA
cannot determine from the information provided whether the data is
generally representative of the industry for variables that can affect
braking equipment, such as weather, general equipment conditions, or
geography. Relatedly, UP provided data it stated showed that QP-only
inspections resulted in bad orders for cars (orders to send a car for
repairs) for less than 0.2% of car trips. FRA notes that the
methodology described by UP also fails to distinguish QMI-trained
inspectors from QPs, resulting in the commingling of data. In addition,
FRA notes that the data cannot be interpreted without contextual
information about the true defect rate.
    In sum, given the shortcomings of the data related to QP
inspections as described above, FRA finds that it does not have
sufficient data to consider allowing an extension of the mileage
permitted between brake tests when those tests are performed by QPs due
to the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 20302(d)(2). When trains undergo
comprehensive Class I brake tests by QMIs and freight car inspections
by designated inspectors, however, FRA finds that a mileage extension
up to 2,500 miles between brake tests may be justified at this time.
FRA's finding is based on the data discussed above gathered through the
ongoing waivers permitting certain trains to travel up to 1,702 miles
between brake tests and preliminary data from separate, newer waivers
involving trains inspected by QMIs and designated inspectors and
traveling up to 2,600 miles between brake tests. See docket numbers
FRA-2016-0018 and FRA-2018-0049. Although data from each of these
waivers is preliminary, coupled with FRA's and industry's experience
operating trains equipped with electronically controlled pneumatic
(ECP) brakes up to 5,000 miles between brake tests,\23\ FRA finds that
an incremental increase in mileage on non-ECP brake trains inspected by
QMIs and designated inspectors may be justified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ FRA's regulations allow trains equipped with ECP brakes and
operating in ECP brake mode to travel up to 3,500 miles between
Class I brake tests. 49 CFR 232.607. FRA has additionally authorized
railroads to operate trains in ECP brake mode up to 5,000 miles
between brake tests with QMI inspections. See Docket No. FRA-2009-
0088. Although ECP brake control valves are designed to
electronically operate and self-report defective brake components in
real time, the brake pipe, brake cylinders, and foundational brake
rigging of an ECP brake system are the same components that make up
traditional air brake systems. Successful operation of trains with
ECP brakes demonstrates that these components can safely operate at
extended distances between brake tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, AAR provides results of its analysis of FRA data on
employee incidents that it concludes show that from 2015 to 2017 there
were 277 employee injuries related to the use of handbrakes, and an
additional 200 injuries associated with getting on or off standing
equipment or related activities. Over the three-year period, this
amounts to 159 annual employee injuries. Citing this data, AAR asserts
that ``the reduction of unnecessary brake tests, including any
additional train stops and car handling, will in turn reduce exposure
to risk of injury from walking on track, as well as from applying and
releasing handbrakes and climbing on and off railcars to do so.''
    FRA finds that AAR's conclusion may overestimate injuries related
to brake testing to the extent that some of the injuries may have
occurred during activities not performed for the purpose of conducting
brake tests. AAR's estimate, however, demonstrates that there may be
opportunity to reduce the incidence of employee injury through a
reduction in the frequency of required brake tests. FRA concludes from
this information that the proposed rule would likely reduce the number
of employee injuries related to brake tests, but FRA cannot estimate
the reduction in incidence of employee injury that would result without
more information.

G. Safety Improvements

    Because the overall reliability of brake systems has increased
through technological and operational improvements and no measurable

decrease in safety resulted from the increase in allowed mileage in
2001, FRA believes that reducing the frequency or extent of brake tests
as proposed in this rule may be warranted. This would have the benefit
of reducing the risk of injury for employees charged with inspection
and testing duties. Increasing overall brake system reliability results
in decreasing the expected number of defects discovered during a brake
test. FRA expects the flexibility proposed in this NPRM would have the
potential to increase the overall quality of brake tests, because the
flexibility provided incentivizes the increased use of more-qualified
inspectors, QMIs, and the data collection and retention requirements
permit FRA and the railroad industry to analyze the effectiveness of
brake tests closely to discover best practices and areas for
improvement. FRA also recognizes the potential that added flexibility
in the reallocation of resources could result in increased safety
through such channels as increasing specialization in safety inspection
functions.
    FRA expects data generated by eABS systems may provide information
useful to further maintain safe car brake systems, and may promote
railroad safety generally by encouraging the use of eABS systems and
therefore identifying and resolving potential brake problems before
brakes fail. For example, electronic tracking of factors that are
correlated with brake system defects such as car age and load weight,
train length, locomotive power, quantity, and distribution, and
applicable routes and terrain, may lead to identification of defects
without a brake test.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

    Unless otherwise noted, all section references below refer to
sections in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FRA
seeks comments on all proposals made in this NPRM.

Section 232.5 Definitions

    FRA proposes to add to this section definitions for the following
terms: ``Electronic air brake slip'' or ``eABS,'' and ``eABS system.''
The terms ``Electronic air brake slip'' or ``eABS'' are intended to
refer to the record that must be stored for the car in order for the
railroad to avail itself of the relief granted in the proposed rule.
The term ``eABS system'' would describe the electronic system that
stores the record.

Sections 232.205, 232.207, and 232.209 Class I Brake Test--Initial
Terminal Inspection, Class IA Brake Tests--1,000-Mile Inspection, and
Class II Brake Tests--Intermediate Inspection

    Under the proposed rule, FRA would provide railroads an option to
comply with new Sec.  232.221 in lieu of Sec. Sec.  232.205, 232.207,
and 232.209.\24\ Specifically, FRA proposes to revise each of these
sections to reference Sec.  232.221 as an alternative means of
compliance. Proposed Sec.  232.221 (discussed in more detail below)
would set forth the proposed requirements for operations using an eABS
system and would also specify the conditions under which proposed
Sec. Sec.  232.205, 232.207, and 232.209 would apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Sections 232.205, 232.207, and 232.209 set forth the
requirements for Class I, Class IA, and Class II brake tests,
respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 232.221 Electronic Air Brake Slip (eABS) System Requirements

    Proposed Sec.  232.221 would set forth the requirements for eABS
systems and railroad operations under those systems. As proposed, this
section would allow railroads to move cars with a compliant eABS up to
either 1,000 or 2,500 miles between brake tests provided certain
conditions are met. FRA intends the proposed requirements of this
section (e.g., automatic tracking of individual car's mileage, testing
prior to exceeding the permitted mileage, and recordkeeping) to support
the ability of an eABS system to ensure that cars operated under this
proposed rule would be appropriately inspected with the parameters of
the rule.
Proposed paragraph (a)
    If a railroad has implemented an eABS system and is operating a
train using the eABS system, proposed paragraph (a) would allow the
railroad to move an individual freight car in that train up to 1,000
miles between brake tests provided certain conditions are met. First,
proposed paragraph (a)(1) would require that the mileage the car
travels since its last Class I brake test be automatically tracked in
the eABS system. Second, consistent with AAR's petition, proposed
paragraph (a)(2) would require the car to be moved only as part of a
train consist consisting entirely of cars being operated under proposed
Sec.  232.221. Third, proposed paragraph (a)(3) would require the eABS
system to retain a record of the car's Class I brake test containing
certain required information.
    The alternative framework outlined in paragraph (a) replaces the
conditions that trigger Class I, Class IA, and Class II inspections of
entire trains under Sec. Sec.  232.205, 232.207, and 232.209. As
proposed, any car that meets the requirements of paragraph (a) may be
moved up to 1,000 miles between Class I air brake inspections, whether
that car moves in one train or multiple trains. Although this reframing
of brake test requirements from the level of the train to the
individual car is a major departure from historical practice, it
reflects the recognition that a Class I brake test is at the core a
detailed, visual inspection of the functioning of the brake systems of
the cars that compose the train. This shift, from a single, whole-train
inspection to timely inspections of individual cars in a train's
consist on a separately-tracked basis, is possible due to technological
improvements in the ability to track large amounts of information
reliably.
    Paragraph (a)(3)'s proposed brake test record requirement is based
on AAR's Petition, and follows current Class I brake test recordkeeping
requirements and industry practices. FRA proposes to require the eABS
records contain the following additional information to preserve
existing requirements and industry practices and to facilitate
effective oversight: (1) Identification and railroad affiliation of the
person creating the eABS record and inputting the record into the eABS
system (the ``author'' of the record); (2) identification and railroad
affiliation of the person who performed the brake test, if different
from the author; (3) record creation date and time; and (4) a
certification that the requirements of Sec. Sec.  232.205(a)(3) and
232.305(c) have been met. FRA expects that, for railroads utilizing
eABS systems, the individual putting the record of a brake test into
the eABS system may not be the individual who conducted the test. FRA
also expects that many eABS systems would be interoperable, or
alternately, that many railroads would elect to utilize jointly a
single eABS system. This may result in one railroad conducting the
brake test and reporting information to another railroad for creation
of the record. Because the author of the record in either case may be
less likely to have firsthand knowledge of the brake test, it is
important to ensure that the record identifies, in separate fields, the
name and railroad affiliation of the author of the record, and the name
and railroad affiliation of the person who performed the last Class I
brake test. See proposed paragraphs (a)(3)(i) through (ii) and (vi).
FRA recognizes that industry practice varies in the identification of
railroad employees, with some railroads

providing for the use of employee names and others requiring the use of
employee identification numbers. Under the proposed rule, any effective
method of identification is permitted.
    Consistent with AAR's Petition, and for the reasons explained in
more detail below, proposed paragraph (a)(3)(vii) would require the
eABS to identify the qualifications of the person conducting each car's
Class I brake test (i.e., whether the person who conducted the brake
test is a QP or QMI as defined in Sec.  232.5). The proposed
requirement to record the qualifications of individuals performing the
brake tests is intended to ensure that only individuals possessing
sufficient knowledge and ability do so, and that the specific
qualifications of each person are known. As discussed below, the
recording of this qualification information will also permit the
collection of information on which to determine more accurately the
relative benefit to safety of inspections by a QMI compared to
inspections by a QP. Such information is necessary to conclude whether
a future extension of the miles traveled between brake tests would be
appropriate where an inspection was conducted by a QP.
    Consistent with AAR's petition, proposed paragraph (a)(3)(viii)
would require an eABS record to contain an ``accurate calculation of
the mileage remaining until the next Class I brake test is required.''
Further description of such a calculation has been proposed as part of
paragraph (h). Proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ix)'s requirement that
railroads record adherence to existing off-air requirements and
existing single car air brake testing timeframes is intended to
reinforce the requirement for continued compliance with those rules,
even under the alternative regulatory framework of Sec.  232.221. FRA
notes it made changes to these requirements in a recent final rule that
extends the time-off-air limits and provides additional flexibility as
to the frequency of single car air brake tests. 85 FR 80544 (Dec. 11,
2020). The requirements in this paragraph complement the changes in
that final rule. Since added flexibilities in the timing and frequency
of air brake tests have been implemented, timely adherence to the
revised requirements as well as all other brake inspection and testing
requirements will take on greater importance.
    FRA notes that proposed paragraph (a)(3)(v)'s requirement that the
eABS include the date and time of the last Class I brake test may
provide sufficient information that the car has not triggered a testing
requirement based on time-off-air, because each Class I test requires
that a car be placed on a source of air during testing. Similarly,
because operation of a train requires a locomotive to provide air to
each car in the train, the time of each car's most recent arrival and/
or departure in a train may likewise serve as sufficient information.
For this reason, proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ix) does not require an eABS
to contain specific information showing that a car has met the off-air
requirements of Sec.  232.205(a)(3) if the maximum time the car has
been off air can be determined from other information on the eABS
record. Accordingly, as proposed, specific information showing that a
car has not been off air in excess of the time allowed by Sec.
232.205(a)(3) would not be required except where it cannot be
determined from the other required information on the eABS (e.g., time
and location of the last Class I brake test) whether or not the car has
been off air for more than 24 hours. FRA expects that railroads will be
able to track time-off-air by reference to this or other information
commonly maintained in the railroad industry or required by regulation.
FRA requests comment on whether the proposed provisions are sufficient
to track individual cars' time-off-air or if a separate record keeping
requirement for time-off-air as part of the eABS is necessary.
    FRA expects that for a significant majority of cars, information
based on the most recently recorded arrival and departure of a car may
be included in the eABS to provide sufficient information for this
proposed recordkeeping requirement. This is based on AAR's assertion
that the proposal in its Petition would result in higher car
utilization rates. AAR also states that the large majority of freight
cars use Automatic Equipment Identification (``AEI'') tags that already
facilitate automatic recording of arrival and departure data.
Accordingly, FRA considers that the burden of this requirement will not
be significant.
Proposed Paragraph (b)
    Consistent with AAR's petition, proposed paragraph (b) would allow
a railroad to move individual freight cars up to 2,500 miles between
Class I brake tests if they meet the requirements of paragraph (a) and
meet certain additional conditions designed to ensure the cars remain
in proper condition for the extended mileage. First, proposed
paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) would require the cars to have their part 215
inspections performed by designated inspectors as defined in Sec.
215.11 and their Class I brake tests performed by QMIs as defined in
Sec.  232.5. The proposed requirements mirror the existing requirements
applicable to extended haul trains. 49 CFR 232.213. As noted in the
2001 final rule that first allowed for extended haul trains, greater
distances provide a greater risk of brake failure, and therefore it is
important to ensure high quality inspections are performed prior to
extended haul trips. Such inspections must be performed by individuals
who can identify defective conditions, have the knowledge and
experience to know how a particular defective condition affects other
parts of the brake system or mechanical components, and have an
understanding of what might have caused a particular defective
condition to arise.
    As noted earlier in section II.B of this preamble, part 232
requires only that a QP receive the instruction and training required
to perform the specific brake test function that the QP will perform
under part 232. Sec. Sec.  232.5 and 232.203. For the purpose of a
Class I brake test under Sec.  232.205, a QP is expected to be able to
identify those observable defects that would cause the train or any car
in the train to fail the test. For example, a QP would be expected to
have the training necessary to identify whether brake rigging is
unsecured, binding or fouling, and engaged or released under
appropriate conditions. In general, a QP is unlikely to be qualified as
a designated inspector for purposes of the pre-departure inspection
under part 215. As a result, a QP would only perform a limited pre-
departure inspection focused on apparent safety hazards (i.e., an
Appendix D inspection). 49 CFR 215.13; appendix D to 49 CFR part 215.
    As also discussed in section II.B above, to meet the requirements
for designation as a QMI, a QP must additionally have primary, ``hands-
on'' responsibility for troubleshooting, inspecting, testing,
maintaining, or repairing of specific train brake components and
systems. This required, additional experience is intended to ensure
that such individuals provide a high-quality train air brake
inspection. 66 FR at 4104. In addition, a QMI is generally qualified as
a designated inspector for purposes of a pre-departure inspection. Such
inspectors are required by regulation to determine whether each car
inspected is in compliance with part 215. As a result, QMIs generally
possess the additional experience and responsibility to identify a
wider range of mechanical defects and equipment conditions that may
adversely affect safety. For example, a QMI must be able to recognize
not only the presence of unsafe conditions, but

also will, through experience, be able to recognize indications of
developing conditions that could become safety defects.
    In the absence of convincing data for inspections by QPs comparable
to that available for inspections by QMIs, FRA proposes to maintain the
current mileage between inspections for cars inspected by QPs. Because
cars operating under an eABS would be permitted to be added to or
removed from a train without limitation, FRA expects that a larger
number of cars would be operated closer to the maximum permitted
distance between inspections. FRA notes that the requirement to record
each inspector's qualification would provide an opportunity to
establish more firmly the comparable safety benefit of inspections by
QPs and QMIs. Should data and experience demonstrate a continued safety
benefit to the use of QMIs, FRA expects that the significant extension
of mileage afforded for inspections by QMIs would result in a
corresponding increase in the proportion of QMI inspections. FRA seeks
comments on proposed paragraph (b), as well as information and data
that may affect this proposal.
Proposed Paragraph (c)
    This proposed paragraph would allow, in certain circumstances, a
car that does not have an eABS record meeting the requirements of
paragraph (a) to move under the provisions of proposed Sec.  232.211.
Proposed paragraph (c) operates in conjunction with proposed paragraph
(d), which sets conditions on the movement of trains with eABS cars.
However, proposed paragraph (c) not only applies in the event of a
disruption in communication with the eABS system but also to other
events leading to a delay in the recording of eABS information prior to
a train movement (e.g., including both delays in the creation of a new
eABS and delays in the update of mileage remaining under proposed
paragraph (a)(3)(viii)). The AAR Petition did not request provisions
for flexibility in the event of eABS system disruption. However, some
flexibility may be necessary to facilitate adoption of electronic
recordkeeping, to promote interoperability of eABS systems, and to
permit railroads to better adapt recordkeeping under eABS to existing
business practices. FRA requests comment on the issue of providing
appropriate flexibility in recordkeeping under an eABS system while
maintaining timely and accurate records.
    To perfect a car movement under proposed paragraph (c), the
railroad must enter an eABS record for the car into its system as soon
as practicable after departure from one location, but no later than the
time at which the car departs any further location in a new train. This
means proposed paragraph (c) would permit a railroad to convert a train
with a Class I brake test under Sec.  232.205 into an eABS train at a
subsequent location, provided that the train consist has remained
intact prior to entering records for the cars in the eABS system and a
record of all necessary car information is available. However, a
railroad would not be permitted under the proposed rule to convert
subsequently an eABS train to a train operating under a Sec.  232.205
brake slip without complying with both rules at the initial terminal.
    A railroad could split an eABS train at a location without
requiring compliance with the proposed requirement to enter the eABS
record before departure. Under present policy, FRA considers the
splitting of a train to be the classification of two new trains, of
which one may continue if it has mileage remaining on its brake test.
Under the framework of eABS, FRA does not consider the splitting of a
train to create a new train because any train movement that occurs
after the splitting of the train remains dependent upon each individual
car's mileage since its last qualifying brake test, and would be
contemporaneous with a train movement of the original train had the
split not occurred.
    FRA notes that operation under proposed paragraph (c) obligates a
railroad to perfect the train movement by entering accurate eABS
records including the remaining allowable mileage within the proposed
limits. This is intended to prevent a railroad from using the
flexibility provided in paragraph (c) to avoid the requirements of
Sec.  232.205. FRA seeks comment on the effects of this proposal.
Proposed Paragraph (d)
    Current regulations for Class I and Class IA brake tests explicitly
apply to trains, and the Class I brake test applies separately both to
trains and to individual cars traveling in a train. Proposed paragraph
(d) clarifies the conditions under which an eABS train is exempted from
the requirement to undergo these tests. Specifically, proposed
paragraph (d) specifies that a train may move the number of miles that
the most restrictive car in the train is authorized to move, provided:
(1) A record is maintained in the cab of the controlling locomotive
that includes certain information for each car in the train; and (2)
the record is updated at each location where the consist is changed to
reflect those changes. Proposed paragraph (d) further provides that in
the event of a disruption of communication between a train and the eABS
system, the train's further movement is limited to the mileage the most
restrictive car in the train is permitted to move under either
paragraph (a) or (b). Taken together, proposed paragraphs (c) and (d)
would allow movement of a train, regardless of whether the eABS for
each car is fully up-to-date, if the railroad performs a Class I brake
test on each added car requiring such test and timely and accurately
records each test. Otherwise, such a train would be required to undergo
a new Class I brake test for the entire train under the requirements of
part 232. Similarly, where the eABS system fails to recalculate
accurately a car's available mileage between stops or fails to capture
information about compliance with time-off-air requirements, the error
may be corrected through an amended record to restore the validity of
the eABS. Such records must be placed in the eABS system as soon as
practicable after departure of the car in a train, but no later than
the time at which the car departs a location in any subsequent train.
    Existing Sec.  232.205(e) requires each railroad to ensure
subsequent crews are notified about prior Class I brake test
information. While such information may be provided to the locomotive
engineer by any written or electronic means determined appropriate by
the railroad, it must be retained in the controlling locomotive's cab
and contain certain prescribed data. The prescribed data is sufficient
for a railroad to create an accurate eABS for each car in the train at
a later time, should conditions prevent communication with the eABS
system. It is essential for train crews to be notified of relevant
train brake test information. Because each car would have its own eABS
record, proposed paragraph (d) would require a written or electronic
record of all such information for each car in a train be placed in the
cab of the controlling locomotive.
    To allow the possibility of manually updating the cab record (e.g.,
in the event of a communications failure), proposed paragraph (d) does
not require that the cab record be modified for every car at every
location. This applies in particular to information on remaining
mileage and compliance with time-off-air requirements, which have the
potential to vary for every car at every location. Instead, a cab
record would

need only to be updated as to consist changes. An accurate cab record
must note the removal of any cars set off from the train, and add all
required information for any cars picked up.
    In conjunction with proposed paragraph (c), movement under the
proposed rule would be permitted based upon this cab record. The
railroad would remain responsible for ensuring that no car exceeds its
permitted mileage, and that each car picked up as part of a train
operated under the proposed rule is in compliance with paragraphs (a),
(b), or (c) of this section. FRA expects that most railroads would
choose to update the cab record electronically wherever possible in
order to minimize compliance risk, promote convenience, and maintain
the proposed flexibility in paragraphs (c) and (d) to continue
operations during periods of disruption. However, under proposed
paragraphs (c) and (d), FRA expects that some railroads for which
participation in an eABS system would be impractical would be able to
interchange with railroads participating in an eABS system with minimal
burden. FRA seeks comment on the proposed paragraph with respect to the
likelihood of Class III railroads and other small entities to
participate in an eABS system.
Proposed Paragraph (e)
    For trains consisting entirely of cars operating under an eABS,
proposed paragraph (e) removes the restriction on block swapping, or
setting off and picking up more than one car or a solid block of cars
at a single location. FRA expects that real-time, accurate tracking of
brake tests and testing at the car level, as eABS systems are designed
to do, would enable railroads to ensure that cars are tested in a
timely manner. The current requirements for block swapping help ensure
that any cars that trains pick up en route are in proper condition for
continued movement, and help ensure accurate monitoring and
recordkeeping functions. At least some brake tests triggered by current
block swapping requirements are unnecessary so long as cars picked up
en route have had valid brake tests and freight car inspections already
performed, and the tests therefore expose railroad employees to
potentially unnecessary workplace hazards associated with the stopping,
securing, inspecting, and classifying of trains to minimal safety
benefit.
    Proposed paragraph (e) also permits a change in the motive power
for the consist without the requirement of an additional brake test,
other than the Class III test. This proposal is consistent with
existing regulations that allow for changing the motive power on a
consist without a Class I brake test in certain instances (see e.g.,
Sec.  232.205(a)(5)(iii), Sec.  232.211(a)(1), and Sec.  232.219). FRA
does not expect that the changing of motive power as proposed would
present any different safety considerations.
Proposed Paragraph (f)
    This proposed paragraph would establish the minimum requirements
that the eABS system must meet to permit coverage under the proposed
rule. The requirements address issues of record integrity,
availability, retention, accuracy, and access. FRA intends for the eABS
system to provide access to information to maintain a level of
information and oversight comparable to current regulations. Additional
provisions are designed to enable the development of an adequate body
of data to determine whether additional flexibility may be provided in
the future (e.g., future mileage extensions between brake tests). The
proposed availability and retention requirements under this paragraph
are intended to augment more limited direct data generated through FRA
inspections with a supply of detailed, auditable data generated by
railroads. As the relative sourcing of data shifts from FRA towards
regulated entities, a heightened requirement for data integrity and
availability is necessary for FRA to remain confident in the safety of
railroad testing and inspection programs. While such requirements
increase the burden of compliance on participating railroads, FRA
expects that the relief provided under the proposed rule would offset
such burdens with substantially greater benefits.
    FRA expects that participating railroads would maintain the
security of the eABS system in a manner consistent with industry
standards for cybersecurity. A failure to maintain the integrity or
availability of records may be evidenced by events including a
significant loss of data required to be retained, an unexplained loss
of availability of more than 48 hours, and a pattern or practice of
providing inaccurate records or a delayed response to FRA requests.
Although many such instances may also reflect violations of other
provisions of the proposed rule, FRA may in its discretion treat such
evidence as a failure to maintain integrity or availability for
purposes of assessing penalties or for suspension or revocation of a
railroad's authority to operate under the proposed rule.
    Consistent with AAR's Petition, proposed paragraph (f)(1) would
require an eABS system to recognize a unique identifier associated with
each person that authors records in an eABS system. Use of a unique
identifier, combined with restrictions in the proposed rule on
destruction or modification of records, is intended to provide
confidence in the authorship and accuracy of the records.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(2) would require an eABS system to ensure
that records stored contain all the information required by paragraph
(a)(3). A requirement that records be fully complete before entry into
the system would help ensure that the system would not accept a partial
record. FRA would consider incomplete records to be ineffective for the
purpose of establishing that a car is operating under an eABS. Although
FRA recognizes that certain circumstances may require the ability to
make amendments to stored records (e.g., to correct identified errors
in those records), as proposed, those amendments must be clearly
identified and tracked. See proposed paragraph (g) of this section.
    Paragraph (f)(3) would require a means to ensure that any
individual performing inspections is identified as a QMI if he or she
meets such requirements. In conjunction with paragraph (b)(3), as
proposed, paragraph (f)(3) would prohibit an eABS system from
identifying a QMI as a QP, even though current regulations otherwise
permit a QMI to be considered a QP. As proposed, an eABS system must
ensure that the qualifications of inspectors are accurately designated
so that no person who does not meet the requirements of a QMI is
designated as such and so that no person who does meet the requirements
of a QMI is identified as a QP. This proposed requirement would
increase the quality of data collected from eABS records and would
provide a method for future comparative analysis between the results of
inspections performed by QPs and inspections performed by QMIs.
    Although FRA expects that the enhanced training and experience of
QMIs result overall in higher quality brake tests, AAR has provided
data with its Petition that challenges this expectation (at least as
applied to some railroads). Based on that data, AAR asserts that the
rate of defect discovery is the same between QMIs and QPs. As discussed
in Section II.F, above, FRA disagrees with AAR's conclusion on this
issue based on the information provided, but FRA finds that use of eABS
systems could provide an opportunity to gather relevant data to better
inform the issue and potential future regulatory action.

    Proposed paragraph (f)(4) would require that records in an eABS
system be made immediately available upon request to FRA and State
inspectors. The proposed paragraph provides a general performance
standard to replace a requirement to maintain a record in a paper
format. Under current regulations, it is common practice for FRA to
observe Class I brake tests, and to compare observed activities with
the written brake slip to ensure the accuracy of both the brake test
and brake slip. There would be reduced time and opportunity both for
FRA to observe inspections and to compare submitted records to FRA
observations of the corresponding cars because the proposed rule is
expected both to increase utilization of cars and to reduce total Class
I brake tests. To address this expected reduction of in-person
observation, it is essential that FRA inspectors are able to access
eABS records quickly.
    Access to inspection records may involve use of an internet-
accessible portal, a telephone hotline, electronic mail, or other
effective means developed by the railroad. In very limited cases such
as in areas with limited access to wireless communication, use of
railroad-owned computer terminals linked to the eABS system or the use
of railroad employees as intermediaries may be sufficient to meet the
proposed requirement. However, widespread use of such on-site provision
of records risks the curtailment of effective oversight. FRA inspectors
would be required to alert railroad employees to their presence prior
to obtaining records that may be pertinent to oversight, and this may
impede FRA review of ordinary operations absent inspector surveillance.
As such, FRA concludes that exclusive use of on-site records access is
not consistent with immediate availability. Whatever the method for
providing access to inspection records, the railroad may not cause
undue delay which would hinder the FRA inspector's ability to provide
accurate and enforceable oversight reports regarding eABS compliance.
Proposed Paragraph (g)
    This paragraph defines the proposed, permitted exceptions for the
modification of an eABS. Although the proposed rule generally would
prohibit modification of an eABS once submitted, amendments would be
permitted where the amended record will supersede, but not replace, the
original. This is based upon AAR's proposal in its Petition. FRA
expects that common corrections of records would include an update of
the time-off-air or single car testing requirements if circumstances
changed for a subject car. An exception is also proposed to allow
records to be updated as to mileage on the same record, as this element
of the record will change frequently, and must be accurately
maintained.
Proposed Paragraph (h)
    Proposed paragraph (h) includes the minimum requirements for any
methodology for calculating and reporting mileage remaining on an eABS
until a car is required to receive a Class I brake test. The proposed
rule would tie the tracking of mileage to movements of a train.
Movements for purpose of train classification, known as switching
movements, would not be required to be recorded as part of the mileage
calculation. Consistent with longstanding practice and existing legal
precedent, movement of a small number of cars over distances less than
one mile is typically considered switching movement, while movement
that crosses public highways or another railroad's tracks at grade is
typically train movement, even if over short distances and within a
yard. FRA requests comment upon the proposal for the calculation and
tracking of mileage, and in particular seeks alternative proposals for
addressing movements of short distance or low risk for which the
recording and calculation of mileage may not be practical.
    Proposed paragraph (h) establishes that a car's remaining mileage
would be updated as soon as practicable after each car's departure in a
train. To align with paragraph (c) and in recognition of the potential
need for flexibility in the proposed alternative regulatory framework,
proposed paragraph (h) requires as an absolute minimum that mileage be
updated prior to a car's departure in a subsequent train. Departure in
a subsequent train occurs after a car has been dropped off from one
train and picked up in any train at a later time. FRA does not consider
that a train can be subsequent to itself absent a train movement;
however, a train that leaves a location and subsequently returns to
that location to pick up a car would be considered a subsequent train
for the purposes of this proposed rule. Accordingly, FRA would not
consider the splitting of a train at any location to create a
requirement under this proposed paragraph.
    If a car exceeds its permitted accumulated mileage between brake
tests, proposed paragraph (h)(3) would require the eABS to track this
excess mileage as a negative number. FRA is proposing this provision to
ensure the eABS clearly reflects instances where cars exceed their
permitted mileage.
Proposed Paragraph (i)
    This proposed paragraph would require railroads to retain eABS
records for a minimum of one year from creation. The proposed retention
period would provide an adequate body of data to inform appropriate
enforcement of the rule and would provide a basis to evaluate the
relative quality of QP and QMI inspections, and may serve to support
future safety analyses of additional potential flexibilities under the
regulations. The proposed requirements under this paragraph are also
intended to augment more limited, direct data generated through FRA
inspections with a supply of detailed, auditable data generated by
railroads. FRA seeks comment on this proposed record retention period.
Proposed Paragraph (j)
    This paragraph would notify railroads that operate eABS trains that
FRA reserves the right to revoke, in whole or in part, their authority
to operate under proposed Sec.  232.211 if the eABS system utilized
fails to meet the requirements of proposed Sec.  232.211 or if a
railroad demonstrates a record of repeated or willful noncompliance
with applicable regulations. This proposed section is modeled on
existing Sec.  232.15(b)(5), which allows railroads to use automated
tracking systems to track and monitor the movement of defective
equipment. Existing Sec.  232.15(b)(5) provides that if FRA finds a
railroad's automated tracking system to be insecure, inaccessible, or
inadequate to track and monitor defective equipment, FRA may ``prohibit
or revoke'' a railroad's authority to use an approved automated system.
When FRA adopted this provision, FRA found that the ability to monitor
and prohibit the use of deficient systems was necessary in part because
no adequate automated system for tracking defective equipment then-
existed on most railroads. 66 FR at 4151. FRA has enacted similar
provisions applicable to electronic or automated tracking systems for
single car air brake tests and the designation of extended haul trains.
See Sec. Sec.  232.303(f)(1) and 232.213(b); see also 66 FR at 4142 and
4175.
    FRA concludes that the proposed rule merits a similar reservation
of the right to revoke, in whole or in part, a railroad's authority to
operate cars under an eABS system if FRA subsequently finds issues
related to security, access, accuracy, or other inadequacy in properly
tracking the movement of equipment using the eABS

system. As with past relief granted for the use of electronic and
automated tracking systems, easy availability of records that
accurately reflect the testing and inspection of operating equipment is
critical to ensure FRA is able to exercise its statutory obligation to
oversee compliance with railroad safety requirements. With regard to
eABS, FRA's ready access to accurate records is key to enabling the
agency to ensure effective oversight, develop data, and support future
changes such as the consideration of future regulatory relief.
    The combination of proposals in this NPRM that would provide
regulatory relief and additional operational flexibility for railroads
operating using eABS systems place additional importance on the quality
of inspections and on the accuracy of recordkeeping compared with the
relief granted in the 2001 final rule discussed above. As AAR states in
its Petition, the proposed rule is expected to increase freight traffic
flow and reduce overall dwell time. These significant operational and
economic benefits come at the cost of reduced opportunity for FRA
equipment inspection, which takes place when equipment is not moving.
    FRA expects the proposed rule to improve overall safety; it is not
clear that the relief proposed would improve safety under all
conditions due to the novelty of the AAR proposal. Such conditions are,
as a result, not known with enough certainty to merit additional and
specific limitations to the proposed relief. FRA therefore considers
that a reserved right to revoke the authority to operate under the
proposed rule, in whole or in part, would permit FRA to act
expeditiously to remedy any specific unsafe condition that may arise
that may not have been considered until the enactment of a rule. Such
conditions would relate to the suitability of freight equipment for
safe transit, which includes not only requirement under part 232, but
additionally requirements for freight cars and locomotives under parts
215 and 229, respectively. Although the principal purpose of the brake
test and inspection requirement is inspection of the brake system, FRA
notes that brake tests indirectly bolster compliance with parts 215 and
229 because their performance provides railroad inspection forces with
an additional opportunity to observe the general condition of all
tested equipment. FRA proposes that repeated or willful noncompliance
with the provisions of parts 215, 229, or 232 would provide sufficient
basis upon which to revoke a railroad's authority to utilize the
proposed relief. Because FRA expects that the proposed rule would
improve safety performance under most conditions, proposed paragraph
(j) requires that FRA's Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety
establish both the basis for revocation of authority and conditions
under which such authority would be restored.

IV. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13771 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures

    This NPRM is a significant regulatory action in accordance with
existing policies and procedures under Executive Order 12866. In
addition, this proposed rule is considered an E.O. 13771 deregulatory
action. Details on the estimated cost savings of this proposed rule can
be found in the proposed rule's Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), which
FRA has prepared and placed in the docket. The RIA details the
estimated costs and cost savings that the Class I railroads are likely
to see over a 10-year period.
    This analysis provides low and high estimates for costs and cost
savings. Cost savings would primarily come from the reduction in brake
tests that would result from mileage and block-swap relief. The
proposed rule would also reduce the filing of waiver renewals by Class
I railroads seeking relief from mileage limitations between brake
tests. Costs would primarily come from training, acquisition of
hardware, and maintenance of the eABS system.
    As shown in Table E-1 and Table E-2, over the 10-year period of
analysis the proposed rule would result in annualized cost savings
ranging between $15.0 million to $30.9 million (discounted at a rate of
7%) and $15.0 million to $30.4 million (discounted at a rate of 3%).

                                           Table E-1--Net Cost Savings
                                                      [Low]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Present value ($)                        Annualized ($)
             Section             -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Undiscounted         3%              7%              3%              7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Savings:
  Increased Mileage.............      91,641,000      79,932,000      67,672,000       9,370,000       9,635,000
    Unlimited Block Swapping....     121,590,000     105,551,000      88,804,000      12,374,000      12,644,000
    Waiver Filing and Review....         133,000         118,000         101,000          14,000          14,000
    Government Waiver Review....          12,000          11,000          10,000           1,000           1,000
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings......     213,376,000     185,612,000     156,587,000      21,759,000      22,294,000
New Costs:
    System Development and            13,845,000      12,665,000      11,427,000       1,485,000       1,627,000
     Maintenance................
    Training....................       6,830,000       6,830,000       6,830,000         801,000         972,000
    Hardware....................      42,613,000      37,982,000      33,188,000       4,453,000       4,725,000
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total New Costs.........      63,288,000      57,477,000      51,445,000       6,738,000       7,325,000
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Net Cost Savings....     150,088,000     128,135,000     105,142,000      15,021,000      14,969,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                           Table E-2--Net Cost Savings
                                                     [High]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Present value ($)                        Annualized ($)
             Section             -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Undiscounted         3%              7%              3%              7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Savings:
    Increased Mileage...........     164,554,000     143,527,000     121,514,000      16,826,000      17,301,000
    Unlimited Block Swapping....     164,047,000     142,408,000     119,813,000      16,695,000      17,059,000

    Waiver Filing...............         133,000         118,000         101,000          14,000          14,000
    Government Waiver Review....          12,000          11,000          10,000           1,000           1,000
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings......     328,746,000     286,064,000     241,438,000      33,536,000      34,375,000
New Costs:
    System Development and            13,845,000      12,665,000      11,427,000       1,485,000       1,627,000
     Maintenance................
    Training....................       5,126,000       5,126,000       5,126,000         601,000         730,000
    Hardware....................       9,690,000       8,637,000       7,547,000       1,013,000       1,075,000
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total New Costs.........      28,661,000      26,428,000      24,100,000       3,099,000       3,432,000
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Net Cost Savings....     300,085,000     259,636,000     217,338,000      30,437,000      30,943,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the net cost savings, the RIA identifies non-
quantified benefits that may come from issuing the proposed rule. The
benefits discussed may maximize and expand freight capacity, increase
equipment availability, shorten cycle times, boost on-time performance
and incentive greater accountability of employees who perform brake
tests.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and
E.O. 13272 (67 FR 53461, Aug. 16, 2002) require agency review of
proposed and final rules to assess their impacts on small entities. An
agency must prepare an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
unless it determines and certifies that a rule, if promulgated, would
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. FRA has not determined whether this proposed rule would have
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Therefore, FRA seeks comment on the potential small business
impacts of the requirements in this NPRM. FRA prepared an IRFA, which
is included as an appendix to the accompanying RIA and available in the
docket for the rulemaking (FRA 2019-0072), to aid the public in
commenting on the potential small business impacts of the requirements
proposed in this NPRM.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    FRA is submitting the information collection requirements in this
proposed rule to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The
sections that contain the proposed and current information collection
requirements and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as
follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Total annual
           CFR section \25\                Respondent universe     Total Annual responses       Average time per        burden hours       Total cost
                                                                                responses               \26\         equivalent \27\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.27--Annual tests..................  30,000 locomotives......  30,000 records of tests.  30 seconds..............               250           $18,000
232.3--Applicability--Export,           708 railroads...........  8 cards.................  10 minutes..............                 1                72
 industrial, & other cars not owned by
 railroads--identification.
232.7--Waivers........................  708 railroads...........  2 petitions.............  160 hours...............               320            23,040
232.15--Movement of Defective           1,620,000 cars..........  128,400 tags/records....  3 minutes...............             5,350           385,200
 Equipment--Tags/Records.
--Written Notification................  1,620,000 cars..........  25,000 notices..........  3 minutes...............             1,250            90,000
232.17--Special Approval Procedure--    708 railroads...........  1 petition..............  100 hours...............               100             7,200
 Petitions for special approval of
 safety-critical revision.
--Petitions for special approval of     708 railroads...........  1 petition..............  100 hours...............               100             7,200
 pre-revenue service acceptance plan.
--(d) Service of petitions............  708 railroads...........  1 petition..............  20 hours................                20             1,440
--(d)(2)(ii) Statement of interest....  Public/railroads........  4 statements............  15 minutes..............            1 hour                72
--(f) Comment.........................  Public/railroads........  6 comments..............  4 hours.................                24             1,728
232.103(f)(2)--Gen'l requirements--all  1,200,000 cars..........  70,000 stickers/stencils/ 10 minutes..............            11,667           840,024
 train brake systems--stickers.                                    badge plates.
(n)(7)--RR Plan identifying specific    708 railroads...........  1 revised plan..........  10 hours................                10               720
 locations or circumstances where
 equipment may be left unattended.
--Notification to FRA when RR develops  708 railroads...........  1 notice................  30 minutes..............            1 hour                72
 and has plan in place or modifies
 existing plan.
--Inspection of Equipment by Qualified  708 railroads...........  12 inspections/records..  4 hours.................                48             3,456
 Employee after Responder Visit.
232.107--Air source requirements and    10 new railroads........  1 plan..................  40 hours................                40             2,880
 cold weather operations--Monitoring
 Plan (Subsequent Years).
--Amendments/Revisions to Plan........  50 railroads/plans......  10 revisions............  20 hours................               200            14,400
--Recordkeeping.......................  50 railroads/plans......  1,150 records...........  10 minutes..............               192            13,824
232.109--Dynamic brake requirements--   708 railroads...........  1,656,000 records.......  4 minutes...............           110,400         7,948,800
 status/record.
--Inoperative dynamic brakes: repair    30,000 locomotives......  6,358 records...........  4 minutes...............               424            30,528
 record.
--Tag bearing words ``inoperative       30,000 locomotives......  6,358 tags..............  30 seconds..............                53             3,816
 dynamic brakes''.
--Deactivated dynamic brakes (Sub.      8,000 locomotives.......  10 markings.............  5 minutes...............            1 hour                72
 Yrs.).
--Operating rules (Subsequent Years)..  5 new...................  5 rules.................  4 hours.................                20             1,440
--Amendments/Revisions................  708 railroads...........  15 revisions............  1 hour..................                15             1,080

--Requests to increase 5 mph overspeed  708 railroads...........  5 requests..............  30 min. + 20 hours......               103             7,416
 restriction.
--Knowledge criteria--locomotive        5 new...................  5 amendments............  16 hours................                80             5,760
 engineers -Subsequent Years.
232.111--Train information handling...  5 new...................  5 procedures............  40 hours................               200            14,400
Sub. Yrs.--Amendments/Revisions.......  100 railroads...........  100 revisions...........  20 hours................             2,000           144,000
--Report requirements to train crew...  708 railroads...........  2,112,000 reports.......  5 minutes...............           176,000        12,672,000
232.203--Training requirements--Tr.     15 railroads............  5 programs..............  100 hours...............               500            36,000
 Prog.--Sub Yr..
--Amendments to written program.......  708 railroads...........  236 revisions...........  8 hours.................             1,888           135,936
--Training records....................  708 railroads...........  24,781 records..........  8 minutes...............             3,304           237,888
--Training notifications..............  708 railroads...........  24,781 notices..........  1 minute................               413            29,736
--Efficiency test plans...............  708 railroads...........  708 copies..............  1 minute................                12               864
232.205--Initial terminal inspection:   708 railroads...........  383,840 notices/records.  45 seconds..............             4,798           345,456
 Class I brake tests and notifications/
 records (Revised/new burden currently
 under review with OMB).
(c)(1)(ii)(B)--RR Development/          708 railroads...........  10 revised operating      8 hours.................                80             5,760
 implementation of operating rules to                              rules.
 ensure compliant operation of train
 if air flow exceeds stipulated
 section parameters after Class I
 brake test is completed (Revised/new
 burden currently under review with
 OMB).
232.207--Class IA brake tests--         708 railroads...........  1 list..................  1 hour..................            1 hour                72
 Designation Lists Where Performed.
Subsequent Years: Notice of Change....  708 railroads...........  250 notices.............  10 minutes..............                42             3,024
232.209--Class II brake tests--         708 railroads...........  159,740 comments........  3 seconds...............               133             9,576
 intermediate ``Roll-by inspection -
 Results to train driver.
232.213--Written Designation to FRA of  83,000 long.............  250 letters.............  15 minutes..............                63             4,536
 Extended haul trains.
--Notification to FRA Associate         7 railroads.............  250 notices.............  10 minutes..............                42             3,024
 Administrator for Safety of a change
 in the location where an extended
 haul brake test is performed (Revised/
 new burden currently under review
 with OMB).
232.219--Double heading and helper      2 railroads.............  100 records.............  5 minutes...............                 8               576
 service: Testing/calibration/records
 of Helper Link devices used by
 locomotives (formerly under
 232.219(c)(3)) (Revised/new burden
 currently under review with OMB).
232.221--Inspection and Testing         708 railroads...........  280,203 records and       90 seconds + 30 seconds.             9,341           672,552
 Requirements for Cars with Electronic                             copies.
 Air Brake Slip System (eABS) Records
 (New requirement).
232.303--General requirements--single   1,600,000 frgt..........  5,600 tags..............  5 minutes...............               467            33,624
 car test: Tagging of Moved Equipment.
--Last repair track brake test/single   1,600,000 frgt..........  240,000 markings........  2 minutes...............             8,000           576,000
 car test--Stenciled on Side of
 Equipment.
232.307--Modification of single car     railroads/AAR...........  1 request + 3 copies....  20 hours + 5 minutes....                20             1,440
 air brake test procedures: Requests
 (includes 232.409(e)).
--Affirmation Statement on Mod. Req.    railroads/AAR...........  1 statement + 4 copies..  30 minutes + 5 minutes..            1 hour                72
 To Employee Representatives.
232.309--Repair track brake test        640 shops...............  5,000 records of          2 minutes...............               167            12,024
 equipment and devices used to perform                             calibrations.
 single car air brake tests--Periodic
 calibration of devices.
232.403--Unique Code..................  245 railroads...........  12 requests.............  5 minutes...............            1 hour                72
232.409--Inspection/Tests/Records EOTs  245 railroads...........  447,500 recording of      30 seconds..............             3,729           268,488
                                                                   tests.
--(d)-(e) Telemetry equipment--Testing/ 245 railroads...........  17,000 records..........  2 minutes...............               567            40,824
 Calibration/Rcds/--Documentations of
 testing (paragraph (d) is a revised
 requirement; paragraph (e) clarifies
 the use of Sec.   229.27) (Revised/
 new burden currently under review
 with OMB).
--(f)(2) Annual report to FRA on        1 manufacturer..........  1 report................  12 hours................                12               864
 radios found with frequency drift
 (Revised/new burden currently under
 review with OMB).
232.503--Process to introduce new       708 railroads...........  1 letter................  1 hour..................            1 hour                72
 brake technology.
--Special approval....................  708 railroads...........  1 request...............  3 hours.................                 3               216
232.505--Pre-revenue service            708 railroads...........  1 procedure.............  160 hours...............               160            11,520
 acceptance test plan--Submission of
 maintenance procedure.
--Amendments to maintenance procedure.  708 railroads...........  1 revision..............  40 hours................                40             2,880
--Design description..................  708 railroads...........  1 petition..............  67 hours................                67             4,824
--Report to FRA Assoc. Admin. for       708 railroads...........  1 report................  13 hours................                13               936
 Safety.
--Brake system technology testing.....  708 railroads...........  1 description...........  40 hours................                40             2,880
232.717(c)--Freight and passenger       40 railroads............  40 written plans........  6 hours.................               240            17,280
 train car brakes--Written maintenance
 plan (formerly under appendix B,
 recodified subpart H) (Revised burden
 currently under review with OMB).
                                       -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Total.............................  708 railroads...........  5,625,811 responses.....  N/A.....................           343,023        24,697,656
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of FRA, including whether the information
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, may be minimized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------