proposal, the definition adopted here does not include commitments made
through look-ahead commitment processes that minimize total production
costs. Consistent with the NOPR proposal, this definition excludes
self-schedules. We expect that by not explicitly requiring the
inclusion of look-ahead commitments, this modified definition will
likely reduce the number of commitments that RTOs/ISOs are required to
report compared to the definition proposed in the NOPR, but the
modified definition will focus RTO/ISO reporting on commitments of
those resources whose offers are least likely to be reflected in day-
ahead and real-time prices and are therefore most likely to result in
uplift costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ Id. P 90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    101. PJM requests clarification that we intend to require PJM to
report all commitments made by operators occurring after the close of
the day-ahead market because it has no ``automated'' commitments. We
clarify that when an automated process makes a recommendation to an
operator who makes the final decision, the commitment must be reported
if the underlying process did not minimize total production costs.
However, we are aware that RTOs/ISOs have a variety of processes
through which units can be committed. On compliance, we therefore
require each RTO/ISO to indicate, for each commitment process (whether
automated or manual) that executes after the day-ahead market, whether
it believes our modified definition implicates some or all commitments
from the process and justify any commitments that it does not plan to
report.
    102. After considering commenters' responses to the questions the
Commission asked about the reporting timeframe, potential
implementation challenges of reporting in real-time, and whether a
different reporting timeframe would provide sufficient
transparency,\214\ we find that requiring operator-initiated
commitments to be posted no later than four hours after the commitment
may place an unnecessary burden on some RTOs/ISOs. Therefore, we
require that each RTO/ISO post this information on its website in
machine-readable format as soon as practicable but no later than 30
days after the end of the month. However, we note that the timing of
operator-initiated commitments is important to understanding system
conditions surrounding those commitments, and was implicit in the
proposed four-hour deadline. Because we no longer require

near-real-time reporting of operator-initiated commitments, we instead
will require each RTO/ISO to include in its report the start time of
each commitment in order to enable stakeholders to understand system
conditions surrounding the commitment. While we are providing each RTO/
ISO significant flexibility in when it must report operator-initiated
commitments, we encourage each RTO/ISO to design its processes so that
this information is provided to market participants as soon as
possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ Id. P 94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    103. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require RTOs/ISOs to report the
size of each commitment. In the NOPR, we described this value as the
upper economic operating limit of the committed resource in MW (i.e.,
its economic maximum).\215\ We continue to believe this requirement
will provide transparency into the size of the system need associated
with the operator-initiated commitment. However, RTOs/ISOs may propose,
on compliance, an alternative metric and must demonstrate that it
provides transparency into the size of the system need associated with
the operator-initiated commitment that is consistent with or superior
to that provided by the economic maximum of each committed resource.
This should address SPP's assertion that this resource parameter should
not be posted because it is considered competitive information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ Id. P 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    104. As with the Zonal Uplift Report discussed above, we adopt the
NOPR proposal and define ``transmission zone'' as a geographic area
that is used for the local allocation of charges and find that this
definition balances the benefits of greater transparency with the
desire to preserve a reasonable level of protection of potentially
commercially-sensitive information. As discussed above, RTOs/ISOs may
have multiple existing types of zones that could meet our definition.
We believe that there are transparency benefits to using the same set
of zones for the Zonal Uplift Report and the Operator-Initiated
Commitment Report. However, we acknowledge that an RTO/ISO may have a
legitimate reason for using a more or less granular set of zones for
one or the other of the two reports and the decision to provide less
granularity on one report does not necessitate less granularity for
both reports simply to maintain consistency between reports. On
compliance, we require each RTO/ISO to include in its tariff the type
of zone that it proposes to use in its Operator-Initiated Commitment
Report, explain how the chosen type of zone meets the definition of
transmission zone adopted in this Final Rule, and provide justification
for any differences between the sets of zones used for the two reports.
    105. We adopt the NOPR proposal and require that the Operator-
Initiated Commitment Reports include the reason for each commitment. In
the NOPR, the Commission requested comment as to whether the Commission
should define a common set of categories of commitment reasons for use
across all RTOs/ISOs and, if so, what reasons should be included, or
whether to allow each RTO/ISO to establish a set of appropriate
operator-initiated commitment reasons on compliance. As EEI suggests,
requiring a common set of commitment reasons will help ensure that
RTOs/ISOs provide similar information to market participants. This
consideration is balanced against the desire for a minimum set of
commitment reasons that are not so broad as to provide limited
inference about the nature of the reliability consideration addressed
through the commitment. While no specific commitment reasons were
suggested by commenters, the potential commitment reasons listed in the
NOPR \216\ appear to be consistent with the broad reasons for which
RTOs/ISOs make operator-initiated commitments. Therefore, we require
that RTOs/ISOs, include, at a minimum, the following three commitment
reasons: system-wide capacity, constraint management, and voltage
support. However, we acknowledge that RTOs/ISOs may use different
terminology or have other reasons for making operator-initiated
commitments that do not minimize total production costs. Therefore, if
RTOs/ISOs would like to include additional or more detailed commitment
reasons in their Operator-Initiated Commitment Reports, they may do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ Id. P 95 and n.109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    106. We clarify that we are not requiring that RTOs/ISOs identify
resource names or specific constraints in the Operator-Initiated
Commitment Report. We also clarify, in response to concerns from PJM
and ISO-NE that each RTO/ISO is permitted to propose, upon compliance,
modifications to the report to avoid disclosing information that could
be used to harm system security.
    107. In response to NYISO's and ISO-NE's comments that it may be
necessary to create new rules or procedures to address market power or
anti-competitive behavior that may arise as a result of this report we
note that any such rules or procedures would be outside the scope of
this proceeding. RTOs/ISOs may propose any further changes they deem
appropriate in a separate filing pursuant to section 205 of the Federal
Power Act.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ 16 U.S.C. 824d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    108. We also confirm that RTOs/ISOs may choose to report more
information about operator-initiated commitments or other operator
actions. However, we find that requests by several commenters to
require reporting of other types of commitments or other operator
actions that may affect uplift are beyond the scope of this proceeding,
as this requirement only addresses operator-initiated commitments.

D. Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors

1. NOPR Proposal
    109. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each RTO/ISO
to include, in its tariff: Its transmission constraint penalty factor
values; the circumstances, if any, under which the transmission
constraint penalty factors can set LMPs; and the procedure, if any, for
temporarily changing the transmission constraint penalty factor values.
The Commission further proposed that any procedure for temporarily
changing transmission constraint penalty factor values must provide for
notice of the change to market participants.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,721 at Regulatory Text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    110. The Commission reasoned that transparency into transmission
constraint penalty factors and associated practices is important
because the penalty factors and practices can affect prices. Without an
understanding of the level of transmission constraint penalty factors
or under what circumstances they can set LMPs or be temporarily
changed, market participants may not be able to hedge transactions
appropriately or raise concerns into RTO/ISO practices through the
stakeholder process.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ Id. P 80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    111. Many commenters support the proposed requirement that all
RTOs/ISOs include provisions related to transmission constraint penalty
factors in their tariffs.\220\ Potomac Economics

explains that transmission constraint penalty factors represent the
maximum re-dispatch cost that a RTO/ISO will incur to resolve
congestion on a constraint, and are generally used to set the
congestion components of LMPs when a constraint is violated. Because
penalty factors can set prices and affect dispatch, Potomac Economics
supports requiring RTOs/ISOs to file transmission constraint penalty
factors, and any provisions to adjust them, in their tariffs to be
reviewed and approved by the Commission.\221\ Competitive Suppliers
state that transmission constraint penalty factors affect prices and
uplift, so transparency around their use is important for market
participants to understand their impact.\222\ MISO asserts that
transparency around transmission constraint penalty factors can
increase confidence that market outcomes are rational and encourage
dialogue to improve market efficiency, while Financial Marketers
Coalition asserts that a lack of transparency around these practices
can lead to confusion and uncertainty in understanding and forecasting
prices.\223\ No commenters express opposition to the requirements
proposed in the NOPR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ APPA/NRECA Comments at 12-13; AWEA Comments at 10;
Competitive Suppliers Comments at 10; Designated Marketers Comments
at 6; Direct Energy Comments at 10; EEI Comments at 10; Financial
Marketers Coalition Comments at 45; Golden Spread Comments at 5;
MISO Comments at 19; NYISO Comments at 1; PJM Comments at 15; PJM
Market Monitor Comments at 10; Potomac Economics Comments at 12-13;
R Street Institute Comments at 6; TAPS Comments at 10; XO Energy
Replacement Comments at 37, 39.
    \221\ Potomac Economics Comments at 12-13.
    \222\ Competitive Suppliers Comments at 10.
    \223\ Financial Marketers Coalition Comments at 45; MISO
Comments at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    112. Several RTOs/ISOs state that they currently comply, plan to
comply, or could comply with the proposed requirements. MISO and MISO
Transmission Owners assert that MISO's tariff is consistent with the
proposal.\224\ MISO also notes that it posts shadow prices,
transmission constraint penalty factors, and reasons for temporary
overrides of transmission constraint penalty factors in reports on its
website.\225\ CAISO states that its tariff already contains the penalty
factors and their impacts on market outcomes for each of its markets
and market calculations.\226\ NYISO intends to file tariff revisions
with the Commission independent of the NOPR, which will align with the
proposed requirements of the NOPR.\227\ PJM supports including certain
provisions related to transmission constraint penalty factors in its
tariff.\228\ The PJM Market Monitor explains that it has recommended
that PJM include transmission constraint penalty factor values in its
tariff, and explicitly state its policy on the use of these penalty
factors in setting LMP, the appropriate triggers of these penalty
factors, and when they should be used to set the shadow prices of
transmission constraints.\229\ ISO-NE allows that it could specify more
information on transmission constraint penalty factors in its
tariff.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ MISO Comments at 18-19 (citing Schedule 28A of its
Tariff); MISO Transmission Owners Comments at 5 n.17.
    \225\ MISO Comments at 19.
    \226\ CAISO Comments at 11-12.
    \227\ NYISO Comments at 12. Since its comments, NYISO has
subsequently filed transmission constraint pricing tariff revisions
with the Commission. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No.
ER17-1453-000 (June 14, 2017) (delegated letter order).
    \228\ PJM Comments at 15.
    \229\ PJM Market Monitor Comments at 10 (citing PJM, 2015 Annual
State of the Market Report, v. 2, Section 3: Energy Market (March
2016), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2015/2015-som-pjm-volume2-sec3.pdf).
    \230\ ISO-NE Comments at 44-45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    113. Several commenters explicitly support the proposal requiring
RTOs/ISOs to explain in their tariffs when transmission constraint
penalty factors can set LMPs, if ever.\231\ Potomac Economics, XO
Energy, and R Street Institute explain that when a constraint is
violated, some RTOs/ISOs relax the constraint to reduce the shadow
price to less than the penalty factor, which reduces congestion
components of LMPs.\232\ Potomac Economics explains that if, for
example, an RTO/ISO has a penalty factor of $1,000 and the unit that is
re-dispatched to manage the constraint has a marginal cost of $999, the
congestion will be determined by the $999 shadow price. However, if the
RTO/ISO relaxes the constraint, thereby diminishing reliability, the
``relaxed'' shadow price that determines the congestion cost may be
well below the penalty factor.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ Competitive Suppliers Comments at 10; EEI Comments at 10;
Financial Marketers Coalition Comments at 45; Golden Spread Comments
at 5; PJM Market Monitor Comments at 10; Potomac Economics Comments
at 16; R Street Institute Comments at 6; XO Energy Replacement
Comments at 37.
    \232\ Potomac Economics Comments at 14-15; R Street Institute
Comments at 6; XO Energy Comments at 37-39.
    \233\ Potomac Economics Comments at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    114. R Street Institute argues that relaxing transmission
constraints to prevent penalty factors from setting prices distorts
congestion price formation, which undermines efficient commitment and
dispatch in the short term and distorts market investments and
retirements in the long term.\234\ XO Energy asserts that penalty
prices are in place to improve price formation when all economic
actions are exhausted, and that constraint relaxation masks the
underlying violation.\235\ XO Energy further argues that RTOs/ISOs that
do not allow penalty factors to set price should explain and justify
the conditions for relaxing a constraint.\236\ Financial Marketers
Coalition states that arbitrary standards on when transmission
constraint penalty factors can set LMPs can afford considerable
discretion to dispatchers and can lead to confusion among market
participants.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ R Street Institute Comments at 6.
    \235\ XO Energy Comments at 38.
    \236\ Id. at 37.
    \237\ Financial Marketers Coalition Comments at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    115. Potomac Economics suggests that the Commission not only
require RTOs/ISOs to explain how penalty factors contribute to setting
LMP, but require that penalty factors set shadow prices for violated
constraints.\238\ The PJM Market Monitor agrees that penalty factors
should affect LMPs in the same manner that generator offer prices
affect LMPs, so if the flow on a transmission constraint exceeds the
line limit, the shadow price of the constraint should equal the
transmission constraint penalty factor.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ Potomac Economics Comments at 16.
    \239\ PJM Market Monitor Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    116. Multiple commenters explicitly support the proposed
requirement that RTOs/ISOs include in their tariffs any procedures for
changing penalty factors and provide notice of any such changes to
market participants.\240\ Potomac Economics states that it has observed
RTOs/ISOs increasing or decreasing the transmission constraint penalty
factors in real-time operations for a variety of reasons.\241\ Potomac
Economics states that RTOs/ISOs generally increase a penalty factor
when a violation raises more serious reliability concerns than normal
and decrease a factor in real-time to reduce the real-time congestion
pricing for a violated constraint. Potomac Economics states that
whether increasing or decreasing the factors, these actions can
profoundly affect LMPs, unit commitments, dispatch levels, and
reliability, and therefore RTOs/ISOs should file any provisions to
adjust them.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ EEI Comments at 10; Golden Spread Comments at 5; PJM
Market Monitor Comments at 10; R Street Institute Comments at 5; XO
Energy Replacement Comments at 39.
    \241\ Potomac Economics Comments at 12-13.
    \242\ Id. at 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    117. XO Energy states that MISO currently posts any overridden
transmission constraint demand curves through its real-time market and
provides reasons for such overrides in its next-day market
reports.\243\ In contrast, XO Energy notes that PJM does not provide
any indication or rationale for changing transmission constraint
penalty factors, but generally performs a

price correction the following day that is only evident through
increased or decreased shadow prices.\244\ ISO-NE and TAPS state that
tariff provisions on transmission constraint penalty factors should be
flexible enough to permit system operators to modify these factors in
real-time to maintain reliability of the system and otherwise
temporarily change these values to account for changes in system
conditions.\245\ CAISO states that while it currently cannot
temporarily change penalty prices, it does not object to obtaining such
flexibility in its tariff or to describing in its tariff the relevant
conditions for utilizing such flexibility.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ XO Energy Replacement Comments at 39-40.
    \244\ Id. at 40.
    \245\ ISO-NE Comments at 44-45; TAPS Comments at 10.
    \246\ CAISO Comments at 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    118. Potomac Economics makes two recommendations to strengthen the
requirement to file transmission constraint penalty factors. Potomac
Economics states that the Commission should require or encourage RTOs/
ISOs to file multi-point demand curves, as in MISO and NYISO, rather
than single penalty values because demand curves demonstrate that the
size of the violation matters from a reliability perspective. XO Energy
also supports the implementation of the demand curve approach used in
MISO.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ XO Energy Replacement Comments at 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    119. Potomac Economics also suggests that the Commission clarify
that penalty values should correspond to the reliability concerns that
arise when constraints are violated. Potomac Economics states that,
while estimating the reliability value of a transmission constraint can
be challenging, reasonable values can be set that reflect the relative
reliability concern associated with violating different
constraints.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ Potomac Economics Comments at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    120. XO Energy states that RTO/ISO actions to affect the
percentages of thermal limits used for controlling constraints also can
mask violations of thermal limits and affect how high shadow prices can
bind. XO Energy therefore suggests enhancing the transparency of
operator actions surrounding Limit Controls.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \249\ XO Energy Replacement Comments at 36, 39 (citing PJM,
Transmission Constraint Control Logic in Market Clearing Engines
(March 2017), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/
committees/mic/20170308/20170308-informational-only-transmission-
constraint-control-logic-in-mces.ashx).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Determination
    121. We adopt the NOPR proposal and require that each RTO/ISO
include in its tariff on an on-going basis: (1) The transmission
constraint penalty factor values used in its market software; \250\ (2)
the circumstances, if any, under which the transmission constraint
penalty factors can set LMPs; \251\ and (3) the procedures, if any, for
temporarily changing transmission constraint penalty factor values. We
also require that any procedures for temporarily changing transmission
constraint penalty factor values must provide for notice of the change
to market participants as soon as practicable.\252\ We find that
transmission constraint penalty factors have the potential to
materially affect energy and ancillary services prices so they should
be included in the tariff. Further, greater transparency into
transmission constraint penalty factors will allow market participants
to understand how an RTO's/ISO's actions and practices affect clearing
prices. We agree with commenters that, without transparency into
transmission constraint penalty factors, market participants cannot
understand the impact of these factors on LMPs or effectively engage in
dialogue or transactions to improve market efficiencies. Accordingly,
we adopt the proposal in the NOPR. On compliance, each RTO/ISO is
required to include its current transmission constraint penalty factors
and associated current practices in its tariff. The three Transmission
Constraint Penalty Factor Requirements also apply to any subsequent
changes to an RTO's/ISO's penalty factor values and practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ As proposed in the NOPR, if the RTO/ISO includes different
transmission constraint penalty factors for different purposes
(e.g., unit commitment and economic dispatch, day-ahead versus real-
time), we require that all sets of transmission constraint penalty
factors be included in the tariff. See NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
32,721 at P 97.
    \251\ As proposed in the NOPR, RTOs/ISOs should provide
explanations in their tariffs if they have different processes for
allowing transmission constraint penalty factors to set LMPs in
different circumstances, as well as any specific restrictions or
conditions under which transmission constraint penalty factors are
allowed to set LMPs. NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,721 at P 98.
    \252\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,721 at PP 96-99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    122. We clarify that we are not requiring RTOs/ISOs to have
procedures to temporarily change their transmission constraint penalty
factor values. Rather, if an RTO/ISO currently has the flexibility to
temporarily override transmission constraint penalty factor values, for
example, to account for reliability concerns, the circumstances under
which the factors may be changed and any procedures for doing so must
be included in the RTO's/ISO's tariff. We appreciate requests that the
Commission require RTOs/ISOs to adopt specific practices in developing
transmission constraint penalty factors and specifications for how
transmission constraint penalty factors can set LMPs. However, we find
that such requests go beyond the scope of this rule, which is focused
on transparency into current RTO/ISO practices related to transmission
constraint penalty factors. Accordingly, we will not address those
requests here. Further, RTOs/ISOs may propose any changes they deem
appropriate to their current practices related to transmission
constraint penalty factors in a separate filing pursuant to section 205
of the Federal Power Act.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ 16 U.S.C. 824d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Other Comments Requested

1. Reporting of Transmission Outages
    123. In the NOPR, the Commission requested comment on whether
additional reporting of transmission outages should be required, noting
that transmission outages are an important facet of price formation
because they can affect RTO/ISO commitment and dispatch decisions and
resulting market clearing prices.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,721 at P 98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Comments
    124. Most RTOs/ISOs state that they already provide information on
transmission outages. MISO states that it posts all transmission
outages on OASIS on an hourly basis.\255\ ISO-NE states that it
currently posts both long- and short-term reports on transmission
outages, updated on a daily and 15-minute basis, respectively.\256\
NYISO states that it posts information regarding scheduled and actual
outages of 100 kV and higher transmission facilities on its website in
machine-readable format.\257\ PJM states that it posts outages on its
website.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ MISO Comments at 19.
    \256\ ISO-NE Comments at 45.
    \257\ NYISO Comments at 12.
    \258\ PJM Comments at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    125. Several commenters support additional transparency into
transmission outages.\259\ The PJM Market Monitor asserts that more
consistent and timely outage reporting is important to
transparency.\260\ Potomac Economics and AWEA argue that additional
reporting of transmission outages would improve market

efficiency and reduce uncertainty for participants.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ AWEA Comments at 10; Direct Energy Comments at 10;
Diversified Trading/eXion Energy Comments at 5-7; EDF Comments at 1-
5; PJM Market Monitor Comments at 11; Potomac Economics Comments at
11-12; XO Energy Replacement Comments at 43-45.
    \260\ PJM Market Monitor Comments at 11.
    \261\ AWEA Comments at 10; Potomac Economics Comments at 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    126. XO Energy contends that all RTOs/ISOs should be required to
post all known transmission outages in real-time at the same frequency
as real-time dispatch, using EMS model detail. XO Energy also contends
that planned and emergency outages known and included in the day-ahead
market solution should be included as an additional report posted with
each RTO/ISO day-ahead market solution.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ XO Energy Replacement Comments at 43-44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    127. Diversified Trading/eXion Energy and XO Energy contend that
RTOs/ISOs should be required to post all outages that are modified or
cancelled after the close of the day-ahead market, as well as the
impact of cancelled outages on prices and uplift. Diversified Trading/
eXion Energy further contend that this posting should also include the
reason for the cancellation or modification, the transmission owner,
and the frequency with which the transmission owner has cancelled or
modified outages after the cut-off.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \263\ Diversified Trading/eXion Energy Comments at 5-7; XO
Energy Replacement Comments at 44-45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    128. EDF asserts that there is a need for RTOs/ISOs to incorporate
economic assessments into their transmission outage scheduling
practices and moves that the Commission establish a technical
conference to address the impact of transmission outages on RTO/ISO
commitment and dispatch decisions and resulting market clearing
prices.\264\ EDF contends that RTOs/ISOs typically only assess the
reliability impact of outages and do not consider economic impacts. EDF
contends that an economic assessment of transmission outages should be
possible, at relatively low cost, most of the time, with no reliability
impact, given sufficient advanced planning.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ EDF Comments at 1.
    \265\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    129. On the other hand, MISO and PJM contend that additional
reporting requirements are unnecessary,\266\ while MISO Transmission
Owners contend that any further reporting requirements may be
duplicative.\267\ Several commenters also bring up confidentiality
concerns. PJM argues that posting additional information may risk
releasing confidential market participant information because the
status of a unit or station would be identified via this posting.\268\
MISO Transmission Owners similarly state that outage information may
contain CEII or other confidential information that should not be
identified publicly.\269\ MISO Transmission Owners contend that
transmission outages are not fully explored in the NOPR and may be
better left to a future rulemaking.\270\ Finally, ISO-NE notes that
outages that only impact specific generation or other supply resources
are considered market sensitive and excluded from reports. However,
ISO-NE states that stakeholders have discussed whether to expand
current reporting practices to include the market sensitive outages in
reports.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ MISO Comments at 19; PJM Comments at 12.
    \267\ MISO Transmission Owners Comments at 15.
    \268\ PJM Comments at 15.
    \269\ MISO Transmission Owners Comments at 15; PJM Comments at
15.
    \270\ MISO Transmission Owners Comments at 14-15.
    \271\ ISO-NE Comments at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    130. We appreciate the input from multiple commenters on the
reporting of transmission outages. In the NOPR, the Commission sought
comment on this topic but did not make a specific proposal.
Accordingly, based on the record in this proceeding, we will not
require additional reporting for transmission outages at this time.
2. Availability of Market Models
    131. In the NOPR, the Commission requested comment on whether
certain classes of market participants are prohibited from obtaining
the network models in certain RTOs/ISOs and the justification for any
such restrictions. The Commission defined ``network model'' as ``the
RTO's/ISO's model used in its energy management system for the real-
time operation of the transmission system (e.g., state-estimation,
contingency analysis).'' \272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,721 at P 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Comments
    132. Financial Marketers Coalition and XO Energy explain that there
are several different types of market models and discuss the varying
availability of different market models between market participant
classes across RTOs/ISOs. XO Energy asserts that MISO and SPP provide a
fair amount of detail and that PJM, NYISO, and CAISO provide the least
amount of model detail.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ Financial Marketers Coalition Comments at 40-44; XO Energy
Replacement Comments at 45-47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    133. ISO-NE and MISO state they provide network models to all
market participants.\274\ However, NYISO and PJM state that market
models are only available to a subset of market participants.\275\
NYISO explains that its network model is only available to participants
in the Transmission Congestion Market, upon request. NYISO states it is
not available to others because it includes certain modifications to
account for system assumptions utilized in that market.\276\ PJM states
that certain entities are prohibited from accessing network models. PJM
explains that in some instances it may share some of these models with
certain entities, such as Transmission Owners, but only to coordinate
the reliability of the transmission system with PJM, not for the sake
of market transparency.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ ISO-NE Comments at 45-46; MISO Comments at 20.
    \275\ NYISO Comments at 12-13; PJM Comments at 11-12.
    \276\ NYISO Comments at 12-13.
    \277\ PJM Comments at 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    134. Some commenters argue against the wider dissemination of
market models, noting confidentiality concerns.\278\ The PJM Market
Monitor argues that there is no efficiency gain and potential market
power issues could arise from the wider dissemination of market
models.\279\ Other commenters argue that market models should be
available to all market participants,\280\ or that releasing market
models subject to CEII protection or non-disclosure agreements is
appropriate.\281\ XO Energy, for example, asserts that access to market
models would allow market participants to place transactions that
increase market efficiency and reliability.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \278\ MISO Transmission Owners Comments at 14-15; PJM Comments
at 11-12.
    \279\ PJM Market Monitor Comments at 11-12.
    \280\ AWEA Comments at 10-14; Designated Marketers Comments at
7; TAPS Comments at 10; XO Energy Replacement Comments at 45-47.
    \281\ Appian Way Comments at 8; Designated Marketers Comments at
7; ISO-NE Comments at 45-46; XO Energy Replacement Comments at 45-
47.
    \282\ XO Energy Reply Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    135. We appreciate the input from multiple commenters on the
availability of market models. In the NOPR, the Commission sought
comment on this topic but did not make a specific proposal.
Accordingly, based on the record in this proceeding, we will not
require changes to the accessibility of market models at this time.

V. Compliance and Implementation Timelines

    136. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require that each RTO/
ISO submit a compliance filing within 90 days of the effective date of
the Final

Rule. The Commission also requested comment on whether 90 days provided
sufficient time for RTOs/ISOs to develop new tariff language in
response to the Final Rule. The Commission also proposed that tariff
changes implementing the Final Rule must become effective no more than
six months after compliance filings are due.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,721 at P 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Comments

    137. The Commission did not propose separate compliance and
implementation deadlines for the uplift cost allocation and
transparency reforms. Accordingly, most of the comments received on
this subject understandably address compliance and implementation
assuming that the Final Rule would address both proposed reforms. We do
not discuss comments that solely addressed compliance and
implementation of the proposed uplift cost allocation reform.
    138. MISO requests that the Commission consider a compliance
timeline of 120 days, citing a need to review existing protocols,
refine current processes to reflect any changes stemming from the NOPR
proposal, and discuss changes with stakeholders. MISO requests that the
Commission consider an implementation timeline of 365 days, as MISO
estimates that the coding and testing of new software will likely take
a minimum of 60 to 90 days.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ MISO Comments at 20-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    139. ISO-NE states that the 90-day compliance deadline is too short
as it leaves insufficient time to consult with stakeholders, consider
alternative compliance approaches and develop and file tariff changes.
ISO-NE also asserts that the six-month deadline appears arbitrary. ISO-
NE concludes that the Commission should allow RTOs/ISOs to submit a
compliance proposal and schedule that reflects each region's unique
circumstances, which may vary significantly.\285\ However, ISO-NE's
support for its position focuses on the proposed uplift cost allocation
reforms, which are not a part of this Final Rule. PJM supports the 90-
day compliance deadline. PJM states specifically that it could
implement the proposed transparency changes within nine months after
issuance of a final rule.\286\ NYISO is silent on the compliance
deadline, but states that it would require at least nine months for
implementation.\287\ CAISO and SPP do not comment on compliance or
implementation timelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ ISO-NE Comments at 46-47.
    \286\ PJM Comments at 17.
    \287\ NYISO Comments at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    140. Direct Energy states that the shorter the period for
implementing the changes to transparency requirements the better, as
the changes will only enhance RTO/ISO markets.\288\ APPA and NRECA
recommend that the Commission seek input from RTOs/ISOs regarding the
feasibility and timing of their ability to comply with the transparency
provisions.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \288\ Direct Energy Comments at 11.
    \289\ APPA and NRECA Comments at 2, 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Determination

    141. In the NOPR, the Commission did not propose separate
compliance and implementation deadlines for the uplift cost allocation
and transparency reforms. Most of the comments received on this subject
address compliance and implementation assuming a Final Rule would
address both initiatives, and in several cases, focused only on
compliance and implementation related to the uplift cost allocation
initiative. As this Final Rule only addresses the transparency
initiative, we reason that some of the proposed compliance and
implementation deadline concerns may be alleviated. We agree with
Direct Energy that it is preferable that the transparency benefits of
these reforms be realized as quickly as possible. Therefore, we require
that each RTO/ISO submit a compliance filing within 60 days of the
effective date of this Final Rule that establishes in its tariff the
three reporting requirements and one requirement related to
transmission constraint penalty factors as described herein. Further,
we require tariff changes to become effective no more than 120 days
after compliance filings are due.

VI. Information Collection Statement

    142. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) \290\ requires each federal
agency to seek and obtain Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
approval before undertaking a collection of information directed to ten
or more persons or contained in a rule of general applicability. OMB's
regulations,\291\ in turn, require approval of certain information
collection requirements imposed by agency rules. Upon approval of a
collection(s) of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and
an expiration date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of a
rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to these
collection(s) of information unless the collection(s) of information
display a valid OMB control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520.
    \291\ 5 CFR 1320 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    143. In this Final Rule, we are amending the Commission's
regulations to improve the operation of organized wholesale electric
power markets operated by RTOs/ISOs. We require that each RTO/ISO: (1)
Report, on a monthly basis, uplift payments for each transmission zone,
broken out by day and uplift category (Zonal Uplift Report); (2)
report, on a monthly basis, total uplift payments for each resource
(Resource-Specific Uplift Report); (3) report, on a monthly basis, for
each operator-initiated commitment, the size of the commitment,
transmission zone, commitment reason, and commitment start time
(Operator-Initiated Commitment Report); and (4) define in its tariff
the transmission constraint penalty factors, as well as the
circumstances under which those factors can set locational marginal
prices (LMP), and any process by which they can be changed
(Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor Requirements).
    144. The reforms required in this Final Rule include a one-time
tariff filing with the Commission due 60 days after the effective date
of this Final Rule. The reforms will also require each RTO/ISO to
maintain and post the three reports on an ongoing basis. We estimate
this will require about 36 hours each year (three hours each month) for
each RTO/ISO. We anticipate the reforms proposed in this Final Rule,
once implemented, would not significantly change currently existing
burdens on an ongoing basis. The Commission will submit the proposed
reporting requirements to OMB for its review and approval under section
3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    145. In the NOPR, the Commission requested comments on its need for
this information, whether the information will have practical utility,
the accuracy of burden and cost estimates, ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected or retained,
and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including
the use of automated information techniques. The comments and the
Commission's determinations related to these issues are discussed
above.

    Burden Estimate and Information Collection Costs: The Commission
believes that the burden estimates below are representative of the
average burden on respondents, including necessary communications with
stakeholders. The estimated burden and cost \293\ for the requirements
contained in this Final Rule follow.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \293\ The estimated hourly cost (salary plus benefits) provided
in this section are based on the salary figures for May 2016 posted
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Utilities sector
(available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm#00-0000)
and benefits effective September 2017 (issued 12/15/2017, available
at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). The hourly
estimates for salary plus benefits are: (a) Legal (code 23-0000),
$143.68; (b) Computer and Mathematical (code 15-0000), $60.70; (c)
Information Security Analyst (code 15-1122), $66.34; (d) Accountant
and Auditor (code 13-2011), $53.00; (e) Information and Record Clerk
(code 43-4199), $39.14; (e) Electrical Engineer (code 17-2071),
$68.12; (f) Economist (code 19-3011), $77.96; (g) Computer and
Information Systems Manager (code 11-3021), $100.68; (h) Management
(code 11-0000), $81.52. The average hourly cost (salary plus
benefits), weighting all of these skill sets equally, is $76.79. For
these calculations, we round that figure to $77 per hour.
    \294\ The RTOs/ISOs (CAISO, SPP, MISO, PJM, NYISO, and ISO-NE)
are required to comply with the reforms in this Final Rule.

                                            FERC-516G, as Implemented by the Final Rule in Docket RM17-2-000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Number of      Annual  number                                              Total annual burden      Cost per
                                          respondents      of  responses    Total number    Average  burden hours   hours and total  annual   respondent
                                             \295\        per  respondent   of responses    and cost per  response            cost               ($)
                                                    (1)               (2)     (1) x (2) =  (4)....................  (3) x (4) = (5)........    (5) / (1)
                                                                                (3)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-Time Effort (in Year 1) to (a)                    6                 1               6  500 hrs.; $38,500......  3,000 hrs.; $231,000...      $38,500
 establish process for reporting on
 company website,\296\ & (b) submit
 tariff filing.
Ongoing Preparing and Posting of 3                    6                12              72  3 hrs.; $231...........  216 hrs.; $16,632......        2,772
 reports on company website each
 month (starting in Year 1), as
 mentioned above.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Cost to Comply: The Commission has projected the total cost of
compliance to industry to be: One-time in Year 1, $231,000; and
ongoing, starting in Year 1, $16,632.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ Respondent entities are either RTOs or ISOs.
    \296\ This includes monthly reporting/posting on the company
website for: (1) The Zonal Uplift Report (posting within 20 days of
end of month), (2) the Resource-Specific Uplift Report (posting
within 90 days of end of month), and (3) the Operator-Initiated
Commitments Report (posting within 30 days of the end of month).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title: FERC-516G, Electric Rate Schedules and Tariff Filings in
Docket RM17-2-000.
    Action: New information collection.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0295.
    Respondents for this Rulemaking: RTOs/ISOs.
    Frequency of Information: One-time, and ongoing posting to company
website.
    Necessity of Information: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
implements this rule to improve competitive wholesale electric markets
in the RTO/ISO regions.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the changes and has
determined that such changes are necessary. These requirements conform
to the Commission's need for efficient information collection,
communication, and management within the energy industry. The
Commission has specific, objective support for the burden estimates
associated with the information collection requirements.
    Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen
Brown, Office of the Executive Director], email:
[email protected], Phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Comments concerning the collection of information and the associated
burden estimate(s) may also be sent to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street
NW, Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission]. Due to security concerns, comments
should be sent electronically to the following email address:
[email protected]. Comments submitted to OMB should refer to
FERC-516G and OMB Control No. 1902-0295.

VII. Environmental Analysis

    146. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\297\ The
Commission concludes that neither an Environmental Assessment nor an
Environmental Impact Statement is required for this Final Rule under
section 380.4(a)(15) of the Commission's regulations, which provides a
categorical exemption for approval of actions under sections 205 and
206 of the Federal Power Act relating to the filing of schedules
containing all rates and charges for the transmission or sale of
electric energy subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, plus the
classification, practices, contracts and regulations that affect rates,
charges, classifications, and services.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs.
] 30,783 (1987).
    \298\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(15) (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    147. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \299\ generally
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The RFA does not mandate any particular outcome in a rulemaking. It
only requires consideration of alternatives that are less burdensome to
small entities and an agency explanation of why alternatives were
rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \299\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    148. This rule would apply to six RTOs/ISOs (all of which are
transmission organizations). The average estimated annual PRA-related
cost to each of the RTOs/ISOs is $41,272 (one-time and ongoing costs)
in Year 1, and $2,772 (ongoing cost) in Year 2 and beyond. This cost of
implementing these changes is not significant. Additionally, the RTOs/
ISOs are not small entities, as defined by the RFA.\300\ This is
because the relevant threshold between small and large entities is 500
employees and the Commission understands that each RTO/ISO has more
than 500 employees.

Furthermore, because of their pivotal roles in wholesale electric power
markets in their regions, none of the RTOs/ISOs meet the last criterion
of the two-part RFA definition a small entity: ``not dominant in its
field of operation.'' As a result, we certify that this Final Rule
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \300\ The RFA definition of ``small entity'' refers to the
definition provided in the Small Business Act, which defines a
``small business concern'' as a business that is independently owned
and operated and that is not dominant in its field of operation. The
Small Business Administrations' regulations at 13 CFR 121.201 define
the threshold for a small Electric Bulk Power Transmission and
Control entity (NAICS code 221121) to be 500 employees. See 5 U.S.C.
601(3), citing to Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C.
632.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX. Document Availability

    149. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in
the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
    150. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
    151. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's
website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].

X. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    152. These regulations are effective July 9, 2018. The Commission
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 251 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. The Final Rule will be
provided to both Houses of Congress, the Government Accountability
Office, and the Small Business Administration.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35

    Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

    By the Commission.

    Issued: April 19, 2018.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.

Regulatory Text

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends part 35,
chapter I, title 18, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 35--FILING OF RATE SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS

0
1. The authority citation for part 35 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  16 U.S.C. 791a-825r, 2601-2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42
U.S.C. 7101-7352.

0
2. Amend Sec.  35.28 by adding paragraph (g)(10) to read as follows:

Sec.  35.28   Non-discriminatory open access transmission tariff.

* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (10) Transparency--(i) Uplift reporting. Each Commission-approved
independent system operator or regional transmission organization must
post two reports, at minimum, regarding uplift on a publicly accessible
portion of its website. First, each Commission-approved independent
system operator or regional transmission organization must post uplift,
paid in dollars, and categorized by transmission zone, day, and uplift
category. Transmission zone shall be defined as the geographic area
that is used for the local allocation of charges. Transmission zones
with fewer than four resources may be aggregated with one or more
neighboring transmission zones, until each aggregated zone contains at
least four resources, and reported collectively. This report shall be
posted within 20 calendar days of the end of each month. Second, each
Commission-approved independent system operator or regional
transmission organization must post the resource name and the total
amount of uplift paid in dollars aggregated across the month to each
resource that received uplift payments within the calendar month. This
report shall be posted within 90 calendar days of the end of each
month.
    (ii) Reporting Operator-Initiated Commitments. Each Commission-
approved independent system operator or regional transmission
organization must post a report of each operator-initiated commitment
listing the size of the commitment, transmission zone, commitment
reason, and commitment start time on a publicly accessible portion of
its website within 30 calendar days of the end of each month.
Transmission zone shall be defined as a geographic area that is used
for the local allocation of charges. Commitment reasons shall include,
but are not limited to, system-wide capacity, constraint management,
and voltage support.
    (iii) Transmission constraint penalty factors. Each Commission-
approved independent system operator or regional transmission
organization must include, in its tariff, its transmission constraint
penalty factor values; the circumstances, if any, under which the
transmission constraint penalty factors can set locational marginal
prices; and the procedure, if any, for temporarily changing the
transmission constraint penalty factor values. Any procedure for
temporarily changing transmission constraint penalty factor values must
provide for notice of the change to market participants.

    Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.

Appendix--List of Short Names/Acronyms of Commenters

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Short name/acronym                       Commenter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPA/NRECA...........................  American Public Power Association
                                        and National Rural Electric
                                        Cooperative Association.
Appian Way...........................  Appian Way Energy Partners, LLC.
AWEA.................................  American Wind Energy Association.
Brookfield...........................  Brookfield Energy Marketing LP.
CAISO................................  California Independent System
                                        Operator Corporation.
CAISO Market Monitor.................  Department of Market Monitoring
                                        for the California Independent
                                        System Operator Corporation.
California SWP.......................  California Department of Water
                                        Resources State Water Project.
Calpine..............................  Calpine Energy Solutions, LLC.
Competitive Suppliers................  Electric Power Supply
                                        Association; PJM Power
                                        Providers; and Western Power
                                        Trading Forum.
Direct Energy........................  Direct Energy Business, LLC, on
                                        behalf of itself and its
                                        affiliate, Direct Energy
                                        Business Marketing, LLC.
Diversified Trading/eXion Energy.....  Diversified Trading Company, LLC
                                        and eXion Energy, Inc.
EDF..................................  EDF Renewable Energy, Inc.

EEI..................................  Edison Electric Institute.
ELCON................................  Electricity Consumers Resource
                                        Council.
Exelon...............................  Exelon Corporation.
Financial Marketers Coalition........  Financial Marketers Coalition.
Golden Spread........................  Golden Spread Electric
                                        Cooperative, Inc.
ISO-NE...............................  ISO New England, Inc.
IRC..................................  ISO/RTO Council.
Joint Marketers......................  DC Energy, LLC; Mercuria Energy
                                        Trading, Inc.; and Perdisco
                                        Trading, LLC.
MISO.................................  Midcontinent Independent System
                                        Operator, Inc.
MISO Transmission Owners.............  Ameren Services Company, as agent
                                        for Union Electric Company d/b/a
                                        Ameren Missouri, Ameren Illinois
                                        Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois
                                        and Ameren Transmission Company
                                        of Illinois; Big Rivers Electric
                                        Corporation; Central Minnesota
                                        Municipal Power Agency; City
                                        Water, Light & Power
                                        (Springfield, IL); Cleco Power
                                        LLC; Cooperative Energy;
                                        Dairyland Power Cooperative;
                                        Duke Energy Business Services,
                                        LLC for Duke Energy Indiana,
                                        LLC; East Texas Electric
                                        Cooperative; Entergy Arkansas,
                                        Inc.; Entergy Louisiana, LLC;
                                        Entergy Mississippi, Inc.;
                                        Entergy New Orleans, Inc.;
                                        Entergy Texas, Inc.; Great River
                                        Energy; Hoosier Energy Rural
                                        Electric Cooperative, Inc.;
                                        Indiana Municipal Power Agency;
                                        Indianapolis Power & Light
                                        Company; MidAmerican Energy
                                        Company; Minnesota Power (and
                                        its subsidiary Superior Water,
                                        L&P); Missouri River Energy
                                        Services; Montana-Dakota
                                        Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana
                                        Public Service Company; Northern
                                        States Power Company, a
                                        Minnesota corporation, and
                                        Northern States Power Company, a
                                        Wisconsin corporation,
                                        subsidiaries of Xcel Energy
                                        Inc.; Northwestern Wisconsin
                                        Electric Company; Otter Tail
                                        Power Company; Prairie Power
                                        Inc.; Southern Illinois Power
                                        Cooperative; Southern Indiana
                                        Gas & Electric Company (d/b/a
                                        Vectren Energy Delivery of
                                        Indiana); Southern Minnesota
                                        Municipal Power Agency; Wabash
                                        Valley Power Association, Inc.;
                                        and Wolverine Power Supply
                                        Cooperative, Inc.
NCPA.................................  Northern California Power Agency.
NYISO................................  New York Independent System
                                        Operator, Inc.
PG&E.................................  Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
PJM..................................  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
PJM Market Monitor...................  Monitoring Analytics, LLC, acting
                                        in its capacity as the
                                        Independent Market Monitor for
                                        PJM.
Potomac Economics....................  Potomac Economics, Ltd.
R Street Institute...................  R Street Institute.
Six Cities...........................  Cities of Anaheim, Azusa,
                                        Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and
                                        Riverside, California.
SPP..................................  Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
SPP Market Monitor...................  Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Market
                                        Monitoring Unit.
TAPS.................................  Transmission Access Policy Study
                                        Group.
XO Energy............................  XO Energy, LLC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2018-08609 Filed 4-24-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register: March 12, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 48)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 11740-11744]
[DOCID:fr12mr10-5]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 180

[EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0127; FRL-8814-5]

S-Abscisic Acid, (S)-5-(1-hydroxy-2,6,6-trimethyl-4-oxo-1-
cyclohex-2-enyl)-3-methyl-penta-(2Z,4E)-dienoic Acid; Amendment to an
Exemption from the Requirement of a Tolerance

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This regulation amends the current temporary exemption from
the requirement of a tolerance for residues of the biochemical
pesticide S-Abscisic Acid, (S)-5-(1-hydroxy-2,6,6-trimethyl-4-oxo-1-
cyclohex-2-enyl)-3-methyl-penta-(2Z,4E)-dienoic Acid (ABA), to make it
a permanent exemption from the requirement of a tolerance for residues
of ABA in or on all food commodities when applied or used preharvest as
a plant regulator. Valent Biosciences Corporation submitted a petition
to EPA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA),
requesting that the Agency amend the existing temporary exemption from
the requirement of a tolerance. This regulation eliminates the need to
establish a maximum permissible level for residues of S-Abscisic Acid.

DATES: This regulation is effective March 12, 2010. Objections and
requests for hearings must be received on or before May 11, 2010, and
must be filed in accordance with the instructions provided in 40 CFR
part 178 (see also Unit I.C. of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION).

ADDRESSES: EPA has established a docket for this action under docket
identification (ID) number EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0127. All documents in the
docket are listed in the docket index available at http://
www.regulations.gov. Although listed in the index, some information is
not publicly available, e.g., Confidential Business Information (CBI)
or other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Certain
other material, such as copyrighted material, is not placed on the
Internet and will be publicly available only in hard copy form.
Publicly available docket materials are available in the electronic
docket at http://www.regulations.gov, or, if only available in hard
copy, at the OPP Regulatory Public Docket in Rm. S-4400, One Potomac
Yard (South Bldg.), 2777 S. Crystal Dr., Arlington, VA. The Docket
Facility is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday,
excluding legal holidays. The Docket Facility telephone number is (703)
305-5805.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chris Pfeifer, Biopesticides and
Pollution Prevention Division (7511P), Environmental Protection Agency,
1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20460-0001; telephone
number:<PHONE_NUMBER>; e-mail address<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. General Information

A. Does this Action Apply to Me?

    You may be potentially affected by this action if you are an
agricultural producer, food manufacturer, or pesticide manufacturer.
Potentially affected entities may include, but are not limited to:
     Crop production (NAICS code 111).
     Animal production (NAICS code 112).
     Food manufacturing (NAICS code 311).
     Pesticide manufacturing (NAICS code 32532).
    This listing is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather provides
a guide for readers regarding entities likely to be affected by this
action. Other types of entities not listed in this unit could also be
affected. The North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS)
codes have been provided to assist you and others in determining
whether this action might apply to certain entities. If you have any
questions regarding the applicability of this action to a particular
entity, consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT.

B. How Can I Get Electronic Access to Other Related Information?

    You may access a frequently updated electronic version of 40 CFR
part 180 through the Government Printing Office's e-CFR site at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/ecfr.

C. Can I File an Objection or Hearing Request?

    Under section 408(g) of FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. 346a(g), any person may
file an objection to any aspect of this regulation

and may also request a hearing on those objections. The EPA procedural
regulations which govern the submission of objections and requests for
hearings appear in 40 CFR part 178. You must file your objection or
request a hearing on this regulation in accordance with the
instructions provided in 40 CFR part 178. To ensure proper receipt by
EPA, you must identify docket ID number EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0127 in the
subject line on the first page of your submission. All objections and
requests for a hearing must be in writing, and must be received by the
Hearing Clerk on or before May 11, 2010. Addresses for mail and hand
delivery of objections and hearing requests are provided in 40 CFR
178.25(b).
    In addition to filing an objection or hearing request with the
Hearing Clerk as described in 40 CFR part 178, please submit a copy of
the filing that does not contain any CBI for inclusion in the public
docket that is described in ADDRESSES. Information not marked
confidential pursuant to 40 CFR part 2 may be disclosed publicly by EPA
without prior notice. Submit your copies, identified by docket ID
number EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0127, by one of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the on-line instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) Regulatory Public
Docket (7502P), Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania
Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20460-0001.
     Delivery: OPP Regulatory Public Docket (7502P),
Environmental Protection Agency, Rm. S-4400, One Potomac Yard (South
Bldg.), 2777 S. Crystal Dr., Arlington, VA. Deliveries are only
accepted during the Docket Facility's normal hours of operation (8:30
a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays).
Special arrangements should be made for deliveries of boxed
information. The Docket Facility telephone number is<PHONE_NUMBER>.

II. Background and Statutory Findings

    In the Federal Register of May 6, 2009 (74 FR 20946) (FRL-8411-2),
EPA issued a notice pursuant to section 408(d)(3) of FFDCA, 21 U.S.C.
346a(d)(3), announcing the filing of a pesticide tolerance petition (PP
8F7391) by Valent Biosciences Corporation, 870 Technology Way,
Libertyville, IL 60048. The petition requested that 40 CFR 180.1281 be
amended by establishing a permanent exemption from the requirement of a
tolerance for residues of S-Abscisic Acid, (S)-5-(1-hydroxy-2,6,6-
trimethyl-4-oxo-1-cyclohex-2-enyl)-3-methyl-penta-(2Z,4E)-dienoic Acid
(hereafter referred to as ABA). This notice stated that a summary of
the petition prepared by the petitioner Valent Biosciences Corporation
could be found in the docket for this action, which is available to the
public in the docket, http://www.regulations.gov. There were no
substantive comments received in response to the notice of filing.
Currently, there is a two-part temporary exemption from the requirement
of a tolerance for residues of ABA. ABA is exempt from the requirement
of a tolerance when used on grapes in accordance with Experimental Use
permit 73049-EUP-4, which expires on October 1, 2010; and ABA is exempt
when used on grapes, herbs and spices, leafy vegetables, pineapple,
pome fruit and stone fruit in accordance with Experimental Use permit
73049-EUP-7, which expires on August 7, 2012. Valent Biosciences
Corporation requested an amendment of this two-part temporary exemption
to a permanent exemption in or on all food commodities.
    Section 408(c)(2)(A)(i) of FFDCA allows EPA to establish an
exemption from the requirement for a tolerance (the legal limit for a
pesticide chemical residue in or on a food) only if EPA determines that
the exemption is ``safe.'' Section 408(c)(2)(A)(ii) of FFDCA defines
``safe'' to mean that ``there is a reasonable certainty that no harm
will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue,
including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for
which there is reliable information.'' This includes exposure through
drinking water and in residential settings, but does not include
occupational exposure. Pursuant to section 408(c)(2)(B) of FFDCA, in
establishing or maintaining in effect an exemption from the requirement
of a tolerance, EPA must take into account the factors set forth in
section 408(b)(2)(C) of FFDCA, which require EPA to give special
consideration to exposure of infants and children to the pesticide
chemical residue in establishing a tolerance and to ``ensure that there
is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result to infants and
children from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue. . .
.'' Additionally, section 408(b)(2)(D) of FFDCA requires that the
Agency consider ``available information concerning the cumulative
effects of a particular pesticide's residues'' and ``other substances
that have a common mechanism of toxicity.''
    EPA performs a number of analyses to determine the risks from
aggregate exposure to pesticide residues. First, EPA determines the
toxicity of pesticides. Second, EPA examines exposure to the pesticide
through food, drinking water, and through other exposures that occur as
a result of pesticide use in residential settings.

III. Toxicological Profile

    Consistent with section 408(b)(2)(D) of FFDCA, EPA has reviewed the
available scientific data and other relevant information in support of
this action and considered its validity, completeness, and reliability
and the relationship of this information to human risk. EPA has also
considered available information concerning the variability of the
sensitivities of major identifiable subgroups of consumers, including
infants and children.
    ABA is a plant regulator present in all vascular plants, algae, and
some fungi. Its name derives from its purported role in abscission--the
shedding of leaves, fruits, flowers, and seeds. As a plant hormone, ABA
is known to be a strong actor in regulating plant growth by aiding in
stress resistance, fruit set, ripening, and senescence. It is naturally
present in fruits and vegetables at various levels, generally not in
excess of 10 parts per million (ppm), and has always been a component
of any diet containing plant materials. To date, no toxic effects to
humans have been associated with the consumption of ABA in fruits and
vegetables.
    Summaries of the toxicological data submitted in support of this
exemption from the requirement of a tolerance follows:
    1. Acute toxicity. Acute toxicity studies, submitted to support the
registration of the end-use product containing ABA, confirm a low
toxicity profile and buttress the finding that this active ingredient
poses no significant human health risk with regard to new food uses.
Altogether, the acute toxicity data show virtual nontoxicity for all
routes of exposure and suggest that any dietary risks associated with
this naturally occurring plant regulator would be negligible.
    i. The acute oral median lethal dose (LD50) in rats was
greater than 5,000 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) and confirmed
negligible toxicity through the oral route. There were no observed
toxicological effects on the test subjects in the acute oral study
submitted (Master Record Identification Number MRID No. 46895611). ABA
is Toxicity Category IV for acute oral toxicity.
    ii. The acute dermal LD50 in rats was greater than 5,000
mg/kg. These data substantiated ABA's relative dermal nontoxicity to
the general public (MRID

No. 46895612). ABA is Toxicity Category IV for acute dermal toxicity.
    iii. The acute inhalation median lethal concentration
(LC50) was greater than 2.06 milligrams per liter (mg/L) in
rats and showed no significant inhalation toxicity (MRID No. 46895613).
ABA is Toxicity Category IV for acute inhalation toxicity.
    iv. A skin irritation study on rabbits indicated that ABA was not
irritating to the skin (MRID No. 46895615). ABA is Toxicity Category IV
for dermal irritation.
    v. Data indicated ABA is not a dermal sensitizer (MRID No.
46895616). Data indicate that ABA is not acutely toxic. No toxic
endpoints were established, and no significant toxicological effects
were observed in any of the acute toxicity studies.
    2. Mutagenicity. Three mutagenicity studies, using ABA as the test
substance, were performed. These studies are sufficient to confirm that
there are no expected dietary or non-occupational risks of mutagenicity
with regard to new food uses.
    i. The Reverse Mutation Assay (MRID No. 47030901) showed that ABA
did not induce mutant colonies relative to control groups.
    ii. The In vitro Mammalian Cells in Culture Assay (MRID No.
47005302) demonstrated that ABA did not damage chromosomes or the
mitotic apparatus of hamster ovary cells.
    iii. A Bone Marrow Micronucleus Assay (MRID No. 47005301) indicated
no mutagenicity in the bone marrow cells of mice up to the limit dose
of 2,000 mg/kg.
    3. Subchronic toxicity. Based on its biodegradation properties,
residues of ABA are not expected to result in significant dietary
exposure beyond the levels expected in background dietary exposures.
Nonetheless, two subchronic oral toxicity studies satisfied the data
requirements for subchronic toxicity and indicated that ABA has no
subchronic toxicological effect.
    i. A 28-day Oral Toxicity Study (MRID No. 47470509) found no
toxicological effects regarding mortality, clinical observations,
neurotoxicity assessment, body weight, food consumption, hematology,
clinical chemistry, organ weights, and macroscopic or microscopic
observations. The no observable adverse effect level (NOAEL) was
determined to be 20,000 milligrams per kilogram per day (mg/kg/day).
    ii. A 90-day Oral Toxicity Study (MRID No. 47470510) found no
statistical difference in hematology, clinical chemistry, or urinalysis
between test subjects and the control. The NOAEL was determined to be
20,000 mg/kg/day.
    4. Developmental toxicity. The data submitted to the Agency (MRID
No. 47470511) demonstrate a clear lack of developmental toxicity and
support the Agency's conclusion that there is no risk of developmental
toxicity associated with new food uses. Data submitted to the Agency
satisfy the data requirements for developmental toxicity and indicate
that ABA poses negligible risk with regard to developmental toxicity.
    A Prenatal Developmental Toxicity Study (MRID No. 47470512) found
no significant treatment-related reproductive effects or fetal
abnormalities and established a NOAEL of 1,000 mg/kg/day.
    5. Effects on endocrine systems. There is no available evidence
demonstrating that ABA is an endocrine disruptor in humans. As a
result, the Agency is not requiring information on the endocrine
effects of ABA at this time. However, the Endocrine Disruption
Screening Program (EDSP) has established a protocol, which guides the
Agency in selecting suspect ingredients for review, and the Agency
reserves the right to require new information should the program
require it. Presently, based on the lack of exposure and the negligible
toxicity profile of ABA, no adverse effects to the endocrine are known
or expected. Overall, the lack of evidence of endocrine disruption is
consistent with ABA's low toxicity profile and supports this exemption
from the requirement of a tolerance.

IV. Aggregate Exposures

    In examining aggregate exposure, section 408 of FFDCA directs EPA
to consider available information concerning exposures from the
pesticide residue in food and all other non-occupational exposures,
including drinking water from ground water or surface water and
exposure through pesticide use in gardens, lawns, or buildings
(residential and other indoor uses).

A. Dietary Exposure

    ABA is a plant regulator present in all vascular plants, algae, and
some fungi. It is naturally present in fruits and vegetables at various
levels, generally not in excess of 10 ppm, and has always been a
component of any diet containing plant materials. Because of the rapid
degradation of ABA, the proposed preharvest uses of this active
ingredient are not expected to result in dietary residues in or on food
above the natural background levels. Even in a worst-case scenario,
exposure to ABA residues would not be expected to exceed exposures
expected in a vegetarian diet.
    1. Food. Residues of ABA applied to food crops are expected to
dissipate to background levels before they are distributed for
consumption. Data submitted by the registrant confirm ABA's rapid
dissipation through metabolization, photo-isomerization, and
degradation (MRID No. 47131404). Data demonstrate that ABA residues on
grape leaves are 95% degraded within 24 hours of application. Moreover,
confirmatory data on the degradation of ABA on wheat leaves show a
half-life ranging between 5 and 8 hours. Given ABA's preharvest
application and rapid degradation, no significant residues are
expected. Even in the unlikely event of dietary exposure to ABA
residues, it is noted that ABA is naturally present in fruits and
vegetables at various levels up to 10 ppm and has always been a
component of any diet containing plant materials. No toxicological
hazard has historically been associated with its consumption. In sum,
while little to no dietary exposure from use of ABA as a pesticide is
expected, dietary exposures would not be expected to pose any
quantifiable risk, due to ABA's nontoxic profile as described in Unit
III.
    2. Drinking water exposure. Applications of ABA are made directly
to terrestrial crops. Accordingly, no aquatic exposures are expected.
While ABA residues might runoff after application, they are not
expected to be able to reach surface water or to percolate through the
soil to ground water because of the rapid biodegradation of ABA and the
rapid metabolization of ABA by soil microbes (MRID No. 47131404).
Modeling of estimated environmental concentrations (EECs) in water
indicate that maximum residues in water resulting from an incidental
offsite movement of ABA would not exceed the low parts per billion
level - an amount that is indistinguishable from the natural level of
ABA already found in our water. (Notably, the highest potential EECs in
water are many orders of magnitude below the amounts that would be
commonly found in a typical serving of fruit and vegetables.) In sum,
the Agency concludes that any residues resulting from the application
of ABA to crops are not expected to result in any significant drinking
water exposure and that any incidental residues resulting from a drift
or run-off event would be so negligible that they would not pose any
quantifiable risk.

B. Other Non-Occupational Exposure

    Non-occupational exposure is not expected because ABA is not
approved for residential uses. The active ingredient is applied
directly to food commodities and degrades rapidly. Furthermore, the
Agency notes that health risks are not expected from any pesticidal
exposure to this active ingredient, no matter the circumstances. A
December 2009 Agency risk assessment of ABA clearly establishes that
even prolonged and regular occupational exposures, which are associated
with this active ingredient, pose negligible risks. In the event of
incidental non-occupational exposure, no risks are expected due to
ABA's low toxicity profile, nontoxic mode of action, and demonstrable
lack of dietary effects.
    1. Dermal exposure. Non-occupational dermal exposures to ABA are
expected to be negligible because of its directed agricultural use. In
the event of dermal exposure to residues, the nontoxic profile of ABA
(as described in Unit III.) is not expected to result in any risks
through this route of exposure.
    2. Inhalation exposure. Non-occupational inhalation exposures are
not expected to result from the agricultural uses of ABA. Any
inhalation exposure associated with this new agricultural use pattern
is expected to be occupational in nature.

V. Cumulative Effects from Substances with a Common Mechanism of
Toxicity

    Section 408(b)(2)(D)(v) of FFDCA requires that, when considering
whether to establish, modify, or revoke a tolerance, the Agency
consider ``available information'' concerning the cumulative effects of
a particular pesticide's residues and ``other substances that have a
common mechanism of toxicity.''
    EPA has not found S-Abscisic Acid to share a common mechanism of
toxicity with any other substances, and S-Abscisic Acid does not appear
to produce a toxic metabolite produced by other substances. For the
purposes of this tolerance action, therefore, EPA has assumed that S-
Abscisic Acid does not have a common mechanism of toxicity with other
substances. For information regarding EPA's efforts to determine which
chemicals have a common mechanism of toxicity and to evaluate the
cumulative effects of such chemicals, see EPA's website at http://
www.epa.gov/pesticides/cumulative.

VI. Determination of Safety for U.S. Population, Infants and Children

    Health risks to humans, including infants and children, are
considered negligible with regard to the pesticidal use of ABA. As
illustrated in Unit III., acute toxicity studies indicate that ABA has
negligible toxicity. Furthermore, it is ubiquitous in nature and
present in all fruits and vegetables. To date, there is no history of
toxicological incident involving its consumption. Of equal note, little
to no exposure to the residues of ABA is expected. Pesticidal
applications are applied directly to agricultural crops, and data
suggest that significant residues are not expected beyond the time of
harvest. Accordingly, little to no dietary exposure is expected. As
such, the Agency has determined that this food use of ABA poses no
foreseeable risks to human health or the environment. Thus, there is a
reasonable certainty of no harm to the general U.S. population,
including infants and children, from exposure to this active
ingredient.
    1. U.S. population. The Agency has determined that there is a
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure
to residues of ABA to the U.S. population. This includes all
anticipated dietary exposures and other non-occupational exposures for
which there is reliable information. The Agency arrived at this
conclusion based on the low levels of mammalian dietary toxicity
associated with ABA, the natural ubiquity of ABA in foodstuffs, and
information suggesting that the pesticidal use of ABA will not result
in any significant exposure. For these reasons, the Agency has
determined that ABA residues in and on all food commodities will be
safe, and that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result
from aggregate exposure to residues of ABA.
    2. Infants and children. Section 408(b)(2)(C) of FFDCA provides
that EPA shall assess the available information about consumption
patterns among infants and children, special susceptibility of infants
and children to pesticide chemical residues, and the cumulative effects
on infants and children of the residues and other substances with a
common mechanism of toxicity. In addition, section 408(b)(2)(C) of
FFDCA provides that EPA shall apply an additional tenfold margin of
exposure (safety) for infants and children in the case of threshold
effects to account for prenatal and postnatal toxicity and the
completeness of the database unless the EPA determines that a different
margin of exposure (safety) will be safe for infants and children.
Margins of exposure (safety), which are often referred to as
uncertainty factors, are incorporated into EPA risk assessments either
directly or through the use of a margin of exposure analysis, or by
using uncertainty (safety) factors in calculating a dose level that
poses no appreciable risk. Based on all the information evaluated for
ABA, the Agency concludes that there are no threshold effects of
concern and, as a result, the provision requiring an additional margin
of safety does not apply. Further, the considerations of consumption
patterns, special susceptibility, and cumulative effects do not apply
to pesticides, such as ABA, without a demonstrated significant adverse
effect.

VII. Other Considerations

A. Analytical Enforcement Methodology

    Through this action, the Agency proposes an exemption from the
requirement of a tolerance of ABA when used on all food commodities
without any numerical limitations for residues. EPA has determined that
residues resulting from the pesticidal uses of ABA would be so low as
to be virtually indistinguishable from natural background levels. As a
result, the Agency has concluded that an analytical method is not
required for enforcement purposes for ABA.

B. International Residue Limits

    There are no codex maximum residue levels established for residues
of ABA.

VIII. Conclusions

    Based on the data submitted to support this tolerance exemption,
and other information available to the Agency, EPA is amending the
current temporary exemption from the tolerance requirements, pursuant
to section 408(c) of FFDCA, to be a permanent exemption from the
requirement for a tolerance for residues of ABA in or on all food
commodities when applied pre-harvest as a plant regulator.

 IX. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

    This final rule establishes a tolerance under section 408(d) of
FFDCA in response to a petition submitted to the Agency. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) has exempted these types of actions from
review under Executive Order 12866, entitled Regulatory Planning and
Review (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993). Because this final rule has been
exempted from review under Executive Order 12866, this final rule is
not subject to Executive Order 13211, entitled Actions Concerning
Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or
Use (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001) or Executive Order 13045, entitled
Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety

Risks (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997). This final rule does not contain
any information collections subject to OMB approval under the Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., nor does it require any
special considerations under Executive Order 12898, entitled Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994).
    Since tolerances and exemptions that are established on the basis
of a petition under section 408(d) of FFDCA, such as the tolerance in
this final rule, do not require the issuance of a proposed rule, the
requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.) do not apply.
    This final rule directly regulates growers, food processors, food
handlers, and food retailers, not States or tribes, nor does this
action alter the relationships or distribution of power and
responsibilities established by Congress in the preemption provisions
of section 408(n)(4) of FFDCA. As such, the Agency has determined that
this action will not have a substantial direct effect on States or
tribal governments, on the relationship between the national government
and the States or tribal governments, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government or between
the Federal Government and Indian tribes. Thus, the Agency has
determined that Executive Order 13132, entitled Federalism (64 FR
43255, August 10, 1999) and Executive Order 13175, entitled
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments (65 FR
67249, November 9, 2000) do not apply to this final rule. In addition,
this final rule does not impose any enforceable duty or contain any
unfunded mandate as described under Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (Public Law 104-4).
    This action does not involve any technical standards that would
require Agency consideration of voluntary consensus standards pursuant
to section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Public Law 104-113, section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272
note).

X. Congressional Review Act

    The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., generally
provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating
the rule must submit a rule report to each House of the Congress and to
the Comptroller General of the United States. EPA will submit a report
containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate,
the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the
United States prior to publication of this final rule in the Federal
Register. This final rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5
U.S.C. 804(2).

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 180

    Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure,
Agricultural commodities, Pesticides and pests, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

    Dated: February 25, 2010.
Steven Bradbury,
Acting Director, Office of Pesticide Programs.

0
Therefore, 40 CFR chapter I is amended as follows:

PART 180--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 180 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 21 U.S.C. 321(q), 346a and 371.

0
2. In subpart D, revise Sec.  180.1281 to read as follows:

Sec.  180.1281  S-Abscisic Acid, (S)-5-(1-hydroxy-2,6,6-trimethyl-4-
oxo-1-cyclohex-2-enyl)-3-methyl-penta-(2Z,4E)-dienoic Acid; exemption
from the requirement of a tolerance.

    An exemption from the requirement of a tolerance is established for
residues of S-Abscisic Acid in or on all food commodities when applied
or used preharvest as a plant regulator.

[FR Doc. 2010-5491 Filed 3-11-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-S


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 160 (Thursday, August 18, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Page 55189]
[FR Doc No: 2016-19750]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings #2

    Take notice that the Commission received the following electric
rate filings:
    Docket Numbers: ER16-2414-000.
    Applicants: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: Service Agreement Nos. 4511
and 4512, Queue Positions AB1-127 and AB1-128 to be effective 7/13/
2016.
    Filed Date: 8/12/16.
    Accession Number: 20160812-5145.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/2/16.

    Docket Numbers: ER16-2415-000.
    Applicants: ISO New England Inc.
    Description: ISO New England Inc. submits Second Quarter 2016
Capital Budget Report.
    Filed Date: 8/12/16.
    Accession Number: 20160812-5153.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/2/16.

    Docket Numbers: ER16-2416-000.
    Applicants: Central Maine Power Company.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: Amended CSIA with Brookfield
White Pine Hydro LLC to be effective 8/1/2016.
    Filed Date: 8/12/16.
    Accession Number: 20160812-5160.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/2/16.

    Docket Numbers: ER16-2417-000.
    Applicants: Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.
    Description: Compliance filing: 2016-08-12_Removal of MVP Pricing
Limitation to PJM (ER10-1791) to be effective 7/13/2016.
    Filed Date: 8/12/16.
    Accession Number: 20160812-5197.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/2/16.

    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system by
clicking on the links or querying the docket number.
    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the
proceeding.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call<PHONE_NUMBER>
(toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: August 12, 2016.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-19750 Filed 8-17-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P