[Federal Register: March 31, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 62)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 16815-16822]
[DOCID:fr31mr08-35]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

46 CFR Parts 26 and 28

[Docket No. USCG-2003-16158]
RIN 1625-AA77

Commercial Fishing Industry Vessels

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is developing a set of proposed amendments to
its commercial fishing industry vessel regulations. The proposed
changes would enhance maritime safety by adding new requirements for
vessel stability and watertight integrity, stability training and
assessments, vessel maintenance and self-examinations, immersion suits,
crew preparedness, safety training, emergency preparation, safety and
training personnel, safety equipment, and documentation. Miscellaneous
conforming, clarifying, and other administrative changes are also
contemplated.

DATES: Comments and related material must reach the Docket Management
Facility on or before July 29, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by Coast Guard docket
number USCG-2003-16158 to the Docket Management Facility at the U.S.
Department of Transportation. To avoid duplication, please use only one
of the following methods:
    (1) Online: http://www.regulations.gov.
    (2) Mail: Docket Management Facility (M-30), U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    (3) Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (4) Hand delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground Floor of the West
Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, 20590, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The
telephone number is<PHONE_NUMBER>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this proposed
rule, call M.M. Rosecrans, Chief, Fishing Vessel Safety Division (CG-
5433), U.S. Coast Guard, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, or e-mail
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>If you have questions on viewing or
submitting material to the docket, call Ms. Renee V. Wright, Program
Manager, Docket Operations, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Public Participation and Request for Comments

    We encourage you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting
comments and related materials. All comments received will be posted
without change to http://www.regulations.gov and will include any
personal information you have provided. We have an agreement with the
Department of Transportation (DOT) to use the Docket Management
Facility. Please see DOT's ``Privacy Act'' paragraph below.
    We are interested in the potential impacts from this proposed rule
on small businesses and we request public comment on these potential
impacts. If you think that this proposed rule would have a significant
economic impact on you, your business, or your organization, please
submit a comment to the Docket Management Facility at the address under
ADDRESSES. In your comment, explain why, how, and to what degree you
think this rule would have an economic impact on you.

A. Submitting Comments

    If you submit a comment, please include your name and address,
identify the docket number for this rulemaking (USCG-2003-16158),
indicate the specific section of this document to which each comment
applies, and give the reason for each comment. You may submit your
comments and material by electronic means, mail, fax, or delivery to
the Docket Management Facility at the address under ADDRESSES; but
please submit your comments and material by only one means. If you
submit them by mail or delivery, submit them in an unbound format, no
larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches, suitable for copying and electronic
filing. If you submit them by mail and would like to know that they
reached the Facility, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard
or envelope. We will consider all comments and material received during
the comment period. We may change this proposed rule in view of them.

B. Viewing Comments and Documents

    To view comments, as well as documents mentioned in this preamble
as being available in the docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov at
any time, click on ``Search for Dockets,'' and enter the docket number
for this rulemaking (USCG-2003-16158) in the Docket ID box, and click
enter. You may also visit the Docket Management Facility in room W12-
140 on the Ground Floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue,
SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

C. Privacy Act

    Anyone can search the electronic form of all comments received into
any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment
(or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may review the Department of
Transportation's Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477), or you may visit http://
DocketsInfo.dot.gov.

D. Public Meeting

    The Coast Guard anticipates wide interest in this rulemaking and is
considering how best to obtain early spoken comments from the public.
If we determine a cost-effective way to receive spoken comments from
all segments of the commercial fishing vessel industry and from the
general public, we will announce it in a subsequent Federal Register
notice.

II. Acronym Table

------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Acronym                                Text
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CFIVSAC........................  Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel
                                  Safety Advisory Committee.
CFR............................  Code of Federal Regulations.
CPR............................  Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation.
DOT............................  Department of Transportation.
EPIRB..........................  Emergency Position Indicating Radio
                                  Beacon.
F/V............................  Fishing Vessel.
FRP............................  Fiberglass-reinforced Plastic.
IMO............................  International Maritime Organization.
NPRM...........................  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
SNPRM..........................  Supplemental Notice of Proposed
                                  Rulemaking.
U.S.C..........................  United States Code.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Note on the Regulatory Framework Affecting Commercial Fishing
Industry Vessels

    In the discussions that follow, we sometimes distinguish between
documented and undocumented vessels. Under 46 U.S.C. chapter 121, a
vessel of at least five net tons must meet the ownership tests and
other criteria needed to obtain a certificate of documentation (Form
CG-1270) with a fishery endorsement, before it can be employed in
processing, storing, transporting (except in foreign commerce),
planting, cultivating, catching, taking, or harvesting fish, shellfish,
marine animals, pearls, shells, or marine vegetation in the navigable
waters of the United States or its Exclusive Economic Zone. For Coast
Guard regulations affecting the

documentation of fishing industry vessels, see 46 CFR part 67. Fishing
industry vessels 100 feet or greater in length are also subject to
Maritime Administration requirements found in 46 CFR part 356.

IV. Background and Purpose

    Commercial fishing remains one of the most hazardous occupations in
the United States. Congress addressed this problem by enacting the
Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (``the 1988
Act,'' Pub. L. 100-424, as subsequently amended; see generally, 46
U.S.C. chapter 45, ``Uninspected Commercial Fishing Industry
Vessels''). The Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to provide
safety requirements for fishing vessels, fish processing vessels, and
fish tender vessels. It also established the Commercial Fishing
Industry Vessel Safety Advisory Committee (CFIVSAC) to advise the
Secretary on matters relating to the safe operation of commercial
fishing vessels.
    Coast Guard regulations under the 1988 Act were first issued on
August 14, 1991 (56 FR 40364), and were further addressed in the
following documents:
     August 3, 1992, interim rule (57 FR 34188) that amended
the 1991 immersion suit requirements in 46 CFR 28.110, but advised the
public that immersion suits would be the subject of further rulemaking;
     October 27, 1992, SNPRM (57 FR 48670) that proposed the
adoption of stability regulations for vessels less than 79 feet in
length;
     May 20, 1993, NPRM (58 FR 29502) that proposed further
changes to immersion suit requirements;
     October 24, 1995, final rule (60 FR 54441) that adopted
regulations for Aleutian Trade Act vessels;
     November 5, 1996, interim rule (61 FR 57268) that adopted
safety equipment and vessel operating procedure regulations and
deferred further action on the 1992 SNPRM's proposal to extend
stability regulations to smaller vessels;
     September 4, 1997, final rule (62 FR 46672) that finalized
the 1996 regulations with some changes; and
     July 15, 1998, notice (63 FR 38141) that announced the
termination of the 1993 NPRM and the Coast Guard's plans for a
subsequent rulemaking to address immersion suits, vessel stability, and
other commercial fishing industry vessel issues.
    These documents, as well as other background documents, are
available in the docket. Each document may be downloaded.
    In addition to past Federal Register notices, two recent studies
indicated the need for further regulatory action. The first was the
report of the Fishing Vessel Casualty Task Force appointed by the Coast
Guard in 1999, following the loss of 11 commercial fishermen's lives in
just three weeks. The Task Force report, ``Living to Fish, Dying to
Fish'' (March 1999, see the docket), concluded that Coast Guard
regulations issued under the 1988 Act had improved fishing vessel
safety, but also identified several areas where further action is
necessary. The Task Force recognized that some actions would be
difficult to achieve; for instance, they concluded that an inspection
program aimed at eliminating or reducing unsafe conditions would have
the greatest beneficial impact on safety, but would be the most
difficult measure to implement.
    The second study was compiled by the Coast Guard and is titled
``Analysis of Fishing Vessel Casualties--A Review of Lost Fishing
Vessels and Crew Fatalities, 1994-2004'' (``the 1994-2004 analysis'').
This document is also available in the docket. Based upon the analysis,
we concluded that flooding and capsizing are major causes of vessel
loss and that casualties could be reduced by extending stability
regulations to vessels less than 79 feet in length, improving crew
preparedness, and by extending immersion suit requirements.
    The tables that follow show data for vessel losses, fatalities, and
cause of vessel losses from the 1994-2004 analysis. The data is
included to clarify discussions elsewhere in this preamble. The numbers
from these tables are used in the discussions that follow.

                         Table 1.--Vessel Losses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Year                                Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994..........................................................       153
1995..........................................................       117
1996..........................................................       166
1997..........................................................       138
1998..........................................................       125
1999..........................................................       123
2000..........................................................        85
2001..........................................................       133
2002..........................................................       127
2003..........................................................       114
2004..........................................................       117
                                                               ---------
    Total.....................................................      1398
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                     Table 2.--Cause of Vessel Loss
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Cause                               Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flooding......................................................       493
Fire..........................................................       282
Grounding.....................................................       236
Capsizing.....................................................       142
Collision.....................................................        55
Allision......................................................        52
Unknown.......................................................        42
Structural failure............................................        35
Loss of vessel control........................................        25
Weather.......................................................        18
Explosion.....................................................         9
Loss of electrical power......................................         5
Overloading...................................................         1
Other.........................................................         3
                                                               ---------
    Total.....................................................      1398
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                      Table 3.--Cause of Fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Casualty type                          Fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vessel flooding, sinking, capsizing........................          328
Fall into water............................................          154
Pulled overboard by gear...................................           29
Diving accident............................................           27
Dangerous atmosphere.......................................           18
Caught in winch............................................           16
Smoke inhalation--vessel fire..............................           10
Unknown injury type........................................           10
Crushed by gear............................................           10
Struck by line.............................................            7
Struck by moving object....................................            7
Drowned clearing propeller.................................            4
Caught in lines............................................            3
Vessel collision...........................................            3
Other......................................................           15
                                                            ------------
    Total..................................................          641
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The major cause of fatalities between 1994 and 2004 can be traced
to vessel losses. In the period reviewed, 1,398 vessels were lost and
there were 641 fatalities. Of the 641 fatalities, 328 can be attributed
to vessel losses (i.e., flooding, sinking, and capsizing).

A. Past Recommendations

    In addition to the two aforementioned studies, the Coast Guard
reviewed all recommendations previously made regarding commercial
fishing industry vessel safety. We examined recommendations from the
National Transportation Safety Board, Marine Boards of Investigation,
the Task Force report, and formal and informal marine casualty
investigations. We then collected similar recommendations and
determined the appropriate action to take for each group and individual
recommendation.
    Many recommendations addressed seeking authority to inspect
commercial fishing industry vessels and to license mariners on board
commercial fishing industry vessels to improve the condition of vessels
and the competency

of mariners. The 1988 Act required the CFIVSAC to submit
recommendations to Congress on inspection of vessels and licensing of
mariners in the commercial fishing industry. The CFIVSAC recommended
that Congress mandate vessel inspections and licensing of mariners. The
Coast Guard requested additional authority to reclassify commercial
fishing industry vessels as inspected vessels. This authority could
provide for design and construction standards, mandatory inspections,
and licensing of mariners on commercial fishing industry vessels
similar to current requirements for cargo, passenger, and tank vessels.
Congress has not granted the requested authority.
    Wherever regulatory development authority already exists, we have
analyzed each recommendation to determine the appropriate action. Some
of the recommendations needed no action as regulations or policies
already address the recommendation. Some recommendations form the basis
of the potential regulatory changes discussed here. In certain cases,
we would consider phasing in new requirements in order to reduce the
economic burden on industry. Other safety recommendations are either
inappropriate, overtaken by events, or otherwise untimely. The results
of this review, entitled ``Review of Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel
Safety Recommendations'', are available in the docket.
    In the following pages, we discuss the principal changes we are
considering. Many changes could include documentation requirements.
Documentation gives owners and operating personnel a written record of
regulatory compliance, reinforces the importance of that compliance,
and facilitates quick compliance verification by the Coast Guard and
other regulators.

V. Discussion of Regulatory Changes Under Consideration

A. Overview

    Table 4 shows an overview of the new requirements we are
considering, by vessel length. The potential new requirements are
explained in more detail later in this document.
    New stability and watertight integrity requirements, except for
training, would apply only to vessels 50 to 79 feet because of the
findings of the 1994-2004 analysis, the recommendations of the CFIVSAC,
and because existing regulations apply to most vessels over 79 feet in
length.

                                         Table 4.--Applicability of Potential New Requirements by Vessel Length
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      New requirement under
          consideration              All lengths    30' > L < = 40'  40' > L < = 50'  50' > L < = 60'  60' > L < = 70'  70' > L < = 80'      L > 80'
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Stability Test...........  ...............  ...............  ...............               X                X                X   ...............
Stability Review at Alteration...  ...............  ...............  ...............               X                X                X   ...............
Five-Year Periodic Stability       ...............  ...............  ...............               X                X                X                X
 Review..........................
Shipbuilding Requirements........  ...............  ...............  ...............               X                X                X   ...............
Stability Training...............  ...............               X                X                X                X                X                X
Immersion Suits..................               X                X                X                X                X                X                X
Safety Training, Emergency Drills  ...............               X                X                X                X                X                X
 and Documentation...............
EPIRB............................  ...............               X                X                X                X                X                X
Survival Craft Stowage...........  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............               X
Embarkation Station..............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............  ...............               X
High Water Alarms................  ...............               X                X                X                X                X                X
Door Notice......................               X                X                X                X                X                X                X
Departure Reports................  ...............  ...............  ...............               X                X                X                X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Vessel Stability and Watertight Integrity

    The major new requirements we are considering for vessel stability
and watertight integrity include:
     Stability requirements for vessels between 50 and 79 feet
in length and certain loadlined vessels that are currently exempt from
stability requirements;
     Stability training for masters and owners of vessels
greater than 30 feet in length;
     Minimum criteria for stability training and training
instructors;
     Repeating lightweight surveys (and in some circumstances,
inclining tests) and updating stability instructions at least once
every five years;
     Addition of new items to be addressed in stability
instructions;
     Revision of certain stability calculations;
     Upgrading and highlighting of weathertight and watertight
integrity requirements to prevent unintentional flooding;
     Emphasis on the owner's, as well as the master's,
responsibility for vessel stability; and
     Notification to the Coast Guard prior to substantial
vessel alteration or major conversion, recognizing that many stability
and watertight integrity improvements can be made economically only
during original construction or during a major modification.
1. General Discussion
    Stability is the capacity of a vessel to return to an upright
condition after being ``heeled'' or leaned over by external forces.
Watertight integrity refers to a vessel's ability to withstand a static
head of water without any leakage. Current Coast Guard regulations
require stability calculations to be made, and stability instructions
prepared, for newly constructed or substantially altered vessels of 79
feet or more in length. We are considering adding stability and
watertight integrity requirements for fishing vessels between 50 and 79
feet in length. Stability and watertight integrity standards have been
designed with 50- to 79-foot vessels in mind. Vessels of less than 50
feet in length might also benefit from such standards, but because
standards for those vessels have not yet been designed, we are
considering only 50-to 79-foot vessels at this time.
    The 1988 Act mandates regulations for the operating stability of
certain vessels. We originally proposed applying stability regulations
to vessels of any length, but comments on our 1991 rulemaking expressed
concern that the proposed standards drew upon International Maritime
Organization (IMO) stability standards developed for vessels of 79 feet
or more in length (``Torremolinos International Convention for the
Safety of Fishing Vessels'', 1977) that would be inappropriate for
smaller vessels. In light of those concerns, we set the 1991 rule's
threshold at 79 feet, but we indicated our intention to revisit
requirements for smaller vessels. In 1992, we proposed extending
stability regulations to smaller vessels, but as previously noted that
regulatory effort was deferred in 1996.

    The 1999 Task Force report called for developing stability
regulations for vessels greater than 50 feet in length (Recommendation
4.1). As previously mentioned, the 1994-2004 analysis identified
flooding, sinking, and capsizing as the leading causes of vessel loss.
Of the vessel losses, capsizing accounted for 142 vessel losses (10
percent of all vessel losses). Of the 328 fatalities, 115 can be
attributed to capsizing and sudden sinkings where individuals had
insufficient time to properly use survival equipment, including
immersion suits. These statistics explain why the Coast Guard continues
to be concerned with stability and watertight integrity issues within
the commercial fishing industry.
    In 1995, the CFIVSAC was asked to assist in developing stability
standards for commercial fishing industry vessels less than 79 feet in
length. In 1997, the CFIVSAC's stability subcommittee offered a set of
recommended standards that would apply to commercial fishing industry
vessels 50 feet or more in length. Those recommended standards are
contained in the docket and form the basis of the stability
requirements we are considering for vessels 50 to 79 feet in length.
    The Task Force report called for changes in how stability is
treated. Recommendations addressed developing instructions readily
understood by masters (Recommendation 4.3) and programmatic enforcement
of all requirements with a focus on dockside checks (Recommendation
3.2). In 1999, due to the high number of deaths in the Alaska/Bering
Sea crab fisheries, the Coast Guard and the Alaska Department of Fish
and Game began a program to analyze crab-vessel loading when stability
instructions are provided on board the vessel prior to departure.
Despite having stability information on board, overloading still
occurred in some instances. Factors contributing to this, as confirmed
in casualty investigations, are that the calculations often were not
understood by operating personnel and stability information was often
not updated after changes were made to the vessel, which invalidated
the instructions provided.
2. Stability Training
    Lack of situational awareness and understanding regarding stability
principles and watertight integrity have been shown to contribute to or
have been the primary reasons for a high percentage of vessel losses
from sinking, flooding, and sudden capsizing. Analysis of
recommendations made for improving commercial fishing industry vessel
safety from Coast Guard investigating officers, the Task Force report,
and other sources offer a number of recommendations for improving the
competency of vessel masters relating to stability. Training in these
principles may help prevent the cause of vessel losses. Therefore, we
are considering requiring stability training for vessels 30 feet or
more in length. We believe the 30-foot threshold covers all those
vessels that are likely to operate in conditions where such training
can be a critical safety factor.
    The CFIVSAC has previously recommended mandatory stability training
for masters of vessels. In July 2005, the CFIVSAC was asked to provide
specific recommendations on who must have stability training and the
composition of that training. The CFIVSAC recommended that the Coast
Guard require masters and owners to receive a three-tiered regimen of
stability instruction:
    1. General principles of stability;
    2. Risk factors specific to the region or fishery in which engaged;
and
    3. Vessel-specific training.
    The requirements we are considering would be consistent with these
recommendations.
    The Coast Guard is inclined to adopt the CFIVSAC recommendation to
require owners to receive training, since they provide operational
guidance to the master in many instances. It is also the owner's
responsibility to ensure the master is prepared for a voyage,
including, but not limited to, understanding: the stability and
watertight integrity risk factors; the stability instructions; and
loading constraints and restrictions for the vessel.
    The 1983 Marine Board of Investigation for the capsizing of the F/V
ALTAIR and F/V AMERICUS stated that:

    There is convincing evidence that commercial fishermen in
general lack an appreciation of principles of stability. This
investigation demonstrated that there was a critical failure to
utilize information (stability booklets) readily available for
determining safe loading.

    An example of lack of situational awareness regarding stability is
the sinking of the F/V NORTHERN EDGE. The F/V NORTHERN EDGE blocked its
freeing ports as a standard practice when dumping scallops on deck. In
an instant, the vessel took water on deck that could not run off
because of the blocked freeing ports. Water entered the vessel's
interior through an open weathertight door that led to progressive
flooding and sudden capsizing with the loss of five persons. Stability
training would be intended to raise the situational awareness of
masters, including the hazards presented by blocking freeing ports and
leaving doors that may permit downflooding to remain open when not used
for transit.
3. Stability Reassessment
    The basis of all stability calculations is an accurate weight and
location of the center of gravity in the lightweight condition. Any
time there is uncertainty regarding the lightweight values, a
reassessment of stability and/or a determination of the revised
lightweight values is necessary.
    A vessel in service for a period of time will experience weight
changes. Some changes are easily determined such as the addition or
removal of large equipment. In addition to weight changes that can be
accurately determined from manufacturer's information, unaccounted
weight changes occur. Unless carefully managed, weight changes tend to
degrade the stability of a vessel by increasing the vessel's
lightweight thereby decreasing the reserve buoyancy and raising the
center of gravity, which decreases overall stability. Unfortunately,
most vessels do not have a weight management system to account for the
many large and small changes that occur; therefore, as a vessel ages,
the margin of safety degenerates and a stability reassessment is
needed. A stability review at least once every five years could be a
reasonable interval for examining the vessel for the accumulated
changes, both known and unknown.
    We are considering requiring a lightweight survey to determine the
amount of change to a vessel's lightweight. If changes can be accounted
for accurately, the lightweight survey would be sufficient and the
stability instructions could be updated based on that survey.
Otherwise, an inclining test could be required to determine the
lightweight and location of the center of gravity.

C. Vessel Maintenance and Self-Examination

    We are considering requiring the owners of vessels that operate
beyond the boundary line, with more than 16 persons on board, or that
are fish-tender vessels in the Aleutian trade to conduct monthly self-
examinations of their vessels according to criteria that we would
provide. Masters would document these self-examinations.
    The 1994-2004 analysis revealed that the majority (69 percent) of
vessel losses can be attributed to hull and machinery failures.
Predominantly, the losses

occurred while the vessels were not engaged in fishing operations. The
most prevalent operation directly preceding a vessel loss (616) was
transiting during non-fishing activities. The next most prevalent
operation contributing to vessel loss was sinking while the vessel was
moored (163).
    The vessels experiencing the highest numbers of losses were wooden-
hull vessels (548), steel-hull vessels (277), and fiberglass-reinforced
plastic (FRP) hull vessels (261). Of the wooden-hull vessels lost, 265
(48 percent) were between 20 and 40 years old. For steel-hull vessels
lost, 185 (66 percent) were between 20 and 40 years old. For FRP-hull
vessels lost, 197 (75 percent) were in this age range.
    Hull and machinery failures leading to vessel loss accounted for 25
percent of the 328 fatalities attributed to vessel flooding, sinking,
or capsizing. Maintenance is an issue of major concern in reducing the
likelihood of vessel losses and consequent fatalities. Because vessel
loss is a major contributor to fatalities, reductions in vessel losses
should lead to fewer fatalities.
    The 1988 Act authorized the Coast Guard to develop regulations for
equipment, maintenance, and use of equipment to minimize the risk of
serious injury on documented fishing industry vessels that operate
beyond the boundary line, with more than 16 individuals on board, or
that are fish-tender vessels in the Aleutian trade. The 1988 Act also
requires regulations for operational stability, as mentioned elsewhere
in this document. In addition, the Coast Guard has developed
regulations for fire protection, fire extinguishing, firefighting
equipment, dewatering and bilge systems, fuel systems, and electrical
systems. Each of these areas has a critical maintenance component. For
instance, a watertight hull envelope, which is necessary for
operational stability, can be compromised by loose planking, corroded
or eroded hull plating, or wasted-through hull fittings, all of which
can lead to breaches of a vessel's watertight integrity and stability
degradation.
    As previously discussed, the Coast Guard lacks authority for
mandatory inspections of most commercial fishing industry vessels.
Nonetheless, periodic examinations of a vessel and its equipment by
personnel on board the vessel or other employees selected by the owner
may accomplish safety improvements by reducing the number of vessel
losses from machinery and hull failures.
    Self-examinations would be the responsibility of the owner and the
master. The owner would determine: (a) The level of detail for the
examination; (b) the testing required as part of the examination
process; and (c) the acceptance criteria for each item examined, if
none is otherwise specified by regulation. The master would be the
individual that either performs the examinations or supervises the
examination process and documents acceptable completion of the
examination. The master would be required to maintain a record of
examinations.
    Most vessel owners and masters are familiar enough with their
vessels that they are already effectively performing these periodic
examinations. For those owners and masters, these requirements would
have little impact. For owners and masters that do not follow good
marine practice and do not routinely check their vessel's condition,
these requirements would mean spending the time to systematically
examine the vessel and its equipment and document the examinations.
Given the high number of vessels lost to mechanical and hull failures,
improvements within vessel maintenance areas should reduce vessel
losses and fatalities. A more formal process and documentation of
examinations may lead to better maintenance.
    As vessels become larger and more complex, the ability of the
master to personally perform all examinations becomes increasingly
difficult. It is common for larger vessels to have licensed engineers
and mates on board to share the burden and responsibility with the
master for performing examinations or to have specialized vendors and
subcontractors perform some maintenance and examinations. These persons
would be able to continue those processes as before with the exception
of documenting their examinations.

D. Immersion Suits

    The immersion suit requirements in 46 CFR 28.110 were originally
issued in 1991. We amended the requirements in 1992 in response to
public objections.
    Documented commercial fishing industry vessels currently must carry
immersion suits whenever operating seaward of the boundary line and
beyond 32 degrees north or 32 degrees south latitude. Prior to the 1992
amendment, we also applied this requirement to documented vessels on
any of the Great Lakes.
    We are considering requiring vessels to carry immersion suits for
their crew members whenever they operate in seasonally-cold waters. We
would define ``seasonally cold'' much as we did in our 1993 NPRM.
    All vessels, whether documented or not, must carry immersion suits
while operating beyond-coastal cold waters; in Pacific coastal waters
north of Point Reyes, CA; and on Lake Superior. Prior to the 1992
amendment, we also applied this requirement to all vessels operating in
any cold-coastal waters or on any of the other Great Lakes. In issuing
the 1992 amendment, we stated our intention to undertake further
rulemaking under a recommendation of the CFIVSAC, which continued to
support the 1991 scope of the requirement.
    Our 1993 NPRM proposed extending immersion suit requirements to
coastal and beyond-coastal waters that, regardless of latitude, are so
cold at certain seasons that immersion suits can be important safety
equipment. As previously noted, we terminated this proposal in 1998,
with the intention of revisiting the immersion suit issue at a later
time.
    The 1994-2004 analysis of fishing vessel casualties identified
water exposure as ``by far the most significant factor in personnel
loss'' and pointed out that water exposure is involved in 80 percent of
all fatalities. Two hundred and thirty-four (71 percent) fatalities
from vessel losses occurred in west coast and northeastern waters that
tend to be colder and more severe than elsewhere in the country. At the
same time, Coast Guard data indicate ``fishermen survive nearly twice
as often when survival equipment is used.'' The survival rate is even
higher in the case of immersion suits: 61 percent for West Coast and
northeastern incident victims who used the suits, compared with 27
percent for those who did not. Based on data from cold waters, we
expect that requiring vessels to carry immersion suits if they are
operating in cold waters would likely reduce casualties.

E. Crew Preparedness

    We are considering the following crew preparedness requirements for
vessels that operate beyond the boundary line, with more than 16
persons on board, or that are fish-tender vessels in the Aleutian
trade:
     Recurring crew safety and survival training;
     Recurring drill requirements;
     Designation of a vessel safety officer;
     Presence of an on board drill conductor;
     Minimum training requirements for safety instructors,
drill conductors, and

other individuals who are required to have safety training; and
     Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and First Aid
retraining every three years.
1. Training and Drills
    The 1994-2004 analysis showed a marked increase in survivability
for those familiar with lifesaving equipment, especially personal
flotation devices. Of the 328 vessel-related fatalities due to sinking,
flooding, and capsizing, only 48 (15 percent) had properly used
personal flotation devices or immersion suits. Fatalities involving
vessels that operate beyond the boundary line, with more than 16
persons on board, or that are fish-tender vessels in the Aleutian trade
might be decreased by increasing the frequency with which realistic
drills, involving all crew members, cover the proper use of lifesaving
equipment.
    The Marine Board of Investigation report into the 2001 sinking of
the F/V ARCTIC ROSE, with the loss of 15 lives, recommended requiring
recurring safety and survival training.
    The need for this training is further demonstrated by the sinking
of the F/V GULF KING 15. On December 11, 1997, the F/V GULF KING 15
burned and sank in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 60
miles south of Freeport, Texas. The emergency position indicating radio
beacon (EPIRB) failed to transmit a distress signal. All three
crewmembers on board were able to abandon the vessel; however, they
were unable to properly deploy the liferaft. They managed to cling to
the uninflated liferaft for several hours. One of the crew drowned
after letting go of the raft and the vessel master drowned while being
rescued by another vessel. Had the EPIRB been operating properly, the
crew would have had a better chance of surviving the casualty. Liferaft
deployment and EPIRB operation are two of the topics that would be
covered in the safety training we are considering.
    A number of training organizations offer the type of training we
have in mind, but it is not widespread enough for most of the
commercial fishing industry. We think the initial investment for those
desiring to provide this training is low and that the facilities needed
for this training are generally available throughout the country.
    We are considering requiring emergency drills after any personnel
change involving persons to whom safety responsibilities are assigned.
Most crews are small and rely heavily on teamwork and a shared
understanding of responsibilities, equipment, and methodologies in an
emergency. Having only one individual with safety responsibilities
within a crew of eight or less can significantly affect the functioning
of the team, because team members are highly interdependent during an
emergency.
2. Vessel Safety Officer
    We are considering requiring vessels that operate beyond the
boundary line, with more than 16 persons on board, or that are fish-
tender vessels in the Aleutian trade, to have a designated safety
officer. The safety officer would report to the master, or if the
master is the designated safety officer, to the owner. The safety
officer would report on the condition or status of safety equipment,
emergency instruction, emergency drills, and safety orientations, among
other things. The purpose of having a designated safety officer is to
reinforce the importance of safety on board fishing industry vessels.
The larger the vessel, the more responsibility the master has. The
master has primary responsibility for safety on board, but his or her
many other responsibilities can detract from the master's focus on
safety.
    The designation of a safety officer would not relieve the master of
responsibility for the safety of the vessel and crew. The safety
officer could provide assistance to the master in safety
responsibilities and be a constant reminder that safety should never be
overlooked, forgotten, or subordinated to other vessel business.
3. On Board Drill Conductors
    For vessels that operate beyond the boundary line, with more than
16 persons on board, or that are fish-tender vessels in the Aleutian
trade, we are considering requiring an on board fishing vessel drill
conductor to conduct safety orientations. This requirement would
conform to recommendations of the Task Force report and the casualty
investigation on the sinking of the fish processing vessel GALAXY. Each
orientation would include survival equipment location and use, and any
potential hazards affecting the vessel such as deck machinery,
hazardous materials, or confined or unventilated spaces. Addressing
these potential hazards would increase the overall safety awareness of
the crewmembers in their work environment. The lessons initially
communicated through safety orientations would be reinforced through
monthly emergency drills.
    Current regulations permit safety instruction and emergency drills
to be conducted by any qualified person. A common practice is to have a
professional trainer conduct the safety instruction and drills prior to
the local fishing season; however, if a voyage lasts for an extended
period of time or port calls are unpredictable, there may not be a
professional trainer available for subsequent safety instruction and
emergency drills. This potentially leaves the crew with nobody on board
experienced in safety instruction and conducting emergency drills.
Since on board instruction and drills are the primary means for the
majority of those within the commercial fishing industry to become
prepared for emergencies, this matter is too important to leave to
chance.
    In the past, the master was often qualified as a fishing vessel
drill conductor, and this may remain the case. The master or a member
of the crew who is trained as a fishing vessel drill conductor would be
able to provide personal knowledge about the particulars, procedures,
and equipment of that vessel. A second fishing vessel drill conductor
would be required on board vessels with more than 16 individuals. This
would alleviate the burden on the master and help ensure everyone gets
trained in a timely manner. The Coast Guard does not believe more than
two fishing vessel drill conductors are necessary on any particular
vessel.
4. Requirements for Safety Instructors, Drill Conductors, and Other
Safety Personnel
    For vessels that operate beyond the boundary line, with more than
16 persons on board, or that are fish-tender vessels in the Aleutian
trade, we are considering requiring minimum standards for the safety
instructors, drill conductors, and for other personnel with specific
safety responsibilities.
    Fishing vessel safety instructors would need a valid Coast Guard
letter of acceptance, renewable after five years. The letter of
acceptance would verify that an instructor possesses necessary maritime
and instructional experience, and is able to offer an eight-hour
curriculum in various safety topics, using either a nationally
recognized curriculum or one that the instructor submits for Coast
Guard review.
    Drill conductors and other individuals with specific safety
responsibilities would need certification from a safety instructor
attesting that they have satisfactorily completed the training that the
safety instructor's letter of acceptance authorizes the safety
instructor to give. Like letters of acceptance, these certificates
would be valid for five years and could be

renewed after additional training. Fishing vessel drill conductors
would also need to show that they can effectively communicate with all
members of the crew despite any language barriers, either through
translation or hands-on demonstration.
5. CPR and First Aid Training
    We are considering expanding the existing requirements for CPR and
First Aid training on vessels that operate beyond the boundary line,
with more than 16 persons on board, or that are fish-tender vessels in
the Aleutian trade. Currently, depending on the size of a vessel's
crew, from one to four crew members must have certified training in CPR
and First Aid. We are considering requiring refresher training every
three years, per the recommendations and practice of the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, American National Red
Cross, and American Heart Association. Training in first aid and CPR is
readily available in most locations and is relatively inexpensive.

F. Safety Equipment

    We are considering new measures, relating to the following safety
equipment and affecting all commercial fishing industry vessels:
     Emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs);
     Survival craft;
     Embarkation stations;
     High water alarms; and
     Excess or outdated equipment.
1. EPIRBs
    Current regulations require all commercial fishing vessels
operating on the high seas or beyond three miles from the coastline of
the Great Lakes to be equipped with EPIRBs, which can alert the
worldwide search and rescue system and provide the exact location of a
vessel in distress or immersed in water. By existing regulation (47 CFR
80.1061(f)), EPIRBs are supposed to be registered with the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration but this requirement is
frequently overlooked, resulting in unregistered EPIRB activations and
risk to Coast Guard search and rescue personnel. We are considering
requiring that registration to be documented so that we can enforce the
existing registration requirement.
2. Survival Craft
    We are considering requiring all survival craft to be easily
accessible, and launchable by just one crew member. This conforms to a
recommendation of the GALAXY investigation. The means used to comply
with this requirement would be left up to the individual vessel, and,
for smaller devices, could include manual launching.
3. Embarkation Stations
    We are considering new measures to upgrade the safety and usability
of survival craft embarkation stations in the event the crew must
abandon ship. Embarkation stations would need to be equipped with
emergency lighting and boarding ladders, in conformity with a GALAXY
investigation recommendation. After a phase-in period, this requirement
would be extended to Aleutian Trade Act vessels.
4. High-Water Alarms
    In line with a recommendation from the ARCTIC ROSE investigation,
we are considering requiring the use of high-water alarms in enclosed
fish sorting or processing spaces. Sudden flooding in these spaces can
threaten a vessel's stability. By installing alarms that would sound
both in the affected space and in the vessel's operating station
regardless of the vessel's heel or trim, the crew would have more time
to restore watertight integrity or prepare for abandonment of the
vessel.
5. Excess or Outdated Equipment
    Safety equipment exceeding regulatory minimums would need to be
maintained and inspected like required equipment, or else clearly
labeled and segregated for ``training use'' only. Outdated equipment,
like expired distress flares, could be kept for training use, but also
would need to be clearly labeled and segregated for that purpose.

G. Documentation

    Compliance with most of the measures under consideration would be
facilitated by new documentation requirements. Vessel owners or masters
would need to document stability training and assessments, vessel self-
examinations, safety and survival training, and the use and maintenance
of immersion suits and other safety equipment. Before leaving on a
fishing trip, a vessel's master would need to file a departure report
with the owner, attesting to the vessel's stability condition.
Operating personnel would have a written record of compliance with the
requirements. Written documentation would provide owners not operating
as the vessel master with one means of ensuring that safety is not
overlooked, and it would give them a record of operating personnel's
activities. Written documentation of safety activities also allows the
Coast Guard and other regulatory enforcement agencies to more quickly
verify compliance with the safety requirements. This leads to more
thorough examinations and less time spent verifying compliance with
safety requirements. This is especially beneficial when compliance is
checked while vessels are engaged in fishing activities.
Questions
    Public response to the following questions will help the Coast
Guard develop a more complete and carefully considered rulemaking. The
questions are not all-inclusive, and any supplemental information is
welcome. In responding to each question, please explain the reasons for
each answer. We encourage you to let us know your specific concerns
with respect to each/any of the requirements under consideration.
    1. Given the statistics on vessel losses in Tables 2 and 3, what
issues related to stability and watertight integrity should the Coast
Guard consider addressing in regulations?
    2. Table 2 shows that vessel flooding results in the most vessel
losses, and Table 3 shows that flooding and sinking account for a
significant portion of fatalities. What areas should be addressed to
reduce vessel flooding losses and fatalities?
    3. What routine measures are used to prevent unintentional
flooding?
    4. How often is your vessel examined by a marine surveyor and under
what circumstances? Is documentation of the survey provided?
    5. Table 3 shows that fire is a significant cause of vessel losses.
What areas should the Coast Guard consider addressing to reduce the
number of fire-related vessel losses (including, but not limited to:
construction standards, detection and extinguishing equipment, fire
fighting equipment, and firefighting training)?
    6. What means are used to limit the danger of fires and the
consequence of fires?
    7. Table 2 shows that a significant number of vessel losses are
related to allisions, collisions, and groundings; how should the Coast
Guard address these causes of vessel losses?
    8. What impact has safety training had in improving safety within
the commercial fishing industry? Do you have recommendations concerning
safety training?
    9. What impact has crew drills had in improving safety within the
commercial fishing industry? Do you have recommendations concerning
crew drills?

    10. If training were required would it be accomplished during off-
season times?
    11. How would additional training impact one's ability to fish?
    12. If stability standards for vessels between 50 feet and 79 feet
in length are considered, what standards should apply, and to which
vessels should the standards apply?
    13. How does a crew become experienced in safety procedures?
    14. Should entry level crewmembers be expected to have a minimum
level of familiarity with safety procedures?
    15. How and when is stability guidance used? If stability guidance
is available but not used, please explain why.
    16. How are operating personnel made aware of stability and
watertight integrity guidance?
    17. How often should stability guidance be reviewed, updated, or
validated?
    18. How are modifications to a vessel or its gear accounted for
relative to the vessel's maximum load, watertight integrity, and other
stability considerations?
    19. How adequate are current requirements for personal protection
and survival equipment?
    20. How do crew members become familiar with vessel safety and
survival equipment?
    21. How are safety risks aboard your vessel(s) identified and
minimized?
    22. If you are a small business, what economic impact on you, your
business, or your organization would the rules we are considering have?
In your comments please explain why, how, and to what degree such rules
would have an economic impact.
    23. Have you experienced--or are you aware of--any situations where
any of the measures under consideration saved lives, or prevented/
reduced harm/damage to vessels?
    24. Are there areas not addressed that would benefit safety within
the commercial fishing industry?
    25. What are the costs of each requirement we are considering? Are
there comparable alternative solutions to each requirement under
consideration that may be more cost effective?
    26. What are the direct and indirect costs of each requirement we
are considering? For example, labor costs, training costs, and hourly
wages of fishermen (or alternative measures of valuing their time if
they are not salaried)? The costs of vessel losses, including
equipment, lost catches, and any other opportunity costs?
    27. Can any of the requirements we are considering be completed
off-season? If so, which ones? For those that cannot, how much time
would be taken away from productive fishing time to complete the
requirement? How would this affect revenue, i.e., fish catches?
    28. What would be the impact on the domestic fishing industry, if
any, of each requirement we are considering? Would there be a
differential impact by size of vessel or region?
    29. What would be the economic impact of each requirement we are
considering on States, local, and tribal governments?
    30. What other requirements, if any, should the Coast Guard be
considering?

    Dated: March 21, 2008.
Brian M. Salerno,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety,
Security and Stewardship.
[FR Doc. E8-6477 Filed 3-28-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-15-P


[Federal Register: June 11, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 111)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 27695-27698]
[DOCID:fr11jn09-8]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-1237; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-125-AD;
Amendment 39-15932; AD 2009-12-09]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; ATR Model ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-
320, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211,
ATR72-212, and ATR72-212A Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

* * * * *
    [C]hafed wirings were found in the rear baggage zone, closed
[close] to the forward side of the aft pressure bulkhead, due to
contact with an understructure securing screw. The concerned wiring
harness includes rudder trim, pitch trim and stick pusher control
wires. Damages on those wires might lead to the loss of fail safe
criteria for those critical functions.
* * * * *

    The unsafe condition is reduced controllability of the airplane. We
are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition
on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective July 16, 2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of July 16,
2009.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1137; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on November 26, 2008
(73 FR 71961). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for
the specified products. The MCAI states:

    One ATR operator reported some spurious ``Pitch disconnect''
warning and ``AIL and R ELEV'' Anti-Ice Horn Fault caution
annunciations which precluded the use of the autopilot.
    During the investigation, chafed wirings were found in the rear
baggage zone, closed [close] to the forward side of the aft pressure
bulkhead, due to contact with an understructure securing screw. The
concerned wiring harness includes rudder trim, pitch trim and stick
pusher control wires. Damages on those wires might lead to the loss
of fail safe criteria for those critical functions.
    To address the identified unsafe condition, this AD mandates a
one-time inspection and a routing modification of the electrical
wires in the bulkhead area.

The unsafe condition is reduced controllability of the airplane. The
corrective action also includes contacting ATR for repair instructions
and doing the repair if any damage (chafing or contact between bundles
of cables and the airframe structure) is found during the one-time
inspection. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in
the AD docket.

Explanation of Change to the NPRM

    We have revised paragraph (c) of the AD to coincide with the
effectivity of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD.

Explanation of Revised Service Information

    ATR has issued the service bulletins identified in the following
table.

                   Table--Revised Service Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ATR Service Bulletin--       Revision--            Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATR42-92-0015, including                  01  February 11, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR42-92-0018, including                  01  September 4, 2008.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR42-92-0018, including                  02  February 13, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR72-92-1016, including                  01  February 11, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.

ATR72-92-1018, including                  01  September 4, 2008.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR72-92-1018, including                  02  February 13, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

These service bulletins differ from the original issues of those
service bulletins, all dated February 11, 2008 (which were referenced
in the NPRM), by including clarifications and editorial changes that do
not affect the technical content. This AD does not require the
``Additional Work'' described in ATR Service Bulletins ATR42-92-0018
and ATR72-92-1018, both Revision 01, both dated September 4, 2008.
    We have changed paragraphs (f)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(3) of this AD to
refer to the most recent revisions of the service bulletins identified
in the previous table, and added paragraph (f)(4) of this AD to give
credit for actions done according to the prior issues identified in the
following table.

                  Table--Acceptable Service Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ATR Service Bulletin--        Revision--              Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATR42-92-0015...............  Original........  February 11, 2008.
ATR42-92-0018...............  Original........  February 11, 2008.
ATR42-92-0018...............  01..............  September 4, 2008.
ATR72-92-1016...............  Original........  February 11, 2008.
ATR72-92-1018...............  Original........  February 11, 2008.
ATR72-92-1018...............  01..............  September 4, 2008.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of
the cost to the public.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and
the public interest require adopting the AD with the changes described
previously. We determined these changes will not increase the economic
burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 48 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 5 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $131 per product.
Where the service information lists required parts costs that are
covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge
for these parts. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected
parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based
on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the U.S. operators
to be $25,488, or $531 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2009-12-09 ATR-GIE Avions De Transport R[eacute]gional (Formerly
Aerospatiale): Amendment 39-15932. Docket No. FAA-2008-1237;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-125-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective July 16,
2009.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to the airplanes identified in paragraphs
(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) of this AD, certificated in any category.
    (1) ATR Model ATR42-200, ATR42-300, and ATR42-320 airplanes, all
serial numbers, except serial numbers 1 through 107 inclusive, 110
through 112 inclusive, 114, and 115, and except airplanes on which
ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-92-0018 has been incorporated.
    (2) ATR Model ATR42-500 airplanes, all serial numbers, except
serial numbers 667 and subsequent, and except airplanes on which ATR
Service Bulletin ATR42-92-0018 has been incorporated.
    (3) ATR Model ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-
211, ATR72-212, and ATR72-212A airplanes, all serial numbers except
serial numbers 756 and subsequent, and except airplanes on which ATR
Service Bulletin ATR72-92-1018 has been incorporated.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 24:
Electrical power.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:

    ``One ATR operator reported some spurious ``Pitch disconnect''
warning and ``AIL and R ELEV'' Anti-Ice Horn Fault caution
annunciations which precluded the use of the autopilot.
    ``During the investigation, chafed wirings were found in the
rear baggage zone, closed [close] to the forward side of the aft
pressure bulkhead, due to contact with an understructure securing
screw. The concerned wiring harness includes rudder trim, pitch trim
and stick pusher control wires. Damages on those wires might lead to
the loss of fail safe criteria for those critical functions.
    ``To address the identified unsafe condition, this AD mandates a
one-time inspection and a routing modification of the electrical
wires in the bulkhead area.''

The unsafe condition is reduced controllability of the airplane. The
corrective action also includes contacting ATR for repair
instructions and doing the repair if any damage (chafing or contact
between bundles of cables and the airframe structure) is found
during the one-time inspection.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
    (1) Within 550 flight hours after the effective date of this AD,
perform a one-time detailed inspection for damage of the electrical
routing in the rear baggage zone, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-92-0015 or
ATR72-92-1016, both Revision 01, both dated February 11, 2009, as
applicable.
    (2) If any damage is found during the inspection required by
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the actions in paragraphs (f)(2)(i)
and (f)(2)(ii) of this AD.
    (i) Before further flight, contact ATR for repair instructions,
and do the repair.
    (ii) Before further flight, modify the electrical routing and
protective sleeve in the rear cargo compartment at frame 44 in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of ATR Service
Bulletin ATR42-92-0018 or ATR72-92-1018, both Revision 02, both
dated February 13, 2009, as applicable.
    (3) If no damage is found during the inspection required by
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD: Within 5,000 flight hours after the
effective date of this AD, modify the electrical routing and replace
the protective sleeve in the rear cargo compartment at frame 44 in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of ATR Service
Bulletin ATR42-92-0018 or ATR72-92-1018, both Revision 02, both
dated February 13, 2009, as applicable.
    (4) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the service bulletins listed in Table 1 of this AD
are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding requirements of
this AD.

                                     Table 1--Acceptable Service Information
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ATR Service Bulletin--                     Revision--                           Dated--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATR42-92-0015............................  Original......................  February 11, 2008.
ATR42-92-0018............................  Original......................  February 11, 2008.
ATR42-92-0018............................  01............................  September 4, 2008.
ATR72-92-1016............................  Original......................  February 11, 2008.
ATR72-92-1018............................  Original......................  February 11, 2008.
ATR72-92-1018............................  01............................  September 4, 2008.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note 1: This AD does not require the ``Additional Work''
described in ATR Service Bulletins ATR42-92-0018 and ATR72-92-1018,
both Revision 01, both dated September 4, 2008.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 2: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows:
    Although the MCAI or service information tells you to submit
information to the manufacturer, such submittal is not required by
this AD.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom
Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0062, dated April 1, 2008,

and the ATR service bulletins contained in Table 2 of this AD, for
related information.

                  Table 2--Related Service Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ATR Service Bulletin--       Revision--            Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATR42-92-0015, excluding                  01  February 11, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR42-92-0018, excluding                  02  February 13, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR72-92-1016, excluding                  01  February 11, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR72-92-1018, excluding                  02  February 13, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (i) You must use the service information contained in Table 3 of
this AD to do the actions required by this AD, as applicable, unless
the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact ATR-
GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional, 1, All[eacute]e Pierre
Nadot, 31712 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 (0) 5 62 21 62 21;
fax +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18; e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Internet http://www.aerochain.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER> or<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to: http://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.

               Table 3--Material Incorporated by Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ATR Service Bulletin--       Revision--            Dated--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATR42-92-0015, excluding                  01  February 11, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR42-92-0018, excluding                  02  February 13, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR72-92-1016, excluding                  01  February 11, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
ATR72-92-1018, excluding                  02  February 13, 2009.
 Accomplishment Report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 2, 2009.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-13405 Filed 6-10-09; 8:45 am]

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