[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 53 (Wednesday, March 18, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15526-15530]
[FR Doc No: 2020-05561]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-88376; File No. SR-NYSE-2020-17]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC;
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Amend its Rules To Add New
Rule 7.19

March 12, 2020.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby
given that, on March 10, 2020, New York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE'' or
the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I
and II below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
    \3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend its rules to add new Rule 7.19 (Pre-
Trade Risk Controls). The proposed rule change is available on the
Exchange's website at www.nyse.com, at the principal office of the
Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    In order to assist member organizations' efforts to manage their
risk, the Exchange proposes to amend its rules to add new Rule 7.19
(Pre-Trade Risk Controls) to establish a set of pre-trade risk controls
by which Entering Firms and their designated Clearing Firms (as defined
below) may set credit limits and other pre-trade risk controls for an
Entering Firm's trading on the Exchange and authorize the Exchange to
take action if those credit limits or other pre-trade risk controls are
exceeded.\4\
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    \4\ The Exchange initially filed a proposed rule change to add
new Rule 7.19 relating to pre-trade risk controls on November 27,
2019. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87715 (December 11,
2019), FR (date) (Notice of Filing) (SR-NYSE-2019-68) (``Original
Filing''). The Exchange withdrew the Original Filing and is filing
this proposed rule change as its replacement. This filing is
substantially the same as the Original Filing and proposes the same
functionality. It differs because it includes proposed Commentary
.02 through .04, which provides additional detail specific to Floor
brokers and Designated Market Makers, and makes minor, clarifying
changes to the proposed rule text as compared to the Original
Filing.
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    For purposes of this proposed rule change, the Exchange proposes to
define the term ``Entering Firm'' to mean a member organization that
either has a correspondent relationship with a Clearing Firm whereby it
executes trades and the clearing function is the responsibility of the
Clearing Firm or clears for its own account \5\ and to define the term
``Clearing Firm'' to mean a member organization that acts as principal
for clearing and settling a trade, whether for its own account or for
an Entering Firm.\6\
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    \5\ See proposed Rule 7.19(a)(1).
    \6\ See proposed Rule 7.19(a)(2). As required by Rule 7.14, a
member organization is required to give up the name of the clearing
firm through which each transaction on the Exchange will be cleared.
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1. Overview
    In order to help firms manage their risk, the Exchange proposes to
offer optional pre-trade risk controls that would authorize the
Exchange to take automated actions if a designated credit limit or
other pre-trade risk control for a firm is breached. Because Clearing
Firms bear the risk on behalf of their correspondent Entering Firms,
the Exchange proposes to make the proposed pre-trade risk controls
available not only to Entering Firms, but also to their Clearing Firms,
if so authorized by the Entering Firm. These pre-trade risk controls
would provide Entering Firms and their Clearing Firms with enhanced
abilities to manage their risk with respect to orders on the Exchange.
    As proposed, these optional controls would allow Entering Firms and
their Clearing Firms (if designated by the Entering Firm) to each
define different pre-set risk thresholds and to choose the automated
action the Exchange would take if those thresholds are breached, which
would range from notifying the Entering Firm and Clearing Firm that a
limit has been breached, blocking new orders, or canceling orders until
the Entering Firm has been reinstated to trade on the Exchange.
    Although use of the proposed Exchange-provided pre-trade risk
controls are optional, all orders on the Exchange will pass through
risk checks. As such, an Entering Firm that does not choose to set
limits or permit its Clearing Firm to set limits on its behalf will not
achieve any latency advantage with respect to its trading activity on
the Exchange. In addition, the Exchange expects that any latency added
by the pre-trade risk controls will be de minimis.
    The proposed pre-trade risk controls described are meant to
supplement, and not replace, the member organizations' own internal
systems, monitoring and procedures related to risk management. The
Exchange does not guarantee that these controls will be sufficiently
comprehensive to meet all of a member organization's needs, the
controls are not designed to be the sole means of risk management, and
using these controls will not necessarily meet a member organization's
obligations required by Exchange or federal rules (including, without
limitation, the Rule 15c3-5 under the Act \7\ (``Rule 15c3-5'')). Use
of the Exchange's pre-trade risk controls will not automatically
constitute compliance with Exchange or federal rules and responsibility
for compliance with all Exchange and SEC rules remains with the member
organization.\8\
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    \7\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5.
    \8\ The Exchange proposes Commentary .01 to Rule 7.19 to provide
that ``[t]he pre-trade risk controls described in this Rule are
meant to supplement, and not replace, the member organization's own
internal systems, monitoring and procedures related to risk
management and are not designed for compliance with Rule 15c3-5
under the Exchange Act. Responsibility for compliance with all
Exchange and SEC rules remains with the member organization.''
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2. Proposed Rule Change
    Proposed Rule 7.19(a) would set forth the definitions that would be
used for purposes of the Rule. In addition to the defined terms of
``Entering Firm'' and ``Clearing Firm,'' as described above, the
Exchange proposes the following definitions:
     The term ``Single Order Maximum Notional Value Risk
Limit'' would mean a pre-established maximum dollar amount for a single
order before it can be traded.
     The term ``Single Order Maximum Quantity Risk Limit''
would mean a pre-established maximum number of shares

that may be included in a single order before it can be traded.
     The term ``Gross Credit Risk Limit'' would mean a pre-
established maximum daily dollar amount for purchases and sales across
all symbols, where both buy and sell orders are counted as positive
values. For purposes of calculating the Gross Credit Risk Limit,
unexecuted orders in the Exchange Book,\9\ orders routed on arrival
pursuant to Rule 7.37(a)(1), and executed orders are included.
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    \9\ The term ``Exchange Book'' is defined in Rule 1.1(k) to
refer to the Exchange's electronic file of orders, which contains
all orders entered on the Exchange.
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    Proposed Rule 7.19(b) would set forth the Pre-Trade Risk Controls
that would be available to Entering Firms and Clearing Firms. Under
proposed Rule 7.19(b)(1), an Entering Firm may select one or more of
the following optional pre-trade risk controls with respect to its
trading activity on the Exchange: (i) Gross Credit Risk Limits; (ii)
Single Order Maximum Notional Value Risk Limits; and (iii) Single Order
Maximum Quantity Risk Limits, which would collectively be referred to
as the ``Pre-Trade Risk Controls.''
    In addition, under proposed Rule 7.19(b)(2)(A), an Entering Firm
that does not self-clear may designate its Clearing Firm to (i) view
any Pre-Trade Risk Controls set by the Entering Firm, or (ii) set one
or more Pre-Trade Risk Controls on the Entering Firm's behalf, or both.
Proposed Rule 7.19(b)(2)(B) provides that an Entering Firm would be
able to view any Pre-Trade Risk Controls that its Clearing Firm sets
with respect to the Entering Firm's trading activity on the Exchange.
Because both an Entering Firm and Clearing Firm (if so designated by
the Entering Firm) would be able to access information about Pre-Trade
Risk Controls, this mechanism would foster transparency between an
Entering Firm and its Clearing Firm regarding which Pre-Trade Risk
Control limits may have been set. For example, if an Entering Firm
designates its Clearing Firm to view the Pre-Trade Risk Controls set by
that Entering Firm, its Clearing Firm may determine that it does not
need to separately set Pre-Trade Risk Controls on behalf of such
Entering Firm.
    Because the Entering Firm is the member organization that is
entering orders on the Exchange, the Exchange will not take action
based on a Clearing Firm's instructions about the Entering Firm's
trading activities on the Exchange without first receiving consent from
the Entering Firm. Accordingly, proposed Rule 7.19(b)(2)(C) would
provide that if an Entering Firm designates a Clearing Firm to set Pre-
Trade Risk Controls for the Entering Firm, the Entering Firm would be
consenting to the Exchange taking certain prescribed actions (discussed
further below) with respect to the Entering Firm's trading activity as
provided for in proposed Rules 7.19(c) and (d), described below. The
Exchange would consider an Entering Firm to provide such consent by
authorizing a Clearing Firm to enter Pre-Trade Risk Controls via the
risk management tool that will be provided to Entering Firms in
connection with this proposed rule change. Once such authorization is
provided by the Entering Firm, the Clearing Firm would have access to
the Pre-Trade Risk Controls that the Entering Firm designates. The
proposed Rule makes clear that by designating a Clearing Firm to set
limits on its trading activities, the Entering Firm will have
authorized the Exchange to act pursuant to the Clearing Firm's
instructions if the limits set by the Clearing Firm are breached.
    Proposed Rule 7.19(b)(3) would set forth how the Pre-Trade Risk
Controls could be set or adjusted. Proposed Rule 7.19(b)(3)(A) would
provide that Pre-Trade Risk Controls may be set before the beginning of
a trading day and may be adjusted during the trading day. Proposed Rule
7.19(b)(3)(B) would provide that Entering Firms or Clearing Firms may
set Pre-Trade Risk Controls at the MPID level or at one or more sub-IDs
associated with that MPID.\10\ The Exchange believes that supporting
Pre-Trade Risk Controls at both an MPID and sub-ID level would provide
both Entering Firms, and if designated, their Clearing Firms, more
granular control over how such risk controls are determined and
monitored.
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    \10\ Entering Firms may request that the Exchange create sub-IDs
associated with their MPIDs. If an Entering Firm uses a Floor broker
to enter orders on the Exchange, it can assign a sub-ID that would
be used for the entry of orders by that Floor broker on the Entering
Firm's behalf.
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    Proposed Rule 7.19(b)(4) would provide that with respect to Gross
Credit Risk Limits, an Entering Firm and, if so designated, its
Clearing Firm, will receive notifications when the Entering Firm is
approaching or has breached a limit set by itself or by the Clearing
Firm. The Exchange believes that by providing such notifications, the
Entering Firm, and if designated, its Clearing Firm, would have advance
notice that the Entering Firm is approaching a designated limit and
could take steps to mitigate the potential that an automated breach
action would be triggered.
    Proposed Rule 7.19(c) would set forth the actions the Exchange
would be authorized to take when a Pre-Trade Risk Control set by an
Entering Firm or a Clearing Firm is breached, which would be referred
to as ``Automated Breach Actions.'' These proposed actions would be
automated; if a Pre-Trade Risk Control is breached, the Exchange would
automatically take the designated action and would not need further
direction from either the Entering Firm or Clearing Firm to take such
action.
    At the outset, proposed Rule 7.19(c)(1) would provide that if both
an Entering Firm and its Clearing Firm set the same type of Pre-Trade
Risk Control for the Entering Firm but have set different limits, the
Exchange would enforce the more restrictive limit. For example, if an
Entering Firm sets a Single Order Maximum Notional Value Risk Limit of
$20 million and its Clearing Firm sets the same risk limit at $15
million, the Exchange will take action when the more restrictive limit
is breached--i.e., $15 million.
    Proposed Rule 7.19(c)(2) would set forth the Automated Breach
Action the Exchange would take if an order would breach the designated
limit of either a Single Order Maximum Notional Value Risk Limit or
Single Order Maximum Quantity Risk Limit. As proposed, the Exchange
would reject the incoming order that would have breached the applicable
limit.
    Proposed Rule 7.19(c)(3)(A) would set forth the Automated Breach
Actions the Exchange would take if a designated Gross Credit Risk Limit
is breached. The Exchange proposes to provide options of which
Automated Breach Action the Exchange would be authorized to take if a
Gross Credit Risk Limit is breached. Such Automated Breach Actions
would be taken at the MPID or sub-ID level that is associated with the
designated Gross Credit Risk Limit. As proposed, when setting Gross
Credit Risk Limits, the Entering Firm or Clearing Firm setting the
limit would be required to indicate one of the following actions that
the Exchange would take if such limit is breached:
     ``Notification Only.'' As set forth in proposed Rule
7.19(c)(3)(A)(i), if this option is selected, the Exchange would
continue to accept new orders and order instructions and would not
cancel any unexecuted orders in the Exchange Book. Proposed Rule
7.19(b)(4), described above, sets forth the notifications that would be
provided to an Entering Firm, and if designated, a Clearing Firm
regarding the Pre-Trade Risk Controls that have been set. With the
``Notification Only'' action, the

Exchange would provide such notifications, but would not take any other
automated actions with respect to new or unexecuted orders.
     ``Block Only.'' As set forth in proposed Rule
7.19(c)(3)(A)(ii), if this option is selected, the Exchange would
reject new orders and order instructions but would not cancel any
unexecuted orders in the Exchange Book. The Exchange would continue to
accept instructions from the Entering Firm to cancel one or more orders
in full (including Auction-Only Orders) or any instructions specified
in proposed Rule 7.19(e) (described below), but would not take any
automated action to cancel orders.
     ``Cancel and Block.'' As set forth in proposed Rule
7.19(c)(3)(A)(iii), if this option is selected, in addition to the
Block actions described above, the Exchange would also cancel all
unexecuted orders in the Exchange Book other than Auction-Only Orders.
    If an Entering Firm and its Clearing Firm each set different limits
for a Gross Credit Risk Limit for the Entering Firm's activities on the
Exchange, proposed Rule 7.19(c)(3)(B) would provide that the Exchange
would enforce the action that was chosen by the party that set the
limit that was breached. For example, if a Clearing Firm sets a lower
limit and designates the ``Cancel and Block'' Automated Breach Action,
if that limit is breached, the Exchange will implement that ``Cancel
and Block'' action even if the Entering Firm designated a different
Automated Breach Action.
    Proposed Rule 7.19(c)(3)(C) would provide that if both the Entering
Firm and Clearing Firm set the same Gross Credit Risk Limit and that
limit is breached, the Exchange would enforce the most restrictive
Automated Breach Action. As further proposed, for purposes of this
Rule, the ``Cancel and Block'' action would be more restrictive than
``Block Only,'' which would be more restrictive than ``Notification
Only.'' For example, if the Entering Firm selects the ``Block Only''
action for a Gross Credit Risk Limit and its Clearing Firm selects the
``Cancel and Block'' action for the same Gross Credit Risk Limit, if
the limit is breached, the Exchange would take the ``Cancel and Block''
action for the Entering Firm's orders.
    Proposed Rule 7.19(c)(4) would provide that if a Pre-Trade Risk
Control set at the MPID level is breached, the Automated Breach Action
specified at the MPID level would be applied to all sub-IDs associated
with that MPID. For instance, if a Clearing Firm sets a Gross Credit
Risk Limit for an MPID at $500 million and the Entering Firm sets Gross
Credit Risk Limits for each of three sub-IDs associated with that MPID
at $500 million each, if two of the sub-IDs reach a $250 million limit,
which combined is the Gross Credit Risk Limit at the MPID level, the
Automated Breach Action associated with the limit at the MPID level
would be triggered and would apply also to the associated sub-IDs, even
though none of the sub-IDs have breached their separate $500 million
limits. This functionality ensures that an Entering Firm cannot
effectively override a Pre-Trade Risk Control set at the MPID level by
setting risk limits for each of the MPID's associated sub-IDs that
cumulatively equal more than the MPID's total Gross Credit Risk Limit.
    Proposed Rule 7.19(d) concerns how an Entering Firm's ability to
enter orders and order instructions would be reinstated after a ``Block
Only'' or ``Cancel and Block'' Automated Breach Action has been
triggered. In such case, proposed Rule 7.19(d) provides that the
Exchange would not reinstate the Entering Firm's ability to enter
orders and order instructions on the Exchange (other than instructions
to cancel one or more orders (including Auction-Only Orders) in full)
without the consent of (1) the Entering Firm, and (2) the Clearing
Firm, if the Entering Firm has designated that the Clearing Firm's
consent is required. The Exchange proposes to include this
functionality because the Clearing Firm bears the risk of any exposure
of its correspondent Entering Firms.
    Finally, proposed Rule 7.19(e) would set forth ``kill switch''
functionality, which would allow an Entering Firm or its designated
Clearing Firm to direct the Exchange to take certain bulk Kill Switch
Actions with respect to orders. In contrast to the Automated Breach
Actions described above, which the Exchange would take automatically
after the breach of a credit limit, the Exchange would not take any of
the Kill Switch Actions without express direction from the Entering
Firm or its designated Clearing Firm.
    Specifically, Proposed Rule 7.19(e) would specify that an Entering
Firm, or if authorized pursuant to proposed Rule 7.19(b)(2)(A), its
Clearing Firm, could direct the Exchange to take one or more of the
following actions with respect to orders at either an MPID, or if
designated, sub-ID Level: (1) Cancel all Auction-Only Orders; (2)
Cancel all unexecuted orders in the Exchange Book other than Auction-
Only Orders; or (3) Block the entry of any new orders and order
instructions, provided that the Exchange would continue to accept
instructions from Entering Firms to cancel one or more orders
(including Auction-Only Orders) in full, and later, reverse that block.
    The Exchange proposes that the Kill Switch functionality proposed
in Rule 7.19(e) would supersede and replace the Exchange's previously
filed proposed rule change (the ``2013 Risk Control Filing''),\11\
which provided certain post-trade risk management tools to member
organizations, but not to their Clearing Firms.
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    \11\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 71164 (December 20,
2013), 78 FR 79044 (December 27, 2013) (SR-NYSE-2013-80) (Notice of
filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change) (the
``2013 Risk Control Filing'').
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    The Exchange proposes to provide these post-trade Kill Switch
Actions in addition to the pre-trade Automated Breach Actions described
above in order to give Entering Firms and their Clearing Firms more
flexibility in setting risk controls. An Entering Firm that wants more
control over when and which actions are taken with respect to its
orders may choose to use these Kill Switch Actions instead of the
``Block'' or ``Cancel and Block'' Automated Breach Actions described
above. For example, for an Entering Firm that selects the
``Notification Only'' Automated Breach Action, if it receives
notification of a credit breach, it could choose to direct the Exchange
to take a Kill Switch Action described in proposed Rule 7.19(e).
3. Proposed Rule Commentary
    The Exchange proposes Commentary .01 to Rule 7.19 to specify that
the Pre-Trade Risk Controls described in this Rule are meant to
supplement, and not replace, the member organization's own internal
systems, monitoring and procedures related to risk management and are
not designed for compliance with Rule 15c3-5 under the Act (``Rule
15c3-5'').\12\ This proposed Commentary specifies that use of the
Exchange's pre-trade risk controls would not automatically constitute
compliance with Exchange or federal rules and responsibility for
compliance with all Exchange and SEC rules remains with the member
organization. The Exchange does not guarantee that these controls will
be sufficiently comprehensive to meet all of a member organization's
needs, the controls are not designed to be the sole means of risk
management, and using these controls will not necessarily meet a member
organization's obligations required by Exchange or federal rules
(including, without limitation, the Rule 15c3-5).
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    \12\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5.
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    Proposed Commentary .02 would provide that when a customer of a
Floor

broker firm is a member organization (``Customer''), both the Customer
and the Floor broker firm would be considered an ``Entering Firm'' for
purposes of setting Pre-Trade Risk Controls or Kill Switch Actions for
that Floor broker's trading activity on the Exchange on behalf of that
Customer. There would be no differences in the Pre-Trade Risk Controls
available to the Customer and Floor broker.
    Proposed Commentary .03 would provide that manual transactions by a
Floor broker and crossing transactions pursuant to Rule 76 will be
excluded from Pre-Trade Risk Controls. The Exchange proposes this
exception because the proposed Pre-Trade Risk Controls would be
incorporated into the Exchange's matching engine systems, and neither
manual transactions nor crossing transactions pursuant to Rule 76 are
processed in such systems. Floor brokers representing such orders would
continue to have their independent obligation to comply with Rule 15c3-
5 with respect to these orders.
    Proposed Commentary .04 would specify how the proposed Pre-Trade
Risk Controls would apply to Designated Market Makers (``DMMs'') on the
Exchange. The proposed commentary would provide that if either a
``Block Only'' or a ``Cancel and Block'' Automated Breach Action has
been triggered by an Entering Firm acting as a DMM in an assigned
security, such DMM would be prevented from facilitating an auction that
would include any DMM Interest, as defined in Rule 7.35(a)(8).\13\ If
the DMM has not yet been reinstated, the DMM can facilitate an auction
if it does not include DMM Interest. This restriction would apply
whether the DMM attempted to facilitate the auction electronically or
manually; if the DMM attempted to electronically facilitate the auction
and include DMM Interest, the Exchange would reject the attempt.
However, the DMM would still have an opportunity to facilitate such
auction manually without DMM Interest. The Exchange anticipates that a
DMM will set Gross Credit Risk Limits at levels that would not result
in Automated Breach Actions, and if they do trigger a ``Block Only'' or
a ``Cancel and Block'' Automated Breach Action, they would promptly
reinstate themselves to avoid such a situation.
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    \13\ DMMs have an affirmative obligation to facilitate openings,
reopenings, and the close of trading for each of the securities in
which the DMM is registered as required by Exchange rules. See Rule
104(a)(2) and (3).
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2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with Section 6(b) of the Act,\14\ in general, and furthers the
objectives of Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\15\ in particular, because it
is designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,
to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating,
clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and
facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market
system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest,
and because it is not designed to permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
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    \14\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \15\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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    Specifically, the Exchange believes that the proposed rule will
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open
market and a national market system because the proposed optional Pre-
Trade Risk Controls would provide both Entering Firms, and if
designated, Clearing Firms, with the ability to manage risk, while also
providing an alert system that would help to ensure that such firms are
aware of developing issues. In addition, the Pre-Trade Risk Controls
would provide Clearing Firms, who have assumed certain risks of the
Entering Firms, greater control and flexibility over setting risk
tolerance and exposure on behalf of their correspondent Entering Firms.
As such, the Exchange believes that the Pre-Trade Risk Controls would
provide a means to address potentially market-impacting events, helping
to ensure the proper functioning of the market.
    In addition, the Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is
designed to protect investors and the public interest because the Pre-
Trade Risk Controls are a form of impact mitigation that will aid
Entering Firms and Clearing Firms in minimizing their risk exposure and
reduce the potential for disruptive, market-wide events. The Exchange
understands that member organizations implement a number of different
risk-based controls, including those required by Rule 15c3-5. The
proposed controls will serve as an additional tool for Entering Firms
and Clearing Firms to assist them in identifying any risk exposure. The
Exchange believes the Pre-Trade Risk Controls will assist Entering
Firms and Clearing Firms in managing their financial exposure which, in
turn, could enhance the integrity of trading on the securities markets
and help to assure the stability of the financial system.
    Further, the Exchange believes that the proposed rule will foster
cooperation and coordination with persons facilitating transactions in
securities because the Exchange will provide alerts to Entering Firms
and their Clearing Firms when the Entering Firm's trading reaches
certain thresholds. As such, the Exchange will help Clearing Firms
monitor the risk levels of their correspondent Entering Firms and
provide tools for Clearing Firms, if designated, to take action.
    The Exchange believes that proposed Commentary .01 to Rule 7.19 is
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices and
promote just and equitable principles of trade because it provides
clarity in Exchange rules that the proposed Pre-Trade Risk Controls are
intended to supplement, and not replace, a member organization's own
internal systems, monitoring, and procedures related to compliance with
Rule 15c3-5.
    The Exchange believes that proposed Commentary .02 and .03 to Rule
7.19 would remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system because they provide
clarity regarding how the Pre-Trade Risk Controls would be available to
both Floor brokers and their Customers and that the proposed controls
would not be available for specified order types that are not processed
by the matching engine.
    The Exchange similarly believes that proposed Commentary .04 would
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open
market and a national market system because it promotes transparency
and clarity in Exchange rules that DMMs would be able to continue to
facilitate auctions on the Exchange if they are subject to a ``Block
Only'' or ``Cancel and Block'' Automated Breach Action if they do not
seek to include DMM Interest in such auction.
    Finally, the Exchange believes that the proposed rule change does
not unfairly discriminate among the Exchange's member organizations
because use of the Pre-Trade Risk Controls is optional and is not a
prerequisite for participation on the Exchange. In addition, because
all orders on the Exchange would pass through the risk checks, there
would be no difference in the latency experienced by member
organizations who have opted to use the Pre-Trade Risk Controls

versus those who have not opted to use them.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. In fact, the Exchange
believes that the proposal will have a positive effect on competition
because, by providing Entering Firms and their Clearing Firms
additional means to monitor and control risk, the proposed rule will
increase confidence in the proper functioning of the markets. The
Exchange believes the proposed Pre-Trade Risk Controls will assist
Entering Firms and Clearing Firms in managing their financial exposure
which, in turn, could enhance the integrity of trading on the
securities markets and help to assure the stability of the financial
system. As a result, the level of competition should increase as public
confidence in the markets is solidified.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register, or such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove the proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-NYSE-2020-17 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSE-2020-17. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-NYSE-2020-17 and should be submitted on
or before April 8, 2020.
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    \16\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\16\
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-05561 Filed 3-17-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 150 (Wednesday, August 5, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 46575-46576]
[FR Doc No: 2015-19257]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-9931-41-OA]

Notification of a Closed Teleconference of the Chartered Science
Advisory Board

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA), Science Advisory
Board (SAB) Staff Office is announcing a teleconference of the
Chartered SAB to conduct a review of a draft report of recommendations
regarding the agency's 2015 Scientific and Technological Achievement
Awards (STAA). The Chartered SAB teleconference will be closed to the
public.

DATES: The Chartered SAB teleconference date is Thursday, September 10,
2015, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. (Eastern Time).

ADDRESSES: The Chartered SAB closed teleconference will take place via
telephone only. General information about the SAB may be found on the
SAB Web site at http://www.epa.gov/sab.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Members of the public who wish to
obtain further information regarding this announcement may contact Mr.
Thomas Carpenter, Designated Federal Officer, by telephone: (202) 564-
4885 or email at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. 2, and section (c)(6) of
the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6), the EPA has
determined that the chartered SAB quality review teleconference will be
closed to the public. The purpose of the teleconference is for the
chartered SAB to conduct a review of a draft SAB advisory report of
recommendations regarding the agency's 2015 STAA. The Chartered SAB
teleconference will be closed to the public.
    Quality review is a key function of the chartered SAB. Draft
reports prepared by SAB committees, panels, or work groups must be
reviewed and approved by the chartered SAB before transmittal to the
EPA Administrator. The chartered SAB makes a determination in a meeting
consistent with FACA about all draft reports and determines whether the
report is ready to be transmitted to the EPA Administrator.
    At the teleconference, the chartered SAB will conduct a review of
draft report developed by an SAB committee

charged with developing recommendations regarding the agency's 2015
STAA. (for more information, see http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/02ad90b136fc21ef85256eba00436459/3c60dba294ebf58885257da2004d194f!OpenDocument&Highlight=0,staa.
    The STAA awards are established to honor and recognize EPA
employees who have made outstanding contributions in the advancement of
science and technology through their research and development
activities, as exhibited in publication of their results in peer
reviewed journals. I have determined that the Chartered SAB quality
review teleconference will be closed to the public because it is
concerned with recommending employees deserving of awards. In making
these draft recommendations, the EPA requires full and frank advice
from the SAB. This advice will involve professional judgments on the
relative merits of various employees and their respective work. Such
personnel matters involve the discussion of information that is of a
personal nature, the disclosure of which would be a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy and, therefore, is protected from
disclosure by section (c)(6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(6). Minutes of the Chartered SAB teleconference will be
certified by the chair and retained in the public record.

    Dated: July 29, 2015.
Gina McCarthy,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015-19257 Filed 8-4-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


1 United States Prevention, Pesticides November 2002 Environmental Protection and Toxic Substances EPA 738 F 02 015 Agency ( 7508C)

Chlorpropham TRED Facts EPA has assessed the risks of chlorpropham and completed a Report of the Food Quality Protection Act ( FQPA) Tolerance Reassessment Progress and Risk Management Decision ( known as a TRED) for this pesticide. Provided that risk mitigation measures are adopted, as outlined in the TRED, individual and aggregated risks are within acceptable levels.

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ( FFDCA), as amended by FQPA, requires EPA to review all the tolerances ( legal limits for residues in food) for registered chemicals in effect on or before the date of the enactment of the FQPA. In reviewing these tolerances, the Agency must consider, among other things, aggregate risks from non occupational sources of pesticide exposure, whether there is increased susceptibility to infants and children, and the cumulative effects of pesticides with a common mechanism of toxicity. The tolerances are considered reassessed once the safety finding has been made or a revocation occurs. EPA completed a chlorpropham reregistration eligibility decision ( RED) prior to FQPA of 1996 enactment; therefore, tolerances needed to be reassessed to meet the FQPA standard.

The Agency has evaluated the dietary ( food and drinking water) risk associated with chlorpropham and has determined that provided the Special Local Need registration ( SLN) for Easter lily bulb use is amended to reduce the maximum rate of application as agreed upon by stakeholders, there is a reasonable certainty that no harm to any population subgroup will result from aggregate exposure to chlorpropham when considering dietary exposure and all non occupational sources of pesticide exposure. Therefore, with the implementation of this mitigation measure, fifteen ( 15) tolerances established for residues of chlorpropham in/ on raw agricultural commodities are now considered reassessed as safe under section 408( q) of the FFDCA.

Uses ° Chlorpropham is a herbicide primarily registered for use on post harvest potatoes for sprout control. There are four SLN registrations for use of Easter lilies ( on approximately 150 acres annually in Oregon and California); gingko trees in the District of Columbia; and post harvest potatoes stored in high humidity conditions in the state of Maine, which requires a higher application rate.

° Approximately 445,600 pounds of chlorpropham active ingredient ( a. i.) are used annually. 2 Health Effects ° Parent chlorpropham has been classified by the Agency as a " Group E" human carcinogen ( no evidence of carcinogenicity). However, some chlorpropham is metabolized to 3 chloroaniline ( 3 CA) on potatoes and some anilines are known carcinogens. The Agency does not have data on 3 CA necessary to conduct a carcinogenicity assessment, but does have data for 4 chloroaniline ( 4 CA), which is structurally similar, but not expected to be formed in the breakdown of chlorpropham in potatoes. The cancer potency factor ( or Q 1*) for 4 CA was used as a surrogate to assess the potential cancer risk from 3 CA and is expected to overestimate potential cancer risk.

° There is no evidence of endocrine disruption from exposure to chlorpropham.

Dietary ( Food and Drinking Water) Risks ° Acute and chronic ( non cancer and cancer) dietary exposures from eating food crops treated with chlorpropham are not of concern for the entire U. S. population and all subgroups that were assessed.

° Acute and chronic ( non cancer) exposure through surface and ground water sources of drinking water is negligible, and not of concern to the Agency. However, there are risks of concern from chronic ( cancer) exposure to chlorpropham from ground water sources of drinking water from the limited Easter lily bulb use. These risks are addressed through the mitigation measures described below.

Occupational and Ecological Risks ° Occupational and ecological risk have not been assessed. Occupational and ecological risk management decisions were made as part of the 1996 chlorpropham registration eligibility decision ( RED). No new data has been received to warrant reconsideration of these risks.

Risk Mitigation/ Label Amendments In completing this TRED, the Agency has identified certain label amendments which need to be implemented to mitigate risks of concern and ensure consistency among the labels.

° To mitigate chronic ( cancer) food and drinking water risks of concern from Easter lily bulb use, product labels need to be amended to reduce the maximum application rate from 3.99 lb a. i. per acre to 2.0 lb a. i. per acre.

° For aerosol ready to use ( RTU) products used on stored potatoes, the labels which specify a maximum application rate of 165% of the typical rate ( 0.017 lbs a. i. per 1000 lbs of potatoes), need to clearly state a total seasonal rate of 0.028 lb a. i. per 1000 pounds of potatoes. For the same product labels which specify a maximum application rate of 145% of the typical rate, 3 product labels need to clearly state a total seasonal rate that does not exceed 0.025 lbs a. i. per 1000 pounds of potatoes.

° For Emulsifiable Concentrate ( EC) products, a maximum seasonal rate of 0.0104 lb a. i. per 1000 pounds of potatoes needs to be specified.

° For entry into enclosed treatment / storage areas after application of products heated above 250 ° F, handlers must wear a respirator with either an organic vapor removing cartridge with a prefilter approved for pesticides, or a canister approved for pesticides.

Tolerance Reassessment Decisions A total of fifteen ( 15) tolerances for chlorpropham have been reassessed. Thirteen ( 13) tolerances are to raised, one ( 1) tolerance is to be lowered, and one ( 1) tolerance is to be revoked. In addition, nine ( 9) new tolerances are to be established for residues in/ on raw agricultural commodities under section 408( q) of the FFDCA.

Availably of Supporting Documents A Notice of Availability of the chlorpropham TRED and other supporting documents, including the risk assessments and response to comments, has bee published in the Federal Register on September 18, 2002 ( 67 FR 58795). A copy of the TRED and all supporting documents will also be available on the Agency's website at: http:// www. epa. gov/ pesticides/ reregistration/ status. htm EPA has established an official public docket for this action under docket ID number OPP 2002 0180, an electronic version of which is available through EPA's electronic public docket and comment system, EPA Dockets. You may use EPA Dockets at http:// www. epa. gov/ edocket/ to submit or view public comments, access the index listing of the contents of the official public docket, and to access those documents in the public docket that are available electronically. Additionally, you may still access any of the publicly available docket materials through the OPP docket facility. Once in the system, select " search," then key in the appropriate docket ID number.


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 147 (Wednesday, August 2, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50901-50902]
[FR Doc No: 2023-16348]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4713-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2023-0001]

Soboba Band of Luise[ntilde]o Indians; Amendment No. 1 to Notice
of a Major Disaster Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration
for the Soboba Band of Luise[ntilde]o Indians (FEMA-4713-DR), dated May
18, 2023, and related determinations.

DATES: This change occurred on June 20, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dean Webster, Office of Response and
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW,
Washington, DC 20472,<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the
Administrator, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Andrew F.
Grant, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer
for this disaster.
    This action terminates the appointment of Benigno B. Ruiz as
Federal Coordinating Officer for this disaster.

    The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers
(CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030,
Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster
Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance
Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and
Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049,
Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing
Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially
Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other
Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants--Public Assistance

(Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation
Grant.

Deanne Criswell,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2023-16348 Filed 8-1-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P