We proposed testing the vehicles with the tires installed on the
vehicle at time of initial vehicle sale. The agency's compliance test
programs generally evaluate new vehicles with new tires. Therefore, we
proposed that a new test vehicle have less than 500 miles on the
odometer when received for testing.
    For testing, the agency proposed that tires be inflated to the
vehicle manufacturer's recommended cold tire inflation pressure(s)
specified on the vehicle's certification label or the tire inflation
pressure label. We will not change the vehicle's tires during testing
unless test vehicle tires are damaged before or during testing. We did
not propose using inner tubes for testing because we have not seen any
tire debeading in any test.
    Before executing any test maneuvers, the agency proposed to
condition tires to wear away mold sheen and achieve operating
temperatures. To begin the conditioning the test vehicle would be
driven around a circle 46 meters (150 feet) in radius at a speed that
produces a lateral acceleration of approximately 0.1g for two clockwise
laps followed by two counterclockwise laps.
    EMA asserted that there should be no requirement for testing using
the tires installed on the vehicle at the time of initial sale.
According to EMA, sometimes a test vehicle is used for certifying
compliance, but sometimes a vehicle that is later sold to a customer is
tested. Further, EMA notes that heavy truck manufacturers often offer
hundreds of different tire options for their customers. EMA notes that
different tires would change the road adhesion and cornering stiffness,
potentially affecting test results.
    Finally, EMA recommended using language from FMVSS No. 121 for the
tire inflation procedure specified by manufacturer for the vehicle's
GVWR, instead of the procedure proposed in the NPRM, which is to use
the vehicle's certification label or tire inflation pressure label. EMA
reasoned that the actual tires installed on the vehicle may differ from
the specifications given on the label.
    First, inasmuch as EMA is referring to the tires used for
certifying compliance, we note that our regulations do not specify how
manufacturers certify compliance. We recognize that some manufacturers
do wish to base their certification of compliance on a vehicle's
performance in NHTSA's test maneuvers. However, there is no obligation
for manufacturer's to conduct NHTSA's compliance test for any vehicle,
much less for every possible tire combination. For instance,
manufacturers currently certify that their vehicles meet the minimum
stopping distance and ABS requirements of FMVSS No. 121. They must
satisfy those requirements for any vehicle-tire combination that is
sold. That is, manufacturers have an obligation to certify compliance
with all applicable standards in whatever configuration that tires are
delivered to customers. We expect that manufacturers design their ESC
systems to account for any potential differences in tires that might be
installed on the vehicle at the time of initial sale.
    However, with respect to the tire inflation pressure at which
testing will be conducted, we agree with EMA that we should not use the
inflation pressure specified on the vehicle's certification or tire
information labels. As EMA observes, a heavy truck may be sold with
many different tire combinations. However, nothing requires that all of
those combinations be listed on the certification or tire information
label.\61\ However, multiple combinations may be listed on the label.
Thus, we are removing from the regulatory text the reference to the
vehicle's certification or tire information label and merely specifying
that the tires' inflation pressure will be the inflation pressure
specified for the GVWR of the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ In fact, S5.1.2 of FMVSS No. 120, the standard that
provides for tire information labeling on vehicles over 10,000
pounds GVWR, expressly contemplates that a vehicle may be sold with
a tire size designation that is not listed on the tire information
label.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding tire conditioning, Bendix requested clarification of
whether the presence of a tire conditioning procedure means that the
vehicle must be equipped with new tires. Bendix also recommended that
the agency remove this section about the removal of mold sheen because
by performing the brake conditioning test procedure, the same result is
likely to be achieved.
    To clarify, the agency is not specifying that new tires must be
installed prior to the ESC testing. However, in the event the vehicle
has not been driven prior to testing (for example, a FMVSS No. 121
compliance test has not been performed), we do not believe that the
brake burnishing procedure is sufficient to wear away any mold sheen on
the tire prior to ESC testing. Therefore, the requirement to perform
four laps is necessary for the consistency and repeatability of the ESC
tests. We do not believe that this procedure is especially burdensome,
even if the mold sheen was removed during prior testing.

J. Mass Estimation Drive Cycle

    Both truck tractors and large buses experience large variations in
payload mass, which affects a vehicle's roll and yaw stability
thresholds. To adjust the activation thresholds for these variations,
stability control systems estimate the mass of the vehicle after
ignition cycles, periods of static idling, and other driving scenarios.
To estimate the mass, these systems require a period of initial
driving.
    The agency proposed including a mass estimation drive cycle as a
part of pre-test conditioning. To complete this drive cycle the test
vehicle is accelerated to a speed of 64 km/h (40 mph), and then, by
applying the vehicle brakes, decelerated at 0.3g to 0.4g to a stop.
    Meritor WABCO requested that the mass estimation drive cycle
procedure be made manufacturer-specific. That is, Meritor WABCO
requested that the procedure be changed to specify that NHTSA would
contact the ESC system supplier for a mass estimation procedure.
    Although we specified a mass estimation procedure in the NPRM, that
procedure is based on current ESC system designs. We recognize that
system designs could change or new suppliers could enter the market
with different designs that estimate vehicle mass differently. Thus, we
accept Meritor WABCO's request that NHTSA not specify a mass estimation
cycle.
    However, we do not agree with Meritor WABCO's suggestion that NHTSA
contact the ESC system supplier for the mass estimation cycle. It is
the vehicle's manufacturer that is ultimately responsible for
certifying compliance with the FMVSSs. Thus, we believe it is the
vehicle's manufacturer, not the ESC system supplier, who should be
responsible for supplying NHTSA with the mass estimation cycle
procedure. Thus, we expect that the vehicle manufacturer will be able
to provide the mass estimation cycle procedure to NHTSA upon request in
advance of any compliance testing.

K. Brake Conditioning

    Heavy vehicle brake performance is affected by the original
conditioning and temperatures of the brakes. We believe that
incompletely burnished brakes and excessive brake temperatures can have
an effect on ESC system test results, particularly in the rollover
performance testing, because a hard brake application may be needed for
the foundation brakes to reduce speed to prevent rollover.
    The agency proposed that the burnish procedure specified in S6.1.8
of FMVSS

No. 121 be conducted prior to ESC system testing. The burnish procedure
is performed by conducting 500 brake snubs \62\ between 40 mph and 20
mph at a deceleration of 10 fps\2\. If the vehicle has already
completed testing to FMVSS No. 121, the agency did not propose to
repeat the full burnishing procedure. Instead, the brakes are
conditioned for ESC system testing with 40 snubs. The agency proposed
that the brake temperatures be in the range of 65 [deg]C to 204 [deg]C
(150[emsp14][deg]F to 400[emsp14][deg]F) at the beginning of each test
maneuver. We also proposed that the brake temperature be measured by
plug-type thermocouples installed on all brakes and that the hottest
brake be used for determining whether cool-down periods required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ A snub is a brake application where the vehicle is not
braked to a stop but to a lower speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We received no comment on the burnishing procedure and are adopting
the proposed procedure in this final rule, with two exceptions. First,
in the NPRM, we proposed to repeat the FMVSS No. 121 burnish procedure
at the manufacturer's option. However, in this final rule, we have
removed the option. Rather, we are merely specifying that a burnish
procedure similar to the one in FMVSS No. 121 be completed prior to
testing. Furthermore, rather than referencing FMVSS No. 121, we have
included the entire burnishing in FMVSS No. 136 to avoid the need to
cross-reference between Standards. Second, we have altered the metric
conversion of 150[emsp14][deg]F from 65 [deg]C to 66 [deg]C to be more
accurate.
    In the NPRM, the agency suggested, as a general rule, that a new
test vehicle have less than 500 miles on the odometer when received for
testing. EMA commented on this suggestion, requesting that there be no
odometer requirements on a test vehicle. EMA believes that this
requirement may require transporting the test vehicle by hauling it on
a trailer to the test site if the test site is located far away from
the place of manufacture. NHTSA agrees with EMA that it is not feasible
to require that a test vehicle have less than 500 miles on its odometer
prior to testing. This is particularly true in light of the burnishing
procedure, which could itself require 500 miles of driving. Thus, the
final rule does not have a mileage requirement for test vehicles.

L. Compliance Options

    Both Bendix and Volvo requested clarification of the proposed
regulatory text specifying compliance options. That provision would
require that a manufacturer identify which compliance option was
selected for compliance test purposes and provide that information to
the agency upon request. Bendix and Volvo raised this issue because
they did not believe that any of the proposed requirements offered
manufacturers any compliance options to choose from.
    In this final rule, we are giving manufacturers a compliance option
with respect to the length of the control trailer used for testing
truck tractors. As discussed in section XI.D, manufacturers of truck
tractors with four or more axles may, at the manufacturer's option,
have testing conducted with a longer control trailer. Thus, we are
retaining the language requiring manufacturers to specify compliance
options prior to agency testing.

M. Data Collection

    In the NPRM, we proposed that the collection of data from the
vehicle, such as engine torque output and driver-requested torque, come
from the SAE J1939 communication data link. Bendix requested that NHTSA
change the collection procedure to specify that the data come from the
vehicle controller area network (CAN) bus, which is a more generic
reference instead of specifically requiring a SAE J1939 data link. The
CAN bus is what allows a vehicle's electronic control units and other
devices to communicate with each other. SAE J1939 is a recommended
practice to standardize vehicle communications. Bendix believes that
citing SAE J1939 specifically may have the effect of limiting vehicle
design in the future.
    We agree with Bendix that the reference to SAE J1939 should be
changed to a more generic reference. This will allow future
technological advances regarding in-vehicle communications, including
the adoption of new industry recommended practices. Accordingly, we are
specifying that data be collected from the vehicle's communication
network or CAN bus.
    Bendix also commented upon the filtering of engine torque data
received from an analog signal. Bendix noted that data from an SAE
J1939 compliant communication network is digital data. However, because
we are removing the references to SAE J1939 in response to Bendix's
comment, we are not changing the procedure for filtering analog data
signals because recognize that some communication systems could use
analog signals.

XII. ESC Disablement

A. Summary of Comments

    In the NPRM, the agency considered allowing a control for the ESC
to be disabled by the driver. Because, heavy vehicles currently
equipped with ESC systems do not include on/off controls for ESC that
allow a driver to deactivate or adjust the ESC system, the agency did
not propose allowing an on/off switch for ESC systems. The agency
sought public comment on the need to allow an on/off switch, and asked
that commenters specifically address why manufacturers might need such
a switch and how manufacturers would implement a switch in light of the
ABS requirements.
    Temsa and Advocates opposed allowing the disablement of the ESC
system. They stated that the ESC system should not be allowed to be
deactivated by a switch because the driver may inadvertently forget to
reactivate the system.
    In contrast, Daimler, Volvo, Meritor WABCO, HDBMC, Associated
Logging, EMA, and Bendix recommended that we allow the ESC systems to
be disabled. The commenters asserted that the ESC system may need to be
disabled in certain conditions such as slippery roads in snow and mud,
off-road operation, and when using snow chains on the tires.
    Daimler stated in its comment that the current ESC and traction
control systems are interlinked, and the disablement of traction
control will disable ESC systems. Daimler asserted that disabling
traction control may be necessary in conditions such as starting from
rest on sloped ground, driving on slippery roads, and using snow
chains. HDBMC also asserted that ESC disablement is needed for gaining
traction in snow and mud and to provide optimum performance when using
snow chains. Meritor WABCO similarly referred to the need for the
ability to change the control scheme of the ESC system to allow for
deep snow and mud.
    In contrast, Bendix stated that its ESC system is tuned for both
on-road and mild off-road conditions. However, Bendix suggested that
different vehicle tuning may be necessary for severe off-road
conditions.
    Regarding the absence of ESC disablement on current truck tractors,
EMA also suggested that some small volume tractors are more likely to
need to have an ESC disablement function for off-road operation and
claimed that at least one manufacturer had equipped a vehicle with such
a switch to temporarily disable ESC. Further, EMA

suggested that ESC disablement functions are not prevalent because
large fleet customers have been purchasing ESC systems.
    HDMBC recommended that vehicles that have a switch to disable ESC
systems be equipped with a lamp indicating that the ESC system is off
similar to the ESC Off telltale in FMVSS No. 126. In its comment,
Meritor WABCO suggested that the ESC malfunction lamp should be
constantly illuminated if ESC is deactivated.
    Meritor WABCO, HDBMC, Bendix, EMA, and Volvo also suggested that
vehicles be allowed to automatically disable their ESC systems under
certain conditions. Meritor WABCO claimed that all-wheel drive is an
example of when ESC should automatically be disabled. HDBMC, EMA, and
Bendix said there should be the ability to automatically disable ESC
system for certain applications such as all-wheel drive and truck
tractors with multiple steering axles. Volvo asserted that, while it
has no plans to offer an ESC on/off switch, it recognizes that some
customers may want to convert a truck tractor to a truck. Volvo
believes that it may be preferable to allow an ESC off switch rather
than having converters disabling the ESC system during a conversion.
    In its comment, Bendix also recommended changing the minimum speed
at which an ESC system is required to operate from 20 km/h (12.4 mph)
to 25 km/h (15.5 mph) to accommodate the wide variation of tires sizes,
tone ring tooth counts, and production tolerances. Bendix said the
higher speed threshold is necessary based on wheel-speed sensor signal
strength and antilock braking system functionality.

B. Response to Comments

    This final rule does not allow a function to disable an ESC system
at speeds where ESC systems are required to operate.
    First, we address the integration between traction control systems
and ESC systems. Both systems use the vehicle's brake control system to
accomplish different goals. Traction control reduces engine power and
applies braking to a spinning drive wheel in order to transfer torque
to the other drive wheel on the axle. This function is used to allow a
vehicle to move forward in certain conditions where wheel spin may
otherwise prevent forward movement. In contrast, ESC systems are
designed to maintain roll and yaw stability rather than facilitate
forward movement.
    While we agree that traction control may need to be disabled in
slippery conditions such as snow or mud or other off-road conditions,
the commenters do not explain why ESC functions must be disabled in
those circumstances. Although ESC may share components with traction
control, the requirements for ESC are independent of those for traction
control. As explained above, ESC mitigates roll and yaw instability of
the vehicle by reducing lateral acceleration and maintaining
directional control, respectively. Although traction control provides
mobility in starting on slippery surfaces, it does not improve lateral
stability beyond what ESC provides through braking and reduction in
engine torque. Likewise, traction control does not improve yaw
stability by providing directional control. Traction control provides
no further assistance when lateral or yaw instability is detected.
    Furthermore, we are not requiring the ESC system to activate at
extremely low vehicle speeds, which is when the vehicle would be
starting from rest. This concern may be remedied by optimizing traction
control, and a manufacturer has the option to activate traction control
or allow deactivation of traction control at any vehicle speed. If the
disablement of traction control also disables the ESC system, then the
disablement function is prohibited from disabling ESC functionality at
speeds above the minimum speed ESC systems are required to operate.
This means that the ESC system must automatically reactivate once the
vehicle reaches the minimum speed at which the ESC system is required
to operate.
    Some of the commenters asserted the need for ESC disablement on
vehicles with all-wheel-drive or multi-steering axles. In FMVSS No.
126, we allow the ESC to be disabled on light vehicles for certain
four-wheel drive modes. None of the commenters asserted any
similarities that truck tractors and large buses have with light
vehicles regarding enhanced traction modes such as four-wheel drive
low. Therefore, we do not believe any exceptions should be made for
all-wheel drive vehicles because there was insufficient data submitted
to justify an exception for heavy vehicles.
    With regard to vehicles with multiple steering axles, we received
no specific information about the vehicle operation and why vehicle
with multiple steer axles should be allowed to have their ESC systems
disabled either by switch or automatically. Without any information,
the agency cannot justify an exception.
    Regarding off-road use, Bendix and Meritor WABCO discussed ESC
tuning differences between on-road and off-road uses in their comments.
However, neither supplier provided detailed reasons for why ESC system
disablement would be beneficial when used in off-road circumstances. In
contrast, Bendix said the off-road situations need ESC disablement at
low speeds and different ESC tuning is expected.
    Regarding Volvo's assertion that an ESC disablement switch may be
preferable to converters disabling ESC during a conversion of a vehicle
from a truck tractor to a truck, we do not believe that this limited
circumstance justifies an ESC disablement switch. Volvo was not
specific on the nature of the conversion it was referring to and why
the ESC system would need to be disabled.
    Bendix suggested that a switch could be allowed to disable an ESC
system below a maximum speed of 25 mph. Bendix believes that this would
allow for maneuverability in slippery conditions such as mud or snow.
Relatedly, Bendix suggested that the minimum ESC operational speed be
raised from the proposed 20 km/h (12.4 mph) to 25 km/h (15.5 mph).
    After considering the comments, we are not raising the minimum
speed at which an ESC system must operate. We proposed the minimum
operating speed of 20 km/h (12.4 mph) based on information we obtained
from vehicle manufacturers and ESC system suppliers, including Bendix.
As we stated in the NPRM, the low speed thresholds of ESC systems were
10 km/h (6.2 mph) for yaw stability control and 20 km/h (12.4 mph) for
roll stability control. We believed that setting a single low speed
threshold was preferable because yaw and roll stability functions are
intertwined. Bendix's recommendation for increasing the minimum speed
criteria presents new information to the agency. We also observe that
the proposed minimum speed threshold is the same as UN ECE Regulation
13. Instead of raising the minimum activation speed, at which an ESC
system must operate, manufacturers may wish to disable the traction
control system, where disabling traction control does not cause the ESC
system to be in a malfunction state, without compromising the
effectiveness of an ESC system. However, once a vehicle reaches a
forward speed of 20 km/h (12.4 mph), the ESC system is required to be
functional to prevent roll and yaw instability. We believe that changes
to the traction control system operation will mitigate the concerns
raised by the commenters regarding

system operability in slippery or off-road conditions.
    Finally, we also sought and received comments on how a manufacturer
would implement an ESC disablement switch. Because we have decided not
to allow ESC disablement above the minimum speed at which ESC is
required to operate, we need not address these comments in this final
rule.

XIII. ESC Malfunction Detection, Telltale, and Activation Indicator

A. ESC Malfunction Detection

    The NPRM proposed that that vehicles would be required to be
equipped with an indicator lamp, mounted in front of and in clear view
of the driver, which would be activated whenever there is a malfunction
that affects the generation or transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle's ESC system. Heavy vehicles presently equipped
with ESC generally do not have a dedicated ESC malfunction lamp.
Instead, they share that function with the mandatory ABS malfunction
indicator lamp or the traction control activation lamp. The agency
proposed requiring a separate ESC malfunction lamp because it would
alert the driver to the malfunction condition of the ESC and would help
to ensure that the malfunction is corrected at the earliest
opportunity.
    The ESC malfunction telltale would be required to remain
illuminated continuously as long as the malfunction exists whenever the
ignition locking system is in the ``On'' (``Run'') position. The
proposal required that ESC malfunction telltale extinguish after the
malfunction has been corrected.
    The NPRM also included a test that would allow the engine to be
running and the vehicle to be in motion as part of the diagnostic
evaluation. The agency proposed simulating several possible
malfunctions to ensure the system and corresponding malfunction
telltale provides the required warning to the vehicle operator, such as
by disconnecting the power source to an ESC system component or
disconnecting an electrical connection to or between ESC system
components. After a malfunction has been simulated and identified by
the system, the system would be restored to normal operation. The
engine is started and the malfunction telltale is checked to ensure it
has cleared.
    We received no adverse comments on the requirement that an ESC
system malfunction be displayed to the driver, nor did we receive
comments on the test procedure for ensuring malfunction detection.
Therefore, we are adopting these requirements as proposed in the NPRM.

B. ESC Malfunction Telltale

    The NPRM proposed requiring that an ESC malfunction lamp provide a
warning to the driver when one or more malfunctions that affect the
generation of control or response signals in the vehicle's electronic
stability control system is detected. Specifically, the ESC malfunction
telltale would be required to be mounted in the driver's compartment in
front of and in clear view of the driver and be identified by the
symbol shown for ``ESC Malfunction Telltale'' or the specified words or
abbreviations listed in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101, Controls and
displays. FMVSS No. 101 includes a requirement for the telltale symbol,
or abbreviation, and the color required for the indicator lamp to show
a malfunction in the ESC system.
    The agency proposed that the symbol and color used to identify ESC
malfunction should be standardized with the symbol used on light
vehicles. The symbol established in FMVSS No. 126 is the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) ESC symbol, designated J.14 in
ISO Standard 2575. The symbol shows the rear of a vehicle trailed by a
pair of ``S'' shaped skid marks, shown below in Figure 3. The
malfunction telltale is displayed in the color yellow, which
communicates the malfunction of a system that does not require
immediate correction. The agency found that the ISO J.14 symbol and
close variations were the symbols used by the greatest number of light
vehicle manufacturers that used an ESC symbol before the requirement
was established. Furthermore, FMVSS No. 126 allows, as an option, the
use of the text ``ESC'' in place of the telltale symbol. This same
option was proposed in the NPRM for heavy vehicles.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR23JN15.010

    In addition to the ESC malfunction telltale being used to warn the
driver of a malfunction in the ESC, the telltale is also used as a
check of lamp function during vehicle start-up. We believe that the ESC
malfunction telltale should be activated as a check of lamp function
either when the ignition locking system is turned to the ``On''
(``Run'') position whether or not the engine is running. This function
provides drivers with the information needed to ensure that the ESC
system is operational before the vehicle is driven. It also provides
Federal and State inspectors with the means to determine the
operational status of the ESC system during a roadside safety
inspection.
    In the regulatory text of the NPRM, we proposed requiring that the
ESC malfunction telltale illuminate only when a malfunction exists.
However, we also required that the telltale illuminate as a check of
lamp function. These two requirements may be read as inconsistent with
each other. We have added language to this final rule to clarify that
the check of lamp function is an exception to the requirement that the
telltale only illuminate in the event of a system malfunction.
    Meritor WABCO commented on the operation of the light and said that
the ESC malfunction lamp should be continuously illuminated if there is
a malfunction in the ESC system. We agree with Meritor WABCO. The
requirement that the indicator lamp be continuously illuminated if
there is a malfunction in the ESC system was included in the proposed
standard and is included in this final rule.
    Bendix recommended a change that would allow a malfunction lamp to

remain illuminated until either the system self-resets with an ignition
cycle or a recommended diagnostic tool can be used to clear faults.
Bendix states that in some cases of faults, their systems are not
guaranteed to self-reset upon correction.
    We are not adopting Bendix's suggested change to allow that the
telltale remain illuminated until a diagnostic tool can be used to
reset a fault. If a diagnostic tool can be used to remedy a fault
without an ignition cycle, there is nothing prohibiting the malfunction
telltale from being extinguished. However, we cannot include in the
malfunction lamp requirements the ability for the telltale to remain
illuminated, even after a malfunction may have been corrected, until a
diagnostic tool can be used. The purpose of the requirement that the
malfunction lamp extinguish upon an ignition cycle after correction of
the problem is that the system should be able to detect both a
malfunction and a correction without the use of external tools. The
malfunction lamp should not extinguish until the fault is actually
corrected.
    We also received comments regarding the ESC system malfunction
telltale itself. Temsa commented that there should be the option to use
the text of ``ESC'' on the malfunction indicator. Temsa reasoned that
this would be more user-friendly. This option was included in the NPRM
and is included in this final rule.
    We received several comments on the depiction of the vehicle in the
telltale. Daimler referred to ECE Regulation 13, which citing ISO 2575,
allows the vehicle shape to be changed to better represent the true
exterior shape of a given vehicle. Daimler also stated that it uses a
heavy truck or bus symbol on its European systems and it may result in
an increased cost if the symbol depicting a passenger car was required
in the U.S. Daimler asserted that the discretion to choose the vehicle
outline should be left to the manufacturer. Similarly ATA and Volvo
recommended that the telltale should depict the rear of a truck tractor
above the ``S'' shaped skid marks.
    In response, we acknowledge desire of the industry to most
accurately depict the type of vehicle being displayed on the ESC system
malfunction telltale. We believe that requiring a symbol depicting the
rear end of a trailer or bus above the ``S'' skid marks will satisfy
the concerns of the manufacturers without causing any confusion
regarding the identification of the telltale. We are including in the
allowable telltales for this Standard trailer and bus symbols drawn
from ISO 2575. We have chosen to depict the rear outline of a trailer
rather than a truck because it is a better depiction of the usual rear
view of a combination vehicle. The symbols are depicted in Figure 4
below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR23JN15.011

C. Combining ESC Malfunction Telltale With Related Systems

    In its comment, CVSA supported NHTSA's proposal to require a
separate ESC malfunction telltale, without which the end user would not
know if the system is operating. Further, CVSA reasoned that an
anticipated Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) rule
would require commercial vehicles with ESC systems be free of any
indicated ESC faults.
    Volvo supported combining the ESC malfunction indicator with a
malfunction indicator for a traction control system. Volvo reasoned
that a malfunction in the traction control system would be likely to
also constitute a malfunction in the ESC system. In a simplified fault
representation system submitted by Volvo, 17 out of 18 faults in a
traction control system were also ESC system faults that would
presumably trigger the ESC malfunction indicator. Volvo reasoned that
having separate lamps for traction control and ESC system faults could
confuse a driver and diminish the importance of addressing the fault.
    Likewise, EMA noted that the current industry practice is to
combine the malfunction indicator lamp for the ESC and traction control
systems. EMA also observed that traction control and ESC systems share
similar components and, thus, tend to fail simultaneously. EMA stated
that by mandating separate traction control and ESC malfunction lamps,
NHTSA would be unnecessarily requiring investment of resources to
change the instrument cluster. EMA stated that in FMVSS No. 126, NHTSA
permits light vehicles to use the ESC malfunction indicator to signal
malfunctions in related systems such as traction control. EMA requested
that NHTSA provide similar flexibility.
    Bendix similarly observed that the current industry practice is to
combine ESC and traction control system malfunction indicators and that
having a third lamp for traction control system malfunctions is
unnecessary. Bendix also stated that the interconnected nature of
traction control and ESC systems means that a failure in one system is
likely to be a failure in the other system.
    In response, the agency must first correct what appears to be a
common misconception shared by the commenters advocating that a
separate traction control malfunction indicator should not be required.
Currently, NHTSA has no performance requirements for traction control
systems and no requirement that a traction control system malfunction
generate a telltale visible to the driver. Thus, to require an ESC-only
telltale does not necessarily require separate telltales for ESC system
malfunctions and traction control system malfunctions. In fact, as the
comments demonstrate, nearly all traction control system malfunctions
would also be ESC system malfunctions and will require an ESC system
malfunction telltale to illuminate. For those limited circumstances
where a traction control system malfunction is not simultaneously an
ESC system malfunction, the manufacturer could

display the malfunction to the driver in any manner that is not
contrary to FMVSS No. 101 or not display the malfunction at all.

D. ESC Activation Indicator

    The agency requested comment on whether there is a safety need for
an ESC activation indicator. We received four comments on the issue.
    Daimler stated that UN ECE Regulation 13 requires an ESC activation
indicator and that the U.S. should allow such an indicator. Daimler
reasoned that the driver would benefit from indication of the
activation of an ESC system because it may allow him to realize that a
more cautious driving style may be appropriate. Moreover, Daimler
argued that it would not be advantageous to have contrary requirements
in the U.S. and Europe.
    Volvo and Bendix stated that it currently provides ESC system
activation indication by flashing the malfunction lamp during system
interventions. Both Volvo and Bendix requested that NHTSA not preclude
the use of system activation indicators. EMA similarly requested
flexibility for manufacturers to allow system activation indicators.
    Based on the comments, NHTSA is allowing, but not requiring, the
use of the ESC malfunction telltale in a flashing mode to indicate ESC
operation. Furthermore, we are expressly excluding this function from
the requirement that the malfunction telltale only illuminate if there
is an ESC system malfunction. We believe that allowing an activation
indicator will give manufacturers flexibility to inform drivers when
the ESC system is activating. However, we are not requiring such an
indicator because we do not believe, nor do we have any data to
suggest, that drivers with activation indicators will perform better
than drivers who are given no indicator. This is consistent with the
agency's decision to allow, but not require, activation indicators on
light vehicles.

XIV. Benefits and Costs

    This section addresses the benefits and costs of the rule,
including estimates of ESC system effectiveness and the size of the
crash population. We also address public comments related to these
issues. Much of the information in this section is derived from the
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA) associated with this final
rule, which has been placed in the docket.

A. Target Crash Population

    The initial target crash population for estimating benefits
includes all crashes resulting in occupant fatalities, MAIS 1 and above
nonfatal injuries, and property damage only crashes that were the
result of either (a) first-event untripped rollover crashes and (b)
loss-of-control crashes (e.g., jackknife, cargo shift, avoiding,
swerving) that involved truck tractors or large buses and might be
prevented if the subject vehicle were equipped with a stability control
system.
    We updated the estimates from the NPRM which used the 2006-2008
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and General Estimate System
(GES) to used 2006-2012 FARS and GES data. The FARS data were used for
evaluating fatal crashes and the GES data were used for evaluating
nonfatal crashes. The updated crash data showed a lower number of
rollover crashes and injuries from rollover crashes compared to the
NPRM, but a higher number of fatalities from rollover crashes.
Conversely, there are a higher overall number of loss-of-control
crashes and injuries resulting from those crashes compared to the NPRM,
but a lower number of fatalities from loss-of-control crashes. The
estimated number of crashes, fatalities, injuries, and deaths that make
up the initial target population are summarized in the following table.

     Table 4--Initial Target Crashes, MAIS Injuries, and Property Damage Only Vehicle Crashes by Crash Type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Crash type                         Crashes       Fatalities       Injuries           PDO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover........................................           4,577             122           1,957           2,510
Loss of control.................................           6,266             184           1,510           5,351
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................          10,843             306           3,467           7,861
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 2006-2012 FARS, 2006-2012 GES.
PDO: property damage only.

    The 2006-2012 crash data were then adjusted to take account of the
estimated ESC and RSC system installation rates in model year 2018. To
determine the number of crashes that could be prevented by requiring
that ESC systems be installed on new truck tractors, the agency had to
consider two subsets of the total crash population--those vehicles that
would not be equipped with stability control systems (Base 1
population) and those vehicles that would be equipped with RSC systems
(Base 2 population). The Base 1 population will benefit fully from this
final rule. However, the Base 2 population will benefit only from the
incremental increased effectiveness of ESC systems over RSC systems.
    Based upon manufacturer production estimates, about 26.2 percent of
truck tractors manufactured in model year 2012 were equipped with ESC
systems and 16.0 percent were equipped with RSC systems. We also
estimate that 80 percent of large buses subject to this final rule are
equipped with ESC systems. Based upon historical rates of increase of
installation of ESC and RSC systems, from 2013 to 2018 (which is the
base model year for the cost and benefit analysis), we expect the rate
of ESC system installation to increase by approximately 15 percent
annually and the rate of RSC system installation to increase by about 5
percent annually. Thus, by 2018, we expect that 33.9 percent of
vehicles would be equipped with ESC systems and 21.3 percent of
vehicles would be equipped with ESC systems. We would not expect that
the installation rate on buses would change substantially before 2018.
Adjusting the initial target crash populations using these estimates,
the agency was able to estimate the Base 1 and Base 2 populations and
the projected target crash population (Base 1 + Base 2) expressed in
the following table.

     Table 5-Projected Crashes, MAIS Injuries, and Property Damage Only Vehicle Crashes by Crash Type, Crash
                              Severity, Injury Severity, and Vehicle Type for 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Crash type                         Crashes       Fatalities       Injuries           PDO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Base 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover........................................           2,099              56             898           1,151
Loss of Control.................................           2,813              83             678           2,403
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................           4,912             139           1,576           3,554
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Base 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover........................................             998              27             426             547
Loss of Control.................................           1,337              39             322           1,142
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................           2,335              66             748           1,689
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Base 1 + Base 2 (Projected Target Population)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover........................................           3,097              83           1,324           1,698
Loss of Control.................................           4,150             122           1,000           3,545
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................           7,247             205           2,324           5,243
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 2006-2012 FARS, 2006-2012 GES.
PDO: property damage only.

    The agency has also examined the same crash data sources for large
buses. Based upon this examination, the agency estimates that an
average of two target rollover and three loss-of-control crashes that
would be affected by ESC systems occur annually. The small number of
crashes combined with the high projected voluntary ESC system
installation rate causes the benefits resulting from this final rule
attributable to buses to be very small. Therefore, the benefits
estimates for buses are not further presented and the benefits of this
final rule are assumed to be the benefits derived only from truck
tractors.

B. System Effectiveness

1. Summary of the NPRM
    As we stated in the NPRM, direct data that would show the
effectiveness of stability control systems is not available because
stability control technology on heavy vehicles is relatively new.
Accordingly, the effectiveness rates presented in the NPRM were built
upon from three earlier studies: (1) A 2008 study on RSC that was
conducted by American Transportation Research Institute and sponsored
by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA),\63\ (2) a
2009 study that was conducted by UMTRI and Meritor WABCO and sponsored
by NHTSA,\64\ and (3) The 2011 NHTSA Research Note.\65\ The
effectiveness rates from the first two studies were based on computer
simulation results, expert panel assessments of available crash data,
input from trucking fleets that had adopted the technology, and
research experiments. The third study refined the effectiveness that
was established in the second study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Murray, D., Shackelford S., House, A., Analysis of Benefits
and Costs of Roll Stability Control Systems, FMCSA-PRT-08-007
October 2008.
    \64\ Woodrooffe, J., Blower, D., and Green, P., Safety Benefits
of Stability Control Systems for Tractor-Semitrailers, DOT HS 811
205, October 2009.
    \65\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0034-0043.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    None of these studies derived the effectiveness from a statistical
analysis of real-world crashes. Such statistical analyses require a
comparison of vehicles with and without the technology. This is not
feasible because ESC and RSC penetration in the national fleet of truck
tractors is still small. ESC and RSC are relatively new technologies
that have only been installed on a small percentage of new tractors
over the past few years.
2. Summary of Comments and Response
    ATA, Schneider, OOIDA, EMA, Bendix, and Martec commented on the
agency's effectiveness estimates. ATA, Schneider, and OOIDA all relied
upon a study by the American Transportation Research Institute entitled
``Roll Stability Systems: Cost Benefit Analysis of Roll Stability
Control Verses Electronic Stability Control Using Empirical Crash
Data.'' EMA and OOIDA both criticized the use of simulation and expert
analysis data as a substitute for real-world data. OOIDA asserted that
the ATRI study represented real-world data that did not support
requiring vehicles to have ESC systems. EMA asserted that, with so many
trucks on the road currently equipped with stability control systems,
real-world data ought to be available. Martec presented a rebuttal to
the ATRI study. Bendix conducted its own ESC and RSC system
effectiveness study using a method similar to that used by NHTSA.
(a) ATRI Study
    ATRI's study concluded that equipping vehicles with RSC systems
would result in fewer rollover, jackknife, and tow/struck crashes
compared to ESC systems. The ATRI study used crash data, miles
traveled, and financial information that they collected through their
survey of 14 large and mid-size motor carriers. Of these carriers, 81.5
percent were in the truckload sector, 10.0 percent were in the less-
than-truckload sector, and 8.5 percent were in the specialized sector.
The ATRI sample included 135,712 trucks; of these trucks, 68,647
(50.6%) were equipped with RSC systems, 39,529 (29.1%) with ESC
systems, and 27,536 (20.3%) with no stability control systems. Using
the data received, ATRI calculated the crash rate per 100 million miles
traveled, the crash cost per 1,000 miles traveled, and annual benefits
and crash costs for three truck groups: Those with ESC systems, those
with RSC systems, and those with no stability control systems. The
group with no stability control systems served as the baseline to
compare the other two groups. ATRI concluded that, if their sample is
consistent with the industry as whole, RSC would result in fewer

rollover, jackknife, and tow/struck crashes than ESC. RSC also would
provide greater benefits and lower installation costs than ESC.
    Martec was asked by Bendix to evaluate the ATRI's study. Martec
asserted that the methods employed by ATRI do not meet basic standards
found in the global market research industry. Martec stated that,
because the methods ATRI employed in its study were inadequate, the
results cannot be used to draw any meaningful conclusions about the
overall trucking industry's experience with stability control systems
or the analysis of the costs and benefits of individual technologies as
sold into the marketplace.
    Martec reached four conclusions regarding ATRI's study. First,
ATRI's study demonstrated confirmation bias by elaborating on its
hypotheses and stating that the results of its research will be used to
``inform responses'' to a proposed NHTSA mandate. Second, ATRI's study
lost objectivity by not collecting all evidence in a controlled and
systematic way so that the results can be replicated and validated by
other researchers and by not making an attempt to assure that its
sample of fleets was random. Third, ATRI's study is biased due to
disproportionate sampling that is not representative of the industry.
Fourth, ATRI's study lacks the necessary statistical tests to address
the uncertainty of the statistics.
    We largely agree with Martec's conclusions regarding the ATRI
study. Based in these concerns, we conclude that it is inappropriate to
use ATRI's results to calculate the benefits and the cost-effectiveness
of ESC and RSC systems.
    ATRI's sample is subjected to self-selection bias. When soliciting
data, ATRI revealed the research hypothesis in their data request form,
as shown in Appendix A of the ATRI report: ``ATRI's Research Advisory
Committee hypothesized that, while ESC has more crash mitigation
sensors than RSC systems, the higher per-unit cost of ESC may not make
it as `cost-effective' as RSC.'' Furthermore, in the survey form, ATRI
stated that its research is intended to inform responses to NHTSA's
NPRM, which proposed to mandate ESC systems on all new equipment two
years after the rule goes into effect.
    By revealing the hypothesis and the very specific intention of
survey, ATRI potentially biased the participants' responses in favor of
RSC systems. Carriers who have strong opinions in favor of RSC systems
over ESC systems may have been more willing to respond than those who
did not respond. We believe that this happened given that trucks with
RSC systems (50.6 percent) and ESC systems (29.1 percent) are
substantially overrepresented in the ATRI's sample. The self-reporting
bias is further evidenced by the lack of accurate representation of
trucking industry and counterintuitive crash rate outcome. Based on
ATRI's data, the respondents skewed towards the truckload sector (e.g.,
dry van, refrigerated, flatbed, intermodal container, and end-dump
carriers) compared to the overall industry and thus does not represent
the truck industry as a whole. Therefore, ATRI's results may not be
attributed to the effects of RSC systems and ESC systems, but rather to
the sample bias from self-reporting.
    The quality of the self-reporting is also questionable, as
evidenced by the crash rates per 100 million miles traveled as shown in
Table 1 of ATRI's report. The report states that trucks equipped with
ESC systems had higher rollover and jackknife crash rates than trucks
equipped with RSC systems. Given that ESC systems include all of the
functionality of an RSC system, that ESC systems have additional
braking capability, and that ESC has substantially more effect on loss-
of-control crashes, these rates are illogical. These illogical results
most likely can be explained by the impact of self-selection in the
sample.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ The results may also reflect that the RSC systems could be
tuned to be more sensitive to allow them to brake more aggressively.
We noted this possibility in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ATRI used control and comparison methodology to examine RSC and
ESC. In its approach, ATRI used the trucks without stability control as
the control group and compared the crash rates of trucks equipped with
ESC and RSC systems to those of the control group. For this approach,
controlling confounding factors (i.e., factors other than the
technologies of interest that would influence the crash rates) is
critical in order to draw valid conclusions. There is no indication
that ATRI investigated whether the three groups have similar
characteristics. For example, if the majority of trucks in the control
group were specialty trucks and specialty trucks were prone to rollover
crashes while the ESC and RSC groups were overrepresented by a
different truck sector that would prone to loss-of-control crashes,
then the ATRI results are not valid to address the difference between
ESC and RSC.
    ATRI acknowledged that there are some confounding factors that were
not controlled for. However, ATRI did not try to identify these factors
and examine the effects of these factors. Examining the confounding
factors is essential to the validity of the analysis. With these
concerns, the agency believes that it is inappropriate to use ATRI's
results to support this final rule.
    There are no other sources of real-world data available to NHTSA
that discriminate between crashes involving heavy vehicles equipped
with stability control systems and those that do not. The UMTRI study,
which includes case reviews and simulation, which has been reviewed and
slightly modified by NHTSA, represents the best estimate available to
the agency regarding the effectiveness of stability control systems.
(b) Bendix Study
    Bendix stated that, based on over 30 years of experience on
commercial vehicle dynamic, braking, and stability control systems, the
agency's assessment of the effectiveness of ESC systems is
conservative. Bendix reviewed the 159 cases that were used as the basis
for the agency's effectiveness estimates and re-rated ESC and RSC
system effectiveness based on its experience. Furthermore, Bendix
identified some of these 159 cases that were not stability-control
relevant and included additional cases that agency did not identify as
relevant. Based upon these changes and Bendix's own estimates of ESC
and RSC system effectiveness, Bendix concluded that ESC systems are 31
percent greater than RSC systems. The gap is much wider that the 6 to 7
percent estimated by NHTSA. Table 6 shows the effectiveness from
Bendix's analysis and those estimated by NHTSA in the NPRM.

                  Table 6--Effectiveness Comparison Between Bendix's Analysis and NHTSA's NPRM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Bendix                              NHTSA's NPRM
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Overall      Rollover       LOC        Overall      Rollover       LOC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESC...............................           78           83           69        28-36        40-56           14
RSC...............................           47           58           26        21-30        37-53            3
Difference........................           31           25           43          6-7            3           12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency believes that Bendix's method of determining system
effectiveness is biased in favor of ESC systems. Prior to issuing the
NPRM, the agency had shared its concerns with Bendix's assignment of
effectiveness at two meetings. The agency identified four issues.
    First, for many rollover crashes, Bendix assigned a significant
higher effectiveness to ESC systems compared to RSC systems. Based on
the agency's understanding of ESC and RSC system functions to prevent
rollover crashes, the agency's engineers did not believe the difference
between ESC and RSC would be as pronounced as Bendix had estimated.
Second, Bendix assigned a relatively high effectiveness for RSC systems
against loss-of-control crashes. However, the agency's testing suggests
that RSC systems would have a small effect on loss-of-control crashes.
Third, although Bendix categorized some of the cases addressed by NHTSA
as not relevant, Bendix still assigned effectiveness for those cases.
This seems contradictory. Finally, Bendix included additional cases
that were not included by NHTSA and UMTRI. However, these cases
included truck types that are not covered by the NPRM or this final
rule. Thus, while we commend Bendix for undertaking the review that
NHTSA and UMTRI undertook to review individual crash cases, we cannot
agree with the conclusion that ESC systems are substantially more
effective that RSC systems at preventing rollover crashes.
3. Effectiveness Estimate
    In this final rule, we are generally using the effectiveness
estimate used the NPRM, which was derived from 2011 research note.
However, we have made two modifications. First, we have included an
additional loss-of-control crash type (non-collision single-vehicle
jackknife crashes) that should have been included in the PRIA. Second,
because we added an additional loss-of-control crash type, we have
reweighted the ratio of rollover to loss-of-control crashes. However,
these modifications have not substantially changed the effectiveness
rates for ESC and RSC systems from the rates presented in the NPRM. As
shown in Table 7, ESC systems are considered to be 3 percent more
effective than RSC systems at reducing rollover crashes and 12 percent
more effective at reducing loss-of-control crashes.

   Table 7--Effectiveness Rates for ESC and RSC by Target Crash Types
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Technology               Overall      Rollover       LOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESC..............................        25-32        40-56           14
RSC..............................        17-24        37-53            2
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the J-turn performance test does not measure an ESC
system's ability to prevent loss-of-control crashes resulting from yaw
instability, the equipment requirement ensures some level of yaw
stability performance. Our assessment for yaw stability control
performance is based on the ability of current generation ESC systems
to prevent yaw instability, just as our assessment for roll stability
performance (which does have an associated performance test) is based
on the ability of current generation ESC systems to prevent roll
instability.

C. Benefits Estimates

1. Safety Benefits
    The crash benefits of this final rule were derived by multiplying
the projected target population, including fatalities, injuries, and
property damage only crashes by the effectiveness rate for both
rollover and loss-of-control crashes. The benefits estimate for
rollover crashes are presented as a range because the ESC effectiveness
rate is a range. In contrast, there is only one estimate of benefits
for loss-of-control crashes. Table 8 presents the benefits of this
final rule. As shown in that table, this final rule will prevent 1,424
to 1,759 crashes, 40 to 49 fatalities, and 505 to 649 injuries.

                                       Table 8--Benefits of the Final Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Crash type                         Crashes       Fatalities       Injuries           PDO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover........................................       870-1,205           23-32         372-516         476-661
LOC.............................................             554              17             133             473
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................     1,424-1,759           40-49         505-649       949-1,134
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Monetized Benefits
    ESC systems are crash avoidance systems. Preventing a crash not
only saves lives and reduces injuries, but it also provides tangible
benefits associated with the reduction in crashes. These benefits
include savings from medical care, emergency services, insurance
administration, workplace costs, legal costs, congestion, property
damage, and productivity. We have broken down these benefits into those
that are injury related and those that are non-injury related. Of the
listed

benefits, congestion and property damage reduction are non-injury-
related benefits, and the others are injury-related benefits. These
benefits are estimated based upon periodic examinations of the economic
impact of vehicle crashes. The most recent analysis was completed in
2014.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Blincoe, L. J., Miller, T. R., Zaloshnja, E., & Lawrence,
B. A., The economic and societal impact of motor vehicle crashes,
2010, (May 2014) (DOT HS 812 013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also monetized benefits in terms of the value of a
statistical life (VSL), which represents individuals' willingness to
pay to reduce the risk of dying. These benefits include the value of
quality of life, household productivity, and after-tax wages. These
benefits are realized through the life of the vehicle and must be
discounted to reflect their value at the time of purchase.
    June 2014 guidance from the Department's Office of the Secretary
sets forth guidance for the treatment of VSL in regulatory
analysis.\68\ This guidance establishes a VSL of $9.2 million for
analyses based on 2013 economics and a 1.18 percent annual adjustment
rate for the VSL for the next 30 years. The VSL is adjusted to reflect
real increases in VSL that are likely to occur in the future as
consumers become economically better off in real terms over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ 2014 Office of the Secretary memorandum on the ``Guidance
on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in U.S.
Department of Transportation Analyses--2014 Adjustment., June 13,
2014'' http://www.dot.gov/regulations/economic-values-used-in-analysis
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using this guidance applied to the prevention of crashes resulting
in fatalities, injuries, and property damage only, the following
undiscounted monetized benefits of this final rule are estimated.

       Table 9--Undiscounted Monetized Benefits of the Final Rule
                             [2013 Dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Low            High
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Societal Economic Savings for                $27,013,989     $34,526,917
 Crashworthiness........................
Congestion and Property Damage..........      14,234,540      17,566,251
Societal Economic Savings Total.........      41,248,529      52,093,168
VSL.....................................     484,836,271     603,762,776
                                         -------------------------------
    Total Monetized Savings.............     526,084,800     655,855,944
------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Cost Estimate

    In the NPRM, we relied upon data received from manufacturers to
estimate the costs of implementing the proposal to require ESC systems
on truck tractors and large buses. Based upon these submissions, NHTSA
calculated that the average cost of an ESC system for both truck
tractors and buses was $1,160 and the average cost of an RSC system was
$640. Based on our estimates that 150,000 truck tractors and 2,200
buses would be covered by the proposal, and the estimates of 2012 ESC
and RSC system adoption in the fleet, we estimated that the total cost
of the proposal would be $113.6 million in 2010 economics. Furthermore,
we estimated that the proposed SIS and SWD test maneuvers would cost
approximately $15,000 per test to run, assuming availability of test
facilities, tracks, and vehicles.
    We received specific a comment on the costs of ESC system from
Bendix. Bendix stated that they did not see a correlation between the
cost differential estimated in the PRIA and those from Bendix to its
OEM customers. Bendix did not specify their cost differential. However,
Bendix stated that when ESC was mandated, they believed the cost would
be in the lower end of estimates. Thus, the net benefits of ESC would
be further increased.
    After publishing the NPRM, the agency published a cost teardown
study for ESC and RSC systems for heavy trucks to assess the required
components and their unit costs. The results were published in a report
titled, ``Cost and Weight Analysis of Electronic Stability Control and
Roll Stability Control for Heavy Trucks,'' on October 25, 2012.\69\ The
study looked at the incremental costs of equipping vehicles with ESC
and RSC systems over a baseline of ABS by looking at one truck equipped
only with ABS, two truck tractors equipped with RSC, one truck tractor
equipped with ESC, and one large bus equipped with ESC. The following
table shows the components and the cost of each component on the five
vehicles that were examined.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0066-0034.
    \70\ The cost teardown study is in 2011 economics, and it was
revised to 2013 economics using an implicit price deflator
(1.033=106.588/103.199).

                                         Table 10--Component Cost Estimates for Baseline ABS and Four Stability Technology Systems in 2013 Dollars \70\
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        ABS WABCO tractor      RSC Bendix tractor             RSC WABCO tractor                 ESC Bendix large bus                  ESC WABCO tractor
                                            baseline        ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    ------------------------
                                      component     total     component     total     component           total           component           total           component           total
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wheel Speed Sensor.................      $11.85      $47.40           X           X           X  X.....................           X  X.....................           X  X
Wheel Speed Cables.................        5.32       21.28           X           X           X  X.....................           X  X.....................           X  X
Dual Modulator Valves..............      284.82      569.64           X           X           X  X.....................           X  X.....................           X  X
Modulator Valve Cables.............       10.50       42.00           X           X           X  X.....................           X  X.....................           X  X
ECU................................       90.05       90.05           X           X           X  X.....................           X  X.....................           X  X
Delta ECU *........................  ..........  ..........       37.80       37.80       50.36  50.36.................       37.80  37.80.................       43.58  43.58
Solenoid Valves....................  ..........  ..........       29.20       58.40       29.20  58.40.................       29.20  58.40.................       29.20  87.60
Solenoid Valve Cables..............  ..........  ..........        9.58       19.16        9.58  19.16.................        9.58  19.16.................        9.58  28.74
Lateral Accelerometer..............  ..........  ..........       49.74       49.74  ..........  In ECU................  ..........  In Yaw Sensor.........  ..........  In ESC Module

Modulator Valve (for trailer)**....  ..........  ..........      197.82      197.82      197.82  197.82................  ..........  ......................      197.82  197.82
Modulator Valve Cables (for          ..........  ..........       10.50       10.50       10.50  10.50.................  ..........  ......................       10.50  10.50
 trailer).
Yaw Rate Sensor....................  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ......................       51.38  51.38.................  ..........  In ESC Module
Pressure Sensor....................  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ......................        2.14  6.42..................        2.14  6.42
Pressure Sensor Cable..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ......................       10.12  30.36.................       10.12  30.36
Steering Angle Sensor..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ......................       29.50  29.50.................       29.50  29.50
ESC Module.........................  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ......................  ..........  ......................       85.48  85.48
ESC Module Cable...................  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ......................  ..........  ......................       28.86  28.86
Baseline ABS Cost..................  ..........      770.37  ..........  ..........  ..........  ......................  ..........  ......................  ..........  .......................
Incremental Costs Above Baseline     ..........  ..........  ..........      373.42  ..........  336.24................  ..........  233.02................  ..........  548.86
 ABS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Delta ECU is an incremental cost estimate over the cost of WABCO Tractor Baseline ABS ECU.
** Modulator Valve for trailer is added as a component in Bendix Tractor RSC, Meritor-WABCO Tractor RSC and Meritor-WABCO Tractor ESC since it is required to be installed in trailers in the
  final rule.

    Furthermore, the installation of an ESC system requires a
technician to tune a system for each vehicle. We estimate that it will
take one hour of labor to perform this task at the cost of $33.40.
Additionally, this final rule requires the installation of a telltale
lamp using specific symbols or text. We estimate the cost of this lamp
and associated wiring at $2.96. Thus, we estimate the total cost for
installing an ESC system to be $585.22 on truck tractors and $269.38 on
large buses. We have averaged the two estimates of the cost to install
an RSC system, which is $391.19.\71\ We note that this estimate
generally corresponds to the lower end of the cost estimate in the
FRIA, which is consistent with Bendix's comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Unlike in the NPRM, the cost of installing an ESC system on
a bus is considered to be substantially less than on a truck
tractor. This is because an ESC system on a bus is not required to
control a trailer's brakes.

   Table 11--Summary of ESC and RSC System Unit Cost Estimates in 2013
                                 Dollars
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESC.....................................................         $585.22
RSC.....................................................          391.19
ESC Incremental over RSC................................          194.03
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also examined the effect of increased costs on vehicle
sales. We expect that the cost of ESC systems is relatively small
compared to the estimated average cost of a truck tractor of $110,000.
We expect that this cost will be passed on to purchasers of truck
tractors and large buses. Those purchasers have indicated that truck
operating costs represent about 21 percent of total operating costs,
and that the elasticity of demand for truck freight is approximately -
1.174. Thus, we believe that the increased costs of truck tractors
related to this final rule will reduce truck tractor sales by 101 units
per year. We expect that this rule will have even less of an impact on
the sales of large buses, because the average cost of a bus affected by
this rule is approximately $400,000.
    Based on our assumptions regarding costs and the estimates of ESC
and RSC system penetration in the market in 2018, we expect that this
final rule will result in a total cost of $45.6 million. The costs are
set forth in Tables 12 and 13. This total cost is based upon 21.3
percent of truck tractors sold annually upgrading from RSC systems to
ESC systems, 44.8 percent of truck tractors sold annually without
stability control systems installing ESC systems, and 20.0 percent of
large buses sold annually without stability control systems installing
ESC systems.

                                     Table 12--Total Cost of the Final Rule
                                                    [2013 $]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Technology Upgrade Needed
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                                Upgrade RSC to
                                                                       None             ESC             ESC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Truck Tractors:
    % Needing Improvements......................................           33.9%           21.3%           44.8%
    150,000 Sales Estimated.....................................          50,850          31,950          67,200
    Costs per Affected Vehicle..................................               0         $194.03         $585.22
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
        Total Costs.............................................               0          $6.2 M         $39.3 M
Large Buses:
    % Needing Improvements......................................             80%              0%             20%
    2,200 Sales Estimated.......................................           1,760               0             440
    Costs per Affected Vehicle..................................               0              NA         $269.38
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
        Total Costs.............................................               0            $0 M          $0.1 M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
M: million.

                   Table 13--Summary of Vehicle Costs
                                [2013 $]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Average
                                           vehicle costs    Total costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Truck Tractors..........................         $303.50         $45.5 M
Large Buses.............................           53.90           0.1 M
                                         -------------------------------
    Total...............................          299.90          45.6 M
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency estimates that the cost of executing the J-turn test
maneuvers will be $13,400 per truck tractor and $20,100 per large bus,
assuming access is available to test facilities, tracks, and vehicles.
The costs include preparation, brake burnish test, and other
miscellaneous preparations and required equipment. Table 14 presents
these estimated costs. In addition, for comparison purpose, the table
also includes the costs for SWD maneuver that was proposed in the
NPRM.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ We have revised the estimated SWD maneuver costs from the
PRIA. In the PRIA, the estimated cost for SWD is $15,000 which
included $10,000 for preparing for and executing the maneuvers,
$2,000 for executing FMVSS No. 121 brake burnish test, and $3,000
for other miscellaneous preparations and required equipment.

                              Table 14--Estimated Compliance Test Cost per Vehicle
                                                    [2013 $]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              J-Turn                            SWD
                   Cost Items                    ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Tractor        Large Bus        Tractor        Large Bus
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Preparing for and executing the test               $8,400.00      $12,800.00      $10,800.00      $14,700.00
 maneuvers,.....................................
(2) Executing brake burnish test, and...........        2,600.00        3,600.00        2,600.00        3,600.00
(3) Other miscellaneous preparations and                2,400.00        3,700.00        3,400.00        4,800.00
 required equipment such as.....................
    (a) Brake conditioning between maneuvers,
    (b) Jackknife cable maintenance,
    (c) ballast loading, and
    (d) Post data processing, i.e., LAR and
     Torque reduction process
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Sum.....................................       13,400.00       20,100.00       16,800.00       23,100.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Cost Effectiveness

    Safety benefits can occur at any time during the vehicle's
lifetime. Therefore, the benefits are discounted at both 3 and 7
percent to reflect their values in 2013 dollars, as reflected in Table
15. Table 15 also shows that the net cost per equivalent life saved
from this final rule range from $0.1 to $0.3 million at a 3 percent
discount rate and from $0.3 to $0.6 million at a 7 percent discount
rate. The net benefits of this final rule are estimated to range from
$412 to $525 million at a 3 percent discount rate and from $312 to $401
million at a 7 percent discount rate.

                    Table 15--Summary of Cost-Effectiveness and Net Benefits by Discount Rate
                                                    [2013 $]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            3% Discount                     7% Discount
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Low            High             Low            High
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatal Equivalents...............................              40              50              32              40
Societal Economic Savings for Crashworthiness...     $21,816,498     $27,883,938     $17,288,953     $22,097,227
Congestion and Property Damage..................      11,495,815      14,186,504       9,110,106      11,242,401
Total Societal Economic Savings (1).............      33,312,313      42,070,442      26,399,059      33,339,628
VSL.............................................     424,352,045     528,442,215     331,681,943     413,040,877
Total Monetized Savings (2).....................     457,664,358     570,512,657     358,081,002     446,380,505
Vehicle Costs *.................................      45,644,570      45,644,570      45,644,570      45,644,570
Net Costs (3)...................................      12,332,257       3,574,128      19,245,511      12,304,942
Net Cost Per Fatal Equivalent (4)...............         308,306          71,483         601,422         307,624
Net Benefits (5)................................     412,019,788     524,868,087     312,436,432     400,735,935
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Vehicle costs are not discounted, since they occur when the vehicle is purchased, whereas benefits occur over
  the vehicle's lifetime and are discounted back to the time of purchase.
(1) = Societal Economic Savings for Crashworthiness + VSL Savings.
(2) = Societal Economic Savings + VSL.
(3) = Vehicle Costs - Total Societal Economic Savings.
(4) = Net Costs/Fatal Equivalents.
(5) = VSL - Net Costs.

F. Comparison of Regulatory Alternatives

    The agency considered two alternatives to this final rule. The
first alternative was requiring RSC systems be installed on all newly
manufactured truck tractors and buses covered by this final rule. The
second alternative was requiring RSC systems be installed on all newly
manufactured trailers.
    Regarding the first alternative, requiring RSC systems be installed
on truck tractors and large buses, our research has concluded that RSC
systems are less effective than ESC systems. An RSC system is only
slightly less effective at preventing rollover crashes than an ESC
system, but it is much less effective at preventing loss-of-control
crashes. However, RSC systems are estimated to cost less than ESC
systems. Furthermore, only approximately 44.8% of truck tractors will
be required to install RSC systems based on data regarding
manufacturers' plans and the agency's estimates of ESC and RSC system
adoption rates between 2012 and 2018.
    A summary of the cost effectiveness of RSC systems is set forth in
Table 16. When comparing this alternative to this final rule, requiring
RSC systems rather than ESC systems would be slightly more cost
effective. However, this alternative would save fewer lives and have
lower net benefits than this final rule. Consequently, the agency has
rejected this alternative.

                    Table 16--Summary of Cost-Effectiveness and Net Benefits by Discount Rate
                               Alternative 1--Requiring Tractor-Based RSC Systems
                                                    [2013 $]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            3% Discount                     7% Discount
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Low            High             Low            High
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatal Equivalents...............................              25              35              20              28
Societal Economic Savings--Crashworthiness......     $14,708,167     $20,700,276     $11,655,804     $16,404,380
Congestion and Property Damage..................       6,694,636       9,378,093       5,305,308       7,431,871
Total Societal Economic Savings (1).............      21,402,803      30,078,369      16,961,112      23,836,251
VSL.............................................     260,249,473     363,828,274     203,416,130     284,375,367
Total Monetized Savings (2).....................     281,652,276     393,906,643     220,377,242     308,211,618
Vehicle Costs *.................................      26,406,495      26,406,495      26,406,495      26,406,495
Net Costs (3)...................................       5,003,692      -3,671,874       9,445,383       2,570,244
Net Cost Per Fatal Equivalent (4)...............         200,148             N/A         472,269          91,794
Net Benefits (5)................................     255,245,781     367,500,148     193,970,747     281,805,123
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Vehicle costs are not discounted, since they occur when the vehicle is purchased, whereas benefits occur over
  the vehicle's lifetime and are discounted back to the time of purchase.
(1) = Societal Economic Savings - Crashworthiness + VSL Savings.
(2) = Societal Economic Savings + VSL.
(3) = Vehicle Costs - Total Societal Economic Savings; Cost per equivalent life saved is not presented where the
  alternative results in negative net cost because there would be no cost per equivalent life saved.
(4) = Net Costs/Fatal Equivalents.
(5) = VSL - Net Costs.

    The second alternative considered was requiring trailer-based RSC
systems to be installed on all newly manufactured trailers. Trailer-
based RSC systems are only expected to prevent rollover crashes. Based
on 2006-2012 GES data, 98 percent of the target truck-tractor crashes
involve truck tractors with trailers attached. Therefore, the base
crash population is 98 percent of Base 1 discussed above.
    As discussed in the NPRM, it became apparent during testing that
trailer-based stability control systems were less effective than
tractor-based systems because trailer-based systems could only control
the trailer's brakes. Based upon the agency's testing of trailer-based
RSC systems using a 150-foot J-turn test maneuver, the benefits of
trailer-based RSC systems in preventing rollover are about 17.6 percent
of tractor-based ESC systems, corresponding to an effectiveness rate of
7 to 10 percent.
    The agency estimates that about 217,000 new trailers are
manufactured each year. Further, based on information from
manufacturers, the agency estimates that a trailer-based RSC system
costs $400 per trailer. Available data indicates that as much as 5
percent of the current annual production of trailers comes with RSC
systems installed. Assuming all new trailers would be required to
install RSC, the cost of this alternative is estimated to be $74.7
million.
    Table 17 sets forth a summary of the cost effectiveness of trailer-
based RSC systems. Because the operational life of a trailer
(approximately 45 years) is much longer than that of a truck tractor,
it would take longer for trailer-based RSC systems to fully penetrate
the fleet than it would for any tractor-based system. Therefore, when
the benefits of trailer-based RSC systems are discounted at a 3 and 7
percent rate, there is a much higher discount factor. As can be seen in
Table 17, this results in this alternative having negative net benefits
and a high cost per life saved. Also, this alternative would have no
effect on buses. Accordingly, the agency has rejected this alternative.

                    Table 17--Summary of Cost-Effectiveness and Net Benefits by Discount Rate
                               Alternative 2--Requiring Trailer-Based RSC Systems
                                                    [2013 $]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            3% Discount                     7% Discount
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Low            High             Low            High
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatal Equivalents...............................               3               3               2               2

Societal Economic Savings--Crashworthiness......      $1,571,042      $2,036,588      $1,057,467      $1,370,825
Congestion and Property Damage..................         684,213         938,236         460,543         631,526
Total Societal Economic Savings (1).............       2,255,255       2,974,824       1,518,010       2,002,351
VSL.............................................      30,196,954      39,659,995      19,696,851      25,869,398
Total Monetized Savings (2).....................      32,452,209      42,634,819      21,214,861      27,871,749
Vehicle Costs *.................................      74,734,800      74,734,800      74,734,800      74,734,800
Net Costs (3)...................................      72,479,545      71,759,976      73,216,790      72,732,449
Net Cost Per Fatal Equivalent (4)...............      24,159,848      23,919,992      36,608,395      36,366,225
Net Benefits (5)................................     -42,282,591     -32,099,981     -53,519,939     -46,863,051
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Vehicle costs are not discounted, since they occur when the vehicle is purchased, whereas benefits occur over
  the vehicle's lifetime and are discounted back to the time of purchase.
(1) = Societal Economic Savings - Crashworthiness + VSL Savings.
(2) = Societal Economic Savings + VSL.
(3) = Vehicle Costs - Total Societal Economic Savings; negative means benefits are greater than the cost.
(4) = Net Costs/Fatal Equivalents.
(5) = VSL - Net Costs.

XV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures

    NHTSA has considered the impact of this rulemaking action under
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and the Department of
Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures. This rulemaking is
considered economically significant and was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget under E.O. 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and
Review.'' The rulemaking action has also been determined to be
significant under the Department's regulatory policies and procedures.
NHTSA has placed in the docket a Final Regulatory Impact Analysis
(FRIA) describing the benefits and costs of this rulemaking action. The
benefits and costs are summarized in section XIV of this preamble.
    Consistent with Executive Order 13563 and to the extent permitted
under the Vehicle Safety Act, we have considered the cumulative effects
of the new regulations stemming from NHTSA's 2007 ``NHTSA's Approach to
Motorcoach Safety'' plan, DOT's 2009 Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, and
the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act, and have taken steps to identify
opportunities to harmonize and streamline those regulations. By
coordinating the timing and content of the rulemakings, our goal is to
expeditiously maximize the net benefits of the regulations (by either
increasing benefits or reducing costs or a combination of the two)
while simplifying requirements on the public and ensuring that the
requirements are justified. We seek to ensure that this coordination
will also simplify the implementation of multiple requirements on a
single industry.
    NHTSA's Motorcoach Safety Action Plan identified four priority
areas--passenger ejection, rollover structural integrity, emergency
egress, and fire safety. There have been other initiatives on large bus
performance, such as ESC systems--an action included in the DOT plan--
and an initiative to update the large bus tire standard.\73\ In
deciding how best to initiate and coordinate rulemaking in these areas,
NHTSA examined various factors including the benefits that would be
achieved by the rulemakings, the anticipated vehicle designs and
countermeasures needed to comply with the regulations, and the extent
to which the timing and content of the rulemakings could be coordinated
to lessen the need for multiple redesign and to lower overall costs.
After this examination, we decided on a course of action that
prioritized the goal of reducing passenger ejection and increasing
frontal impact protection because many benefits could be achieved
expeditiously with countermeasures that were readily available (using
bus seats with integral seat belts, which are already available from
seat suppliers) and whose installation would not significantly impact
other vehicle designs. Similarly, we have also determined that an ESC
rulemaking presents relatively few synchronization issues with other
rules, because the vehicles at issue already have the foundation
braking systems needed for the stability control technology and the
additional equipment necessary for an ESC system are sensors that are
already available and that can be installed without significant effect
on other vehicle systems. Further, we estimate that 80 percent of the
affected buses already have ESC systems. We realize that a rollover
structural integrity rulemaking, or an emergency egress rulemaking,
could involve more redesign of vehicle structure than rules involving
systems such as seat belts, ESC, or tires.\74\ Our decision-making in
these and all the rulemakings outlined in the ``NHTSA's Approach to
Motorcoach Safety'' plan, DOT's Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, and the
Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act will be cognizant of the timing and
content of the actions so as to simplify requirements applicable to the
public and private sectors, ensure that requirements are justified, and
increase the net benefits of the resulting safety standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ 75 FR 60037 (Sept. 29, 2010).
    \74\ The initiative on fire safety is in a research phase.
Rulemaking resulting from the research will not occur in the near
term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions).
The Small Business Administration's

regulations at 13 CFR part 121 define a small business, in part, as a
business entity ``which operates primarily within the United States.''
(13 CFR 121.105(a)). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required if
the head of an agency certifies the rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. SBREFA
amended the Regulatory Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to
provide a statement of the factual basis for certifying that a rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
    NHTSA has considered the effects of this final rule under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. I certify that this final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. This final rule will directly impact manufacturers of truck-
tractors, large buses, and stability control systems for those
vehicles. It will indirectly affect purchasers of new truck-tractors
and large buses, which include both fleets and owner-operators. NHTSA
believes the entities directly affected by this rule do not qualify as
small entities. Inasmuch as some second-stage manufacturers of certain
body-on-frame buses that are subject to this final rule are small
businesses, this final rule will not substantially affect those small
businesses. The small manufacturers that may be affected by this rule
are final stage manufacturers that purchase incomplete vehicles from
other large manufacturers and complete the manufacturing process. The
incomplete vehicle manufacturers, which we do not believe are small
businesses, typically certify compliance with all braking-related
standards and we believe ESC would be included among those. The sole
effect on the final stage manufacturers is a marginal increase in the
cost of incomplete vehicles due to the addition of ESC systems. This
additional cost is very small relative to the average cost of buses
subject to this final rule ($200,000 to $500,000), and the costs would
likely ultimately be passed on to the final purchaser.

C. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order
13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional
consultation with States, local governments or their representatives is
mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that
the rulemaking will not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement. The final rule will not have
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
    NHTSA rules can preempt in two ways. First, the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision:
When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a
State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue
in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is
identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C.
30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any
non-identical State legislative and administrative law addressing the
same aspect of performance.
    The express preemption provision described above is subject to a
savings clause under which ``[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from
liability at common law.'' 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this
provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle
manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express
preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme
Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied
preemption of such State common law tort causes of action by virtue of
NHTSA's rules, even if not expressly preempted. This second way that
NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon there being an actual
conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would
effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone
obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer,
notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard.
Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum
standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose
a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be
preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist--for
example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum
standard--the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly
preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.C. 861
(2000).
    Pursuant to Executive Order 13132 and 12988, NHTSA has considered
whether this rule could or should preempt State common law causes of
action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the
preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that
preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.
    To this end, the agency has examined the nature (e.g., the language
and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this rule and
finds that this rule, like many NHTSA rules, prescribes only a minimum
safety standard. As such, NHTSA does not intend that this rule preempt
state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor
vehicle manufacturers than that established by this rule. Establishment
of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with
the minimum standard announced here. Without any conflict, there could
not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of
action.

D. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

    With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation,
section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform'' (61 FR
4729; Feb. 7, 1996), requires that Executive agencies make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies
the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing
Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for
affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction;
(4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) specifies
whether administrative proceedings are to be required before parties
file suit in court; (6) adequately defines key terms; and (7) addresses
other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship
under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General. This document is
consistent with that requirement.
    Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes as follows. The issue of
preemption is discussed above. NHTSA notes further that there is no
requirement that individuals submit a petition for reconsideration or
pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in
court.

E. Protection of Children From Environmental Health and Safety Risks

    Executive Order 13045, ``Protection of Children from Environmental
Health and Safety Risks'' (62 FR 19855, April 23, 1997), applies to any
rule that: (1) is determined to be ``economically significant'' as
defined under Executive

Order 12866, and (2) concerns an environmental, health, or safety risk
that the agency has reason to believe may have a disproportionate
effect on children. If the regulatory action meets both criteria, the
agency must evaluate the environmental health or safety effects of the
planned rule on children, and explain why the planned regulation is
preferable to other potentially effective and reasonably feasible
alternatives considered by the agency.
    This document is part of a rulemaking that is not expected to have
a disproportionate health or safety impact on children. Consequently,
no further analysis is required under Executive Order 13045.

F. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), a person is not
required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency
unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. There is not
any information collection requirement associated with this final rule.

G. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act (NTTAA) requires NHTSA to evaluate and use existing voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory activities unless doing so would
be inconsistent with applicable law (e.g., the statutory provisions
regarding NHTSA's vehicle safety authority) or otherwise impractical.
Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies. Technical standards
are defined by the NTTAA as ``performance-based or design-specific
technical specification and related management systems practices.''
They pertain to ``products and processes, such as size, strength, or
technical performance of a product, process or material.''
    Examples of organizations generally regarded as voluntary consensus
standards bodies include ASTM International, SAE International (SAE),
and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). If NHTSA does not
use available and potentially applicable voluntary consensus standards,
we are required by the Act to provide Congress, through OMB, an
explanation of the reasons for not using such standards.
    This final rule requires truck tractors and large buses to have
electronic stability control systems. In the definitional criteria, the
agency adapted the criteria based on the light vehicle ESC rulemaking,
which was based on (with minor modifications) SAE Surface Vehicle
Information Report on Automotive Stability Enhancement Systems J2564
JUN2004 that provides an industry consensus definition of an ESC
system. In addition, SAE International has a Recommended Practice on
Brake Systems Definitions--Truck and Bus, J2627 AUG2009 that has been
incorporated into the agency's definition.
    The agency based the performance requirement (with modifications)
on SAE Surface Vehicle Recommended Practice J266 JAN96, Steady-State
Directional Control Test Procedures for Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks. UN ECE Regulation 13 also allows the J-Turn test maneuver as
one option to be used for demonstrating proper function of an ESC
system.
    The agency has also incorporated by reference two ASTM standards in
order to provide specifications for the road test surface. These are:
(1) ASTM E1136-93 (Reapproved 2003), ``Standard Specification for a
Radial Standard Reference Test Tire,'' and (2) ASTM E1337-90
(Reapproved 2008), ``Standard Test Method for Determining Longitudinal
Peak Braking Coefficient of Paved Surfaces Using a Standard Reference
Test Tire.''

H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more
than $100 million annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). Before promulgating a rule for which a written statement is
needed, section 205 of the UMRA generally requires the agency to
identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives
and adopt the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome
alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule. The provisions of
section 205 do not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable
law. Moreover, section 205 allows the agency to adopt an alternative
other than the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome
alternative if the agency publishes with the final rule an explanation
of why that alternative was not adopted.
    This final rule will not result in any expenditure by State, local,
or tribal governments or the private sector of more than $100 million,
adjusted for inflation.

I. National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that
implementation of this action will not have any significant impact on
the quality of the human environment.

J. Incorporation by Reference

    As discussed earlier in the relevant portions of this document, we
are incorporating by reference various materials into the Code of
Federal Regulations in this rulemaking. The standards we are
incorporating are:
     ASTM E1136-93 (Reapproved 2003), ``Standard Specification
for a Radial Standard Reference Test Tire,'' approved March 15, 1993.
     ASTM E1337-90 (Reapproved 2008), ``Standard Test Method
for Determining Longitudinal Peak Braking Coefficient of Paved Surfaces
Using a Standard Reference Test Tire,'' approved June 1, 2008.
    Under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1)(E), Congress allows agencies to
incorporate by reference materials that are reasonably available to the
class of persons affected if the agency has approval from the Director
of the Federal Register. As a part of that approval process, the
Director of the Federal Register (in 1 CFR 51.5) directs agencies to
discuss (in the preamble) the ways that the materials we are
incorporating by reference are reasonably available to interested
parties. Further the Director requires agencies to summarize the
material that they are incorporating [proposing to incorporate] by
reference.
    NHTSA has worked to ensure that standards being considered for
incorporation by reference are reasonably available to the class of
persons affected. In this case, those directly affected by incorporated
provisions are NHTSA and parties contracting with NHTSA to conduct
testing of new vehicles. New vehicle manufacturers may also be affected
to the extent they wish to conduct NHTSA's compliance test procedures
on their own vehicles. These entities have access to copies of
aforementioned standards through ASTM International for a reasonable
fee. These entities have the financial capability to obtain a copy of
the material incorporated by reference.
    Other interested parties in the rulemaking process beyond the class
affected by the regulation include members of the public, safety
advocacy groups, etc. Such interested parties can access the standard
by obtaining a copy from the aforementioned standards development
organizations.

    Interested parties may also access the standards through NHTSA or
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). All approved
material is available for inspection at NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, and at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NHTSA, contact NHTSA's Office of Technical Information
Services, phone number<PHONE_NUMBER>. For information on the
availability of this material at NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to:
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
    Finally, we have also described and summarized the materials that
we are incorporating by reference in this document to give all
interested parties an effective opportunity to comment. The materials
were previously discussed in section XI.G.

K. Regulatory Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

L. Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Incorporation by reference, Motor vehicle safety, Motor
vehicles, Rubber and rubber products, Tires.
    Regulatory Text
    In consideration of the foregoing, we amend 49 CFR part 571 as
follows:

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30166 and 30177;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.

0
2. Revise paragraphs (d)(33) and (34) of Sec.  571.5 to read as
follows:

Sec.  571.5  Matter incorporated by reference.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (33) ASTM E1136-93 (Reapproved 2003), ``Standard Specification for
a Radial Standard Reference Test Tire,'' approved March 15, 1993, into
Sec. Sec.  571.105; 571.121; 571.122; 571.126; 571.135; 571.136;
571.139; 571.500.
    (34) ASTM E1337-90 (Reapproved 2008), ``Standard Test Method for
Determining Longitudinal Peak Braking Coefficient of Paved Surfaces
Using a Standard Reference Test Tire,'' approved June 1, 2008, into
Sec. Sec.  571.105; 571.121; 571.122; 571.126; 571.135; 571.136;
571.500.
* * * * *

0
3. Revise Table 1 of Sec.  571.101 to read as follows:

Sec.  571.101  Standard No. 101; Controls and displays.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR23JN15.012

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR23JN15.013

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR23JN15.014

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR23JN15.015

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR23JN15.016

* * * * *

0
4. Revise the heading of Sec.  571.126 to read as follows:

Sec.  571.126  Standard No. 126; Electronic stability control systems
for light vehicles.

* * * * *

0
5. Add Sec.  571.136 to read as follows:

Sec.  571.136  Standard No. 136; Electronic stability control systems
for heavy vehicles.

    S1 Scope. This standard establishes performance and equipment
requirements for electronic stability control (ESC) systems on heavy
vehicles.
    S2 Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to reduce crashes
caused by rollover or by directional loss-of-control.
    S3 Application. This standard applies to the following vehicles:
    S3.1 Truck tractors with a gross vehicle weight rating of greater
than 11,793 kilograms (26,000 pounds). However, it does not apply to:
    (a) Any truck tractor equipped with an axle that has a gross axle
weight rating of 13,154 kilograms (29,000 pounds) or more;
    (b) Any truck tractor that has a speed attainable in 3.2 km (2
miles) of not more than 53 km/h (33 mph); and
    (c) Any truck tractor that has a speed attainable in 3.2 km (2
miles) of not more than 72 km/h (45 mph), an unloaded vehicle weight
that is not less than 95 percent of its gross vehicle weight rating,
and no capacity to carry occupants other than the driver and operating
crew.
    S3.2 Buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of greater than
11,793 kilograms (26,000 pounds). However, it does not apply to
    (a) School buses;
    (b) Perimeter-seating buses;
    (c) Transit buses;
    (d) Any bus equipped with an axle that has a gross axle weight
rating of 13,154 kilograms (29,000 pounds) or more; and
    (e) Any bus that has a speed attainable in 3.2 km (2 miles) of not
more than 53 km/h (33 mph.)
    S4 Definitions.
    Ackerman Steer Angle means the angle whose tangent is the wheelbase
divided by the radius of the turn at a very low speed.
    Electronic stability control system or ESC system means a system
that has all of the following attributes:
    (1) It augments vehicle directional stability by having the means
to apply and adjust the vehicle brake torques individually at each
wheel position on at least one front and at least one rear axle of the
truck tractor or bus to induce correcting yaw moment to limit vehicle
oversteer and to limit vehicle understeer;
    (2) It enhances rollover stability by having the means to apply and
adjust the vehicle brake torques individually at each wheel position on
at least one front and at least one rear axle of the truck tractor or
bus to reduce lateral acceleration of a vehicle;
    (3) It is computer-controlled with the computer using a closed-loop
algorithm to induce correcting yaw moment and enhance rollover
stability;
    (4) It has a means to determine the vehicle's lateral acceleration;
    (5) It has a means to determine the vehicle's yaw rate and to
estimate its side slip or side slip derivative with respect to time;
    (6) It has a means to estimate vehicle mass or, if applicable,
combination vehicle mass;
    (7) It has a means to monitor driver steering inputs;
    (8) It has a means to modify engine torque, as necessary, to assist
the driver in maintaining control of the vehicle and/or combination
vehicle; and
    (9) When installed on a truck tractor, it has the means to provide
brake pressure to automatically apply and modulate the brake torques of
a towed trailer.
    ESC service brake application means the time when the ESC system
applies a service brake pressure at any wheel for a continuous duration
of at least 0.5 second of at least 34 kPa (5 psi) for air-braked
systems and at least 172 kPa (25 psi) for hydraulic-braked systems.
    Initial brake temperature means the average temperature of the
service brakes on the hottest axle of the vehicle immediately before
any stability control system test maneuver is executed.
    Lateral acceleration means the component of the vector acceleration
of a point in the vehicle perpendicular to the vehicle x-axis
(longitudinal) and parallel to the road plane.
    Oversteer means a condition in which the vehicle's yaw rate is
greater than the yaw rate that would occur at the vehicle's speed as
result of the Ackerman Steer Angle.
    Over-the-road bus means a bus characterized by an elevated
passenger deck located over a baggage compartment, except a school bus.
    Peak friction coefficient or PFC means the ratio of the maximum
value of braking test wheel longitudinal force to the simultaneous
vertical force occurring prior to wheel lockup, as the

braking torque is progressively increased.
    Perimeter-seating bus means a bus with 7 or fewer designated
seating positions rearward of the driver's seating position that are
forward-facing or can convert to forward-facing without the use of
tools and is not an over-the-road bus.
    Side slip or side slip angle means the arctangent of the lateral
velocity of the center of gravity of the vehicle divided by the
longitudinal velocity of the center of gravity.
    Snub means the braking deceleration of a vehicle from a higher
speed to a lower speed that is greater than zero.
    Stop-request system means a vehicle-integrated system for passenger
use to signal to a vehicle operator that they are requesting a stop.
    Transit bus means a bus that is equipped with a stop-request system
sold for public transportation provided by, or on behalf of, a State or
local government and that is not an over-the-road bus.
    Understeer means a condition in which the vehicle's yaw rate is
less than the yaw rate that would occur at the vehicle's speed as
result of the Ackerman Steer Angle.
    Yaw Rate means the rate of change of the vehicle's heading angle
measure in degrees per second of rotation about a vertical axis through
the vehicle's center of gravity.
    S5 Requirements. Each vehicle must be equipped with an ESC system
that meets the requirements specified in S5 under the test conditions
specified in S6 and the test procedures specified in S7 of this
standard.
    S5.1 Required Equipment. Each vehicle to which this standard
applies must be equipped with an electronic stability control system,
as defined in S4.
    S5.2 System Operational Capabilities.
    S5.2.1 The ESC system must be operational over the full speed range
of the vehicle except at vehicle speeds less than 20 km/h (12.4 mph),
when being driven in reverse, or during system initialization.
    S5.2.2 The ESC must remain capable of activation even if the
antilock brake system or traction control is also activated.
    S5.3 Performance Requirements.
    S5.3.1 Lane Keeping During Reference Speed Determination. During
each series of four consecutive test runs conducted at the same
entrance speed as part of the test procedure to determine the
Preliminary Reference Speed and the Reference Speed (see S7.7.1), the
wheels of the truck tractor or bus must remain within the lane between
the start gate (0 degrees of radius arc angle) and the end gate (120
degrees of radius arc angle) during at least two of the four test runs.
    S5.3.2 Engine Torque Reduction. During each series of four
consecutive test runs for the determination of engine torque reduction
(see S7.7.2), the vehicle must satisfy the criteria of S<IP_ADDRESS> and
S<IP_ADDRESS> during at least two of the four test runs.
    S<IP_ADDRESS> The ESC system must reduce the driver-requested engine
torque by at least 10 percent for a minimum continuous duration of 0.5
second during the time period from 1.5 seconds after the vehicle
crosses the start gate (0 degree of radius arc angle) to when it
crosses the end gate (120 degrees of radius arc angle).
    S<IP_ADDRESS> The wheels of the truck tractor or bus must remain within
the lane between the start gate (0 degrees of radius arc angle) and the
end gate (120 degrees of radius arc angle).
    S5.3.3 Roll Stability Control Test. During each series of eight
consecutive test runs for the determination of roll stability control
(see S7.7.3) conducted at the same entrance speed, the vehicle must
satisfy the criteria of S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>, and S<IP_ADDRESS>
during at least six of the eight consecutive test runs.
    S<IP_ADDRESS> The vehicle speed measured at 3.0 seconds after vehicle
crosses the start gate (0 degrees of radius arc angle) must not exceed
47 km/h (29 mph).
    S<IP_ADDRESS> The vehicle speed measured at 4.0 seconds after vehicle
crosses the start gate (0 degrees of radius arc angle) must not exceed
45 km/h (28 mph).
    S<IP_ADDRESS> The wheels of the truck tractor or bus must remain within
the lane between the start gate (0 degrees of radius arc angle) and the
end gate (120 degrees of radius arc angle).
    S<IP_ADDRESS> There must be ESC service brake activation.
    S5.4 ESC Malfunction Detection. Each vehicle must be equipped with
an indicator lamp, mounted in front of and in clear view of the driver,
which is activated whenever there is a malfunction that affects the
generation or transmission of control or response signals in the
vehicle's electronic stability control system.
    S5.4.1 Except as provided in S5.4.3 and S5.4.6, the ESC malfunction
telltale must illuminate only when a malfunction exists and must remain
continuously illuminated for as long as the malfunction exists,
whenever the ignition locking system is in the ``On'' (``Run'')
position.
    S5.4.2 The ESC malfunction telltale must be identified by the
symbol shown for ``Electronic Stability Control System Malfunction'' or
the specified words or abbreviations listed in Table 1 of Standard No.
101 (Sec.  571.101).
    S5.4.3 The ESC malfunction telltale must be activated as a check-
of-lamp function either when the ignition locking system is turned to
the ``On'' (``Run'') position when the engine is not running, or when
the ignition locking system is in a position between the ``On''
(``Run'') and ``Start'' that is designated by the manufacturer as a
check-light position.
    S5.4.4 The ESC malfunction telltale need not be activated when a
starter interlock is in operation.
    S5.4.5 The ESC malfunction telltale lamp must extinguish at the
next ignition cycle after the malfunction has been corrected.
    S5.4.6 The manufacturer may use the ESC malfunction telltale in a
flashing mode to indicate ESC operation.
    S6 Test Conditions. The requirements of S5 must be met by a vehicle
when it is tested according to the conditions set forth in the S6,
without replacing any brake system part or making any adjustments to
the ESC system except as specified. On vehicles equipped with automatic
brake adjusters, the automatic brake adjusters will remain activated at
all times.
    S6.1 Ambient Conditions.
    S6.1.1 The ambient temperature is any temperature between 2 [deg]C
(35[emsp14][deg]F) and 40 [deg]C (104[emsp14][deg]F).
    S6.1.2 The maximum wind speed is no greater than 5 m/s (11 mph).
    S6.2 Road Test Surface.
    S6.2.1 The tests are conducted on a dry, uniform, solid-paved
surface. Surfaces with irregularities and undulations, such as dips and
large cracks, are unsuitable.
    S6.2.2 The road test surface produces a peak friction coefficient
(PFC) of 0.9 when measured using an American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) E1136-93 (Reapproved 2003) standard reference test
tire, in accordance with ASTM Method E 1337-90 (Reapproved 2008), at a
speed of 64.4 km/h (40 mph), without water delivery (both documents
incorporated by reference, see Sec.  571.5).
    S6.2.3 The test surface has a consistent slope between 0% and 1%.
    S6.2.4 J-Turn Test Maneuver Test Course. The test course for the J-
Turn test maneuver is used for the Reference Speed Test in S7.7.1, the
Engine Torque Reduction Test in S7.7.2, and the Roll Stability Control
Test in S7.7.3.

    S<IP_ADDRESS> The test course consists of a straight entrance lane with
a length of 22.9 meters (75 feet) tangentially connected to a curved
lane section with a radius of 45.7 meters (150 feet) measured from the
center of the lane.
    S<IP_ADDRESS> For truck tractors, the lane width of the test course is
3.7 meters (12 feet). For buses, the lane width of the test course is
3.7 meters (12 feet) for the straight section and is 4.3 meters (14
feet) for the curved section.
    S<IP_ADDRESS> The start gate is the tangent point on the radius (the
intersection of the straight lane and the curved lane sections) and is
designated as zero degrees of radius of arc angle. The end gate is the
point on the radius that is 120 degrees of radius arc angle measured
from the tangent point.
    S<IP_ADDRESS> Figure 1 shows the test course with the curved lane
section configured in the counter-clockwise steering direction relative
to the entrance lane. The course is also arranged with the curved lane
section configured in the clockwise steering direction relative to the
entrance lane. The cones depicted in Figure 1 defining the lane width