[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 33 (Thursday, February 19, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8917-8921]
[FR Doc No: 2015-03403]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-74268; File No. SR-OCC-2014-24]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Concerning Extended and Overnight
Trading Sessions

February 12, 2015.
    On December 12, 2014, The Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change SR-OCC-2014-24 pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4
thereunder.\2\ The proposed rule change was published for comment in
the Federal Register on December 30, 2014.\3\ The Commission did not
receive any comments on the proposed rule change. This order approves
the proposed rule change.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4. OCC also filed this change as an advance
notice under Section 806(e)(1) of the Payment, Clearing, and
Settlement Supervision Act of 2010. 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1). Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 74073 (January 15, 2015), 80 FR 3287
(January 22, 2014) (SR-OCC-2014-812). The Commission did not receive
any comments on the advance notice.
    \3\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73907 (December 22,
2014), 79 FR 78543 (December 30, 2014) (SR-OCC-2014-24).
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I. Description

    This rule change was filed in connection with OCC's proposed change
to its operations concerning the clearance of confirmed trades executed
in overnight trading sessions offered by exchanges for which OCC
provides clearance and settlement services. OCC currently clears
overnight trading activity for CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC (``CFE'').\4\
The total number of trades submitted to OCC from overnight trading
sessions is nominal, typically less than 3,000 contracts per session.
However, OCC has recently observed an industry trend whereby exchanges
are offering overnight trading sessions beyond traditional hours.
Exchanges offering overnight trading sessions have indicated to OCC
that such sessions benefit market participants by providing additional
price transparency and hedging opportunities for products traded in
such sessions, which, in turn, promotes market stability.\5\ In light
of this trend, OCC proposed to implement a framework for clearing
trades executed in such sessions that includes: (1) Qualification
criteria used to approve clearing members for overnight trading
sessions, (2) systemic controls to identify trades executed during
overnight trading sessions by clearing members not approved for such
sessions, (3) enhancements to OCC's overnight monitoring of trades
submitted by exchanges during overnight trading sessions, (4)
enhancements to OCC's credit controls with respect to monitoring
clearing members' credit risk during overnight trading sessions,
including procedures for contacting an exchange offering overnight
trading sessions in order to invoke use of the exchange's kill switch,
and (5) taking appropriate disciplinary action against clearing members
who attempt to clear during the overnight trading sessions without
first obtaining requisite approvals. These changes (described in
greater detail below) are designed to reduce and mitigate the

risks associated with clearing trades executed in overnight trading
sessions. In addition, the only products that will be eligible for
clearing in the overnight trading sessions are index options and index
futures products.
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    \4\ ELX Futures LP (``ELX'') previously submitted overnight
trading activity to OCC, but currently does not submit trades from
overnight trading sessions to OCC. OCC will re-evaluate ELX's risk
controls in the event ELX re-institutes its overnight trading
sessions.
    \5\ See CFE-2014-010 at http://cfe.cboe.com/publish/CFErulefilings/SR-CFE-2014-010.pdf.
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    OCC's framework for determining whether to provide clearing
services for overnight trading sessions offered by an exchange is
designed to work in conjunction with the risk controls of the exchange
that offers overnight trading sessions. OCC will confirm an exchange's
risk controls as well as its staffing levels as they relate to
overnight trading sessions to determine if OCC may reasonably rely on
such risk controls to the reduce risk presented to OCC by the
exchange's overnight trading sessions. Such exchange risk controls will
consist of: (1) Price reasonability checks; (2) controls to prevent
orders from being executed beyond a certain percentage (determined by
the exchange) from the initial execution price; (3) activity based
protections which focus on risk beyond price, such as a high number of
trades occurring in a set period of time; and (4) kill switch
capabilities, which may be initiated by the exchange and can cancel all
open quotes or all orders of a particular participant. OCC believes
that confirming the existence of applicable pre-trade risk controls as
well as overnight staffing at the relevant exchanges is essential to
mitigating risks presented to OCC from overnight trading sessions.\6\
OCC believes that providing clearing services to exchanges offering
such sessions is consistent with OCC's mission to provide market
participants with clearing and risk management solutions that respond
to changes in the marketplace.
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    \6\ Comparable controls are applied to futures and future option
trades executed in overnight trading sessions currently cleared by
OCC, although such controls have been implemented by clearing
futures commission merchants (``clearing FCMs'') pursuant to
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') Regulation 1.73.
This requires clearing FCMs to monitor for adherence to such
controls during regular and overnight trading sessions. Some of the
risk control measures are similar to those proposed by OCC for use
in clearing securities trades in overnight trading sessions. For
instance, OCC confirmed that CFE maintains kill switch capabilities.
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Qualification Criteria

    In order to mitigate risks associated with clearing for overnight
trading sessions, clearing members that participate in such trading
sessions will be required to provide contact information to OCC for
operational and risk personnel available to be contacted by OCC during
such sessions. In addition, OCC will require that clearing members
participating in an overnight trading session post additional margin in
a designated account in order to mitigate the risk that OCC cannot
draft a clearing member's bank account during an overnight trading
session.\7\ OCC also will adopt a procedure whereby, on a quarterly
basis, it confirms its record of clearing members eligible for
overnight trading sessions with a similar record maintained by
exchanges offering such overnight trading sessions.
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    \7\ Clearing members will be required to designate a firm
account to ensure that OCC has a general lien on the assets in the
account and can use them to satisfy any obligation of the clearing
member to OCC.
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    With respect to providing operational and risk contacts, under OCC
Rule 201, each clearing member is required to maintain facilities for
conducting business with OCC and to have a representative authorized in
the name of the clearing member to take all action necessary for
conducting business with OCC be available at the facility during such
hours as may be specified from time-to-time by OCC. Similarly, OCC
Rules 214(c) and (d) require clearing members to ensure that they have
the appropriate number of qualified personnel and to maintain the
ability to process anticipated volumes and values of transactions. OCC
will use this existing authority to require clearing members trading
during overnight trading sessions to maintain operational and risk
staff that may be contacted by OCC during such sessions.
    OCC will impose upon clearing members qualified to participate in
overnight trading sessions additional margin requirement in an amount
of the lesser of $10 million or 10% of the clearing member's net
capital (``Additional Margin''), which will be equal to the first
monitoring risk threshold (described below) and which will be collected
the morning before each overnight trading sessions. Clearing members
must identify the proprietary account that would be charged the
Additional Margin amount. The Additional Margin requirement is intended
to provide OCC with additional margin assets should a clearing member's
credit risk increase during overnight trading sessions.\8\ OCC will
adopt a process whereby each morning OCC Financial Risk Management
staff will assess the Additional Margin requirement prior to
participating in any future overnight trading sessions against clearing
members eligible to participate in overnight trading sessions. Clearing
members that do not have sufficient excess margin on deposit with OCC
to meet the Additional Margin amount will be required to deposit
additional funds with OCC to satisfy the Additional Margin
requirement.\9\ This process will be adopted under existing rule
authority.
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    \8\ Clearing members approved for overnight trading sessions who
do not meet the Additional Margin requirement for a given overnight
trading session will be treated like a clearing member not approved
overnight trading sessions, as described below.
    \9\ Under OCC Rule 601, OCC has the discretion to fix the margin
requirement for any account at an amount that it deems necessary or
appropriate under the circumstances to protect the interests of
clearing members, OCC and the public.
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    Moreover, OCC also will confirm that an exchange offering overnight
trading sessions has adopted a procedure whereby such exchange would
contact OCC when a trader requests trading privileges during overnight
trading sessions. The purpose of this contact is to verify that the
trader's clearing firm (i.e., the OCC clearing member) is approved for
overnight trading sessions. If the applicable OCC clearing member is
not approved for overnight trading sessions, then the clearing member
must receive OCC's approval for overnight trading sessions, or the
exchange will not provide the trader trading privileges during
overnight trading sessions. Moreover, OCC will confirm that an exchange
offering overnight trading sessions has implemented a procedure to
periodically (i.e., quarterly) validate its record of approved clearing
firms against OCC's record of clearing members approved for overnight
trading sessions.\10\ Any discrepancies between the two records will be
promptly resolved by either the clearing member obtaining approval from
OCC for overnight trading sessions, or by the exchange revoking the
clearing firm's trading privileges for overnight trading sessions.
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    \10\ As discussed in more detail below, clearing members that
attempt to participate in overnight trading sessions without the
necessary approval will be subject to a minor rule violation fine.
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Systemic Controls

    OCC will implement system changes so that trades submitted to OCC
during overnight trading sessions that have been executed by clearing
members not approved for such trading sessions will be reviewed by OCC
staff after acceptance but before being processed (each such trade
being a ``Reviewed Trade''). OCC will contact the submitting exchange
regarding each Reviewed Trade in order to determine if the trade is a
valid trade. If the exchange determines that the Reviewed Trade was in
error such that, as provided in Article VI, Section 7(c) of OCC's By-
laws, new

or revised trade information is required to properly clear the
transaction, OCC expects the exchange would instruct OCC to disregard
or ``bust'' the trade. If the exchange determines that the Reviewed
Trade was not in error, then OCC will clear the Reviewed Trade and take
appropriate disciplinary action against the non-approved clearing
member, as described below. OCC believes that clearing the Reviewed
Trade is appropriate in order to avoid potentially harming the clearing
member approved for overnight trading sessions that is on the opposite
side of the transaction.

Overnight Monitoring

    OCC will implement additional overnight monitoring in order to
better monitor clearing members' credit risk during overnight trading
sessions. Such monitoring of credit risk is similar to existing OCC
practices concerning futures cleared during overnight trading hours and
includes automated processes within OCC's clearing ENCORE to measure,
by clearing member: (i) The aggregate mark-to-market amounts of a
clearing member's positions, including positions created during
overnight trading, based on current prices using OCC's Portfolio
Revaluation System; (ii) the aggregate incremental margin produced by
all positions resulting from transactions executed during overnight
trading; and (iii) with respect to options cleared during overnight
trading hours, the aggregate net trade premium positions resulting from
trades executed during overnight trading (each of these measures being
a ``Credit Risk Number''). Hourly credit reports would be generated by
ENCORE containing the Credit Risk Numbers expressed in terms of both
dollars and, except for the mark-to-market position values, as a
percentage of net capital for each clearing member trading during
overnight trading sessions. The Credit Risk Numbers are the same
information used by OCC staff to evaluate clearing member exposure
during regular trading hours and, in addition to OCC's knowledge of its
clearing members' businesses, are effective measures of the risk
presented to OCC by each clearing member. OCC's Operations staff will
review such reports as they are generated and, in the event that any of
the Credit Risk Numbers for positions established by a clearing member
during an overnight trading session exceed established thresholds,
staff will alert OCC's Market Risk staff \11\ of the exceedance in
accordance with established procedures, as described below.
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    \11\ OCC's Member Services staff will also receive alerts in
order to contact clearing members as may be necessary.
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    Market Risk staff will follow a standardized process concerning
such exceedances, including escalation to OCC's management, if required
by such process. Given the nominal volume of trades executed in
overnight trading sessions that are presently submitted for clearance,
OCC does not contemplate changes in its current staffing levels that
support overnight clearing activities at this time, however, OCC will
periodically assess and adjust such staffing levels, as appropriate. As
part of the overnight clearing activities, OCC has, however, designated
an on-call Market Risk duty officer who would be responsible for
reviewing issues that arise when clearing for overnight trading session
and determining what measures to be taken as well as additional
escalation, if necessary.
    With respect to OCC's escalation thresholds, if any Credit Risk
Number of a clearing member approved for overnight trading sessions is
$10 million or more, or any Credit Risk Number equals 10% or more of
the clearing member's net capital, OCC's Operations staff will be
required to provide email notification to Market Risk and Member
Services staff. If any Credit Risk Number of a clearing member not
approved for overnight trading sessions is $10 million or more, or any
Credit Risk Number equals 10% or more of the clearing member's net
capital, OCC's Operations will also notify Market Risk and Member
Services staff as well as its senior management. Such departments will
take action to prevent additional trading by the non-approved clearing
member, including contacting the exchange to invoke use of the
exchange's kill switch.
    If any Credit Risk Number of a clearing member approved for
overnight trading sessions is $50 million or more, or equals 25% or
more of the clearing member's net capital, Operations staff will be
required to contact, by telephone: (i) Market Risk and Member Services,
(ii) the applicable exchange for secondary review, and (iii) the
clearing member's designated contacts. The on-call Market Risk duty
officer also will consider if additional action is necessary, which may
include contacting a designated executive officer in order to issue an
intra-day margin call, increase the clearing member's margin
requirement in order to prevent the withdrawal of a specified amount of
excess margin collateral, if any, the clearing member has on deposit
with OCC or contacting the exchange in order to invoke the use of its
kill switch.
    If any Credit Risk Number is $75 million or more, or equals 50% or
more of the clearing member's net capital, Operations staff will be
required to contact, by telephone, Market Risk staff, the on-call
Market Risk duty officer and a designated executive officer. Such
officer will be responsible for reviewing the situation and determining
whether to implement credit controls, which are described in greater
detail below and include: Issuing an intra-day margin call, increasing
a clearing member's margin requirement in order to prevent the
withdrawal of a specified amount of excess margin collateral, if any,
the clearing member has on deposit with OCC, whether further escalation
is warranted in order for OCC to take protective measures pursuant to
OCC Rule 305, or contact the exchange in order to invoke use of its
kill switch. OCC stated that it chose the above described escalation
thresholds based on its analysis of historical overnight trading
activity across the futures industry. OCC believes that these
thresholds strike an appropriate balance between effective risk
monitoring and operational efficiency.

Credit Controls

    In order to address credit risk associated with trading during
overnight trading sessions, and as described above, OCC will collect
Additional Margin from clearing members as well as monitor and analyze
the impact that positions established during such sessions have on a
clearing member's overall exposure. Should the need arise based on
threshold breaches described above, and pursuant to OCC Rule 609, OCC
may require the deposit of additional margin (``intra-day margin'') by
any clearing member that increases its incremental risk as a result of
trading activity during overnight trading sessions. Accordingly, a
clearing member's positions established during such sessions will be
incorporated into OCC's intra-day margin process. Further, if a
clearing member's exposure significantly increases during a time when
settlement banks are not open to process an intra-day margin call, OCC
will use its current authority under OCC Rule 601 to increase a
clearing member's margin requirement, which will restrict the clearing
member's ability to withdraw excess margin collateral. The
implementation of these measures is discussed more fully below.
    In the event that a clearing member's exposure during overnight
trading sessions causes a clearing member to exceed OCC's intra-day
margin call threshold for overnight trading sessions, OCC will require
the clearing member to

deposit intra-day margin equal to the increased incremental risk
presented by the clearing member. Specifically, if a clearing member
has a total risk charge \12\ exceeding 25% (a reduction of the usual
figure of 50%), as computed overnight by OCC's STANS system, and a loss
of greater than $50,000 from an overnight trading session(s), as
computed by Portfolio Revaluation, OCC will initiate an intra-day
margin call. OCC will know at approximately 8:30 a.m. (Central Time) if
an intra-day margin call on a clearing member will be initiated based
on breaches of these thresholds. This ``start of business'' margin call
is in addition to daily margin OCC collects from clearing members
pursuant to OCC Rule 605, any intra-day margin call that OCC may
initiate as a result of regular trading sessions or special margin call
that OCC may initiate.
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    \12\ Total risk charge is a number derived from STANS outputs
and is the sum of expected shortfall, stress test charges and any
add-on charges computed by STANS. STANS is OCC's proprietary margin
methodology.
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    In addition to, or instead of, requiring additional intra-day
margin, OCC Rule 601 \13\ and OCC's Clearing Member Margin Call Policy
will work together to authorize Market Risk staff to increase a
clearing member's margin requirement which may be in an amount equal to
an intra-day margin call.\14\ (Any increased margin requirement will
remain in effect until the next business day.) This action will
immediately prevent clearing members from withdrawing any excess margin
collateral (in the amount of the increased margin requirement) the
clearing member has deposited with OCC. With respect to clearing trades
executed in overnight trading sessions, and in the event OCC requires
additional margin from a clearing member, Market Risk staff may use
increased margin requirements as a means of collateralizing the
increase in incremental risk a clearing member incurred during such
sessions without having to wait for banks to open to process an intra-
day margin call.\15\ Such action may be taken by OCC instead of, or in
addition to, issuing an intra-day margin call depending on the amount
of excess margin a clearing member has on deposit with OCC and the
amount of the incremental risk presented by such clearing member. OCC
believes that the expansion of its intra-day margin call process as
described in the preceding paragraph, including OCC's ability to
manually increase clearing members' margin requirements, will mitigate
the risk that OCC is under-collateralized as a result of overnight
trading hours.
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    \13\ In addition, OCC Rule 601 provides OCC with the authority
to fix the margin requirement for any account or any class of
cleared contracts at such amount as it deems necessary or
appropriate under the circumstances to protect the respective
interests of clearing members, OCC and the public.
    \14\ Clearing members frequently deposit margin at OCC in excess
of requirements.
    \15\ Clearing members will be able to substitute the locked-up
collateral during normal time frames (i.e., 6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
(Central Time) for equity securities).
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    Moreover, a designated executive officer may call an exchange
offering overnight trading sessions to invoke the use of its kill
switch. The kill switch prevents a clearing member (or the market
participant clearing through a clearing member) from executing trades
on the exchange during a given overnight trading session or, if needed,
stop all trading during a given overnight trading session. Finally,
pursuant to OCC Rule 305, the Executive Chairman or the President of
OCC, in certain situations, has the authority to impose limitations and
restrictions on the transactions, positions and activities of a
clearing member. This authority will be used, as needed, in the event a
clearing member accumulates significant credit risk during overnight
trading sessions, or a clearing member's activities during such trading
sessions otherwise warrant OCC taking protective action.

Rule Enforcement Actions

    In order to deter clearing members from attempting to participate
in overnight trading sessions without authorization as well as
appropriately enforce the above described processes, OCC will ensure
that any attempt by a clearing member to participate in overnight
trading sessions without first obtaining the necessary approval will
result in the initiation of a rule enforcement action against such
clearing member. As described above, clearing members not approved for
overnight trading sessions that trade during such overnight sessions
will have their trades reviewed by OCC staff. Clearing members that
attempt to participate in overnight trading sessions but not obtain the
necessary approval to do so will be subject to a minor rule violation
fine.\16\ In addition, if a clearing member's operational or risk
contacts for overnight trading sessions were unavailable had OCC
attempted to contact such individuals, the clearing member will be
subject to a minor rule violation fine. OCC has existing processes in
place to monitor for clearing member violations of OCC's rules and such
processes will also apply to clearing member activity during overnight
trading sessions.
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    \16\ See OCC Rule 1201(b).
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II. Discussion and Commission Findings

    Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act \17\ directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements
of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such
organization.
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    \17\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
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    The Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent
with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act,\18\ which requires, among other
things, that the rules of a clearing agency are designed to assure the
safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the custody or
control of the clearing agency or for which it is responsible. Although
clearing transactions executed in overnight trading sessions may
present additional risk to OCC and the markets in general, OCC's
proposal is designed to monitor and mitigate these risks and thus
assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in OCC's
custody or control or for which it is responsible.
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    \18\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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    By limiting the product set eligible for overnight trading sessions
to index options and index futures products and by instituting
qualification criteria for determining whether to provide clearing
services for overnight trading sessions offered by a particular
exchange, OCC should be able to better assure the safeguarding of
securities and funds which are in its custody or control. In addition,
in order to address the risks associated with extended trading hours,
including those associated with OCC and clearing members' inability to
transfer funds to satisfy margin during overnight hours, OCC's proposed
framework, which includes a number of mechanisms designed to further
control the risks and safeguard securities and funds, should also
facilitate the safeguarding of securities and funds. These mechanisms
include (i) clearing member qualification criteria; (ii) systemic
controls to identify trades executed by clearing members not approved
for overnight trading; (iii) enhancements to OCC's overnight monitoring
of trades submitted by exchanges during overnight trading sessions;
(iv) enhancements to OCC's credit controls with respect to monitoring
clearing members' credit risk during overnight trading sessions; and
(v) disciplinary actions for unapproved clearing members who

attempt to clear during overnight trading sessions.
    In particular, OCC's overnight monitoring and escalation mechanism,
which includes the ability for OCC to require additional intra-day
margin, increase a clearing member's margin requirement, invoke an
exchange's kill switch, or use any combination thereof, should provide
OCC with the necessary mechanisms to ensure securities and funds which
are in its custody or control. The obligation for OCC and clearing
members to maintain and enforce adequate staffing by employing the use
of a designated an on-call Market Risk duty officer should also help
assure that clearing activities and margin levels are being adequately
monitoring during the overnight trading hours, which in turn should
facilitate the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the
custody or control of OCC or for which it is responsible.

III. Conclusion

    On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
proposal is consistent with the requirements of the Act and in
particular with the requirements of Section 17A of the Act \19\ and the
rules and regulations thereunder.
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    \19\ In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission has
considered the proposed rule's impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
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    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Act,\20\ that the proposed rule change (SR-OCC-2014-24) be, and it
hereby is, approved.
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    \20\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\21\
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    \21\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-03403 Filed 2-18-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 53 (Monday, March 22, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15226-15227]
[FR Doc No: 2021-05844]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

[Docket No. USCG-2021-0049]

Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory Committee; Vacancies

AGENCY: U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Request for applications.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Coast Guard is requesting nominations for persons
interested in serving as a member of the Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory
Committee (Committee). The Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory Committee
provides advice and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland
Security through the U.S.

Coast Guard Commandant on matters relating to Great Lakes pilotage,
including review of proposed Great Lakes pilotage regulations and
policies.

DATES: Your completed applications should reach the U.S. Coast Guard on
or before May 21, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Nominations should include a cover letter expressing a
letter of support from the nominating group, a cover letter expressing
the nominees' interest in an appointment to the Committee, and a resume
detailing their experience. We will not accept a biography.
Applications should be submitted via email with the subject line
``GLPAC'' to Mr. Vincent Berg at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Vincent Berg; telephone 202-906-
0835 or email at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory Committee
is a Federal advisory committee. It will operate under the provisions
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C., Appendix). The Great
Lakes Pilotage Advisory Committee operates under the authority of 46
U.S.C. 9307 and makes recommendations to the Secretary and the U.S.
Coast Guard on matters relating to the Great Lakes.
    Meetings of the Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory Committee will be
held with the approval of the Designated Federal Officer. The Committee
is required to meet at least once per year. Additional meetings may be
held at the request of a majority of the Committee or at the discretion
of the Designated Federal Officer.
    Each Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory Committee member serves a term
of office of up to 3 years. Members may serve a maximum of six
consecutive years. All members serve at their own expense and receive
no salary or other compensation from the Federal Government. Members
may be reimbursed, however, for travel and per diem in accordance with
Federal Travel Regulations.
    The membership of the Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory committee was
recently modified by Section 8334 of the Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2020 within the William M. (Mac) Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Public Law
116-283, January 1, 2021. Section 8334(a) of the Elijah E. Cummings
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020 contains the changes to the
Committee membership requirements in 46 U.S.C. 9307(b) that we are
soliciting for now.
    We will consider nominations for the following positions modified
under the Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020 for:
    1. One member chosen from among nominations made by Great Lakes
port authorities and marine terminals;
    2. One member chosen from among nominations made by Great Lakes
maritime labor organizations.
    3. One member, who is recommended by unanimous vote of the other
members of the Committee, and may be appointed without regard to the
requirement to have 5 years of practical experience in maritime
operations.
    To be eligible, applicants who are nominated should have particular
expertise, knowledge, and experience regarding the regulations and
policies on the pilotage vessels on the Great Lakes, and at least five
years of practical experience in maritime operations.
    Registered lobbyists are not eligible to serve on Federal Advisory
Committees in an individual capacity. See ``Revised Guidance on
Appointment of Lobbyists to Federal Advisory Committees, Boards and
Commissions'' (79 FR 47482, August 13, 2014). Registered lobbyists are
``lobbyists'' as defined in Title 2 U.S.C. 1602 who are required by
Title 2 U.S.C. 1603 to register with the Secretary of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House Representatives.
    The Department of Homeland Security does not discriminate in
selection of Committee members on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, political affiliation, sexual orientation, gender
identity, marital status, disability and genetic information, age,
membership in an employee organization, or other non-merit factor. The
Department of Homeland Security strives to achieve a widely diverse
candidate pool for all of its recruitment actions.
    Nomination(s) to become a member of the Committee, should include
the cover letter and resume to be sent to Mr. Vincent F. Berg, Great
Lakes Pilotage Advisory Committee, via the transmittal method in the
ADDRESSES section by the deadline in the DATES section of this notice.
    When you send your application to us via email, we will send you an
email confirming receipt of your application.

    Dated: March 16, 2021.
Michael D. Emerson,
Director, Marine Transportation Systems.
[FR Doc. 2021-05844 Filed 3-19-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P