[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 83 (Friday, April 29, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 24188-24211]
[FR Doc No: 2011-10113]

Vol. 76

Friday,

No. 83

April 29, 2011

Part III

Department of Energy

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

18 CFR Part 35

Electricity Market Transparency Provisions of Section 220 of the
Federal Power Act; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 83 / Friday, April 29, 2011 /
Proposed Rules

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 35

[Docket No. RM10-12-000]

Electricity Market Transparency Provisions of Section 220 of the
Federal Power Act

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission proposes to amend its regulations pursuant to
section 220 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), as enacted by section 1281
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), to facilitate price
transparency in markets for the sale and transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce. In doing so, the Commission proposes to
require market participants that are excluded from the Commission's
jurisdiction under FPA section 205 and have more than a de minimis
market presence to file Electric Quarterly Reports (EQR) with the
Commission.
    In addition, the Commission proposes to refine the existing EQR
filing requirements by directing all filers to: report the transaction
date and time, as well as the type of rate by which the price in the
transaction or contract was set (i.e., fixed price, formula, index,
regional transmission organization/independent system operator (RTO/
ISO) price, or index); indicate whether the transaction was reported to
an index publisher; identify the broker or exchange used for a
transaction, if applicable; and report electronic tag (e-Tag) ID data
in EQRs. The Commission also proposes to: Standardize the unit for
reporting energy and capacity transactions; omit the time zone from the
contract section; and eliminate the Data Universal Numbering System
(DUNS) data requirement. These refinements to the existing EQR filing
requirements reflect the evolving nature of electricity markets and
promote greater price transparency and confidence in electricity
markets.

DATES: Comments are due June 28, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number by any
of the following methods:
     Agency Web Site: http://ferc.gov. Documents created
electronically using word processing software should be filed in native
applications or print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format.
     Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments
electronically must mail or hand-deliver an original and 14 copies of
their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of
the Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Maria Vouras, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
8062<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Christina Switzer, Office of General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
6379<EMAIL_ADDRESS>William Sauer, Office of Enforcement, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
6639, William<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

                                                               Paragraph
                                                                numbers

I. Background...............................................           3
    A. Order No. 2001.......................................           3
    B. EPAct 2005...........................................           5
    C. Notice of Inquiry....................................           8
II. Discussion..............................................           9
    A. Extending the EQR Filing Requirements to Non-Public             9
     Utilities..............................................
        1. Background.......................................           9
        2. Commission Authority.............................          14
        3. Proposed Filing Requirements for Non-Public                32
         Utilities..........................................
    B. Refinements to the Existing EQR Requirements.........          78
        1. Background.......................................          78
        2. General Refinements..............................          81
        3. Additional EQR Enhancements......................         107
III. Information Collection Statement.......................         123
IV. Environmental Analysis..................................         131
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification.................         132
VI. Comment Procedures......................................         136
VII. Document Availability..................................         140
Appendix A: List of Commenters
Appendix B: Proposed Refinements to the Existing EQR

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking--April 21, 2011

    1. To facilitate price transparency in markets for the sale and
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to revise its
regulations to require market participants that are excluded from the
Commission's jurisdiction under section 205 of the Federal Power Act
(FPA) \1\ and have more than a de minimis market presence to file
Electric Quarterly Reports (EQR) with the Commission.\2\ In doing so,
the Commission proposes to exercise its

authority under section 220 of the FPA,\3\ as adopted in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005).\4\ This proposal would allow the
Commission and the public to gain a more complete picture of wholesale
power and transmission markets in interstate commerce by providing
additional information concerning price formation and market
concentration in these markets. Public access to additional sales and
transmission-related information in the EQR would improve market
participants' ability to assess supply and demand fundamentals and to
price interstate wholesale market transactions. It also would
strengthen the Commission's ability to identify potential exercises of
market power or manipulation and to better evaluate the competitiveness
of the interstate wholesale markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824d. For ease of reference, this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) refers to market participants that are
not public utilities under section 201(f) of the FPA as ``non-public
utilities.'' FPA section 201(f) provides: No provision in this Part
shall apply to, or be deemed to include, the United States, a State
or any political subdivision of a State, an electric cooperative
that receives financing under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936
(7 U.S.C. 901 et seq.) or that sells less than 4,000,000 megawatt
hours of electricity per year, or any agency, authority, or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing, or any
corporation which is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any
one or more of the foregoing, or any officer, agent, employee of any
of the foregoing acting as such in the course of his official duty,
unless such provision makes specific reference thereto. 16 U.S.C.
824(f).
    \2\ These proposed requirements would not apply to a transaction
for the purchase or sale of wholesale electric energy or
transmission services within the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas (ERCOT), consistent with the exclusion set forth in FPA
section 220(f). 16 U.S.C. 824t(f).
    \3\ 16 U.S.C. 824t.
    \4\ EPAct 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. In addition, the Commission proposes to make certain revisions
to the existing EQR filing requirements and apply those revisions to
all market participants filing EQRs. The Commission proposes to revise
the EQRs currently filed by public utilities under FPA section 205(c)
and that will be filed by non-public utilities under FPA section 220.
These revisions include the addition of new fields for: (1) Reporting
the transaction date and time, as well as the type of rate; (2)
indicating whether the sales transaction was reported to an index
publisher; (3) identifying the broker or exchange used for a sales
transaction, if applicable; and (4) reporting electronic tag (e-Tag) ID
data. The Commission also proposes to eliminate the time zone from the
contract section and the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) data
requirement. Further, the Commission proposes to standardize the unit
for reporting energy and capacity transactions. These refinements to
the existing EQR filing requirements reflect the evolving nature of
electricity markets, would increase market transparency for the
Commission and the public, and would allow market participants to file
the information in the most efficient manner possible.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ The Commission also is reviewing the software currently used
to file EQRs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Background

A. Order No. 2001

    3. The Commission set forth the EQR filing requirements in Order
No. 2001.\6\ Order No. 2001 requires public utilities to electronically
file EQRs summarizing transaction information for short-term and long-
term cost-based sales and market-based rate sales and the contractual
terms and conditions in their agreements for all jurisdictional
services.\7\ The Commission established the EQR reporting requirements
to help ensure the collection of information needed to perform its
regulatory functions over transmission and sales,\8\ while making data
more useful to the public and allowing public utilities to better
fulfill their responsibility under FPA section 205(c) \9\ to have rates
on file in a convenient form and place.\10\ As noted in Order No. 2001,
the EQR data is designed to ``provide greater price transparency,
promote competition, enhance confidence in the fairness of the markets,
and provide a better means to detect and discourage discriminatory
practices.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001,
67 FR 31043 (May 8, 2002), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,127, reh'g
denied, Order No. 2001-A, 100 FERC ] 61,074, reh'g denied, Order No.
2001-B, 100 FERC ] 61,342, order directing filing, Order No. 2001-C,
101 FERC ] 61,314 (2002), order directing filing, Order No. 2001-D,
102 FERC ] 61,334, order refining filing requirements, Order No.
2001-E, 105 FERC ] 61,352 (2003), order on clarification, Order No.
2001-F, 106 FERC ] 61,060 (2004), order revising filing
requirements, Order No. 2001-G, 72 FR 56735 (Oct. 4, 2007), 120 FERC
] 61,270, order on reh'g and clarification, Order No. 2001-H, 73 FR
1876 (Jan. 10, 2008), 121 FERC ] 61,289 (2007), order revising
filing requirements, Order No. 2001-I, 73 FR 65526 (Nov. 4, 2008),
125 FERC ] 61,103 (2008).
    \7\ Order No. 2001, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,127.
    \8\ Id. P 13-14.
    \9\ 16 U.S.C. 824d(c).
    \10\ Order No. 2001, FERC Stats. & Regs.] 31,127 at P 31.
    \11\ Id. P 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Since issuing Order No. 2001, the Commission has provided
guidance and refined the reporting requirements, as necessary, to
simplify the filing requirements and to reflect changes in the
Commission's rules and regulations.\12\ For instance, in 2007 the
Commission adopted an Electric Quarterly Report Data Dictionary, which
provides in one document the definitions of certain terms and values
used in filing EQR data.\13\ Moreover, in 2007, the Commission required
transmission capacity reassignment to be reported in the EQR.\14\ The
refinements to the existing EQR requirements that we are proposing in
this NOPR build upon the Commission's prior improvements to the
reporting requirements and further enhance the goals of providing
greater price transparency, promoting competition, instilling
confidence in the fairness of the markets, and providing a better means
to detect and discourage discriminatory and manipulative practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See, e.g., Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements for
Electric Quarterly Reports, 124 FERC ] 61,244 (2008) (providing
guidance on the filing of information on transmission capacity
reassignments in EQRs); Notice of Electric Quarterly Reports
Technical Conference, 73 FR 2477 (Jan. 15, 2008) (announcing a
technical conference to discuss changes associated with the EQR Data
Dictionary).
    \13\ Order No. 2001-G, 120 FERC ] 61,270.
    \14\ Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 FR 12266 (Mar. 15, 2007),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241, at P 817, order on reh'g, Order No.
890-A, 73 FR 2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,261
(2007), order on reh'g and clarification, Order No. 890-B, 73 FR
39092 (July 8, 2008), 123 FERC ] 61,299 (2008), order on reh'g,
Order No. 890-C, 74 FR 12540 (March 25, 2009), 126 FERC ] 61,228
(2009), order on clarification, Order No. 890-D, 74 FR 61511 (Nov.
25, 2009), 129 FERC ] 61,126.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. EPAct 2005

    5. In EPAct 2005, Congress added section 220 to the FPA,\15\
directing the Commission to ``facilitate price transparency in markets
for the sale and transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce'' with ``due regard for the public interest, the integrity of
those markets, fair competition, and the protection of consumers.''
\16\ FPA section 220 grants the Commission authority to obtain and
disseminate ``information about the availability and prices of
wholesale electric energy and transmission service to the Commission,
State commissions, buyers and sellers of wholesale electric energy,
users of transmission services, and the public.'' \17\ The statute
specifies that the Commission may obtain this information from ``any
market participant,'' \18\ except for entities with a de minimis market
presence.\19\ EPAct 2005 added a similar transparency provisions in the
Natural Gas Act.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 16 U.S.C. 824t.
    \16\ In addition, FPA section 220(b)(1-2) directs the Commission
to exempt from disclosure information that is ``detrimental to the
operation of an effective market or [that would] jeopardize system
security,'' and ``to ensure that consumers and competitive markets
are protected from the adverse effects of potential collusion or
other anticompetitive behaviors that can be facilitated by untimely
public disclosure of proprietary trading information.'' 16 U.S.C.
824t(b)(1-2).
    \17\ 16 U.S.C. 824t(a)(2).
    \18\ Id. 824t(a)(3)(A).
    \19\ Id. 824t(d).
    \20\ 15 U.S.C. 717t-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. In 2006, Commission staff conducted an extensive outreach effort
to formulate options for implementing EPAct 2005's transparency
provisions for wholesale natural gas and electricity markets. As a
result, the Commission used its new transparency authority to adopt
additional filing and posting requirements for the sale or
transportation of physical natural gas in interstate commerce in Orders
No. 704 and 720. Order No. 704 requires buyers and sellers of more than
a de minimis volume of natural gas to report aggregate volumes of
relevant transactions in an

annual filing.\21\ In Order No. 720, the Commission required major non-
interstate pipelines to post daily scheduled volume and other data for
certain receipt and delivery points.\22\ Order No. 720 also requires
interstate pipelines to post information regarding no-notice
service.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Transparency Provisions of Section 23 of the Natural Gas
Act, Order No. 704, 73 FR 1014 (Jan. 4, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,260, at P 32 (2007), order on reh'g, Order No. 704-A, 73 FR 55726
(Sept. 26, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,275, order dismissing
reh'g and clarification, Order No. 704-B, 125 FERC ] 61,302 (2008),
order granting clarification, Order No. 704-C, 75 FR 35632 (June 23,
2010), 131 FERC ] 61,246 (2010); see also, Pipeline Posting
Requirements under Section 23 of the Natural Gas Act, Order No. 720,
73 FR 73494 (Dec. 2, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,283, at P 3
(2008), order on reh'g, Order No. 720-A, 73 FR 73494 (Dec. 2, 2008),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,302, order on reh'g and clarification,
Order No. 720-B, 75 FR 44893 (July 30, 2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,314 (2010).
    \22\ Order No. 720, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,283 at P 1.
    \23\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. The Commission declined to extend such requirements to wholesale
electricity markets because, at the time of the Natural Gas
Transparency Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission was
considering other reforms to its regulation of electricity markets.\24\
In particular, the Commission was undertaking open access transmission
service reforms and the more general review of competition in wholesale
electricity markets.\25\ As a result of these efforts, the Commission
issued two final rules. In Order No. 890, the Commission exercised its
remedial authority ``to limit further opportunities for undue
discrimination, by minimizing areas of discretion, addressing
ambiguities and clarifying various aspects of the pro forma [Open
Access Transmission Tariff].'' \26\ Moreover, in Order No. 719, the
Commission made reforms ``to improve the operation [and
competitiveness] of organized wholesale electric power markets'' in
connection with ``fulfilling its statutory mandate to ensure supplies
of electric energy at just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential rates.'' \27\ Although these final rules improved
transparency in wholesale markets in a number of ways, the Commission
believes the revisions proposed in this order are necessary to
facilitate price transparency in wholesale electricity markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See Transparency Provisions of Section 23 of the Natural
Gas Act; Transparency Provisions of the Energy Policy Act, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 72 FR 20791 (April 26, 2007), FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 32,614, at P 9-11 (2007) (Natural Gas Transparency NOPR)
(``The Commission does not propose action with respect to electric
markets at this time. The Commission has recently addressed and is
currently addressing electric market transparency in other
proceedings.'').
    \25\  Id.
    \26\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 40.
    \27\ Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric
Markets, Order No. 719, 73 FR 64100 (Oct. 28, 2008), FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,281 (2008), order on reh'g, Order No. 719-A, 74 FR 37776
(July 29, 2009), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,292, order on reh'g and
clarification, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ] 61,252 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Notice of Inquiry

    8. On January 21, 2010, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry
\28\ seeking comments on whether the Commission should apply the EQR
filing requirements to non-public utilities and whether the Commission
should consider other refinements to the existing EQR filing
requirements. In response to the Transparency NOI, the Commission
received 40 comments. Of those comments, twenty-eight discuss extending
the EQR filings to non-public utilities; five discuss EQR refinements;
and six discuss both. We have considered these comments in drafting the
proposals in this NOPR, and we invite further comments on these
proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Electricity Market Transparency Provisions of Section 220
of the Federal Power Act, Notice of Inquiry, 75 FR 4805 (Jan. 29,
2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 35,565 (2010) (Transparency NOI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Discussion

A. Extending the EQR Filing Requirements to Non-Public Utilities

1. Background
a. Need for Information from Non-Public Utilities
    9. Currently, market participants that fall within the Commission's
jurisdiction under FPA section 205(c) \29\ must file EQRs summarizing
contractual terms and conditions in their agreements for jurisdictional
services, including market-based rate sales, cost-based sales,
transmission service, and transmission capacity reassignments. In
addition, EQR filers must provide detailed transactional information
for power sales and transmission capacity reassignments made during the
most recent calendar quarter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ FPA section 205(c) requires public utilities to file all
rates and charges for any transmission or sale subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction in a convenient form and place for public
inspection. 16 U.S.C. 824d(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    10. Transactions made by both public utility and non-public utility
market participants provide critical pricing information that market
participants can use to make better-informed decisions about, among
other things, sales, purchases, and infrastructure investments. Access
to reliable data reduces differences in available information among
various market participants, results in greater market confidence,
lowers transaction costs, and ultimately supports competitive markets,
which helps lower electricity costs for consumers. Applying the EQR
filing requirements to the non-public utilities that fall above the de
minimis threshold will increase price transparency to the public and
the Commission and aid the Commission in its oversight of wholesale
power and transmission markets. As the Commission explained in
implementing the transparency provisions under section 23 of the
Natural Gas Act:

    The Commission's market-oriented policies for the wholesale
natural gas industry require that interested persons have broad
confidence that reported market prices accurately reflect the
interplay of legitimate market forces. Without confidence in the
fairness of price formation, the true value of transactions is very
difficult to determine. Further, price transparency makes it easier
for us to ensure that jurisdictional prices are ``just and
reasonable.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Order No. 704-A, 124 FERC ] 61,269 at P 3; see also Order
No. 704, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,260 at P 7.

    11. Based on the most recent data available in the 2009 U.S. Energy
Information Administration's (EIA) Form 861, non-public utilities
account for significant volumes of the 3.2 billion MWh of total annual
wholesale electricity sales made within the 48 contiguous states
(excluding ERCOT).\31\ In particular, about 29 percent of those
wholesale sales are made by non-public utilities. Non-public utilities
make a significant portion of sales in certain regional wholesale
markets within the United States. The 2009 EIA Form 861 data indicates
that non-public utilities account for 60 and 70 percent of wholesale
sales within the Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) and SERC
Reliability Corporation (SERC) regions, respectively. Similarly, non-
public utilities make up about 80 percent of all wholesale sales that
occur within the Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC). Given
non-public utilities' significant presence in national and regional
wholesale electricity markets, obtaining information about their sales
transactions is important to unmasking how prices are formed in
electricity markets. The lack of information from non-public utilities
results in an incomplete picture of these markets, and hampers the
ability of the public

and the Commission to detect and address the potential exercise of
market power and manipulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-861,
Annual Electric Power Industry Report (April 2010), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    12. Among the refinements this NOPR proposes to the EQR filing
requirements is a requirement that all market participants provide
information about the index publishers, if any, to which they report
their transactions and any broker or exchange they use. This
information would provide greater transparency regarding electricity
index prices and how well those index prices reflect market forces,
thus creating greater confidence in the electricity market. In
addition, this NOPR proposes several refinements to the EQR filing
requirements, including requiring all filers to report: (1) The
transaction date and time; (2) the type of rate by which the price in
the transaction or contract was set (i.e., fixed price, formula, index,
or RTO/ISO price); and (3) e-Tag ID data. The Commission also proposes
to: (1) Standardize the unit for reporting energy and capacity
transactions; (2) omit the time zone from the contract section; and (3)
eliminate the DUNS number requirement.
    13. Section 220(a)(4) of the FPA requires the Commission to
``consider the degree of price transparency provided by existing price
publishers and providers of trade processing services, and * * * rely
on such publishers and services to the maximum extent possible.'' As
discussed below, we have reviewed existing publications and we believe
that the additional data that would be required under this NOPR is not
available through existing sources and is necessary to provide a
complete picture of price formation in wholesale power markets.
b. Notice of Inquiry Regarding Extending the EQR Filing Requirements
    14. In the Transparency NOI, the Commission sought comments
regarding whether the Commission should extend the EQR filing
requirements to non-public utilities. The Commission also sought
comments on what information the Commission should collect, whether the
Commission should establish a threshold for reporting, and the burden
on market participants that would have to adapt their existing systems
to be able to provide the information. The Commission also asked
whether extending the filing requirements would impact market
liquidity.
2. Commission Authority
a. Comments
    15. Several commenters question whether the Commission has the
authority to extend the EQR filing requirements to non-public
utilities.\32\ Many of these commenters emphasize that the Commission's
jurisdiction under section 220 is limited to collecting information
regarding wholesale electricity and transmission markets. They point to
section 220(b), which states that ``[t]he Commission may prescribe
rules * * * [that] provide for the dissemination, on a timely basis, of
information about the availability and prices of wholesale electric
energy and transmission service.'' \33\ They argue that non-public
utilities constitute a small percentage of the wholesale market, and
therefore information from these market participants will not enhance
transparency significantly.\34\ In addition, Alaska Power argues that
utilities in Alaska do not engage in energy and transmission
transactions in interstate commerce and, therefore, should not be
required to file EQRs. Many commenters also argue that there is a lack
of evidence to support imposing the EQR filing requirements on non-
public utilities.\35\ For instance, NRECA and TANC argue that, in the
Transparency NOI, the Commission overstated the volume of sales that
would be reported if the Commission extended the filing requirements to
non-public utilities.\36\ APPA asserts that EIA statistics on non-
public utility sales cited by the Commission in the Transparency NOI
reflect bundled retail sales to consumers rather than information on
wholesale sales, which is relevant to the Commission's oversight of
jurisdictional wholesale markets.\37\ NRECA and TANC claim that the
Commission should have excluded retail sales from EIA's estimate of
electric utility sales that are made by entities other than public
utilities.\38\ TANC also asserts that the Commission should have
excluded sales from utilities in ERCOT because those utilities are
outside the Commission's section 220 jurisdiction. APPA asserts that
the Commission's efforts would be better spent focusing on Regional
Transmission Organization (RTO) and Independent System Operators (ISO)
market transparency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ APPA; NRECA; Southwest Transmission; EMCOS; Public Systems;
East Texas Electric Cooperatives; Cities/M-S-R; TANC; MID; New York
Public Power; Delaware Municipal; California DWR; Public Power
Council; Allegheny; Utah Associated Municipal; NCPA; NYMPA/MEUA.
    \33\ 16 U.S.C. 824t(b).
    \34\ APPA; NRECA; EMCOS; Public Systems; East Texas Electric
Cooperatives; TANC; Delaware Municipal; Utah Associated Municipal;
NYMPA/MEUA.
    \35\ Southwest Transmission; East Texas Electric Cooperatives;
TANC; Utah Associated Municipal.
    \36\ NRECA at 11; TANC at 16.
    \37\ APPA at 5-6.
    \38\ NRECA at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    16. NRECA and TANC further contend that the absence of EQR
information from non-public utilities has not hampered the Commission's
ability to approve market-based rates. For example, TANC argues that
the Commission has been conducting ex ante and ex post analyses of
public utilities' market power and has been approving and evaluating
mergers for decades without information from non-jurisdictional
entities.
    17. Cities/M-S-R state that entities under consideration in this
proceeding have no statutory obligation to file their energy sales
agreements with the Commission, nor are their rates subject to
reasonableness determinations before the Commission. Accordingly,
Cities/M-S-R argue that there is no need to use the EQR mechanism to
replace other filing obligations, such as an annual filing with the
EIA, for entities exempt from section 205 of the FPA.
    18. Other commenters argue that the Commission has the authority
under the FPA to extend the EQR filing requirements to non-public
utilities. EEI asserts that section 220 provides the Commission with
clear authority and responsibility to extend the EQR filing
requirements. DC Energy notes that section 205 also provides the
Commission with broad authority to require otherwise exempt entities to
provide information related to the rates for jurisdictional services.
    19. Several commenters also support the Commission's effort to
increase transparency in wholesale electricity markets and assert that
the additional reporting requirements will assist the Commission in
carrying out its statutory obligations.\39\ The City of Dover states
that reporting is needed to enable the Commission to understand the
impact of certain transactions. DC Energy strongly supports the
Commission's efforts and argues that such reporting will help
facilitate the detection of market power. In addition, California PUC
states that the additional filing requirements can help state
regulatory agencies: (1) Oversee utility procurement; (2) establish
statewide renewable portfolio standards, energy efficiency initiatives,
demand response programs, and capacity market activities; and (3)
further greenhouse gas policies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See, e.g., City of Dover at 1; DC Energy at 5-6; California
PUC at 2-3; PG&E at 3; Wisconsin Electric at 2; EEI at 3.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Discussion
    20. The market transparency provisions in section 220 of the FPA
direct the Commission to ``facilitate price transparency'' in markets
for the sale and transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce.\40\ The transparency provisions authorize the Commission to
``prescribe such rules as the Commission determines necessary and
appropriate'' for the dissemination of ``information about the
availability and prices of wholesale electric energy and transmission
service.'' \41\ These provisions expand the Commission's authority to
collect such information, not only from public utilities, but ``from
any market participant'' \42\ with more than a de minimis market
presence.\43\ The Commission proposes, in this NOPR, to fulfill its
responsibility under section 220 of the FPA by requiring non-public
utilities with more than a de minimis market presence in wholesale
markets to comply with the EQR filing requirements outlined in the next
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 16 U.S.C. 824t(a)(1).
    \41\ Id. at 824t(a)(2).
    \42\ Id. at 824t(a)(3). This section states, in relevant part,
that ``[t]he Commission may obtain the information described in
paragraph (2) from any market participant.'' Id. (emphasis added).
    \43\ Id. at 824t(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    21. Currently, market participants that fall within the
Commission's jurisdiction under FPA section 205 must file EQRs. Section
201(f) of the FPA exempts certain entities (i.e., Federal entities,
municipalities, and certain cooperatives with Rural Electrification Act
financing and that sell less than 4,000,000 MWh of electricity per
year) from the Commission's section 205 jurisdiction.\44\ However, the
transparency provisions in FPA section 220 specifically permit the
Commission to obtain price and availability information from ``any
market participant.'' The phrase ``any market participant'' is not
defined in section 220 and is not limited to public utilities subject
to the Commission's jurisdiction under section 205 of the FPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Id. at 824(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    22. We interpret ``any market participant'' to include non-public
utilities that fall under FPA section 201(f).\45\ Such an
interpretation of ``any market participant'' is consistent with the
broad mandate in section 220 to ``facilitate price transparency in the
markets for the sale and transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce, having due regard for the public interest, the integrity of
those markets, fair competition, and the protection of consumers.''
Furthermore, in EPAct 2005, Congress amended section 201(b)(2) of the
FPA \46\ to provide that, ``[n]otwithstanding section 201(f),'' the
entities described in section 201(f) shall be subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction for purposes of carrying out certain
provisions, including FPA section 220. Thus, reading FPA section
201(b)(2) in conjunction with section 220, EPAct 2005 granted the
Commission authority to collect information concerning the availability
and prices of wholesale electric energy and transmission service from
entities that are not public utilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See id. at 824t(a)(3)(A).
    \46\ FPA section 201(b)(2) states that: Notwithstanding section
201(f), the provisions of sections * * * 220 * * * shall apply to
the entities described in such provisions, and such entities shall
be subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission for purposes of
carrying out such provisions and for purposes of applying the
enforcement authorities of this Act with respect to such provisions.
Id. at 824(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    23. We disagree with certain commenters' assertions that
information about wholesale sales made by non-public utilities will not
significantly enhance price transparency because non-public utilities
are a small percentage of the wholesale market. As noted above, based
on 2009 EIA Form 861 data, non-public utility sales account for
approximately 29 percent of wholesale sales in the 48 contiguous states
(excluding ERCOT),\47\ while non-public utilities account for 60 and 70
percent of wholesale sales within the WECC and SERC regions,
respectively. Similarly, non-public utilities make up about 80 percent
of all wholesale sales that occur within FRCC. Given non-public
utilities' significant presence in national and regional wholesale
electricity markets, obtaining information about their sales
transactions is essential to understanding how prices are formed in
electricity markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ The Commission has excluded ERCOT from its calculations
consistent with FPA section 220(f), which states that section 220
does not apply to wholesale sales of electric energy or transmission
services within ERCOT. Id. at 824t(f). However, ERCOT members would
need to report wholesale power sale contract and transaction
information in EQR to the extent they make interstate sales outside
of ERCOT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. Certain commenters dispute the accuracy of the 29 percent
figure cited in the Transparency NOI \48\ as the percentage of
wholesale sales made by non-public utilities, arguing that the
Commission incorrectly relied on EIA statistics pertaining to non-
public utility bundled sales instead of wholesale sales. In particular,
NRECA, APPA, and TANC argue that the Transparency NOI calculated the 29
percent figure based on EIA's figures for retail electric utility
sales, labeled ``Sales to Ultimate Consumers.'' In fact, however, the
Commission arrived at the 29 percent figure in the Transparency NOI by
using the 2007 EIA Form 861 wholesale sales data classified by EIA as
``Sales for Resale,'' and not ``Sales to Ultimate Consumers.'' \49\
This 29 percent figure remains the same using the most recently
available date (i.e. 2009) from EIA Form 861.\50\ Thus, the percentages
of wholesale sales made by non-public utilities cited in the
Transparency NOI and this NOPR are accurate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Specifically, the Transparency NOI stated that EIA's
Electric Power Industry Overview 2007 estimated that 29 percent of
electric utility sales are made by publicly-owned electric utilities
(municipals, public utility districts or public power districts,
state authorities, irrigation districts, and joint municipal action
agencies, consumer-owned rural electric cooperatives, and Federal
electric utilities). See Transparency NOI, FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
35,565 at P 9 & n. 21 (citing Energy Information Administration,
Electric Power Industry Overview 2007 (March 2009) available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html).
    \49\ See Annual Electric Power Industry Report Instructions,
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/forms/eia861.pdf.
    \50\ At the time that the Commission issued the Transparency
NOI, EIA had not yet released the data for 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    25. With respect to APPA's comments that the Commission should
focus on increasing market transparency in RTOs/ISOs instead of
increasing market transparency by requiring non-public utilities to
file EQRs, we agree that transparency in the organized markets is
important. In fact, the RTOs/ISOs already make available a significant
amount of information about the availability and prices for wholesale
sales and transmission service within their markets. For example, in
Order No. 719, the Commission further promoted transparency in RTO/ISO
markets by directing RTOs/ISOs to reduce the lag time for the release
of offer and bid data and requiring RTOs/ISOs to justify in compliance
filings their policy regarding the aggregation of offer data and cost
data, discussing how the policy avoids participant harm and the
possibility of collusion, while fostering market transparency.\51\
However, notwithstanding the high value the Commission places on market
transparency in RTO/ISO markets, we continue to believe that increasing
transparency broadly across all markets subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction by requiring all market participants,

including non-public utilities with more than a de minimis presence in
those markets, to provide information through EQRs is equally
important.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized
Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 FR 64100 (Oct. 28, 2008), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,281 (2008), order on reh'g, Order No. 719-A, 74
FR 37776 (Jul. 29, 2009), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,292, order on
reh'g, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ] 61,252 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. NRECA's and TANC's arguments that the Commission should not
require non-public utilities to report information in the EQR because
the Commission has been approving market-based rates and evaluating
mergers for decades without such information miss the mark.
Disseminating information through the EQR about wholesale sales made by
non-public utilities would benefit the Commission, market participants
and the public in several different ways in addition to improving the
Commission's ability to evaluate jurisdictional sellers' market-based
rate authorizations and proposed mergers and acquisitions. Information
about non-public utility sales would provide a more complete view of
the prices and volumes that underlie price formation in the wholesale
power markets. Information on all sales, rather than sales made only by
public utilities, would allow market participants to value their
transactions more accurately and increase confidence that market prices
reflect all relevant supply and demand forces. Such information, in
combination with other information tools, would also allow the
Commission to better monitor for indications of market power and
manipulation at major trading hubs and on electricity indices. For
example, without the inclusion of non-public utility transactions in
the EQR, the Commission may incorrectly conclude that substantial
market price deviations, or other indicators, at major trading hubs or
on electricity indices are attributable to the exercise of market power
or manipulation by a public utility, when in fact, those price
deviations reflect legitimate market forces caused by significant
volumes being transacted by non-public utilities.
    27. In addition, as the Commission explained in the Transparency
NOI, obtaining EQR information from non-public utilities would
strengthen the Commission's oversight of its market-based rate program
under FPA section 205 and provide a better basis for considering
whether to approve merger and acquisition proposals under FPA section
203.\52\ The Commission's market-based rate program is grounded in an
ex ante analysis of whether to grant a seller market-based rate
authority and an ex post analysis of whether a seller with market-based
rate authority has obtained excessive market share since it was granted
authorization to transact at market-based rates or since the last
review of such rates.\53\ One tool used in some cases to conduct an ex
ante analysis of whether to grant market-based rate authority to a
seller is the delivered price test (DPT). The DPT defines the relevant
market by identifying potential suppliers based on market prices, input
costs, and transmission availability, and then calculates each
supplier's economic capacity and available economic capacity for each
season/load condition.\54\ Rather than relying on a DPT analysis for
analyzing a market-based rate seller's authority that is based on proxy
prices and published price indices for sales by non-public utilities,
obtaining more complete price and volume information for sales of
electricity by non-public utilities would more accurately reflect
market prices, improve the quality of the DPT results and assist the
Commission in identifying whether sellers can exercise market power.
The DPT also is used by the Commission to evaluate the effect on
competition with respect to proposed mergers and acquisitions under FPA
section 203. Therefore, obtaining more complete price and volume
information would provide a better basis for considering whether to
approve merger and acquisition proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\  See Transparency NOI, 130 FERC ] 61,039 at P 10-12.
    \53\ The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's
market-based rate regulatory scheme because it relies on a ``system
[that] consists of a finding that the applicant lacks market power
(or has taken sufficient steps to mitigate market power), coupled
with strict reporting requirements to ensure that the rate is `just
and reasonable' and that markets are not subject to manipulation.''
State of California, ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006,
1013 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied (S. Ct. Nos. 06-888 and 06-1100,
June 18, 2007) (Lockyer).
    \54\  See Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric
Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order
No. 697, 72 FR 39904 (July 20, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,252,
clarified, 121 FERC ] 61,260 (2007), order on reh'g, Order No. 697-
A, 73 FR 25832 (May 7, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,268,
clarified, 124 FERC ] 61,055, order on reh'g, Order No. 697-B, 73 FR
79610 (Dec. 30, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,285 (2008), order on
reh'g, Order No. 697-C, 74 FR 30924 (June 29, 2009), FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,291 (2009), order on reh'g, Order No. 697-D, 75 FR 14342
(March 25, 2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,305 (2010). The
Commission requires the DPT if a seller fails one of the indicative
screens. The indicative screens analyze the number of megawatts of
capacity an applicant owns or controls, rather than analyzing actual
price data. However, ``sellers that do not pass the indicative
screens are allowed to provide additional analysis for Commission
consideration,'' including price data. Order No. 697, FERC Stats. &
Regs ] 31,252 at P 62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. Such information from non-public utilities would also provide
the Commission with important actual sales information for performing
ex post analysis of whether a jurisdictional seller with market-based
rate authority has gained an excessive market share since the original
authorization to transact at market-based rates or since the
Commission's last review of such rates. Information about sales by non-
public utility market participants will allow the Commission to compare
prices for power sold by jurisdictional sellers with those of non-
public utility sellers in the same market.
    29. Cities/M-S-R argues that the EQR mechanism should not replace
other filings made by non-public utilities, such as an annual filing
with the EIA, because non-public utilities have no statutory obligation
to file sales agreements with the Commission and their rates are not
subject to the Commission's reasonableness determinations. Although
non-public utilities are not subject to the same filing requirements
and rate determinations under FPA sections 205 and 206 as public
utilities are, we propose that reporting in the EQR is the proper
mechanism for non-public utilities to make information about their
wholesale sales and transmission available to the public. As we note
below, existing sources of information about non-public utility
wholesale sales are insufficient to facilitate price transparency. The
EQR is an established public reporting process that already provides
substantial transparency into public utility sales. Furthermore, by
requiring non-public utilities to file information in the EQR in the
format used by public utilities, we can help ensure the consistency and
comparability of the information. Consistency and comparability between
filers is important because wholesale markets do not distinguish
between sellers that are subject to the Commission's FPA section 205
jurisdiction or the Commission's regulations and sellers that are
typically exempt from such Commission's jurisdiction. Expanding the
applicability of the Commission's EQR filing requirements allows the
Commission and the public to equally evaluate all transactions in the
market.
    30. With respect to Cities/M-S-R's arguments that they do not file
sales agreements or need reasonableness determinations from the
Commission on their rates, so they should not be required to file EQRs,
we note that our jurisdiction under FPA section 220's transparency
provisions is limited to the dissemination of information that will aid
in market transparency for the public and the Commission. Section 220
gives the Commission no jurisdiction related to, nor do our proposed
regulations govern, the rates, terms, and conditions of service of
market

participants that are excluded from the Commission's FPA section 205
jurisdiction. The Commission is requiring only the posting of
information important to ensuring market transparency and is not
engaging in traditional regulation of rates, terms and conditions of
service for non-public utilities.
    31. In response to Alaska Power, we propose to exempt utilities
located entirely in Alaska from the EQR filing requirements because
they are electrically isolated from the contiguous United States. In
addition, we propose to apply this exemption to utilities located
entirely in Hawaii.
3. Proposed Filing Requirements for Non-Public Utilities
a. Existing Sources of Information
i. Comments
    32. California DWR, NRECA, New York Public Power, City of
Fayetteville, and SWP argue that section 220 of the FPA requires the
Commission to determine that existing price publications are
insufficient before establishing any new reporting requirements.
Commenters also urge the Commission to consider whether new reporting
requirements would be duplicative of existing sources, such as EIA
reports, ISO/RTO data, and private index publishers.\55\ Public Systems
claim that the Commission may not impose EQR filing requirements on
market participants in New England because RTOs in New England already
provide the public with extensive data regarding price and the
availability of wholesale electric energy. SWP also suggests that the
Commission could combine data from multiple sources, such as the
California Independent System Operator (CAISO), existing EQRs, and
pricing publications, to conduct ex ante or ex post market analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See, e.g., East Texas Electric Cooperatives at 2-3; New
York Public Power at 3-4; NRECA at 6-8; Cities/M-S-R at 10-11; DEMEC
at 3-4; Public Systems at 11-15; TANC at 10-11, 14-15; SWP at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. According to APPA, before expanding EQR requirements to non-
public utilities, the Commission should look closely at the amount and
type of wholesale sales these utilities actually make and consider
other sources of available information on such sales, such as EIA
publications and forms, to determine whether the additional information
supplied through their EQR filings would help in achieving the
Transparency NOI's stated goals. NRECA and Cities/M-S-R state that
cooperatives and other electric utilities annually file form EIA-861,
``Annual Electric Power Industry Report,'' with the EIA. They explain
that this form includes information such as peak load, generation,
electric purchases, sales and revenues. Moreover, NRECA states that EIA
provides access to the daily volumes, high and low prices, and weighted
average prices from hubs around the country. In addition, NRECA states
that cooperatives that receive Rural Utilities Service (RUS) financing
are required to file RUS Form 12, which includes such information as
electric purchases, sales, and revenues and is publicly available
through a database purchased from Ventyx.\56\ NRECA also states that
the Energy Management Institute provides results of a daily survey of
wholesale transactions that they conduct in all the major trading
regions of the country. Furthermore, TANC and NRECA note that forward
market prices are available through the New York Mercantile Exchange
and the IntercontinentalExchange. Finally, Sam Rayburn Municipal
believes that any additional reporting requirement would be duplicative
because its power supply structure is simple and reported in detail in
its formal financing, accounting and engineering documents.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Ventyx is a commercial provider that offers Velocity Suite,
an application that includes data from generation and transmission
cooperatives, distribution cooperatives, municipal utilities, and
other market participants exempt from the Commission's FPA section
205 jurisdiction.
    \57\ Sam Rayburn Municipal at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Discussion
    34. In carrying out Congress' directive to facilitate price
transparency in wholesale sales and transmission markets, FPA section
220 requires that the Commission consider the degree of price
transparency provided by existing price publishers and trade processing
services, and rely on such publishers and services to the maximum
extent possible.\58\ As pointed out by commenters, there are already a
number of sources of publicly available information about wholesale
markets, including EIA and RUS forms, RTOs/ISOs, electric index
publishers, and commercial data providers that provide varying degrees
of price transparency. However, the Commission believes the degree of
price transparency provided by existing sources is insufficient for
facilitating price transparency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See 16 U.S.C. 824t(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. The two most significant publicly available forms that capture
information about non-public utility power sales are the EIA Form 861
and the RUS Form 12. EIA Form 861 reports total volume (MWh) and
revenue associated with a filer's wholesale power sales for an entire
year.\59\ However, Form EIA Form 861 does not detail individual
wholesale transactions, including the counterparty, location, price,
and delivery timeframe as well as other transaction details contained
in EQR. Rather, EIA Form 861 filers report their aggregated annual
volume of sales for resale and corresponding revenues. RUS Form 12
provides accounting details for power transaction by entities that fall
under 7 U.S.C. 901 authority.\60\ RUS Form 12 provides considerably
more detail than EIA Form 861 through the inclusion of the energy
purchaser and other contract details for individual energy sales.\61\
However, RUS Form 12 provides only limited price transparency because
the form does not contain information on delivery location and time.
Delivery location and time are critical for gaining insight into price
formation.\62\ Without transaction-specific delivery location and time
information, Form EIA 861 and RUS Form 12 do not provide sufficient
price transparency into wholesale electricity markets. Therefore,
expanding EQR filing requirements to non-public utilities would provide
price transparency that is not available through EIA Form 861 or RUS
Form 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ On line 12 of Schedule 2, Part B, EIA Form 861 collects
information on electricity ``Sales for Resale.'' http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/forms/eia861.pdf.
    \60\ RUS Form 12b SE itemizes sales of electricity while RUS
Form 12b PP itemizes purchases of electricity. http://www.usda.gov/rus/dcs/electric-forms/form12-2006.pdf, http://www.usda.gov/rus/dcs/downloads/form12/1717b-3.pdf.
    \61\ RUS Form 12b SE data field ``Statistical Classification
(b)'' provides detail on whether the sale is for requirements
service, long-term firm service or intermediate-term firm service,
among other classifications. http://www.usda.gov/rus/dcs/downloads/form12/1717b-3.pdf.
    \62\ For example, one would expect power sold in a load-
constrained area during on-peak hours to be priced very differently
from power sold in a generation-rich area during off-peak hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. RTOs/ISOs post extensive information about RTO/ISO wholesale
market prices and market participant bid/offer data that provide
valuable transparency for spot wholesale power markets run by RTOs/
ISOs. These postings contain detailed location, market and product
information. However, these postings are limited to the wholesale
electricity markets that are administered by RTOs and ISOs. In
addition, publicly posted RTO/ISO data does not provide price
transparency into the bilateral transactions entered into by market
participants within the RTO/ISO balancing authority area that can
impact RTO/ISO market price formation. These bilateral transactions are
frequently

scheduled into the RTO/ISO market.\63\ The terms of bilateral
transactions are often not reported to RTO/ISO markets and not included
in publicly posted price and bid/offer data. While some bilateral
transactions are already reported in the EQR, expanding the EQR filing
requirements to include non-public utilities would give the Commission
and the public a better view into bilateral transactions. This data
would also enhance the RTO/ISO market monitoring units' ability to
monitor RTO/ISO markets. Thus, expanding EQR filing requirements to
non-public utilities would provide valuable price transparency into
bilateral wholesale electricity markets that is not currently captured
in publicly posted data from RTOs/ISOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ For example, NYISO estimates that approximately 50 percent
of the energy scheduled in their markets was transacted bilaterally.
See http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_the_markets/energy_market/index.jsp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Existing daily index publications provide a degree of price
transparency into spot wholesale electricity markets by capturing
certain transactions. However, this price transparency is limited
because these index publications do not capture longer-term
transactions. Expanding EQR filing requirements to non-public utilities
would provide price transparency for longer-term transactions not
included in daily index publications.
    38. Organized exchanges, such as the Intercontinental Exchange,
also provide valuable price information, but that information is
limited only to prices for particular power products at standardized
locations. Finally, commercial data providers, like Ventyx, provide a
valuable service by collecting and packaging existing publicly
available data. However, their products are limited by the availability
of existing information, and therefore do not, in themselves, increase
price transparency.
    39. In addition, information about non-public utility transmission
service and reassigned transmission capacity sales may be available in
the Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS). However,
information on OASIS is not readily accessible to the public. Thus,
requiring information about non-public utility transmission service and
reassigned transmission capacity sales to be made publicly available
through the EQR will facilitate price transparency in the transmission
markets and aid the public and the Commission in detecting and
addressing possible market power and manipulation in these markets.
b. Scope of Proposed EQR Filing Requirements for Non-Public Utilities
i. Comments
    40. BPA and Cities/M-S-R question whether the Commission needs all
of the information included in the EQR and whether quarterly filings
are necessary. In particular, BPA believes that the critical
information that the Commission needs to measure the size of the
relevant market is contained in the transaction section, Field Numbers
46-67, and that the information in the contract section would not be
necessary or helpful to the Commission. In addition, APPA and Salt
River note that the Commission may need to customize the EQR filing
forms to reflect the types of information applicable to public power
entities.\64\ However, EEI states that if particular reporting
requirements do not apply to a given filer, it can simply indicate
``not applicable.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Salt River at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    41. In addition, BPA asserts that the burden would be greatly
reduced if the Commission were to limit the filing requirements for BPA
to wholesale power sales at market-based rates. Thus, BPA supports
excluding the cost-based sales to consumer-owned utilities, direct
services industries, and inter-business line transmission services
transactions.
    42. APPA asserts that sales by joint action agencies, state
agencies, and power or water districts to their own members should not
be reported.\65\ APPA argues that if the Commission expands EQR filing
requirements to public power utilities, these agencies and districts
should only be required to file EQR information on their excess power
sales (i.e., sales to entities other than their member utilities or
long-term distribution customers). TAPS and Public Power argue that
joint-action agencies should not be required to report transactional
information on long-term, wholesale sales of power to their member
utilities. In addition, TAPS argues that generation and transmission
(G&T) cooperatives' sales to their members should not be included. TAPS
explains that although technically at wholesale, such sales are
analogous to a vertically integrated utility's internal supply of its
retail sales unit and subsequent retail sale, neither of which is
reported through public utilities' EQRs.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ APPA at 5.
    \66\ TAPS at 2, 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. LPPC and Salt River argue that the Commission should avoid
requirements for reporting on long-term power supply arrangements that
are solely between non-jurisdictional entities. For instance, LPPC
argues that the power sold under long-term arrangements between non-
jurisdictional entities is not a factor to market participants when
considering competitive purchases or sales nor is it relevant to the
Commission's market manipulation oversight. Thus, such power
arrangements do not factor into the market over which the Commission
has oversight.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ LPPC at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. By contrast, PG&E, Wisconsin Electric, and EEI believe that
market participants that are excluded from the Commission's section 205
jurisdiction should file the same data elements that jurisdictional
entities are required to file under the EQR Data Dictionary.
ii. Commission Proposal
    45. The Commission proposes to apply the same EQR requirements to
non-public utilities that it currently requires from public utilities,
with some adjustments, as discussed below. In particular, the
Commission proposes that non-public utilities be required to report the
same information about wholesale sales, transmission service, and
transmission capacity reassignments that are currently reported by
public utilities. Expanding the same EQR data elements to non-public
utilities will help ensure comparability and consistency with filings
by public utilities, which will make it easier for market participants
and the public to use the information. In addition, requiring the same
sales and transmission-related information from non-public utilities
will allow the Commission to better evaluate the performance of
wholesale markets as a whole and make it easier to determine that
jurisdictional prices are ``just and reasonable.''
    46. In their comments, several market participants suggest that
non-public utilities should not be required to file certain sales in
the EQR, such as certain cost-based sales. BPA, for instance, suggested
that cost-based sales to consumer-owned utilities, inter-business line
transmission services transactions and sales to direct services
industries, which are developed based on cost-based rates, should not
be filed.\68\ Other commenters suggest that joint action agencies
should not be required to report transactional information on the long-
term, wholesale sales of power to their member utilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ Cities/M-S-R at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. The Commission proposes that all wholesale sales, including
cost-based and market-based sales, be included in EQR filings from non-
public utilities with more than a de minimis market

presence. Although several commenters argue that certain sales, such as
sales by joint action agencies, state agencies, and power or water
districts to their own members, should not be reported, we conclude
that excluding these wholesale sales in the EQR adversely impacts price
transparency in wholesale electricity markets. Specifically, these
sales can impact market prices regardless of whether or not they are
made by entities that fall under the Commission's FPA section 205
jurisdiction. For instance, if the agencies and districts did not
supply their members, then the members would have to purchase supply
from other sources in the market. Also, depending on these agency and
district rules, the members may be able to sell excess power into the
market. In either case, these sales would have an effect on the
formation of prevailing market prices. Sales transactions by non-public
utilities, whether cost-based or market-based, can influence wholesale
electricity markets. Excluding certain segments of wholesale sales
would result in an incomplete picture of wholesale price formation and
would hamper the ability of the public and Commission to detect and
address the potential exercise of market power and manipulation.
    48. Furthermore, we agree with TAPS that a vertically integrated
utility that internally supplies its retail sales unit would not need
to report that supply in the EQR because there is no wholesale sale in
this situation. However, in the case of a G&T cooperative selling to
its member cooperatives to meet the members' load obligations, this
would constitute a wholesale sale that must be reported in the EQR.
Such reporting is consistent with how jurisdictional cooperatives
report their sales in the EQR. Any subsequent sale by a member
cooperative to its retail customers would be a retail sale that is not
reported in the EQR.
    49. We believe that certain data fields in the EQR may not be
applicable to filings made by non-public utilities. For example,
contract data Field Number 19 (FERC Tariff Reference) and transaction
data Field Number 50 (FERC Tariff Reference) require filers to insert a
``FERC Tariff Reference.'' Non-public utilities may not possess an
appropriate FERC Tariff Reference (Fields 19 and 50) for certain
wholesale contracts and transactions. In cases where a FERC Tariff
Reference is not applicable, the Commission proposes to require that a
filer state that the appropriate FERC Tariff Reference is ``Not
Required,'' or ``n/r,'' in their EQR filing. However, if the sale
relates to a previously filed reciprocal open access transmission
tariff (OATT), the Commission proposes that the appropriate reference
to the reciprocal OATT be included in the EQR. In addition, non-public
utilities can mark as ``Not Required,'' or ``n/r,'' for the ``Product
Type Information'' captured in Field Number 30, which relates to
whether the transaction is ``cost-based,'' ``capacity reassignment,''
``market-based,'' or ``other,'' because the values for Field Number 30
are defined based on types of FERC-approved tariffs.
    50. In its comments, BPA noted that the information necessary for
the Commission to measure the size of a relevant market for merger
analysis can be found in the transaction section (Field Numbers 46
through 67) of the EQR, but that the contract section (Field Numbers 14
through 45) does not appear to be necessary or helpful for merger
analysis. The Commission agrees with BPA's assessment that the
transaction section would be the relevant data fields in the EQR to use
in determining the size of a wholesale energy market. However, the
EQR's function is not limited to merger analysis, as discussed above.
    51. Furthermore, limiting EQR data to only transactions data would
significantly detract from the Commission's efforts to facilitate price
transparency under FPA section 220. The contract section of the EQR
provides critical price transparency information in several ways.
First, the contract section provides information and valuable context
on when rates were established and the terms of the rates. Without
contextual information, such as when and how a rate was agreed upon,
the sales price that is reported in the transaction section (Field
Number 64) might appear anomalous compared to other prices reported in
the transaction section. Second, there are a number of products and
agreements that are reported solely on the contract section of the EQR,
such as emergency energy, interconnection agreements, membership
agreements, and must run agreements.\69\ These products and agreements
can impact a market participant's ability to make sales and access
transmission, which are aspects of price formation. Therefore,
excluding them would limit the price transparency impact associated
with expanding the EQR to non-public utilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ For a detailed list, please refer to Appendix B in the
Electric Quarterly Report Data Dictionary, Version 1.1, available at
http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/eqr/soft-tools/eqrdatadictionary.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Burden
i. Comments
    52. EEI believes that the burden on non-public utilities would be
no greater than the burden on jurisdictional entities, once systems are
in place to collect and compile the information. However, several
commenters state that complying with any additional reporting
requirements would be a significant burden for municipals and
cooperatives. Public Power Council states that the EQR requirements are
burdensome and the value of the information that the Commission would
collect from most Northwest public power entities does not justify the
cost that would be expended by non-public utilities to produce the
information. Further, Utah Associated Municipal states that filing EQRs
to report those sales made every hour of every day to nearly every
member utility would give the Commission no useful information relevant
to its purposes.
    53. Cities/M-S-R argue that it is unnecessarily burdensome for the
Commission to collect transaction data for market transparency purposes
on a quarterly basis and state that the Commission has created annual,
not quarterly, reporting requirements under the natural gas
transparency provisions. Cities/M-S-R also assert that the data
required on Form 552 for natural gas transactions is less involved than
EQR data fields and creates a more limited burden on responding
parties. Further, Cities/M-S-R state that the scope of the EQR
information is broader than necessary and the frequency is too great
for the limited purpose of obtaining information to improve the
Commission's delivered price test analysis.
    54. According to APPA, a number of its members estimated that they
would require from two weeks to nine months for the initial setup, and
one to three days to compile, verify, and file the EQR each quarter.
The City of Fayetteville states that it has not done a detailed cost/
time analysis, but believes that it would fall in the upper quartile of
the time estimates reported in the APPA comments. Allegheny estimates
that significant computer system changes and additional ongoing
personnel resources may be required, the costs of which would need to
be passed along to the cooperative's customers. Salt River estimates
that it would need at least six months to develop an internal EQR
filing program. In addition, Salt River encourages the Commission to
provide guidance through workshops or training sessions and to provide
opportunities for interaction with staff while

preparing initial filings, and to allow sufficient time to ensure
completeness and accuracy of the filings. Based on its own experience,
DC Energy states that, while the burden will vary depending on the
scope and amount of activities, there would be an upfront time
investment of 2-4 person-weeks to design and implement an EQR tracking/
reporting system, and an ongoing reporting burden of 2-3 person-days
per quarter. It states that this estimate is based on a ``self-build
model'' and believes there also are off-the-shelf products that will
automatically generate these reports for an entity, resulting in less
of a burden.
    55. BPA states that the burden would be greatly reduced if the
Commission were to limit the filing requirements for BPA to wholesale
power sales at market-based rates (thereby excluding inter-business
line transmission services transactions, and the statutorily-mandated
cost-based sales to consumer-owned utilities and direct services
industries\70\) and eliminate the fields associated with contract data.
BPA also argues that it should not be required to report transmission
services sales made by BPA's functionally separated Power Services
section to its Transmission Services section because these inter-
business line transactions are not discretionary, open market
transactions that would aid the Commission in evaluating market power
issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ BPA notes that direct services industries are generally a
defined set of aluminum companies and large industries in the
Pacific Northwest. BPA at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Discussion
    56. We acknowledge that enhancing price transparency by extending
the EQR filing requirements to non-public utility market participants
will impose a new burden on those market participants. However, we
believe that, on balance, the benefit of increased price transparency
stemming from the filing of such information will outweigh the burden
on these market participants above the de minimis threshold. We assume
that most non-public utilities already capture transaction-specific
information for accounting and record-keeping purposes. Therefore, we
believe the burden imposed will relate primarily to the required format
for submitting that information. In addition, we believe that the
amount of burden created by requiring non-public utilities to file EQRs
will depend on how many transactions the non-public utility makes.
Accordingly, entities with a relatively small number of wholesale sales
will face less of a burden.
    57. Cities/M-S-R contend that the data collected under the natural
gas market transparency provisions is less burdensome because it is
collected annually, not quarterly, and contains less detail than the
EQR data. We note that the Commission has promulgated two rules under
the natural gas market transparency provisions in section 23 of the
NGA,\71\ Order Nos. 704 and 720. Order No. 704 requires certain
purchasers and sellers of natural gas to file an annual report about
specified physical natural gas transactions. Order No. 720 requires
major non-interstate pipelines to file certain receipt and delivery
information on a daily basis. Therefore, Order No. 720 requires data to
be provided more frequently than the EQR. In addition, Order No. 720
requires non-interstate pipelines to post detailed information,
including the transportation service provider's name, posting data,
posting time, nomination cycle, location name, additional locational
information if needed to distinguish between points, location purpose
description, posted capacity, scheduled volume, available capacity, and
measurement unit for each receipt or delivery point that meets certain
criteria.\72\ Although the level of detail in the EQR may be greater
than that required under Order Nos. 704 and 720, this difference
reflects variations between transactions made in the natural gas and
electricity markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ 15 U.S.C. 717t-2.
    \72\ See 18 CFR 284.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    58. We disagree with Cities/M-S-R's suggestion that the Commission
seeks to obtain EQR information from non-public utilities solely to
improve the Commission's DPT. As discussed above, the Commission
proposes to require non-public utilities to file EQRs to fulfill
Congress's directive in FPA section 220 to facilitate price
transparency in markets for the sale and transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce. The information in these EQRs will
provide valuable information that serves a number of purposes. This
information will provide a more complete picture of price formation in
wholesale electricity markets for the Commission and the public. In
addition, obtaining sales price and volume information in EQRs from
non-public utilities will increase the Commission's ability to monitor
utilities' power sales for indications of market power and
manipulation. Also, as explained in the Transparency NOI,\73\ and
discussed above, collecting EQR information from non-public utilities
would improve the quality of the DPT results and assist the Commission
in determinations concerning a seller's ability to exercise market
power and provide a better basis for considering whether to approve
merger/acquisition proposals under FPA section 203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\  See Transparency NOI, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 35,565 at P 9-
12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    59. We believe that the EQR compliance burden on non-public
utilities above the de minimis threshold would be greatest during the
initial set-up phase, when data is mapped into the new required format.
However, to the extent a filer uses the same format for each EQR, once
the filer's system is mapped to the interim and final formats, the
burden will be significantly reduced. The Commission invites comment
from non-public utilities and public utilities on how their existing
data capture processes have been or can be mapped to facilitate EQR
filing in its current and proposed formats.
    60. We recognize that the initial implementation and ongoing
reporting associated with the proposed EQR filing requirements will
result in additional costs and burden on non-public utilities. However,
the Commission has tried to balance the need for data with efforts to
minimize the burden on filers. To help alleviate the burden of filing
EQRs, the Commission has designed a system that allows EQRs to be filed
using the Internet so that all filers submit EQRs to the Commission
electronically. In addition, the Commission is only requiring those
non-public utilities that fall above the de minimis threshold test to
file EQRs. We also agree with Salt River that workshops or training
sessions to provide guidance may be helpful and we will make every
effort to provide technical assistance prior to the implementation of
the EQR filing requirements for non-public utilities.
d. De Minimis Threshold
i. Comments
    61. Commenters propose a wide range of de minimis market presence
thresholds for non-public utility exemptions from the EQR filing
requirements, from 8 million MWh to 100 MWh of annual sales. In favor
of the 8 million MWh threshold, two commenters \74\ point to FPA
section 206(e), which gives the Commission refund authority over
certain sales made by non-jurisdictional entities except for an entity
that sells less than 8 million MWh of electricity per year.\75\ Cities/
M-S-R also argue that a threshold of at least 8 million MWh per year is
appropriate because of the growth in the electricity market, as
evidenced by the

reported wholesale sales, which have nearly tripled between 1997 and
2008.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ Cities/M-S-R at 14; Imperial at 6.
    \75\ 16 U.S.C. 206(e).
    \76\ Cities/M-S-R at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    62. Other commenters recommend a threshold level of 4 million MWh,
based on either annual wholesale sales \77\ or annual total sales.\78\
In support of a 4 million MWh threshold, many commenters refer to
section 201(f) of the FPA, which specifically excludes from the
Commission's jurisdiction electric cooperatives that sell less than 4
million MWh of electricity per year.\79\ They also cite to the
definition of a small utility under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and
Small Business Act, which define a utility as small if its total annual
output (i.e., wholesale and/or retail) does not exceed 4 million
MWh.\80\ APPA states that a threshold of 4 million MWh annual wholesale
sales would capture approximately 70 percent of public power utilities'
wholesale sales, and 82 percent of wholesale sales made by cooperative,
Federal, and public power utilities combined. APPA argues that using
annual wholesale sales will eliminate the potential for double-counting
some public power wholesale sales in RTO regions, such as joint action
agency sales to their members. APPA also argues that the use of EIA
data to determine which utilities are above the de minimis threshold
for reporting purposes will eliminate the potential for double-counting
some public power wholesale sales in RTO regions. For example, notes
APPA, joint action agencies situated in RTO regions are often required
to sell their wholesale power into their RTO's market at the point of
generation, buy it back at their members' load nodes, and then sell the
same energy to their members. Using EIA data would eliminate potential
double-counting of these joint action agency sales to members as sales
to an RTO as well. Additionally, the City of Fayetteville argues that,
in promoting wholesale market transparency, retail sales to ultimate
consumers should not be counted toward the cutoff, because such sales
do not bear on whether a section 201(f) entity's wholesale market
presence is de minimis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See, e.g., APPA at 9; NRECA at 26; New York Public Power at
6; Delaware Municipal at 5; City of Fayetteville at 7; Southwest
Transmission at 3; Alaska Power at 2.
    \78\ See, e.g., City of Dover at 2; Northwest Utility at 2; TANC
at 20.
    \79\ In particular, FPA section 201(f) provides, in part, that
``[n]o provision in this subchapter shall apply to, or be deemed to
include * * * an electric cooperative that receives financing under
the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 901 et seq.) or that
sells less than 4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year.''
16 U.S.C. 824(f).
    \80\ The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) definition of a
``small entity'' refers to a definition provided in the Small
Business Act, which defines a ``small business concern'' as a
business that is independently owned and operated and that is not
dominant in its field of operation. See 15 U.S.C. 632. According to
the Small Business Act, a small electric utility is one that has a
total electric output of less than 4 million MWh in the preceding
year. 15 U.S.C. 631.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    63. EMCOS believes that 4 million MWh based on total annual sales
is appropriate, but that both inter-affiliate sales by consumer-owned
utilities and must-offer sales into Day 2 markets should be excluded to
avoid over-reporting. NRECA and Allegheny argue that the Commission
also should not consider sales by G&T cooperatives to their members as
wholesale sales for purposes of the de minimis 4 million MWh sales
threshold. NRECA states that when a G&T cooperative makes sales to its
member cooperatives under long-term wholesale power contracts, it is
essentially acting as the functional equivalent of a generation
division of a vertically integrated public utility. NRECA also argues
that if the Commission does not exclude sales by G&T cooperatives to
their member cooperatives, then it should establish a rebuttable
presumption that non-public utility cooperatives that sell less than 4
million MWh of power to third parties other than their member
cooperatives are exempt from the filing requirement as having a de
minimis impact on wholesale markets if such sales constitute less than
2 percent of wholesale sales in the region.
    64. LPPC asks the Commission to exempt non-jurisdictional entities
from having to report long-term sales agreements (of greater than one
year) between non-jurisdictional entities. LPPC also asks the
Commission to provide a mechanism for requests for waiver sought by
parties on the ground that specific transactions or categories of
transactions are not of a nature that their reporting is relevant to
the Commission's oversight of the wholesale marketplace. LPPC states
that examples of typical long-term agreements between non-
jurisdictional entities are the thirty-year sales agreements between
municipal utilities and MEAG Power, which was formed by the Georgia
Assembly for the purpose of generating power to be sold under long-term
agreements to municipal utility participants. LPPC states that the
power sold under these agreements does not factor into the market over
which the Commission has oversight.
    65. Some commenters further note that the Commission has used a 4
million MWh of total sales threshold in several contexts. For instance,
TANC states that the Commission has used this threshold in granting
waivers of standards of conduct for transmission providers under Order
Nos. 888,\81\ 889,\82\ and 890,\83\ and with respect to the requirement
that RTOs/ISOs accept demand response bids by aggregators of retail
customers.\84\ Furthermore, some commenters, such as LPPC, argue that a
utility that sells 4 million MWh or less of energy per year is too
small to affect the electricity markets, so excluding it from the EQR
requirements would still provide the Commission with information on the
large majority of wholesale transactions by non-jurisdictional
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,036 (1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, 62 FR 12274 (Mar.
14, 1997), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,048, order on reh'g, Order No.
888-B, 62 FR 64688 (Dec. 9, 1997), 81 FERC ] 61,248 (1997), order on
reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ] 61,046 (1998), aff'd in relevant
part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S.
1 (2002).
    \82\  Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of
Conduct, Order No. 889, 61 FR 21737 (May 10, 1996), FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,035 (1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 889-A, 62 FR 12484
(March 14, 1997), FERC Stats & Regs. ] 31,049, reh'g denied, Order
No. 889-B, 81 FERC ] 61,253 (1997).
    \83\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241.
    \84\ TANC at 19-20 (citing Wolverine Power Supply Coop., Inc.,
127 FERC ] 61,159, at P 15 (2009); Order No. 719, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,218).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    66. By contrast, EEI and DC Energy recommend adopting relatively
low thresholds. EEI states that the Commission could apply one of the
following thresholds: (1) 100 MWh of sales for resale per year used by
the Commission in the context of FERC Forms 1 and 1-F between major and
non-major utilities; or (2) 114,000 MWh of sales per year, based on
what a qualifying facility (QF) exempted from FPA section 205 (20 MW or
smaller) could produce in a year.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ EEI at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    67. Sam Rayburn Municipal believes that a threshold exemption
should exist where there is no retail competition or the relative size
or amount of power transactions is insignificant by size or substance.
ii. Discussion
    68. FPA section 220(c)(2)(d) specifies that the Commission shall
not require entities with a de minimis market presence to comply with
the reporting requirements of FPA section 220. At present, the
Commission collects data regarding cost-based sales, market-based rate
sales, transmission service, and transmission capacity reassignments
from entities subject to section 205 of the FPA. Data regarding sales,

transmission service, and transmission capacity reassignments provided
by non-public utilities is not readily available. Without this data,
the public is unable to observe a significant number of trades and is
unable to develop a more complete view of wholesale power and
transmission markets. As discussed above, a more complete view of price
formation in the markets will provide the public with greater price
transparency to evaluate the concentration of market participants in a
market and the market participant's ability to unduly influence the
market, and will assist the public and the Commission in detecting and
addressing the potential exercise of market power and manipulation.
    69. The Commission proposes that a non-public utility would be
exempt under the de minimis market presence threshold from filing EQRs
if it makes 4 million MWh or less of annual wholesale sales (based on
an average of the wholesale sales it made in the preceding three
years), unless the non-public utility is a Balancing Authority \86\
that makes 1 million MWh or more of annual wholesale sales (based on an
average of wholesale sales it made in the preceding three years). As
requested by some commenters, the Commission proposes to calculate the
de minimis market presence threshold on the amount of annual wholesale
sales made by the non-public utility rather than total (i.e. wholesale
and retail) sales. The transparency provisions in FPA section 220 focus
on the Commission requiring information concerning the availability and
prices of ``wholesale electric energy and transmission service.'' \87\
Therefore, the Commission proposes to use only the wholesale
electricity sales made by non-public utilities for purposes of
calculating the de minimis market presence threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ As defined in the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation's (NERC) Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability
Standards, a Balancing Authority is the ``responsible entity that
integrates resource plans ahead of time, maintains load-interchange-
generation balancing within a Balancing Authority Area, and supports
Interconnection frequency in real time.'' See http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_of_Terms_2011Mar15.pdf.
    \87\ See 16 U.S.C. 824t(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    70. To reduce the filing burden and promote clear compliance
requirements, the Commission proposes that non-public utilities use the
annual wholesale sales volumes they currently report to EIA to
calculate whether they meet the de minimis threshold.\88\ The
Commission proposes that the threshold be calculated using the ``Sales
for Resale'' data published in EIA Form 861.\89\ ``Sales for Resale''
as reported in EIA Form 861 does not include retail sales, as addressed
above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ This proposal is consistent with APPA's suggestion to use
EIA data when calculating the de minimis threshold. See APPA at 9-
10.
    \89\ ``Sales for Resale'' figures can be found on Line 12 in
``Schedule 2, Part B. Energy Sources and Disposition.'' See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/forms/eia861/eia861instr.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    71. The Commission believes that establishing a 4 million MWh
annual wholesale sales threshold for non-public utilities that are not
Balancing Authorities will allow the Commission and the public to
access information from market participants whose transactions could
have an impact on wholesale market prices and thereby increase price
transparency for the markets and aid in the Commission's oversight of
wholesale electricity markets,\90\ while alleviating the reporting
burden for smaller entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ It is important to note that electricity markets can be
comprised of markets that are regional, local, and even nodal. For
example, exerting market power does not necessarily involve a large
volume of physical sales. In fact, small volumes of power sales can
influence market pricing, particularly when transmission limitations
and other dynamics exist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    72. With respect to non-public utilities that are Balancing
Authorities, the Commission believes requiring them to file EQRs if
they make 1 million MWh or more of annual wholesale sales will provide
a more complete picture of prices within the balancing authority area
markets that are operated by non-public utilities and thereby assist
market participants and the Commission, particularly with respect to
conducting market-based rate analyses for jurisdictional market-based
rate sellers. For traditional (non-RTO/ISO) markets, the Commission
uses the balancing authority area as the default relevant geographic
market for its market-based rate analysis.\91\ For example, Order No.
697 noted that if a transmission-owning Federal power marketing agency
is the home or first-tier market to a seller located outside of an RTO/
ISO, then that seller must treat that Federal power marketing agency's
balancing authority area as a relevant geographic market and file a
market power analysis on it just as it would any other relevant
market.\92\ Obtaining sales information from non-public utility
Balancing Authorities that operate that balancing authority area would
greatly assist the Commission in determining whether to grant a seller
market-based rate authority (ex ante analysis) and allow a more
effective after-the-fact examination of market-based rate
authorizations (ex post analysis). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the Commission's market-based rate program based on the dual
requirement of an ex ante finding of the absence of market power and
post-approval reporting requirements through the EQR. Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit held that ``FERC's system consists of a finding that the
applicant lacks market power (or has taken sufficient steps to mitigate
market power), coupled with strict reporting requirements to ensure
that the rate is `just and reasonable' and that markets are not subject
to manipulation.'' \93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\  See Order No. 697, FERC Stats. & Regs ] 31,252 at P 232.
    \92\ See id.
    \93\ Lockyer, 383 F.3d 1013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    73. APPA expresses concern about double counting of wholesale sales
by joint action agencies situated in RTO/ISO markets. APPA notes that
joint action agencies in RTO/ISO regions are often required to sell
their wholesale power into the RTO/ISO market at the point of
generation, buy it back at their members' load nodes and then sell the
same energy to their members. APPA suggests that using EIA data would
eliminate double counting of these joint action agency-to-member
transactions as sales to an RTO/ISO. As noted above, the Commission
proposes that non-public utilities use EIA data to determine whether
they meet the de minimis threshold. However, the Commission is
concerned with capturing all wholesale power sales as they occur (no
matter how many times the power changes hands). Therefore, in the
example provided by APPA, the Commission agrees that EIA data should be
used by the joint action agency to determine whether it meets the de
minimis threshold for filing EQRs. However, if the joint action agency,
or other non-public utility, determines that it falls above the de
minimis threshold based on the EIA data, then the Commission would
expect the joint action agency or other non-public utility to report
all wholesale sales in a manner that is consistent with existing EQR
reporting standards.
    74. Some commenters argue that the Commission should not consider
sales such as inter-affiliate sales by consumer-owned utilities or
sales by G&T cooperatives to their members for purposes of the de
minimis threshold. For ease of reference, we shall refer to the
transactions raised by NRECA, and others as ``inter-familial
transactions''. We disagree with commenters' assertions that wholesale
inter-familial transactions should not be considered sales for purposes
of the de minimis annual wholesale sales threshold. Rather, the
Commission believes that

any sale of wholesale electricity should count towards the threshold,
regardless of the type of transaction from which the sale originated
(e.g., G&T cooperative sales to its members captured under long-term
wholesale power agreements). Moreover, reporting of wholesale inter-
familial transactions will assist the Commission and the public in
monitoring price formation and understanding electricity prices,
quantities, and market trends, particularly in bilateral markets.
    75. We further note that the Commission will not propose the
rebuttable presumption suggested by NRECA that non-public utility
cooperatives that sell less than 4 million MWh of power to third
parties other than their member cooperatives are exempt from the EQR
filing requirements as having a de minimis impact on wholesale markets
if such sales constitute less than 2 percent of wholesale sales in the
region. We also do not propose a mechanism for requesting waiver of the
EQR reporting requirements on the basis that the nature of specific
transactions or categories of transactions are not relevant to the
Commission's oversight of wholesale markets. Under the proposed de
minimis threshold, a non-public utility that makes 4 million MWh or
less of annual wholesale sales would be exempt from filing EQRs unless
the non-public utility is a Balancing Authority making 1 million MWh or
more of annual wholesale sales. Because entities with a de minimis
market presence are thereby exempted from the EQR filing requirement,
the Commission does not believe it is necessary to establish a
rebuttable presumption or waiver procedures. In addition, as explained
above, we believe that it is necessary to capture a G&T cooperative's
sales to its members for transparency purposes, and therefore will not
propose the rebuttable presumption approach as suggested by NRECA.
    76. Sam Rayburn Municipal believes that a threshold exemption
should exist where there is no retail competition or the relative size
or amount of power transactions is insignificant by size or substance
under this effort. We agree with Sam Rayburn Municipal's comments about
a threshold exemption, but we disagree with its comment on an exemption
where retail competition does not exist. In states where retail
competition is not present there are still wholesale transactions that
are of interest to the Commission and public. These transactions are
part of wholesale electricity price formation even in regions where
retail competition does not exist. Additionally, it is the Commission's
duty to ensure market transparency and obtain reporting from a
sufficient number of market participants to accurately understand the
physical electricity market as a whole.
    77. EMCOS believes that must-offer sales into a ``Day-2'' RTO/ISO
market should be excluded because they involve output committed under
contracts.\94\ In particular, EMCOS commented that must-offer sales
into ``Day-2'' central security-constrained dispatch/central unit
commitment markets should be excluded from the calculation of the de
minimis threshold, because such sales reflect only the application of a
tariff requirement for bidding both load and the output of resources
already contractually committed to serving that load in order to
facilitate bid-based pricing, and do not provide useful information
about the exchange of commercial consideration leading to price
formation. The Commission believes that resources committed under
contract do impact price formation and should be included in the de
minimis threshold calculation. Must-offer provisions often do not
dictate the price at which a unit may offer its supply into the market.
Even if a must-offer unit is a price taker through self-scheduling, the
unit is impacting price formation through its supply into RTO/ISO
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ EMCOS at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Refinements to the Existing EQR Requirements

1. Background
    78. In addition to seeking comments on whether the Commission
should extend the EQR reporting requirements to non-public utilities,
the Commission also sought comments regarding certain refinements to
the EQR reporting requirements. Specifically, the Commission sought
guidance on whether to: (1) Require the reporting of the trade date,
type of rate, and resales of financial transmission rights in secondary
markets; (2) use a standard unit for reporting energy and capacity
transactions; and (3) omit the time zone from the contract section.
    79. As discussed above, the Commission has determined that it
should consider whether substantial reforms to the EQR reporting
requirements are needed. After considering comments received in
response to the Transparency NOI, the Commission is proposing in this
NOPR to make the following refinements to the EQR: (1) Reporting of the
transaction date; (2) reporting of the type of rate by which the price
was set (i.e., fixed price, formula, index, or RTO/ISO price); (3)
standardizing the unit for reporting energy and capacity transactions
(i.e., $/MWh, $/MW-month); and (4) omitting the time zone from the
contract section. The Commission is also proposing not to require the
reporting of resales of financial transmission rights in secondary
markets.
    80. In addition, the Commission proposes other refinements that
were not included in the Transparency NOI. In particular, the
Commission proposes to require EQR filers to: (1) Report the time that
the transaction took place; (2) identify the broker or exchange used
for a sales transaction, if applicable; (3) indicate whether the
transaction was reported to an index publisher; and (4) report certain
e-Tag data. The Commission also proposes to eliminate the DUNS number
requirement.
2. General Refinements
    81. In combination with the broader effort to improve the
Commission's access to information about the availability and prices of
wholesale sales of electricity, the Transparency NOI considered other
refinements to the existing EQR filing requirements. As discussed
above, these refinements included: (1) Reporting the trade date (i.e.,
the date on which a transaction price is set) and the type of rate
(i.e., fixed price, a formula, an index, or an RTO/ISO price); (2)
reporting resales of financial transmission rights in secondary
markets; (3) standardizing the unit for reporting energy and capacity
transactions (i.e., $/MWh and $/MW-month); and (4) omitting the time
zone from the contract section of the EQR. The proposals described
above are detailed in Appendix B.
a. Trade Date & Time and Type of Rate
i. Comments
    82. DC Energy agrees that the EQR reporting requirement should
include the contract date, and states that master agreements or
evergreen contracts do not preclude an entity from specifying when the
agreement to transact was executed.\95\ California PUC also supports
the addition of requirements to report the trading date information and
to specify whether the reported rate is a fixed price, a formula, or an
index. It states that prices without trading dates are less informative
because prices change over time.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ DC Energy at 10.
    \96\ California PUC at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    83. EEI, EPSA, and Duke Energy argue that the burden of collecting
the trade

date and type of rate from all filers likely will require system
changes and thus outweighs the value of such information.\97\ In
addition, EPSA suggests that there are several problems with adding the
trade date, such as it being subject to multiple interpretations and
creating major software problems in the Commission's EQR program.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ EEI at 6-7; EPSA at 2-3; Duke Energy supports the comments
filed by EEI at 2.
    \98\ EPSA at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    84. EPSA's other major concern with this reporting requirement is
timing. Any reporting requirement would have to be prospective only, as
``trade date'' is not currently a reporting requirement. Thus, there
may be major software problems created with the Commission's EQR
program. EPSA states that, if implemented by the Commission without
grandfathering preexisting transactions, there would be no way for
reporting entities to differentiate new deals from old, and the old
deals will not have a reported trade date. Thus, any analysis done with
this newly reported data would have a field precluded from historical
data. Any adjustments made to prior quarters' data presumably would
need to include this information, which may be impossible to gather for
preexisting transactions. EPSA is concerned that the Commission's EQR
software would generate error messages for leaving the field blank. The
Transparency NOI provides no discussion of these problems and EPSA
states that the Commission should seriously consider these concerns
before requiring that transaction dates be reported.
    85. In addition, EPSA states there is an overlap issue. If a deal
is concluded in one quarter but goes to delivery in another quarter (or
quarters), will it have to be reported in the quarter the transaction
was concluded as well as the quarter(s) of delivery? What about any
intervening quarters--will the entity have to report deals in some form
of abeyance between conclusion and delivery?
    86. Also, EPSA states that some of its member companies have
reported that they do not track how the price was set and therefore
could not currently comply with a requirement to report the type of
rate. Thus, if this proposal is adopted, market participants would need
to make major system changes to be able to capture and report this
data. If the Commission proceeds down this route, EPSA contends that
the Commission should allow a significant period of time for
implementation before this aspect of a rule change became mandatory so
that reporting parties could hire the necessary contractors, and have
time to reconfigure data capture and reporting systems to collect this
new data.
    87. However, if the Commission decides to require filers to include
the trade date and type of rate, then EEI and EPSA propose several
revisions. EEI suggests that the Commission clarify that ``trade date''
includes only the date and not the time of day when a transaction price
was set and only include it in the transactions section, not the
contract section.\99\ Also, EEI proposes that ``the date the price was
agreed to'' should refer to the date the trade was finally
executed.\100\ According to EPSA, its members have reported that
through custom and usage in the trading industry, the term ``Trade
Date'' has developed the broadly understood meaning of ``the date upon
which the parties agree upon the terms of, and enter, a transaction.''
EPSA argues that the Commission should give the term ``Trade Date'' the
same meaning it generally has in the industry.\101\ In addition, EEI
suggests that if the Commission decides to include the type of rate,
then the options should be modified to ``fixed,'' ``formula without
index,'' and ``formula with index.'' EEI also requests that the
Commission clearly define these rate types and give examples to ensure
that industry applies the terms consistently.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ EEI at 6-7.
    \100\ Id. at 6.
    \101\ EPSA at 4.
    \102\ EEI at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    88. FirstEnergy asserts that the EQR Contract Data already captures
the trade date via the Contract Execution Date in Field 21, which
provides for the date the contract was signed. According to
FirstEnergy, typically the rate for the transaction will be agreed upon
on this date. FirstEnergy also states that the Commencement Date is
reported in the Contract Terms in Field 22, which provides for the date
that the terms in the contract are effective. Further, FirstEnergy
explains that Fields 43 and 44 provide the first and last dates for the
sale of the product at the specified rate. In addition, FirstEnergy
states that the Commission's proposed field to describe the type of
rate for each transaction is already reported under field 37, Rate
Description. According to FirstEnergy, this field currently requires
that the filing company either cite the FERC accession number for the
relevant FERC tariff or provide the entire rate algorithm.\103\
Similarly, EPSA argues that the ``type of rate'' information is already
captured in the ``contract'' field and that creating a new field would
be a significant burden.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ FirstEnergy at 2-3.
    \104\ EPSA at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Discussion
    89. The current Commission EQR reporting requirements include,
among other things, the Contract Execution Date (Field Number 21), the
Contract Commencement Date (Field Number 22), Rate Description (Field
Number 37), Begin Date (Field Number 43), and End Date (Field Number
44).\105\ These contract fields were not intended to capture trade-
specific details related to each specific transaction, but rather to
capture contractual terms and conditions under which two entities
transact for all jurisdictional services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ These fields are outlined in more detail in the Electronic
Quarterly Report Data Dictionary, Version 1.1, available at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/eqr/soft-tools/eqrdatadictionary.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    90. We agree with the points made by DC Energy and the California
PUC. Master agreements and evergreen contracts do not preclude an
entity from specifying when an agreement to transact was executed.
Prices without trading dates are less informative because prices change
over time.
    91. Presently, the trade date and type of rate by which the price
was set are not provided or collected publicly. The trade date is
essential to assessing the significance of prices in relation to market
conditions in effect at that time.\106\ Many of the prices reported in
the EQR are the result of confirmation made under master agreements.
Because the prices are not set in the contracts themselves, the
Commission is unable to determine from EQR data when the price was set.
Additionally, the Commission is unable to conclude whether the price
was based on a fixed price, a formula, an index, or an RTO/ISO price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Currently, the EQR collects only the start and end date of
physical transactions. Trades entered into months before the
transaction dates are reported in the same manner as trades entered
into minutes before the transaction occurs, making it difficult to
differentiate between trades made under different circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    92. Therefore, to improve market transparency, the Commission
proposes to require market participants to report the date on which
parties to a reported transaction agreed upon a price (trade date) and,
additionally, require the type of rate by which the price was set
(i.e., fixed price, formula, index, or RTO/ISO price) in its respective
EQR filings. The date and type of rate are to accompany each specific
sales transaction and be reported in the EQR transaction section only
in the quarter the sale occurs.
    93. We propose to clarify the term ``trade date'' as ``the date
upon which the

parties agree upon the price of a transaction.'' As discussed below, we
also propose tracking the time of the transaction. Further, EEI
suggests that the Commission clarify how to specify the type of rate
and provide examples to ensure that industry applies the terms
consistently. As a result, the options for the type of rate that the
Commission is proposing will be ``fixed,'' ``formula,'' ``index,'' and
``RTO/ISO price.'' A ``fixed'' rate will be defined as a fixed charge
per unit of consumption. An example is an agreement for the sale of 30
MWh during every on-peak hour during 2012 for an agreed upon rate in
advance of delivery. A ``formula'' rate will be defined as a
calculation of a rate based upon a formula that does not contain an
index component. An example is a cost-of-service rate. An ``index''
rate will be defined as a calculation of a rate based upon an index or
a formula that contains an index component. An example is an options
agreement where power is sold at a published index price (or at a
percentage of that published index price). An ``RTO/ISO price'' will be
defined as a rate that is based on an RTO/ISO published price or a
formula that contains an RTO/ISO price component. An example is a
generator's sale to into a RTO/ISO day-ahead market.
    94. This proposal would impose additional reporting requirements on
any market participant that is required to file an EQR with the
Commission. The Commission will ensure its EQR software can accommodate
such requirements before the first EQR filings containing the trade
date and type of rate must be submitted. Reporting of the trade date
and type of rate would occur prospectively from the time the
requirements are implemented. Accordingly, market participants would
not have to re-file prior EQR filings with the proposed time and date
information and would not have to adjust a prior quarter's information
on already executed transactions. However, if the Final Rule requires
EQR filers to report the trade date and type of rate of their
transactions, we would expect market participants to include the trade
date and type of rate for transactions taking place from the date of
the Final Rule's implementation. Any re-filings and adjustments to EQR
filings made prior to the date of effectiveness of such a rule would
follow the EQR filing requirements imposed at the time of the original
filing.
    95. Although not raised in the Transparency NOI, the Commission now
proposes to require market participants to also report the time of
trade. We propose to clarify the term ``time of trade'' as ``the time
upon which the parties agree upon the price of a transaction.'' The
Commission recognizes that not only the date, but also the time of
trade, is essential in identifying some forms of market manipulation
that may be designed to target daily index price creation for the
purpose of benefiting financial swap settlements. Without knowing what
time a trade occurred, customers and the Commission would have
difficulty identifying these out-of-market, or anti-competitive,
transactions from those that followed the ebbs and flows of the daily
market. This is due to the fact that competitive market pricing is
often fluid to reflect changes in supply and demand fundamentals. For
example, market pricing for next-day power on the morning before
delivery may be entirely different than pricing that afternoon as
outage, forecast and other information continually changes. It is
possible for market participants to attempt to ``direct'' physical
market pricing throughout the day in an effort to impact settlement
pricing for other positions. This behavior may involve trading large
volumes at the beginning of the trading day in order to ``direct''
pricing in subsequent hours or other strategies that concentrate
trading in a narrow time window.
b. Resales of Financial Transmission Rights in Secondary Markets
    96. In the Transparency NOI, staff sought comments as to whether
the Commission should collect information about the resale of financial
transmission rights in secondary markets through reporting to the EQR.
Specifically, the Transparency NOI asked whether market participants
perceive that collecting this information would enhance market
transparency and, if so, to designate what current EQR filing
requirements should be imposed on resales of financial transmission
rights in secondary markets. In addition, comments were sought to
identify other filing requirements that may be applicable to the resale
of financial transmission rights in secondary markets that are not
current EQR filing requirements and explain whether and, if so, how
collection of the information would improve market transparency.
i. Comments
    97. California PUC and SDG&E support reporting sales of financial
transmission rights to increase transparency of financial transmission
right trading by both transmission and non-transmission owners and to
reveal whether sales in the secondary market result in market
concentration or increased liquidity. SDG&E also supports requiring
transaction-specific information for financial transmission right
secondary transactions as is required for all other transactions. APPA,
Duke Energy, EEI and Morgan Stanley question the need for information
concerning resale of financial transmission rights and assert that the
burden of collecting financial transmission right resale information
may outweigh the minimal value of such information. EPSA believes that
the Commission should not collect financial transmission right data as
part of this transparency effort because it would be unnecessary,
duplicative and not provide any useful information.\107\ APPA and EPSA
state that secondary financial transmission right markets are
relatively illiquid and Morgan Stanley states that the Commission has
recognized that financial transmission right markets are thinly traded
at this time.\108\ FirstEnergy argues that this filing requirement
would be duplicative because RTO market monitors may have the
responsibility for reviewing the secondary bilateral financial
transmission right markets.\109\ DC Energy also believes that reporting
requirements for secondary market financial transmission right sales
should be the province of the ISOs/RTOs.\110\ APPA also sees the task
of assuring transparency of financial transmission right transactions
as a responsibility of the RTOs.\111\ Morgan Stanley similarly
recommends that the Commission monitor secondary market financial
transmission right transactions by requesting each RTO to provide
quarterly or annual data on such transactions arising in their
markets.\112\ In addition, PJM observes that, as a threshold question,
the Commission should first determine whether it has any jurisdiction
over this type of transaction before deciding whether to compel
participant reporting.\113\ PJM also states that its bulletin board on
the PJM eFTR system may provide a means to access secondary market
financial transmission right transaction information, making increased
participant reporting unnecessary.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ EPSA at 5-6.
    \108\ Morgan Stanley at 2.
    \109\ FirstEnergy at 3-4.
    \110\ DC Energy at 10-11.
    \111\ APPA at 13.
    \112\ Morgan Stanley at 2-3.
    \113\ PJM at 4-5.
    \114\ Id. at 2-4.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Discussion
    98. We agree with certain commenters that RTOs/ISOs collect and
publish some financial transmission right data and that RTOs/ISOs are
the proper entities for reporting information about financial
transmission rights. We believe that requiring financial transmission
right data to be reported by market participants in the EQR, in
addition to the information already provided by RTOs/ISOs, would not
significantly improve price transparency in these markets. Therefore,
we do not propose to require entities to report information about
financial transmission rights in the EQR at this time.
c. Standardizing the Unit for Reporting Energy and Capacity
Transactions
i. Comments
    99. California PUC, DC Energy, and PG&E support standardizing EQR
data on capacity and energy across all filers to help the Commission
and other market participants compare prices.\115\ PG&E further states
that $/MWh is an appropriate unit for energy transactions and $/MW is
an appropriate unit for capacity transactions because these units are
commonly used in organized electricity markets, including the markets
operated by CAISO.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ California PUC at 4; DC Energy at 11; and PG&E at 3.
    \116\ PG&E at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    100. EEI states that having common units for reporting energy and
capacity transactions (i.e., $/MWh and $ per MW-month) would simplify
interpretation of the data, but that the Commission should clarify that
this change requires the conversion only of KWh to MWh and KW to MW
(i.e., utilities can still report transactions in MW/Month, MW/Day,
KVA, MVAR, etc.). In addition, EEI notes that if the Commission makes
this change, then it will likely have to increase the number of digits
allowed in the Rate field--particularly if the units being reported are
MWhs.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ EEI at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    101. EPSA does not advocate standardizing units for reporting
transactions. EPSA states that capacity may be sold on a $/MW-Day, $/
MW-Week, $/KW-Day, $/KW-Week, $/KW-Month, or $/KW-Year basis, and
argues that the parties should report those trades in accordance with
the way the products were measured, priced and sold under each
transaction. According to EPSA, this will reduce the possibility of
errors in translating one unit to another.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ EPSA at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Discussion
    102. We propose to insert an additional field to the EQR
transaction section to standardize the units for reporting energy and
capacity within the EQR. We agree with several commenters that the
usefulness of the additional field will simplify interpretation of the
data and aid the Commission and other market participants in comparing
prices. The additional field will provide a consistent rate for
comparison purposes and allow the Commission to develop internal checks
in the EQR software on the accuracy of a filing.
    103. Today, the EQR filing requirements include, among other