Surface N Leached N Reg Scenari Operation lb/ yr lb/ yr BaselineCattle Baseline Beef 32,421,273 58,443,486 BaselinePoultry Baseline Broiler 11,265,989 34,187,527 BaselineDairy Baseline Dairy 9,618,204 26,934,178 BaselineDairy Baseline Heifer 676,508 2,860,567 BaselinePoultry Baseline Layers 9,291,985 48,304,606 BaselinePoultry ( wet) Baseline Layers ( wet) 15,306,698 16,650,508 BaselineSwine Baseline Swine combined 7,526,495 16,664,208 BaselineSwine Baseline Swine slaughter 17,148,312 38,733,726 BaselinePoultry Baseline Turkey 4,784,900 16,648,320 BaselineVeal Baseline Veal 0 0 BaselineTotal Baseline Total 108,040,364 259,427,127 Option 1Cattle Option 1 Beef 28,257,090 25,977,602 Option 1Poultry Option 1 Broiler 9,688,971 29,865,969 Option 1Dairy Option 1 Dairy 8,767,432 16,448,256 Option 1Dairy Option 1 Heifer 673,614 2,802,473 Option 1Poultry Option 1 Layers 7,501,259 34,499,971 Option 1Poultry ( wet) Option 1 Layers ( wet) 15,224,712 16,036,290 Option 1Swine Option 1 Swine combined 7,518,712 16,451,490 Option 1Swine Option 1 Swine slaughter 17,146,142 38,690,725 Option 1Poultry Option 1 Turkey 4,522,466 14,538,719 Option 1Veal Option 1 Veal 0 0 Option 1Total Option 1 Total 99,300,398 195,311,496 Option 2Cattle Option 2 Beef 26,374,623 25,673,880 Option 2Poultry Option 2 Broiler 9,305,719 30,213,114 Option 2Dairy Option 2 Dairy 8,403,220 16,279,818 Option 2Dairy Option 2 Heifer 668,569 2,804,784 Option 2Poultry Option 2 Layers 7,100,339 33,783,086 Option 2Poultry ( wet) Option 2 Layers ( wet) 15,077,426 16,281,445 Option 2Swine Option 2 Swine combined 7,271,333 16,287,332 Option 2Swine Option 2 Swine slaughter 16,974,885 38,848,278 Option 2Poultry Option 2 Turkey 4,271,196 14,861,909 Option 2Veal Option 2 Veal 0 0 Option 2Total Option 2 Total 95,447,311 195,033,645 Option 3Cattle Option 3 Beef 20,015,688 25,673,880 Option 3Poultry Option 3 Broiler 9,305,719 30,213,114 Option 3Dairy Option 3 Dairy 5,615,795 16,279,818 Option 3Dairy Option 3 Heifer 274,098 2,804,784 Option 3Poultry Option 3 Layers 7,100,339 33,783,086 Option 3Poultry ( wet) Option 3 Layers ( wet) 13,398,665 16,281,445 Option 3Swine Option 3 Swine combined 6,608,832 16,287,332 Option 3Swine Option 3 Swine slaughter 8,084,074 38,848,278 Option 3Poultry Option 3 Turkey 4,271,196 14,861,909 Option 3Veal Option 3 Veal 0 0 Option 3Total Option 3 Total 74,674,406 195,033,645 Option 5aCattle Option 5 Beef 23,974,103 25,673,881 Option 5aPoultry Option 5 Broiler 9,305,720 30,213,115 Option 5aDairy Option 5 Dairy 7,540,294 16,279,818 Option 5aDairy Option 5 Heifer 547,313 2,804,784 Option 5aPoultry Option 5 Layers 7,100,339 33,783,086 Option 5Poultry ( wet) Option 5 Layers ( wet) 4,651,409 16,281,445 Option 5Swine Option 5 Swine combined 5,227,042 28,477,993 Option 5Swine Option 5 Swine slaughter 13,395,389 49,023,903 Option 5aPoultry Option 5 Turkey 4,271,195 14,861,910 Option 5aVeal Option 5 Veal 0 0 Option 5Total Option 5 Total 76,012,803 217,399,935 Option 6Cattle Option 6 Beef 26,374,623 25,673,880 Option 6Poultry Option 6 Broiler 9,305,719 30,213,114 Option 6Dairy Option 6 Dairy 7,956,879 16,279,818 Option 6Dairy Option 6 Heifer 668,569 2,804,784 Option 6Poultry Option 6 Layers 7,100,339 33,783,086 Option 6Poultry ( wet) Option 6 Layers ( wet) 15,077,426 16,281,445 Option 6Swine Option 6 Swine combined 6,519,082 16,287,332 Option 6Swine Option 6 Swine slaughter 15,827,008 38,848,277 Option 6Poultry Option 6 Turkey 4,271,196 14,861,909 Option 6Veal Option 6 Veal 0 0 Option 6Total Option 6 Total 93,100,843 195,033,644 Option 7Cattle Option 7 Beef 26,368,472 25,673,880 Option 7Poultry Option 7 Broiler 9,305,719 30,213,114 Option 7Dairy Option 7 Dairy 7,361,857 16,279,818 Option 7Dairy Option 7 Heifer 668,569 2,804,784 Option 7Poultry Option 7 Layers 7,100,339 33,783,086 Option 7Poultry ( wet) Option 7 Layers ( wet) 15,077,426 16,281,445 Option 7Swine Option 7 Swine combined 4,789,009 16,287,332 Option 7Swine Option 7 Swine slaughter 13,172,617 38,848,278 Option 7Poultry Option 7 Turkey 4,271,196 14,861,909 Option 7Veal Option 7 Veal 0 0 Option 7Total Option 7 Total 88,115,206 195,033,645 N Surface P Leached P P Sediment Sed BOD lb/ yr lb/ yr tons/ yr lb/ yr 91 78,397,155 1,480,871 80 5,669,274 11,339 7,236,755 45 19,357,915 1,392,079 21 3,360,498 6,721 3,017,180 37 12,869,959 1,205,363 14 924,591 1,849 2,601,427 4 315,561 45,832 0 3,387 7 365,548 58 21,743,392 712,832 22 1,771,916 3,544 2,550,342 32 9,232,732 50,212 9 442,711 885 13,256,449 24 9,074,689 968,606 10 717,517 1,435 2,943,354 56 9,304,769 984,925 10 750,919 1,502 4,500,599 21 8,024,347 734,668 9 365,634 731 397,172 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 367 168,320,520 7,575,390 176 14,006,446 28,013 36,868,824 54 66,588,080 1,480,577 68 5,068,861 10,138 7,236,755 40 17,451,883 1,392,072 19 3,352,198 6,704 0 25 10,471,896 1,205,234 12 874,921 1,750 2,601,427 3 297,515 45,833 0 3,387 7 365,548 42 17,595,273 712,841 18 1,765,736 3,531 0 31 9,067,045 50,213 9 442,712 885 13,256,449 24 9,006,092 968,606 10 717,517 1,435 2,943,354 56 9,285,964 984,926 10 750,919 1,502 4,500,599 19 7,636,945 734,668 8 364,499 729 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 295 147,400,693 7,574,970 155 13,340,751 26,682 30,904,131 52 60,943,207 1,425,911 62 5,068,861 10,138 7,236,755 40 14,570,245 1,388,335 16 3,344,288 6,689 0 25 9,184,882 1,135,380 10 874,921 1,750 2,601,427 3 238,341 45,819 0 3,358 7 365,548 41 15,672,179 694,222 16 1,709,434 3,419 0 31 8,064,649 49,014 8 438,482 877 13,256,449 24 7,549,267 944,396 8 681,625 1,363 2,943,354 56 7,798,554 982,281 9 730,388 1,461 4,500,599 19 6,220,188 720,256 7 358,114 716 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 290 130,241,513 7,385,615 138 13,209,471 26,419 30,904,131 46 60,943,207 1,425,911 62 5,068,861 10,138 7,236,755 40 14,570,245 1,388,335 16 3,344,288 6,689 0 22 9,184,882 1,135,380 10 874,921 1,750 2,601,427 3 238,341 45,819 0 3,358 7 365,548 41 15,672,179 694,222 16 1,709,434 3,419 0 30 8,064,649 49,014 8 438,482 877 13,256,449 23 7,549,267 944,396 8 681,625 1,363 2,943,354 47 7,798,554 982,281 9 730,388 1,461 4,500,599 19 6,220,188 720,256 7 358,114 716 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 270 130,241,513 7,385,615 138 13,209,471 26,419 30,904,131 50 60,348,412 1,425,913 62 5,056,500 10,113 4,342,053 40 14,570,245 1,388,335 16 3,344,288 6,689 0 24 8,971,068 1,135,380 10 871,960 1,744 1,560,856 3 208,296 45,819 0 2,734 5 219,329 41 15,672,179 694,222 16 1,709,434 3,419 0 21 5,807,470 49,014 6 393,696 787 0 34 5,900,694 1,162,768 7 849,040 1,698 0 62 5,677,216 1,140,265 7 849,753 1,700 0 19 6,220,188 720,256 7 358,114 716 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 293 123,375,768 7,761,971 131 13,435,520 26,871 6,122,238 52 60,943,207 1,425,911 62 5,068,861 10,138 7,236,755 40 14,570,245 1,388,335 16 3,344,288 6,689 0 24 8,906,923 1,135,380 10 870,506 1,741 390,214 3 238,341 45,819 0 3,358 7 365,548 41 15,672,179 694,222 16 1,709,434 3,419 0 31 8,064,649 49,014 8 438,482 877 13,256,449 23 7,196,407 944,396 8 681,531 1,363 441,503 55 7,260,116 982,281 8 730,245 1,460 675,090 19 6,220,188 720,256 7 358,114 716 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 288 129,072,256 7,385,615 136 13,204,819 26,410 22,365,558 52 60,941,439 1,425,911 62 5,068,829 10,138 7,225,999 40 14,570,245 1,388,335 16 3,344,288 6,689 0 24 8,885,569 1,135,380 10 871,285 1,743 780,602 3 238,341 45,819 0 3,358 7 365,548 41 15,672,179 694,222 16 1,709,434 3,419 0 31 8,064,649 49,014 8 438,482 877 13,256,449 21 7,011,857 944,396 8 681,519 1,363 101,768 52 6,975,382 982,281 8 730,225 1,460 148,197 19 6,220,188 720,256 7 358,114 716 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 283 128,579,849 7,385,615 136 13,205,533 26,411 21,878,562 BOD FC FC FS FS Zn Cu 10 10 cfu/ yr 10 10 cfu/ yr lb/ yr lb/ yr 7 422,027,483 422 192,778,775 193 1,720,470 398,635 3 494,135 0 435,060,159 435 1,481,908 210,313 3 34,615,456 35 203,781,532 204 1,605,719 212,177 0 18,987,425 19 8,515,170 9 21,061 3,930 3 6,352,260 6 13,756,830 14 3,960,603 230,358 13 56,508,185 57 120,580,443 121 1,072,272 67,838 3 55,144,590 55 1,628,043,190 1,628 1,115,654 134,728 5 83,650,999 84 2,467,176,611 2,467 1,147,397 138,223 0 319,252 0 700,022 1 1,617,382 86,738 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 678,099,784 678 5,070,392,731 5,070 13,742,465 1,482,941 7 411,506,389 412 187,209,650 187 1,622,306 386,382 0 24,209 0 24,605,854 25 1,452,518 204,017 3 33,629,428 34 197,042,045 197 1,586,865 207,650 0 18,960,203 19 8,500,883 9 19,999 3,814 0 397,909 0 997,874 1 3,804,478 224,904 13 56,475,851 56 120,499,105 120 1,010,161 65,974 3 54,937,280 55 1,620,890,652 1,621 1,111,547 134,183 5 83,461,986 83 2,460,655,266 2,461 1,146,317 138,074 0 41,042 0 101,960 0 1,591,259 85,928 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 659,434,295 659 4,620,503,289 4,621 13,345,449 1,450,927 7 411,465,173 411 187,155,191 187 1,580,899 381,295 0 23,927 0 24,548,662 25 1,450,247 203,771 3 33,672,752 34 197,338,596 197 1,519,382 199,564 0 18,960,870 19 8,501,122 9 19,886 3,792 0 396,859 0 992,229 1 3,738,618 219,793 13 56,475,674 56 120,498,413 120 1,004,518 65,478 3 54,928,051 55 1,620,579,731 1,621 1,073,967 130,107 5 83,451,249 83 2,460,292,357 2,460 1,128,444 135,920 0 40,929 0 101,922 0 1,578,440 84,983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 659,415,484 659 4,620,008,223 4,620 13,094,401 1,424,703 7 411,465,173 411 187,155,191 187 1,580,899 381,295 0 23,927 0 24,548,662 25 1,450,247 203,771 3 33,672,752 34 197,338,596 197 1,519,382 199,564 0 18,960,870 19 8,501,122 9 19,886 3,792 0 396,859 0 992,229 1 3,738,618 219,793 13 56,475,674 56 120,498,413 120 1,004,518 65,478 3 54,928,051 55 1,620,579,731 1,621 1,073,967 130,107 5 83,451,249 83 2,460,292,357 2,460 1,128,444 135,920 0 40,929 0 101,922 0 1,578,440 84,983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 659,415,484 659 4,620,008,223 4,620 13,094,401 1,424,703 4 161,609,335 162 72,350,662 72 1,580,903 381,296 0 0 0 250,884 0 1,450,247 203,771 2 14,094,057 14 82,220,899 82 1,519,382 199,563 0 8,145,008 8 3,651,214 4 19,886 3,792 0 2,921 0 127 0 3,738,618 219,793 0 46,197 0 115,528 0 861,563 59,233 0 529,741 1 18,284,079 18 1,213,098 139,057 0 476,884 0 16,460,519 16 1,192,822 135,489 0 144 0 0 0 1,578,441 84,983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 184,904,285 185 193,333,910 193 13,154,959 1,426,979 7 411,465,173 411 187,155,191 187 1,580,899 381,295 0 23,927 0 24,548,662 25 1,450,247 203,771 0 337,050 0 1,971,693 2 1,519,382 199,563 0 18,960,870 19 8,501,122 9 19,886 3,792 0 396,859 0 992,229 1 3,738,618 219,793 13 56,475,674 56 120,498,413 120 1,004,518 65,478 0 548,987 1 16,202,174 16 1,073,965 130,108 1 834,174 1 24,598,768 25 1,128,443 135,921 0 40,929 0 101,922 0 1,578,440 84,983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 489,083,643 489 384,570,174 385 13,094,399 1,424,704 7 410,907,883 411 186,905,371 187 1,580,878 381,289 0 23,927 0 24,548,662 25 1,450,247 203,771 1 10,746,593 11 63,602,669 64 1,513,650 198,131 0 18,960,870 19 8,501,122 9 19,886 3,792 0 396,859 0 992,229 1 3,738,618 219,793 13 56,475,674 56 120,498,413 120 1,004,518 65,478 0 1,187,023 1 38,205,038 38 1,059,038 126,524 0 1,134,104 1 36,509,743 37 1,105,578 130,432 0 40,929 0 101,922 0 1,578,440 84,983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 499,873,862 500 479,865,168 480 13,050,854 1,414,194 Cd Ni Pb As Metals lb/ yr lb/ yr lb/ yr lb/ yr 2,840 478,641 52,040 151,768 2.804 2,555 488,985 99,257 115,134 2.398 2,640 468,130 71,124 71,930 2.432 31 6,266 1,283 757 0.033 8,240 774,935 130,711 159,760 5.265 2,195 164,198 41,404 28,711 1.377 2,488 267,831 45,230 150,224 1.716 2,538 279,529 46,917 151,890 1.766 1,312 292,385 48,042 129,865 2.176 0 0 0 0 0.000 24,839 3,220,898 536,008 960,038 19.967 1,248 456,216 51,604 145,250 2.663 2,063 479,722 96,562 108,267 2.343 2,524 464,448 70,918 68,482 2.401 31 5,994 1,283 757 0.032 8,271 772,912 126,031 153,956 5.091 2,083 163,428 39,512 27,900 1.309 2,480 267,768 45,194 149,163 1.710 2,538 279,510 46,907 151,617 1.765 1,310 292,199 47,562 128,107 2.146 0 0 0 0 0.000 22,547 3,182,196 525,574 933,499 19.460 1,195 443,467 49,196 127,180 2.583 1,985 477,486 95,867 103,196 2.333 2,389 441,859 67,133 62,898 2.293 31 5,926 1,285 588 0.032 8,014 751,673 123,584 147,339 4.989 1,994 161,437 38,776 26,029 1.298 2,064 255,626 43,272 142,724 1.648 2,104 273,589 45,976 147,259 1.733 1,295 287,997 46,332 123,608 2.123 0 0 0 0 0.000 21,072 3,099,059 511,420 880,821 19.031 1,195 443,467 49,196 127,180 2.583 1,985 477,486 95,867 103,196 2.333 2,389 441,859 67,133 62,898 2.293 31 5,926 1,285 588 0.032 8,014 751,673 123,584 147,339 4.989 1,994 161,437 38,776 26,029 1.298 2,064 255,626 43,272 142,724 1.648 2,104 273,589 45,976 147,259 1.733 1,295 287,997 46,332 123,608 2.123 0 0 0 0 0.000 21,072 3,099,059 511,420 880,821 19.031 1,197 443,463 49,195 127,184 2.583 1,985 477,487 95,868 103,196 2.333 2,390 441,859 67,134 62,896 2.293 31 5,926 1,285 588 0.032 8,013 751,672 123,584 147,340 4.989 1,708 159,556 33,208 24,998 1.140 1,625 316,601 51,620 151,134 1.873 1,643 316,506 51,244 146,562 1.844 1,296 287,997 46,331 123,608 2.123 0 0 0 0 0.000 19,888 3,201,067 519,469 887,506 19.210 1,195 443,467 49,196 127,180 2.583 1,985 477,486 95,867 103,196 2.333 2,390 441,859 67,134 62,896 2.293 31 5,926 1,285 588 0.032 8,014 751,673 123,584 147,339 4.989 1,994 161,437 38,776 26,029 1.298 2,065 255,626 43,272 142,725 1.648 2,104 273,589 45,975 147,258 1.733 1,295 287,997 46,332 123,608 2.123 0 0 0 0 0.000 21,073 3,099,061 511,421 880,820 19.031 1,195 443,461 49,196 127,180 2.583 1,985 477,486 95,867 103,196 2.333 2,380 440,968 67,133 62,898 2.285 31 5,926 1,285 588 0.032 8,014 751,673 123,584 147,339 4.989 1,994 161,437 38,776 26,029 1.298 1,983 255,388 43,021 140,663 1.627 1,981 273,225 45,592 144,101 1.701 1,295 287,997 46,332 123,608 2.123 0 0 0 0 0.000 20,858 3,097,562 510,785 875,602 18.970


[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 141 (Friday, July 22, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 44026]
[FR Doc No: 2011-18612]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-3324-EM; Docket ID FEMA-2011-0001]

Kansas; Emergency and Related Determinations

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of an
emergency for the State of Kansas (FEMA-3324-EM), dated June 25, 2011,
and related determinations.

DATES: Effective Date: June 25, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peggy Miller, Office of Response and
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20472,<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter
dated June 25, 2011, the President issued an emergency declaration
under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5208 (the Stafford Act), as
follows:

    I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas
of the State of Kansas resulting from flooding beginning on June 1,
2011, and continuing, are of sufficient severity and magnitude to
warrant an emergency declaration under the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.
(``the Stafford Act''). Therefore, I declare that such an emergency
exists in the State of Kansas.
    You are authorized to provide appropriate assistance for
required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the
Stafford Act, to save lives and to protect property and public
health and safety, and to lessen or avert the threat of a
catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, you are
authorized to provide assistance for emergency protective measures
(Category B), limited to direct Federal assistance, under the Public
Assistance program. This assistance excludes regular time costs for
subgrantees' regular employees.
    Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance is
supplemental, any Federal funds provided under the Stafford Act for
Public Assistance will be limited to 75 percent of the total
eligible costs. In order to provide Federal assistance, you are
hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these
purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal emergency
assistance and administrative expenses.
    Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration
for the approved assistance to the extent allowable under the
Stafford Act.

    The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice
that pursuant to the authority vested in the Administrator, Department
of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Bradley
Harris, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer
for this declared emergency.
    The following areas of the State of Kansas have been designated as
adversely affected by this declared emergency:

    Atchison, Doniphan, Leavenworth, and Wyandotte Counties for
emergency protective measures (Category B), limited to direct
Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program.

    The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers
(CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030,
Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster
Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance
Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and
Households in Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049,
Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing
Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially
Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other
Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants--Public Assistance (Presidentially
Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

    Dated: July 18, 2011.
W. Craig Fugate,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2011-18612 Filed 7-21-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 215 (Thursday, November 5, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70646-70647]
[FR Doc No: 2020-24588]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Docket ID: FEMA-2020-0037; OMB No. 1660-0137]

Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection;
Comment Request; Emergency Notification System (ENS)

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: 60 day notice and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Emergency Management Agency, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, invites
the general public to take this opportunity to comment on a revision of
a currently approved information collection. In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this notice seeks comments concerning
the Emergency Notification System (ENS).

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before January 4, 2021.

ADDRESSES: To avoid duplicate submissions to the docket, please use the
following means to submit comments: Submit comments at
www.regulations.gov under Docket ID FEMA-2020-0037. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
    All submissions received must include the agency name and Docket ID
and will be posted, without change, to the Federal eRulemaking Portal
at http://www.regulations.gov, and will include any personal
information you provide. Therefore, submitting this information makes
it public. You may wish to read the Privacy and Security Notice that is
available via a link on the homepage of www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melton Roland, ENS Program Manager,
FEMA/ORR<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>. You
may contact the Records Management Division for copies of the proposed
collection of information at email address<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FEMA's Office of Response & Recovery (ORR)
owns and operates the Emergency Notification System (ENS). FEMA
Directive 262-3, Emergency Notification System, designates ENS as the
agency solution for all notification and alerts activities. The ENS
sends electronic notifications and relays messages, whether critical in
nature, routine, or for testing purposes with appropriate
authorization, to DHS employees and contractors, as well as emergency
response personnel. In accordance with Executive Order 12656, as
amended, Presidential Policy Directive 40, and Federal Continuity
Directive (FCD)-1, all DHS organizational components must have in place
a viable Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) capability and plan
that ensures the performance of their essential functions during any
emergency or situation that could disrupt normal operations. An
effective ENS solution is a critical part of this plan.

Collection of Information

    Title: Emergency Notification System (ENS).
    Type of Information Collection: Revision of a currently approved
information collection.
    OMB Number: 1660-0137.
    FEMA Forms: None.
    Abstract: The Emergency Notification System has been deemed the
standard notification tool for FEMA. The purpose of this notification
tool is to activate teams and disseminate information. The respondents
to this information are Mobile Operation Centers and Regions that use
this information to make decisions on how to meet operational missions.
This revision includes a new form for data gathering, which includes
the Privacy Act Statement, Paperwork Reduction Act, and Retention
Period information for members of the public that receive ENS
Notifications.
    Affected Public: State, Local or Tribal Government; Federal
Government.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 700.
    Estimated Number of Responses: 700.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 183.2.
    Estimated Total Annual Respondent Cost: $6,247.
    Estimated Respondents' Operation and Maintenance Costs: $0.
    Estimated Respondents' Capital and Start-Up Costs: $0.
    Estimated Total Annual Cost to the Federal Government: $214,651.

Comments

    Comments may be submitted as indicated in the ADDRESSES caption
above. Comments are solicited to (a) evaluate whether the proposed data
collection is necessary for the proper performance of the agency,
including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b)
evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used; (c) enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) minimize the burden
of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection techniques or other forms of information
technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses.

Maile Arthur,
Acting Records Management Branch Chief, Office of the Chief
Administrative Officer, Mission Support, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2020-24588 Filed 11-4-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 53 (Friday, March 18, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14921-14927]
[FR Doc No: 2016-06098]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-77358; File No. SR-OCC-2016-004]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation;
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Related to the Adoption of an
Options Exchange Risk Control Standards Policy

March 14, 2016.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on March 4, 2016, The Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the proposed
rule change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been
prepared by OCC. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the
Proposed Rule Change

    This proposed rule change by OCC would adopt a new Options Exchange
Risk Control Standards Policy (``Policy''), which details OCC's policy
for addressing the potential risks arising from erroneous trades
executed on an options exchange (``Options Exchange'' or ``Options
Exchanges,'' as applicable) \3\ that has not demonstrated the existence
of certain risk controls (``Risk Controls'') that are consistent with a
set of principles-based risk control standards (``Risk Control
Standards'') developed by OCC in consultation with the exchanges. The
proposed rule change would also revise OCC's Schedule of Fees in
accordance with the proposed Policy to charge and collect from Clearing
Members \4\ a fee of two cents per each cleared options contract (per
side) (``Fee'') executed on an Options Exchange that did not
demonstrate sufficient Risk Controls designed to meet the proposed Risk
Control Standards. The text of the proposed Policy and related changes
to the OCC Schedule of Fees is attached as Exhibit 5. Material proposed
to be added is marked by underlining and material proposed to be
deleted is enclosed in bold brackets.
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    \3\ Current Options Exchanges are: (i) BATS Options Market, (ii)
Box Options Exchange LLC, (iii) C2 Options Exchange, Inc., (iv)
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., (v) EDGX Options Exchange,
(vi) International Securities Exchange, LLC, (vii) ISE Gemini LLC,
(viii) ISE Mercury, LLC, (ix) MIAX Options Exchange, (x) NASDAQ OMX
BX, Inc., (xi) NASDAQ OMX PHLX, LLC, (xii) NASDAQ Options Market,
(xiii) NYSE Amex Options, and (xiv) NYSE Arca Options.
    \4\ See Article I, Section 1 of OCC's By-Laws.
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II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, OCC included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. OCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections (A),
(B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of these
statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

(1) Purpose
Background
    OCC proposes to adopt a new Options Exchange Risk Control Standards
Policy, which is designed to better protect OCC against risks related
to erroneous transactions that may occur on Options Exchanges that have
not implemented Risk Controls that are consistent with a defined set of
principles-based Risk Control Standards, which were developed by OCC in
consultation with the exchanges, and that are sent to OCC for a
guarantee. The proposed Policy would, among other things, impose an
additional Fee on cleared trades that are executed on an Options
Exchange that has not certified the existence of Risk Controls that
meet the Risk Control Standards in the following categories: (i)
``Price Reasonability Checks;'' (ii) ``Drill-Through Protections;''
(iii) ``Activity-Based Protections;'' and (iv) ``Kill-Switch
Protections'' (in each case discussed more thoroughly below) along with
OCC's review to determine if the Risk Controls are consistent with the
Risk Control Standards. The Policy would also require that any funds
collected from the Fee be retained as earnings and, as such, be
eligible for use for Clearing Member defaults under Article VIII,
Section 5(d) of OCC's By-Laws but prohibit such funds from being used
for any other purpose.
    OCC believes that the implementation of Risk Controls that are
consistent with

the proposed principles-based Risk Control Standards at Options
Exchanges would guard against risks attendant to erroneous transactions
on such Options Exchanges and serve OCC, its Clearing Members, and the
financial markets OCC serves by helping to ensure the potential
significant financial impact and elevated risk of disruption resulting
from erroneous transactions is limited to the greatest extent possible.
As a systemically important financial market utility and the sole
clearing agency for the US listed options markets, OCC seeks to control
risks presented to it that might have the effect of disrupting routine
processes at OCC, and thus threatening the stability of the financial
system of the United States. As described in more detail below, there
have been numerous cases in the recent past where erroneous
transactions have occurred that could have caused substantial damage to
financial market entities and resultant damage to OCC. The options
market is not immune to the harmful effects of erroneous transactions,
and in fact OCC is more susceptible than other financial market
entities to the risks attendant thereto by virtue of: (i) Its role as a
guarantor of all options transactions that are novated, and (ii) its
lack of discretion to elect not to clear transactions executed on
Options Exchanges. OCC believes that Options Exchanges that apply the
Risk Control Standards to all transactions executed on such Options
Exchanges are better equipped to capture and eradicate erroneous and
potentially disruptive transactions at the Options Exchange level,
thereby reducing the likelihood that the risk inherent in such
erroneous and potentially disruptive trades is transferred to OCC, its
other Clearing Members, and the financial markets served by OCC.
Furthermore, and as discussed in more detail below, OCC believes this
proposal is complementary to efforts undertaken by the Commission to
strengthen critical market infrastructure and improve its resilience,
consistent with current Commission requirements \5\ and international
guidance,\6\ and in furtherance of remarks made by Chair White after
the latest in a series of prominent market disruptions to encourage
self-regulatory organizations to consider such complementary
efforts.\7\
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    \5\ See Clearing Agency Standards, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 68080 (October 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (November 2,
2012). More specifically, the Release states,
    ``The Commission notes however that under Section 17A(b)(3)(F)
of the Exchange Act, a clearing agency is charged with
responsibility to coordinate with persons engaged in the clearance
and settlement of securities transactions, not just other clearing
agencies. . . Further, the Commission notes that during the
clearance and settlement process, a registered clearing agency is
confronted with a variety of risks that must be identified and
understood if they are to be effectively controlled. To the extent
that these risks arise as a result of a registered clearing agency's
links with another entity involved in the clearance and settlement
process, Rule 17Ad- 22(d)(7) should help ensure that clearing
agencies have policies and procedures designed to identify those
risks.''
    Id. at 66251.
    \6\ See Principle 20 of the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems and Technical Committee of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (``CPSS-IOSCO''), Principles for Financial
Market Infrastructures (April 16, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf (``PFMI Report'').
    \7\ See SEC Chair White Statement on Meeting with Leaders of
Exchanges, September 12, 2013. (``Today's meeting was very
constructive. I stressed the need for all market participants to
work collaboratively--together and with the Commission--to
strengthen critical market infrastructure and improve its resilience
when technology falls short.'') See also Chair White, Statement on
Nasdaq Trading Interruption, August 22, 2013. (``The continuous and
orderly functioning of the securities markets is critically
important to the health of our financial system and the confidence
of investors. Today's interruption in trading, while resolved before
the end of the day, was nonetheless serious and should reinforce our
collective commitment to addressing technological vulnerabilities of
exchanges and other market participants.'')
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Proposed Options Exchange Risk Control Standards Policy
    Under the proposed Policy, if an Options Exchange does not submit a
signed certification sufficiently demonstrating that it has certain
Risk Controls in place that are consistent with the proposed Risk
Control Standards, OCC will charge and collect a fee \8\ in accordance
with its Schedule of Fees for each trade executed on such Options
Exchange until such time that the Options Exchange completes the
certification process, which is described in more detail below. Funds
collected through the imposition of the Fee are segregated for
recordkeeping purposes from other funds generated by clearing fees and
would not be available for a Clearing Member refund or Stockholder
Exchange dividend under OCC's approved Capital Plan. These funds would
be available for use by OCC, with unanimous approval by the Stockholder
Exchanges, in accordance with Article VIII, Section 5(d) of OCC's By-
Laws \9\ and as provided for in the Policy.
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    \8\ OCC is proposing to collect a fee of two cents per each
cleared options contract (per side). Any changes to this fee would
be subject to a future rule filing with the Commission.
    \9\ See Article VIII, Section 5(d). Under Article VIII, Section
5(d), usage of current or retained earnings may be considered after
the defaulting clearing member's margin has been exhausted, and it
may be used to reduce in whole or in part the pro rata contribution
otherwise made from the Clearing Fund to cover the loss. Id.
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Risk Control Standards
    The proposed Options Exchange Risk Control Standards Policy details
each of the Risk Control Standards to which an Options Exchange must
attest so that the proposed Fee would not be applied to trades executed
on that Options Exchange. The proposed Risk Control Standards, which
were developed by OCC in consultation with the Options Exchanges, are
principle-based and designed to provide the flexibility for each
Options Exchange to develop specific Risk Controls that best suit its
own marketplace while still guarding against the types of risks
contemplated by the Policy. The proposed Risk Control Standards are
described below.
1. Price Reasonability Checks
    Mandatory Price Reasonability Checks prevent limit orders,\10\
complex orders,\11\ and market maker quotes from being entered and
displayed on an Options Exchange if the price on such order or quote is
outside a defined threshold set in relation to the current market price
or National Best Bid or Offer (``NBBO''). For example,\12\ an Options
Exchange may set a Price Reasonability Check that would reject an order
that is priced at a certain percentage above the set parameter or a
quote entered by a market maker that is priced a certain dollar amount
higher than the set threshold.\13\ Options Exchanges' Price
Reasonability Checks would include:
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    \10\ A limit order is an order placed on an Options Exchange to
buy or sell a specific amount of options contracts at a specified
price or better. (See, e.g., International Securities Exchange Rule
715(b).)
    \11\ A complex order is an order involving the execution of two
or more different options series in the same underlying security
occurring at or near the same time. (See, e.g., Chicago Board
Options Exchange Rule 6.53C(a)(1).)
    \12\ Examples herein are illustrative only, and the specifics of
such examples are not necessarily required for an Options Exchange
to certify having specific Risk Controls sufficient to meet the Risk
Control Standards.
    \13\ By way of example, assume the market is $1.00 bid at $1.10.
An Options Exchange Price Reasonability Check could reject orders
greater than 5 cents above the offer or below the bid. Accordingly,
if a broker wanted to buy an option for $1.10, but inadvertently
``fat fingers'' the limit price for $11.00 on the order, the Options
Exchange would reject the order prior to execution because the limit
on the order is greater than the Price Reasonability Check limit.
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    (i) Mandatory limit order, complex order and quote Price
Reasonability Checks;
    (ii) Application to all trading sessions, including market
openings; and
    (iii) If the checks do not prevent the display and execution of
quotes, the Options Exchange would have other means by which it
mitigates the risks associated with the display and

execution of quotes outside the specific threshold.
    Trades executed on an Options Exchange that occur at prices that
were input erroneously and are substantially removed from other trades
executed in the same product have the potential to result in large
trading losses. In 2013, a trading firm's internal algorithm used to
satisfy market demand for equity options inadvertently produced orders
with inaccurate price limits and sent those orders to Options Exchanges
(``2013 Trading Firm Error''). Though many of the erroneous trades were
later canceled, it has been estimated that the trading firm could have
faced approximately $500 million in losses.\14\ If these potential
losses were realized and if the OCC Clearing Member clearing and
settling those trades was unable to honor them, OCC and its remaining
Clearing Members would have been exposed to significant losses and a
potential disruption to the operations of OCC.
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    \14\ See In the Matter of Goldman, Sachs & Co., Order
Instituting Administrative and Cease- and-Desist Proceedings,
Pursuant to Sections 15(9b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a
Cease-and-Desist Order (June 30, 2015) (Release No. 34-75331).
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2. Drill-Through Protections
    Drill-Through Protections are closely related to Price
Reasonability Checks and would require all orders, including market
orders,\15\ limit orders, and complex orders, to be executed within
pre-determined price increments of the NBBO. Drill-Through Protections
also restrict orders from immediately trading up or down an unlimited
number of price intervals and allow market liquidity to be refreshed
prior to the execution of further trades.\16\ Options Exchanges' Drill-
Through Protections would include:
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    \15\ A market order is an order to buy or sell a stated number
of options contracts at the best price obtainable when the order
reaches the Options Exchange in which the order was sent to. (See,
e.g., Chicago Board Options Exchange Rule 6.53).
    \16\ By way of example, assume the market is $1.00 bid at $1.10
and the size, or liquidity provided on the bid, or offered on the
ask, is 100 contracts by 100 contracts. Assume an order is entered
as a market order to buy 1000 contracts and the Drill-Through
Protection is set at 5 cents and 500 milliseconds (or half a
second). The Drill-Through Protection would allow the order to trade
up to the price limit set, or $1.15. At $1.15, the order would be
halted by the Options Exchange and either routed to another Options
Exchange or manually executed. Also, after executing 100 contracts
for $1.10, the Drill-Through Protection would temporarily halt the
order for 500 milliseconds (or half a second) to allow market makers
to refresh their market and size.
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    (i) Mandatory Drill-Through Protections with reasonably
quantifiable limits;
    (ii) Application to all orders; and
    (iii) Application to all trading sessions, including market
openings.
    Options orders that are large in size may, due to the available
contra orders, be partially executed at reasonable prices with the
remainder of the same order executed at prices that are far from the
NBBO, and thus have the potential to result in large trading losses.
For example, in 2012, a trading firm erroneously sent more than 4
million orders to equity exchanges over a period of forty-five minutes,
creating a loss of over $450 million that nearly resulted in the
trading firm's insolvency (``2012 Trading Firm Error'' and collectively
with the 2013 Trading Firm Error, the ``Trading Firm Errors'').\17\ If
the trading firm was unable to absorb the loss and honor the trades,
the clearing agency and its surviving Clearing Members would have been
exposed to significant losses and a potential disruption to their
operations. While detailed facts surrounding the incident are not
publicly known, Drill-Through Protections could have helped limit the
losses by preventing execution of orders that would have traded through
a large number of price increments in a short period of time.
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    \17\ See http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-knightcapital-results-idUSBRE89G0HI20121017.
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3. Activity-Based Protections
    Activity-Based Protections extend an Options Exchange's Risk
Controls to factors beyond price and are most commonly designed to
address risks associated with a high frequency of trades in a short
period of time. Activity-Based Protections may address the maximum
number of contracts that may be entered as one order, the maximum
number of contacts that may be entered or executed by one firm over a
certain period of time, and the maximum number of messages that may be
entered over a certain period of time. Options Exchanges' Activity-
Based Protections would include:
    (i) Application to all traded products available on the Options
Exchange;
    (ii) Mandatory use of available Activity-Based Protections by its
members where the use of such protections is consistent with sound risk
management practice; and
    (iii) Maximum number of contracts or orders that may be executed
over a certain period of time.
    Options Exchanges that don't have Activity-Based Protections have a
greater likelihood of facilitating erroneous trades by not imposing
limits based on factors other than price. Trading errors that result in
a large number of orders or quotes could magnify the trading losses
that result from the error and could cause the default of a Clearing
Member if the Clearing Member cannot meet its obligations due to such
losses. For example, Activity-Based Protections could have limited the
loss associated with the 2013 Trading Firm Error mentioned above.
4. Kill-Switch Protections
    Kill-Switch Protections provide Options Exchanges, and their market
participants, with the ability to cancel existing orders and quotes
and/or block new orders and quotes on an exchange-wide or more tailored
basis (e.g., symbol specific, by Clearing Member, etc.) with a single
message to the Options Exchange after established trigger events are
detected. A trigger event may include a situation where a market
participant is disconnected from an Options Exchange due to an
abnormally large order or manual errors in the system by a market
participant causing multiple erroneous trades to occur. Kill-Switch
Protections are considered a last line of defense, applicable where,
for example, a severe trading problem occurs or an Options Exchange
market participant loses connectivity to the Options Exchange. Options
Exchanges' Kill-Switch Protections would include:
    (i) The availability, and required use in the case of Options
Exchange market makers, of ``heartbeat monitoring,'' a function that
periodically sends an electronic signal between the Options Exchange
and the market participant that subsequently cancels all quotes and/or
orders if the market participant does not respond to the signal in a
certain period of time;
    (ii) The ability for participants of the Options Exchange to
``cancel-on-disconnect;''
    (iii) The ability to cancel all quotes and/or orders with a single
message to the Options Exchange, with the availability of backup
alternative messaging systems; and
    (iv) Restricted automated reentry to trading after the activation
of a kill-switch.
    Trades executed on Options Exchanges without Kill-Switch
Protections increase the risk that trading malfunctions or other
harmful events could lead to erroneous trades being executed on an
Options Exchange and sent to OCC for clearance and settlement. If the
Clearing Member for these trades was not able to absorb losses
associated with them, it could potentially expose OCC and its surviving
Clearing Members to

significant losses and a disruption of operations. For example, the
potential severity of the 2012 Trading Firm Error could have been
substantially limited if a Kill-Switch Protection temporarily
restricted the trading firm's ability to trade.
Certification Process \18\
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    \18\ OCC intends to begin the collection of certifications from
the Options Exchanges after appropriate regulatory approval has been
obtained.
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    OCC has developed, in conjunction with the Options Exchanges, the
following process to evaluate each Options Exchange's Risk Controls.
Under the proposal, each Options Exchange would certify to OCC that the
Options Exchange implemented Risk Controls consistent with the Risk
Control Standards using a form provided by OCC and signed by an
executive officer of the Options Exchange.\19\ Provided regulatory
approval is received, Options Exchanges that submit documentation would
receive a determination from OCC regarding their Risk Controls by a
date no sooner than June 30 of each year (``Evaluation Completion
Date'').\20\
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    \19\ The signed certification signed by an executive officer of
the Options Exchange will attest to the validity, efficacy and
implementation of Risk Controls satisfying each of the above
described Risk Control Standards. As part of the certification, the
executive officer of the Options Exchange will certify that the
Options Exchange has met the Risk Control Standards as described in
this proposed rule change as approved by the Commission.
    \20\ OCC notes that the implementation of the Policy and
resulting Evaluation Completion Date for 2016 are subject to
regulatory approval of the proposed rule change. After receiving
regulatory approval, OCC will notify Options Exchanges, its Clearing
Members, and market participants of the Evaluation Completion Date
for 2016 by issuing an Information Memo on its public Web site. The
Evaluation Completion Date for 2016 will be set for a date not
sooner than 30 days after issuing the Information Memo (which may be
later than June 30, 2016).
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    Under the Policy, OCC would evaluate each Options Exchange's Risk
Controls and the Risk Controls' compliance with the Risk Control
Standards by the Evaluation Completion Date based on a review of its
certification and supporting materials, which will include, but will
not be limited to, proposed rule changes filed with the Commission,
approved Options Exchange rules, information circulars, and/or written
procedures, if any, in each case consistent with the date of receipt of
the certification. If OCC is unable to determine that an Options
Exchange has Risk Controls sufficient to meet Risk Control Standards,
OCC would furnish the Options Exchange with a concise written statement
of the reason(s) as soon as reasonably practicable. The Options
Exchange may, within 30 days of receipt of the written statement
providing the reason OCC was unable to find the Options Exchange
maintained sufficient Risk Controls to meet the proposed Risk Control
Standards, present further evidence of such sufficient Risk Controls to
OCC. OCC would then conduct a second review and make a recommendation
to OCC's Risk Committee \21\ whether the Options Exchange has
sufficient Risk Controls within 30 days of receiving the evidence of
such Risk Controls from the Options Exchange. OCC's Risk Committee
would, within 30 days of receipt of the recommendation, review the
recommendation and the Options Exchange's supporting materials, as
appropriate, to determine whether the Options Exchange has Risk
Controls sufficient to meet the Risk Control Standards (``Risk
Committee Review''). OCC would furnish the Options Exchange with a
concise written statement of the Risk Committee determination and the
reason for such determination as soon as reasonably practicable
following the Risk Committee Review.
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    \21\ OCC's Risk Committee is chaired by a public Director and it
does not currently have an Options Exchange representative. In the
event OCC's Risk Committee has an exchange representative at some
time in the future, such representative would be recused from a
decision on the appeal of a determination of an Options Exchange's
compliance with the Risk Control Standards.
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    Pursuant to the proposed Policy, on June 30 of each year (with the
potential exception of 2016, as noted above),\22\ OCC would post a
notice to its Web site to which Clearing Members (but not the general
public) have access advising Clearing Members, with respect to each
Options Exchange, whether: (1) The Options Exchange has implemented
sufficient Risk Controls to meet the Risk Control Standards; (2) OCC
was unable to determine the Options Exchange has sufficient Risk
Controls that meet the Risk Control Standards; or (3) a certification
has not been submitted by the Options Exchange.\23\
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    \22\ See supra note 19.
    \23\ For annual certifications commencing in 2017 and
thereafter, beginning June 30 of the calendar year for which the
certification is being made, OCC would post a notice to its Web site
to which Clearing Members (but not the general public) have access
advising members, with respect to each Options Exchange, whether:
(i) OCC has determined the Options Exchange has sufficient Risk
Controls that meet the Risk Control Standards; (ii) OCC was unable
to determine the Options Exchange has sufficient Risk Controls that
meet the Risk Control Standards; or (iii) a certification has not
been submitted by the Options Exchange. In addition, OCC will
continue to keep a record posted of the history of each Options
Exchange's compliance submission status, and any changes made to
that status, with the Risk Control Standards on the same OCC Web
site to which Clearing Members (but not the general public) have
access in order for Clearing Members to properly keep internal
records.
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Collection of Proposed Fee
    Beginning on the first business day that is at least 60 days after
OCC posts such notice, OCC would charge and collect the Fee in
accordance with the Policy for trades executed on an Options Exchange
that was determined not to have sufficient Risk Controls to satisfy the
Policy.\24\ In the event the Fee is charged, it would continue to be
charged to and collected from Clearing Members,\25\ and the notice
would remain posted on OCC's Web site to which Clearing Members (but
not the general public) have access, until the Options Exchange has
demonstrated it has Risk Controls that satisfy the Policy.\26\ OCC
believes that implementing this Fee may incentivize Options Exchanges
to maintain Risk Controls that are consistent with the proposed Risk
Control Standards, thereby reducing the likelihood that erroneous
trades are submitted to OCC and the attendant risk identified above
comes to fruition.\27\ However, the primary reason for the Fee is to
provide additional funds for OCC to manage the elevated risk that would
be presented to OCC absent the Risk Control Standards and for which OCC
has no reasonable means to predict, measure, or consider otherwise. OCC
believes the Fee is reasonable, as it represents less than half but
more than a third of a premium over the base rate of five cents per
contract, and, since clearing fees represent two percent or less of the
total execution cost, should not materially impact a Clearing Member
that chooses to execute a transaction on an Options Exchange that has
not certified its Risk Control Standards.
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    \24\ Exhibit 5A contains an updated Schedule of Fees reflecting
the Fee. As proposed, the Fee will be applied to all trades executed
on an Options Exchange that has not completed the certification
process.
    \25\ The Accounting and Finance Department is responsible for
the collection of the Fee and segregation of those funds from other
monies collected by OCC.
    \26\ The National Operations Group is responsible for
operationally updating each Options Exchange's certification status,
and associated Fee date, as applicable, within the OCC system.
    \27\ OCC notes, however, that an Options Exchange that does not
maintain Risk Controls consistent with the Risk Control Standards is
not prevented from submitting transactions to OCC.
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    OCC believes ensuring that funds collected through imposition of
the Fee are available for use as current or retained earnings in
accordance with Article VIII Section 5(d) of OCC's By-Laws is an
integral component of the proposed rule change, as it provides OCC with
increased financial means to cover potential losses stemming from a

default caused by erroneous trades that would be presented to OCC
absent the Risk Controls and for which OCC has no reasonable means to
predict, measure, or consider.
Exception and Escalation Processes
    The proposed Policy also provides that, on rare occasion, OCC may
grant exceptions to the Policy in order to appropriately address
immediate business issues and provides for an escalation process to
report breaches of the Policy.
Commission Rules and Statements on Critical Market Infrastructure
    Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5 (``Market Access Rule'') \28\ and
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (``Regulation SCI,''
collectively with ``Market Access Rule,'' ``Market Integrity Rules'')
\29\ provide some requirements for the resiliency of critical market
infrastructures. The Market Access Rule, which was adopted in November,
2010, generally prohibits broker-dealers from providing ``unfiltered''
or ``naked access'' to the securities markets through an exchange or
automated trading system. To comply, broker-dealers must establish and
maintain a system of risk management controls and supervisory
procedures that are reasonably designed to systematically limit the
financial, regulatory, and other risks related to the business activity
of any customer utilizing the broker-dealer for access to the national
market system. OCC believes that the Risk Control Standards
contemplated by the Policy are in no way designed to interfere with,
contradict, or undermine the Market Access Rule and are in fact
designed to be complementary to the Market Access Rule. The proposed
Risk Control Standards, which are based upon calculated prices of
orders, bids, and offers, and activity of each Options Exchange
participant, as described in more detail above, would provide an
additional layer of protections at the Options Exchange level to guard
against the risks associated with erroneous trades and would thereby
complement the Market Access Rule, which is primarily aimed at
controlling access to the marketplace at the firm level. While the
Market Access Rule has no doubt contributed to a more resilient market
infrastructure, OCC believes there remain gaps in critical market
infrastructure with respect to erroneous transactions that should be
addressed; in fact, each of the Trading Firm Errors discussed above
occurred while the Market Access Rule was in place.
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    \28\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5.
    \29\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73639 (November 19,
2014), 79 FR 72252 (December 5, 2014) (Reg SCI Adopting Release).
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    In addition, OCC believes that the Risk Control Standards
complement Regulation SCI. Regulation SCI is focused on the need for
market participants to bolster the operational integrity of automated
systems, whereas the Risk Control Standards are designed to adopt more
granular controls around the actual entry of an order that occurs
outside the four walls of OCC before a trade is settled or cleared by
OCC. As such, OCC believes the Risk Control Standards set specific
standards to better further the intent of Regulation SCI. Regulation
SCI mandates that an applicable entity have reasonable policies,
procedures, and controls in place to ensure the integrity of its
systems, but the rule doesn't necessarily prescribe what those controls
should be. As proposed, the Risk Control Standards complement the
objectives of Regulation SCI by applying specific risk controls related
to the execution of trades on Options Exchanges. Because the Risk
Control Standards would act to further the intentions of the Market
Integrity Rules, rather than undermine or act contrary to them, OCC
believes the implementation of the Risk Controls by Options Exchanges
consistent with the proposed Risk Control Standards would promote
market resiliency when working alongside these Market Integrity Rules.
    Finally, OCC believes the proposed Risk Control Standards are
consistent with Commission rules requiring clearing agencies to
establish and enforce written policies reasonably designed to evaluate
the potential sources of risks that can arise when the clearing agency
establishes links to clear and settle trades, and to ensure that these
risks are managed prudently on an ongoing basis.\30\
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    \30\ See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(d)(7). OCC notes that these links
are not limited in scope to linkages between clearing agencies. See
supra note 5 at 66250-66251.
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    OCC also notes that the proposed Risk Control Standards are
principle-based in nature and do not prescribe any specific method for
satisfying the standards, which would allow each Options Exchange to
develop specific Risk Controls that are best suited for its
marketplace. Moreover, the adoption of any Risk Control that would be
deemed to be a ``rule of an exchange'' \31\ under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the ``Act''), would be subject to the
rule filing requirements of Section 19(b) of the Act \32\ and thereby
subject to review by the Commission before it could be implemented by
the Options Exchange.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(27).
    \32\ 15 U.S.C. 78(s)(b).
    \33\ Certain Options Exchanges have already filed proposed rule
changes, and received approval for such rule changes, with the
Commission to implement risk controls that are designed to guard
against the same types of risks contemplated by the Risk Control
Standards. See, e.g. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 76123
(October 16, 2015), 80 FR 62591 (October 16, 2015) (SR-NASDAQ-2015-
096) (Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Adopt a Kill Switch
for NOM). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 77092
(February 9, 2016), 81 FR 7873 (February 16, 2016) (SR-BOX-2016-03)
(Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule
Change to Add Rule 7310 (Drill-through Protection) to Implement a
New Price Protection Feature).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Anticipated Risk Mitigation
    As discussed above and throughout the rule proposal, OCC believes
that charging an additional fee for trades executed on Options
Exchanges that have not implemented Risk Controls consistent with the
proposed Risk Control Standards would mitigate potential risks to OCC,
its Clearing Members, and the financial markets OCC serves, and
mitigate any threat to the stability of the financial system of the
United States. OCC believes the potential harm from the recent market
disruptions described above would have been limited if Risk Control
Standards were in place on the exchanges on which they occurred. As
discussed above, OCC believes that market disruptions of this nature
present additional risk to OCC for which it has no other means to
reasonably predict, measure, or consider, and as a result presents
otherwise uncovered risk to OCC's Clearing Members and the financial
markets OCC serves and, if left unchecked, could threaten the stability
of the financial system of the United States. The imposition of the
proposed Fee would provide additional financial resources to help OCC
mitigate such risks.
(2) Statutory Basis
    OCC believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \34\ as it would help to promote the
prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions
and assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the
custody and control of OCC or for which it is responsible. Absent the
certification of Risk Controls consistent with the Risk Control
Standards at Options Exchanges from which OCC has no authority or
discretion to elect not to clear options transactions, OCC has no
assurance that reasonable controls are in place at

Options Exchanges to help mitigate the potential risks that may arise,
for example, due to operational errors outside of OCC, that OCC has no
ability to predict, measure, or consider. This otherwise uncovered risk
increases the likelihood that an OCC Clearing Member would experience a
default that would cause OCC to use the funds of other Clearing Members
that are in its custody and control (Clearing Fund deposits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Market Integrity Rules help to build a safe and reliable
market structure environment, they do not provide absolute protections
to OCC, its Clearing Members, and the financial markets OCC serves from
risks attendant to the clearance of erroneous transactions that are
nevertheless executed on Options Exchanges. OCC notes that the Trading
Firm Errors described above occurred after the adoption of the Market
Access Rule, and Regulation SCI does not mandate the implementation of
Risk Control Standards as contemplated by the Policy. In the event an
Options Exchange has not implemented Risk Controls designed to meet the
proposed Risk Control Standards, imposition of the Fee would provide
OCC with additional financial resources, which are derived from fees
associated with the execution of transactions that are driving such
risks, that would facilitate OCC's ability to promptly fulfill its
settlement obligations and contribute to the safeguarding of funds in
OCC's custody and control by reducing the likelihood an erroneous trade
that causes an OCC Clearing Member to default would exhaust the
financial resources of the defaulting Clearing Member available to OCC
so that OCC is required to use mutualized resources deposited by non-
defaulting Clearing Members with OCC as Clearing Fund.
    OCC also believes the proposed increase to fees for transactions
executed on an Options Exchange that does not implement sufficient Risk
Controls to meet the Risk Control Standards is an equitable allocation
of reasonable fees among its participants, as required by Section
17A(b)(3)(D) of the Act.\35\ The proposed Fee would be charged only to
Clearing Members that execute trades on Options Exchanges that have not
implemented Risk Controls designed to meet the proposed Risk Control
Standards. The transactions executed on these Options Exchanges
generate risk for OCC by increasing the likelihood that a guaranteed
erroneous trade would exhaust OCC's financial resources available in
the event of a Clearing Member default and that OCC would use
mutualized resources deposited by non-defaulting Clearing Members to
cover at least part of the loss. The two cent charge will better enable
OCC to allocate fees to transactions that are driving that risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, OCC believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
Rule 17Ad-22(d)(7),\36\ which requires OCC to establish, implement,
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to ensure that risks that arise when OCC establishes links are
managed prudently on an ongoing basis. Though the primary type of link
arrangement contemplated by Rule 17Ad-22(d)(7) is between clearing
agencies, the Commission declined to explicitly restrict application of
Rule 17Ad-22(d)(7) to links between clearing agencies, noting that
``during the clearance and settlement process, a registered clearing
agency is confronted with a variety of risks that must be identified
and understood if they are to be effectively controlled. To the extent
that these risks arise as a result of a registered clearing agency's
links with another entity involved with the clearance and settlement
process, Rule 17Ad-22(d)(7) should help ensure that clearing agencies
have policies and procedures designed to identify those risks.'' \37\
OCC believes this proposed rule change is the product of thorough
evaluation of risks presented to OCC arising from links with another
entity involved with the clearance and settlement process.\38\ Finally,
the proposed rule change is not inconsistent with any existing OCC By-
Laws or Rules, including those proposed to be amended.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(d)(7).
    \37\ See supra note 5.
    \38\ The Commission's proposed Standards for Covered Clearing
Agencies would also require a covered clearing agency to establish,
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to identify, monitor, and manage risks related
to any link the covered clearing agency establishes with among other
things, trading markets. See Proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(20), Standards
for Covered Clearing Agencies, Proposed Rule, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 71699 (March 12, 2014), 79 FR 29507 (May 22, 2014).
    \39\ OCC also notes that many of the Risk Controls require
regulatory approval prior to implementation on the Options
Exchanges. As such, OCC does not believe that any of the Risk
Controls will be in conflict with any other rules of the exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(B) Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition

    OCC believes the proposed rule change may impose a burden on
competition amongst Options Exchanges, as Options Exchanges that do not
implement sufficient Risk Control Standards to meet the Risk Control
Standards will have the Fee added to the cost of transacting on such
Options Exchange. OCC believes that the burden on competition is
necessary and appropriate in furtherance of the Act because, as
discussed above, imposition of the Fee would provide OCC with a means
to accrue funds to help cover additional risk that OCC has no other
means to predict, measure, or consider, and as a result presents
otherwise uncovered risk to OCC's Clearing Members and the financial
markets OCC serves and, if left unchecked, could threaten the stability
of the financial system of the United States. The additional risk to
OCC, its Clearing Members, and the financial markets it serves that
results from the increased likelihood that an erroneous transaction
will cause an OCC Clearing Member to default and cause OCC to cover the
loss in part through mutualized resources available in its Clearing
Fund must be addressed by OCC in furtherance of Sections 17A(b)(3)(F)
\40\ and 17A(b)(3)(D) \41\ of the Act and Rule 17Ad-22(d)(7)
thereunder,\42\ as described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \41\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(D).
    \42\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(d)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the proposed Fee would be charged to Clearing Members that
execute on Options Exchanges that do not implement sufficient Risk
Controls to meet the Risk Control Standards, OCC does not believe that
this charge results in a burden on competition between Clearing
Members. OCC believes that differential fees are not, in and of
themselves, burdens on competition amongst industry participants that
pay those fees; in fact, OCC's current fee structure applies
differential fees for Clearing Members based on the number of contracts
within a trade. Furthermore, while the Fee is important for OCC to
properly manage risks attendant with the provision of clearing services
in a market that does not have Risk Control Standards, it represents an
incremental increase--less than half but more than a third of a premium
over the base rate of five cents per contract of what is an
infinitesimal component--approximately two percent--of the total
execution costs for an options contract.

(C) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments on the proposed rule change were not and are not
intended to be solicited with respect to

the proposed rule change and none have been received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self- regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove the proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-OCC-2016-004 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2016-004. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filings also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of OCC and on OCC's
Web site at http://www.theocc.com/components/docs/legal/rules_and_bylaws/sr_occ_16_004.pdf.
    All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission
does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You
should submit only information that you wish to make available
publicly.
    All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2016-004 and
should be submitted on orbefore April 8, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\43\
Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-06098 Filed 3-17-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


                             Summary of Meetings
                          With Escanaba Paper Company

Following the publication on August 6, 2012 of the notice of proposed rulemaking regarding Michigan's regional haze plan, EPA held two meetings with the Escanaba Paper Company:

August 27, 2012 call
	Escanaba Paper attendees: Todd Schmidt, Dave Holland (consultant to Escanaba Paper)
	EPA attendees: Douglas Aburano, John Summerhays,
	Michigan attendees: Bob Irvine, Asad Khan
   	Synopsis:  The primary topic of discussion was the form and magnitude of the limit for Boiler 8.  EPA had proposed a limit reflecting a weighted average (weighted according to fuel use) of a 0.26 pounds per million British Thermal Units (lb/MMBTU) for gas and 0.50 lb/MMBTU for oil.  Escanaba Paper requested a fixed limit irrespective of fuel used. and urged that this limit be between 0.35 and .040 lb/MMBTU, preferably 0.375 lb/MMBTU.

August 30, 2012 call
	Escanaba Paper attendees: Todd Schmidt, Dave Holland (consultant to Escanaba Paper)
	EPA attendees: Douglas Aburano, John Summerhays,
	Michigan attendees: Bob Irvine, Asad Khan
   	Synopsis:  Again, the primary topic of discussion was the form and magnitude of the limit for Boiler 8.  EPA proposed to promulgate a fixed limit of 0.35 lb/MMBTU, and Escanaba Paper agreed.

November 2, 2012 call
	Escanaba Paper attendees: Todd Schmidt, Dave Holland (consultant to Escanaba Paper)
	EPA attendees: Douglas Aburano, John Summerhays,
	Michigan attendees: Bob Irvine, Asad Khan
   	Synopsis:  EPA and Escanaba Paper discussed details of the codification of requirements for Escanaba Paper, discussing comments that Escanaba provided by email on November 1, 2012.  EPA committed to use the company's formal identity as Escanaba Paper Company where appropriate.  EPA committed to clarify that the statement in the notice of proposed rulemaking that it viewed the Boiler 9 limit as requiring overfire air did not mean that this particular compliance approach was mandated.  Escanaba Paper asked that the codification expressly allow alternative test methods for the Boiler 9 limit; EPA stated that the intent was for Escanaba Paper, in the context of demonstrating compliance, to have flexibility to use alternate test methods that could be shown to the regulatory agency to provide equivalent, adequate demonstration of compliance.  EPA indicated that this might be done by stating that Method 7 is the reference method.  Escanaba Paper sought a delayed compliance date, but EPA stated that it found no justification for delaying the compliance date for a limit that is already being met.


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 192 (Monday, October 5, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60195-60197]
[FR Doc No: 2015-25186]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-76024; File No. SR-CBOE-2015-080]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Incorporated; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Bandwidth

September 29, 2015.
    Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby
given that on September 25, 2015, Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Incorporated (the ``Exchange'' or ``CBOE'') filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change
as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been prepared by
the self-regulatory organization. The Exchange has designated this
proposal as a ``non-controversial'' proposed rule change pursuant to
section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act \4\ and Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii)
thereunder,\5\ which renders it effective upon filing with the
Commission. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C.78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
    \3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \5\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to provide that certain quote cancel messages
are subject to bandwidth limitations. The text of the proposed rule
change is available on the Exchange's Web site (http://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/CBOELegalRegulatoryHome.aspx), at the Exchange's Office of
the Secretary, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below,

of the most significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange is proposing to make an amendment to Rule 6.23B to
state that certain quote messages are subject to bandwidth limitations
and count towards the maximum number of quotes allowed per second(s).
Specifically, quote cancel messages, a message type that is used by an
originator of quotes to cancel quotes, will be subject to existing
bandwidth limitations and counted towards the maximum number of quotes
allowed per second(s) as described below.
    By way of background, the Exchange does not have unlimited system
bandwidth to support an unlimited number of order and quote entries per
second. For this reason, the Exchange limits each Trading Permit to a
maximum number of messages per second(s). Currently, for example, a
Trading Permit Holder (``TPH'') is limited to x quote messages
(``blocks'') per 1 second. Each block is limited to a maximum number of
quotes. Additionally, there is a set maximum number of total quotes per
3 seconds. For example, if the Exchange limited each Trading Permit to
100 quotes per 1 block, 10 blocks per 1 second and a maximum of 200
quotes per 3 seconds, then a user cannot, for example, enter 11 blocks
per 1 second. The Exchange will reject the entire block of quotes that
puts the user over the threshold. If a user in the above example were
to enter, 10 blocks comprised of 10 quotes (i.e., total of 100 quotes)
in the first second and 5 blocks comprised of 20 quotes (i.e., total of
100 quotes) in the following second, then the user would not be able to
enter any more blocks (and therefore quotes) in the third second, as
the user would exceed the 200 quotes per 3 second threshold. To date,
quote cancel messages have not been counted towards the maximum number
of messages per second(s). The Exchange believes however, that the
volume of quote cancel requests by series messages in addition to
quotes, can potentially threaten the Exchange's systems capacity. As
such, the Exchange proposes to include these messages as part of the
maximum number of quotes allowed per second(s), so as not to overburden
the Exchange's system. Accordingly, a ``block'' may be comprised of
either a maximum number of quotes or quote cancels messages (for
requests by series \6\) and the maximum number of blocks per second
allowed may be comprised of quote blocks, quote cancel message blocks
or both quote and quote cancel message blocks. Also, the maximum number
of total quotes per 3 seconds may now be comprised of quotes, quote
cancel messages, or a combination of both. The Exchange will reject any
block of messages that put a user over the bandwidth thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ For example, under the proposed rule change, if a TPH were
to send a quote cancel message for a quote in the XYZ 75 Dec 2015
Call and the XYZ 85 Dec 2015 Call (i.e. each a different series of
XYZ class), a TPH could send a block identifying each series and
would count towards the bandwidth limitations as two quote messages
and one block message.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange established bandwidth allowances for the purpose of
protecting its systems and ensuring its systems were capable of
handling all its message traffic. The Exchange believes that subjecting
quote cancel messages (by series) to bandwidth allowance will help
achieve this objective. The Exchange notes however, that requests to
cancel by class or by session will not count towards the bandwidth
limitation. Because the ability to cancel all quotes in a class is an
important risk control for TPHs, the Exchange does not wish to count
requests to cancel quotes for an entire class towards the maximum
bandwidth allowance.
    The Exchange will announce the implementation date of the proposed
rule change in an Information Circular to be published no later than 90
days following the effective date of this rule filing. The
implementation date will be no later than 180 days following the
effective date of this rule filing.
2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ``Act'') and the rules and
regulations thereunder applicable to the Exchange and, in particular,
the requirements of section 6(b) of the Act.\7\ Specifically, the
Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the
section 6(b)(5) \8\ requirements that the rules of an exchange be
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation
and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing,
settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and,
in general, to protect investors and the public interest. Additionally,
the Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the
section 6(b)(5) \9\ requirement that the rules of an exchange not be
designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers,
brokers, or dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \8\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
    \9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In particular, the Exchange believes that imposing a bandwidth
limitation on quote cancel messages protects its systems and ensures
its systems are capable of handling its message traffic, thus removing
impediments to and perfecting the mechanism of a free and open market
and a national market system, as well protecting investors and the
public interest. As noted above, quote cancel request messages in
addition to quotes, can result in message traffic that can be
burdensome to the Exchange's systems. In addition, the proposed rule
change does not discriminate unfairly between market participants
because this will be applied equally to all TPHs that may quote (i.e.,
Market-Makers).

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    CBOE does not believe that imposing a bandwidth limitation on quote
cancel messages for a series or group of series will impose any burden
on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act. In particular, the Exchange does not believe
that imposing a bandwidth limitation on quote cancel messages will
place any burden on intramarket competition because this will be
applied to equally to all relevant TPHs (i.e., Market-Makers), in that
all Market-Makers will be limited (in terms of bandwidth capacity) in
the number of quote cancel and quote messages that they can send to the
Exchange. Additionally, as noted above, the proposed rule change allows
the Exchange to better protect its systems and ensures its systems are
capable of handling all its message traffic. The Exchange does not
believe that imposing a bandwidth limitation on quote cancel messages
will place any burden on intermarket competition because this only
applies to the sending of quote cancel messages to CBOE. To the extent
the proposed rule change makes CBOE a more attractive trading venue to
market participants on other exchanges, such market participants may
elect to become CBOE market participants.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    The Exchange neither solicited nor received comments on the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    The Exchange has designated this rule filing as non-controversial
under section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act and Rule 19b-4(f)(6)
thereunder.\10\ The proposed rule change effects a change that does not
(i) significantly affect the protection of investors or the public
interest; (ii) impose any significant burden on competition; and (iii)
become operative for 30 days from the date on which it was filed, or
such shorter time as the Commission may designate if consistent with
the protection of investors and the public interest; provided that the
self-regulatory organization has given the Commission written notice of
its intent to file the proposed rule change, along with a brief
description and text of the proposed rule change, at least five
business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed rule change,
or such shorter times as designated by the Commission.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ In addition, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii) requires the Exchange to
give the Commission written notice of the Exchange's intent to file
the proposed rule change, along with a brief description and text of
the proposed rule change, at least five business days prior to the
date of filing of the proposed rule change, or such shorter time as
designated by the Commission. The Exchange has satisfied this
requirement.
    \11\ The Exchange has fulfilled this requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is: (1)
Necessary or appropriate in the public interest; (2) for the protection
of investors, or (3) otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the
Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-CBOE-2015-080 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CBOE-2015-080. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090, on official business days between the hours
of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing will also be available
for inspection and copying at the NYSE's principal office and on its
Internet Web site at www.nyse.com. All comments received will be posted
without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying
information from submissions. You should submit only information that
you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to
File Number SR-CBOE-2015-080 and should be submitted on or before
October 26, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\12\
Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-25186 Filed 10-2-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY [ OAR 2004 0501; FRL ]

Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for OMB Review and Approval; Comment Request; Reporting Requirements Under EPA's Green Power Partnership and Combined Heat and Power ( CHP) Partnership, ICR Number 2173.01.

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA).

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act ( 44 U. S. C. 3501 et seq.),

this notice announces that EPA is planning to submit the following proposed Information Collection Request ( ICR) to the Office of Management and Budget ( OMB) for review and approval. This is a request for a new collection.

DATES: Additional comments may be submitted on or before [ 30 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, referencing docket ID number OAR 2004 0501,

to ( 1) EPA online using EDOCKET ( our preferred method), by email to a and r

Docket@ epa. gov, or by mail to: Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Docket Center ( EPA/ DC), Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center, EPA West, Mail Code 6102T, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20460, and ( 2) OMB at: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget ( OMB),

Attention: Desk Officer for EPA, 725 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20503.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jim Sullivan, Climate Protection Partnerships Division, Office of Atmospheric Programs, 6202J, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, D. C. 20460; telephone number: 2 ( 202) 343 9241; fax number: ( 202) 565 2134; email address sullivan. jamest@ epa. gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: EPA has submitted the following ICR to OMB for review and approval according to the procedures prescribed in 5 CFR 1320.12. On May 4, 2004 ( 70 FR 23152), EPA sought comments on this ICR pursuant to 5 CFR 1320.8( d). EPA received no comments.

EPA has established a public docket for this ICR under Docket ID No.

OAR 2004 0501, which is available for public viewing at the Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center in the EPA Docket Center ( EPA/ DC), EPA West, Room B102,

1301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. The EPA Docket Center Public Reading Room is open from 8: 30 a. m. to 4: 30 p. m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. The telephone number for the Reading Room is ( 202) 566 1744, and the telephone number for the Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center is ( 202)

566 1742. An electronic version of the public docket is available through EPA Dockets ( EDOCKET) at http:// www. epa. gov/ edocket. Use EDOCKET to obtain a copy of the draft collection of information, submit or view public comments, access the index listing of the contents of the public docket, and to access those documents in the public docket that are available electronically. Once in the system, select " search," then key in the docket ID number identified above.

Any comments related to this ICR should be submitted to EPA within 60 days of this notice, and according to the following detailed instructions: Submit your comments to EPA online using EDOCKET ( our preferred method), by e mail to a and r docket@ epamail. epa. gov, or by mail to: EPA Docket Center, Environmental 3 Protection Agency, Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center, MC 6102T, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20460.

EPA's policy is that public comments, whether submitted electronically or in paper, will be made available for public viewing in EDOCKET as EPA receives them and without change, unless the comment contains copyrighted material, confidential business information ( CBI), or other information whose public disclosure is restricted by statute.

When EPA identifies a comment containing copyrighted material, EPA will provide a reference to that material in the version of the comment that is placed in EDOCKET. The entire printed comment, including the copyrighted material, will be available in the public docket. Although identified as an item in the official docket, information claimed as CBI,

or whose disclosure is otherwise restricted by statute, is not included in the official public docket, and will not be available for public viewing in EDOCKET. For further information about the electronic docket, see EPA's Federal Register notice describing the electronic docket at 67 FR 38102 ( May 31, 2002), or go to www. epa. gov/ edocket.

Title: Reporting Requirements Under EPA's Green Power Partnership and Combined Heat and Power ( CHP) Partnership Abstract: In an effort to aid implementation of the President's May 2001 National Energy Strategy, as well as the President's February 2002 Climate Change Strategy, EPA has launched two new partnership programs with industry and other stakeholders: the Green Power Partnership and the CHP Partnership. These partnership programs encourage organizations to invest in clean, efficient energy technologies,

including renewable energy and CHP. 4 The EPA has developed this ICR to obtain authorization to collect information from organizations participating in the Green Power Partnership and CHP Partnership to ensure that they are meeting their voluntary renewable energy and CHP goals and to assure the credibility of these partnership programs. Organizations that join these programs voluntarily agree to the following respective actions: ( 1) designating a Green Power or CHP Partnership liaison; ( 2) for the Green Power Partnership, reporting to EPA,

on an annual basis, their progress toward their green power commitment via a 1 page Green Power Partner Yearly Report; ( 3) for the CHP Partnership, reporting to EPA information on their existing CHP projects and project development activity via the CHP Partner Projects Data Form. The EPA uses the data obtained from its Partners to assess the success of these programs in achieving their national energy and greenhouse gas reduction goals.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,

a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control numbers for EPA's regulations are listed in 40 CFR part 9 and 48 CFR chapter 15.

Burden Statement: The annual public reporting and recordkeeping burden for this three ( 3) year collection of information is estimated to equal 3980 hours and to average 3.4 hours per year per respondent. The average number of annual burden hours per type of response is: 4.9 hours for a Letter of Intent ( a one time burden for Green Power and CHP Partners); for the Green Power Partnership, 2.4 hours for the Green Power Partner Yearly Report; for the CHP Partnership, 2.0 hours for end user Partners to complete the 5 CHP Partner Projects Data Form report on completed CHP projects ( a one time report),

or 1.7 hours per year for CHP project updates for Partners with ongoing CHP project development activities. Burden means the total time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency. This includes the time needed to review instructions; develop,

acquire, install, and utilize technology and systems for the purposes of collecting,

validating, and verifying information, processing and maintaining information, and disclosing and providing information; adjust the existing ways to comply with any previously applicable instructions and requirements; train personnel to be able to respond to a collection of information; search data sources; complete and review the collection of information; and transmit or otherwise disclose the information.

Respondents/ Affected Entities: corporations, institutions, state, local, and tribal agencies that voluntarily agree to work with EPA to purchase or market green power or to support the use of CHP.

Estimated number of respondents: 1,164 Frequency of Response: Annually, semiannually Estimated Total Annual Hour Burden: 3,980 hours Estimated Total Annual Costs: $ 298,886, which includes $ 0 annualized capital/ startup costs, $ 3,248 annual O& M costs, and $ 295,638 annual labor costs.

Changes in the Estimates: This does not apply, as this is a new collection. 6 Dated: _____________________________

____________________________________ Sara Hisel McCoy, Acting Director, Collection Strategies Division