equipment. The agency notes that rear visibility systems have currently
been designed to be equipped on vehicles as a cost-option or for more
expensive vehicles. As rear visibility systems are required under
today's final rule to be equipped to all vehicles with a GVWR less than
10,000 pounds, the agency is concerned with ensuring that these rear
visibility systems will meet minimum performance standards even when
installed on relatively low-cost vehicles in the future. The agency
believes that, while relieving the manufacturers of the burden of
complying with the requirements of today's rule beyond the field of
view requirements during the phase-in period can lead to a net increase
in safety benefits in the near term, all the requirements in today's
final rule are important towards ensuring the long-term quality of rear
visibility systems.
    As mentioned above, the comments on the NPRM demonstrate that the
costs of bringing existing rear visibility systems into compliance with
all of the requirements of today's final rule (by the second year
phase-in target) are significantly greater than the agency anticipated.
In the NPRM we proposed a ``rear-loaded'' phase-in period which
required a second year phase-in target of 10% and a third year target
of 40% in order to afford the manufacturers a significant amount of
flexibility. However, we acknowledge the comments from the
manufacturers and agree that to require rear visibility systems which
currently do not comply with all of the requirements in today's final
rule to become compliant by the second year phase-in target would
compel manufacturers to conduct significant redesigns outside of the
normal product cycle. In the NPRM, we considered the proposed phase-in
schedule to be appropriate as we assumed that most rear visibility
systems currently available on the market would be able to meet the
requirements proposed in the NPRM. In addition, the costs/benefits
analysis in the NPRM was also based on this assumption as it did not
consider the costs of redesigning rear visibility systems within the
phase-in period. In order to avoid significantly increasing the costs
of this rule, today's final rule does not require that manufacturers
conduct costly product redesigns by the second year phase-in target. As

suggested by the Alliance, allowing additional flexibility for
manufacturers to incorporate the additional design changes at any point
before the 48 month deadline will allow time for proper system design
and validation.
    However, today's final rule adopts the phase-in schedule proposed
in the NPRM in regards to the field of view requirements. We believe
that the field of view requirements are the most appropriate
requirements to phase-in according to the schedule adopted by today's
final rule because they are crucial requirements that enable drivers to
see and avoid striking pedestrians behind the vehicle. In addition,
testing conducted by the agency indicates that the vast majority of
rear visibility systems are currently able to meet the field of view
requirements of today's final rule. Thus, by only requiring that the
field of view requirements be phased-in according to the schedule in
today's final rule, we believe that most, if not all, current systems
can now be used to meet the phase-in requirements as anticipated in the
NPRM.
    Further, today's final rule no longer requires separate phase-in
schedules for passenger cars and MPVs, trucks, low-speed vehicles, and
buses. As we have noted on many occasions, while the crash data suggest
that larger vehicles such as MPVs represent a larger portion of the
fatalities, they do not represent a disproportionate amount of backover
crashes in general. Thus, the agency agrees with the comments from
General Motors that a separate phase-in schedule would not support the
safety goals of this rulemaking. As noted in the regulatory impact
analysis, manufacturers have installed a greater portion of their rear
visibility systems on larger vehicles such as trucks and MPVs.\120\ As
the agency anticipates that manufacturers will continue this pattern
with a combined fleet phase-in schedule, the agency has added the
flexibility for manufacturers to combine their passenger car and light
truck fleets for the purposes of phase-in compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Considering this additional flexibility, the agency no longer
believes the carry forward credit system is necessary as suggested by
the Alliance, BMW, and Volkswagen for the following reasons. First, we
note that the carry-forward credit systems proposed by BMW and
Volkswagen cannot be implemented as they extend beyond the 48-month
``full compliance'' deadline required by the K.T. Safety Act. As we
interpret the K.T. Safety Act, allowing carry-forward credits to be
used towards the final, 100% compliance, year of the phase-in would not
constitute ``full compliance'' within the meaning of the Act. Second,
as the agency has adjusted the phase-in schedule to afford additional
flexibility through minimizing the requirements that must be met at the
beginning of the schedule, we no longer believe it is necessary to
utilize a carry-forward credit system to further alleviate the burden
of compliance. We also note that adopting a carry-forward credit system
will instead increase the compliance burden on manufacturers by
requiring manufacturers to file additional compliance documents with
the agency while still being unable to afford the additional
flexibility beyond the 48-month statutory deadline as requested by the
commenters. Therefore, today's final rule has not included a carry-
forward credit system with the phase-in schedule.
    Today's final rule also adopts the exclusions proposed in the NPRM
for limited line, small, and multistage manufacturers from the phase-in
schedule and simply requires full compliance at the 48-month statutory
deadline. The agency continues to reason that small, limited line, and
multistage manufactures face unique circumstances, mentioned above,
which support the need for additional flexibility. However, due to the
restrictions in the K.T. Safety Act, we cannot accommodate the request
of multistage manufacturers to be afforded a phase-in schedule which
allows an extension beyond the 48-month deadline.
    Finally, we note that the phase-in schedule has been adjusted so
that the first year of the schedule begins on May 1, 2014 (with the
first compliance year as between May 1, 2016 and April 30, 2017). The
agency believes that adjustment in the phase-in schedule is appropriate
in order to ensure that manufacturers would have the amount of time
that Congress authorized the agency to allot for the phase-in period
under the K.T. Safety Act.

l. Remaining Issues

    Finally, the agency received other comments on the NPRM on the
following additional issues. We have examined these comments and
respond to them in turn in the paragraphs that follow.
Executive Order 13045
    In addition to their comments mentioned above, KidsAndCars.org
noted that Executive Order 13045 requires that federal agencies
evaluate the environmental health or safety effects that an
economically significant rule may have on children and explain why the
approach selected is preferable to other potentially effective and
reasonably feasible alternatives. KidsAndCars.org stated in its
comments that this rulemaking is economically significant and that
NHTSA is required, under Executive Order 13045, to provide the
aforementioned analysis.
Agency Response
    As explained below in section V, Regulatory Analyses, we agree that
Executive Order 13045 is applicable to this rulemaking. Pursuant to the
criteria set forth in Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, we agree with
KidsAndCars.org that this rulemaking is economically significant and is
subject to the requirements of Executive Order 13045. As we have noted
below in section V, the health and safety effects of this rule on
children are a central concern of this rulemaking. Thus, the
environmental health and safety effects, and the potential alternatives
to this rule are extensively discussed directly in this preamble and
the accompanying regulatory impact analysis for today's final rule.
Driver Education and Driver Distraction
    As noted in above is section II, Background and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, many individual commenters stated that driver education
would contribute significantly towards reducing backover crashes. In
addition, KidsAndCars.org also commented that driver education will be
crucial in ensuring that drivers are trained and able to effectively
utilize the required rear visibility systems. In a related issue,
individual commenters also expressed concern that drivers will be
distracted by rearview images and focus on the displays instead of
being aware of their surroundings.
Agency Response
    While we noted in the NPRM that driver education may lead to
greater effectiveness statistics for rear visibility systems, NHTSA
currently has not yet established a new driver education campaign to
complement this rulemaking. In the K.T. Safety Act, Congress was
concerned with the expansion of the required field of view behind the
vehicle in order to avoid backover crashes. Thus, this rulemaking
focused on the possible rearview countermeasures and how they could be
used to expand the rear field of view as contemplated by Congress. In
general, the agency is aware of the benefit of driver education when it
comes to all

crash avoidance technologies. We will continue to use www.safercar.gov
to support these efforts and carefully consider if any additional
action is warranted.
    In addition, as described in our earlier discussion on linger time,
deactivation, and backing event, NHTSA shares the individual
commenters' concern that drivers may be distracted by the rearview
images from being aware of their surroundings. Thus, we have aimed in
today's final rule to ensure that the rearview image is presented to
the driver only under appropriate circumstances by including
restrictions on when the image shall be displayed in relation to the
defined backing event. While the agency notes that the rearview image
will divert some driver attention away from the rearview mirrors or
windows during a backing maneuver, we believe that the increased field
of view afforded to the driver through the rear visibility system will,
on the whole, increase the driver's awareness of his or her
surroundings.
Color/Real-time Rear Visibility Systems
    While the NPRM did not propose specifications to require that rear
visibility systems display the rearview image in color or in real time,
two suppliers commented that such requirements would be appropriate.
Sony commented that, as third party research indicates that humans
possess a greater ability to recognize objects in a color environment,
a color camera and display system should be required. In addition,
Rosco was concerned that when a rearview video system is integrated
with various other vehicle systems, there may be a time delay in which
could affect the rear visibility system's effectiveness.
Agency Response
    While the agency acknowledges the concerns from Sony and Rosco, the
agency is unaware of any rearview video systems, currently offered on
the market, which do not offer a rearview that is both in color and in
real-time. We note that, as rearview displays are items of automotive
equipment that drivers will frequently interact with, we believe it is
reasonable to expect the decision making process of manufacturers to be
significantly influenced by consumer expectations. Thus, we decline to
establish requirements in today's final rule requiring that rear
visibility systems use color displays as suggested by Sony. To do as
Sony suggests would unnecessarily complicate today's rule and the cost
of compliance as manufacturers would be required to certify not only
that their vehicles have color displays--but color displays that meet a
certain minimum standard. We also decline to set a ``real-time video''
performance standard as requested by Rosco for similar reasons. To
require manufacturers meet to real-time video performance standards
would increase the cost of compliance, while providing no demonstrated
increase in safety benefit from the rear visibility systems that we
expect manufacturers to be utilizing to meet the requirements of
today's rule.
Multistage Vehicles
    In its comments, NTEA requested that testing be conducted more on
the component level in order to afford the multistage manufacturers
maximum flexibility in utilizing different cameras to meet the
standard. Further, NTEA requested confirmation that the rear visibility
camera would not have to be mounted behind temporarily attached
equipment such as a salt or sand spreader which is temporarily mounted
to the trailer hitch of a pickup truck.
Agency Response
    The agency appreciates the concerns of the multistage
manufacturers. We recognize that many of the requirements of today's
final rule are dependent on the presentation of the test objects behind
the vehicle, through a rear visibility system, in relation to the
vehicle and the driver. Since the goals of today's final rule include
the driver's ability to view pedestrians within the backing path of his
or her vehicle, it is necessary to establish performance requirements
in relation to attributes such as the driver eye point and the vehicle
rear bumper. Thus, the test procedure adopted by today's final rule
inevitably must incorporate various tests on the vehicle level.
However, we note that the test procedure in today's final rule
prescribes the method by which the agency will conduct compliance
testing. Thus, it does not preclude manufacturers (such as multistage
vehicle manufacturers) from conducting testing in a different manner as
long as the rear visibility system will meet all the requirements of
today's rule when installed and tested, by the agency, according to the
test procedure described in today's rule.
    Finally, we also acknowledge NTEA's concerns that temporary
equipment installed by the vehicle owner, such as salt or sand
spreaders, may be restricted by today's final rule. However, we note
that today's rule does not apply to trailers and other temporary
equipment that can be installed by the vehicle owner.
Persons With Disabilities
    The K.T. Safety Act directs the agency not only to issue a
regulation to reduce death and injury resulting from backover crashes,
but to particularly examine crashes involving small children and
disabled persons. As described above, the agency examined the FARS and
NASS-GES databases to determine whether or not persons with
disabilities are frequently involved in backover crashes. While the
agency identified various cases in the databases between the years 2007
and 2010 that involved persons with disabilities, the data do not
indicate that such persons were frequently involved in backover
crashes.
    The FARS and NASS-GES data (from 2007-2010) show one case that
involves a vision-impaired individual that resulted in a fatality and
two cases involving persons in a wheelchair that resulted in injuries.
As we noted above, the agency found other cases where the individual
was specified as ``impaired'' (1 in FARS, and 11 in NASS-GES). For
these cases, the agency is not able to identify whether the person was
``impaired'' due to a physical disability (temporary or otherwise) or
due to some other cause. However, even considering all the
aforementioned cases, the data suggests (on the whole) that persons
with disabilities are infrequently involved in backover crashes.
    While the data do not suggest persons with disabilities are
frequently involved with backover cases, the agency believes that such
persons will benefit from the requirements of today's final rule in a
similar way to other pedestrians. While persons using wheelchairs would
generally be lower in height when compared to a standing adult, such
persons would unlikely be shorter than the 18-month-old toddler (upon
which agency has based the 0.8-meter height of its test objects). As
described in our discussion of our test objects and field of view
requirements in today's final rule, using the 0.8 meter test object
located beyond the width of the vehicle (at 5 feet to either side of
the vehicle longitudinal centerline) enables the agency to ensure that
the 18-month-old toddler will be covered by the required rear
visibility system as he/she moves towards the vehicle's longitudinal
centerline. The same is true for persons in wheelchairs. As it is
highly unlikely that a person in a wheelchair would be shorter than the
0.8 meter test object, the agency believes that such persons would be
visible in all the relevant areas behind the vehicle (through the
required rear visibility system) that are associated with the highest
crash risk.

    Similarly, the agency believes that persons with other forms of
disabilities will also be visible to a driver using a rear visibility
system meeting the requirements of today's final rule. Persons using
crutches or other similar mobility aides will also generally be taller
than the 0.8-meter test object as these individuals are generally
standing when using their mobility aid. Further, vision- or hearing-
impaired persons will also be readily visible to the driver using a
rear visibility system meeting the requirements of today's final rule
as such a person would also be typically standing when located in the
relevant areas behind the vehicle.
    Further, the available data indicate that persons with disabilities
would not move into the vehicle blind zone at a speed that is
significantly greater or different than the test speed used by NHTSA in
the 2012 research that used a moving obstacle presentation (2.3
mph).\121\ In the agency's review of the available research, the agency
found various studies that state that persons using wheelchairs
generally travel at a speed between 0.96 and 2.42 mph.\122\ As the
agency does not anticipate that persons with other types of
disabilities may move into the vehicle's blind zone at a speed greater
than persons using wheelchairs, the agency believes that drivers will
be able to use the rear visibility system required by today's final
rule to avoid backover crashes with persons with disabilities. Thus,
while the data do not indicate that persons with disabilities are
frequently involved in backover crashes, the agency believes that the
requirements in today's final rule will nonetheless enable drivers to
detect and to avoid potential backover crashes that may involve a
person with a disability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253, Rearview Video System
Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle Scenario.
    \122\ See generally Tolerico, M.L., Ding, D., Cooper, R.A.,
Spaeth, D.M., Fitzgerald, S.G., Cooper, R., Kelleher, A., Boninger,
M.L., (2007) Assessing mobility characteristics and activity levels
of manual wheelchair users, J Rehabil Res Dev. 2007;44(4):561-71;
Kaminski, B.A, (2004) Application of a Commercial Datalogger to
Electric Powered and Manual Wheelchairs of Children, available at
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-11292004-115314/unrestricted/Thesis2.pdf; Sonenblum, S.E., Sprigle, S., Lopez, R.A.,
(2012) Manual Wheelchair Use: Bouts of Mobility in Everyday Life,
available at http://www.hindawi.com/journals/rerp/2012/753165/;
Cooper, R.A., Thorman, T., Cooper, R., Dvorznak, M.J., Fitzgerald,
S.G., Ammer W., Guo, S.F., Ph.D., Boninger, M.L., (2002) Driving
Characteristics of Electric-Powered Wheelchair Users: How Far, Fast,
and Often Do People Drive?, available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~cga/
behavior/epw-datalogger.pdf; Ikeda, H., Mihoshi A., Nomura T.,
Ishibashi T., (2003) Comparison of Electric and Manual Wheelchairs
Using an Electrocardiogram, available at http://www.union-services.com/aevs/449-452.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additional Research From IIHS and UMTRI
    While the NCAP request for comments and final decision notices are
a separate agency action that is independent from the actions taken in
today's final rule, various commenters to the NCAP request for comments
mentioned additional research that may contain information relevant to
this rulemaking action. The first comment was from the Alliance
regarding the potential contents of a forthcoming study by the
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI). The
second comment was from IIHS on data that they obtained through their
Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI).
Forthcoming UMTRI Study
    The Alliance and General Motors both commented to the NCAP request
for comments that a forthcoming study from the University of Michigan
Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) examining the effectiveness
of rear video systems is likely to be available soon. They asserted
that, if the study shows that rearview video systems are already having
a significant impact on reducing crashes, then it may not be necessary
to include various performance requirements for these systems.
    As we stated in the NCAP final decision notice, the agency is
encouraged that organizations continue to devote resources to
researching backover crashes. Unfortunately, this additional
information from the referenced UMTRI study is currently unavailable
for analysis. However, the agency believes that the information
resulting from this study is unlikely to alter the agency's regulatory
decisions in today's final rule. As the commenters suggest, the results
of the study may indicate that rearview video systems are already
having an effect on reducing backover crashes.
    However, even if the results of the study are as the commenters
anticipate, the agency believes that minimum performance requirements
are still appropriate and necessary in order to ensure that the rear
visibility systems installed on vehicles in compliance with FMVSS No.
111 are systems that can assist drivers in avoiding backover crashes.
While the currently available systems being equipped on vehicles may
already help drivers avoid backover crashes, the available data still
indicate that the performance requirements adopted in today's final
rule address various conditions under which a poor-performing system
could lead to increased backover safety risk. As we noted above in our
discussion of SCI cases with rearview video systems, it is important
that future systems be designed to show the rearview image to the
driver as early as possible so that the driver will be able to see any
pedestrian behind the vehicle and avoid the crash.
    Further, we believe that minimum performance requirements are
necessary--even if current systems meet those requirements. Without
performance requirements established in an FMVSS, NHTSA would not be
able to ensure that future systems would continue to be effective in
helping drivers avoid backover crashes.
IIHS Highway Loss Data Institute Information
    Separately, IIHS commented in response to the NCAP request for
comments that they support NHTSA's efforts to promote countermeasures
that assist drivers in avoiding backover crashes. They also noted that
the available data show that rearview video systems greatly increase
visibility behind the vehicle and should create a measureable effect on
reducing backing crashes. However, they stated that the preliminary
data that they have gathered from their Highway Loss Data Institute
(HLDI), to date, provide little evidence at this time that these
systems are preventing crashes and reducing loss at a measurable
rate.\123\ We have reviewed the available information from HLDI that
shows a lack of a statistical difference in one instance and a
statistically significant increase in claims in another instance.\124\
However, due to the preliminary nature and the directional
inconsistencies in the data, we do not believe that this information
should lead the agency to conclude differently on the effectiveness of
the available technologies considered in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ This apparent inconsistency between the cited substantial
increase in rear visibility and the lack of reduction in real world
insurance data claims may be associated with a few potential
factors. First, there is a limited amount of insurance data due to
these systems being relatively new. Second, these crashes are a
relatively small proportion of the overall vehicle claims. Finally,
the study considers data beyond backover crash data. This comparison
may contain confounding factors that do not reduce the utility of
this information for the purposes of IIHS, but it does not contain
information specific enough for make conclusions about rearview
video systems for the purposes of this analysis.
    \124\ Bulletin Vol. 28, No. 13: December 2011 and Bulletin Vol.
29, No. 7: April 2012
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In their HLDI study, IIHS compared insurance claim frequencies for
various categories such as physical damage to the at-fault vehicle
(collision coverage)

and physical damage to a struck vehicle or property (property damage
liability coverage). This study focused on select Mazda and Mercedes-
Benz vehicle models with and without rearview video systems. In
general, they stated that, for these models, they did not observe
statistically significant reductions in claim frequencies and in some
cases found that cars with cameras had increased claims.\125\ For
example, in their analysis of crash data for Mercedes-Benz vehicles (a
more robust data set than the analysis of the Mazda vehicles \126\)
with and without rearview video systems, IIHS did not find a
statistically significant difference in any of the claim frequencies
(which may be partially attributable to the data's wide confidence
interval). In addition, the authors of the study of Mercedes-Benz
vehicles noted that the transmission status was unknown (i.e., whether
the vehicle was in reverse or not). Thus, for those vehicles, all crash
types were considered--including those for which rearview video systems
cannot be reasonably expected to prevent.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ For Mazda vehicles ``the only significant effect on claim
frequency was a paradoxical increase in collision claims. There was
also a decrease in high-severity claims for bodily injury,
suggesting a reduction in collisions with nonoccupants.'' For
Mercedes vehicles there were no statistically significant changes in
any of the five insurance coverage types.
    \126\ Mercedes vehicles had four times as many insured vehicle
years in the database as Mazda vehicles.
    \127\ A more detailed discussion of these studies is available
in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis--available in the docket
referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency understands that the types of crashes contemplated by
Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (backover crashes) occur much less
frequently than all property damage crashes. This makes it more
difficult to find statistical significance using the Highway Loss Data
Institute methodology. As IIHS stated in their comments, this data is
still preliminary data. Further, this data is not designed to isolate
the effect of rearview video systems on the specific type of crashes
that we are addressing in this document--backover crashes. Thus, when
considering these studies as well as the other available studies
completed by NHTSA and other organizations, including all the
limitations within the methodologies, the data continue to show that
the installation of rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of
today's final rule will decrease the risk of pedestrian backover
crashes. However, with more data, the HLDI methodology may be valuable
in the future for examining the overall effect of rearview video
systems.

m. Effective Date

    Section 30111(d) of title 49, United States Code, provides that a
Federal motor vehicle safety standard may not become effective before
the 180th day after the standard is prescribed or later than one year
after it is prescribed except when a different effective date is, for
good cause shown, in the public interest. Pursuant to the K.T. Safety
Act (requiring that the agency establish a phase-in schedule with a
full compliance date no later than 48 months after this final rule is
issued), today's final rule requires compliance in accordance with a
phase-in schedule. This schedule establishes May 1, 2016 as the first
compliance date with full compliance being required by May 1, 2018. For
the reasons mentioned in our discussion of the phase-in, above, the
agency believes that there is good cause and it is in the public
interest to use the aforementioned phase-in schedule. The agency
believes that the phase-in schedule contained in today's final rule
affords the manufacturers an appropriate amount of time to meet the
phase-in production targets and achieve full compliance by May 1, 2018.

IV. Estimated Costs and Benefits

    Based on the data from FARS, NASS-GES, and NiTS, NHTSA estimates
that backing crashes result in 410 fatalities and 42,000 injuries
annually. Of these backing crashes, backover crashes (which involve a
vehicle striking a non-occupant of the vehicle) contribute to an
estimated 267 fatalities and about 15,000 injuries \128\ annually.
However, backover crashes involving vehicles with a GVWR of under
10,000 pounds account for an estimated 210 fatalities and 15,000
injuries annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Due to rounding, injuries for light vehicles and all
vehicles are estimated to be 15,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. System Effectiveness

    As we mentioned in the NPRM, three factors must be present for a
rear visibility system to avoid a backover crash and thereby provide a
safety or other benefit. We have designated these factors
FA, FS, and FDR. In the agency's
estimates regarding the effectiveness of the countermeasure required by
today's final rule, we combine all three of these factors in order to
determine the impact that countermeasures meeting the requirements of
today's final rule will have in preventing backover crashes.
Defining Factors FA, FS, and FDR
    The first factor is designated as factor FA. This factor
examines whether or not the crash is one that is ``avoidable'' through
the use of the device. In this factor, the pedestrian must be within
the target range (i.e., design range) for the sensor, or the viewable
area of the camera or mirror. In other words, the details and geometric
parameters of the specific crash scenario must be such that (assuming
perfect system function and driver use) the crash would be avoidable.
In summary, factor FA separates the avoidable crash
scenarios from the unavoidable crash scenarios.
    The second factor is designated as factor FS. This
factor assesses whether or not the system will detect the presence of a
pedestrian behind the vehicle and output the appropriate visual display
or otherwise warn the driver. This factor assumes that the pedestrian
is within the system's design range and that the driver will react
appropriately to the warning. In other words, this factor asks whether
or not the device will successfully detect the pedestrian that is
located within the range that the device is designed to detect. Thus,
this factor assumes that the crash is an avoidable crash in factor
FA and assumes that the driver will react in the appropriate
manner to avoid the backover crash.
    Finally, the third factor is designated as FDR. This
factor examines whether or not (given that the crash is avoidable in
FA, and that the system has detected the pedestrian in
FS) the driver will be able to successfully use the
technology in order to avoid the backover crash. In this factor, the
driver must both perceive the information presented by the rear
visibility system and respond appropriately before impact with the
pedestrian. Thus, this factor evaluates the ability of drivers to use
the rear visibility system that has detected a pedestrian in an
avoidable crash situation.
Estimating FA, FS, and FDR and Total
Rear Visibility System Effectiveness
    As the rear visibility systems under today's final rule are
required to display an image of the area behind the vehicle to the
driver, such systems will convey information to the driver regarding
obstacles behind the vehicle (that are within its design detection
range) 100% of the time. Thus, for the purposes of estimating the
effectiveness of the rear visibility systems required under today's
final rule, FS is 100% and the relevant factors for
discussion, are FA and FDR.

    In order to determine FA, the agency conducted a study
that reviewed 50 SCI cases that were available at the time of the
study. The purpose of this study was to analyze whether or not the
specific crash occurred at a location that is within the zone that a
given countermeasure was designed to detect.\129\ In other words, the
study sought to identify the crashes in the 50 SCI cases studied that
would have been avoidable by the driver--assuming an ideal (or perfect)
driver response. This factor takes into consideration the fact that,
even when a rear visibility system warns the driver regarding a
potential backover crash and the driver reacts appropriately to the
warning, the physics and geometric parameters of the particular
situation may not allow for the backover crash to be avoided. In order
to determine whether or not each SCI case would have been avoidable
using a rear visibility system, the study considered factors such as
the movement of the pedestrian (e.g., direction, speed), whether or not
the pedestrian would have been visible to the driver using the rear
visibility system, the general trajectory and speed of the vehicle etc.
The study found that between 76% and 90% of the cases reviewed would
have been avoidable cases using rear visibility systems meeting the
requirements in today's final rule.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ For further information, please reference the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis prepared in support of this final rule,
available in the docket number referenced at the beginning of this
document.
    \130\ The agency decided to use the SCI cases to perform this
analysis due to the level of detail required in order to analyze
whether or not the totality of the facts would suggest that a case
could have been avoided with a rear visibility system. The agency is
not aware of any other source of information that could provide the
same level of detail about crashes that would enable the agency
determine circumstances of the crash such as the general trajectory/
speed of both the pedestrian and the backing vehicle. The agency
believes it is reasonable to use the results of this study to
estimate FA in this instance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to determine FDR, the agency performed research
by presenting an unexpected test object (with an image of a child
pedestrian affixed to the test object) to drivers that were executing
backing maneuvers. These studies examined the likelihood that the
driver will react to the information from the rear visibility system
sufficiently so as to avoid the crash by controlling test conditions
such that the test object would always be presented in a location and
in a manner where the rear visibility system would detect the test
object (and inform the driver of the presence of the object). The
agency conducted four separate studies (designated in this discussion
as Studies 1, 2, 3, 4a, and 4b) since 2008 to examine the ability of
drivers to avoid backover crashes when utilizing rear visibility
systems.\131\ Through these studies, the agency observed drivers (with
various demographic characteristics) utilizing different rear
visibility systems and different vehicle types when subject to
different test object presentation methods. By carefully selecting the
test parameters to be changed from one iteration of the study to the
next, the agency is able to use these data to arrive at a reasonable
estimate of drivers' ability to utilize rear visibility systems
required under today's rule while also ensuring that potential
variations (such as driver and vehicle type) in real-world
circumstances will not have an unanticipated impact on the agency's
estimates. The general parameters and results of the four studies are
presented in the table below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253, Rearview Video System
Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle Scenario.

                                            Table 12--NHTSA Research on Driver Use of Rear Visibility Systems
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Study 1 (2008) 2007
                                                   Honda Odyssey & Study 2
                                                      (2009) 2007 Honda
                                                           Odyssey
                                                     Study 3 (2010) 2007
                                                        Honda Odyssey
                                                    Study 4a (2012) 2012
                                                        Nissan Altima
                                                    Study 4b (2012) 2012
                                                        Nissan Altima
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obstacle:                                              Centered op-Up
                                                       Centered Pop-Up
                                                       Centered Pop-Up
                                                      Laterally Moving
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test Setting:                                            Laboratory
                                                           Daycare
                                                         Laboratory
                                                         Laboratory
                                                     Garage/Parking Lot
                                                     Garage/Parking Lot
                                                     Garage/Parking Lot
                                                     Garage/Parking Lot
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            N    % Crashes            N    % Crashes            N    % Crashes            N    % Crashes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline (No System)............................           12          100           36          100                                     56           91
RV, 7.8'', in-dash..............................           12           58           36           61
RV 4.25'', in-dash..............................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........           36           67           51           69
RV, 3.5'' in-mirror.............................           10           30           23           52
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This table shows the basic information for each of the four studies
conducted by the agency. In this table, ``N'' represents the number of
participants for each test condition and the percentage of those
participants that crashed is shown. For the baseline condition, no
rearview video system was installed on the vehicle, while the size and
location of the display is shown in each of the other conditions.
    By observing drivers under these various conditions, the agency
believes that a reasonable estimate for FDR can be obtained
for the rear visibility systems required by today's final rule. In each
of the agency's tests, participants performed backing maneuvers either
with or without a rear visibility system. Regardless of the specific
conditions used in the particular test (e.g., driver/vehicle type,
obstacle presentation, etc.), drivers with rearview video systems were
consistently able to avoid crashes with the test object at a rate that
is statistically greater than drivers without any rear visibility
system.
    As described above, the original research referenced in the NPRM
(Studies 1 and 2 conducted in 2008 and 2009, respectively) utilized a
Honda Odyssey as the test vehicle and tested the ability of drivers to
avoid a pop-up test object located in the vehicle's blind zone. This
research included participants age 25 to 55 and a mixture of male and
female drivers. The research revealed that, while drivers were
universally unable to avoid crashes with the test object without a rear
visibility system, the drivers were able to avoid a crash with the pop-
up test object approximately 55% of the time with a rearview video
system.\132\ While the research referenced in the NPRM

accurately and effectively isolated the incremental benefit of the
rearview video system over a uniform set of conditions (e.g., vehicle
model, obstacle presentation, and driver demographics), NHTSA
considered other research in conjunction with the information
referenced in the NPRM in order to enhance the robustness of our
analysis for the purposes of today's final rule. Although this
additional research refines the agency's estimates of the potential
benefits of the rear visibility systems required under today's final
rule, the additional research does not alter the agency's decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ 75 FR 76228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In considering the subsequent research, the agency aimed to
investigate whether or not a different test setting, a different
vehicle type, different driver demographics, and a different obstacle
presentation method would lead to an unanticipated effect on the
agency's previous estimates on drivers' ability to utilize rear
visibility systems to avoid a backover crash. In other words, the
agency examined the available data from the additional studies to
determine if there was any evidence that the aforementioned factors
could lead to a statistically different test result.
    In order to examine whether or not drivers would utilize rear
visibility systems differently in a setting where drivers may expect
the presence of children, the agency examined data from an additional
study that was conducted in a day care center parking lot (Study 3
conducted in 2010).\133\ This study showed that, given the same
vehicle, driver demographic, and obstacle presentation parameters, the
new setting (the day care center) did not influence drivers to avoid or
crash with the test object at a statistically different rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0001, Drivers' Use of
Rearview Video and Sensor-Based Backing Aid Systems in a Non-
Laboratory Setting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency also conducted additional studies in 2012 (Studies 4a
and 4b) where the agency utilized an additional vehicle model (the
Nissan Altima) and expanded driver demographics (including a more
balanced distribution of male and female participants \134\ and
including participants under age 25 and over age 55). The 2012 research
contained two parts in order to enable the agency to examine whether or
not the test object presentation method would lead to statistically
different driver performance results. As discussed above, the two
studies did not indicate that the expanded driver and vehicle types or
the different obstacle presentation method caused drivers to avoid a
crash with the test object at a statistically different rate.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ While the agency sought to more evenly balance the gender
distribution in its 2012 study, the information from NHTSA's
previous studies indicate that male and female drivers did not crash
with the pop-up test object behind the vehicle at statistically
different rates. In Studies 1-3, male drivers crashed 77.8% of the
tests whereas female drivers crashed 75.5% of the tests.
    \135\ See Section II, g. Additional 2012 Research, supra. As we
noted previously, testing additional participants may have enabled
the agency to observe statistically different results for some of
these new test parameters (e.g., age). The raw results of the data
in Study 4 (See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253) show that drivers
older than 55 and younger than 25 did crash with the unexpected test
object more frequently than drivers between age 25 and 55. (We did
not test different age groups in Studies 1-3 because we did not
anticipate that there would be a difference across age groups).
However, the data do not show that these differences were
statistically significant. While testing additional participants may
have revealed a statistically significant difference, the agency was
unable to identify more participants (that are familiar with the
vehicle model and the technology) for this study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the additional research examined by the agency since the NPRM
did not indicate that the additional test parameters created
statistically different results, the agency decided to incorporate the
new data as additional data points in calculating its estimate of
FDR. In other words, to perform an analysis of the driver's
ability to avoid a backover crash using rear visibility systems
required by today's final rule, the participants from Studies 3, 4a,
and 4b were combined with NHTSA's previous studies (Studies 1 and 2) as
additional test participants in order to expand the total number of
participants examined. The agency believes this is a reasonable
approach as the agency was not able to find a statistical difference
between these test participants and increasing the number of
participants considered in NHTSA's analysis will increase the overall
robustness of NHTSA's estimates regarding the ability of drivers to
avoid a backover crash when using the rear visibility systems required
by today's final rule.\136\ When considering the data from these
studies, the agency estimates that FDR is 37%. In other
words, 37% of the time, drivers would be able to avoid a backover crash
when utilizing a rear visibility system meeting the requirements of
today's final rule when the crash is an avoidable crash (under
FA).\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ While we acknowledge that the tests conducted in Study 4b
used a different object presentation method, we believe that these
results can be included and analyzed in conjunction with Studies 1,
2, 3, and 4a. As we described above in our discussion of the
research, we designed the moving test object presentation method
with test parameters that were as close to the pop-up test object
presentation method as possible (e.g., exposure time of the object
in the rearview image). We reasoned that this approach would enable
both presentation methods to mimic the same types of crash scenarios
that we believe are the most prevalent (i.e., scenarios where the
driver reacts to the unexpected presence of a pedestrian behind the
vehicle). As these methods were designed with similar parameters,
were design to mimic the same crash scenarios, and did not yield a
statistically significant difference, we believe it's appropriate to
incorporate Study 4b in our analysis of FDR. We note that
some participants were able to avoid a collision with the moving
test object in the baseline (no rearview video system) condition in
Study 4b. We have taken this baseline condition into account when
calculating the effectiveness of rearview video systems in the
moving test object presentation method.
    \137\ All the available data continue to indicate that rear
visibility systems meeting the requirements of today's final rule
(e.g., rearview video systems) would be the best technology that can
address the backover safety concern that Congress directed the
agency to address. Separate from our aforementioned concern that
Study 4b lacks a clear method for isolating the incremental effect
of the rearview video system, the agency is also not aware of any
method of incorporating the data from Study 4b (in analyzing
FDR) that would produce a total system effectiveness for
rearview video systems that would be inferior to any of the other
available countermeasure technologies. Thus, while the agency
believes that it is not appropriate to incorporate the data from
Study 4b into its analysis of FDR, the agency notes that
it is unaware of any method of incorporating the data from Study 4b
that would provide a rational basis for the agency to alter its
decisions in today's final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the basis of the agency's research into these three factors, the
agency believes that the rear visibility systems required under today's
final rule will have a predicted effectiveness of between 28 and 33
percent. Below is a table showing the aforementioned effectiveness
factors and the estimated system effectiveness for each of the
regulatory alternatives considered during the rulemaking process. As
mentioned above, these effectiveness estimates differ from the NPRM
because the agency has incorporated the new information obtained from
the tests performed at the day care center parking lot and NHTSA's
subsequent study that utilized a Nissan Altima along with the pop-up
test object presentation.\138\ While the NPRM was unable to include
these updated numbers for the tests performed at the day care center
(Study 3) in its analysis, the NPRM referenced this material and NHTSA
included it in the NPRM docket.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0001.
    \139\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0001.
    \140\ In NHTSA's sensor system tests, one vehicle model was able
to detect our plastic test object placed in the test location 100%
of the time. The other detected the same test object in the same
location approximately 40% of the time. By combining the number of
trials for both vehicle models and the number of positive alerts for
both vehicle models the agency roughly estimates that sensor systems
will detect objects within their designed detection zone 84% of the
time. However, the agency believes that this figure may represent
the sensor system's performance under idealized conditions. As the
primary purpose of these studies were to determine the ability of
the driver to react to the output information from either a sensor
or rearview video system, the test object was not designed with
properties such as motion and material in mind. As discussed in
Section III, c. Alternative Countermeasures, supra, various
technical limitations on the sensors ability to detect objects
within its design detection range suggest that the ability of the
sensor system to detect a child may not be similar to the sensor
system's ability to detect a plastic test object.

                                    Table 13--Estimated System Effectiveness
                                                  [In percents]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Final
                     System                       effectiveness         FA              FS              FDR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
180[deg] RV....................................               33              90             100              37
130[deg] RV....................................               28              76             100              37
Ultrasonic.....................................                8              49        * * * 84              18
Radar..........................................                8              54        * * * 84              18
Rear-Mounted Convex Mirrors....................                0            33 *             100           0 **
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* FA for mirrors is taken from a separate source due to lack of inclusion in the SCI case review that generated
  FA for cameras and sensors.
** FDR for mirrors is taken from a small sample size of 20 tests. It is 0% because throughout testing, drivers
  did not take advantage of either cross-view or lookdown mirrors to avoid the obstacle in the test.
* * * FS for sensors was obtained from the agency's tests regarding the driver's ability to utilize sensor
  systems to avoid a backover crash with a test object. Thus, this figure involves the sensors' ability to
  detect the test object under idealized conditions.\140\

b. Benefits

    On the basis of its application of the predicted effectiveness of
the rear visibility systems that can be utilized to satisfy the
requirements of today's final rule to the annual target population of
210 fatalities and 15,000 injuries, the agency estimates that the
requirements of today's final rule will save between 13 and 15 lives
per year and prevent between 1,125 and 1,332 injuries per year.\141\
These updated estimates are lower than the estimates in the NPRM for a
few reasons. First, the updated estimates account for the increased
market penetration of rearview video systems since the publication of
the NPRM \142\ and the projected market penetration as a result of
voluntary adoption of rear visibility systems through the year 2018.
Second, the estimates take into account new data that has revised the
size of the target population. Finally, the estimates have been revised
based on new information available regarding the effectiveness of the
rear visibility systems required under today's final rule. While this
new information refines the agency's ability to better assess the costs
and benefits of the countermeasure required in today's rule, the
available data continue to indicate that rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of today's final rule are the most effective
countermeasure for addressing the backover crashes contemplated by
Congress in the K.T. Safety Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ In order to compare the annual costs of equipping the
fleet to the benefits that can be realized from the equipped fleet,
these estimates reflect the number of lives that can be saved
annually once the full fleet of vehicles operating have been
equipped with the rear visibility systems required by today's final
rule. We anticipate that the number of vehicles with this safety
equipment will rise steadily and be in all vehicles operated on the
public roads by 2054. It also does not count any benefits that would
be attributable to systems that the manufacturers are already
installing on their vehicles prior to the first full year of
mandatory full compliance (2018).
    \142\ While Model Year (MY) 2014 sales are not yet complete, the
agency has information on the models that will offer rearview video
systems as standard or optional equipment. When comparing this
information to the sales projections and historic sales trends for
each model, we are able to determine that approximately 57% of
MY2014 vehicles will have rearview video systems. Further, if the
sales trend after MY2014 continues to follow the historic sales
trend, we anticipate that 73% of MY2018 vehicles will have rearview
video systems. We discuss this issue further in the sections that
follow and additional details about our projections are in the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis available in the docket referenced at the
beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As further discussed in the sections that follow, the agency is
aware that rear visibility systems are being adopted in the market.
This adoption by the industry of rear visibility systems is estimated
and accounted for in our analysis of the costs and benefits of today's
final rule. However, the safety benefits that would be realized from
these rear visibility systems are not included as benefits in this
section because they do not result from the vehicles that are not
projected to have rear visibility systems by 2018.
    For the purposes of our analysis, we have assumed that the benefit
of installing a rear visibility system is the same for each vehicle.
Therefore, the voluntary adoption of rear visibility systems due to
market factors create a proportional decline in both costs and benefits
attributable to today's rule. As the agency is not aware of any data to
indicate whether the vehicles voluntarily installed with rear
visibility systems have a higher or lower risk of being involved in a
backover crash, we have used this assumption in our analysis.

            Table 14--Estimated Annual Quantifiable Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities Reduced......................  13 to 15.
Injuries Reduced........................  1,125 to 1,332.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Beyond avoiding injuries and fatalities, the agency expects that
benefits will accrue over the life of the vehicle as a result of
avoiding property damage. While damage to rear visibility systems are a
potential source of additional repair cost as a result of rear-end
collisions, the agency calculates that these costs will be offset by
the benefits realized by vehicle owners as a result of avoiding
property damage only backing collisions. Across the 3 and 7 percent
discount level (over the lifetime of the vehicle), the agency expects
the net impact of rear visibility systems on property damage only
crashes is a net benefit which ranges between $10 and $13 per
vehicle.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these quantifiable benefits, the agency continues to
believe that today's final rule will contribute significantly toward
achieving many unquantifiable benefits. NHTSA believes that a simple
quantitative analysis is not sufficient when evaluating the benefits of
this rulemaking. We note that Executive Order 12866 (reaffirmed by
Executive Order 13563) refers expressly to considerations of equity by
directing that agencies, ``choosing among alternative regulatory
approaches . . . should select those approaches that maximize net
benefits (including . . . equity).'' Executive Order 13563 explicitly
states not only that each agency shall ``use the best available
techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and
costs as

accurately as possible,'' but also that each agency ``may consider (and
discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to
quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive
impacts.''
    These values--especially equity, fairness, and distributive
impacts--are directly relevant to this final rule. There are strong
reasons, grounded in unquantifiable considerations, to take action to
prevent the deaths and injuries at issue here, including:
    (1) We believe it is important to reduce the risk that drivers will
be the direct cause of the death or injury of a person, particularly a
small child at one's own place of residence or that of a relative or
close friend. In many cases, parents are responsible for the deaths of
their own children. We continue to believe that avoiding that horrible
outcome is a significant benefit which is not fully or adequately
captured in the traditional measure of the value of a statistical life.
Of course, any death of a young child is a tragedy, but we believe that
this traditional measure also does not adequately account for the value
of reducing the risk that parents will be responsible for the death of
or serious injury to their own children.
    (2) We noted that 37 percent of the deaths and 7 percent of the
injuries at issue here involve young children (under the age of five),
and there is an important social interest in avoiding such deaths and
injuries. While the agency has used the Department's standard monetary
figure for the value of a statistical life, we acknowledge that various
studies have placed the value of a statistical life at a higher value
and the value of a statistical life of a child even higher. However, we
note that the literature is in a state of development.
    (3) The victims of the relevant crashes here include not only
children but also people with disabilities and the elderly. Especially
in the context at issue, such people lack relevant control over the
situation and are not in a good position to protect themselves. There
are strong considerations, rooted in fairness and equity, to reduce
these risks that they face.
    (4) The focus of the benefits analysis is on the prevention of
deaths and injuries, and the avoidance of property damage, but the
requirements of the rule will also provide a range of additional
benefits. Drivers will benefit in numerous ways from increases in rear
visibility. For example, parking will be simplified, especially in
congestion. The evolution of the automobile market attests to these
benefits. The agency believes that apart from the monetized values,
increase in ease and convenience will provide significant, but not yet
quantifiable, benefits to drivers.

c. Costs

    The agency estimates that to equip each vehicle with a rear
visibility system compliant with the requirements of today's final rule
will cost between $132 and $142 per vehicle. For vehicles already
equipped with a suitable display, the incremental cost of equipping the
vehicle with a compliant rear visibility system is estimated to be $43
to $45. Given these per unit costs (and the current state of the
market), the agency estimates that the cost to equip the entire fleet
of new passenger vehicles sold annually (estimated at 16.0 million
vehicles) with rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of
today's final rule is between $546 and $620 million.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ These costs do not include costs attributable to systems
that will already be installed by vehicle manufacturers prior to
2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These cost estimates differ from those in the NPRM, where the
agency estimated that rearview video systems would cost between $159
and $203 for each vehicle not already equipped with a suitable display
unit, $58 for each vehicle that was already equipped with a suitable
display unit, and a total fleet cost of $1.9 billion to $2.7 billion
annually.\145\ In response to these estimates, the agency received
comments from both equipment manufacturers and advocacy groups stating
that the agency had overestimated the potential costs of these
systems.\146\ Specifically, both the Advocates and the American Academy
of Pediatrics commented that the agency did not sufficiently estimate
the potential reduction of costs for rearview video systems over time
as manufacturers of such products gain experience in producing these
systems. In addition, Sony and Magna commented that they expect that
manufacturers will realize significant cost reductions through
increased production levels and refinements in the manufacturing
process. Further, Sony commented that voluntary adoption of this
technology will conservatively double by 2013--even absent a final
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ 75 FR 76236. This estimate assumed a market adoption rate
of 19.8% (across the fleet) prior to a final rule. $1.9 to $2.7
billion is the range of costs for rearview video systems only (does
not include the cost range for sensor systems).
    \146\ Conversely, we note that the agency did not receive any
substantial comment stating that the agency had overestimated the
per unit price. We did receive comments from vehicle manufacturers
that our phase-in schedule would create additional design/
development costs for the industry and we believe we have
accommodated these concerns through adjusting the phase-in
requirements in today's final rule. However, those comments did not
address the long-term per-unit costs that we use to calculate the
costs of today's rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, in response to these comments, the agency reexamined the cost
estimates of the NPRM in order to obtain more accurate estimates
regarding the annual costs of today's final rule. As the first year
requiring full compliance with today's final rule is 2018, the agency
has used the following information in order to more accurately predict
the costs of today's rule in 2018.
    First, the agency conducted a teardown analyses of representative
rearview video systems which afforded updated cost estimates for
individual rearview video systems that would meet the requirements of
today's rule.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the agency also took a closer look at the rate of voluntary
adoption of rear visibility systems through 2018. While the agency
agrees with Sony that (even absent today's rule) rear visibility
systems will experience increased market penetration, we did not rely
on Sony's assertion that rearview video systems will increase two-fold
by 2013. Instead, the agency took a different approach of basing its
projections of the voluntary adoption of rearview video systems in 2018
on a combination of the data on the historical adoption trend for these
systems and the agency's information on the vehicle models that will
have rearview video systems in Model Year (MY) 2014. While MY2014 sales
are not yet complete, we have information on the models that will offer
these systems (either as standard or optional equipment). When we
combine this information with the sales projections for each model, we
are able to determine that approximately 57% of MY2014 vehicles will
have rearview video systems. Further, if the sales trend after MY2014
continues to follow the historic sales trend, we anticipate that 73% of
MY2018 vehicles will have rearview video systems.\148\ We discuss this
issue further in the sections that follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the agency also agrees with the commenters that
manufacturers will realize cost reductions through increased
familiarity with the manufacturing process and through economies of
scale. However, because the agency did not receive any detailed
information from the commenters regarding the extent of these
particular possible cost savings, the agency has applied a general
learning factor (based

on historic data on the adoption of automotive safety technologies
\149\) to the information received from the teardown study. Using a
constant learning factor (a 7% cost savings) over each cumulative
doubling of production, the agency obtained what it believes is a more
accurate estimate of the potential cost of rearview video systems in
2018.\150\ Using this learning analysis method, the agency predicts
that the per-unit costs in 2018 will be between $132 and $142 per
vehicle (and $43-$45 per vehicle for vehicles that already have a
suitable screen).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ The agency examined the historical data for the following
automotive safety technologies: driver air bags, antilock braking
systems, manual lap/shoulder belts, adjustable head restraints, dual
master brake cylinders. See ``Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis, Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY2017-MY2025 Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks'', November 2011, Docket No. 2010-0131-0167,
(discussing our analysis of the learning curve discussion on pages
577-591).
    \150\ For additional information regarding the method that the
agency used to calculate the cost savings over time due to learning,
please reference the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in
the docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using the aforementioned information (the new teardown study, the
new adoption rate, and the new per-unit cost after learning), the
agency estimates that the cost to equip the entire fleet of new
passenger vehicles sold annually with rear visibility systems meeting
the requirements of today's final rule is between $546 and $620
million.

                 Table 15--estimated installation costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Costs (2010 $)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full system installation per vehicle...  $132 to $142.
Camera-only installation per vehicle...  $43 to $45.
Total Fleet............................  $546 M to $620 M.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the agency agrees with the commenters and conducted the
aforementioned analyses to refine its estimates of the actual costs of
today's final rule, the agency notes that these updated cost estimates
do not affect any of the agency decisions regarding the requirements in
today's final rule. The agency continues to believe that the
requirements we've adopted in today's final rule are the only effective
way of fulfilling the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act.
    Separately, in estimating the above costs, the agency did not
include ultrasonic or other rear sensor systems as part of the analyses
because the systems examined by NHTSA are not able to meet the
requirements of today's final rule. However, the agency did conduct a
teardown analyses for ultrasonic sensor systems and found these systems
to be much more expensive than the agency had previously estimated. In
the NPRM, the estimated costs of various rear object sensor systems
ranged between $52 and $92 to equip each vehicle. After conducting the
teardown analyses and applying the learning factor, the agency now
estimates that to equip each vehicle with ultrasonic systems would cost
between $79 and $138.

d. Market Adoption Rate

    In order to estimate the likely benefits and costs of this
regulation, NHTSA has considered different methods for establishing a
baseline market adoption rate of rear visibility systems against which
to measure the effects of the regulation. Applying OMB Circular A-4, a
baseline(s) would reflect ``what the world would look like'' in the
absence of regulation.
    Towards this end, the above sections measure the impact of
equipping the vehicles that are not projected to have rear visibility
systems by 2018. Thus, we have projected (based on the available data)
what the market adoption of rear visibility systems would be by 2018
(the 100% compliance date in the phase-in schedule established by
today's final rule). By comparing this projection to 100% compliance in
2018, our analysis shows the costs and benefits that are attributable
to those remaining vehicles. The data indicate that many vehicle models
are already being sold with rear visibility systems as standard or
optional equipment. As described above, NHTSA projects that 73% of new
light-duty vehicles will be sold with rear visibility systems by 2018.
    However, calculating the costs and benefits based only on these
vehicles that would not have rear visibility systems by 2018 does not
account for other potential events that could affect market adoption.
It is possible that some of the projected 73% market adoption in 2018
is attributable to events that are beyond ``pure market forces'' (e.g.,
the K.T. Safety Act and the rulemaking process). However, it is
difficult to know with any certainty how many of these vehicles would
be so equipped in the absence of this regulation, the rulemaking
process, and the K.T. Safety Act. In other words, how much of the
increase in the popularity of these systems is driven purely by market
forces and how much is the result of manufacturers acting in
anticipation of the regulation taking effect?
    For several reasons NHTSA believes market forces are responsible
for the majority of the recent increase in the number of rearview video
systems projected to be installed by MY 2018. Typically, the market
forces that lead to a surge in popularity of a technology are a decline
in their cost and/or an increase in consumer demand. There is strong
evidence that both of these factors are affecting the adoption of
cameras in light-duty vehicles. For example, the increasing popularity
of other features that require screens (such as navigation and
infotainment systems) has significantly reduced the incremental cost of
adding a video system since the screen is already there. It is also
likely that consumers are beginning to better appreciate the value of
such systems for safety reasons as well as their value to assist
parking.
    At the same time, NHTSA cannot rule out the possibility that some
of the recent increase in projected future installations is due to
manufacturers' anticipation of the regulation and would not be in the
fleet were it not for the statutory requirement that NHTSA issue a
regulation. If manufacturers believe that a regulation is imminent and
they are in the process of redesigning models, they may add rear video
systems now because it is usually less costly to integrate new features
at the vehicle-redesign stage than at other times.
    However, there is reason to believe that this factor has been less
important than market forces. For example, some manufacturers have
begun offering rear video systems in models before the normal re-design
cycle. Such sales growth is more likely reflective of market forces
rather than regulation. In addition, at least one major car
manufacturer, Honda, had already in 2013 made rear-visibility cameras a
standard feature in 94% of its vehicles. The fact that automakers have
greatly increased the output of cars with rearview video systems
suggests the demand for those devices is largely consumer driven and
perhaps bound up with consumers' desire for the convenience of such
cameras as well as their safety benefits. Additional evidence that
adoption is market driven is that sales of aftermarket rear visibility
kits that customers themselves install, despite being under no possible
regulatory mandate to do so, are projected by industry sources to grow
very rapidly.\151\ The advertising of rearview video systems as a
safety feature by several manufacturers has

likely fueled further consumer demand for these devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ CE Outlook, ``Backup Camera Sales to Near Double,'' 2/21/
2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we believe that now that rear visibility cameras have
become a common safety device on many models, manufacturers may have
some concern that they face potential tort liability if they market
models that do not offer this safety feature. Finally, we note that
once a manufacturer has designed a vehicle model to include a rearview
video system, regardless of the motivation for that action, a variety
of considerations, including consumer expectations and product
liability, will preclude the possibility of the manufacturer's ceasing
to offer cameras in future model years vehicles. In other words, those
are costs that the industry have already incorporated into their
production plans and thus are not affected by this rulemaking action.
    Given the above, NHTSA finds substantial evidence that market
forces are driving the increase in the rate of adoption of rearview
video systems, but is unable to determine with any reasonable certainty
the precise extent to which the prospect of regulation might also be a
factor. Thus, in order to reflect this uncertainty about how to
attribute the existing market adoption rate, we have conducted an
additional analysis that presents a range of both the benefits and
costs of this rule. In developing this analysis we are attempting to
estimate the range of adoption of rear visibility systems which might
have occurred by 2018 if Congress had not passed the K.T. Safety Act,
NHTSA did not initiate a rulemaking on this subject, and no final rule
were adopted.
    At the top-end of this range, we adopt the assumption that all
current and projected installations are due purely to market forces and
that none are due to the rule. We recognize that this is a strong
assumption, but we think that in light of the evidence discussed above
it is a reasonable one on which to base an upper bound of the range of
projected adoption levels. As noted above, our latest projection shows
that 73% of the new vehicle fleet will be equipped with rearview video
systems by 2018. We based this calculation on data on the historical
adoption trend of these systems and the agency's information on which
vehicle models will have these systems in MY2014. Using both historical
sales data and the information the agency has about the vehicle models
that will have rearview video systems as standard or optional equipment
in 2014, NHTSA is able to estimate that approximately 57% of MY2014
vehicles will have rearview video systems. Then, if the sales trend
after MY2014 continues to follow the historic sales trend established
up to and including 2012 and we assume that this is all attributable to
market forces (and none to the rule), we obtain a 73% baseline MY2018
rate of adoption rearview video systems.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Further details on the agency's estimates are available in
the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis. This document can be found in
the docket cited at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the low-end of the range, we adopt the assumption that half of
the increase in the market adoption trend as a result of the data from
MY2014 is attributable to ``pure market forces'' and half is not. In
other words, we make the following two assumptions for this low end
estimate: (1) That the MY2008 to MY2012 historic adoption trend
represents ``pure market forces'' and that this trend would have
continued apart from the K.T. Safety Act and NHTSA's rulemaking process
in response to the Act; and (2) that half of the difference between
that continuation of the MY2008 to MY2012 trend (through to 2018) and
our top end of the range estimate (that produces a 73% market adoption
rate in 2018) represents a shift in ``pure market forces.'' We believe
these assumptions are appropriate as a low end of the range estimate
because we believe it is unlikely that none of the projected increase
in installation for MY2014 (and beyond) are due to market forces (i.e.,
that all is due to anticipation of the rule). However, in the case of
this rulemaking, the available information does not enable the agency
to make any reliable determinations as to what portion of the market
adoption (between our top and low end estimates) is due to ``pure
market forces'' as opposed to other factors. As discussed above, we
think the evidence supports ascribing a substantial majority of the
increased adoption rate to market forces. Thus, we believe that the top
and low-end estimates described above both represent somewhat strong
assumptions and sufficiently capture the uncertainty surrounding what
portion of the market adoption is attributable to ``pure market
forces.''
    Thus, in addition to reporting our data on the market adoption in
MY2014 and our projections for 2018, this analysis considers what the
costs and benefits (the effect) of the rule, the rulemaking process,
and the K.T. Safety Act are. Using the top and low end estimated
adoption trends described above, we believe that the market adoption in
2018 would be between 59% and 73%. Assuming this range of market
adoption, we believe that $546 million to $924 million in costs and
$265 million to $595 million in monetized benefits are attributable to
today's final rule, the rulemaking process, and the K.T. Safety
Act.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ Further information on these calculations is available in
the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis. This analysis is available in
the docket referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Net Impact

    Table 16 below presents the lifetime monetized benefits, lifetime
costs, and presents their difference--the net impact. The table
monetizes the aforementioned installation costs and fatality/injury
reduction benefits and combines these values with maintenance costs and
property damage only crash avoidance benefits. The costs in Table 16 do
not vary by discount rate because this part of Table 16 only includes
the costs that are incurred in order to produce the rear visibility
system and install it on the vehicle (the installation costs). All
these costs are incurred on the year the vehicle is produced. Thus, the
costs vary by 180[deg] or 130[deg] camera and display type but do not
vary by discount rate.
    However, the benefits do vary by both discount rate and camera
selection. Depending on the type of equipment used by the manufacturer
(180[deg] or 130[deg] camera) and the discount rate (3% or 7%) the
agency expects today's final rule to save between 20 and 30 equivalent
lives per year.\154\ Using the most up-to-date value of a statistical
life from the Department's guidance \155\, the agency expects the
annual benefit of the rule (due to fatality and injury reduction) to be
between $206 million and $317 million. We anticipate that the benefits
from societal costs avoided due to fatality and injury reduction \156\
will be $16 million to $24 million. Further, the net benefits \157\
from property

damage avoided range from $44 million to $57 million. Thus, the agency
expects the total benefits from today's rule to range from $265 million
to $396 million when considering injuries avoided, fatalities avoided,
and property damage across the 3 and 7 percent discount rates.\158\
Note that for the 180[deg] camera options (the Low and High Estimates),
the lifetime monetized benefits are the same, but the cost of display
placement differs based on display type.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ These benefits do not include those lives that would be
saved by rearview video systems voluntarily installed by the
industry.
    \155\ See Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a
Statistical Life in U.S. Department of Transportation Analyses,
available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf.
    \156\ These are costs that would be incurred as a result of a
fatality or injury that is apart from the value of the life lost or
the quality of life lost (e.g., medical costs.
    \157\ While rearview video systems enable a driver to avoid
property damage only crashes in addition to crashes resulting in
injuries and fatalities, the property damage only cases also include
cases where the crash was either not avoided or unavoidable (such as
a rear-end collision) which would result in the additional expense
of repairing the rearview video system. When considering these
cases, the benefit of avoiding property damage outweighed costs of
repairing rearview video systems when such crashes were not avoided.
Thus, this value is expressed as a net benefit and is included in
the benefits section of Table 16.
    \158\ The benefits estimates in this paragraph are expressed in
ranges. Each range represents the highest and lowest figure when
considering the different discount rates and camera types. However,
the same combination of camera type and discount rate do not produce
the highest and lowest figure in each of the ranges specified in
this paragraph. Thus, the sum of highest and lowest figures in
fatality/injury reduction benefits range and the property damage
only benefits range do not correspond to the highest and lowest
figures in the total benefits range. The Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis contains the exact figures that show the total monetized
benefit (as the sum of the fatality, injury, and property damage
reduction benefits) for each combination of camera type and
discount, available in the docket number referenced at the beginning
of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this case, the monetized costs outweigh the monetized benefits
and therefore the net impacts are cost figures. However, as mentioned
above, there are significant benefits to this rule that cannot be
quantified in monetary terms. The Primary Estimate is the lowest
installation cost option (which assumes manufacturers will use a
130[deg] camera and will utilize any existing display units already
offered in their vehicles). The Low Estimate and High Estimate provide
the estimated minimum and maximum net impacts possible. The Low
Estimate is the 180[deg] camera and assumes that manufacturers will
install a new display to meet the requirements of today's rule. It
represents the minimum overall benefit estimate as it has the largest
negative net impact. Conversely, the High Estimate is the 180[deg]
camera and assumes that manufacturers that currently offer vehicles
with display units are able and choose to use those existing display
units to meet the requirements of today's rule. This represents the
maximum overall benefit estimate because it has the smallest negative
net impact.

 Table 16--Summary of Benefits and Costs Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (millions 2010$) MY2018 and Thereafter
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Discount
                          Benefits                              Primary        Low          High         rate
                                                                estimate     estimate     estimate    (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Monetized..........................................         $265         $305         $305            7
Lifetime Monetized..........................................          344          396          396            3
Costs:
    Lifetime Monetized......................................          546          620          557            7
    Lifetime Monetized......................................          546          620          557            3
Net Impact:
    Lifetime Monetized......................................         -281         -315         -252            7
    Lifetime Monetized......................................         -202         -224         -161            3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

f. Cost Effectiveness and Regulatory Alternatives

    Based on the aforementioned revised figures for costs and
quantifiable benefits, and on the relevant discount rates of 3 and 7
percent, the net cost per equivalent life saved for rearview video
systems ranges from $15.9 to $26.3 million. However, as discussed
above, the agency believes that today's rule also affords significant
unquantifiable benefits in the form of reducing a safety risk that
disproportionately affects particularly vulnerable population groups
(such as young children), and exacts a significant emotional cost on
relatives and caretakers who backover their own children. In addition,
the rear visibility systems required under today's rule are the only
effective means of addressing the backover crash safety concern and
fulfilling the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act. Further, after
considering the totality of the information, we find that the
requirements of today's rule are the most cost-effective way of
achieving the objectives of the K.T. Safety Act.

                 Table 17--Estimated Cost Effectiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Cost per Equivalent Life Saved
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rearview Video Systems............  $15.9 to $26.3 million.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The range presented is from a 3% to 7% discount rate.

    To devise an appropriate regulatory approach to address the safety
risks presented by backover crashes and the requirements of the K.T.
Safety Act, the agency considered various technologies and applications
of those technologies over the course of this rulemaking, beginning
with the ANPRM and continuing through to the development of this final
rule. As previously noted, the three main technologies considered
included rearview video systems, sensor systems, and additional
rearview mirrors. While various commenters suggested alternative
sensor-based systems, none of these systems were able to address our
concerns that the data indicate that without visual confirmation of the
presence of a child or other pedestrian behind the vehicle, sensors
simply did not induce a sufficient and timely response from the driver
so as to avoid the crash. While rearview video systems were the most
expensive technology considered, the agency's research found that
rearview video systems were also the only effective technology. Because
of the significantly lower effectiveness of sensor systems that do not
afford the driver a visual image of the area behind the vehicle, the
NPRM estimated a significantly higher cost per equivalent life saved
for rear object detection sensor systems than rearview video systems.
In spite of the lower per vehicle cost estimate for sensor systems in
the NPRM, their very low effectiveness resulted in the agency's
estimating that the cost per equivalent life saved by these sensor
systems would be between $95.5 and $192.3 million. While the new
information that the agency received through the day care study has
improved the estimated effectiveness of sensor systems somewhat, the
agency still estimates that the cost per equivalent life saved for
sensor systems would range from $44.6 to $94.1 million.\159\ This means

that sensors would cost more than twice the amount per life saved when
compared to rearview video technology. Thus, the agency continues to
believe that rearview video systems are significantly more cost
effective than rear sensor systems and that rearview video systems are
the most cost effective technology available that can address the
backover safety concern. While we believe that the statutory mandate in
the K.T. Safety Act compels the agency to take regulatory action to
address the backover safety risk (even in situations where the
regulatory action may not be cost beneficial when comparing monetized
cost to benefits), we believe that mandate is more rationally achieved
through the alternative that saves substantially more lives at
substantially less cost per life than the potential alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ For further information, please reference the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis prepared in support of this final rule,
available in the docket number referenced at the beginning of this
document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, while the agency considered the application of rear
visibility countermeasures to certain vehicle types or size, the agency
understands the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act as directing the
agency to make revisions to FMVSS No. 111 to expand the required field
of view for all vehicles with a GVWR under 10,000 pounds except for
motorcycles and trailers. Although the agency is afforded the limited
discretion of applying different rear visibility countermeasures to
different vehicle types, the agency does not believe that the
effectiveness data from our research or our cost estimates support
applying a different rear visibility countermeasure based on vehicle
type. As mentioned above, to apply sensor or mirror-based
countermeasures, instead of the rear visibility system requirements of
today's final rule, to certain vehicle types would forgo important
safety benefits. Further, such application would increase the cost per
equivalent life saved as the reduction in the costs of these
alternative countermeasures would not offset the greater reduction in
the effectiveness of the countermeasure. Given this information, the
agency concludes in today's final rule that the rear visibility systems
required in today's rule are the only effective means of achieving a
meaningful reduction in backover crash fatalities and injuries.
    Therefore, after considering the aforementioned technological and
regulatory alternatives, the agency reiterates its conclusion above
that the rear visibility systems required under today's rule are not
only the single effective way of addressing the backover safety risk
and meeting the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act, but also the most
cost effective way of doing so.

V. Regulatory Analyses

Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures

    Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and the Department of
Transportation's regulatory policies require this agency to make
determinations as to whether a regulatory action is ``significant'' and
therefore subject to OMB review and the requirements of the
aforementioned Executive Orders. The Executive Order 12866 defines a
``significant regulatory action'' as one that is likely to result in a
rule that may:
    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or Tribal governments or
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
the Executive Order.
    We have considered the potential impact of this final rule under
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and the Department of
Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures and have determined
that today's final rule is economically significant. This rulemaking is
economically significant because it is likely to have an annual effect
on the economy of $100 million or more. Thus it was reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget under E.O. 12866 and 13563. The
rulemaking action has also been determined to be significant under the
Department's regulatory policies and procedures. The regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) fully discusses the estimated costs and benefits of this
rulemaking action. The costs and benefits are also summarized in
section IV of this preamble, supra.

Executive Order 13609: Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation

    The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609
provides, in part:

    The regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may
differ from those taken by U.S. regulatory agencies to address
similar issues. In some cases, the differences between the
regulatory approaches of U.S. agencies and those of their foreign
counterparts might not be necessary and might impair the ability of
American businesses to export and compete internationally. In
meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues, international regulatory
cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective
as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such
cooperation. International regulatory cooperation can also reduce,
eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements.

    NHTSA is not currently aware of any ``regulatory approaches taken
by foreign governments'' that would address the safety concerns raised
in this rulemaking. While today's amendments to FMVSS No. 111 establish
new requirements, the agency is not aware of any approaches taken by
foreign governments that would address Congress' concern in the K.T.
Safety Act regarding fatalities and injuries resulting from backover
crashes. Thus, the agency is not aware of any such approach that would
be at least as protective as the approach adopted by the agency in
today's final rule.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking or final rule, it must prepare and make
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions).
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR Part 121
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency
certifies the proposal will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. SBREFA amended the Regulatory
Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a statement of
the factual basis for certifying that a proposal will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    I hereby certify that this proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
We believe that the rulemaking will not have a significant economic
impact on the small vehicle manufacturers because the systems are not
technically difficult to develop or install and the cost of the systems
($44 to $147) is a small proportion of the

overall vehicle cost for most of these specialty cars.
    Today's final rule will directly affect motor vehicle manufacturers
and final-stage manufacturers. The majority of motor vehicle
manufacturers will not qualify as a small business. There are ten
manufacturers of passenger cars that are small businesses.\160\ These
manufacturers, along with manufacturers that do not qualify as a small
business, are already required to comply with the current mirror
requirements of FMVSS No. 111. Similarly, there are several
manufacturers of low-speed vehicles that are small businesses.\161\
Previously, FMVSS No. 111 did not apply to low-speed vehicles, although
they were required to have basic mirrors pursuant to FMVSS No. 500,
Low-speed vehicles (including the option of having either an exterior
driver-side mirror or an interior rearview mirror). The addition of a
rearview video system can be accomplished via the purchase of an
exterior video camera, integration of a console video screen or the
addition of an interior rearview mirror-mounted screen, and wiring to
connect the two as well as to connect them to the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ Carbon Motor, CODA, Fisker Automotive Inc., GGT Electric,
Mosler Automotive, Panoz Auto Development Company, Saleen, Shelby
American Inc., Standard Taxi, Tesla Motors Inc.
    \161\ Columbia ParCar Corp., Club Car, LLC, Miles Electric
Vehicles LLC, STAR Electric Car Sales, Tomberlin, Wheego Electric
Cars, Inc., and Wildfire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the K.T. Safety Act applies to all motor vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (except motorcycles and trailers) in its
mandate to reduce backovers, all of these small manufacturers are
affected by the requirements in today's final rule. However, the
economic impact upon these entities will not be significant for the
following reasons.
    (1) Potential cost increases are small compared to the price of the
vehicles being manufactured.
    (2) Today's final rule provides four years lead-time, the limit
permitted by the K.T. Safety Act, and will allow small volume
manufacturers the option of waiting until the end of the phase-in
(until May 1, 2018) to meet the rear visibility requirements.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ While the agency currently does not have information that
would show how long it would take for small manufacturers to
implement the requirements in today's final rule, we do not have the
statutory flexibility to afford small manufacturers more lead time
beyond the four-year statutory limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, the agency had also considered several alternatives
that could help to reduce the burden on small businesses. The agency
considered an alternative under which passenger cars would be required
to be equipped with either a visibility system or with a system that
utilizes an ultrasonic sensor that monitors the specified area behind
the vehicle and an audible warning. This alternative would have lower
installation costs but also substantially lower safety benefits. Thus,
it would have significantly higher costs per equivalent life saved.

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    NHTSA has examined today's final rule pursuant to Executive Order
13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional
consultation with States, local governments or their representatives is
mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that
the rulemaking would not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement. Today's final rule does not
have ``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
    NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express
preemption provision:
    When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the
standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.

49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that
preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law
addressing the same aspect of performance.
    The express preemption provision described above is subject to a
savings clause under which ``[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from
liability at common law.'' 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) Pursuant to this
provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle
manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express
preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme
Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied
preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of
NHTSA's rules--even if not expressly preempted.
    This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the
existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher
standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle
manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment
against the manufacturer--notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance
with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an
FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action
that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers
will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict
does exist--for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum
and a maximum standard--the State common law tort cause of action is
impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861 (2000).
    Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether
this rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action.
The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the
preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that
preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.
    To this end, the agency has examined the nature (e.g., the language
and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of today's final
rule and finds that this rule, like many NHTSA rules, prescribes only a
minimum safety standard. Accordingly, NHTSA does not intend that this
final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a
higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by
today's final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of
State tort law would not conflict with the minimum standard established
in this document. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied
preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.
    NHTSA solicited comments from the States and other interested
parties on this assessment of issues relevant to E.O. 13132 in the
NPRM. However, we did not receive any comments with regard to this
issue.

Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

    When promulgating a regulation, Executive Order 12988 specifically
requires that the agency must make every reasonable effort to ensure
that the regulation, as appropriate: (1) Specifies in clear language
the preemptive effect; (2) specifies in clear language the effect

on existing Federal law or regulation, including all provisions
repealed, circumscribed, displaced, impaired, or modified; (3) provides
a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general
standard, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4)
specifies in clear language the retroactive effect; (5) specifies
whether administrative proceedings are to be required before parties
may file suit in court; (6) explicitly or implicitly defines key terms;
and (7) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general
draftsmanship of regulations. Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes as
follows. The preemptive effect of this final rule is discussed above in
connection with Executive Order 13132. NHTSA notes further that there
is no requirement that individuals submit a petition for
reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceeding before they
may file suit in court.

Executive Order 13045 (Protection of Children From Environmental Health
and Safety Risks)

    Executive Order 13045, ``Protection of Children from Environmental
Health and Safety Risks,'' (62 FR 19885; April 23, 1997) applies to any
proposed or final rule that: (1) Is determined to be ``economically
significant,'' as defined in Executive Order 12866, and (2) concerns an
environmental health or safety risk that NHTSA has reason to believe
may have a disproportionate effect on children. If a rule meets both
criteria, the agency must evaluate the environmental health or safety
effects of the rule on children, and explain why the rule is preferable
to other potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives
considered by the agency.
    Today's final rule is subject to Executive Order 13045 because it
is economically significant and available data demonstrate that the
safety risk addressed by this proposal disproportionately involves
children, especially very young ones. As the safety risk to children is
a central concern of this rulemaking, the issues that must be analyzed
under this Executive Order are discussed extensively in the preamble
above and in the RIA.

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA) (Pub.L. 104-113), ``all Federal agencies and departments shall
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means
to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies
and departments.'' Voluntary consensus standards are technical
standards (e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling
procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE). The NTTAA directs us to provide Congress, through OMB,
explanations when we decide not to use available and applicable
voluntary consensus standards.
    Pursuant to the above requirements, the agency conducted a review
of voluntary consensus standards to determine if any were applicable to
today's final rule. While the agency did not discover any voluntary
consensus standards that can be applied to the entirety of rear
visibility systems, we found various voluntary consensus standards
which could be utilized for durability and luminance requirements for
today's final rule. The agency considered the possibility of using
these voluntary consensus standards. However, we have found these
standards to be unsuitable for incorporation into an FMVSS at this
time. Our analysis of each of the applicable voluntary consensus
standards can be found in our discussion of the durability and
luminance requirements in earlier sections of this preamble. Further,
in response to comments, NHTSA endeavored to establish requirements
that are as performance based and technologically-neutral as possible,
to allow maximum design freedom while still meeting the performance
requirements needed for safety.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to
result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). NHTSA must comply with
that requirement in connection with this rulemaking as today's final
rule would result in expenditures by the private sector of over $100
million annually.
    As noted previously, the agency has prepared a detailed economic
assessment in the RIA. In that assessment, the agency analyzes the
benefits and costs of the rear visibility systems required under
today's final rule for passenger cars, MPVs, trucks, buses, and low-
speed vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. NHTSA's analysis
indicates that today's final rule could result in private expenditures
of up to $1.7 billion annually.
    The RIA and the PRIA (published in conjunction with the NPRM)
analyzed the expected benefits and costs of alternative countermeasure
options, including mirrors, cameras, and sensors, as specified in the
K.T. Safety Act. The agency subjected several types of each class of
countermeasure to thorough effectiveness testing and cost-benefit
analysis. Additionally, the agency previously published a detailed
ANPRM, NPRM, and PRIA, in order to explain its thoughts on the
technological solutions available and solicit information on costs,
benefits, and applications on all possible solutions to the safety
concern. NHTSA received a large variety of comments on the ANPRM, NPRM,
and PRIA and used that information in formulating today's final rule.
    As explained in detail in the RIA and the preamble for today's
final rule, after carefully exploring all possible alternatives to meet
the statutory mandate of the Act, NHTSA concluded that rearview video
systems offer not only the highest overall benefits, but also the most
efficient cost per life saved ratio.
    In addition, NHTSA has performed a probabilistic uncertainty
analysis to examine the degree of uncertainty in its cost and benefit
estimates and included that analysis in the RIA.

National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that
implementation of this action would not have any significant impact on
the quality of the human environment.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), a person is not
required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency
unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. Today's
final rule includes a collection of information, i.e., the phase-in
reporting requirements. If approved, these requirements would require
manufacturers of passenger cars and of trucks, buses, MPVs, and low-
speed vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, to annually submit
a report for each of two years (with requirements in the phase-in
period) concerning the number of such vehicles that meet the rear
visibility system requirements. In

the preamble of the NPRM, the agency solicited public comment on the
following information collection request. In response, the agency did
not receive any comments.
    Accordingly, the Department of Transportation is submitting the
following information collection request to OMB for review and
clearance under the PRA. The following information is identical to the
information the agency offered for public comment in the NPRM except
that the agency discovered an error in the Estimated Costs calculation
and in the estimated number of manufacturers. While the agency believes
that this information request will create a small recordkeeping burden
on the manufacturers, we do not expect that manufacturers will incur
any additional costs beyond that recordkeeping burden. Thus, we have
adjusted the Estimated Costs to be $0. In addition, while the agency
correctly calculated 42 total burden hours (2 hours per manufacturer),
the agency stated, in error, that there were 24 total manufacturers. We
have corrected the number of manufacturers to 21 and the total burden
hours continue to be 42 total hours. The agency will complete the
information collection request process before the beginning of the
phase-in schedule on May 1, 2016.
    Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
    Title: Phase-In Production Reporting Requirements for Rear
Visibility Systems.
    Type of Request: New request.
    OMB Clearance Number: None assigned.
    Form Number: This collection of information will not use any
standard forms.
    Affected Public: The respondents are manufacturers of passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed
vehicles having a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kg (10,000
pounds) or less. The agency estimates that there are approximately 21
such manufacturers.
    Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
Resulting from the Collection of Information: NHTSA estimates that the
total annual burden is 42 hours (2 hours per manufacturer per year).
Two reports per manufacturer would be collected.
    Estimated Costs: NHTSA estimates that the total annual cost burden,
in U.S. dollars, will be $0. No additional resources would be expended
by vehicle manufacturers to gather annual production information
because they already compile this data for their own purposes.
    Summary of the Collection of Information: This collection would
require manufacturers of passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles having a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less to provide motor
vehicle production data for the following two years: May 1, 2016
through April 30, 2017; and May 1, 2017 through April 30, 2018.
    Description of the Need for the Information and the Proposed Use of
the Information: The purpose of the reporting requirements will be to
aid NHTSA in determining whether a manufacturer has complied with the
requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111, Rear
visibility, during the phase-in of new requirements for rear visibility
systems.

Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

VI. Regulatory Text

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, incorporation by reference, motor vehicle safety,
reporting and recordkeeping, tires.

    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as
follows:

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for Part 571 of Title 49 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.

0
2. Section 571.5 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)(5) and (k)(26)
to read as follows:

Sec.  571.5  Matter incorporated by reference.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (5) ASTM B117-03, ``Standard Practice for Operating Salt Spray
(Fog) Apparatus,'' approved October 1, 2003, into Sec. Sec.  571.106;
571.111.
* * * * *
    (k) * * *
    (26) SAE Standard J826 JUL95, ``Devices for Use in Defining and
Measuring Vehicle Seating Accommodation,'' revised July 1995, into
Sec. Sec.  571.10; 571.111; 571.202; 571.202a; 571.216a.
* * * * *

0
3. Section 571.111 is amended by
0
a. Revising the section heading;
0
b. Revising S1;
0
c. Revising S3;
0
d. Adding, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Backing event,''
``Environmental test fixture,'' ``External component,'' ``Key,''
``Limited line manufacturer,'' ``Rearview image,'' ``Rear visibility
system,'' ``Small manufacturer,'' and ``Starting system'' to S4;
0
e. Adding S5.5 through S5.5.7;
0
f. Revising S6;
0
g. Adding S6.2 through S6.2.7;
0
h. Adding S14 through S14.3;
0
i. Adding S15 through S15.7; and
0
j. Adding Figures 5 and 6 to read as follows:

Sec.  571.111  Standard No. 111; Rear visibility.

    S1. Scope. This standard specifies requirements for rear visibility
devices and systems.
* * * * *
    S3. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, school buses,
motorcycles and low-speed vehicles.
    S4. * * *
    Backing event means an amount of time which starts when the
vehicle's direction selector is placed in reverse, and ends at the
manufacturer's choosing, when the vehicle forward motion reaches:
    (a) a speed of 10 mph,
    (b) a distance of 10 meters traveled, or
    (c) a continuous duration of 10 seconds.
* * * * *
    Environmental test fixture means a device designed to support the
external components of the rear visibility system for testing purposes,
using any factory seal which would be used during normal vehicle
operation, in a manner that simulates the on-vehicle component
orientation during normal vehicle operation, and prevents the exposure
of any test conditions to portions of the external component which are
not exposed to the outside of the motor vehicle.
    External component means any part of the rear visibility system
which is exposed to the outside of the motor vehicle.
    Key means a physical device or an electronic code which, when
inserted into the starting system (by physical or electronic means),
enables the vehicle operator to activate the engine or motor.

    Limited line manufacturer means a manufacturer that sells three or
fewer carlines, as that term is defined in 49 CFR 583.4, in the United
States during a production year, as that term is defined in S15.
    Rearview image means a visual image, detected by means of a single
source, of the area directly behind a vehicle that is provided in a
single location to the vehicle operator and by means of indirect
vision.
    Rear visibility system means the set of devices or components which
together perform the function of producing the rearview image as
required under this standard.
    Small manufacturer means an original vehicle manufacturer that
produces or assembles fewer than 5,000 vehicles annually for sale in
the United States.
    Starting system means the vehicle system used in conjunction with
the key to activate the engine or motor.
* * * * *
    S5.5 Rear visibility.
    (a) Phase-in period requirements. For passenger cars with a GVWR of
4,536 kg or less manufactured on or after May 1, 2016, but not later
than April 30, 2018, a percentage of each manufacturer's production, as
specified in S15, shall display a rearview image meeting the
requirements of S5.5.1.
    (b) Final requirements. Each passenger car with a GVWR of 4,536 kg
or less manufactured on or after May 1, 2018, shall display a rearview
image meeting the requirements of S5.5.1 through S5.5.7.
    S5.5.1 Field of view. When tested in accordance with the procedures
in S14.1, the rearview image shall include:
    (a) A minimum of a 150-mm wide portion along the circumference of
each test object located at positions F and G specified in S14.1.4; and
    (b) The full width and height of each test object located at
positions A through E specified in S14.1.4.
    S5.5.2 Size. When the rearview image is measured in accordance with
the procedures in S14.1, the calculated visual angle subtended by the
horizontal width of
    (a) All three test objects located at positions A, B, and C
specified in S14.1.4 shall average not less than 5 minutes of arc; and
    (b) Each individual test object (A, B, and C) shall not be less
than 3 minutes of arc.
    S5.5.3 Response time. The rearview image meeting the requirements
of S5.5.1 and S5.5.2, when tested in accordance with S14.2, shall be
displayed within 2.0 seconds of the start of a backing event.
    S5.5.4 Linger time. The rearview image meeting the requirements of
S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 shall not be displayed after the backing event has
ended.
    S5.5.5 Deactivation. The rearview image meeting the requirements of
S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 shall remain visible during the backing event until
either, the driver modifies the view, or the vehicle direction selector
is removed from the reverse position.
    S5.5.6 Default view. The rear visibility system must default to the
rearview image meeting the requirements of S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 at the
beginning of each backing event regardless of any modifications to the
field of view the driver has previously selected.
    S5.5.7 Durability. The rear visibility system shall meet the field