[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 234 (Tuesday, December 6, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 88006-88069]
[FR Doc No: 2016-28280]

Vol. 81

Tuesday,

No. 234

December 6, 2016

Part II

Department of Transportation

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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Parts 236 and 238

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 234 / Tuesday, December 6, 2016 /
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 236 and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2013-0060, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC46

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to amend its regulations for passenger
equipment safety standards, which currently provide for passenger rail
service in a shared right-of-way under two separate tiers of safety
standards: Tier I (speeds up to 125 miles per hour (mph)) and Tier II
(speeds up to 150 mph). Consistent with the regulations' approach
supporting interoperable passenger rail service by sharing the right-
of-way, this proposed rulemaking would add a new tier of safety
standards (Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of
interoperable high-speed passenger rail service at speeds up to 220
mph. However, Tier III standards would require operations at speeds
above 125 mph to be in an exclusive right-of-way without grade
crossings. The proposal also would establish crashworthiness and
occupant protection performance requirements in the alternative to
those currently specified for Tier I passenger trainsets. Adopting the
proposed alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection
requirements would remove regulatory barriers, allowing a more open
U.S. rail market, incorporating recent technological designs. In
addition, the proposal would increase from 150 mph to 160 mph the
maximum speed FRA's existing regulations allow for passenger equipment
that complies with FRA's Tier II standards.

DATES: Written comments must be received by February 6, 2017. Comments
received after that date will be considered to the extent possible
without incurring additional expense or delay.
    FRA anticipates it can resolve this rulemaking without a public,
oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a public,
oral hearing prior to January 5, 2017, FRA will schedule one and will
publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to inform
interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2013-0060,
Notice No. 1, may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal,
www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for
submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, Washington,
DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the
Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name, docket
name, and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for
this rulemaking (2130-AC46). Note that all comments received will be
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading in
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act
information related to any submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or
visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the Ground
level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Devin Rouse, Mechanical Engineer,
Passenger Rail Division, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Safety, Mail Stop 25, West
Building 3rd Floor, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590
(telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>); or Michael Hunter, Trial Attorney, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office
of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd Floor, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Common Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads
APTA American Public Transportation Association
ATD anthropomorphic test dummy
AW0 ready-to-run weight, empty
CEM crash energy management
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CG center of gravity
EN EuroNorm
ETF Engineering Task Force
FE finite element
FEA finite element analysis
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
g gravitational acceleration (32.2 feet/second/second)
HSR high-speed rail
in inch(es)
kip kilopound(s)
kN kilo-Newton(s)
kph kilometer(s) per hour
lbf pound(s)-force
lbs pounds
mph mile(s) per hour
ms millisecond(s)
MU multiple unit
NEC Northeast Corridor
OVI occupied volume integrity
PTC Positive Train Control
ROW right-of-way
RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
ITM inspection, testing, and maintenance
PTEP Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
PESS Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
U.S.C. United States Code
UIC International Union of Railways

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    A. Statutory Background
    B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking
Mandate
    C. Overview of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
    D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group and the
Engineering Task Force
III. Technical Background and Overview
    A. General: Approaches to Crashworthiness and Occupant
Protection
    B. Development of Technical Criteria and Procedures Report
    C. Adoption of Alternative Crashworthiness and Occupant
Protection Performance Standards for Tier I Passenger Equipment and
New Standards for Tier III Passenger Equipment
    1. Occupied Volume Integrity
    2. Truck Attachment Strength
    3. Interior Attachment Strength
    D. Development of Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger
Equipment
    1. Brake Systems
    2. Cab Glazing
    3. Emergency Systems
    4. Cab Equipment
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272;
Regulatory Flexibility Assessment
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications

    E. International Trade Impact Assessment
    F. Environmental Impact
    G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
    H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)
    I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    J. Energy Impact
    K. Privacy Act
    L. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

I. Executive Summary

    This proposed rule is the product of consensus reached by FRA's
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which accepted the task of
reviewing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and
recommending specific actions that could be useful to advance the
safety of passenger service, including the development of standards for
the next generation of high-speed trainsets. The RSAC established the
Passenger Safety Working Group (``PSWG'' or ``Working Group'') to
handle this task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to
consider. In September 2009, the Working Group in turn established the
Engineering Task Force (``ETF'' or ``Task Force'') for the purpose of
producing a set of technical criteria and procedures to evaluate
passenger rail equipment built based on alternative designs. This work
led to the development of the report entitled ``Technical Criteria and
Procedures for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection
Performance of Alternatively Designed Passenger Rail Equipment for Use
in Tier I Service'' (Technical Criteria and Procedures Report or
Report).\1\ The guidance in the Technical Criteria and Procedures
Report has assisted railroads and rolling stock manufacturers who have
petitioned FRA for waivers from compliance with FRA's Tier I passenger
equipment crashworthiness standards, and has been useful to FRA in
evaluating such petitions. In addition to developing the criteria in
that Report, the task of the ETF was expanded to develop formal
recommendations to the full RSAC for adopting these alternative
crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations and to establish
minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-speed
trainsets, capable of operating at speeds of up to 220 mph, classified
as Tier III passenger equipment. The ETF reached consensus on
recommending the adoption of these alternative crashworthiness criteria
in 49 CFR part 238 for Tier I passenger equipment. The ETF also reached
consensus on criteria for Tier III passenger equipment, specifically
trainset structure, side-window glazing, brake systems, interior
fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems and cab equipment, and
cab glazing. The ETF further reached consensus on the definition of
Tier III, including the proposed speed limitations on when Tier III
equipment can operate on shared infrastructure and when the equipment
must operate in an exclusive right-of-way. On June 14, 2013, the full
RSAC voted to recommend the consensus items to the Administrator of
FRA, as the basis for a formal rulemaking.
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    \1\ U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-ORD-11/
22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of
Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available at
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
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    This NPRM is based on these RSAC recommendations and, in
particular, represents the first phase of rulemaking to establish Tier
III passenger equipment safety standards as the work of the ETF
continues.
    This NPRM proposes requirements in three main subject areas: (1)
Tier III trainset safety standards; (2) alternative crashworthiness and
occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger
equipment; and (3) the maximum authorized speed for Tier II passenger
equipment. The following is a brief overview of the proposed rule
organized by subject area and a summary of its economic impact.

Tier III Trainset Safety Standards

    This NRPM proposes to define Tier III passenger train operations
and outline minimum safety standards for the use of such trainsets in
the United States, focusing on core structural and critical system
design criteria. FRA intends for the Tier III trainset requirements to
facilitate safe implementation of interoperable high-speed rail
service, enable the use of common infrastructure, and promote
efficiencies. The Tier III operating environment would be unique: Tier
III passenger trains would operate in a shared right-of-way at speeds
up to 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings
at speeds up to 220 mph. The requirements would provide for the sharing
of rail infrastructure among various types of rail equipment,
especially in more urban areas, while providing for dedicated passenger
rail service at maximum speeds up to 220 mph. FRA's Passenger Equipment
Safety Standards would therefore continue to allow high-speed passenger
rail service to be interoperable with other types of rail service, the
same way that Tier I and Tier II passenger train operations are
currently interoperable.
    The proposed rule would establish requirements for Tier III
trainset structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings
and surfaces, certain emergency systems (including window egress and
rescue access requirements), and certain cab equipment. To support
operational compatibility, the proposed Tier III trainset
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements are predominantly
based on the proposed alternative crashworthiness and occupant
protection requirements for Tier I passenger equipment and are intended
to safely apply to operations at speeds up to 220 mph in a dedicated
environment as approved by FRA. Specialized RSAC task groups developed
the requirements for braking systems and cab glazing by focusing on the
development of performance-based requirements that could be implemented
in a technology-neutral manner, wherever possible.
    To develop their recommendations, the ETF and full RSAC considered
the latest trainset designs and technology available globally, and
adapted their recommendations for North American standards. The intent
of the proposed requirements is to ensure that safety and reliability
are paramount, while incorporating elements from the most advanced,
service-proven technology. The proposed requirements would be
supplemented by additional requirements FRA intends to propose in a
subsequent rulemaking based on recommendations the ETF is developing,
which remains active addressing the topics of inspection, testing, and
maintenance (ITM), as well as safety planning for high-speed
operations.

Alternative Crashworthiness Requirements for Tier I Passenger Trainsets

    As noted above, FRA proposes to codify a set of technical
evaluation criteria the ETF developed as guidance to those seeking to
use alternatively designed Tier I passenger trainsets to demonstrate
the trainsets' crashworthiness and occupant protection performance is
equal to the requirements in part 238. We intend for the proposed
alternative technical criteria to allow industry greater flexibility to
use contemporary design techniques and more fully apply emerging
technology, including crash energy management (CEM) technology, without
requiring a waiver of compliance for operating the equipment. The
technical criteria are based on established international standards and
significant research and

testing both the industry and DOT's John A. Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) conducted over the past 25
years. Codifying the technical criteria would dovetail with alternative
crashworthiness performance requirements FRA established in part 238
for the front-end structures of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU)
locomotives, thereby broadening application of such requirements to
other main structures.

Tier II Maximum Authorized Speed

    On March 13, 2013, FRA issued a final rule (78 FR 16052) to amend
the Federal Track Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of
rail vehicles and the tracks they operate on at speeds up to 220 mph.
That final rule revised the track geometry and safety limits for
various track classes, extended the limits for the highest track speeds
from 200 to 220 mph (Class 9 track), and affirmed that the maximum
authorized speed for Class 8 track is 160 mph. This proposed rule would
make the maximum authorized operating speed for Tier II passenger
equipment consistent with the limits for Class 8 track. Under the
proposal, existing Tier II operations FRA has approved to operate at
speeds up to 150 mph would be required to provide sufficient testing
and vehicle/track interaction performance data required under 49 CFR
213.329 and 238.111 and obtain FRA approval before any operations occur
at the new maximum authorized speed of 160 mph.
    At this time, FRA is not proposing to amend the Tier II
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements, or other specific
Tier II requirements, to make them more performance-based. The Tier II
standards are more stringent than those for Tier I passenger equipment
or proposed for Tier III passenger equipment principally because they
were developed to support operations above 125 mph in a right-of-way
shared with freight and other rail traffic. See 64 FR 25629. To
compensate for the increased risk of a collision, a more crashworthy
trainset design was needed. FRA's focus in this NPRM, as informed by
the RSAC process, has been principally to address the industry's need
for more performance-based Tier I crashworthiness and occupant
protection standards and to develop new Tier III standards to support
the next generation of high-speed rail in an environment where
operations above 125 mph are in a dedicated right-of-way (so as to
avoid the risk of collision with other rail traffic at speeds above 125
mph). However, FRA makes clear that its approach to this NPRM does not
mean FRA may not reexamine its Tier II requirements in the future.

Economic Analysis

    This rule proposes to expand and make more flexible FRA's Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards. The rule would introduce a new tier of
safety standards, Tier III, passenger equipment must meet to operate at
speeds up to 220 mph. Currently, FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards do not specifically address safety requirements for passenger
rail equipment operations at speeds above 150 mph. Furthermore, the
current regulatory framework generally sets Tier I safety compliance
through equipment design requirements which limit application of recent
technology. Therefore, this rule would facilitate using more
performance-based requirements to demonstrate Tier I compliance in
alternative ways. FRA believes this rule would have a net beneficial
effect on the passenger rail industry and society as a whole.
    Specifically, the proposed rule would generate cost savings
benefits by enabling high-speed rail operators to avoid new right-of-
way acquisition and infrastructure construction for dedicated rail
lines in dense urban areas. Instead it would allow such trains to
travel on existing, non-dedicated rail lines but at slower speeds than
permissible for travel on dedicated rail lines. As there is no
comprehensive set of equipment safety regulations for this type of
operation in the United States, a high-speed rail operation of this
nature (operating at speeds up to 220 mph) could be constructed in the
absence of this rule only if the operation was governed by a rule of
particular applicability, which would set forth the minimum safety
standards and conditions that would apply to the operator's proposed
operation. Most likely, FRA would grant this regulatory approval only
if the proposed system was self-contained (i.e., no high-speed
passenger trains intermixing with conventional passenger or freight
trains, and no highway-rail grade crossings). Such a dedicated high-
speed rail system would not be as efficiently integrated with the rest
of the general rail system. Not issuing the proposed regulation would
also increase costs associated with the acquisition of new passenger
trains and could delay new U.S. passenger rail infrastructure projects.
The proposed rule would ensure additional existing alternative designs
can operate in the U.S. railroad environment on a widespread basis
compared to existing FRA regulations. This would help avert a potential
patchwork in the U.S. passenger rail fleet that would perpetuate the
current unattractiveness of the U.S. passenger equipment market to
manufacturers. The proposed rule would allow U.S. trainsets to use
technological advances for the improvement of safety and passenger rail
operations which cannot be used under existing regulations. (For
example it would be cost prohibitive to adapt Japanese high speed train
technologies under current U.S. regulations.)
    There would also be safety benefits associated with improvement of
the existing rail infrastructure to accommodate the operation of new
high-speed rail equipment in these shared rights-of-way. Additionally,
as the requirements herein are largely performance-based standards and
not prescriptive requirements, the proposal would result in equipment
benefits generated by passenger rail operators being able to adopt
service-proven safety-equivalent technology and practices and apply
future technological advancements.
    Over a 30-year period, FRA estimates quantifiable benefits would
range from $8.7 to $16.8 billion.\2\ Of this total, $1.2 to $2.1
billion would be for equipment benefits and $7.5 to $14.7 billion would
be for infrastructure benefits. FRA estimates the present value of the
total benefits to be $3.8 to $7.1 billion (when discounted at a 7-
percent rate) or $6.0 to $11.2 billion (when discounted at a 3-percent
rate). The proposed rule would have a positive effect on society and
the safety performance of the passenger railroad system. Some of the
identified safety benefits are due to the ability to adopt safe
equivalent technology and best practices to better the current safety
environment, and to apply future technological advancements to improve
rail safety.
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    \2\ Tier III benefits are uncertain because they are based on
assumptions regarding the future growth of high-speed rail
operations and how those operations will be incorporated into the
U.S. rail network. It is possible that all benefits relating to Tier
III equipment, including infrastructure benefits, will be zero,
which would occur if no high-speed rail projects come to fruition
over the forecast horizon. Similarly, the estimated infrastructure
benefits hinge on the assumption of not having to build dedicated
HSR track for the whole system (i.e., they represent savings from
being able to operate HSR using shared infrastructure). If the
baseline is shared infrastructure, then these benefits will not be
realized. Tier III benefits, including infrastructure benefits, are
provided for expository purposes. Similarly, Tier I benefits from
having performance standards are challenging to quantify, as is
always the case for such benefits. However, given that they provide
an option to design standards, operators would only comply with such
standards voluntarily if they found it beneficial to do so.

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    Over the same period, FRA estimates industry would incur
approximately $4.6 billion in quantifiable costs, with a present value
of $2.0 billion (when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or $3.2 million
(when discounted at a 3-percent rate). All quantified costs \3\ would
be for testing to demonstrate compliance with either the Tier I
alternative or Tier III standards. FRA assumes that the proposed
rulemaking would provide an option, not a mandate, for railroads to use
a different type or design of passenger equipment in Tier I service and
would not impose any burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment
qualifying under existing regulations. Similarly, the proposed
rulemaking would only provide a framework for railroads to operate
equipment in new Tier III service--it would not impose any burden on
existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing
regulations.
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    \3\ This assessment allows railroads to plan for future
improvements and maintenance activities, minimizing capital
investment but ensuring plant and operations are balanced for the
expected service. Potential train delay was not quantified in this
assessment. The relationship between train delays and the number of
trains per day is determined by several factors inherent to the
infrastructure, operations, and equipment used in the line segment.
At this stage, it is difficult, to estimate the exact effect of the
proposed rule on train delay in the United States because the
characteristics of the rail lines affected by the proposed rule are
still unknown.
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Alternatives Considered

    One of the main purposes of the proposed regulation is to provide a
set of minimum Federal safety requirements to determine whether
passenger equipment platforms designed to contemporary standards
outside of the U.S. are safe for operation in the U.S. rail
environment. Traditionally, U.S. railroad safety regulations evolved as
a consequence of specific accidents scenarios, which have led to the
identification of specific risks in the operating environment. While
FRA seeks to continue ensuring the safety risks are adequately
addressed for the operating environment, the proposed rule places
special emphasis on measures to avoid those risks rather than simply
mitigating them.
    Importantly, the proposed rule does not intend to adopt or
incorporate by reference a specific international design standard. But
it is intended to open up the U.S. passenger rail market, to the
greatest extent possible, to global manufacturers while ensuring
passenger equipment is safe.
    The alternatives FRA considered in establishing the proposed safety
requirements for Tier III trainsets are the European and Japanese
industry standards. These options provide a continuum of safety
requirements for a range of aspects such as: Varying levels of
regulatory requirements; market accessibility; benefits and costs; and
operational efficiency and safety.
    FRA prepared a high-level cost comparison of those options based on
the key attributes of the alternatives and the effect of those
attributes on societal welfare and the regulatory purpose. FRA compared
the technical requirements of other established high-speed rail
standards to illustrate the primary differences, not a direct
comparison between comparable requirements/standards.
    Passenger rail equipment crashworthiness and occupant protection
design standards have been largely standardized by Euronorms.\4\ FRA
concluded that there are no significant differences between trains
built to the design standards contained in Euronorms and trains built
to meet the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the
proposed rule. FRA estimates that on average trainset prices would
increase $310,250 (0.62 percent) per trainset to meet the proposed Tier
III requirements in this rule.
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    \4\ Euronorms title derived: ``Standard'' means ``norme'' in
French and ``norm'' in German. https://www.cen.eu/work/ENdev/whatisEN/Pages/default.aspx.
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    In Japan, railroad safety regulation is governed by the Railway
Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and is codified
in the Technical Regulatory Standards on Railways.\5\ These technical
standards are primarily performance-based and railways have the
obligation to conform their operations, equipment and infrastructure to
these standards. In the case of its high-speed rail system, the
Shinkansen, the railway transports only passengers and the rail line is
entirely dedicated to high-speed rail with no conventional trains
operating and has full grade separation. These are the significant
differences underlying the design of Shinkansen trainsets operating in
Japan when compared to passenger trainsets currently operating in the
U.S. The key to the Japanese high-speed rail network's ongoing safety
and reliability is the principle of crash avoidance. Modifying advanced
Japanese high-speed trainsets to comply with the proposed Tier III
requirements and be interoperable in the U.S. rail system would likely
be cost prohibitive; FRA estimates $4.7 million per trainset.
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    \5\ http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/2006/h_railway_bureau/Laws_concerning/14.pdf.
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    European trains generally would not need carbody, truck,
suspension, or brake modifications to comply with the proposed Tier III
requirements. However, either the analysis used to demonstrate
compliance of the train safety features or components would require
modification or minor design modification(s) would likely be needed, or
both. These differences are illustrated in the following:

     Summary of Potential Changes for Equipment Designed to European
           Standards To Comply With Proposed Rule in the U.S.
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            Analysis difference             Minor modifications required
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 Quasi static compression.........   End structure
                                             integrity of non-cab end.
 Dynamic collision scenario.......   Interior fixture
                                             attachment.
 Override protection..............   Seat
                                             crashworthiness.
 Fluid entry inhibition...........   Luggage racks.
 Roof and side structure integrity   Emergency window
                                             egress & rescue access
                                             windows.
 Glazing..........................   Emergency lighting.
                                             Alerters.
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    The regulatory impact analysis (RIA) that accompanies this proposed
rule contains a preliminary analysis of regulatory alternatives FRA
considered. Specifically, the preliminary analysis compares at a
general level the costs and benefits of the proposed Tier III
requirements to both European and Japanese standards for high-speed
trains. The preliminary analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50
million European high-speed trainset

could be modified to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements
with only minor structural modifications and as indicated above at
little additional cost--about $310,000 per trainset. Modifications are
expected to ensure such trainsets will safely operate in a U.S.
setting. Due to the lack of historical safety information for
operations at Tier III speeds in the U.S., FRA was unable to estimate
the incremental safety benefit that would be provided by our proposed
Tier III requirements as compared to the European standards. However,
proposed requirements are supported by the recommendation of the RSAC
and FRA is confident about the cost-beneficial nature of the proposal.
Additionally, our analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million
Japanese high-speed trainset would need significant structural
modifications, including those to the carbody, trucks, and suspension,
to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements, and would incur
significant additional costs--about $4.7 million per trainset, as
indicated above. Similarly, FRA is unable to provide an estimate of the
expected incremental benefit of our proposed Tier III requirements, but
we believe these additional costs are justified by the unique risks
within the U.S. rail operating environment and the recommendations of
the RSAC. U.S. high-speed trains may share track with other rail
operations, including heavy and long freight trains, and operate on
track with highway-rail grade crossings and the accompanying risks of
colliding with trucks and other highway vehicles.
    FRA conducted a qualitative analysis comparing the proposed Tier I
alternative requirements to two alternatives: Not taking any regulatory
action or adopting existing international design standards. As
discussed in the RIA, trainsets compliant with international design
standards (such as European or Japanese) would require extensive
modifications to meet existing Tier I requirements if FRA elected to
take no regulatory action. However, under the proposed Tier I
Alternative requirements, FRA believes the cost associated with
compliance would be similar to those discussed for Tier III equipment.
    A second alternative would be to codify EN standards as a Federal
regulation, instead of the proposed Tier I alternative requirements.
This option opens the possibility for manufacturers to accrue savings
from fewer modifications; however, such an option would require
manufacturers to expend resources that favor a particular technology or
approach to equipment design. Additionally, codifying EN standards in
lieu of the proposed regulation may require equipment that is designed
to some other standard to incur certain costs related to modifying the
equipment to bring it into compliance. This means that regardless of
the requirements codified, manufacturers will have to modify trainsets
in order to meet these regulatory requirements. Importantly, trainsets
meeting only a European standard (or Japanese or other international
standard) would not be interoperable with existing U.S. passenger or
freight equipment. Therefore, this equipment could only operate on an
exclusive right-of-way, unable to take advantage of existing
infrastructure.
    FRA requests public comment on the alternatives presented and
discussed here and invites suggestions for other alternatives that
should be considered. Please also see the RIA's ``Alternatives
Considered'' section, in which FRA similarly requests public comment on
these and other alternatives.
    FRA did consider the alternative of standalone HSR systems
operating on an exclusive right-of-way (not physically connected to the
general railroad system), utilizing passenger equipment that complies
with European or other international standards but not necessarily with
FRA's proposed requirements. For the reasons discussed below, FRA
rejected this alternative. A major tenet of this rule is to safely
facilitate the implementation of nationwide, interoperable HSR service.
Standalone systems operating equipment that is not compliant with FRA's
current or proposed passenger equipment safety standards would
significantly limit the interoperability of HSR service. When
developing the proposed requirements, FRA did not envision a network of
standalone, non-interoperable HSR systems comprising the nationwide
network.
    Additionally, it would be very costly for a standalone system to
attempt to connect with major metropolitan areas because those
standalone systems could not take advantage of a major regulatory
benefit--operating over existing infrastructure. FRA determined that 86
to 89 percent of the regulatory benefits are due to infrastructure cost
avoidance for operations electing to use Tier I alternative and Tier
III equipment. Interoperability will allow HSR operators to reach into
major metropolitan areas where building a new, exclusive right-of-way
may not be feasible due to land density, environmental, and other
considerations.
    An advantage of the standalone alternative is that such an
individual railroad system could optimize its operations to high levels
of performance without necessarily having to adhere to requirements
generally applicable to railroad systems in the U.S. However, for such
a project to attain that level of performance, the project would have
to optimize the design of the entire system, not only the passenger
equipment. Basically, a standalone system would have to bring together
all the other aspects of railroad safety (such as operating practices,
signal and train control, and track) that must be applied to the
individual, standalone system. Given that such an approach covers more
than passenger equipment, and would likely necessitate particular
right-of-way intrusion protection and other safety requirements not
adequately addressed in FRA's current regulations, FRA continues to
believe that addressing proposals for standalone HSR systems on a case-
by-case basis (RPA or waiver) is prudent because of the very small
number of potential operations and the potential for significant
differences in their design. Moreover, this form of regulatory approval
is comprehensive, covering more than equipment safety concerns, to
ensure proposed standalone systems properly address all rail safety
concerns. Entities considering such operations voluntarily assume the
higher costs of building new infrastructure, knowing they cannot take
advantage of the cost savings from sharing existing infrastructure.
Nonetheless, FRA requests public comment on whether the final rule
should adopt other standards--including but not limited to the Japanese
and European standards--that could be used in the alternative to the
proposed requirements, potentially only in appropriate Tier I or Tier
III operational environments. Comment on the specific alternative
standard(s) it should consider, the operational environments in which
it would be appropriate to allow use of such standard(s), and
information on the benefits and costs of the alternative standard(s)
compared to FRA's proposed approach is requested.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. Statutory Background

    In September 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary)
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one initiative of
this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would

begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a
five-year period. In November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of
1994 (the Act), Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November
2, 1994). In the Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations and to issue
orders under it. See section 215 of the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C.
20133).

B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate

    On May 4, 1998, under section 215 of the Act, FRA published the
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule (PTEP). See 63 FR
24629. The PTEP contained minimum Federal safety standards for the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains,
including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail
service. The rule also established specific requirements for passenger
train emergency systems and contained specific requirements for
participation in debrief and critique sessions following emergency
situations and full-scale simulations.
    On May 12, 1999, FRA published the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards final rule (PESS). See 64 FR 25540. The PESS established
comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment
including requirements for carbody structure and emergency systems. FRA
subsequently amended the PESS to address petitions seeking FRA's
reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the rule. In
response to the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and published
three sets of amendments to the final rule. See 65 FR 41284, Jul. 3,
2000; 67 FR 19970, Apr. 23, 2002; and 67 FR 42892, June 25, 2002.
    FRA has engaged in a number of rulemakings to amend and enhance its
passenger safety requirements. On October 19, 2006, FRA published a
final rule addressing various requirements on the inspection, testing,
and operation of passenger equipment, and the attachment of safety
appliances. See 71 FR 61835. On February 1, 2008, FRA published the
Passenger Train Emergency Systems final rule promoting passenger
occupant safety by addressing emergency communication, emergency
egress, and rescue access requirements. See 73 FR 6370. FRA also
established additional requirements for passenger train emergency
systems on November 29, 2013, see 78 FR 71785, revised and clarified
its PTEP regulations on March 31, 2014, see 79 FR 18128, and
established new standards to improve the integrity of passenger train
exterior side door safety systems on December 7, 2015, see 80 FR 76118.
    On January 8, 2010, FRA published a final rule enhancing
requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars
and MU locomotives. See 75 FR 1180. FRA included energy-absorption
requirements in the 2010 rulemaking to address traditional cab car and
MU locomotive designs, with very strong underframes and relatively
weaker superstructures, because it is vitally important to provide
protection to crewmembers and passengers if the superstructure is
impacted. In that rulemaking, FRA applied mature technology and design
practice to extend requirements from linear-elastic to elastic-plastic
and provided descriptions of allowable deformations without complete
failure of the system. Although FRA believed at the time of the
rulemaking that the alternative performance requirements would
principally apply to shaped-nose equipment designs or CEM designs, or
both, FRA also intended for them to apply to conventional flat-nosed
equipment designs. In particular, the alternative performance
requirements allow innovative designs that protect the occupied volume
for its full height, even without traditional full-height collision and
corner post structures, and the rule has been applied to such
innovative end frame designs and traditional end frame designs.

C. Overview of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

    FRA established the RSAC in March 1996 and it serves as a forum for
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety
program issues. The RSAC includes representation from all of the
agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations,
suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ The member groups are: American Association of Private
Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO); American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American Chemistry Council;
American Petroleum Institute; American Public Transportation
Association (APTA); American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association (ASLRRA); American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
Association of American Railroads (AAR); Association of State Rail
Safety Managers (ASRSM); Association of Tourist Railroads and
Railway Museums; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen
(BLET); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); Chlorine Institute; Federal
Transit Administration (FTA);* Fertilizer Institute; Institute of
Makers of Explosives; International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers; International Association of Sheet Metal, Air,
Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART), including the Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association (SMWIA) and United Transportation
Union (UTU); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA);* League of
Railway Industry Women;* National Association of Railroad Passengers
(NARP); National Association of Railway Business Women;* National
Conference of Firemen & Oilers; National Railroad Construction and
Maintenance Association (NRCMA); National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);*
Railway Supply Institute (RSI); Safe Travel America (STA);
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte (Mexico);* Transport
Canada;* Transport Workers Union of America (TWU); Transportation
Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); and
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).* *Indicates associate,
non-voting membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and, after
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the
task is accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses
the appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
consensus recommendations to FRA for action on the task. A working
group may establish one or more task forces to develop facts and
options on a particular aspect of a given task. The individual task
force then provides that information to the working group for
consideration.
    When a working group comes to unanimous consensus on
recommendations for action, the package is presented to the full RSAC
for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of RSAC
members, the proposal is formally recommended to the Administrator of
FRA. FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation.
Because FRA staff members play an active role at the working group
level discussing the issues and options and drafting the language of
the consensus proposal, FRA often adopts the RSAC recommendation.
    FRA is not bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency
exercises its independent judgment on whether a recommended rule
achieves the agency's regulatory goal(s), is soundly supported, and is
consistent with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in
some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual
regulatory proposal or final rule. FRA explains any such variations in
the rulemaking. However, to the maximum extent

practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations
with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is
withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group and the
Engineering Task Force

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented the RSAC with the task of reviewing
existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending
consideration of specific actions that could be useful in advancing the
safety of passenger rail service. In turn, the RSAC accepted the task
and established the PSWG to handle the task and develop recommendations
for the full RSAC to consider. Members of this Working Group, in
addition to FRA, include many of the same entities as the full RSAC.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ AAR, including BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), CSX
Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), and Union Pacific Railroad Company
(UP); AAPRCO; AASHTO; Amtrak; APTA, including Bombardier, Inc.,
Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology, Inc.
(Interfleet), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), Maryland Transit
Administration (MTA), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-
North), and Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad
Corporation; ASLRRA; ATDA; BLET; BRS; IBEW; NARP; NRCMA; NTSB; RSI;
SMART, including SMWIA and UTU; STA; TCIU/BRC; Transport Canada;
TSA; and TWU.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 23, 2009, the Working Group established the ETF. The
ETF was given the mission of developing technical criteria for the
evaluation of passenger rail equipment built to alternative designs.
Members of the ETF include representatives from various organizations
that are part of the larger Working Group, in addition to FRA.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ AAR; AAPRCO; AASHTO, including California Department of
Transportation, and Interfleet; APTA, including Alstom, Ansaldo
Breda, Bombardier, Central Japan Railway Company (JRC), China South
Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation (CSR), Denver Regional
Transportation District (RTD), East Japan Railway Company, Faiveley
Transport, GE Transportation, Japan International Transport
Institute, Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism, Kawasaki, Keolis, KPS N.A., LIRR, LTK Engineering Services,
Marsh, Metro-North, Nippon Sharyo, Parsons Brinckerhoff, PS
Consulting, Safetran Systems, SEPTA, Sharma & Associates, Siemens,
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA), Stadler, STV,
Talgo, Texas Central Railway, Veolia, Voith Turbo, and Wabtec;
Amtrak; ASLRRA; BLET; European Railway Agency (ERA); NTSB; RSI,
including Battelle Memorial Institute, and ENSCO; SMART, including
SMWIA and UTU; TCIU/BRC; and Transport Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ETF developed the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
After it developed the Report, the task of the ETF was expanded to (1)
develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC to adopt the
alternative crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations and (2)
establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-
speed trainsets able to operate at speeds up to 220 mph,\9\ classified
as Tier III passenger equipment. While much of the ETF's initial work
was used to develop the proposed crashworthiness elements of this NPRM,
the ETF found it necessary to create smaller task groups to develop
other and related technical criteria and recommendations for the safe
operation of high-speed trainsets: The Brake Systems Task Group (BTG);
Engineering, Structures, and Integrity (ESI) Task Group; Tier III Cab
Glazing Task Group; and Vehicle-Track Interaction (VTI) Task Group. In
addition, as explained below, the ETF established a task group to
examine various requirements in 49 CFR part 229 and determine their
applicability to Tier III trainsets. FRA intends to use the work of
that part 229/Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Task Group--the
``229/ITM Task Group''--in a future rulemaking so it is not
specifically included in this proposal. With the exception of the Tier
III Cab Glazing Task Group, the task groups consisted primarily of ETF
members and participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ FRA elected 220 mph as the maximum operating speed for Tier
III equipment to remain harmonious with FRA's track safety standards
(49 CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013 (discussing the
reasoning and research behind the 220 mph maximum track speed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The BTG was established in June 2011, in response to a request from
industry representatives to develop technology-neutral requirements
applicable to brake systems and technology commonly found on today's
high-speed trainsets worldwide. The BTG met as a group from November
2011 to December 2012. Group members reviewed and compared current U.S.
brake system requirements and international brake system requirements,
including current U.S. inspection and maintenance requirements;
analyzed common brake system features to determine basic brake system
parameters; and identified performance-based requirements to permit
operators to develop equipment-specific maintenance, inspection and
service plans. The BTG divided into two sub-groups representing the
Asian and European perspectives on high-speed trainset design. Each
sub-group independently compared Asian and European best practices to
current U.S. brake system regulations. As needed, each sub-group
developed proposed amendments to current U.S. regulations to
incorporate international best practices. The BTG presented its
recommendations to the ETF on December 6, 2012, jointly to the PSWG and
the ETF on May 30, 2013, and to the full RSAC on June 14, 2013.
    The ESI Task Group was established in June 2012 to provide
additional technical and engineering guidance to standardize (to the
extent possible and practical) how compliance with the provisions of
the proposed requirements should be demonstrated. Since many of the
proposed requirements in the NPRM rely heavily on computer analysis and
simulations to demonstrate compliance, the ETF sought to separate the
criteria (the performance requirements) from the methodology of
demonstrating compliance with those requirements. The original Report
included both technical criteria and procedures for actually
demonstrating that the proposed alternatives to current requirements
could provide an equivalent level of safety. The Task Force agreed that
the procedures were not appropriate to include in the regulatory
language, and recommended that the rule text contain only the criteria
and conditions for which such criteria apply. It recommended that the
detailed procedures for demonstrating compliance with the criteria be
in an accompanying guidance document or industry standard. The ESI Task
Group met from July 2012 to March 2013, and developed a draft guidance
document of suggested methods for demonstrating compliance with
proposed Tier I alternative and Tier III crashworthiness requirements.
This group will reconvene to finalize this document and develop a more
general compliance document to accompany ETF rulemakings.
    The Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group was created to resolve
particular issues related to proposed cab glazing requirements for Tier
III trainsets. The group consists of ETF members, and glazing experts
and manufacturers from around the world. The group met four times
between March and May 2013. It presented its recommendations for this
NPRM to the PSWG on May 30, 2013, which FRA has adopted.
    The VTI Task Group evaluated whether high-speed trainsets operate
safely under conditions the Federal Track Safety Standards in 49 CFR
part 213 establish. The VTI Task Group focused on the conditions
presented at lower-speed classes of track, and whether certain
conditions presented a challenge to the highly-specialized suspension
systems of high-speed trainsets. This group provided intermediate
findings to the ETF. However, the ETF decided the

information was not sufficiently conclusive to warrant continued
exploration of the topic at the time.
    As noted above, the ETF established an additional task group to
examine various requirements in 49 CFR part 229 and determine their
applicability to Tier III trainsets. This task group more narrowly
addresses concerns and discussions originating from the BTG. This
ongoing 229/ITM Task Group is developing appropriate language to apply
pertinent elements from 49 CFR part 229 and ITM provisions from 49 CFR
part 238 to both Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment, and
recommending equivalent requirements for Tier III trainsets. The work
of the 229/ITM Task Group is ongoing, and the ETF intends to
incorporate the group's work into future rulemaking recommendations.
    Overall, in addition to the work of the various task groups, the
full ETF met 18 times over four years in support of the development of
this NPRM. Minutes of each of the meetings are part of the docket in
this proceeding and are available for public inspection.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ These meetings were held on the following dates and in the
following locations: September 23-24, 2009, Cambridge,
Massachusetts; November 3-4, 2009, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
January 7-8, 2010, Atlanta, Georgia; March 9-10, 2010, Orlando, FL;
October 20-21, 2010, Cambridge, Massachusetts; January 11-12, 2011,
Orlando, Florida; February 14-15, 2011, Washington, DC; March 30-31,
2011, Washington, DC; June 16-17, 2011, Boston, Massachusetts;
October 6-7, 2011, New Orleans, Louisiana; June 27-28, 2012,
Manhattan Beach, California; September 25-26, 2012, Washington, DC;
December 6, 2012, Arlington, Virginia; February 13-14, 2013,
Washington, DC; May 30, 2013, Washington, DC; and September 11-12,
2013, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To assist the ETF, FRA often drafted proposed regulatory text for
discussion at the various task groups' meetings and task group
participants offered suggested changes and additions to the proposed
draft text. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center attended all of
the ETF's meetings and made significant contributions to the technical
discussions and development of the ETF's work product, especially the
Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
    Through the many meetings and discussions, proposed regulatory
language was developed and then presented, accepted, and approved at a
joint meeting of the ETF and the Working Group on May 30, 2013. The
consensus language was then presented before the full RSAC on June 14,
2013, where it was approved by consensus vote, including the
recommendations from the Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group (which were in
a separate document). The Working Group's recommendations were thereby
adopted by the full RSAC as its recommendations to FRA. The ETF did
hold an additional meeting on September 11-12, 2013, which concerned
these recommendations; the ETF addressed comments from ETF members to
add clarification to, but not alter, the agreed-upon recommendations.
    This NPRM is a product of the RSAC's consensus recommendations and
FRA believes the NPRM is consistent with RSAC's recommendations. Please
note that the RSAC did not expressly consider FRA's proposal concerning
the removal of the requirement for a rule of particular applicability
to conduct operations at speeds above 150 mph, as specified in subpart
I of part 236 of this chapter. See the discussion of proposed changes
to Sec.  236.1007 of this chapter in the section-by-section analysis,
below. FRA nonetheless believes this proposal, concerning the removal
of this language from part 236, is consistent with the RSAC recommended
approach to Tier III operations.

III. Technical Background and Overview

A. General: Approaches to Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection

    FRA, with help from the Volpe Center, conducted substantial
research on rail equipment crashworthiness to establish a base of
information to use to evaluate, amend, and develop regulations (with a
specific focus on performance-based regulations) to respond to industry
needs. Recognizing that railroads seek to deploy equipment designed to
more performance-based and modern standards, FRA advanced its efforts
to keep its crashworthiness regulations apace with current safety
technology, particularly for passenger trains. In a passenger train
collision or derailment, the principal crashworthiness risks that
occupants face are the loss of safe space inside the train due to
crushing of the train structure and, as the train decelerates, the risk
of secondary impacts with interior surfaces. Therefore, the principal
goals of the crashworthiness research FRA sponsored are twofold: First,
to preserve a safe space in which occupants can ride out the collision
or derailment; and, second, to minimize the physical forces occupants
are subjected to when impacting surfaces inside a passenger train as
the train decelerates.
    Crashworthiness regulations and specifications are intended to
result in equipment features that increase survivability in accidents.
The traditional approach to verify rail equipment crashworthiness in
the U.S. (which is the approach used in FRA's existing regulations) is
essentially car-oriented, prescribing such characteristics as the
strength of the carbody and the strength of the attachment of the
trucks. These features are intended to be effective for a wide range of
accident conditions the equipment may be subjected to in service. The
modern approach to rail equipment crashworthiness adds train-oriented
specifications and typically includes minimum survivability
requirements for prescribed collision scenarios. The modern approach to
rail equipment crashworthiness does not replace the traditional
approach. Rather, the modern approach expands the focus and manner in
which rail equipment crashworthiness is evaluated, often using the
traditional requirements as a performance baseline.
    Modern specifications generally describe the crashworthiness
performance desired of equipment that utilizes CEM features.
Significant research has been conducted on CEM strategies by both FRA/
Volpe and industry. CEM systems in passenger trains can improve
crashworthiness by incorporating crush zones in unoccupied areas of the
train cars. These zones are designed to collapse in a controlled
fashion during a collision, dissipating collision energy by
distributing crush through the unoccupied areas of the cars. This
occupant protection strategy intends to preserve the occupied volumes
in the train and limit the decelerations that occupants experience. In
fact, Tier II passenger equipment must be designed with a CEM system to
dissipate kinetic energy during a collision, see Sec.  238.403, and
Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets were designed with a CEM system
complying with this requirement. CEM-designed equipment has
demonstrated that it preserves all occupied volume in a train-to-train
collision scenario at more than twice the closing speed of conventional
equipment in the same scenario where the CEM-designed equipment has the
same level of occupied volume strength as conventional equipment.

B. Development of Technical Criteria and Procedures Report

    In 2009, FRA elected to develop, in consultation with RSAC,
alternative criteria and procedures to assess the crashworthiness and
occupant protection performance of rail passenger equipment applicable
to a wide range of equipment designs to be used in Tier I

service. The ETF was charged with producing a set of technical criteria
and procedures for evaluating petitions for waivers from (or, as
appropriate under Sec.  238.201(b), approval of alternative compliance
with) one or more of the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; these
technical criteria and procedures were published in 2011.\11\ The ETF
developed the technical evaluation criteria and procedures so that they
would provide a means of establishing whether equipment of an
alternative design would result in at least equivalent performance to
that of equipment designed in accordance with the structural standards
in 49 CFR part 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA intended that entities (i.e., railroads, equipment
manufacturers, and consultants) would apply these criteria and
procedures to support requests for waiver of the applicable regulations
to allow alternative evaluation of safety performance. To assist with
this effort, RSAC's ETF had the following goals: Produce clear,
realistic technical requirements, benefiting from the collective
``best'' thinking in the passenger rail industry; define the analysis
and testing required to demonstrate compliance with the technical
requirements; provide clear pass/fail criteria for the analyses and
tests; and work expeditiously so that sponsors of potential passenger
service recognize available equipment options. Through RSAC's ETF, FRA
began to work with the industry to develop new criteria to evaluate
passenger equipment designed to standards differing from those
historically used for procurements in the U.S. (e.g., AAR and APTA
standards), while providing an equivalent level of crashworthiness. The
initial work of the ETF culminated in development of the Technical
Criteria and Procedures Report. The Report contains guidelines for
assessing the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance of
alternatively-designed equipment used in Tier I service, including
trainsets designed for operation outside the U.S. that may not be
compliant with FRA's current requirements. As described in the Report,
the criteria are defined by the specific conditions evaluated and the
critical results of the evaluation; the procedures are defined as the
analysis and test techniques applied to demonstrate compliance with the
criteria. The criteria and procedures developed take advantage of the
latest technology in rail equipment crashworthiness.

C. Adoption of Alternative Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection
Performance Standards for Tier I Passenger Equipment and New Standards
for Tier III Passenger Equipment

    After initial publication of the Technical Criteria and Procedures
Report, FRA concluded it would be beneficial to revise the Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards to formally adopt the alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance criteria, in part
due to renewed demand for passenger equipment in the U.S. By codifying
the criteria into the regulations, FRA could expand the options for
regulatory compliance in a clearer and more direct manner. This would
reduce the industry's burden and risk of relying solely on waiver
petitions to provide flexibility for additional safety-equivalent
options for passenger car designs and the use of modern CEM technology.
Therefore, FRA presented the ETF with a regulatory plan to formally
adopt Tier I alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection
performance standards within part 238, based on the criteria previously
developed by the ETF.
    At the same time, while the ETF developed the Technical Criteria
and Procedures Report, the RSAC expanded the mission of the ETF to
develop new safety standards for the next generation of interoperable
high-speed rail passenger equipment capable of speeds up to 220 mph
(Tier III). The technical criteria and procedures the ETF originally
developed as alternatives for Tier I equipment also are the basis for
the proposed crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements for
Tier III equipment in this NPRM. Therefore, FRA discusses the
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements
proposed in this NPRM together for both tiers of passenger train
service and highlights the pertinent differences between the
alternative criteria and procedures described in the Report for Tier I
equipment and the crashworthiness and occupant protection proposals for
Tier III equipment in the section-by-section analysis.
    It is important to note that the development of the Technical
Criteria and Procedures Report was heavily influenced by international
experience with high-speed rail.\12\ In particular, FRA drew from
European standards, attempting to harmonize, to the extent possible,
the technical criteria and procedures FRA developed (and is
consequently proposing to require in this NPRM) with the technical
requirements in the European standards. This was done in part to
minimize the burden on foreign car builders entering the U.S.
marketplace and to take advantage of sophisticated means of validating
equipment designs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-
ORD-11/22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office
of Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available
at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, FRA found that in some instances the technical
requirements of the European standards did not fully address the safety
concerns presented by the U.S. operating environment. FRA, in the
section-by-section analysis, has highlighted those divergences. For
example, in Sec.  238.705, Dynamic collision scenario, FRA discusses
the need for an additional collision scenario with a large rigid mass
(a rigid or non-deformable locomotive) as opposed to a deformable mass.
The additional scenario provides further insight on how tested
equipment performs in preserving the occupied volume during a collision
with a rigid mass, which is a known collision scenario in the U.S. rail
operating environment. Additionally, in Sec.  238.733, Interior fixture
attachment, FRA proposes a greater level of interior fixture attachment
strength than the European standard of 1g laterally. This
enhancement is necessary for safety, is not an onerous requirement, and
represents only a minimal increase in overall trainset cost if
modifications are required.
    Overall, it is important to recognize that differences between the
proposed requirements and international technical standards do not mean
that in all cases structural modifications are necessary. Equipment
designed to international standards can meet the requirements of this
proposal. Therefore, the most immediate burden this proposal places on
a foreign equipment manufacturer is to validate, and provide supporting
documentation, that the equipment meets FRA's requirements, as
proposed.
1. Occupied Volume Integrity
    To meet FRA's existing passenger train crashworthiness regulations,
the underframe of a train car must not experience permanent deformation
when subjected to a large compressive load at the coupler locations at
either end of the car. Car deformation must remain elastic (no
permanent deformation) when subjected to 800,000

pounds (lbs) of force applied along the line of draft (the theoretical
line running from the coupler at one end of the car to the other).
Beginning in 1939, AAR formally recommended this practice for new
passenger equipment operated in trains of more than 600,000 lbs empty
weight in response to numerous fatal accidents involving compromised
occupied volumes. In 1945, this recommendation was adopted into AAR
Standard S-034--Specifications for the Construction of New Passenger
Equipment Cars. Federal law applied this standard to all MU locomotives
built new after April 1, 1956 and operated in trains having a total
empty weight of 600,000 lbs or more. See 49 CFR 229.141(a). In 1999,
when FRA issued the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, FRA expanded
this 800,000-pound static strength standard by Federal regulation to
virtually all intercity passenger and commuter rail equipment (see 49
CFR 238.203, 238.405).
    This line-of-draft strength approach has remained the cornerstone
of occupied volume integrity (OVI) evaluation for nearly a century for
several reasons. The pass/fail criterion of no permanent deformation
anywhere in the vehicle is straightforward to implement and can be
readily examined visually and confirmed using strain gages or other
measuring devices. If the test is conducted properly and successfully,
the vehicle remains in its original condition and can therefore enter
service following the test. The intended nondestructive nature of the
test makes it economical to perform because the first manufactured
vehicle serves both as test article and proven, deliverable product.
    In addition, this proof-strength approach provides additional
crashworthiness benefits and has increased in importance as additional
crashworthiness features are incorporated in the structure of passenger
rail vehicles. For instance, for an end frame to successfully prevent
an intrusion from impacts above the floor, the structure supporting the
end frame must itself be sufficiently strong. A strong end frame
attached to an insufficiently robust supporting structure may prevent
intrusion at the end of the vehicle but cause loss of occupied volume
elsewhere in the vehicle as collision loads travel through the occupied
volume. The proof-strength approach is effective in demonstrating the
sufficiency of the underlying supporting structure and FRA is proposing
to optimize it for application to CEM designs.
    Ultimately, preserving the occupied volume is accomplished
primarily by ensuring the strength of the structure protecting it. If
the occupied compartment is sufficiently strong, survivable space for
the occupants is maintained. Secondary impacts are limited through a
combination of structural crashworthiness and occupant protection
measures. Allowing portions of the car to crush in a predetermined
manner can limit the forces applied to the structure surrounding the
occupied volume and control the decelerations that occupants
experience. Conventional practice is to make individual cars uniformly
strong and principally attempt to control the behavior of individual
cars during a collision. The CEM approach is train-oriented,
controlling the load into the occupied volume, and apportioning the
structural crushing to unoccupied areas throughout the train.
    Within Europe, passenger trains are subject to two distinct
standards for ensuring adequate OVI. European Standard (or Euronorm) EN
12663, ``Railway Applications--Structural Requirements of Railway
Vehicle Bodies--Part 1: Locomotives and Passenger Rolling Stock (and
Alternate Method for Freight Wagons),'' contains several quasi-static
load cases to be evaluated at different locations on train cars,
including a line-of-draft load case. The load locations and the
magnitude of the load to be applied at each location tend to differ
from U.S. requirements. In addition to EN 12663, a second standard, EN
15227, also applies to passenger rail equipment in Europe. EN 15227,
``Railway Applications--Crashworthiness Requirements for Railway
Vehicle Bodies,'' contains several dynamic impact scenarios that must
be evaluated. EN 12663 and EN 15227 were developed to work in concert
with one another, with EN 12663 used to ensure a baseline level of OVI
and EN 15227 used to ensure a baseline level of performance in an
idealized collision.
    FRA has employed a similar, two-step approach to OVI in this NPRM.
Because a strong OVI serves as the foundation for other crashworthiness
features, such as CEM components, a quasi-static OVI requirement is
included. Whereas current domestic practice provides that the
evaluation loads be applied along the line-of-draft, the proposed
regulation instead places the evaluation loads at the locations on the
occupied volume that constitute the ends of the collision load path.
FRA intends for this change in placement of the loads to ensure that
for designs featuring CEM elements, or another non-conventional
longitudinal load path, the evaluation loads are applied in areas that
will actually experience high compression loads during an accident.
This helps ensure the rail vehicle possesses adequate OVI to restrict
crushing to the intended CEM elements during a collision severe enough
to activate the CEM system. The load magnitudes proposed in this NPRM
were chosen to help ensure structural compatibility between existing
Tier I rail equipment and any future vehicles designed to meet the
proposed requirement.
    The second OVI requirement FRA is proposing in this NPRM involves a
dynamic collision scenario evaluated using a standardized train consist
(the ``initially-standing train'') being struck by the trainset
undergoing evaluation (the ``initially-moving train''). Whereas the
quasi-static OVI requirement is applied at the individual car-level,
this scenario is applied at the trainset-level. The results of the
scenario evaluation are used to evaluate CEM system performance,
override resistance, and truck attachment integrity. Working together,
the quasi-static OVI requirement and the dynamic collision scenario
requirements help ensure the energy-absorbing features of a design
function at a trainset-level and that each car possesses sufficient OVI
to resist loss of occupied volume during operation of the energy-
absorption components.
2. Truck Attachment Strength
    The current FRA regulation for Tier I passenger equipment truck
attachment, 49 CFR 238.219, Truck-to-car-body attachment, specifies
static load requirements. In an effort to develop standards that are
more performance-based, the ETF recommended dynamic load requirements
for alternatively evaluating truck attachment strength. However,
comparing the safety differences between the proposed dynamic
requirements and existing static requirements is not straightforward.
There are many different design approaches in service for attaching the
truck to the carbody and meeting the current static load requirements.
The different designs have exhibited varied performance in accidents:
In some relatively severe accidents, compliant designs have remained
attached; while in some less severe accidents, compliant designs have
become detached. The ETF strove to assure the performance the
alternative, dynamic truck attachment requirements provide would be at
least as effective as that the attachment strength of an average or
typical truck compliant with the current static

requirements provides. The alternative, dynamic truck attachment
requirements the ETF developed and recommended provide for
demonstration of compliance using results from the same computer
simulation of the train-to-train collision scenario used to demonstrate
sufficient OVI.
3. Interior Attachment Strength
    FRA's existing, acceleration-based performance requirements for
interior attachments were established after years of industry practice
designing interior fittings to withstand the forces due to
accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically. As
noted in the 1997 NPRM for the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
rulemaking (62 FR 49728), FRA and NTSB investigations of accidents
involving passenger trains designed based on this practice revealed
that luggage racks, seats, and other interior fixtures breaking loose
were a frequent cause of injury to passengers and crewmembers. Due to
injuries caused by broken seats and other loose fixtures, FRA concluded
that the practice of designing interior fittings to withstand
accelerations of 6g longitudinally, and 3g laterally and vertically,
was not adequate. FRA therefore proposed to enhance interior attachment
fitting strength. In the 1999 final rule (64 FR 25540), FRA then set
the current attachment strength requirements of 8g longitudinally, and
4g laterally and vertically. Subsequent accident investigations have
revealed that interior fixtures that comply with the requirements for
Tier I passenger equipment in Sec.  238.233 perform significantly
better than interior fixtures in passenger cars that do not meet the
current regulations, i.e., generally passenger cars already in service
at the time the 1999 final rule took effect.
    The ETF discussed at length requirements for interior fittings and
occupant protection during accidents. As these discussions developed,
there was a desire to accommodate existing equipment designs built to
European standards, i.e., EN 12663 and EN 15227, while maintaining a
comparable level of safety to that within the U.S. rail operating
environment. Many manufacturers of high-speed trainsets stressed during
these discussions that this approach would allow the use of ``service-
proven'' designs and avoid the need for significant redesign that would
affect critical suspension characteristics or lead to a completely new
and unproven vehicle platform. In the interest of maintaining the
industry's ability to adopt service-proven designs, the ETF examined
existing practices throughout the world to help establish how current
and proven design practice could be evaluated for application in the
U.S.
    The ETF adopted an approach that incorporates specific requirements
of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for
Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd.,
December 2010 (GM/RT2100). GM/RT2100 is a safety standard that mandates
requirements for the design and integrity of rail vehicle structures,
including interior fixtures, for trains that operate in the United
Kingdom (U.K.). GM/RT2100 (referencing EN 12663) requires interior
fixtures to withstand carbody accelerations of 5g longitudinally, 1g
laterally and 3g vertically. However, FRA has never found the 1g
lateral acceleration requirement adequate for the U.S. rail operating
environment. See FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards final rule,
published May 12, 1999, for a discussion on lateral attachment strength
for interior fixtures (64 FR 25540).
    Thus, the proposed rule increases this minimum lateral acceleration
requirement to 3g, as further discussed in the section-by-section
analysis below. FRA notes that the structural vehicle requirements in
EN 15227 limit the mean longitudinal deceleration to 5g within certain
specified collision scenarios for vehicles designed to operate on
international, national, and regional networks (6.4.1). ETF industry
members recommended attachment strength requirements consistent with
the collision behavior of vehicle structures built to the Euronorm
standards and FRA agreed with their recommendation. The specific
details on how to apply this alternative international approach are
discussed in the section-by-section analysis below.

D. Development of Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger
Equipment

    While the proposed crashworthiness and occupant protection
performance requirements for Tier III passenger equipment derive from
the work initially conducted by the ETF for alternatively evaluating
Tier I passenger equipment, the ETF did focus specifically on a more
comprehensive body of requirements for Tier III passenger equipment.
These include requirements for brake systems, cab glazing, emergency
systems, and cab equipment. An overview of specific proposals for Tier
III passenger equipment in these areas is provided below.
1. Brake Systems
    Brake systems requirements for Tier III trainsets were developed
from the recommendations of the RSAC's BTG. This group examined
existing brake systems and technologies from around the world, and
compared brake system requirements in the U.S. with systems on high-
speed trainsets operating internationally. The goal of this task group
was to identify common features and determine basic regulatory
parameters that considered all types of service-proven braking systems,
regardless of the technology employed.
    To achieve this goal, the BTG created two sub-groups to examine
trainset brake system design philosophies from both Asian and European
industries that currently design trainsets to operate at the speeds
envisioned for Tier III. The BTG focused on developing technology-
neutral, performance-based braking system requirements by selecting the
best practices and designs of the international models, while still
maintaining the safety intent of the original, pneumatic-based U.S.
requirements. This need for a technology-neutral approach was the
cornerstone for development of the Tier III brake system
recommendations to the ETF, which suggested creating new requirements
that would both permit the use of applicable international standards
and be performance-driven to allow the development of future
technologies.
    To accomplish this, the BTG suggested that FRA utilize the proposed
Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment (``Tier III Safe
Operation Plan''), and ITM plan, discussed below, to establish and
approve technology-specific performance metrics that it could not
otherwise define without a prescriptive regulation. This
recommendation, ultimately adopted by FRA following the RSAC process,
is a fundamental concept reflected in other elements of this proposed
rule: to maintain the core safety intent of existing U.S. requirements
in a manner that takes into account the inherent safety of service-
proven designs, as demonstrated on rail systems around the world.
2. Cab Glazing
    FRA's original requirements for window and windshield safety
glazing on locomotives, passenger cars, and cabooses were established
in 49 CFR part 223 on December 31, 1979 (44 FR 77352) to protect
railroad employees and passengers from injury due to objects striking
windows or windshields. Part 223 specifies a

process for certifying window glazing material, including testing
requirements for glazing in both end-facing (FRA Type I) and side-
facing (FRA Type II) locations. With the introduction of Tier II
requirements in 1999 (64 FR 25686) designed to provide protection at
speeds up to 150 mph, FRA established additional requirements for both
end-facing (FRA Type IH) and side-facing (FRA Type IIH) glazing
locations in Tier II passenger equipment. FRA amended the large object
impact requirements for end-facing glazing locations in 2002 (67 FR
19992) with slight modifications, creating FRA Type IHP glazing. See 49
CFR 238.421.
    During the development of the Tier III requirements, the ETF
decided a new, large object impact test was necessary for end-facing
glazing locations (e.g. windshields) to address optical clarity issues
stemming from current requirements (for both Tier I and II) and the
need for a test procedure that could be repeated reliably. To address
the optical clarity issue, the ETF wanted a methodology to use to
evaluate the performance of the end-facing glazing system at its angle
of installation (similar to the approach for Type IHP glazing in 49 CFR
238.421(b)(1)). Such a methodology would be more representative of the
actual conditions in real-world applications. It would also help
alleviate optical clarity issues resulting from thicker glazing as a
function of higher operational speeds and perpendicular impact testing
requirements in part 223. In addition, given the range of performance
typically observed when testing most glazing materials, establishing a
test procedure that could be reliably repeated on multiple test
specimens was essential to ensure the quality of test results for these
high-speed operations. FRA agrees with this approach.
    To address these issues the ETF, through its Tier III Cab Glazing
Task Group, sought to refine the glazing requirements for high-speed
operations by examining current international practice. In particular,
it focused on established and proven experience with the application of
European standard EN 15152, and its predecessors, including
International Union of Railways (UIC) standard UIC 651. It considered
these standards together with high-speed rail operating experience
involving the prominent modes and causes for glazing failure. These
standards and operating experience, together with the existing glazing
requirements for Tier I and Tier II operations, served as the basis for
the development of the proposed requirements for Tier III operations.
3. Emergency Systems
    This NPRM includes proposed requirements for passenger train
emergency systems specific to Tier III trainsets and takes into account
potential design considerations for Tier III trainset operating speeds.
These proposed requirements focus particularly on emergency egress and
rescue access through windows or alternative openings as part of an
emergency window egress and rescue access plan. Sections 238.113
(Emergency window exits) and 238.114 (Rescue access windows) were used
as the baseline requirements for the total number of emergency egress
and rescue access windows, as well as their acceptable means of removal
and their dimensions.
    To address Tier III trainsets not designed to comply with the
requirements in Sec.  238.113 or Sec.  238.114, the proposed rule would
include a means for FRA to consider alternatives based on service-
proven approaches that provide an equivalent level of safety. The
railroad would submit to FRA for approval an emergency window egress
and rescue access plan during the design review stage. This plan would
allow consideration of: production challenges unique to high-speed
trainsets, such as the need to pressurize compartments; proven
international practice; and approaches other modes have taken (e.g.,
emergency egress window panels/door exits similar to over-wing exit
doors on aircraft). Where an appropriate safety case can be made, the
proposed rule would allow a railroad to elect to employ an alternative
feature or approach if the railroad can demonstrate an equivalent or
superior level of safety.
    This NPRM also addresses the attachment strength and performance of
critical emergency systems. Specifically, it explains the requirements
for minimum attachment strength of emergency lighting fixtures and any
corresponding emergency power sources to be consistent with the
approach we took for all other interior attachments in Tier III
equipment. The NPRM would effectively provide a railroad with the
option of complying with either the loading requirements currently
applicable to Tier I equipment or alternative loading criteria based on
an appropriate crash pulse that is justified by the intended vehicle
design.
4. Cab Equipment
    This NPRM contains certain equipment requirements proposed for the
cabs of Tier III trainsets. These proposed requirements were developed
by the RSAC's BTG and address alerters (devices installed in the
controlling cab of trainsets that promote continuous, active locomotive
engineer attentiveness by monitoring select trainset engineer-induced
control activities) and sanders (appurtenances on trainsets that
provide a means for depositing sand on each rail in front of the first
power operated wheel set in the direction of movement to increase
wheel-track adhesion). The BTG adopted the same approach it used to
develop the braking system proposal for these two cab features, seeking
performance-based requirements that could be implemented in a
technology-neutral manner wherever possible. FRA intends to propose
additional requirements for cab equipment in a future rulemaking based
on recommendations developed by the 229/ITM Task Group.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

Part 236--Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the
Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train
Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances

Subpart I--Positive Train Control Systems
Section 236.1007 Additional Requirements for High-Speed Service
    FRA is proposing to remove paragraph (d) of this section as it is
no longer relevant, and to redesignate paragraph (e) as paragraph (d)
of this section. Paragraph (d) provides that, in addition to the
requirements of paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, a host
railroad that conducts a freight or passenger operation at more than
150 mph shall have an approved Positive Train Control (PTC) Safety Plan
(PTCSP) accompanied by an ``HSR-125'' developed as part of an overall
system safety plan approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety and Chief Safety Officer (Associate Administrator). Paragraph
(d) also provides that such an operation would be governed by a rule of
particular applicability. Paragraph (c) of this section contains
particular requirements for freight and passenger operations at speeds
more than 125 mph, and provides that a host railroad have an approved
PTCSP accompanied by an HSR-125. Generally, an HSR-125 is a document
establishing that the system will be operated at a level of safety
comparable to that achieved over the 5-year period prior to the
submission of the PTCSP by other train control systems that perform PTC
functions required by subpart I to 49 CFR part 236, and which have been
utilized on

high-speed rail systems with similar technical and operational
characteristics in the U.S. or in foreign service, and that the system
has been designed to detect incursions into the right-of-way, including
incidents involving motor vehicles diverting from adjacent roads and
bridges, where conditions warrant.
    The particular treatment in paragraph (d) of operations at speeds
over 150 mph is a legacy of FRA regulations from the 1990s concerning
high-speed rail. When FRA's Track Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213)
were amended on June 22, 1998, to include standards for higher-speed
operations, the rule envisioned regulating rail operations at speeds
over 150 mph through a rule a particular applicability. See 63 FR
33992. This same approach was codified in the Passenger Equipment
Safety Standards when the rule was promulgated in 1999. See 64 FR
25540. Subsequently, however, FRA amended the Track Safety Standards on
March 13, 2013, to remove the prescriptive reference to a rule of
particular applicability and make clear that operations at speeds above
125 mph require FRA regulatory approval. See 78 FR 16052. In this NPRM,
FRA is similarly proposing to remove the prescriptive reference to a
rule of particular applicability in the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards and reaffirm that operations at speeds over 125 mph require
FRA regulatory approval.
    Accordingly, FRA is proposing to modify 49 CFR 236.1007 to remove
the prescriptive reference requiring a rule of particular applicability
for operations at speeds over 150 mph. Paragraph (c) of this section
would continue to require that operations at speeds over 125 mph
require FRA regulatory approval. However, there is no further need to
prescribe in all cases distinct regulatory treatment through a rule of
particular applicability for operations at speeds above 150 mph.
Operations in both speed ranges constitute high-speed rail operations
and are regulated by FRA as such.
    FRA does not intend anything in this proposal to affect any order
of particular applicability FRA has issued or may issue. In 1998, FRA
issued an order of particular applicability governing certain rail
operations on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). See 63 FR 39343, Jul. 22,
1998. The order, as amended, specifies requirements for equipping
trains to respond to the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System
(ACSES) in NEC territory. See 71 FR 33034, Jun. 7, 2006. As delegated
by the Secretary, FRA may issue such an order after an investigation
requiring a railroad carrier to install, on any part of its line, a
signal system that complies with requirements FRA has established as
necessary for safety. See 49 U.S.C. chapter 205 (signal systems). Such
an order of particular applicability has a far more limited scope than
that envisioned at one time for a rule of particular applicability
governing high-speed operations (i.e., a comprehensive rule addressing
all aspects of a high-speed rail operation, not just signal systems).
To be clear, the order of particular applicability governing certain
rail operations on the NEC will not be affected by this rulemaking.

Part 238--Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 238.5 Definitions
    FRA is proposing to add new definitions to this part and revise
certain existing definitions to clarify the meaning of important terms
and minimize potential for misinterpretation of the rule. FRA requests
public comment regarding the terms defined in this section and whether
we should also define other terms.
    FRA proposes to revise the definitions of ``glazing, end-facing''
and ``glazing, side-facing,'' and to make technical revisions to the
definitions of ``Tier II'' and ``Train, Tier II passenger'' to reflect
the proposed change in the maximum authorized speed of Tier II
passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA also proposes to add
new definitions for ``Associate Administrator,'' ``Cab,'' ``Tier III,''
``Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger,'' ``Trainset, Tier III,'' and
``Trainset unit.'' Some of the proposed definitions we added involve
new or fundamental concepts which require further discussion.
    FRA proposes to define ``Associate Administrator'' to mean the FRA
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Associate Administrator
for Safety, or the Associate Administrator's delegate. The title of
Associate Administrator for purposes of this part has always referred
to the same FRA official; only the full description of this official's
title has changed since this part was originally promulgated. Because
of the use of different titles in this part to refer to the same
official, FRA proposes to add this definition to make clear that there
is one official who is the Associate Administrator for purposes of this
part. In the final rule, FRA may instead update and make consistent
each reference to the Associate Administrator in each individual
section of part 238 that refers to the Associate Administrator.
    FRA proposes to add the definition ``cab'' to mean, for purposes of
subpart H of this part, a compartment or space in a trainset designed
to be occupied by the engineer and contain an operating console from
which the engineer exercises control over the trainset. Cab includes a
locomotive cab. FRA is adding a more general definition of ``cab'' to
ensure the requirements apply to high-speed trainsets, which do not
utilize conventional locomotives. This new definition for ``cab'' is
not intended to impose any new requirement on other types of equipment.
This definition presumes there is a typical design of a high-speed
trainset where the engineer and operating console are located in the
leading end of the trainset. Regardless, FRA would expect the
protections of Sec. Sec.  238.703 through 238.717 (Trainset structure)
and Sec.  238.721 (Glazing) to apply, as appropriate, to that leading
end whether it is to be occupied by operating crewmembers or
passengers, or both. In this regard, and consistent with the definition
of ``Occupied volume'' under Sec.  238.5, the protections mentioned
above would apply, as appropriate, for the entire width of a trainset's
leading end, irrespective of the occupant(s). In addition, this
definition would apply to vehicles designed under appendix G to this
part. FRA invites comment on this proposed definition, as well as
comment on whether FRA should make more explicit in the rule text the
protections that apply to the leading end of a trainset, whether
intended to be occupied by crewmembers or passengers, or both.
    FRA proposes to revise the definition ``glazing, end-facing'' to
mean any exterior glazing located where a line perpendicular to the
plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal angle of 50 degrees or
less with the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material
is installed, except for: The coupled ends of MU locomotives or other
equipment that is semi-permanently connected to each other in a train
consist; and, end doors of passenger cars at locations other than the
cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. Any glazing location which, due
to curvature of the glazing material, can meet the criteria for either
end-facing glazing or side-facing glazing would be considered end-
facing glazing. This definition makes clear that the glazing location
means an ``exterior'' location and expressly identifies locations that
FRA would not consider end-facing glazing locations. Additionally, the
definition accounts for the aerodynamic shape of vehicle front-ends and
expressly provides that any

window, based on its geometry, that could be either an end-facing
glazing location or a side-facing glazing location is considered an
end-facing glazing location that must comply with the end-facing
glazing requirements. FRA intends for this proposed definition to be
substantively the same as the revised definition for ``end facing
glazing location'' in the final rule on Safety Glazing Standards (part
223 of this chapter). See 81 FR 6775, Feb. 9, 2016. This revision is
not intended to add any new requirement on glazing installed in
passenger vehicles subject to the requirements of part 238. FRA intends
this definition and other glazing requirements in the final rule to be
consistent with the Safety Glazing Standards rulemaking.
    FRA proposes to revise the definition ``glazing, side-facing'' to
mean any glazing located where a line perpendicular to the plane of the
glazing material makes a horizontal angle of more than 50 degrees with
the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material is
installed. Side-facing glazing also means glazing located at the
coupled ends of MU locomotives or other equipment that is semi-
permanently connected to each other in a train consist, and glazing
located at end doors other than at the cab end of a cab car or MU
locomotive. FRA intends for this proposed revision to be substantively
the same as the revised definition for ``side facing glazing location''
in the final rule on Safety Glazing Standards, see id., and is
necessary due to our proposed revision to the definition of ``glazing,
end-facing'' in this part 238. Nonetheless, we do not intend for this
revision to add any new requirement on glazing installed in passenger
vehicles subject to the requirements of this part. As noted above, FRA
intends this definition and other glazing requirements in the final
rule to be consistent with the Safety Glazing Standards rulemaking.
    As discussed above, FRA proposes to revise the definition of ``Tier
II'' to increase the maximum speed allowable for this tier of passenger
equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA likewise proposes to revise the
definition ``train, Tier II passenger.'' In addition, FRA proposes to
add a definition for ``Tier III'' to add this equipment safety tier to
this part with the definition ``trainset, Tier III'' to apply the
proposed Tier III requirements to such equipment. Further, FRA intends
for these definitions to make clear that the definitions of Tier I and
Tier II do not include Tier III passenger equipment merely because the
equipment operates in the Tier I and Tier II speed ranges. The
operation of passenger equipment in both lower- and higher-speed ranges
is integral to the definition of Tier III (please see above for a more
detailed discussion of these safety tiers). This Tier III definition
also makes clear that 125 mph is the maximum speed at which Tier III
equipment can operate when sharing the right-of-way with non-Tier III
equipment or when highway-rail grade crossings are present along the
right-of-way. FRA elected this maximum speed to maintain operational
compatibility with non-Tier III equipment based on the safety
equivalency of the crashworthiness and occupant protection
requirements. Further, this definition makes clear FRA is limiting Tier
III operations to an absolute maximum speed of 220 mph, which is the
maximum track speed permitted under FRA's Track Safety Standards (49
CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013. FRA invites comments on
the speed and operational restrictions discussed above and whether
there are more appropriate alternatives to FRA's proposal.
    FRA proposes to add the definition ``trainset, Tier I alternative
passenger'' to mean a trainset consisting of Tier I passenger equipment
designed under the requirements of appendix G to this part. FRA
proposes to add this definition to distinguish specific Tier I trainset
designs that conform to alternative standards from Tier I equipment
that meets the existing Tier I requirements in subpart C but provide an
equivalent level of protection by conforming with the proposed
requirements of appendix G to this part.
    FRA also proposes to add a new definition of ``trainset unit'' to
mean that segment of a trainset located between connecting arrangements
(articulations). This definition would clarify that the proposed
requirements may apply to individual vehicles within a trainset
consist, but not necessarily to the trainset as a whole.
Section 238.21 Special Approval Procedure
    FRA proposes to amend paragraph (c)(2) of this section to be
consistent with the changes proposed to Sec.  238.201(b) for
alternative compliance. The proposed applicable elements would be in
new Sec.  238.201(b)(1) rather than in Sec.  238.201(b) due to the
proposed reorganization of that section. FRA intends to conform
paragraph (c)(2) of this section accordingly.
    Additionally, FRA is updating the reference to ``Associate
Administrator for Safety'' to read simply ``Associate Administrator,''
consistent with the discussion provided above under Sec.  238.5.
Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements
Section 238.111 Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
    FRA proposes to amend paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), and (7), and (c)
of this section to require railroads to obtain FRA approval before
using Tier III passenger equipment that either has not been used in
revenue service in the U.S. or has been used in revenue service in the
U.S. and is scheduled for a major upgrade or introduction of new
technology that affects a safety system on such equipment. The explicit
inclusion of a Tier III notification and approval process is consistent
with FRA's approach to the implementation of high-speed rail
technology. It also provides a formal mechanism for FRA to ensure all
required elements of this part are satisfactorily addressed and
documented.
    FRA invites comment on FRA's proposed changes to this section.
Specifically, we invite comment on any additional changes we should
make concerning testing and approval requirements for Tier I, Tier II,
or Tier III operations.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
Section 238.201 Scope/Alternative Compliance
    In this section, FRA is proposing to redesignate existing paragraph
(b) as paragraph (b)(1) and to add new paragraph (b)(2) due to the
proposed addition of standards for alternative compliance in appendix G
to this part.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) would continue to provide the existing
option for railroads to petition FRA's Associate Administrator for
approval to use Tier I passenger equipment designed to alternative
crashworthiness standards. This approval remains contingent upon the
railroad's successful demonstration that such standards provide a level
of safety at least equivalent to those in subpart C of this part.
Although FRA is proposing to add a new appendix G to this part that
provides specific alternative crashworthiness standards to those in
subpart C, FRA does not intend to limit the flexibility this section
currently provides for using other alternative designs.
    Proposed new paragraph (b)(2) would explain how Tier I passenger
trainsets may comply with the alternative crashworthiness and occupant
protection requirements in appendix G to this part instead of the
requirements

of Sec. Sec.  238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213,
and 238.219. Railroads would be required to submit test plans and
supporting documentation for FRA review and give FRA at least 30 days'
notice before commencing any testing, whether partially or in full, to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of proposed appendix G to
this part. Railroads would also be required to submit a carbody
crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance report based on the
analysis, calculations, and test data necessary to demonstrate
compliance. After receipt of this report, FRA would deem the submission
acceptable, unless FRA stays action within 60 days by written notice.
If FRA stays action, then the railroad would be required to correct any
deficiencies FRA identified and notify FRA it has corrected the
deficiencies before placing the subject equipment into service. FRA may
also impose conditions in writing necessary for safely operating the
equipment for cause stated.
    FRA notes that the proposed approval process would differ from that
for Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment, which would require
affirmative FRA approval. Tier I trainsets that FRA reviews under this
paragraph would be deemed acceptable without further FRA action based
on the appropriate submissions to FRA, unless FRA stays approval by
written notice to the railroad. If FRA stays approval, FRA would then
identify issues for clarification or resolution, as appropriate, which
the railroad would be required to address and notify FRA it had
corrected prior to placing the equipment into service.
    FRA invites comment on the proposed changes to this section.
Section 238.203 Static End Strength
    FRA proposes to revise this section to include a cross reference to
Sec.  238.201(b)(2) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in
appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. Please note that the
existing alternative compliance provision in Sec.  238.201(b), which we
propose to redesignate as Sec.  238.201(b)(1), does not apply to the
requirements of this section, unlike the other structural requirements.
Hence, FRA is not proposing to reference Sec.  238.201(b) generally in
this section. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing
requirements of this section.
Section 238.205 Anti-Climbing Mechanism
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.207 Link Between Coupling Mechanism and Carbody
    FRA is proposing to revise paragraph (b) of this section to include
a cross reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed
alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets.
However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of
this section.
Section 238.209 Forward End Structure of Locomotives, Including Cab
Cars and MU Locomotives
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.211 Collision Posts
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.213 Corner Posts
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.219 Truck-to-Car-Body Attachment
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.401 Scope
    FRA proposes to revise this section to increase the maximum
allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160
mph. This proposal is consistent with FRA's March 13, 2013, final rule
amending and clarifying the Track Safety Standards, which affirmed that
the maximum allowable speed on Class 8 track is 160 mph. See 78 FR
16052. Further, this proposal would make the speed range for Tier II
passenger equipment consistent with that for Class 8 track in the Track
Safety Standards. As specified in Sec.  213.307 of this chapter, Class
8 track encompasses the speed range above 125 mph up to 160 mph--the
same speed range for Tier II passenger equipment standards. This change
would only increase the maximum operating speed to 160 mph and would
still require FRA approval to do so as this part and other FRA safety
regulations require.
    For example, Amtrak's Acela Express currently operates at a maximum
speed of 150 mph and has done so for well over a decade with FRA
approval. While the proposed change would neither impose any new
requirement on Acela Express, nor alter any aspect of FRA's regulatory
approval of Acela Express, the rule would require FRA approval to
increase the maximum operating speed to 160 mph.
    FRA's Tier II passenger equipment safety standards are based on
safety requirements developed for the operation of Amtrak passenger
trainsets at speeds up to 150 mph on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). See
64 FR 25629. Amtrak sponsored a risk assessment of high-speed rail
operations and FRA sponsored computer modeling to predict the
performance of various equipment structural designs and configurations
in collisions. The risk assessment found a significant risk of
collisions at speeds below 20 mph and a risk of collisions at speeds
exceeding 100 mph due to heavy and increasing conventional commuter
rail traffic, freight rail traffic, highway-rail grade crossings,
moveable bridges, and a history of low speed collisions in or near
stations and rail yards. Based on the risk assessment and the results
of the computer modeling, FRA determined that full reliance on
collision avoidance measures rather than crashworthiness, though the
hallmark of safe high-speed rail operations in several parts of the
world, could not be implemented in corridors like the north end of the
NEC. Traffic density patterns and right-of-way configurations would not
permit implementation of the same collision avoidance measures that
have proven successful in Europe and Japan. To compensate for the
increased risk of a collision, a more crashworthy trainset design was
needed. Accordingly, the structural requirements for Tier II passenger
equipment are more stringent than those for Tier I passenger equipment
or the design practice for North American passenger equipment or for
high-speed rail equipment in other parts of the world.

Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier
II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.501 Scope
    FRA proposes to revise this section to increase the maximum
allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160
mph. Please see the discussion of Sec.  238.401.
Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
    This proposed subpart would contain specific requirements Tier III
passenger equipment must meet. Many of the requirements proposed herein
consider Tier III passenger equipment in terms of an integrated
trainset, particularly for purposes of crashworthiness and occupant
protection requirements. This rule presumes that Tier III trainsets
will consist of semi-permanently coupled, articulated, or otherwise
``fixed'' configurations, that are not intended to operate normally as
individual vehicles or in mixed consists (with equipment of another
design or operational tier).
    The requirements proposed in this subpart are organized into
subject areas based on their general applicability: trainset structure,
window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces,
emergency systems, and cab equipment. These proposed requirements are
intended to be applied in concert with proposed subparts I and J to
establish a set of minimum safety requirements for Tier III passenger
equipment that encourages a systemic approach to safety. FRA also
intends that the requirements be applied in a manner that is
performance-based and technology-neutral, where possible.
    FRA intends to supplement these specific requirements in future
rulemaking(s). As noted above, the ETF remains active and continues to
address safety requirements for Tier III operations. FRA will consider
regulatory changes and additions that will help FRA safely and
efficiently implement Tier III operations from design, to entry into
revenue service, to ongoing inspection and maintenance.
    FRA notes that it intends for certain proposed sections of this
subpart to be applied as an integrated set of alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for
Tier I passenger equipment as delineated in appendix G to this part. We
consider this set of proposed requirements to provide an equivalent
level of safety to its counterpart set of Tier I requirements in
subpart C of this part. As explained in greater detail in the
discussion of appendix G below, the proposed rule clarifies which
specific Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection performance
requirement should be applied as an alternative set of Tier I
counterpart requirements. Specifically, FRA makes clear that if
alternative Tier I compliance is sought under appendix G, then all the
requirements in appendix G must be met so the integrity of the
alternative requirements is maintained.
Section 238.701 Scope
    This proposed subpart contains specific requirements for railroad
passenger equipment operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph, and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade
crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. FRA
believes that in most cases new exclusive rights-of-way designed for
Tier III operations will be constructed without highway grade
crossings. However, some newly constructed exclusive rights-of-way may
include highway grade crossings, but may have long stretches of track
without a grade crossing. In these instances, imposing a 125 mph speed
restriction on the entire exclusive right-of-way may have greater costs
than benefits. Additional net benefits may be achievable, in certain
circumstances, by applying the speed restriction only to track at or
near each grade crossing instead of the entire exclusive right-of-way.
In such cases, FRA would expect the railroad to address the safety
considerations surrounding highway grade crossings in the exclusive
right-of-way in its Tier III Safe Operation Plan, which is subject to
FRA review and approval. However, FRA invites comment on alternative
approaches, such as whether the rule should include provisions that
explicitly apply the speed restriction only to track located at or near
each grade crossing within an exclusive right-of-way.
    FRA is proposing to allow passenger seating in the leading unit of
a Tier III trainset if safety issues associated with passengers
occupying the leading unit are addressed and mitigated through a
comprehensive Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Demonstration of compliance
with the requirements of this subpart would be subject to FRA review
and approval under Sec.  238.111.
Trainset Structure
Section 238.703 Quasi-Static Compression Load Requirements
    As discussed above, FRA proposes a two-step approach to OVI in this
NPRM. Accordingly, in paragraph (a) of this section, FRA proposes that
for it to consider a Tier III trainset to have sufficient OVI,
compliance with the requirements of both paragraph (b) of this section
and Sec.  238.705 must be demonstrated. The purpose of applying both
requirements is to ensure the integrity of the occupied volume during a
collision or other accident. Integrity of the occupied volume is a
fundamental requirement of crashworthiness--the primary goal of which
is preservation of space to protect occupants during an accident.
Additionally, a strong OVI serves as the foundation for other
crashworthiness features such as CEM components.
    Although the language of this section references only Tier III
trainsets, the requirements of this section may also be applied to Tier
I trainsets through the application of appendix G, instead of complying
with the existing requirements of 49 CFR 238.203, ``Static end
strength.'' Tier I passenger equipment designed to alternative
crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an appropriate level of
crashworthiness by complying with the quasi-static compression load
requirements proposed in Sec.  238.703(b). In general, Sec.  238.203
requires all passenger equipment to support an 800,000-pound
compressive load along its line-of-draft without experiencing permanent
deformation. This magnitude of load applied to the line-of-draft has
been the longstanding practice in the U.S. This evaluation is readily
performed on passenger equipment conventionally designed for service in
the U.S. For vehicles designed less conventionally or alternatively
(e.g., articulated trainsets, full or partial low-floor trainsets, and
trainsets utilizing CEM), the structure of the occupied volume may be
designed so that collision loads are not transmitted along the line-of-
draft. While a rail vehicle may be designed to carry normal,
longitudinal service loads along its line-of-draft, the more severe
collision loads may be introduced into the structure differently. Below
is a discussion of the quasi-static compression load requirements
proposed in paragraph (b) that would apply to each vehicle of a Tier
III trainset, and, if elected, as an alternative for Tier I trainsets,
through application of appendix G.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) introduces three means of compliance,
each consisting of a prescribed load magnitude and a corresponding
pass/fail criterion (or pass/fail criteria), and states that each
vehicle under evaluation must comply with one of three compression load
pass/fail criteria enumerated in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)-(iii). FRA notes
that this paragraph (b)(1)

applies to evaluation of individual vehicles of a trainset, not a
trainset as a whole. Additionally, FRA is not proposing to require
using all three alternatives to evaluate a vehicle; FRA would require
only demonstration that the vehicle design complies with one
compression load pass/fail criterion. By including three sets of load
magnitudes and pass/fail criteria, FRA intends to accommodate quasi-
static compression load evaluation for a variety of passenger trainset
vehicle designs and ensure that each alternative provides an equivalent
level of safety.
    For each of the three quasi-static compression load requirements
that may be applied, the evaluation loads are introduced not at the
line-of-draft, but at the ends of the collision load path through the
occupied volume. Introducing the loads along the collision load path
permits evaluation of the quasi-static compression resistance of a
given design in a manner more representative of the type of loading the
occupied volume would experience in a collision. The details of the
location(s) of the load points at the ends of the collision load path
would be determined on a design-by-design basis.
    The proposed quasi-static compression load requirements also permit
use of a combination of elastic testing and elastic/plastic computer
simulation to demonstrate a trainset's ability to comply with one of
the three requirements. While an analysis of a properly-executed,
finite-element (FE) computer simulation can demonstrate a design's
compliance, some structural testing of the actual occupied volume
undergoing evaluation is needed to validate the results the computer
simulation produced. The process of validation essentially provides a
computer simulation with a foundation in reality.
    A detailed FE model of the carbody undergoing evaluation is
necessary to properly capture the structural response of the occupied
volume to the evaluation compression loads. FRA expects this model will
include all the structural members and connections that comprise the
occupied volume. If the carbody structure is symmetric from side to
side, a symmetry boundary condition may be used to facilitate efficient
model evaluation. Certain details of the carbody structure that do not
directly affect the OVI, such as couplers and designated CEM
components, may be omitted from the OVI model.
    FRA also expects the material properties (e.g., stress-strain
characteristics) that are used in the model would be derived from
either manufacturer-certified minimum properties or from tests
conducted on the actual construction materials. Material properties may
be assumed to be independent of the rate of deformation for the
purposes of OVI evaluation. Failure modeling of connections (e.g.,
welds, rivets, bolts, etc.) would not be required if the analysis does
not indicate critical stresses or strains near those connections.
    Appropriate boundary conditions must be chosen to provide
reasonable restraint to the model. FRA expects that vertical support to
the model would be provided at the locations in the actual vehicle
where it would carry vertical loads. Typically, those locations include
the attachments of the secondary suspension components to the
underframe and, if the car is so equipped, the articulation.
Longitudinal restraint in the model may be accomplished by a rigid wall
that is in contact with the reaction-end of the vehicle structure.
Lateral restraint may either be introduced through a symmetry boundary
condition or by applying a reasonable coefficient of friction between
the longitudinal restraint wall and the body structure.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i) provides that the first load magnitude
and corresponding pass/fail criterion is an 800,000-pound compression
load applied to the collision load path without causing any permanent
deformation to the occupied volume. The load magnitude (800,000 pounds)
is the same as the evaluation load generally required in existing Sec.
238.203 for Tier I passenger equipment but would be introduced into the
occupied volume along the collision load path (whether or not that is
the line-of-draft). The pass/fail criterion of no permanent deformation
would be the same as the pass/fail criterion in existing Sec.  238.203.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) provides that the second load
magnitude and corresponding pass/fail test is a 1,000,000-pound
compression load applied to the collision load path without exceeding
either of two pass/fail criteria. Under this proposal, both pass/fail
criteria must be met for a design to successfully meet this quasi-
static compression load requirement, which would increase the
evaluation load by 25 percent over the conventional 800,000-pound load.
As a consequence of applying a more severe load, FRA would relax the
pass/fail criteria to permit small areas of plastic strain to develop
within the structure. Thus, the first pass/fail criterion in proposed
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) states that local plastic strains that may
develop anywhere within a model may not exceed 5 percent. This pass/
fail criterion would be applied to the entire structure of the vehicle
undergoing evaluation. The second pass/fail criterion in proposed
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B) states that local shortening (deformation) of
the vehicle may not exceed 1 percent over any 15-foot length of the
occupied volume. This criterion is intended to prevent localized loss
of occupied volume that may occur when the 5-percent plastic strain
criterion is not exceeded.
    Paragraph (b)(1)(iii) provides that the third load magnitude and
corresponding pass/fail criterion is a 1,200,000 pound compression load