conclusions are consistent with research about price formation about
futures and spot prices generally that often finds that the futures
market leads price formation. See id. at 21.
    \182\ See id. at 22 (citing Alexander & Heck; Kapar & Olmo at
62-64).
    \183\ See id. at 22.
    \184\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the static time invariant approaches used in the
research discussed above, the Sponsor cites research using a time-
varying approach that it states confirms that bitcoin futures
consistently lead the bitcoin spot market in price formation.\185\ The
authors of this research paper separately comment that their analysis
of data from the CME and Cboe Futures Exchange (``CFE'') \186\ from
December 2017 through June/July 2019 found that the CME and CFE bitcoin
futures prices generally cause the underlying spot prices.\187\ This
commenter states that with respect to CFE bitcoin futures, the futures
market caused the underlying spot market prices between August/November
2018 and June 2019, and that there was no evidence of causality running
from the spot market to the futures market.\188\ This commenter further
states that with respect to CME bitcoin futures, there was a very short
causality episode that ran from spot prices to futures prices between
March and June 2019, but that such episodes in which causality runs
from the spot market to futures prices are short and occasionally bi-
directional.\189\ According to this commenter, except for some short
periods, the ``overwhelming evidence'' is that bitcoin futures prices
cause or lead bitcoin spot prices, as one would expect in an
informationally efficient market.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ See id. (citing Yang Hu et al., What Role Do Futures
Markets Play in Bitcoin Pricing? Causality, Cointegration and Price
Discovery From a Time-Varying Perspective, Aug. 26, 2019, available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3442706).
    \186\ The Commission notes that CFE ceased offering new bitcoin
futures contracts as of March 2019. See New CFE Products Being Added
in March 2019--Update, Cboe (Mar. 14, 2019), available at https://markets.cboe.com/resources/product_update/2019/New-CFE-Products-Being-Added-in-March-2019-Update.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
    \187\ See Letter from Dr. Yang Hu, Dr. Greg (Yang) Hou, &
Professor Les Oxley (Jan. 7, 2020).
    \188\ See id.
    \189\ See id.
    \190\ See id. This commenter also states that the bitcoin
futures markets dominate the price discovery process using a time-
varying version of an information share measure of two types, and
that both types indicate that bitcoin price discovery takes place in
the futures market rather than the spot market. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Sponsor also asserts that trade volume and trade size can be
determinants of price discovery, and that the Constituent Platforms
have a higher average trade volume than the CME bitcoin futures market,
while the average size of trades on the CME bitcoin futures market is
much larger than the average size of trades on the

Constituent Platforms.\191\ According to the Sponsor, a relative number
of small trades in a given bitcoin market is statistically
insignificant for purposes of price discovery.\192\ The Sponsor argues
that the average trade size on the CME futures market facilitates its
lead in price discovery versus the Constituent Platforms.\193\ The
Sponsor also states that the trading volume of the CME bitcoin futures
market is higher than the trading volume on each Constituent Platform
when considered individually, and that this also facilitates price
discovery within the futures market.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 22-23.
    \192\ See id. at 23.
    \193\ See id.
    \194\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Constituent Platforms as a Regulated Market of Significant Size
    The Sponsor also asserts that the Constituent Platforms constitute
a regulated market of significant size and that surveillance-sharing
agreements are in place to give NYSE Arca the ability to obtain the
information necessary to detect and deter market manipulation.\195\ The
Constituent Platforms compose a market of significant size, according
to the Sponsor, because there is a reasonable likelihood that a would-
be manipulator would have to trade on the Constituent Platforms to
successfully manipulate the Shares.\196\ The Sponsor states that
trading data from the Constituent Platforms is used to derive the
Bitcoin Reference Rate and the Bitcoin Reference Rate is used by the
Trust to value the Trust's bitcoin assets.\197\ Therefore, according to
the Sponsor, the most direct way to attempt to manipulate the Shares is
to manipulate the Constituent Platforms and thereby manipulate the
price of bitcoin utilized by the Trust to value its assets.\198\ The
Sponsor further states that potential countervailing forces in the CME
futures market make it more difficult to manipulate the Constituent
Platforms, and therefore a would-be manipulator would likely need to
trade in the CME bitcoin futures market and on the Constituent
Platforms.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 10-19. See also
Notice, 84 FR at 56226 (asserting that the CME bitcoin futures
market alone or as a group of markets together with the Constituent
Platforms is a ``market of significant size'').
    \196\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12.
    \197\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12; Notice, 84 FR at
56227.
    \198\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12; Notice, 84 FR at
56227. See also Notice, 84 FR at 56227 n.57 (stating that
manipulating the Bitcoin Reference Rate must entail manipulating the
price data at one or more Constituent Platforms).
    \199\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Sponsor asserts that the Constituent Platforms are regulated
because each of the Constituent Platforms uses established, non-
discretionary methods under which orders interact with each other and
buyers and sellers entering such orders must agree to these terms, and
each of the Constituent Platforms is regulated by federal and state
regulators.\200\ The Sponsor states that the Constituent Platforms are
each registered with FinCEN as an MSB, and that as a result the
Constituent Platforms must fully comply with BSA and AML
requirements.\201\ According to the Sponsor, the CFTC has jurisdiction
to police fraud and manipulation in the cash or spot markets, including
the Constituent Platforms, and the CME has executed contracts with the
Constituent Platforms to explicitly adhere to the regulations.\202\ The
Sponsor states that the Constituent Platforms are subject to regulatory
oversight by the FCA because CF Benchmarks is a registered benchmark
administrator under the EU BMR, and CF Benchmarks has executed
contracts with the Constituent Platforms to explicitly adhere to those
regulations, which include requirements designed to detect manipulation
of a benchmark.\203\ With respect to the rules concerning the processes
of the Constituent Platforms, the Sponsor states that these rules must
be in line with CME standards for inclusion in the reference rate
calculation.\204\ The Sponsor states that these non-discretionary rules
explicitly address manipulation and fraudulent activity, and that these
rules and the review of such rules by CF Benchmarks are comparable to
those used by national securities exchanges or the futures exchanges
associated with the underlying assets of the commodity-trust ETPs
approved to date.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12.
    \201\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12. See also supra
notes 77-79 and accompanying text. The Sponsor also states that this
is consistent with recent FATF guidance that directs certain
platforms, including the Constituent Platforms, to comply with AML
regulations. See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12. See also
supra note 78.
    \202\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 12-13. See also
supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
    \203\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 13. See also supra
notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
    \204\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 13. See also id. at
16-17 (stating that the CME Committee is responsible for overseeing
the Bitcoin Reference Rate's methodology and calculation process and
providing effective oversight of CF Benchmarks as it relates to the
Bitcoin Reference Rate, and that the scope of this oversight
includes CF Benchmarks' manipulation surveillance).
    \205\ See id. at 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Sponsor states that to be eligible for consideration as a
Constituent Platform, a platform must comply with specific eligibility
criteria established by CF Benchmarks, which provides each Constituent
Platform with all material trade information, including information
that can identify customers placing trades.\206\ The Sponsor states
that the Constituent Platforms must make trade data and order book data
available to CF Benchmarks, have controls and processes in place
against, among other things, market abuse, and ensure that the data
provided to CF Benchmarks accurately represents the prices that were
available or traded on their trading venues at the relevant times.\207\
CF Benchmarks and the CME Committee, according to the Sponsor, monitor
each Constituent Platform for continued compliance with these
requirements.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 14 (stating that a
platform must (i) have policies in place that ensure fair and
transparent market conditions at all times; (ii) have processes in
place to identify and impede illegal, unfair, or manipulative
trading practices; and (iii) comply with applicable laws and
regulations, including regulations concerning capital markets, money
transmission, client money custody, KYC, and AML). See also id. at
16 (stating that CF Benchmarks is independently tasked with
overseeing each Constituent Platform for potential manipulation and
that that this responsibility includes establishing appropriate
monitoring processes and procedures to identify attempted
manipulation or manipulative behavior and reporting any such
incidents to the CME Committee in a timely manner).
    \207\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 14-15. See also id.
at 18-19. The Sponsor asserts that the ability of a Constituent
Platform to fully share relevant trade data, not just with CF
Benchmarks, but also publicly, is an integral factor on whether to
include a platform as a Constituent Platform for purposes of the
Bitcoin Reference Rate. See id. at 15.
    \208\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 15. NYSE Arca states
that the BRR Calculation Agent receives trading data from the
Constituent Platforms through its API, noting that ``[CF Benchmarks]
will have primary responsibility for all of the following in respect
of Bitcoin Pricing Products: . . . Establishing appropriate
monitoring processes and procedures designed to identify any
breaches of these Practice Standards and any attempted manipulation
or manipulative behavior and reporting any such incidents to the
[CME Committee] in a timely manner.'' See Notice, 84 FR at 56227
n.58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Sponsor and NYSE Arca also state that each Constituent Platform
is required to enter into data-sharing agreements with the CME.\209\
The Sponsor states that, through these surveillance-sharing agreements,
the

CME receives information related to customer identification, trade
data, order book data, and other relevant information and data.\210\
Thus, the Sponsor and NYSE Arca assert that the CME can effectively
share any information that it receives from the Constituent Platforms
with NYSE Arca and this arrangement satisfies the requirement that a
listing exchange have surveillance-sharing agreements in place with
such markets.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56227 (stating that the Constituent
Platforms must also cooperate with inquiries and investigations of
regulators and CF Benchmarks and submit each of its clients to its
KYC procedures); Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 15. The Sponsor
asserts that this requirement of cooperation would allow NYSE Arca
to directly request from each Constituent Platform any information
that may be relevant to detecting potential manipulation. See
Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 17.
    \210\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 15.
    \211\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 16. See also Notice,
84 FR at 56227 (stating that CME and NYSE Arca would be able, in the
case of any suspicious trades, to discover all material trade
information including the identities of the customers placing the
trades).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the Sponsor asserts that the Commission, the CFTC, and
the FCA have a long-standing history of consultation, cooperation, and
information sharing in relation to the securities markets.\212\ As
such, the Commission, according to the Sponsor, would be able to access
any information regarding an attempt at manipulating the Constituent
Platforms by requesting such information from the FCA.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 18 (stating that the
FCA is obligated to take appropriate steps to cooperate with
oversees regulators, including the Commission).
    \213\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Whether Trading in the ETP Would Be the Predominant Influence on
Prices in the Relevant Market
    The second component of the Commission's interpretation of the term
``market of significant size'' is that it is unlikely that trading in
the ETP would be the predominant influence on prices in the market of
significant size.\214\ NYSE Arca and the Sponsor assert that it is
unlikely that the Trust would be the predominant influence on prices in
the identified markets of significant size.\215\ The Sponsor asserts
that the three critical factors it used to arrive at this conclusion
are the events causing the Trust to buy or sell bitcoin, the frequency
with which it will do so, and the composition of assets of the
Trust.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
    \215\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56228; Wilshire Phoenix Submission II
at 25.
    \216\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, NYSE Arca and the Sponsor state that the Trust will only buy
and sell bitcoin in connection with the issuance of Shares, the
redemption of Shares by holders, or potentially in connection with
monthly balancing of the Trust's assets.\217\ NYSE Arca and the Sponsor
state that the Trust will not buy or sell bitcoin as a result of
trading of the Shares on NYSE Arca.\218\ The Sponsor asserts that it
structured the Trust in this manner to limit any effect the Trust could
potentially have on the underlying market.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56228; Wilshire Phoenix Submission II
at 25.
    \218\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56228 (asserting that trading the
Shares will therefore not influence the price of bitcoin); Wilshire
Phoenix Submission II at 25.
    \219\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, NYSE Arca and the Sponsor state that the Trust will only
redeem Shares and rebalance the Trust on limited occasions and will not
have a daily or continuous effect, or be the predominant influence, on
CME bitcoin futures prices or prices on the Constituent Platforms.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56228; Wilshire Phoenix Submission II
at 25 (stating that the Trust will redeem Shares and rebalance its
assets monthly, with a requirement on a holder of Shares to submit a
notice of redemption at least five business days prior to the
redemption date, and the Trust will only issue Shares in offerings
that will occur from time to time).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, NYSE Arca and the Sponsor state that the Trust's assets
consist of bitcoin and T-Bills and that the presence of T-Bills
reinforces that the Trust would not be the predominant influence on
prices in the CME bitcoin futures market or on the Constituent
Platforms.\221\ According to NYSE Arca, the Sponsor notes that even if
it was possible to influence the price of bitcoin or the Bitcoin
Reference Rate through trading shares of the Trust, the influence of
such trades would be muted by the presence of the T-Bills held by the
Trust.\222\ The Sponsor asserts that the Trust and Shares of the Trust
are imperfect substitutes for bitcoin pricing due to the Trust's T-
Bills component, and that therefore prices of the Shares would not be
an appropriate or accurate proxy for the pricing of stand-alone bitcoin
on the Constituent Platforms or the CME bitcoin futures market.\223\
The Sponsor states that the impact of any issuance of Shares on the
identified markets will be muted relative to the value of the Shares
issued because only a portion of the cash received in connection with
the issuance would be used to purchase bitcoin.\224\ The Sponsor also
states that the Trust's allocation of its bitcoin and T-Bill assets
will change on a monthly basis based on the allocations determined by
the Index, based on the realized volatility of the Bitcoin Reference
Rate; therefore, trading in the Shares will not have a direct effect on
the re-allocation of the Index and thus will not have an impact on the
determination of the Trust to buy or sell bitcoin in connection with
such rebalancing.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56228; Wilshire Phoenix Submission II
at 25.
    \222\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56228.
    \223\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 25.
    \224\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 25.
    \225\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 26. The Sponsor
states that the more volatility that bitcoin exhibits, the lower the
ration of bitcoin to T-Bills in the Index, and the fewer the amount
of bitcoin that the Trust would buy in connection with rebalancing.
See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Analysis
    The record before the Commission does not demonstrate that NYSE
Arca has entered into a surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated
market of significant size related to the underlying assets. As stated
in the Winklevoss Order, as well as the Bitwise Order and Commission
orders considering bitcoin-related trust issued receipts, the
Commission's interpretation of the term ``market of significant size''
depends on the interrelationship between the market with which the
listing exchange has a surveillance-sharing agreement and the proposed
ETP.\226\ This interrelationship must be such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that a person attempting to manipulate the
proposed ETP would also have to trade on that market to successfully
manipulate the ETP.\227\ Thus, a surveillance-sharing agreement must be
entered into with a ``significant market'' to assist in detecting and
deterring manipulation of the ETP, because a person attempting to
manipulate the ETP is reasonably likely to also engage in trading
activity on that ``significant market.'' NYSE Arca and the Sponsor do
not challenge this standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ See Winklevoss Order, 83 FR at 37594; Bitwise Order, 84 FR
at 55410; ProShares Order, 83 FR at 43936; GraniteShares Order, 83
FR at 43925; Direxion Order, 83 FR at 43914.
    \227\ See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission first considers assertions by NYSE Arca and the
Sponsor that the CME bitcoin futures market constitutes such a market
and concludes that the record does not demonstrate that there is a
reasonable likelihood that a person attempting to manipulate the
proposed ETP would have to trade on the CME bitcoin futures market to
successfully manipulate the proposed ETP, nor does it demonstrate that
it is unlikely that trading in the proposed ETP would be the
predominant influence on prices in that market. The Commission then
considers assertions regarding the Constituent Platforms. NYSE Arca has
not entered into a surveillance-sharing agreement with any Constituent
Platform and the record does not demonstrate that the regulation of the
Constituent Platforms is sufficient to constitute a ``regulated
market.'' Therefore, the Commission concludes that NYSE Arca's
relationship with the Constituent

Platforms likewise does not satisfy the standard through which the
listing exchange for a proposed ETP may satisfy its obligations under
Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act.
(i) CME as a Regulated Market of Significant Size
(A) Reasonable Likelihood
    Regarding the CME bitcoin futures market, while the Commission
recognizes that the CFTC regulates the CME futures market, the evidence
that NYSE Arca and the Sponsor present, including that concerning the
relative size of the bitcoin futures market and the relationship
between prices in the spot and futures markets, does not, as explained
further below, establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that a
person attempting to manipulate the proposed ETP would also have to
trade on the CME to successfully manipulate the ETP. Therefore, the
record does not establish that the CME bitcoin futures market
constitutes a ``market of significant size'' in the context of the
proposed ETP.
    The Sponsor's assertions about the size of the bitcoin futures
market, either as compared to the size of the segment of the spot
market composed of the Constituent Platforms or as compared to the
futures market for other commodities, do not establish that the bitcoin
futures market is significant.\228\ As stated above, the Commission's
interpretation of the term ``market of significant size'' depends on
the interrelationship between the market with which the listing
exchange has a surveillance-sharing agreement and the proposed
ETP.\229\ The Sponsor's assertions regarding the size of the CME
bitcoin futures market, either in an absolute sense or in relation to
other futures markets that underlie existing ETPs, are not sufficient
to establish an interrelationship between the CME bitcoin futures
market and the proposed ETP.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \228\ See supra notes 171-173. The Sponsor asserts that the
trading volume on the CME bitcoin futures market is greater than the
EUA futures market underlying the AirShares EU Carbon Allowances
Fund. See Wilshire Phoenix Submission III at 2. Wilshire Phoenix
Submission III is improperly focused on the absolute size of the
futures market and the length of existence of the futures market for
purposes of establishing its significance.
    \229\ See supra note 226.
    \230\ See Bitwise Order, 84 FR at 55410.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Likewise, the Sponsor's comparisons to approvals of ETPs that hold
futures contracts and for which the listing exchanges entered into
surveillance-sharing agreements with regulated, significant markets
trading those futures contracts are inapposite and do not establish the
CME bitcoin futures market's significance.\231\ First, in the approval
orders cited by the Sponsor the Commission noted a number of factors
supporting its findings that surveillance-sharing agreements were in
place with significant regulated markets. For example, the approval
order for the AirShares EU Carbon Allowances Fund stated ``the Exchange
has an information sharing agreement in place with ICE Futures for the
purpose of providing information in connection with trading in, or
related to, futures contracts traded on ICE Futures.'' \232\ In the
case of the iShares GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust the Commission
specifically addressed whether the futures on which the ETP was based,
which were futures on an index of well-established commodity futures,
were illiquid or susceptible to manipulation and concluded, as the
Sponsor concedes, that the requirements of Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5)
had been met because, among other things, the ETP's listing exchange
had a comprehensive surveillance-sharing agreement not only with the
regulated market for the index futures, but also with the regulated
markets for the component futures.\233\ And as concerns the Breakwave
Dry Bulk Shipping ETF, the Commission specifically found, as the
Sponsor also concedes, that the exchange would be able to ``share
surveillance information with a significant regulated market for
trading futures on dry bulk freight.'' \234\ Second, unlike the ETPs
that were the subject of the approvals cited by the Sponsor, the
proposed ETP would hold bitcoin as assets, not futures contracts, and
the comparisons made by the Sponsor do not establish that an actor
attempting to manipulate the price of the proposed ETP's assets would
be reasonably likely to trade in the regulated bitcoin futures market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission III at 2-4 (citing to
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 57838 (May 20, 2008), 73 FR
30649 (May 28, 2008) (SR-NYSEArca-2008-09) (order approving listing
of shares of the AirShares EU Carbon Allowances Fund); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 54013 (June 16, 2006), 71 FR 36372 (June
26, 2006) (SR-NYSE-2006-17) (order approving listing of shares of
iShares GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust); Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 82390 (Dec. 22, 2017), 82 FR 61625 (Dec. 28, 2017) (SR-
NYSEArca-2017-107) (order approving listing of shares of the
Breakwave Dry Bulk Shipping ETF).
    \232\ 73 FR at 30652.
    \233\ See 71 FR at 36379. The Commission distinguished the
iShares GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust in previous orders concerning
proposals to list bitcoin-based trust issued receipts. See
GraniteShares Order, 83 FR at 43927 n.39; Direxion Order, 83 FR at
43916 n.40; ProShares Order, 83 FR at 43938 n.37. The Sponsor also
asserts that it was ``highly likely'' that trading in this ETP would
be a predominant influence on the price of the index futures. See
Wilshire Phoenix Submission III at 3 n.13. However, the Sponsor
offers no data or evidence to support this contention. And in any
event, the Commission in that previous order rejected such a
contention. See 71 FR at 36379.
    \234\ See 82 FR at 61633-34. The Commission distinguished the
Breakwave Dry Bulk Shipping ETF in a previous order concerning a
proposal to list bitcoin-based trust issued receipts. See
GraniteShares Order, 83 FR at 43930 n.87. The Sponsor also asserts
that as compared to the CME bitcoin futures market, the freight
futures market is conducted through ``a largely unregulated network
of brokers.'' See Wilshire Phoenix Submission III at 3-4. However,
the Commission specifically noted in the approval order that all
freight futures are listed and cleared through a number of regulated
futures exchanges, including the CME. See 82 FR at 61629.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence in the record also does not support a conclusion that
price formation on the CME bitcoin futures market leads the bitcoin
spot market in such a manner that the CME bitcoin futures market is a
``market of significant size.'' As the Commission has previously
stated, establishing a lead-lag relationship between the bitcoin
futures market and the spot market is central to understanding whether
it is reasonably likely that a would-be manipulator of the ETP would
need to trade on the bitcoin futures market to successfully manipulate
prices on those spot platforms that feed into the proposed ETP's
pricing mechanism.\235\ In particular, if the spot market leads the
futures market, this would indicate that it would not be necessary to
trade on the futures market to manipulate the proposed ETP, even if
arbitrage worked efficiently, because the futures price would move to
meet the spot price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ See Bitwise Order, 84 FR at 55411.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Sponsor asserts that its analysis indicates ``that
futures contracts contributed more to price formation than spot,'' the
Sponsor has not provided sufficient details supporting this conclusion,
and unquestioning reliance by the Commission on representations in the
record is an insufficient basis for approving a proposed rule change in
circumstances where, as here, the proponent's assertion would form such
an integral role in the Commission's analysis and the assertion is
subject to several challenges.\236\ For example, the Sponsor has not
provided sufficient information explaining its underlying analysis,
including detailed information on the analytic methodology used, the
specific time period analyzed, or any information that would enable the
Commission to evaluate whether the findings are statistically
significant or time varying.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ See Susquehanna, 866 F.3d at 447.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Sponsor has not assessed the possible influence
that spot market platforms not included among

the Constituent Platforms may have on the proposed ETP's pricing
mechanism. The record does not demonstrate that the Sponsor addressed
whether or not there is any lead/lag relation between prices on the
Constituent Platforms and prices on other bitcoin spot market platforms
or where price formation occurs as between the Constituent Platforms
and the rest of the spot market.\237\ The Commission thus cannot agree
with the Sponsor's assertion that its analysis demonstrates that it is
reasonably likely that a would-be manipulator of the proposed ETP would
transact on the CME bitcoin futures market absent additional
information supporting such an assertion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The academic literature on the lead-lag relationship between
bitcoin spot and futures markets is unsettled.\238\ Contrary to the
Sponsor's assertion, the academic evidence on this topic is, in fact,
mixed, and thus the Commission cannot conclude--based solely on the
papers cited by the Sponsor in relatively new markets--that it is
reasonably likely that a would-be manipulator of the proposed ETP would
transact on the CME bitcoin futures market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ See infra notes 239-244 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the findings of the papers cited by the Sponsor are
responsive to choices made regarding time period, futures contracts,
spot market platforms, spot market prices, and analytic methodologies
that do not sufficiently establish the general proposition that the CME
bitcoin futures market leads the spot market such that the CME bitcoin
futures market is ``significant'' for purposes of this proposal.
Indeed, the findings of the cited studies run counter to those of other
studies that have analyzed the lead-lag relationship between the
bitcoin spot and futures markets. For example, a study on this topic
that was published in a peer reviewed journal found that the spot
market price leads the CME futures price.\239\ A working (that is,
nonpublished and non-peer reviewed) paper cited by the Sponsor for the
proposition that the futures market prices lead the spot market
surmises that its findings differ from this published study because of
choices regarding the particular spot prices and futures contracts used
in the two analyses.\240\ However, another working paper cited by the
Sponsor followed a similar approach, yet arrived at a different
conclusion, finding that price discovery measures vary significantly
over time without one market being clearly dominant over the
other.\241\ Moreover, this second working paper found that the spot
market was the leading market during the months at the end of the
sample period, which concluded in March of 2019.\242\ The documented
time variation from this study also limits the reliability of the
findings of another working paper cited by the Sponsor which used only
two months of data to support its results.\243\ This data choice limits
the applicability of its results to other time periods. The Commission
concludes that, in light of the mixed results found in these academic
studies, the Sponsor has not demonstrated that the bitcoin futures
market constitutes a market of significant size.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ See D. Baur & T. Dimpfl, Price discovery in Bitcoin spot
or futures?, 39 J. Futures Mkts. 803 (2019).
    \240\ See Alexander & Heck at 24.
    \241\ See Entrop et al. Figure 1 of this working paper shows
that price discovery measures of the spot market fluctuate between
15% and more than 80%. Such a fluctuation could suggest that the
market has not yet found its natural equilibrium.
    \242\ See id. at 2. The record does not include evidence to
explain why, because this shift occurred at the end of the study
period, it would not indicate a shift toward prices in the spot
market leading the futures market that would be expected to persist
into the future.
    \243\ See Mizrach & Aleti.
    \244\ The Commission notes that two other papers cited by the
Sponsor utilize daily spot market prices, as opposed to intraday
prices. See Kapar & Olmo; Hu et al. In seeking to draw conclusions
regarding which market leads price discovery, studies based on daily
price data may not be able to distinguish which market incorporates
new information faster, because the time gap between two consecutive
observations in the data samples could be longer than the typical
information processing time in such markets. The Sponsor has not
provided evidence to support the assertion that daily price data is
sufficiently able to capture information flows in the bitcoin
market. Furthermore, one study that used daily trading data found
inconclusive evidence that futures prices lead bitcoin spot market
prices. For example, for a period of time spanning over 20% of the
study, prices in the bitcoin spot market led futures market prices.
Such time inconsistency in the direction of price discovery could
suggest that the market has not yet found its natural equilibrium.
Moreover, this period spanned the end of the study period and the
record does not include evidence to explain why this would not
indicate a shift towards prices in the spot market leading the
futures market that would be expected to persist into the future.
See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, none of the papers cited by the Sponsor assesses the
possible influence that spot market platforms not included among the
Constituent Platforms may have on bitcoin prices on the Constituent
Platforms or the bitcoin futures prices. Specifically, the papers cited
by the Sponsor do not address whether or not there is any lead/lag
relation between prices on the Constituent Platforms in particular and
prices on other bitcoin spot market platforms or where price formation
occurs as between the Constituent Platforms and the rest of the spot
market.\245\ Accordingly, the Commission cannot conclude that the
papers cited by the Sponsor establish that it is reasonably likely that
a would-be manipulator of the proposed ETP would transact on the CME
bitcoin futures market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, neither the Sponsor, nor NYSE Arca, has provided
sufficient data to support their contentions that comparative trade
volumes and trade sizes between the CME bitcoin futures market and the
Constituent Platforms are evidence that prices on the bitcoin futures
market lead the relevant spot markets.\246\ For example, the Sponsor
neither provided any explanation nor otherwise demonstrated that
comparatively larger average trade sizes suggest that one market's
prices lead those of another. Thus, the evidence provided concerning
trade volumes and trade sizes does not demonstrate that the futures
market leads the relevant segment of the spot market such that it would
establish a reasonable likelihood that a would-be manipulator of the
ETP would need to trade on the bitcoin futures market to successfully
manipulate prices on those spot platforms that feed into the proposed
ETP's pricing mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \246\ See supra notes 191-194.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission is not persuaded by the Sponsor's citations
to academic studies about the interrelationship of spot and futures
markets for other asset classes,\247\ because NYSE Arca has the burden
of showing that the relevant market at issue here--the bitcoin futures
market--is of significant size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ See supra note 181.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(B) Predominant Influence
    The record similarly does not establish that NYSE Arca has
satisfied the second aspect of the assessment of significance, as NYSE
Arca and the Sponsor have not sufficiently supported the Sponsor's
assertions that it is unlikely that trading in the proposed ETP would
become the predominant influence on prices in either the Constituent
Platforms or the CME bitcoin futures market.\248\ The Sponsor's
assertions about the potential effect of issuances or redemptions on
trading in the bitcoin spot market are speculative and the Sponsor has
not provided any analysis to support its assertions concerning, for
example, whether it is possible for issuances or redemptions to be of
such size that it would be the

predominant influence on prices in the Constituent Platforms. Moreover,
in the Trust's Registration Statement, the Sponsor acknowledges that
its buying activity, as a result of issuances or rebalances, as well as
its selling activity, as a result of redemptions or rebalances, may
cause the price of bitcoin to increase or decrease.\249\ Furthermore,
the Sponsor states that because there is no limit on the number of
bitcoin that the Trust may acquire, growth of the Trust could have an
impact on the supply and demand of bitcoin.\250\ Thus, the Commission
cannot conclude based on the Sponsor's statements that its trading in
the ETP would not be the predominant influence on prices in the
Constituent Platforms absent any evidence or analysis in support of the
Sponsor's assertions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ See supra notes 215-225 and accompanying text.
    \249\ See Registration Statement at 31.
    \250\ See id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is also not persuaded by the Sponsor's assertions
that the proposed ETP would not be the predominant influence on prices
in the relevant market because the Trust will only purchase or sell
bitcoin at certain specified dates, as opposed to on a daily or
continuous basis, and pursuant to specific Index allocations. As stated
in the Winklevoss Order, this component of the interpretation of
significance concerns the influence on prices from trading in the
proposed ETP, which is broader than just trading by the proposed ETP.
While the Trust might only transact in the bitcoin market on certain
specified dates, the proposed ETP will be traded in the secondary
market in the interim. The record does not establish the potential
effect of the ETP's trade prices on prices for either bitcoin or
bitcoin futures. For example, the Sponsor does not provide any data or
analysis about the potential effect the quotations or trade prices of
the proposed ETP might have on market-maker quotations in bitcoin
futures contracts and whether those effects would constitute a
predominant influence on the prices of those futures contracts.
    Lastly, the Sponsor asserts that, because the Trust will also hold
T-Bills it is an imperfect substitute for bitcoin pricing and that its
impact on bitcoin markets will be muted. But this assertion is not
supported by evidence or analysis regarding the value and size of the
Trust's bitcoin holdings and whether that may likely be the predominant
influence on prices notwithstanding that the Trust will also own T-
Bills. Irrespective of the weighting of the Trust's two components,
there is no cap on the notional amount of bitcoin that the Trust may
hold. The record does not include any analysis regarding whether the
notional amount of bitcoin held by the Trust would be of such size that
it would be the predominant influence on prices in the underlying
market. To that end, the Commission reiterates that the Sponsor states
that, because there is no limit on the number of bitcoin the Trust may
acquire, growth of the Trust could have an impact on the supply and
demand of bitcoin.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, the Commission cannot conclude that, based on the current
record, the CME bitcoin futures market is a ``market of significant
size,'' such that NYSE Arca would be able to rely on surveillance-
sharing with the CME to provide sufficient protection against
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.
(ii) Constituent Platforms as a Regulated Market of Significant Size
    The Commission is not persuaded by the Sponsor's contention that
NYSE Arca has satisfied the requirements of Section 6(b)(5) of the
Exchange Act because the Constituent Platforms constitute a regulated
market of significant size and the CME, as well as other entities, can
obtain information regarding trading activity on the Constituent
Platforms and then share that information with NYSE Arca pursuant to
NYSE Arca's surveillance-sharing agreement with the CME, or through
other means. As discussed above, the Commission concludes that the
record does not establish that the Constituent Platforms are subject to
a level of regulation comparable to that of a national securities
exchange or to futures exchanges, and as such, the Constituent
Platforms do not constitute a regulated market.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ See supra Section III.B.1(a)(ii)(B) for a discussion of
the Commission's conclusion that the Constituent Platforms are not
regulated in a manner equivalent to that of a national securities
exchange or a futures exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, even if the Constituent Platforms were ``regulated,''
the record would not support a conclusion that NYSE Arca has
demonstrated that it has satisfied Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act
because NYSE Arca concedes that it has not entered into bilateral
surveillance-sharing agreements with the Constituent Platforms. NYSE
Arca represents that it has entered into surveillance-sharing
agreements with the CME, through which the Sponsor asserts would be
able to obtain certain information from the Constituent Platforms by
virtue of data-sharing agreements the CME has entered into with the
Constituent Platforms.\253\ As the Commission has previously stated, a
surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated, significant market
facilitates the ETP listing exchange's ability to obtain the necessary
information to detect and deter such manipulative misconduct.\254\
Here, NYSE Arca has not entered into bilateral surveillance-sharing
agreements with the Constituent Platforms and therefore NYSE Arca lacks
a surveillance-sharing agreement that could be sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Exchange Act as set forth in the Winklevoss
Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
    \254\ See Winklevoss Order, 83 FR at 37549.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is also not convinced by the Sponsor's assertion
that the Constituent Platforms must make trade data and order book data
publicly available in order for the platform to be included in the
Bitcoin Reference Rate.\255\ Trade data and order book data only
represent a small subset of the information that the Commission has
said represent the hallmarks of a surveillance-sharing agreement.\256\
For example, the Constituent Platforms do not make information
regarding clearing activity or customer identity publicly available.
Accordingly, the record does not establish that NYSE Arca would have
access to necessary information to detect and deter fraudulent and
manipulative activity through the data that the Sponsor asserts is
publicly available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ See supra note 207.
    \256\ See Winklevoss Order, 83 FR at 37592-93.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, a surveillance-sharing agreement with the spot bitcoin
platforms at issue here would not be a sufficient substitute for such
an agreement with a futures market, because the spot platforms at issue
here lack the ability of a self-regulatory organization to discipline
its members to compel compliance with surveillance-sharing
requirements.\257\ Accordingly, the Commission cannot conclude that a
surveillance-sharing agreement between NYSE Arca and CME satisfies the
requirements of the Exchange Act if the regulated market of significant
size is not, in fact, the CME, but rather is the Constituent Platforms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ See Bitwise Order, 84 FR at 55393, 55411 n.478.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also is not persuaded by the Sponsor's assertions
that NYSE Arca has satisfied the requirements of the Exchange Act by
virtue of the Commission's ability to obtain information from other
Federal and international regulators.\258\ First, the requirements of
Section 6(b)(5) of

the Exchange Act apply to the rules of national securities exchanges.
As the Commission previously explained, MOUs with foreign or domestic
regulators are tools to assist the Commission in performing its
regulatory functions, not a mechanism for the Commission to assume an
SRO's obligations under the Exchange Act.\259\ Accordingly, the
relevant obligation for a surveillance-sharing agreement resides with
the listing exchange, not the Commission. When a listing exchange
enters into a surveillance-sharing agreement, such agreement
establishes the exchange's ability to obtain relevant information to
detect and deter manipulation in furtherance of the listing exchange's
obligation to ensure that its rules are designed to prevent fraudulent
and manipulative acts and practices. Absent evidence in the record
demonstrating that the listing exchange has satisfied its obligations,
the Commission cannot approve a proposed ETP for listing and trading on
a national securities exchange. Second, the Commission's ability to
obtain information from other regulators is not a factor that affects
whether an exchange needs to enter into a surveillance-sharing
agreement with a regulated market of significant size for purposes of
detecting and deterring fraud or manipulation. Indeed, in prior
instances where the Commission has relied on the existence of
surveillance-sharing agreements in approving ETPs, the Commission's
ability to obtain relevant information from other regulatory
authorities was not impeded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \258\ See supra note 213.
    \259\ See Winklevoss Order, 83 FR at 37591.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, because (1) the Constituent Platforms are not ``regulated
markets'' and (2) because NYSE Arca has not entered into a
surveillance-sharing agreement with the Constituent Platforms, the
Commission does not reach the question of whether the Constituent
Platforms constituent a market of significant size.
    The Commission recognizes that, over time, bitcoin-related
markets--including bitcoin futures markets--may continue to grow and
develop. Should circumstances or conditions change in a manner that
affects the Exchange Act analysis, the Commission would then have an
opportunity to consider whether such a bitcoin ETP would be consistent
with the requirements of the Exchange Act.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ See supra at p.8; Winklevoss Order, 83 FR at 37580;
Bitwise Order, 84 FR at 55411.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Whether NYSE Arca Has Met Its Burden To Demonstrate That the
Proposal Is Consistent With the Protection of Investors and the Public
Interest

    NYSE Arca contends that, if approved, its ETP would protect
investors and the public interest, but the Commission finds that NYSE
Arca has not made such a showing on the current record. The Commission
must consider any potential benefits in the broader context of whether
the proposal meets each of the applicable requirements of the Exchange
Act. And because NYSE Arca has not demonstrated that its proposed rule
change is designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, the Commission must disapprove the proposal.
1. Representations Made and Comments Received
    The Sponsor asserts that the Trust was formed to provide retail
investors with access to bitcoin through a regulated and transparent
investment vehicle.\261\ The Sponsor states that investors in the Trust
will receive full disclosure about the Trust; that the Trust was
created to mitigate the volatility of bitcoin; that the Trust's
structure provides an understandable, efficient, and cost-effective
investment product; that the Trust will utilize qualified custodians
and its bitcoin assets will be covered by the Bitcoin Custodian's
fidelity insurance; that investors in the Trust will be able to trade
the Shares on NYSE Arca and hold them through accounts with Commission-
registered broker-dealers; and that any adviser or broker who
recommends the Shares to a client will be required to undertake a
suitability analysis.\262\ The Sponsor also asserts that the Trust's
monthly redemption schedule increases investor protection by reducing
operational risk, counterparty risk, and other risks.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \261\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission I at 6. See also Notice,
84 FR at 56225.
    \262\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission I at 6-7.
    \263\ See Wilshire Phoenix Submission II at 28-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter states that introducing a digital-asset related ETP
that would be traded on national securities exchanges will benefit the
bitcoin spot market by improving price discovery, reducing volatility,
and diminishing the potential for manipulation and money laundering to
affect bitcoin's price.\264\ The same commenter also asserts that the
ability of market participants to engage in short selling with respect
to digital asset ETPs would bring more information about their
intrinsic value into the market--which would result in a more fair and
orderly market.\265\ This commenter also states that U.S.-traded
digital asset ETPs would facilitate the development of U.S.-traded
derivatives such as options and futures, and that these additional
hedging tools would permit even more information to be incorporated in
digital asset prices.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ See Letter from James J. Angel (Dec. 15, 2019) (``Angel
Letter'') at 2, 6-7.
    \265\ See Angel Letter at 6.
    \266\ See Angel Letter at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Analysis
    As it has in disapproving previous proposals for bitcoin-related
ETPs, the Commission acknowledges that, as compared to trading in
unregulated bitcoin spot markets, trading a bitcoin-based ETP on a
national securities exchange may provide some additional protection to
investors, but the Commission must consider this potential benefit in
the broader context of whether the proposal meets each of the
applicable requirements of the Exchange Act.\267\ Pursuant to Section
19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, the Commission must disapprove a proposed
rule change filed by a national securities exchange if it does not find
that the proposed rule change is consistent with the applicable
requirements of the Exchange Act--including the requirement under
Section 6(b)(5) that the rules of a national securities exchange be
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices.\268\ Thus, even if a proposed rule change would provide
certain benefits to investors and the markets, the proposed rule change
may still fail to meet other requirements under the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ See Winklevoss Order, 83 FR at 37602; GraniteShares Order,
83 FR at 43931; ProShares Order, 83 FR at 43941; Direxion Order, 83
FR at 43919; Bitwise Order, 84 FR at 55413.
    \268\ See 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the reasons discussed above, NYSE Arca has not met its burden
of demonstrating that the proposal is consistent with Exchange Act
Section 6(b)(5),\269\ and, accordingly, the Commission must disapprove
the proposal.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
    \270\ In disapproving the proposed rule change, as modified by
Amendment No. 1, the Commission has considered its impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C.
78c(f). For the reasons discussed throughout, the Commission is
disapproving the proposed rule change because it does not find that
the proposed rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Proposed Amendments to NYSE Arca Rule 8.201-E (Commodity-Based Trust
Shares)

    Rule 8.201-E(c)(1) currently states that Commodity-Based Trust
Shares

may be issued and redeemed for the underlying commodity. NYSE Arca
proposes to amend this rule to also allow issuances and redemptions in
cash, or in a combination of the underlying commodity and cash.\271\
Rule 8.201-E(c)(2) currently states that the term ``commodity'' is
defined in Section 1(a)(4) of the Commodity Exchange Act. NYSE Arca
proposes to update the reference for the definition of the term
``commodity'' to Section 1(a)(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ See Notice, 84 FR at 56220.
    \272\ See id. at 56221.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Representations Made and Comments Received
    NYSE Arca states that the Commission has previously approved
listing and trading on NYSE Arca of Commodity-Based Trust Shares that
permit issuance and redemption of shares for cash in whole or in
part.\273\ NYSE Arca states that it believes that such an alternative
would allow a trust issuing Commodity Based Trust Shares to structure
the procedures for issuance and redemption of shares in a manner that
may provide operational efficiencies and accommodate investors who may
wish to deliver or receive cash rather than the underlying
commodity.\274\ NYSE Arca further asserts that the proposed change will
facilitate the listing and trading of additional types of exchange-
traded derivative securities products that will enhance competition
among market participants, to the benefit of investors and the
marketplace.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ See id. at 56220 & n.11.
    \274\ See id. at 56220.
    \275\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to its proposed change to Rule 8.201-E(c)(2), NYSE Arca
states that the change in cross-reference to the definition of
``commodity'' in the Commodity Exchange Act is to reflect an amendment
to the Commodity Exchange Act included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ See id. at 56221.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Analysis
    The Commission is disapproving the proposed rule change, as
modified by Amendment No. 1, on the basis that NYSE Arca has not
demonstrated that its proposal to list and trade the Shares is
consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act. As such, in this
order the Commission does not reach the question of whether these
proposed amendments to Rule 8.201-E are consistent with the Exchange
Act.

E. Other Comments

    Comment letters also addressed the general nature and uses of
bitcoin; \277\ the state of development of bitcoin as a digital asset;
\278\ the inherent value of, and risks of investing in, bitcoin; \279\
the desire of investors to gain access to bitcoin through an ETP; \280\
the volatility of the spot price of bitcoin and the potential
volatility of the price of the ETP; \281\ the legitimacy or enhanced
regulatory protection that Commission approval of the proposed ETP
might confer upon bitcoin as a digital asset; \282\ the potential
impact of Commission approval of the proposed ETP on the price of
bitcoin and on bitcoin markets; \283\ the level of fees proposed by the
Sponsor; \284\ the role of the U.S. in promoting innovation through
bitcoin; \285\ and the bitcoin network's effect on the
environment.\286\ Ultimately, however, additional discussion of these
topics beyond that included above is unnecessary, as they do not
further bear on the basis for the Commission's decision to disapprove
the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \277\ See Angel Letter at 3.
    \278\ See id. at 14; Letter from Alex Heuer (Oct. 16, 2019);
Letter from James Williams (Dec. 19, 2019).
    \279\ See, e.g., Angel Letter; Thompson Letter; Letter from
Alastair Holdsworth (Dec. 20, 2019).
    \280\ See, e.g., Angel Letter; Letter from Scott Page (July 5,
2019) (``Page Letter'').
    \281\ See, e.g., Notice, 84 FR at 56228.
    \282\ See, e.g., Angel Letter; Page Letter.
    \283\ See, e.g., Angel Letter.
    \284\ See, e.g., Letter from Avinash Shenoy (May 22, 2019).
    \285\ See, e.g., Page Letter.
    \286\ See Thompson Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Conclusion

    For the reasons set forth above, the Commission does not find,
pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, that the proposed
rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange, and in
particular, with Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act.
    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act, that proposed rule change SR-NYSEArca-2019-39, as
modified by Amendment No. 1, is disapproved.

    By the Commission.
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-04294 Filed 3-2-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register: November 26, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 229)]
[Notices]
[Page 72100-72101]
[DOCID:fr26no08-116]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-58973; File No. SR-OPRA-2008-04]

Options Price Reporting Authority; Notice of Filing and Immediate
Effectiveness of Proposed Amendment to the Options Price Reporting
Authority's Policies With Respect to Device-Based Fees

November 18, 2008.
    Pursuant to Section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 608 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on November 12, 2008, the Options Price Reporting Authority (``OPRA'')
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') an
amendment to the Plan for Reporting of Consolidated Options Last Sale
Reports and Quotation Information (``OPRA Plan'').\3\ The proposed
amendment would revise OPRA's ``Policies with Respect to Device-Based
Fees.'' \4\ The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments from interested persons on the proposed OPRA Plan amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78k-1.
    \2\ 17 CFR 242.608.
    \3\ The OPRA Plan is a national market system plan approved by
the Commission pursuant to Section 11A of the Act and Rule 608
thereunder (formerly Rule 11Aa3-2). See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 17638 (March 18, 1981), 22 S.E.C. Docket 484 (March 31,
1981). The full text of the OPRA Plan is available at http://
www.opradata.com.
    The OPRA Plan provides for the collection and dissemination of
last sale and quotation information on options that are traded on
the participant exchanges. The seven participants to the OPRA Plan
are the Boston Stock Exchange, Inc., the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Incorporated, the International Securities Exchange, LLC,
NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc., NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, NYSE Alternext US
LLC, and NYSE Arca, Inc.
    \4\ OPRA most recently amended its Policies with Respect to
Device-Based Fees in File No. SR-OPRA-2007-02, Release No. 34-55455.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Description and Purpose of the Plan Amendment

    The primary purpose of this filing is to amend the language of the
current version of OPRA's Policies with Respect to Device-Based Fees to
confirm their application to third party payment arrangements. A
secondary purpose of this filing is to make a few additional changes in
the Policies.

Background

    OPRA uses the term ``device-based fees'' to refer to fees that are
determined by counting ``devices'' or ``User IDs'' that are enabled to
receive OPRA data. If a person signs a Professional Subscriber
Agreement with OPRA, OPRA collects device-based fees with respect to
the receipt of the data by the Professional Subscriber.\5\ OPRA's
Policies with Respect to Device-Based Fees, as their title suggests,
describe various policies with respect to OPRA's device-based fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ A person may also become an OPRA Professional Subscriber by
entering into a ``Subscriber Agreement'' with a ``Vendor''--an
entity that has entered into a Vendor Agreement with OPRA that
authorizes the entity to redistribute OPRA Data to third persons. If
a person becomes a Professional Subscriber by signing a Subscriber
Agreement with a Vendor, the Vendor pays ``usage-based fees'' to
OPRA. The Policies with Respect to Device-Based Fees are not
relevant to usage-based fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OPRA invoices most Professional Subscribers that pay device-based
fees directly, and the Professional Subscribers pay the device-based
fees directly to OPRA. Some Professional Subscribers establish
arrangements with third parties pursuant to which the third parties
(each, a ``third party payor'') agree to pay OPRA's fees for the
Professional Subscribers' use of OPRA data. This kind of payment
arrangement is usually memorialized using an OPRA form agreement
entitled ``Third Party Billing Agreement.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ OPRA filed its current form of Third Party Billing Agreement
in File No. SR-OPRA-2007-01, Release No. 34-55454.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Primary Purpose of Filing

    The sections of the Policies entitled ``Counting Devices and User
IDs'' and ``Professional Subscriber's Responsibility to Verify
Invoices'' are applicable to device-based fees that a third party payor
has agreed to pay, and OPRA is proposing to add an express statement to
this effect to the Policies.
    The section of the Policies entitled ``Counting Devices and User
IDs'' states a longstanding OPRA policy that OPRA does not require a
Professional Subscriber that pays device-based fees directly to OPRA to
pay more than one fee with respect to any device or User ID that is
enabled to receive OPRA information, even if the device or User ID is
enabled to receive OPRA information from more than one source or
``service.'' OPRA proposes to amend this section to state more
explicitly that OPRA applies this policy on a ``payor by payor'' basis.
For example, if a particular device is receiving data from one service
that is being paid for by the Professional Subscriber and a second
service that is being paid for by a third party payor, OPRA requires
that the Professional Subscriber pay a device-based fee for the device
and that the third party payor also pay a device-based fee for the
device.

Secondary Purpose of Filing

    OPRA is also proposing to amend a paragraph in the Policies that
describes how a Professional Subscriber may count its devices and User
IDs to state explicitly that the paragraph is relevant only to those
Professional Subscribers that have been authorized to enable their own
devices and User IDs to receive OPRA information. OPRA authorizes
Professional Subscribers to enable their own devices and User IDs
pursuant to OPRA's form ``Indirect (Vendor Pass-Through) Circuit
Connection Rider'' or form ``Direct Circuit Connection Rider.'' The
``enablement'' process is controlled, for all other Professional
Subscribers, by the Vendors providing service to these Subscribers, and
for these Subscribers, the Vendors report this information to OPRA and
this paragraph in the Policies is not relevant. OPRA is also proposing
to make a few additional self-explanatory changes in the language of
the Policies.
    The text of the proposed amendment to the OPRA Plan is available at
OPRA, the Commission's Public Reference Room, and http://opradata.com.

II. Implementation of the OPRA Plan Amendment

    Pursuant to paragraph to (b)(3)(iii) of Rule 608 under the Act,\7\
OPRA designated this amendment as one involving solely technical or
ministerial matters thereby qualifying the amendment for effectiveness
upon filing. OPRA states that it will implement the revised form of the
Policies upon filing with the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ 17 CFR 242.608(b)(3)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission may summarily abrogate the amendment within sixty
days of its filing and require refiling and approval of the amendment
by Commission order pursuant to Rule 608(b)(2) under the Act \8\ if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets, to remove impediments to, and
perfect the mechanisms of, a national market system, or otherwise in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ 17 CFR 242.608(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed OPRA
Plan amendment is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by
any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://
www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an e-mail to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File No. SR-OPRA-2008-04 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OPRA-2008-04. This file
number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/
sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed plan amendment that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed plan amendment between the Commission and any person,
other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for inspection
and copying in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours
of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal office of OPRA. All comments
received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit
personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit
only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-OPRA-2008-04 and should be
submitted on or before December 17, 2008.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\9\
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    \9\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(29).
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Florence E. Harmon,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-28090 Filed 11-25-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 238 (Wednesday, December 13, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58615-58617]
[FR Doc No: 2017-26791]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2017-D-6554]

Refuse To File: New Drug Application and Biologics License
Application Submissions to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research;
Draft Guidance for Industry; Availability

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

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SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) is announcing
the availability of a draft guidance for industry entitled ``Refuse to
File: NDA and BLA Submissions to CDER.'' The purpose of this guidance
is to clarify certain circumstances under which FDA's Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER) may refuse to file a new drug
application (NDA) or

supplemental NDA, or a biologics license application (BLA) or
supplemental BLA submitted to CDER, and to underscore the importance of
submitting a complete application to minimize the chance of a refuse-
to-file (RTF) action by FDA.

DATES: Submit either electronic or written comments on the draft
guidance by February 12, 2018 to ensure that the Agency considers your
comment on this draft guidance before it begins work on the final
version of the guidance.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on any guidance at any time as
follows:

Electronic Submissions

    Submit electronic comments in the following way:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments. Comments submitted
electronically, including attachments, to https://www.regulations.gov
will be posted to the docket unchanged. Because your comment will be
made public, you are solely responsible for ensuring that your comment
does not include any confidential information that you or a third party
may not wish to be posted, such as medical information, your or anyone
else's Social Security number, or confidential business information,
such as a manufacturing process. Please note that if you include your
name, contact information, or other information that identifies you in
the body of your comments, that information will be posted on https://www.regulations.gov.
     If you want to submit a comment with confidential
information that you do not wish to be made available to the public,
submit the comment as a written/paper submission and in the manner
detailed (see ``Written/Paper Submissions'' and ``Instructions'').

Written/Paper Submissions

    Submit written/paper submissions as follows:
     Mail/Hand delivery/Courier (for written/paper
submissions): Dockets Management Staff (HFA-305), Food and Drug
Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, Rm. 1061, Rockville, MD 20852.
     For written/paper comments submitted to the Dockets
Management Staff, FDA will post your comment, as well as any
attachments, except for information submitted, marked and identified,
as confidential, if submitted as detailed in ``Instructions.''
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the Docket No.
FDA-2017-D-6554 for ``Refuse to File: New Drug Application and
Biologics License Application Submissions to the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research; Draft Guidance for Industry.'' Received
comments will be placed in the docket and, except for those submitted
as ``Confidential Submissions,'' publicly viewable at https://www.regulations.gov or at the Dockets Management Staff between 9 a.m.
and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday.
     Confidential Submissions--To submit a comment with
confidential information that you do not wish to be made publicly
available, submit your comments only as a written/paper submission. You
should submit two copies total. One copy will include the information
you claim to be confidential with a heading or cover note that states
``THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.'' The Agency will
review this copy, including the claimed confidential information, in
its consideration of comments. The second copy, which will have the
claimed confidential information redacted/blacked out, will be
available for public viewing and posted on https://www.regulations.gov.
Submit both copies to the Dockets Management Staff. If you do not wish
your name and contact information to be made publicly available, you
can provide this information on the cover sheet and not in the body of
your comments and you must identify this information as
``confidential.'' Any information marked as ``confidential'' will not
be disclosed except in accordance with 21 CFR 10.20 and other
applicable disclosure law. For more information about FDA's posting of
comments to public dockets, see 80 FR 56469, September 18, 2015, or
access the information at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-09-18/pdf/2015-23389.pdf.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
the electronic and written/paper comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov and insert the docket number, found in brackets in
the heading of this document, into the ``Search'' box and follow the
prompts and/or go to the Dockets Management Staff, 5630 Fishers Lane,
Rm. 1061, Rockville, MD 20852.
    You may submit comments on any guidance at any time (see 21 CFR
10.115(g)(5)).
    Submit written requests for single copies of the draft guidance to
the Division of Drug Information, Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, Food and Drug Administration, 10001 New Hampshire Ave.,
Hillandale Building, 4th Floor, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002. Send one
self-addressed adhesive label to assist that office in processing your
requests. See the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for electronic
access to the draft guidance document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amalia Himaya, Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, 10903 New
Hampshire Ave., Bldg. 22, Rm. 6439, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002, 301-
796-0700.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    FDA is announcing the availability of a draft guidance for industry
entitled ``Refuse to File: NDA and BLA Submissions to CDER.'' The
purpose of this guidance is to clarify certain circumstances under
which CDER may refuse to file an NDA or supplemental NDA, or a BLA or
supplemental BLA submitted to CDER, and to underscore the importance of
submitting a complete application to minimize the chance of an RTF
action by FDA. Since the early 1990s, in conjunction with the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act, FDA's processes and timelines for
reviewing newly submitted applications have substantially evolved. The
administrative complexity of applications, with corresponding
determinations of completeness, has become more challenging. The
overall goal is to efficiently and effectively review applications, and
thus it is critical to avoid use of resources to review an application
when necessary components are so deficient as to render the application
incomplete. FDA exercises its RTF authority for incomplete applications
to optimize the use of both the applicant's and FDA's resources.
    Incomplete applications, including applications for which minor
components not received within 30 calendar days after receipt of the
original application, as may have been agreed upon at a presubmission
meeting, may be refused for filing.
    This guidance focuses on FDA's policy for refusing to file an NDA
under 21 CFR 314.101(d)(3) because the NDA is incomplete because it
does not on its face contain information required under section 505(b)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)) and 21
CFR 314.50. FDA considers incompleteness to be a basis for refusal to
file for BLAs as well (21 CFR 601.2(a)).
    On May 19, 2017, FDA withdrew its previously published guidance for
industry entitled ``Refusal to File'' (issued July 12, 1993). FDA is
issuing this guidance to update and clarify CDER's procedures for
determining whether an application should be

refused for filing because it is incomplete. This guidance includes
procedures for certain BLAs and supplemental BLAs, given that CDER has
regulatory responsibility for certain therapeutic biological products
subject to licensing under the Public Health Service Act.
    This draft guidance is being issued consistent with FDA's good
guidance practices regulation (21 CFR 10.115). The draft guidance, when
finalized, will represent the current thinking of FDA on refusal to
file NDA and BLA submissions to CDER. It does not establish any rights
for any person and is not binding on FDA or the public. You can use an
alternative approach if it satisfies the requirements of the applicable
statutes and regulations. This guidance is not subject to Executive
Order 12866.

II. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

    This guidance refers to previously approved collections of
information that are subject to review by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-
3520). The collections of information in 21 CFR part 314 have been
approved under OMB control number 0910-0001. The collections of
information in 21 CFR part 601 have been approved under OMB control
number 0910-0338.

III. Electronic Access

    Persons with access to the internet may obtain the draft guidance
at either https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/default.htm or
https://www.regulations.gov.

    Dated: December 7, 2017.
Leslie Kux,
Associate Commissioner for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2017-26791 Filed 12-12-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4164-01-P


UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D. C. 20460 OFFICE OF PREVENTION, PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES August 1, 2002 CERTIFIED MAIL Tom Stommel Dupont Stine Haskell Research Center PO Box 30 Newark, DE 19714 Dear Mr. Stommel:

This is the Environmental Protection Agency's (hereafter referred to as EPA or the Agency) "Report of the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) Tolerance Reassessment Progress and Risk Management Decision (TRED) for Hexazinone," which was approved on August 1, 2002. A Notice of Availability of this tolerance reassessment decision will be published in the Federal Register (FR) shortly.

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended by FQPA, requires EPA to reassess all the tolerances for registered chemicals in effect on or before the date of the enactment of the FQPA, which was August of 1996. In reassessing these tolerances, the Agency must consider, among other things, aggregate risks from non occupational sources of pesticide exposure, whether there is increased susceptibility to infants and children, and the cumulative effects of pesticides with a common mechanism of toxicity. Once a safety finding has been made that aggregate risks are not of concern, the tolerances are considered reassessed. A Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED) for hexazinone was completed in September, 1994, prior to FQPA enactment. Therefore, the tolerances need to be reassessed to meet the FQPA standard.

The Agency has evaluated the dietary risk associated with hexazinone and has determined that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm to any population subgroup will result from aggregate exposure to hexazinone when considering dietary, drinking water, and residential exposure and all other non occupational sources of pesticide exposure for which there is reliable information. There are no registered residential uses for hexazinone.

FQPA requires that EPA consider "available information" concerning the cumulative effects of a particular pesticide's residues and "other substances that have a common mechanism of toxicity." The reason for considering other substances is because of the possibility that low level exposures to multiple chemical substances that cause a common toxic effect by a common mechanism could lead to the same adverse health effect, as would a higher level of exposure to any of the other substances individually. EPA did not perform a cumulative risk assessment as part of this review of hexazinone, 2 because the Agency has not determined that there are any other chemical substances that have a mechanism of toxicity common with that of hexazinone. If EPA identifies other substances that share a common mechanism of toxicity with hexazinone, then a cumulative risk assessment will be conducted that includes hexazinone once the final framework EPA will use for conducting cumulative risk assessments is available. Further, EPA is in the process of developing criteria for characterizing and testing endocrine disrupting chemicals and plans to implement an Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program. Hexazinone will be reevaluated at that time and additional studies may be required.

The Agency's human health findings for the pesticide hexazinone, were discussed in a closure conference call, and are summarized in the enclosed Hexazinone Overview and Hexazinone Summary of the risk assessments. The risk assessments and other documents pertaining to the hexazinone tolerance reassessment decision are available on the Internet at http:// www. epa. gov/ pesticides/ reregistration/ status. htm and are in the public docket for viewing.

The Agency has reassessed all 25 tolerances for hexazinone and can make a FQPA safety determination. Anticipated residues for commodities included in the dietary risk assessment are equal to the tolerance levels and it was assumed that 100% of each crop was treated. Acute and chronic dietary risks from exposure to hexazinone does not exceed the Agency's level of concern. Tolerances for residues of hexazinone in/ on plant, livestock, and processed commodities are currently expressed in terms of the combined residues of hexazinone and its metabolites (calculated as hexazinone).

Because existing data were inadequate to calculate residue estimates for pasture and rangeland grass and grass hay, EPA constructed the maximum theoretical dietary burden (MTDB) of hexazinone to livestock using protective assumptions for the contributions of other hexazinone treated feed items. Thus, tolerances for meats and milk can be reassessed. Additional field trial data for grass forage and grass hay, as well as rotational crop studies for corn and wheat are required. Because of the relatively low volume of use on pasture and rangeland, data from these confirmatory studies are not expected to significantly change current dietary risk estimates. Final tolerances are being proposed as part of this Tolerance Reassessment Decision (TRED). Some revisions to these tolerance values may be needed once the field trial data and rotational crop studies have been submitted to and reviewed by the Agency.

Tolerance Reassessment Summary for Hexazinone.

Commodity Current Tolerance (ppm) a Tolerance Reassessment (ppm) Comment/ Correct Commodity Definition Tolerances presently listed under 40 CFR §180.396( a):

Alfalfa green forage 2.0 2.0 Alfalfa, forage Alfalfa hay 8.0 4.0 Tolerance should be reduced based on re calculation of expected residues. Alfalfa, hay Blueberries 0.2 0.6 Tolerance should be increased based on the combined LOQ (0.55 ppm) of the enforcement method. Blueberry Commodity Current Tolerance (ppm) a Tolerance Reassessment (ppm) Comment/ Correct Commodity Definition 3 Cattle, fat 0.1 Revoke b Cattle, mbyp 0.1 0.1 Cattle, meat 0.1 0.1 Goat, fat 0.1 Revoke b Goat, mbyp 0.1 0.1 Goats, meat 0.1 0.1 Grasses, pasture 10 TBD c Grass, forage Grasses, rangeland 10 TBD c Grass, hay Hog, fat 0.1 Revoke b Hog, mbyp 0.1 Revoke b Hog, meat 0.1 Revoke b Horses, fat 0.1 Revoke b Horses, mbyp 0.1 0.1 Horses, meat 0.1 0.1 Milk 0.5 0.2 Tolerance should be reduced based on re calculation of expected residues.

Pineapple 0.5 0.6 Tolerance should be increased based on the combined LOQ (0.55 ppm) of the enforcement method.

Sheep, fat 0.1 Revoke b Sheep, mbyp 0.1 0.1 Sheep, meat 0.1 0.1 Tolerances needed under 40 CFR §180.396( a):

Alfalfa, seed 2.0 Tolerances presently listed under 40 CFR §180.396( c):

Sugarcane 0.2 0.6 Tolerance should be increased based on the combined LOQ (0.55 ppm) of the enforcement method.

Sugarcane molasses 5.0 4.0 Tolerance should be reduced based on re calculation of expected residues. Commodity Current Tolerance (ppm) a Tolerance Reassessment (ppm) Comment/ Correct Commodity Definition 4 Sugarcane molasses d 5.0 4.0 Tolerance should be reduced based on re calculation of expected residues. a Expressed in terms of the combined residues of hexazinone and its metabolites (calculated as hexazinone). b Tolerances for fat are not required (Category 3, 40 CFR §180.6). c TBD: These tolerances require additional field trial data and may be revised once the data have been submitted to and reviewed by the Agency. d For reassessment counting purposes, the Agency will count the sugarcane molasses tolerances as two reassessments to reflect the tolerances which existed both in 40 CFR Part 185 (185.3575) and Part 186 (186.3575) at the start of FQPA.

No maximum residue limits (MRLs) for hexazinone and its metabolites have been established or proposed by Codex for any agricultural commodity. Therefore, no compatibility questions exist with respect to U. S. tolerances.

Note that you will be sent a Section 3( c)( 2)( B) Data Call In (DCI) letter under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in a separate mailing. If you have questions on this or any of the attached documents, please contact the Chemical Review Manager, Dirk V. Helder, at (703) 305 4610.

Sincerely,

Lois A. Rossi, Director Special Review and Reregistration Division Enclosures: "Hexazinone Overview" and "Hexazinone Summary"


[Federal Register: October 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 194)]
[Notices]
[Page 57320]
[DOCID:fr09oc07-66]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings 1

September 25, 2007.
    Take notice that the Commission has received the following Natural
Gas Pipeline Rate and Refund Report filings:

    Docket Numbers: RP96-312-169.
    Applicants: Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company.
    Description: Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company submits various
negotiated rate agreements with Boston Gas Company.
    Filed Date: 09/20/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070921-0050.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Tuesday, October 2, 2007.

    Docket Numbers: RP96-383-081.
    Applicants: CNG Transmission Corporation, Dominion Transmission,
Inc.
    Description: Dominion Transmission Inc submits Fifth Revised Sheet
1401 to FERC Gas Tariff, Third Revised Volume 1, effective 11/1/07.
    Filed Date: 09/21/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070921-0100.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Wednesday, October 3, 2007.

    Docket Numbers: RP07-567-001.
    Applicants: Crossroads Pipeline Company.
    Description: Crossroads Pipeline Company submits Third Revised
Sheet 73 et al. to FERC Gas Tariff, First Revised Volume 1, effective
9/10/07.
    Filed Date: 09/20/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070920-0138.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Tuesday, October 2, 2007.

    Docket Numbers: RP07-692-001.
    Applicants: Vector Pipeline L.P.
    Description: Vector Pipeline, LP submits a revised tariff sheet to
correct a pagination error in its 9/13/07 submittal of First Revised
Sheet 55 et al. to FERC Gas Tariff, Original Volume 1.
    Filed Date: 09/21/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070924-0373.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Wednesday, October 3, 2007.

    Docket Numbers: RP07-702-000.
    Applicants: National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation.
    Description: National Fuel Gas Supply Corp submits Second Revised
Sheet 376 to FERC Gas Tariff, Fourth Revised Volume 1, effective 10/21/
07.
    Filed Date: 09/21/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070921-0099.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Wednesday, October 3, 2007.

    Docket Numbers: RP07-703-000.
    Applicants: Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C.
    Description: Guardian Pipeline, LLC submits Fourteenth Revised
Sheet 5 to FERC Gas Tariff, Original Volume 1, effective 11/1/07.
    Filed Date: 09/21/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070921-0058.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Wednesday, October 3, 2007.

    Docket Numbers: RP07-704-000.
    Applicants: Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
    Description: Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp submits their Rate
Schedules PAL and ICTS Revenue Sharing Refund Report.
    Filed Date: 09/21/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070924-0372.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Wednesday, October 3, 2007.

    Docket Numbers: RP07-705-000.
    Applicants: Kern River Gas Transmission Company.
    Description: Kern River Gas Transmission Co requests that the
Commission waive an obligation set forth in Article II, Section 1.1 of
the 1998 Settlement Agreement.
    Filed Date: 09/21/2007.
    Accession Number: 20070924-0371.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Wednesday, October 3, 2007.

    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and
385.214) on or before 5 p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment
date. It is not necessary to separately intervene again in a subdocket
related to a compliance filing if you have previously intervened in the
same docket. Protests will be considered by the Commission in
determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to
make protestants parties to the proceeding. Anyone filing a motion to
intervene or protest must serve a copy of that document on the
Applicant. In reference to filings initiating a new proceeding,
interventions or protests submitted on or before the comment deadline
need not be served on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov.
 To facilitate electronic service, persons with Internet

access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and
14 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First St., NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    The filings in the above proceedings are accessible in the
Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in the
above list. They are also available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link
on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail notification
when a document is added to a subscribed dockets(s). For assistance
with any FERC Online service, please e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Acting Deputy Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E7-19760 Filed 10-5-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P