NEI Data Sources 1999 NEI Degreasing Data  Total 2002 NEI Degreasing Data  Total EMISSION_ CALC_ METHOD_ CODE CALCULATION_ METHOD_ DESC Number of Records Number of Records 0 UNKNOWN 2 0 01 CEMS  CONTINUOUS EMISSION MONITORING SYSTEM 0 1 02 ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT 78 20 03 MATERIAL BALANCE 158 198 04 STACK TEST 7 5 05 EPA SPECIATION PROFILE 0 0 06 STATE/ LOCAL SPECIATION PROFILE 0 0 07 MANUFACTURER SPECIFICATION 0 1 08 EPA EMISSION FACTOR 9 21 09 STATE/ LOCAL EMISSION FACTOR 52 1083 10 SITE SPECIFIC EMISSION FACTOR 1 47 11 VENDER EMISSION FACTOR 0 2 12 TRADE GROUP EMISSION FACTOR 0 0 BLANK 1803 362 TOTAL 2110 1740 1999 NEI Degreasing Data  Total 2002 NEI Degreasing Data  Total data_ source Description Number of Records Number of Records I Industry 2002 revision 0 0 L Local agency submittal ( June 2001) 31 35 M1 ESD original submittal ( MACT data) 24 0 M2 ESD 2002 revision ( MACT data) 0 0 N 1996 NTI Data 59 0 S State agency submittal ( June 2001) 1691 1705 S1 State or tribal agency submittal ( Feb 2002) 70 0 S2 State or tribal agency submittal ( June 2002) 45 0 T TRI Data ( 1999) 9 0 L2 Local agency submittal ( June 2002) 2 0 L3 Local agency submittal ( June 2003) 20 0 S3 State or tribal agency submittal ( Feb 2003) 155 0 I2 Industry 2003 revision 0 0 M3 ESD 2003 revisions ( MACT data) 0 0 L1 Local agency submittal ( Feb 2002) 4 0 TOTAL 2110 1740 TABLE 1  EMISSION CALCULATION METHODS FOR 1999 AND 2002 NEI DEGREASING DATA TABLE 2  DATA SOURCES FOR 1999 AND 2002 NEI DEGREASING DATA 8/ 11/ 2006


[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 67 (Friday, April 9, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18523-18525]
[FR Doc No: 2021-07324]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. AD21-10-000]

Modernizing Electricity Market Design; Notice Inviting Post-
Technical Conference Comments

    On March 23, 2021, the Federal Energy Regulation Commission
(Commission) convened a Commissioner-led technical conference to
discuss the role of the capacity market constructs in PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), ISO New England Inc., and New York
Independent System Operator, Inc. in an environment where state
policies increasingly affect resource entry and exit. The technical
conference included the discussion on the implications of retaining the
expanded minimum offer price rule (Expanded MOPR) in the PJM capacity
market, as well as prospective alternative approaches that could
replace PJM's Expanded MOPR.
    All interested persons are invited to file initial and reply post-
technical conference comments on the topics in Parts I and II below.
Commenters may reference material previously filed in this docket,
including the technical conference transcript, but are encouraged to
avoid repetition or replication of previous material. Commenters need
not answer all of the questions, but commenters are encouraged to
organize responses using the numbering and order in the below
questions. Commenters are encouraged to limit their responses to the
questions identified below and not provide significant background or
other material. Initial comments must be submitted on or before April
26, 2021. Reply comments must be submitted on or before May 10, 2021.
Initial comments should not exceed 25 pages and reply comments should
not exceed 15 pages. PJM's initial and reply comments are not subject
to these page limitations.

I. Comments on Supplemental Notice

    We are seeking comments on the topics discussed during the
technical conference, including responses to the questions listed in
the Supplemental Notice issued in this proceeding on

March 16, 2021, in accordance with the deadlines and other guidance
above.

II. Comments on PJM's Capacity Market

    We are also interested in comments regarding PJM's capacity market,
in accordance with the deadlines and other guidance above, as follows:

A. Existing PJM MOPR Implications

    (1) Have circumstances regarding the nature and scope of state
actions to support specific resource types (e.g., new state
legislation, new or revised state subsidies, new or revised standards
such as increased renewable portfolio standards, etc.) changed in the
PJM footprint since the establishment of the Reliability Pricing Model?
If so, should the purpose and goals of the capacity market evolve in
response to this change? Please explain.
    (2) Please explain how the expected quantity of state supported and
non-state supported resources, by resource type, has changed since
2018. Please provide the relevant dates of relevant legislation,
executive actions, rulemakings, and/or other state actions. How is the
Expanded MOPR likely to affect the entry of these resources? Will the
expected impact of the Expanded MOPR change over time? Please explain.
    (3) Is there a particular type or quantity of state supported
resources that are unlikely to clear PJM's capacity market as a result
of PJM's Expanded MOPR, in the near term or in the future? If so,
please provide examples.
    (4) Please explain whether and, if so, how PJM's Expanded MOPR will
result in over-procurement of capacity, or ``surplus capacity'' (i.e.,
capacity in excess of the PJM Installed Reserve Margin), due to reasons
other than the capacity market's sloped demand curve. To the extent the
Expanded MOPR results in surplus capacity, including the delayed
retirement of existing resources, what are the impacts on PJM's
customers? What impact could such surplus capacity have on PJM's energy
and ancillary services markets? How do any such impacts bear on the
Commission's responsibility to ensure just and reasonable rates under
the Federal Power Act?
    (5) Does PJM's Expanded MOPR affect states' willingness to remain
in PJM's capacity market? Does the Expanded MOPR compel states to
choose between relying on PJM's capacity market to meet their resource
adequacy needs and achieving state policies? If so, how? Which states
are relying on or are considering relying on PJM's Fixed Resource
Requirement (FRR), rather than the PJM's capacity market, as a result
of the Expanded MOPR and why?
    (6) Please explain whether the implementation of PJM's Expanded
MOPR has led or may lead to unforeseen impacts, including those
enumerated below:
    a. Several panelists at the conference noted the potential for
greater use of the FRR construct as a result of the Expanded MOPR.
Please explain any potential impacts or concerns from an increased
reliance on PJM's FRR construct in this manner (e.g., adverse impacts
on capacity prices in PJM in zones that remain in the market, the
reduced ability to ensure resource adequacy, etc.).
    b. Does the Expanded MOPR create administrative burdens for PJM,
capacity resource owners, or others? If so, please explain and include
details regarding the difficulties encountered.
    c. Does the Expanded MOPR have any impact on the ability of
resources to engage in private voluntary, bilateral transactions? \1\
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    \1\ Calpine Corporation v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 169 FERC
] 61,239, at P 70 (2019) (``As to whether private, voluntary
bilateral transactions might raise inappropriate subsidy concerns,
we find that the record in the instant proceeding does not
demonstrate a need to subject voluntary, arm's length bilateral
transactions to the MOPR at this time.'') (footnote omitted).
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    (7) What are the benefits of the Expanded MOPR? Please explain.
    (8) Is it appropriate for the Commission to apply a MOPR to address
state actions intended to suppress capacity market prices? Please
explain why or why not?

B. Potential Alternatives to Expanded MOPR in PJM

    (9) Should the Expanded MOPR be revised or eliminated? If so, what,
if any, are any other changes to the PJM Tariff would be necessary or
appropriate? Please explain fully.
    (10) If any changes are made to the MOPR rules, is it necessary or
appropriate to combine those changes with reforms to ensure that
capacity resources are properly accredited for their reliability value?
    (11) Please explain the timeframe in which a proposed replacement
rate could be implemented to avoid delaying the December 2021 Base
Residual Auction.
    (12) Should a MOPR designed to address only buyer-side market power
(i.e., a Targeted MOPR) replace the Expanded MOPR? How should the
Commission determine what constitutes a potential exercise of buyer-
side market power? \2\
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    \2\ For example, a buyer could contract with a seller outside of
the PJM capacity market and direct the seller to submit an offer
below the supplier's cost (e.g., at zero) in the PJM capacity
auction to lower the market clearing price. Such a strategy would
lower the buyer's total capacity procurement costs if the savings
the buyer achieves from the lower market clearing price paid for the
total quantity of capacity the buyer purchased in the PJM capacity
market exceeds the losses (excess costs in this example) the buyer
incurred from the out-of-market contract with the seller.
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    (13) Please explain to which resources a Targeted MOPR should apply
(e.g., only to natural gas-fired resources or to all resource types;
only to new resources or to all new and existing resources).
    (14) Under a Targeted MOPR construct, what exemptions, if any,
should be considered (e.g., self-supply, competitive entry exemptions)?
Please explain.
    (15) For states that choose to achieve resource adequacy outside of
the PJM capacity market, please describe any options (e.g., FRR, self-
supply, etc.) that should be considered for availability to the states.
    a. Should FRR or other self-supply options be modified in any way
to make them more useful to states that wish to reclaim authority for
resource adequacy in order to meet state policies?
    (16) Should load serving entities be able to procure capacity
outside of PJM's capacity market such that PJM would only administer a
residual capacity auction (i.e., an auction that removes demand
procured outside the capacity market from the demand curve and supply
curve would not include capacity procured outside of the capacity
market) to procure the remaining capacity requirements? What rules
should govern such a residual auction? Would a residual auction provide
sufficient incentives for capacity to enter the PJM market when needed
to ensure resource adequacy? Please explain.
    (17) Several panelists at the conference stated that removing the
Expanded MOPR in PJM would not have any adverse impacts on resource
adequacy and in turn reliability. Please explain whether you agree or
disagree with this statement and why.
    (18) Are there differences among the expected short-term,
intermediate term, and long-term effects of removing the Expanded MOPR
on resource adequacy and in turn reliability? Please explain why or why
not.
    (19) Is there a concern that merchant resources may fail to receive
financing due to state supported resource entry in PJM? Please explain
and provide supporting evidence if possible. Please also explain how
this consideration bears on the Commission's responsibilities under the
Federal Power Act.

    a. Should PJM's capacity market address this concern, and if so,
how? Is there an option to address potential financing challenges by
adjusting the parameters that establish the capacity market demand
curve, such as changes to the net cost of new entry (Net CONE)
estimate? For example, Net CONE estimates could be adjusted by reducing
the expected economic life of the reference unit used to establish Net
CONE, increasing the reference unit's cost of capital to reflect higher
risks, or through changes to the shape of the demand curve.
    b. Many state polices related to electric generation (e.g.,
renewable portfolio standards) are specified in statute and include
timelines (often decades into the future) that investors can use to
estimate the timing, type, and quantity of state supported resources
entering PJM's markets and potential market impacts. To what extent
does the transparency of such state polices mitigate or reduce these
risks to merchant resources?
    c. Would a capacity market with a Targeted MOPR provide a
sufficient incentive for capacity to enter the PJM market when needed
to ensure resource adequacy?
    (20) What changes are needed to ensure PJM's energy and ancillary
services markets send appropriate price signals and ensure sufficient
incentives for investment?
    (21) What is FERC's responsibility toward states in the PJM region
that have chosen a state policy of not subsidizing their preferred
resources in light of the competitive capacity market?
    (22) How urgent is the need to reconcile PJM's capacity market
rules and state policies? Could PJM or the Commission adopt a phased
approach with short-term and long-term solutions? For example, could
short-term actions include eliminating the Expanded MOPR and replacing
it with a Targeted MOPR? What long-term solutions are needed, if any?
    For further information, please contact individuals identified for
each topic:

Technical Information, David Rosner, Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>Legal Information, Rebecca J. Michael, Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>
    Dated: April 5, 2021.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-07324 Filed 4-8-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P