be required 5 years after the effective date of the final rule.
    A certificate holder may seek a deviation to allow credit for
related aircraft operating experience and consolidation, recency of
experience and proficiency checking through a deviation request
submitted in accordance with Sec. Sec.  121.434, 121.439, and 121.441
respectively.
    Currently, in accordance with Sec.  121.433(d), a PIC who serves on
more than one aircraft type must complete either recurrent flight
training or a proficiency check on each aircraft type. To ensure PICs
operating multiple aircraft types (whether designated as related or not
designated as related) maintain proficiency on each aircraft type, the
FAA has carried forward the proposal from the SNPRM to require a
proficiency check on each aircraft type in which a PIC serves.
    The recurrent frequency for a PIC proficiency check in this final
rule aligns with the existing recurrent checking frequency of 12
months. The agency does not believe this requirement results in any
additional burden or cost to a certificate holder. Section 121.433(d)
currently requires a PIC to satisfactorily complete either recurrent
flight training or a proficiency check on each aircraft type in which a
PIC serves within the preceding 12 calendar months. Therefore, this
amendment to Sec.  121.441 does not require any additional time in an
FSTD during flightcrew member recurrent

training. Additionally, the FAA expects that any training program
updates needed to reflect this change are minimal and are subsumed in
the paperwork costs for the collective amendments made to the recurrent
training provisions.
    However, the final rule does allow a certificate holder to seek a
deviation from this requirement for aircraft that are designated
related. In accordance with Sec.  121.441(f), a certificate holder may
apply for a deviation that would allow reduced frequency and/or reduced
content of the designated related aircraft proficiency check for PICs.
Although the final rule does not amend the existing requirements
applicable to SICs in Sec.  121.441(a)(2), the deviation authority
added to Sec.  121.441(f) also permits a certificate holder to seek a
deviation from the proficiency check requirements applicable to SICs
for designated related aircraft.
    The agency notes that, consistent with current practice, the FAA
has not established a limit on the number of aircraft types, or
variants within a type, on which a flightcrew member may be qualified
to serve provided a flightcrew member is able to demonstrate
proficiency and complete the training and checking requirements set
forth in the certificate holder's approved training program.
    Airbus supported the proposal to allow certificate holders to
modify their pilot training programs based on FSB related aircraft
designation. However, FedEx, Southwest, Continental, ASTAR, American,
ATA, and USAirways questioned the necessity for the designation of
related aircraft because existing FSB reports already define the
relationship between aircraft. Commenters further asserted that they
should not be required by regulation to seek approval from the FAA for
related aircraft designation a second time outside the FSB process.
    The agency clarifies that neither the proposal nor the final rule
make any substantive changes to the process by which FSB analysis of
aircraft with the same or different type certificates is currently
conducted. Currently, part 121 requires differences training for
variants of aircraft with the same type certification, but it does not
specifically address a differences training concept for aircraft with
different type certification. Thus, the agency determined codification
of the related aircraft policy in AC 120-53A is necessary.
    ASTAR, Continental, American, ATA, USAirways, and Southwest asked
the agency to clarify the proposed recurrent training requirements for
flightcrew members qualified on related aircraft that required an
alternating sequence of flight training and checking for each related
aircraft type.
    Upon further review of the proposal, the agency has determined that
the concept currently in place for recurrent differences training and
recurrent evaluations should apply to training on aircraft designated
as related. In the final rule, flightcrew member recurrent training
must include all required ground training, flight training and checking
and crewmember emergency training on a ``base aircraft.'' For an
aircraft designated as related to the base aircraft, each flightcrew
member must be trained or trained and checked on the differences as
described in the FSB report.
    ATA, USAirways, FedEx, Continental, ASTAR, Southwest, and American
expressed confusion regarding the use of the term ``classification of
related aircraft'' as proposed in the SNPRM provision that would allow
part 121 operators to seek deviations from operating experience,
consolidation, and recent experience requirements. These commenters
also stated that there is no clear guidance on acceptable reasons for
the agency to authorize a deviation from operating experience,
consolidation and recent experience based on related aircraft
designation.
    In response to commenters' concerns regarding the term
``classification of related aircraft,'' the agency has amended the
final rule deviation language to refer to ``designation of related
aircraft'' for clarity and consistency. Regarding commenters' concerns
about the basis for authorizing deviations from operating experience,
consolidation and recent experience, the agency will evaluate a
deviation request based on the recommendations in the FSB report.
Additionally, the agency notes that under existing requirements and in
the final rule, separate operating experience, operating cycles, and
line operating flight time for consolidation of knowledge and skills
are not required for variations within the same type airplane. See 14
CFR 121.434(a).
    ATA, USAirways, FedEx, Continental, ASTAR, Southwest, and American
noted that the deviations are now required to be approved by the FAA
Director of Flight Standards. These commenters suggest that the
deviation authority should remain at the principal operations inspector
(POI) level, asserting that a POI who is familiar with the airline's
operation, experience levels, and training programs is critical to
making a well-founded decision regarding a deviation.
    The agency generally agrees with commenters that POIs are the most
familiar with the operation, experience levels and training programs of
the certificate holder they oversee. However, upon further review of
the proposal, the agency has determined that it is more appropriate to
address the Administrator's delegation of authority for specific
functions associated with related aircraft designations and deviations
in guidance material. Accordingly, the final rule reflects this change.
    The agency emphasizes that the related aircraft provisions do not
create a requirement for an operator to seek designation of related
aircraft. A part 121 operator's determination whether to pursue a
related aircraft designation or develop related aircraft differences
training is voluntary. The alternative to related aircraft differences
training is for the part 121 operator to develop comprehensive training
programs for any new aircraft type as is currently required.

L. Extended Envelope Flight Training

    Currently, the agency does not require ground or flight training on
recovery from aerodynamic (full) stall or upset conditions. In Sec.
208 of Public Law 111-216, enacted August 1, 2010, Congress directed
the FAA to require part 121 operators to provide flightcrew members
with ground and flight training on the recognition and avoidance of
stalls and upsets as well as full stall and upset recovery maneuvers.
Public Law 111-216 also directed the agency to implement the
recommendations of the expert panel convened to report on methods to
increase flightcrew member familiarity with and response to stick
pusher systems and adverse weather events.
    Public Law 111-216 followed the Colgan accident in which the flight
crew incorrectly responded to both a stall warning and a stick pusher
activation resulting in an aerodynamic stall. Additional improper
response to the stalled condition precipitated an upset condition from
which the flight crew did not recover, resulting in the death of
everyone on board as well as one person on the ground and a
catastrophic loss of the aircraft.
    In the SNPRM, the agency proposed to require flightcrew members to
receive flight training on upset recognition and recovery, as well as
recovery from full stall and stick pusher activations. The SNPRM also
proposed to require pilot ground training on recognition and recovery
from stall and upset.
    As required by Public Law 111-216, the final rule includes stall
and upset

ground and flight training. Consistent with Public Law 111-216 and the
208 ARC recommendations, the agency has determined that the greatest
safety benefit can be achieved by adjusting the focus of the training
requirements to ``avoid'' or prevent the upset or stall. Accordingly,
the final rule promotes pilot manual handling skill development to
prevent stall and upsets, coupled with training which allows pilots to
quickly recover from developed stalls and upsets. The final rule also
includes the proposed requirement for flight training on recovery from
bounced landings.
    In the final rule, the agency identifies the stall and upset
prevention and recovery maneuvers and procedures as ``extended envelope
training.'' The term ``extended envelope training'' refers to maneuvers
and procedures conducted in a FSTD that may extend beyond the limits
where typical FSTD performance and handling qualities have been
validated with heavy reliance on flight data to represent the actual
aircraft. In instances when obtaining such flight data is hazardous or
impractical, engineering predictive methods and subject-matter-expert
assessment are used to represent the aircraft adequately in the
simulator.
    The final rule extended envelope flight training maneuvers and
procedures are required in qualification curriculums as proposed in the
SNPRM, as well as in recurrent curriculums. The time required to
complete the extended envelope training is in addition to existing
programmed hour requirements for inflight training.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The programmed hours identified in Sec.  121.424 refer to
``inflight'' training. As defined in 121.401, ``inflight'' refers to
maneuvers, procedures or functions that must be conducted in the
airplane. Extended envelope training does not fall within this
definition because this training must be completed in a FFS.
Therefore, the pilot inflight training programmed hours have not
been amended to account for the additional time required for these
new training requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the SNPRM, the agency proposed to require all pilots in part 121
operations to complete recurrent training for the extended envelope
flight training tasks at either 9 month or 36 month intervals. The
agency also proposed to require all pilots to complete recurrent
training or evaluation on approach to stall in at least one
configuration (clean, takeoff or maneuvering, or landing) every 9
months. A number of commenters raised concern generally regarding the
totality of required recurrent training proposed in the SNPRM. However,
commenters did not provide specific objections to the proposed training
or evaluation frequency for approach to stall or the extended envelope
flight training tasks.
    In the final rule, the agency replaces the term ``approach to
stall'' with ``stall prevention training.'' \16\ This change does not
alter the substantive requirements of existing approach to stall
training. The FAA has adopted this terminology change in concert with
ICAO and as a result of the FAA/ICAO/EASA joint initiative to study the
contributing factors of loss of control inflight, internationally
recognized as the LOCART initiative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The agency considers stall prevention training and approach
to stall training as synonymous. As such, the FAA is not requiring
certificate holders to adopt this new nomenclature in any
documentation. However, the FAA will revise AC 120-109 and make
other conforming changes to adopt this terminology in future
rulemakings and guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has determined that the term ``stall prevention training''
more accurately describes the training objective intended by the
existing ``approach to stall'' maneuvers. This terminology change also
draws a clearer distinction from the full stall recovery training
introduced in this final rule. As described in AC 120-109, pilots
should continue to be trained that the primary response at the first
indication of a stall is to reduce the angle of attack.
    The recurrent frequency for stall prevention (approach to stall)
training and evaluation and the extended envelope maneuvers training in
this final rule aligns with the existing recurrent training and
evaluation frequency of 6 months for PICs and 12 months for SICs. The
extended envelope maneuvers training focuses on manual handling skills
for proper response to development of slow flight, stall prevention and
loss of reliable airspeed. Accordingly, in the final rule, the agency
has increased the frequency for these manual handling maneuvers from
the proposed rule and decreased the frequency of recurrent training
proposed for stall and upset recovery from the proposed rule to target
resources to the areas in which the greatest safety benefit can be
achieved. As a result, and in order to encourage a cohesive training
approach, the agency has determined that every 24 months, upset and
stall recovery should be trained together with the manual handling
skill development. The agency further notes that this frequency is
consistent with the 208 ARC recommendation that upset recovery should
be trained no less frequently than every 36 months.
    Additionally, in furtherance of stall prevention, the agency
ensures that the existing requirement to train or evaluate approach to
stall every 12 months is maintained even if a part 121 operator
substitutes line-oriented simulator training or LOFT for alternating
SIC recurrent training. Training and checking on stall prevention
(approach to stall) provides the greatest benefit in that proficiency
in this area provides the highest likelihood that the pilot will be
able to avoid the onset of stall or upset.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The agency notes that currently, line-oriented simulator
training (also referred to as line oriented flight training or LOFT)
may be substituted for alternating SIC recurrent training which may
exclude stall prevention (approach to stall) training. See
Sec. Sec.  121.409 and 121.441. For this reason, the final rule
ensures that stall prevention training must be conducted every 12
months even if a part 121 training program substitutes LOFT for
alternating SIC recurrent training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Also, in the final rule, the agency is furthering the training
concepts developed in the Pilot Certification rule. The requirements in
both this final rule and the Pilot Certification rule use academic
training to develop foundational knowledge and then consolidate that
knowledge with FSTD training and experience. Together, these final
rules require certificate holders to effectively provide a building
block approach to learning for pilots. Developing the broad concepts of
aerodynamics in the ATP CTP to the type specific aerodynamic concepts
now required in an air carrier's training program, serves as an
effective method to deliver the training mandated by Public Law 111-216
and recommended by the 208 ARC.
    Enhanced academic knowledge, emphasis on prevention training, and
the recommended recovery techniques developed by the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) constitute a complete training solution. The agency
expects that if this solution is properly delivered, it will have a
significant effect on the LOC-I statistics.
1. Upset Prevention and Recovery
    Existing regulations do not specifically require pilots to receive
flight training on upset prevention and recovery. The Colgan Air flight
3407 and American Airlines flight 587 accidents reinforced the need for
this training because each involved sudden or unexpected aircraft
upset.
    In the NPRM, the agency proposed to require flight training for
upset recognition and recovery during every qualification curriculum
and during recurrent training. In the SNPRM, the agency added a
requirement for pilots to be evaluated on this task.
    Upset prevention: The greatest safety benefit can be achieved if an
upset condition is prevented through proper pilot intervention.
Although the agency

supports training pilots on recovery skills for a developed upset, the
probability of recovery from the upset condition decreases with the
magnitude of the divergence from the desired flight path. Accordingly,
the final rule extended envelope flight training includes both training
on manual handling skills to enhance a pilot's ability to prevent
upset, as well as training to recover from an upset condition. Each of
these concepts is derived from recommendations received from the 208
ARC.
    The purpose of requiring manual handling skills is to ensure
correct pilot control inputs to avoid undesired flightpath deviations.
Manual handling skills are essential to the prevention of stall and
upset because they allow a pilot to master the aircraft's flight path
without the use of total automation. Development and maintenance of
these skills are necessary to keep pilots engaged in the operation of
the aircraft and more easily allow them to become re-engaged if an
abnormal problem arises which prohibits automation or typical flight
path guidance. Thus, the final rule maintains the SNPRM proposal to
require, as part of the extended envelope flight training, manual
handling training throughout all phases of flight to better develop a
pilot's core manual handling skills and consolidate the principles of
airplane energy management.
    Pilots must know the common errors to avoid and why they occur, as
well as the importance of cross-checking and verifying inputs and
communication and coordination between pilots. It is also critical for
pilots to know how the airplane responds to inputs across all flight
regimes (e.g., high and low altitudes, airspeeds, and energy states).
    Accordingly, the training requirements in the final rule include
manually flown arrival and departure, slow flight, and flight with loss
of reliable airspeed. The agency expects that training on these
maneuvers and procedures will provide pilots with the manual handling
skills necessary to prevent undesired flight path divergence.
    Manually controlled arrival and departure: In the SNPRM, the agency
proposed to require pilots to complete training on manually controlled
departure and arrival. The agency did not receive any comments on the
proposal to train these maneuvers.
    Existing appendices E and F of part 121 currently require area
departure and area arrival for both training and checking, but these
maneuvers need not be performed manually. Modern aircraft are commonly
operated using autoflight systems (e.g., autopilot or autothrottle/
autothrust). Autoflight systems are useful tools for pilots and have
improved safety and workload management, and thus enabled more precise
operations. However, continuous use of autoflight systems could lead to
degradation of the pilot's ability to quickly recover the aircraft from
an undesired state. Therefore, the agency has retained the provisions
regarding manually controlled arrival and departure in the final rule.
    Slow flight: In the SNPRM, the agency proposed to require ``slow
flight'' training during qualification and recurrent training to
provide pilots with an understanding of the performance of the airplane
and ``hands-on'' exposure to the way the airplane handles at airspeeds
that are just above the stall warning. Similarly, the 208 ARC
recommended slow flight as a task which can develop a pilot's manual
handling skill.
    ALPA and an individual supported the proposed addition of slow
flight to pilot training curriculums. However, ALPA expressed concern
regarding the target speeds specified for slow flight in the draft
advisory circular published with the SNPRM (AC 120-FCMT), which are set
as those between the onset of stall warning and aerodynamic stall. ALPA
believes that the airspeed for slow flight should be established by the
manufacturer (such as Vref) and be near the onset of stall warning
indication, but fast enough that stall warnings would rarely, if ever,
be activated. ALPA further states that requiring slow flight practice
at speeds that require pilots to continuously fly while ignoring
impending stall indications would result in negative training and could
cause pilots to become desensitized by the approach to stall warnings.
    The FAA agrees that encountering continuous stall warnings during
slow flight practice without initiating an immediate stall recovery
procedure would result in negative training. The target speed for slow
flight must be below the speeds that are normal and appropriate for the
various configurations, but targeted to avoid stall warning devices.
Further, the FAA concurs with the use of Vref for the configuration
which should allow for the necessary experience in low speed/low energy
handling characteristics with sufficient margins to avoid stall
warning/stall onset with proper airspeed control. The agency will
revise draft guidance contained in AC 120-FCMT on slow flight
accordingly.
    Loss of reliable airspeed: Finally, practice and experience with
the recognition of and appropriate response to a system malfunction
that results in loss of reliable airspeed is essential to minimizing
the risk of stall and upset. Failure or erroneous display of critical
flight information, such as airspeed, can lead to an upset if loss of
energy is not quickly recognized and aircraft control is not
maintained. As such, loss of reliable airspeed has been included in the
final rule extended envelope training requirements.
    The training of an airspeed indication system malfunction is
critical for a pilot's understanding of type specific failure modes.
Additionally, cascading failure of other dependent systems provides a
training environment, which allows a pilot to practice manually
handling an aircraft with varying degrees of automation and
capabilities that may be present during upset. In many instances, the
loss of reliable airspeed results in an aircraft which must be flown
primarily by relying on pitch and power. Further, these maneuvers
require an understanding of the aerodynamic qualities of large
transport category aircraft. Therefore, this training requirement
covers a broad spectrum of conditions that could be encountered during
the period in which the upset could be prevented as well as during
recovery. The training is also consistent with 208 ARC recommendations
regarding pilot awareness of how system malfunctions affect their
specific aircraft and the recommendation to provide more manual
handling skill training with emphasis on the aircraft's pitch and power
relationship.
    Checking extended envelope flight training maneuvers: In the SNPRM,
the agency proposed to require evaluation of two components of the
extended envelope training--recovery from full stall and upset. Atlas
Air recommended against any evaluation of upset recovery or any other
maneuvers and procedures in this area. This commenter stated that the
requirement to evaluate upset recognition and recovery skills will not
improve pilot response and will likely have a negative unintended
consequence that will far outweigh any perceived benefit of evaluating
the maneuver.
    Upon further review of the proposal and comments, the agency has
removed the requirement to evaluate upset recovery from the final rule
because the agency agrees that a successful recovery is somewhat
difficult to quantify due to the multitude of variables involved. This
final rule increases the academic knowledge of pilots, requires
increased instructor training to deliver these concepts, develops
pilot's manual handling skills which aid in upset

prevention, and trains the pilots in proper recovery techniques.
Achieving the learning objective defined in the recovery maneuvers is
paramount.
    Evaluation and approval of upset training programs: Commenters also
raised concerns regarding upset training. APS recommended that the FAA
produce guidance for the evaluation and approval of programs of
instruction in upset recognition and recovery that includes
stipulations for appropriate content, methodology, and delivery of
training.
    The FAA concurs with the commenter's recommendation and will
provide operators and training providers with sufficient and
comprehensive guidance on the academic content, validated maneuvers,
and appropriate cautions for the delivery of upset prevention and
recovery training. In developing guidance, the agency has considered
the recommendations of the 208 ARC on many aspects of training upset
prevention and recovery in FSTD, including the scope and objective of
conducting this training in an FSTD; the training device requirements;
the instructor requirements; the academic training elements required
before beginning upset prevention and recovery training in an FSTD; the
flight training elements required including slow flight and manual
handling training; and, the completion criteria for upset prevention
and recovery training in an FSTD. In making its recommendations, the
208 ARC considered information provided by experts on LOC-I causal
factors and reviewed previous guidance such as the Airplane Upset
Recovery Training Aid (AURTA) produced by Airbus/Boeing and endorsed by
the Flight Safety Foundation. The FAA has included e a copy of the ARC
recommendations in the docket for this rulemaking.
    Data and qualification of FSTDs: FlightSafety commented that most
data packages do not contain the information and data necessary to
model a FFS to accomplish the required upset recognition and recovery
training. FlightSafety further commented that a mandate to train a
recovery technique to use for a specific aircraft type without OEM data
and/or FAA approved procedures would not improve training or safety.
APS raised the same concern based in part on the expectation that
extreme pitch and roll angles would necessarily be part of upset
recognition and recovery training.
    The FAA shares the commenter's concerns on the use of validated
aircraft data and addresses this concern later in this section of the
preamble. However, the agency disagrees with the assertion that upset
recovery training must contain extreme pitch and roll angles. The FAA
sought recommendations on this issue from the 208 ARC. The 208 ARC
reviewed the work completed by such groups as the developers of the
AURTA, the Industry/FAA Stall Work Group, and the International
Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). The 208
ARC validated much of the previous work done by each of these groups
and used the AURTA Revision 2 \18\ and the FAA AC 120-109 \19\ as the
basis of their recommendations. The ARC recommended the FAA use these
two documents as source documents for the development of advisory
material for upset prevention and recovery training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/training/media/AP_UpsetRecovery_Book.pdf
    \19\ http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%20120-109.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, an airplane OEM group was also established within the 208
ARC to develop recommended standard OEM guidance for the recovery from
nose-high/nose-low upsets. Airbus, ATR, Boeing, Bombardier, and Embraer
developed the upset prevention and recovery template contained in the
advisory material published with this final rule.
    The FAA is satisfied the upset recovery techniques developed in
conjunction with this final rule are appropriate. Each maneuver and
associated recovery was developed by OEMs and has been validated to
remain in both the data and motion limitations of a Level C or Level D
FFS if conducted properly. The FAA also stresses that the increased
instructor and check airmen training will allow instructors and check
airmen to recognize any excursions outside of the data or motion
capabilities of the device and debrief pilots on any such event.
    Expand ``Upset'' definition: Calspan recommends the following
expanded definition of upset: ``An aircraft upset is further defined as
an airplane unintentionally exceeding the parameters normally
experienced in line operations or an event that alters the normal
response of the airplane to pilot input such that the pilot must adopt
an alternate control strategy to sustain or regain controlled flight.''
    Calspan commented that the definition of upset used in the NPRM
does not capture how the precipitating event may impact the pilot's
ability to control the aircraft. A number of accidents have occurred
where a control failure or disturbance significantly altered the normal
response of the airplane to pilot input such that conventional control
strategies proved to be inadequate. Calspan further commented that the
NPRM cited numerous NTSB recommendations developed from accidents that
resulted in extreme upset conditions precipitated by an underlying
control system issue. Calspan stated that these accidents were in fact
controllable had the crew executed proper alternate control responses,
but without upset recovery training they did not possess the knowledge
and skill necessary to safely recover.
    The FAA agrees that alternate control strategies are a component of
a well-developed upset prevention and recovery training program. In
guidance material developed for upset prevention and recovery, the
agency will discuss the advantages and cautions for using alternate
control strategies when primary control responses are not effective.
However, the FAA disagrees with the commenter's assertion that most
cited upset accidents were a result of control system issues. In the
most recent accidents such as Colgan Air flight 3407, American Airlines
flight 587 and USAir flight 427, the NTSB identified improper pilot
response as a contributing factor.
    Further, the FAA is not persuaded that the description of upset
should be changed as recommended by the commenter. The agency continues
to recognize the description of upset proposed in the NPRM. This
description is also consistent with the AURTA and the 208 ARC
recommendations.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ In the NPRM Upset Recognition and Recovery is described as
follows:
    6.5 Task: Upset Recognition and Recovery
    (d) Reference the most current version of the Industry's
Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid. An aircraft upset is almost
universally described as exceeding one or more of the following:
    (1) Pitch attitude greater than 25[deg] nose up.
    (2) Pitch attitude greater than 10[deg] nose down.
    (3) Bank angle greater than 45[deg]or within these parameters,
but flying at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Stall Prevention and Recovery
    In the SNPRM, the agency proposed to require pilots to train on
recovery from full stall. Further, the agency proposed to require that,
for pilots operating aircraft equipped with stick-pusher, stall
recovery training must be completed by going through stick pusher
release. Although the agency did not receive any comments objecting to
the proposed requirement to train recovery from full stall in general,
the agency did receive a number of technical comments regarding this
proposed flight training. For example, ALPA commented that ICATEE has

concluded that there is a need and a benefit for training pilots to the
full aerodynamic stall because aircraft behavior in a full aerodynamic
stall is very different from the aircraft behavior in an approach to
stall condition. However, ALPA cautioned that the ICATEE recommendation
for full-stall training should be put into place only if the
aerodynamic model of the aircraft in the FFS is representative of a
full aerodynamic stall in flight; the instructor pilot is given
enhanced training in upset recovery training; and the FFS has feedback
capability to assist the instructor and pilots in ensuring the stall
training is conducted and evaluated properly. The agency agrees with
ALPA's comments and addresses these comments throughout the preamble.
The separate part 60 rulemaking initiative previously noted is also
responsive to the issues raised by ALPA.
    One recovery procedure: ALPA commented that the FAA-Industry Stall/
Stick Pusher Work Group concluded that successful recovery from an
impending stall and a full aerodynamic stall, require the same
procedure. ALPA supports an approach in which pilots are trained to
treat an ``approach to stall'' the same way as a ``full stall.''
Further, ALPA commented that this would simplify pilot recognition and
response to an impending stall and allows for a single pilot
conditioned response (i.e., one recovery procedure) to both approach to
stall warning and full aerodynamic stall.
    The agency agrees with the comments regarding one procedure for
recovery from an impending stall and full aerodynamic stall. In AC 120-
109, Stall and Stick Pusher Training, the agency stresses that pilot
training should emphasize treating an ``approach to stall'' the same as
a ``full stall.'' This common recovery procedure is also consistent
with the recommendations from the 208 ARC for stall prevention and
recovery.
    Stall training methods and evaluation: FlightSafety commented that,
in practice, a pilot should initiate a stall recovery at the first
indication of a stall or at least at the stick shaker warning. However,
in the SNPRM, the agency proposed to require stick pusher training that
would give a pilot the experience of allowing an aircraft to go through
early warning signs of stall, including stick shaker, so that they
experience stick pusher. Thus, FlightSafety believes the requirement as
proposed will not enhance safety. Further, FlightSafety recommends
conducting stick pusher recovery as a demonstration, with training
emphasis placed on recovery well before stick pusher activation.
    Similarly, while ALPA agrees with industry experts that full-
aerodynamic stall training and recovery should be demonstrated as a
``train to proficiency maneuver,'' ALPA states that full-aerodynamic
stall should not be an evaluated item. ALPA states that only stall
recoveries initiated at the first sign of the stall should be
evaluated. ALPA recommends that the final rule incorporate the
recommendations from the FAA-Industry Stall/Stick Pusher Work Group by
maintaining the training requirement as a demonstration maneuver but
removing the requirement to evaluate full stalls and stalls to stick
pusher activation.
    The FAA agrees with the FlightSafety and ALPA comments regarding
evaluation and traditional training methods for recovery from full
stall and stick pusher release. As discussed earlier, given that
recovery procedures for approach to stall and full stall are the same,
to avoid the potential for negative training that might occur by having
pilots avoid early warning signs of stall, the FAA is not requiring
evaluation of recovery from full stall.
    In Sec.  121.423, added to subpart N by this final rule, the agency
has revised the recovery from full stall and stick pusher activation
tasks. In the final rule, recovery from full stall and stick pusher
activation are instructor-guided hands-on experience tasks only. This
training will emphasize the recovery by the pilot incorporating the
same angle of attack (AOA) principles from the stall prevention
(approach to stall) training. Accordingly, in the final rule, neither
full stall nor stick pusher is evaluated during a proficiency check.
    Further, just as with upset training, the FAA has focused training
on maneuvers that develop a flightcrew member's skill of preventing
stalls. The FAA will continue to emphasize training and checking of
prompt recovery at the first indication of a stall. Approaches to
stalls (stall prevention training) are critical maneuvers which gauge a
pilot's understanding and early response to stall indications including
stall warning; as such the final rule maintains existing requirements
for evaluation of this task.
    High altitude approach to stall maneuver: ALPA recommends splitting
the proposed requirement to complete training on stalls in a ``clean
configuration'' into two separate tasks: one for high altitude and one
for low altitude because high altitude stalls have unique issues that
should be separately trained. Although the FAA agrees with the comment
regarding differences between high altitude stalls and low altitude
stalls, in the final rule, the agency continues to require recovery
from approach to stall as it exists in current appendices E and F
(i.e., requiring training in at least takeoff, clean and landing
configuration). The agency does not specify the scenarios for stall
prevention (approach to stall) in order to provide part 121 operators
with the flexibility needed to develop a training methodology most
appropriate for their operation.
    However, in AC 120-109, the FAA recommends that air carriers
incorporate high altitude stall prevention training into their training
programs. This AC also recommends training on the differences between
low altitude and high altitude stall prevention and appendix 2 of the
AC includes a sample training scenario of a clean configuration high
altitude approach to stall.
    Manufacturer stall recovery procedures: ALPA notes that the SNPRM
did not consider that manufacturers are developing and publishing stall
recovery procedures for each specific aircraft. ALPA recommends that
the final rule and stall recovery guidance recognize this development
by including language to ensure that the pilot correctly executes the
manufacturer-recommended stall recovery procedure in the Flightcrew
Operating Manual (FCOM) and returns the aircraft to a safe flying
condition. The agency agrees with ALPA and in AC 120-109 emphasizes
that the manufacturer's recommended stall recovery procedure takes
precedence over the generic recovery template.
    Recovery and training criteria: ALPA commented that stall recovery
training and evaluation criteria should not mandate a predetermined
altitude or emphasize a ``minimum loss of altitude.'' Similarly, Atlas
Air stated that it has difficulty with overemphasis on ``minimizing
altitude loss'' for approach to stall training.
    In response to commenters' concerns regarding stall recovery
training and evaluation criteria, the agency notes that it has recently
issued a number of information and guidance documents to assist air
carriers with properly and consistently evaluating pilots' recovery
from approach to stall. The agency initially issued SAFO 10012,
Possible Misinterpretation of the Practical Test Standards (PTS)
Language ``Minimal Loss of Altitude,'' to clarify the intent of the
requirement for ``minimal loss of altitude'' during evaluation of
recovery from approach to stalls. Then, in August 2012, the agency
published AC 120-109, Stall and Stick Pusher Training,

emphasizing that the primary goal of testing or checking recovery from
approach to stall is to evaluate a pilot's immediate recognition and
response, which should be an immediate reduction of AOA. Additionally,
the agency has revised the approach to stall evaluation criteria in the
ATP PTS. The ATP PTS revision eliminates the language referring to
``minimum loss of altitude,'' emphasizes reduction of AOA over
maintaining altitude, and also recommends that one of the three
required approach to stalls should be accomplished while the autopilot
is engaged.
3. Recovery From Bounced Landing
    In the SNPRM, the agency proposed to add training on recovery from
bounced landing to initial and transition curriculums. The agency also
proposed to require that pilots complete recovery from bounced landing
in recurrent training. The agency determined that the appropriate
recurrent training interval for this task was 36 months based on the
agency's balancing of the potential risk with the frequency of such an
event.
    The FAA determined that training on recovery from bounced landing
is necessary based on FAA review of accident history including FedEx
flight 859. On September 14, 2004, a Boeing McDonnell Douglas MD-11F
operating as FedEx flight 859 experienced a tail strike during a go-
around maneuver from Memphis International Airport. Neither of the two
flightcrew members was injured. In its investigation of this accident,
the NTSB found the probable cause was the pilot's over-rotation during
a go-around maneuver initiated because of a bounced landing. See NTSB
Event ID DCA04MA082.
    Upon further review of the accident history related to bounced
landings, and comments submitted by the NTSB, the agency agrees with
the NTSB that the bounced landing proposal is responsive to NTSB
recommendation A-05-30 issued following the American Eagle flight 5401
accident in San Juan, Puerto Rico. On May 9, 2004, American Eagle
flight 5401 skipped on initial contact with the runway. Then, after the
initial touchdown, the PIC took control of the airplane. Flight data
recorder (FDR) data indicated that after taking control, the PIC made
several abrupt changes in pitch and power, which led to two bounces
before the airplane crashed at Luis Mu[ntilde]oz Marin International
Airport. The PIC was seriously injured; the SIC, 2 flight attendants,
and 16 of the 22 passengers received minor injuries. The NTSB concluded
that company guidance on bounced landing recovery techniques would have
increased the possibility that the PIC could have recovered from the
bounced landings or handled the airplane more appropriately by
executing a go-around. The NTSB recommended that the FAA take action to
require all part 121 and part 135 operators to incorporate bounced
landing recovery techniques in their flight manuals and to teach these
techniques during initial and recurrent training.
    On June 9, 2006, the FAA issued SAFO 06005, Bounced Landing
Training for certificate holders operating under Title 14 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 121 and 135. This SAFO recommends
that each part 121 or 135 operator check to see that bounced landing
recovery techniques are included in the manuals used by their pilots
and in their initial ground training for each of the airplane types
that the operator flies. The SAFO also recommends that those same
techniques are reinforced by briefings and debriefings during flight
training, supervised operating experience, and line checks. The SAFO
includes instructions on how to develop bounced landing recovery
techniques if not already addressed by the operator.
    In 2009, the FAA enlisted the assistance of the ATA and the RAA to
poll part 121 and 135 member carriers to find out if they incorporated
recovery from bounced landing into their training program as SAFO 06005
suggests. Both organizations reported 100 percent implementation of the
SAFO's recommendations.
    The final rule requirements for flight training in an FFS on
recovery from bounced landing supplements the ground training
recommended by SAFO 06005. The agency has included the proposal for
bounced landing training in the final rule subject to the modification
described in the following discussion. In the final rule, the FAA has
determined that recovery from bounced landing must be trained during
all qualification training curriculums, including upgrade. The agency
notes that any maneuver or procedure that is trained in recurrent must
be covered in the pilot's qualification training because the pilot's
base month for recurrent is reset upon the completion of the
qualification curriculum. If an upgrade curriculum does not also
include all maneuvers and procedures required by the recurrent
curriculum, then the recurrent interval for a maneuver or procedure may
be extended.
    FlightSafety questioned how training would be developed for an
aircraft that does not have written procedures for recovery from
bounced landings and whether the FAA developed a training tool and
syllabus for simulator training. FlightSafety further commented that if
the agency has developed a training tool and syllabus for simulator
training, it would question the data that forms the basis for the tool.
    In the draft Flightcrew Member AC (AC 120-FCMT) published for
comment with the SNPRM, the agency developed generic procedures and
performance expectations for recovery from a bounced landing, including
techniques for avoiding overcontrol and premature derotation during
bounced landings. These procedures were based on a review of the
accidents and extensive FAA and industry experience with these
accidents and incidents. However, the FAA expects that the
recommendations of the aircraft OEM to take precedence regarding
procedures that may differ from any published FAA guidance.
4. Use of Full Flight Simulators for Extended Envelope Flight Training
    Currently, air carriers may voluntarily use simulators for varying
amounts of the training and checking required by subparts N and O. The
agency requires an airplane simulator for windshear training only. See
Sec.  121.409(d). However, the FAA has long recognized that the use of
simulation in flight training provides an opportunity to train,
practice, and demonstrate proficiency in a safe, controlled
environment.
    In the SNPRM, the agency proposed to require all flight training
and evaluation to be completed in an FSTD. This requirement included a
range of FSTDs from Level 4 flight training devices (FTDs) through
Level D FFSs depending on the maneuver or procedure. For the extended
envelope maneuvers and procedures, the agency proposed to allow the use
of FFSs ranging from Level A to Level D.
    For certain maneuvers required in part 121 pilot training, such as
the maneuvers included in the extended envelope training requirements,
motion provides cues that may affect pilot control strategies and
subsequently, vehicle performance. Motion serves as an essential
element of a task when, in order to complete the task, the flightcrew
member must make continual adjustments based on any number of sensory
inputs. Accordingly, for those training tasks where motion is critical
to achieving the training objective, such as ``recovery from stall,''
an FFS is essential to successful training outcomes.
    Although commenters generally supported the agency's proposal to
require FSTDs for all flight training and

evaluation, some air carriers such as Continental, United, and JetBlue
were generally critical of the agency's reliance on FFSs, noting that
effective training programs currently in place use a combination of
FFSs and FTDs to deliver training. Other commenters such as the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW)
and the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU), ALPA, and APS stated
that only the highest levels of FSTDs should be used to deliver
training citing concerns including the risk for negative training. APS
commented specifically that operators should be required to use the
highest level of device available to train upset recognition and
recovery because, considering the high consequence nature of aircraft
upset events, every effort should be made to provide pilots with the
greatest fidelity possible in order to learn the skills necessary for
prevention and recovery from a LOC-I situation.
    The agency has not included the proposal to require all flightcrew
member training to be completed in an FSTD although currently, most
operators use FSTDs in pilot training programs. The final rule does,
however, require the extended envelope training required in Sec.
121.423 to be completed in a FFS. The agency addresses the APS comments
regarding the use of the highest level of device available for training
upset events in the discussion on the requirement for Level C FFSs.
    Level C FFS: In the final rule, the agency continues to require the
extended envelope flight training maneuvers and procedures to be
completed in an FFS. However, the final rule requires a minimum of a
Level C FFS because these devices provide the highest level of
aerodynamic modeling, visual fidelity and motion cueing to replicate
the aircraft for motion based pilot training. The requirement to use a
Level C or higher FFS is consistent with current appendix H
requirements for Advanced Simulation Programs that do not permit Level
B devices except in limited circumstances. Further, the 3-degree-of-
freedom motion cues provided by Level A and B devices do not provide
the level of fidelity required to meet the training objectives of the
extended envelope flight training maneuvers and procedures as compared
to the 6-degree-of-freedom requirements for Level C and higher devices.
    In response to comments suggesting that the highest level of device
is required for training in a simulated environment, the FAA has
determined that the current distinction in capabilities between a Level
C and Level D FFS is negligible for the extended envelope training
included in this final rule. The primary difference that exists today
between a Level C and a Level D FFS is the evaluation of vibration and
sound. Level D evaluation involves objective criteria while Level C
evaluation of vibration and sound is subjective.
    Deviation Authority: Although the final rule applies the
requirement to train in an FFS to a limited number of tasks, the agency
has considered comments on the FSTD deviation authority proposed in the
SNPRM as they relate to the final rule requirements. In the SNPRM, the
agency proposed a means by which certificate holders could seek a
deviation from the requirements to complete all flight training in an
FSTD. The proposed deviation authority contemplated the use of an
aircraft as an alternate training platform.
    ASTAR commented on the SNPRM deviation authority, stating that the
FSTD requirements in the SNPRM did not recognize that some operators
fly older aircraft for which the level of simulator required exists in
limited numbers or does not exist at all. The National Air Carrier
Association, Atlas Air, and six individuals commented on deviation
authority generally, opposing a deviation authority that allows
training in lower level devices than those specified for each flight
training task in the SNPRM.
    The agency agrees that the challenges identified by ASTAR may arise
with respect to the requirement to use a Level C or higher FFS for
extended envelope flight training, although currently over 95% of FAA-
evaluated FFS devices that replicate part 121 aircraft are either a
Level C or higher FFS. Therefore, in those limited instances in which a
Level C or higher FFS does not exist (e.g., certain older fleets such
as the Convair 580) or for extraordinary reasons, access to a Level C
or higher FFS is limited, a carrier may apply for FAA consideration of
a deviation in accordance with the process described in Sec.
121.423(e) of the final rule. Conducting extended envelope flight
training inflight presents significant safety risks. Therefore, the
extended envelope maneuvers and procedures must be trained in a
controlled simulated environment or through another means by which the
learning objectives can be achieved.
    Training in Other Devices: Two training providers, ETC and Calspan,
commented that current capabilities of existing FSTDs are limited in
their ability to fully train crewmembers in the competencies needed to
prevent and recover from LOC-I events because they cannot replicate the
stressors that will be present. These commenters and APS suggested
using alternate training resources (e.g., in-flight simulation aircraft
or a continuous-g motion platform) in conjunction with FSTD and
academic training. Calspan commented that academic training should be
augmented with both an in-flight simulator and ground-based FFS
training.
    The agency intends for the extended envelope training to include
ground training and flight training in a FFS. At this time the agency
does not have sufficient information by which to determine the safety
and effectiveness of the alternate training devices proposed by
commenters. Enhanced academic knowledge, emphasis on prevention
training and the recommended recovery techniques developed by the OEM
constitutes a complete training solution. The agency has determined
that if this solution is implemented properly, it will have a
significant effect on the LOC-I statistics.
    Consistency with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
9625: United, Continental, and USAirways stated that the FSTD
requirements proposed in the SNPRM are inconsistent with some of the
more progressive concepts in contained in ICAO Document 9625 which
seeks to align simulator standards and training tasks on a global
basis. It is designed to address all levels of pilot training and
licensing, which is outside of the scope of the SNPRM.\21\ Although the
final rule does not contain many of the maneuvers contemplated by the
SNPRM, the remaining maneuvers and FSTD requirements are consistent
with the standards contained in the ICAO Document 9625.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Document
9625 addresses the use of Flight Simulation Training Devices
(FSTDs). The methods, procedures and testing standards contained in
this manual are the result of the experience and expertise provided
by National Aviation Authorities (NAA), aeroplane and FSTD operators
and manufacturers. Document 9625 may be obtained from ICAO at
www.icao.int.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Device Qualification: ALPA, FlightSafety, and Families of
Continental Flight 3407 commented that existing FFSs lack the data
package containing the information required to create the aerodynamic
model necessary to accomplish full stall and upset recovery training.
ALPA further commented that modifications to part 60 are also necessary
for existing FSTDs to address bounced landings, as well as tasks such
as icing, microburst and windshear, so as to avoid negative training in
these areas.

    APS stated that there are Instructor Operating Station (IOS)
capabilities that could enhance training in upset recognition and
recovery. APS recommends that an FSTD specification be created for the
qualification of newly manufactured devices which calls for information
to be provided to the instructor indicating whether or not the FSTD is
being operated within the valid training envelope for that device.
    The FAA agrees with commenters that modifications to part 60 are
necessary to train the extended envelope flight training tasks, but
such modifications are outside of the scope of this rulemaking.
Imposing new FSTD evaluation requirements will require revisions to the
qualifications standards in part 60 (for newly qualified FSTDs) or an
FSTD Directive (for previously qualified FSTDs). Accordingly, the FAA
has initiated rulemaking to address the necessary changes to part 60
which will be needed to deliver the FFS fidelity and IOS tools needed
to effectively deliver many of the extended envelope training tasks.
Amendments to part 60 qualification standards for extended envelope
training and the IOS panel upgrades are also responsive to the
recommendations for simulation improvements from the 208 ARC.
    The FAA believes that the 5 year compliance period in this rule
provides an ample amount of time for an FSTD sponsor to conduct any
necessary modifications as may be required by amendments to part 60 to
ensure the FSTD validation limits are sufficient to conduct the
required training tasks.

M. Extended Envelope Ground Training

    Currently, the agency does not require specific ground training on
stall or upset recovery concepts. As stated above, Sec.  208 of Public
Law 111-206 directed the FAA to require part 121 operators to provide
flightcrew members with ground and flight training on the recognition
and avoidance of aerodynamic stalls and upsets as well as aerodynamic
stall and upset recovery maneuvers. The agency proposed to require
training on these two ground training subjects in the SNPRM (Table 2A
in attachment 2 of appendix Q). The agency did not receive any comments
on this proposal.
    The final rule includes training on stall prevention and recovery
as well as upset prevention and recovery. In the final rule, the agency
identifies upset ground training as upset prevention and recovery. The
modification focuses the training requirements on knowledge to create
awareness and the ability to prevent an occurrence of upset, rather
than focusing solely on training after the upset has already occurred
and recovery is necessary. Prevention serves to avoid incidents and
includes any pilot action to avoid a divergence from a desired airplane
state prior to entering an upset event. Recovery training serves to
reduce accidents as a result of an unavoidable upset event.
Accordingly, recovery refers to pilot actions that return an airplane
that is diverging in altitude, airspeed, or attitude to a desired
state. This change to ground training is consistent with the
recommendations of the 208 ARC, convened by the FAA as required by
Sec.  208 of Public Law 111-216.
    In the final rule the agency included ground training on full
stalls and upset as additions to current Sec.  121.419, Pilots and
flight engineers: Initial, transition, and upgrade ground training.
Section 121.427 requires that the subjects covered in Sec.  121.419 are
covered in recurrent training as well. Due to the addition of these
subjects, the agency has adjusted the existing required programmed
hours for initial and recurrent ground training. The agency has
determined that 2 additional hours are required for initial training
and 30 additional minutes are required for recurrent training, based on
a review of the content required for training these subjects and the
agency's experience evaluating and approving training programs.

N. Communication Records for Domestic and Flag Operations

    Under the current regulations, Sec.  121.711 requires certificate
holders conducting domestic or flag operations to record all en route
radio contacts between the certificate holder and its pilots and to
keep the record for at least 30 days. Existing Sec.  121.711 recodified
14 CFR 40.512, which provided that ``[e]ach air carrier shall maintain,
and retain for a period of 30 days, records of radio contacts by or
with pilots en route.'' The rationale behind this rule, as stated in
the preamble to the NPRM that proposed Sec.  40.512, was to ``enable
the [Civil Aeronautics] Board and the Administrator to discharge fully
their respective accident investigation and safety regulatory
responsibilities.'' See 23 FR 7721, 7723 (October 7, 1958).
    The FAA issued a legal interpretation of this section setting forth
the minimum content that must be included in a Sec.  121.711
communication record, including: the date and time of the contact; the
flight number; aircraft registration number; approximate position of
the aircraft during the contact; call sign; and narrative of the
contact. See Legal Interpretation to John S. Duncan, Division Manager,
Air Transportation Division, FAA Flight Standards Service, from Rebecca
B. MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division (Feb. 2,
2010), a copy of which is included in the docket for this rulemaking
    In the SNPRM, the FAA proposed revisions to Sec.  121.711 to
clarify the contents of the record required for each en route radio
contact between the certificate holder and its pilots, based on the
agency's February 2010 legal interpretation. The agency also proposed
to extend the record requirement in Sec.  121.711 to supplemental
operations. In the SNPRM, the FAA proposed that these additional
recordkeeping requirements be effective 120 days from the publication
of the final rule.
    The FAA received comments on the proposed revisions to Sec.
121.711 from Continental, USAirways, Southwest, American, ATA, FedEx,
ASTAR, and one individual. Commenters stated that the time frame for
implementation is too short because it requires carriers to incorporate
new functionality into existing software systems, and the agency did
not identify a safety benefit that would result from this new
requirement. The commenters asserted that this requirement does not
enhance safety or increase efficiency, but increases complexity and
cost for operators, with no positive cost/benefit. Based on the
foregoing, Continental, USAirways, Southwest, ATA, FedEx, and American
recommend striking this proposal from the SNPRM.
    As discussed in the background section of the preamble, the FAA has
determined it is necessary to move forward at this time with a final
rule that contains certain discrete provisions proposed in the SNPRM.
As a result, this final rule does not change the operational control
requirements for supplemental operations. Since the final rule does not
provide for supplemental operators to share in operational control, it
would be incongruous to impose the requirements of Sec.  121.711 to
communications in supplemental operations. Therefore, the communication
record requirements in Sec.  121.711 will not be extended to
supplemental operations as part of this final rule.
    In the final rule, the FAA has retained the proposed changes to
Sec.  121.711 as they apply to domestic and flag operators. As set
forth previously, the agency has interpreted the current provision of
the regulations as requiring certain minimum details regarding the
contact between a certificate holder and its pilots. The approach in
the SNPRM has merely codified the agency's

interpretation of the level of detail required to comply with existing
regulations. Accordingly, in the final rule, the agency has retained
the 120-day timeline for compliance with this provision because the
final rule no longer extends the Sec.  121.711 recordkeeping
requirement to supplemental operations.
    The communication record requirements in Sec.  121.711 apply to
communications that take place while an aircraft is ``en route'' to its
destination. In the SNPRM preamble, the agency clarified that in this
specific context, an aircraft is considered to be ``en route'' from the
time the aircraft pushes back from the departing gate until the
aircraft reaches the arrival gate at its destination. See 76 FR 29336,
29352 (May 20, 2011). One individual commenter noted that the agency's
interpretation of ``en route'' in this context was inconsistent with a
legal interpretation previously issued by the FAA and suggested that
Sec.  121.711 be revised to clearly state that communication records
are required from the time the aircraft has pushed back from the origin
gate until the time it arrives at the destination gate. See Legal
Interpretation to Mr. Charles Lewis from Donald P. Byrne, Assistant
Chief Counsel, Regulations Division (April 17, 1997); see also, Legal
Interpretation to Ansel McAllaster, Manager, Flight Standards Division
from John H. Cassidy, Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division
(September 21, 1988), copies of which are included in the docket for
this rulemaking.
    The FAA agrees with the commenter that clarification is necessary
given the context in which the term ``en route'' is primarily used in
existing regulations and the conflicting intent of the SNPRM.
Therefore, the final rule revises Sec.  121.711 to reflect the meaning
of ``en route'' in this context, consistent with the meaning asserted
in the SNPRM preamble.
    The same individual further suggested removing the word ``radio''
from current Sec.  121.711 ``if the intent is for the certificate
holder to maintain records of all contact from pushback at origin to
arrival at destination gate.'' As the commenter points out, if a pilot
communicates with dispatch via a means of communication other than
radio, a record may not be required under current Sec.  121.711. The
agency agrees with this commenter. Since the meaning of en route in the
context of Sec.  121.711 includes time when the aircraft is on the
ground, the potential exists for non-radio communications to occur
between dispatch and the flightcrew. Such a result would be contrary to
the clear intent of the SNPRM and the original premise of Sec.
121.711, which was to ensure that appropriate records of all en route
communications between aircraft dispatchers and the flightcrew are
created and maintained. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with the
provisions of current Sec.  121.99.
    Sections 121.711 and 121.99 were added to part 121 in the same
rulemaking and both provisions were recodifications from the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulations. See 29 FR 19186, 19195, and 19228
(Dec. 31, 1964). Section 121.99 describes the type of communication
system each certificate holder is required to have for purposes of
communications in domestic and flag operations. Although these
provisions are not currently cross-referenced, they are closely
intertwined because the requirements of Sec.  121.711 contemplate the
type of communication system that is required in Sec.  121.99.
    In 2007, Sec.  121.99 was revised to change the previous
requirement for a ``two-way radio communication system . . .'' to a
requirement of a ``two-way communication system under normal operating
conditions.'' See 72 FR 31662, 31668 (Jun. 7, 2007). This revision,
removing the word ``radio,'' was made in recognition that advancements
in technology have provided for other communication methods for
contacting an aircraft other than radio. The agency explained the
revision in the preamble to the NPRM stating that ``these changes would
make the regulation more flexible for modern means of communication and
would allow for future changes in technology.'' See 67 FR 77326, 77333-
34 (Dec. 17, 2002). To ensure that Sec.  121.711 is not rendered
meaningless by the use of non-radio communication technology, the FAA
has removed the word ``radio'' from Sec.  121.711 in the final rule and
included a cross-reference to Sec.  121.99.

O. Runway Safety

    Currently, the maneuvers ``taxi'' and ``pre-takeoff checks'' appear
in appendices E and F and are required training and evaluation
maneuvers. Upon review of accident and runway incursion history, the
FAA determined that it was necessary to include additional procedures
within ``taxi'' and ``pre-takeoff checks'' to reduce the causal factors
that led to accidents and runway incursions.
    For example, on August 27, 2006, Comair flight 5191 crashed during
takeoff from Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky. See NTSB/AAR-
07/05. The flight crew was instructed to take off from runway 22 but
instead lined up the airplane on runway 26 and began the takeoff roll.
The airplane ran off the end of the runway and impacted the airport
perimeter fence, trees, and terrain. The PIC, flight attendant, and 47
passengers were killed, and the SIC received serious injuries. The
airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire.
    Existing agency guidance and advisory material identify procedures
that part 121 operators should use to enhance runway safety. See AC
120-74B, Parts 91, 121, 125 and 135 Flightcrew Procedures During Taxi
Operations; SAFO 06013 Flight Crew Techniques and Procedures That
Enhance Pre-takeoff and Takeoff Safety; and SAFO 07003, Confirming the
Takeoff Runway. The taxi and pre-takeoff procedures proposed in the
SNPRM and included in the final rule are consistent with this guidance
and advisory material.
    In the SNPRM, the agency proposed to include three additional
procedures during the execution of the ``taxi'' maneuver. The agency
proposed that, to comply with the maneuver requirement, ``taxi,'' a
flightcrew member must complete the procedures ``Use of airport diagram
(surface movement chart),'' ``Appropriate clearance before crossing or
entering active runways,'' and ``Observation of all surface movement
guidance control markings and lighting.'' Although some certificate
holders may already train and evaluate taxi at this level of
specificity, the FAA has determined that this maneuver must be targeted
by all certificate holders to ensure that flightcrew members
consistently use available cues and aids to identify the airplane's
location on the airport surface during taxi and verify proper
clearances before crossing or entering active runways.
    Further, in response to the accident involving Comair flight 5191
and NTSB recommendation A-07-044, the FAA determined it was necessary
to add pre-takeoff procedures, ``receipt of takeoff clearance'' and
``confirmation of aircraft location and FMS entry for departure runway
prior to crossing hold short line for takeoff.'' The purpose of these
procedures is to positively confirm and cross check the airplane's
location at the assigned departure runway before crossing the hold-
short line for takeoff.
    The final rule incorporates the proposals in the SNPRM for airport
runway safety training into existing taxi and pre-takeoff checks
requirements in appendices E and F of part 121. The FAA has determined
that the training and evaluation time required to

complete these taxi and pre-takeoff procedures would not take any
longer than the time currently required to complete those maneuvers
because the procedures are incorporated into the existing taxi and pre-
takeoff maneuver requirements.
    In incorporating the final rule runway safety requirements into
appendices E and F, the agency has eliminated the option to complete
pre-takeoff procedures in a non-visual simulator. Flightcrew members
use visual cues, signs, and markings to confirm the aircraft's location
prior to crossing the hold short line for takeoff. Accordingly, if an
operator chooses to train and evaluate pre-takeoff procedures in a
simulator instead of inflight, a simulator with a visual system must be
used. The agency does not believe this change causes any additional
cost to operators since there are currently no non-visual simulators
qualified by the FAA's National Simulator Program.

P. Crosswind Maneuvers Including Wind Gusts

    Existing training requirements for a PIC and SIC include the
requirement to perform multiple takeoffs and landings until the PIC or
SIC achieves proficiency. Currently, as part of the required training
and evaluation of takeoffs and landings, flightcrew members must
successfully complete crosswind maneuvers, as set forth in appendices E
and F to part 121.
    In the NPRM, the proposed Qualification Performance Standards for
pilots specifically provided that while performing landings during
training, pilots must demonstrate the ability to ``apply gust and wind
factors and take into account meteorological phenomena . . .''. See 74
FR 1280, 1366 (Jan. 12, 2009). This requirement was inadvertently left
out of the SNPRM, but remains consistent with the SNPRM's incorporation
of existing crosswind training into the proposed training requirements
for flightcrew members.
    In its comments on the SNPRM, the NTSB stated that this rulemaking
should include the requirements to train high gusty crosswinds. The
agency agrees that wind gust maneuvers are a critical component of
crosswind takeoffs and landings and that the training requirement
should clearly reflect the incorporation of this variable into
crosswind takeoff and landing training.
    The final rule clarifies that crosswind training for flightcrew
members in takeoff and landing maneuvers includes training on maneuvers
necessary to respond to wind gusts. Wind gusts are a key variable of
crosswind training given that a pilot must be able to rapidly respond
to changes in speed and direction of winds to maintain the correct
flight path to the runway. Moreover, crosswind training that includes
the wind gust variable will improve training in areas identified as
probable causes of accidents by the NTSB, including the accident
involving Continental Airlines flight 1404. The NTSB determined that
the probable cause of this accident was the PICs ``cessation of rudder
input, which was needed to maintain directional control of the
airplane, about 4 seconds before the excursion, when the airplane
encountered a strong and gusty crosswind that exceeded the captain's
training and experience.'' In connection with this accident, the NTSB
issued a number of safety recommendations including A-10-111, which
advised the FAA to require part 121, 135, and 91K operators to
incorporate realistic, gusty crosswind profiles into their pilot
simulator training programs.
    In the final rule, the FAA has amended appendices E and F to
include the requirement for training and evaluation in crosswind
takeoff and crosswind landing with gusts. The FAA has determined that
this level of specificity is necessary to ensure that all flightcrew
members have the necessary skills for takeoff and landing in gusty
winds. It is likely that many certificate holders already train and
evaluate crosswind takeoffs and landings with gusty winds included as a
variable of the training. However, the agency recognizes that not all
FFSs are capable of replicating gusts and is reviewing simulator
capabilities as part of a separate rulemaking. Moreover, since
crosswind takeoff and landing are already required and gusty winds are
merely one variable of this current requirement, the agency does not
believe any additional time is necessary to train and evaluate
crosswind takeoffs and landings with gusts.

Q. Miscellaneous

    The final rule includes a number of miscellaneous editorial and
clarifying changes. These changes remedy typographical errors,
redundancies and provisions that are no longer applicable within the
regulatory text.
    In those instances in which the agency must provide approval or
authorization, for consistency, the final rule refers only to the
Administrator. The Administrator's delegation of authority for specific
functions is appropriately addressed in guidance material.
    Finally, the agency has removed flight navigator training
requirements from subpart N. Flight navigators are no longer required
on aircraft used in part 121 operations. Also, consistent with the
SNPRM, the agency replaced the terms proficiency check and competency
check in Sec.  121.413(a)(2) with checks and supervision of operating
experience, to more accurately reflect check airman functions in part
121 operations.

R. SNPRM Economic Comments

    In March 2010, the FAA conducted a preliminary regulatory
evaluation to estimate the costs and benefits of the provisions
proposed in the SNPRM. The agency received several comments on the
SNPRM regulatory evaluation from air carriers, labor organizations and
trade associations. This section provides a summary of issues raised by
commenters on the SNPRM regulatory evaluation and the FAA's response.
1. Benefit Analysis
    ATA, Continental, and United noted the benefit methodology
developed for the SNPRM regulatory evaluation differs significantly
from the original methodology used in the NPRM regulatory evaluation.
    The FAA refined the SNRPM regulatory evaluation benefit analysis
based on public comments to the NPRM analysis. For example, in the
SNPRM benefit analysis, the FAA limited historical accidents to those
associated with airlines that did not have an existing AQP for pilot
training. The agency made this change based on comments stating it was
inconsistent for the FAA to determine that the provisions in the NPRM
would have minimal cost impact on AQP operators while claiming monetary
benefits for preventing or mitigating accidents that involved carriers
using AQP for training. Further, consistent with NPRM comments, the FAA
discounted the benefits in the same way costs were discounted.
    The agency has determined it is necessary to move forward at this
time with a final rule to address certain provisions proposed in the
SNPRM that enhance pilot training for rare but high risk scenarios and
provide the greatest safety benefit. Therefore, the methodology used in
the regulatory evaluation for the final rule differs somewhat from the
SNPRM.
    The final rule regulatory evaluation benefits analysis uses the
same methodology as that used in the SNPRM analysis in terms of using
the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) approach to select and score
each accident, and discounting benefits and costs. However, after
further review of the proposal and existing AQPs, the

FAA has determined that the training standards required in the final
rule will result in new training for all pilots who complete training
under subparts N and O as well as those who complete training under
AQP.
    Thus, the agency has estimated the benefits and costs of the final
rule requirements on all part 121 operators, including those training
pilots under an AQP. In addition, the final rule benefit analysis adds
benefits from accidents involving air carriers that trained pilots
under an AQP at the time of the accident if the accident could have
been prevented or mitigated by the requirements in the final rule. The
cost analysis for the final rule also calculates costs for carriers
that use AQP to train pilots based on new training requirements for all
pilots and not just traditionally trained pilots.
    Several commenters raised concerns about the accident avoidance
safety benefit analysis in which the FAA estimated the potential
benefits of the SNPRM by attempting to calculate the number and cost of
future accidents that would be prevented if this proposal were adopted.
Continental and Southwest assert the methodology the FAA used assumed
that past accident history from the chosen time period would be an
accurate reflection of future accidents. The commenters contend that
the accident rate per departure has been decreasing over the past 60
years and therefore the FAA methodology is flawed.
    First, although part 121 accidents have generally decreased over
the past 20 years, major and serious accidents still occur. The NTSB's
records on Accidents and Accident Rates show that from 2001 to 2010, 26
major accidents, 19 serious accidents, 160 accidents with injuries, and
209 accidents with aircraft damage occurred.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ NTSB Aviation Statistical Reports, Table 2. Accidents and
Accident Rates by NTSB Classification, 1992 through 2011, for U.S.
Air Carriers Operating Under 14 CFR 121, http://www.ntsb.gov/data/table2_2012.html, (visited. March 14, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, OMB guidance directs the FAA to monetize quantitative
estimates by using sound and defensible procedures to monetize benefits
and costs. The FAA used the willingness-to-pay approach to assume that
past accident history would be an accurate reflection of reducing the
risk of future airplane accident fatalities. This approach is
transparent, reproducible and follows OMB guidance. OMB states the
willingness-to-pay approach is the best methodology to use if reduction
in fatality risk is monetized, and the monetized value of small changes
in fatality risk can be measured by the ``value of statistical life''
(VSL).\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4, March
4, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA estimated total damages for the accidents identified in the
SNPRM regulatory evaluation based on assumptions identified in the
benefits analysis. ATA commented that accident investigation costs were
assigned based on the agency conducting the investigation and that it
is unclear how the FAA identified which type of cost applied to each
accident.
    The FAA calculated investigation costs based on the results of a
study completed in 2003 and 2004 to provide the FAA with critical
values the agency uses in costs analyses. The results of the study can
be found in a report ``Economic Values for FAA Investment and
Regulatory Decisions, A Guide'' at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost/media/050404%20Critical%20Values%20Dec%2031%20Report%2007Jan05.pdf. The
benefit analysis added the weighted averages of investigation costs (in
2002 dollars) for an NTSB investigation, an FAA investigation and a
private investigation from Table 8-2 of the study to estimate the total
per accident investigation cost savings. Since Table 8-2 was in 2002
dollars, using a GDP deflator, we escalated the results of Table 8-2 to
2012 dollars. In addition, the FAA used Department of Transportation
guidance to estimate accident costs found at http://www.dot.gov/policy/transportation-policy/treatment-economic-value-statistical-life. The
SNPRM regulatory evaluation documented this report as a data source for
accident costs.
    ATA, Continental, and Delta commented that the SNPRM regulatory
evaluation contains no description of the criteria the FAA used to
determine which accidents were relevant or how the criteria were
applied.
    The process the FAA used to determine which accidents were relevant
to the proposal is described in Section II.B.2. Accident Population and
Scoring on page 7 of the SNPRM regulatory evaluation. To determine
which accidents were relevant to the accident avoidance benefit
analysis, the FAA initially reviewed accident data for U.S. certificate
holders required to train under parts 121 and 121/135 from 1988 through
2009. The agency considered accidents that occurred during this 22-year
period because this period includes accidents with open NTSB
recommendations. The agency then selected accidents in which the NTSB
identified areas of inadequate training as either the probable cause or
a contributing factor to the accident. The accidents included for
consideration in the analysis were those for which the FAA developed a
regulatory change proposed in the SNPRM that could have mitigated each
accident. Finally, the agency eliminated from consideration accidents
that occurred by operators with an AQP training program and while the
carrier was operating under part 135.
    The importance of training varies for each of the accidents.
Therefore, the FAA rated each accident by evaluating the effectiveness
of the proposed rule against each accident using the scoring process in
CAST. All of the accidents with published final NTSB reports were
scored against the CAST safety enhancements. The agency used the NTSB
recommendations along with narratives, probable cause, contributing
factors and other pertinent data to score the accidents.
    American, ATA, Continental, Southwest, and United believe the
accident analysis should only include accidents from the past 10 years
because of the dramatic decline in accident rates over the past 20
years. ATA and United contend the FAA should exclude pilot-related
accidents from carriers who are now out of business, have merged with
other carriers, or involve more than one airline.
    For the benefits analysis, the FAA analyzed the causal factors, as
determined by the NTSB, for past accidents that occurred in part 121
operations. As discussed earlier in this preamble, the first accident
with pertinent accident causal factors was Delta flight 1141. Although
the accident rate has declined in the last 10 years, accident causal
factors identified by the NTSB during the 22-year historical benefit
analysis period are still relevant and need to be addressed. Also,
accidents by carriers who are out of business, have merged with other
carries, or involve more than one airline could have been mitigated if
this proposal had been in effect when the accident occurred. Therefore
these accidents were included in the benefits analysis because (1) the
accident occurred while the pilot was training under a part 121
traditional training program, and (2) new US certificated operators
entering part 121 service and training under a traditional training
program would benefit from the additional training requirement proposed
in the SNPRM.
    American, ASTAR, ATA, Continental, Delta, Southwest, and USAir
contend the FAA has failed to give adequate credit for accident rate
reduction

resulting from existing training program enhancements and technological
advancements that have been incorporated over the last 20 years,
including the following: Terrain Avoidance Warning System (TAWS);
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) standard operating procedures;
CFIT avoidance, vertical angles; CFIT prevention training; Visual Glide
Slope Indicators (VGSI) requirements implemented; Area Navigation
(RNAV) 3D and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) approach
procedures; Flight Operation Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP); loss of control prevention, policies,
systems and training; and runway incursion prevention policies, systems
and training. Taking these enhancements into account, the commenters
assert the FAA economic analysis overstates the potential benefit/cost
savings purported to be achieved by implementation of the proposed
rule.
    Even with these existing programs, the NTSB shows that major and
serious accidents still occur. The final rule requirements include
higher training standards and specific tasks which improve pilot
training program's content and application that will reduce human error
among crewmembers, particularly in hazardous or emergency situations.
    Southwest disagrees with the FAA's analysis of NTSB recommendations
relevant to training and accidents that could have been mitigated if
the proposed training requirements had been in effect at the time of
the accident. The SNPRM cited 28 NTSB recommendations relevant to
training programs that were issued as a result of 178 accidents, which
occurred between 1988 and 2009. Southwest reviewed the 28 NTSB
recommendations and stated ``the FAA speculates that no more than 4
accidents were associated with pilot inflight actions.'' Additionally,
Southwest noted the NTSB did not identify inadequate training as the
probable cause of these four accidents. Therefore, Southwest disagrees
with the FAA's conclusion that these pilot inflight accidents could
have been mitigated if the proposed training requirements had been in
effect at the time of the accident.
    As part of the decision to move forward with certain provisions
proposed in the SNPRM that enhance pilot training for rare but high
risk scenarios and other discrete provisions, the agency has conducted
a new analysis and determined the final rule addresses the seven NTSB
recommendations identified in the background section of this preamble.
    Moreover, the FAA clarifies that relevant NTSB recommendations were
used to establish the proposed training requirements. These
recommendations served as one of the components of the analysis used to
establish the mitigation effect on discrete accidents. The approach
taken to establish an effectiveness ratio (mitigation for each
accident) for the training requirements included an analysis of each
accident in the context of the CAST scoring process.
2. Cost Analysis
    ATA, Continental, ASTAR, and United contend the SNPRM regulatory
evaluation fails to provide documentation of the underlying assumptions
of the cost estimates.
    The FAA documented the sources for its information in the
assumption sections, tables and footnotes of the SNPRM regulatory
evaluation. The methodologies employed in the analysis were discussed
in the sections preceding the tables showing total costs.
    ATA and United stated the projected growth in affected crew
population levels of initial/new hire training in the SNPRM regulatory
evaluation was based on the net increase in total crew population but
ignores training necessary to replace retiring crew. United also stated
that, retirements alone are expected to be 5 percent annually
throughout the benefit period and thus the FAA underestimated the pilot
attrition rate in the SNPRM regulatory evaluation. As a result of
underestimating the attrition rate, United asserts that we have
underestimated the training costs that will result from retirements.
United contends one retirement would generate at least two initial
courses.
    The FAA crew population forecast accounts for the replacement of a
retired crewmember in the turnover percentage. Although United
projected a 5 percent retirement rate for their pilots, the FAA
maintains its assumption that 5 percent of the total number of pilots
would leave an operator through attrition (including loss of medical
certificate, loss of airman certificate, career transfer, or
retirement). This assumption is based on objective data presented in a
University of North Dakota study.\24\ The FAA disagrees with United's
assertion that for every crewmember who retires, two courses of initial
training would be required. The agency assumed that for each pilot lost
through attrition, one pilot will complete initial training. For any
additional training, the agency considered transition training and
upgrade training and accounted for those training costs in the final
rule regulatory evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ http://www.faa.gov/news/conferences_events/aviation_forecast_2010/agenda/media/GAF%20Jim%20Higgins%20and%20Kent%20Love.pdf. The University of North
Dakota estimates that 2.12% of pilots have retired annually along
with forecasting 2.94% pilot attrition (loss of medical, loss of
certificate, career transfer) from 2009 to 2024. We rounded to three
digits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the FAA Aerospace Forecasts 2013-2023, we expect the total
number of part 121 pilots to increase by 0.4 percent annually.\25\
Applying BLS labor wage data, the FAA has determined that the training
costs due to attrition and growth will range from $51.6M to $69.1M.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ FAA Aerospace Forecasts 2013-2033. Table 30: Active Pilots
by Type of Certificate, Airline Transport, 2012-2033. http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/2013-2033/ Accessed March 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ATA stated the FAA's determination of the net impact on annual
training hours appears to be based on the minimum programmed hour
requirements rather than on the actual number of training hours
necessary to complete the required training tasks.
    In preparing the cost estimate for the SNPRM regulatory evaluation,
the FAA identified the proposed programmed hour requirements and
calculated the incremental costs that the proposed programmed hours
would add over the current regulatory requirements. If operators
voluntarily exceed the training standard proposed in the SNPRM, then
there was no additional compliance cost estimated in the FAA cost
analysis.
    ALPA, American, Continental, JetBlue, Southwest, United, UPS, and
USAir stated the FAA underestimated the time it takes to complete
flight training tasks proposed in the SNPRM.
    On October 26, 2009 the FAA conducted a simulator trial to
determine the time required to complete the proposed recurrent
proficiency check requirements. The agency collected data on the time
it took to complete the recurrent proficiency check tasks proposed in
the NPRM and then used this data to estimate the time required to
complete the proficiency check requirements proposed in the SNPRM. See
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2008-0677-0177. In
preparing the cost estimate for the SNPRM regulatory evaluation, the
FAA used the data from the simulator trial to determine the additional
training hours required by the proposal and calculated the incremental
costs, over the current regulations, the proposed requirements would
add.

    On June 19, 2012, the FAA conducted a second simulator trial to
determine the time required to complete the additional final rule
maneuvers and procedures in each curriculum. During the second
simulator trial, the agency observed two FAA pilots perform the
extended envelope flight training requirements in an Airbus 330 Level D
simulator.\26\ The FAA pilots serving as the PIC and SIC both held ATP
certificates and were current and qualified to operate the Airbus 330.
All required checklists and procedures were completed in their entirety
for each maneuver and procedure. In addition, all required Air Traffic
Control (ATC) instructions and clearances were provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Recognition of, and recovery from, full stall and
demonstration of stick pusher activation were not completed during
the second simulator trial. Therefore, the agency considered the
time for recognition of, and recovery from, approach to stall--clean
configuration, collected during the first simulator trial. The
agency expects the time for each of these two maneuvers to be
similar to the time for recognition of, and recovery from, approach
to stall because full stall and stick pusher are further developed
stages of an approach to stall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The data collected during this simulator trial provides the
estimated simulator time required to meet the extended envelope flight
training requirements in the final rule. The FAA has reviewed both
simulator trials and revised the cost estimates for the training tasks
required by the final rule.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ The FAA has amended the Technical Report to add the 2012
simulator trial data in new appendix G. The agency has placed the
revised Technical Report in the public docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ATA, Continental, United, and USAIR noted the FAA calculates
simulator costs at an hourly rate instead of the industry-standard 4-
hour blocks for the purpose of keeping the cost of the proposed rule
low. These commenters also stated the simulator hour projection for the
SNPRM regulatory evaluation does not consider collective bargaining
agreements that may further limit training hours per day.
    The SNPRM regulatory evaluation calculated simulator costs at an
hourly rate instead of 4-hour blocks. Industry is not tied to the 4-
hour simulator training blocks. With the 5-year compliance date in the
final rule for simulator training tasks, air carriers have the ability
to revise their internal processes or re-negotiate contracts with
simulator training providers. In addition, the FAA believes that
bargaining agreements can be adjusted before the 5 year compliance
date. Therefore these costs are not attributed to the rule. The final
rule includes extended envelope training that must be completed in an
FFS. The agency estimates that the time required to complete this
training ranges from 90 to 135 minutes for initial training, 60 to 90
minutes for transition training, 45 to 60 minutes for upgrade training,
and 30 to 45 minutes for recurrent training.
    Continental contends the associated costs for legacy mainframe
computer programming related to the proposed requirement for evaluating
and recording line check performance in proposed Sec.  121.1233(d) were
not accounted for in the SNPRM regulatory evaluation. Continental also
states the requirements proposed in the SNPRM would add significantly
to the recordkeeping system requirement.
    The agency notes programmers in major companies, such as
Continental, are typically on staff. Staff programmers typically cover
software updates and maintenance. The FAA has reviewed the paperwork
requirements for the new final rule provisions and has revised the
regulatory evaluation accordingly. Upon further review of the SNPRM
regulatory evaluation, the agency identified paperwork costs that were
inadvertently omitted. For the final rule regulatory evaluation, the
FAA has further reviewed the potential costs of implementing the final
rule requirements and captured additional detail. For example, the
paperwork costs now fully address the review and development of
training programs, courseware and manuals.
    ATA, Continental, JetBlue, and USAir assert the SNPRM regulatory
evaluation did not include non-paperwork costs for program development,
and maintenance including high capital and management costs necessary
to modify or replace training equipment, reconfigure training
facilities, or re-program and maintain software systems.
    The agency included costs in the SNPRM regulatory evaluation for
maintenance, including high capital and management costs, necessary to
modify or replace training equipment, reconfigure training facilities,
or re-program and maintain software systems with a simulator or ground
cost hourly rental expense.
    For the final rule, the FAA determined that the average simulator
rental fee is $500 per hour plus the cost of an instructor for
consistency with the FAA's ``Pilot Certification and Qualification
Requirements for Air Carrier Operations'' final rule. The FAA believes
the hourly rental price accurately reflects the cost of capital and
includes costs for maintenance, capital, management, reconfiguring
training facilities, and reprogramming.
    The FAA received several comments from air carriers stating the
agency underestimated the cost of a number of SNPRM provisions,
including: Operating manual changes; the continuous analysis process;
crewmember and aircraft dispatcher requalification; flightcrew member
recurrent training; relief pilot recent experience; PIC line checks;
training with a complete flightcrew; flight attendant operating
experience; check flight attendant requirements; aircraft dispatcher
qualification and recurrent training; and, check dispatcher training.
    At this time, the agency is proceeding with a final rule to address
certain provisions proposed in the SNPRM that enhance pilot training
for rare but high risk scenarios, provide the greatest safety benefit,
and require time to implement, as well as certain other discrete
proposals. This final rule does not include the provisions identified
by commenters as having underestimated costs. If a subsequent final
rule includes the provisions cited by commenters, the agency will
review the costs identified in the SNPRM and determine whether
reassessment of these costs is necessary.
3. General Cost-Benefit Analysis
    ATA asserted that the FAA failed to correctly match the timing of
the benefits and costs in the SNPRM regulatory evaluation and asserted
that the incurrence of implementation costs would necessarily precede
any benefits that might occur by at least two years.
    The FAA initiated the benefits and costs of the analysis at the
compliance date of the final rule. The compliance date proposed in the
SNPRM was 2016, or 5 years after the proposed effective date of the
final rule. In the SNPRM regulatory evaluation, the agency determined
the timing of both the benefits and costs would start in 2016 and end
in 2025.
    In the SNPRM, the agency proposed an effective date for the final
rule of 120 days after publication in the Federal Register. The agency
further proposed to require compliance with certain amendments to part
121 on the effective date and to delay compliance with other amendments
requiring time to implement, to 5 years after the effective date.
However, in the SNPRM regulatory evaluation, the agency assumed the
timing of both the benefits and costs for all provisions would start in
2016 to account for a compliance date of 5 years after the proposed
effective date of the final rule, and end in 2025.
    The agency agrees that some implementation costs may be incurred
prior to when the full benefits of the final rule are realized. For the
final rule, safety benefits are realized beginning in 2019, when
compliance is required with

the new pilot training maneuvers and procedures. However, the agency
assumes paperwork costs associated with the training provisions for
instructors and check airmen who serve in FSTDs will begin the year
before the compliance date in preparation to meet the final rule
requirements. For the paperwork costs associated with the remaining
final rule provisions, the agency assumes new paperwork costs start to
accrue on the date that compliance is required. These timelines are
reflected in the table that appears in the Paperwork Reduction Act
discussion in the Regulatory Notices and Analyses section of this
preamble (Section IV). Greater detail regarding the paperwork burden
can be found in the Summary of Estimated Paperwork Costs by Objective
Grouping section of the final rule regulatory evaluation.
4. Economic Impact to Operators Training under AQP
    The FAA received several comments from air carriers concerned that
the agency failed to include costs to air carriers with pilots who
train under an AQP in its economic analysis of the SNPRM.
    In the economic analysis of the SNPRM, the agency determined the
proposals in the SNPRM would have a minimal impact on carriers that
train pilots using an AQP. Therefore, the SNPRM regulatory evaluation
included only certain paperwork costs for these carriers.
    Following further review of existing AQP curriculums and the final
rule pilot training requirements, the agency has determined that the
majority of new pilot training maneuvers and procedures are not
incorporated into existing AQPs used to train pilots. Therefore, the
FAA has estimated the cost of the new requirements on all part 121
operators, including those who train under AQP.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

Regulatory Evaluation

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub.
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act
(Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's
analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule. We suggest readers
seeking greater detail read the full regulatory evaluation, a copy of
which we have placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this final
rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs, (2) is not an
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866, (3) is ``significant'' as defined in the
U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Regulatory Policies and
Procedures; (4) will have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities; (5) will not create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and (6) will
not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments,
or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold identified above.
These analyses are summarized below.

Total Benefits and Costs of This Rule

    The following table shows the FAA's estimate for the base case
costs, including the low and high cost range, in 2012 dollars. This
table also shows our estimated potential quantified safety benefits
using a 22-year historical accident analysis period.

Total Benefits and Costs (2012 $ Millions) From 2019 to 2028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12NO13.161

    For the benefits analysis, the FAA analyzed the causal factors, as
determined by the NTSB, for past accidents that occurred in part 121
operations. The objective of the analysis was to determine if an
accident could have been prevented or mitigated by the training
provisions in the final rule. In 1988, Delta flight 1141 crashed
shortly after lifting off from the runway at the Dallas-Fort Worth
International Airport (DCA88MA072). In its final report, the NTSB
determined that one causal factor for the accident was ``The captain
and first officer's inadequate cockpit discipline which resulted in the
flightcrew's attempt to take off without wing flaps and slats properly
configured.''
    As a result of the accident investigation, the NTSB made
recommendations to the FAA that emphasized the importance of training
and manual procedures regarding ``the roles of each flight crewmember
in visually confirming the accomplishment of all operating checklist
items,'' as well as the ``verification of flap position during stall
recognition and recovery procedures.''
    The FAA determined that the pilot monitoring training and
operational provisions may have prevented or mitigated this accident.
The pilot monitoring training will provide pilots an opportunity to
practice monitoring skills in an environment that closely simulates
real line operations. The operational requirements will require
flightcrew members to follow air carrier procedures regarding pilot
monitoring. Together, these provisions establish an active requirement
for the pilot not flying the aircraft to remain engaged throughout the
flight by monitoring the

pilot flying, as well as the position of the aircraft, the flight
instruments, the configuration of the aircraft, etc. The provisions
will ensure that the pilot monitoring is prepared to notify the pilot
flying of any anomalies or to assume the flying responsibilities if
necessary. If these requirements had been in place at the time of this
accident, the pilot monitoring may have identified the incorrect
configuration and notified the pilot flying prior to takeoff.
    Therefore, the FAA initiated the historical accident interval for
the benefits analysis with this accident in 1988. The FAA concluded the
accident interval in 2009 with the Colgan accident because, at this
time, the NTSB still has not finalized its reports on the major
accidents (that may be pertinent to this training rule) that occurred
in 2010 and 2011. This is why the FAA uses the same 22 year accident
interval (1988-2009) for the benefits analysis in the final rule as in
the SNPRM.
    The FAA identified 10 additional major accidents with casual
factors identified by the NTSB that are addressed by the provisions in
the final rule that occurred during this 22 year accident interval. The
FAA cited these accidents in the benefits analysis based on pertinent
accident causal factors, regardless of whether or not there were open
NTSB recommendations associated with those accidents.
    The FAA notes, however, that it conducted a sensitivity analysis to
explore the effect of reducing the historical accident analysis period
from the 22 years to 10 years in response to comments disputing the use
of a 22-year time frame. Appendix 14 of the regulatory evaluation shows
that using a shorter historical accident analysis period increases the
estimated benefits of the final rule by approximately 17 percent.

Who is potentially affected by this rule?

    This final rulemaking will increase costs to operators of transport
category airplanes operating under 14 CFR part 121 by requiring
improved pilot training, as well as by requiring accompanying revisions
to their training manuals and related training materials.

Assumptions

    The benefit and cost analysis for the regulatory evaluation is
based on the following factors/assumptions:
     The analysis is conducted in constant dollars with 2012 as
the base year.
     The estimates of costs and benefits reported in this
evaluation include both 2012 dollar values and present values. Benefits
and costs are calculated in present values using both 3 percent and 7
percent discount rates as prescribed by OMB in Circular A-4.
     This final rule will be published in late 2013.
     This final rule will become effective in 2014, 120 days
after its publication. Compliance is required on the effective date
(120 days) for a few of the provisions, including for example all
technical amendments, Sec. Sec.  121.9 (falsification), 121.392
(identification of personnel as flight attendants), and 121.711
(communication records). Compliance with the remaining substantive
provisions is required within 5 years after the effective date.
     Although some incidental costs are expected to occur prior
to 2019, the primary analysis period for costs and benefits extends for
10 years, from 2019 through 2028. This period was selected because
annual costs and benefits will have reached a steady state by 2019.
     Safety benefits will be realized beginning in 2019, when
compliance is required with the new training provisions in the final
rule.
     Past accident history from 1988 to 2009 (22 years) is an
appropriate basis on which to forecast the likely future occurrence of
the types of accidents that the training and other provisions of this
rule will help to prevent. The full regulatory evaluation provides a
detailed justification for the selection of the 22 year analysis
period, as well as a sensitivity analysis that explores the effect of
reducing the historical analysis period from the 22 year period to 10
years. The Accident Population and Scoring section in the full final
rule regulatory evaluation gives more details on the use of accident
history in this analysis.

Changes From the SNPRM to the Final Rule Regulatory Evaluation

    Based on public comments and further agency review of the proposal,
the FAA made the following changes to the regulatory evaluation for the
final rule:
     Re-estimated costs and benefits to correspond directly to
the provisions of this final rule. The final rule focuses on
enhancements to pilot training for rare, but high-risk scenarios.
     Assumed that the final rule will affect all Advanced
Qualification Program (AQP) and non-AQP trained pilots in command,
second in command, check pilots, and flight instructors by adding
simulator and ground school time to their current training curriculum.
     Accounted for paperwork costs documenting the required
revisions to operators listed in Appendix 9 of the regulatory
evaluation.
     Updated the value of averted fatalities, injuries,
accident investigation and medical costs based on current DOT
guidance.\28\
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    \28\ ``Revised Departmental Guidance 2013: Treatment of the
Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic
Analysis.'' available at http://www.dot.gov/regulations/economic-values-used-in-analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Updated the hourly wages and benefits for aircraft crew
members with current hourly wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).
     Removed airfare, hotel, and per diem travel costs from the
cost estimates because the FAA believes operators will be able to
complete the new final rule training requirements within their current
initial, upgrade, transition, or recurrent simulator and ground school
training days. The FAA conducted a sensitivity analysis on the costs of
the final rule adding an additional day of travel. The results of the
sensitivity analysis are shown in Appendix 10 of the regulatory
evaluation. Even with the cost of an extra day of travel, the benefits
of the final rule still exceed the costs.
     Conducted a new accident analysis that took into account
the mitigations of other rulemakings for the same accidents in
determining the probability of effectiveness for this final rule.
     Assumed that the ``Flight Simulation Training Devices
Qualification Standards For Extended Envelope and Adverse Weather Event
Training Tasks'' rulemaking (RIN 2120-AK08) is in place by the time
compliance is required with the new pilot training requirements because
amendments to FSTD qualification and evaluation standards in part 60
are needed to support the new full flight simulator training
requirements in this final rule. In addition, the agency recognizes
that the final rule on Pilot Certification and Qualification
Requirements for Air Carrier Operations will be in place at the time
that compliance is required with the pilot training requirements in
this final rule.
     Included a table in Appendix 13 of the regulatory
evaluation comparing the probability of effectiveness ratings of the
overlapping accidents from the Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest
Requirements final rule, the Pilot Certification and Qualification
Requirements for Air Carrier Operations final rule and this final rule.
     Updated employment growth rates for pilots based on
current FAA forecasts and actual February 2013 employment statistics
for operators

listed in Appendix 9 of the regulatory evaluation.
     Updated the hourly simulator costs from the $550 estimate
used in the SNPRM to $500 for the final rule based on updated FAA
Flight Standards Service (AFS) data. This revised cost maintains
consistency with analysis from the Pilot Certification and
Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations final rule
published on July 15, 2013 (78 FR 42324).
     Conducted a sensitivity analysis on the hourly simulator
rental rate using the $550 rate from the SNPRM. The agency estimated
$323.1 million for the total costs using the $550 hourly rate. The
total benefits, as shown in the table above, exceed the costs for the
$550 hourly simulator rental rate.
     Initiated the ``Flight Simulation Training Device
Qualification Standards for Extended Envelope and Adverse Weather Event
Training Tasks'' rulemaking to amend 14 CFR part 60 to require the
additional programming and upgrades to simulators, which will be needed
to comply with extended envelope training required by the final rule.
The FAA estimates that the $500 hourly simulator rental rate assumed in
this analysis includes all upgrades expected to be required by the
Flight Simulation Training Device rulemaking. As an alternative, the
agency also conducted a sensitivity analysis using $600 for an hourly
simulator rental rate. The agency estimated $332.4 million for the
total costs with the $600 hourly rate. The total benefits as shown in
the table above also exceed the costs for the $600 hourly simulator
rental rate.
     Conducted a sensitivity analysis to explore the effect of
reducing the historical analysis period from the 22 year period to 10
years in response to comments disputing the use of a 22-year time frame
for accidents. Appendix 14 of the final rule regulatory evaluation
shows that using the 10-year period, the estimated benefits of this
final rule increase by approximately 17 percent. The full regulatory
evaluation provides a detailed justification for the selection of the
22 year analysis period.
     Changed the pilot ground school distance learning \29\
percentage from the 80 percent estimate used in the SNPRM to 100
percent, because the FAA allows 100 percent of ground training to be
accomplished via distance learning.\30\
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    \29\ Distance learning allows pilots to train out of the
classroom (such as at home).
    \30\ FAA Order 8900.1, Vol.3, Ch. 19, Sec. 5, Para. 3-1209 (July
15, 2013). The FAA notes that pilot ground school training
requirements include hands-on emergency equipment training (current
Sec.  121.417(c) requires that every 24 months, pilots must perform
hands-on drills on aircraft emergency equipment) that may not be
accomplished via distance learning. These costs are not included in
this cost analysis because those hands-on drills are currently
required.
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Benefits of This Rule

    Phased-in potential benefits will accrue from the additional
training requirements, and these are estimated in the table above. As
prescribed by OMB in Circular A-4, we discounted the 2012 $ benefits to
their present values using a seven and three percent annual rate.
    The final rule will also generate qualitative benefits. The final
rule addresses safety issues identified during two recent FAA ``Call to
Action'' initiatives including improvement of runway safety by
requiring training in critical runway safety issues, responds to seven
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendations, and
addresses the requirements in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010.

Costs of This Rule

    The FAA estimates the range of costs to air carriers in the table
above. As prescribed by OMB in Circular A-4, we discounted the 2012 $
to their present values using a seven and three percent annual rate.

Alternatives Considered

    The FAA considered multiple alternatives to the final rule. Three
of the alternatives that were considered would have provided relief
from some of the rule's provisions to small entities, while one
alternative considered accepting all of the provisions of the SNPRM. A
discussion of these alternatives can be found in the final regulatory
flexibility analysis.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    The FAA believes that this final rule will result in a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The purpose
of this analysis is to provide the reasoning underlying the FAA
determination.
    Section 604 of the Act requires agencies to prepare and make
available for public comment a final regulatory flexibility analysis
(FRFA) describing the impact of final rules on small entities. Section
604(a) of the Act specifies the content of a FRFA.
    Each FRFA must contain:
     A statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule;
     A statement of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a
statement of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a
statement of any changes made in the proposed rule as a result of such
comments;
     The response of the agency to any comments filed by the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration in
response to the proposed rule, and a detailed statement of any change
made to the proposed rule in the final rule as a result of the
comments;
     A description of and an estimate of the number of small
entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such
estimate is available;
     A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping
and other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of
the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement
and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the
report or record; and
     A description of the steps the agency has taken to
minimize the significant economic impact on small entities consistent
with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a
statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the
alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one of the other
significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which
affect the impact on small entities was rejected.

Statement of the Need for, and Objectives of, the Rule

    The primary purpose and objectives of the final rule are to ensure
that training and evaluation is provided for crewmembers by
establishing new

requirements for part 121 commercial air carrier training programs, as
mandated by Public Law 111-216. The changes seek to make a significant
contribution to the FAA's accident reduction goal by directly
addressing the safety goals from two recent FAA ``Call to Action''
initiatives including improvement of runway safety by requiring
training in critical runway safety issues. The requirements of the
final rule also implement numerous safety recommendations from the
NTSB.

Statement of the Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments

    There were no significant issues raised by the public comments in
response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis.

Agency Response to Comments Filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy

    There were no comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of
the Small Business Administration in response to the proposed rule.

Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance
Requirements of the Rule

    As described in the Paperwork Reduction Act summary in this
preamble, the agency expects only minimal new training documentation,
reporting and record-keeping compliance requirements to result from
this final rule. Every operator (including small businesses and
businesses with greater than 1500 employees) will incur a paperwork
burden as described in Paperwork Reduction Act discussion in this
preamble.
    Costs for the labor entailed in meeting these documentation,
reporting, and record-keeping requirements constitute a burden under
the Paperwork Reduction Act, and these costs are accounted for in the
final rule regulatory evaluation. The types of professional skills
necessary for preparation of the report or record include both
technical writers and flight instructors.
    Under section 604 of the Act, the FAA must determine an estimate of
the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement.
This determination is typically based on small entity size and cost
thresholds that determine whether an entity meets the definition of
``small,'' and these thresholds vary depending on the affected
industry.
    Using the size standards from the Small Business Administration for
Air Transportation and Aircraft Manufacturing, the FAA defined
companies as small entities if they have fewer than 1,500
employees.\31\
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    \31\ 13 CFR 121.201, Size Standards Used to Define Small
Business Concerns, Sector 48-49 Transportation, Subsector 481 Air
Transportation.
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Small Entities Affected

    This final rule will be published in 2013 and become effective in
2014. Operators affected by this final rule will be required to comply
with a majority of the final rule requirements 5 years after the
effective date. The FAA does not know if an operator will still be in
business or will still remain a small business entity by the 2019
compliance date applicable to the majority of the provisions.
Therefore, the FAA will use current U.S. operator's employment and
annual revenue in order to determine the number of operators this final
rule affect.
    To determine the economic impact of this final rule on small-
business operators the agency began by identifying the affected firms,
gathering operational data, and establishing the compliance cost
impact. The FAA obtained a list of U.S. operators, who are affected by
the final rule, from the FAA Flight Standards Service National Vital
Information Subsystem (NVIS) database.\32\ Using information provided
by the U.S. Department of Transportation Form 41 filings and the World