[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 49 (Thursday, March 13, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14319-14321]
[FR Doc No: 2014-05453]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-71662; File No. SR-NSX-2014-06]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Stock Exchange, Inc.;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Amend Its Fee and Rebate Schedule To Reduce a Fee for Orders Routed to
Other Trading Centers

March 7, 2014.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that, on February 28, 2014, National Stock Exchange, Inc.
(``NSX[supreg]'' or the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the proposed rule change, as
described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared
by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange is proposing to amend its Fee and Rebate Schedule (the
``Fee Schedule'') issued pursuant to Exchange Rule 16.1. Specifically,
the Exchange is seeking to amend Section II. (Other Services),
subsection A. (Order Routing--All Tapes) \3\ to reduce the per share
fee charged to Exchange Equity Trading Permit (``ETP'') \4\ Holders for
orders in securities priced at $1.00 or greater that are routed away
to, and executed on, another Trading Center \5\ from the current rate
of $0.0030 to the proposed rate of $0.0025.
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    \3\ The term ``Tapes'' refers to the designation assigned in the
Consolidated Tape Association (``CTA'') Plan for reporting trades
with respect to securities in Networks A, B and C. Tape A securities
are those listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Tape B
securities are listed on NYSE MKT, formerly NYSE Amex, and regional
exchanges. Tape C securities are those listed on the NASDAQ Stock
Market LLC.
    \4\ Exchange Rule 1.5 defines ``ETP'' as the Equity Trading
Permit issued by the Exchange for effecting approved securities
transactions on the Exchange's trading facilities.
    \5\ Exchange Rule 2.11(a) describes ``Trading Centers'' as other
securities exchanges, facilities of securities exchanges, automated
trading systems, electronic communications networks, or other
brokers or dealers.
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    The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's
Web site at http://www.nsx.com, at the principal office of the
Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant parts of such
statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange is proposing to amend the current Fee Schedule,
Section II.A. to reduce the per share fee charged to ETP Holders for
orders routed to, and executed on, other Trading Centers from the
current rate of $0.0030 to the proposed rate of $0.0025. As proposed,
this rate will apply only to transactions in securities priced at $1.00
or greater. Consistent with this proposed reduction in the transaction
fee for routed order [sic], the Exchange proposes to amend Section
II.A. with respect to the fees applicable to Double Play Orders.\6\ An
ETP Holder that enters a Double Play Order will not be charged a
routing fee under Section II. for the initial routing to a designated
away Trading Center and any unexecuted portion of a Double Play Order
in a security priced at $1.00 and above that is returned and executed
on the Exchange shall be subject to either Section I of the Fee
Schedule, or a fee of $0.0025 per share if the order is subsequently
routed to an away Trading Center in accordance with Exchange Rule
11.15(a)(ii).\7\
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    \6\ Exchange Rule 11.11(c)(10) defines a Double Play Order as
``[a] market or limit order for which the ETP Holder instructs the
System to route to designated away Trading Centers which are
approved by the Exchange from time to time without first exposing
the order to the NSX Book. A Double Play Order that is not executed
in full after routing away receives a new timestamp upon return to
the Exchange and is ranked and maintained in the NSX Book in
accordance with Rule 11.14(a).''
    \7\ Exchange Rule 11.15 (Order Execution), subparagraph (a)(ii),
Routing to Away Trading Centers, describes the Exchange's process
for routing eligible orders to away Trading Centers.
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    The Exchange states that it is making these changes to Section
II.A. of the Fee Schedule as part of its ongoing assessment of the U.S.
equity securities markets and the competitive environment in which it
operates. The Exchange submits that the proposed reduction in the
transaction fee for routed orders in securities priced at $1.00 or
greater from $0.0030 to $0.0025 aligns with the changes to the Fee
Schedule that the Exchange filed with the Commission for effectiveness
as of February 25, 2014.\8\ Specifically, the Exchange believes that
the instant proposal will increase opportunities to enhance the
execution quality experienced by ETP Holders through improved
interaction between liquidity providers and liquidity removers
(respectively described as ``Makers'' and ``Takers'' of liquidity in
the current Fee Schedule). The Exchange believes that, by reducing the
transaction fee per executed share for routed orders in securities
priced at $1.00 or greater, it will further incentivize liquidity
removers to access the Exchange to remove liquidity at lower cost. In
seeking to draw more liquidity, the Exchange aspires to improve the
price discovery process, improve execution quality, and lower costs for
ETP Holders. The Exchange notes that the proposed change will be
available to all ETP Holders with the anticipated result of better
execution quality at lower costs.
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    \8\ See SR-NSX-2014-05. The Exchange filed with the Commission
amendments to the Fee Schedule effective as of February 25, 2014
that, among other changes, adopted a new pricing model that provided
for fees for adding liquidity and rebates for removing liquidity (a
``taker/maker'' pricing model) and made certain other conforming
amendments. These included eliminating the separate fee and rebate
structure for the Automatic Execution and Order Delivery modes of
order interaction and eliminating certain execution-based rebates
available in some instances.
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    The Exchange submits that the instant proposal furthers its goals
of maximizing the effectiveness of its business model, offering
economic incentives to ETP Holders to access the Exchange and providing
a high-quality and cost-effective execution venue.
2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with the provisions of Section 6(b) of the Act,\9\ in general and, in
particular, Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,\10\ which requires that the
rules of a national securities exchange provide for the equitable
allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its
members and issuers and other persons using its facilities, and with
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\11\ which requires, among other things,
that the rules of a national securities exchange not permit

unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers,
and be designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade, and
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open
market and a national market system.
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    \9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78(f)(b)(4).
    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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    The Exchange submits that its proposal to reduce the per share fee
for transactions in routed orders in securities priced at $1.00 or
greater from $0.0030 to $0.0025 is consistent with Section 6(b)(4) of
the Act in that it is equitably allocated. The reduced fee will be
available to all ETP Holders entering orders in securities priced at
$1.00 or greater that result in a route to another Trading Center and a
subsequent transaction. The Exchange believes that the proposal also
meets the requirement under Section 6(b)(4) of the Act that fees
assessed by the Exchange be reasonable. Specifically, the Exchange
proposes to lower the current fee from $0.0030 to $0.0025 as a means to
incentivize increased activity by ETP Holders. The Exchange submits
that the proposed reduction of $0.0005 in the fee for shares routed
away and executed on another Trading Center and the adoption of a new
fee of $0.0025 constitutes a reasonable fee that aspires to encourage
more activity by liquidity providers, which in turn will result in more
ETP Holders accessing the Exchange to remove liquidity. As noted by the
Exchange, the reduced fee will apply to all ETP Holders that enter an
order on the Exchange in a security priced at $1.00 or greater that is
subsequently routed, in whole or in part, and results in a transaction
on another Trading Center. The Exchange proposes a parallel change to
the fee applicable to any unexecuted portion of a Double Play Order in
a security priced at or above $1.00 that is returned to the Exchange
after the initial route to the designated away Trading Center, and
subsequently routed out to another Trading Center for purposes of
compliance with trading rules. Such an order will be subject to the
proposed fee of $0.0025 per executed share. This pricing change with
respect to Double Play Orders will be equitably applied to all ETP
Holders entering Double Play Orders and is reasonable to assure that
such orders do not receive disparate pricing.
    The Exchange further submits that its proposal meets the
requirements of Section 6(b)(5) of the Act. By seeking to attract more
liquidity to the NSX market through the proposed amendment, the
Exchange is seeking to improve execution quality, price discovery and
cost-effectiveness. The Exchange believes that this amendment will,
therefore, further the purposes of Section 6(b)(5) in that it does not
permit unfair competition between customers, issuers, brokers or
dealers and is designed to promote just and equitable principles of
trade, and remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. The Exchange
believes, in fact, that the proposed change will operate to enhance
rather than burden competition by aspiring to increase liquidity and
improve execution quality on the Exchange through an equitable
allocation of a reasonable economic incentive. The Exchange submits
that its belief that the instant change will enhance competition is
supported by the fact that the proposed fee rate of $0.0025 per
executed share for orders routed by the Exchange to other Trading
Centers is within the range of fees assessed by other national
securities exchanges for executions in routed orders.\12\
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    \12\ See, e.g., NASDAQ OMX Price List at http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=PriceListTrading2; BATS BZX
Exchange Fee Schedule at http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/regulation/rule_book/BATS-Exchanges_Fee_Schedules.pdf.
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C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    The Exchange has not solicited or received written comments on the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    The proposed rule change has taken effect upon filing pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act \13\ and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule
19b-4.\14\ At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed
rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
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    \13\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
    \14\ 17 CFR.240.19b-4.
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml ); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-NSX-2014-06 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NSX-2014-06. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml
). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington,
DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit
personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit
only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NSX-2014-06 and should be
submitted on or before April 3, 2014.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\15\
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    \15\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-05453 Filed 3-12-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register: April 24, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 80)]
[Notices]
[Page 22149]
[DOCID:fr24ap08-42]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. AC08-55-000]

Southeast Chicago Energy Project, LLC; Notice of Filing

April 17, 2008.
    Take notice that on April 15, 2008 Southeast Chicago Energy
Project, LLC submitted a request for waiver of the FERC Form Nos. 1 and
3-Q under sections 141.1 and 141.4 of the Commission's regulations.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date. On or
before the comment date, it is not necessary to serve motions to
intervene or protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://
www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription''
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For
TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Comment Date: May 16, 2008.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E8-8852 Filed 4-23-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 222 (Friday, November 16, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57675-57677]
[FR Doc No: 2018-24989]

========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.

========================================================================

Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 222 / Friday, November 16, 2018 /
Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0446; Product Identifier 2010-SW-007-AD; Amendment
39-19498; AD 2013-21-05R1]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH
(Previously Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH) Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-21-05 for
Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (now Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH)
(Airbus Helicopters) Model EC135 P1, P2, P2+, T1, T2, and T2+
helicopters. AD 2013-21-05 required an initial and repetitive
inspections of certain bearings and modifying the floor and a rod.
Since we issued AD 2013-21-05, we have determined that modifying the
floor and rod removes the unsafe condition. This AD retains the
requirements of AD 2013-21-05 but removes the repetitive inspections.
The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on
these products.

DATES: This AD is effective December 21, 2018.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of December 5,
2013 (78 FR 65169, October 31, 2013).

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX
75052; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER> or<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>;
or at http://www.airbushelicopters.com/website/technical-expert/. You
may view this referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is also available on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2013-
0446.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov in Docket No. FAA-2013-0446; or in person at Docket
Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) AD, any incorporated-by-reference information, the
economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations (phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>) is Docket
Operations, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30,
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt Fuller, Senior Aviation Safety
Engineer, Safety Management Section, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, FAA,
10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>;
email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to remove AD 2013-21-05, Amendment 39-17629 (78 FR 65169,
October 31, 2013) (AD 2013-21-05) and add a new AD. AD 2013-21-05
applied to Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (now Airbus Helicopters) Model
EC135 P1, P2, P2+, T1, T2, and T2+ helicopters with bearing part number
(P/N) LN9367GE6N2; rod P/N L671M5040205; lever P/N L671M5040101; and
floor P/N L533M1014101, L533M1014102, L533M1014103, L533M1014104,
L533M1014105 or L533M1014106 installed. AD 2013-21-05 required
inspecting each bearing for freedom of movement within 100 hours time-
in-service (TIS) and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 800 hours
TIS. AD 2013-21-05 also required modifying the floor and modifying and
re-identifying the rod with a new P/N. The NPRM published in the
Federal Register on April 2, 2018 (83 FR 13883). The NPRM was prompted
by AD No. 2006-0318R2, dated April 25, 2017, issued by EASA, which is
the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, issued
to correct an unsafe condition for all Eurocopter Model EC 135
helicopters. EASA determined, based on a review of data and operator
feedback, that repetitive inspections are not required for helicopters
with the modified rod and floor. EASA accordingly revised its AD to
remove the repetitive inspections.
    Accordingly, the NPRM proposed to retain the requirements of AD
2013-21-05 but remove the repetitive inspections. The proposed actions
were intended to detect and prevent the binding of a bearing, which
could lead to loss of helicopter control.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD, but we received no comments on the NPRM.

FAA's Determination

    These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of
Germany and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with Germany, EASA, its technical
representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in
its AD. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information
provided by EASA and determined that an unsafe condition exists and is
likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type
designs and that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD requirements as proposed.

Differences Between This AD and the EASA AD

    The EASA AD sets compliance times from its original effective date
of October 20, 2006, and this AD does not. This AD requires modifying
each rod within 100 hours TIS, rather than within 800 hours TIS as
specified in the EASA AD. This AD does not require contacting
Eurocopter customer support, unlike the EASA AD. Finally, this AD does
not apply to Airbus Helicopters Model EC635 T1, EC635 P2+, and EC635
T2+ helicopters because they have no FAA type certificate.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    We reviewed Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin EC135-67A-012,
Revision 1, dated October 18, 2006 (ASB Rev 1), which specifies
repetitively inspecting the bearing of the linear transducer for
freedom of movement and the lower side of the floor for chafing or
damage. If there is binding, ASB Rev 1 specifies replacing the bearing.
If there is chafing or damage on the floor, ASB Rev 1 specifies
replacing the bearing and repairing the floor. ASB Rev 1 also specifies
modifying and re-identifying a certain rod.
    This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Other Related Service Information

    We also reviewed Airbus Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin EC135-
67A-012, Revision 2, dated April 3, 2017 (ASB Rev 2). ASB Rev 2 states
that the repetitive inspection has been added to the helicopter
maintenance manual. The repetitive inspection is therefore removed, and
ASB Rev 2 requires no action. ASB Rev 1 is attached to ASB Rev 2 as an
Appendix.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 304 helicopters of U.S. Registry
and that labor costs average $85 a work hour. We estimate it takes
about 10 work-hours to inspect the bearing, and no parts or materials
are required, for a cost of $850 per helicopter and $258,400 for the
U.S. fleet. If necessary, replacing the bearing requires 3 additional
work-hours, and parts cost $50, for a cost of $305 per helicopter.
Repairing the floor requires 3 additional work-hours and a minimal cost
for materials, for a cost of $255 per helicopter.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent
that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by removing Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2013-21-05, Amendment 39-17629 (78 FR 65169, October 31, 2013), and
adding the following new AD:

2013-21-05R1 Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Previously
Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH): Amendment 39-19498; Docket No. FAA-
2013-0446; Product Identifier 2010-SW-007-AD.

(a) Applicability

    This AD applies to Model EC135 P1, P2, P2+, T1, T2, and T2+
helicopters, with bearing, part number (P/N) LN9367GE6N2; rod, P/N
L671M5040205; lever, P/N L671M5040101; and floor, P/N L533M1014101,
L533M1014102, L533M1014103, L533M1014104, L533M1014105 or
L533M1014106, installed, certificated in any category.

(b) Unsafe Condition

    This AD defines the unsafe condition as limited control of a
tail rotor because of the binding of a bearing. This condition could
result in subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Affected ADs

    This AD replaces AD 2013-21-05, Amendment 39-17629 (78 FR 65169,
October 31, 2013).

(d) Effective Date

    This AD becomes effective December 21, 2018.

(e) Compliance

    You are responsible for performing each action required by this
AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been
accomplished prior to that time.

(f) Required Actions

    (1) Within 100 hours time-in-service (TIS), inspect each bearing
for freedom of movement by turning and tilting the bearing as
depicted in Figure 2 of Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin No. EC135-
67A-012, Revision 1, dated October 18, 2006 (ASB). During any
inspection:
    (i) If there is binding or rough turning, before further flight,
replace the bearing with an airworthy bearing.
    (ii) If there is chafing on the lower side of the floor that
does not extend through the panel outer layer, before further
flight, replace the bearing with an airworthy bearing.
    (iii) If there is damage on the lower side of the floor in the
area of the assembly opening that extends through the panel outer
layer (revealing an open honeycomb cell or layer), before further
flight, replace the bearing with an airworthy bearing and repair the
floor.
    (2) After performing the actions in paragraphs (f)(1)(i) through
(iii) of this AD, before further flight, install a Teflon strip and
identify the floor by following the Accomplishment Instructions,
paragraphs 3.E.(1) through 3.E.(4), of the ASB.
    (3) Within 100 hours TIS, modify and re-identify the rod as
depicted in Figure 1 of the ASB and by following the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs 3.H.(1) through 3.H.(3)(f), of the ASB.

 (g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Safety Management Section, FAA, may approve
AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Matt Fuller, Senior
Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Section, Rotorcraft
Standards Branch, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; email [email protected].
    (2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating
certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you
notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the local flight standards district office or

certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft
complying with this AD through an AMOC.

 (h) Additional Information

    (1) Airbus Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin No. EC135-67A-012,
Revision 2, dated April 3, 2017, which is not incorporated by
reference, contains additional information about the subject of this
AD. For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus
Helicopters, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone
(972) 641-0000 or<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; or at http://www.helicopters.airbus.com/website/en/ref/Technical-Support_73.html.
You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office
of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy.,
Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177.
    (2) The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) AD No. 2006-0318R2, dated April 25, 2017. You
may view the EASA AD on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov
in the AD Docket.

 (i) Subject

    Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6720, Tail Rotor
Control System.

 (j) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (3) The following service information was approved for IBR on
December 5, 2013 (78 FR 65169, October 31, 2013).
    (i) Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin No. EC135-67A-012,
Revision 1, dated October 18, 2006.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (4) For Airbus Helicopters service information identified in
this AD, contact Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N Forum Drive, Grand
Prairie, TX 75052; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER> or<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax
(972) 641-3775; or at http://www.helicopters.airbus.com/website/en/ref/Technical-Support_73.html.
    (5) You may view this service information at FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-
321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (6) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 7, 2018.
James A. Grigg,
Acting Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2018-24989 Filed 11-15-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


Site Visits Related to Combustible Dust:

Facility Y–Titanium Recycler

	Prepared for:

U.S. Department of Labor

	Occupational Safety and Health

Administration

	Directorate of Standards and Guidance

	Prepared by:

	Eastern Research Group, Inc.

Lexington, MA 02421

 (June 22, 2010)

Table of Contents

  TOC \o "1-5" \h \z \u   HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772484" 1	Project
Overview	  PAGEREF _Toc258772484 \h  1

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772485" 2	Facility Description	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772485 \h  2

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772486" 3	Process Descriptions	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772486 \h  4

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772487" 3.1	Overview of Common Operations
PAGEREF _Toc258772487 \h  4

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772488" 3.1.1	Raw Materials Handling and
Processing	  PAGEREF _Toc258772488 \h  4

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772489" 3.1.2	Melting and Re-melting	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772489 \h  5

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772490" 3.2	Specific Issues Pertaining to
Combustible Dust	  PAGEREF _Toc258772490 \h  6

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772491" 3.2.1	Dust Accumulations	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772491 \h  6

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772492" 3.2.2	Housekeeping Practices	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772492 \h  7

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772493" 3.2.3	Dust Collectors	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772493 \h  8

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772494" 3.2.4	Classification of Hazardous
Locations	  PAGEREF _Toc258772494 \h  10

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772495" 3.2.5	Fire History and Suppression
PAGEREF _Toc258772495 \h  10

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772496" 3.2.6	Building Insulation and Insulation
Facing	  PAGEREF _Toc258772496 \h  11

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772497" 4	Document Review	  PAGEREF _Toc258772497
\h  12

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772498" 4.1	Testing Data	  PAGEREF _Toc258772498
\h  12

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772499" 4.1.1	Facility Y’s Testing Data
PAGEREF _Toc258772499 \h  12

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772500" 4.1.2	OSHA’s Analyses of Samples
Collected During the Site Visit	  PAGEREF _Toc258772500 \h  13

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772501" 4.1.3	Published Information	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772501 \h  13

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772502" 4.2	Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs)
PAGEREF _Toc258772502 \h  14

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772503" 4.3	Risk Assessment of Dust Fires and
Explosions	  PAGEREF _Toc258772503 \h  15

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772504" 5	Training and Safety Programs	  PAGEREF
_Toc258772504 \h  15

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772505" 6	Main Findings	  PAGEREF _Toc258772505 \h
 16

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772506" 7	Feedback to OSHA	  PAGEREF _Toc258772506
\h  18

 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc258772507" 8	References	  PAGEREF _Toc258772507 \h
19

Table 1 		Titanium Dust Testing Results Provided by Facility Y

Table 2			Testing Results for Samples Collected During the Site Visit

Figure 1		Photograph of Titanium Chips Storage Area

Figure 2		Photograph of Rotary Drum Blender

Figure 3		Photograph of Employee Removing Metal Condensate From Slab

Figure 4		Photograph of Dusts and Turnings Collected by a Tiger Vac

Figure 5 	 	Photograph of Two Dry Dust Collectors

Figure 6		Photograph of Dry Dust Collector

Figure 7		Photograph of Wet Dust Collector and Insulation Facing

Attachment 1	Copy of Testing Results Provided by OSHA’s Analytical
Laboratory

Abbreviations

cfm			cubic feet per minute

CO2		carbon dioxide

EB			electron beam

ERG		Eastern Research Group, Inc.

MEC		minimum explosible concentration

MIE		minimum ignition energy

MIT		minimum ignition temperature

MSDS		Material Safety Data Sheet

NFPA		National Fire Protection Association

OSHA		Occupational Safety and Health Administration

VAR		vacuum arc remeltProject Overview

On June 29 and 30, 2009, Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG) conducted a
two-day site visit to a titanium recycling facility (hereafter referred
to as “Facility Y”). The site visit was conducted by an ERG employee
and a consultant. Its purpose was to obtain facility-specific
information on combustible dust recognition, prevention, and protection
programs, and to relay notable findings and other facility feedback to
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Site visit
activities included touring facility operations, reviewing relevant
documentation, collecting samples for analysis by OSHA’s analytical
laboratory, and interviewing employees who work in areas with
combustible dust.

The purpose of this report is strictly to document observations made
during the site visit, which may not reflect facility conditions at
other times. The site visit was not designed to assess Facility Y’s
compliance with OSHA regulations or adherence to National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards; it should not be used
to make such assessments. The site visit focused on safety issues
pertaining to combustible dust and was not intended to be a facilitywide
evaluation of all OSHA regulations (e.g., means of egress, fire
protection, powered platforms). This report should not be viewed as a
comprehensive review of Facility Y’s operations, because site visitors
toured only a subset of the facility’s processes, and not all of the
site visitors’ observations are documented in this report.

The remainder of this report is organized into the following sections:

Organization of Report

Section	Title	Contents

2	Facility Description	General information about Facility Y, such as its
main products, operational history, and number of employees.

3	Process Descriptions	Descriptions of the production processes that ERG
toured, with a focus on combustible dust safety issues; section includes
information on process-specific controls, housekeeping practices, and
equipment cleaning procedures.

4	Document Review	Summary of various facility documents pertaining to
combustible dust safety issues.

5	Training and Safety Programs	Review of Facility Y’s training
programs and summary of the extent to which combustible dust factors
into other safety programs.

6	Main Findings	Key observations made by the site visit team.

7	Feedback to OSHA	Feedback that Facility Y representatives wished to
communicate to OSHA as it proceeds with its combustible dust rulemaking
effort.

8	References	Full references for documents cited throughout the report.

Facility Description

Facility Y is a titanium recycling facility. It receives titanium-rich
material in various shapes, sizes, and alloys. The raw materials are
cleaned, sized, and blended before being melted (and sometimes
re-melted) in furnaces. Titanium products generated by the furnaces are
sent to customers as large electrodes, smaller ingots, or slabs; the
customers then further process this material in different shapes and
forms. Facility Y representatives suspected that their potential
combustible dust hazards are likely reasonably representative of those
experienced by other titanium recyclers.

Facility Y operates a large material handling area and multiple melting
furnaces; ERG site visitors toured a representative subset of these
furnaces, including the facility’s oldest and newest ones. The
facility operates continuously throughout the year, though some
individual operations (e.g., certain furnace melts) are batch processes.
The oldest furnace at Facility Y is approximately 30 years old, and the
newest was installed two years ago.

Facility Y’s main production areas are located in buildings with a
combined total floor space of roughly 450,000 square feet. Approximately
350 employees work at Facility Y, and around 275 of these work in
locations where combustible dusts might be found. The facility hires
contractors primarily for specialized services, like welding, plumbing,
and electrical work. Contractors are also used to perform various
equipment and process maintenance activities.

Facility Y does not have its own fire brigade, but several employees are
trained in all aspects of emergency response, including fire fighting.
The facility has installed several “safety islands” throughout the
production areas where employees can readily access fire extinguishers
and other emergency response equipment. Section 3.2.5 documents the
facility’s recent history of fires attributed to combustible dust.
Smoking is not allowed in or near Facility Y’s production areas; site
visitors noticed no evidence of smoking (e.g., discarded cigarettes) in
the production areas, with the exception of a testing report (see
Section 4.1.1) that indicated the presence of a cigarette butt in a
sample.

Three full-time employees work in Facility Y’s safety department, and
these employees estimated that they spend no more than 20% of their
collective time on combustible dust safety issues. The company that owns
Facility Y has a corporate safety practice, but local and regional
safety personnel conduct most of their own facility-specific safety and
engineering evaluations, without extensive input from corporate safety
officials.

Site visitors asked the facility’s safety personnel to comment on the
roles that outside parties play in Facility Y’s combustible dust
safety programs. A summary of those responses follows:

Facility Y is located in a township served by a volunteer fire company.
Once every year or two, facility representatives invite the local fire
marshal to tour Facility Y to discuss process safety, firefighting
measures for metal fires, and emergency response issues. The local fire
company does not require or suggest adherence to NFPA standards specific
to combustible dust, and Facility Y tends to teach the fire company
about unique combustible dust safety hazards, rather than the other way
around.

Facility Y’s insurance underwriter conducts inspections once every
year or two. Facility representatives noted that one inspector is very
knowledgeable about combustible dust safety issues. However, this person
does not conduct every inspection. The facility has also contracted with
Global Risk Consultants to conduct independent loss prevention analyses.

Approximately once every three years, Facility Y hires external
consultants to conduct comprehensive reviews of the facility’s health
and safety programs. These reviews evaluate many different general
health and safety issues (e.g., confined space entry, means of egress,
emergency response, and personal protective equipment) and do not focus
specifically on combustible dust.

Facility Y’s regional safety manager has accessed various reference
materials that OSHA posted to its combustible dust Web site. He has also
attended a technical presentation on combustible dust given by the
Assistant Director of a nearby OSHA Area Office. Facility Y was
inspected as part of OSHA’s combustible dust National Emphasis
Program.

Facility Y is a member of the International Titanium Association, which
provides its members a wide range of services. However, the trade
association has not yet offered detailed technical guidance on
combustible dust safety hazards. The trade association is currently
preparing a manual that describes safe practices for using and handling
titanium, and facility representatives are assisting the trade
association with that effort.

The company that owns Facility Y has recently formed a corporate
combustible dust safety team, but this team has not developed any
technical guidance for the company’s titanium recyclers and
manufacturers.

Facility representatives have accessed all NFPA standards applicable to
combustible dust issues and are very actively engaged in the process of
revising NFPA’s combustible metals standard (NFPA 484).

Process Descriptions

This section describes the process operations that the site visitors
viewed at Facility Y. Section 3.1 provides a very general overview of
Facility Y’s production processes, and Section 3.2 summarizes site
visitors’ specific observations pertaining to dust accumulations,
housekeeping practices, presence of hazardous locations, control
technologies, and other related issues. All photographs referred to in
this section appear at the end of this report.

Overview of Common Operations

This section presents a very general overview of the production lines
that the site visitors toured. Housekeeping procedures are described
here and discussed in greater detail in Section 3.2. Many operations
occur at Facility Y in addition to those listed below.

Raw Materials Handling and Processing

Facility Y receives scrap titanium in various shapes and sizes. The
material arrives in bales, boxes, crates, bins, super-sacks, and other
containers. The scrap is stored in many locations, including open bays
(see Figure 1). Only four of the specific processing steps in the
materials handling area are reviewed here. Taken together, these and
other operations are conducted to prepare scrap before it is sent to a
furnace for melting (see Section 3.1.2).

One of the first processing steps is to remove fine surface layers of
oxidized material from the titanium scrap. This is accomplished by
feeding scrap through an abrasive blasting operation with a steel shot
blasting material (see Section 4.2 for further information on the
properties of the steel shot). Dusts generated in this operation are
controlled by a wet dust collector on the shop floor (see Section
3.2.3).

Some scrap material (e.g., turnings) is crushed in a ring mill to for
size reduction. Dust-laden air streams generated in the ring mill pass
through a wet dust collector, with the exhaust vented into the
workplace. Interlocks prevent the ring mill from operating without a
sufficient water supply.

Further processing occurs in a wash line, where processed scrap is
washed, rinsed, centrifuged, and then dried at temperatures up to
325°F. The wash line does not perform additional size reduction, but
removes trace surface contamination from the processed titanium scrap.
Titanium fines that settle from the dryer are collected and sold as a
product. Airborne dusts generated in this operation are controlled by a
cyclone located outside the building (see Section 3.2.3). The dryer has
interlocks that prevent it from operating unless the exhaust fan is
activated.

A final stage before melting involves blending mixtures of the processed
scrap titanium metal. In this step, a tote of titanium scrap is loaded
into a rotary drum blender (see Figure 2), which is flushed with argon.
After each blending cycle, the mixed material is unloaded into a bin
beneath the rotary drum opening. The loading and unloading operations
are uncontrolled sources of fugitive metal dust.

At many locations throughout the materials handling area, employees can
activate a manual emergency stop (e-stop) shutdown. These e-stops are
labeled “Fire alarm/argon suppression.” E-stop activation causes 1)
exhaust fans to stop, thus reducing the risk of burning material
spreading through production equipment, and 2) argon flush of individual
production equipment (e.g., ring mill, dryer, cyclone) via hose
connections to extinguish burning material.

The wash-line duct from the dryer to the cyclone outside is equipped
with a spark detection system. It provides a local alarm upon detection
of a burning ember in the duct.

Melting and Re-melting

Facility Y operates both electron beam (EB) furnaces and vacuum arc
remelt (VAR) furnaces. The EB furnaces manufacture large titanium
products: electrodes, slabs, and other products. Some electrodes are
sold to customers without further processing; others are used as a raw
material for the VAR furnaces, which re-melt the electrodes to form
ingots. The VAR furnaces that site visitors toured were relatively new
and exhibited less evidence of combustible dust accumulations.
Accordingly, this section focuses on site visitors’ observations in
the EB furnace rooms.

Processed titanium scrap was fed by vibratory conveyor and other means
into the EB furnace, which operates under vacuum. After the furnace is
charged, a steel lid (approximately 12 feet wide) is secured on top and
melting begins. At the end of a campaign, which is a series of
consecutive melts, the lid is lifted and combustible material at the top
of the chamber begins to burn once air (oxygen) enters the furnace. This
controlled burn can last for a few hours, after which the titanium
product is removed from the furnace.

The titanium melt process causes the underside of the lid to be coated
with metallic “condensate.” Before the lid can be reused, this
condensate must be removed by one of the following two processes:

For some lids, employees remove metal condensate with a pneumatic chisel
(see Figure 3). This operation takes place in a designated area, and
dusts generated during the chiseling vent to a wet dust collector
located inside the furnace building, which exhausts outdoors. Note that
metal condensate dust from this area was sampled (see Table 2) and found
to be a Class II dust.

For other lids, employees remove the metal condensate using a backhoe
scraper that travels around the lid’s perimeter. This operation takes
place in a portable blast enclosure, in which employees must don
supplied air respirators when operating the motorized backhoe. Metal
dusts generated during this activity are collected and vented to a wet
dust collector—the same dust collector that controls dusts released by
a furnace. Operators manually engage a gate valve in the ductwork to
ensure that dust from the condensate cleaning vents to the wet dust
collector (see Section 3.2.3 for further details).

EB furnace loading, unloading, and continuous casting of titanium did
not occur while site visitors were touring the furnace rooms. To avoid
dangerous over-pressures, all furnaces have either been designed with or
retrofit with pressure relief systems. Site visitors encouraged facility
representatives to ensure that this design is consistent with NFPA
484’s guidelines and requirements and other published guidelines for
safe operation of titanium furnaces (e.g., Poulsen, 2000).

Specific Issues Pertaining to Combustible Dust

This section summarizes site visitors’ observations on several
specific issues regarding potential combustible dust hazards at Facility
Y. These specific issues were selected for more detailed summaries
because they either 1) demonstrate unique challenges faced by this
industry, 2) highlight effective engineering solutions implemented by
Facility Y, or 3) point to areas where improved combustible dust control
measures could be implemented.

Dust Accumulations

The nature and extent of dust accumulations at Facility Y varied across
the different production areas. In the materials handling area,
localized fine accumulations were observed near size reduction and
materials handling and transfer operations (e.g., centrifuge, ring mill,
dryer, presses, blenders). As Section 3.2.2 discusses, these localized
accumulations were removed at least once per shift. However, the
fugitive releases from these operations apparently contributed to
accumulations on equipment surfaces and elevated overhead structures. A
facility representative collected a settled dust sample from an
unspecified location in the materials handling area, and the laboratory
concluded that the sampled material was a Class II dust (see Table 2).

Dust accumulations observed in the furnace rooms varied across buildings
and production areas within buildings. As noted previously, limited
evidence of dust accumulations was observed in the newer VAR furnace,
except for highly localized accumulations near the electrode sawing
operation. In contrast, dust accumulations were evident at selected
locations in the EB furnace building. Site visitors did not tour the
entire operation, but noted that dusts had settled on pipes, beams,
electrical boxes, and other horizontal and vertical surfaces. These
dusts most likely originated from processes inside the EB furnace room,
but the relative contribution from different sources was not known.
Chemical analysis of the settled dusts might indicate which specific
operations account for dust accumulations (e.g., excess iron content
might suggest a greater contribution from abrasive blasting) in this
part of the facility—an insight that would be useful for determining
which operations require enhanced dust control.

Housekeeping Practices

A wide range of housekeeping practices have been developed for Facility
Y’s individual production areas. This section reviews selected
observations made by site visitors, which fall into two general
categories:

Current practices and the need for a written program. Facility Y does
not have a written housekeeping program, but has a Fire Prevention
Program that includes housekeeping requirements. However, during the
facility tour, site visitors learned of numerous routine and non-routine
housekeeping practices and procedures. For instance, in the materials
handling area, settled dust on the floors in the sorting area was
removed every shift using some combination of Tiger vacs (see below),
brooms, aluminum pans, and other non-spark-producing tools.
Accumulations around the wash line and ring mill are also reportedly
removed every shift.

Some other housekeeping (and equipment cleaning) practices in the
materials handling area occur at other frequencies. For example, the
entire wash line undergoes weekly cleaning, which includes removal of
accumulated material from inside the dryer and ductwork. This cleaning
can take two employees up to eight hours to complete. Finally,
“top-to-bottom” cleaning occurs every six months in the area with
rotary blenders and every two years in other materials handling areas.
This extensive cleaning involves vacuuming of dusts and other materials
from walls, rafters, beams, and other surfaces. Materials handling
operations generally do not shut down during the “top-to-bottom”
cleaning.

By developing and implementing a written housekeeping program, facility
representatives can have a single resource documenting preferred
housekeeping procedures and frequencies for each production area.
Effective housekeeping programs identify roles and responsibilities,
include housekeeping checklists for process operators, record amounts of
dust collected, and require periodic inspections and audits to ensure
that the required housekeeping activities are being conducted.

Use of “Tiger vacs.” As an example of Facility Y’s attempts to
minimize hazards from combustible dusts, facility personnel recently
purchased approximately 50 stainless steel “Tiger vacs” (see Figure
4) to replace nearly every conventional electric vacuum cleaner used in
production areas. According to the Tiger vac manufacturer’s
literature, the Tiger vacs used most widely at Facility Y are explosion
proof, dust ignition proof, and certified for use with Group E, F, and G
Class II materials. This certification is notable given that samples
collected during the site visit confirm that settled dust from the
materials handling area is a Class II dust (see Sample #7115 in Table
2).

The vacuums are equipped with non-sparking wheels and static conductive
hoses, and have an internal storage capacity for 10 gallons of collected
dry material. Dust capture efficiencies are reportedly greater than
99.99% for the filters internal to the equipment. It was not clear how
frequently collected material was removed from the Tiger vacs, and site
visitors encouraged facility safety personnel to establish a removal
frequency consistent with NFPA 484 requirements and ensure that
employees abide by the established guideline.

In 2008, the cost for purchasing a single Tiger vac unit with several
hose and wand attachments was quoted as $4,000. The quote did not
include costs for replacement parts (e.g., additional filters) and
optional components (e.g., grounding reels and cable). Facility Y likely
received a volume discount when purchasing multiple units, but invoices
documenting the magnitude of the discount were not available.

Dust Collectors

Facility Y operates dry and wet dust collectors that vary considerably
in terms of design and measures for preventing fires and explosions.
Site visitors’ observations on several selected dust collectors
follow:

Wet dust collector for abrasive blasting unit. Dusts generated from the
steel shot abrasive blasting operation vent to this wet dust collector,
located on the shop floor in the middle of the materials handling area.
The dust laden air from the abrasive blasting operation flows through a
pool of water and the formerly airborne metal dust settles as sludge in
the water reservoir. Exhaust air from the dust collector passes through
a high-efficiency particulate arresting filter before venting into the
workplace. (For every other dust collector viewed by site visitors,
cleaned air was vented to the outdoor, ambient environment.) Facility
personnel remove sludge from the dust collector on a weekly basis. The
dust collector does not have a water level sensor interlocked to the
abrasive blasting equipment. Facility Y paid approximately $40,000 to
purchase and install this dust collector from a used equipment vendor.

Two dry dust collectors. Dusts generated from welding, torch cutting,
and selected other operations are vented to two adjacent dry dust
collectors located outside the materials handling area (see Figure 5).
The dust collectors (baghouses) remove metal dusts and fines before
venting the cleaned exhaust air to the outdoor environment. Both dust
collectors are equipped with linear heat detectors that would trigger
argon quench systems should temperatures approach levels indicative of
fires or smoldering material. Collected material is periodically removed
in 55-gallon drums placed beneath the devices.

Cyclone. Also located outside the materials handling building, another
dry dust collector (see Figure 6) controls dusts generated in the dryer
on the wash line. Two spark detection systems have been installed in
this process: one in the ductwork connecting the dryer and the cyclone
and the other at the cyclone’s outlet. Detection of sparks or embers
activates an audible alarm and strobe. When these are observed,
employees are instructed to visually inspect the process and cyclone and
manually activate an argon suppression system if hazardous conditions
are observed. While this procedure might prove to be effective in some
instances, explosions would propagate faster than the time needed for
employees to activate controls. Thus, installation of an explosion
isolation system at the inlet of the cyclone would help ensure that an
explosion originating in the cyclone does not propagate back into the
production area. Grounding straps are visible in the photograph, though
site visitors encouraged facility representatives to ensure that
connecting segments of flexible ductwork are adequately bonded.

Dust collector for “rough cleaning area.” Operation of pneumatic
chisels in the enclosed “rough cleaning area” generates small clouds
of metal dusts, which vent through ductwork to an adjacent wet dust
collector (“RotoClone”). The RotoClone has a water level sensor
interlocked with the power: meaning, the RotoClone cannot operate unless
the water reservoir is filled above a designated level. However, the
RotoClone and blasting room are not interlocked: an employee can operate
the pneumatic chisel without the dust control measures activated.
Nonetheless, employees noted that their standard operating procedure is
to first activate the RotoClone before entering the blasting room to
operate the pneumatic chisel. The RotoClone has a 950-gallon water
reservoir, and employees remove roughly three 55-gallon drums of sludge
material from the device every six months. Accumulation of metal dusts
in the ductwork is believed to be minimal, most likely due to the
system’s air flow rate, which is typically more than 12,000 cubic feet
per minute.

Dust collected in EB furnace room. A smaller RotoClone is located in the
furnace room. It controls dusts generated in multiple operations: the
portable blasting enclosure and at least one of the EB furnaces. The
position of a gate valve in the ductwork determines which particular
equipment is being controlled at a given time. For instance, before
working in the portable blasting enclosure, the operator must first set
the gate valve position such that dusts from this operation can blow
through the ductwork into the dust collector. Failure to set the gate
valve in the correct position would result in dusts not being vented to
the RotoClone; however, no interlock is in place between the gate valve
and the other operations to prevent dusts from being generated unless
the valve is in the correct position.

Standard operating procedures call for the RotoClone to be activated
before dust-generating processes begin and to continue operating after
the dust-generating processes end, but no interlocks are in place to
ensure that these procedures are followed. However, an interlock does
prevent operators from activating the RotoClone if the water reservoir
does not reach a minimum water level. There has been a fire in this dust
collector, attributed to a gradual buildup of collected material that
dried following a long period of inactivity; this material apparently
ignited when the RotoClone was reactivated. A heat detector that
triggers an alarm and argon suppression has since been added to the
system to prevent future fires. The facility paid a vendor $68,500 to
purchase and install this RotoClone.

Classification of Hazardous Locations

No information on Class II locations is available, though dust sampling
suggests that some settled materials at Facility Y are Class II dusts.
According to an employee interview, dust-tight electrical enclosures
showed some evidence of accumulated material inside; this was believed
to result from employees not securely engaging the clamps when shutting
the enclosures. Site visitors were not able to determine whether the
enclosures had the dust ingress protection rating needed for Class II
classified locations.

Fire History and Suppression

Facility Y keeps a log of all fires that occur in production areas, and
site visitors reviewed a copy of the log that documented approximately
85 events between January 2004 and March 2006. Individual entries varied
in severity: some events were a series of sparks or smoldering material,
and other events were fires that required suppression and, in a few
cases, employee injury. No general trends could be gleaned from the log,
and fires occurred in various production areas. However, certain events
appear to have occurred in Class II hazardous locations, when employees
operated equipment not rated for these locations. These examples include
fires in forklift tailpipes and a fire in the motor of a pump at the
briquetting press.

One more damaging fire has occurred since 2006. An employee was cleaning
ductwork and process equipment on the titanium wash line, when the wash
line was configured differently: a “transition box” was placed
downstream of a dust collector (which at the time was indoors) and the
ductwork venting to the atmosphere. The employee was removing
accumulated dust from the transition box with a vacuum cleaner not rated
for Class II locations, and this operation led to a flash fire that
injured the employee and damaged process equipment. After that incident,
the portable vacuum cleaners have been replaced by the Tiger Vacs
described in Section 3.2.2.

As Section 3.1.2 notes, metal condensate fires are reportedly fairly
common when operators remove lids from furnace crucibles. These fires
eventually burn out, with smoke collected by dust collectors. However,
facility representatives are taking proactive measures to investigate
options for using other Class D fire suppression agents and other means
to minimize the severity of these fires. Other Class D agents used to
extinguish metal fires elsewhere at the facility include Met-L-X powder
and salt.

Building Insulation and Insulation Facing

When touring Facility Y, site visitors noted that some production
buildings had building insulation along walls and ceilings that was
covered with insulation facing—a material that had the appearance of a
white plastic coating. (The insulation facing is visible in the
background of Figure 7.) Given the proximity of the facing to titanium
metal dust accumulations, site visitors asked about the potential for
the material to burn and delaminate, drip, or melt. Compounding the
concern was the fact that 1) some insulation facing had tears and holes,
potentially allowing titanium metal dusts to accumulate behind the
facing in certain localized areas, and 2) extinguishing fires on the
walls and ceilings might be complicated, because the facility production
areas are not equipped with sprinklers due to the incompatibility of
water and titanium dusts.

Site visitors reviewed a product data sheet for the insulation facing
(“Lamtec Corporation WMP-50”), which indicated that the
polypropylene-based material has a flame spread rating of 5 (which is
relatively low) and a smoke developed rating of 30, as determined by
tests conducted following ASTM method E84. Facility personnel are
encouraged to compare these measurements to their applicable building
code requirements, which will depend on the locality and building
occupancy designation.

Similarly, site visitors reviewed a product data sheet for the
fiberglass building insulation used at most of Facility Y’s metal
structures. This insulation is placed on walls and ceilings, and then
covered with the insulation facing. According to Owens Corning product
specifications, Facility Y’s building insulation is non-combustible
(as determined by ASTM method E136) and found to have a flame spread
rating of 25 and a smoke developed rating of 50. Efforts should be made
to ensure that titanium dusts cannot accumulate behind the insulation
facing and in the insulation itself. This can be achieved by
periodically replacing damaged insulation facing.

Document Review

This section summarizes documents pertaining to combustible dust safety
issues that Facility Y made available to site visitors. This section
does not review every document that site visitors evaluated, but rather
focuses on documents that offered unique insights into combustible dust
safety issues and Facility Y’s approaches for controlling them.

Testing Data

Testing data for materials that Facility Y handles and produces were
available from two sources: Facility Y representatives let site visitors
review testing data that they had recently collected, and site visitors
collected four samples that were sent to OSHA’s laboratory for
testing. This section summarizes both data sets, as well as information
published by other researchers.

Facility Y’s Testing Data

Facility Y has recently conducted extensive testing on the
combustibility and explosibility of titanium dusts. In 2007 and 2008,
for instance, facility representatives sent four titanium dust samples
to be tested in a laboratory for particle size distribution and for one
or more explosibility parameters. Three of the four samples were tested
for minimum ignition temperature (MIT) of a dust cloud and MIT of a dust
layer; the fourth sample was tested for minimum ignition energy (MIE)
and minimum explosible concentration (MEC). The samples not only varied
in physical characteristics, but may also have varied in chemical
composition. Table 1 presents the sampling results, which indicate that
MIT of a dust cloud ranged from 285 to 470°C and MIT of a dust layer
ranged from 260°C to 650°C. Facility Y paid approximately $2,000 to
have a single sample analyzed for particle size distribution and the two
MIT values. Table 1 also indicates that a titanium dust sample had an
MIE of 180 mJ.

Facility representatives shared more recent testing results for three
additional titanium dust samples. The sample with the finest particle
size distribution (93.1% smaller than 75 microns) was found to have a
deflagration index (Kst) of 184 bar-m/s and minimum ignition energy less
than 9 mJ. Samples with larger particle sizes (and probably different
oxidation levels or alloy composition) had lower Kst values and higher
MIE values. The small particulate sample was labeled “RM dust,”
while the two larger particulate samples were labeled “EB MS dust”
and chamber booth dust.

OSHA’s Analyses of Samples Collected During the Site Visit

Site visitors collected four samples during the site visit, with the
permission and concurrence of Facility Y representatives. Site visitors
requested that every sample be subject to a “Class II test” at
OSHA’s laboratory. Table 2 summarizes the testing results, and
Attachment 1 of this report presents copies of the testing data, as
reported by the laboratory. More information on the samples collected
and the test results follows:

Sample #7112: Tiger vac dusts. This sample is a mixture of titanium
dusts, turnings, and dirt that had settled onto the floor in the
materials handling area and been collected by a Tiger vac. Facility
representatives estimated that the alloy dust composition was comparable
to “6-4 Titanium”: 90% titanium, 6% aluminum, and 4% vanadium. A
Class II test was requested but could not be performed because the
material was too coarse. The laboratory instead tested the sample for
explosibility and concluded that the material tested was not explosive.

Sample #7113: Metal condensate. This sample is metal condensate, which
is generated inside the furnace; in the rough cleaning area, employees
use pneumatic chisels to remove the condensate from the surface of the
metal product. The condensate is composed primarily of titanium and
contains much lesser quantities of iron, aluminum, and vanadium. The
laboratory concluded that this sample is a Class II dust.

Sample #7114: Dryer fines. This sample contains fine metal dust
collected from bins beneath dryers on the metal wash line. The
composition was estimated to be comparable to 6-4 Titanium. A Class II
test was requested but could not be performed because the material was
too coarse. The laboratory instead tested the sample for explosibility
and concluded that the material tested was not explosive.

Sample #7115: Settled dust. This metal sample was collected from
elevated horizontal surfaces in the milling processes in the materials
handling area. It also was estimated to have composition comparable to
6-4 Titanium. The laboratory concluded that this sample is a Class II
dust.

As noted in the testing results (see Attachment 1), the information
presented above should not be used in designing or engineering
protective safety equipment.

Published Information

Site visitors reviewed several scientific publications on titanium’s
fire and explosion hazards before visiting Facility Y (e.g., Poulsen,
2000; DOE, 1994). Findings from these publications echoed insights that
facility representatives shared during the site visit. For instance, the
U.S. Department of Energy reports that titanium dust, turnings, and
other small particles readily ignite and release large quantities of
heat once burning; further, the MIT for titanium dust clouds are between
330°C and 590°C (DOE, 1994). Titanium dust layers can ignite at
similar temperature ranges (380°C to 510°C) (DOE, 1994). Some tests
indicate that finely divided titanium powder’s MIE is as low as 25 mJ
(Poulsen, 2000). The publications also state that molten titanium reacts
violently with water, as facility representatives noted throughout the
visit (Poulsen, 2000).

Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs)

Facility Y representatives provided site visitors several MSDSs for
review. Three of these MSDSs pertained to materials that can generate
combustible dusts, whether at Facility Y or at one of its customers’
facilities:

Steel shot. Facility Y conducts abrasive blasting in the materials
handling area to remove oxide layers from raw materials. Site visitors
reviewed the MSDS for the steel shot used in the blasting operation. The
MSDS reports that: “Cast steel shot and grit are non-hazardous as
received. Fine metallic dust is generated as the abrasive breaks down
from impact and wear during normal use…the fine steel dust created can
be a mild explosion hazard.” Later sections of the MSDS indicate that
fires should be extinguished with Class D agents or sand, and not with
water, other liquids, or foam. The MSDS does not include quantitative
data on combustibility or explosibility.

Titanium product #1. Site visitors reviewed a copy of an MSDS that
Facility Y issued in 2006 for its commercially pure titanium (99%)
product. The MSDS clearly identifies health hazards and environmental
concerns associated with formation of titanium dusts. For instance, the
MSDS indicates: “chronic overexposure to dust and fumes may cause
respiratory irritation…” and “if significant amounts of dust are
created, these may have impacts on the air and water quality.”
However, the MSDS is not as explicit when acknowledging fire and
explosion risks associated with dusts that may occur under normal
conditions of use. The MSDS states that salt, sand, or Class D agents
should be used when fighting titanium fires, but does not identify or
describe any unusual fire or explosion hazards.

Titanium product #2. Site visitors reviewed a copy of an MSDS that
Facility Y issued in 2003 for a titanium product that included aluminum
and vanadium alloys. This MSDS had virtually the same content as that
for the commercially pure product.

Risk Assessment of Dust Fires and Explosions

A Facility Y contractor recently conducted a risk assessment project to
evaluate all potential combustible dust hazards and to prioritize them
according to hazard potential. The facility developed a
spreadsheet-based ranking tool, in which dozens of potentially hazardous
situations are evaluated and scored based on two factors:

Probability of occurrence. Every potentially hazardous situation is
assigned a score for its likelihood of occurring, with risk values
ranging from 1 for “no likelihood” to 6 for “almost certain.”

Severity of event. This category also assigns scores between 1 and 6. A
score of 1 refers to an event with no injury, illness, or property
damage; a score of 6 is assigned to events expected to cause a fatality,
disabling injury, or property damage that takes at least two weeks to
repair.

For each operation or employee activity, a composite rank between 1 and
36 was calculated by multiplying the two aforementioned scores. Facility
representatives then assign “hazard ratings” based on the composite
ranks. For instance, a composite rank between 30 and 36 is considered to
be an operation or activity with “extreme risk;” and a composite
rank between 1 and 5 is considered a “minor risk.” By this ranking
scheme, a few operations and employee activities—all in the materials
handling area—fell in the “high risk” or “extreme risk”
categories. For these and other activities, the risk assessment document
not only ranked potential hazards, but offered recommendations for
mitigating them.

Though not tasked with commenting on the specific assumptions in the
scoring spreadsheet (i.e., whether the specific criteria, scenarios, and
scores assigned were appropriate), site visitors found this
spreadsheet-based hazard ranking scheme to provide useful insights into
how Facility Y prioritizes future work to reduce combustible dust safety
hazards.

Training and Safety Programs

Site visitors and facility representatives briefly discussed employee
training efforts and other safety programs (e.g., confined space entry,
lockout/tagout, hot work permits), but had limited time to conduct
thorough evaluations of these topics. Observations for selected general
issues follow:

Contractor and visitor training video. Site visitors watched a 10-minute
safety video that Facility Y required contractors and other visitors to
view before entering production areas. The training addresses a wide
range of topics, including emergency response, lockout/tagout, operation
of overhead cranes, and confined space entry. The video mentions
Facility Y’s requirement that contractors provide MSDSs for all
hazardous materials brought to the workplace. The video does not mention
any unique fire or explosion hazards associated with titanium dusts.

Personal protective equipment. All operators and maintenance staff at
Facility Y are required to wear hard hats, safety goggles, and
steel-toed shoes in most production areas. Face shields, gloves, and
respiratory protection are also required for selected operations. Site
visitors noted that employees wore cotton uniforms (see Figure 3) when
removing condensate from furnace lids and during other operations that
generate atmospheres of Class II metal dusts. In these cases, cotton
uniforms might not offer adequate protection against potential fire
hazards. Facility representatives were encouraged to consider
information presented in NFPA 484 (e.g., Section A.13.3.4) and elsewhere
to investigate the need for employees to wear fire-resistant clothing
while performing certain operations.

Work in oxygen-deficient atmospheres. Several of Facility Y’s
processes are equipped with argon suppression systems that fires will
trigger. In these cases, employees who respond to these incidents might
come into direct contact with argon atmospheres, especially when
responding to fires or doing other work at floor level and below the
argon-air interface. Because people can lose consciousness within
seconds of entering argon atmospheres, Facility Y should consider
providing oxygen sensors to response teams that work in areas expected
to have argon purges.

Main Findings

During the closing meeting of the site visit, the ERG site visitors
shared several key findings. These represent observations raised by two
independent engineers and should not be viewed as a judgment on Facility
Y’s compliance with OSHA regulations or adherence to NFPA consensus
standards. The main findings communicated to Facility Y representatives
include:

Site visitors commended Facility Y for developing its “Risk Assessment
of Dust Fires and Explosion” as one approach to identifying high
priority combustible dust safety issues. They also commended the
facility for systematically tracking past fire incidents, no matter how
minor, and taking measures for preventing their recurrence.

Facility and regional safety personnel have clearly taken the initiative
to exchange information about combustible dusts, whether by attending
informational workshops, attending technical presentations at the local
OSHA Area Office, actively tracking and participating in the revision of
applicable NFPA standards, or participating in trade association efforts
to develop guidance on combustible dust safety issues.

Site visitors noted many outward signs of a strong emphasis on
occupational safety and health: numerous employees wore clothing with
safety slogans; several banners and posters were hanging in and near
production areas with important safety messages; and signage in some
parts of the facility clearly described safe working practices and
conditions to avoid.

Facility representatives seemed well aware of the specific workplace
activities that released metal dusts and caused the most fires.
Engineering solutions have already been pursued to minimize or eliminate
hazards in many process areas. Further consideration should be given to
manual operations that either 1) cause uncontrolled emissions of
fugitive metal dusts (e.g., transfer of material between containers) or
2) require employees to work in potentially unsafe operations (e.g.,
cleaning of spray shields and furnace lids). Development and evaluation
of new Class D fire extinguishing agent dispensers and delivery systems
are also encouraged to allow agent application without endangering
personnel doing the application. Facility Y should investigate the need
for employees performing high risk operations, such as cleaning furnace
lids and unloading the blender, to be outfitted with flame-resistive
clothing, per NFPA 2113, “Standard on Selection, Care, Use, and
Maintenance of Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection of Industrial
Personnel Against Flash Fire,” 2007 Edition.

Facility Y employees perform many different routine and non-routine
housekeeping duties, ranging from daily removal of localized dust
accumulations to annual “top-to-bottom” cleaning of entire
buildings. The recent shift to Tiger vacs should reduce the potential of
fires during housekeeping activities, provided that collected material
is removed at set frequencies. Facility Y can best ensure ongoing safe
and effective housekeeping practices by developing and implementing a
written housekeeping plan. Effective plans establish housekeeping
procedures and cleaning frequencies based on observed dust accumulation
rates and specify roles and responsibilities for operators, supervisors,
and management. One objective to consider in the written plan is to
minimize dust accumulations so as to avoid the need for Class II
hazardous locations (see next finding) and building deflagration
venting.

Testing data provided by Facility Y and sampling results from the site
visit indicate that titanium dusts from various production areas are
considered Class II dusts. Moreover, some past fires at Facility Y
appeared to result from use of electrical equipment that was not rated
for Class II environments. While the recently purchased Tiger vacs
appear to be rated for Class II environments, it is not clear if other
electrical and fuel-fired equipment (e.g., forklifts, motors) used in
the presence of Class II dusts carry the same rating, and metal dusts
had settled in some electrical boxes in these areas. Facility Y is
encouraged to systematically evaluate its hazardous locations and ensure
that appropriately rated electrical equipment is used.

Efficient operation of ductwork and dust collectors is critical to
ensuring that combustible metal dusts are handled appropriately and in a
manner that does not allow for hidden, unsafe accumulations. Several
opportunities exist to ensure that Facility Y’s dust collectors are
not the source of a future combustible dust incident, but generally
involve ensuring that design and operation of dust collectors are
consistent with specifications outline in NFPA 484. Specific examples of
potential enhancements include: use of additional interlocks to prevent
dust-generating processes from starting unless dust collectors are
operating with gate valves set in correct positions and verification of
air flow in the exhaust duct; installation of explosion isolation
measures in ducts for dry dust collectors handling titanium dusts; and
ensuring that connecting segments of flexible ductwork are adequately
bonded.

Facility Y should consider converting from manual initiation of argon
suppression agents into process equipment to fire detector actuated
discharge of the agent. This conversion would allow earlier agent
application and would reduce the need for personnel to be in an area
where argon is discharged and fires may be spreading. Facility
representatives are encouraged to refer to NFPA 484 to identify
additional opportunities for safe operations (e.g., adequacy of
protective clothing, furnace operations, use of coolants).

Although it is not directly a combustible dust issue, the use of
petroleum-based hydraulic oils and cutting oils poses a spray fire
hazard that could eventually involve titanium particulates.  Therefore,
consideration of the feasibility of replacing these oils with less
flammable oils would provide an opportunity for potential fire hazard
reduction.

Feedback to OSHA

At the end of the site visit, ERG asked representatives from Facility Y
if they had any specific feedback for OSHA on combustible dust safety
issues. (Note that this site visit occurred after OSHA publicly
announced its intention to initiate a rulemaking on combustible dust
[OSHA, 2009], but before the agency convened its stakeholder meetings).
They offered the following responses:

Facility representatives voiced concern about having to understand and
comply with multiple consensus and regulatory standards all pertaining
to combustible dust (e.g., NFPA standards, insurance guidelines, OSHA
regulations). They recommended that OSHA consider referencing some
existing standards, rather than developing entirely new requirements. By
this approach, facilities that already have invested considerable
resources to meet applicable NFPA standards would not have to invest
additional resources to evaluate specific requirements in OSHA’s
pending rulemaking.

Noting that larger companies tend to have extensive internal resources
for researching new safety regulations and ensuring compliance, facility
representatives expressed concern that smaller businesses—including
many that receive and process Facility Y’s products—do not have the
necessary resources to research, comprehend, and comply with highly
technical combustible dust safety standards.

Facility Y representatives noted that its furnaces (as with those at
other titanium manufacturers) are major capital investments. These
facilities may face a considerable economic burden should OSHA’s
combustible dust rulemaking effectively require replacement of, or
significant retrofit to, this equipment.

References

DOE, 1994. Primer on spontaneous heating and pyrophoricity. U.S.
Department of Energy, Washington, DC. DOE-HDBK-1081-94. December, 1994.

OSHA, 2009. U.S. Department of Labor’s OSHA announces rulemaking on
combustible dust hazards. U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA, Office of
Communications. National News Release: 09-475-NAT. April 29, 2009.

Poulsen, E., 2000. Safety-related problems in the titanium industry in
the last 50 years. Journal of Occupational Medicine, 52(5):13-17.

Table 1. Titanium Dust Testing Results Provided by Facility Y

Parameter	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4

Particle size data

   % on 40 mesh	Not tested	Not tested	30.6%	0.0%

   % on 70 mesh	2.1%	15.1%	7.0%	0.1%

   % on 100 mesh	0.6%	10.2%	2.8%	0.1%

   % on 200 mesh	3.9%	11.2%	9.7%	0.1%

   % in pan	93.4%	63.5%	49.9%	99.4%

Moisture content	0.6%	1.6%	1.0%	1.0%

MIT (cloud) (°C)	380	650	470	Not tested

MIT (surface) (°C)	285	285	260	Not tested

MEC (g/cm3)	Not tested	Not tested	Not tested	120

MIE (mJ)	Not tested	Not tested	Not tested	180

Notes:	See Section 4.1 for a more detailed description of Facility Y’s
testing data.

	All measurements shown in the table were made using standard ASTM
methods.

MIT (cloud) = minimum ignition temperature of a dust cloud

MIT (surface) = minimum ignition temperature of a dust layer

MEC = minimum explosible concentration

MIE = minimum ignition energy

Notes in the testing report indicate that a cigarette butt was found
within Sample 2.

Testing results also documented data for two reference materials:

Pittsburgh Steam Coal: MIT (cloud) = 585°C; MIT (surface) = 235°C; MEC
= 65 g/cm3; and MIE = 110 mJ.

Lycopodium spores: MIT (cloud) = 430°C; MIT (surface) = 245°C; MEC =
30 g/cm3; and MIE = 17 mJ.

Table 2. Testing Results for Samples Collected During the Site Visit

Parameter	Sample #7112	Sample #7113	Sample #7114	Sample #7115

Description of material	Tiger vac dusts	Metal condensate	Dryer fines
Settled dust

Particle size data

   % through 20 mesh	52%	78%	52%	94%

   % through 40 mesh	38%	58%	9.7%	91%

   % through 200 mesh	13%	11%	0.2%	66%

Moisture content	Not tested (<5%)	0.1%	Not tested (<5%)	1.2%

Explosive material?	No	Not tested	No	Not tested

Class II dust?	Not tested	Yes	Not tested	Yes

Notes:	See Section 4.1 for a more detailed description of the sampled
materials and where they were collected.

Refer to Attachment 1 for the original reports from OSHA’s analytical
laboratory and important disclaimers about use of these data (e.g.,
“it is possible that the material is hazardous under different
conditions; the results obtained from this equipment can not be used in
designing or engineering protective safety equipment”).

Figure 1. Photograph of Titanium Chips Storage Area

Note: 	This photograph shows a bay in which small titanium chips were
stored before processing. The materials handling area at Facility Y
included many different storage areas, many of which are not enclosed.

Figure 2. Photograph of Rotary Drum Blender

Note: 	This photograph shows a rotary drum blender used to mix processed
titanium chips and pieces into a homogeneous blend, before they are fed
to the furnace. This vessel is charged with titanium material, purged
with argon, and then spun to achieve the desired mixing. The mixed
material is then poured into a vessel (visible in photograph)—an
activity that was not viewed during the site visit but reportedly is a
source of fugitive dusts. Grounding straps were applied to this blender.

Figure 3. Photograph of Employee Removing Metal Condensate From Slab

Note: 	The photograph above shows an employee operating a pneumatic
chisel to remove metal condensate from a slab. Metal dusts are visible
on the floor around this operation.

The photograph at right is a close-up of the broken-up metal condensate,
which has the appearance of a coarse metal dust. Site visitors submitted
a sample of this material to OSHA’s laboratory for testing. The
testing concluded that the material is a Class II dust. Refer to Section
4.1.2, Table 2, and Attachment 1 for additional information on the
testing results and associated caveats.

Figure 4. Photograph of Dusts and Turnings Collected by a Tiger Vac

Note: 	This photograph shows the collected material within an
explosion-proof and dust-ignition-proof Tiger vac. The collected
material appeared to be a mixture of dirt, metal dusts, and fine metal
shavings and turnings—all removed from the floor of the materials
handling area. Site visitors submitted a sample of this material to
OSHA’s laboratory for testing. The testing concluded that the material
in this particular sample was not explosive. Refer to Section 4.1.2,
Table 2, and Attachment 1 for additional information on the testing
results and associated caveats.

Figure 5. Photograph of Two Dry Dust Collectors

Note: 	This photograph shows two dust collectors located outside
Facility Y’s materials handling area. The dust collectors are
baghouses that control dusts from welding operations. Cleaned exhaust
air from both dust collectors vents to the ambient air and not returned
to the workplace. Both dust collectors are equipped with continuous heat
detectors that trigger argon quenches if temperatures exceed action
levels. Facility representatives reported no history of fires in these
dust collectors.

Figure 6. Photograph of Dry Dust Collector

Note: 	This photograph shows a dust collector (cyclone) that controls
airborne dusts from a dryer on Facility Y’s “wash line.” Exhaust
air from the dust collector is vented to the ambient air and not
returned to the workplace. A spark detection sensor is placed on the
exhaust end of the cyclone, and another is located in the ductwork
inside the building. These sensors trigger a strobe and horn alarm in
the process control area for the “wash line.” When the alarm is
activated, operators are instructed to go outdoors and assess whether a
fire is taking place; if so, the employees press a button (not visible
in the photograph) to engage an argon suppression system. To date, no
fires have occurred in this dust collector, nor have employees been
required to activate the argon suppression system.

Figure 7. Photograph of Wet Dust Collector and Insulation Facing

Note: 	This photograph shows a new RotoClone dust collector installed in
a furnace room. The insulation facing, discussed extensively in Section
3.2.6, is visible on the wall behind the dust collector. Some of the
insulation facing at Facility Y had holes and tears, raising concern
about combustible dusts accumulating behind the facing, though no holes
or tears were evident at this location.

Attachment 1. Copy of Testing Results Provided by OSHA’s Analytical
Laboratory

Notes:

Refer to Section 4.1.2 for information on the materials sampled and how
they were collected.

Table 1 summarizes the sampling results; note that the “Sample
Numbers” across the top of the table correspond to the “Submission
Numbers” in this attachment.

As acknowledged in OSHA’s testing results presented throughout this
attachment: “The results obtained from this equipment can not be used
in designing or engineering protective safety equipment.” Further, it
is possible that some materials that were tested exhibit lesser or
greater explosion hazards under different conditions.

 The next edition of NFPA 484 has a method to use the amounts of metal
dust accumulated to determine the possible need for (1) building
explosion venting or (2) employee fire-resistant personal protective
equipment.

 These values are consistent with data reported in Table 4.5.2 of NFPA
499 for pure titanium, which indicates that MIT for a titanium dust
cloud is 330°C.

 Note that MIE is very sensitive to particle size and oxidation state.
As evidence of this, data provided by Facility Y indicated that MIE for
one titanium dust sample was < 9 mJ.

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Site Visits Related to Combustible Dust – Facility Y

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Site Visits Related to Combustible Dust – Facility Y