[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 225 (Friday, November 24, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 82441-82447]
[FR Doc No: 2023-25883]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-98979; File No. SR-OCC-2023-003]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation;
Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Partial
Amendment No. 1, Concerning Clearing Member Cybersecurity Obligations

November 17, 2023.

I. Introduction

    On March 21, 2023, the Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change SR-OCC-2023-003 pursuant to Section 19(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4
\2\ thereunder. The proposed rule change would amend certain provisions
in OCC's Rules relating to each Clearing Member's obligation to address
a ``Security Incident'' (i.e., the occurrence of a cyber-related
disruption or intrusion of a Clearing Member's systems that is
reasonably likely to pose an imminent risk or threat to OCC's
operations) of that Clearing Member. The proposed rule change was
published for public comment in the Federal Register on April 5,
2023.\3\ The Commission has received comments regarding the proposed
rule change.\4\
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 97225 (Mar. 30, 2023),
88 FR 20195 (Apr. 5, 2023) (File No. SR-OCC-2023-003) (``Notice of
Filing'').
    \4\ Comments on the proposed rule change are available at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2023-003/srocc2023003.htm.
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    On May 18, 2023, pursuant to the Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange
Act,\5\ the Commission designated a longer period within which to
approve, disapprove, or institute proceedings to determine whether to
approve the proposed rule change.\6\ On May 24, 2023, OCC filed Partial
Amendment No. 1 to the Notice of Filing.\7\ For the reasons discussed
below, the Commission is approving the proposed rule change, as
modified by Partial Amendment No. 1 (hereinafter, ``proposed rule
change'').
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    \5\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 97525 (May 18,
2023), 88 FR 33655 (May 24, 2023) (File No. SR-OCC-2023-003).
    \7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 97602 (May 26,
2023), 88 FR 36351 (June 2, 2023) (File No. SR-OCC-2023-003)
(``Notice of Partial Amendment''). OCC submitted Partial Amendment
No. 1 in response to comments regarding the proposed definition of
``Security Incident'' for purposes of proposed Rule 213(d), the
notification requirements and procedure in the event of a Security
Incident, factors considered when determining whether to disconnect
or reduce a clearing member's access, and clarification related to
reconnection.
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II. Background

    Currently, the only OCC Rule governing a Clearing Member's
cybersecurity obligations to OCC is Rule 219, titled ``Cybersecurity
Confirmation.'' \8\ It requires Clearing Members and applicants for
clearing membership to submit to OCC a form called the ``Cybersecurity
Confirmation'' at least every two years or as part of its application
materials. Through the form,

Clearing Members and applicants confirm that they maintain a
comprehensive cybersecurity program that meets certain criteria (e.g.,
the cybersecurity program is approved by senior management, it is
reviewed and updated periodically, the cybersecurity program is
designed to protect the segment of the Clearing Member's or applicant's
system that interacts with OCC, it includes a process for the Clearing
Member to remediate cyber issues, etc.). However, current Rule 219 does
not require Clearing Members to notify OCC if they experience a
cybersecurity incident that could impact OCC or otherwise address OCC's
processes, or the Clearing Member's obligations with respect to OCC.
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    \8\ Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the
meanings specified in OCC's Rules and By-Laws, available at https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp.
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    The proposed rule change would renumber Rule 219 as Rule 213 and
rename the rule ``Cybersecurity Obligations'' to reflect the expanded
scope of the Rule.\9\ It also would add section headings to the Rule
and replace references to ``OCC'' with references to ``the
Corporation,'' but otherwise would not change the provisions regarding
the existing Cybersecurity Confirmation form that confirms the
existence of a Clearing Member's cybersecurity program.\10\
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    \9\ The renumbering follows proposed changes to OCC's clearing
membership standards, which includes removal of current Rules 213
through 218. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 97150 (Mar. 15,
2023), 88 FR 17046 (Mar. 21, 2023) (File No. SR-OCC-2023-002).
    \10\ Specifically, OCC would add the following headings:
``Cybersecurity Confirmation Submission'' to paragraph (a);
``Representations in the Cybersecurity Confirmation'' to paragraph
(b); and ``Execution of the Cybersecurity Confirmation'' to
paragraph (c).
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    The substantive changes to the Rule would be the addition of two
new subsections--(d) and (e)--titled ``Occurrence of a Security
Incident'' and ``Procedures for Connecting Following a Security
Incident,'' respectively. New subsection (d) would require a Clearing
Member to immediately notify OCC if the member becomes aware or should
be aware of a Security Incident (as defined in the Rule). It would also
specify that OCC may take actions reasonably necessary to mitigate any
effects on its operations following a Security Incident. New subsection
(e) would require a Clearing Member wishing to reconnect its systems to
OCC's systems to provide OCC with a new form, titled ``Reconnection
Attestation,'' that describes the Security Incident and attests to
certain security requirements, as well as an associated checklist,
titled ``Reconnection Checklist,'' that describes the affected Clearing
Member's remediation efforts and other key information. Each of these
proposed changes is described in greater detail below.

A. New Paragraph (d): Occurrence of a Security Incident

    Proposed Rule 213(d) would define a Security Incident as an
incident that has occurred or is occurring involving a cyber-related
disruption or intrusion of the Clearing Member's system(s) that is
reasonably likely to pose an imminent risk or threat to OCC's
operations.\11\ To provide guidance regarding the types of disruptions
or intrusions that might be considered Security Incidents, the proposed
rule includes a non-exhaustive list of examples. Specifically, a
Security Incident may include any disruption or degradation of the
normal operation of the Clearing Member's systems or any unauthorized
entry into the Clearing Member's systems that would result in loss of
OCC's data or system integrity, an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
information related to OCC, or the inability of OCC to conduct
essential clearance and settlement functions.\12\
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    \11\ In response to public comment, OCC amended the proposed
rule change to specify that a disruption or intrusion of a Clearing
Member's systems would only be deemed a Security Incident if it is
``reasonably likely to pose an imminent risk or threat to OCC's
operations.'' See Notice of Partial Amendment, 88 FR at 36352.
    \12\ In response to public comment, OCC added the non-exhaustive
list of potential Security Incidents to clarify that the focus of
the Rule would be on the potential impact on OCC of a disruption or
intrusion. See Notice of Partial Amendment, 88 FR at 36352.
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    Under the proposed rule, a Clearing Member would be required to
immediately notify OCC if the member becomes aware or should be aware
that there has been a Security Incident or that a Security Incident is
occurring.\13\ The Clearing Member would also need to promptly confirm
such notice in writing.
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    \13\ See Notice of Partial Amendment, 88 FR at 36352.
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    The proposed rule would specify that, if OCC receives notice of a
Security Incident from a Clearing Member or has a reasonable basis to
believe a Security Incident has occurred or is occurring, OCC may take
actions reasonably necessary to mitigate any effects to its operations,
including disconnecting the Clearing Member's access to OCC's
information and data systems or modifying the scope and specifications
of such access. Finally, paragraph (d) of the proposed rule would
provide a non-exhaustive list of factors OCC may consider in
determining whether to modify a Clearing Member's access to OCC's
information and data systems, up to and including disconnection, in
response to a Security Incident. Specifically, among other factors, OCC
may consider the potential loss of control by a Clearing Member of its
internal system(s), the potential loss of OCC's confidential data, the
potential strain on or loss of OCC's resources due to OCC's inability
to perform clearance and settlement functions, and the overall severity
of the threat to the security and operations of OCC.\14\ Further, if
the Corporation reasonably determines that disconnection of a Clearing
Member is necessary, the Clearing Member must continue to meet its
obligations to the Corporation, notwithstanding disconnection from the
Corporation's systems.
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    \14\ In response to public comment, OCC amended its proposed
rule to specify that these are the types of factors OCC would
consider when determining whether to disconnect a Clearing Member.
See Notice of Partial Amendment, 88 FR at 36353. OCC also clarified
its anticipation that not all Security Incident notifications will
result in a Clearing Member disconnection. See id. at 36352.
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B. New Paragraph (e): Procedures for Connecting Following a Security
Incident That Results in Disconnection

    Proposed Rule 213(e) would clarify the process for a Clearing
Member to request reconnection to OCC's systems following disconnection
as a result of a Security Incident. In particular, the Clearing Member
would need to complete and submit, upon OCC's request, a new form
referred to by OCC as the ``Reconnection Attestation'' and a related
checklist referred to by OCC as the ``Reconnection Checklist.'' The
Reconnection Attestation would include a text box for the Clearing
Member to provide a narrative description of the Security Incident and
five representations to which, by signing the form, the Clearing Member
would be attesting. Specifically, by signing the Reconnection
Attestation, the Clearing Member would be attesting that it has:
     provided full, complete and accurate information in
response to all requests made by OCC regarding the Security Incident,
including all requests contained in the Reconnection Checklist, on a
good faith, best efforts basis;
     provided full, complete and accurate information regarding
any OCC data or systems that were potentially compromised during the
Security Incident, including any potential exposure of credentials used
to access OCC's systems, and will immediately notify OCC if it later
becomes aware of a previously undetected or unreported compromise of
OCC data or systems during the Security Incident;

     determined whether the Security Incident resulted,
directly or indirectly, from any controls that failed or were
circumvented by its employees, contractors or agents (``Failed
Controls''); \15\
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    \15\ The proposed language would further specify that the
Clearing Member has communicated the existence of Failed Controls to
OCC and is remediating or has remediated all Failed Controls.
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     implemented, or will implement promptly, technical and
operational changes, both preventative and detective, with the intent
to prevent a recurrence of the Security Incident and has provided
written summaries of such changes to OCC; and
     complied and will continue to comply with all applicable
laws in connection with its response to the Security Incident,
including any notifications required to be provided to government
agencies, OCC, and third parties.\16\
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    \16\ See proposed Rule 213(e)(1)(A) through (E). Further, each
Reconnection Attestation must be provided in writing and signed by a
designated senior executive of the Clearing Member.
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    The associated Reconnection Checklist would include questions
designed to elicit additional details regarding the Security Incident,
including the potential cause of the incident, steps taken to contain
it, the exposure and impact to OCC's systems or data, the Clearing
Member's remediation efforts, and any other details relevant to the
Clearing Member's request to reconnect to OCC's systems. The
Reconnection Checklist would require the Clearing Member to respond to
the following questions: \17\
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    \17\ The description of the checklist provided here is based on
the Exhibit 3 to File No. SR-OCC-2023-003 provided by OCC at the
time of filing.
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     was the disconnection the result of a cybersecurity-
related incident;
     describe the nature of the incident;
     what steps were taken to contain the incident;
     what OCC data, if any, was compromised during the
incident;
     what OCC systems, if any, were impacted during the
incident;
     was there any risk of exposure of credentials used to
access OCC systems and, if so, were the credentials reissued;
     which controls were circumvented or failed that led to the
incident occurring;
     what changes, preventative and detective, were implemented
to prevent a reoccurrence;
     how has data integrity been preserved and what data checks
have been performed prior to reconnecting to and sending/receiving data
to/from OCC;
     have third-parties, including government agencies, been
notified; and
     any additional details relevant to reconnection.\18\
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    \18\ These are the specific questions included in the
Reconnection Checklist that OCC submitted as Exhibit 3 to the
proposed rule change. See Exhibit 3 to File No. SR OCC2023-003.
However, proposed Rule 213(e)(2) specifies that the Reconnection
Checklist may require ``information including, but not limited to,''
the 11 questions noted above. This is to account for the evolving
nature of Security Incidents and provide OCC with flexibility to
modify the specific information requirements if necessary. See
Notice of Filing, 88 FR at 20196.
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    According to OCC, the Reconnection Attestation and Reconnection
Checklist are designed to accomplish several goals. First, they are
designed to enable OCC to determine whether the risk or threat to OCC
has been mitigated sufficiently for OCC to resume connectivity to the
Clearing Member.\19\ Second, they are designed to provide OCC with
evidence related to a Clearing Member's response to a Security
Incident, including whether the Clearing Member has appropriate
security requirements and carried out suitable remediation measures, to
enable OCC to better understand and manage Security Incidents more
broadly.\20\ Finally, they would better enable OCC to identify areas of
interest, concern, or heightened risk by presenting information in a
standardized format.\21\
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    \19\ See Notice of Filing, 88 FR at 20196.
    \20\ Id. at 20197.
    \21\ Id.
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III. Discussion and Commission Findings

    Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to such organization.\22\ Under the Commission's
Rules of Practice, the ``burden to demonstrate that a proposed rule
change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the rules and
regulations issued thereunder . . . is on the self-regulatory
organization [`SRO'] that proposed the rule change.'' \23\
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    \22\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
    \23\ Rule 700(b)(3), Commission Rules of Practice, 17 CFR
201.700(b)(3).
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    The description of a proposed rule change, its purpose and
operation, its effect, and a legal analysis of its consistency with
applicable requirements must all be sufficiently detailed and specific
to support an affirmative Commission finding,\24\ and any failure of an
SRO to provide this information may result in the Commission not having
a sufficient basis to make an affirmative finding that a proposed rule
change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the applicable rules and
regulations.\25\ Moreover, ``unquestioning reliance'' on an SRO's
representations in a proposed rule change is not sufficient to justify
Commission approval of a proposed rule change.\26\
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    \24\ Id.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Susquehanna Int'l Group, LLP v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 866 F.3d 442, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (``Susquehanna'').
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    After carefully considering the proposed rule change, the
Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to OCC. More specifically, the Commission finds
that the proposal is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the
Exchange Act \27\ and Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17)(i) \28\ thereunder as
described in detail below.
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    \27\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \28\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(17)(i).
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act

    Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act requires, among other
things, that a clearing agency's rules are designed to promote the
prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities
transactions.\29\ In addition to centralizing relevant information
pertaining to Clearing Member Security Incidents in a single rule, the
proposed rule change is designed to support OCC's management of
potential cybersecurity risks by enhancing OCC's ability to identify
and mitigate cybersecurity risks posed by a Security Incident
experienced by one of OCC's Clearing Members. It also is designed to
standardize OCC's cybersecurity risk management practices with respect
to such Security Incidents. Among other things, the changes set forth
Clearing Member obligations and the actions OCC may take if reasonably
necessary to mitigate the effects of a Security Incident on its
operations. As discussed further below, the changes also strengthen
OCC's ability to manage its cyber-related risks by requiring Clearing
Members to immediately notify OCC if the Clearing Member becomes aware
of or should be aware that there has been a Security Incident or one is
occurring, and promptly confirm such a notice in writing. Taken
together, the proposed changes should strengthen OCC's cybersecurity
risk management processes. By creating a consistent set of obligations
on Clearing Members for identifying and reporting Security

Incidents, OCC would enhance its ability to monitor, mitigate, and
manage cybersecurity risks--such as unauthorized disclosure of
sensitive information or a loss of data or system integrity--in the
event a Clearing Member experiences a Security Incident. Because OCC's
information, data, and systems support and enable OCC's ability to
conduct essential clearance and settlement functions, enhancing OCC's
ability to limit the impact of a Security Incident at a Clearing Member
promotes OCC's ability to continue the prompt and accurate clearance
and settlement of securities transactions.
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    \29\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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    Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed below, the proposal is
consistent with the requirements of Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the
Exchange Act.

B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17)(i) of the Exchange Act

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17)(i) requires that a covered clearing agency
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed to manage the covered clearing agency's
operational risks by identifying the plausible sources of operational
risk, both internal and external, and mitigating their impact through
the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls.\30\
In adopting Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17)(i), the Commission provided guidance,
stating that a covered clearing agency generally should consider, among
other things, whether it identifies, monitors, and manages the risks
that key participants pose to its operations.\31\ To the extent they
interact with OCC's systems, Clearing Member systems may present
operational risk to OCC. As described above, OCC proposes requiring
members to report any cyber-related disruption or intrusion that could
pose a risk to OCC's operations, such as a degradation of normal
operations that would result in the inability of OCC to conduct
essential clearance and settlement functions. OCC also proposes
numerous protective measures, such as the ability to take reasonably
necessary actions to mitigate the effects of a Security Incident on its
operations, including disconnecting the Clearing Member's access to
OCC's systems; the ability to consider a non-exhaustive list of factors
to determine whether to modify a Clearing Member's access to OCC's
systems in response to a Security Incident, up to and including
disconnection; and the requirement for disconnected Clearing Members to
complete a Reconnection Attestation and Reconnection Checklist that OCC
would review and evaluate as part of a determination to reconnect the
Clearing Member to OCC's systems. Taken together, these proposals
support OCC's ability to effectively identify, monitor, and manage the
risks that Clearing Members pose to OCC operations, and are therefore
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17)(i).
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    \30\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(17)(i).
    \31\ See Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (Sept. 28, 2016), 81 FR 70786, 70838
(Oct. 13, 2016).
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    A commenter opposed the proposal on a number of grounds.\32\
Specifically, the commenter expressed concerns about the proposed
definition of Security Incident, stating that because the proposed
definition applies to all of a Clearing Member's systems and therefore
could include an incident that would not affect OCC systems, the
definition is inconsistent with the risks identified by OCC in the rule
filing, other regulatory and SRO requirements, and is potentially
beyond the scope of OCC's authority.\33\ The commenter also stated that
OCC's proposed definition of Security Incident is inconsistent with
other regulatory and SRO requirements because it does not require that
a loss or harm has occurred and it does not require that a clearing
member be aware of the incident.\34\ The commenter stated that the
definition of Security Incident should be limited to an incident that
could result in ``loss of data or system integrity,'' ``unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive information,'' or ``an inability [for the OCC]
to conduct essential clearance and settlement functions.'' \35\ The
commenter further requested clarification that the reference to
``disruption or degradation of a clearing member's systems'' in the
proposed definition of Security Incident is limited to cyber-related
disruptions or intrusions resulting from malicious third-party activity
as opposed to, for example, a power outage.\36\
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    \32\ See letter from Howard Meyerson, Managing Director,
Financial Information Forum (``FIF''), dated April 26, 2023, to
Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission (``FIF Letter'').
    \33\ Id. at 2-3. FIF stated that, as drafted, a Security
Incident could include an incident that would not affect OCC systems
and this approach appears to be overly broad with the risks
identified in the proposed rule change, indicating that the
reference to ``disruption or degradation of a clearing member's
systems'' in the proposed definition of Security Incident is
ambiguous. Id. at 2.
    \34\ Id. at 4-5.
    \35\ Id. at 3.
    \36\ Id. at 5-6.
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    OCC responded by amending the proposed rule change in a number of
ways.\37\ First, OCC amended the definition of Security Incident to
limit it to a cyber-related disruption or intrusion of the Clearing
Member's systems that is reasonably likely to pose an imminent risk or
threat to OCC's operations.\38\ OCC further amended the definition of
Security Incident to state that such an incident may include, but is
not limited to, any disruption or degradation of the normal operation
of the Clearing Member's systems or any unauthorized entry into the
Clearing Member's systems that would result in loss of OCC's data or
system integrity, unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information
related to OCC, or the inability of OCC to conduct essential clearance
and settlement functions.\39\ In amending the Security Incident
definition this way, OCC reasonably addressed the commenter's concerns
about the scope of the rule by clarifying that only occurrences that
present certain risks or threats to OCC's operations are considered
Security Incidents, and provided examples to help illustrate the types
of risks and threats to OCC's operation that are covered by the rule.
In response to the commenter's concern that the proposed definition of
Security Incident does not require that a clearing member be aware of
the Incident, OCC also amended the proposed definition to require
notice only if the Clearing Member becomes aware or should be aware
that such an incident has occurred or is occurring.\40\ The commenter
further stated that OCC ``should incorporate into the notice provision
a [condition] that only requires reporting when a clearing member has a
reasonable basis to conclude that a reportable cybersecurity incident
has occurred or determines that a reportable cybersecurity incident has
occurred.'' \41\ As noted, OCC amended the proposed definition to
require reporting only where a Clearing Member becomes or should be
aware of a Security Incident. The proposed rule change therefore would
require Clearing Members to engage in reasonable diligence to obtain
and report to OCC readily discoverable information about a Security
Incident, consistent with the Clearing Member's current obligation to
maintain a comprehensive cybersecurity program that, among other
things, is designed to protect the segment of the Clearing Member's
system that interacts with OCC, but it would not require reporting of a
cybersecurity incident if the member could not reasonably be aware of
such an incident. OCC's

response reasonably balances the commenter's concern about being
required to report unknown information and OCC's need to ensure that
its Clearing Members are diligently monitoring their own systems so
that OCC can identify, monitor, and manage the impact of a Security
Incident at a Clearing Member on OCC's systems and operations, as well
as the listed options markets generally.
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    \37\ See Notice of Partial Amendment supra note 7.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ Id.
    \40\ Id.
    \41\ FIF Letter at 5.
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    A commenter stated that the content of the notification should be
limited in scope given the requirement for ``immediate'' notification,
and recommended that OCC should provide more detail about the expected
content in the notification.\42\ The commenter also expressed the view
that the need for immediate written notice ``does not provide a
clearing member with the opportunity to evaluate the incident prior to
reporting.'' \43\ OCC addressed these comments in the amendment by
clarifying the notification requirements and procedure in the event of
a Security Incident. Specifically, because there are ``innumerable
circumstances that could lead to a Security Incident,'' rather than
requiring the notice to include specific, pre-determined content, OCC
clarified that a Clearing Member can share information it believes is
relevant, and that OCC can follow up directly as needed.\44\ OCC also
noted that, given the urgency required to address a Security Incident
quickly and remain functional as a systemically important financial
market utility, OCC will provide a dedicated email address for Clearing
Members to provide OCC with written notification (or confirmation) of a
Security Incident.\45\ By clarifying that the notice is limited to
information the affected Clearing Member believes is relevant and that
OCC can follow up directly with the Clearing Member as needed, OCC's
response reasonably balances the commenter's concern about the rule not
specifying what information needs to be included in the notice and
OCC's need to identify, monitor, and manage the impact of a Security
Incident at a Clearing Member on OCC's systems and operations, as well
as the listed options markets generally. Allowing Clearing Members to
provide the information they believe is relevant together with OCC's
ability to gather additional information as necessary and appropriate
helps ensure that OCC gets timely information on Security Incidents,
which supports OCC's ability to identify, monitor, and manage risks
posed to its operations,\46\ consistent with the Commission's guidance
regarding Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17)(i).
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    \42\ Id. at 5-6.
    \43\ Id. at 5.
    \44\ See Notice of Partial Amendment, 88 FR at 36352.
    \45\ See id.
    \46\ The clarification provided by OCC also addresses a
commenter concern that the disclosure should ``take into account the
fact that target firms often have incomplete information about a
cybersecurity incident and engage in an investigative process over a
period of time.'' FIF Letter at 7. OCC's ability to follow up
directly as needed ensures that Clearing Members will have an
opportunity to provide additional information as facts develop.
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    A commenter stated that OCC should enumerate threshold conditions
that must be satisfied before OCC could disconnect or modify a Clearing
Member's access.\47\ The commenter further requested clarification on
the relationship between the proposed Security Incident notifications
and the proposed disconnection and reconnection process.\48\ In
response, as noted above, OCC amended the definition of Security
Incident to limit it to a cyber-related disruption or intrusion of the
Clearing Member's systems that is reasonably likely to pose an imminent
risk or threat to OCC's operations.\49\ OCC also stated that because
there are ``innumerable circumstances that could lead to a Security
Incident,'' such a determination would require an evaluation of the
specific facts and circumstances related to the Security Incident, and
amended the proposed rule to include a non-exhaustive list of factors
OCC will consider when making a disconnection determination.\50\
Specifically, as amended, the rule provides that OCC may consider any
one or more of the following in determining whether or not to
disconnect a member: the potential loss of control by a Clearing Member
of its internal system(s), the potential loss of OCC's confidential
data, the potential strain on or loss of OCC's resources due to OCC's
inability to perform clearance and settlement functions, and the
overall severity of the threat to OCC's security and operations. By
amending the definition of a Security Incident in this way, OCC
identified the threshold condition that must be satisfied before OCC
could disconnect or modify a Clearing Member's access in response to a
Security Incident. Specifically, unless the Clearing Member experiences
a cyber-related disruption or intrusion of the Clearing Member's system
that is reasonably likely to pose an imminent risk or threat to OCC's
operations, OCC would not have a basis under the proposed rule to
disconnect or modify a Clearing Member's access to OCC systems.
Further, disconnection or modification of a Clearing Member's access to
OCC's systems is not an automatic consequence in the event a Clearing
Member notifies OCC of a Security Incident. OCC stated that it believes
that not all Security Incident notifications will result in a Clearing
Member disconnection, and the proposed rule does not mandate
disconnection in response to a Security Incident. Rather, disconnection
or modification of access are among the various mitigation actions that
OCC may take if it determines that it is reasonably necessary to do so
to mitigate a Security Incident's effects on its operations. In
addition, OCC's non-exhaustive list of factors provides examples of
specific risks or threats to OCC's operations that OCC would consider
as factors in making a disconnection determination, and that are
consistent with the Commission's guidance related to Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(17)(i). Given the extensive variety and rapidly evolving nature
of cyber-related threats, it is reasonable for OCC to balance its need
to evaluate the specific facts and circumstances of each cyber-related
incident at a Clearing Member and the desire of Clearing Members to
know in advance the specific conditions that could result in a
disconnection or modification of its access to OCC's systems. OCC's
proposed approach of defining a single, specific threshold condition--
namely, a cyber-related disruption or intrusion of the Clearing
Member's system reasonably likely to pose an imminent risk or threat to
OCC's operations--while providing an illustrative list of factors OCC
will consider as it makes a disconnection determination, strikes this
balance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Id. at 6-7.
    \48\ Id. at 7.
    \49\ See Notice of Partial Amendment supra note 7.
    \50\ See Notice of Partial Amendment, 88 FR at 36353.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By making these amendments, OCC also clarified the connection
between a Security Incident notification and the proposed disconnection
and reconnection process. If OCC determines that disconnection is
reasonably necessary to mitigate any effects to its operations, the
process for the affected Clearing Member to reconnect to OCC's systems
following the disconnection are set forth in paragraph (e) of proposed
rule 213, ``Procedures for Connecting Following a Security Incident.''
Additionally, OCC amended the proposed rule to require a Clearing
Member to complete the Reconnection Attestation and Reconnection
Checklist only in the event that OCC disconnected the Clearing Member
that has reported a

Security Incident.\51\ The information provided in the Reconnection
Attestation and Reconnection Checklist would help OCC determine whether
the risk to OCC has been mitigated sufficiently for OCC to resume
connectivity to the Clearing Member. Taken together, these changes as
well would allow OCC to identify and mitigate operational risks
presented by its Clearing Members and secure its environment more
effectively against potential vulnerabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter stated that the Reconnection Checklist appears to be a
security incident notification form rather than a checklist for
reconnection.\52\ As discussed above, the Reconnection Checklist is
only required in the event that a Clearing Member is disconnected from
OCC's systems as the result of a Security Incident. The checklist
includes information such as the nature of the incident, the steps
taken to contain the incident, and any OCC data that was compromised
during the incident, all of which is used by OCC to determine whether
the risk to OCC posed by the Security Incident has been mitigated
sufficiently to resume the Clearing Member's connectivity. The
commenter also stated that the proposed rule should establish a clear
process for reconnection, including the process and timing for OCC to
decide on a reconnection request and the process for OCC to communicate
its determination.\53\ As noted above, the process for reconnection is
set forth in paragraph (e) of proposed Rule 213. In addition, although
the proposed rule does not mandate the specific timing for OCC to make
a reconnection determination, the information provided to OCC by the
Reconnection Attestation and Reconnection Checklist is designed to
facilitate OCC's reconnection determinations, which should help
expedite the process. Given the innumerable circumstances that could
lead to a Security Incident and a resulting disconnection, the proposed
rule strikes a reasonable balance between OCC's need to ensure that the
operational risks presented by a Security Incident at a Clearing Member
have been sufficiently mitigated before reconnecting to OCC's systems
and the Clearing Member's desire to reconnect as quickly as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ FIF Letter at 8.
    \53\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter expressed concern that the information required to be
disclosed in Reconnection Checklist and Attestation is too detailed and
could either provide a roadmap to malicious actors or subject the
Clearing Member to third-party litigation risk.\54\ The commenter also
requested clarification on the protection of information reported by
Clearing Members to OCC.\55\ Any information disclosed to OCC in a
Reconnection Checklist and Attestation would be kept confidential by
OCC and would not be made publicly available, including to third
parties and potential malicious actors, and therefore would not, by
virtue of being provided to OCC, provide a roadmap to malicious actors
or subject the reporting Clearing Member to third-party litigation
risk. Further, OCC routinely receives, and is responsible for the
protection of, confidential information related to its Clearing
Members. For example, OCC routinely receives and protects confidential
and sensitive information related Clearing Members' risk management
practices,\56\ as well as information related to any financial or
operational difficulty reported by Clearing Members to any regulatory
organization.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Id. at 7-8. For example, the commenter expressed concern
that the level of detail required by the proposed rule change could
provide a roadmap for malicious actors who wish to gain access to
OCC's systems or could present third-party litigation risk to the
Clearing Member.
    \55\ Id. at 6.
    \56\ See OCC Rule 305(b).
    \57\ See OCC Rule 306A(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The commenter also stated that OCC should provide an exception to
disclosure when law enforcement directs the member not to disclose.\58\
However, the lack of the type of law enforcement exception suggested by
the commenter is consistent with the Exchange Act. For example, OCC's
current rules, as approved by the Commission, include various reporting
and disclosure requirements, none of which provide the type of explicit
law enforcement exception suggested by the commenter.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ FIF Letter at 6.
    \59\ See, e.g., OCC Rules 207 (Submission to and Retrieval of
Items to and from the Corporation) and 306A (Event-Based Reporting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The commenter also questioned whether the Clearing Members should
be required to provide evidence of regulatory compliance to other
government agencies and third parties.\60\ OCC's current rules, as
approved by the Commission, require Clearing Members to notify OCC if
the Clearing Member is required to notify any regulatory organization
of any operational difficulty affecting the Clearing Member, or of any
failure by the Clearing Member to be in compliance with the operational
responsibility rules of any regulatory organization.\61\ Thus, a
Clearing Member that experiences a Security Incident that subjects the
Clearing Member to a regulatory notification requirement is already
required, under existing OCC Rules, to notify OCC that it complied with
that requirement. The proposed rule change does not create a new
obligation for Clearing Members to notify OCC of regulatory notices to
regulatory organizations; it merely specifies when a notification to
OCC in connection with a Security Incident must be provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ FIF Letter at 7. The commenter stated that many clearing
members would be subject to numerous governmental and third-party
notification requirements in the event of a cybersecurity incident
and expressed confusion regarding why OCC would require an
attestation relating to a clearing member's notification to other
regulators and third-parties if the clearing member has provided all
required notifications to the OCC. Id. The commenter also stated
that any required attestation should be to the knowledge of the
attesting executive. The proposed rule change states explicitly that
the representations in the Reconnection Attestation would be made
``on a good faith, best efforts basis,'' which necessarily means the
attestation would be to the knowledge of the attesting executive.
See proposed Rule 213(e)(1)(A).
    \61\ See OCC Rule 306A (Event-Based Reporting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, a commenter referenced a number of cybersecurity-related
rule proposals recently published by the Commission and stated that the
proposed rule change should be delayed at least until the Commission
finalizes all the currently proposed cybersecurity rulemaking to ensure
that investors are protected from cyber threats and unnecessary
additional burdens are not placed on OCC Clearing Members.\62\ The
commenter states further that the proposed rule change interconnects
and may overlap with four different rules proposed by the
Commission,\63\ and requests that the Commission extend the period for
comment on the proposed rule change to allow time to analyze the
proposed rule change alongside the rules proposed by the
Commission.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See letter from Melissa MacGregor, Managing Director,
Deputy General Counsel & Corporate Secretary, SIFMA, dated April 25,
2023, to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission, (``SIFMA
Letter'') available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2023-003/srocc2023003-20164982-334488.pdf. A similar perspective was provided
by a second commenter. See FIF Letter at 8-9; see also Securities
Exchange Act Release Nos. 97141 (Mar. 15, 2022), 88 FR 20616 (Apr.
6, 2023); 97142 (Mar. 15, 2022), 88 FR 20212 (Apr. 5, 2023); 97143
(Mar. 15, 2023), 88 FR 23146 (Apr. 14, 2023); 97144 (Mar. 15, 2023),
88 FR 16921 (Mar. 21, 2023); 94382 (Mar. 9, 2022), 87 FR 16590 (Mar.
23, 2022).
    \63\ SIFMA Letter at 2. SIFMA does not state how the proposed
rule change interconnects or conflicts with the Commission's
proposed rules.
    \64\ Id. This concern was echoed in a letter from the FIF. See
FIF Letter (stating that OCC should withdraw the proposed rule
change and resubmit after the comment periods for the Commission's
proposals have expired).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Exchange Act and relevant rules thereunder, SROs,
including OCC, determine for themselves when to file a proposed rule
change. The Exchange Act defines the process and time within which the
Commission may act,\65\ and Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act
requires the Commission to approve a proposed rule change of a SRO if
it finds that such change is consistent with the Exchange Act and rules
and regulations thereunder that are applicable to the SRO.\66\ Concerns
regarding rules proposed by the Commission may be presented as comments
to such rules so that the Commission may consider them in determining
what, if any, final rule it will adopt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(A)(ii) (allowing the
Commission to extend the period for review by not more than 45 days
if the Commission determines that a longer period is appropriate and
publishes the reasons for such determination).
    \66\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that the proposed rule
change is consistent with the requirements of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(17)(i)
under the Exchange Act.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(17)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Conclusion

    On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
proposed rule change, as modified by Partial Amendment No. 1, is
consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act, and in
particular, the requirements of Section 17A of the Exchange Act \68\
and the rules and regulations thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission has
considered the proposed rules' impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act,\69\ that the proposed rule change (SR-OCC-2023-003), as
modified by Partial Amendment No. 1, be, and hereby is, approved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-25883 Filed 11-22-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 123 (Friday, June 26, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36803-36804]
[FR Doc No: 2015-15757]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[ER-FRL-9021-6]

Environmental Impact Statements; Notice of Availability

    Responsible Agency: Office of Federal Activities, General
Information (202)

564-7146 or http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/.
Weekly receipt of Environmental Impact Statements (EISs)
Filed 06/15/2015 Through 06/19/2015
Pursuant to 40 CFR 1506.9.
    Notice: Section 309(a) of the Clean Air Act requires that EPA make
public its comments on EISs issued by other Federal agencies. EPA's
comment letters on EISs are available at: https://cdxnodengn.epa.gov/cdx-enepa-public/action/eis/search.

EIS No. 20150176, Draft, DOE, ID, Recapitalization of Infrastructure
Supporting, Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Handling (DOE/EIS-0453-D), Comment
Period Ends: 08/10/2015, Contact: Erik Anderson<PHONE_NUMBER>.
EIS No. 20150177, Draft, NHTSA, REG, Phase 2 Fuel Efficiency Standards
for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, Comment Period Ends:
08/31/2015, Contact: James MacIsaac<PHONE_NUMBER> EIS No. 20150178,
Draft, DOE, MN, Great Northern Transmission Line Project, Comment
Period Ends: 08/10/2015, Contact: Julie Ann Smith<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: June 23, 2015.
Dawn Roberts,
Management Analyst, NEPA Compliance Division, Office of Federal
Activities.
[FR Doc. 2015-15757 Filed 6-25-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 131 (Monday, July 9, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31763-31764]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14596]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

[Docket No. USCG-2017-0915]

Waterway Suitability Assessment for Operation of Liquefied
Natural Gas Terminal; Cameron, LA

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of inquiry; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are requesting your comments on a Letter of Intent and
Preliminary Waterway Suitability Assessment we received from Sabine
Pass LNG, L.P. (SPLNG) regarding SPLNG's plans to construct a new berth
at its Cameron Parish, LA facility and to increase the number of
liquefied natural gas vessels calling at the facility from
approximately 400 to 580 annually. The Coast Guard is notifying the
public of this proposed increase in LNG marine traffic on the Sabine-
Neches Waterway and is soliciting comments relevant to the Coast
Guard's preparation of a Letter of Recommendation for issuance to the
federal, state, or local agency with jurisdiction over the proposed
facility.

DATES: Comments and related material must be received on or before
August 8, 2018.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by docket number USCG-
2017-0915 using the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov. See the ``Public Participation and Request for
Comments'' portion of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below for
further instructions on submitting comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions about this
notice of inquiry, call or email Mr. Scott K. Whalen, Vessel Traffic
Service Director, Marine Safety Unit Port Arthur, U.S. Coast Guard;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Table of Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations
COTP Captain of the Port Marine Safety Unit Port Arthur
DHS Department of Homeland Security
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LOI Letter of Intent
LOR Letter of Recommendation
NVIC Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
U.S.C. United States Code
WSA Waterway Suitability Assessment

II. Background and Purpose

    Under 33 CFR 127.007(a), an owner or operator planning to build a
new facility handling liquefied natural gas (LNG), or an owner or
operator planning new construction to expand or modify marine terminal
operations in an existing facility handling LNG, where the
construction, expansion, or modification would result in an increase in
the size and/or frequency of LNG marine traffic on the waterway
associated with the proposed facility or modification to an existing
facility, must submit a Letter of Intent (LOI) to the Captain of the
Port of the zone in which the facility is or will be located. Under 33
CFR 127.007(e), an owner or operator planning such new construction or
expansion of an existing facility must also file or update a Waterway
Suitability Assessment (WSA) that addresses the proposed increase in
LNG marine traffic in the associated waterway.
    Under 33 CFR 127.009, after receiving an LOI, the Captain of the
Port issues a Letter of Recommendation (LOR) as to the suitability of
the waterway for LNG marine traffic to the appropriate jurisdictional
authorities. The LOR is based on a series of factors listed in 33 CFR
127.009 that relate to the physical nature of the affected waterway and
issues of safety and security associated with LNG marine traffic on the
affected waterway.

III. Information Requested

    On January 29, 2018, Sabine Pass LNG, L.P. (SPLNG), located in
Cameron Parish, LA, submitted an LOI and Preliminary WSA regarding the
company's proposed plans to develop a new marine berth and expand the
number of vessels calling on the facility each year from approximately
400 to 580. The purpose of this notice is to solicit public comments on
the proposed increase in LNG marine traffic on the Sabine-Neches
Waterway. The Coast Guard believes that public input may be useful to
the Captain of the Port Marine Safety Unit Port Arthur (COTP) with
respect to validating the information provided in SPLNG's Preliminary
WSA and development of the LOR. A brief summary of SPLNG's proposal is
available in the docket where indicated under ADDRESSES.
    On January 24, 2011, the Coast Guard published Navigation and
Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01-2011, titled ``Guidance Related to
Waterfront Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities''. NVIC 01-2011
provides guidance for owners and operators seeking approval to build
and operate LNG facilities. The

Coast Guard will refer to NVIC 01-2011 for process information and
guidance in evaluating SPLNG's WSA. NVIC 01-2011 is available in the
docket where indicated under ADDRESSES and also on the Coast Guard's
website at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/5ps/NVIC/2011/NVIC%2001-2011%20Final.pdf.

IV. Public Participation and Request for Comments

    We encourage you to submit comments through the Federal portal at
http://www.regulations.gov. If your material cannot be submitted using
http://www.regulations.gov, contact the person in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document for alternate
instructions. In your submission, please include the docket number for
this notice of inquiry and provide a reason for each suggestion or
recommendation.
    We accept anonymous comments. All comments received will be posted
without change to http://www.regulations.gov and will include any
personal information you have provided. For more about privacy and the
docket, visit http://www.regulations.gov/privacyNotice.
    Documents mentioned in this notice of inquiry as being available in
the docket, and all public comments, will be in our online docket at
http://www.regulations.gov and can be viewed by following that
website's instructions.
    This document is issued under authority of 5 U.S.C. 552 (a).

    Dated: July 2, 2018.
Jacqueline Twomey,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port Marine Safety Unit Port
Arthur.
[FR Doc. 2018-14596 Filed 7-6-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 76 (Wednesday, April 20, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23223-23225]
[FR Doc No: 2016-09096]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 100

[Docket Number USCG-2016-0276]
RIN 1625-AA08

Special Local Regulation; Lake of the Ozarks, Lakeside, MO

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to establish a special local
regulation for certain waters of the Lake of the Ozarks. This action is
necessary to provide for the safety of life on these navigable waters
near Lakeside, MO, during a powerboat race on June 4, 2016. This
proposed rulemaking would designate prohibited areas for the race
course and associated safety buffer, spectator areas, and location for
vessels to transit during the race at no wake speeds. Deviation from
the established special local regulation must be authorized by the
Captain of the Port Upper Mississippi River or a designated
representative. We invite your comments on this proposed rulemaking.

DATES: Comments and related material must be received by the Coast
Guard on or before May 5, 2016.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by docket number USCG-
2016-0276 using the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov. See the ``Public Participation and Request for
Comments'' portion of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for further
instructions on submitting comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions about this
proposed rulemaking, call or email LCDR Sean Peterson, Chief of
Prevention, U.S. Coast Guard; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Table of Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations
COTP Captain of the Port
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FR Federal Register
NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking
Sec.  Section
U.S.C. United States Code

II. Background, Purpose, and Legal Basis

    On March 16, 2016, the Lake Race Steering Committee notified the
Coast Guard that it will be hosting a

powerboat race from 9 a.m. until 6 p.m. on June 4, 2016. This is the
third year for this event and the sponsor has indicated the intent to
host this event annually. The Coast Guard will work with the sponsor
for future occurrences and may propose to add this event and special
local regulation to the list of permanently recurring events for future
years to eliminate the need for a separate rulemaking each year. For
this year, on June 4, several heats are planned to occur throughout the
day in the four-mile race course located on the Lake of the Ozarks
Osage Branch. Hazards from the powerboat race include capsizing of
participating vessels and loss of control of participating vessels. The
Captain of the Port (COTP) Upper Mississippi River has determined that
potential hazards associated with the powerboat race would be a safety
concern.
    The purpose of this rulemaking is to ensure the safety of life on
the navigable waters immediately prior to, during, and immediately
after the powerboat race. The Coast Guard proposes this rulemaking
under authority in 33 U.S.C. 1233.

III. Discussion of Proposed Rule

    The COTP proposes to establish a special local regulation from 9
a.m. until 6 p.m. on June 4, 2016, designating the race course and
location of spectator areas. Vessels transiting near the course would
be restricted to transiting at the slowest safe speed. This special
local regulation would cover navigable waters on the Lake of the Ozarks
Osage Branch between miles 0 and 4. The Coast Guard has also posted a
map depicting the location and restricted areas for this special local
regulation in the docket. Six anchorage areas for spectators will be
designated and are also shown on the map and labeled as A through F.
This map may be viewed as indicated under the ADDRESSESS section. The
duration of the regulation is intended to ensure the safety of vessels
and these navigable waters before, during, and after the power boat
race, scheduled from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. No vessel or person would be
permitted to deviate from the special local regulation without
obtaining permission from the COTP or a designated representative. The
regulatory text we are proposing appears at the end of this document.

IV. Regulatory Analyses

    We developed this proposed rule after considering numerous statutes
and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our
analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders and
we discuss First Amendment rights of protestors.

A. Regulatory Planning and Review

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits. Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of
quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing
rules, and of promoting flexibility. This NPRM has not been designated
a ``significant regulatory action,'' under Executive Order 12866.
Accordingly, the NPRM has not been reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget.
    This regulatory action determination is based on the size,
location, and duration of the special local regulation. Vessel traffic
would be able to safely transit around the race course and spectators
will have designated locations to view the race. Moreover, the Coast
Guard would include event information in the Local Notice to Mariners,
and the rule would allow vessels to seek permission to deviate from the
regulation.

B. Impact on Small Entities

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, as
amended, requires Federal agencies to consider the potential impact of
regulations on small entities during rulemaking. The term ``small
entities'' comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations
that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than
50,000. The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
    While some owners or operators of vessels intending to transit the
safety zone may be small entities, for the reasons stated in section
IV.A. above this proposed rule would not have a significant economic
impact on any vessel owner or operator.
    If you think that your business, organization, or governmental
jurisdiction qualifies as a small entity and that this rule would have
a significant economic impact on it, please submit a comment (see
ADDRESSES) explaining why you think it qualifies and how and to what
degree this rule would economically affect it.
    Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), we want to assist small
entities in understanding this proposed rule. If the rule would affect
your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you
have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance,
please contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section. The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that
question or complain about this proposed rule or any policy or action
of the Coast Guard.

C. Collection of Information

    This proposed rule would not call for a new collection of
information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-
3520).

D. Federalism and Indian Tribal Governments

    A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. We have analyzed this proposed rule under that Order and
have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism
principles and preemption requirements described in Executive Order
13132.
    Also, this proposed rule does not have tribal implications under
Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments, because it would not have a substantial direct effect on
one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes. If
you believe this proposed rule has implications for federalism or
Indian tribes, please contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section.

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538)
requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary
regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may
result in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in
the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (adjusted for
inflation) or more in any one year. Though this proposed rule would not
result in such an expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this rule
elsewhere in this preamble.

F. Environment

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Department of Homeland
Security Management Directive 023-01 and Commandant Instruction
M16475.lD, which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f), and have made
a preliminary determination that this action is one of a category of
actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment. This proposed rule involves a special
local regulation designating the race course, location of spectator
area, and location for vessels to transit during the race at slowest
safe speed. Normally such actions are categorically excluded from
further review under paragraph 34(h) of Figure 2-1 of Commandant
Instruction M16475.lD. A preliminary environmental analysis checklist
and Categorical Exclusion Determination are available in the docket
where indicated under ADDRESSES. We seek any comments or information
that may lead to the discovery of a significant environmental impact
from this proposed rule.

G. Protest Activities

    The Coast Guard respects the First Amendment rights of protesters.
Protesters are asked to contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section to coordinate protest activities so that
your message can be received without jeopardizing the safety or
security of people, places, or vessels.

V. Public Participation and Request for Comments

    We view public participation as essential to effective rulemaking,
and will consider all comments and material received during the comment
period. Your comment can help shape the outcome of this rulemaking. If
you submit a comment, please include the docket number for this
rulemaking, indicate the specific section of this document to which
each comment applies, and provide a reason for each suggestion or
recommendation.
    We encourage you to submit comments through the Federal eRulemaking
Portal at http://www.regulations.gov. If your material cannot be
submitted using http://www.regulations.gov, contact the person in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document for alternate
instructions.
    We accept anonymous comments. All comments received will be posted
without change to http://www.regulations.gov and will include any
personal information you have provided. For more about privacy and the
docket, you may review a Privacy Act notice regarding the Federal
Docket Management System in the March 24, 2005, issue of the Federal
Register (70 FR 15086).
    Documents mentioned in this NPRM as being available in the docket,
and all public comments, will be in our online docket at http://www.regulations.gov and can be viewed by following that Web site's
instructions. Additionally, if you go to the online docket and sign up
for email alerts, you will be notified when comments are posted or a
final rule is published.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 100

    Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Waterways.

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes
to amend 33 CFR part 100 as follows:

PART 100--SAFETY OF LIFE ON NAVIGABLE WATERS

0
1. The authority citation for part 100 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  33 U.S.C. 1233.

0
2. Add Sec.  100.T08-0276 to read as follows:

Sec.  100.T08-0276  Special Local Regulation; Lake of the Ozarks;
Lakeside, MO.

    (a) Location. The following areas are regulated areas: (1) Lake of
the Ozarks Osage Branch between miles 0 and 4; the Bagnell Dam and
Birdsong Hollow Cove, covering the entire width of the branch. Access
to the race course and associated safety buffer area will be prohibited
to authorized vessels only. The safety buffer area for the course will
be marked with blue buoy markers. Vessels transiting outside of the
safety buffer area shall proceed at no wake speed. See attached map for
additional information on location.
    (2) Six designated areas will be available for spectators for the
duration of the races. The designated anchorage areas will be marked
with blue and yellow buoy marker. They are labeled A-F on the attached
map. The anchorage areas are located a minimum of 100 feet outside the
race course safety buffer area marked with blue buoy markers. The six
anchorages are located in the following areas: Branch Rd Point; Emerald
Ln Point; Lotell Hollow Cove; McCoy Branch Cove; west of Duck Head
Point; and Jennings Branch Cove. In addition to the listed designated
anchorages, vessels may also anchor inside the protective coves.
    (b) Definitions. As used in this section, designated representative
means a Coast Guard Patrol Commander, including a Coast Guard coxswain,
petty officer, or other officer operating a Coast Guard vessel and a
Federal, State, and local officer designated by or assisting the
Captain of the Port Upper Mississippi River in the enforcement of the
regulation.
    (c) Regulations. (1) Under the general regulations in Sec.  100.35
of this part, deviation from the regulations described in paragraph (a)
of this section is prohibited unless authorized by the COTP Upper
Mississippi River or designated representative.
    (2) To seek permission to deviate from the regulation, contact the
COTP or the COTP's designated representative via VHF-FM ch 16 or by
calling Sector Upper Mississippi River at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (d) Enforcement period. This section will be enforced from 9 a.m.
to 6 p.m. on June 4, 2016.

    Dated: April 14, 2016.
M.L. Malloy,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port Sector Upper Mississippi
River.
[FR Doc. 2016-09096 Filed 4-19-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 119 (Wednesday, June 20, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 37034]
[FR Doc No: 2012-14986]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Notice of Effectiveness of Exempt Wholesale Generator Status

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Docket Nos.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solano 3 Wind LLC....................................        EG12-36-000
Atlantic Power (Coastal Rivers) Corporation..........        EG12-37-000
Atlantic Power (Williams Lake) Ltd...................        EG12-38-000
Atlantic Power Preferred Equity, Ltd.................        EG12-39-000
Atlantic Power Limited Partnership...................        EG12-40-000
Magic Valley Wind Farm I, LLC........................        EG12-41-000
Wildcat Wind Farm I, LLC.............................        EG12-42-000
Diamond State Generation Partners, LLC...............        EG12-44-000
Palouse Wind, LLC....................................        EG12-45-000
Silver State Solar Power North, LLC..................        EG12-46-000
Wellhead Power Delano, LLC...........................        EG12-47-000
Ensign Wind, LLC.....................................        EG12-48-000
Tuscola Bay Wind, LLC................................        EG12-49-000
Minco Wind III, LLC..................................        EG12-50-000
Alta Wind VII, LLC...................................        EG12-51-000
Alta Wind IX, LLC....................................        EG12-52-000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Take notice that during the month of May 2012, the status of the
above-captioned entities as Exempt Wholesale Generators became
effective by operation of the Commission's regulations. 18 CFR
366.7(a).

    Dated: June 12, 2012.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-14986 Filed 6-19-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 67 (Friday, April 6, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 14759-14762]
[FR Doc No: 2018-06989]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 52

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0135; FRL-9976-35-OAR]

Findings of Failure To Submit State Implementation Plan
Submissions for the 2012 Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS)

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is taking final
action to find that three states have failed to submit timely revisions
to their state implementation plans (SIPs) as required to satisfy
certain requirements under the Clean Air Act (CAA) for implementation
of the annual 2012 Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (2012 PM2.5 NAAQS). These findings of failure to
submit apply to states with overdue SIP revisions (or attainment plans)
for certain areas initially designated as nonattainment and classified
as Moderate for the 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS on April 15, 2015. The
SIP revisions to address all applicable Moderate area attainment plan
requirements for these areas were due on October 15, 2016. If a state
does not make the required complete SIP submission within 18 months of
the effective date of these findings, the CAA requires the imposition
of sanctions for the affected area(s). In addition, EPA is obligated to
promulgate a federal implementation plan (FIP) to address any
outstanding SIP requirements, if a state does not submit, and EPA does
not approve, a state's submission within 24 months of the effective
date of these findings.

DATES: The effective date of this action is May 7, 2018.

ADDRESSES: EPA has established a docket for this action under Docket ID
No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0135. All documents in the docket are listed and
publicly available at http://www.regulations.gov. Although listed in
the index, some information is not publicly available, i.e.,
Confidential Business Information or other information whose disclosure
is restricted by statute. Certain other material, such as copyrighted
material, is not placed on the internet and will be publicly available
only in hard copy form. Publicly available docket materials are
available either electronically at http://www.regulations.gov or in
hard copy at the EPA Docket Center (EPA/DC), EPA WJC West Building,
Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC. The Public
Reading Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through
Friday, excluding legal holidays. The telephone number for the Public
Reading Room is<PHONE_NUMBER>, and the telephone number for the Office
of Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center is<PHONE_NUMBER>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Patrick Lessard, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, Air Quality Policy Division, Mail Code: C539-01, 109 T.W.
Alexander Drive, Research Triangle Park, NC 27711; by telephone (919)
541-5383; or by email at [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. General Information

A. Notice and Comment Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

    Section 553 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(e)(B), provides that, when
an agency for good cause finds that notice and public procedures are
impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest, the
agency may issue a rule without providing notice and an opportunity for
public comment. EPA has determined that there is good cause for making
this final agency action without prior proposal and opportunity for
comment because no significant EPA judgment is involved in making
findings of failure to submit SIPs, or elements of SIPs. Rather, the
findings are required by the CAA where states have made no submissions
to meet the SIP requirements, or where EPA has separately determined
that they made incomplete submissions. Thus, notice and public comment
procedures are unnecessary. EPA finds that this constitutes good cause
under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B).

B. How can I get copies of this document and other related information?

    In addition to being available in the docket, an electronic copy of
this action will be posted at https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/implementation-national-ambient-air-quality-standards-naaqs-fine-particulate-matter.

C. Where do I go if I have a specific state question?

    For questions related to specific states mentioned in this notice,
please contact the appropriate EPA Regional office:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Regional offices                          States
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Susan Spielberger, Associate Director, Office   Pennsylvania.
 of Air Program Planning, Mailcode 3AP30,
<PHONE_NUMBER> or Gerallyn Duke, Acting
 Associate Director, Office of Permits and
 State Programs, Mailcode 3AP10, Region 3,
 1650 Arch Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103,
<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Doris Lo, Chief, Rulemaking Office, Mailcode    California.
 AIR-4,<PHONE_NUMBER> or Laura Lawrence,
 Acting Chief, Planning Office, Mailcode AIR-
 4, Region 9, 75 Hawthorne Street, San
 Francisco, CA 94105,<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Gina Bonifacino, Acting Unit Manager, Air       Idaho.
 Planning Unit, Mailcode AWT-50, Office of Air
 and Waste, 1200 6th Avenue, Suite 900,
 Seattle, WA 98101,<PHONE_NUMBER>.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. How is the preamble organized?

Table of Contents

I. General Information
    A. Notice and Comment Under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)
    B. How can I get copies of this document and other related
information?
    C. Where do I go if I have a specific state question?
    D. How is the preamble organized?
II. Background
III. Consequences of Findings of Failure To Submit
IV. Findings of Failure to Submit for States that Failed To Make a
Moderate Nonattainment Area SIP Submission
V. Environmental Justice Considerations
VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
    A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Executive
Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
    B. Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulations and Controlling
Regulatory Costs
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
    D. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
    E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
    F. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
    G. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With
Indian Tribal Governments
    H. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From
Environmental Health and Safety Risks
    I. Executive Order 13211: Actions That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution or Use
    J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)
    K. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations
    L. Congressional Review Act (CRA)
    M. Judicial Review

II. Background

    Airborne particulate matter (PM) can be composed of a complex
mixture of particles in both solid and liquid form. Particulate matter
can be of different sizes, commonly referred to as ``coarse'' and
``fine'' particles. Fine particles, in general terms, are PM with an
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a nominal 2.5 micrometers
([micro]m). For this reason, particles of this size are referred to as
PM2.5.
    EPA first promulgated annual and 24-hour NAAQS for PM2.5
in July 1997 \1\ and then revised the 24-hour PM2.5 NAAQS in
October 2006.\2\ Most recently, on December 14, 2012, EPA revised the
primary annual PM2.5 standard by lowering the level from
15.0 to 12.0 micrograms per cubic meter of air ([micro]g/m\3\) to
provide increased protection against health effects associated with
long- and short-term PM2.5 exposures. EPA did not revise the
secondary annual PM2.5 standard, which remains at 15.0
[micro]g/m\3\.\3\ In addition, EPA retained the level and form of the
primary and secondary 24-hour PM2.5 standards to continue to
provide supplemental protection against health and welfare effects
associated with short-term PM2.5 exposures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 62 FR 38652 (July 18, 1997).
    \2\ 71 FR 61143 (October 17, 2006).
    \3\ 78 FR 3086 (January 15, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Promulgation of a revised NAAQS triggers a requirement for EPA to
designate areas of the country as nonattainment, attainment, or
unclassifiable for the standards. As prescribed by CAA section 188(a),
areas designated as nonattainment for a PM2.5 NAAQS are
initially classified as Moderate. Designations and initial
classifications for 14 areas in six states as Moderate nonattainment
for the 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS became effective on April 15,
2015.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 80 FR 2206 (January 15, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nonattainment areas for PM2.5 are subject to the general
nonattainment area planning requirements of CAA section 172 and to the
PM-specific planning requirements of CAA sections 188-189. On August
24, 2016, EPA established a final implementation rule (PM2.5
SIP Requirements Rule) \5\ outlining the attainment planning and
control requirements for current and future PM2.5 NAAQS.
Accordingly to that rule, Moderate area PM2.5 SIP
submissions shall include base year emissions inventory requirements,
an attainment projected emissions inventory, a control strategy
including reasonably available control measures and reasonably
available control technology (RACM/RACT), an attainment demonstration
with air quality modeling, a reasonable further progress (RFP)
demonstration, quantitative milestones, contingency measures, and a
nonattainment new source review (NNSR) program.\6\ The PM2.5
SIP Requirements Rule also established the due date for Moderate area
PM2.5 SIP submissions as no later than 18 months from the
effective date of area designations.\7\ Accordingly, the areas
designated as nonattainment for the 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS (with
an effective date of April 15, 2015) were required to submit Moderate
area attainment plans to EPA no later than October 15, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air Quality
Standards: State Implementation Plan Requirements; final rule; 81 FR
58009 (August 24, 2016).
    \6\ 40 CFR 51.1003(a)(2).
    \7\ 40 CFR 51.1003(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Consequences of Findings of Failure To Submit

    For plan requirements under part D, title I of the CAA, such as
those for PM2.5 nonattainment areas, if EPA finds that a
state has failed to make the required complete SIP submission, then CAA
section 179 establishes specific consequences, including the eventual
imposition of mandatory sanctions for the affected area(s).
Additionally, such a finding triggers an obligation under CAA section
110(c) for EPA to promulgate a FIP no later than 2 years from the
effective date of the finding, if the affected state has not submitted,
and EPA has not approved, the required SIP submission.
    If EPA has not affirmatively determined that a state has submitted
a complete SIP addressing the deficiency that is the basis for these
findings within 18 months of the effective date of this rulemaking, or
the submission has not become complete by operation of law 6 months
after submission, then, pursuant to CAA section 179(a) and (b) and 40
CFR 52.31, the emissions offset sanction identified in CAA section
179(b)(2) will apply in the affected nonattainment area. If EPA has not
affirmatively determined that the state has submitted a complete SIP
addressing the deficiencies that are the basis for these findings
within 6 months

after the offset sanction is imposed, or the submission has not become
complete by operation of law 6 months after submission, then the
highway funding sanction will apply in the affected nonattainment area,
in accordance with CAA section 179(b)(1) and 40 CFR 52.31. The state
must make the required SIP submission and EPA must take final action to
approve the submission within 2 years of the effective date of these
findings; otherwise, EPA is required to promulgate a FIP to address the
relevant requirements. This is required pursuant to CAA section 110(c)
for the affected nonattainment area.

IV. Findings of Failure To Submit for States That Failed To Make a
Moderate Nonattainment Area SIP Submission

    In this action, EPA is finding that the states listed in Table 1
have failed to submit specific Moderate area SIP elements for the 2012
PM2.5 NAAQS required under subpart 4 of part D of title I of
the CAA.

                                        Table 1--Findings of Failure To Submit Certain Required SIP Elements for
                                                      2012 PM2.5 NAAQS Moderate Nonattainment Areas
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Region                          State                    Area name                               Required SIP elements
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3...................................  PA.....................  Allegheny County...........   Emissions inventory;
                                                                                Control strategy, including RACM/RACT;
                                                                                Attainment demonstration;
                                                                                RFP;
                                                                                Quantitative milestones; and
                                                                                Contingency measures;
                                                                                NNSR program.
3...................................  PA.....................  Delaware County............   NNSR program.
3...................................  PA.....................  Lebanon County.............   NNSR program.
9...................................  CA.....................  Imperial County............   Emissions inventory;
                                                                                Control strategy, including RACM/RACT;
                                                                                Attainment demonstration;
                                                                                RFP;
                                                                                Quantitative milestones; and
                                                                                Contingency measures.
10..................................  ID.....................  West Silver Valley.........   Control strategy, including RACM/RACT;
                                                                                Attainment demonstration;
                                                                                RFP;
                                                                                Quantitative milestones; and
                                                                                Contingency measures.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Environmental Justice Considerations

    EPA believes that the human health or environmental risks addressed
by this action will not have disproportionately high or adverse human
health or environmental effects on minority, low-income, or indigenous
populations. This is because it does not directly affect the level of
protection provided to human health or environment under the
PM2.5 NAAQS. The purpose of this rule is to make findings
that three states have failed to provide EPA with the identified SIP
submissions, which are required by the CAA for purposes of implementing
the 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS. As such, this action does not directly
affect the level of protection provided for human health or the
environment. Moreover, it is intended that the actions and deadlines
resulting from this notice will lead to greater protection for United
States citizens, including minority, low-income, or indigenous
populations by ensuring that states meet their statutory obligation to
develop and submit SIPs to ensure that areas make progress toward
attaining the 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS.

VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Executive Order
13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review

    This action is not a significant regulatory action, and therefore,
was not submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
review.

B. Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulations and Controlling
Regulatory Costs

    This action is not an Executive Order 13771 regulatory action
because this action is not significant under Executive Order 12866.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    This action does not impose an information collection burden under
the provisions of the PRA. This final rule does not establish any new
information collection requirement apart from what is already required
by law. This rule relates to the requirement in the CAA for states to
submit SIPs under CAA sections 172, 188 and 189 which address the
statutory requirements that apply to areas designated as Moderate
nonattainment for the 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS.

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

    I certify that this rule will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities under the RFA. This
action will not impose any requirements on small entities. The rule is
a finding that the named states have not submitted the necessary SIP
revisions.

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)

    This action does not contain any unfunded mandate as described in
UMRA 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not significantly or uniquely affect
small governments. The action imposes no enforceable duty on any state,
local or tribal governments or the private sector.

F. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    This action does not have federalism implications. It will not have
substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

G. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian
Tribal Governments

    This action does not have tribal implications as specified in
Executive Order 13175. This rule finds that three states have failed to
submit SIP revisions that satisfy the nonattainment area planning
requirements under sections 172, 188 and 189 of the CAA for the 2012
PM2.5 NAAQS. No tribe is subject to the requirement to
submit an implementation plan under section 172, or under subpart 4 of
part D of Title I of the CAA. Thus, Executive Order 13175 does not
apply to this action.

H. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental
Health and Safety Risks

    EPA interprets Executive Order 13045 as applying only to those
regulatory actions that concern health or safety risks that EPA has
reason to believe may disproportionately affect children, per the
definition of ``covered regulatory action'' in section 2-202 of the
Executive Order. This action is not subject to Executive Order 13045
because it is a finding that three states have failed to submit SIP
revisions that satisfy the Moderate nonattainment area planning
requirements under sections 172, 188 and 189 of the CAA for the 2012
PM2.5 NAAQS and does not directly or disproportionately
affect children.

I. Executive Order 13211: Actions That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution or Use

    This action is not subject to Executive Order 13211, because it is
not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.

J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)

    This rulemaking does not involve technical standards.

K. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations

    EPA believes the human health or environmental risk addressed by
this action will not have potential disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects on minority, low-income, or
indigenous populations. In finding that three states have failed to
submit SIP revisions that satisfy the Moderate nonattainment area
planning requirements under sections 172, 188 and 189 of the CAA for
the 2012 PM2.5 NAAQS, this action does not directly affect
the level of protection provided to human health or the environment.
The results of this evaluation are contained in Section V of this
preamble titled ``Environmental Justice Considerations.''

L. Congressional Review Act (CRA)

    This action is subject to the CRA, and EPA will submit a rule
report to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of
the United States. This action is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5
U.S.C. 804(2).

M. Judicial Review

    Section 307(b)(l) of the CAA indicates which Federal Courts of
Appeal have venue for petitions of review of final agency actions by
EPA under the CAA. This section provides, in part, that petitions for
review must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, (i) when the agency action consists of
``nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final actions
taken, by the Administrator,'' or (ii) when such action is locally or
regionally applicable, if ``such action is based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the
Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a
determination.''
    EPA has determined that this final rule consisting of findings of
failure to submit certain of the required SIP revisions is ``nationally
applicable'' within the meaning of section 307(b)(1) of the CAA. This
final agency action affects three states with Moderate nonattainment
areas located in three of the ten EPA Regional offices, and in two
different U.S. Federal Circuit Courts (3rd Circuit for Pennsylvania and
9th Circuit for California and Idaho).
    In addition, EPA has determined that this rule has nationwide scope
or effect because it addresses a common core of knowledge and analysis
involved in formulating the decision and a common interpretation of the
requirements of 40 CFR part 51 appendix V applied to determining the
completeness of SIPs in states across the country. This determination
is appropriate because, in the 1977 CAA Amendments that revised CAA
section 307(b)(l), Congress noted that the Administrator's
determination that an action is of ``nationwide scope or effect'' would
be appropriate for any action that has ``scope or effect beyond a
single judicial circuit.'' H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 323-324, reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1402-03. Here, the scope and effect of this action
extends to the two judicial circuits that include the states across the
country affected by this action. In these circumstances, CAA section
307(b)(1) and its legislative history authorize the Administrator to
find the rule to be of ``nationwide scope or effect'' and, thus, to
indicate that venue for challenges lies in the District of Columbia
Circuit. Accordingly, EPA is determining that this rule is of
nationwide scope or effect.
    Under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, petitions for judicial review
of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit within 60 days from the date this
final action is published in the Federal Register. Filing a petition
for review by the Administrator of this final action does not affect
the finality of the action for the purposes of judicial review, nor
does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review
must be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or
action.

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 52

    Environmental protection, Approval and promulgation of
implementation plans, Administrative practice and procedures,
Incorporation by reference, Air pollution control, Intergovernmental
relations, and Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    Dated: March 26, 2018.
William L. Wehrum,
Assistant Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-06989 Filed 4-5-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P