UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory 2565 Plymouth Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 2498 May 19, 2004 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: In Use Testing for Heavy Duty Diesel Engines and Vehicles   Discussions with California Air Resources Board and Engine Manufacturers Association FROM: Richard S. Wilcox

Richard S. Wilcox Environmental Scientist Assessment and Standards Division THRU: Gene Tierney, Director

Gene Tierney Air Quality and Modeling Center Assessment and Standards Division TO: Rulemaking Docket, OAR 2004 0072 On February 19, 2004 a meeting was held among representatives of the EPA and Engine Manufacturers Association ( EMA) to discuss the development of draft regulations to establish an in use testing program for heavy duty diesel engines. More specifically, the protocol for determining the number of engine families that may be designated by EPA for testing each year was discussed. Those present and their affiliations are as follows:

Gene Tierney, EPA Rich Wilcox, EPA Tim French, EMA


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 40 (Wednesday, March 1, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 12928]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04195]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket Nos. EL23-15-000, ER23-680-000]

Sunfish Solar, LLC v. PJM Interconnection, LLC; Notice of
Withdrawal

    On February 16, 2023, pursuant to Rule 216 of the Commission's
Rules of Practice and Procedure,\1\ Sunfish Solar LLC (Sunfish) filed a
notice of withdrawal (Notice of Withdrawal) to withdraw its December
12, 2022 complaint in Docket No. EL23-15-000 and its December 16, 2022
petition for limited waiver, motion to consolidate proceedings, and
request for expedited review in Docket No. ER23-680-000. Sunfish
requests expedited treatment of its Notice of Withdrawal. On February
21, 2023, the Commission issued a notice shortening the answer period
for the Notice of Withdrawal to February 22, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 18 CFR 385.216 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sunfish states that PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) and Sunfish
have resolved all of the issues that were the subject of the complaint
and are actively engaged in amending their respective Interconnection
Service Agreement (ISA) and Interconnection Construction Service
Agreement (ISCA) with Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
accordingly. Sunfish states that the Notice of Withdrawal is made in
good faith based on the current agreement among Sunfish, PJM, and VEPCO
regarding the necessary amendments to the ISA and ICSA. Sunfish notes
that, to the extent required by the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff
and the Commission's regulations, such amended agreements will be filed
with the Commission in the near future. Sunfish states that no party
will be prejudiced by its withdrawal of its pleadings in these
proceedings.
    Upon consideration, notice is hereby given that Sunfish's requested
Notice of Withdrawal is granted, effective as of the date of this
notice.

    Dated: February 23, 2023.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-04195 Filed 2-28-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 43 (Monday, March 8, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13414-13417]
[FR Doc No: 2021-04676]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-91236; File No. SR-NYSEArca-2020-56]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Order
Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change To Amend NYSE Arca Rules 5.2-
E(j)(3), 5.2-E(j)(8), 5.5-E(g)(2), 8.600-E, and 8.900-E

March 2, 2021.

I. Introduction

    On June 18, 2020, NYSE Arca, Inc. (``Exchange'' or ``NYSE Arca'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission''),
pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a proposed rule
change to amend certain listing requirements relating to maintaining a
minimum number of beneficial holders and minimum number of shares
outstanding. The proposed rule change was published for comment in the
Federal Register on July 7, 2020.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89197 (June 30,
2020), 85 FR 40720 (``Notice'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 17, 2020, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange
Act,\4\ the Commission designated a longer period within which to
approve the proposed rule change, disapprove the proposed rule change,
or institute proceedings to determine whether to disapprove the
proposed rule change.\5\ On October 2, 2020, the Commission instituted
proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed
rule change.\6\ On December 15, 2020, the Commission designated a
longer period for Commission action on the proposed rule change.\7\ The
Commission received one comment letter on the proposed rule change.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89584, 85 FR 51817
(Aug. 21, 2020).
    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90075, 85 FR 63597
(Oct. 8, 2020) (``OIP'').
    \7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90672, 85 FR 83135
(Dec. 21, 2020).
    \8\ The comment on the proposed rule change can be found on the
Commission's website at: https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-2020-56/srnysearca202056-8163217-226939.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This order disapproves the proposed rule change because, as
discussed below, NYSE Arca has not met its burden under the Exchange
Act and the Commission's Rules of Practice to demonstrate that its
proposal is consistent with the requirements of Exchange Act Section
6(b)(5), and, in particular, the requirement that the rules of a
national securities exchange be designed ``to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices'' and ``to protect investors and the
public interest.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Description of the Proposal

    As described in detail in the Notice and OIP, the Exchange proposes
to amend the listing standards governing the listing and trading of
Investment Company Units, Exchange-Traded Fund Shares, Managed Fund
Shares, and Managed Portfolio Shares (collectively, ``Fund
Shares'').\10\ Specifically, NYSE Arca proposes to: (1) Remove the
listing requirement that, following the initial twelve-month period
after commencement of trading of a series of Fund Shares on the
Exchange, such series have at least 50 beneficial holders (``Beneficial
Holders Rule''); and (2) replace the existing minimum number of shares
requirements (``Minimum Shares Outstanding Rules'') \11\ with a
requirement that a series of Fund Shares have at least one creation
unit outstanding on an initial and continued listing basis.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See NYSE Arca Rules 5.2-E(j)(3) and 5.5-E(g)(2) (Investment
Company Units); 5.2-E(j)(8) (Exchange-Traded Fund Shares); 8.600-E
(Managed Fund Shares); and 8.900-E (Managed Portfolio Shares).
    \11\ See Commentary .01(d) to NYSE Arca Rule 5.2-E(j)(3)
(requiring a minimum of 100,000 shares of a series of Investment
Company Units to be outstanding at commencement of trading); NYSE
Arca Rule 5.2-E(j)(8)(e)(1)(A) (requiring the Exchange to establish
a minimum number of Exchange-Traded Fund Shares to be outstanding at
the time of commencement of trading); NYSE Arca Rule 8.600-
E(d)(1)(A) (requiring the Exchange to establish a minimum number of
Managed Fund Shares to be outstanding at the time of commencement of
trading); and NYSE Arca Rule 8.900-E(d)(1)(A) (requiring the
Exchange to establish a minimum number of Managed Portfolio Shares
to be outstanding at the time of commencement of trading).
    \12\ The Exchange represents that the term ``creation unit''
would have the same meaning as defined in Rule 6c-11(a)(1) under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (``1940 Act'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange states that Beneficial Holders Rule as it pertains to
Fund Shares listed on NYSE Arca is no longer necessary. The Exchange
contends that the requirements of Rule 6c-11 under the 1940 Act and, in
particular, the website disclosure requirements of Rule

6c-11(c), together with the existing creation and redemption process,
serve to mitigate the risks of manipulation and lack of liquidity that
the Beneficial Holders Rule was intended to address.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ The portfolio holdings underlying Managed Portfolio Shares
must be disclosed within at least 60 days following the end of every
fiscal quarter. See NYSE Arca Rule 8.900-E(c)1.d. As a result, the
requirements of Rule 6c-11 upon which the Exchange relies to
mitigate manipulation risk and illiquidity do not apply to Managed
Portfolio Shares. See Investment Company Act Release No. 33646
(September 25, 2019), 84 FR 57162, 57163 (October 24, 2019)
(``Because these non-transparent ETFs do not provide daily portfolio
transparency, they would not meet the conditions of rule 6c-11'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange also asserts that requiring at least one creation unit
to be outstanding at all times, together with the enhanced disclosure
requirements of Rule 6c-11 under the 1940 Act, will facilitate an
effective arbitrage mechanism that, with respect to Investment Company
Units, Managed Fund Shares, and Exchange-Traded Fund Shares, will
provide investors with sufficient transparency into the holdings of the
underlying portfolio and help ensure that the trading price in the
secondary market remains in line with the net asset value-per-share of
a fund's portfolio. In support of this assertion, the Exchange cites to
Rule 6c-11(c)(1)(vi) under the 1940 Act, which requires additional
disclosures if the premium or discount with respect to a fund's trading
price in the secondary market and the net asset value-per-share of a
fund's portfolio is in excess of 2% for more than seven consecutive
days. NYSE Arca asserts that such enhanced disclosure would provide
transparency to investors in the event there are indications of an
inefficient arbitrage mechanism. With respect to Managed Portfolio
Shares, while these securities do not publicly disclose their portfolio
holdings daily and are not eligible to rely on Rule 6c-11 under the
1940 Act, the Exchange argues that the applicable Verified Intraday
Indicative Value and other information required to be disseminated in
connection with the listing and trading of Managed Portfolio Shares
ensures transparency of key values and information, and that such
information is sufficient to support an effective arbitrage process,
independent of any Beneficial Holders Rule.
    The Exchange states that the arbitrage mechanism generally causes
the market price and the net asset value-per-share to align, and the
functioning of the arbitrage mechanism helps to ensure that the trading
price in the secondary market is at fair value. The Exchange further
states that the existence of the creation and redemption process, as
well as the proposed requirement that at least one creation unit is
always outstanding, would ensure that market participants are able to
redeem Fund Shares and, thereby, allow the arbitrage mechanism to
function properly. The Exchange concludes, therefore, that such
arbitrage mechanism would obviate the need for a Beneficial Holders
Rule to support a fair and orderly market in Fund Shares. In addition,
the Exchange contends that its surveillance procedures for Fund Shares
and its ability to halt trading in Fund Shares in specified
circumstances provide for additional investor protections by further
mitigating any abnormal trading that would affect the Fund Shares'
prices.
    The Commission received one comment in support of the proposal.\14\
The commenter states that the Beneficial Holders Rule ``does not appear
to provide any meaningful investor-protection benefits.'' \15\
Specifically, the commenter expresses the view that the liquidity of
shares of an exchange-traded fund (``ETF'') is primarily a function of
the liquidity of the ETF's underlying securities, that the marketplace
taps into this liquidity through the creation and redemption and
arbitrage processes, and that this mitigates potential price
manipulation concerns.\16\ In addition, the commenter believes that the
enhanced disclosure requirements of Rule 6c-11 under the 1940 Act,\17\
including those relating to an ETF's portfolio holdings and when an
ETF's premium or discount exceeds 2% for more than seven consecutive
days, will help facilitate effective arbitrage. The commenter conducted
a survey of its members that sought information on level of assets,
number of beneficial holders, and various trading measures of newly-
listed ETFs over different periods following initial listing, and
concluded that the number of shareholders in an ETF does not appear to
be a significant consideration in an ETF's sponsor's decision to delist
and terminate an ETF and that this requirement does not appear to offer
investor protection benefits.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See Letter to Secretary, Commission, from Timothy W.
Cameron, Asset Management Group--Head, and Lindsey Weber Keljo,
Asset Management Group--Managing Director and Associate General
Counsel, SIFMA AMG (Dec. 18, 2020) (``SIFMA Letter'').
    \15\ SIFMA Letter, id. at 3.
    \16\ See id.
    \17\ See id. at 3-4. The commenter also states that the
Beneficial Holders Rule puts newer and smaller sponsors at an
unnecessary disadvantage to larger sponsors having the enterprise-
wide scale and distribution reach to gather assets in the months
after launch. See id.
    \18\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Discussion and Commission Findings

    The Commission must consider whether NYSE Arca's proposal is
consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, which requires, in
relevant part, that the rules of a national securities exchange be
designed ``to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices''
and ``to protect investors and the public interest.'' \19\ Under the
Commission's Rules of Practice, the ``burden to demonstrate that a
proposed rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the rules
and regulations issued thereunder . . . is on the self-regulatory
organization [`SRO'] that proposed the rule change.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2), the Commission must disapprove a
proposed rule change filed by a national securities exchange if it
does not find that the proposed rule change is consistent with the
applicable requirements of the Exchange Act. Exchange Act Section
6(b)(5) states that an exchange shall not be registered as a
national securities exchange unless the Commission determines that
``[t]he rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with
persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system, and, in general,
to protect investors and the public interest; and are not designed
to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers,
or dealers, or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by
this title matters not related to the purposes of this title or the
administration of the exchange.'' 15 U.S.C. 78(f)(b)(5).
    \20\ Rule 700(b)(3), Commission Rules of Practice, 17 CFR
201.700(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The description of a proposed rule change, its purpose and
operation, its effect, and a legal analysis of its consistency with
applicable requirements must all be sufficiently detailed and specific
to support an affirmative Commission finding,\21\ and any failure of an
SRO to provide this information may result in the Commission not having
a sufficient basis to make an affirmative finding that a proposed rule
change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the applicable rules and
regulations.\22\ Moreover, ``unquestioning reliance'' on an SRO's
representations in a proposed rule change is not sufficient to justify
Commission approval of a proposed rule change.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See id.
    \22\ See id.
    \23\ Susquehanna Int'l Group, LLP v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 866 F.3d 442, 447 (DC Cir. 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has consistently recognized the importance of the

minimum number of holders and other similar requirements, stating that
such listing standards help ensure that exchange listed securities have
sufficient public float, investor base, and trading interest to provide
the depth and liquidity necessary to promote fair and orderly
markets.\24\ As stated by the Exchange, the minimum number of holders
requirement is intended to address the risks of manipulation.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The Commission considers distribution standards, including
minimum number of holders and number of shares outstanding
requirements, to be important means of promoting fair and orderly
markets. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 57785 (May
6, 2008), 73 FR 27597 (May 13, 2008) (SR-NYSE-2008-17) (stating that
the distribution standards, which include exchange holder and number
of shares outstanding requirements ``. . . should help to ensure
that the [Special Purpose Acquisition Company's] securities have
sufficient public float, investor base, and liquidity to promote
fair and orderly markets''); Securities Exchange Act Release No.
86117 (June 14, 2019), 84 FR 28879 (June 20, 2018) (SR-NYSE-2018-46)
(disapproving a proposal to reduce the minimum number of public
holders continued listing requirement applicable to Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies from 300 to 100).
    \25\ See Notice, supra note 3, 85 FR at 40722. See also SIFMA
Letter, supra note 14, at 3 (acknowledging that the Beneficial
Holders Rule was intended to address ``potential price
manipulation,'' among other things).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the Exchange is proposing to (1) remove the
Beneficial Holders Rule applicable to Fund Shares listed on NYSE Arca,
and (2) replace the existing Minimum Shares Outstanding Rules with a
requirement that a series of Fund Shares have at least one creation
unit outstanding on an initial and continued listing basis. In support
of its proposal, the Exchange asserts that the requirements of Rule 6c-
11 under the 1940 Act, and in particular the website disclosure
requirements of Rule 6c-11(c) and, for Managed Portfolio Shares, the
information required to be disseminated (including the verified
intraday indicative value) in connection with the listing and trading
of those Shares, together with the existing creation and redemption
process and proposed requirement that at least one creation unit is
always outstanding, would serve to mitigate the risks of manipulation
and the lack of liquidity that the Beneficial Holders Rule was intended
to address. However, the Exchange does not sufficiently support its
assertions, particularly where a series of Fund Shares is permitted to
have a very small number of beneficial holders. For example, the
Exchange does not sufficiently address how the arbitrage mechanism will
ensure Fund Shares with very few beneficial holders would be
sufficiently liquid to support fair and orderly markets. The Exchange
also does not discuss in sufficient detail the potential inefficiencies
in the arbitrage mechanism that might occur with illiquid Fund Shares
that have very few holders, and the impact that would have on the
ability of the arbitrage mechanism to effectively mitigate the risks of
manipulation. In addition, the Exchange does not sufficiently explain
how an efficient and effective arbitrage mechanism and sufficient
liquidity could result for a series of Fund Shares held only by a very
few number of buy-and-hold investors and thereby mitigate manipulation
risks. Further, the Exchange does not sufficiently address the impact
of creation unit size on the efficiency of the arbitrage mechanism. For
example, with respect to a series of illiquid Fund Shares with very few
beneficial holders, the Exchange does not describe how the proposal is
designed to mitigate the risks of manipulation if the creation unit
size for the Fund Shares is large in comparison to the total number of
Fund Shares outstanding. The Exchange provides no data or analysis to
support its position, other than noting the number and size of the
creation units for existing series of Fund Shares. As discussed above,
the Beneficial Holders Rule and other minimum number of holders
requirements are important to ensure that trading in exchange listed
securities is fair and orderly and not susceptible to manipulation, and
the Exchange does not sufficiently explain why its proposed
modification of these requirements is consistent with the Exchange Act.
    While the Exchange also proposes to replace the existing Minimum
Shares Outstanding Rules with a requirement that a series of Fund
Shares have a number of shares outstanding equal to at least one
creation unit, the Exchange does not sufficiently explain why this is
an appropriate substitute for its existing standards. Creation unit
sizes could be highly variable, since they are determined at the
discretion of the issuer of Fund Shares, and the Exchange has not
articulated how this new standard would effectively support fair and
orderly markets, address the risks of manipulation, and otherwise be
consistent with Section 6(b)(5) and other relevant provisions of the
Act. The Exchange argues that requiring at least one creation unit to
be outstanding at all times, together with the enhanced disclosure
requirements of Rule 6c-11, would facilitate an effective arbitrage
mechanism that would provide investors with sufficient transparency
into the holdings of the underlying portfolio and help ensure that the
trading price in the secondary market remains in line with the value
per share of a fund's portfolio. The Exchange, however, fails to
explain in sufficient detail how an efficient and effective arbitrage
mechanism could result for an illiquid series of Fund Shares held by
very few beneficial holders and with only one creation unit of Fund
Shares outstanding. The Exchange also does not provide any explanation
as to how such series of Fund Shares with only a single creation unit
outstanding is therefore less susceptible to manipulation risks on a
continued listing basis.
    Finally, while the Exchange asserts that its surveillance
procedures and trading halt authority would provide for additional
investor protections by further mitigating any abnormal trading that
would affect the Fund Shares' prices, it does not offer any explanation
of the basis for that view or provide any supporting information or
evidence to support its conclusion. Notably, the Exchange does not
explain how any of its specific existing surveillance procedures or
administration of its trading halt authority effectively address, in
the absence of the Beneficial Holders Rule \26\ and the Minimum Shares
Outstanding Rules, manipulation concerns and other regulatory risks to
fair and orderly markets, investor protection, and the public interest.
Accordingly, the Commission is unable to assess whether the Exchange's
assertion has merit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission identified all of these concerns in the OIP, but the
Exchange has not responded or provided additional data addressing these
concerns.\27\ As stated above, under

the Commission's Rules of Practice, the ``burden to demonstrate that a
proposed rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the rules
and regulations issued thereunder . . . is on the self-regulatory
organization [`SRO'] that proposed the rule change.'' \28\ The
description of a proposed rule change, its purpose and operation, its
effect, and a legal analysis of its consistency with applicable
requirements must all be sufficiently detailed and specific to support
an affirmative Commission finding, and any failure of an SRO to provide
this information may result in the Commission not having a sufficient
basis to make an affirmative finding that a proposed rule change is
consistent with the Exchange Act and the applicable rules and
regulations.\29\ The Commission concludes that, because NYSE Arca has
not demonstrated that its proposal is designed to prevent fraudulent
and manipulative acts and practices or to protect investors and the
public interest, the Exchange has not met its burden to demonstrate
that its proposal is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange
Act.\30\ For this reason, the Commission must disapprove the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See OIP, supra note 6. The commenter asserts that the
creation and redemption processes, which tap into the liquidity of
the underlying holdings, coupled with the enhanced disclosures
mandated under Rule 6c-11 under the 1940 Act, mitigate manipulation
concerns. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 14, at 3. However, neither
the Exchange nor the commenter explains why arbitrage opportunities
would sufficiently mitigate manipulation concerns for the full range
of ETFs, including ETFs overlying a portfolio of instruments that
are themselves illiquid, or where market interest in the ETF is not
sufficient to attract effective arbitrage activity. While the
Exchange and the commenter assert that certain disclosures under
Rule 6c-11 under the 1940 Act provide investors with transparency
into the holdings of the underlying portfolio and additional insight
into the effectiveness of an ETF's arbitrage (see Notice, supra note
3, 85 FR at 40721; SIFMA Letter, supra note 14, at 3-4), neither the
Exchange nor the commenter sufficiently explains how such
disclosures might prevent manipulation. In addition, while the
commenter states that its survey data showed that an ETF's number of
shareholders, level of assets and liquidity tended to improve after
three years of operation as compared to one year, the commenter does
not assert that the survey addressed the concerns about potential
manipulation that the proposal raises, as described above.
    \28\ Rule 700(b)(3), Commission Rules of Practice, 17 CFR
201.700(b)(3).
    \29\ See id.
    \30\ In disapproving this proposed rule change, the Commission
has considered the proposed rule's impact on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). Although
the commenter (see SIFMA Letter, supra note 14, at 4) asserts that
the current Beneficial Holders Rule puts newer and smaller sponsors
at an unnecessary disadvantage to larger sponsors having the
enterprise-wide scale and distribution reach to gather assets in the
months after launch, neither the commenter nor the Exchange has
provided data to support this conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Conclusion

    For the reasons set forth above, the Commission does not find,
pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act,\31\ that the proposed
rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and
the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national
securities exchange, and in particular, with Section 6(b)(5) of the
Exchange Act.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \32\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act, that proposed rule change SR-NYSEArca-2020-56 is
disapproved.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-04676 Filed 3-5-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


LNG and Related Facilities in the Northeast Region Chris Boelke NOAA Fisheries/ Northeast Regional Office Gloucester, MA LNG Facilities in the Northeast Region   2 existing inshore   Distrigas Everett, MA 1971, Cove Point, MD   2 planned offshore   9 proposed or planned inshore   Weavers Cove ( inshore)

  Northeast Gateway ( offshore) Weavers Cove LNG   Mount Hope Bay/ Taunton River   Winter Flounder, Shellfish, anadromous   3 million CY dredging, onsite disposal   SSFATE Modeling  Impacts to EFH   36 Months   Cooperating agency, DEIS end of July   controversial Northeast Gateway   10 miles SE of Gloucester  Hubline   two subsea buoys, anchors/ chains   8 mile pipeline   offloading  one week, continuous presence   3 KM exclusion zone   Application within six months   less controversial, fishing groups Construction Issues   Dredging of areas   direct loss of fish/ shellfish habitat, suspended sediment impacts to WF eggs, shellfish, anadromous   inshore projects   Siting of Pipes and Pipelines   impact to intertidal habitats, SAV, etc   inshore and offshore projects   Fill   site construction, loss of habitats   inshore projects Operational Issues   Ballast Water/ Invasive species   increased vessel traffic, ballast water intakes/ discharges   inshore vs. offshore   Regasification     T  anadromous fish passage in rivers/ estuaries, coastal resources   inshore vs. offshore ° resources and sensitivity to thermal changes   Impingement / entrainment   fishery resources   closed loop/ open loop   inshore vs. offshore ° abundance of sensitive life stages in vicinity Operational Issues   Protected resources   buoys/ anchor lines  harassment issues?

  pressures/ noise   siting within critical habitats   Access/ Exclusion during operation   arrivals, facility exclusion zones   siting  relationship to fishing activities   Transit of Vessels   increase in turbidity , 5X background levels ( Wilber& Clarke ( 2001))

  less impact offshore   Effects of LNG   level of toxicity to aquatic ecosystems, residence within water column   siting within shallow waters vs deeper waters Cumulative effects   Inshore facilities   Taunton River ° potentially 2 LNG within 3 miles ° potentially 2 LNG, 3 power plants, 1 desal plant   Saugus river  Rainbow Smelt   modeling for ecosystem effects   Offshore facilities   existing pipelines, potential to tie in  Hubline ° cumulative exclusion of fishing activity Conclusions   BMP's should be developed for siting of LNG and related facilities AND for operation of facilities   BMP's should address impacts from both inshore facilities and offshore facilities   Information needed for decisionmaking,

dissemination of info between regions