[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 228 (Wednesday, November 25, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75388-75391]
[FR Doc No: 2020-26011]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-90458; File No. SR-NYSE-2020-97]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Shorten the Time Period Before a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and
Consent Under Rule 9216 and an Uncontested Offer of Settlement Under
Rule 9270(f)

November 19, 2020.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby given
that on November 16, 2020, New York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE'' or the
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I and
II below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
    \3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to shorten the time period before a letter of
acceptance, waiver, and consent under Rule 9216 and an uncontested
offer of settlement under Rule 9270(f) becomes final and the
corresponding time period to request review of these settlements under
Rule 9310 from 25 days to 10 days. The proposed rule change is
available on the Exchange's website at www.nyse.com, at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose

    The Exchange proposes to shorten the time period before a letter of
acceptance, waiver, and consent (``AWC'') under Rule 9216 and an
uncontested offer of settlement under Rule 9270(f) becomes final and
the corresponding time period to request review of these settlements
under Rule 9310 from 25 days to 10 days.
    In 2013, the NYSE adopted disciplinary rules that are, with certain
exceptions, substantially the same as the FINRA Rule 8000 Series and
Rule 9000 Series, and which set forth rules for conducting
investigations and enforcement actions.\4\ The NYSE disciplinary rules
were implemented on July 1, 2013.\5\
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    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 68678 (January 16,
2013), 78 FR 5213 (January 24, 2013) (SR-NYSE-2013-02) (``2013
Notice''), 69045 (March 5, 2013), 78 FR 15394 (March 11, 2013) (SR-
NYSE-2013-02) (``2013 Approval Order''), and 69963 (July 10, 2013),
78 FR 42573 (July 16, 2013) (SR-NYSE-2013-49).
    \5\ See NYSE Information Memorandum 13-8 (May 24, 2013).
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    In adopting disciplinary rules modeled on FINRA's rules, the NYSE
established processes for settling disciplinary matters both before and
after issuance of a complaint.\6\ At the time, the Exchange retained a
25 day call for review process only for determinations or penalties
imposed by a Hearing Panel or Extended Hearing Panel. In 2015, the
Exchange amended Rules 9216, 9270 and 9310 to permit a Director and any
member of the Committee for Review (``CFR'') to require a review by the
Board of any AWC letter under Rule 9216 and any offer of settlement
under Rule 9270 within 25 days after the AWC letter or offer of
settlement was sent to each Director and each member of the CFR.\7\
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    \6\ See 2013 Approval Order, 78 FR at 15396-98.
    \7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 76436 (November 13,
2015), 80 FR 72460, 72462-63 (November 19, 2015) (SR-NYSE-2015-35).
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Proposed Rule Change
    Rule 9216 (Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent; Procedure for
Imposition of Fines for Minor Violation(s) of Rules) establishes AWC
procedures by which a member organization or covered person, prior to
the issuance of a complaint, may execute a letter accepting a finding
of violation, consenting to the imposition of sanctions, and agreeing
to waive such member organization's or covered person's right to a
hearing, appeal and certain other procedures. The rule also establishes
procedures for executing a minor rule violation plan letter.
    Under Rule 9216(a)(4), an AWC accepted by the Chief Regulatory
Officer (``CRO'') must be sent to each Director and each member of the
CFR and would be deemed final and constitute the complaint, answer, and
decision in the matter 25 days after being sent to each Director and
each member of the CFR, unless review by the Exchange Board of
Directors is requested pursuant to Rule 9310(a)(1)(B).\8\
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    \8\ Requests for review of an AWC accepted by the CRO are
governed by Rule 9310(a)(1)(B)(i). For the sake of clarity and
transparency, the Exchange proposes the non-substantive change of
including the omitted reference to subsection (B)(i) of Rule
9310(a)(1) in both in the current and proposed text of Rule
9216(a)(4).
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    The Exchange proposes that an AWC accepted by the CRO would be
deemed final and constitute the complaint, answer, and decision in a
matter 10 days after being sent to each Director and each member of the
CFR, unless review is requested pursuant to Rule 9310(a)(1)(B)(i). As
described below, the time period to request review under Rule
9310(a)(1)(B)(i) would also be shortened to 10 days.
    Rule 9270 (Settlement Procedure) provides a settlement procedure
for a Respondent who has been notified of the initiation of a
proceeding. Specifically, Rule 9270(f) provides that uncontested
settlement offers accepted by the CRO, the Hearing Panel or, if
applicable, Extended Hearing Panel must be issued and sent to each
Director and each member of the CFR and

becomes final 25 days after being sent to each Director and each member
of the CFR, unless review by the Exchange Board of Directors is
requested pursuant to Rule 9310(a)(1).
    The Exchange proposes that uncontested settlement offers accepted
by the CRO, the Hearing Panel or, if applicable, Extended Hearing Panel
(together, a ``Panel'') under Rule 9270(f) would become final 10 days
after being sent to each Director and each member of the CFR, unless
review by the Exchange Board of Directors is requested pursuant to Rule
9310(a)(1). As noted, the time to request review of an uncontested
settlement under Rule 9310(a)(1) would also be shortened to 10 days.
    Finally, under Rule 9310(a)(1)(B)(i), any Director and any member
of the CFR may require a review by the Board of any determination or
penalty, or both, imposed in connection with an AWC letter under Rule
9216 or an offer of settlement determined to be uncontested before a
hearing on the merits has begun under Rule 9270(f), except that none of
those persons could request Board review of a determination or penalty
concerning an affiliate of the Exchange as such term is defined in Rule
12b-2 under the Exchange Act. A request for review under this provision
is made by filing with the Secretary of the Exchange a written request
stating the basis and reasons for such review, within 25 days after an
AWC letter or an offer of settlement has been sent to each Director and
each member of the CFR pursuant to Rule 9216(a)(4) or Rule 9270(f)(3).
    To permit AWC letters and uncontested settlements to become final
within 10 days as proposed, the Exchange would amend Rule
9310(a)(1)(B)(i) to provide that a request for review of these
settlements as permitted by the rule must be made by filing the
requisite written request with the Secretary of the Exchange within 10
days after the AWC letter or an offer of settlement is sent to each
Director and each member of the CFR pursuant to Rule 9216(a)(4) or Rule
9270(f)(3).\9\
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    \9\ The time period for requesting review pursuant to Rule
9310(a)(1)(B)(ii) of any rejection by the CRO of any AWC letter
under Rule 9216 or of an uncontested offer of settlement under Rule
9270(f), would remain unchanged as would the time period to request
for review of any determination or penalty, or both, imposed by a
Panel under the Rule 9310(a)(1)(A) other than an offer of settlement
determined to be uncontested after a hearing on the merits have
begun under Rule 9270(f). For the avoidance of doubt, the Exchange
would add text to Rule 9310(a)(1)(A) providing that any request for
review of an offer of settlement determined to be uncontested after
a hearing on the merits has begun under Rule 9270(f) that has been
accepted by a Panel shall be governed by Rule 9310((a)(1)(B)(i).
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    The Exchange believes maintaining a 25 day waiting period for
negotiated settlements under Rule 9216 and uncontested settlements
pursuant to 9270(f) unnecessarily delays final resolution of matters
that have been resolved by the parties and accepted by the CRO or a
Panel. Shortening the waiting period to 10 days, and requiring requests
for Board of Directors review to be made within that same 10 day
period, would significantly expedite the settlement process in
situations where member organizations, covered persons and Respondents
have entered into a consensual, negotiated settlement with Enforcement
or made settlement offers that Enforcement does not oppose, while
continuing to ensure the independence and integrity of the regulatory
process by preserving the ability of Directors and CFR members to call
those settlements for review.
    Further, the Exchange believes that the proposed 10 day period to
call a settlement for review under Rule 9310(a)(1)(B)(i) is reasonable
and sufficient. Like the current 25 day period, the time to call a
settlement for review would begin when the AWC or uncontested
settlement is sent to each Director and member of the CFR. Rules 9216
and 9270 specify that an AWC or uncontested settlement accepted by the
CRO or a Panel can be sent to each Director and each CFR member via
courier, express delivery or electronic means. As a practical matter,
AWCs and settlements are sent to the Directors and CFR members by
email, which ensures prompt and instantaneous communication. As a
result, the Directors and members of the CFR will have the full 10 day
period to determine whether to call these settlements for review.
Moreover, the requirement in Rule 9310(a)(1)(B)(i) that a request for
review be in writing and state the basis and reasons for such review
can similarly be satisfied by a Director or CFR member sending an email
to the Secretary of the Exchange requesting that a specific matter be
reviewed within the proposed 10 day period. The Director or CFR member
would need to take no additional steps nor include any additional
information in order to call a matter for review under Rule
9310(a)(1)(B)(i). In light of these facts, and the relative infrequency
of calls for review of AWCs and uncontested settlements,\10\ the
Exchange believes that 10 days are more than sufficient for a Director
or member of the CFR to determine whether to call a settlement for
review. Once accepted by the CRO or Panel, the proposed 10 day period
for negotiated settlements to be called for review or become final
would expedite disciplinary proceedings and provide finality to the
disciplinary process sooner, to the benefit of the parties and the
investing public.
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    \10\ For example, no AWC letter or uncontested settlement has
been called for review in the past year.
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    Finally, the Exchange also believes that shortening these time
periods would further promote efficiency in connection with cross-
market settlements involving multiple self-regulatory organizations
(``SROs''). Often such settlements are contingent upon the acceptance
of a settlement by all of the SROs involved in the matter. In these
situations, a settlement with the Exchange would not be final until the
end of the time period specified in Rules 9216 and 9270 while a
settlement with other SROs could be final once accepted.\11\ Thus by
reducing the amount of time these settlements are outstanding at the
Exchange, the proposed change could speed up the settlement process for
cross-market settlements involving multiple SROs, to the benefit of the
parties and the investing public.
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    \11\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 9216(a)(4) (``If the [AWC] letter is
accepted by the National Adjudicatory Council, the Review
Subcommittee, or the Office of Disciplinary Affairs, it shall be
deemed final and shall constitute the complaint, answer, and
decision in the matter.''); FINRA Rule 9270(e)(3) (``If the offer of
settlement and order of acceptance are accepted by the National
Adjudicatory Council, the Review Subcommittee, or the Office of
Disciplinary Affairs, they shall become final and the Director of
the Office of Disciplinary Affairs shall issue the order and notify
the Office of Hearing Officers. The Department of Enforcement shall
provide a copy of an issued order of acceptance to each FINRA member
with which a Respondent is associated.''). See also e.g., Nasdaq
Rule 9216(a)(4) & 9270(e)(3); Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. Rule 8.8(a);
Cboe EDGA Exchange, Inc. Rule 8.8(a).
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    The Exchange intends to announce the operative date of the amended
time periods in Rules 9216(a)(4), 9270(f)(3) and 9310(a)(1) at least 30
days in advance via regulatory notice to its members and member
organizations.\12\ To further facilitate an orderly transition from the
current rules to the new rules, the Exchange proposes that matters
already initiated under the current rules would be completed under such
rules. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to apply the current 25 day
period for AWCs prepared and submitted to a member organization or
covered persons under Rule 9216(a)(1) prior to the operative date and
to uncontested settlement offers in proceedings where a Party was
served with a complaint by Enforcement pursuant to Rule 9131 prior to
the operative date. Rules

9216(a)(4), 9270(f)(3) and 9310(a)(1)(B)(i) would be amended to reflect
the transition process. When the transition is complete, the Exchange
intends to submit a proposed rule change that would delete the
unnecessary transition provisions of 9216(a)(4), 9270(f)(3) and
9310(a)(1)(B)(i).
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    \12\ The effective date of the new time periods would be
simultaneously communicated to the Directors and to the members of
the CFR.
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2. Statutory Basis

    The proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b) of the
Act,\13\ in general, and furthers the objectives of Section
6(b)(5),\14\ in particular, because it is designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination
with persons engaged in facilitating transactions in securities, to
remove impediments to, and perfect the mechanism of, a free and open
market and a national market system and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest. Additionally, the Exchange believes
the proposed rule change is consistent with the Section 6(b)(5) \15\
requirement that the rules of an exchange not be designed to permit
unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
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    \13\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \14\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
    \15\ Id.
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    Specifically, the Exchange believes that shortening the waiting
period for negotiated settlements and uncontested offers of settlement
would serve to expedite the final resolution of both Exchange and
cross-market matters that have been resolved by the parties and
accepted by the CRO or Panel, thereby protecting investors and the
public interest by addressing rule violations and achieving finality in
disciplinary matters sooner. The proposed rule change to shorten the
waiting period before an AWC letter and offer of settlement becomes
final and the member of CFR or Board's time to call such settlements
for review will therefore provide for a more efficient, streamlined
disciplinary process.
    The Exchange further believes that the proposed amendments are
consistent with Section 6(b)(6) of the Act,\16\ which provides that
members and persons associated with members shall be appropriately
disciplined for violation of the provisions of the rules of an exchange
by expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and
operations, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being
associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction. As noted, the
proposed changes will not affect the ability of Enforcement to enter
into negotiated settlements or accepting uncontested settlement offers
when appropriate, and will not alter the requirement that settlements
be scrutinized by the CRO or Panel, who will continue to approve them,
or the Directors and members of the CFR, whose right to call both types
of voluntary settlements for review will not change.
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    \16\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(6).
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    For the same reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposed
changes are designed to provide a fair procedure for the disciplining
of members and persons associated with members, consistent with
Sections 6(b)(7) and 6(d) of the Act.\17\ Moreover, as noted, the
Exchange believes that the proposed 10 day period to call a settlement
for review under Rules 9310(a)(1)(B)(i) is reasonable and sufficient,
and provides an appropriate balance between the procedural safeguards
of the call for review process and the benefits of expediting the
resolution of disciplinary matters and providing finality to the
disciplinary process sooner. Reducing the period for review would also
mean that AWCs and uncontested settlements would be published two weeks
earlier, thereby allowing members and the investing public to be
educated about the issues they addressed sooner. Finally, the Exchange
believes that the proposed transition plan is designed to provide a
fair procedure for the disciplining of members and persons associated
with members by providing for a clearly demarcated and orderly
transition from the current 25 day period to the proposed 10 day
period.
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    \17\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(7) and 78f(d).
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    Finally, the Exchange believes that the non-substantive changes to
clarify the cross-reference to Rule 9310 in Rules 9216 would remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and
a national market system and, in general, protect investors and the
public interest because the proposed non-substantive changes would add
clarity, transparency and consistency to the Exchange's disciplinary
rules. The Exchange believes that market participants would benefit
from the increased clarity, thereby reducing potential confusion and
ensuring that persons subject to the Exchange's jurisdiction,
regulators, and the investing public can more easily navigate and
understand the Exchange's rules.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The proposed rule change is
not intended to address competitive issues but is rather concerned with
facilitating less burdensome regulatory compliance and processes and
enhancing the quality of the regulatory process. The Exchange believes
the proposed rule changes would reduce the burdens within the
disciplinary process, as well as move matters through the process
expeditiously by providing for more efficient finality of negotiated
settlements and offers of settlement, to the benefit of all members and
member organizations and the investing public.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    Because the foregoing proposed rule change does not: (i)
Significantly affect the protection of investors or the public
interest; (ii) impose any significant burden on competition; and (iii)
become operative for 30 days from the date on which it was filed, or
such shorter time as the Commission may designate, it has become
effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act \18\ and
subparagraph (f)(6) of Rule 19b-4 thereunder.\19\
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    \18\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(iii).
    \19\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6). In addition, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)
requires a self-regulatory organization to give the Commission
written notice of its intent to file the proposed rule change at
least five business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed
rule change, or such shorter time as designated by the Commission.
The Exchange has satisfied this requirement.
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    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to
determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-NYSE-2020-97 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSE-2020-97. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-NYSE-2020-97, and should be submitted on
or before December 16, 2020.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\20\
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    \20\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-26011 Filed 11-24-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 163 (Wednesday, August 22, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50750-50754]
[FR Doc No: 2012-20575]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-67672; File No. SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Amex LLC; Notice of Filing of
Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed
Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, Amending Commentary .07 to
NYSE Amex Options Rule 904 To Eliminate Position Limits for Options on
the SPDR[supreg] S&P 500[supreg] Exchange-Traded Fund

August 15, 2012.

I. Introduction

    On May 2, 2012, NYSE Amex LLC (``NYSE Amex'' or ``Exchange'') \1\
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission''),
pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ a proposed rule change to
eliminate position limits for options on the SPDR[supreg] S&P
500[supreg] exchange-traded fund (``SPY ETF'') on a pilot basis.\4\ The
proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register
on May 18, 2012.\5\ On June 27, 2012, the Commission extended to August
16, 2012 the time period in which to approve the proposed rule change,
disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings to
determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved.\6\
The Commission received two comment letters on the proposal.\7\ On
August 9, 2012, NYSE Amex filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule
change.\8\ The Commission is publishing

this notice to solicit comments on Amendment No. 1 from interested
persons and is approving the proposed rule change, as modified by
Amendment No. 1, on an accelerated basis.
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    \1\ NYSE Amex now is known as ``NYSEMKT.'' The proposed rule
change to which this order relates, however, was submitted before
the name change was implemented.
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \4\ ``SPDR[supreg],'' ``Standard & Poor's[supreg],''
``S&P[supreg],'' ``S&P 500[supreg],'' and ``Standard & Poor's 500''
are registered trademarks of Standard & Poor's Financial Services
LLC. As described by the Exchange, the SPY ETF represents ownership
in the SPDR S&P 500 Trust, a unit investment trust that generally
corresponds to the price and yield performance of the SPDR S&P 500
Index.
    \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 66984 (May 14,
2012), 77 FR 29721 (May 18, 2012) (``Notice'').
    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67278 (June 27,
2012), 77 FR 39547 (July 3, 2012).
    \7\ See letters to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission,
from: John E. Andrie, Managing Member, Andrie Trading LLC, dated
July 16, 2012 (``Andrie Letter''); and Jenny Klebes Golding, Senior
Attorney, Legal Division, Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Incorporated (``CBOE''), dated July 30, 2012 (``CBOE Letter'').
    \8\ In Amendment No. 1, the Exchange proposed to implement its
proposal on a pilot basis and also explicitly stated that NYSE Amex
Options Rule 906(b) applies to SPY options. These aspects of the
proposal are described in more detail below.
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II. Description of the Amended Proposal

    Options on the SPY ETF (``SPY options'') are American-style, p.m.-
settled options that physically settle into shares of the underlying
SPY ETF.\9\ Currently, Commentary .07 to NYSE Amex Options Rule 904
imposes a position limit for SPY options of 900,000 contracts on the
same side of the market. The Exchange believes that the current
position limit could deter the optimal use of SPY options as a hedging
tool.\10\ Further, it contends, the current position limit may inhibit
the ability of certain large market participants, such as mutual funds
and other institutional investors with substantial hedging needs, to
utilize SPY options and gain meaningful exposure to the hedging
function they provide.\11\
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    \9\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29724.
    \10\ Id. at 29721.
    \11\ Id. at 29722-23.
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    Thus, the Exchange's proposal, as amended, seeks to amend
Commentary .07 to NYSE Amex Options Rule 904 to eliminate position
limits for SPY options on a fourteen-month pilot basis set to end
October 15, 2013. The Exchange states that it will perform an analysis
of the initial pilot program after a twelve month period (the ``Pilot
Report''), which will be submitted to the Commission within thirty (30)
days of the end of the Pilot Period. The Pilot Report will compare the
impact of the pilot program, if any, on the volumes of SPY options and
the volatility in the price of the underlying SPY contract,
particularly at expiration. The Pilot Report also will detail the size
and different types of strategies employed with respect to positions
established in SPY options; note whether any problems, in the
underlying SPY ETF or otherwise, arose as a result of the no-limit
approach; and include any other information that may be useful in
evaluating the effectiveness of the pilot program. In preparing the
Pilot Report, the Exchange will utilize various data elements such as
volume and open interest. If the pilot is not extended or permanently
approved by the end of the Pilot Period, the position limits for SPY
options will revert to the limits in effect at the commencement of the
pilot program.
    The Exchange believes that SPY options with no position limit will
(1) offer investors another investment option through which they could
obtain and hedge significant levels of exposure to the S&P 500 stocks,
(2) be available to trade on the Exchange (and presumably all other
U.S. options exchanges) electronically, and (3) provide investors with
added flexibility through an additional product that, in the Exchange's
view, may be better tailored to meet their particular investment,
hedging, and trading needs, because, among other things, they are p.m.-
settled.\12\
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    \12\ Id. at 29722. In support of its proposal, the Exchange
contends that the creation and redemption process for the SPY ETF
allows large investors to transfer positions from a basket of stocks
comprising the S&P 500 Index to an equivalent number of ETF shares
(and the reverse) with relative ease, and argues that, because of
this, there is no reason to disadvantage options overlying the one
versus the other. Id.
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    The Exchange cites the current treatment of SPX index options \13\
and SPXPM index options,\14\ both of which, like SPY options, are based
on the S&P 500, and neither of which is subject to position limits.\15\
The Exchange contends that, because SPX, SPXPM, and SPY options are
ultimately derivative of the same benchmark--the S&P 500 Index--they
should be treated equally from a position limit perspective.\16\ The
Exchange also argues that the Delta-Based Equity Hedge Exemption for
delta-neutral option positions,\17\ which allows SPY option positions
to be delta-hedged by SPX index option positions, reflects the economic
equivalence of the two products.\18\
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    \13\ SPX index options are a.m.-settled, cash-settled options on
the S&P 500 Index, which list and trade exclusively on the CBOE.
    \14\ SPXPM index options are p.m.-settled, cash-settled options
on the S&P 500 Index, which list and trade on the C2 Options
Exchange (``C2''). SPXPM, unlike SPX, is based on the closing value
of the S&P 500 Index, and, in this respect, the Exchange states, it
is very much like SPY options, which are also settled at the close,
acknowledging that the SPXPM is settled into cash as opposed to
shares of the underlying, like SPY options. See Notice, 77 FR at
29722.
    \15\ Id. The Exchange notes that SPX index options are 10 times
the size of SPY options, so that a position of only 90,000 SPX index
options is the equivalent of a position of 900,000 SPY options. Id.
The Exchange further notes that the reduced-value option on the S&P
500 Index (option symbol XSP) is the equivalent size of SPY options,
and, similar to SPX index options, is not subject to position
limits. Id.
    \16\ Id. As a practical matter, the Exchange adds, investors
utilize SPX, SPXPM, and SPY options and their respective underlying
instruments and futures to gain exposure to the same benchmark
index, the S&P 500. Id. The Exchange also states that, anecdotally,
market participants perceive value in avoiding the regulatory risk
of exceeding the position limit on SPY options by instead using SPX
index options for their hedging needs. Although exemptions are
available with respect to the position limits for SPY options, the
Exchange believes that such exemptions and the regulatory burden
attendant with them, in its view, may dissuade investors from using
SPY options when they can instead use an SPX index option without
the need for an exemption. Id. at 29723.
    \17\ See Commentary .10 to NYSE Amex Options Rule 904.
    \18\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29722. In making this argument, the
Exchange states that, given the fact that SPX index options are not
subject to position limits, an Exchange member, member organization,
or non-member affiliate could theoretically establish a position in
SPY options far in excess of the current 900,000 contract limit,
provided that the position is hedged with SPX index options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange argues that, if no position limits have been found to
be warranted on both SPX and SPXPM index options, the same treatment
should be extended to SPY options so that inconsistent position limits
do not produce competitive advantages and disadvantages among
contracts. The Exchange cites observations regarding competition among
economically equivalent products, appearing in a 2005 paper by Hans R.
Dutt and Lawrence E. Harris,\19\ in making this argument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See The Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 25, no. 10, 945-
965 (2005) (``Position Limits for Cash-Settled Derivative
Contracts,'' by Hans R. Dutt and Lawrence E. Harris) (``Dutt-Harris
Paper'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange cites the Commission as noting, in its approval of the
elimination of position and exercise limits with respect to SPX index
options, that the markets for the securities underlying the S&P 500
Index are deep and liquid, and maintaining that this reduces concerns
regarding manipulation or disruption in the underlying markets.\20\ The
Exchange represents that this would similarly be the case if position
limits were eliminated for SPY options.\21\ According to the Exchange,
SPY options as well as the SPY ETF exhibit deep, liquid markets.\22\ In
this regard, the Exchange states that SPY options are currently the
most actively traded option class in terms of average daily volume
(``ADV''),\23\ with ADV of 5,789,511 for year 2011 and 4,525,709 for
the period January 1, 2012 to April 19, 2012.\24\ The Exchange also
provides figures indicating that the SPY ETF ADV was 218,227,747 for
year 2011 and 145,164,527 for the period January 1, 2012 to April 19,
2012.\25\ The Exchange represents further that there is tremendous
liquidity in the component securities upon which the S&P 500 is based,
providing figures indicating that the component securities' ADV was

3,289,595,675 for year 2011 and 2,851,457,600 for the period January 1,
2012 to April 19, 2012.\26\
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    \20\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29723.
    \21\ Id.
    \22\ Id.
    \23\ Id. at 29721.
    \24\ Id. at 29723.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Id. at 29723-24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange also believes that the SPY ETF's market capitalization
is at a level consistent with that which the Commission has previously
determined to be sufficiently large, in tandem with the depth and
liquidity of the markets for the SPY ETF, to reduce concerns regarding
manipulation.\27\ In this regard, the Exchange provides figures
indicating that the average SPY ETF market capitalization was
$89,533,777,897 for year 2011 and $99,752,986,022 for the period
January 1, 2012 to April 19, 2012.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Id. at 29724.
    \28\ Id. The Exchange also provides figures indicating that the
average S&P 500 Index market capitalization was $11,818,270,341,270
for year 2011 and $12,547,946,920,000 for the period January 1, 2012
to April 19, 2012. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange further cites the Dutt-Harris Paper in addressing
possible concerns that the elimination of the position limit on SPY
options could raise the risk of market manipulation. The Exchange
believes that the Dutt-Harris analysis, which focuses on concerns
relating to manipulation of cash-settled derivatives, suggests that
whatever manipulation risk does exist in a cash-settled, broad-based
product such as the SPXPM index option, the corresponding risk in a
physically-settled, but equally broad-based product such as the SPY
option, is likely to be equally low, if not lower.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29723. In this context, the Exchange
notes the observation of the Dutt-Harris Paper that the manipulation
of such instruments as U.S. exchange-traded, cash-settled derivative
contracts requires ``very large trades that are costly to make and
easy to detect through conventional surveillance,'' and argues that
the same observation applies equally to SPY options. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In assessing the appropriateness of eliminating position limits for
SPY options, the Exchange also notes its rules setting forth reporting
requirements for large options positions and, among other things, the
Exchange's ability to impose higher margin requirements upon accounts
that it determines to be under-hedged. \30\ The Exchange further states
that the reporting, surveillance, and monitoring mechanisms that it
currently has in place for certain other option products that trade on
the Exchange without position limits are effective and could easily
accommodate SPY options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29724; see also NYSE Amex Options Rule
906. Additionally, the Exchange notes that Rule 15c3-1 under the Act
imposes a capital charge on members to the extent of any margin
deficiency resulting from the higher margin requirement. See Notice,
77 FR at 29724.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, with respect to concerns that the elimination of position
limits for SPY options could result in, or increase, market-on-close
volatility, the Exchange believes that the ability to hedge SPY options
with shares of the SPY ETF reduces the likelihood of such
volatility.\31\ In this regard, the Exchange argues that, because SPY
options are physically-settled, they can be easily hedged via long or
short positions in shares of the SPY ETF, which, as discussed at supra
note 12 and accompanying text, the Exchange maintains can be easily
created or redeemed as needed.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29724-25.
    \32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Comment Summary

    The Commission received two comment letters on the proposal. One
letter supported the proposed elimination of position limits on SPY
options.\33\ The commenter also expressed a belief that elimination of
SPY option position limits would result in more trading business on
regulated exchanges, as opposed to other venues, and would improve
market transparency.\34\ A second comment letter neither supported nor
opposed the proposal, but suggested that a reporting requirement would
be useful should position and exercise limits be eliminated for SPY
options.\35\
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    \33\ See Andrie Letter.
    \34\ Id.
    \35\ See CBOE Letter. In Amendment No. 1 the Exchange responded
to this comment by stating explicitly that the hedge reporting
requirements of NYSE Amex Options Rule 906(b) apply to SPY options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Discussion and Commission Findings

    After careful review, the Commission finds that the proposed rule
change is consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities
exchange.\36\ In particular, the Commission finds that the proposed
rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\37\ which
requires, among other things, that the rules of a national securities
exchange be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating,
clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and
facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market
system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest;
and not be designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers,
issuers, brokers or dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission has
considered the proposed rule's impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \37\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Position and exercise limits serve as a regulatory tool designed to
address manipulative schemes and adverse market impact surrounding the
use of options. Since the inception of standardized options trading,
the options exchanges have had rules limiting the aggregate number of
options contracts that a member or customer may hold or exercise.\38\
These position and exercise limits are intended to prevent the
establishment of options positions that can be used or might create
incentives to manipulate the underlying market so as to benefit the
options position.\39\ In particular, position and exercise limits are
designed to minimize the potential for mini-manipulations and for
corners or squeezes of the underlying market.\40\ In addition, such
limits serve to reduce the possibility for disruption of the options
market itself, especially in illiquid classes.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45236
(January 4, 2002), 67 FR 1378 (January 10, 2002) (SR-Amex-2001-42).
    \39\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47346
(February 11, 2003), 68 FR 8316 (February 20, 2003) (SR-CBOE-2002-
26).
    \40\ Id.
    \41\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, the Commission has taken a gradual, evolutionary
approach toward expansion of position and exercise limits for option
products overlying certain ETFs where there is considerable liquidity
in both the underlying cash markets and the options markets, and, in
the case of certain broad-based index options, toward elimination of
such limits altogether.\42\ The Commission has been careful to balance
two competing concerns when considering proposals by the self-
regulatory organizations to change position and exercise limits. The
Commission has recognized that the limits can be useful to prevent
investors from disrupting the market in securities underlying the
options. At the same time, the Commission has determined that limits
should not be established in a manner that will unnecessarily
discourage participation in the options market by institutions and
other investors with substantial hedging needs or to prevent
specialists and

market-makers from adequately meeting their obligations to maintain a
fair and orderly market.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The Commission's incremental approach to approving changes
in position and exercise limits for option products overlying
certain ETFs is well-established. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 64695 (June 17, 2011), 76 FR 36942, n. 19 and
accompanying text (June 23, 2011) (SR-Phlx-2011-58) (approving
increase of SPY option position limit to 900,000 contracts).
    \43\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 40969 (January 22,
1999), 64 FR 4911 (February 1, 1999) (SR-CBOE-98-23).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has carefully considered the Exchange's proposal.
The Exchange argues that SPY options are ultimately derivative of the
S&P 500 Index, and should therefore be treated, from a position limit
perspective, similarly to index options based on the S&P 500 which have
no position limits, such as SPX and SPXPM. However, in reviewing the
Exchange's arguments, the Commission considered certain noteworthy
differences that exist, in its view, between SPY options and those
index option products.
    Among other things, SPX and SPXPM are cash-settled options on the
S&P 500 Index. SPY options, on the other hand, are physically-settled
options on a single security--the SPY ETF. Moreover, SPY options settle
into shares of the SPY ETF, a single security, the performance of
which, in turn, generally corresponds to the performance of the S&P 500
Index. Thus, unlike SPX and SPXPM, SPY options are indirectly based on
the performance of the individual components of the S&P 500 Index.
    Nevertheless, in spite of such differences, the Commission believes
that SPY options have certain characteristics that serve to mitigate
the concerns that position limits are designed to address. As the
Exchange has represented, SPY options are the most actively traded
options in terms of ADV. That, in combination with the depth and
liquidity of the markets for the underlying SPY ETF as well as the
component securities of the S&P 500 Index, and the surveillance
capabilities of the Exchange, support the elimination of position
limits for SPY options while still helping to ensure that large
positions in such options will not unduly disrupt trading in the
options or in the underlying SPY ETF. Given the Exchange's belief that
eliminating position limits will afford investors more flexibility in
meeting their particular investment, hedging, and trading needs, the
Commission believes that it is consistent with the Act and appropriate,
at this time, to allow SPY options to be traded on the Exchange without
position limits on a pilot basis. The Commission believes that
eliminating position limits on the highly liquid SPY options represents
the next step of a measured approach to position limits on these
options.
    As an initial matter, the Commission notes that certain
characteristics unique to SPY options, taken together, significantly
mitigate concerns regarding manipulation or potential disruptions of
the markets for SPY options or the underlying SPY ETF. Importantly, and
as supported by the figures the Exchange has provided, the markets for
SPY options, the underlying SPY ETF, and the component securities upon
which the S&P 500 Index is based are extremely deep and liquid.\44\
Figures provided by the Exchange also reflect enormous capitalization
of both the SPY ETF and the S&P 500 Index.\45\ Given these
characteristics, the Commission believes that removing position limits
may benefit investors by bringing additional depth and liquidity, in
terms of both volume and open interest, to SPY option classes without
raising significant concerns about manipulation or potential market
disruption. As set forth in more detail below, however, the Commission
is approving the proposal on a pilot basis, during which the Exchange
will monitor and report to the Commission on the impact of the removal
of SPY option position limits on the SPY option market as well as the
markets for the underlying securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29723-24.
    \45\ Id. at 29724. The Commission also notes that, according to
the Exchange, the creation and redemption mechanism for SPY ETF
shares is robust, as evidenced by its close tracking of its
benchmark index, and limited only by the number of shares available
in the component securities of the S&P 500 Index. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also believes that the Exchange's reporting
requirements and surveillance systems should enable it to detect and
deter any trading abuses that might arise from the elimination of
position limits for SPY options.\46\ These safeguards also should
enable the Exchange to monitor large positions to identify instances of
potential risk and provide the Exchange with the information to
determine whether to impose additional margin and/or whether to assess
capital charges upon a member organization carrying the account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See Notice, 77 FR at 29724. The Commission also expects
that the Exchange's surveillance procedures should enable the
Exchange to assess and respond to market concerns at an early stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this regard, the Commission believes that financial requirements
imposed by the Exchange and the Commission help allay concerns that an
Exchange member or its customer may try to maintain an inordinately
large, unhedged SPY option position. Current margin and risk-based
haircut methodologies serve to limit the size of positions maintained
by any one account by increasing the margin and/or capital that a
member must maintain for a large position held by it or by its
customer.\47\ The Exchange also has the authority under its rules to
impose a higher margin requirement upon the member or member
organization when it determines a higher requirement is warranted.\48\
In addition, Rule 15c3-1 imposes a capital charge on members to the
extent of any margin deficiency resulting from the higher margin
requirement. Further, the OCC will serve as the counter-party guarantor
in every exchange-traded transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ The Commission's net capital rule, Rule 15c3-1 under the
Act, requires a capital charge equal to the maximum potential loss
on a broker-dealer's aggregate index position over a + (-) 10%
market move.
    \48\ See NYSE Amex Options Rule 462(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the Exchange notes, NYSE Amex Options Rule 906(a) requires
Exchange members to report to the Exchange any account with an
aggregate position (whether long or short) of 200 or more options
contracts where the underlying security is a stock or ETF share.\49\ In
addition, as the Exchange sets forth in Amendment No. 1, NYSE Amex
Options Rule 906(b) requires each member (other than an Exchange
market-maker) that maintains a position in excess of 10,000 non-FLEX
equity option contracts on the same side of the market, on behalf of
its own account or for the account of a customer, to report to the
Exchange whether and how such position is hedged.\50\ If the position
is under-hedged, pursuant to Rule 906(b), the Exchange may consider
imposing additional margin upon the account maintaining such under-
hedged position.\51\ CBOE suggests that the Exchange's proposal lacks a
hedge reporting requirement,\52\ but the Exchange affirms in Amendment
No. 1 that the requirements of Rule 906(b) apply to SPY options.\53\
Moreover, the Exchange asserts in Amendment No. 1 that the hedge
reporting requirements of Rule 906(b) are actually more stringent than
those cited in the CBOE Letter applicable to certain index options.\54\
The Commission believes that, if problems were to occur during the
Pilot Period, the market surveillance of large positions should help
the Exchange to take the appropriate action to avoid any manipulation
or market risk concerns.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See NYSE Amex Options Rule 906(a).
    \50\ See NYSE Amex Options Rule 906(b).
    \51\ Id.
    \52\ See CBOE Letter.
    \53\ See Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change.
    \54\ Id.
    \55\ In addition to the aforementioned reporting requirements,
the Commission notes that the Exchange would have, through its
membership in the Intermarket Surveillance Group, access to
information concerning the trading of the securities underlying the
S&P 500 Index, i.e., the securities that are used to create or
redeem SPY ETY shares.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes further that, to the extent that the
elimination of SPY option position limits results in movement of
trading interest from the OTC market onto the Exchange,\56\
transparency in the SPY option market would be enhanced, which is a
benefit for investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See Andrie Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notwithstanding the protections discussed above, the Commission
believes that a prudent approach is warranted with respect to the
Exchange's proposal to eliminate position limits for SPY options. In
this regard, the Commission believes that the risks of manipulation and
potential market disruption are significantly mitigated as discussed
above. To the extent the potential for adverse effects on the markets
for the SPY ETF or the S&P 500 component securities underlying the SPY
ETF continues to exist, the Exchange's proposal to implement this
change on a pilot basis should help to address this concern.
Accordingly, the Commission is approving the proposal, as amended, on a
fourteen-month pilot basis.\57\ Within thirty (30) days of the end of
the Pilot Period the Exchange will be required to submit to the
Commission the Pilot Report. The Pilot Report will compare the impact
of the pilot program, if any, on the volumes of SPY options and the
volatility in the price of the underlying SPY contract, particularly at
expiration. The Pilot Report will also detail the size and different
types of strategies employed with respect to positions established in
SPY options; note whether any problems, in the underlying SPY ETF or
otherwise, arose as a result of the no-limit approach; and include any
other information that may be useful in evaluating the effectiveness of
the pilot program. Furthermore, if the pilot is not extended or
permanently approved by the end of the Pilot Period, the pre-pilot
position limit for SPY options of 900,000 contracts on the same side of
the market will go back into effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ The Commission took a similarly measured approach to the
first proposals to eliminate position limits for certain broad-based
index options by approving those proposals on a pilot basis. See,
e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 40969 (January 22, 1999),
64 FR 4911 (February 1, 1999) (SR-CBOE-98-23); 41011 (February 1,
1999), 64 FR 6405 (February 9, 1999) (SR-Amex-98-38).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission expects that, throughout the Pilot Period, the
Exchange will monitor for any problems and collect and analyze on an
ongoing basis the data and information that the Exchange ultimately
intends to include in the Pilot Report. The Commission also expects
that the Exchange will take prompt action, including timely
communication with the Commission and with other marketplace self-
regulatory organizations responsible for oversight of trading in
component stocks, should any unanticipated adverse market effects
develop.
    The Commission finds good cause to approve the filing, as amended
by Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change, prior to the thirtieth
day after the date of publication of notice of filing thereof in the
Federal Register. Specifically, by limiting the proposed rule change to
a pilot program, the amendment narrows the scope of the proposal.
Moreover, the proposal, which in its original version would have
eliminated position limits permanently, was open for comment, as is
usual, for twenty-one days after publication and generated only two
responses--one of which supported the proposal and one that did not
raise objection to it.\58\ Further, the Pilot Report and the data that
the Exchange commits in Amendment No. 1 to provide to the Commission
enhance the proposal by adding a component that should help the
Exchange and the Commission assess the impact of eliminating SPY option
position limits. In addition, Amendment No. 1 enhances the proposal by
making explicit that the hedge reporting requirement of NYSE Amex
Options Rule 906(b) applies to SPY options. Accordingly, the Commission
believes that good cause exists, consistent with Sections 6(b)(5) and
19(b) of the Act to approve the filing, as amended by Amendment No. 1
to the proposed rule change, on an accelerated basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See Andrie Letter and CBOE Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Solicitation of Comments on Amendment No. 1

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether Amendment No. 1
is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the
following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29 and should
be submitted on or before September 12, 2012.

VI. Conclusion

    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Act,\59\ that the proposed rule change (SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29) be, and it
hereby is, approved, as amended, on a fourteen-month pilot basis set to
expire on October 15, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-20575 Filed 8-21-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P