[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 238 (Monday, December 12, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 77183-77200]
[FR Doc No: 2011-31441]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0174]
RIN 2127-AK88

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Theft Protection and
Rollaway Prevention

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In this NPRM, we (NHTSA) address safety issues arising from
increasing variations of keyless ignition controls, and the operation
of those controls. At issue are drivers' inability to stop a moving
vehicle in a panic situation, and drivers who unintentionally leave the
vehicle without the vehicle transmission's being ``locked in park,'' or
with the engine still running, increasing the chances of vehicle
rollaway or carbon monoxide poisoning in an enclosed area.
    Therefore in this NPRM, among other matters, we propose to
standardize the operation of controls that are used to stop the vehicle
engine or other propulsion system and that do not involve the use of a
physical key. We are also proposing to require that an audible warning
be given to any driver who: Attempts to shut down the propulsion system
without first moving the gear selection control to the ``park''
position (for vehicles with a ``park'' position); exits a vehicle
without having first moved the gear selection control to ``park'' (for
vehicles with a ``park'' position), or exits a vehicle without first
turning off the propulsion system.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before March 12, 2012.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to the docket number identified in
the heading of this document by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Rm. W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE. Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern
Time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Regardless of how you submit your comments, you should mention the
docket number of this document.
    You may call the Docket at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change
to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information
provided.
    Privacy Act: Please see the Privacy Act heading under Rulemaking
Analyses and Notices.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, Ms. Gayle
Dalrymple, Office of Crash Avoidance Standards (telephone: 202-366-
5559) (fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>). Ms. Dalrymple's mailing address is
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NVS-112, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    For legal issues, Ms. Dorothy Nakama, Office of the Chief Counsel
(telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>) (fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>). Ms. Nakama's mailing
address is National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NCC-112,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. Safety Need for Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114
    A. Inability To Stop a Moving Vehicle in a Panic Situation
    B. Rollaway--Leaving a Vehicle Not in ``Park''
    C. Leaving the Vehicle With the Vehicle Propulsion System
Unintentionally Left Active
IV. Society of Automotive Engineers Effort in This Area
V. NHTSA's Proposal
    A. New Definitions
    B. Standardizing Shutting Down a Moving Vehicle's Propulsion
System
    C. Audible Warning When Key Is in the Starting System and the
Driver Opens the Door
    D. Audible Warning To Prevent Rollaways
    E. Audible Warning To Reduce Chances of Drivers' Leaving a
Vehicle With the Propulsion System Active
    F. Owners' Manual Required Language
VI. Other Issues Considered by NHTSA
    A. Propulsion System Kill Switch in Plain View of the Driver
    B. Stepping on Brake Before Starting the Propulsion System

    C. Specified Actuation Time for the Propulsion System Start
Control
    D. Automatic Timed Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a
Stationary Vehicle
    E. Preventing Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a Stationary
Vehicle Not in ``Park''
VII. Additional Questions
VIII. Benefits, Costs and Lead Time
IX. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
X. Public Participation

I. Executive Summary

    In this notice, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) addresses safety issues arising from increased availability of
ignition systems that do not use physical keys to start and stop
passenger motor vehicles' engines or other propulsion systems. At issue
are drivers' inability to stop a moving vehicle in a panic situation,
and drivers who unintentionally leave the vehicle without the vehicle
transmission's being locked in ``park,'' or with the engine still
running, increasing the chances of vehicle rollaway or carbon monoxide
poisoning in an enclosed area.
    Therefore in this NPRM, among other matters, we propose to
standardize the length of time it is necessary to push a control to
stop the vehicle engine or other propulsion system. We are also
proposing to require that an audible warning be given to any driver
who: (1) Attempts to shut down the propulsion system without first
moving the gear selection control to the ``park'' position (for
vehicles with a ``park'' position); (2) exits a vehicle without having
first moved the gear selection control to ``park'' (for vehicles with a
``park'' position), or (3) exits a vehicle without first turning off
the propulsion system.
    This rulemaking action is undertaken in response to our review of
complaints from consumers to our Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
reporting incidents such as those described above and investigations of
crashes and complaints regarding unintended acceleration.\1\ While we
recognize that this is not the traditional data base upon which our
agency typically bases a rulemaking, we believe that, in this instance,
we are addressing an emerging safety issue with non-standardized new
technology in way that imposes minimal cost on vehicle manufacturers,
especially given that the proposed two-year lead time of the new
requirements, and that many vehicles already have some form of the
features we are proposing today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ We also note the recommendation of the National Aeronautic
and Space Administration's (NASA) Engineering and Safety Center
(NESC) that NHTSA consider regulation of ``controls for managing
safety critical functions'' and that we noted that ``Keyless
ignition systems can exacerbate UA incidents (particularly prolonged
incidents involving a stuck accelerator pedal) if the driver cannot
determine how to shut off the engine quickly.'' ``Technical
Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) Systems,''
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, February 2011, page
65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Today's proposal would, if finalized:
     Clarify that definitions for ``key'' and ``starting
system'' currently in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.
114 apply to all propulsion systems.
     Propose a new definition for ``key code carrying device.''
     Propose to revise the definition of ``starting system.''
     Propose a new definition for ``stop control.''
     Delete the door opening alert exclusion currently in FMVSS
No. 114 for a running vehicle (only for vehicles equipped with keyless
ignition).
     Add requirements for the operation of a pushed stop
control: The driver must hold the control for a minimum of 500
milliseconds to shut down the propulsion system, whether the vehicle is
moving or stationary, and the propulsion system must shut down within 1
second of the initial push of the stop control.
     Add a requirement for an internal alert to the driver when
s/he requests propulsion system shut down without first placing the
gear selection control in ``park.''
     Add a requirement for an external alert that the driver
and bystanders can hear when the vehicle is not in ``park'' and the
driver exits the vehicle.
     Add a requirement for an external alert that sounds when
the driver leaves a keyless ignition vehicle with the propulsion system
active.
     Add new test procedures for the new requirements.
    We believe that the benefits of the new requirements proposed
today, while not yet quantifiable on a national level, will reduce the
risk that drivers will misuse these new keyless ignition systems and
therefore also reduce:
     Crashes, injuries and deaths resulting from a driver's
inability to shut down a moving vehicle;
     Rollaway incidents due to drivers failing to place the
gear shift control in ``park'' before shutting down the propulsion
system, and leaving the vehicle; and
     Incidents of carbon monoxide poisoning due to drivers
inadvertently leaving a vehicle running or with its propulsion system
active in an enclosed space, such as a garage adjoining a home.
    We believe that taking precautionary action now, before these non-
standardized systems become more widely available, will be beneficial
to highway safety. Production of vehicles with these systems has grown
from about 5,000 vehicles in model year 2002 to over 1,2 million in
model year 2008. We believe we will accrue benefits by establishing a
consistent experience for the users across all vehicles and a
consistent way to turn off the propulsion system whether the vehicle is
moving or not. This not only simplifies training new drivers, but also
training drivers new to keyless ignition vehicles, and reduces the
stress and confusion relating to fundamental differences in how one
operates a vehicle. This is especially important in vehicles that
provide less obvious cues as to the state of the engine and the
starting system. If the measures we propose in this notice prevent just
one serious injury over three years, the rule will be cost beneficial.
We believe the countermeasures we have proposed can reasonably be
expected to have their intended effect based on similar requirements
already in place in FMVSS No. 114 and other standards and in common
automotive practice. For example, the warning to drivers to take their
keys with them when they leave their vehicles (currently in FMVSS No.
114) and the threshold warning device for platform lifts (currently in
FMVSS No. 403) are effective alerts, and we see no reason the new
alerts proposed here should be less effective. The common automotive
practice of the rotating ignition switch, combined with a physical key,
has standardized the engine shut down procedure before the advent of
the new electronic convenience controls. We believe standardizing the
operation of these new controls, combined with the new alerts, will
have the same effect. We believe these new requirements are especially
worthwhile considering what we believe to be minimal costs to implement
them.
    Today, in the vehicles with keyless ignition systems, the great
majority use push-button type switches. Some require a momentary tap,
some require longer hold times, and some use different hold times to
affect different functions. The countermeasure for driver confusion
over shutting down a moving vehicle is to require that the switch that
turns off the propulsion system work consistently, whether the vehicle
is moving or not. From our knowledge of the operation of current
designs, we believe that our proposed 500 millisecond hold time is well
within the functional range of the switches currently in use. The only

change necessary, in most cases, will be in the additional software
coding. Thus, we believe there will be little incremental cost for
changing the behavior of the keyless ignition control. There will be
costs associated with testing the new software for correct operation.
    We are proposing to require one new internal driver alert and two
new external driver alerts. Some models already use some version of
these alerts and other alerts are already required by FMVSS No. 114. In
most cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound
generating systems to engage under the right circumstances. For this
reason, we believe the warning cues proposed here have little cost
associated with their implementation.
    Because the incremental cost for equipping every vehicle in the
fleet would be very small, it follows that regardless of the number of
vehicles needing a countermeasure, the cost to equip the entire fleet
of keyless ignition vehicles would be similarly small.
    If the proposed changes in this NPRM are made final, NHTSA proposes
a lead time of two years from the next September 1 after a final rule
is published in the Federal Register. We believe that this lead time
gives vehicle manufacturers ample time to implement the new
requirements in the normal course of vehicle model updating at minimal
cost.

II. Background

    Under 49 U.S.C. Section 30111(a), NHTSA (by delegation from the
Secretary of Transportation) is directed to prescribe Federal motor
vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs). Section 30111(a) also states that
``Each standard shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle
safety, and be stated in objective terms.'' This subsection was the
statutory basis for the original promulgation of FMVSS No. 114, Theft
protection and rollaway prevention (49 CFR Section 571.114) and is also
the basis for this proposal.
    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114, specifies vehicle
performance requirements intended to reduce the incidence of crashes,
injuries and fatalities resulting from theft and accidental rollaway of
motor vehicles. The purpose of this standard is to decrease the
likelihood that a vehicle is in a crash as a result of theft, or
accidentally set in motion. FMVSS No. 114 applies to all passenger
cars, and to trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or
less. However, it does not apply to walk-in vans.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ In addition, FMVSS No. 114 specifies requirements for a
brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) at S5.3. S5.3 applies to
all motor vehicles (except trailers and motorcycles) with a GVWR of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To minimize crashes involving stolen vehicles, FMVSS No. 114
specifies at S5.1.1 that each vehicle must have a starting system
which, whenever the key is removed from the starting system prevents:
(a) The normal activation of the vehicle's engine or motor and; (b)
either steering, or forward self-mobility, of the vehicle, or both. To
deter theft, Section 5.1.3 requires an audible alert to the driver if
the driver's door is opened and the key left in the starting system.
This serves as a reminder to the driver to always take the key. It is
further specified at S5.1.4 that if a vehicle is equipped with a
transmission with a ``park'' position, the means for deactivating the
vehicle's engine or motor must not activate any device installed to
prevent steering or forward self-mobility, unless the transmission is
locked in the ``park'' position.
    To minimize rollaway in vehicles equipped with transmissions with a
``park'' position, the standard specifies in S5.2.1 that the starting
system must prevent key removal unless the transmission or gear
selection control is locked in ``park'' or becomes locked in ``park''
as a direct result of key removal. The standard further specifies at
S5.2.2 that the vehicle must be designed such that the transmission or
gear selection control cannot move from the ``park'' position, unless
the key is in the starting system.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Exceptions (not relevant to this rulemaking) to these
requirements are specified at S5.2.3 Key removal override option and
S5.2.4 Gear selection control override option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FMVSS No. 114 includes a specific definition of ``key'': ``means a
physical device or an electronic code which, when inserted into the
starting system (by physical or electronic means), enables the vehicle
operator to activate the engine or motor.'' For purposes of FMVSS No.
114, ``key'' means both the traditional physical key and codes that are
electronically transmitted by a fob, plastic card, or a similar device.
The electronic code also includes numeric codes entered onto a keypad
inside the vehicle by the driver. The standard also includes a
definition of ``starting system'': ``means the vehicle system used in
conjunction with the key to activate the engine or motor.''
    While the new electronic keyless ignitions systems are currently
subject to FMVSS No. 114, NHTSA is aware of emerging safety issues that
we believe should be addressed by new requirements specific to these
systems.
    Keyless ignition systems, as they are commonly called, usually
consist of a device carried by the driver, which contains an electronic
code that grants access to the vehicle (allows the doors to unlock) and
the ignition system. The electronic code is transmitted to the
vehicle's starting system without physical contact with the vehicle,
other than its presence in the vehicle, and the driver is granted
access to start the vehicle's propulsion system, usually by pushing a
button or turning a rotary switch. Keyless ignition systems first
became available in luxury models but are now migrating to more popular
vehicles (for example, the 2011 Kia Sedona minivan has keyless entry
and ignition standard on the base model, with a manufacturer's
suggested retail price of $24,595). Implementation of keyless ignition
differs across models. Circular push buttons are most common, but there
are also rocker switches and rotary switches (similar to the familiar
ignition switch that is turned with a key). Among the push button
keyless ignition systems, there are differences in how these systems
turn on and shut off the propulsion system, both while the vehicle is
stationary (normal usage) and while moving (emergency situations).
There are also differences in alerts given to the driver by different
models if the driver does something unsafe while using the system, such
as not putting the transmission in ``park'' before shutting down the
engine, or leaving the vehicle while the propulsion system is still
active.

III. Safety Need for Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114

    In this section, we describe alleged incidents, and those that we
have investigated, resulting in crashes, injuries and fatalities,
involving vehicles with electronic keyless ignition systems. We also
describe how we believe such incidents may have occurred.
    The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is the office within
NHTSA responsible for conducting defect investigations and
administering safety recalls in support of NHTSA's mission to improve
safety on our nation's roadways. One important means by which ODI
discovers vehicle safety-related defects is self-reporting by vehicle
owners. By relating the information over a toll-free hotline number (1-
(888) 327-4236, TTY for the hearing impaired: 1-(800) 423-9153) or
filling out an on-line or paper questionnaire, the Vehicle Owner's

Questionnaire (VOQ), vehicle owners can provide complaint information
that is entered into NHTSA's ODI vehicle owner's complaint database.
This information is used with other complaints and information to
determine if a safety-related defect trend exists.
    Traditionally, the data NHTSA uses for rulemakings are from data
bases of police- or NHTSA-investigated crashes: the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS), the National Automotive Sampling System
Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS) and the National Automotive
Sampling System General Estimates System (NASS-GES). Today's discussion
is based on driver complaints to ODI through the VOQ because in this
case the crashes or incidents of interest either cannot be identified
from data elements available in those data bases (crashes involving a
vehicle speeding out of control, such as with a stuck accelerator
pedal) or they will not be present in those data bases in the first
place because they do not involve a motor vehicle in transport
(rollaways and carbon monoxide poisoning). The relatively new ``Not-In-
Traffic Surveillance'' (NiTS) data base was searched for these
incidents, but no keyless ignition vehicles were found. Keyless
ignition is an item of equipment that is still not widely used on
vehicles, constituting less than 10 percent of vehicles sold, so it is
not surprising that none of these vehicles are in the relatively new
NiTS.
    We recognize that there are many caveats to using VOQs as a data
source, among them are:
     The crashes are not randomly selected.
     VOQs are self-reported and for most there is no follow up
investigation as to what actually happened in the incident.
     There is no analysis of the root cause of the crash so we
cannot confirm if the type of ignition switch contributed to crash
causation.
     We have no information on other possible contributing
factors in these crashes.
     There may be many more incidents that were not reported to
NHTSA because the driver did not know how or where to make the
complaint.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ NASA ESC also observed this quality regarding the VOQ data,
``The available incident reporting databases are valuable for
identifying potential vehicle symptoms related to UA events.
However, voluntary reporting systems may not allow for accurate
quantitative estimates of incident rates or statistical trends.
``Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC)
Systems,'' National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, February
2011, page 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, an accumulation of VOQs from drivers stating a similar
problem with a particular vehicle system points to emerging safety
issues with new systems, which is what we are trying to document and
correct with this precautionary proposal in a manner that has very
little cost. We request comment on the use of vehicle owners complaints
as a basis of this proposal.

A. Inability To Stop a Moving Vehicle in a Panic Situation

    On August 28, 2009, there was a passenger car crash near San Diego,
California that resulted in the deaths of four people. The vehicle at
issue had a keyless electronic starting system, including a start/stop
control (a push button) on the front dashboard. This control would stop
the engine immediately when the vehicle was stationary, but the driver
needed to depress the ``stop'' control for as long as three seconds to
stop the engine when the vehicle was moving. NHTSA's Office of Defects
Investigation inspected this vehicle and crash site on September 3,
2009 and a report was filed on September 30, 2009.\5\ The investigator
noted the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Memorandum from Bill Collins (Investigator and Interviewer,
Vehicle Research and Test Center) to Kathleen DeMeter (Director,
Office of Defects Investigation), September 30, 2009, available at
http://www.odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/docservlet/Artemis/Public/Pursuits/2009/DP/INME-DP09001-37211P.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The vehicle was a loaned Lexus ES-350 traveling at a very
high rate of speed that did not stop at the end of Highway 125.
     The driver was a 19 year veteran of the California Highway
Patrol.
     The cause of the crash was ``very excessive speed.''
     The accelerator pedal had apparently been entrapped by the
all-weather floor mat that was not the correct mat for the vehicle.
     Among the ``other significant factors'' was:

    Push Button Ignition Start with no Emergency Instantaneous Shut
off Device--In the event that this vehicle was producing unwanted
power, there was no ignition key that could be mechanically actuated
to instantaneously disconnect electrical power to the engine. In
place of the key is a software push button that delays engine
shutdown for three seconds once depressed. This instruction is not
indicated on the dashboard.

    In July of 2007, another fatal crash occurred in California
involving a 2007 Toyota Camry equipped with keyless ignition
experiencing an unwanted acceleration which hit a Honda Accord, killing
its driver. This crash was investigated by Dynamic Science, Inc., under
contract to NHTSA's Special Crash Investigation Division. The report on
this crash notes,

    The driver reported that he attempted to turn off the vehicle by
pushing the power button several times. The vehicle was equipped
with a Smart Key system. In order to turn off the power while moving
at speed requires the driver to press and hold the power button down
for three seconds. The driver was unaware of this feature.\6\ \7\

    \6\ ``ODI Unintended Acceleration Investigation/Vehicle to
Vehicle'', Dynamic Science, Inc. Case Number: DS07035, 2007 Toyota
Camry, California, July 2007 available at http://www-nass.nhtsa.dot.gov/BIN/logon.exe/airmislogon by entering case number
DS07035.
    \7\ Reviewers of UA complaints during NHTSA's investigation of
Toyota UA incidents also noted the necessity of learning this new
procedure for shutting down the propulsion system with a keyless
ignition system. ``Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic
Throttle Control (ETC) Systems,'' National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, February 2011, page 51, section 2.7.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation has received complaints,
through the submission of Vehicle Owner's Questionnaires (VOQ) \8\
submitted to the agency, of similar situations in which the driver
attempted to shut down the propulsion system in a runaway vehicle with
keyless ignition. Two examples are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ To see the questionnaire form, go to https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ivoq/online.cfm.

    While driving the car on the Falmouth connector with the toll
booth in sight, I lifted my foot from the accelerator to decelerate
and suddenly the accelerator just took off. I immediately applied
the brake, but the car continued to try to accelerate, I then
applied both feet to the brake as I tried desperately to stop the
car while the front wheels were spinning and burning rubber. I tried
to shut down the ignition with the pushbutton on the gear shifter
and also desperately tried to move the gear shifter from drive but
could not. Neither the ignition button nor the gear shifter would
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
respond.

and

    The critical safety concern is noted as follows: * * *, I was
traveling with the cruise control active at 55 miles per hour. Upon
approaching a slower vehicle and checking traffic, I proceeded to
accelerate the vehicle in an attempt to quickly pass the vehicle
driving before me. Upon successful passage of the vehicle, I let off
the accelerator and pressed the brakes several times, but the
vehicle continued to accelerate under full power. Under the
conditions, I tried to quickly disrupt this safety critical issue.
To the best of my recollection I tried to slow the vehicle by
pushing the power button, manipulating the cruise control lever, and
putting the vehicle in neutral. All attempts were unsuccessful.

    We can conclude from these VOQs and others like them that:
     Drivers will attempt to stop a vehicle in a wide open
throttle event by using the engine stop control.
     Drivers expect the engine stop control to function the
same way every time it is used, regardless of the vehicle state,
stationary or moving.

     It is reasonable to link the driver's inability to shut
down the moving vehicle to the difference between the expectation of
how the control would work in this situation and the reality of how it
actually does function.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ This difference in function was also noted by NASA NESC,
``The keyless (push-button) ignition design can likewise have an
unintended consequence. Here, the concern was that the driver (or
passenger) might inadvertently turn off it the vehicle when it is in
motion. To prevent such an error, the safeguard was added that the
button must be held for three seconds to turn off the vehicle when
the vehicle is in motion. However, this procedure is certainly not
well practiced by drivers. Indeed, many owners are not even aware of
this `hold the button' requirement. In any case, the most common
behavior in an emergency situation is to revert to the well-learned,
oft-practiced, always-successful procedure: push the button briefly
to turn off the vehicle. However, this procedure fails in the off-
nominal situation, no matter how many times the driver executes it
in rapid succession.'' NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical
Assessment Report, ``Technical Support to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on the Reported Toyota Motor
Corporation (TMC) Unintended Acceleration (UA) Investigation,'' page
44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Rollaway--Leaving a Vehicle Not in ``Park''

    When shutting down a stationary vehicle (with a transmission with a
``park'' position) to leave it parked, the driver should first move the
gear selection control to ``park'' and then request propulsion system
shut down. Performing these actions in this order will ensure that the
vehicle is in ``park'' before the driver leaves the vehicle. In a
vehicle fitted with a traditional key and starting system, this
involves moving to ``park,'' turning the ignition switch to ``off'' and
removing the key. Due to a requirement in FMVSS No. 114, the driver
will not be able to remove the key if the gear selection control is not
in ``park'' unless it becomes locked in ``park'' as a direct result of
key removal. To prevent rollaway in the keyless ignition vehicle, the
gear selection control should be moved to ``park'' and then propulsion
system shut down should be requested via whatever type of switch is
used in the vehicle, most typically a push button. What we find drivers
are reporting is that they occasionally (often while distracted) push
the switch to shut down the engine without first moving the gear
selection control into ``park.'' \10\ If they then leave the vehicle in
this condition and it is on any kind of incline it can rollaway,
possibly causing injury or fatality to the driver or bystanders or
damage to surrounding property. In ODI's VOQ data base, we found six
complaints of rollaway and another three complaints in which the
drivers realized that the vehicle could have rolled in this condition,
but it did not. Below are two examples of rollaway incidents (quoted
exactly from the VOQ statement):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The vehicle complies with S5.2.1 of FMVSS No.114 because
the key is the electronic code and that code can remain in the
vehicle even if the physical device the driver carries is taken
outside the vehicle.

    I bought a used 2006 Audi A6 two months before the accident. I
had been using the ``keyless'' option when starting and stopping the
vehicle. I stopped at a library, pushed the button twice to turn off
the ignition and the vehicle's electrical system. I got out of the
vehicle and noticed that it was rolling forward. I attempted to stop
it; I opened the driver's door and as I was getting in the door
struck a trash can in the parking lot, knocking me down. The
vehicle's rear wheel caught my left heel and drug me across a curb
before stopping on my left foot. Several men in the parking lot
lifted the vehicle off my foot. I was transported to the hospital
and kept for injuries to my left leg. Evidently I failed to put the
vehicle's transmission in ``p'' and had left it in ``d''. Cars that
use a physical key to start and stop the vehicle will not allow a
driver to remove the key unless the vehicle's transmission has been
shifted to ``park.'' A vehicle that does not utilize a physical key,
does not have that built-in safety feature. Five weeks later I am in
physical therapy and am grateful I did not sustain more serious
injuries, or that an innocent bystander was not killed by a
driverless car rolling through a parking lot at a library that is
frequented by children. Now I am adamant about always setting the
emergency brake. My concern is real: as more and more vehicles are
manufactured with ``keyless'' ignition systems that contain no fail-
safe feature to prevent ``inadvertent rolling'' as explained in the
Audi's owner's manual, I believe more injuries and deaths will be
realized. In speaking with the regional representative at Audi, he
explained that Audi publishes a ``book'' explaining the vehicle and
what happened was totally my fault. My Audi has a sensor in the
passenger seat that prevents an expensive airbag from deploying
unnecessarily; how about a sensor in the driver's seat that prevents
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a vehicle from rolling when there is no driver?

and

    The contact owns a 2007 Toyota Avalon. The contact stated that
when the vehicle is shut off, there is no way to determine if the
vehicle is in park due to the keyless entry. She is able to exit the
vehicle with the gear shift indicator in the drive position. This
failure has caused the vehicle to roll away after she exits. The
dealer stated that the failure was dangerous and was unable to
perform the repair because the vehicle was designed in that manner.
The manufacturer also stated that there was nothing they could do
about the design.

C. Leaving the Vehicle With the Vehicle Propulsion System
Unintentionally Left Active

    There were four VOQs regarding carbon monoxide incidents with
keyless ignition vehicles in the past 10 years. Reviewing complaints
involving vehicles without a physical key for the propulsion system, we
note that drivers occasionally do not turn off the propulsion systems
on their vehicles after parking them. One possibility for this behavior
is that the driver may not immediately know that the propulsion system
has not been turned off. In the following self-reported cases (quoted
directly from the VOQs), the drivers only found that they did not turn
off the propulsion system because their in-house carbon monoxide
detectors were activated after an extended period of the vehicle
running in an attached garage:

    I arrived home after dinner, drove my 2007 Lexus LS460 (equipped
with keyless ignition) into my attached garage, closed the garage
door and, leaving the key fob inside the vehicle, I entered my home
and eventually went to sleep. I was awoken at approx. 2:15 a.m. by a
carbon monoxide alarm located in the foyer inside my home adjacent
to the entrance to the garage. I entered the garage to discover that
the car's engine was still running, the garage filled with noxious
fumes, and the entire vehicle extremely hot to touch, inside and
out. I opened the garage door and was eventually able to shut down
the engine and clear out the fumes. As I see it, the failure here
was two-fold: (1) When I opened my door to exit the car, no alarm or
other sound alerted me that the engine was still running, as is the
case with ignitions requiring keys.\11\ This is particularly
problematic because the car's engine runs in virtual silence; and
(2) even after the car was unwittingly left idling while in park,
the engine did not cut off after some predetermined period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ This statement by the vehicle owner is not correct for all
vehicles. As previously discussed, FMVSS No. 114 excludes the
situation of the running vehicle from the requirement to sound the
alert to the driver when the door has opened and the key is in the
ignition. However, some manufacturers do sound the alert when the
engine is running, so this driver's experience may have been with
those vehicles.

    The following incident was reported by the owner of another motor
vehicle manufacturer's product which happens to have a hybrid
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
propulsion system:

    Our garage is attached to our house with our bedroom above the
garage. With 3 kids, both my wife and I have been distracted leaving
the car in the garage to unload groceries or help the children. When
on electric power we have neglected to turn off the ignition since
the car is silent. Only when the carbon-monoxide detector sounded in
our garage did we realize the engine had started while we were in
the house. We think this could be deadly to other families without
carbon monoxide alarms who may also forget to turn off the engine
when parked in an attached garage while on electric power.

    Because the above two owners had carbon monoxide detectors in their
homes, they were alerted of the problem

in time to be able to shut down their vehicle propulsion systems.
Others, not as fortunate, may have died because of carbon monoxide
poisoning from their vehicles. For example, a September 1, 2010 article
in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel.com, reported that Palm Beach County
detectives were investigating whether a keyless ignition system on a
vehicle that was left running in a garage attached to a house could
have led to the death of a 29 year-old woman from carbon monoxide
poisoning. (A copy of this article taken from www.sun-sentinel.com is
placed in the docket cited in the heading of this notice.)

IV. Society of Automotive Engineers Effort in This Area

    In response to the above areas of safety concern and concern
regarding the myriad different ways manufacturers are implementing
keyless ignition features, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
created the Keyless Ignition Subcommittee as a subcommittee of the
Controls and Displays Committee, which has worked since early 2009 to
develop an SAE Recommended Practice (RP) to standardize the operation
of keyless ignition systems.\12\ The committee consisted of experts in
the study of how humans interact with machines (human factors experts)
and designers of keyless ignition systems from auto manufacturers and
suppliers. A NHTSA staff person attended the subcommittee meetings, but
did not participate in decision making. The resulting RP is based on
the subcommittee members' experience with their company's vehicles and
systems, knowledge of consumers' comments about the operation of the
systems, knowledge of human factors engineering and, in some cases,
knowledge of proprietary studies done during the development of their
products (actual data was not shared with the group). The RP applies to
all passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), and trucks
of 10,000 pounds GVWR and under, with automatic and manual
transmissions (some provisions apply only to vehicles with automatic
transmissions with a ``park'' position). The RP sets control actuation
requirements for starting and stopping stationary and moving vehicles,
and requirements in the form of visual or audible alerts to the driver
to address leaving the vehicle without putting it in ``park'' and
inadvertently leaving the engine running. NHTSA has used portions of
the SAE RP as a foundation for the requirements proposed and explained
in the next section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ SAE J2948-201101 ``Keyless Ignition Control Design,''
January 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to better address specific safety issues and to be more
enforceable, our proposal today differs from the SAE RP on several
points:
     The SAE RP has a range of 500msec-2sec for control
actuation to stop a moving vehicle, while we propose a 500 millisecond
control actuation for all stops regardless of whether the vehicle is
moving or stationary.
     The SAE RP has requirements for control actuation to start
the propulsion system, while we tentatively conclude that there is, at
this time, no safety benefit upon which this agency can regulate
propulsion system starting.
     The ``Not in Park'' alert required by the SAE RP sounds
upon door opening, but has no measureable attributes. The internal
audible alert we are proposing today sounds at 85dBA (500-3000 Hz) the
instant the driver requests engine shut down (in a stationary vehicle)
without the transmission in ``park'' and continues until the gear
selection control is moved to ``park''.
     The SAE RP requires an unspecified audible or visual
external alert if the vehicle is not in ``park'' and the key code
carrying device is not in the vehicle, while we are proposing an
external audible alert that sounds at 85dBA, 1 meter from the vehicle,
for 1 minute when the vehicle is stationary, the key code carrying
device leaves the vehicle, and the vehicle is not in ``park''.
     The SAE RP requires an unspecified audible alert if the
propulsion system is active and the driver's door is opened, while our
proposal is for an external audible alert at 85dBA, 1 meter from the
vehicle, for 1 second when the vehicle is stationary, the key code
carrying device leaves the vehicle, and the propulsion system is active
(either an internal combustion engine is running, or in the case of a
hybrid vehicle the propulsion system is in a state that the internal
combustion engine could engage when the electric power became depleted
over time).
    We seek comment on whether our deviations from the SAE RP are
appropriate for an FMVSS.
    NHTSA requested that human factors experts at the John A. Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center review the SAE RP to help us
make our proposal more specific in addressing the safety issues we have
noted in our VOQs. Their report has been placed in the docket for this
notice.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ ``Review of SAE RP J2948 JAN2011: Keyless Ignition Control
Design,'' John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
March 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. NHTSA Proposal

    In this section, we will describe how we propose to amend FMVSS No.
114 so that the safety issues described in Section III. Safety Need for
Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114 may be mitigated.
    Based in part on NHTSA's ODI VOQ data, we are proposing regulatory
text for addressing the following three types of safety related
problems: (1) The driver's inability to shut down a moving vehicle in
an emergency because the driver may be unfamiliar with the fact that
the shut-down process is different in a moving vehicle than in a
stopped vehicle. This situation may lead to a crash. (2) The
possibility that the driver will walk away from a vehicle which is not
locked in ``park'' because the driver is able to shut off the vehicle
propulsion system without first putting the transmission in ``park.''
This results in a greater likelihood that the vehicle will roll away on
its own. (3) The possibility that the driver will walk away from a
vehicle whose propulsion system has been unintentionally left active
(even though the driver may have placed the transmission in ``park.'').
If the vehicle is in an enclosed garage connected to living quarters,
this situation may result in carbon monoxide poisoning of persons in
the dwelling; if outdoors, this increases the possibility of vehicle
theft and a subsequent crash.
    As the earlier incidents related from the VOQs have shown, in many
ignition systems that don't use physical keys, the driver may not know
whether s/he has turned off the vehicle propulsion system.
    In this NPRM, NHTSA proposes additional requirements for vehicles
using keyless ignition systems because, unlike systems which use the
traditional physical key, the start/stop process on vehicles that use
electronic codes as keys are not standardized across manufacturers. In
particular, if a push-button type control is used, the amount of time
the start/stop control must be pressed differs not only among
manufacturers, but also on the same vehicle, depending on whether the
vehicle is started from a stopped position, stopped while the vehicle
is in motion, or whether the vehicle propulsion system is being turned
off while the vehicle is stopped. Standardization of controls teaches
drivers how the controls will operate and ensures that drivers'
expectations about those operations are met.
    The problem presented by the lack of standardization is exacerbated
by the fact that electronic keys lack many of the visual and tactile
cues about the

status of the vehicle's propulsion system that are available to drivers
when using traditional physical keys. In a system using the physical
key, the driver knows from the angle of the key in the ignition whether
the vehicle is in ``lock,'' ``accessory,'' ``start,'' or ``run.'' Also,
the key will not release from the ignition switch unless the
transmission is in ``park.'' The keyless ignition system provides no
such physical cues to the driver.
    The requirement for a visible indication of transmission position
comes from FMVSS No. 102, Transmission shift position sequence, starter
interlock, and transmission braking effect. S<IP_ADDRESS> requires that if
the transmission shift position sequence includes a ``park'' position,
identification of shift positions, including the positions in relation
to each other and the position selected, shall be displayed in view of
the driver whenever: (a) The ignition is in a position where
transmission can be shifted; or (b) the transmission is not in
``park.'' Despite this visual cue that the transmission is not in
``park'', some drivers of vehicles equipped with keyless ignition
systems, especially when distracted or unfamiliar with the operation of
the vehicle they are driving, leave their vehicles without ensuring the
transmission is in the ``park'' position. They do so because they do
not have the tactile cue of being unable to remove the key unless the
transmission or gear selection control is locked in ``park.'' \14\ Such
actions result in a risk that the vehicle will roll away of its own
accord.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ In keyless ignition vehicles, the ``key'' is the electronic
code transmitted from a device carried by the driver to the
vehicle's starting system. When the vehicle is not in ``park,'' this
key code remains in the vehicle, thus the vehicle conforms to the
requirement at 49 CFR 571.114 S5.2.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We note that the current title of Standard No. 114, ``Theft
protection and rollaway prevention,'' may be made outdated and not
inclusive if the proposals described in this notice were made final.
However, a title that is fully descriptive of all the purposes served
by the standard may be unwieldy. We seek comment on the need to update
the title and ask commenters to suggest a new title if they believe a
change would be necessary or beneficial.

A. New Definitions

    As mentioned in the Background section of this NPRM, FMVSS No. 114
already contains definitions for ``key'' and ``starting system'' which
are inclusive of systems that use electronic codes without a physical
key to allow the driver to start the vehicle. However, we are proposing
the addition of one definition specific to keyless ignition systems:

    Key code carrying device means a physical device which is
capable of electronically transmitting a key code to the vehicle
starting system without physical connection (other than its presence
in the vehicle) between the device and the vehicle.

    This key code carrying device is typically called a ``key fob'' by
consumers. It carries and transmits the electronic code to the vehicle
that gives the driver permission to start the vehicle. The electronic
code carried in the device is the ``key.'' The device is not the
``key.'' This new definition for key code carrying device is based on
that used in the SAE Recommended Practice discussed in Section IV
above.\15\ We propose adding ``without physical connection (other than
its presence in the vehicle) between the device and the vehicle,'' to
SAE's RP language to differentiate these devices from physical keys
which also carry a chip containing an electronic code as part of a
theft deterrent system. These physical keys must be inserted into the
ignition switch of the vehicle and the key is used to turn the switch.
Our proposed definition is intended to specifically exclude any key
which must be physically inserted into any part of the vehicle each
time the driver desires to start the propulsion system. If a key must
be inserted into the vehicle we consider it to be a physical key,
regardless of whether or not it also contains electronic components
which communicate with the vehicle intended to identify this particular
key as belonging to this particular vehicle (i.e., for theft prevention
purposes). Further, our proposed definition of key code carrying device
(KCCD) is not intended to exclude a device which otherwise would be a
KCCD simply because it occasionally must have physical contact with the
vehicle to recharge the battery in the KCCD or because the vehicle
manufacturer provides a place where the driver may insert the KCCD if
s/he chooses for the convenience of providing a place to keep the
device while driving. We note that the primary attraction of these
keyless systems appears to be that the driver need not handle a key to
access and start the vehicle. We seek comment on whether our proposed
definition is specific enough to (a) Exclude devices that we would
consider physical keys--they must be inserted to start the vehicle, and
(b) include devices which may be inserted to charge a battery or for
driver convenience, but do not need to be inserted for normal vehicle
operation. We request comment on how the definition of KCCD could be
improved to clarify these points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ SAE J2948-201101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At this time, we are not proposing to change our definition of
``key,'' which provides that for keyless ignition systems, the
electronic code, not the physical device carried by the driver, is the
key. We note that NHTSA's definition of the code as the key is long-
standing. It was first articulated in a letter to Mr. Stephen Selander
of General Motors in May of 1992.\16\ Further, in August of 2005 we
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which, among other things,
proposed the current definition of ``key.'' There were no comments
which disagreed with our definition of ``key'' with regard to keyless
ignition systems at that time and we finalized that rulemaking in April
of 2006.\17\ However, we acknowledge that consumers may think of the
key code carrying device as the key and that some manufacturers do
refer to this device as a key in their consumer literature, so there
may be some confusion on the part of consumers as to what is actually
the key. Therefore, we seek comment on whether we should revise our
definition of ``key'' and if so, what that definition should be and how
we should differentiate between the device the driver carries and the
code that actually allows the vehicle to start. Changing the definition
of ``key'' may change the interpretation of what it means for the key
to be removed from (S5.1.1) or inserted into the starting system
(S5.1.3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Letter from Paul Jackson Rice, Chief Counsel to Stephen E.
Selander, General Motors Corp, May 22, 1992.
    \17\ 71 FR 17752, April 7, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we are proposing to amend the definition of ``starting
system.'' At present, ``starting system'' is defined as: ``means the
vehicle system used in conjunction with the key to activate the engine
or motor.'' In this NPRM, we propose to amend the end of the ``starting
system'' definition to state: ``* * * activate the engine, motor, or
other system which provides propulsion to the motor vehicle.'' We are
proposing this clarification so that it is explicit that FMVSS No. 114
applies to any propulsion ``starting system'' available in motor
vehicles today, or at some point in the future.
    We are proposing to add a second definition, ``stop control means
the device used by the driver to deactivate the engine, motor, or other
system which provides propulsion to the motor

vehicle.'' In most vehicles available today, this control is a push
button switch, but this definition is not limited to push button
switches.

B. Standardizing Shutting Down a Moving Vehicle's Propulsion System

    As we have seen in the quoted VOQs, drivers recognize the need and
desirability of shutting down the engine in a moving vehicle when they
experience an event in which the acceleration of the vehicle does not
seem to be under their control. The VOQs also point out that drivers
are stymied in their efforts to shut down the engine in a moving
vehicle by the fact that when the vehicle is moving the shut down
procedure they are used to in every day operation does not work. To
remedy this safety issue, NHTSA proposes to standardize the length of
time the driver must press on a ``stop'' control in order to stop a
vehicle, whether moving or stationary. At S<IP_ADDRESS>(a), we propose that
for vehicles equipped with propulsion system stop controls that are
activated by the driver pressing on the control, the vehicle's
propulsion system must stop only after the control has been depressed
for more than 500 milliseconds. The 500 milliseconds time is based on
SAE Recommended Practice J2948 Keyless Ignition Control Design (January
2011). Five hundred milliseconds is the lowest time specified by the
Recommended Practice for engine shut down in a moving vehicle (the RP
has a range of 500 milliseconds to 2 seconds, NHTSA believes that
standardization is not achieved by allowing a window of operation).
    We are proposing to regulate only the operation of controls that
are pushed because we believe that this covers the great majority of
stop controls manufactured today (a circular push button) or
contemplated for the future (pressing or touching a portion of a
display screen). However, we note that other controls, such as rotary
knobs and rocker switches \18\ have been used in keyless ignition
systems in the past. We seek comment on what other controls are used or
contemplated and whether there is a safety need to regulate the
actuation of all types of stop controls (not just those that are
pushed) and how that might be accomplished. NHTSA seeks comment on
whether the language of S5.4 needs to be more specific as to the point
at which the 500 msec time begins and what that more specific language
would be. When offering suggestions, commenters should keep in mind
that there are several different types of switch designs currently
available and that could become available that would be subject to this
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ We noted that a rocker switch must be pressed and therefore
would be subject to the regulatory text proposed in this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA understands manufacturers implemented the practice of
designing keyless ignition systems to shut down differently while the
vehicle is moving than while stationary to help prevent inadvertent
propulsion system shut down, i.e. a situation in which the driver
reaches for a different control, accidentally bumps the engine off
control and as a result experiences an unintended, unexpected engine
shut down, which can create a hazardous situation. However, different
times for different modes of operation (for example, a light tap to
start or stop a parked vehicle and several seconds to turn the
propulsion system off while the vehicle is in motion) result in the
driver experiencing an unexpected result when using his accustomed tap
motion to request engine shut off (in a stationary vehicle). The
drivers' accustomed tap motion does not have the expected effect in a
moving vehicle in a panic situation. As previously discussed, this
safety issue was identified in the VOQs by and NASA NESC in its review
of UA incidents. NHTSA believes that requiring the driver to use the
same action to request engine shut down in all cases should result in
the safety benefit of drivers' ability to shut down a moving vehicle
without the necessity of knowing or remembering a separate motion. We
have chosen to propose the 500 millisecond control actuation time
believing it will be long enough to guard against inadvertent shut
down, while also short enough for drivers to tolerate for everyday
normal stationary shut down. We ask for comment on whether this time is
too long or too short and whether the danger of inadvertent shut down
is that much greater than that of an inability to shut the propulsion
system off in the event of a stuck throttle, engine fire, or other
emergency situation. Please provide data on this risk comparison. We
also believe that the instances of inadvertent shut down can be
mitigated by other means, such as better control or switch location,
which will not inadvertently get in the way of the driver's wrist, arm,
bracelet, or other foreseeable obstruction and ask for comment on this
facet of vehicle design.
    In our proposal, the time between when the control actuation starts
the shut down process (500 milliseconds) and the time the engine must
be stopped (1 second) allows for the signals to be sent and acted upon
by the vehicle to bring the engine to a stop. We seek comment on this
length of time and the problem of engine inertia working to keep the
engine running when the vehicle is moving. We propose that the test
procedures for compliance with this standard will be conducted on a
level surface.
    We have proposed a requirement that once the propulsion system of a
moving vehicle is shut down, any restart of the system must be
initiated by the driver by actuation of the engine start control. This
is to prevent automatic restart by any vehicle system, such as idle-
stop technology, when the driver has shut down the engine in an
emergency situation.
    In developing this NPRM, we considered whether to make all control
actuations the same, 500 millisecond hold for starting and stopping the
engine under any condition, to emphasize to the driver that this
control functions the same under all conditions. However, we understand
that drivers are so anxious to get started as soon as possible that
they would not tolerate a wait time as long as 500 milliseconds to
start the engine. We have seen examples of vehicles in which the
manufacturers have designed their systems such that if the driver
``taps'' the start control (as little as 60 milliseconds) the vehicle
will start. After careful consideration, we have tentatively decided
that requiring all stops to be the same accomplishes the goal of
standardizing the propulsion stop function without inconveniencing
drivers in the start mode and that there is little additional safety
benefit to be gained by regulating the starting of the propulsion
system. However we note that more time spent in the starting up process
would provide more time for systems like a rearview camera system to
boot up and begin functioning before rearward movement begins. We ask
for comment on this tentative decision.
    In S<IP_ADDRESS>(b), we are not proposing to allow auto-shift to
``neutral'' in lieu of engine shut down because we believe, based on
the VOQ data, that when drivers actuate the engine ``off'' control or
switch, they expect the engine to shut off. An engine which continues
to run could confuse the driver and cause unwanted actions by the
driver. We are aware that some manufacturers currently do shift the
transmission to ``neutral'' when the driver requests engine shut down
while the vehicle is moving. These manufacturers believe that if the
engine is shut down while the vehicle is moving, the driver's ability
to control the vehicle will be hampered by the resulting loss of power
steering and power braking. In the same vein, we are

not requiring auto-shift to ``neutral'' because, in addition to the
issue of driver expectation, we know requiring this feature would
require all vehicles to be fitted with electronic transmissions and
this would be extremely costly. We note that drivers have dealt with
this loss of control when shutting down conventionally keyed vehicles
for many years. If we were to determine that loss of power control when
shutting down the propulsion system of a moving vehicle is a safety
concern, we believe we would need to address that safety issue for all
vehicles, not just those fitted with keyless ignitions.
    We ask for comment on whether the safety problem associated with
loss of power assist to braking and steering is greater than the safety
risk of the driver believing that s/he has requested the engine to shut
down and has instead experienced an unexpected action by the vehicle.
If we were persuaded by comments to the NPRM on this issue that
allowing auto-shift to ``neutral'' is a countermeasure that meets the
need for safety, the regulatory language proposed today would be
altered so that S<IP_ADDRESS>(b) would read ``The propulsion system must
shut off, or remove motive power from the drive wheels, within 1 second
after the control has been depressed for more than 500 milliseconds.''
The phrase ``or remove motive power from the drive wheels,'' is not
part of the current proposal. We also note that we have seen examples
where the manufacturer has chosen not to allow the vehicle's propulsion
system to shut down at all while the vehicle is moving. If today's
proposal is made final, these systems would not be allowed. We note
that as early as 1997 we voiced our concern about the fact that such
systems would not meet driver's expectations.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Letter to a redacted party from John Womack, Acting Chief
Counsel, January 30, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also considered allowing a vehicle to enter a ``limp home''
mode instead of shutting down the propulsion system when shut down is
requested in a moving vehicle. Such an operating mode would allow the
driver to finish his or her trip at some reduced maximum allowable
throttle output, rather than requiring the driver to pull over to the
side of the road (encumbered with the loss of power assist to braking
and steering) as would be the case with full engine shut down. While
this mode has the advantage of allowing the driver to continue his or
her trip, it has all the disadvantages of the auto-shift to neutral
listed above. It is also uncertain whether whatever vehicle malfunction
was causing the excessive throttle condition to which the driver was
initially responding (by requesting shut down) would also affect the
``limp home'' mode. For these reasons, we have tentatively decided not
to allow this mode of operation, but we ask for comment on whether any
manufacturer is currently using such a ``limp home'' mode when
propulsion shut down is requested in a moving vehicle and what are the
possible advantages and disadvantages of such an operating mode.
    Finally, we note that SAE J2948 specifies stop conditions at
S<IP_ADDRESS>., '' Stop Conditions Met.'' Among other matters, S<IP_ADDRESS>
states that the vehicle shall also exit the run mode after multiple
actuations (defined at S3.7.3 as two or three actuations in a row) of
the keyless ignition control system. We do not believe that NHTSA needs
to include this requirement in our proposal since we believe that
standardizing propulsion control shut down to a 500 msec hold obviates
the likelihood that the driver will attempt to shut down the propulsion
system using multiple short presses. We believe this has happened in
current vehicles because the ``everyday'' shut down procedure is a
momentary press of the control and the driver uses that momentary press
in the moving condition also. When it does not work, s/he tries it
again. S/he is not intentionally pressing multiple times because s/he
knows the shut down procedure is different while the vehicle is moving,
s/he's just repeating what s/he thought should work.\20\ If today's
proposal were made final, the driver will experience no need for
multiple control actuations; the propulsion system will have
deactivated within the time period that the driver expects from normal
use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See footnote 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Audible Warning When Key Is in the Starting System and Driver Opens
the Door

    At present, S5.1.3 of FMVSS No. 114 specifies that an audible
warning must be activated when the key is in the ignition system and
the door closest to the driver's designated seating position is opened.
There are three exceptions to this requirement: (a) After the key has
been inserted into the starting system, and before the driver takes
further action; (b) if the key is in the starting system in a manner or
position that allows the engine or motor to be started or to continue
operating; or (c) for mechanical keys and starting systems, after the
key has been withdrawn to a position from which it may not be turned.
    In this NPRM, we propose to limit the exclusion at S5.1.3(b) to
vehicles with mechanical keys and starting systems. The original logic
of S5.1.3(b) (i.e., applying to motor vehicles with all types of keys
and starting systems) was that if the engine were running, then the
driver must have intentionally left the key behind. However, with
keyless ignition systems, it is not obvious to the driver that s/he has
left the ``key'' (the electronic code) behind and also it may not be
obvious that the engine or other propulsion system is running.
    Therefore, if this NPRM were made final, on vehicles with
electronic keyless ignition systems, when the ``key'' is left in the
starting system in a manner or position that allows the engine, motor
or other propulsion system to be started or to continue operating, the
audible warning currently excluded by S5.1.3(b) must be activated when
.the driver's door is opened. S5.1.3 does not specify the volume or
duration of this audible warning. Many manufacturers currently choose
to sound this alarm regardless of whether they use a physical or
electronic key in the vehicle.

D. Audible Warning To Prevent Rollaway

    In this NPRM at S5.4.2 Warnings to driver exiting a vehicle with
the gear selection control not in ``park'' for vehicles equipped with a
``park'' position, we propose two new audible alerts of no less than 85
dBa between 500-3000 Hz. The first, S<IP_ADDRESS>, must sound if propulsion
shut down is requested, the gear selection control is not in ``park,''
and the vehicle is moving at less than 15 km/h (9.3 miles per hour). We
propose that the alert must continue until the gear selection control
is placed in ``park.'' The gear selection control must be able to be
moved to the ``park'' position without having to restart the propulsion
system.
    We are proposing a loud audible warning as opposed to allowing the
manufacturer a choice between an audible or visual warning (as allowed
by the SAE RP) for two reasons. First, FMVSS No. 114 currently requires
an audible warning as discussed above, so drivers are accustomed to
this type of warning. Secondly, we believe that a visual alert, such as
a written or pictographic message to the driver in the message center
of the dashboard (currently used in some vehicles), is too easily
ignored by the driver. The alert must be loud to guarantee a driver's
response to this very dangerous situation. The sound level proposed, 85

dBA between 500-3000 Hz, comes from the threshold- warning alert
required in FMVSS No. 403, Platform lift systems for motor vehicles. We
seek comment on whether the test method proposed today in S6.3.1 is the
best method to measure the sound level and whether the sound level is
too loud or not loud enough (for this requirement and all other sound
levels proposed in this NPRM).
    The test procedure proposed at S6.3.1 uses the height of a seated
50th percentile male dummy to establish the height at which sound
levels are measured. The proposal is that the sound be measured 740 mm
above the driver's seat. This height was derived from the fact that the
seated height of the 50th percentile male dummy (to the top of the
head) is 909mm and the shoulder height is 565mm above the seat. The
midpoint of the difference between those two distances is 740mm.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ 909--[(909--565)/2] = 737mm, rounded up is 740mm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An alternative to this loud warning sound could be an audible voice
command telling the driver exactly what is wrong (for example,
``Danger. Not in `park'.'') and how to remedy the situation (``Move
gear selection control to `park'''). This solution may be more helpful
to the driver, but we do not know if most vehicles currently have the
capability for voice commands or if such capability could be added at
very low cost. We know that such artificial human voice alerts have
been used in some vehicles in the past to alert drivers and passengers
to potentially harmful conditions, e.g. ``door ajar'' or ``turn off
headlights.'' We have the following questions regarding this
alternative form of alert:
     Is a voice command preferable to an unspecified loud
audible warning?
     How loud should such a voice alert be?
     Should a voice alert be required to be in English?
     Should it be required to be able to be programmed to the
driver's choice of language?
     Should NHTSA specify the exact words to be used and if so
what should those words be?
     Are most vehicle manufacturers capable of providing such a
voice alert and at what cost?
    We propose to use the phrase ``the vehicle is moving at less than
15 km/h'' in lieu of ``the vehicle is stationary.'' We believe that
most currently available wheel speed sensors are not capable of
determining speeds of 0. The 15 km/h figure is also that referenced in
the final rule establishing the electronic stability control
system.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See 66 FR 17236, at 17264, April 6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second alert, at S<IP_ADDRESS>, must sound outside the vehicle if
the driver does not respond to the internal alarm and continues to exit
the vehicle without placing the transmission in ``park.'' We propose to
determine that the driver has left the vehicle by requiring the vehicle
to sense the absence of the KCCD. The proposed regulatory text is:

    When tested in accordance with S6.3.2, an audible alert of no
less than 85dBA between 500-3000 Hz, measured outside the vehicle,
must sound when the door located closest to the driver's designated
seating position is opened while the gear selection control is not
in ``park'', the vehicle is moving at less than 15 km/h (9.3 mph),
and the key code carrying device is not present in the vehicle. This
alert must sound for 1 minute or until the gear selection control is
moved to ``park,'' whichever occurs first. This alert is not
required to sound if the transmission becomes locked in ``park'' as
a direct result of key removal upon door opening, or upon removal of
the key code carrying device from the vehicle.

    We seek comment on the ways in which vehicles manufactured today
sense the absence of the key code carrying device. If the system does
not already incorporate such a sensor, what would be the cost to add
it? We realize that sensing the presence or absence of the KCCD is not
an ideal substitute for sensing the presence or absence of the driver,
for a number of reasons, primarily that the driver may not take the
KCCD with him or her, in which case the warning will not sound and the
vehicle will be left in an unsafe condition--vulnerable to rollaway and
theft. (Sensing the absence of the KCCD is the approach used in SAE
J2948.) The driver may be especially likely to leave the KCCD in the
vehicle when the vehicle is in his or her own garage or driveway. As
explained in the next section, we also seek comment on whether a one-
second audible warning to the driver leaving a vehicle with the
propulsion system operating sufficiently reduces this risk.
    One way of sensing the driver's presence is to do it directly, such
as is done for the right front passenger for the purpose of determining
whether or not to deploy an air bag in a crash. However, we do not
believe that most, if any, manufacturers currently have such sensors in
the driver's position. We estimate that adding some sort of sensor to
indicate the driver has left the vehicle would cost between $4 per
vehicle for a seat belt sensor, and $12 per vehicle for a weight sensor
in the driver's seat. We request comment on how such sensors might be
used to indicate the presence or absence of the driver, the accuracy of
our cost estimate, and whether this cost is commensurate with the
safety risk we are attempting to reduce.
    The sound level required, again 85 dBA between 500-3000 Hz, is
measured at 1580mm \23\ above the ground, one meter from the vehicle
(S6.3.3). We also propose that the alarm discontinue after one minute
(or until the gear selection control has been moved to ``park''), as
after that time, we believe the alarm has been ignored by the driver
and will be ignored by any bystanders. We seek comment on the duration
of the alarm, on whether the alarm should be continuous, and on the
test method proposed at S6.3.2. We also seek comment on whether such an
alarm requirement can be readily confused with the antitheft alarm
system that is already standard on many passenger motor vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ As with the previous discussion this height is based on the
height of the 50th percentile male dummy. The height to the top of
the standing dummy's head is 1750mm. Subtracting the same 172mm as
above leaves 1578mm which we round up to 1580mm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Audible Warning To Reduce Chances of Drivers' Leaving a Vehicle With
the Propulsion System Active

    In S5.5 Warning to driver exiting a vehicle with the propulsion
system operating, we propose to require an audible alert to sound
outside the vehicle if the propulsion system is running, or is capable
of starting without reintroduction of the electronic key code into the
starting system, the door closest to the driver's designated seating
position is opened, and the KCCD is not in the vehicle.
    This is a proposed countermeasure for those cases in which a driver
is unaware that s/he has inadvertently left the vehicle running. We are
proposing an alert time of one second because a person walking at an
average pace of three miles per hour will cover three feet in less than
one second. After that time and distance, we assume that the driver has
left the vehicle running intentionally, either because someone else is
in the vehicle, to facilitate vehicle repair, or for some other reason.
The alert would sound for one second (rather than one minute, as the
alert for leaving the vehicle not in ``park'' would sound), because
leaving the vehicle with the propulsion system on is more commonly
intentional on the part of the driver, and less immediately risky to
bystanders. If it sounds for longer than a second, the alert would also
tend to

annoy bystanders and serve no purpose. However, we seek comment on
whether one second is long enough for an alert that the driver has left
the vehicle with the propulsion system active.
    We recognize that there is a competition between our desire to
alert the driver to the fact that s/he has inadvertently left the
vehicle with the propulsion system active and the potential to create a
nuisance alert when the driver has left the vehicle running
intentionally. Most of these potential nuisance situations will be
alleviated if the driver takes the KCCD with him or her. We also
recognize that there are occasions when a driver may leave the vehicle
running while a passenger remains in the vehicle. The required alert
then becomes a nuisance to the passenger, but this is very brief--one
second. We seek comment on whether this warning would be necessary if
the manufacturer could determine that seating positions other than the
driver's are occupied. We know that most vehicles are capable of
determining if the right front passenger position is occupied for
purposes of complying with FMVSS No. 208, Occupant protection. Would
manufacturers value the ability to reduce passenger annoyance equal to
the cost of adding software to prevent this alarm if the seat were
occupied, if given the option?
    As with the above section on the ``not in park'' alerts we seek
comment on whether simulated voice alerts containing a warning (such as
``Propulsion system active'') and how to remedy the situation (e.g.
``Turn off propulsion system'') would be an effective alternative to
the proposed alert and if manufacturers are capable of installing this
type of alert and at what cost.
    We also recognize that this requirement will not have the intended
result of preventing vehicle theft or death due to carbon monoxide
poisoning if the driver does not take the KCCD from the vehicle. A
driver may be especially prone to leave the KCCD in the vehicle when
the vehicle is locked in the garage at home. This is another reason
that we are seeking comment on the availability and cost of sensors
that would indicate the presence or absence of the driver as discussed
in the last section.
    As will be explained later, we considered requiring the engine to
shut down after a specified period of time, however, there are many
situations in which a driver intends to leave some electrical system or
the engine in the vehicle running without his or her presence. An
example is leaving a passenger with heat or air conditioning on while
the driver runs an errand, or keeping the engine running to prevent the
inability to restart the engine in a very cold climate. After reviewing
many possible scenarios and careful consideration, we decided we could
not propose a time period for shut down that would cover all possible
reasons consumers would want to leave the propulsion system running in
their absence from the vehicle.

F. Owner's Manual Required Language

    In order to ensure that drivers who are so inclined have access to
information on how the propulsion system in their vehicles operates,
normally, and in the event of an emergency, in this NPRM at S5.6, we
are proposing to require that manufacturers place in the vehicle's
owner's manual, instructions regarding the operation of the control(s)
that stops and starts the propulsion system. This proposed language
would provide a warning that power assist to steering and braking will
be lost in the event the propulsion system is shut down while the
vehicle is in motion. We are also proposing that there must be an
explanation of how to handle the vehicle safely in the event power
assist to steering and braking is lost.
    NHTSA has reviewed the available owner's manuals for many
manufacturers. As a practical matter, we are not aware of any
manufacturer whose manual does not already address this critical safety
situation. The proposed language at S5.6 will ensure that this language
will continue to be maintained. Nothing in this proposed language
should dissuade a manufacturer from adding additional information, if
it believes the information would help a driver safely handle the
vehicle in the event of an emergency.
    We note that NHTSA's proposed language in the owner's manual, if
made final, would be a ``collection of information'' as defined by the
Office of Management and Budget at 5 CFR 1320 Controlling Paperwork
Burdens on the Public. In this NPRM, we seek public comment on this
proposed collection of information. A full description of this proposed
collection of information is provided in Section IX Rulemaking Analyses
and Notices.
    Since we believe that very few drivers actually read the owner's
manual, we request comment on whether this proposed requirement (and
hence the collection of information) is actually necessary and if
manufacturers will continue to provide the instructions for these
controls regardless of any requirement by NHTSA to do so.

VI. Other Issues Considered by NHTSA

    In the following sections, we will discuss additional measures,
other than those mentioned above that we have taken under consideration
to address the safety issues raised in this NPRM. We have considered
whether each of these measures would meet the need for safety in both
keyless ignition systems and systems using the traditional physical
key. We are not proposing regulatory text for the following measures
and explain why we are not doing so. However, we seek comment on each
of them and may adopt provisions relating to one or more of them in the
final rule, if it can be demonstrated that they can be incorporated by
manufacturers at little cost. Further, nothing in this rulemaking
should be construed as prohibitions against manufacturers from
voluntarily incorporating these systems in the passenger motor vehicles
they manufacture.

A. Propulsion System Kill Switch in Plain View of the Driver

    NHTSA considered whether to require a kill switch in plain view of
the driver that would stop the propulsion system in the event of an
emergency. Preferably, this switch would be an eye-catching color, such
as red, and would be readily accessible on the instrument panel or
other obvious location. Such a switch would, ideally, be used for all
stops, not just emergency stops, so that drivers would learn the
function and correct use of the switch. For example NHTSA requires such
a switch for motorcycles.\24\ Boats, personal water craft, and
construction equipment and power tools also have such switches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ FMVSS No. 123 Motorcycle controls and displays, at S5.1.
states: ``Each motorcycle shall be equipped with a supplemental
engine stop control, located and operable as specified in Table 1.''
Table 1 specifies that this control must be located on the right
handlebar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has not proposed regulatory text that would require this kill
switch in passenger motor vehicles. Requiring the separate switch would
mean adding new equipment to the passenger motor vehicle at issue, thus
adding expense to the vehicle and possibly requiring a significant
amount of lead time to implement. We cannot at this time determine
whether such a switch would be easier for drivers to understand and use
in an emergency than a stop control that meets the requirements we are
proposing today. We seek comment and data on whether a stand alone stop
control would be safer than the combined start/stop control in use now,

if the stop control function complied with our proposal.

B. Stepping on Brake Before Starting the Propulsion System

    In thinking about the risks associated with today's keyless
ignition systems, NHTSA considered whether we should propose requiring
that the driver must first step on the service brake before the
propulsion system can be started. This feature is currently available
in some vehicles. It addresses the situation in which an unattended
child left in a vehicle could play with power windows or other
electrical system features to which s/he could have access by actuating
a control that works with a simple touch, even in the absence of the
KCCD. NHTSA has not proposed regulatory text for this requirement
because we cannot estimate this risk at this time.
    We also note that on September 1, 2010, the requirement in FMVSS
No. 114 for a brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) took effect.
The requirement was mandated by Congress and implemented into FMVSS No.
114 by rulemaking.\25\ The new S5.3 Brake transmission shift interlock
states as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ 75 FR 15621, March 30, 2010.

    Each motor vehicle manufactured on or after September 1, 2010
with a GVWR of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less with an
automatic transmission that includes a ``park'' position shall be
equipped with a system that requires the service brake to be
depressed before the transmission can be shifted out of ``park.''
This system shall function in any starting system key position in
which the transmission can be shifted out of ``park.'' This section
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
does not apply to trailers or motorcycles.

    This S5.3 requirement is intended to prevent children from being
able to shift the transmission out of ``park'' even if the physical key
is in the ignition. We believe it also will minimize sudden
acceleration by brake/accelerator misapplication because the driver
must have his foot on the brake before the vehicle can be shifted out
of ``park.'' It would then take a conscious decision to remove the foot
from the brake, and then onto the accelerator, before the vehicle can
be set in motion.
    A new requirement that the driver must step on the service brake
before the propulsion system can be started would extend the length of
time the driver's foot must be on the brake (i.e., because the foot
must be on the brake before the propulsion system can be started and
then when the driver takes the vehicle out of ``park.'') S5.1.4
specifies that the vehicle must be in ``park'' before the key can be
removed, so the stopped vehicle should always begin in the ``park''
position. The vehicle can only move when the vehicle is taken out of
``park.'' This is when the driver must step on the brake, before s/he
makes a conscious decision to move, forward or in reverse.

C. Specified Actuation Time for the Propulsion System Start Control

    As mentioned above, we considered whether to propose specifying,
for electronic key systems, the amount of time that the driver must
press on the ``start'' control in order to start the vehicle. We were
considering a 500 millisecond time period (the same as the time period
we are proposing to shut down the propulsion system). This would
indicate to the driver that pushing the control for the same period of
time (500 milliseconds) would actuate both stopping and starting, i.e.,
that the control works the same way at all times. However, NHTSA
understands that some manufacturers have received complaints from their
customers regarding a perceived lengthy start time (such as 500
milliseconds). To satisfy such drivers, some vehicle manufacturers have
designed their vehicles to start at a mere tap on the ``start''
control, which could be as little as 60 milliseconds.
    After carefully considering this issue and the safety issue that
would be addressed by such a requirement, NHTSA has decided not to
propose regulatory text to specify the length of time the ``start''
control must be depressed to start the vehicle. We are not aware of any
safety issues resulting from a ``start'' control that has to be pushed
for either a too short (e.g., less than 60 millisecond) or a too long
(e.g., more than two second) period of time.
    We have also considered the fact that when the vehicle is started,
the transmission position should presumably still be in ``park.''
Therefore, even if a sudden start of the vehicle propulsion system
should startle the driver, the vehicle should not move. Due to the
brake transmission shift interlock requirement specified at S5.3, the
driver would then need to depress the service brake in order to shift
the transmission out of the ``park'' position to commence driving. The
driver decides when to commence driving.

D. Automatic Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a Stationary Vehicle

    When examining possible countermeasures for the situation in which
a driver walks away from a vehicle with its propulsion system active,
thereby increasing the risk of theft or carbon monoxide poisoning,
NHTSA considered a requirement for an automatic shut-off feature
applied to vehicles fitted with electronic key code systems. We are
aware that some manufacturers already provide this feature on their
passenger motor vehicles. Such manufacturers have determined on their
own the appropriate range of time (15 minutes to half an hour or
longer) after which the vehicle propulsion system is automatically shut
off. We are also aware that some systems that allow the vehicle to be
started from a remote location rather than from inside the vehicle
(``remote start'') have this feature as well--if the driver does not
enter the vehicle after a certain amount of time after having remotely
started the vehicle, the propulsion system will shut off.
    NHTSA is not proposing regulatory text to require these automatic
shut off systems. We have been unable to conclude that there is a
specified period of time after which the propulsion system should be
shut down to effectively address various scenarios mentioned in VOQs
submitted to the agency. There are scenarios, such as leaving pets in
the vehicle with the air conditioning or heating system on while the
driver shops or is at a restaurant, where an automatic shut off of the
propulsion system would have adverse results. It is our understanding
that some drivers may stay in their vehicles for hours, for example, to
sleep, with the air conditioning or heating system on. For the pet
owner or the person staying in the vehicle for an extended period, it
would be inconvenient if the propulsion system had to be restarted
every 15 minutes or so.
    As earlier noted, a consumer submitted a VOQ reporting a carbon
monoxide build up situation where the driver parked the vehicle in the
garage without turning off the engine, and locked the garage, but left
the key fob, or key code carrying device, in the vehicle. Some
propulsion systems that automatically shut off do so after they sense
that the KCCD has been removed from the interior of the vehicle. In the
situation reported in the VOQ, the automatic system would not have shut
off the propulsion system because it continued to sense the presence of
the KCCD in the vehicle interior.
    We believe that the new alert that we are proposing would refocus
the driver's attention on the vehicle when s/he is leaving if s/he has
inadvertently left the propulsion system active. For these reasons, we
tentatively conclude that we do not need to regulate vehicle propulsion
automatic shut off systems at

this time, however, we request comment on this issue.

E. Preventing Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a Stationary Vehicle
not in ``Park''

    We have reviewed vehicles with keyless ignition systems in
situations where the driver has forgotten to place the gear selection
control in ``park'' before shutting down the propulsion system and
leaving the vehicle. As a countermeasure to rollaway incidents in such
situations, we have considered whether preventing the propulsion system
from shutting down unless the gear selection control is in ``park''
would meet the need for safety. Some manufacturers already provide this
feature on their passenger motor vehicles. We considered requiring this
feature, but have tentatively decided that the internal and external
alerts that we are proposing are more appropriate because they alert
the driver to the situation rather than masking it (i.e., not only may
the driver not realize the gear selection control is not in ``park'',
s/he may not realize that the propulsion system has not shut down).
This proposed remedy is simpler and more direct and reinforces the
message that a driver must put the gear selection control in ``park''
before requesting propulsion system shut down, just as the inability to
remove a traditional key from the ignition if the gear selection
control was not in ``park'' does. We also believe that a strategy of
not shutting down a vehicle that is not in ``park'' may contribute to
an increased risk of carbon monoxide poisoning if a driver walks away
from a vehicle in this condition. We seek comment on why manufacturers
who choose to implement this strategy have done so and what are the
perceived benefits. What would be the cost to implement such a
strategy? If we were to require such a strategy, should it be instead
of, or in addition to, the proposed internal and external alarms?

VII. Additional Questions

    NHTSA requests comment on the following questions:
    1. Is there any safety benefit to keyless ignition (separate from
keyless entry) systems over the traditional physical key that is used
to turn a rotary switch? Are there cost or weight savings? If there are
no safety benefits to these new systems over the traditional key, do
their convenience advantages outweigh the new safety risks we are
seeing in VOQ submissions?
    2. What would be the effects--safety or otherwise--of requiring
vehicles to have an ignition system that uses a physical key inserted
by the driver, in other words, doing away with current ignition systems
that are activated by electronic key codes and touching some sort of
switch?
    3. Will vehicles with propulsion stop systems that meet the new
FMVSS No. 114 requirements proposed in this notice somehow interfere
with the functioning of anti-theft systems (immobilizers) that are part
of vehicle antitheft systems available today? \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ We are aware that Canadian Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
No. 114 requires the use of immobilizers and that many manufacturers
equip some or all of the U.S. market vehicles with immobilizers that
meet the requirements of CMVSS 114 to sell the same vehicles in both
the U.S. and Canada. We do not want to add requirements to FMVSS No.
114 that would prevent this practice unnecessarily.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Benefits, Costs and Proposed Lead Time

Benefits
    We believe that the benefits of the new requirements proposed
today, while not yet quantifiable, would be a reduction in the risk
that drivers will misuse these new keyless ignition systems and
therefore a reduction in:
     Crashes, injuries and deaths resulting from a driver's
inability to shut down a moving vehicle,
     Rollaway incidents and their accompanying crashes,
injuries, and deaths, and
     Incidents of carbon monoxide poisoning due to drivers
inadvertently leaving a vehicle running or with its propulsion system
active in an enclosed space, such as a garage underneath or adjoining a
home.
    Although the current information indicates a clear safety problem,
it is difficult to quantify the benefits. However, we believe the
potential risks justify the costs of this rule. Given that we believe
the total costs of this proposal would be relatively small, certainly
less than $500,000 a year, for the entire industry, preventing even one
serious injury over three years would make the proposed rule cost-
beneficial.
    We believe that taking precautionary steps now, before these non-
standardized systems become more widely available, would be beneficial
to vehicle safety. The availability of these systems increases every
model year. For example, for the 11 manufacturers for which we have
data, production of models with any type of keyless ignition (as
standard or optional equipment) increased from 5,000 vehicles in model
year 2002 to over 1.2 million vehicles in model year 2008. For models
equipped with push button controls as standard or optional equipment,
production increased from 5,000 vehicles in model year 2002 to over 1.1
million vehicles in model year 2008. We believe a benefit would accrue
from establishing consistent experience for the users across all
vehicles. This simplifies the operation of these systems for drivers,
reducing the stress and confusion relating to fundamental differences
in how one operates a vehicle. This is especially important in vehicles
that provide less obvious cues as to the state of the engine and the
starting system. We believe the countermeasures we have proposed can
reasonably be expected to have their intended effect based on similar
requirements already in place in FMVSS No. 114 and other standards and
in common automotive practice. For example, the warning to drivers to
take their key with them when they leave the vehicle (currently in
FMVSS No. 114) and the threshold warning device for platform lifts
(currently in FMVSS No. 403) are effective alerts. We see no reason why
the new alerts proposed here should be less effective. The common
automotive practice of the rotating ignition switch combined with a
physical key has standardized engine shut down procedure before the
advent of the new electronic convenience controls. We believe
standardizing the operation of these new controls, combined with the
new alerts, will have the same effect. We believe these new
requirements are especially worthwhile considering what we believe to
be minimal costs to implement them. We seek comments on this
understanding of the benefit of the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 114.
Costs
    The countermeasure for driver confusion over how to shut down a
moving vehicle is to require that the switch that turns off the
propulsion system work consistently, whether the vehicle is moving or
not. In the vehicles that are in production today and are fitted with
keyless ignition systems, the great majority have push-button type
switches. Some require a momentary tap, some require longer hold times,
and some use different times to affect different functions. From our
knowledge of the operation of current designs, we believe that our
proposed 500 millisecond hold time is well within the functional range
of the switches currently in use. The only change necessary, in most
cases, would be in the lines of software coding for the system operated
by button. Thus, we believe there would be little incremental cost for
changing the behavior of the keyless ignition control. There would be
costs associated with testing the new

software for correct operation. Those costs would be minimized by the
lead time we are proposing below. This lead time would allow changes to
be made between and not during model years.
    We are proposing to require one new internal driver alert and two
new external driver alerts. Some models already use some version of
these alerts and other alerts are already required by FMVSS No. 114. In
most cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound
generating systems to engage under the right circumstances. For this
reason, we believe the warning cues proposed here have very little cost
associated with their implementation.
    Because the incremental cost for equipping every vehicle in the
fleet would be very small, it follows that regardless of the number of
vehicles needing a countermeasure, the cost to equip the entire fleet
would be similarly small.
    We seek comment on our tentative conclusions regarding the costs to
manufacturers to implement the changes proposed today.
Proposed Lead Time
    If the proposed changes in this NPRM are made final, NHTSA proposes
a lead time of two years from the next September 1 after a final rule
is published in the Federal Register. This means, for example, if a
final rule were published on September 2, 2012, the final rule would
take effect on September 1, 2015. We believe that this lead time gives
vehicle manufacturers ample time to implement the new requirements at
minimal cost, especially given that we believe the required changes
would be minimal. Manufacturers are already making changes to
accommodate the SAE RP. The changes we are proposing today would be
minimal changes from that RP. Comments are requested on this proposed
lead time.
    We are not proposing a phased-in lead time because we believe that
the changes we propose today are relatively minor and can be
implemented in a two-year period. We tentatively conclude that a
phased-in lead time would be an unnecessary complication that would
increase cost to the manufacturers and to the agency due to the need to
keep track of which vehicle lines are subject to compliance in a given
model year. The percentage of vehicles now using keyless ignition and
the number of model lines is so small that we believe the proposed
changes can be made in the proposed two year lead time without phase
in.\27\ We seek comment on our tentative conclusion that a phased-in
lead time is not necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ The most recent information we have for a full year of
production and sales indicates that the 2008 model year production
of vehicles with keyless ignition standard or optional was 1,212,355
vehicles while the 2008 calendar year sales of all vehicles was
13,194,741 vehicles. Therefore, we believe the current sales level
of keyless ignition vehicles is less than ten percent of the total
U.S. sales.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Orders 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    The agency has considered the impacts of this rulemaking action
under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and the Department of
Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR 11034;
February 26, 1979). This proposal has been deemed ``non-significant''
by the Office of Management and Budget. This NPRM includes the
following proposed changes to FMVSS No. 114: Establishing a
standardized time for pushing a control to stop the vehicle propulsion
system and several new warnings to the driver; requesting propulsion
system shut down without first moving the gear selection control to the
``park'' position (for vehicles with a ``park'' position), exiting a
vehicle with the gear selection control not in ``park'' (for vehicles
with a ``park'' position), and exiting a vehicle with the propulsion
system operating.
    None of these proposed changes would require the addition of new
systems or equipment on existing vehicles. The first proposed change,
standardizing the time to push a control to stop the vehicle propulsion
system, could be accomplished by reconfiguring lines of software coding
for the system operated by the control. The costs involved in
reconfiguring the software are minimal. For the proposed driver alerts
(one new internal driver alert and two new external alerts), in most
cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound generating
systems to engage under the right circumstances. For these reasons, we
have tentatively concluded that the warning cues proposed in this NPRM
have little cost associated with their implementation.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions).
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency
certifies that the rule would not have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities. The SBREFA amended the
Regulatory Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a
statement of the factual basis for certifying that a rule will not have
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
    NHTSA has considered the effects of this rulemaking action under
the Regulatory Flexibility Act. According to 13 CFR 121.201, the Small
Business Administration's size standards regulations used to define
small business concerns, manufacturers of passenger vehicles would fall
under North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) No. 336111,
Automobile Manufacturing, which has a size standard of 1,000 employees
or fewer. Using the size standard of 1,000 employees or fewer, NHTSA
estimates that there are a limited number of small business
manufacturers of passenger vehicles subject to the proposed
requirements. These small U.S. businesses, which include Tesla,
manufacture specialty passenger cars which serve niche markets.
    I hereby certify that this proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The basis for this certification is that as earlier stated, if made
final, none of these proposed changes would require the addition of new
systems or equipment on existing vehicles, and would result in minimal
costs to all businesses, small and large. The first proposed change,
standardizing the time to push a control to stop the vehicle propulsion
system, would incur minimal costs resulting from reconfiguring lines of
software coding for the system operated by the control. All the
proposed driver alerts can rely on the existing systems that are
already required by FMVSS No. 114 or used for other purposes. In most
cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound generating
systems to engage under the right circumstances.

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    NHTSA has examined today's NPRM pursuant to Executive Order 13132
(64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional
consultation with States, local governments or their representatives is
mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that
the rulemaking would not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement. The final rule would not have
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
    NHTSA rules can preempt in two ways. First, the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision:

    When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe
or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if
the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this
chapter.

    49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1).
    It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-
identical State legislative and administrative law addressing the same
aspect of performance.
    The express preemption provision described above is subject to a
savings clause under which ``[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from
liability at common law.'' 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) Pursuant to this
provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle
manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express
preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme
Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied
preemption of such State common law tort causes of action by virtue of
NHTSA's rules, even if not expressly preempted. This second way that
NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon there being an actual
conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would
effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone
obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer,
notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard.
Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum
standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose
a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be
preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist--for
example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum
standard--the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly
preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
    Pursuant to Executive Order 13132 and 12988, NHTSA has considered
whether this rule could or should preempt State common law causes of
action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the
preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that
preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.
    To this end, the agency has examined the nature (e.g., the language
and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of today's rule
and finds that this rule, like many NHTSA rules, prescribes only a
minimum safety standard. As such, NHTSA does not intend that this rule
preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard
on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by today's rule.
Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not
conflict with the minimum standard announced here. Without any
conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common
law tort cause of action. Nevertheless, we solicit the comments of the
States and other interested parties on this assessment of issues
relevant to E.O. 13132.

National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this NPRM for the purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that implementation
of this action would not have any significant impact on the quality of
the human environment.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Before a Federal agency can collect certain information from the
public, it must receive approval from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, a person is
not required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal
agency unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number.
Before seeking OMB approval, Federal agencies must publish a document
in the Federal Register providing a 60-day public comment period and
otherwise consult with members of the public and affected agencies
concerning each proposed collection of information. In this NPRM, we
are proposing a revision to an existing OMB approved collection, OMB
Clearance No. 2127-0541, Consolidated Justification of Owner's Manual
Requirements for Motor Vehicles and Equipment, for which we are
soliciting public comment.
    Title: Consolidated Justification of Owner's Manual Requirements
for Motor Vehicles and Equipment.
    OMB Control Number and Expiration Date: OMB Control No. 2127-0541,
approved through May 31, 2012.
    Type of Request: Revision of a currently approved collection.
    Abstract: In this NPRM, at S5.6 Owner's manual required language,
we are proposing that manufacturers must place in the vehicle owner's
manual, instructions regarding the operation of the control(s) that
stops and starts the propulsion system. This language (which the
manufacturers would provide) must contain a warning that power assist
to steering and braking will be lost in the event the propulsion system
is shut down while the vehicle is in motion. There must also be an
explanation of how to handle the vehicle safely in the event power
assist to steering and braking is lost.
    If this proposed S5.6 language (in FMVSS No. 114) is made final, we
will submit a request for OMB clearance of the proposed collection of
information in time to obtain clearance prior to the effective date of
the final rule.
    Description of the likely respondents--Manufacturers of passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and multipurpose
passenger vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less. NHTSA estimates
that there are a total of 21 such manufacturers.
    Estimated total annual reporting and recordkeeping burden of the
proposed collection of information--The total estimated annual burden
(counting all respondents) is estimated at 21 hours. This breaks down
to an estimated one hour per manufacturer to write the information to
be provided in the owner's manual. 21 times one hour each results in 21
estimated burden hours for report preparation. Because the information
to be provided is of a very general nature, NHTSA does not believe that
manufacturers must provide separate explanations for each vehicle line
or model they produce regarding how to handle a vehicle in the event of
an emergency.
    There are no proposed recordkeeping requirements associated with
this collection of information.
    Estimated total annual costs of the proposed collection of
information--

NHTSA believes all manufacturers already have the engineering staff on
hand needed to write the description, which they will accomplish in the
regular performance of their duties. The additional few pages in an
owner's manual (or, especially, information on a CD ROM) will result in
minimal additional costs. NHTSA notes that it is not aware of any
manufacturer that is not already providing this information in the
vehicle owner's manuals. Therefore, NHTSA believes the cost of
complying would be $0.
    Comments are invited on: (i) Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of
the agency, including whether the information will have practical
utility; (ii) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of
the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions; (iii) How to enhance the quality, utility,
and clarity of the information to be collected; and (iv) How to
minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are
to respond, including the use of appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses.
    Please provide comments on this proposed collection of information
by the comment due date cited in the DATES section of this NPRM, and
please reference the docket number cited in the heading of this notice
in your comments. Any of the means of comment described in the
ADDRESSES section of this NPRM may be used.

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), ``all Federal agencies and departments shall
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means
to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies
and departments.'' For today's NPRM, NHTSA has relied on an SAE
Recommended Practice, J2948 Keyless Ignition Control Design (January
2011) for guidance.

Executive Order 12988

    With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation,
section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform'' (61 FR
4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies
the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing
Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for
affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction;
(4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately
defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting
clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the
Attorney General. This document is consistent with that requirement.
    Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes as follows.
    The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O.
13132. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that
individuals submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other
administrative proceeding before they may file suit in court.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to
result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995 this is $141.23 million
in 2009 dollars). This NPRM, if made final, would not result in
expenditures by State, local or tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector in excess of $141.23 million annually.

Executive Order 13045

    Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997) applies to any
rule that: (1) Is determined to be ``economically significant'' as
defined under E.O. 12866, and (2) concerns an environmental, health, or
safety risk that NHTSA has reason to believe may have a
disproportionate effect on children. This rulemaking is not subject to
the Executive Order because it is not economically significant as
defined in E.O. 12866. However, since this NPRM, if made final, would
make more explicit how the stop control on electronic keyless coded
vehicles are to be actuated, and would provide warnings to the driver,
it should have a beneficial safety effect on children riding in such
vehicles.

Executive Order 13211

    Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 18, 2001) applies to any
rulemaking that: (1) Is determined to be economically significant as
defined under E.O. 12866, and is likely to have a significantly adverse
effect on the supply of, distribution of, or use of energy; or (2) that
is designated by the Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action. This rulemaking is
not subject to E.O. 13211.

Plain Language

    Executive Order 12866 requires each agency to write all rules in
plain language. Application of the principles of plain language
includes consideration of the following questions:
     Have we organized the material to suit the public's needs?
     Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated?
     Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that
isn't clear?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections,
use of headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand?
     Would more (but shorter) sections be better?
     Could we improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or
diagrams?
     What else could we do to make the rule easier to
understand?
    If you have any responses to these questions, please include them
in your comments on this proposal.

Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78).

X. Public Participation

How do I prepare and submit comments?

    Your comments must be written and in English. To ensure that your
comments are correctly filed in the Docket, please include the docket

number of this document in your comments.
    Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21).
We established this limit to encourage you to write your primary
comments in a concise fashion. However, you may attach necessary
additional documents to your comments. There is no limit on the length
of the attachments.
    Comments may also be submitted to the docket electronically by
logging onto the Federal Docket Management System Web site at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
    Please note that pursuant to the Data Quality Act, in order for
substantive data to be relied upon and used by the agency, it must meet
the information quality standards set forth in the OMB and DOT Data
Quality Act guidelines. Accordingly, we encourage you to consult the
guidelines in preparing your comments. OMB's guidelines may be accessed
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/reproducible.html. DOT's
guidelines may be accessed at http://www.bts.gov/programs/statistical_policy_and_research/data_quality_guidelines/html/introduction.html.

How can I be sure that my comments were received?

    If you wish Docket Management to notify you upon its receipt of
your comments, enclose a self-addressed, stamped postcard in the
envelope containing your comments. Upon receiving your comments, Docket
Management will return the postcard by mail.

How do I submit confidential business information?

    If you wish to submit any information under a claim of
confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete
submission, including the information you claim to be confidential
business information, to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given
above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition, you should
submit a copy, from which you have deleted the claimed confidential
business information, to the docket at the address given above under
ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed to be
confidential business information, you should include a cover letter
setting forth the information specified in our confidential business
information regulation. (49 CFR part 512.)

Will the agency consider late comments?

    We will consider all comments received before the close of business
on the comment closing date indicated above under DATES. To the extent
possible, we will also consider comments that the docket receives after
that date. If the docket receives a comment too late for us to consider
in developing a final rule (assuming that one is issued), we will
consider that comment as an informal suggestion for future rulemaking
action.

How can I read the comments submitted by other people?

    You may read the comments received by the docket at the address
given above under ADDRESSES. The hours of the docket are indicated
above in the same location. You may also see the comments on the
Internet. To read the comments on the Internet, go to  http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for accessing the
dockets.
    Please note that even after the comment closing date, we will
continue to file relevant information in the docket as it becomes
available. Further, some people may submit late comments. Accordingly,
we recommend that you periodically check the Docket for new material.
You can arrange with the docket to be notified when others file
comments in the docket. See www.regulations.gov for more information.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, and Tires.

    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA proposes to amend 49 CFR
Part 571 as set forth below.

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

    1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117 and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

    2. Section 571.114 is amended by:
    a. revising S1.;
    b. revising S2.;
    c. revising in S4, the definition of ``Key'';
    d. adding, in S4, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Key
code carrying device'', ``Starting system'' and ``Stop control'';