operator would be forced to abort flight at the straight up time. Also,
the rules for allowing vehicles to enter gates are too subjective and
not easily tied to specific hazards.
    Part 431, applicable to RLVs, does not impose specific flight abort
rules. However, Sec.  431.39(a) requires an applicant to submit mission
rules and contingency abort plans that ensure safe conduct of mission
operations during nominal and non-nominal vehicle flight. These would
encompass flight abort rules because Sec.  401.5 defines contingency
abort as the cessation of

vehicle flight during ascent or descent in a manner that does not
jeopardize public health and safety and the safety of property, in
accordance with mission rules and procedures. Part 431 requires flight
abort when needed to mitigate risk and a set of rules to that end, yet
does so without following part 417's more detailed and prescriptive
approach. In practice, orbital rockets licensed under part 431 have
used an AFSS with flight abort rules that are conservatively consistent
with the six scenarios identified in 417.113(d), when applicable (e.g.,
no straight-up time for a horizontal launch).
    Section 450.165(c) lays out the proposed consolidation and
clarification of flight abort rules. Although the FAA would maintain
much of Sec.  417.113(d)'s structure and requirements, the FAA looked
for opportunities to replace prescriptive requirements with outcome
objectives. The FAA would require operators to develop flight abort
rules to comply with the public safety criteria of Sec.  450.101, as
well as to prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting
in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful
mission. Operators would also need to identify the functions of any
flight abort crew, as specifically required in part 417. This is also
consistent with the FAA's practice in implementing part 431. Although
not specifically stated in Sec.  431.39(a), the FAA has required
operators to identify crew functions. The FAA proposes to eliminate the
straight-up rule, as it is not reasonable to include the rule at the
exclusion of other existing mitigation options. Also, the FAA proposes
to simplify the current requirements for gate passage to allow a
vehicle to pass through a gate if it can achieve a useful mission. This
would allow the operator to specify which vehicle parameters are the
most useful for determining whether a vehicle should be allowed to
enter a gate. For orbital launches, vehicles unable to achieve orbit
cannot achieve a useful mission and should be terminated. The FAA would
delete separate requirements for hold-and-resume gates, as analysis
should show which types of gates are most effective for the proposed
flight, and those should be implemented.
    These proposed rules, which would be similar to those from part
417, were chosen over the generic requirement for mission rules from
part 431 because they correspond to other sections in the proposed rule
describing flight safety limits, gates, and other requirements. This is
consistent with the ARC's recommendation to change part 431 to better
capture the intent of the flight abort rules. An operator should
balance potentially competing objectives as necessary to minimize risk
when writing specific flight abort rules. For example, if there is a
rule to destruct a vehicle to prevent an intact impact in order to
reduce distant focused overpressure risk, the operator should also
consider the resulting risk to aircraft when establishing the timing of
the destruct action.
    Proposed Sec.  450.165(d) lays out the application requirements for
flight safety rules. For flight commit criteria, the FAA would require
an applicant to provide a list of all flight commit criteria. These
would include any criteria related to surveillance, monitoring of
meteorological conditions, implementation of launch or reentry windows
closures for the purpose of collision avoidance, confirmation that any
safety-critical system is ready for flight, monitoring of safety-
critical systems prior to enabling re-entry flight, and any other
hazard controls. For flight abort rules, the FAA would require an
applicant to provide a description of each rule, and the parameters
that will be used to evaluate each rule, as well as a list that
identifies the rules necessary for compliance with each requirement in
Sec.  450.101. All conditions in which flight abort action would be
taken must be described, as well as rules and conditions allowing
flight to continue past a gate. Lastly, the FAA would require an
applicant to provide a description of the vehicle data that will be
available to evaluate flight abort rules across the range of normal and
malfunctioning flight. This information is necessary to ensure that
compliance with the flight abort rules is achievable.
11. Tracking
    The FAA proposes to adopt vehicle tracking requirements.
Specifically, proposed Sec.  450.167 (Tracking) would require an
operator to measure and record in real time the position and velocity
of the vehicle. The system used to track the vehicle would be required
to provide data to determine the actual impact locations of all stages
and components, and to obtain vehicle performance data for comparison
with the preflight performance predictions. The proposed requirements
would be consistent with current practice for a wide variety of
vehicles, including the widespread use of telemetry data, and various
requirements of parts 417, 431, and 437.
    Current regulations for ELVs require a vehicle tracking system as
part of the FSS. For example, in Sec.  417.113(c), as part of the
flight commit criteria for a launch that uses an FSS, readiness for
flight includes that the launch vehicle tracking system has no less
than two tracking sources prior to lift-off. Also, the launch vehicle
tracking system must have no less than one verified tracking source at
all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital launch, to
the end of powered flight for a suborbital launch. Of course, the need
for tracking is implicit in other requirements for launch of a vehicle
with an FSS, including the requirements regarding data loss flight
times in Sec.  417.219.
    Section Sec.  417.125 also requires an operator of an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle to track the flight of its vehicle.
Specifically, Sec.  417.125(f) requires an operator to provide data to
determine the actual impact locations of all stages and components, to
verify the effectiveness of a launch operator's wind weighting safety
system, and to obtain rocket performance data for comparison with the
preflight performance predictions.
    Part 431 has no explicit requirements related to tracking. However,
currently every operation licensed under part 431 is required to employ
a telemetry system that provides, among other safety critical
information, data on the position and velocity of the vehicle in real-
time. In addition, the one orbital RLV operation licensed to date
employed an FSS and established data loss flight times. The use of data
loss flight times is an explicit recognition that a vehicle without
tracking poses a potential hazard to the public.
    Tracking is also required under Experimental Permit regulations.
Under Sec.  437.67, an operator must, during permitted flight, measure
in real-time the position and velocity of its reusable suborbital
rocket. The requirements for an operator to measure in real time the
position and velocity of its rocket, coupled with the requirement to
communicate with ATC during all phases of flight, are intended (among
other things) to provide ATC with enough information to protect the
public if the vehicle flies outside its planned trajectory envelope.
    Tracking data sufficient to identify the location of any vehicle
impacts following an unplanned event are necessary to ensure a proper
response to an emergency. Specifically, a launch operator must
implement its mishap response plan if an unplanned event occurring
during the flight of a launch vehicle results in the impact of a launch
vehicle, its payload or any component thereof outside designated impact
limit lines for an expendable launch vehicle; and, for an RLV, outside
a designated landing site. More generally, vehicle-

tracking data provide a level of awareness that enables an appropriate
response to an off-nominal situation, such as knowing where to apply
fire suppression resources or where to evacuate the public to protect
against predicted toxic plumes. More specifically, tracking data are an
important element of current U.S. Government consensus standards, in
accordance with RCC 321, to ensure the safety of people in aircraft.
Specifically, since 2007, RCC 321 has included a requirement (in
paragraph 3.3.4) to coordinate with the FAA to ensure timely
notification of any expected air traffic hazard associated with range
activities. In the event of a mishap, RCC 321 requires that the
operator must immediately inform the FAA of the volume and duration of
airspace where an aircraft hazard is predicted.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ Range Commanders Council, Common Risk Criteria for
National Test Ranges, RCC 321-07, White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Tracking data are also necessary to evaluate vehicle safety
performance, even for normal flight. For example, Sec.  417.125(g)(3)
requires a launch operator of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle to
compare the actual and predicted nominal performance (i.e., trajectory)
of the vehicle. Accurate data to describe the vehicle normal trajectory
envelope are necessary for valid quantitative public risk assessments.
    Current practice demonstrates that tracking data will help
facilitate safe and efficient integration of launch and reentry
operations into the NAS. The increasingly congested and constrained NAS
creates a need to transition from segregation, to full integration of
space vehicles. The FAA has several efforts underway to ensure the safe
and efficient transition of launch and reentry vehicles through the
NAS, while minimizing the effects of these operations on other users of
the NAS. The FAA has contemplated the need to obtain real time data
tracking data, including vehicle state vectors, reports of mission
events, and indications of vehicle status, to help accomplish this.
However, the FAA is deferring that discussion until after the Airspace
Access Priorities ARC.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ Information regarding the Airspace Access Priorities ARC
is available at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/3443.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  450.167(a) would require an operator to measure and
record in real time the position and velocity of the vehicle. The
system used to track the vehicle would need to provide data to
determine the actual impact locations of all stages and components, and
to obtain vehicle performance data for comparison with the preflight
performance predictions. The proposed requirements are consistent with
current practice for a wide variety of vehicles, including the
widespread use of telemetry data, and various requirements levied under
parts 417, 431, and 437.
    Proposed Sec.  450.167(a) would consolidate and standardize the
current regulatory requirements for vehicle tracking-related
information. Vehicle-tracking data facilitate appropriate emergency
responses, and an ability to determine the actual vehicle impact
locations due to an unplanned event is critical to evaluate the class
of mishap. Comparison of the actual vehicle safety performance, such as
the trajectory, with preflight predictions helps ensure the continued
accuracy of the FSA input, and thus the validity of the public risk
assessments and hazard areas. A comparison of the actual vehicle safety
performance data to predict performance provides the FAA with a means
to evaluate an operator's understanding of its safety margins, which is
a measure of maturity of the operation and thus a potential factor in
the probability of failure analysis.
    Proposed Sec.  450.167(b) would require an applicant to identify
and describe each method or system used to meet the tracking
requirements of proposed Sec.  450.167(a) of this section. Because the
proposed requirements are consistent with current practice, and in some
cases less restrictive, the application requirements would not increase
burden on license applicants.
12. Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements
    The FAA proposes to modernize the launch and reentry collision
avoidance analysis criteria to match current common practice and
provide better protection for inhabitable and active orbiting objects.
It would also allow launch and reentry operators to obtain a launch
collision avoidance analysis from Federal entities identified by the
FAA. Previously, the FAA established identical rules for expendable
launches from Federal and non-Federal launch ranges, RLV operations,
and permitted launch operations. The proposed rule would consolidate
launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis requirements from these
three different parts into a single safety rule.
    The FAA anticipates that proposed changes to the collision
avoidance analysis criteria would not significantly affect operators.
The changes would capture current practice, provide alternative means
of meeting existing requirements, and clarify the time period that the
analysis must address.
    Launch and reentry collision avoidance measures are necessary
actions for responsible and safe launches and reentries. Under current
regulations, a launch collision avoidance analysis is performed prior
to each launch to protect against collision with only inhabitable
objects, including the International Space Station, as required
screening objects. It is important to avoid collisions during launches
because the energy released through an impact during launch would most
likely be catastrophic for the launch vehicle and the object it
impacted.
    In addition to mission assurance, to ensure the successful launch
of an object, there are significant reasons to mitigate debris creation
through collision avoidance. Launch collision avoidance analysis occurs
prior to launch and entails the determination of times when a launch
should not be initiated. There is a balance between launch
opportunities and orbital safety that must be established to protect
both the launch vehicle and on-orbit objects. Reentry collision
avoidance analysis occurs prior to the initiation of a reentry maneuver
and provides for the review of the maneuver trajectory to establish
when reentry should not be initiated. Section 431.43(c)(1)(ii)
documents the requirement for reentry collision avoidance.
    The creation of orbital debris is an expected result of a collision
during launch or reentry.\133\ As stated earlier, limiting orbital
debris is a vital part of protecting the space environment and is a
national objective. Therefore, the FAA believes it is paramount to
avoid all collisions during launch and reentry. The Department of
Defense created a tiered level of separation distance to avoid
collisions and still allow ample opportunity for launch. The FAA agrees
with the tiers, identified in the chart below. This chart excludes the
object launching or reentering, which would be damaged or destroyed in
all cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ Orbital debris is all human-generated debris in Earth
orbit that is greater than 5 mm in any dimension. This includes, but
is not limited to, payloads that can no longer perform their
mission, rocket bodies and other hardware (e.g., bolt fragments and
covers) left in orbit as a result of normal launch and operational
activities, and fragmentation debris produced by failure or
collision. Gases and liquids in free state are not considered
orbital debris.

                                              Figure 2--Launch Collision Avoidance Justifications and Tiers
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                U.S. national
                                      Separation        Protect public                            security or        International       Avoid debris
                                       distance        health and safety  Safety of property    foreign policy        obligations         generation
                                                                                interests
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inhabitable Objects.............  200 km............  Yes...............  Yes...............  Yes...............  Yes...............  Yes.
Active Satellites...............  25 km.............  ..................  Yes...............  Yes...............  Yes...............  Yes.
Trackable Debris >10 cm\2\ (LEO)  2.5 km............  ..................  ..................  Yes, if it creates  Yes, if it creates  Yes.
                                                                                significant         significant
                                                                                debris.             debris.
Un-trackable Debris <10 cm \2\    Not applicable....  ..................  ..................  ..................  ..................  Protect with
 (LEO).                                                                                shielding &
                                                                                design.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With space becoming more congested every year, it is vitally
important for launch or reentry collision avoidance to extend beyond
inhabitable objects to include all active orbiting objects and
trackable orbital debris. Records from a recent Intelsat launch showed
that if the launch occurred 35 minutes into the 2-hour launch window,
the launch vehicle could have passed by a defunct but still orbiting
COSMOS navigation satellite by only 600 meters. The FAA believes not
proposing launch collision avoidance in this instance is unnecessarily
hazardous.
    Sections 417.107(e), 417.231, and 437.65 require launch operators
to ensure that the launch vehicle does not pass closer than 200 km
(approximately 124 statute miles) to a manned or mannable orbital
object to avoid collisions during launch. A collision avoidance
analysis must be obtained through a Federal entity. The analysis must
be used to determine any launch holds to avoid potential collisions.
    In Sec.  417.107(e), a launch operator must ensure that a launch
vehicle, any jettisoned component, and its payload do not pass closer
than 200 km to a manned or mannable orbital object throughout a sub-
orbital launch, and for an orbital launch, during ascent to initial
orbital insertion and through at least one complete orbit, and during
each subsequent orbital maneuver or burn from initial park orbit, or
direct ascent to a higher or interplanetary orbit, or until clear of
all manned or mannable objects, whichever occurs first. A launch
operator is also required under Sec.  417.107(e) to obtain a collision
avoidance analysis for each launch from United States Strategic Command
or from a Federal launch range having an approved launch site safety
assessment. The detailed requirements for obtaining a collision
avoidance analysis are found in Sec.  417.231 and section A417.31 of
appendix A to part 417. The results of the collision avoidance analysis
must be used to develop flight commit criteria for collision avoidance
as required by Sec.  417.113(c).
    These requirements and processes for ascertaining launch collision
avoidance are unnecessarily complicated and are inconsistent with the
current practices executed at Federal launch ranges that provides an
equivalent level of safety. The current practice is to use a common
analysis time frame instead of a single orbit as identified in the
current regulations. The safety standard for the standoff distance of
200 km remains consistent throughout launch (and reentry) requirements
for launches of expendable and reusable launch vehicles and for
launches from both Federal launch ranges as well as non-Federal launch
sites.
    Section 417.231 requires a launch operator to include in its flight
safety analysis a collision avoidance analysis that (1) establishes
each launch wait in a planned launch window during which a launch
operator must not initiate a flight in order to protect any manned or
mannable orbiting object, and (2) accounts for uncertainties associated
with launch vehicle performance and timing and ensures that any
calculated launch waits incorporate additional time periods associated
with such uncertainties. It also requires the launch operator to
implement any launch waits into its flight commit criteria under Sec.
417.113(c) to ensure that the operator's launch vehicle, any jettisoned
components, and its payload do not pass closer than 200 km to a manned
or mannable orbiting object during ascent to initial orbital insertion
through one complete orbit. Further, under Sec.  417.231 no collision
avoidance analysis is required if the maximum altitude attainable,
using an optimized trajectory, assuming 3-sigma maximum performance, by
a launch operator's unguided suborbital launch vehicle is less than the
altitude of the lowest manned or mannable orbiting object. Appendices
A, section A417.31, and C, section C417.11, of part 417 provide
constraints for performing the collision avoidance analysis as part of
the flight safety analysis required by Sec.  417.231. Section 437.65
establishes the minimum required altitude as 150 km, which is the
current standard practice.
    Section 431.43(c)(1) and (3) also requires a collision avoidance
analysis for RLVs to be performed to maintain at least a 200 km
separation from any inhabitable orbiting object during launch and
reentry. It requires the analysis to address closures in a planned
launch window for ascent to outer space for an orbital RLV to initial
orbit through at least one complete orbit; for reentry, the reentry
trajectory; and expansions for the closure period. For reentry of
vehicles not part of a reusable system, Sec.  435.33 refers to part
431, subpart C, including Sec.  431.43(c)(1) as a requirement.
    Appendix A to part 415 contains a worksheet for the data input for
launch. However, Appendix A to part 415 is a U.S. Space Command form
that is no longer in use.\134\ The current practice is to submit the
launch collision avoidance analysis data prior to launch in a form and
manner accepted by the Administrator, which is currently the R-15
launch plan worksheet. The data collected on the R-15 launch plan
worksheet are detailed in sections A417.31 and C417.11 and are used by
the agency performing the launch collision avoidance analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ The U.S. Space Command was deactivated in 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of issues are unclear or outdated under section A417.31.
In section A417.31(c)(8), the option to use an ellipsoidal screening
method does not identify the size of the ellipsoid required. Section
A417.31(b)(3) limits an operator to use collision avoidance analysis
(COLA) products to 12 hours from when ``manned'' objects were last
tracked. This information is not provided to launch or reentry
operators and therefore is not implemented in the current practices.
Section A417.31(b)(4) and (c)(7) also includes two expansions of window
closures. The first expansion is for every 90 minutes, a 15 second
buffer should be added before and after the provided window closures,
and the second is a 10-minute addition to the screening time. Neither
of these practices are currently implemented at Federal launch ranges
or non-Federal launch sites.
    With proposed Sec.  450.169 and appendix A to part 450, the FAA
would align the collision avoidance analysis

criteria with current practice and provide better protection for
inhabitable and active orbiting objects. The FAA also proposes to allow
a launch operator to obtain a collision avoidance analysis from a
Federal entity identified by the FAA. The proposed changes balance
increased options and additional requirements and would allow more
flexibility and accuracy in avoiding collision with orbiting objects.
    The FAA also proposes to remove appendix A to part 415 in its
entirety because the Launch Notification Form is no longer used by the
FAA or launch operators. The data is currently collected via the R-15
work sheet and associated trajectory files and is detailed in sections
A417.31 and C417.11. Sections A417.31 and C417.11 would be replaced
with appendix A to part 450, which would contain the Collision Analysis
Worksheet information requirements and captures current practice.
    The FAA proposes a few format and editorial changes in the
collision avoidance requirements of proposed Sec.  450.169. First, the
proposal would refer to ``inhabitable'' rather than ``manned or
mannable'' objects for greater simplicity and ease of understanding.
Similarly, the proposal would refer to ``separation distances'' rather
than ``miss distances,'' as this terminology is more accurate and
better connotes the FAA's goal of maintaining a safe separation of
objects on orbit. Finally, the proposal would refer to ``window
closures'' for launch and reentry rather than ``waits'' in a launch or
reentry window to provide a more cogent and accurate description. These
updated terms would have the same meaning as the terms they
replace.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ The FAA recognizes reentry windows as a number of discrete
or short duration windows during which a reentry may be commanded.
Past experience shows window closures are insignificant for reentry.
The safety requirements for launch or reentry window management are
intended to be equitable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Substantively, the FAA proposes to consolidate the launch and
reentry collision avoidance analysis requirements into proposed Sec.
450.169. Proposed Sec.  450.169(a) would require, for orbital or
suborbital launch or reentry, an operator to establish any window
closures needed to ensure that the vehicle, any jettisoned components,
or payload meet the specified requirements of that section. When
performing a launch or reentry collision avoidance analysis for
inhabitable objects, under proposed Sec.  450.169(a)(1), an operator
would have two alternatives in addition to maintaining a spherical
separation distance. An operator would be able to stipulate an
ellipsoidal rather than a spherical separation distance between its
vehicle and an inhabitable object or satisfy a probability of collision
threshold rather than calculating a separation distance. The FAA also
would maintain the current requirement to maintain a spherical
separation distance as a third option. These proposed requirements are
discussed more fully later in this section.
    The FAA also proposes to require that a collision avoidance
analysis address other orbiting objects, such as active spacecraft and
tracked debris. The uninhabitable active objects would be protected
with significantly less restrictive clearance distances than provided
to inhabitable objects. This would require no extra work from the
operators, including those from non-Federal launch sites. Additionally,
no launches have been scrubbed for COLA closures, and the FAA does not
anticipate any impact to future operations due to this requirement.
    Proposed Sec.  450.169(b) would require an operator to ensure that
the requirements of proposed Sec.  450.169(a) are met for the durations
specified. Specifically, proposed Sec.  450.169(b)(1) would require
screening through the entire flight of a suborbital vehicle. Proposed
Sec.  450.169(b)(2) would standardize the time period of the launch
collision avoidance analysis for an orbital launch to ascent from a
minimum of 150 km to initial orbital insertion and for a minimum of 3
hours from liftoff. Proposed Sec.  450.169(b)(3) would identify the
screening time frame for reentry as the time frame from initial reentry
burn to an altitude of 150 km. Similarly, proposed Sec.  450.169(b)(4)
would cover a disposal reentry with the same altitude.
    Proposed Sec.  450.169(c) would establish that planned rendezvous
operations that occur within the screening time frame are not
considered a violation of collision avoidance if the involved operators
have pre-coordinated the rendezvous or close approach.
    Proposed Sec.  450.169(d) would establish the exclusion of
collision avoidance for launch vehicles that do not reach a maximum
altitude of 150 km. The FAA also proposes to change from a 3-sigma
maximum performance established in current Sec.  C417.11 and replace it
with maximum performance within 99.7% confidence level, extended
through fuel exhaustion of each stage. The intention of the 3-sigma
rule was the use of a 99.7% confidence level. However, the 3-sigma rule
does not hold true (the same percentage confidence level) when the
analysis adds multiple dimensions. Therefore, the FAA proposes the
requirement with 99.7% confidence level instead of the 3-sigma rule in
the existing regulation.
    In proposed Sec.  450.169(e) an operator would be required to
obtain a collision avoidance analysis for each launch or reentry from a
Federal entity identified by the FAA. An operator would be required to
use the results of the collision avoidance analysis to establish flight
commit criteria for collision avoidance, account for uncertainties
associated with launch or reentry vehicle performance and timing, and
ensure that each window closure incorporates all additional time
periods associated with such uncertainties. This latter proposed
requirement would remove outdated practices from the launch collision
avoidance requirements that are currently found in sections
A417.31(c)(7)(iv) and C417.11(d)(7)(iv), which require adding 10
minutes to the screen duration time, sections A417.31(b)(4) and
C417.11(c)(4) and Sec.  431.43(c)(1)(iii) which require adding 15-
second buffers to the launch window closures, and appendix A to part
415 which is a redundant form to the worksheet specified in sections
A417.31 and C417.11. The current practices no longer require a 10-
minute extra pad as the screening time is no longer a single orbit.
Also, the 15-second buffers are no longer required because the service
provider accounts for the accuracy of the result products and the 15-
second buffers were based upon the last time the orbital objects were
tracked. The launch operator is not responsible for tracking orbital
objects and is not provided data on when the orbital objects were last
tracked making the existing requirement difficult to apply. The launch
or reentry operator would only be required to account for uncertainties
associated with launch or reentry vehicle performance and timing in
accordance with proposed Sec.  450.169(e)(2). This is consistent with
the existing requirement in Sec.  417.231(a).
    In proposed Sec.  450.169(f), the FAA would require an operator to
prepare a collision avoidance analysis worksheet for each launch or
reentry using a standardized format that contains the input data
required by appendix A to part 450. Proposed Sec.  450.169(f)(1) would
require an operator to file the input data with a Federal entity
identified by the FAA and the FAA at least 15 days before the first
attempt at the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry
vehicle or in a different time frame in accordance with proposed Sec.
404.15. The FAA anticipates that it initially would identify the Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC) as an entity

with whom to file the collision avoidance analysis inputs.
    The FAA also proposes to maintain the current 15-day requirement of
sections A417.31(b)(1) and C417.11(c)(1) in proposed Sec.
450.169(f)(1). The 15-day requirement is necessary for federal agencies
to evaluate the content of the submission and ensure the trajectory
files and data provide acceptable data and can be processed
successfully. It would also allow federal agencies to determine early
potential conjunctions with national systems or human space flight
activities, and would provide adequate time for federal agencies to
develop a strategy for early orbit detection and tracking including
taskings to global sensors and expected trajectories for sensors to aid
in initial acquisition.
    Proposed Sec.  450.169(f)(2) would require an operator to obtain a
collision avoidance analysis performed by a Federal entity identified
by the FAA 6 hours before the beginning of a launch or reentry window.
This is consistent with existing sections A417.31(b)(2) and
C417.11(c)(2).
    Consistent with current sections A417.31(b)(3) and C417.11(c)(3),
proposed Sec.  450.169(f)(3) would require an operator that needs an
updated collision avoidance analysis due to a launch or reentry delay
to file the request with the Federal entity and the FAA at least 12
hours prior to the beginning of the new launch or reentry window.
Additionally, the current regulations, sections A417.31(b)(3) and
C417.11(c)(3), limit the use of products to 12 hours from the time U.S.
Strategic Command determines the state vectors of manned or mannable
objects. The FAA intends to remove this limitation, as launch or
reentry operators are not provided with the last time of observation of
inhabitable objects and therefore cannot determine a 12-hour expiration
time. The removal of this requirement would place the responsibility on
the service provider to provide the time frame that the analysis is
valid. For most cases, the analysis would be valid for the entire
launch or reentry window. However, an extremely long launch window or
sporadic reentry window may require additional analysis. The service
provider would identify to an operator when its analysis in no longer
valid, which is similar in intent to the original 12-hour expiration
time, but more flexible in its application.
i. Inhabitable Objects
    Inhabitable objects are those that are or may be occupied by
persons. An inhabitable object need not be inhabited, and the FAA views
the term as encompassing any object that may be inhabited, regardless
of whether it is at the time of launch. One point that merits
clarification in light of inquiries the FAA has received--a launch
operator's own vehicle, if it is inhabitable, does not impose a
corresponding obligation on a space station to keep away from it. A
launch operator whose vehicle carries people should not construe the
requirement to mean that the operator must always keep the vehicle 200
km away from any other object. Current FAA regulations do not protect
persons on board a launch or reentry vehicle.
    Vehicles deliberately approaching each other for rendezvous or
docking purposes will have to get within 200 km of each other. In these
instances, collision avoidance remains paramount for those orbital
objects other than the intended rendezvous spacecraft. Under proposed
Sec.  450.169(c), planned close approaches for rendezvous would not be
considered violations of collision avoidance if the involved operators
have previously coordinated the rendezvous. The proposed requirement to
perform collision avoidance would apply during launches that have a
rendezvous within the screening period and for licensed reentries that
originate from orbiting spacecraft or objects. For planned reentry,
coordinated close approaches and departures would not be considered
violations of collision avoidance requirements if the involved
operators have previously coordinated the operation.
ii. Probability of Collision
    The FAA also proposes to amend the collision avoidance screening
methods to include new options for analysis. The current regulation
offers spherical or ellipsoidal screening, however, it fails to provide
distances for ellipsoidal screening and identifies a spherical distance
of 200 km as default. The FAA proposes an additional option of
collision probability screening using a covariance matrix. A covariance
matrix is a mathematical construct that describes the upper stage's
position and the uncertainty of that position in all dimensions.
    In proposed Sec.  450.169(a)(1)(i), the FAA would permit a launch
operator to employ a probability of collision of 1 x 10-6,
consistent with current Air Force practice, rather than relying solely
on the spherical or ellipsoidal separation distance of 200 km currently
required by section A417.31(c)(8)(i) and (ii) and Sec.  431.43(c)(1).
The spherical separation-distance option is the most conservative
option and requires the least detail about the location of the launch
vehicle and therefore results in the largest window closures. If launch
operators have covariance--that is, uncertainty--information applicable
to their nominal trajectories, the option of limiting the probability
of collision allows for greater fidelity in avoiding a collision with
inhabitable objects.
    For collision probability screening, proposed Sec.
450.169(a)(1)(i) would require a covariance information, typically
provided in a matrix, that identifies the uncertainty of the launch
vehicle trajectory. When an operator can provide sufficient covariance
(as identified in proposed appendix A to part 450, paragraph (d)(3)),
the probability of its collision with an inhabitable object can be
accurately calculated and launch window closures can be limited to only
those times where actual high risk exists. In essence, this fine-tuned
launch collision avoidance would provide assurance against collisions
while minimizing potential launch window closures.
    The FAA proposes to allow the use of a probability of collision
because the 18th Space Control Squadron's (SPCS) use of the proposed
probability threshold has prevented collisions while still allowing for
maximum availability of launch windows. The FAA agrees that using
probability assessment adequately protects inhabitable spacecraft while
maximizing the time available for launch. Probability of collision is
also the preferred analysis method for reentry collision avoidance.
    According to NASA,\136\ the Department of Defense's 18th SPCS
current practice for on-orbit debris regarding the ISS is to assess
potential conjunctions inside specific-sized boxes centered on the ISS.
Any object predicted to pass within this box is tracked with higher
priority. The 18th SPCS then uses the best available data set to
compute the probability of collision with the potentially-threatening
catalogued object. If that probability is greater than 1 x
10-4, the ISS performs a collision avoidance maneuver. If
that probability is greater than 1 x 10-5, then the ISS
would perform a collision avoidance maneuver when doing so would not
compromise its mission objectives. Additionally, the proposed
requirements in Sec.  450.169 for a launch and reentry collision
avoidance probability of collision criteria of 1 x 10-6
against inhabitable

objects is consistent with current NASA practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ Operational Interface Procedures. Volume A, Report Number
SSP-50643-A, Section 7.16.2. Published June 28, 2003, and last
modified October 17, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Separation Distance Calculations by Sphere or Ellipsoid
    Section 417.231 currently requires a launch operator to ensure a
separation distance of 200 km between its launch vehicle, any
jettisoned components, or its payload, and an inhabitable object.\137\
The regulation does not specify whether the separation distance must be
spherical or may be ellipsoidal. Section A417.31(c)(8) of Appendix A
does, however, permit a launch operator to use spherical or ellipsoidal
screening. In practice, the 18th SPCS provided ellipsoidal distances in
the standardized collision avoidance request form, and the FAA has
allowed the 18th SPCS methods as acceptable for launch screening
volumes. The FAA anticipates that identifying these options in proposed
Sec.  450.169(a) will reduce confusion and accurately capture the
requirements for ellipsoidal screening. Additionally, the FAA's
proposal would clarify that either method of calculation would be
acceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ 14 CFR 417.231(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using ellipsoidal separation calculation would permit a launch
vehicle to come within a predicted 50 km from an inhabitable object in
the cross-track and radial directions. The in-track distance would be
maintained at 200 km. The result is an ellipse around the inhabitable
object that looks approximately like a pencil with the tip in the
direction of travel. In accordance with longstanding Federal range
standards, the 50-km separation distance in the cross-track and radial
directions would provide an equivalent level of safety compared to a
separation distance based on a sphere because the uncertainty in
orbital location is significantly less side-to-side than it is along
the velocity vector. Because the velocity vector is greatest in-track,
a small change in velocity results in a significant variation in
arrival time, and therefore requires the greatest compensation (200
km). However variations in orbital altitude are possible, but occur at
a significantly reduced rate, allowing the exclusion distance to be
reduced to 50 km radially. Variations laterally are also minimal and
require the smallest compensation, allowing the reduction to 50 km in
the cross-track directions. The FAA agrees with the Federal range
conclusions that the ellipsoidal calculation maintains an equivalent
level of safety as the 200-km spherical calculation.
iv. Collision Avoidance for Objects That Are Not Inhabitable
    Sections A417.31(c)(8) and C417.11(d)(8) require that if a launch
operator requests launch collision avoidance analysis for unmanned or
unmannable objects, the analysis must use the spherical screening
method with a separation distance of 25 km (approximately 15.5 statute
miles). The screening was optional but, if used, the distance was
mandated. The FAA proposes to alter the collision avoidance
requirements for uninhabitable objects. Launches from federal ranges
require screening for uninhabitable objects to meet Air Force or NASA
requirements, therefore there most space launch operators are already
familiar with the process and requirements. The FAA proposal creates a
common standard for all commercial space launches.
    In proposed Sec.  450.169(a)(2) and (3), the screening for
potential conjunctions would include avoidance of uninhabitable
objects, active objects, and trackable debris. The required minimum
separation distance would remain at 25 km, or a PC of 1 x
10-5, for active satellites. For those objects that are
tracked and not active, such as debris, defunct rocket bodies, and dead
or inactive satellites, for which the FAA currently has no requirement,
the FAA proposes a required minimum separation distance of 2.5 km
(approximately 1.6 statute miles), consistent with 18th SPCS screening
practice. This proposed separation distance would provide increased
safety for launches and reentries.
    The proposed screening would coincide with the screening for
inhabitable objects and would cover the same time frames. This is
consistent with current 18th SPCS operational procedures.
    Launch availability during the launch window is a concern of the
FAA because excessive launch window closures could limit launch
opportunities, increase the effects of prolonged airspace closures on
aviation, and increase launch operations costs. The FAA analyzed
previous U.S. launches--commercial, civil, and military--to determine
the consequence to the launch window availability of adding
uninhabitable objects as a mandatory launch collision avoidance
requirement. Of the worldwide launches between September 2011 and June
2012, the maximum impact was the closing of approximately 12% of the
launch window. The average impact was only 2% of each launch window
closed due to launch collision avoidance accounting for both
inhabitable and uninhabitable objects. This level of impact was
validated for launch closures for launches conducted in 2017. The
worst-case scenarios for launch collision avoidance are launches of low
inclination that pass through the densest part of the low earth orbit
(LEO) population, around 800 km (approximately 497 statute miles) in
altitude. The FAA believes implementing collision avoidance for
inhabitable objects, active satellites, and trackable debris would
adequately prevent collisions without placing excessive restrictions on
launch opportunities. The FAA seeks comment on the potential impact of
implementing these requirements.
v. Accounting for A Conjunction Up to 3 Hours After Launch
    The current FAA requirement for screening time is one orbit (at
least 100 minutes) plus 10 minutes padding.\138\ The current Federal
screening practice at the 18th SPCS covers 3 hours. The FAA proposes to
adopt 18th SPCS's current practice as the minimum standard to ensure
the necessary level of safety to inhabitable and active space objects
and to avoid the generation of space debris. Under proposed Sec.
450.169(b), the collision avoidance analysis for orbital launches would
have to account for a conjunction that could occur up to 3 hours after
launch. This change would be in line with practices for Federal
launches. In actual practice, the 18th SPCS performs an analysis from
launch to about 3 hours against all objects and debris in the catalog.
However, commercial launchers currently can request screening through
only one orbit after launch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ 14 CFR 417.107(e)(1)(ii)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pre-launch collision avoidance analysis ensures there are no
immediate conjunctions during orbital insertion and shortly thereafter
but is dependent on pre-launch estimated trajectories. Extending this
collision avoidance analysis to three hours post-launch provides
sufficient time for creation of the first orbital element set (ELSET),
at which point collision avoidance analysis begins being calculated
using real positioning information. To create an ELSET, the Department
of Defense uses multiple tracking information to establish the first
ELSET and reduce the position error significantly. Once an ELSET has
been created when the vehicle is on-orbit, an on-orbit collision
avoidance analysis is routinely run out to 72 hours. Pre-launch
collision avoidance analysis is the only possible method to prevent a
collision until that first ELSET is created.

    There is a significant collision avoidance warning time gap between
the end of 18th SPCS's 3-hour launch screening time and when 18th SPCS
determines an ELSET. Pre-launch collision avoidance analysis beyond 3
hours is currently of limited utility. As positional errors based on
predicted trajectories grow, data validity becomes increasingly
suspect. Additionally, it is possible to create large launch window
closures or even close the launch window entirely. Therefore, without a
significant development in prediction calculation fidelity and
accuracy, the FAA proposes to extend pre-launch collision avoidance to
3 hours. The accuracy of pre-launch collision avoidance analysis would
be dependent on the accuracy of the trajectories provided.
    This 3-hour extension is important to protect inhabitable objects
on-orbit. The ISS incurs collision risk from every launch. There is a
warning time gap between the end of the pre-launch collision avoidance
analysis and the start of on-orbit collision analysis done by the 18th
SPCS. Until the 18th SPCS can determine the ELSET, the location of
upper stages, payloads, and any released debris is unknown. During that
time, whether the ISS is at risk from a collision would also be
unknown. Extending the pre-launch collision avoidance requirement from
one orbit to 3 hours would codify current practice.
    Additionally, although not required by FAA regulation, operators
should promptly provide the 18th SPCS positional updates after orbital
insertion until such time as the ELSET is established and on-orbit
collision avoidance analysis commences.
    The FAA proposes to remove the requirements to expand the collision
avoidance analysis screening time by 10 minutes to ensure that the
entire first orbit of the launch vehicle is screened in sections
A417.31(c)(7)(iv) and C417.11(d)(7)(iv). The expanded screening time
required by those appendices would be unnecessary if the FAA extends
the screening to 3 hours as described in proposed Sec.  450.169(b).
vi. Submitting Collision Avoidance Inputs to the FAA
    Proposed Sec.  450.169(f) would require a launch operator to submit
launch collision avoidance trajectory data to both AFSPC and the FAA.
The current regulations only requires an operator to submit the data to
the AFSPC. However, the AFSPC does not review launch operator data to
ensure it complies with FAA requirements. The proposal would ensure the
FAA receives and reviews the same data that is provided to AFSPC for
launch collision avoidance. As this data is generally submitted
electronically, sending the data to both the FAA and AFSPC is not
expected to increase cost or paperwork burden of the submission. Direct
submission to AFSPC and the FAA will facilitate a quicker response to
the operator than having the FAA act as a middleman between the
operator and AFSPC, and enables coordination throughout the process.
    In the past, the FAA has found discrepancies between operator
trajectory data and operator requests to AFSPC for specific launch
collision avoidance analysis methods. On multiple occasions, operators
have misapplied existing launch collision avoidance regulations. To
ensure proper application of launch collision avoidance regulations the
FAA must be able to review the launch collision data. A specific
example of a discrepancy occurred when a launch operator directed the
exclusion of the ISS from launch collision avoidance analysis in a
request to AFSPC. The launch operator incorrectly assumed the
protections for the ISS, the ultimate destination for one of the
launched payloads, did not apply. In actuality, the planned rendezvous
with the station was days into the mission, and not all objects
launched were planned to rendezvous with the ISS. Collision avoidance
analysis should have been requested for all launched objects against
the catalog of space objects, including the ISS. FAA review of launch
collision avoidance trajectory data would have identified that
oversight.
vii. Appendix A to Part 450--Collision Analysis Worksheet
    The FAA proposes to consolidate the data input requirements of
sections A417.31 and C417.11 and to clarify the data and process for
collision avoidance in appendix A to part 450. Existing sections
A417.31 and C417.11 provide nearly identical requirements for mission
information. However, some elements are no longer useful or require an
update to meet current practices. Specifically, proposed appendix A to
part 450, paragraph (a)(1) mission name and launch location, paragraph
(a)(2) launch or reentry window, paragraph (a)(3) epoch, time of
powered flight, and point of contact remain the same as existing
requirements. Proposed paragraph (a)(4) segment number has been updated
to change the requirement to provide vector at injection to instead
provide orbital parameters. The substantive requirement to identify how
the operator would receive analysis results in current sections
A417.31(c)(3) and C417.11(d)(3) also remains unchanged in proposed
paragraph (b); however, minor editorial revisions were made to the
examples of the transmission mediums provided to reflect modern
technology.
    The proposed rule provides clarifications for some data elements.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to change the requirement to identify
orbital objects to evaluate contained in section A417.31(c)(9). As
written, section A417.31(c)(9) requires the operator to identify the
orbiting objects to be included in the analysis. In all cases the
analysis must include all objects. However, the current practice is to
identify the characteristics of the orbiting object, i.e., name,
length, width, depth, diameter, and mass. The FAA proposes to capture
current practice in proposed paragraph (a)(6). Also, the proposed
appendix would replace ``vector at injection'' in sections
A417.31(c)(5) and C417.11(d)(5), with orbital parameters at proposed
paragraph (a)(5). The proposed change would require an operator to
identify the orbital parameters for all objects achieving orbit
including the parameters for each segment after thrust end instead of
the vector at injection for each segment. This requirement would allow
accurate COLA calculations that consider changes in trajectory after
orbital insertion.
    The FAA also proposes to clarify the trajectory file requirements
in proposed paragraph (d) of appendix A to part 450. Sections
A417.31(c)(5)(ii) and C417.11(d)(5)(ii) require that current operators
provide position and velocity for each launched object after burnout or
deployment. This requirement severely lacks in clarity and
completeness. Proposed paragraph (d) would provide a clearer
requirement in line with current practices. Launch and reentry
operators would be required to provide trajectory files with position
and velocity for each object through the entire screening process, not
exclusively after burnout. The current practice at Federal ranges is to
provide data through the entire screening process, therefore the FAA
proposal is in line with current practices. Additionally, radar cross
section and covariance (position and velocity) for probability of
collision analysis would be required by proposed paragraph (d). These
products are used in the analysis of potential collisions. Parts 431
and 437 require the same trajectory files for analysis, however the
current regulations do not provide guidance on how to provide the
products necessary to complete the analysis. Proposed Sec.  450.169 and
appendix A to part 450 would provide

the necessary guidance for all launch and reentry analysis.
    Proposed (e) of appendix A to part 450 would provide the three
possible screening methodologies--spherical, ellipsoidal, or
probability of collision. These requirements were discussed previously
in this section.
13. Safety at End of Launch
    Proposed Sec.  450.171 would include requirements aimed at
preventing the creation of orbital debris. Proposed Sec.  450.171(a) is
the same as Sec.  417.129 and substantively the same as Sec.
431.43(c)(3), which require certain measures to be taken by a launch
operator to prevent the creation of orbital debris. The FAA is not
proposing to update the substantive requirements for orbital debris
mitigation in this rulemaking because it plans to do so in a future
rulemaking.
    Proposed Sec.  450.171(b) would require an applicant to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements in Sec.  450.171(a) in its
application. This requirement is the same as Sec.  415.133, which
applies to applications for the launch of an ELV from a non-Federal
launch site. Proposed Sec.  450.171(b) would broaden the applicability
of the application requirement to all launches. This is necessary
because the importance of orbital debris mitigation has no relation to
whether a launch takes place from a Federal or non-Federal launch site,
or whether the launch vehicle is expendable or reusable. The expansion
of the applicability of the application requirement is the only change
related to orbital debris mitigation. As noted earlier, the substantive
safety requirements remain the same.
14. Mishaps: Definition, Plan, Reporting, Response, Investigation,
Test-Induced Damage
    As a part of its streamlining efforts, the FAA proposes four
mishap-related actions, including a revised definition of anomaly.
First, the FAA proposes to consolidate the many chapter III mishap-
related definitions into a mishap classification system. Second, this
proposal would consolidate existing chapter III requirements for
mishap, accident investigation, and emergency response plans, and
clarify and streamline reporting requirements. Third, the FAA proposes
to redefine the term ``anomaly'' and expand its application to include
licensed, and not just permitted, activities. Fourth, the FAA proposes
to exempt pre-coordinated test-induced damage to property involved with
the test from being a mishap.
    The FAA proposes using an overarching mishap classification system
instead of separate terms for ``mishap,'' ``launch accident,''
``reentry accident,'' ``launch incident,'' ``reentry incident,''
``human space flight incident,'' and ``launch site accident.'' The
proposed mishap classification system would streamline and clarify the
current accident, incident, and mishap definitions to create four
mishap categories organized by severity, from most severe (Class 1) to
least severe (Class 4). This proposal would also eliminate the $25,000
monetary threshold from current ``mishap'' and accident terms. This
proposal would consolidate parts 417 (Accident investigation plan), 420
(Launch site accident investigation plan), 431 and 435 (Mishap
investigation plan and emergency response plan), and 437 (Mishap
response plan), into a single section applicable to all types of
licenses, permits, and vehicles.
    Additionally, the FAA proposes to update the definition of the term
``anomaly'' and relocate it from part 437 to part 401, making it
applicable to licensed and permitted activities. Finally, the FAA
proposes to exclude pre-coordinated test activities, resulting in
damage to property owned by the operator and associated with test
activities, from mishap consideration. This test-induced damage
proposal provides permittees and licensees the freedom to conduct test
activities that may result in damage to associated property, and the
freedom to test without the need for a mishap investigation for
foreseeable test failures.
i. Mishap Definitions
    The FAA currently uses a variety of terms to describe the
occurrence of an unplanned event during commercial launch, reentry, and
site activities. The term ``mishap'' is a broad term encompassing
several of these unplanned events. Mishap, as currently defined in
Sec.  401.5, means a launch or reentry accident, launch or reentry
incident, launch site accident, failure to complete a launch or reentry
as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events resulting in a
fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or resulting
in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a payload, a launch or
reentry vehicle, a launch or reentry support facility, or government
property located on the launch or reentry site.\139\ As the definition
shows, the term ``mishap'' captures 15 specific kinds of unplanned
events,\140\ including five types of accidents and incidents. These are
launch accident, reentry accident, launch incident, reentry incident,
and launch site accident. These terms are defined separately in
Sec. Sec.  401.5 and 420.5. Mishap also includes unplanned events
resulting in failure to complete a mission as planned, a fatality or
serious injury, or damages greater than $25,000 to certain property
associated with the licensed or permitted activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ Section 401.5.
    \140\ (1) Launch accident; (2) reentry accident; (3) launch
incident; (4) reentry incident; (5) launch site accident; (6)
failure to complete a launch as planned; (7) failure to complete a
reentry as planned; (8) an unplanned event resulting in a fatality;
(9) an unplanned event resulting in a serious injury; (10) an
unplanned event resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to
a payload; (11) an unplanned event resulting in greater than $25,000
worth of damage to a launch vehicle; (12) an unplanned event
resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a reentry
vehicle; (13) an unplanned event resulting in greater than $25,000
worth of damage to a launch support facility; (14) an unplanned
event resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to
government property located on the launch site; or (15) an unplanned
event resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a reentry
site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The terms ``launch accident,'' ``reentry accident,'' and ``launch
site accident,'' which are encompassed by the mishap definition, all
include the occurrence of a fatality or serious injury to persons not
associated with the activity and damage to property not associated with
the activity exceeding $25,000. Unlike the term ``launch site
accident,'' launch and reentry accidents account for the occurrence of
a fatality or serious injury to a space flight participant or crew
member during FAA-regulated activities. Other factors may also satisfy
the various accident definitions. For instance, for launches involving
an ELV, impacts of a launch vehicle, its payload, or any component
thereof outside designated impact limit lines constitute an accident.
If, however, the launch involves an RLV, impacts outside the designated
landing site constitute an accident. In contrast, the definition for
reentry accident makes no distinction between expendable and reusable
vehicles. For reentry accidents, if the vehicle, its payload, or any
component thereof lands outside a designated reentry site, the FAA
deems it an accident.
    Similarly, although launch incidents and reentry incidents are both
incidents, their definitions consist of different requirements. Launch
and reentry incidents occur due to the malfunction of a FSS or other
safety-critical system, or a failure of the operator's safety
organization, design or operations. The FAA proposes to consolidate
these

terms into a single mishap classification system eliminating the need
for multiple terms.
    Current definitions of mishap and accident also include a $25,000
monetary threshold that is arbitrary and outdated. Experience has shown
that even minor damage that does not pose a threat to public safety can
easily exceed the $25,000 monetary threshold, triggering potentially
costly and burdensome notification, reporting, and investigation
requirements. For example, a relatively minor unplanned event following
a successful launch could result in damages to ground support equipment
or launch facilities exceeding $25,000. The ARC noted the amount is
outdated and does not necessarily reflect safety implications.
Additionally, the conditions listed under the current definitions do
not necessarily reflect the severity of consequences and associated
public safety risks. A better mishap classification system would
provide consistency of mishap thresholds and applicability to all types
of operations, mitigating potential confusion. Rather than adding more
definitions, the FAA would consolidate and replace the existing
accident, incident, and mishap definitions with a mishap classification
system that would be defined in Sec.  401.5 and would apply to all
licensed and permitted activities.
    Under the proposed changes, ``mishap'' would mean any event, or
series of events associated with a licensed or permitted activity, that
meets the criteria of a Class 1, 2, 3 or 4 mishap. The FAA would use
this overarching definition to describe any mishap type occurring
during permitted or licensed activities regardless of classification or
consequence threshold. The FAA's proposal was informed by existing NASA
and Air Force mishap classification system definitions,\141\ and NTSB
definitions.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ NPR 8621.1C, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and
Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping. Air Force
Instruction 91-204, Safety Investigation and Hazard Reporting.
    \142\ As defined in 49 CFR 830.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A ``Class 1 mishap'' would mean any event resulting in a fatality
or serious injury to any person who is not associated with the licensed
or permitted activity (e.g., members of the public) along with any
space flight participant, crew, or government astronaut. The FAA would
be adopting the definition of fatality or serious injury from 49 CFR
830.2. To constitute a Class 1 mishap, the fatality or injury must
result from licensed or permitted activity, including ground operations
at a launch or reentry site. A Class 1 mishap would be a mishap that
has the highest consequences and greatest impact on public safety. The
proposed Class 1 mishap definition would incorporate existing fatality
and serious injury criteria from current ``launch accident,'' ``reentry
accident'' and ``launch site accident'' definitions.
    On November 25, 2015, the U.S Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act was signed into law (Pub. L. 114-90). This law
amends 51 U.S.C. 50901(15) by inserting ``government astronauts'' after
``crew'' each place it appears. In accordance with this amendment, and
to ensure Class 1 mishap criteria applies equally to all persons on
board a launch or reentry vehicle, the FAA Class 1 mishap definition
includes government astronauts. The definition would only cover
fatalities or serious injuries to crew, Government astronauts,
spaceflight participants, or uninvolved public. The definition of Class
1 mishap would not cover other persons associated with the launch or
reentry, similar to the current accident definitions for which it
replaces. The proposed Class 1 Mishap also consolidates existing
accident definitions, which would include potential recovery site
accidents that were previously not defined. The FAA proposes to define
a ``Class 2 mishap'' as any unplanned event, other than a Class 1
mishap, resulting in a malfunction of a safety-critical system, a
failure of the safety organization or procedures, substantial damage to
property not associated with the operation, or a high risk of causing a
serious or fatal injury to any space flight participant, crew,
government astronaut, or member of the public. The Class 2 mishap
definition would encompass the current definitions of a ``launch
incident,'' ``reentry incident,'' and ``human space flight incident.''
The definition would use a substantial damage to uninvolved property
requirement instead of the $25,000 damage threshold.
    Under this proposal, the FAA would make a case-by-case
determination whether the damage to public property is substantial.
This evaluation may be based on, but not limited to, direct replacement
cost, repair cost, and the property's intended use and functionality.
For example, structural damage to public property exceeding 50 percent
of its market value may be deemed as substantial damage. This approach
potentially reduces the burden on the commercial space industry and
Federal government by providing flexibility on the determination of
substantial damage and the scope of the resulting investigation. This
is consistent with the ARC feedback. Other criteria--such as events
posing a high risk of causing a serious or fatal injury to any space
flight participant, crew, government astronaut, or member of the
public--are based on the existing ``human space flight incident''
definition and expanded to include government astronauts and members of
the public. With this criterion, the FAA intends to cover events akin
to a near miss in the aviation industry and is consistent with the Air
Force and NASA practices. The addition of ``members of the public'' is
consistent with the FAA's public safety mission. The FAA's goal is to
evaluate the event type by impact to public safety.
    The FAA proposes to define ``Class 3 mishap'' as any unplanned
event, other than a Class 1 or Class 2 mishap, resulting in permanent
loss of a vehicle during licensed activity or the impact of a vehicle,
its payload, or any component thereof outside the planned landing site
or impact area. This change would differentiate between licensed
launches and reentries and permitted launches and reentries. The FAA
believes this proposal captures the intent of the current mishap
definition that includes the failure to complete a launch or reentry as
planned criterion. At the same time, the separation of licensed and
permitted operations between Class 3 and 4 mishaps is also consistent
with ARC feedback.
    The FAA would consider debris impacts outside of defined limits to
meet the Class 3 mishap definition, provided the event did not satisfy
the criteria of a Class 1 or 2 mishap. Impacts of launch vehicle debris
outside designated impact limit lines are currently considered a launch
accident.
    The FAA proposes to define a ``Class 4 mishap'' as an unplanned
event, other than a Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 mishap, resulting in
permanent loss of a vehicle during permitted activity, a failure to
achieve mission objectives, or substantial damage associated with
licensed or permitted activity. The FAA intends proposed ``Class 4
Mishap'' to capture other events with the potential for future public
safety implications without directly affecting public safety during
occurrence. For example, an operator may have complete loss of a
permitted vehicle in a remote and unpopulated area. Although the loss
may not have resulted in fatalities, serious injuries, or public
property damage on this occasion, it is important to find the root
cause of the mishap. Otherwise, if the operator does not identify and
address the underlying

cause, it may endanger public safety during a future launch in
different conditions.
ii. Anomaly Definition
    The FAA proposes to change the definition of ``anomaly'' and to
move the definition to Sec.  401.5, where it would apply to all of
chapter III. Anomaly would mean any condition during a licensed or
permitted activity that deviates from what is standard, normal, or
expected, during the verification or operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment. The inclusion of anomaly in
Sec.  401.5 would clearly define the expectation of post-operation
reporting for all licensed or permitted operations. It would also
capture off-nominal events that do not fall under the thresholds of
Class 1-4 mishaps as part of the required post-launch report.
    The FAA currently defines anomaly only in part 437. Part 437
defines an anomaly as a problem that occurs during verification or
operation of a system, subsystem, process, facility, or support
equipment. Section 437.73 requires strict recording, reporting, and
implementation of corrective actions in the event of a public safety
related anomaly. Section 417.25(c)(1), applicable to ELVs, requires
operators to report an anomaly that occurred during launch countdown
and flight in the post-launch report but does not define anomaly.
Although part 431 does not have specific anomaly reporting
requirements, in practice, the FAA requires operators to report
anomalies. To ensure anomaly reporting, the FAA has begun adding a term
and condition to launch licenses requiring operators to report
anomalies prior to the next launch. The FAA uses anomaly reporting to
track vehicle-related issues and to ensure an operator mitigates those
issues prior to future flights. Given that not all anomalies are
identified during flight, the post-launch reporting requirement allows
the operator to review countdown and flight data for off-nominal
conditions and report any anomalous condition to the FAA as a part of
the post-launch report.
    Although an anomaly is defined in Sec.  437.3, as ``a problem that
occurs during verification or operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment,'' it is not defined in part
415, 417, 431, or 435, and hence, it is applicable only to experimental
permits. However, Sec.  417.25--Post launch report, requires an
operator to ``identify any discrepancy or anomaly that occurred during
the launch countdown or flight.'' The FAA is proposing to update the
existing definition of an anomaly to ``any condition during a licensed
or permitted activity that deviates from what is standard, normal, or
expected, during the verification or operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment.'' The proposed definition
seeks only to clarify what a ``problem'' is by adding ``deviates from
what is standard, normal, or expected.''
iii. Mishaps--Reporting, Response, and Investigation Requirements
    The FAA proposes to consolidate current chapter III mishap plan,
reporting, response and investigation requirements into proposed Sec.
450.173. The FAA seeks comment on its proposed approach, as discussed
below, to mishap requirements, including reporting.
    Current title 14 CFR chapter III requirements for mishap and
accident reporting, response, and investigation requirements are
inconsistent and create confusion. For that reason, the FAA's proposed
changes would apply to mishap requirements for launch and reentry
licenses, experimental permits, and launch and reentry site licenses.
Proposed Sec.  450.173 would replace Sec. Sec.  417.111(h) (Accident
Investigation Plan), 417.415(c) (Post launch and post flight hazard
controls), and 431.45 (Mishap investigation plan and emergency response
plan). The proposed mishap plan changes to Sec. Sec.  420.59(a)
(Mishap) and 437.41 (Mishap plan) would require an operator to meet the
requirements of Sec.  450.173.
    The inconsistencies in the FAA's current regulatory scheme,
including signature requirements for mishap plans, has led to much
confusion. For example, Sec.  417.111(h) requires an operator to
implement a plan containing the launch operator's procedures for
reporting and responding to launch accidents, launch incidents, or
other mishaps. It also requires two signatures, one from an individual
authorized to sign and certify the application, and another from the
designated safety official. Similarly, Sec.  420.59 requires that
licensed launch site operators develop and implement a launch site
accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for
reporting, responding to, and investigating launch site accidents and
for cooperating with Federal officials in case of a launch accident. It
also requires a signature from an individual authorized to sign and
certify the application, but not from the designated safety official
like Sec.  417.111(h). Current Sec.  431.45 requires an RLV operator to
submit a mishap investigation plan (MIP) containing the applicant's
procedures for reporting and responding to launch and reentry
accidents, launch and reentry incidents, or other mishaps that occur
during the conduct of an RLV mission. It also requires that an RLV
operator submit an emergency response plan (ERP) containing procedures
for informing the affected public of a planned RLV mission. The FAA
requires that an individual authorized to sign and certify the license
application, the person responsible for the conduct of all licensed RLV
mission activities, and the designated safety official, sign the MIP
and ERP. In contrast, Sec.  437.41 does not require any signatures. To
ensure consistency between all title 14 CFR chapter III requirements,
the FAA proposes to consolidate these requirements.
    The ARC noted that reporting requirements for mishaps not involving
a fatality or serious injury are unclear and left up to the operator to
determine. The ARC said the FAA should define a minimum standard for a
reportable mishap, in addition to a minimum set of investigation and
reporting requirements, including information that should be provided
during initial notification.
    Current notification requirements are generally consistent for a
launch, reentry, launch site accident, launch or reentry incident, or
mishap involving a fatality or serious injury. In those instances,
regulations throughout title 14 CFR chapter III require that operators
provide immediate notification to the FAA's Washington Operations
Center (WOC).\143\ This is not the case when a mishap does not involve
a fatality or serious injury.\144\ For example, part 417 requires
notification within 24 hours to the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation or to the FAA WOC in the event of a
mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious injury. In contrast,
parts 431 and 437 only require 24-hour notification to the Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, but not to the FAA
WOC for a mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious injury.
Current part 420 does not require a launch site operator to provide a
24-hour mishap notification. If a mishap occur during non-business
hours, this raises the possibility that a launch operator may be unable
to report it to the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, which would create the potential for a

non-compliance. To address these issues, the FAA proposes to provide a
single source for all initial mishap notifications. The single source
would be the FAA's WOC, a 24-hour, seven-day, operational facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(i), 420.59(b)(1), 431.45(b)(1), and
437.75(a)(1).
    \144\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(ii), 431.45(b)(2), and 437.75(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Parts 417, 420, 431, and 437 all require an operator to submit a
written preliminary report within five days \145\ of either an accident
or incident to the FAA, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation. The five-day report is a follow-up requirement designed
to supplement initial mishap notification once more detailed
information is known. Under the proposed mishap classification system
and mishap plan requirements, all mishaps would have similar reporting
requirements. The FAA believes the proposed mishap classification
system would save the operator time and resources during the initial
mishap response by eliminating the need to evaluate whether the event
is an accident, incident, or mishap. This streamlining of reporting
requirements reduces the burden of unclear reporting requirements noted
by the ARC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(iii), 420.49(b)(2), 431.45(b)(3), and
437.75(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on past examples, the five-day report is usually only one to
three pages in length, requiring minimal time to compose. The FAA will
use the information contained within the five-day report to ensure the
mishap has been properly classified and the proper level of
investigation and FAA oversight is being conducted. The FAA believes
the time required to complete the five-day report is minimal and that
by providing a clear expectation of required report contents in the
event of all mishap types will eliminate confusion and ultimately
result in time-savings.
    Response plan requirements for containing and minimizing the
consequences of a mishap and for ensuring the preservation of data and
physical evidence are generally consistent throughout license types
with some exceptions. For instance, the regulations require that a
launch site operator's plan include procedures for reporting and
cooperating with FAA and NTSB investigations, and for designating one
or more points of contact. Additionally, licensees must identify and
adopt preventive measures for avoiding recurrence of the event.
    Current investigation requirements are also generally consistent
across license types. The FAA currently requires that operators
investigate the cause of a launch, reentry, or launch site accident,
launch or reentry site incident, or mishap across license types.\146\
After the investigation, an operator must report investigation results
to the FAA and delineate responsibilities for personnel assigned to
conduct the investigation and for anyone retained by the operator to
participate in an investigation. Section 420.59(e)(1) also requires
that a launch site operator's investigation plan include procedures for
participating in an investigation of a launch accident for launches
launched from the launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(3), 420.59(d)(3), 431.45(d), and
437.75(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To ensure vehicle recovery can be conducted safely and effectively
and with minimal risk to the public, part 431 operators must submit an
ERP containing the operator's procedures for notifying local officials
of unplanned and offsite landings. In addition, these operators must
provide a plan for informing the public potentially affected of the
estimated date, time, and landing location for the reentry activity.
This information must be provided in layman's terms. These requirements
are unique to operations conducted under part 431.
    Section 417.415(c)'s post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard
controls require that an operator establish procedural controls for
hazards associated with an unsuccessful flight where the launch vehicle
has a land or water impact. These procedures ensure the evacuation and
rescue of members of the public, the dispersion and movement of toxic
plumes, identifying areas of risk, and communication with local
government authorities. Additionally, these procedures require that an
operator extinguish fires, secure impact areas, evacuate members of the
public, prevent unauthorized access, and preserve evidence. Lastly, the
operator must ensure public safety from hazardous debris and have plans
for the recovery, salvage, and safe disposal of debris and hazardous
materials.
    For all FAA-licensed operations, proposed Sec.  450.173 would
require that an operator report, respond, and investigate class 1, 2,
3, and 4 mishaps, using a plan or other written means.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ For purposes of the preamble discussion regarding proposed
Sec.  450.173, the term ``mishap plan document'' is used to
encompass a plan or other written means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An approved mishap plan document would be eligible for reuse with
other specific or similar vehicles, sites, and operations. This would
ease the burden on industry. For example, a permittee applying for a
license or a current licensee applying for a different type of license,
would be able to use the same written mishap plan document previously
developed because the requirements would be the same regardless of
license type. This mishap plan document would include notification to
local officials should a mishap cause the vehicle to land offsite, such
that a coordinated effort can be made to protect the public. Provided
emergency response requirements such as coordinated emergency response
agreements remain current, a permittee can submit a mishap response
plan developed for permitted operations to satisfy the mishap plan
document application requirements under a license. Additionally, the
FAA would not have to evaluate the same company differently depending
on the permit or license type. This would reduce time and cost for the
industry and the FAA while maintaining the same level of public safety.
iv. Discussion of the Mishap Plan--Reporting, Response, and
Investigation Proposed Requirements
    Proposed Sec.  450.173 would eliminate all mishap plan signature
requirements. The requirement that the person certifying the accuracy
of the application also sign the mishap plan document is not necessary
because by signing the application, the operator is already certifying
that the components thereof, including the mishap plan document, are
accurate. Additional signatures (e.g., from the safety official or
mission director) are also unnecessary as the roles and
responsibilities for personnel implementing the mishap plan document
are contained in the plan itself. Eliminating the signature
requirements would provide operators with the flexibility to assign
personnel to implement a mishap plan document without having to
resubmit a signed document to the FAA.
    Proposed Sec.  450.173(a) would require an operator to report,
respond, and investigate class 1, 2, 3, and 4 mishaps according to
paragraphs (b) through (h) of Sec.  450.173, using a plan or other
written means. Proposed Sec.  450.173(b)(1) would require that an
operator document the responsibilities for personnel assigned to
implement the requirements of proposed Sec.  450.173. Proposed Sec.
450.173(b)(2) would require an operator to document reporting
responsibilities for personnel assigned to conduct investigations and
for anyone retained by the licensee to conduct or participate in
investigations. Proposed Sec.  450.173(b)(3) would require an operator
to document the allocation of roles and responsibilities between the
launch operator and any site operator for reporting, responding to, and

investigating any mishap during ground activities at the site. Further,
proposed Sec.  450.173(c) would require an operator to report to, and
cooperate with, FAA and NTSB mishap investigations. Also, it would
require that the operator identify one or more points of contact for
the FAA and NTSB. This proposal does not substantively change current
requirements to report, cooperate, and designate points of contact. Any
changes from current regulations would be made merely for clarification
purposes. In the event of an FAA- or NTSB-led investigation, the FAA
would not require an operator to perform an independent internal
investigation because it would be a party to the investigation.
However, the operator would remain responsible for reporting
investigation results to the FAA, which would include any government-
generated or independent investigation reports as well as party
submissions. In the event of an operator-led investigation under FAA
oversight, the operator's investigation would be the primary
investigation, although the FAA may grant official observer status to
U.S. Government representatives (e.g., NASA, the Air Force). As
official observers, these representatives would be integrated into the
operator's investigation to the extent the FAA finds appropriate. These
U.S. Government entities may decide to conduct their own investigation
independent of FAA oversight, although the FAA and NTSB have primary
jurisdiction.
    Proposed Sec.  450.173(d) would establish mishap reporting
requirements applicable to all operations, vehicles, or mishap types.
Proposed Sec.  450.173(d)(1) would require that an operator immediately
notify the FAA WOC in case of a mishap involving a fatality or serious
injury. Immediately would continue to mean notification without delay.
The immediate notification should not hamper emergency response
activities. Proposed Sec.  450.173(d)(2) would require that operators
report other mishaps not involving a fatality or serious injury to the
WOC within 24 hours. This would eliminate the current option to notify
the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation instead
of the WOC because the WOC, unlike the Administrator for Commercial
Space Transportation, is available 24-hours per day, 7 days per week.
Proposed Sec.  450.173(d)(3) would require operators to submit a
written preliminary report to the FAA Office of Commercial Space
Transportation within five days of any mishap. The report would need to
include the information listed in proposed Sec.  450.173(d)(3). This
list of information would include the operator's assessment on how the
cause of its mishap could potentially affect similar vehicles, systems,
or operations. Given some systems and components are common across
operators, this information could prevent mishaps due to similar
failures of a common system or component, including ground and range
systems. The reporting requirements in this paragraph are similar to
existing five-day reporting requirements. Under current regulations, a
five-day preliminary written report was only required in the event of
an accident or incident. Based on lessons learned from past mishaps,
the FAA is streamlining these reporting requirements to ensure
consistency between mishap classes and that information required to
properly classify a mishap and the level of investigation required are
reported. For example, mishaps involving a fatality or serious injury
are typically investigated at the Federal level, as such, the FAA is
aware of the information that may affect the safety of the public or
public property. The operator, in accordance with their mishap plan,
may investigate mishaps not involving a fatality or serious injury. In
such cases, it is possible that the FAA may not become aware of
information potentially affecting the public safety or public property
in a timely manner, or other facts that may require elevating the class
of mishap to a higher level.
    Proposed Sec.  450.173(e) sets emergency response requirements.
Proposed Sec.  450.173(e)(1) would require that an operator activate
emergency response services following a mishap. This requirement is
consistent with the post-launch and post-flight attempt hazard controls
in current Sec.  417.415. Proposed Sec.  450.173(e)(2) would require
that an operator maintain existing hazard area surveillance and
clearance as necessary to protect public safety. These notices would
include NOTAM and NOTMAR. Proposed Sec.  450.173(e)(3) would require
that an operator contain and minimize the consequences of a mishap.
Proposed Sec.  450.173(e)(4) would provide for the preservation of data
and physical evidence, including debris, which the FAA considers to be
a physical record. In an effort to contain and minimize the
consequences of the mishap and maintain site integrity for
investigation, an operator would need to safe and secure the mishap
site in a timely manner. Proposed Sec.  450.173(e)(4) is consistent
with current requirements. Proposed Sec.  450.173(e)(5) would require
an operator to implement agreements with local government authorities
and emergency response services, as necessary. Emergency response
procedures should identify who is responsible for securing the mishap
site, and procedures for access to the mishap site. For example, the
procedures should identify who is responsible for educating persons on
the treatment of debris, and the disposal of hazardous materials. The
FAA recommends that prior to beginning operations, an operator
coordinate with Federal, state, and local authorities and emergency
first responders to familiarize them with permitted and licensed
operations and hazards associated with an operator's activities, such
as launch vehicle hazards. This pre-coordination is important to ensure
the safety of emergency personnel responding to the mishap. Vehicle and
operational hazards may include vehicle composites, propellants,
oxidizers, pressure vessels, unexploded ordnance, oxygen systems, and
batteries.
    If implemented, proposed Sec.  450.173(f) would require an operator
to investigate the root causes of a mishap and report the results to
the FAA. Proposed Sec.  450.173(g) would require that an operator
identify and implement preventive measures prior to the next flight,
unless otherwise approved by the Administrator. The FAA is proposing
that preventive measures be implemented prior to the next flight in all
cases in order to codify current practice. The FAA would work with
operators on a case-by-case basis to determine whether its next
operation may proceed if it is unable to implement preventive measures
before the next flight. The requirement to implement corrective action
prior to next flight is consistent with existing requirements in Sec.
437.73(d) for anomaly recording, reporting, and implementation of
corrective actions.
    Proposed Sec.  450.173(h) would require that an operator maintain
records associated with a mishap in accordance with proposed Sec.
450.219(d) (Records). The operator would make these records available
to Federal officials for inspection and copying. This requirement is
consistent with existing record keeping requirements.\148\ Records
would include debris, which the FAA considers a physical record. In all
mishap cases, disposal of any related debris would be required to be
coordinated with the FAA. Note that this proposal would allow for the
sharing of proposed Sec.  450.173

responsibilities between launch and reentry operators pursuant to an
agreement. For example, the site operator may report the mishap
occurrence to the FAA as required by proposed Sec.  450.173(d), while
the emergency response requirements of proposed Sec.  450.173(e) may be
shared by both the launch or reentry operator and site operator. An
operator would be required to retain all records until completion of
any Federal investigation and the FAA advises the operator that the
records need no longer be retained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ Sections 417.15(b), 420.61(b), 431.77(b), and 437.87(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, proposed Sec.  450.173(i) would set application
requirements. This section would require the submission of the mishap
plan document at the time of license or permit application.
v. Test-Induced Damage
    The FAA proposes to introduce a test-induced damage exception to
the mishap definition in proposed Sec.  450.175 (Test-induced Damage).
This proposal would allow an operator to coordinate testing activities
with the FAA before the activities take place to prevent the FAA from
labeling failures as mishaps. Any test failure covered by this section
would be considered test-induced damage and not a mishap, so long as
the failure falls within the pre-coordinated and FAA-approved testing
profile. The test-induced damage concept is not currently within the
FAA's commercial space regulations. This proposal is due to the FAA's
recognition that current mishap regulations may deter the kind of
robust testing that may yield future safety benefits.
    The FAA currently deems a failure to achieve test objectives as a
mishap (failure to complete a launch or reentry as planned). Similarly,
a test failure that results in over $25,000 in damage to associated
property would also be considered a mishap.\149\ In both cases, the
resulting mishap designation would require a mishap investigation to
identify root causes and preventive measures, which the operator would
need to implement before the next operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ ``[R]esulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage . .
.'' in accordance with the mishap definition in Sec.  401.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the recent past, the FAA accepted the possibility of a test-
induced damage approach by pre-coordinating with a launch operator
prior to conducting an in-flight abort test of a crew escape
system.\150\ The FAA found that this process worked well in pre-
defining the objectives of the test, test limits, expected outcomes,
and potential failure modes. It also allowed the operator and FAA to
reach a common understanding of what events would be categorized as a
test-induced damage or mishap. This approach would also be consistent
with ARC feedback that the existing mishap definition leads to
protracted mishap investigations because it does not recognize the
difference between operational missions and higher risk experimental or
test missions. The ARC and FAA believe this discourages robust testing
to push the limits of a vehicle and undercutting test programs
currently covered under experimental permits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ Given these events fell within the pre-coordinated
possible scenarios, the FAA did not consider them unplanned events
and therefore, did not consider the events mishaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, the ARC shared its concern that current mishap
reporting and investigation requirements discourage robust testing. The
FAA believes that the proposed test-induced damages paradigm addresses
this concern by providing an opportunity for license applicants and
existing license holders to pre-coordinate test activities and pre-
declare damages that the FAA would not consider a mishap. Under this
paradigm, failure to achieve identified test objectives and certain
pre-declared damages to property associated with the licensed activity,
including ground support equipment, ground support systems, and flight
hardware would not be reportable as an FAA-mishap provided the
requirements of this section are met. The FAA also proposes to replace
its existing mishap related definitions in favor of a mishap
classification system to further clarify the types of events that would
be considered a mishap.
    Proposed Sec.  450.175(a) would lay out the specific conditions for
the test-induced damage approach. It would require an operator to
coordinate test activities with and obtain approval from the FAA before
the planned activity. The coordination should take place with
sufficient time for the FAA to evaluate the proposal during the
application process or as a license modification. A test activity would
need to be pre-coordinated with the FAA to be eligible for the test-
induced damage mishap exception. The FAA would conduct pre-coordination
activities during pre-application consultation. The test-induced damage
exception would be optional and an operator would not be required to
take this path. However, absent the test-induced damage exception, the
FAA would categorize an unplanned event as a mishap in accordance with
the proposed mishap classification system. Proposed Sec.  450.175(a)(2)
would preclude certain kinds of mishaps from the test-induced damage
alternative. Specifically, any mishap involving a serious injury or
fatality, damage to property not associated with the licensed activity,
or hazardous debris leaving the pre-defined hazard area would be
treated as a mishap and not test-induced damage. Finally, proposed
Sec.  450.175(a)(3) would require test-induced damage to fall within
the scope of activities coordinated with the FAA to be eligible for
this alternative. In other words, the FAA would consider the occurrence
of damages resulting from test activities that fall outside the scope
of approved activities (e.g., before scheduled test activities begin or
exceeding operation limits) as a mishap in accordance with the proposed
mishap classification system. The approved scope of the test would be
outlined in the information submitted by the permittee or licensee to
meet the application requirements of proposed Sec.  450.175(b).
    Proposed Sec.  450.175(b) would set the test-induced damage
application requirements. The paragraph would list the information an
applicant would need to submit under the test-induced damage
alternative to mishap classification. The FAA does not intend the test-
induced damage exception to apply to the operation of an entire
vehicle, but rather the testing of specific components and systems. The
applicant should submit test objectives in a complete, clear, and
concise manner to help the FAA distinguish between nominal operations
and specific test objectives. It should also provide test limits such
as the expected environments, personnel, equipment, or environmental
limits. Also, the applicant would identify expected outcomes that the
FAA would later compare to actual outcomes. The FAA would also request
a list of potential risks, including the applicant's best understanding
of the uncertainties in environments, test limits, or system
performance. Applicable procedures or steps taken to execute the tests
and the expected time and duration of the test would also be required.
Finally, the FAA may request additional information such as
clarification information to ensure public safety, safety of property,
and to safeguard the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States.
    This proposal is similar to NASA's test-induced damages process, as
defined in NPR 8621.1C (NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and
Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping). NASA developed
the test-induced damages paradigm in support of the December 2014
launch of Exploration Flight Test-1 and it has been in use supporting
NASA test

programs ever since. The test-induced damages process is a formal
process documenting the risk of damage and accepting that risk by
signature before the test. Similar to the commercial space industry,
NASA conducts tests to better understand and mitigate complex design,
manufacturing, or operational issues with the objective of providing
NASA with confidence that the system meets its technical and
programmatic requirements and can successfully and safely perform its
mission in the operational environment. As noted in NPR 8261.1C, some
tests are designed and intended to result in hardware damage (e.g., a
structural test-to-failure). Other tests are aggressive in nature, and
test-incurred damage often occurs; the knowledge gained is used to
improve designs. These statements hold true for the commercial space
transportation industry as well. The FAA's proposed test-induced
damages takes a NASA-proven process and tailors it to satisfy the FAA's
public safety mission.

L. Pre- and Post-Flight Reporting

1. Preflight Reporting
    Under proposed Sec.  450.213, the FAA would continue to require a
licensee to provide the FAA with specified information prior to each
launch or reentry, consistent with current requirements. An operator
would send the information as an email attachment to
[email protected], or by some other method as agreed to by the
Administrator in the license. The FAA would require five categories of
information: mission-specific, flight safety analysis products, flight
safety system test data, data required by the FAA to conduct a
collision avoidance analysis, and a launch or reentry schedule.
    The first category would be mission-specific information in
proposed Sec.  450.213(b). As currently required in Sec. Sec.
417.17(b)(2) and 431.79(a), an operator would be required to provide
this information to the FAA not less than 60 days before each mission
conducted under the license. The FAA may also agree to a different time
frame in accordance with Sec.  404.15. An operator would not have to
provide any information under this section if the mission-specific
information was already provided in the application. This would be the
case if an operator's license authorizes specific missions, as opposed
to unlimited launches or reentries within certain parameters.
    Specifically, an operator would continue to have to provide payload
information in accordance with proposed Sec.  450.43(i), and flight
information, including the vehicle, launch site, planned flight path,
staging and impact locations, each payload delivery point, intended
reentry or landing sites including any contingency abort locations, and
the location of any disposed launch or reentry vehicle stage or
component that is deorbited. This section would combine the reporting
requirements of Sec. Sec.  417.17(b)(2) and 431.79(a), although
reporting the location of any disposed launch or reentry vehicle stage
or component that is deorbited would be a new requirement. The FAA
would add this information requirement because disposals are much more
common now than when parts 417 and 435 were issued, and notifications
to airmen and mariners would be necessary to protect the public from
vehicle stages or components reentering as part of a disposal. In
practice, licensees have arranged for the issuance of NOTAMs and NTMs
for vehicle stages purposefully deorbited.
    The second category is flight safety analysis products in proposed
Sec.  450.213(c). An operator would need to submit to the FAA updated
flight safety analysis products, using previously-approved
methodologies, for each mission no less than 30 days before flight. The
FAA may also agree to a different time frame in accordance with
proposed Sec.  404.15. The flight safety analysis products are similar
to what is currently required under Sec.  417.17(c)(3). Part 431 does
not require similar flight safety analysis products to be submitted,
although current practice is to require similar information in license
orders.
    An operator would not be required to submit flight safety analysis
products if the analysis submitted in the license application already
satisfies all the requirements of the section. This would be the case
if a licensee's license authorizes specific missions, as opposed to
unlimited launches within certain parameters. An operator would also
not be required to submit flight safety analysis products if the
operator demonstrated during the application process that the analysis
does not need to be updated to account for mission-specific factors.
This would be the case if an operator operates within certain
operational constraints proven to satisfy public safety criteria.
    Otherwise, an operator would be required to submit flight safety
analysis products while accounting for vehicle and mission specific
input data and potential variations in input data that may affect any
analysis product within the final 30 days before flight. An operator
would also be required to submit the analysis products using the same
format and organization used in its license application. Lastly, an
operator would not be able to change an analysis product within the
final 30 days before flight, unless the operator has a process,
approved in the license, for making a change in that period as part of
the operator's flight safety analysis process.
    The third category is flight safety system test data in proposed
Sec.  450.213(d). If an operator would be required to use an FSS to
protect public safety as required by proposed Sec.  450.101(c), it
would need to submit to the FAA, or provide access to, any test reports
in accordance with approved flight safety system test plans no less
than 30 days before flight. The FAA may also agree to a different time
frame in accordance with proposed Sec.  404.15. This reporting
requirement is discussed earlier in the section for flight safety
systems.
    The fourth category would be data required by the FAA to conduct a
collision avoidance analysis in proposed Sec.  450.213(e). Not less
than 15 days before the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a
reentry vehicle, an operator would need to submit the collision
avoidance information in proposed Appendix A to part 450 to a Federal
entity identified by the FAA, and the FAA. This reporting requirement
is discussed in the ``Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance
Requirements'' section.
    The fifth category, as proposed in Sec.  450.213(f), a launch or
reentry schedule that identifies each review, rehearsal, and safety-
critical operation. The schedule would be required to be filed and
updated in time to allow FAA personnel to participate in the reviews,
rehearsals, and safety-critical operations. This is similar to current
Sec.  417.17(b).
    2. Post-Flight Reporting
    Under proposed Sec.  450.215, the FAA would require an operator to
provide specified information no later than 90 days after a launch or
reentry. The FAA may also agree to a different time frame in accordance
with proposed Sec.  404.15. An operator would send the information as
an email attachment to [email protected], or other method as agreed
to by the Administrator in the license.
    Specifically, as discussed earlier, an operator would need to
provide any anomaly that occurred during countdown or flight that is
material to public health and safety and the safety of property,\151\
and any corrective action

implemented or to be implemented after the flight due to an anomaly or
mishap. Section 417.25(b) and (c) requires similar information. Part
431 does not require post-flight information, although current practice
is to require similar information in license orders.
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    \151\ What is material to public health and safety and the
safety of property is discussed later in this preamble in reference
to proposed Sec.  450.211(a)(2).
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    In addition, an operator would need to provide the actual
trajectory flown by the vehicle, and, for an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle, the actual impact location of all impacting stages and
impacting components. The actual trajectory flown by the vehicle would
be a new requirement, while the actual impact locations for an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle is similar to the requirements in current
Sec.  417.25(b) and (c). The FAA would use the actual trajectory flown
by the vehicle to compare it to predicted trajectories. Because the FAA
may not need this information for all launches, this information would
only need to be reported if requested by the FAA.
    Lastly, an operator would need to report the number of humans on
board the vehicle. This would be required because the FAA keeps a human
space flight database for use by launch and reentry operators for the
purposes of informed consent. Under Sec.  460.45(c), and pursuant to
statute, an operator must inform each space flight participant of the
safety record of all launch or reentry vehicles that have carried one
or more persons on board, including both U.S. government and private
sector vehicles, to include the total number of people who have died or
been seriously injured on these flights, the total number of launches
and reentries conducted with people on board, and the number of
catastrophic failures. To facilitate all operators accurately informing
space flight participants, the FAA maintains the human space flight
database and populates it using voluntarily provided information from
industry. As more launches and reentries are expected with humans on
board, the FAA will require this information to keep the human
spaceflight database up to date, and expects that this would not
significantly increase the burden to operators.

Ground Safety

A. Definition and Scope of Launch

    As discussed in more detail in this section, the FAA proposes to
amend the definitions of ``launch'' and ``reentry'' in part 401 to
mirror the statutory definitions. The FAA would move the beginning and
end of launch to proposed Sec.  450.3, which defines the scope of a
vehicle operator's license. Proposed Sec.  450.3(b) would establish
that launch begins under a license with the start of hazardous
activities that pose a threat to the public, and it would amend the end
of launch language to remove any reference to ELVs and RLVs. Finally,
the FAA proposes to clarify that, absent the launch vehicle, the
arrival of a payload at the launch site would not trigger the beginning
of launch. Also, at a non-U.S. launch site, launch would begin at
ignition or take-off for a hybrid vehicle.
    Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines launch as to place or try to place a
launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any payload or human being from
Earth in a suborbital trajectory; in Earth orbit in outer space; or
otherwise in outer space, including activities involved in the
preparation of a launch vehicle or payload for launch, when those
activities take place at a launch site in the United States. The FAA
added the current regulatory definition of launch in the 1999 final
rule.\152\ The language in the regulatory definition differs slightly
from the current statutory language regarding activities in preparation
of the vehicle, and the regulatory definition does not include the
reference to human beings because that reference was added to the
statute after 1999.\153\ The regulatory definition also includes
language that is not set forth in the statute pertaining to pre- and
post-flight ground operations including language identifying the
beginning of launch and end of launch.
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    \152\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999).
    \153\ As currently defined in 14 CFR 401.5, launch means to
place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any
payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in
outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes preparing a
launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United States. The
current definition also defines beginning and end of launch, which,
as discussed later in the preamble, the FAA proposes to amend and
move to proposed part 450 (Scope of a vehicle operator license).
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    The FAA and industry have identified a number of issues associated
with the current definition of launch in Sec.  401.5. The current
definition of launch is inflexible and has resulted in confusion
regarding launch from non-U.S. sites and whether the arrival of a
payload constitutes the beginning of launch.
    The preamble discussion in the 1999 final rule stated that the
intent of the FAA's definition of ``launch'' is to require a license at
the start of those hazardous preflight activities that put public
safety at risk. The final rule stated that, in accordance with this
responsibility, the FAA will exercise regulatory oversight only if an
activity is so hazardous as to pose a threat to third parties.
Specifically, the FAA determined that launch begins when hazardous
activities related to the assembly and ultimate flight of the launch
vehicle commence.\154\ The preamble further elaborated that the moment
at which hazardous activities begin is when the major components of a
licensee's launch vehicle enter, for purposes of preparing for flight,
the gate of a U.S. launch site, regardless of whether the site is
situated on a Federal launch range and regardless of whether flight
occurs from that site.\155\ At the time, the FAA determined that the
arrival of the launch vehicle at a U.S. launch site would trigger the
beginning of launch for the following reasons: ease of administration,
consistent and broad interpretation, and change in the level of
risk.\156\ Additionally, the rule stated that shortly after vehicle
components arrive, hazardous activities related to the assembly and
ultimate flight of the launch vehicle begin and therefore the arrival
of the vehicle or its parts is a logical point at which the FAA should
ensure that a launch operator is exercising safe practices and is
financially responsible for any damage it may cause.\157\ In accordance
with the definition of launch, the FAA has required a launch license to
be in place before the arrival of major components of a launch vehicle
at a U.S. launch site that are intended for use on a specific FAA-
licensed launch.
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    \154\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19591.
    \155\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999).
    \156\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19589.
    \157\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19591.
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    The lack of flexibility in the definition of beginning of launch
has led to multiple requests from the industry to waive the requirement
for a license to bring vehicle hardware on site and begin preflight
activity.\158\ The FAA has issued numerous waivers because it
determined that the proposed preflight activities associated with the
arrival of launch vehicles or their major components were not so
hazardous to the public as to require FAA oversight. In granting a
waiver, the FAA determines that the waiver is in the public interest
and will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of
property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the
United States. In addition, by requesting a waiver to conduct preflight
activities, the operator agrees that it must forgo the opportunity to
seek indemnification for

any loss incurred under the waiver during the waived preflight
activities.
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    \158\ As stated previously, the FAA is only able to waive
regulatory requirements, not definitions, and therefore has issued
waivers to the requirement to obtain a license, rather than to the
definition of launch.
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    Further, the current definition does not account for the
significant technological advances the industry has experienced since
adoption of the 1999 rule. For example, in the current commercial space
transportation environment, launch operations often include vehicles or
vehicle stages that fly back to a U.S. launch site and remain at the
launch site. In cases where no license was in place to cover the
presence of flight hardware for possible reuse, consistent with 1999
rule preamble language, the FAA has deemed this to be storage and does
not require a license or waiver.\159\ As currently written, however,
the definition could imply that a license is required for RLV launches
during the period between end-of-launch and launch vehicle reuse, even
when the vehicle is in a safe and dormant state, and would not be a
threat to public safety.
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    \159\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19593. ``On the other
hand, the FAA does not intend a launch license to encompass
components stored at a launch site for a considerable period of time
prior to flight.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the current definition states that launch begins under a
license with the arrival of a launch vehicle or payload at a U.S.
launch site, the term ``or payload'' has been interpreted to mean
arrival of a payload by itself could constitute beginning of launch.
However, the 1999 preamble explicitly states that the FAA does not
define launch to commence with the arrival of a payload absent the
launch vehicle at a launch site.\160\ Also, it states that the FAA does
not consider payload processing absent launch vehicle integration to
constitute part of licensed activities.\161\ In addition, the 1999 rule
preamble refers to launch beginning when the ``major components'' of a
launch vehicle arrive at the launch site. However, the regulatory
language remains unclear.
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    \160\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19589.
    \161\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19593.
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    Another point of current uncertainty is when launch begins from a
non-U.S. site. Title 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 gives the FAA authority to
issue a launch license to a U.S. citizen conducting a launch anywhere
in the world. However, the current definition of launch is silent as to
when launch begins from a non-U.S. site. This has resulted in operators
lacking clarity as to when launch begins. In recent years, the FAA has
licensed launches from international waters, Australia, the Marshall
Islands, New Zealand, and Spain. In licensing these launches, the FAA
has consistently interpreted that launch from outside of U.S. territory
to begin at ignition or at the first movement that initiates flight,
whichever occurs earlier.
    The ARC commented about the definition of launch for licensed
launches from a U.S. launch site. The ARC report stated that launch
should be defined on a case-by-case basis for all operators. The ARC
recommended licensed activities on U.S. launch sites for all vehicles
include preflight ground operations, flight operations, and launch
operations phases as tailored by each launch operator. The ARC further
recommends the initiation and scope of launch activities, including
preflight ground operations and flight operation phases, be defined by
the impact of each activity on public safety and property. These
activities may include both hazardous and safety-critical operations,
the latter encompassing non-hazardous activities that may impact public
risk during other pre-launch and flight activities. A list of
performance-based criteria for licensed activities would be tailored
for each operator and the FAA based on their specific concept of
operations. This scope should only include hazardous operations unique
to activities as defined in the operator's license application
documents and not activities already regulated by another government
agency.
    In light of the multiple waiver requests and ARC recommendations,
the FAA proposes to amend the regulatory definitions of launch and
reentry (discussed later in this section) to match the statutory
definitions. The FAA would also move the details in the definitions for
beginning and end of launch (discussed later in this section) and
reentry to the scope of a vehicle operator license requirements in
proposed Sec.  450.3. In addition, the FAA would revise ``beginning of
launch'' to be more performance-based and ``end of launch'' to remove
references to ELVs and RLVs. Finally, the FAA proposes to clarify that
launch from a non-U.S. site would begin at ignition, and that the
arrival of a payload to a launch site does not constitute beginning of
launch. The FAA believes the proposed revisions capture the primary
intent of the ARC's recommendation, which is to limit FAA oversight to
those launch operations that pose a hazard to public safety and the
safety of property.
    The FAA would revise the definitions of launch and reentry in Sec.
401.5 to mirror the statutory definitions. Specifically, the FAA would
remove the beginning and end of launch language from the definition of
``launch,'' and add the term ``human being'' to align with the 2015
update to the Act. Similarly, the FAA would revise the definition of
``reenter/reentry'' in part 401 to mirror the statutory definition, and
would add the term ``human being'' to align with the 2015 update to the
Act.
    The FAA would move the beginning and end of launch and reentry
language to proposed Sec.  450.3. The FAA proposes this change because
such detail in a definition makes the definition unwieldy and, unlike
regulatory requirements, definitions cannot be waived.
    The FAA would amend beginning of launch such that launch begins
with the first hazardous activities related to the assembly and
ultimate flight of the launch vehicle at a U.S. launch site. Unless a
later point is agreed to by the Administrator, hazardous preflight
ground operations would be presumed to begin when the launch vehicle or
its major components arrive at the launch site. For operations where an
applicant identifies a later time when hazardous operations begin, the
applicant may propose the event that it believes should constitute the
beginning of launch during the pre-application process.\162\ As a
result, there would be no need to request a waiver.
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    \162\ The FAA's proposal regarding how an operator would
determine what event constitutes the beginning of launch, and how to
obtain the Administrator's approval, is located in the Ground Safety
section under the Identifying First Hazardous Activity sub-heading
of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed change would also clarify that for launch vehicle
stages or when launch begins for an RLV that returns to a launch site
and remains there in a dormant state, FAA oversight is not necessary
since no hazardous activity that falls under the FAA's oversight
responsibilities are being performed.
    This proposal would clarify that, absent vehicle hardware, the
arrival of payload does not constitute beginning of launch. Instead,
launch would begin with the arrival of a launch vehicle or its major
components at a U.S. launch site, or at a later point as agreed to by
the Administrator.
    This proposal would also specify that launch from a non-U.S. site
begins at ignition, or at the first movement that initiates flight, of
the launch vehicle, whichever comes first. For hybrid vehicles, flight