[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 86 (Friday, May 3, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26110-26112]
[FR Doc No: 2013-10545]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Safety Advisory 2013-03]

Kicking Cars and Going Between Rolling Equipment During Flat
Switching Operations

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: A fatality occurred during a railroad switching operation that
involved a railroad employee kicking cars and subsequently going
between rolling equipment. In response, FRA is publishing this Safety
Advisory 2013-03 to make recommendations to railroads regarding the
adoption of car-handling procedures during flat switching operations at
certain locations and to re-emphasize the importance of following
procedures when going between rolling equipment due to the hazards
involved. FRA previously made related recommendations to railroads and
their employees regarding going between rolling equipment in Safety
Advisory 2011-02.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron Hynes, Director, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>;
Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director, Operating Practices Division, Office
of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; or Joseph St. Peter,
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The overall safety of railroad operations
has improved in recent years. However, in July 2012, a fatal event
occurred during a switching operation which involved a railroad
employee going between rolling equipment after kicking \1\ two loaded
tank cars up a 0.2-percent ascending grade. This 2012 incident
illustrates the safety risks that are present when railroads allow the
kicking of cars in flat switching operations at locations where the
cars will likely roll back out toward the employees conducting such
operations if the cars do not couple to secured standing equipment as

intended. This incident also highlights the need for the railroad
industry to again focus its attention on compliance with safety rules
and procedures that apply to employees who, in the course of their
work, must place themselves between rolling equipment.
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    \1\ As referenced in 49 CFR 218.99(a)(2), kicking cars refers to
the common railroad switching practice of shoving or pushing rolling
equipment and then uncoupling the equipment and allowing it to roll
free.
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    As background, FRA previously published a safety advisory regarding
the importance of following procedures when going between rolling
equipment. Safety Advisory 2011-02 \2\ was issued in response to a
series of fatal switching accidents that also involved employees
placing themselves between rolling equipment. As discussed in that
safety advisory, FRA previously established a group of industry
stakeholders to examine and address a past trend of increasing deaths
occurring during railroad switching operations. The group included
representatives from both industry and labor organizations, and was
named the Switching Operations Fatality Analysis (SOFA) Working Group.
In 1999, the SOFA Working Group issued a report that contained five
major findings with an accompanying recommendation and discussion for
each finding.\3\ The first of these five recommendations is directly
applicable to situations where employees go between rolling equipment,
or otherwise foul track or equipment. That recommendation reads as
follows:

    \2\ 76 FR 62894 (Oct. 11, 2011).
    \3\ See ``Findings and Recommendations of the SOFA Working
Group''; available online at: http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L03078. More recently, in March 2011, the SOFA Working Group issued
a report titled ``Findings and Advisories of the SOFA Working
Group''; available online at: http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L03071.

    Any crew member intending to foul track or equipment must notify
the locomotive engineer before such action can take place. The
locomotive engineer must then apply locomotive or train brakes, have
the reverser centered, and then confirm this action with the
individual on the ground. Additionally, any crew member that intends
to adjust knuckles/drawbars, or apply or remove EOT device, must
insure that the cut of cars to be coupled into is separated by no
less than 50 feet. Also, the person on the ground must physically
inspect the cut of cars not attached to the locomotive to insure
that they are completely stopped and, if necessary, a sufficient
number of hand brakes must be applied to insure the cut of cars will
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not move. [Emphasis added]

    Most railroads have procedures similar to those described in this
SOFA recommendation, and other railroads have adopted or modified their
procedures to be utilized when going between rolling equipment to
respond to this recommendation. However, as discussed further below, in
flat switching operations where cars are kicked into a coupling rather
than shoved, it may be more difficult for railroad employees engaged in
such operations to make the determination that cars not attached to the
locomotive are stopped and secured in compliance with this SOFA
recommendation. That difficulty in making the determination that cars
are stopped and secured is heightened at locations where grade or other
conditions can cause kicked cars to roll back out towards crews
conducting switching operations, and correspondingly can lead to
increased safety risks when employees then have to place themselves
between rolling equipment.

Incident Summary

    As noted above, Safety Advisory 2011-02 discussed the circumstances
surrounding five switching fatalities that occurred between 2009 and
2011. The following is an overview of the circumstances surrounding the
most recent fatal switching incident that occurred in July 2012.
Information regarding this incident is based on FRA's preliminary
investigatory findings. The probable cause of this incident has not yet
been established. Accordingly, nothing in this safety advisory is
intended to attribute a definitive cause to this incident, or place
responsibility for the incident on the acts or omissions of any
specific person or entity.
     On July 31, 2012, at approximately 2:30 a.m., a
conventional three-person crew, consisting of an engineer, a footboard
yardmaster, and a conductor/switchman (switchman) were conducting
switching operations. The crew kicked--rather than shoved--two loaded
tank cars southward into a yard track with the goal of coupling them to
other cars that had been previously placed into the yard track and
secured. The yard track had a 0.2-percent ascending grade (southward).
The switchman had originally positioned himself to verify that the cars
kicked into the track coupled to the standing equipment. However, after
the footboard yardmaster was not able to uncouple the cars and kick
them into the track, he shoved the cars toward the switchman's location
so that the switchman could make the cut and kick the cars into the
standing equipment. After the two tank cars were kicked into the yard
track by the switchman, he noticed that the knuckle on the last car of
the block of cars still attached to the crew's locomotive had fallen to
the ground and needed to be reinserted. The switchman then informed the
crew that the knuckle pin was missing. Following applicable railroad
rules, prior to reinserting and adjusting the knuckle, the switchman
first requested and received ``Red Zone'' protection. However, the two
loaded tank cars that had previously been kicked into the yard track
did not couple to the standing cars on that track as intended, and the
uncoupled cars rolled back northward. As the switchman adjusted the
knuckle, the two loaded tank cars struck him and the standing equipment
attached to the locomotive. The conductor sustained fatal injuries.

    In the incident discussed above, the switchman did not physically
inspect the cut of cars to verify that they were stopped and secured
prior to going between them and the cars still attached to the
locomotive. Further, because the tank cars were kicked toward the
standing equipment rather than shoved into a coupling, and, thus, not
stretched as is standard railroad operating practice to ensure that a
coupling is made, it may have been more difficult for the switchman to
ascertain whether the cars had coupled. These factors became
particularly significant because the switching operation occurred on a
track with a 0.2-percent grade, and because the sloshing action that
typically occurs in loaded tank cars can cause the cars to roll in the
opposite direction after they have stopped. Environmental factors such
as the time of day (light) and noise interference from a refrigerated
car standing approximately 50 feet away from the incident location on
an adjacent track may have also interfered with the employee's ability
to see and hear the two approaching free rolling tank cars. In
addition, during flat switching operations when cars are kicked into a
coupling, and, thus, have to roll free for a certain distance,
employees are often physically located farther from the location where
a coupling is to be made than if the cars are shoved into a coupling,
dependent on the number of cars to be cut off and distance that the
cars have to travel into a track. The farther an employee is from the
location of an intended coupling, the more difficult it may be to make
a proper determination that cars are stopped and secured.

    As a result, in such situations, it is imperative that railroad
employees adhere to--and the railroads require--verification that the
cars the employees go between are completely stopped, and, if
necessary, secured with handbrakes. Depending on a track's grade and
the type of equipment being switched, kicking cars rather than shoving
them into a coupling increases

safety risks because if the kicked cars fail to couple, there is a
likelihood that the equipment may roll backward toward employees who
have to place themselves between rolling equipment in the course of
conducting switching operations. Thus, one of FRA's recommendations
below is that railroads adopt procedures to prohibit crews from kicking
cars in flat switching operations at locations where the physical
characteristics make it likely that such cars will roll back out toward
the crew if a proper coupling is not made.
    The discussion contained in this safety advisory is not intended to
place blame on or assign responsibility to individuals or railroads,
but rather to emphasize the fact that a culture of safety and rules
compliance is everyone's responsibility. FRA encourages railroad
management to adopt and adhere to policies that promote the safest
course of action in conducting switching operations, particularly by
taking into account unique characteristics that exist at different
locations when adopting those policies. Further, a culture of
performing each task safely and as instructed in training in accordance
with applicable railroad operating rules must be reinforced not only by
management, but by railroad employees as well. Railroad management must
positively reinforce, via job briefings and other appropriate means,
safe job performance in accordance with established rules and
procedures. Support from railroad management and positive peer pressure
from fellow railroad employees encouraging individuals to perform each
task in a safe manner via the proper procedures will help railroad
employees maintain responsibility for their own safety.
    Recommended Railroad Action: In light of the above discussion, and
in an effort to maintain a heightened sense of vigilance among
railroads and their employees who conduct switching operations, FRA
recommends that railroads:
    (1) Review with their employees the circumstances of the fatal
incident described in this Safety Advisory 2013-03.
    (2) Evaluate locations where flat switching operations are
conducted and identify those where the physical characteristics and the
types of cars being switched heighten the possibility that cars will
roll out toward the employees conducting such operations. After
identifying such locations, FRA recommends that railroads adopt
procedures requiring that cars be shoved into couplings rather than
kicked during such operations in an effort to lessen the potential
safety risks, particularly when employees have to go between equipment.
    (3) Review with their employees, including management employees,
SOFA Safety Recommendation  1, Adjusting Knuckles, Adjusting
Drawbars, and installing End of Train Devices, reproduced above, and
communicate its procedures implementing that recommendation to
employees working in yards or other locations where the possibility of
entering between rolling equipment exists. FRA recommends that
railroads place emphasis on the portion of SOFA Safety Recommendation
1 discussing the need to ensure that equipment not attached to
the locomotive is stopped, and is secured with handbrakes when
necessary, before employees go between rolling equipment. Inherent in
complying with SOFA Safety Recommendation 1 is recognition of
the physical characteristics of the track on which switching operations
are being conducted and the rolling characteristics of the type of
equipment being switched, particularly as related to the handling of
loaded tank cars.
    (4) Re-emphasize the recommendations contained in previous Safety
Advisory 2011-02 with all of their employees, including railroad
management.
    FRA encourages railroad industry members to take actions that are
consistent with the preceding recommendations, and to take other
complementary actions to help ensure the safety of the Nation's
railroad employees. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2013-03, issue
additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate actions
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under its rail
safety authority.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on April 29, 2013.
Joseph C. Szabo,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2013-10545 Filed 5-2-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 112 (Monday, June 11, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26997-26998]
[FR Doc No: 2018-12505]

=======================================================================
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[EPA-HQ-SFUND-2006-0361; FRL-9978-99-OLEM]

Proposed Information Collection Request; Comment Request; Trade
Secrets Claims Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Information (EPCRA Section 322)

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is planning to
submit an information collection request (ICR), ``Trade Secrets Claims
under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Information''
(EPA ICR No. 1428.11, OMB Control No. 2050-0078) to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act. Before doing so, EPA is soliciting public
comments on specific aspects of the proposed information collection as
described below. This is a proposed extension of the ICR, which is
currently approved through November 30, 2018. An Agency may not conduct
or sponsor and a person is not required to respond to a collection of
information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before August 10, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, referencing Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-
SFUND-2006-0361 referencing the Docket ID numbers provided for each
item in the text, online using www.regulations.gov (our preferred
method), by email to [email protected], or by mail to: EPA
Docket Center, Environmental Protection Agency, Mail Code 28221T, 1200
Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20460.
    EPA's policy is that all comments received will be included in the
public docket without change including any personal information
provided, unless the comment includes profanity, threats, information
claimed to be Confidential Business Information (CBI) or other
information whose disclosure is restricted by statute.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sicy Jacob, Office of Emergency
Management, (5104A), Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania
Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20460; telephone number:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email
address: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Supporting documents which explain in detail
the information that the EPA will be collecting are available in the
public docket for this ICR. The docket can be viewed online at
www.regulations.gov or in person at the EPA Docket Center, WJC West,
Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, DC. The telephone
number for the Docket Center is<PHONE_NUMBER>. For additional
information about EPA's public docket, visit http://www.epa.gov/dockets.
    Pursuant to section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the PRA, EPA is soliciting
comments and information to enable it to: (i) evaluate whether the
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the Agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility; (ii) evaluate the accuracy of
the Agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of
information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions
used; (iii) enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; and (iv) minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of appropriate automated electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection techniques or other forms of information
technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses. EPA
will consider the comments received and amend the ICR as appropriate.
The final ICR package will then be submitted to OMB for review and
approval. At that time, EPA will issue another Federal Register notice
to announce the submission of the ICR to OMB and the opportunity to
submit additional comments to OMB.
    Abstract: This information collection request pertains to trade
secrecy claims submitted under Section 322 of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). EPCRA contains
provisions requiring facilities to report to State and local
authorities, and EPA, the presence of extremely hazardous substances
(Section 302), inventory of hazardous chemicals (Sections 311 and 312)
and manufacture, process and use of toxic chemicals (Section 313).
Section 322 of EPCRA allows a facility to withhold the specific
chemical identity from these EPCRA reports if the facility asserts a
claim of trade secrecy for that chemical identity. The provisions in
Section 322 establish the requirements and procedures that facilities
must follow to request trade secrecy treatment of chemical identities,
as well as the procedures for submitting public petitions to the Agency
for review of the ``sufficiency'' of trade secrecy claims. The
regulations are codified in 40 CFR part 350.
    Trade secrecy protection is provided for specific chemical
identities contained in reports submitted under each of the following:
(1) Section 303 (d)(2)--Facility notification of changes that have or
are about to occur, (2) Section 303 (d)(3)--Local Emergency Planning
Committee (LEPC) requests for facility information to develop or
implement emergency plans, (3) Section 311--Material Safety Data Sheets
(MSDSs) submitted by facilities, or list of those chemicals submitted
in place of the MSDSs, (4) Section 312--Emergency and hazardous
chemical inventory forms (Tier I or Tier II), and (5) Section 313 Toxic
chemical release inventory form.
    Form Number: EPA Form No. 8700-30.
    Respondents/affected entities: Entities potentially affected by
this action are manufacturers or non-manufacturers subject to reporting
under Sections 303, 311/312 or 313 of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).
    Respondent's obligation to respond: Mandatory if the respondents
wish to claim the chemical identity for any of the chemicals as trade
secret in any of the reports required to be submitted under EPCRA.
    Estimated number of respondents: 305 (total). This number may be
revised prior to submitting the ICR package to OMB based on the claims
received as the compliance date for Section 313 report is July 1, 2018
for 2017 reporting year.
    Frequency of response: Trade secret claim packages must be
submitted to EPA at the same time the reports under Sections 303, 311,
312, and 313 are submitted.
    Total estimated burden: 2,898 hours (per year). Burden is defined
at 5 CFR 1320.03(b)
    Total estimated cost: $169,373 (per year). No capital and operation
and maintenance costs are associated with any requirements in this ICR.
    Changes in Estimates: There is a decrease of 311 hours in the total
estimated respondent burden compared with the ICR currently approved by

OMB. The actual number of claims submitted under Section 312 is
slightly lower than the estimate provided in the previous ICR. The
burden hours and costs may be revised based on the actual trade secret
claim submissions received for Section 313 reports. The compliance
deadline for section 313 report is July 1, 2018. EPA will revise the
burden and costs prior to submitting the package to OMB.

    Dated: May 24, 2018.
Becki Clark,
 Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Management.
[FR Doc. 2018-12505 Filed 6-8-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register: September 27, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 186)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 59077-59078]
[DOCID:fr27se10-11]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0260; Directorate Identifier 2010-CE-015-AD;
Amendment 39-16440; AD 2010-20-06]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; GROB-WERKE (Type Certificate Previously
Held by BURKHART GROB Luft- und Raumfahrt) Models G115C, G115D and
G115D2 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    The manufacturer has received a report of a failed canopy
jettison test, during a regular maintenance check. The investigation
revealed that a cable shroud of the jettison system protruded the
canopy structure, which probably caused the malfunction. Inability
to jettison the canopy in flight would prevent evacuation of the
aeroplane in case of need.

    We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective November 1, 2010.
    On November 1, 2010, the Director of the Federal Register approved
the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this
AD.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov or in person at Document Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC
20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA,
Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri
64106; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to
amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified
products. That SNPRM was published in the Federal Register on June 4,
2010 (75 FR 31734). That SNPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition
for the specified products. The MCAI states:

    The manufacturer has received a report of a failed canopy
jettison test, during a regular maintenance check. The investigation
revealed that a cable shroud of the jettison system protruded the
canopy structure, which probably caused the malfunction. Inability
to jettison the canopy in flight would prevent evacuation of the
aeroplane in case of need.
    For the reason stated above, this AD mandates an additional one
time canopy jettison test and repair if necessary.

    You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD
docket.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We received no comments on the SNPRM or on the determination
of the cost to the public.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and
the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 3 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 3 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $85 per work-hour.
    Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S.
operators to be $765 or $255 per product.
    In addition, we estimate that any necessary follow-on actions will
take about 3 work-hours and require parts costing $68, for a cost of
$323 per product. We have no way of determining the number of products
that may need these actions.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Office (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>) is in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be

available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2010-20-06 GROB-WERKE (Type Certificate Previously Held by BURKHART
GROB Luft- und Raumfahrt): Amendment 39-16440; Docket No. FAA-2010-
0260; Directorate Identifier 2010-CE-015-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective November
1, 2010.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to GROB-WERKE (Type Certificate Previously
Held by BURKHART GROB Luft- und Raumfahrt) Models G115C, G115D, and
G115D2 airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 52: Doors.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
    The manufacturer has received a report of a failed canopy
jettison test, during a regular maintenance check. The investigation
revealed that a cable shroud of the jettison system protruded the
canopy structure, which probably caused the malfunction. Inability
to jettison the canopy in flight would prevent evacuation of the
aeroplane in case of need.
    For the reason stated above, this AD mandates an additional one
time canopy jettison test and repair if necessary.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done, do the following actions:
    (1) Before further flight after November 1, 2010 (the effective
date of this AD), fabricate a placard (using at least 1/8-inch
letters) with the following words and install the placard on the
instrument panel within the pilot's clear view: ``AEROBATIC FLIGHT
PROHIBITED.''
    (2) Before the next aerobatic flight after November 1, 2010 (the
effective date of this AD), do a canopy jettison test following Grob
Aircraft AG Service Bulletin No. MSB1078-164, dated July 21, 2009.
    (3) If the canopy jettison fails the test required in paragraph
(f)(2) of this AD, before further aerobatic flight, contact Grob
Aircraft AG, Customer Service, 86874 Tussenhausen-Mattsies, Germany,
telephone: + 49 (0) 8268-998-105; fax; + 49 (0) 8268-998-200; e-
mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>for an FAA-approved repair
scheme and incorporate the repair scheme.
    (4) Within 7 days after doing the canopy jettison test required
in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD or within 7 days after November 1,
2010 (the effective date of this AD), whichever occurs later, submit
a report of the test results using Appendix 1 of Grob Aircraft AG
Service Bulletin No. MSB1078-164, dated July 21, 2009, to Grob
Aircraft AG at the address specified in paragraph (f)(3)(i) of this
AD.
    (5) After the corrective actions specified in paragraph (f)(3)
or if the canopy jettison passed the test required in paragraph
(f)(2) of this AD, before further flight, remove the placard that
was installed in accordance with paragraph (f)(1) of this AD.

FAA AD Differences

    Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: The MCAI does not have a placard requirement. To
eliminate any confusion and to ensure pilot awareness of the unsafe
condition, we added a temporary placard requirement to this AD.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
Standards Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this
AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send
information to ATTN: Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small
Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri
64106; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>. Before using
any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify
your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
approved the information collection requirements and has assigned
OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD No.
2009-0279, dated December 23, 2009; and Grob Aircraft AG Service
Bulletin No. MSB1078-164, dated July 21, 2009, for related
information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (i) You must use Grob Aircraft AG Service Bulletin No. MSB1078-
164, dated July 21, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD,
unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Grob
Aircraft AG, Customer Service, 86874 Tussenhausen-Mattsies, Germany,
Internet: http://www.grob-aircraft.eu/.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information
incorporated by reference for this AD at the FAA, Central Region,
Office of the Regional Counsel, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri
64106. For information on the availability of this material at the
Central Region, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information
incorporated by reference for this AD at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to: http://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on September 16, 2010.
William J. Timberlake,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-23740 Filed 9-24-10; 8:45 am]
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 22, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 10851]
[FR Doc No: 2023-03590]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Parts 122 and 123

[EPA-HQ-OW-2022-0834; FRL-10123-05-OW]
RIN 2040-AG27

NPDES Small MS4 Urbanized Area Clarification; Withdrawal of
Direct Final Rule

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Withdrawal of direct final rule.

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SUMMARY: Due to the receipt of an adverse comment, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is withdrawing the direct final rule ``NPDES
Small MS4 Urbanized Area Clarification,'' published on December 2,
2022.

DATES: Effective February 22, 2023, the EPA withdraws the direct final
rule published at 87 FR 73965, on December 2, 2022.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Heather Huddle, Water Permits Division
(MC4203), Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW,
Washington, DC 20004; telephone number:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email address:
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 2, 2022, the EPA published a
direct final rule (87 FR 73965). We stated in that direct final rule
that if we received adverse comment by January 3, 2023 (extended to
January 18, 2023 (87 FR 80079, December 29, 2022)), the direct final
rule would not take effect and we would publish a timely withdrawal in
the Federal Register. Because the EPA subsequently received adverse
comment on that direct final rule, we are withdrawing the direct final
rule.
    The EPA published a parallel proposed rule on the same day (87 FR
74066, December 2, 2022) as the direct final rule, which proposed the
same rule changes as the direct final rule. The proposed rule invited
comment on the substance of these rule changes. The EPA will respond to
comments as part of any final action it takes on the parallel proposed
rule. As stated in the direct final rule and the parallel proposed
rule, we will not institute a second comment period on this action.

List of Subjects

40 CFR Part 122

    Environmental protection, Stormwater, Water pollution.

40 CFR Part 123

    Environmental protection, Stormwater, Water pollution.

Michael S. Regan,
Administrator.

0
Accordingly, as of February 22, 2023, the EPA withdraws the direct
final rule amending 40 CFR parts 122 and 123, which published at 87 FR
73965, on December 2, 2022.
[FR Doc. 2023-03590 Filed 2-21-23; 8:45 am]
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