[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 165 (Thursday, August 25, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 53102-53112]
[FR Doc No: 2011-21596]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0131]

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Denial of Petition for
Rulemaking; School Buses

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Denial of petition for rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This document denies a petition for rulemaking from the Center
for Auto Safety (CAS) and 21 others asking that NHTSA mandate the
installation of three-point seat belts (lap/shoulder belts) for all
seating positions on all school buses. We are denying the petition
because we have not found a safety problem supporting a Federal
requirement for lap/shoulder belts on large school buses, which are
already very safe. The decision to install seat belts on school buses
should be left to State and local jurisdictions, which can weigh the
need for, benefits and consequences of installing belts on large school
buses and best decide whether their particular pupil transportation
programs merit installation of the devices.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal issues: Ms. Deirdre Fujita,
Office of the Chief Counsel, NCC-112, phone<PHONE_NUMBER>. For non-
legal issues: Ms. Shashi Kuppa, Office of Crashworthiness Standards,
NVS-113, phone<PHONE_NUMBER>. You can reach both of these officials at
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Overview

    This document denies a petition for rulemaking from the CAS and
others \1\ (hereinafter referred to as the ``CAS petition'') asking
NHTSA to mandate the installation of three-point seat belts (lap/
shoulder belt) for all seating positions on large school buses.\2\
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    \1\ The petition, dated March 9, 2010 on CAS letterhead,
described itself as from the following groups and individuals in
addition to the CAS: the National Coalition for School Bus Safety,
Public Citizen, Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety, Consumers
Union, KidsandCars.org, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety,
Consumer Federation of America, SafetyBeltSafe U.S.A., the Trauma
Foundation, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), the American
Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons, the Orthopaedic Trauma
Association, 2safeschools.org, Safe Ride News, the Advocacy
Institute for Children, Belt Up School Kids, the Coalition for Child
Safety, Nancy Bauder, Lynn Brown/Rhea Vogel, Ruth Spaulding, and
Norm Cherkis.
    \2\ ``School bus'' is defined in 49 CFR 571.3 as a bus that is
sold, or introduced in interstate commerce, for purposes that
include carrying students to and from school or related events, but
does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as a common
carrier in urban transportation. A ``bus'' is a motor vehicle,
except a trailer, designed for carrying more than 10 persons. In
this document, when we refer to ``large'' school buses, we refer to
school buses with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of more than
4,536 kilograms (kg) (10,000 pounds (lb)). These large school buses
may transport as many as 90 students. ``Small'' school buses are
school buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000 lb) or less. Generally,
these small school buses seat 15 persons or fewer, or have one or
two wheelchair seating positions.
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    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 222, ``School bus
passenger seating and crash protection,'' requires lap/shoulder belts
for all seating positions on small school buses, and requires that
passengers on large school buses be protected through a concept called
``compartmentalization.'' \3\ The deceleration experienced by small
school buses necessitates installation of the belts for adequate
occupant crash protection. For large school buses, we have determined
there is not a safety problem warranting national action to require the
addition of lap/shoulder belts to these vehicles. Large school buses
are very safe due to their greater weight and higher seating height
than most other vehicles, high visibility to motorists, and occupant
protection through compartmentalization. The vehicles have compiled an
excellent safety record.
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    \3\ Compartmentalization is a protective envelope formed of
strong, closely spaced seats that have energy absorbing seat backs
so that passengers are cushioned and contained by the seat in front
in the event of a school bus crash. Compartmentalization is
described more fully in the next section of this denial notice.
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    In considering the issue of seat belts for large school buses,
NHTSA has been mindful that a requirement for seat belts could affect
funding for school transportation. A Federal requirement for seat belts
on large school buses will increase the cost to purchase and operate
the vehicles, which would impact school budgets. Increased costs to
purchase and operate large school buses could reduce the availability
of school bus service overall, and reduce school bus ridership. The
reduced ridership may result in more students finding alternative, less
safe means of getting to or from school or related events, such as
riding in private vehicles--often with a teenage driver. When
alternative means are used, the risk of traffic-related injury or
fatality to children is greater than when a large school bus is used.
    As such, there are many factors to be weighed in deciding whether
seat belts should be installed on large school buses. Throughout the
past 34 years that compartmentalization and the school bus safety
standards have been in effect, the agency has openly and continuously
considered the merits of a seat belt requirement for large school
buses. (See, e.g., responses to petitions to require seat belt
anchorages and seat belt assemblies, 41 FR 28506 (July 12, 1976) and 48
FR 47032 (October 17, 1983); response to petition for rulemaking to
prohibit the installation of lap belts on large school buses, 71 FR
40057 (July 14, 2006).)
    Most recently, NHTSA discussed the issue of requiring seat belts on
large school buses at length in a rulemaking proceeding completed in
2010 (Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) 2127-AK09) (NPRM upgrading
school bus passenger crash protection, 72 FR 65509 (November 21, 2007);
final rule, 73 FR 62744 (October 21, 2008)); (RIN 2127-AK49) response
to petitions for reconsideration, 75 FR 66686 (October 29, 2010)).
NHTSA undertook the rulemaking to raise the minimum seat back height on
school bus passenger seats, require small school buses to have lap/
shoulder belts at each passenger seating position (the small buses were
previously required to provide at least lap belts \4\), and incorporate
test procedures to test lap/shoulder belts in small school buses and
voluntarily-installed lap/shoulder belts in large school buses. The
test procedures ensure both the strength of the seat belt systems and
the compatibility of the

seat belt systems with compartmentalization.
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    \4\ Small school buses are different from large ones in that
they are built on the same chassis and frame as a light truck and
thereby have similar crash characteristics of a light truck. The
upgraded seat belt requirements (from lap belts to lap/shoulder
belts) on these vehicles reflects the similar upgrade to lap/
shoulder belts in other passenger vehicles.
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    In that rulemaking, the agency presented up-to-date information and
discussed the reasoning behind the agency's decision not to propose to
require seat belts in large school buses. The NPRM and final rule
preambles presented data and findings from the following studies of the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), and NHTSA (in chronological order):

Studies

     NTSB, 1987
    In 1987, the NTSB reported on its investigation of forty-three
post-standard school bus crashes.\5\ The NTSB concluded that most
fatalities and injuries in school bus crashes occurred because the
occupant seating positions were directly in line with the crash forces,
and that seat belts would not have prevented those injuries and
fatalities. (NTSB/SS-87/01, Safety Study, Crashworthiness of Large
Post-standard School Buses, March 1987, National Transportation Safety
Board.)
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    \5\ FMVSS No. 222 became effective on April 1, 1977.
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     NAS, 1989
    A 1989 NAS study concluded that the overall potential benefits of
requiring seat belts on large school buses were insufficient to justify
a Federal mandate for installation. The NAS also stated that funds used
to purchase and maintain seat belts might be better spent on other
school bus safety programs with the potential to save more lives and
reduce more injuries. (Special Report 222, Improving School Bus Safety,
National Academy of Sciences, Transportation Research Board,
Washington, DC 1989).
     NTSB, 1999
    In 1999, the NTSB reported on six school bus crashes it
investigated in which passenger fatalities or serious injuries occurred
away from the area of vehicle impact. The NTSB found
compartmentalization to be an effective means of protecting passengers
in school bus crashes. However, because many of those passengers
injured in the six crashes were believed to have been thrown from their
compartments, the NTSB believed other means of occupant protection
should be examined. (NTSB/SIR-99/04, Highway Safety Report, Bus
Crashworthiness Issues, September 1999, National Transportation Safety
Board).
     NAS, 2002
    In 2002, the NAS published a study that analyzed the safety of
various transportation modes used by school children to get to and from
school and school-related activities. The NAS found that among 815
school-age children killed in motor vehicle crashes during normal
school travel hours each year, less than 0.6 percent are passengers in
school buses, 1.8 percent are children outside the bus near the
loading/unloading zone, 22 percent are students walking/bicycling, and
75 percent are in crashes involving passenger vehicles, especially
those with teen drivers. The report stated that changes in any one
characteristic of school travel can lead to dramatic changes in the
overall risk to the student population. Thus, the NAS concluded, it is
important for school transportation decisions to take into account all
potential aspects of any changes in school transportation. (Special
Report 269, ``The Relative Risks of School Travel: A National
Perspective and Guidance for Local Community Risk Assessment,''
Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 2002.)
     NHTSA, 2002
    In 2002, NHTSA issued a report to Congress detailing school bus
occupant safety and analyzing options for improvement. NHTSA concluded
that compartmentalization effectively lowered injury measures by
distributing crash forces with the padded seating surface. Lap belts
showed little to no benefit in reducing serious/fatal injuries. The
agency determined that properly used lap/shoulder belts have the
potential to be effective in reducing fatalities and injuries for not
only frontal collisions, but also rollover crashes where seat belt
systems are particularly effective in reducing ejection. However, the
addition of lap/shoulder belts on buses would increase capital costs
and reduce seating capacity on the buses. (``Report to Congress, School
Bus Safety: Crashworthiness Research, April 2002,'' http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crashworthiness/SchoolBus/SBReportFINAL.pdf.)
    In addition, the agency considered the public discussions at a July
11, 2007 roundtable meeting with State and local government
policymakers, school bus and seat manufacturers, pupil transportation
associations, and consumer groups. (Notice of public meeting, 72 FR
30739, June 4, 2007, Docket NHTSA-2007-28103.)
    The agency explained in the NPRM and final rule preambles of the
documents comprising RIN 2127-AK09 that, after considering all
available information, NHTSA was not able to conclude that requiring
seat belts on large school buses would protect passengers against an
unreasonable risk of death or injury in an accident. NHTSA continued:
``Whether the same conclusion can be made by a State or local
jurisdiction is a matter for local decision-makers and we encourage
them to make the decisions most appropriate for their individual needs
to most safely transport their students to and from school.'' Id. 73 FR
at 62745.
    Following publication of the final rule, CAS et al. submitted the
petition for rulemaking discussed today to require lap/shoulder belts
on large school buses. The petition refers to a ``Highway Accident
Brief'' published November 12, 2009 by the NTSB.
    Also following publication of the final rule, the State of Alabama
completed a comprehensive study to evaluate the merits of having lap/
shoulder belts on newly purchased large school buses in Alabama. Among
other factors, the State evaluated the rate of seat belt use, the
effects on bus discipline, the attitudes of other stakeholders, the
loss of capacity attributable to seat belts, and cost effectiveness of
requiring lap/shoulder seat belts. The study found that, for Alabama,
the cost and consequences of ordering the seat belts on large school
buses would exceed the benefit. The authors concluded that if funding
is to be spent on school bus safety, more lives could be saved in
Alabama by investing in enhanced safety measures in loading/unloading
zones.
    Additionally, following publication of the final rule, NHTSA
completed an estimate of possible impacts that reduced school bus
ridership might have on traffic-related injury or fatality. This
analysis is discussed later in this document. The agency undertook the
analysis to understand, in a more comprehensive manner, the possible
consequences of a national requirement for seat belts on large school
buses. If a national requirement were imposed, how could such a
requirement affect the availability of school bus service? How might
reduced availability of school bus service impact pupil transportation
safety? The analysis is illustrative in nature and is based on
established economic methodologies. Under the described conditions, the
agency estimates that the increased risk from students finding
alternative, less safe means of getting to and from school could result
in an increase of 10 to 19 school transportation fatalities annually.
    After carefully considering the petition for rulemaking and all the
above information, the agency is denying the petition.
    The agency notes that part of the response repeats some discussion
from the November 21, 2007 NPRM and the October 21, 2008 final rule
comprising

RIN 2127-AK09, supra. The discussion is set forth again here because it
is relevant, particularly because a large part of the petitioners'
``facts which it is claimed establish that an order is necessary'' \6\
are not new, having been previously raised to the agency and to which
NHTSA has responded. The agency is repeating some of the discussion set
forth in the November 21, 2007 NPRM and the October 21, 2008 final rule
for completeness, and to provide a context for discussion of the
petition.
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    \6\ 49 CFR 552.4(c), Requirements for petition for rulemaking.
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Discussion

Introduction

    School buses are one of the safest forms of transportation in the
United States. Every year, approximately 485,500 school buses travel
approximately 4.2 billion miles to transport 23 million children to and
from school and school-related activities.\7\ The school bus occupant
fatality rate of 0.23 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) is nearly 6 times lower than the rates for passenger cars (1.29
per 100 million VMT \8\). The safety of current school buses was
confirmed by NAS in 2002.\9\
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    \7\ Based on the 2006-07 school year, ``School Bus Fleet, 2009
Fact Book,'' page 30.
    \8\ 2008 Traffic Safety Facts FARS/GES Annual Report, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811170.pdf.
    \9\ National Academy of Sciences, Special Report 269: The
Relative Risks of School Travel: A National Perspective and Guidance
for Local Community Risk Assessment, National Research Council,
Washington, DC, September 2002.
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    The agency estimates that an average of 19 school-age children die
in school bus-related traffic crashes \10\ each year: 5 are occupants
of school buses and 14 are pedestrians near the loading/unloading zone
of the school bus.\11\ These numbers do not include school-age children
who are killed going to or from school using means other than by school
buses.
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    \10\ A school bus-related crash is a crash which involves,
either directly or indirectly, a school bus body vehicle (e.g., a
yellow school bus), or a non-school bus functioning as a school bus
(e.g. a transit bus functioning as a school bus), transporting
children to or from school or school-related activities.
    \11\ School Transportation-Related Crashes, Traffic Safety Facts
2008 Data, DOT HS 811 165.
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    The CAS petition cited an American Association of Pediatrics (AAP)
analysis of the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS).
The AAP analysis indicated that there are 17,000 school bus-related
nonfatal injuries annually, among which 7,200 were crash related, 4,060
were during boarding/alighting, 1,160 were slips/fall related, 860 were
non-crash related, and 3,750 were of other/unknown cause. Among those
injured in this study, 97 percent were treated and released from the
hospital. Most of these injuries were of minor severity (strains,
sprains, and bruises).
    We agree with the petitioners that school bus crashes are an
important public health priority. Due to regulation in this area and
public interest in the safety of school buses, school buses are very
safe vehicles. The Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Amendments of
1974, which amended the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(Vehicle Safety Act), directed NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety
standards applicable to school buses and school bus equipment. In
response to this legislation, NHTSA revised several of its safety
standards to improve existing requirements for school buses, extended
ones for other vehicle classes to those buses, and issued new safety
standards exclusively for school buses. FMVSS No. 222 was promulgated
to improve protection to school bus passengers during crashes and
sudden driving maneuvers.
    Effective since 1977, FMVSS No. 222 contains occupant protection
requirements for school bus seating positions and restraining barriers.
Its requirements for school buses with GVWRs of 4,536 kilogram (kg)
(10,000 pound (lb)) or less differ from those set for school buses with
GVWRs greater than 4,536 kg (10,000 lb), because the ``crash pulse,''
or deceleration, experienced by the small school buses is more severe
than that of the large buses in similar collisions. For the small
school buses, the standard includes requirements that all seating
positions must be equipped with properly installed seat belts for
passengers. NHTSA decided that seat belts were necessary on small
school buses to provide adequate crash protection for the occupants.
    For large school buses, FMVSS No. 222 relies on requirements for
``compartmentalization'' to provide passenger crash protection.
Investigations of school bus crashes prior to issuance of FMVSS No. 222
found the school bus seat was a significant factor in causing injury.
NHTSA found that the seat failed the passengers in three principal
respects: By being too weak, too low, and too hostile (39 FR 27584;
July 30, 1974). In response to this finding, NHTSA developed a set of
requirements which comprise the compartmentalization system.
    Compartmentalization ensures that passengers are cushioned and
contained by the seats in the event of a school bus crash by requiring
school bus seats to be positioned in a manner that provides a compact,
protected area surrounding each seat. If a seat is not
compartmentalized by a seat back in front of it, compartmentalization
must be provided by a padded and protective restraining barrier. The
seats and restraining barriers must be strong enough to maintain their
integrity in a crash yet flexible enough to be capable of deflecting in
a manner which absorbs the energy of the occupant. They must meet
specified height requirements and be constructed, by use of substantial
padding or other means, so that they provide protection when they are
impacted by the head and legs of a passenger. Compartmentalization
minimizes the hostility of the crash environment and limits the range
of movement of an occupant. The compartmentalization approach ensures
that high levels of crash protection are provided to each passenger
independent of any action on the part of the occupant to buckle up.
    Nonetheless, throughout the past 34 years that compartmentalization
and the school bus safety standards have been in effect, the agency has
openly and continuously considered the consequences, pros and cons, of
a seat belt requirement for large school buses. The most recent
detailed discussion of the issue was in NHTSA's October 21, 2008 final
rule.

October 21, 2008 Final Rule

    On October 21, 2008, the agency issued a final rule, supra,
upgrading the passenger protection requirements for school buses. The
NPRM preceding the final rule discussed the agency's considerations
when we drafted the NPRM as to whether to propose requiring lap/
shoulder belts in large school buses. We considered whether Federal
enhancements on an already very safe vehicle were reasonable and
appropriate, given the low safety need \12\ and especially when the
cost of installing and maintaining lap/shoulder belts on the buses
could impact the ability of transportation providers to transport
children to or from school or spend funds in other areas affecting
pupil safety. After considering that large school buses were already
very safe, and

after considering the possibility that seat belts on large school buses
could affect school bus service and ridership, NHTSA decided not to
propose to require lap/shoulder belts on large school buses.
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    \12\ As indicated earlier, among 19 school-age child fatalities
in school transportation-related crashes each year, 5 are passengers
of school buses while 14 are killed outside the school bus at or
near the loading/unloading zone, by motorists passing the bus or by
the school bus itself. Children inside the bus are typically killed
in crashes when they are in the direct zone of intrusion of the
impacting vehicle or object, in such circumstances seat belts will
not be effective in preventing the fatality.
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    The agency estimated the benefit that seat belts in large school
buses may offer in frontal, side, and rollover crashes. For frontal
crashes, we estimated the benefits of seat belts by using the sled test
data obtained from NHTSA's 2002 school bus safety study. For estimating
the incremental benefits of seat belts in rollover and side crashes,
the agency used the effectiveness estimates of 74 percent for rollover
crashes and 21 percent for side crashes attributed to seat belts in
passenger cars.\13\ We estimated that lap/shoulder seat belts would
save about 2 lives per year and prevent about 1,900 crash injuries, of
which 97 percent are of minor/moderate severity (mainly cuts and
bruises), assuming every child wore them correctly on every trip.
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    \13\ The benefits analysis is explained in the Final Regulatory
Evaluation (FRE), Final Rule to Upgrade School Bus Passenger Crash
Protection in FMVSS Nos. 207, 208, 210, and 222, Docket No. NHTSA-
2008-0163-0002, http://www.regulations.gov. We used the passenger
car effectiveness estimates because real-world data on the
effectiveness of seat belts on buses is not available. Data are
available on the effectiveness of seat belts on passenger cars and
light trucks. We used the passenger car effectiveness estimates to
calculate the effectiveness of seat belts in school bus side impact
and rollover events because the passenger car effectiveness is
closer to what we expect for school buses. The light truck
effectiveness estimates are highly influenced by ejections, which
are not common in large school buses.
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    The agency estimated that the incremental cost of installing lap/
shoulder belts on a new 45-inch school bus seat to be $467-$599 and
that on a 30-inch seat to be $375-$487. The incremental cost of newer
seat designs that minimize any loss in seating capacity due to seat
belts was estimated to be within these cost ranges. Assuming that an
average large school bus has 11 rows of seats with 2 seats per row, we
estimated the incremental cost of installing lap/shoulder belts in
large school buses to be $5,485-$7,346. (This cost does not include
added fuel costs to operate the buses, which would increase due to the
added weight from the seat belt system and different school bus seats.)
The benefits would be achieved at a cost of between $23 and $36 million
per equivalent life saved. (This estimate of cost per equivalent life
saved did not factor in increased fuel costs or the effect of the loss
in seating capacity.)
    After considering all available information, NHTSA was not able to
conclude that there exists an unreasonable risk of death or injury in
an accident that justified an FMVSS requirement for seat belts on large
school buses.\14\ Aside from the fact that large school buses were
already very safe, real world data showed that fatalities and injuries
occurring in school bus loading/unloading zones, and fatalities and
injuries associated with other school transportation modes (walking,
biking, transporting in private vehicles), are significantly higher
than those occurring in the school bus. The agency determined that a
Federal requirement for seat belts to address fatalities and injuries
on large school buses would not be appropriate since large school buses
were very safe and the cost of such a requirement would likely impact
the monies available to local jurisdictions to use toward their pupil
transportation programs. The greater cost to buy and operate a school
bus with seat belts may reduce the number of school buses available for
pupil transportation and divert the limited school transportation funds
away from important safety programs, such as driver and pupil training
on safe loading/unloading practices.
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    \14\ Under the Vehicle Safety Act, NHTSA is authorized to
prescribe motor vehicle safety standards that are practicable, that
meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and that are stated in
objective terms. Under the Safety Act, ``motor vehicle safety''
means the performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
in a way that protects the public against unreasonable risk of
accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or
performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of
death or injury in an accident. * * *'' 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(8). After
considering all available information, we could not conclude that a
requirement for seat belts on large school buses would protect
against an unreasonable risk of accident or an unreasonable risk of
death or injury in an accident. 73 FR at 62745. Based on available
information, we concluded that a science-based, data-driven
determination that there should be a Federal requirement for seat
belts could not be supported.
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    In the October 2008 final rule, the agency affirmed that States and
local jurisdictions should continue to have the choice of whether to
order seat belts on their large school buses since belts could enhance
compartmentalization. We stated our view that States and local school
districts are better able to analyze school transportation risks
particular to them and identify approaches to best manage and reduce
those safety risks.
    The agency encouraged local officials to make the decisions most
appropriate for their individual needs to most safely transport their
students to and from school. (Final rule, 73 FR at 62745.)

The Petition

    The CAS petition requests the agency to mandate a lap/shoulder belt
requirement for all seating positions on all school buses. The
petitioners disagree with the agency's discussion in the November 21,
2007 NPRM and October 21, 2008 final rule on this subject (RIN 2127-
AK09) and believe that the agency ``ignored'' NTSB recommendation NTSB/
SIR-99/04 (1999).\15\ NTSB/SIR-99/04 recommended, among other things,
that NHTSA develop performance standards for school bus occupant
protection systems that account for frontal impacts, side impacts, rear
impacts, and rollovers (Recommendation H-99-45), and recommended that
NHTSA require new school buses to have an occupant crash protection
system that meets the new performance standards and retains passengers
within the seating compartment throughout the accident sequence of all
accident scenarios (H-99-46). The petitioners state that NTSB
classified NHTSA's response to H-99-46 as ``Closed--Unacceptable
Action.'' \16\
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    \15\ National Transportation Safety Board, Highway Special
Investigation Report, Bus Crashworthiness Issues, September 21,
1999.
    \16\ With regard to H-99-45, the NTSB explains in the Highway
Accident Brief NTSB/HAB-9/03, footnote 4 that ``[t]he Board's vote
on the status of Safety Recommendation H-99-45 was split, with two
members voting `Closed--Acceptable Alternative Action' and two
members voting `Closed--Unacceptable Action.' As a result of the
split vote, Safety Recommendation H-99-45 remained `Open--Acceptable
Response.' ''
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    The petitioners provided an overview of the development of seat
belts in motor vehicles, starting in the 1950s, and expressed
dissatisfaction with FMVSS No. 222 due to the standard's specifying,
since 1977, requirements for compartmentalization for large school
buses and not for seat belts. They base many of their arguments for a
seat belt requirement on what they believe to be limitations of
compartmentalization, views that were previously expressed, most
recently in response to the 2007 NPRM of RIN 2127-AK09, by proponents
of the opinion that NHTSA should require seat belts on large school
buses.
    The petitioners cite an NTSB Highway Accident Brief \17\ regarding
a May 28, 2008, school bus rollover accident near Milton, Florida, in
which all the passengers were wearing lap belts and only one sustained
a serious injury (according to the NTSB, the injury was possibly due to
a loosely worn belt.) The NTSB determined that injury severity in the
Milton, Florida crash ``was mitigated by the use of lap belts.'' The
petitioners state that NTSB referred to a similar rollover crash in

Flagstaff, Arizona, on August 14, 1996. In the Arizona crash, the large
school bus did not have passenger seat belts, and the accident resulted
in multiple ejections and one passenger sustaining lifetime crippling
injuries.\18\
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    \17\ National Transportation Safety Board, Highway Accident
Brief, School Bus Loss of Control and Rollover, Interstate 10, Near
Milton, Florida, May 28, 2008, NTSB/HAB-09/03.
    \18\ The NTSB/HAB-09/03 calls the Florida and Arizona accidents
``comparable.'' The NTSB document does not have a statement about
the possible effect of belts in the Arizona accident.
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    The petitioners also believe that NHTSA should require seat belts
on large school buses because there has been a ``thirty-year history of
failure by school districts and states to voluntarily install belts on
large school buses.'' The petition refers to a January 9, 2010 fatal
crash in Hartford, Connecticut, involving a school bus carrying 16
students and 2 adult passengers, which did not have seat belts.\19\ The
petition states that following the crash, there was a State move to
require seat belts on school buses, but it was unsuccessful. ``History
has demonstrated that * * * voluntary implementations by school
authorities are extremely rare unless the vehicle construction
improvement is required by law or regulatory standard at time of
manufacture.''
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    \19\ According to the petitioners, the school bus ``crashed
through a roadside guardrail, plummeted down a 20-foot drop-off, and
ended in the ravine below. One child was killed, and fifteen were
injured.''
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NHTSA Response to Petition

    NHTSA has considered the question of whether seat belts should be
required on large school buses from the inception of
compartmentalization and the school bus safety standards and has
reassessed its decisions repeatedly. Each time, after analyzing the
implications of a seat belt requirement and all available information,
we have concluded that a seat belt requirement for large school buses
has not been shown to be warranted.
    We have discussed our position regarding the need for seat belts on
large school buses at length in the 2007 NPRM and 2008 final rule
documents of RIN 2127-AK09. To the extent the petitioners' assertions
are repetitive of previously discussed points-of-view, our positions on
the issues are set forth at length in the November 21, 2007 and October
21, 2008 preambles, and are summarized above. For plain language
purposes and to avoid redundancy when possible, we do not repeat the
detailed discussion here; interested persons can review those documents
for the agency's full response to the issues. In Appendix A of today's
document, we address a few miscellaneous issues the petitioners raised,
in a question-and-answer format.
    We carefully considered NTSB's recommendation H-99-46 when we
developed the 2007 NPRM and 2008 final rule documents. We recognized in
the RIN 2127-AK09 rulemaking that seat belts in large school buses may
have some effect on reducing the risk of harm in frontal, side and
rollover crashes, since seat belts can help restrain occupants within
the seat and prevent their ejection and impact with interior surfaces.
We estimated that in frontal, side and rollover crashes, lap/shoulder
belts would save 2 lives annually.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ This number is low because in side crashes, children are
typically killed when they are in the direct zone of intrusion of
the impacting vehicle or object. Seat belts would be unlikely to be
effective in preventing the side crash fatality. NHTSA is conducting
research to determine how the passenger compartment can be made more
protective to mitigate injurious impacts with interior surfaces. In
rollover crashes, seat belts are effective in mitigating occupant
ejections, but real world data show that school bus passenger
fatalities and injuries in rollover events are rare (8 serious
injuries and 2 fatalities annually).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering all views, including H-99-46, we could not agree
with those asking us to propose to require seat belts on large school
buses. We assessed the safety need for seat belts. Since school buses
are already very safe and are the safest mode of school transportation,
a seat belt mandate would result in very few benefits.
    We also weighed that safety need against possible negative
consequences of requiring seat belts on large school buses. The greater
cost to purchase and operate a large school bus with seat belts may
reduce the number of school buses available for pupil transportation,
and/or divert limited school transportation funds away from other
necessary safety programs, such as driver and pupil training on safe
loading/unloading practices. We determined that it would be
inappropriate for NHTSA to require seat belts given the low safety need
for the belts, when such a decision has a direct bearing on the ability
of the local decision-makers to allocate and spend limited pupil
transportation resources on other school transportation safety needs
that are likely to garner greater benefits, perhaps at lower cost.
    It bears repeating that the agency has been acutely aware that a
decision on requiring seat belts in large school buses cannot ignore
the implications of such a requirement on pupil transportation costs.
The agency has been attentive to the fact that, as a result of
requiring belts on large school buses, school bus purchasers would have
to buy and operate belt-equipped vehicles regardless of whether seat
belts would be appropriate for their needs. NHTSA has concluded that
those costs should not be imposed on all purchasers of school buses
when large school buses are currently very safe. In the area of school
transportation especially, where a number of needs are competing for
limited funds, we did not believe there was reason to limit the
policymaking discretion of the States and local governments in deciding
school transportation issues.
    As presented later in this document, our analysis shows that a
National lap/shoulder belt requirement for large school buses could
result in an increase of 10 to 19 student fatalities annually in the
U.S. A State or local jurisdiction, that is able to, could adjust its
budget in the face of a seat belt mandate to avoid impacting its pupil
transportation safety program in a manner that might result in this net
increase in student fatalities. However, each State or local
jurisdiction will differ in its ability to adjust to the cost impacts
of a belt mandate. Moreover, even if a State or local jurisdiction were
able to adjust its budget, the soundness of a public policy that
imposes this burden on State or local jurisdictions is debatable when
the incremental benefit from seat belts on large school buses is so
low. We believe that the decision to reallocate local resources to
account for a seat belt mandate should be a matter left to the
policymaking discretion of the State or local authorities.
    It is true that seat belts have been proven beneficial in rollover
crashes. However, real world data show that school bus passenger
fatalities and injuries in rollover events are rare. The CAS petition
cites two school bus accidents in support of its position that there is
a safety need for seat belts on large school buses. We cannot agree
that citing to these rare instances of fatal rollover crashes forms the
basis for a finding of a problem of national significance that warrants
trumping local policymaking on this matter.
    Under the Vehicle Safety Act, the Federal motor vehicle safety
standards we issue must ``meet the need for motor vehicle safety.''
``Motor vehicle safety'' means the performance of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public against
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design,
construction, or performance of a motor vehicle, and against
unreasonable risk of death or injury in an accident * * *'' 49 U.S.C.
30102(a)(8). In large school buses, fatal rollover crashes are rare
(approximately 1 crash per year, resulting in 2 fatalities annually),
as are fatal side impact crashes in which seat belts would have

prevented death or serious injury. Fatal non-rollover frontal crashes
in large school buses are uncommon (less than 1 crash per year). Large
school buses are already very safe vehicles. More important, as
explained below, requiring seat belts on large school buses is likely
to have the effect of increasing fatalities related to school
transportation. After considering all available information, we cannot
conclude there is an unreasonable risk of death or injury in an
accident that warrants a Federal requirement for seat belts on large
school buses.

The Role of States and Local School Districts

    The petitioners state a Federal requirement for seat belts on large
school buses is needed because there has been a ``thirty-year history
of failure by school districts and states to voluntarily install belts
on large school buses.''
    We strongly disagree with characterizing a State's decision not to
order seat belts on large school buses as a ``failure.'' We believe
that it is most appropriate if the decision to order seat belts on
large school buses were left to the States and local jurisdictions
rather than to NHTSA. 73 FR at 62750. States and local school districts
are better able to recognize and analyze school transportation risks
particular to their areas and identify approaches to best manage and
reduce those safety risks. Local officials are in the best position to
decide whether to purchase seat belts, since the officials must weigh a
multitude of unique considerations bearing on purchasing decisions,
especially when faced with budgetary constraints. Contrary to the
petitioners' view, we believe that if, after weighing all the
considerations, a purchaser decides not to purchase the belts, then the
purchaser is determining what is best for its needs. 73 FR at 62752.
    An example of a State's undertaking a comprehensive assessment of
whether to purchase belts for large school buses is illustrated by the
State of Alabama. Its study is summarized below.

Alabama Study Group on School Bus Seat Belts

    On September 30, 2010, at the direction of Alabama Governor Bob
Riley, Alabama issued a comprehensive study evaluating the need for
seat belts in its school buses.\21\ Governor Riley had formed a Study
Group on School Bus Seat Belts in the wake of a tragic school bus crash
in Huntsville \22\ that took the lives of four students in November
2006. The Study Group's report, ``Cost-Effectiveness of Lap/Shoulder
Seat Belts on Large Alabama School Buses,'' was issued as part of an
Alabama School Bus Seat Belt Pilot Project. The project was conducted
for the Alabama State Department of Education and the Governor's Study
Group on School Bus Seat Belts by the University Transportation Center
for Alabama, at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Turner, D., Anderson, K., Tedla, E., Lindly, J., Brown, D.,
``Cost-Effectiveness of Lap/Shoulder Seat Belts on Large Alabama
School Buses,'' September 30, 2010. https://docs.alsde.edu/documents/120/Pilot_Project_Cost_Effectiveness.pdf.
    \22\ National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB/HAB-09/02,
Highway Accident Brief: School Bus Bridge Override Following
Collision With Passenger Vehicle, Huntsville, Alabama, November 20,
2006, adopted November 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The goal of the project was to explore the implementation of lap/
shoulder belts on newly-purchased large school buses in Alabama. The
study included determining the rate of seat belt use, the effects on
bus discipline, the attitudes of other stakeholders, the loss of
capacity attributable to seat belts, and cost effectiveness of
requiring lap/shoulder seat belts. The study also considered flexible
seating systems in its analysis.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ These newly-developed seating systems have lap/shoulder
belts and are reconfigurable to accommodate either three smaller
students or two larger students.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The study found that school buses in Alabama travelled 83 million
miles in 2009-2010 and on an average had 560 traffic crashes annually.
The authors noted that school bus crashes per mile travelled is
significantly lower than that of other vehicles in the State. In
addition, since 1976, there were only five pupil fatalities inside of
Alabama school buses.
    As part of the pilot project, 12 school buses in the state were
equipped with lap/shoulder belts. Researchers observed over 125,000
pupils inside the school buses, and determined that the average seat
belt use in Alabama school buses was approximately 61.5 percent. Seat
belt use was found to be quite variable in different buses, ranging
from 4.8 to 94.5 percent. The study noted a 5 to 18 percent reduction
in seating capacity of school buses with seat belts.
    The study reported that the estimated net benefit of implementing
seat belts on Alabama school buses was -$104 million to -$125 million.
The net benefit is negative because the cost of the seat belts exceeds
the benefit.
    The authors of the study recommended using more cost-effective
safety measures, other than implementing seat belts across Alabama's
large school bus fleet. Most school bus pupil fatalities in Alabama
occur outside the buses, in or near loading/unloading zones. The
authors concluded that if funding is to be spent on school bus safety,
more lives could be saved by investing in enhanced safety measures in
loading/unloading zones.
    NHTSA believes that the Alabama study reinforces the view that a
Federal mandate requiring seat belts on large school buses would be an
overreaching venture for the agency. States such as Alabama have
decided that more lives would be saved in the State if its resources
were spent on safety measures other than the installation of seat
belts. Given the limited safety need at issue, we are not convinced
there is merit for NHTSA to override a State's conclusions.
    The petitioners were unsatisfied that only six States have laws
requiring seat belts on large school buses. We do not view this low
number as an indicator that the States have ``failed.'' Instead, we see
it as a reflection of a stance taken by the States that their efforts
and monies are better spent trying to keep children safe other than by
the installation of seat belts on vehicles that are already very safe.
For States such as Alabama, it is a decision taken after a thorough
consideration of the issue.

NHTSA Analysis on the Changes in School Transportation Fatalities Due
to a Seat Belt Requirement on Large School Buses

    NHTSA conducted an analysis of accident data to estimate, in a
manner not previously explored, how a National lap/shoulder belt
requirement for large school buses might affect the current pupil
transportation arena as it is today. The analysis illustrates that a
National lap/shoulder belt requirement could result in more children's
lives lost than saved.
    The 2002 NAS study described earlier in this document indicated
that the safest means for students to get to school \24\ is by a school
bus. Among school-aged children killed annually in motor vehicle
crashes during normal school travel hours, only 0.5 percent were
passengers on school buses and 1.5 percent were pedestrians involved in
school bus-related crashes. Seventy-five percent of the annual
fatalities were to occupants in passenger vehicles and 24 percent were
to those walking or riding a bicycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ By ``school,'' we mean to or from school or related events.
See 49 CFR 571.3, ``school bus.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Yet, there are many ways to get to school. If a school bus is not
used to transport a child to school, other means

will be used to get to school. Those other means of getting to school
are associated with higher safety risks.
    In previous documents, NHTSA has expressed concern that, when
making regulatory decisions on possible enhancements to school bus
safety, the agency must bear in mind how improvements in one area might
have an adverse effect on programs in other areas. The net effect on
safety could be negative if the costs of purchasing and maintaining the
seat belts and ensuring their correct use results in non-implementation
or reduced efficacy of other pupil transportation programs that affect
child safety. For example, if school bus service were reduced because
of the costs to purchase and operate large seat belt-equipped school
buses, more children would have to get to school using alternative,
less safe ways to get to school.
    NHTSA has analyzed accident data to estimate possible consequences
on overall school transportation fatalities and injuries if a Federal
requirement for seat belts on large school buses were adopted.\25\
NHTSA used data from the School Bus Fleet, 2010 Fact Book, the 2009
National Household Travel Survey,\26\ and the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS). To analyze the effects of lap/shoulder belts
on the demand for school buses, we applied the theory of elasticity of
demand. Elasticity is an economic term that measures responsiveness of
one economic variable to a change in another economic variable. In this
case, we are examining the change in demand for school buses when there
is an increase in the cost of a bus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ ``Changes in School Bus Travel by Requiring Lap/Shoulder
Belts and the Effect on Fatalities,'' National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, February 2011. A copy has been placed in the
docket for today's document.
    \26\ 2009 National Household Travel Survey: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, February, 2011,
http://nhts.ornl.gov/download.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FARS data files for the period 2000 to 2008 were analyzed to
determine the number of school-age children killed in motor vehicle
crashes during the time of school transportation to and from school
(Monday to Friday between 6 AM to 9 AM and 2 PM to 5 PM) of the school
year (September 1 to June 15). As shown in Table 1 below, the analysis
showed that among 6,869 fatalities of school-age children (5-18 year
olds), 0.5 percent were occupants in school buses, 78.6 percent were in
passenger vehicles, 12.1 percent were pedestrians, 4.9 percent were
motorcycle riders and occupants of other vehicles, and 3.5 percent were
pedalcyclists. Only 3.8 percent of the 6,869 fatalities were in school
bus-related crashes \27\ among which a majority were passenger vehicle
occupants and pedestrians as shown in Table 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ A school bus-related crash is a crash which involves,
either directly or indirectly, a school bus body vehicle, or other
type of bus functioning as a school bus, transporting children to or
from school or school-related activities.

   Table 1--School-Age Children (5-18 Year-Old) Killed in Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes During Normal Weekday
  School Transportation Hours (Monday-Friday, 6 a.m.-9 a.m. and 2 p.m.-5 p.m.) of the School Year (September 1-
   June 15) Categorized by Mode of Transportation and Whether the Crash Was School Bus-Related. FARS 2000-2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Not school bus-     School bus-related           Total
                                                       related       -------------------------------------------
      School-age children (5-18 year-old)      ----------------------
                                                  Number    Percent     Number    Percent     Number    Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Occupant in School Bus Body Type Vehicle or          ** 1        0.0         37        0.5         38       0.55
 Vehicle Used as School Bus...................
Occupant of Other Bus Type....................          2        0.0          0        0.0          2        0.0
Passenger Vehicle Occupant....................       5268       76.7        131        1.9       5399       78.6
Motorcycle Rider..............................        128        1.9          3        0.0        131        1.9
Occupant of All Other Vehicle Types...........        198        2.9          5        0.1        203        3.0
Pedestrian....................................        748       10.9         81        1.2        829       12.1
Bicyclist.....................................        233        3.4          6        0.1        239        3.5
Other/Unknown.................................         27        0.4          1        0.0         28        0.4
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.....................................       6605       96.2        264        3.8       6869     100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
** A van-based school bus that was not functioning as a school bus at the time of the crash.

    Table 2, below, shows the student miles traveled in the different
school transportation modes, obtained from the 2009 National Household
Travel Survey. Among 123,266 million miles traveled annually by school-
age children to and from school, 69.5 percent was in passenger
vehicles, 25.3 percent was in school buses, 2.1 percent was walking and
0.4 percent was riding a bicycle.

       Table 2--Distribution of Student Miles Traveled To-and-From School and School-Related Activities by
                                               Transportation Mode
                                [Source: National Household Travel Survey--2009]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Million miles traveled
                       Mode of travel                        ---------------------------------------------------
                                                                Morning     Afternoon      Total       Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
School Buses................................................      15407.6      15793.7      31201.3         25.3
Other Buses.................................................        868.8        977.5       1846.4          1.5
Passenger Vehicles..........................................      39752.7      45975.3      85728.0         69.5
Pedestrian..................................................        904.6       1629.4       2534.0          2.1
Bicycles....................................................        137.0        320.2        457.2          0.4
Other (Motorcycle, Other Vehicles)..........................        429.5        816.2       1245.7          1.0

Unknown.....................................................        236.0         18.1        254.1          0.2
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
    Total...................................................      57736.2      65530.3     123266.5  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to determine the number of fatalities per 100 million
miles traveled by school-age children to and from school and school-
related activities, the fatality data for the years 2000-2008 (Table 1)
were used along with the estimates of student miles traveled to and
from school in 2009 \28\ shown in Table 2. An estimate of annual
fatalities for each school transportation mode was determined by
dividing the number of fatalities in 2000-2008 (from Table 1) by 9. The
school-age child fatalities per 100 million miles traveled to and from
school was determined by dividing the average annual fatalities for
each transportation mode by the corresponding total miles traveled in
that mode (Table 2). This analysis is shown in Table 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The distribution of student travel modes has not changed by
much since the 2002 National Household Transportation survey.

Table 3--Number of School-Age Child Fatalities per 100 Million Miles Traveled by Students To and From School and
                                            School-Related Activities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Miles
                                                               Number of                traveled in   Fatalities
                       Mode of travel                          fatalities     Annual        2009       per 100
                                                               2000-2008    fatalities    (million     million
                                                                                miles)       miles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
School Buses................................................         * 37          4.1      31201.3         0.01
Other Buses.................................................          * 3          0.3       1846.4         0.02
Passenger Vehicles..........................................         5399        599.9      85728.0         0.70
Pedestrian..................................................          829         92.1       2534.0         3.64
Bicycles....................................................          239         26.6        457.2         5.81
Other (Motorcycle, Other Vehicles)..........................          334         37.1       1245.7         2.98
Unknown.....................................................           28          3.1        254.1        1.22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The van-based school bus in Table 1 that was not functioning as a school bus at the time of the crash was put
  in the category ``other buses'' in Table 3.

    In order to evaluate the change in fatality due to a Federal
requirement for seat belts on all school buses, the agency examined
different types of bus seats with seat belts, their costs, and any
changes in seating capacity in the bus by replacing existing seats with
seats with seat belts. In the October 2008 final rule, the agency
estimated that the cost of a large school bus (66-72 passengers)
without seat belts is $75,000 and the incremental cost of adding seat
belts on large school buses is $5,485 to $7,345 per bus. Some State
officials have suggested that seats with seat belts cost closer to
$10,296.\29\ The agency estimated that these seats with seat belts
could result in a loss in bus capacity by as much as 17 percent,
depending on the mix of students riding in the buses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Presentation by Charlie Hood, Director of Student
Transportation in the Florida Department of Eductation at the July
11, 2007 Public Meeting on the issue of seat belts in large school
buses, Docket No. NHTSA-2007-28103-0016, http://www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In recent years, flexible school bus seat designs (flex-seats) have
emerged in the marketplace where lap/shoulder belts on these bench
seats can be adjusted to provide two lap/shoulder belts for two
average-size high school students or three lap/shoulder belts for three
elementary school students. These flex-seats with seat belts offer the
potential for maintaining the original bus capacity. We do not have
cost estimates for flex-seats but expect it to be in the range of the
high cost estimate ($10,296). To estimate the maximum benefit for lap/
shoulder belts, we only considered the flex-seat designs which can
potentially limit any loss in bus capacity. Therefore, the percentage
increase in cost of a large school bus with lap/shoulder belts without
any resulting loss in capacity is 13.7 percent (=$10,296/$75,000).
    For determining the effect on demand for school buses due to an
increase in cost \30\ of a new bus, we estimated a Price Elasticity of
Demand (PED) value for school buses. PED is a measure of the
responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a good or service to the
change in its price and is calculated as the percent change in the
quantity demanded divided by the percent change in price.\31\ In this
case, we are assessing the percentage change in the number of new
school buses purchased by school districts, for a percentage change in
the price of new school buses due to a requirement for lap/shoulder
belts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ This cost does not include operating and maintenance costs
(such as additional fuel cost due to increase in weight of the bus
and additional cost to maintain seat belts).
    \31\ PED = (percentage change in quantity demanded) /
(percentage change in price).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In economic terms, the overriding factor in determining the PED is
the willingness and ability of consumers after a price change to
postpone consumption decisions concerning the good and to search for
substitutes. A number of factors can thus affect the PED of a good or
service including:
    1. The availability of substitute goods and services: The more
easily available

the substitute goods and services, the higher the PED is likely to be.
    2. Percentage of Income: The higher the percentage of the
consumer's income that the good or service represents, the higher the
PED tends to be.
    3. Necessity: The more necessary the good or service is, the lower
the PED for the good or service.
    4. Duration of price change: The longer the price change holds, the
higher the PED is likely to be since there is more time available to
find substitutes.
    5. Who pays: When the purchaser does not directly pay for the good,
the PED is likely to be lower.
    Various research methods are used to calculate PEDs in real life,
including analysis of historic sales data and surveys of customer
preferences. To determine the PED for school bus transportation, the
agency examined PEDs associated with public transportation.\32\ The bus
transit fare PED values, published by the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) and widely used for transit planning
and modeling in North America, suggest PED values in the range of 0.36
to 0.43. This APTA estimate was based on a study of the short-term
(less than two years) effects of fare changes in 52 U.S. transit
systems during the late 1980s. Based on extensive research,
Transportation Research Laboratory (TRL) \33\ calculated that bus fare
PED values average around 0.4 in the short-run, 0.56 in the medium run,
and 1.0 over the long run, while metro rail fare elasticities are 0.3
in the short run and 0.6 in the long run.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Transportation Elasticities--How Prices and other Factors
Effect Travel Behavior, Transportation Demand Management (TDM)
Strategies Encyclopedia, Victoria Transport Policy Institute, http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm11.htm#_Toc161022586.
    \33\ TRL (2004), The Demand for Public Transit: A Practical
Guide, Transportation Research Laboratory, Report TRL 593 (http://www.trl.co.uk); at http://www.demandforpublictransport.co.uk. This
240-page document is a detailed analysis of factors that affect
transit demand, including demographic and geographic factors, price,
service quality and the price of other modes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the PED estimates for school bus transportation are
likely to be similar to that for transit systems since the alternative
services are similar (use of personal car, walking, or biking). Since a
mandate for seat belts on school buses would not be a temporary cost
increase and would be applicable to all new buses sold after the
compliance date of such a rule, we are only considering PED in the long
run. The cost of school bus transportation is an indirect cost to the
consumer; therefore, we expect the PED for school buses to be a little
lower than the estimates of PED in the long run for transit buses and
metro rail. We do not expect the PED value for school bus
transportation to be equal to 1.0 \34\ because we expect that school
districts will find creative ways to maximize school transportation
service in spite of the added cost of new school buses.\35\ Therefore,
based on the available PED values for transit systems, we estimate PED
values for school bus transportation to range between 0.35 and 0.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ PED = 1.0 implies that the percentage decrease in the
number of school buses bought by a school district is equal to the
percentage increase in the cost of a new school bus.
    \35\ One such option would be reducing operations to a 4-day
school week which is currently under consideration in 13 percent of
the school districts nationwide. NAPT School Bus Fleet Magazine,
June 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When school district officials are faced with installing lap/
shoulder belts in school buses, they will purchase the number of buses
according to their budget. If their budget is limited, using PED values
from 0.35 to 0.6 for school buses, a 13.7 percent increase in the price
of a school bus would result in a 4.795 (13.7 x 0.35) percent to 8.22
(13.7 x 0.6) percent decrease in quantity demanded. We have assumed
that the percentage decrease in the demand for school buses results in
a similar decrease in school bus ridership (in this case, decrease in
student miles traveled in school buses). The decrease in school bus
ridership would result in students taking other modes of transportation
to and from school. We assume that the students who no longer can take
the school bus would adopt a mode of travel roughly in the same
proportion as that being used currently by those who do not use the
school bus.
    Thus, we distributed the decrease in student miles traveled by
school buses among the other modes of travel in accordance with the
proportion of vehicle miles traveled in non-school bus travel modes
presented in Table 2, above. Based on the redistributed student miles
traveled, we estimated the number of fatalities associated with the
different transportation modes, using the fatalities per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled for the different transportation modes in Table
3, above. Table 4 presents the redistribution of vehicle miles traveled
and the resulting number of fatalities for an 8.22 percent reduction in
vehicle miles traveled in school buses (corresponding to a PED of 0.6).

Table 4--Student Miles Traveled and Annual Fatalities for Baseline Condition (No Seat Belts on School Buses) and
    Redistributed Vehicle Miles Traveled and Associated Annual Fatalities for a Reduction in School Bus Miles
                              Traveled by 8.22 Percent Corresponding to a PED = 0.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Miles traveled (millions)                   Annual fatalities
         Mode of travel          -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Baseline (table 3)   Redistributed \1\  Baseline (table 3)   Redistributed \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
School Buses....................             31201.3             28636.6                 4.1                 3.8
Other Buses.....................              1846.4              1897.8                 0.3                 0.3
Passenger Vehicles..............             85728.0             88116.2               599.9               616.6
Pedestrian......................              2534.0              2604.6                92.1                94.7
Bicycles........................               457.2               469.9                26.6                27.3
Other (Motorcycle, Other                      1245.7              1280.4                37.1                38.1
 Vehicles)......................
Unknown.........................               254.1               261.1                 3.1                 3.2
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................            123266.5            123266.5               763.2              784.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ School bus miles traveled were reduced by 8.22 percent of the baseline and these miles were redistributed
  according to the proportion of vehicle miles traveled in non-school bus transportation modes in Table 2. This
  column represents the student miles traveled to and from school in the various transportation modes when all
  school buses have seat belts.
\2\ The redistributed annual fatalities were computed by multiplying the fatalities per 100 million miles (last
  column in Table 3) with the redistributed miles traveled in this table. This column represents the number of
  fatalities due to a reduction of school bus service by 8.22 percent.

    In the October 21, 2008 final rule, the agency estimated that seat
belts on school buses would prevent 2 fatalities annually. Therefore,
the annual redistributed school bus fatalities in Table 4 are reduced
by 2 due to seat belts (i.e., 3.8 - 2 = 1.8). Similarly, the total
number of school transportation fatalities when all school buses are
required to have seat belts is 782 (i.e., 784 - 2 = 782). This total
number is 18.8 fatalities more than the baseline when seat belts are
not required on school buses. Therefore, for a PED = 0.6 for school
buses, the requirement for seat belts on school buses would result in
18.8 more school transportation-related fatalities per year even though
seat belts are expected to save 2 lives annually. Using a PED = 0.35
(the lower estimate of the PED range), the number of redistributed
fatalities is 775.4. After subtracting the estimated 2 lives saved by
seat belts on school buses, the increase in school transportation
fatalities when all school buses are required to have seat belts is
10.2 compared to the baseline.
    This analysis suggests that there could be an overall increase of
10.2-18.8 school transportation fatalities if seat belts are required
on all school buses. The cost estimates used in this analysis assume
that there is no loss in capacity. Since school buses are the safest
form of school transportation, any reduction in capacity per bus will
result in more school transportation fatalities than when there is no
loss in capacity. The cost estimates in our analysis also do not
account for added fuel costs that would incur due to more fuel being
used to operate heavier school buses equipped with seat belt systems.

Conclusion

    After carefully considering all aspects of the petition, the agency
has decided to deny it. In the 2007 NPRM and 2008 final rule documents,
we considered but did not agree with NTSB's recommendation H-99-46 to
the extent that the recommendation asked NHTSA to require lap/shoulder
belts on large school buses. The petitioners have not presented
information to suggest that the agency's decision not to require lap/
shoulder belts on large school buses was incorrect.
    The agency's latest analysis indicates that a requirement for lap/
shoulder belts on all school buses may result in an additional 10 to 19
school transportation fatalities than currently where there is no such
Federal requirement. A State or local jurisdiction, that is able to,
could adjust its budget to avoid impacting its pupil transportation
safety program in a manner that might result in this net increase in
student fatalities in the face of a seat belt mandate. However, we
believe that the decision to reallocate local resources to account for
seat belts should be a matter left to the policymaking discretion of
the State or local authorities. Large school buses are already very
safe. States or local authorities should continue to have the
discretion to decide whether their efforts and monies should be spent
on seat belts on large school buses, or on measures that could be more
effective in improving pupil transportation safety.
    In accordance with 49 CFR part 552, this completes the agency's
review of the petition for rulemaking.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30162;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

    Issued on: August 18, 2011.
Christopher J. Bonanti,
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.

Appendix A: Miscellaneous Issues Raised by the Petitioners

    Question 1. Why doesn't NHTSA require seat belts on large school
buses when NHTSA's April 2002 report to Congress \36\ on school bus
safety showed that lap/shoulder belts offered the best level of
protection compared to lap belts or compartmentalization alone?
Didn't the 2002 NHTSA report show that head injury criterion (HIC)
measurements were significantly lower for lap/shoulder belts than
for compartmentalization and the seat belts kept the dummies in
their seats?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Report to
Congress--School Bus Safety: Crashworthiness Research, April 2002,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crashworthiness/SchoolBus/SBReportFINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Answer: NHTSA's 2002 school bus safety study results provided
information about potential enhancements to large school bus
occupant protection that could be achieved through the use of lap/
shoulder seat belts. The study involved simulations of a 48 km/h
frontal crash test of a large school bus (Type C) into a rigid
barrier using a test sled and various test dummies (representing
50th percentile adult male, 5th percentile adult female, and a 6-
year old child) in various seat and restraint configurations. The
HIC measurements were low and below the injury assessment reference
values (IARV) \37\ for all the dummies in all the restraint
environments (compartmentalization with low and high seat backs, lap
belts, and lap/shoulder belts) except for the unrestrained 50th
percentile male dummy in some tests with low seat back height where
the dummy overrode the seat and contacted the dummy in front. This
issue was addressed in the 2008 final rule by requiring higher seat
back heights (increased from 20 inches to 24 inches) to enhance
protection through compartmentalization for larger occupants. The
neck injury measures were above the IARV in some tests with the
unrestrained 6-year-old child and 5th percentile female dummy while
they were below the IARVs when restrained by lap/shoulder belts.
However, neck injuries are rare in real world crashes so it is
unclear how representative the laboratory tests were of the real
world condition, e.g. how representative the test dummies were of
humans, the sled test of an actual vehicle crash, and the magnitude
of the crash replicated as compared to real-world school bus
crashes. Nevertheless, the agency used these test results to
determine the incremental benefits garnered in frontal crashes by
the addition of lap/shoulder belts to large school bus seats and is
presented in detail in NHTSA's Final Regulatory Evaluation (FRE)
\38\ accompanying the 2008 final rule. The FRE determined that the
addition of lap/shoulder belts in large school buses would save 0.55
lives and 750 injuries (97 percent of which are minor/moderate
severity) in frontal school bus crashes for 100 percent correct seat
belt use. Using effectiveness estimates for lap/shoulder belts of 74
percent in rollover and 21 percent in side impacts, the FRE
estimated that lap/shoulder belts on large school buses would save
1.33 lives in rollover and 0.25 lives in side impacts crashes when
all occupants use their seat belts. These benefits are relatively
low since school buses (with high back seats for effective
compartmentalization) are already very safe and are the safest mode
of transportation to and from school. The cost-benefit analysis in
the FRE found that installing lap/shoulder belts on all new large
school buses would cost $183-$252 million annually and save 2 lives
and 1,900 injuries per year for 100 percent correct belt use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Injury assessment in accordance with that specified in
FMVSS No. 208, ``Occupant crash protection'').
    \38\ Final Regulatory Evaluation of the Final Rule to Upgrade
School Bus Passenger Crash Protection in FMVSS Nos. 207, 208, 210,
and 222, October 2008, Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0163-0002, http://www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to the limited funds available for school transportation, a
Federal requirement for seat belts on all school buses may reduce
school bus service and as a result school bus ridership. We are
concerned that the reduced bus ridership may result in more student
fatalities, since riding in private vehicles is less safe than
riding a large school bus without seat belts. Our analysis presented
in this notice shows that a Federal mandate for seat belts on large
school buses could result in 10-19 more school children being killed
annually while traveling to and from school. Therefore, the agency
continues to not support a Federal requirement for seat belts on
large school buses. We believe that States and local school
districts are better able to analyze school transportation risks
particular to them and identify approaches to best manage and reduce
these safety risks. The final rule, while not requiring seat belts
on large school buses, provides appropriate performance requirements
for these systems if school districts determine that seat belt
installation is in their best interest.
    Question 2. In a document submitted after publication of the
October 21, 2008 final rule, Public Citizen (PC) submitted a post-
final

rule comment objecting to NHTSA's decision not to require lap/
shoulder belts on large school buses. For a summary of the comment,
see 75 FR at 66694. Among other things, PC objected to the cost and
benefit analysis of the Final Regulatory Evaluation (FRE). PC raised
the question: why didn't the FRE ``discuss the effect of `economies
of scale' in reducing the incremental cost of adding belts to the
buses * * * Economies of scale and learning by doing can
significantly reduce costs, but NHTSA's economic analyses makes no
mention of these efforts.''
    Answer: We have evaluated this comment and do not believe that
the ``economies of scale'' and ``learning by doing'' will
significantly reduce the cost of requiring lap/shoulder belts in
large school buses. The lap/shoulder belts in large school buses are
similar to the lap/shoulder belts that are sold for the many
millions of light duty vehicles, so the economies of scale for
webbing, buckles, and retractors have already been achieved. There
will be little economies of scale by the seat manufacturers; since
they are just replacing one seat with one equipped with lap/shoulder
belts. Again, they are just installing a different seat and perhaps
a different seat track. We also do not agree that ``learning by
doing'' will decrease the cost of installing lap/shoulder belts in
large school buses because school bus manufacturers already know how
to install lap/shoulder belts in large school buses.
    Question 3. In its comments to the final rule, PC stated that
lap-only belts should not be permitted in school buses. PC stated
that in 1999 the NTSB suggested there may be potential for greater
injuries in occupants restrained using lap-only belts in side
crashes. Why hasn't NHTSA banned lap belts in large school buses?
    Answer: The agency explained in the final rule that it has
studied lap belts in frontal crashes in the school bus research
program \39\ and analyzed data from States which include side impact
and rollovers, and could not determine that lap belts translate to
an overall greater safety risk. Our real world data indicates that
lap belts are as effective as lap/shoulder belts in rollover
crashes, and benefit far side occupants in side impacts involving
these vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Report to Congress, School Bus Safety: Crashworthiness
Research, April 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PC provided no data to support the implication that lap belts
may be harmful in side impacts, and we disagree with its view of the
1999 NTSB study. The NTSB came to the conclusion in the 1999 report
that ``* * * because injuries occurred for all restraint conditions
in the simulated accidents and because injury levels varied
depending upon occupant kinematics and seating location, the Safety
Board concludes that it cannot be determined whether the current
design of available restraint systems for large school buses would
have reduced the risk of injury to the school bus passengers in
these accidents.''
    The NTSB has since studied two school bus crashes where lap-only
belts have been beneficial in mitigating injuries in side impact and
rollover crashes. In its review of the March 2000 side impact
collision between a school bus and a freight train near the
Tennessee and Georgia border \40\ and the May 2008 school bus
rollover near Milton, Florida,\41\ the NTSB concluded that passenger
injuries were reduced because of lap belts. We note that the Milton,
Florida crash, where the school bus was equipped with lap belts, was
cited by the petitioners, among which PC was a signatory, as an
exemplar case where seat belts on large school buses were effective
in preventing fatalities and serious injuries. Given the available
information, the agency declines to change its position on the
allowance of lap belts on large school buses in response to PC's
comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ ``Collision of CSXT Freight Train and Murray County School
District School Bus at Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing, Conasauga,
Tennessee,'' March 28, 2000; National Transportation Safety Board,
HAR 01/03, December 2001.
    \41\ ``School Bus Loss of Control and Rollover, on Interstate
10, near Milton, Florida,'' May 28, 2008; National Transportation
Safety Board, HAB-09-03, November 2009.

 [FR Doc. 2011-21596 Filed 8-24-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P


[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 207 (Thursday, October 27, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 65011-65013]
[FR Doc No: 2022-22164]

========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.

========================================================================

Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 207 / Thursday, October 27, 2022 /
Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 71

[Docket No. FAA-2022-0436; Airspace Docket No. 22-ASW-1]
RIN 2120-AA66

Amendment and Establishment of Air Traffic Service (ATS) Routes;
South Central United States

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action amends VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR) Federal
airways V-198, V-212, V-556, and V-558; amends Area Navigation (RNAV)
route T-256; and establishes RNAV route T-466. The FAA is taking this
action due to the planned decommissioning of the VOR portion of the
Eagle Lake, TX (ELA), VOR/Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME)
navigational aid (NAVAID). The Eagle Lake VOR is being decommissioned
in support of the FAA's VOR Minimum Operational Network (MON) program.

DATES: Effective date 0901 UTC, December 29, 2022. The Director of the
Federal Register approves this incorporation by reference action under
1 CFR part 51, subject to the annual revision of FAA Order JO 7400.11
and publication of conforming amendments.

ADDRESSES: FAA Order JO 7400.11G, Airspace Designations and Reporting
Points, and subsequent amendments can be viewed online at www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/. For further information, you can contact the
Rules and Regulations Group, Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267-
8783.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Colby Abbott, Rules and Regulations
Group, Office of Policy, Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267-
8783.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is
found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's
authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described
in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section,
the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of
the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority as it modifies the route structure as necessary to preserve
the safe and efficient flow of air traffic within the National Airspace
System.

History

    The FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking for Docket No.
FAA-2022-0436 in the Federal Register (87 FR 24905; April 27, 2022),
amending VOR Federal airways V-198, V-212, V-556, and V-558; amending
RNAV route T-256; and establishing RNAV route T-466. The proposed
amendment and establishment actions were due to the planned
decommissioning of the VOR portion of the Eagle Lake, TX, VOR/DME
NAVAID. Interested parties were invited to participate in this
rulemaking effort by submitting written comments on the proposal. No
comments were received.
    VOR Federal airways are published in paragraph 6010(a) and United
States Area Navigation Routes are published in paragraph 6011 of FAA
Order JO 7400.11G, dated August 19, 2022, and effective September 15,
2022, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1. The Air
Traffic Service (ATS) routes listed in this document will be published
subsequently in FAA Order JO 7400.11.

Availability and Summary of Documents for Incorporation by Reference

    This document amends FAA Order JO 7400.11G, Airspace Designations
and Reporting Points, dated August 19, 2022, and effective September
15, 2022. FAA Order JO 7400.11G is publicly available as listed in the
ADDRESSES section of this document. FAA Order JO 7400.11G lists Class
A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, air traffic service routes, and
reporting points.

The Rule

    This action amends 14 CFR part 71 by amending VOR Federal airways
V-198, V-212, V-556, and V-558; amending RNAV route T-256; and
establishing RNAV route T-466 due to the planned decommissioning of the
Eagle Lake, TX, VOR. The ATS route actions are described below.
    V-198: V-198 extends between the San Simon, AZ, VOR/Tactical Air
Navigation (VORTAC) and the Eagle Lake, TX, VOR/DME; and between the
Sabine Pass, TX, VOR/DME and the Craig, FL, VORTAC. The route segment
between the San Antonio, TX, VORTAC and the Eagle Lake, TX, VOR/DME is
removed. As amended, the airway is changed to extend between the San
Simon, AZ, VORTAC and the San Antonio, TX, VORTAC; and between the
Sabine Pass, TX, VOR/DME and the Craig, FL, VORTAC.
    V-212: V-212 extends between the San Antonio, TX, VORTAC and the Mc
Comb, MS, VORTAC. The airway segment between the San Antonio, TX,
VORTAC and the Industry, TX, VORTAC is removed. As amended, the airway
is changed to extend between the Industry, TX, VORTAC and the Mc Comb,
MS, VORTAC.
    V-556: V-556 extends between the San Angelo, TX, VORTAC and the
Sabine Pass, TX, VOR/DME. The airway segment between the Stonewall, TX,
VORTAC and the Scholes, TX, VOR/DME is removed. As amended, the airway
is changed to extend between the San Angelo, TX, VORTAC and the
Stonewall, TX, VORTAC; and between the Scholes, TX, VOR/DME and the
Sabine Pass, TX, VOR/DME.
    V-558: V-558 extends between the Llano, TX, VORTAC and the Eagle
Lake, TX, VOR/DME. The airway segment between the Industry, TX, VORTAC
and the Eagle Lake, TX, VOR/DME is removed. As amended, the airway is
changed to extend between Llano, TX, VORTAC and the Industry, TX,
VORTAC.
    T-256: T-256 extends between the San Antonio, TX, VORTAC and the
Sabine, TX, VOR/DME. The Eagle Lake, TX, VOR/DME route point is removed
from the description as it is on a straight

segment of the route and does not change the route structure between
the San Antonio, TX, VORTAC and the MOLLR, TX, waypoint (WP).
Additionally, a RNAV route segment overlaying V-194 is added between
the Sabine, TX, VOR/DME and the DAFLY, LA, WP being established near
the Lafayette, LA, VORTAC. The full route description is listed in the
amendments to part 71 set forth below.
    T-466: T-466 is a new RNAV route that extends between the San
Angelo, TX, VORTAC and the Sabine Pass, TX, VOR/DME. The new T-466
overlays the V-556 airway and, in part, mitigates the removal of the V-
556 segment between the Stonewall, TX, VORTAC and the Scholes, TX, VOR/
DME; providing RNAV routing between the San Angelo, TX, area
southeastward to the Galveston, TX, area and then northeastward to the
Beaumont, TX, area. The full route description is listed in the
amendments to part 71 set forth below.
    All NAVAID radials listed in the VOR Federal airway descriptions
below are unchanged and stated in True degrees.
    FAA Order JO 7400.11, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points,
is published yearly and effective on September 15.

Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an
established body of technical regulations for which frequent and
routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current.
It, therefore: (1) is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under
Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under
Department of Transportation (DOT) Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation
of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal.
Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air traffic
procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule, when
promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Environmental Review

    The FAA has determined that this action of amending VOR Federal
airways V-198, V-212, V-556, and V-558; amending RNAV route T-256; and
establishing RNAV route T-466, due to the planned decommissioning of
the VOR portion of the Eagle Lake, TX, VOR/DME NAVAID, qualifies for
categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act (42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR part
1500, and in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts:
Policies and Procedures, paragraph 5-6.5a, which categorically excludes
from further environmental impact review rulemaking actions that
designate or modify classes of airspace areas, airways, routes, and
reporting points (see 14 CFR part 71, Designation of Class A, B, C, D,
and E Airspace Areas; Air Traffic Service Routes; and Reporting Points)
and paragraph 5-6.5i, which categorically excludes from further
environmental impact review the establishment of new or revised air
traffic control procedures conducted at 3,000 feet or more above ground
level (AGL); procedures conducted below 3,000 feet AGL that do not
cause traffic to be routinely routed over noise sensitive areas;
modifications to currently approved procedures conducted below 3,000
feet AGL that do not significantly increase noise over noise sensitive
areas; and increases in minimum altitudes and landing minima. As such,
this action is not expected to result in any potentially significant
environmental impacts. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, paragraph
5-2 regarding Extraordinary Circumstances, the FAA has reviewed this
action for factors and circumstances in which a normally categorically
excluded action may have a significant environmental impact requiring
further analysis. The FAA has determined that no extraordinary
circumstances exist that warrant preparation of an environmental
assessment or environmental impact study.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 71

    Airspace, Incorporation by reference, Navigation (air).

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

PART 71--DESIGNATION OF CLASS A, B, C, D, AND E AIRSPACE AREAS; AIR
TRAFFIC SERVICE ROUTES; AND REPORTING POINTS

0
1. The authority citation for 14 CFR part 71 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g); 40103, 40113, 40120; E.O.
10854, 24 FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389.

Sec.  71.1   [Amended]

0
2. The incorporation by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 of FAA Order JO
7400.11G, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, dated August 19,
2022, and effective September 15, 2022, is amended as follows:

Paragraph 6010(a) Domestic VOR Federal Airways.

* * * * *

V-198 [Amended]

    From San Simon, AZ; Columbus, NM; El Paso, TX; 6 miles wide INT
El Paso 109[deg] and Hudspeth, TX, 287[deg] radials; 6 miles wide
Hudspeth; 29 miles, 38 miles 82 MSL INT Hudspeth 109[deg] and Fort
Stockton, TX, 284[deg] radials; 18 miles 82 MSL Fort Stockton; 20
miles, 116 miles 55 MSL Junction, TX; to San Antonio, TX. From
Sabine Pass, TX; White Lake, LA; Tibby, LA; Harvey, LA; 69 miles, 33
miles 25 MSL Brookley, AL; INT Brookley 056[deg] and Crestview, FL,
266[deg] radials; Crestview; Marianna, FL; Seminole, FL; Greenville,
FL; Taylor, FL; INT Taylor 093[deg] and Craig, FL, 287[deg] radials;
to Craig.
* * * * *

V-212 [Amended]

    From Industry, TX; Navasota, TX; INT Navasota 019[deg] and
Lufkin, TX, 250[deg] radials; Lufkin; Alexandria, LA; to Mc Comb,
MS.
* * * * *

V-556 [Amended]

    From San Angelo, TX; INT San Angelo 181[deg] and Junction, TX,
310[deg] radials; Junction; to Stonewall, TX. From Scholes, TX; to
Sabine Pass, TX.
* * * * *

V-558 [Amended]

    From Llano, TX; INT Llano 088[deg] and Centex, TX, 306[deg]
radials; Centex; to Industry, TX.
* * * * *

Paragraph 6011 United States Area Navigation Routes.

* * * * *

T-256 San Antonio, TX (SAT) to DAFLY, LA [Amended]

San Antonio, TX (SAT)                           VORTAC                         (Lat. 29[deg]38'38.51'' N, long. 098[deg]27'40.74'' W)
MOLLR, TX                                       WP                             (Lat. 29[deg]39'20.23'' N, long. 095[deg]16'35.83'' W)
Sabine Pass, TX (SBI)                           VOR/DME                        (Lat. 29[deg]41'12.19'' N, long. 094[deg]02'16.72'' W)
DAFLY, LA                                       WP                             (Lat. 30[deg]11'37.70'' N, long. 091[deg]59'33.94'' W)

                                                                      * * * * * * *
T-466 San Angelo, TX (SJT) to Sabine Pass, TX (SBI) [New]

San Angelo, TX (SJT)                            VORTAC                         (Lat. 31[deg]22'29.84'' N, long. 100[deg]27'17.53'' W)
CHILD, TX                                       WP                             (Lat. 31[deg]03'41.17'' N, long. 100[deg]27'40.62'' W)
Junction, TX (JCT)                              VORTAC                         (Lat. 30[deg]35'52.88'' N, long. 099[deg]49'02.93'' W)
BETTI, TX                                       FIX                            (Lat. 29[deg]57'54.97'' N, long. 098[deg]03'23.98'' W)
MARCS, TX                                       FIX                            (Lat. 29[deg]53'52.04'' N, long. 097[deg]51'40.70'' W)
SEEDS, TX                                       FIX                            (Lat. 29[deg]39'31.94'' N, long. 097[deg]14'58.66'' W)
LDRET, TX                                       WP                             (Lat. 29[deg]39'44.93'' N, long. 096[deg]19'00.96'' W)
KEEDS, TX                                       WP                             (Lat. 29[deg]21'59.49'' N, long. 095[deg]36'48.98'' W)
Scholes, TX (VUH)                               VOR/DME                        (Lat. 29[deg]16'09.60'' N, long. 094[deg]52'03.81'' W)
Sabine Pass, TX (SBI)                           VOR/DME                        (Lat. 29[deg]41'12.19'' N, long. 094[deg]02'16.72'' W)

    Issued in Washington, DC, on October 5, 2022.
Scott M. Rosenbloom,
Manager, Airspace Rules and Regulations.
[FR Doc. 2022-22164 Filed 10-26-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P