\259\ We therefore, also disagree with CARB's argument that
EPA's reading of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) ``ignores the statutory
structure--improperly reading Section 209(b) without consideration
of the relationship between Sections 202(a), 209(a) and 209(b).
Specifically, EPA proposes to read Section 209(b) as excluding GHGs
at the same time that it proposes to continue regulating GHGs under
Section 202(a) and presumes, albeit implicitly, that Section 209(a)
preempts other States from regulating GHGs.'' CARB comments at 359.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress enacted waiver authority for California under CAA section
209(b) against the backdrop of traditional, criteria pollutant
environmental problems, under which all three links in this chain bear
a particularized nexus to specific local California features: (1)
Criteria pollutants are emitted from the tailpipes of the California
motor vehicle fleet; (2) those emissions of criteria pollutants
contribute to air pollution by concentrating locally in elevated
ambient levels, which concentration, in turn; (3) results in health and
welfare effects (e.g., from ozone) that are extraordinarily aggravated
in California as compared to other parts of the country, with this
extraordinary situation being attributable to a confluence of
California's peculiar characteristics, e.g., population density,
transportation patterns, wind and ocean currents, temperature
inversions, and topography. In the case of GHG emissions from motor
vehicles, however, this particularized nexus to California's specific
characteristics is missing: (1) The GHG emissions from California cars
are no more relevant to the pollution problem at issue (i.e., climate
change) as it impacts California than are the GHG emissions from cars
being driven in New York, London, Johannesburg, or Tokyo; (2) the
resulting air pollution, i.e., elevated concentrations of GHG in the
upper atmosphere, is globally mixed; (3) the health and welfare effects
of climate change impacts on California are not extraordinary to that
state and to its particular characteristics. Although EPA concludes
that all three of these aspects are lacking in the case of GHG, EPA
further concludes that it is the connection between all the three which
is the original motivation for Congress's creation of the waiver. It is
that original motivation that informs the proper understanding of what
CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) requires.
    It is important to note that, while this interpretation of CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B) departs in major respects from the interpretation
applied in the 2009 waiver denial reversal (74 FR 32744) and the 2013
waiver grant (78 FR 2112), it does not simply constitute a re-adoption
of the interpretation applied in the 2008 waiver denial (73 FR 12156).
The 2008 waiver denial applied what it styled as two alternative
approaches to determining whether California ``need[ed]'' its own
vehicle GHG emissions program to address global climate change ``to
meet compelling and extraordinary conditions'': One that looked at the
causal link between California emissions and elevated GHG
concentrations, 73 FR at 12160 (styled as ``the distinct nature of
global pollution as it relates to section 209(b)(1)(B)''), and an
``alternative'' approach that looked at the magnitude of California
climate effects compared to the rest of the nation, 73 FR at 12163-
12164 (``whether the potential impact of climate change resulting from
these emissions and concentrations will differ across geographic areas
and if so whether the likely effects in California amount to compelling
and extraordinary conditions''). The 2009 waiver denial reversal, and
the 2013 waiver grant, in contrast, applied an interpretation which EPA
styled as a return to the ``traditional'' interpretation. Under that
approach, EPA determined that California ``needs'' its own vehicle GHG
emissions program ``to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,''
a determination that was predicated on what was then EPA's view that,
in the case of such later-adopted programs, satisfaction of the
``need'' criterion of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) was effectively
automatic, being derivative as it were of the State's having long ago
established a ``need'' to have some form of its own vehicle emissions
program (i.e., its criteria pollutant program for which it had already
received many waivers). In conjunction with this, EPA also pointed to
the effects of climate change on certain criteria pollutant impacts.
See 74 FR at 32746; 78 FR at 2125 et seq.
    In this action, EPA adopts an interpretation of CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) that it concludes is more in accord with the text,
structure, purpose, and legislative history of that provision than were
either the position in the 2008 denial (because it does not separate
causal issues and effects issues into alternatives) or the position the
2009 and 2013 grants (because it considers application of CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) to California's need for a GHG/climate program, rather
than subordinating that consideration to California's need for a
criteria pollutant program). Under this interpretation, EPA begins by
noting that only one state, California, is entitled to apply under CAA
section 209(b) for a waiver of the preemptive effect of CAA section
209(a). CAA section 209(a), in turn, provides that (unless a waiver is
issued) no state may regulate new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle
engine emissions. That authority instead is conferred on EPA under CAA
section 202(a), subject to an ``endangerment finding.'' That finding
requires EPA to consider the relationship between [1] sources and their
emissions of pollutants; [2] the pollution to which those emissions
contribute; and [3] resulting impacts on health and welfare. Congress
has

therefore, in the elements of the endangerment finding, laid out the
terms of what constitutes a pollution problem to provide the
appropriate and requisite predicate for federal regulation. Because CAA
section 209(a) expresses Congress's judgment that vehicle emission
pollution problems are presumptively appropriate only for federal
regulation, with one state afforded the extraordinary treatment under
CAA section 209(b) of being able to apply for a waiver from that
preemption, the best, if not the only, reading of the waiver criterion
under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) is that it requires a pollution problem
at the local level that corresponds in a state-specific particularized
manner to the type of pollution problem that Congress required as the
predicate for federal regulation.
    It is against this backdrop that EPA believes the text of CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B) is best interpreted. Informed by the criteria-
pollutant context in which California's pre-1970 program was enacted,
the legislative history, and the principle, as discussed elsewhere in
this action, that differential treatment of the states by Congress in a
geographically disparate way is extraordinary and is justified only by
a sufficient link between that differential treatment and
particularized local facts, EPA interprets Congress's command in CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B), that it may not grant a preemption waiver for a
California state vehicle emissions program if California does not
``need'' that program ``to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions,'' to condition the issuance of a waiver on a state-specific
pollution problem that maps on to the elements as laid out in CAA
section 202(a): [1] Emissions of pollutants; [2] resulting air
pollution; [3] health and welfare effects from that resulting air
pollution. EPA concludes that the interpretation of CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) it adopts in this document is the best, if not the only,
reading of that provision.
    The Supreme Court's opinion in UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014),
instructs that Clean Air Act provisions cannot necessarily rationally
be applied identically to GHG as they are to traditional
pollutants.\260\ For the reasons set forth in this subsection, it is
appropriate to consider the application of the second waiver prong, CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B), to California's ``need'' vel non for its own GHG
and ZEV programs, separate and apart from its ``need'' for its own
criteria pollutant program. EPA determines, based on the application of
the second waiver prong, that California does not ``need'' its own GHG
and ZEV programs ``to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,''
notwithstanding EPA's historical determinations that California does so
``need'' its own criteria pollutant programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ CARB is wrong to suggest in its comments that EPA's
interpretation in this action of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Massachusetts v.
EPA. CARB comments at 360. Massachusetts held that the general, CAA-
wide definition of ``air pollutant'' at CAA section 302(g)
encompasses carbon dioxide, and that the text of CAA section
202(a)(1), which provides that EPA shall regulate standards for
emissions of ``any air pollutant'' from new motor vehicles if EPA
makes certain predicate findings (referred to colloquially as
``endangerment findings''), also encompasses carbon dioxide. 549
U.S. at 528. But CAA section 209, as a whole, in its preemption
provision in 209(a), in the waiver provision in 209(b), and most
specifically in the second waiver prong under CAA 209(b)(1)(B), does
not contain the term ``pollutant,'' and EPA does not in this
document interpret section 209 as simply establishing a distinction
between criteria and GHG pollutants. Rather, for the reasons stated
in this document, EPA interprets CAA section 209(b), and its
extraordinary treatment afforded to one state, as requiring, in its
provision in CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) that no waiver shall issue
where a state does not need its own standards ``to meet compelling
and extraordinary conditions,'' as requiring a state-specific,
particularized nexus between the elements of a pollution problem--
i.e., pollutants, pollution, and impacts--as set forth in CAA
section 202(a). CARB asserts that ``[t]here is no reason Section
209(b)(1)(B) should be interpreted more narrowly than Section
202(a),'' CARB comments at 360. One such reason is perfectly
evident: They have different text. Another, as discussed in this
action, is that CAA 209(b)(1)(B) must be read against the principle
that extraordinary treatment afforded one state must be justified by
``extraordinary conditions'' in that state. Here, CARB misses the
mark when it invokes Massachusetts's observation that ``without
regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete,'' quoting
549 U.S. at 532. CARB comments at 360. The Supreme Court there was
discussing evolution of scientific understanding of what pollutants
may pose harm. Nothing in Massachusetts suggests that scientific
developments can alter the fundamental relationship between the
States among themselves and vis-[agrave]-vis the federal government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the fact that GHG emissions may affect criteria
pollutant concentrations (e.g., increases in ambient temperature are
conducive to ground-level ozone formation) does not satisfy this
requirement for a particularized nexus, because to allow such
attenuated effects to fill in the gaps would eliminate the function of
requiring such a nexus in the first place and would elide the
distinction between national and local pollution problems which EPA
discerns as underlying the text, structure, and purpose of the waiver
provision. EPA departs in this regard from the position it took in the
2009 reversal of the 2008 waiver denial, 74 FR at 32763, where it
determined that ``[t]here is a logical link between the local air
pollution problem of ozone and California's desire to reduce GHGs as
one way to address the adverse impact that climate change may have on
local ozone conditions.''
    EPA further notes that elsewhere in the 2009 waiver denial
reversal, EPA took the position that Massachusetts v. EPA supports the
view that, because ``every small reduction is helpful in reducing
[climate] concerns. . . . [A] reduction in domestic automobile
emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increase no matter
what happens with regard to other emissions,'' and therefore
``opponents [of the waiver] have not met their burden of demonstrating
that California's motor vehicle program, or its GHG standards, does not
have a rational relationship to contributing to amelioration of the air
pollution problems in California.'' Id. at 32766 (emphasis added). EPA
now departs from this prior position in several important respects.
    First, to the extent that its 2009 waiver denial reversal was
guided by an interpretation of the teachings of Massachusetts under
which any reduction in GHG gives warrant for regulatory action (to
include EPA's waiver approvals), that must now be weighed against the
Supreme Court's subsequent 2014 UARG opinion, which stands for the
proposition that particular CAA provisions will not necessarily apply
identically in the case of GHG emissions as they do to criteria
pollutant emissions.
    Second, to the extent that EPA's 2009 waiver denial reversal framed
the question under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) as whether there is a
``rational relationship'' between California's programs and
California's air pollution problems, that conflated the ``arbitrary and
capricious'' test in CAA section 209(b)(1)(A) with the unique and
distinct term ``need[ed] to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions'' in CAA section 209(b)(1)(B); EPA's position in this
document gives that term a distinct and appropriate meaning and
application.
    Third, whereas the 2009 waiver denial reversal also noted in this
passage that ``there is some evidence in the record that proffers a
specific level of reduction in temperature resulting from California's
regulations,'' this action notes elsewhere that the 2012 joint rule
record reflected that even standards much more stringent than either
the 2012 Federal standards or California's ACC program would only
reduce global temperature by 0.02 degrees Celsius in 2100. As discussed
elsewhere in this action, EPA concludes that this does not constitute a
showing

that California ``needs'' its standards to ``meet'' climate change,
separate from the question whether climate change and its impacts on
California constitute ``compelling and extraordinary conditions''
within the meaning of the statute. Further, the claim by some
commenters that ``incremental progress is progress nonetheless'' does
not meaningfully address the reality that the waiver would result in an
indistinguishable change in global temperatures and, based on
geographic variability and measurement sensitivity, likely no change in
temperatures or physical impacts resulting from anthropogenic climate
change in California.
    EPA proposed to determine that the balance of textual, contextual,
structural, and legislative history evidence supports the conclusion
that the statute is ambiguous in one particular respect: Whether CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B) refers to an individual standard or the California
standards as a whole when referring to the Administrator's review of
state standards submitted for a waiver, to determine whether the state
``needs such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions.'' We explained that ``such State standards'' in CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) is ambiguous with respect to the scope of EPA's analysis.
For example, it is unclear whether EPA is meant to evaluate either the
standard or standards at issue in the waiver request or all of
California's standards in the aggregate. We also explained that CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B) does not specifically employ terms that could only
be construed as calling for a standard-by-standard analysis or each
individual standard. For example, it does not contain phrases such as
``each State standard'' or ``the State standard.'' Nor does the use of
the plural term ``standards'' definitively answer the question of the
proper scope of EPA's analysis, given that the variation in the use of
singular and plural form of a word in the same law is often
insignificant and a given waiver request typically encompasses multiple
``standards.'' Thus, we explained that while it is clear that ``such
State standards'' refers at least to all of the standards that are the
subject of the particular waiver request before the Administrator, that
phrase could reasonably be considered as referring either to the
standards in the entire California program, the program for similar
vehicles, or the particular standards for which California is
requesting a waiver under the pending request.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \261\ California suggests in its comments that EPA is
``logically inconsistent'' in that it said at proposal, 83 FR at
43246, that the CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) phrase ``such State
standards'' ``refers at least to all of the standards that are the
subject of the particular waiver request before the Administrator,''
while at the same time proposing to reconsider and withdraw the
January 2013 grant of a waiver with respect to some, but not all, of
the components of the ACC program (i.e., with respect to GHG and
ZEV, but not LEV). EPA disagrees that this is inconsistent. The
question of how to interpret ``such state standards'' refers to the
determination of what the total set of standards is with regard to
which EPA will consider whether California ``needs'' those standards
``to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.'' It is
reasonable to assign that total set at the level of the waiver-
request package before the Agency, rather than all the state-
specific emission standards that California has ever adopted. If the
consideration reveals that, within that set, California does not
need particular subsets ``to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions''--here, because the GHG and ZEV programs lack a
particularized, California-specific nexus between pollutant,
pollution, and impacts, a rationale that does not apply to the LEV
program, for which EPA did not propose to withdraw the waiver and is
not in this document withdrawing the waiver--that is nothing
unusual. And it is consistent with EPA's prior practice, as
discussed in subsection III.B, of only partially granting aspects
of, in combination with denial or deferral of action on other
aspects of, some previous waivers. The ultimate analysis whether a
waiver is appropriate is not limited to a binary, all-or-nothing
determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We did explain, however, that there are reasons to doubt that
``such State standards'' is intended to refer to all standards in
California's program, including all standards that it has previously
adopted and obtained waivers for, because this would limit EPA's
ability to consider and act on standards that are the subject of
particular waiver applications, even where that individualized
consideration is reasonable or the only rational approach.
Specifically, given that the term ``extraordinary'' should refer to
circumstances that are specific to California, such as thermal
inversions resulting from local geography and wind patterns, and
primarily responsible for causing the air pollution problems that the
standards are designed to address, standards which address pollution
problems that lack that type of particularized nexus to California are
particularly appropriate candidates for an individualized
consideration. EPA affirms this view as it relates to the review of GHG
standards, given that GHG emissions from in California cars, and their
consequences for California, bear no particular relation to these
California-specific circumstances--i.e., global GHG emissions in the
aggregate are what present problems for California, not California-
specific ones.
    The waiver under CAA section 209(b) is a waiver of, and is
logically dependent on and presupposes the existence of, the
prohibition under CAA section 209(a), which forbids (absent a waiver)
any State to ``adopt or attempt to enforce any standard [singular]
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines subject to this part.'' States are forbidden from
adopting a standard, singular; California requests waivers seriatim by
submitting a standard or package of standards to EPA; it follows that
EPA considers those submissions as it receives them, individually, not
in the aggregate with all standards for which it has previously granted
waivers. Further, reading the phrase ``such State standards'' as
requiring EPA always and only to consider California's entire program
in the aggregate would limit the application of this waiver prong in a
way that EPA does not believe Congress intended. We explained that,
under the interpretation where EPA is constrained to the aggregate
approach, once EPA had determined that California needed its very first
set of submitted standards to meet extraordinary and compelling
conditions, EPA would never have the discretion to determine that
California did not need any subsequent standards for which it sought a
successive waiver--unless EPA is authorized to consider a later
submission separate from its earlier finding. Moreover, as also
explained at proposal, up until the ACC program waiver request,
California's waiver request involved individual standards or particular
aspects of California's new motor vehicle program. For example, only
GHG standards were at issue in the 2008 GHG waiver request
denial.262 263
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ 73 FR 12156 (March 6, 2008).
    \263\ EPA determines in this document that GHG emissions, with
regard to the lack of a nexus between their State-specific sources
and their State-specific impacts, and California's GHG standard
program, are sufficiently distinct from criteria pollutants and
traditional, criteria pollutant standards, that it is appropriate
for EPA to consider whether California needs its own GHG vehicle
emissions program. EPA does not determine in this document and does
not need to determine today how this determination may affect
subsequent reviews of waiver applications with regard to criteria
pollutant control programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters disagreed with our view of ambiguity and the
proposal to construe ``such state standards,'' in the context of our
reconsideration and proposal to withdraw the January 2013 waiver for
California's GHG and ZEV provisions, as applying to those provisions
themselves, rather than California's entire, aggregate program
consisting of all California's motor vehicle emission standards, when
considering whether California needs its

GHG and ZEV provisions to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions
within the meaning of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B). One commenter argued
that this reading would require EPA to consider the protectiveness of
California's standards by looking at them in the aggregate while also
allowing EPA to consider California's ``need'' on an individual,
standard-by-standard basis. Commenters also argued that EPA's
historical or traditional interpretation was correct. They argued that
EPA could not apply a different interpretation of ``such State
standards'' given that ``such State standards'' in CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) does not relate back to the singular ``any standard'' in
CAA section 209(a). They cast this reading as ``implausible,'' given
that under the rule of last antecedent ``such'' should properly refer
to standards in (b)(1) and not 209(a). We disagree. As explained
earlier above, reading the phrase ``such State standards'' as requiring
EPA always and only to consider California's entire program in the
aggregate would limit the application of this waiver criterion.
Specifically, it would mean that once EPA determines that California
needed its very first set of submitted standards to meet extraordinary
and compelling conditions, EPA would never have the discretion to
determine that California did not need any subsequent standards for
which it sought a successive waiver--unless EPA is authorized to
consider a later submission separate from its earlier finding. Instead,
it is reasonable to read CAA section 209(b) as articulating, first,
that EPA shall consider the standards in the aggregate to determine if
the State's determination that they are sufficiently protective is
arbitrary and capricious (CAA section 209(b)(1)(A)). But, even if this
first criterion for denying a waiver is not triggered, nevertheless,
such a waiver shall not be granted as to such standards that are not
needed to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, under the
second waiver denial criterion (CAA section 209(b)(1)(B)). Commenters'
argument, in effect, inserts the word ``every'' (or ``all'') into CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B) in between the words ``need'' and ``such.''
    Additionally, as shown in further detail in section D.2., below,
the term ``extraordinary'' refers to circumstances that are specific to
California, such as thermal inversions resulting from local geography
and wind patterns, and that are primarily responsible for causing the
air pollution problems that the standard under waiver review is
designed to address. EPA affirms the view that the term
``extraordinary'' refers primarily to factors that tend to produce
higher levels of pollution: Geographical and climatic conditions (like
thermal inversions) that in combination with large numbers and high
concentrations of automobiles, create serious air pollution problems in
California (73 FR 12156, 12159-60).
    The text, context, and structure of CAA section 209(b) support
EPA's reasoning that the relevant ``conditions'' are those conditions
present in a particular state and that have a particularized nexus to
emissions in that state. The statute calls for an examination of
whether the ``State'' needs such ``state standards'' in the context of
a prohibition in CAA section 209(a) of a ``state or other political
subdivision'' adopting or attempting to enforce alternative standards.
It would be inconsistent with the overall structure for a state's own
preferred policy approach to addressing national or global--rather than
local and state-specific--``conditions'' to permit a waiver from a
scheme that otherwise establishes a uniform, national policy.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 606 F.2d 1293, 1301-02 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (``Ford is asking this court to declare that Congress
intended to make standards adopted by California for its own
particular problems, and never substantively reviewed for stringency
or national protectiveness by federal officials, an option which
auto manufacturers can choose in the rest of the country as an
alternative to compliance with the federal standards which Congress
determined are in the best interests of the nation. We find this
reading to be wholly implausible.''). See also id. at 1303 (``It was
clearly the intent of the Act that that determination focus on local
air quality problems . . . that may differ substantially from those
in other parts of the nation.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notably, pertinent legislative history supports this view of the
text and structure of 209(b), insofar as it refers to California's
``peculiar local conditions'' and ``unique problems.'' S. Rep. No. 403,
90th Cong. 1st Sess., at 32 (1967). This legislative history also
indicates that California is to demonstrate ``compelling and
extraordinary circumstances sufficiently different from the nation as a
whole to justify standards on automobile emissions which may, from time
to time, need to be more stringent than national standards.'' Id. EPA
views this as evidence of Congressional intent that separate standards
in California are to be justified by a showing of circumstances in
California that are different from circumstances in the country at
large. Additionally, EPA views this legislative history as
demonstrating that Congress did not intend for CAA section 209(b)(1)(B)
to be based on the need for California to enact separate standards that
address pollution problems of a more national or global nature.
Relevant legislative history also ``indicates that Congress allowed
waivers of preemption for California motor vehicle standards based on
the particular effects of local conditions in California on the air
pollution problems in California.'' Congress discussed ``the unique
problems faced in California as a result of its climate and
topography.'' H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., at 21 (1967).
See also Statement of Cong. Holifield (CA), 113 Cong. Rec. 30942-43
(1967). Congress also noted the large effect of local vehicle pollution
on such local problems. See, e.g., Statement of Cong. Bell (CA) 113
Cong. Rec. 30946. As explained at proposal, Congress focus was on
California's ozone problem, which is especially affected by local
conditions and local pollution. See Statement of Cong. Smith (CA) 113
Cong. Rec. 30940-41 (1967); Statement of Cong. Holifield (CA), id., at
30942. See also, MEMA I, 627 F.2d at 1109 (noting the discussion of
California's ``peculiar local conditions'' in the legislative history).
In sum and as explained at proposal, conditions that are similar on a
global scale are not ``extraordinary,'' especially where
``extraordinary'' conditions are a predicate for a local deviation from
national standards, under CAA section 209(b). 83 FR 43247.
    As further explained in section D2., below, GHG is a globally
distributed pollutant with environmental effects that are different
from emissions of criteria pollutants. For example, GHG emissions from
the California vehicle fleet bear no more relation to GHG emissions in
California than fleet in other parts of the country. As also explained
in the SAFE proposal, EPA believes that the GHG and ZEV standards are
standards that would not meaningfully address global air pollution
problems posed by GHG emissions, in contrast to local or regional air
pollution problem with causal ties to conditions in California.
Additionally, the impacts of California vehicles' GHG emissions on
California are mediated through the context of the global mixture of
elevated levels of GHG in the upper atmosphere. As also shown below,
EPA finds that while potential conditions in California related to
global climate change could be substantial, they are not sufficiently
different from the potential conditions in the nation as a whole to
justify separate state standards under CAA section

209(b)(1)(B).\265\ In this action, EPA is reviewing a waiver for motor
vehicle standards designed to address a global air pollution problem
and its effects, as compared to a local or regional air pollution
problem that has causal ties to conditions in California. EPA must
therefore, review California's GHG standards in light of the fact that
GHG emissions impacts are different from criteria pollutants
themselves, and California must address their need for them as it
relates to conditions in California. In sum, as explained at proposal,
under our reading of ``such state standards'' and ``extraordinary and
compelling conditions,'' EPA will examine California's need for GHG
standards by considering levels of GHG emissions emitted from motor
vehicles in California to determine if they are specific to California
and contribute primarily to environmental effects that are specific to
California. This review, which calls for a showing of a particularized
causal link between the standards under review, emissions in
California, and conditions in California, is similar to agency review
of California's need for standards designed to address criteria
pollutants and is further discussed in section D.2.d, below.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ See Fourth National Climate Assessment, Chapter 25:
Southwest, available at https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/25/. See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Observed Climate Change Impacts Database, available at http://sedac.ipcc- data.org/ddc/observed_ar5/index.html.
    \266\ California argues in its comments that EPA has
inappropriately reduced the scope of waiver ability under CAA
section 209(b) to be narrower than the scope of express preemption
under CAA section 209(a). EPA disagrees. To the extent that CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B), as interpreted and applied here, precludes a
waiver for California's GHG vehicle emissions and ZEV programs, that
effect flows from the text and structure of this statutory section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CARB argues that what it characterizes as EPA's reading of
``compelling and extraordinary'' as equivalent to ``unique'' or
``sufficiently different from'' the rest of the country ``is
inconsistent with Section 209(b)(1)(B), other provisions of the Clean
Air Act, and the legislative history.'' CARB also asserts that EPA
``cites no case'' to support this reading. At the same time, CARB
claims that EPA has either interpreted legislative history incorrectly
or relies entirely on legislative history for the 1967 CAA, which does
note California's ``unique problems,'' instead of legislative history
for the 1977 amendments; CARB asserts that the latter legislative
history is more relevant, given that the addition of section 177 in the
1977 CAA meant that Congress did not intend that Section 209(b)(1)(B)
be construed as requiring ``California's problems to be entirely unique
or sufficiently different from those in other States.'' CARB also
contends that EPA is limiting application of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B)
to smog, even though EPA has granted waivers for pollutants that do not
contribute to smog, such as particulate matter. In addition, CARB
maintains that what it characterizes as EPA's reading ``compelling and
extraordinary conditions'' as restricted to ``local'' or ``regional''
pollutants would weaken Congress's intent that California retain its
own regulatory program and continue to lead the nation as a
``laboratory of innovation.'' CARB further argues that EPA provides no
support for this ``geographic distinction,'' while also casting the
reading as ``illusory.'' According to CARB, both local and global
pollution cause compelling and extraordinary conditions, as evidenced
by provisions of the CAA that address long-range transport of emissions
(beyond the state level). In sum, CARB argues that ``compelling and
extraordinary conditions'' is expansive enough to be read as including
GHG emissions and that EPA's ``exacting and unrealistic'' reading can
only be met by ``a rare air pollution problem.'' CARB comments at 360-
365.
    EPA disagrees. First, as explained at proposal, the 1977 Amendments
revised CAA section 209(b)(1) in only one material aspect.
Specifically, California is required to determine that standards it
seeks a waiver for will be ``in the aggregate, at least as protective
of public health and welfare than applicable Federal standards,''
rather than the ``more stringent'' standard under 1967 Clean Air Act.
83 FR 43247 n.579. Second, there is relevant legislative history from
the 1977 amendments, which describes EPA's role in reviewing
California's protectiveness determination, under CAA section
209(b)(1)(A), as whether ``the State acted unreasonably in evaluating
the relative risks of various pollutants in light of air quality,
topography, photochemistry and climate in that State.'' This 1977
legislative history further supports a reading requiring a
particularized nexus. H. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 302
(1977), U.S. C.C.A.N. 1977, p. 1381. Third, in support of the proposed
reading, EPA cited MEMA I as noting the Senate Committee discussion of
California's ``peculiar local conditions'' in 1967 legislative history
for this provision in upholding the grant of a waiver subsequent to the
1977 CAA amendments. . 627 F.2d at 1109, citing S.Rep. No. 403, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967); see also Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 606 F.2d
1293,1303 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (``It was clearly the intent of the Act that
that determination focus on local air quality problems . . . that may
differ substantially from those in other parts of the nation.'').
Fourth, EPA's reading of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) has never been and is
not limited to ``smog''-causing pollutants. Here, CARB's comment
glosses over extensive discussion in the SAFE proposal of the phrase
``compelling and extraordinary'' including, for example, legislative
history indicating that California is to demonstrate ``compelling and
extraordinary circumstances sufficiently different from the nation as a
whole to justify standards on automobile emissions which may, from time
to time, need to be more stringent than national standards.'' 83 FR
23427, citing S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., at 32 (1967).
Fifth, as shown in greater detail in section III.D, the phrase
``compelling and extraordinary conditions'' qualifies the ``need'' for
California's standards. And in a statute designed to address public
health and welfare, it certainly cannot mean standards that allow a
state to be ``a laboratory for innovation'' in the abstract, without
any connection to a need to address pollution problems. Most notably,
legislative history explains that CAA section 209(b)(1) was is intended
to recognize California's ``unique problems.'' For example, in
originally adopting the provision, the Senate Committee on Public Works
explained that ``California's unique problems and pioneering efforts
justified a waiver of the preemption section to the State of
California.'' S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967)
(emphasis added); see also 113 Cong. Rec. 30948 (bound ed. Nov.
2,1967), Statement of Representative Harley Staggers, chairman of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee (explaining that
``overall national interest required administration of controls on
motor vehicle emissions, with special recognition given by the
Secretary to the unique problems facing California as a result of
numerous thermal inversions that occur within that state because of its
geography and prevailing wind patterns), ; id. at 30950, Remarks of
Rep. Corman (``The uniqueness and the seriousness of California's
problem is evident-more than 90 percent of the smog in our urban area
is caused by automobiles, and in the next 15 years the number of
automobiles in the state will almost double.''). Sixth, while it is

true that local and regional pollutants can be transported at greater
geographic scales than the state level, the Clean Air Act sets out a
comprehensive scheme for addressing air pollution transported to other
regions; see, e.g., CAA sections 126 and 110(a)(2)(D)(i). The fact that
the Act addresses pollutant transport elsewhere does not expand the
scope of the waiver provision. In contrast, in CAA section 209(b),
Congress set out a waiver of preemption for California to address
automotive pollution that give rise to local and regional air quality
problems. Finally, to the extent CARB casts EPA reading as ``exacting
and unrealistic,'' it mischaracterizes CAA section 209(a) and (b),
which preempts states from adopting and enforcing standards for new
motor vehicles and engines, with CAA section 209(b) allowing for a
waiver of the preemption in 209(a) only if certain enumerated
conditions are met. It is not ``a rare air pollution problem'' that
satisfies the particularized nexus interpretation of CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) that EPA adopts in this document. Rather, it is the all-
too-well understood and longstanding air pollution problem that
California continues to face: Aggravated criteria pollution at the
state and local level.
2. It Is Appropriate To Apply This Criterion to California's GHG
Standards Separately, Rather Than to California's Motor Vehicle Program
as a Whole
    Under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act, the
Administrator may not grant a waiver if he finds that the ``State does
not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions.'' EPA proposed to find that CARB does not need its own GHG
and ZEV standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions in
California, on the grounds that ``compelling and extraordinary
conditions'' mean environmental conditions with causes and effects
particular or unique to, California whereas GHG emissions present
global air pollution problems. Specifically, EPA proposed to determine
that the GHG-related standards are designed to address global air
pollution and its consequences, in contrast to local or regional air
pollution problems with causal ties to conditions in California. EPA
also proposed to find that, while effects related to climate change in
California could be substantial, they are not sufficiently different
from the conditions in the nation as a whole to justify separate State
standards under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B). 83 FR 43248-43250. Lastly,
EPA proposed to find that the State's GHG-related standards would not
have a meaningful impact on the potential conditions related to global
climate change. Because EPA has traditionally interpreted and applied
CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) in a manner that examines whether the
conditions that Congress identified (e.g., topography number of
vehicles, etc.) \267\ still give rise to serious air quality problems
in California, and thus a need for California's own motor vehicle
emission control program, EPA concludes that this causal-link test is
the appropriate basis on which to evaluate California's GHG emission
standards under the second waiver prong, CAA section 209(b)(1)(B).\268\
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    \267\ See, e.g., 49 FR 18887, 18890 (May 3, 1984) (waiver
decision discussing legislative history of CAA section 209).
    \268\ It is not appropriate for EPA to defer to California and
other outside parties when EPA is interpreting its own statute. By
contrast, EPA does defer to California's policy choices when it
comes to choosing emissions standards that will best address the
serious air quality problems and impacts on public health and
welfare in California--to the extent that the State standards at
issue will actually address pollution and its consequences that are
particular to California. But the question whether the State
regulations at issue actually do meet the statutory criterion of
being necessary ``to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions''
in the meaning of the statute, CAA section 209(b)(1)(B), is one
which EPA must answer. In this regard, EPA notes that it has
previously taken the position that ``the burden of proof [lies] on
the party opposing a waiver,'' and that ``the burden [is] on those
who allege, in effect, that EPA's GHG emission standards are
adequate to California's needs.'' 78 FR at 2117 (Jan. 2013 waiver
grant). EPA notes that this previous discussion is distinguishable
from the current context in two key regards. First, EPA was in 2013
analyzing third parties' opposition to a waiver, rather than
conducting its own analysis of whether a previously granted waiver
was appropriately granted. Second, EPA's change in position in this
document does not constitute an assertion that ``EPA's GHG emission
standards are [or are not] adequate to California's needs'' as a
matter of policy. Rather, EPA is adopting an interpretation of CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B), specifically its provision that no waiver is
appropriate if California does not need standards ``to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions,'' similar to the
interpretation that it adopted in the 2008 waiver denial but
abandoned in the 2009 and 2013 waiver grants, and applying that
interpretation to determine to withdraw the January 2013 waiver for
California's GHG and ZEV program for model years 2021 through 2025.
Under that interpretation, the question is not whether existing
federal standards are ``adequate to California's needs,'' but
whether California's standards are needed under the meaning of CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B), which, as set forth in this document, requires
a particularized nexus between California-specific pollutant
sources, California-specific pollution contributed to thereby, and
California-specific pollutants impacts caused thereby. Furthermore,
we took comment on burden of proof in the proposal, see 83 FR at
43244 n.567. EPA believes it is not necessary to resolve that issue
in this action as regardless of whether a preponderance of the
evidence or clear and compelling evidence standard is applied, the
Agency concludes that withdrawal of the waiver is appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, EPA has in the past recognized California's unique
underlying conditions and serious air pollution problems when reviewing
waiver requests.\269\ California, and others that oppose the withdrawal
of the waiver, assert that the relevant inquiry is merely whether
California needs to have some form of a separate State motor vehicle
emissions control program to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions, not whether any given standard is needed to meet compelling
and extraordinary conditions related to that air pollution problem. On
the other hand, several commenters that support a withdrawal of the
waiver suggest EPA's determination should be based on whether
California needs greenhouse gas standards in particular to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions, asserting that a proposed set
of standards must be linked to compelling and extraordinary conditions.
These commenters suggest that the Act requires EPA to look at the
particular ``standards'' at issue, not the entire State program.
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    \269\ See American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 600 F.3d 624, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (``With
respect to the statutory language, EPA concluded that `compelling
and extraordinary conditions' refers to the factors that tend to
cause pollution--the `geographical and climate conditions that, when
combined with large numbers and high concentrations of automobiles,
create serious air pollution problems.' The expansive and statutory
language gives California (and in turn EPA) a good deal of
flexibility in assessing California's regulatory needs. We therefore
find no basis to disturb EPA's reasonable interpretation of the
second criterion. See Chevron, USA Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43.'') (citation omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA determines that it in this context it is appropriate to review
whether California needs its GHG standards to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions separately from the need for the remainder of
California's new motor vehicle program, which has historically
addressed criteria pollutants with a particular causal link to local
and regional conditions both in the nature and quantity of emissions
and in the particularized local and regional impacts of the pollution
to which those emissions contribute. EPA bases this decision on the
fact that California's GHG standards are designed to address global
climate change problems that are different from the local pollution
conditions and problems that California has addressed previously in its
new motor vehicle program. The climate change problems are different in
terms of the distribution of the pollutants and the effect of local
California factors, including the local effect of motor vehicle
emissions as differentiated from other GHG emissions worldwide on the
GHG concentrations in California. In

addition, EPA notes that under its traditional interpretation of CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B), where EPA evaluates the need for a separate
California new motor vehicle program, conditions such as the nature of
the air quality problem may change whereby a particular motor vehicle
regulation designed for a specific criteria pollutant is no longer
needed to address a serious air quality problem (e.g., the underlying
air quality problem no longer exists). Therefore, EPA concludes that it
is appropriate to examine the need for GHG standards within
California's mobile source program to ensure that such standard is
linked to local conditions that giving rise to the air pollution
problem, that the air pollution problem is serious and of a local
nature, and that the State standards at issue will meaningfully redress
that local problem.\270\
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    \270\ EPA notes in this regard that the position that GHG and
climate are no different from criteria pollutants and criteria air
pollution in terms of applicability of the CAA section 209(b) waiver
regime, and specifically that no particularized nexus between in-
state emissions and in-state impacts is necessary in order to meet
the CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) ``need[ed] . . . to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions,'' would effectively read the term
``extraordinary'' out of the statute, or reduce it to surplusage
with the term ``compelling.'' Whether GHG emissions and attendant
climate impacts are, in the colloquial sense, compelling or not is
not the relevant question. It is whether they are ``compelling and
extraordinary'' within the reasonably interpreted meaning of that
term in its context here. Inasmuch as that term in its context
requires a particularized nexus between California emissions,
California pollution, and California impacts, they are not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This waiver decision falls within the context of a few instances of
EPA applying the CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) criterion to a California
waiver request for a fundamentally global air pollution problem.\271\
Although EPA's review of this criterion has typically been cursory due
to California needing its motor vehicle emission program due to
fundamental factors leading to local and regional air pollution
problems that were well established at the time of creation of the
waiver provision (as discussed below), it is appropriate in this case
to carefully review the purpose of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) when
applying it to the unique circumstance of California's regulation of
greenhouse gases. By doing so, EPA gives meaning to Congress's decision
to include this provision in CAA section 209(b).\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ See generally California State Motor Vehicle Pollution
Control Standards; Advanced Clean Car Program; Notice of Decision,
January 9, 2013 Volume 78, Number 6 pp. 2211--2145; California State
Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from 2014 and Subsequent Model Year Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines
and Vehicles; Notice of Decision; December 29, 2016 Volume 81,
Number 250, pp. 95982-95987; California State Motor Vehicle
Pollution Control Standards; Heavy-Duty Tractor-Trailer Greenhouse
Gas Regulations; Notice of Decision; August 7, 2014 Volume 79,
Number 152 pp. 46256-46265; California State Motor Vehicle Pollution
Control Standards; Within-the-Scope Determination for Amendments to
California's Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Regulations; Notice of
Decision; June 14, 2011 Volume 76, Number 114 pp. 34693-34700;
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice
of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for
California's 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards for New Motor Vehicles; July 8, 2009 Volume 74, Number 129
pp. 32744-32784; California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control
Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act
Preemption for California's 2009 and Subsequent Model Year
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles; March 6,
2008 Volume 73, Number 45 pp. 12156-12169.
    \272\ See United States v. Menashe, 348 US 528, 538-39 (1955)
(courts must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence of a
statute).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, because both CAA sections 209(b)(B) and (C) employ the
term ``such state standards,'' it is appropriate for EPA to read the
term consistently between prongs (B) and (C). Under CAA section
209(b)(1)(C) EPA conducts review of standards California has submitted
to EPA for the grant of a waiver to determine if they are consistent
with CAA section 202(a).\273\ It follows then that EPA must read ``such
state standards'' in CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) as a reference to the
same standards in subsection (C).\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ ``Technology exists with which to achieve California's
proposed standards for HC and CO, however, the standards are
inconsistent with Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act because the
cost of compliance within the lead time remaining is excessive.'' 38
FR 30136 (November 1, 1973). See also 40 FR 30311 (July 18, 1975);
43 FR 998, 1001 (Jan. 5, 1978).
    \274\ Under CAA section 177 states may adopt and enforce motor
vehicle emissions standards if ``such standards are identical to the
California standards for which a waiver has been granted.'' See,
e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. NYS Dep. of Envt'l Conservation,
17 F.3d 521, 532 (2d Cir. 1994). ``Section 177 refers to `standards
relating to control of emissions ... for which a waiver has been
granted.' Id. In enacting Sec.  209(b), which establishes
California's preemption exception, Congress uses the same words as
it did when it allowed California to set its own `standards . . .
for the control of emissions,' provided the EPA approves a waiver
application. Id. Sec.  7543(b)(1). Hence, the most logical reading
of Sec.  177 is that New York may adopt only those standards that,
pursuant to Sec.  209(b), California included in its waiver
application to the EPA.'' (Emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. EPA Practice in Previous Waivers
    In past waivers that addressed local or regional air pollution, EPA
has interpreted CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) as requiring it to consider
whether California needs a separate motor vehicle program to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions. Under this approach, EPA does
not consider whether the specific standards at issue are needed to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions related to that air pollutant.
For example, EPA reviewed this issue in detail with regard to
particulate matter in a 1984 waiver decision.\275\ In that waiver
proceeding, California argued that EPA is restricted to considering
whether California needs to have its own motor vehicle program to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions, and does not consider whether
any given standard is necessary to meet such conditions. Opponents of
the waiver in that proceeding argued that EPA was to consider whether
California needed these PM standards to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions related to PM air pollution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ See 49 FR 18887 (May 3, 1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Administrator agreed with California that it was appropriate to
look at the program as a whole in determining compliance with CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B). One justification of the Administrator was that
many of the concerns with regard to having separate State standards
were based on the manufacturers' worries about having to meet more than
one motor vehicle program in the country, but that once a separate
California program was permitted, it should not be a greater
administrative hindrance to have to meet further standards in
California. The Administrator also justified this decision by noting
that the language of the statute referred to ``such state standards,''
which referred back to the use of the same phrase in the criterion
looking at the protectiveness of the standards in the aggregate. He
also noted that the phrase referred to standards in the plural, not
individual standards. He considered this interpretation to be
consistent with the ability of California to have some standards that
are less stringent than the federal standards, as long as, under CAA
section 209(b)(1)(A), in the aggregate its standards were at least as
protective as the federal standards.
    The Administrator further stated that in the legislative history of
CAA section 209, the phrase ``compelling and extraordinary
circumstances'' refers to ``certain general circumstances, unique to
California, primarily responsible for causing its air pollution
problem,'' like the numerous thermal inversions caused by its local
geography and wind patterns. The Administrator also noted that Congress
recognized ``the presence and growth of California's vehicle
population, whose emissions were thought to be responsible for ninety
percent of the air pollution in certain parts of California.'' \276\
EPA reasoned that the term compelling and extraordinary conditions
``does not refer to the levels of pollution directly.'' Instead, the
term refers primarily to the

confluence of factors that tend to produce higher levels of pollution
of the type particular to California: ``geographical and climatic
conditions (like thermal inversions) that, when combined with large
numbers and high concentrations of automobiles, create serious air
pollution problems.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ Id. at 18890 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Administrator summarized that the question to be addressed in
the second criterion is whether these ``fundamental conditions'' (i.e.,
the geographical and climate conditions and large motor vehicle
population) that cause air pollution continued to exist, not whether
the air pollution levels for PM were ``compelling and extraordinary,''
nor the extent to which these specific PM standards will address the PM
air pollution problem.
    From this it can be seen that EPA's interpretation in the context
of reviewing standards designed to address local or regional air
pollution has looked at the local causes of the air pollution problems:
Geographic and climatic conditions that turn local emissions into air
pollution problems, such as thermal inversions, combined with a large
number of motor vehicles in California emitting in the aggregate large
quantities of emissions. Under the interpretation EPA adopts in this
document, it is the particularized nexus between the emissions from
California vehicles, their contribution to local pollution, and the
extraordinary impacts that that pollution has on California due to
California's specific characteristics, that set California apart from
other areas when Congress adopted this provision.
    EPA's review of this criterion has usually been cursory and not in
dispute, as the fundamental factors leading to these traditional
criteria air pollution problems--geography, local climate conditions
(like thermal inversions), significance of the motor vehicle
population--have not changed over time and over different local and
regional air pollutants. These fundamental factors have applied
similarly for all of California's air pollution problems that are local
or regional in nature. California's circumstances of geography,
climate, and motor vehicle population continue to show that it has
compelling and extraordinary conditions leading to such local air
pollution problems related to traditional pollutants.
    California's motor vehicle program has historically addressed air
pollution problems that are generally local or regional in nature. The
emission standards have been designed to reduce emissions coming from
local vehicles, in circumstances where these local emissions lead to
air pollution in California that will affect directly the local
population and environment in California. The narrow question in this
waiver proceeding is whether this interpretation is appropriate when
considering motor vehicle standards designed to address a global air
pollution problem and its effects, as compared to a local or regional
air pollution problem that has particular causal ties to conditions in
California.
    As EPA observed in the SAFE proposal, the agency has articulated
differing interpretations of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B). Historically,
EPA has interpreted this provision to require that California needs to
have its own separate new motor vehicle program in the aggregate to
meet compelling and extraordinary conditions in California, not whether
the state needs the specific standards under consideration. In 2008, in
contrast, when EPA first considered whether State GHG emission
regulations meet the requirements for a CAA section 209(b) waiver, EPA
determined that the better reading of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) would be
to consider whether California ``need[s]'' the particular standards at
issue ``to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,'' and the
agency denied the waiver on these grounds. Then, when EPA reconsidered
that denial in 2009, the agency reverted to the interpretation that it
had previously applied for criteria pollutants and granted the waiver.
    EPA concludes that the long and contentious history of this
question, and the recent measures that California has taken even during
the pendency of this administrative action to amend its State
regulations beyond the form in which they were granted the waiver in
2013 and, even more recently, to purport to establish ``voluntary''
programs creating yet a third program distinct both from that for which
CAA preemption was waived in 2013 and the Federal standards promulgated
in 2012 and currently under review by the Federal government, confirm
that extension of CAA section 209(b) waivers to State GHG and ZEV
programs was inappropriate. Such waivers have led to actions by
California increasingly at odds with the clear Congressional design and
intent that national standards would be set by the federal government
with California having an ability to apply for targeted waivers of
preemption to address its own particular problems. EPA therefore views
this interpretation and application of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) set
forth here as, at minimum, a reasonable one that gives appropriate
meaning and effect to this provision and does not second-guess
California's policy judgment notwithstanding assertions to the
contrary.
b. The Distinct Nature of Global GHG Pollution as It Relates to CAA
Section 209(b)(1)(B)
    The air pollution problem at issue here is elevated atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases, and the concern is the impact these
concentrations have on global climate change and the effect of global
climate change on California. In contrast to local or regional air
pollution problems, the atmospheric concentrations of these greenhouse
gases are substantially uniform across the globe, based on their long
atmospheric life and the resulting mixing in the atmosphere. The
factors looked at in the past when considering waiver requests for
State standards addressing criteria pollutants--the geography and
climate of California, and the large motor vehicle population in
California, which were considered the fundamental causes of the air
pollution levels found in California--cannot form the basis of a
meaningful analysis of the causal link between California vehicles' GHG
emissions and climate effects felt in California. The concentration of
greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere may affect California, but
that concentration is not affected in any particular way by the
geography and climate of California. The long duration of these gases
in the atmosphere means they are well-mixed throughout the global
atmosphere, such that their concentrations over California and the U.S.
are, for all practical purposes, the same as the global average. The
number of motor vehicles in California, while still a notable
percentage of the national total and still a notable source of GHG
emissions in the State, bears no more relation to the levels of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere over California than any other
comparable source or group of sources of greenhouse gases anywhere in
the world. Emissions of greenhouses gases from California cars do not
generally remain confined within California's local environment (and,
indeed, were they to do so, rather than rise to the upper atmosphere to
become well-mixed with other GHG emissions, those locally located
emissions would not, by definition, contribute to the ``pollution''
that is at issue here). Instead, those GHG emissions from vehicles
operating in California become one part of the global pool of GHG
emissions, with this global pool of emissions leading to a relatively
homogenous concentration of greenhouse gases over the globe. Thus, the
emissions of motor vehicles in

California do not affect California's air pollution problem in any way
different from emissions from vehicles and other pollution sources all
around the world. Similarly, the emissions from California's cars do
not just affect the atmosphere in California, but in fact become one
part of the global pool of GHG emissions that affect the atmosphere
globally and are distributed throughout the world, resulting in
basically a uniform global atmospheric concentration.
    Given the different, and global, nature of the pollution at issue,
EPA determines that the conceptual basis underlying the practice of
considering California's motor vehicle program as a whole (in the
context of criteria emission regulations) does not meaningfully apply
with respect to elevated atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. Therefore,
EPA has considered whether it is appropriate to apply this criterion in
a different manner for this kind of air pollution problem; that is, a
global air pollution problem.
    As previously explained, the text and relevant legislative history
of CAA section 209 also supports EPA's decision to examine the
application of the second waiver denial criterion (CAA section
209(b)(1)(B)) with regard to California's GHG and ZEV standards
specifically in the context of global climate change. It indicates that
Congress was moved to allow waivers of preemption for California motor
vehicle standards based on the particular effects of local conditions
in California on the air pollution problems in California. Congress
discussed ``the unique problems faced in California as a result of its
climate and topography.'' H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., at
21 (1967). See also Statement of Cong. Holifield (CA), 113 Cong. Rec.
30942-43 (1967). Congress also noted the large effect of local vehicle
pollution on such local problems. See, e.g., Statement of Rep. Bell
(CA), 113 Cong. Rec. 30946. In particular, Congress focused on
California's ozone problem, which is especially affected by local
conditions and local pollution. See Statement of Rep. Smith (CA), 113
Cong. Rec. 30940-41 (1967); Statement of Rep. Holifield (CA), id. at
30942. See also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA (MEMA), 627 F.
2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir., 1979) (noting the discussion of California's
``peculiar local conditions'' in the legislative history). Congress
clearly did not have in view pollution problems of a more national or
global nature in justifying this provision.\277\ Moreover, ``the [Clean
Air] Act also differentiates between the states, despite our historic
tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty. Distinctions can
be justified in some cases. `The doctrine of the equality of States . .
. does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared.' But a departure from the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.'' Nw.
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)
(some citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966)) (ellipses and
emphasis added by Northwest Austin Court); see also Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 334 (``exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures
not otherwise appropriate'') (emphasis added); cf. 42 U.S.C.
7543(b)(1)(B) (``No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator
finds that . . . . such State does not need such State standards to
meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.'') (emphasis added).
These principles support our conclusion that Congress did not intend
the waiver provision in CAA section 209(b) to be applied to California
measures that address pollution problems of a national or global
nature, as opposed to conditions that are ``extraordinary'' with
respect to California in particular--i.e., those with a particularized
nexus to emissions in California and to topographical or other features
peculiar to California.''
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    \277\ In reference to another argument made in the 1984 waiver,
while the administrative costs of a program may not increase
significantly based on the addition of new standards, there is still
cost in the implementation of new standards, particularly in terms
of changes in design necessitated by the new standards. In any case,
this issue does not appear to be relevant to the issue of whether
California needs its standards to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. It Is Appropriate To Apply CAA Section 209(b)(1)(B) Separately to
GHG Standards
    EPA concludes that in the context of reviewing California GHG
related standards designed to address global climate change, it is
appropriate to apply the second criterion separately for GHG standards.
    The intent of Congress, in enacting CAA section 209(b) and in
particular Congress's decision to have a separate CAA section
209(b)(1)(B), was to require EPA to specifically review whether
California continues to have compelling and extraordinary conditions
and the need for State standards to address those conditions. Thus, EPA
concludes that it is appropriate to review California's GHG standards
separately from the remainder of the State's motor vehicle emission
control program for purposes of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B).
    In this context it is appropriate to give meaning to this criterion
by looking at whether the emissions from California motor vehicles, as
well as the local climate and topography in California, are the
fundamental causal factors for the air pollution problem--elevated
concentrations of greenhouse gases--apart from the other parts of
California's motor vehicle program, which are intended to remediate
different air pollution concerns.
    The appropriate criteria to apply therefore is whether the
emissions of California motor vehicles, as well as California's local
climate and topography, are the fundamental causal factors for the air
pollution problem of elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases.
d. Relationship of California Motor Vehicles, Climate, and Topography
to Elevated Concentrations of Greenhouse Gases in California
    Under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B), EPA proposed to withdraw the waiver
of preemption of the ACC program GHG and ZEV standards for MY 2021-2025
on two alternative grounds. Specifically, (1) California ``does not
need'' these standards ``to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions;'' and (2) even if California does have compelling and
extraordinary conditions in the context of global climate change,
California does not ``need'' these standards because they will not
meaningfully address global air pollution problems of the sort
associated with GHG emissions. 83 FR 43248.
    As previously explained, EPA proposed to determine that the balance
of textual, contextual, structural, and legislative history evidence
provide reasonable support for the conclusion that the statute is
ambiguous in one particular respect: Whether section 209(b)(1)(B)
refers to an individual standard or the California standards as a whole
when referring to the Administrator's review of state standards
submitted for a waiver, to determine whether the state ``needs such
State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,'' and
that the approach of examining the need for GHG-related standards
separate from the other, traditional aspects of California's program is
reasonable given, among other factors, the unique nature of the global
pollutant. EPA recognizes that Congress's purpose in establishing the
prohibition in CAA section 209(a) and the waiver in CAA section 209(b)
was to

balance the benefit of allowing California significant discretion in
deciding how to protect the health and welfare of its population with
the burden imposed on the manufacturers of being subject to two
separate motor vehicle programs and the overarching policy judgment
that uniform national standards are appropriate. S. Rep. No. 403, 90th
Cong. 1st Sess., at 32-33 (1967). It is clear that Congress intended
this balance to be premised on a situation where California needs the
State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions. Thus,
if EPA determines that California does not need its State GHG standards
to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, a waiver of preemption
for those State standards is not permitted under the statute.
    Commenters supportive of EPA's proposal to withdraw the waiver
commented that California should not continue to enjoy a waiver for
separate State GHG standards because those State standards are not
needed to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions because there is
no link between California-based motor vehicle GHG emissions and any
alleged extraordinary conditions in California. These commenters state
that while California spends a great deal of time discussing the
effects of climate change in California, California does not link its
GHG standards to those effects. They note that GHGs are not localized
pollutants that can affect California's local climate, or that are
problematic due to California's specific topography. Instead, emissions
from vehicles in California become mixed with the global emissions of
GHG and affect global climate (including California's climate) in the
same way that any GHG from around the world affect global (and
California) climate conditions. They claim that Congress authorized EPA
to grant a waiver of preemption only in cases where California
standards were necessary to address peculiar local air quality
problems. They claim that there can be no need for separate California
standards if the standards are not aimed at, and do not redress, a
California-specific problem.
    In previous waiver decisions, EPA was asked to waive preemption of
standards regulating emissions that were local or regional in effect.
Local air pollution problems are affected directly by local conditions
in California, largely the emissions from motor vehicles in California
in the context of the local climate and topography. As a result, State
standards regulating such local motor vehicle emissions will have a
direct effect on the concentration of pollutants directly affecting
California's environment. They are effective mechanisms to reduce the
levels of local air pollution in California because local conditions
are the primary cause of that kind of air pollution problem. In
addition, reductions in emissions from motor vehicles that occur
elsewhere in the United States will not have the same impact, and often
will have no impact, on reducing the levels of local air pollution in
California.
    By contrast, GHGs emitted by California motor vehicles become part
of the global pool of GHG emissions that affect concentrations of GHGs
on a uniform basis throughout the world. The local climate and
topography in California have no significant impact on the long-term
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases in California.
Greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles or other pollution sources in
other parts of the country and the world will have as much effect on
California's environment as emissions from California vehicles. As a
result, reducing emissions of GHGs from motor vehicles in California
has the same impact or effect on atmospheric concentrations of GHGs as
reducing emissions of GHGs from motor vehicles or other sources
elsewhere in the U.S., or reducing emissions of GHGs from other sources
anywhere in the world. California's motor vehicle standards for GHG
emissions do not affect only California's concentration of GHGs, but
affect such concentrations globally, in ways unrelated to the
particular topography in California. Similarly, emissions from other
parts of the world affect the global concentrations of GHGs, and
therefore concentrations in California, in exactly the same manner as
emissions from California's motor vehicles.
    Further, as explained in the SAFE proposal, California's claims
that it is uniquely susceptible to certain risks because it is a
coastal State does not differentiate California from other coastal
States such as Massachusetts, Florida, and Louisiana, much less that
conditions in California are any more ``extraordinary'' as compared to
any other coastal States, particularly those coastal States that may
possess a greater percentage of low-lying territory than California.
Any effects of global climate change (e.g. water supply issues,
increases in wildfires, effects on agriculture) could certainly affect
California. But those effects would also affect other parts of the
United States.\278\ Many parts of the United States, especially western
States, may have issues related to drinking water (e.g., increased
salinity) and wildfires, and effects on agriculture; these occurrences
are by no means limited to California. These are among the types of
climate change effects that EPA considered in the 2009 CAA section
202(a) endangerment finding which is the predicate for its authority to
issue national motor vehicle GHG standards. But EPA's evaluation of
whether California's standards are ``need[ed] to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions'' is not identical to its prior determination,
pursuant to CAA section 202(a) whether GHG emissions from the national
motor vehicle fleet contribute to pollution that may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. In order for a waiver
request to pass muster under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B), as set forth in
this document, a particularized, state-specific nexus must exist
between sources of pollutants, resulting pollution, and impacts of that
pollution. This is analogous to but distinct from the more abstract or
general predicate finding for regulation under CAA section 202(a); if
it were not distinct, then California would, under CAA section
209(b)(1)(B), always ``need'' a waiver for a state-specific program to
``meet'' any pollution problem that it experienced once EPA had found
under CAA section 202(a) that motor vehicle emissions contribute to
that pollution problem (without particular reference to that pollution
problem's impact on California). This would effectively nullify the
second waiver denial prong, CAA section 209(b)(1)(B).\279\ California

would have it that the 2009 CAA section 202(a) GHG endangerment finding
necessarily means California ``needs'' its own GHG program ``to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions.'' That does not follow.\280\
Cf. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)
(partially reversing the GHG ``Tailoring'' Rule on grounds that the CAA
section 202(a) endangerment finding for GHG emissions from motor
vehicles did not compel regulation of all sources of GHG emissions
under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V permit
programs). 83 FR 43249.
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    \278\ Some commenters made this same point. See, e.g., Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-4406 at 89;
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Docket No. E_A-HQ-OAR-
2018-0283-5648 at 34, 36. At least one recent analysis, cited by a
number of commenters, has produced estimates of climate change
damage that project that with respect to such matters as coastal
damage, agricultural yields, energy expenditures, and mortality,
California is not worse-positioned in relation to certain other
areas of the U.S., and indeed is estimated to be better-positioned,
particularly as regards the Southeast region of the country. See S.
Hsiang, et al. ``Estimating Economic Damage from Climate Change in
the United States,'' 356 Science 1362 (2017).
    \279\ Cf. Ford, 606 F.2d at 1303 n.68 (affirming EPA's refusal
to allow nationwide sale of cars that meet California standards
that, due to the waiver predicate that California's standards only
need be as stringent as federal standards in the aggregate, were not
certified as meeting national standards with respect to all
pollutants) (``[Appellants] suggest to varying degrees that
California is a microcosm of the entire nation and, as such, has no
particularized problems the resolution of which would require
emission control standards inappropriate to the rest of the country.
This may or may not be completely true. The fact remains, however,
that Congress expected California to be putting its interests first
and there is no guarantee that those interests are congruent with
the interests of the nation as a whole.''). Here, California offers
an inverse reflection of appellants' argument in Ford, but it is no
more valid: Because it can marshal a list of climate impacts that it
is experiencing, California insists it is entitled to a waiver for a
state-specific program to address those impacts. All of California's
problems and corresponding programs, under this logic, are
``particularized.'' If this were the case, no waiver request could
ever be denied under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B), and Congress would
much more likely have simply afforded California a blanket and
automatic waiver. Congress did not do so, its choice not to do so
should be respected and given meaning, and EPA in this document sets
forth an interpretation and application of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B)
that does so by articulating a required particularized nexus to
State-specific facts which is present in the case of California's
criteria vehicle emissions programs but lacking in the case of its
GHG and ZEV ones.
    \280\ EPA notes in this regard that, even in the 2009 reversal
of the 2008 waiver denial, the Agency was careful to distinguish its
consideration of the waiver application from ``the issues pending
before EPA under section 202(a) of the Act,'' i.e., the then-pending
endangerment finding. 74 FR at 32765. While EPA maintains the
position that the CAA section 202(a) ``endangerment finding''
inquiry and the CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) inquiry are distinct, EPA
notes that the 2009 waiver denial reversal (and the 2008 waiver
denial itself) took pains to distinguish the two primarily because
the Agency was at that time still considering whether to issue the
endangerment finding. As EPA explains in this document, the two
provisions are distinct, but the CAA section 202(a) predicate
criteria for federal regulation do support the Agency's position
that the CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) waiver prong is best interpreted
as calling for a consideration whether the pollution problem at
issue has a State-specific, particularized nexus between emissions,
pollution, and impacts.
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    EPA has discussed the reasons for concluding that it is appropriate
to consider California's GHGs standards separately in determining
whether the State needs those standards to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions, as compared to looking at its need for a
motor vehicle program in general. These reasons also lead to the
conclusion that California does not need these GHG standards to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions. The text, structure, and
legislative history indicates that Congress's intent in the second
waiver criterion, CAA section 209(b)(1)(B), was to allow California to
adopt new motor vehicle standards because of compelling and
extraordinary conditions in California that were causally related to
local or regional air pollution levels in California. These factors--
including topography and large population of motor vehicles--cause
these kinds of local or regional air pollution levels in California and
because of this causal link, California's motor vehicle standards can
be effective mechanisms to address these local problems. Reductions
outside California would lack that causal link to local or regional air
quality conditions inside California.
    Congress did not indicate any intent to allow California to
promulgate local standards to deal with global air pollution like
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. In California's comments on the
SAFE proposal, it asserted that it has a need for reductions in GHG
atmospheric concentrations and therefore emissions, but the issue is
not whether such reductions are needed as a matter of general policy,
but whether Congress intended them to be effectuated on a State-
specific basis by California through EPA granting a waiver for the GHG
aspects of the State's new motor vehicle program. This type of
pollution seems ill-fitted to Congress's intent to provide California
with a method of handling its local air pollution concentrations and
related problems with local emission control measures. EPA determines
that standards regulating emissions of global pollutants like
greenhouse gases were not part of the compromise envisioned by Congress
in passing CAA section 209(b).\281\ Moreover, even if California does
have compelling and extraordinary conditions in the context of global
climate change, California does not ``need'' these standards under CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B) because they will not meaningfully address global
air pollution problems of the sort associated with GHG emissions. As
noted in the SAFE proposal, the most stringent of the regulatory
alternatives considered in the 2012 final rule and FRIA (under much
more optimistic assumptions about technology effectiveness), which
would have required a seven percent average annual fleetwide increase
in fuel economy for MYs 2017-2025 compared to MY 2016 standards, was
forecast to decrease global temperatures only by 0.02 [deg]C in
2100.\282\ This conclusion was further bolstered by multiple
commenters.\283\ EPA therefore concludes that California's GHG and ZEV
regulations do not fulfil the requirement within CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) that such regulations are ``needed'' to ``meet'' the
impacts of global climate change in California, even assuming arguendo
that those impacts do constitute ``compelling and extraordinary
conditions'' within the meaning of that statutory phrase (although, to
be clear, EPA is determining that those impacts do not in fact fall
within that phrase's meaning). Given that Congress enacted CAA section
209(b) to provide California with a unique ability to receive a waiver
of preemption, which provides California with authority that it would
not otherwise have under CAA section 209, and given the specific
language in CAA section 209(b)(2) pointing out the need for
extraordinary and compelling conditions as a condition for the waiver,
EPA determines that it is not appropriate to waive preemption for
California's standards that regulate GHGs. Atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases are an air pollution problem that is global in
nature, and this air pollution problem does not bear the same causal
link to factors local to California as do local or regional air
pollution problems. EPA determines that globally elevated atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs and their environmental effects are not the kind
of local or regional air pollution problem that fall within the scope
of the ``compelling and extraordinary conditions'' encompassed by the
terms of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B). As such, EPA finds that California
does not need its 2021 through 2025 MY GHG-related standards to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ Moreover, EPA is mindful that principles of equal
sovereignty between the states ordinarily require `` `exceptional
conditions' prevailing in certain parts of the country [to]
justif[y] extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our
federal system.'' Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 211.
    \282\ 83 FR 42986, 43216-43217.
    \283\ The George Washington University Regulatory Studies
Center, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0283-4028; Competitive Enterprise
Institute, Docket No. NHTSA-2018-0067-12015.
    \284\ EPA disagrees with comments that suggest that California
``needs'' its GHG and ZEV programs ``to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions'' in the meaning of CAA section
209(b)(1)(B) because those programs are intended to reduce criteria
pollutants emissions, separate and apart from their status as
programs designed to address climate change. To take this position
would not be in keeping with historical agency practice in reviewing
California's waiver requests. Specifically, EPA practice is not to
scrutinize California's criteria pollutant emissions reductions
projections or air emissions benefits. Rather, EPA's view has been
that these are matters left for California's judgments, especially
given that Title I of the Clean Air Act imposes the obligation of
NAAQS attainment planning on states. See, e.g., 36 FR 17458; 78 FR
2134; 79 FR 46256, 46261 (Aug. 7, 2014). EPA's withdrawal action is
premised on CARB's 2012 ACC program waiver request, which, as
previously discussed, only discussed the potential GHG benefits or
attributes of CARB's GHG and ZEV standards program (78 FR 2114,
2130-2131). If EPA does not even scrutinize a California program's
criteria pollutant emission and benefits projections when California
applies for a waiver for that program presenting it as a criteria
program, then a fortiori commenters' retrospective attempt to claim
criteria benefits to maintain a waiver for programs that were
originally presented to EPA in a waiver request that disclaimed any
such benefits is not appropriate.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. No Findings Under CAA Section 209(b)(1)(C) Are Finalized at This
Time
    In the SAFE proposal, EPA proposed to determine, as an additional
basis for the waiver withdrawal, that California's ZEV and GHG
standards for new MY 2021 through 2025 are not consistent with section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act. That proposed determination was
intertwined with the SAFE proposal's assessment with regard to the
technological feasibility of the Federal GHG standards for MY 2021
through 2025 and the proposed revisions thereto. Because EPA and NHTSA
are not at this time finalizing that assessment or taking final action
on the proposal to revise the Federal standards, and because the
finalized determinations under CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) and the
discussion of the implications of EPCA preemption with regard to the
waiver previously granted with respect to those standards set forth
above are each independent and adequate grounds for the waiver
withdrawal, EPA at this time is not finalizing any determination with
respect to CAA section 209(b)(1)(C). EPA may do so in connection with
potential future final action with regard to the Federal standards.

E. Withdrawal of Waiver

    In this final action, EPA determines that the California Air
Resources Board's (CARB's) regulations pertaining to greenhouse gases-
related (GHG) emission standards for 2021 through 2025 model year (MY)
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty vehicles are not
needed to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions. EPA concludes
that CAA section 209(b) was intended to allow California to promulgate
State standards applicable to emissions from new motor vehicles to
address pollution problems that are local or regional, and that have a
particular nexus to emissions from vehicles in California.\285\ EPA
does not believe CAA section 209(b)(1)(B) was intended to allow
California to promulgate State standards for emissions from new motor
vehicles designed to address global climate change problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ As noted in the SAFE proposal, ``Attempting to solve
climate change, even in part, through the Section 209 waiver
provision is fundamentally different from that section's original
purpose of addressing smog-related air quality problems.'' 83 FR
42999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA's 2013 waiver for CARB's Advanced Clean Car Program (as it
pertains to its 2021 through 2025 MY relating to greenhouse gas
emissions and the ZEV mandate) is withdrawn. This is separate and apart
from EPA's determination that it cannot and did not validly grant a
waiver with respect to those California State measures which are
preempted under NHTSA's determination in this document that EPCA
preempts State GHG and ZEV programs, which, as explained above, is
effective on the effective date of this joint action.

F. States Cannot Adopt California's GHG Standards Under CAA Section 177

    At proposal, EPA explained that CAA section 177 provides that other
States, under certain circumstances and with certain conditions, may
``adopt and enforce'' standards that are ``identical to the California
standards for which a waiver has been granted for [a given] model
year.'' 42 U.S.C. 7507. As a result, EPA proposed to determine that
this section does not apply to CARB's GHG standards given that they are
intended to address global air pollution. We also noted that the
section is titled ``New motor vehicle emission standards in
nonattainment areas' and that its application is limited to ``any State
which has [state implementation] plan provisions approved under this
part''--i.e., under CAA title I part D, which governs ``Plan
requirements for nonattainment areas.''
    We received comments in support of and against our proposal.
Commenters opposing our interpretation argued that CAA section 177 does
not contain any text that could be read as limiting its applicability
to certain pollutants only. They also argued that EPA has
inappropriately relied on the heading for CAA section 177 to construe a
statutory provision as well as arrogated authority to implement an
otherwise self-implementing provision. We disagree with these
commenters, conclude that the text (including both the title and main
text), structural location, and purpose of the provision confirm that
it does not apply to GHG standards, and are finalizing this
determination as proposed.
    Under the Clean Air Act, EPA establishes national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS) to protect public health and welfare and has
established such ambient standards for the following criteria
pollutants: ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide,
lead, and particulate matter. As also explained at proposal, areas are
only designated nonattainment with respect to criteria pollutants for
which EPA has issued a NAAQS, and nonattainment State Implementation
Plan (SIPs) are intended to assure that those areas attain the NAAQS.
    Congress added CAA section 177 in the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments
cognizant that states might need to address air pollution within their
boundaries similar to California but were otherwise preempted under CAA
section 209(a) from setting new motor vehicle and engine standards.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1388 (explaining that the Committee ``was concerned
that this preemption (section 209(a) of the Act) now interferes with
legitimate police powers of States''); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of
U.S., Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521,
527 (2d Cir. 1994) (``It was in an effort to assist those states
struggling to meet federal pollution standards that Congress, . . .
directed in 1977 that other states could promulgate regulations
requiring vehicles sold in their state to be in compliance with
California's emission standards or to `piggyback' onto California's
preemption exemption.''), citing H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 309-10 (1977); id. at 531 ((``[Section] 177 was inserted into the
Act in 1977 so that states attempting to combat their own pollution
problems could adopt California's more stringent emission controls.'').
Relevant legislative history further identifies CAA section 177 as a
means of addressing the NAAQS attainment planning requirements of CAA
section 172, including the specific SIPs content and approvals criteria
for EPA.\286\ H.R.

Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1977), 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N 1077,
1292 (``Still another element of flexibility for States that is
afforded in this section is the authority for States with nonattainment
areas for automotive pollutants (other than California) to adopt and
enforce California new-car emission standards if adequate notice is
given.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ The version of CAA section 172 adopted in 1977 set forth
the general requirements for state plans for nonattainment areas and
CAA section 172(b) set forth the ``requisite provisions'' of those
plans. In drafting the provisions that would become CAA section
172(b), Congress explained that they required the Administrator,
after notice and opportunity for a public hearing, to approve ``a
State plan which meets the following criteria: It must identify all
nonattainment areas for each pollutant. Next it must assure
attainment of the national ambient air quality standard in those
areas as expeditiously as practicable, but not later than December
31, 1982, for all pollutants other than photochemical oxidants. In
respect to photochemical oxidants, the standard must be met as
expeditiously as practicable, but not later than December 31, 1987.
The plan must include a comprehensive, accurate, up-to-date
inventory of actual emissions from all sources of pollutants in the
area. This inventory must be revised and resubmitted every 2 years
to substantiate that reasonable further progress has been achieved
as a condition for permitting additional sources of pollution.
Finally, the plan must identify and quantify the actual emissions
which must be taken into account by the State for purposes of
deciding how to achieve reasonable further progress and assure
timely attainment. Thus, the plan must consider the following
factors among others: The actual emissions increases which will be
allowed to result from the construction and operation of major new
or modified stationary sources in the area; the actual emissions of
such pollutant from unregulated sources, fugitive emissions and
other uncontrolled sources; actual emissions of the pollutant from
modified and existing indirect sources; actual emissions resulting
from extension or elimination of transportation control measures;
actual emissions of such pollutant resulting from in-use motor
vehicles and emissions of such pollutant resulting from stationary
sources to which delayed compliance orders or enforcement orders
(pursuant to sec. 121 (pursuant to sec. 121 or sec 113(b)) and
compliance date extension (pursuant to sec. 119) have been issued;
and actual transported emissions.'' H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 212 (1977), 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1291, 1977 WL 16034
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contrary to commenters' assertions, therefore, the text, placement
in Title I, and relevant legislative history are all indicative that
CAA section 177 is in fact intended for NAAQS attainment planning and
not to address global air pollution. As further explained in section
D.2, GHG is a globally distributed pollutant with environmental effects
that are different enough from emissions of criteria pollutants. For
example, GHG emissions from fleet in California bear no more relation
to GHG emissions in California than fleet in other parts of the
country. Where states are now adopting standards for intents and
purposes far removed from NAAQS attainment planning or more
specifically directed at global air pollution, EPA as the agency
charged with implementing the Clean Air Act is acting well within that
role in setting out an interpretation that aligns with Congressional
intent. See Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (``The
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly,
by Congress.''). This construct also comports with our reading of CAA
section 209(b)(1)(B) as limiting applicability of CAA section 209(b)
waiver authority to state programs that address pollutants that affect
local or regional air quality and not those relating to global air
pollution like GHGs.

G. Severability and Judicial Review

    EPA intends that its withdrawal of the January 2013 waiver for
California's GHG and ZEV programs on the basis of EPCA preemption, to
take effect upon the effective date of this joint action, as set forth
in subsection III.C, on the one hand, is separate and severable from
its withdrawal of the January 2013 waiver for those programs on the
basis of an interpretation and application of CAA section 209(b)(1)(B),
beginning in model year 2021, as set forth in subsection III.D, on the
other. EPA further intends that its withdrawal of the waiver with
regard to California's GHG program is severable from its withdrawal of
the waiver with regard to California's ZEV program. The basis for this
distinction (i.e., that EPA intends that its withdrawal of the waiver
for California's GHG program and for its ZEV program should be
severable from one another) is, as follows, twofold: (1) While EPA
concludes for the reasons set forth in subsection III.D above that the
ZEV program, as subjected to the January 2013 waiver and as presented
to EPA by CARB in CARB's waiver application and supporting documents,
is a GHG-targeting program and as such is susceptible to the
interpretation and application of CAA 209(b)(1)(B) set forth above, EPA
acknowledges that there are aspects to the analysis as it affects the
state's ZEV program that are not applicable with respect to the state's
GHG program; (2) in this final action, NHTSA expresses in section II
above its intent that its determination that a State or local law or
regulation of tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles is
related to fuel economy standards is severable from its determination
that State or local ZEV mandates are related to fuel economy standards.
EPA further intends that its determination with regard to the scope of
CAA section 177 as set forth in subsection III.F above be severable
from all other aspects of this joint action.
    Pursuant to CAA section 307(b)(1), judicial review of this final
action may be sought only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. For the reasons explained in this
section, this final waiver withdrawal action is nationally applicable
for purposes of CAA section 307(b)(1). To the extent a court finds this
action to be locally or regionally applicable, for the reasons
explained in this section, EPA determines and finds for purposes of CAA
section 307(b)(1) that this final waiver withdrawal action is based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect. As also explained at
proposal, CAA Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA provides in which Federal
courts of appeal petitions of review of final actions by EPA must be
filed. This section provides, in part, that petitions for review must
be filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
if: (i) The Agency action consists of ``nationally applicable
regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator,''
or (ii) such action is locally or regionally applicable, but ``such
action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if
in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such
action is based on such a determination.'' Additionally, we proposed to
find that any final action resulting from the August 2018 SAFE proposal
is based on a determination of ``nationwide scope or effect'' within
the meaning of CAA section 307(b)(1). We explained that the withdrawal,
when finalized, would affect persons in California and those
manufacturers and/or owners/operators of new motor vehicles nationwide
who must comply with California's new motor vehicle requirements. For
instance, California's program provides that manufacturers may generate
credits in CAA section 177 States as a means to satisfy those
manufacturers' obligations to comply with the mandate that a certain
percentage of their vehicles sold in California be ZEV (or be credited
as such from sales in CAA section 177 States). In addition, other
States have adopted aspects of California's ACC program; this decision
would also affect those States and those persons in such States, which
are in multiple EPA regions and federal circuits.
    This final action is distinguishable from the situation faced by
the D.C. Circuit in Dalton Trucking Inc., v. EPA, 808 F.3d 875 (D.C.
Cir. 2015), where the Court held that EPA's action on California's
waiver request with respect to its nonroad engine program was not
nationally applicable, and that EPA had not properly made and published
a finding that its action was based on a determination of nationwide
scope and effect. First, Dalton Trucking noted that no other State had
ever adopted California's nonroad program, id. at 880; that is not the
case here. Second, Dalton Trucking noted that the nonroad waiver final
action was facially limited to fleets operating in California, id. at
881; the nature of the California program at issue here, with its
complex credit system connected with sales in other States, is quite
different. Third, Dalton Trucking noted that EPA in the nonroad waiver

final action did not actually make and publish a finding that that
final action was based on a determination of nationwide scope and
effect, id. Dalton Trucking expressly did not hold, and indeed
expressly disclaimed any intent to even suggest, that EPA could not
have made and published such a finding in that action. Id. at 882. EPA
in this document does so with regard to this final action, for the
reasons stated above. For these reasons, this final waiver withdrawal
action is nationally applicable for purposes of CAA section 307(b)(1),
or, in the alternative, EPA determines and finds for purposes of CAA
section 307(b)(1) that this final waiver withdrawal action is based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Thus, pursuant to CAA
section 307(b), any petitions for review of this final action must be
filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
within 60 days from the date such final action is published in the
Federal Register.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    As it is relevant to many of the following discussions, it is
important to clarify at the outset that this action does not finalize
or otherwise affect either EPA's GHG standards or NHTSA's CAFE
standards and, thus, the various impacts associated with those
standards have not been considered below. Further, consistent with its
past practice, EPA's withdrawal of the waiver does not add or amend
regulatory text and is, therefore, subject to considerably fewer of the
below discussions than NHTSA's final rule establishing regulatory text
on preemption.

A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563

    Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR
51735, Oct. 4, 1993), as amended by Executive Order 13563, ``Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review'' (76 FR 3821, Jan. 21, 2011),
provides for making determinations whether a regulatory action is
``significant'' and therefore subject to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) review and to the requirements of the Executive Order.
    Under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, NHTSA's final rule has
been determined to be a ``significant regulatory action,'' but not an
economically significant action. EPA's withdrawal on the waiver,
however, is not a rule under E.O. 12866, as consistent with the
agency's historical classification of its notices and decisions related
to the waiver. However, as part of its commitment to working together
with NHTSA to establish a consistent Federal program for fuel economy
and GHG emissions, EPA has submitted this action to the OMB for review
and any changes made in response to OMB recommendations have been
documented in the docket for this action. EPA's action here, however,
is not a rule as defined by Executive Order 12866, consistent with its
previous actions on waiver requests, and is therefore exempt from
review by the Office of Management and Budget as required for rules and
regulations by Executive Order 12866. See, e.g., 78 FR at 2145 (Jan. 9,
2013); 74 FR at 32784 (July 8, 2009); 73 FR at 12169 (Mar. 6, 2008).
    In determining the economic impact of this action, it is important
to be clear that the rule establishing new standards for the Model
Years within scope of the NPRM is expected to continue to be
economically significant and is, thus, anticipated, to include a full
FRIA. Moreover, as EPA's action is not a rule and not subject to E.O.
12866, its consideration of costs has been limited to the role costs
play under section 209. Accordingly, the following discussion only
concerns the economic impact associated with NHTSA's final regulatory
text clarifying its views on EPCA preemption.
    As a general matter, NHTSA has determined that there may be some
nonsignificant economic impact arising out of its clarification,
particularly some reduction in costs, to this final rule, but the
agency has not quantified any such impact in this rulemaking, which has
been determined to be ``significant'' but not ``economically
significant'' under Executive Order 12866. This rulemaking merely
clarifies the existing statutory provisions relating to preemption that
have been in effect since EPCA was enacted and does not modify any
Federal requirement. As such, as in the NPRM, the agency has provided a
qualitative discussion of the impacts in response to the comments,
which themselves raised qualitative issues.
    In the NPRM, NHTSA mentioned at a general, qualitative, level that
California's currently existing GHG program and ZEV mandate lead to
increased compliance costs, with some greater discussion of potential
increases in costs due specifically to the ZEV mandate, which
constrains an OEMs ability to meet their CAFE and GHG requirements in
the most cost-effective way.
    The agencies received many comments on the economic analysis as it
relates to the CAFE and GHG standards, but only received a small number
of comments that specifically dealt with the issue of the economic
impact of the regulatory text concerning EPCA preemption. These
comments, similar to how the agency addressed the issue in the NPRM,
generally made qualitative and general points about the economic
impact.
    Many of the comments that addressed the economic impacts of
preemption did so by stating that one important aspect of the ``One
National Program'' established beginning in 2009 was that it would
reduce regulatory cost by not allowing for the creation of different
Federal and California programs, with different levels of stringency
and different compliance regimes. NHTSA agrees with this concern, but
this is exactly why Congress provided that any State or local law
``related to'' fuel economy is preempted. This final rule will provide
more certainty on this issue than the prior approach, which would
always be subject to California removing itself from the program. This
is exactly what has occurred in recent months, as the State has taken
action to amend the ``deemed to comply'' provision and then announced
that it entered into an agreement with several automakers to apply a
different set of standards on a national basis.
    Various other commenters noted that the GHG program and ZEV mandate
would increase compliance costs. Most of these comments only made
general statements to this effect and did not provide specific or
detailed information about potential costs. One commenter approvingly
noted NHTSA's citation of a study that found that the ZEV mandate could
potentially lead to increased costs, though the author of the cited
study also commented that the cited value did not provide a complete
picture of the economic effect. The agency agrees that programs such as
these are likely to introduce additional costs, which, of course, was a
significant part of Congress's motivation in providing NHTSA with its
broad preemptive authority over fuel economy. The agency, though, like
commenters, has found calculation of these costs to be challenging, as
they constrain the avenues of compliance with the Federal standards
without actually altering what must be, ultimately, achieved.
    With regard to benefits, some commenters believed that California's
GHG program and ZEV mandate could provide additional benefits, but, as
with costs, these commenters did not provide detailed information about
the benefits of these programs independent of the Federal standards.
One commenter argued that a separate State GHG program is unlikely to
have any

meaningful benefits, because of ``leakage'' from vehicles in States
that adopt the California standards to vehicles in States that do not
adopt this standard. Although the comment was in context of supporting
the ``One National Program,'' NHTSA believes that the argument that
separate State standards will have little benefit has merit. The
existence of State or local laws does not in any way alter an OEM's
obligation under Federal law. For instance, OEMs would likely produce
more efficient vehicles for sale in California and the States that have
adopted California's standards, but the increased fuel economy of these
vehicles would likely be offset by less efficient vehicles produced for
sale in the rest of the U.S., leading to little to no change in either
fuel use or GHG emissions at a national level. Some commenters stated
that the decision to preempt programs including and similar to the ZEV
mandate, to the extent that those programs are related to fuel economy,
would have negative benefits related to ozone-forming pollutants,
though these commenters did not quantify these concerns. NHTSA notes
that, as was discussed in the NPRM, California, in its 2013 waiver
request, noted that the ZEV program did not provide for ozone-forming
pollutants, acknowledging, ``[t]here is no criteria emissions benefit
from including the ZEV proposal in terms of vehicle (tank-to-wheel or
TTW) emissions. The LEV III criteria pollutant fleet standard is
responsible for those emission reductions in the fleet; the fleet would
become cleaner regardless of the ZEV regulation because manufacturers
would adjust their compliance response to the standard by making less
polluting conventional vehicles.'' \287\ NHTSA continues to believe
that preemption of the programs such as the ZEV mandate will not have a
significant effect, as California remains free to revise its LEV
program to reduce ozone-forming emissions and seek a waiver of Clean
Air Act preemption from EPA, as described above, while not violating
NHTSA's preemption authority, and other States and local governments
would continue to be allowed to take other actions so long as those are
not related to fuel economy and are consistent with any other relevant
Federal law.
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    \287\ Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2012-0562, PP. 15-16.
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    The comments, therefore, reaffirm NHTSA's preliminary determination
that State and Local programs including, and similar to, California's
GHG and ZEV programs are likely to lead to increased compliance costs
and highly uncertain, if any, benefits because they constrain the
ability of OEMs to meet the Federal standard without in anyway altering
their obligations under that standard. Further, the agency's decision
that State or local laws such as the GHG program and ZEV mandate should
be preempted is not based on any evaluation of the policy or other
merits of either program, but simply the fact that these programs are
clearly related to fuel economy.

B. DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    The final rule is also significant within the meaning of the
Department of Transportation's Order 2100.6, ``Policies and Procedures
for Rulemakings.'' Regulatory Policies and Procedures.

C. Executive Order 13771 (Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs)

    NHTSA's final rule is expected to be an E.O. 13771 deregulatory
action, but NHTSA has not estimated any quantifiable cost savings.
EPA's withdrawal is not a regulatory action and thus outside the scope
of E.O. 13771.

D. Congressional Review Act

    Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.),
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs designated this action
as not a ``major rule'', as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The EPA and
NHTSA will submit a rule report to each House of the Congress and to
the Comptroller General of the United States.

E. Executive Order 13211 (Energy Effects)

    Executive Order 13211 applies to any rule that: (1) Is determined
to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866, and is
likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a
significant energy action. If the regulatory action meets either
criterion, the agencies must evaluate the adverse energy effects of the
proposed rule and explain why the proposed regulation is preferable to
other potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives
considered. NHTSA's final rule is not subject to E.O. 13211 because it
is not economically significant and is not a significant energy action.
As discussed in the E.O. 12866 section, NHTSA's final rule merely
clarifies the contours of its existing preemption authority and does
not in any way change the existing fuel economy standards. As EPA's
withdrawal is not within the scope of E.O. 12866, it is also not within
scope of E.O. 13211.

F. Environmental Considerations

1. National Environmental Policy Act
    The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) \288\ directs that
Federal agencies proposing ``major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment'' must, ``to the fullest
extent possible,'' prepare ``a detailed statement'' on the
environmental impacts of the proposed action (including alternatives to
the proposed action).\289\ Concurrently with the NPRM, NHTSA released a
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Draft EIS) pursuant to NEPA and
implementing regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), 40 CFR part 1500, and NHTSA, 49 CFR part 520. NHTSA prepared the
Draft EIS to analyze and disclose the potential environmental impacts
of the proposed CAFE standards and a range of alternatives (largely
varying in terms of stringency). NHTSA considered the information
contained in the Draft EIS as part of developing its proposal and made
the Draft EIS available for public comment. For the final rule on the
standards for model year 2021 through 2026 automobiles proposed in the
NPRM, NHTSA will simultaneously issue a Final EIS and Record of
Decision, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 304a(b) and U.S. Department of
Transportation Guidance on the Use of Combined Final Environmental
Impact Statements/Records of Decision and Errata Sheets in National
Environmental Policy Act Reviews (April 25, 2019),\290\ unless it is
determined that statutory criteria or practicability considerations
preclude simultaneous issuance.
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    \288\ 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347.
    \289\ 42 U.S.C. 4332. EPA is expressly exempted from the
requirements of NEPA for actions under the Clean Air Act. 15 U.S.C.
793(c)(1).
    \290\ https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/transportation-policy/permittingcenter/337371/feis-rod-guidance-final-04302019.pdf.
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    NHTSA has not prepared a separate environmental analysis pursuant
to NEPA for this final action on preemption. This final rule provides
clarity on the scope of EPCA's preemption provision. Ultimately, the
determination of whether a particular State or local law is preempted
under EPCA is not determined based upon its environmental impact but
solely whether it is ``related to fuel economy standards or average
fuel economy standards.'' Any preemptive effect

resulting from this final action is not the result of the exercise of
Agency discretion, but rather reflects the operation and application of
the Federal statute. NHTSA does not have authority to waive any aspect
of EPCA preemption no matter the potential environmental impacts;
rather, preempted standards are void ab initio. Courts have long held
that NEPA does not apply to nondiscretionary actions by Federal
agencies.\291\ As NHTSA lacks discretion over EPCA's preemptive effect,
the Agency concludes that NEPA does not apply to this action.
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    \291\ See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541
U.S. 752 (2004); Milo Cmty. Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144 (1st
Cir. 1975); State of South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.
1980); Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. Bd., 267
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502
(9th Cir. 1995).
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    It bears noting that this action only concerns the question of
preemption; it does not set CAFE standards. Fundamentally, this action
is about which sovereign entity (i.e., the Federal government or State
governments) can issue standards that relate to fuel economy. EPCA is
clear that this authority is restricted to the Federal government. This
action provides guidance on the boundary set by Congress, as well as
under principles of implied preemption. NHTSA's regulation concerning
EPCA preemption is independent and severable from any particular CAFE
standards adopted by NHTSA, and this action, in and of itself, is not
expected to have significant environmental impacts on a national scale.
As described above, OEMs would likely produce more efficient vehicles
for sale in California and the States that have adopted California's
standards, but the increased fuel economy of these vehicles would
likely be offset by less efficient vehicles produced for sale in the
rest of the U.S., leading to little to no change in either fuel use or
GHG emissions at a national level. In fact, as NHTSA has not finalized
any action to amend the fuel economy standards that were promulgated in
2012, California's ``deemed to comply'' provision remains operative. As
OEMs are anticipated to make use of this compliance mechanism, CARB's
GHG standards are functionally identical to Federal standards, and
their preemption would not result in additional environmental impacts.
Furthermore, as was discussed in the NPRM, California, in its 2013
waiver request, noted that the ZEV program did not provide for ozone-
forming pollutants, acknowledging, ``[t]here is no criteria emissions
benefit from including the ZEV proposal in terms of vehicle (tank-to-
wheel or TTW) emissions. The LEV III criteria pollutant fleet standard
is responsible for those emission reductions in the fleet; the fleet
would become cleaner regardless of the ZEV regulation because
manufacturers would adjust their compliance response to the standard by
making less polluting conventional vehicles.'' \292\ Ultimately NHTSA
will address potential environmental impacts of fuel economy standards
in its forthcoming Final EIS that will accompany the final rule on the
standards for model year 2021 through 2026 automobiles proposed in the
NPRM. This action, however, does not result in significant
environmental impacts to the quality of the human environment.
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    \292\ Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2012-0562, Pp. 15-16. California's
LEV III criteria pollution standard would not be preempted under
this action.
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