[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 46 (Wednesday, March 9, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13452-13521]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04894]

Vol. 87

Wednesday,

No. 46

March 9, 2022

Part III

Department of Transportation

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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

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New Car Assessment Program; Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 /
Notices

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2021-0002]

New Car Assessment Program

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Request for comments (RFC).

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SUMMARY: NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) provides comparative
information on the safety performance of new vehicles to assist
consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions and to encourage safety
improvements. In addition to star ratings for crash protection and
rollover resistance, the NCAP program recommends particular advanced
driver assistance systems (ADAS) technologies and identifies the
vehicles in the marketplace that offer the systems that pass NCAP
performance test criteria for those systems. This notice proposes
significant upgrades to NCAP, first, by proposing to add four more ADAS
technologies to those NHTSA currently recommends. The new technologies
are blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane keeping
support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking. Other plans on
updating NCAP are discussed in the Supplementary Information.

DATES: Comments should be submitted no later than May 9, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to the docket number above and be
submitted by one of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
     Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting
comments, see the Public Participation heading of the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document. Note that all comments received
will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including
any personal information provided.
     Privacy Act: Anyone can search the electronic form of all
comments received in any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or at https://www.transportation.gov/privacy. For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the street
address listed above. Follow the online instructions for accessing the
dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may contact
Ms. Jennifer N. Dang, Division Chief, New Car Assessment Program,
Office of Crashworthiness Standards (Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>). For
legal issues, you may contact Ms. Sara R. Bennett, Office of Chief
Counsel (Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>). You may send mail to either of these
officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice also proposes changes (including
an increase in stringency) to the test procedures and performance
criteria for the four currently recommended ADAS technologies in NCAP
to enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle
models and to harmonize with other consumer information programs.
Second, this notice describes (but does not propose at this time) how
NHTSA could rate vehicles equipped with these ADAS technologies and
requests comment on how best to develop this rating system. Third,
NHTSA seeks (but does not propose at this time) to provide a crash
avoidance rating at the point of sale on a vehicle's window sticker,
consistent with the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST)
Act, and discusses ways of implementing the program, including a
potential process for updating such information. Fourth, as part of a
new NHTSA approach to NCAP, NHTSA is proposing a ``roadmap'' of the
Agency's plans to upgrade NCAP in phases over the next several years
and presents the roadmap for comment. Fifth, as another first for NCAP,
NHTSA is considering utilizing NCAP to raise consumer awareness of
certain safety technologies that may have the potential to help people
make safe driving choices. This information may be of particular
interest to parents or other caregivers shopping for a vehicle for a
new or inexperienced driver in the household, or parents wanting to
know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/heatstroke. Sixth and
finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several
programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program. The proposal on
ADAS technologies and the aforementioned initiatives pave the way for
the Agency to focus on a much broader safety strategy, including
fulfilling not only the 2015 FAST Act directive but also the recent
mandates included in Section 24213 of the November 2021 Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act, to improve road safety for motor vehicle occupants as well as
other vulnerable road users.

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
    A. Lane Keeping Technologies
    1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
    a. Haptic Alerts
    b. False Positive Tests
    c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
    2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
    B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies
    1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
    a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions
    b. Test Procedure Harmonization
    2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
    C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)
    D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
    1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
    2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
    a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
    b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
    c. Current State of AEB Technology
    d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study
    e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing
    f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing
    g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing
    h. Regenerative Braking
    3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice
    a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-to-Collision
    b. False Positive Test Scenarios
    c. Procedure Clarifications
    d. Expand Testing
    e. AEB Strikeable Target
IV. ADAS Rating System
    A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers
    1. Star Rating System
    2. Medals Rating System
    3. Points-Based Rating System
    4. Incorporating Baseline Risk
    B. ADAS Rating System Concepts
    1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature
    2. Percentage of Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 1
    3. Select Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 2
    4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data--Concept 3
    5. Overall Rating

V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)
VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
    A. Driver Monitoring Systems
    B. Driver Distraction
    C. Alcohol Detection
    D. Seat Belt Interlocks
    E. Intelligent Speed Assist
    F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist
VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
    A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept
    B. Baseline Risk Concept
    C. Half-Star Ratings
    D. Decimal Ratings
    E. Rollover Resistance Test
IX. Other Activities
    A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data
    B. Website Updates
    C. Database Changes
X. Economic Analysis
XI. Public Participation
XII. Appendices

I. Executive Summary

    NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) supports NHTSA's mission
to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries that occur on U.S.
roadways. NCAP, like many other NHTSA programs, has contributed to
significant reductions in motor vehicle fatalities. In the decade prior
to the 1978 start of NCAP, fatalities from motor vehicle crashes
exceeded 50,000 annually. In 2019, 36,096 people still lost their lives
on U.S. roads. Passenger vehicle occupant fatalities decreased from
32,225 in 2000 to 22,215 in 2019.\1\ This reduction is notable,
particularly in light of the fact that the total number of vehicle
miles traveled (VMT) in the U.S. has increased over time. However,
during that same timeframe, pedestrian fatalities increased by 33
percent, from 4,739 in 2000 to 6,205 in 2019.\2\ Furthermore, a
statistical projection of traffic fatalities for the first half of 2021
shows that an estimated 20,160 people died in motor vehicle traffic
crashes--the highest number of fatalities during the first half of the
year since 2006, and the highest half-year percentage increase in the
history of data recorded by the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS).\3\ In addition, the projected 11,225 fatalities during the
second quarter of 2021 represents the highest second quarter fatalities
since 1990, and the highest quarterly percentage change (+23.1 percent)
in FARS data recorded history. Preliminary data reported by the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) show that VMT in the first half of 2021
rebounded from a large pandemic-related dip that occurred in the first
half of 2020, increasing by 173.1 billion miles, or about a 13 percent
increase over the comparable period in 2020. The fatality rate for the
first half of 2021 increased to 1.34 fatalities per 100 million VMT, up
from the projected rate of 1.28 fatalities per 100 million VMT in the
first half of 2020. Early evidence suggests that these fatality rates
have increased as a result of increases in risky behaviors like driving
and riding while unbelted, impaired driving, and speeding.\4\ Although
there have been notable gains in automotive safety over the past fifty
years, far more work must be done.
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    \1\ Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
    \2\ Traffic Safety Facts 2000 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the
General Estimates System.'' U.S. Department of Transportation.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    \3\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2021,
October), Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities for the
First Half (January-June) of 2021. (Traffic Safety Facts. Report No.
DOT HS 813 199), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
    \4\ See https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2020-fatality-data-show-increased-traffic-fatalities-during-pandemic.
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    This notice discusses how NCAP can support NHTSA's mission through
its multi-faceted initiatives and broad safety strategies to address
vehicle safety involving motor vehicle occupants, other vulnerable road
users, and safe driving choices to further reduce injuries and
fatalities occurring on the nation's roads. As stated in the Department
of Transportation's National Roadway Safety Strategy, proposals to
update NCAP are expected to emphasize safety features that protect
people both inside and outside of the vehicle, and may include
consideration of pedestrian protection systems, better understanding of
impacts to pedestrians (e.g., specific considerations for children),
and automatic emergency braking and lane keeping assistance to benefit
bicyclists and pedestrians. In a first-of-its-kind focus--especially
relevant in light of increases in fatalities caused by risky driving
behaviors--this notice seeks comment on how automakers could encourage
consumers to choose safety technologies that could prevent risky
behaviors from occurring in the first place. This notice also proposes
significant upgrades to NCAP by adding four additional crash avoidance
technologies (also termed ADAS throughout this notice) to the program,
increasing the stringency of the tests for currently recommended ADAS
technologies in NCAP for enhanced evaluation of their current
capabilities, and exploring, for the first time, expanding NCAP to
include safety for road users outside of the vehicle. Finally, this
document presents a roadmap of NHTSA's current plans to upgrade NCAP in
phases over the next several years.
    Many of these efforts align with Section 24213 of the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act \5\ and signed on November 15, 2021. First, this RFC, once
finalized, fulfills the requirements of Section 24213(a) of the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law because NHTSA intends for the addition of
the four technologies proposed in this RFC to ``finalize the proceeding
for which comments were requested'' on December 16, 2015.\6\
Specifically, the finalization of this RFC will close the December 16,
2015 proceeding and notice. While NHTSA has future plans described in
the roadmap that the Agency discussed in the December 16, 2015 notice,
none are considered an extension of the December 16, 2015 proceeding,
though all information previously collected by NHTSA may be used in the
development of future notices.
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    \5\ (Pub. L. 117-58).
    \6\ Id. at Section 24213(a); the notice referred to in the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015). This
is the notice that will be finalized once the final decision notice
for today's RFC is published.
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    Second, this RFC fulfills portions of the requirements in Section
24213(b) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that mandates the Agency
``publish a notice, for the purposes of public comment, to establish a
means for providing consumer information relating to advanced crash-
avoidance technologies'' within one year of enactment that includes:
(1) An appropriate methodology for determining which advanced crash
avoidance technologies should be included in the information, (2)
performance test criteria for use by manufacturers in evaluating those
technologies, (3) a distinct rating system involving each technology,
and (4) updating overall vehicle ratings to include the new rating.
Through this RFC, NHTSA is proposing four additional advanced crash
avoidance technologies \7\ for inclusion in NCAP, proposing the test
criteria for evaluating the advanced crash avoidance technologies, and
seeking comment on the future development of a crash avoidance rating
system. NHTSA described in detail why it chose the four

technologies that it did and how those technologies meet NHTSA's
established criteria for inclusion in NCAP. Since NHTSA is proposing
the addition of four advanced crash avoidance technologies and test
criteria for evaluating those technologies, NHTSA meets two of the four
requirements for fulfillment of the Advanced Crash Avoidance section of
Sec. 24213(b).
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    \7\ This notice refers to the advanced crash avoidance
technologies as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS)
technologies.
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    Section 24213(b) of the law also requires that the Agency publish a
notice ``to establish a means for providing to consumers information
relating to pedestrian, bicyclist, or other vulnerable road user safety
technologies'' within one year of enactment. This notice must meet
requirements very similar to the advanced crash avoidance notice
mentioned above. Since NHTSA is today proposing to include pedestrian
automatic emergency braking (PAEB) in the program and is including test
criteria for evaluating PAEB, NHTSA meets two of the four requirements
for fulfillment of the Vulnerable Road User Safety section of Sec.
24213(b). The remaining requirements will be fulfilled once NHTSA
proposes and then finalizes a new rating system for the crash avoidance
technologies in NCAP. The law also requires that NHTSA submit reports
to Congress on its plans for fulfilling the abovementioned
requirements. NHTSA plans to fulfill these reporting requirements in a
timely manner.
    Third, this RFC, once finalized, fulfills the requirements of
Section 24213(c) for NHTSA to establish a roadmap for implementation of
NCAP changes that covers a term of ten years, with five year mid-term
and five year long-term components, and with updates to the roadmap at
least once every four years to reflect new Agency interests and public
comments. The first roadmap must be completed within one year of the
law's enactment. Once finalized, the roadmap on future updates to NCAP
proposed in this RFC in its entirety would fulfill the ten-year roadmap
requirement, as some proposed initiatives will be considered in NCAP in
the first five years while others will be proposed in the second half
of the ten-year plan. The details and analysis of this fulfillment are
available in the Roadmap section of this RFC.
    Fourth, this RFC, once finalized, will fulfill a provision in
Section 24213(c) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that requires
NHTSA to make the roadmap available for public comment and to consider
the public comments received before finalizing the roadmap. These
provisions are in accordance with the Agency's current practice for
updating NCAP and will be followed to finalize the roadmap. Section
24213(c) of the Law also requires that NHTSA identify opportunities
where NCAP would ``benefit from harmonization with third-party safety
rating programs.'' The Agency is taking steps to harmonize with
existing consumer information rating programs where possible, and when
appropriate, as noted in various sections of this RFC.
    Fifth, Section 24213(c) of the Law requires the Agency to engage
with stakeholders with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints not less than
annually to develop future roadmaps. Again, this provision is in
accordance with the Agency's current practice.

Components of the Notice

    There are six main parts to this notice:
    1. Proposes to add four new ADAS technologies to NCAP and updates
to current NCAP test procedures,
    2. Discusses the Agency's plan to develop a new rating system for
advanced driver assistance technologies,
    3. Describes steps to list the crash avoidance rating information
on the vehicle's window sticker (the Monroney label) at the point of
sale,
    4. Describes roadmap of the Agency's plans to update NCAP in phases
over the next ten years,
    5. Requests comments on expanding NCAP to provide consumer
information on safety technologies that could help people drive safer
by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior, and
    6. Discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several programmatic
aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.
    Each of the aforementioned aspects of the notice are described in
greater detail that follows. First, the notice discusses in detail the
Agency's proposed upgrade to add four more ADAS technologies to those
currently recommended by NHTSA through NCAP and that are highlighted on
the NHTSA website. Since 2010, NCAP has recommended four kinds of ADAS
technologies to prospective vehicle purchasers, and has identified to
shoppers the vehicles that have these technologies and that meet NCAP
performance test criteria.\8\ The current technologies are forward
collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent
braking (CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS) (with the latter two
collectively referred to as ``automatic emergency braking).\9\ This
notice proposes changes (including an increase in stringency) to the
test procedures and performance criteria for LDW, CIB, DBS, and FCW to
(1) enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle
models, (2) reduce test burden, and (3) harmonize with other consumer
information programs. This notice also describes and proposes four more
ADAS technologies: Blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane
keeping support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking.
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    \8\ NCAP only indicates that a vehicle has a recommended
technology when NHTSA has data verifying that the technology meets
the minimum performance requirements set by NHTSA for acceptable
performance. If a vehicle's ADAS is reported to have satisfied the
performance requirements using the test methods specified by the
Agency, then NHTSA uses a checkmark system to indicate on the NHTSA
website that the vehicle is equipped with the technology. Each year,
NHTSA also selects a sample of vehicles from that model year to
verify ADAS system performance by performing its own tests.
    \9\ https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driver-assistance-technologies.
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    These four new ADAS technologies are candidates for NCAP because
data indicate they satisfy NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in
the program. The prerequisites are: (1) The update to the program
addresses a safety need; (2) there are system designs (countermeasures)
that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) existing or new system
designs have safety benefit potential; and (4) a performance-based
objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance. In
order to address (1), a safety need, the Agency inherently looks first
to address injuries and fatalities stemming from ``high-frequency and
high-risk crash types''--as these crashes command the largest safety
need and thus may also afford the biggest potential benefit. NHTSA does
not calculate relative costs and benefits when considering inclusion in
NCAP as it is a non-regulatory consumer information program. NHTSA
discusses in this notice how each of the proposed ADAS technologies
meets the four prerequisites. As explained in detail in this notice,
the four new ADAS technologies proposed in NCAP are the only
technologies that the Agency believes meet the four prerequisites for
inclusion at this time. Each technology has demonstrated the ability to
successfully mitigate high frequency and high-risk crash types. With
the proposal to include pedestrian automatic emergency braking, NCAP
would be expanded, for the first time, to include safety for people
outside of the vehicle.
    Second, this notice discusses the Agency's plan to develop a future
rating system for new vehicles based on the availability and
performance of all the NCAP-recommended crash avoidance technologies.
Currently, NCAP only

recommends crash avoidance technologies to shoppers, and identifies the
vehicles that offer the recommended technologies that pass NCAP system
performance criteria. Unlike its crashworthiness and rollover
protection programs that offer a combined rating based on vehicle
performance in frontal, side, and rollover tests, the NCAP crash
avoidance program does not currently have a rating system to
differentiate the performance of ADAS technologies. NHTSA seeks to
remedy this by developing a rating system for ADAS technologies to
provide purchasers improved data with which to compare and shop for
vehicles, and to spur improved vehicle performance. Accordingly, this
document seeks public input on how best to develop this rating system.
    Third, this notice announces NHTSA's steps to list the crash
avoidance rating information on the vehicle's window sticker (the
Monroney label) at the point of sale, as directed by the FAST Act.\10\
NHTSA requests comment on ideas for the Monroney label information.
Research is underway to maximize the effectiveness of the information
in informing purchasing decisions. A follow-on notice will propose the
crash avoidance rating system and explain how NHTSA would use the
ratings. NHTSA will consider the comments received on this notice in
conjunction with the information gained from the consumer research, to
develop a proposal for a revised label. To help shoppers make more
informed purchasing decisions, NHTSA also plans to provide fuel economy
and greenhouse gas rating information with the NHTSA safety ratings,
not only at the point of sale but also on the NHTSA website.
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    \10\ This Act requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to require
vehicle manufacturers to include crash avoidance information next to
the crashworthiness information on vehicle window stickers (Monroney
labels).
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    Fourth, as part of a new approach to advancing NCAP, NHTSA has
developed a roadmap of the Agency's current plans to upgrade NCAP in
phases over the next several years. The roadmap sets forth NHTSA's
near-term and longer-term strategies for upgrading NCAP. The roadmap
takes a gradual approach, which contemplates NHTSA's issuing proposed
upgrades in phases, as the technologies mature to readiness for
proposed inclusion in NCAP. Following a proposal will be a final
decision document that responds to comments and provides NHTSA's
decisions for that phase of NCAP updates, including the lead time
provided for the implementation. The roadmap presents an estimated
timeframe of the phased request for comment (RFC) notices.
    Fifth, this notice also considers expanding NCAP to provide
consumer information on safety technologies that could help people
drive safer by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior. The
Agency is examining the possibility of expanding NCAP to include
technologies that promote NHTSA's continuing efforts to combat unsafe
driving behaviors, such as distracted and impaired driving, riding in a
vehicle unrestrained, and speeding. NHTSA currently uses many
approaches to reduce dangerous driving behaviors, including high
visibility enforcement and advertising campaigns like ``Click it or
Ticket'' and ``Buzzed Driving is Drunk Driving.'' These campaigns have
succeeded in reducing, but not eliminating, human causes of crashes and
there is some evidence that their success has reached a plateau. NHTSA
is considering how NCAP can promote technologies that would reduce
unsafe driving or riding behavior like distracted and impaired driving,
speeding, or riding in a vehicle unrestrained by targeting the human
behaviors most likely to lead to crashes. This information may be of
particular interest to parents or other caregivers who are shopping for
a vehicle for a new or inexperienced driver in the household, or
caregivers wanting to know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/
heatstroke.
    Sixth and finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating
several programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.
NHTSA requests comment on the Agency's ideas for revising the 5-star
safety ratings program. This document also discusses ways NHTSA would
like to update the existing ADAS technology program components,
outlines challenges the Agency has encountered relating to manufacturer
self-reported data, and proposes possible solutions to those problems.
Lastly, the RFC discusses (1) updates to the NCAP website to improve
the dissemination of vehicle safety information to consumers and (2)
the development of an NCAP database to modernize the operational
aspects of the program, including a new vehicle information submission
process for vehicle manufacturers.
    This RFC includes numbered questions throughout the notice that
highlight specific topics on which NHTSA seeks comments. Although
several questions may be posed un-numbered within the body of certain
sections, these un-numbered questions are reiterated at the conclusion
of the topic discussion and in Appendix B. To help ensure that NHTSA is
able to address all comments received, the Agency requests that
commenters provide corresponding numbering in their responses.

II. Background

    NHTSA established its NCAP in 1978 in response to Title II of the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972. When the
program first began providing consumers with vehicle safety information
derived from frontal crashworthiness testing, attention within the
industry to vehicle safety was relatively new. Today's consumers are
much more interested in vehicle safety, and this has become one of the
key factors in vehicle purchasing decisions.\11\ Vehicle manufacturers
have responded to these consumer demands by offering safer vehicles
that incorporate enhanced safety features. This has resulted in
improved vehicle safety performance in NCAP, which has historically
translated into higher NCAP star ratings.
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    \11\ See www.regulations.gov, See www.regulations.gov, Docket
No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for a report of ``New Car Assessment Program 5-
Star Quantitative Consumer Research.''
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    Over the years, NHTSA began to incorporate ADAS technologies into
NCAP's crash avoidance program. In 2007, NHTSA, for the first time,
issued an RFC exploring the addition of ADAS technologies in NCAP.\12\
Later, based on feedback received from written and oral comments, NHTSA
published a final decision \13\ expanding NCAP to include certain ADAS
technologies and specific performance thresholds that a NHTSA-
recommended ADAS system must meet. Beginning with model year 2011, the
Agency began recommending on its website forward collision warning
(FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), and electronic stability control
(ESC),\14\ and identified to shoppers which vehicles have the
technologies that meet NCAP's performance requirements. NHTSA updated
NCAP further to include crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic
braking support (DBS)

technologies, beginning with model year 2018 vehicles.
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    \12\ 72 FR 3473 (January 25, 2007). The RFC included a request
for comments on a NHTSA report titled, ``The New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP); Suggested Approaches for Future Enhancements.''
    \13\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
    \14\ ESC was removed from the Agency's list of recommended ADAS
technologies through NCAP beginning in model year 2014 when the
technology became mandated under FMVSS No. 126, ``Electronic
stability control.'' NHTSA also included rear video systems in its
list of recommended technologies under NCAP from model years 2014 to
2017 and removed that technology from its list when it became
mandated under FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear Visibility.''
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    This RFC continues those efforts. Through several notices and
public meetings, NHTSA has continued discussions with stakeholders
about which technologies should be included in NCAP and the minimum
performance thresholds those technologies should meet. NHTSA has set
forth in Appendix C to this RFC a detailed history of the requests for
comment, public meetings, and other relevant events that underlie this
notice.
    The last RFC NHTSA published to discuss potential changes to NCAP
was published in 2015. It was broad in subject matter and sought
comment on NCAP's potential use of enhanced tools and techniques for
evaluating the safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and
stimulating further vehicle safety developments.\15\ On the
crashworthiness front, the RFC sought comment on establishing a new
frontal oblique test and on using more advanced crash test dummies in
all tests. The RFC also sought comment about establishing a new crash
avoidance rating category and including nine advanced crash avoidance
technologies. Additionally, the RFC sought comment on establishing a
new pedestrian protection rating category involving the use of adult
and child head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and adding two
new pedestrian crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on
combining the three categories (crash avoidance, crashworthiness, and
pedestrian protection) into one overall 5-star rating. NHTSA also
received comments at two public hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on
January 14, 2016, and the second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in
Washington, DC, on January 29, 2016. The numerous comments received on
the RFC are discussed in a section below.
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    \15\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
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    In October 2018, NHTSA hosted a third public meeting to re-engage
stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the Agency plan the
future of NCAP.\16\ The Agency has also been working to finalize its
research efforts on pedestrian crash protection, advanced
anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side
impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover
risk curve. As discussed in the roadmap, NHTSA plans to upgrade the
NCAP crashworthiness program in phases over the next several years with
the knowledge it has acquired from the research programs.
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    \16\ October 1, 2018.
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III. ADAS Performance Testing Program

    ADAS technologies have the potential to increase safety by
preventing crashes or mitigating the severity of crashes that might
otherwise lead to injury and death. NCAP currently conducts performance
verification tests for four ADAS technologies: Forward collision
warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent braking
(CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS). CIB and DBS are collectively
referred to as automatic emergency braking (AEB). Vehicles that are
equipped with one or more of these systems and pass NCAP's performance
test requirements are listed as ``Recommended'' on NHTSA's website.
When the Agency first began recommending FCW and LDW systems for model
year 2011 vehicles, the fitment rate for these systems was less than
0.2 percent (where ``fitment rate'' means the percent of vehicles
equipped with a particular ADAS system). For model year 2018 vehicles,
38.3 percent were equipped with FCW and 30.1 percent were equipped with
LDW.\17\ Providing vehicle safety information through NCAP can be an
effective approach to advance the deployment of safer vehicle designs
and technology in the U.S. market, inform consumer choices, and
encourage adoption of new technologies that have life-saving potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With this notice, NHTSA is proposing to incorporate four additional
ADAS technologies into NCAP's crash avoidance program: Lane keeping
support (LKS), pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB), blind
spot warning (BSW), and blind spot intervention (BSI). Each of these
technologies meets the Agency's established criteria for inclusion in
NCAP: (1) The technology addresses a safety need; (2) system designs
exist that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) the technology provides
the potential for safety benefits; and (4) a performance-based
objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance.\18\
Details about how each of the proposed ADAS technologies addresses a
safety need (criterion 1) will be discussed immediately below, while
the remaining criteria will be discussed in the relevant sections under
each technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 78 FR 20599 (Apr. 5, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To gain an understanding of the safety need that current ADAS
technologies may address, NHTSA analyzed crash data for 84 mutually
exclusive pre-crash scenarios.\19\ The pre-crash scenarios used in the
Agency's analysis were devised using a typology \20\ concept \21\
published by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe),
which categorizes crashes into dynamically distinct scenarios based on
pre-crash vehicle movements and critical events. As detailed in the
referenced March 2019 report, NHTSA mapped the pre-crash scenario
typologies to twelve currently available ADAS technologies \22\
believed to potentially address certain pre-crash scenarios by
assisting the driver to avoid or mitigate a crash. These mappings
served to define the corresponding crash populations (i.e., target
crash populations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
    \20\ A typology is the study or analysis of something, or the
classification of something, based on types or categories.
    \21\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios
based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 745),
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    \22\ The twelve ADAS technologies were as follows: FCW, DBS,
CIB, LDW, LKS, lane centering assist (LCA), BSW, BSI, lane change/
merge warning, PAEB, RAB, and rear cross-traffic alert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since several ADAS technologies presently available on passenger
vehicles \23\ are designed to mitigate the same crash scenarios, NHTSA
first grouped the technologies with similar design intent into
categories. The five technology categories that resulted from this
grouping process include: (1) Forward collision prevention, (2) lane
keeping, (3) blind spot detection, (4) forward pedestrian impact, and
(5) backing collision avoidance. As shown in Table A-6, these
categories address the following high-level crash types: (1) Rear-end;
(2) rollover, lane departure, and road departure; (3) lane change/
merge; (4) pedestrian; and (5) backing, respectively. Of the original
84 pre-crash scenarios studied, we mapped 34 relevant pre-crash
scenario typologies to the five resulting technology categories that
represented these crash types.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Passenger vehicles were defined as cars, crossovers, sport
utility vehicles (SUVs), light trucks, and vans having a gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The forward collision prevention category included three ADAS
technologies: Forward collision warning, crash imminent braking, and
dynamic brake support (FCW, CIB, and

DBS, respectively). The lane keeping category included lane departure
warning (LDW), lane keeping support (LKS),\24\ and lane centering
assist (LCA). The blind spot detection category included blind spot
warning (BSW),\25\ blind spot intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge
warning. The forward pedestrian impact avoidance category included
pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB). Lastly, the backing
collision avoidance category included rear automatic braking (RAB) and
rear cross-traffic alert (RCTA). These ADAS technologies are
characterized as SAE International (SAE) Level 0-1 \26\ driving
automation systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The study uses the term ``lane keeping assist'' (LKA), but
NCAP terminology differs. NCAP uses the term ``lane keeping
support'' throughout this document instead.
    \25\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``blind spot detection''
(BSD) but NCAP uses the term blind spot warning (BSW) throughout
this document instead.
    \26\ SAE International (2018), Taxonomy and definitions for
terms related to driving automation systems for on-road motor
vehicles (SAE J3016). Level 0: No Automation--The full-time
performance by the human driver of all aspects of the dynamic
driving task, even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems.
Level 1: Driver Assistance--The driving mode-specific execution by a
driver assistance system of either steering or acceleration/
deceleration using information about the driving environment and
with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining
aspects of the dynamic driving task.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA derived target crash populations for each of the five
technology categories using 2011 to 2015 Fatality Analysis Reporting
System (FARS) and National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates
System (NASS GES) data sets, which serve as records of police-reported
fatal and non-fatal crashes, respectively, on the nation's roads. For a
given technology category, we compiled data for each of the
corresponding pre-crash scenarios to generate target crash populations
surrounding the number of crashes, fatalities, non-fatal injuries, and
property-damage-only vehicles (PDOVs).\27\ See Table 1 for a breakdown
of target crash populations for each technology category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ PDOVs are vehicles damaged in non-injury-producing crashes
(i.e., crashes in which vehicles only incur property damage and no
occupants incur injury).
    \28\ Defined as reverse automatic braking in DOT HS 812 653.

                             Table 1--Summary of Target Crashes by Technology Group
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Safety systems               Crashes             Fatalities       MAIS 1-5 injuries          PDOVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. FCW/DBS/CIB..............    1,703,541 (29.4%)         1,275 (3.8%)      883,386 (31.5%)    2,641,884 (36.3%)
2. LDW/LKA/LCA..............    1,126,397 (19.4%)       14,844 (44.3%)      479,939 (17.1%)      863,213 (11.9%)
3. BSW/BSI/LCM..............       503,070 (8.7%)           542 (1.6%)       188,304 (6.7%)      860,726 (11.8%)
4. PAEB.....................       111,641 (1.9%)        4,106 (12.3%)       104,066 (3.7%)         6,985 (0.1%)
5. RAB/RvAB \28\ RCTA.......       148,533 (2.6%)            74 (0.2%)        35,268 (1.3%)       231,317 (3.2%)
    Combined................       3,593,18 (62%)       20,841 (62.2%)    1,690,963 (60.3%)    4,604,125 (63.3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is important to note that target crash populations for the five
technology categories covered 62 percent of all crashes. Crossing path
crashes, which also represented a large crash population and a
significant number of fatalities, were not part of our analysis because
we are not aware of a currently available ADAS technology that can
effectively mitigate this crash type.\29\ However, there are emerging
safety countermeasures that hold potential to address some portion of
these crashes in the future and these technologies will be considered
for NCAP as they mature. These include intersection safety assist (ISA)
systems that use onboard sensors with a wide field of view (e.g.,
cameras, lidar, radar) as well as vehicle communications systems.\30\
\31\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes \32\ also had a
relatively high target population and fatality rate,\33\ but were not
included because, aside from electronic stability control (ESC)
systems, which are mandated,\34\ the Agency is not aware of an ADAS
technology that effectively prevents this crash type and also meets
NHTSA's criteria for inclusion in NCAP at this time.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ In its 2019 report, Volpe found that of the 5,480,886 light
vehicle crashes occurring from 2011 through 2015, crossing path
crashes, which totaled 1,131,273, represented 21 percent of all
light vehicle crashes and 16 percent (3,972) of all fatalities
(25,350).
    \30\ NHTSA recognizes that ISA systems are currently available
on a small number of light vehicles. However, preliminary NHTSA
testing has shown that current-generation ISA systems have only
limited capabilities and therefore would not effectively mitigate
intersection-related crashes at this time--which is one of the
requirements in the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
    \31\ Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
technologies have the potential to address crossing path crashes,
but, while NHTSA remains strongly interested in these technologies,
they are not included in the current roadmap. NHTSA is continuing to
consider the various issues that bear upon the deployment path of
V2X, including technological evolution and regulatory changes to the
radio spectrum environment.
    \32\ Crash scenarios were categorized by the first sequence of a
crash event. Target crashes for a technology (e.g., lane-keeping
crashes) were a collective of crash scenarios that are relevant to
the technology. The Loss-of-control in single-vehicle scenario was
defined as crashes where the first event was initiated by a
passenger vehicle, and the event was coded as jackknife or traction
loss. This crash scenario is mutually exclusive from those included
in the lane-keeping crashes.
    \33\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes are about 1% of
crashes and associated with 3% of fatalities.
    \34\ Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126.
    \35\ In its 2019 report, Volpe categorized 9 percent (470,733)
of all light vehicle crashes (5,480,886) occurring from 2011 through
2015 as control loss crashes. Furthermore, 18 percent (4,456) of all
fatal crashes (25,350) were due to control loss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Of the pre-crash typologies included in NHTSA's March 2019 study,
rear-end collisions were found to be the most common crash type with an
annual average of 1,703,541 crashes. Rear-end collisions represented
29.4 percent of all annual crashes (5,799,883), followed by lane
keeping typologies (1,126,397 crashes or 19.4 percent), and those
relating to blind spot detection (503,070 crashes or 8.7 percent).
Backing crashes (148,533) represented 2.6 percent of all crashes,
followed by forward pedestrian crashes (111,641) at 1.9 percent.
    Rear-end collisions also had the highest number of Maximum
Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) \36\ 1-5 injuries at 883,386, which
represented 31.5 percent of all non-fatal injuries (2,806,260) in Table
A-1. Lane keeping crashes had the second highest number of injuries at
479,939 (17.1 percent), as shown in Table A-2, and blind spot crashes
had the third highest at 188,304 (6.7 percent), as shown in Table A-3.
These typologies were followed by forward pedestrian crashes at 3.7

percent and backing crashes at 1.3 percent, as shown in Table A-4.\37\
\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification
system for assessing impact injury severity developed and published
by the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine and is
used for coding single injuries, assessing multiple injuries, or for
assessing cumulative effects on more than one injury. AIS ranks
individual injuries by body region on a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 =
minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 =
maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury severity,
or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the highest single AIS
for a person with one or more injuries). MAIS 0 means no injury.
    \37\ The study uses the term ``impacts'' but for consistency
purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this paragraph.
    \38\ The Agency notes that the highest number of serious
injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were recorded for lane keeping
crashes (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal injuries), followed
by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), forward pedestrian
crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12
percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA found that the lane keeping technology category, represented
by rollover, lane departure, and road departure crashes, included the
highest number of fatalities: 14,844, or 44.3 percent of all fatalities
(33,477), as shown in Table A-2. This was followed by the forward
pedestrian impact category, which included 4,106 pedestrian fatalities
(12.3 percent), as shown in Table A-4. The forward collision prevention
category, made up of rear-end crashes, included 1,275 fatalities (3.8
percent), as shown in Table A-1.\39\ The blind spot detection
technology category, represented by lane change/merge crashes,
accounted for 1.6 percent of all fatalities, as shown in Table A-3.
This was followed by backing crashes at 0.2 percent, as shown in Table
A-5, which defined the backing collision avoidance category. The Agency
notes that forward pedestrian crashes, which comprised the forward
pedestrian impact category, ranked second highest for fatalities, and
were the deadliest based on frequency of fatalities per crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``impacts'' but for
consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this
paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In selecting the ADAS technologies to include in this proposal, the
Agency wanted not only to target the most frequently occurring crash
types, but also prioritize the most fatal and highest risk crashes.
Based on the target crash populations studied, NHTSA believes that
those represented by the forward collision prevention, lane keeping,
blind spot detection, and forward pedestrian impact technology
categories account for the most significant safety need.
    The Agency notes that ADAS technologies representing the backing
collision avoidance category (i.e., RAB, RvAB, and RCTA) are not being
proposed for this program update. The backing collision avoidance
category did not appear in the top third for number of crashes, number
of fatalities, or number of MAIS 1-5 injuries. This may be due, in
part, to the fact that a significant part of this crash target
population is addressed by FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear visibility.'' \40\ The
Agency needs additional time to assess all available real-world data
and study the effects of the recent full implementation of FMVSS No.
111 prior to considering adoption of ADAS technologies designed to
prevent backing crashes in NCAP. Furthermore, while the Agency
acknowledges that it previously proposed adding rear automatic braking
(RAB) to NCAP in the December 2015 notice, it is continuing to make
changes to the RAB test procedure published in support of that proposal
to address the comments received. Thus, it is not proposing to add this
technology to NCAP at this time. The Agency may propose adding to NCAP
ADAS technologies that address the backing pre-crash typologies as the
Agency continues to analyze the real-world data and refine test
procedure revisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 49 CFR 571.111. See 79 FR 19177 (Apr. 07, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Units of measure contained within this notice include meters (m),
kilometers (km), millimeters per second (mm/s), meters per second (m/
s), kilometers per hour (kph), feet (ft.), inches per second (in./s),
feet per second (ft./s), miles per hour (mph), seconds (s), and
kilograms (kg).

A. Lane Keeping Technologies

    A study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \41\ from the
National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Study (NMVCCS) \42\ identified
that 42 percent of lane departure crashes (i.e., where the driver left
the lane of travel prior to the crash) resulted in a rollover and 37
percent resulted in an opposite direction crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., &
Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane
crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to
assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Conference on
the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper
Number 17-0220.
    \42\ The National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NMVVCS)
was a nationwide survey of 5,471 crashes involving light passenger
vehicles, with a focus on factors related to pre-crash events, which
were investigated by the U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA
over a 2.5-year period from July 3, 2005, to December 31, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After analyzing NHTSA's 2019 target population study, NHTSA
believes that lane keeping technologies such as lane departure warning
(LDW), lane keeping support (LKS), and lane centering assist (LCA), can
address ten pre-crash scenarios including the prevention or mitigation
of roadway departures and crossing the centerline or median (i.e.,
opposite direction crashes). These pre-crash scenarios represented on
average 1.13 million crashes annually or 19.4 percent of all crashes
that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 14,844 fatalities and
479,939 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-2. This equals 44.3
percent of all fatalities and 17.1 percent of all injuries
recorded.\43\ \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
    \44\ When only serious injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were
considered, lane keeping crashes represented the highest number of
non-fatal injuries (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal
injuries), followed by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent),
forward pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot
crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02
percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NCAP currently provides information on the performance of LDW, one
of the lane keeping ADAS technologies. LDW was introduced in the
program in 2010 for model year 2011 vehicles.\45\ At the time, the
fitment rate for LDW was less than 0.2 percent. In model year 2018, it
was 30.1 percent.\46\ Although the adoption rate for LDW has increased
over this period, it has not increased as significantly as the fitment
rate for forward collision warning (FCW), which saw an approximate 40
percent increase over the same time period. A possible explanation
regarding the lower fitment rate for LDW will be discussed in the next
section. A second lane keeping ADAS technology that the Agency believes
is appropriate for inclusion in NCAP is LKS. NHTSA believes that LKS
may provide additional safety benefits that LDW cannot and may more
effectively address the number of fatalities and injuries related to
lane departure crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
    \46\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
    Lane departure warning is a NHTSA-recommended technology that is
currently included in NCAP to mitigate lane departure crashes. LDW
systems are used to help prevent crashes that result when a driver
unintentionally allows a vehicle to drift out of its lane of travel.
These systems often use camera-based sensors to detect lane markers,
such as solid lines (including those marked for bike lanes), dashed
lines, or raised reflective indicators such as Botts' Dots, ahead of
the vehicle.\47\ Lane departure alerts are presented to the driver when
the system detects that the vehicle is laterally approaching or
crossing the lane markings. The alert may be visual, audible, and/or
haptic in

nature. Visual alerts may show which side of the vehicle is departing
the lane, and haptic alerts may be presented as steering wheel or seat
vibrations to alert the driver. It is expected that an LDW alert will
warn the driver of the unintentional lane shift so the driver can steer
the vehicle back into its lane. When a turn signal is activated, the
LDW system acknowledges that the lane change is intentional and does
not alert the driver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Note that performance of LDW systems may be adversely
affected by precipitation or poor roadway conditions due to
construction, unmarked intersections, faded/worn/missing lane
markings, markings covered with water, etc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As NHTSA continues its assessment of LDW systems under NCAP, it
plans to use the current NCAP test procedure titled, ``Lane Departure
Warning System Confirmation Test and Lane Keeping Support Performance
Documentation,'' dated February 2013.\48\ This protocol assesses the
system's ability to issue an alert in response to a driving situation
intended to represent an unintended lane departure and to quantify the
test vehicle's position relative to the lane line at the time of the
LDW alert. In NCAP's LDW tests, a test vehicle is accelerated from rest
to a test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) while travelling in a straight
line parallel to a single lane line comprised of one of three marking
types: Continuous white lines, discontinuous (i.e., dashed) yellow
lines, or discontinuous raised pavement markers (i.e., Botts' Dots).
The test vehicle is driven such that the centerline of the vehicle is
approximately 1.8 m (6 ft.) from the lane edge. This path must be
maintained, and the test speed must be achieved, at least 61.0 m (200
ft.) prior to the start gate. Once the driver reaches the start gate,
he or she manually inputs sufficient steering to achieve a lane
departure with a target lateral velocity of 0.5 m/s (1.6 ft./s) with
respect to the lane line. The driver of the vehicle does not activate
the turn signal at any point during the test and does not apply any
sudden inputs to the accelerator pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal.
The test vehicle is driven at constant speed throughout the maneuver.
The test ends when the vehicle crosses at least 0.5 m (1.7 ft.) over
the edge of the lane line marking. The scenario is performed for two
different departure directions, left and right, and for all three lane
marking types, resulting in a total of six test conditions. Five
repeated trials runs are performed per test condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013,
February). Lane departure warning system confirmation test and lane
keeping support performance documentation. See http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    LDW performance for each test trial is evaluated by examining the
proximity of the vehicle with respect to the edge of a lane line at the
time of the LDW alert. The LDW alert must not occur when the lateral
position of the vehicle, represented by a two-dimensional polygon,\49\
is greater than 0.8 m (2.5 ft.) from the inboard edge of the lane line
(i.e., the line edge closest to the vehicle when the lane departure
maneuver is initiated), and must occur before the lane departure
exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.). To pass the test, the LDW system must satisfy
the pass criteria for three of the first five valid individual trials
\50\ for each combination of departure direction and lane line type (60
percent) and for 20 of the 30 trials overall (66 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ The two-dimensional polygon is defined by the vehicle's
axles in the X-direction (fore-aft), the outer edge of the vehicle's
tire in the Y-direction (lateral), and the ground in the Z-direction
(vertical).
    \50\ Trial or test trial is a test among a set of tests
conducted under the same test conditions (including test speed) with
the same subject vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NCAP's LDW test conditions represent pre-crash scenarios that
correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed
in real-world lane departure crashes. In its independent review of the
2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe showed that approximately 40
and 30 percent of fatalities in fatal road departure and opposite
direction crashes, respectively, occurred when the posted speed was
72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\51\ Similarly, the data indicated 64 and 63
percent of injuries resulted from road departure and opposite direction
crashes, respectively, that occurred when the posted speed was 72.4 kph
(45 mph) or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although travel speed was unknown or not reported for a high
percentage of crashes in FARS and GES,\52\ when travel speed was
reported, approximately 6 and 9 percent of fatal road departure and
opposite direction crashes, respectively, occurred at travel speeds of
72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Likewise, the data showed 22 and 25 percent
of the police-reported non-fatal road departure and opposite direction
crashes, respectively, occurred at 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Volpe's
data review indicates that speeding is prevalent in lane departure
relevant pre-crash scenarios, but most road departure- and opposite
direction-related fatalities and injuries did not occur on highways.
For instance, 79 percent of road departure-related fatal crashes and 89
percent of road departure-related police-reported injuries occurred on
roads that were not highways. Similarly, for opposite direction-related
crashes, 87 percent of fatalities and 98 percent of injuries did not
occur on highways. Because highway driving speeds are on average much
higher than non-highway speeds, the Volpe data about a high percentage
of crashes occurring at speeds under 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears
accurate. The test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears to address a
large portion of the travel speeds where the crashes are occurring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ For road departure crashes, 63 and 68 percent of the travel
speed data, respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and
GES. For opposite direction crashes, 65 and 67 percent of the data,
respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and GES.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, 62 percent of road departure-related fatalities and 76
percent of road departure-related injuries occurred on straight roads,
thereby aligning with NCAP's test procedure. For opposite direction-
related crashes, 69 percent of fatalities and 67 percent of police-
reported injuries occurred on straight roads.
    In its December 2015 notice,\53\ NHTSA expressed concern that the
safety benefits afforded by LDW technology were being diminished due to
false activations. Several studies referenced in that notice had found
that drivers were choosing to disable their vehicle's LDW system
because it was issuing alerts too frequently. The Agency was also
concerned about missed detections resulting from tar lines reflecting
sun light or covered with water and other unforeseen anomalies that
cause unreliable driver warnings. To address these issues and improve
consumer acceptance, NHTSA requested comment in 2015 on whether to
revise certain aspects of NCAP's LDW test procedure. Specifically, the
Agency solicited comment on whether it is feasible to (1) award NCAP
credit to LDW systems that only provide haptic alerts, and (2) develop
additional test scenarios to address false activations and missed
detections. The Agency also proposed to tighten the inboard lane
tolerance for its LDW test procedure from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0
ft.). In doing this, an LDW alert could only occur within a window of
+0.3 to -0.3 m (+1.0 to -1.0 ft.) with respect to the inside edge of
the lane line to pass NCAP's LDW procedure. This proposal effectively
increased the space in which a vehicle could operate within a lane
before triggering of an LDW alert was permitted. Each of these topics
are

discussed in detail in the sections that follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Haptic Alerts
    With respect to haptic warnings, NHTSA mentioned in its December
2015 notice that these alerts may offer greater consumer acceptance
compared to audible alerts, and thus improve the effectiveness of LDW
alerts if the driver does not view the alerts as a nuisance and
disengage the system. In response to the notice, commenters generally
did not support a haptic alert requirement. Some commenters suggested
that requiring a specific feedback type would unnecessarily limit the
manufacturer's flexibility to issue warnings to the driver,
particularly when considering the potential effectiveness of different
feedback types and the need to optimize human-machine interface (HMI)
designs to address a suite of ADAS. Bosch suggested the Agency should
allow all warning options to promote the availability of such systems
in a greater number of vehicles, which should ultimately increase
consumer awareness and encourage vehicle safety improvements. Advocates
stated that the Agency should provide details on the effectiveness of
the different types of sensory feedback (visual, auditory, haptic) to
justify its decision to encourage one warning type over another.
Consumers Union (CU) suggested awarding credit for all LDW feedback
types and awarding additional points or credit for haptic alerts to
encourage this feedback type in the future. The Automotive Safety
Council (ASC) acknowledged that haptic warnings may improve driver
acceptance of LDW systems but suggested that false activations must
also be reduced to realize improved consumer acceptance and additional
safety benefits.
    In a large-scale telematics-based study conducted by UMTRI \54\ for
NHTSA on LDW usage, researchers investigated driver behavior in
reaction to alerts. Two types of vehicles were included in the study:
Vehicles with audible-only alerts and vehicles where the driver had the
option to select either an audible or haptic alert. When the latter was
available, the driver selected the haptic warning 90 percent of the
time. Otherwise, the LDW system was turned ``off'' 38 percent of the
time and thus was not providing alerts. For the system that only
provided the audible warning, the LDW was turned ``off'' 71 percent of
the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the findings from the UMTRI's research, NHTSA concludes
that haptic alerts improve driver acceptance of LDW systems. However,
the Agency is not certain if an increase in driver acceptance will
translate to an improvement in the overall efficacy of the LDW system
in reducing crashes. Furthermore, NHTSA does not want to hinder
optimization of HMI designs given the increasing number of ADAS
technologies available in vehicles today. Therefore, the Agency has
decided not to require a specific alert modality for LDW warnings in
its related NCAP test procedure at this time, but is requesting comment
on whether this decision is appropriate. Although NHTSA has limited
data on the effectiveness of the various alert types, it has some
concern (similar to the one raised for FCW) that certain LDW systems,
such as those that may provide only a visual alert, may be less
effective than other alert options in medium or high urgency
situations.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey,
R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September), Human factors for
connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings
(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. False Positive Tests
    In responding to the 2015 RFC, vehicle manufacturers and suppliers
asserted that additional false positive test requirements were not
needed even though they acknowledged NHTSA's concern regarding the
effect of nuisance alerts on consumer acceptance. Specifically, the
Alliance \56\ stated that vehicle manufacturers will optimize their
systems to minimize false positive activations for consumer acceptance
purposes, and thus such tests will not be necessary. Similarly, Honda
stated that vehicle manufacturers must already account for false
positives when considering marketability and HMI. The manufacturer also
indicated that it would be difficult for the Agency to create a valid
false positive test procedure that is robust and repeatable. Mobileye,
Bosch, and MTS Systems Corporation (MTS) also agreed. In fact, Mobileye
explained that it would be hard to reproduce the exact test conditions,
especially with respect to weather, over multiple test locations. Also,
Bosch stated that the specialized tests required to address the
Agency's concern may not be truly representative of all real-world
driving situations that the system encounters. MTS suggested that,
alternatively, a new test could be added to NCAP's LDW test procedure
that would evaluate whether an LDW system can inform the driver that it
is no longer able to issue warnings due to poor environmental
conditions or other reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ After submitting individual comments on the 2015 RFC, the
Alliance and Global Automakers merged to form the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation. This document addresses the individual
comments from the organizations that were then the Alliance and
Global Automakers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the concerns expressed regarding repeatability and
reproducibility of test conditions, and the fact that the Agency's data
do not currently support adoption of a false positive assessment for
lane keeping technologies, NHTSA continues to monitor the consumer
complaint data related to false positives to help inform an appropriate
next step.
    With respect to the recommendation from MTS, the Agency recognizes
that vehicle manufacturers install LDW telltales on the instrument
panel that illuminate to inform drivers when the system is operational.
The systems are typically operational when the vehicle's travel speed
has reached a preset activation threshold speed and the lane markings
and environmental conditions are appropriate. The telltale will
disappear if those conditions are not met to inform the driver that the
system is no longer operational. In such a state, the system will not
provide an alert if the vehicle departs the travel lane. Given this
feature, NHTSA has decided a test to inform the driver that the system
is no longer issuing warnings is unnecessary at this time.
c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
    Support was varied with respect to NHTSA's proposal in the December
2015 notice to modify the LDW test requirements to reduce the leeway
for system activation inside of a lane line from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to
1.0 ft.). Global Automakers stated that the proposed change was
``unduly prescriptive'' and recommended that the Agency retain the
existing lane line tolerance. The organization explained that research
showed 90 percent of drivers needed 1.2 s to react to a warning.\57\
Citing NCAP's LDW test procedure, which requires a steering input
having a target lateral velocity of 0.5 to 0.6 m/s (1.6 to 2 ft./s),
the trade association remarked that this requirement equates to a
necessary warning distance of 0.6 to 0.72 m (1.9 to 2.4 ft.) to ensure
that 90 percent of drivers can react in time to prevent a

lane departure. Advocates agreed that nuisance notifications are a
concern for driver acceptance, but noted that the Agency provided
little information about the effectiveness of LDW systems meeting the
proposed criteria. Conversely, Delphi, ASC, and MTS commented that some
of the more robust systems that are currently available should be able
to comply with the narrower specification. However, ASC suggested that
the Agency may want to evaluate the impact of the proposed changes
before finalizing the requirements to ensure that narrowing the lane
line tolerances translates to a reduction in false positive alerts, and
thus higher consumer acceptance for LDW systems. Mobileye stated that
the tolerance reduction should increase the required accuracy and
quality of lane keeping systems. MTS remarked that systems meeting the
tighter specification will produce higher driver satisfaction, and, in
turn, system use, compared to those that meet only the current
requirements. Hyundai Motor Company (Hyundai) also supported the
tolerance revision. Consumers Union (CU) agreed with others that the
narrowed lateral tolerance should reduce the issuance of false alerts
on main roadways but cautioned the Agency that this change may not
effectively address false alerts on secondary or curved roads, as
vehicles not only tend to approach within one foot of lane lines, but
also may cross them. The group suggested that false alert conditions be
subject to speed limitations or GPS-based position sensors to avoid
``over activation'' on secondary or curved roads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Tanaka, S., Mochida, T., Aga, M., & Tajima, J. (2012, April
16). Benefit Estimation of a Lane Departure Warning System using
ASSTREET. SAE Int. J. Passeng. Cars--Electron. Electr. Syst.
5(1):133-145, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4271/2012-01-0289.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given NHTSA's goal of reducing nuisance notifications to increase
consumer acceptance of LDW systems and the statements from several
commenters that current LDW systems can meet the proposed reduced test
specification, the Agency believes it is reasonable to propose adopting
the reduced inboard lane tolerance of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.).
    In addition to the comments received pertaining to the lane line
tolerance, the Agency also received several suggestions to adopt
additional test scenarios for NCAP's LDW test procedure or make
alternative procedural modifications. Similar to CU's suggestion above
for curved roads, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA add inner and outer
curve scenarios that allow a larger tolerance for the inner lane
boundary than that permitted on a straight road. The company further
recommended that the Agency add road edge detection scenarios,
including curbs and non-structural delimiters such as gravel or dirt,
to reflect real-world conditions and crash scenarios more accurately.
Similarly, Bosch suggested that NHTSA consider introducing road edge
detection requirements in addition to lane markings since not all roads
have lane markings. Additionally, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA alter
the Botts' Dots detail #4 (Botts dots are round, raised markers that
mark lanes) to align with California detail #13, which is more common,
and modify the test procedure to include Botts' Dots on both sides of
the lane or Botts' Dots and a solid line, as these are the most
frequently observed marking pairings.
    The Agency appreciates suggestions from commenters and agrees that
there is merit to considering other procedural modifications for NCAP's
lane departure test procedure(s). As will be discussed in the next
section, the Agency is planning to conduct a feasibility study to
determine whether curved roads can be considered for inclusion in NCAP
test procedures to evaluate LKS systems objectively. NHTSA also plans
to perform research to assess how lane keeping system performance on a
test track compares to real-world data for different combinations of
curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing. Additionally, the
Agency recognizes that the European NCAP program (Euro NCAP) has
adopted a road edge detection test that is conducted in a similar
manner to their ``lane keep assist'' tests (described in the next
section), but the road edge detection test does not use lane markings.
Although NHTSA believes the number of vehicles equipped with an ability
to recognize and respond to road edges not defined with a lane line is
presently low, it has identified roadways where this capability could
prevent crashes. Therefore, the Agency is requesting comment on whether
a road edge detection test for either LDW and/or LKS is appropriate for
inclusion in NCAP. In consideration of the lane markings currently
assessed, the Agency proposes to remove the Botts' Dots test scenario
from the current LDW test, as the lane marking type is being removed
from use in California.\58\ At this time, the Agency believes the
traditional dashed and solid lane marking tests would be sufficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County
Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although NHTSA has tentatively decided not to adopt additional
false activation requirements for this NCAP upgrade, the Agency is
still concerned about the low effectiveness of LDW and its lack of
consumer acceptance stemming from nuisance alerts and missed
detections.
    When NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP program in 2008,\59\
LDW was selected because it met NCAP's four established criteria: (1)
The technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) the system design
of LDW had the potential to mitigate the crash problem; (3) safety
benefits were projected, and (4) test procedures and evaluation
criteria were available to ensure an acceptable performance level. At
the time, the Agency estimated that existing LDW systems were 6 to 11
percent effective in preventing lane departure crashes. Although the
system's effectiveness was relatively low, NHTSA cited the large number
of road departure and opposite direction crashes occurring on the
nation's roadways as well as the resulting AIS 3+ injuries, as reasons
to include LDW in NCAP. Several recent studies have provided varying
results with respect to LDW effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a 2017 study,\60\ the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) concluded that LDW systems were effective in reducing three
types of passenger car crashes (single-vehicle, side-swipes, and head-
on) by 11 percent, which is the same rate NHTSA originally estimated.
Importantly, IIHS also concluded that LDW systems reduce injuries in
those same types of crashes by 21 percent. In its recent study of real-
world effectiveness of crash avoidance technologies in GM vehicles,\61\
UMTRI found that LDW systems showed a 3 percent reduction for
applicable crashes that was determined to be not statistically
significant. Conversely, the active safety technology, LKS (which also
included lane departure warning capability), showed an estimated 30
percent reduction in applicable crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2017, August 23),
Lane departure warning, blind spot detection help drivers avoid
trouble, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/stay-within-the-lines-lane-departure-warning-blind-spot-detection-help-drivers-avoid-trouble.
    \61\ Flannagan, C. and Leslie, A., Crash Avoidance Technology
Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle
Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan
Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other studies that examined driver deactivation rates also suggest
that LDW effectiveness may be lower than originally estimated. In a
survey of Honda vehicles brought into Honda

dealerships for service,\62\ IIHS researchers found that for 184 models
equipped with an LDW system, only a third of the vehicles had the
system activated. Furthermore, in its telematics-based study on LDW
usage,\63\ UMTRI found that, overall, drivers turned off LDW systems 50
percent of the time. However, in Consumer Reports' August 2019 survey
of more than 57,000 CR subscribers, the organization found that 73
percent of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LDW
technology. In fact, 33 percent said that the system had helped them
avoid a crash, and 65 percent said that they trusted the system to work
every time.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, January 28),
Most Honda owners turn off lane departure warning, Status Report,
Vol. 51, No. 1, page 6.
    \63\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
    \64\ Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure
warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep
drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of these findings, the Agency believes that, in addition
to LDW, there is merit to adopting an active lane keeping system, such
as lane keeping support (LKS), in NCAP. As an enhanced active system,
LKS offers the steering and/or braking capability necessary to guide a
vehicle back into its lane without consumer action and should therefore
further enhance safety benefits beyond those that can be realized by
LDW. A detailed discussion pertaining to LKS technology is provided in
the following section.
2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
    LDW systems warn a driver that their vehicle is unintentionally
drifting out of their travel lane, while lane keeping support (LKS)
systems are designed to actively guide a drifting vehicle back into the
travel lane by gently counter steering or applying differential
braking. During an unintended lane departure where the driver is not
using the turn signal, LKS systems help to prevent: ``Sideswiping''
where a vehicle strikes another vehicle in an adjacent lane that is
travelling in the same direction; opposite direction crashes where a
vehicle crosses the centerline and strikes another vehicle travelling
in the opposite direction; and road departure crashes where a vehicle
runs off the road resulting in a rollover crash or an impact with a
tree or other object. LKS systems may also help to prevent unintended
lane departures into designated bicycle lanes in situations where the
system's speed threshold is met.
    LKS systems typically utilize the same camera(s) used by LDW
systems to monitor the vehicle's position within the lane, and
determine whether a vehicle is about to drift out of its lane of travel
unintentionally. In such instances, LKS automatically intervenes by:
Braking one or more of the vehicle's wheels; steering; or using a
combination of braking and steering so that the vehicle returns to its
intended lane of travel. LKS is one of two active lane keeping
technologies mentioned in the Agency's March 2019 report,\65\ with the
other being lane centering assist (LCA). LKS assists the driver by
providing short-duration steering and/or braking inputs when a lane
departure is imminent or underway, whereas LCA provides continuous
assistance to the driver to keep their vehicle centered within the
lane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the previous section, UMTRI evaluated the real-
world effectiveness of ADAS technologies, including LDW and LKS.\66\
The results of the LKS study (which also included lane departure
warning functionality) showed an estimated 30 percent reduction in
applicable crashes. Additionally, in its August 2019 survey, 74 percent
of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LKS
technology, and 35 percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash.
Sixty-five percent of owners said that they trusted the system to work
every time.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ Carol Flannagan, Andrew Leslie, Crash Avoidance Technology
Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle
Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan
Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
    \67\ Consumer Reports. (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure
warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep
drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its December 2015 notice, NHTSA did not propose including LKS
technology as part of the update to NCAP. However, many commenters
recommended that the Agency consider including the technology. For
instance, Bosch and Mobileye stated that LKS systems have the potential
to prevent or mitigate a greater number of collisions involving
injuries and fatalities than LDW systems. The ASC and Delphi
recommended that the Agency adopt LKS in lieu of LDW, with the ASC
adding that Euro NCAP has included LKS in its Lane Support Systems test
protocol since 2016.\68\ \69\ The ASC, Bosch, and Continental noted the
maturity of LKS technology and stated that such systems were already
widely available in vehicles produced at the time. Other proponents of
adopting LKS technology in NCAP include the National Safety Council
(NSC), ZF TRW, and Honda. ZF TRW recommended that the Agency adopt both
active lane keeping (termed LKS in this notice) and lane centering
systems (termed LCA in this notice) due to the high frequency of fatal
road departure crashes. Honda also supports the active safety benefits
of LKS and the system's potential to help prevent crashes. NSC
suggested that the Agency include LKS, as it would complement LDW,
which is already in the program, similar to the way the warning
component of FCW complements the active safety functionality of AEB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ The ASC argued that data from the Highway Loss Data
Institute (HLDI) have shown no statistically significant difference
in collision claim frequencies for vehicles equipped with LDW
compared to those without, and questioned whether LDW systems are
effective in reducing crashes or fatalities.
    \69\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2015,
November), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 1.0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As mentioned previously, the Agency agrees with commenters that
there is merit to adopting LKS technology in NCAP. However, NHTSA
believes an LDW system integrated with LKS may be a better approach for
the Agency to consider rather than replacing LDW with LKS. NHTSA
believes, as NSC commented, that an integrated approach (inclusive of
passive and active safety capabilities for lane support systems) would
be similar to what the Agency is proposing for frontal collision
avoidance systems, FCW and AEB, later in this notice.
    NHTSA is considering the adoption of certain test methods (e.g.,
those for ``lane keep assist'') contained within the Euro NCAP Test
Protocol--Lane Support Systems (LSS) \70\ to assess technology design
differences for LKS. Since the test speeds and road configurations
specified in this protocol are similar to those stipulated in the
Agency's LDW test procedure, the Agency believes Euro NCAP's test
protocol will sufficiently address the lane keeping crash typology
previously detailed for LDW.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019,
July), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 3.0.2. See
section 7.2.5, Lane Keep Assist tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure includes a series of ``lane keep
assist''

trials that are performed with iteratively increasing lateral
velocities towards the desired lane line. Each ``lane keep assist''
trial begins with the subject vehicle (SV) (i.e., the vehicle being
evaluated) being driven at 72 kph (44.7 mph) down a straight lane
delineated by a single solid white or dashed white line. Initially, the
SV path is parallel to the lane line, with an offset from the lane line
that depends on the lateral velocity used later in the maneuver. Then,
after a short period of steady-state driving, the direction of travel
of the SV is headed towards the lane line using a path defined by a
1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) radius curve. The lateral velocity of the SV's
approach towards the lane line (from both the left and right
directions) is increased from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) in 0.1
m/s (0.3 ft./s) increments until acceptable LKS performance is no
longer realized. Acceptable LKS performance occurs when the SV does not
cross the inboard leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.3 m (1.0
ft.).
    NHTSA conducted a limited assessment of five model year 2017
vehicles equipped with LKS systems. The Agency used a robotic steering
controller to maximize the repeatability and minimize variability
associated with manual steering inputs. For this study, NHTSA also used
a slightly modified and older version of Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure
from what was discussed above. Specifically, the lateral velocity of
the SV's approach towards the lane line was increased from 0.1 m/s to
1.0 m/s in 0.1 m/s increments (0.3 ft./s to 3.3 ft./s in 0.3 ft./s
increments) to assess how LKS systems would perform at higher
velocities. In addition, LKS performance was considered acceptable
(when compared to Euro NCAP's assessment criteria at the time of
NHTSA's testing) for instances where the SV did not cross the inboard
leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.4 m (1.3 ft.).\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ At the time of testing, an older version of Euro NCAP's LSS
test procedure was available. This version stipulated a lane keep
assist assessment criterion of 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) for the maximum
excursion over the inside edge of the lane marking. European New Car
Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). See Assessment Protocol--Safety
Assist, Version 7.0 (2015, November).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A preliminary analysis of the five tested vehicles identified
performance differences between the vehicles depending on the lateral
velocity used during the test. Some vehicles only engaged a steering
response at lower lateral velocities and others continued to provide a
steering input as the lateral velocity was increased.\72\ The maximum
excursion over the lane marking after an LKS activation was also found
to be inconsistent, particularly as lateral velocity increased. These
preliminary findings suggested that there are performance differences
in how vehicle manufacturers are designing their systems for a given
set of operating conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ Wiacek, C., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & Shain, K.
(2019), Applying lane keeping support test track performance to
real-world crash data, 26th Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference,
Eindhoven, Netherlands. June 2019, Paper Number 19-0208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The results from these tests, as measured by the maximum excursions
over the lane marking, were compared to the measured shoulder width of
roads where fatal road departure crashes occurred. The analysis
identified roadways where the shoulder width of the roadway was less
than the 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) maximum excursion limit (e.g., certain rural
roadways) used in the Agency's testing. It was observed that only
vehicles displaying robust LKS performance, including at higher lateral
velocities, would likely prevent the vehicle from departing the travel
lane on these roadways. However, most of the roadway departure crashes
were on roads where the shoulder width exceeded 0.4 m (1.3 ft.). On
these roadways, assuming the LKS was engaged, the lane departure could
have been avoided. However, some vehicles did not perform well, with
several exhibiting no system intervention, and others exceeding the
maximum excursion limit as the lateral velocity was increased. To
supplement these initial findings, additional LKS testing has since
been conducted and is undergoing analysis.
    Since the analysis showed that most fatal crashes identified in the
study were on roadways having shoulder widths that exceeded the current
Euro NCAP test excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.), NHTSA believes that
adopting the Euro NCAP criterion may provide significant safety
benefits, but is requesting comment on whether an even smaller
excursion limit may be more appropriate. Furthermore, as the study also
identified fatal crashes where lane markers were not present on the
side of the roadway where a departure occurred (such that LKS would not
provide any benefit unless it had the capability to identify the edge
of the roadway), the Agency is also requesting comment (as mentioned
previously) on adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection test to NCAP so
that it may begin to address crashes that occur where lane markings may
not be present.
    Based on the findings from NHTSA's LKS testing, which showed
differences in LKS performance at greater lateral velocities, the
Agency is concerned about LKS performance at higher travel speeds when
the vehicle first transitions from a straight to a curved road where
lateral velocity may inherently be high. In its independent analysis of
the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that 29 percent of fatal road
departure crashes and 26 percent of fatal opposite direction crashes
occurred at known travel speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph). The
analysis also showed that 55 percent of fatal road departure crashes
and 67 percent of opposite direction crashes occurred on roads with
posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph).\73\ \74\ Furthermore, the
study revealed that speeding was a factor in 31 percent and 13 percent
of fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes,
respectively.\75\ Since NHTSA does not currently have data to show that
LKS system performance at Euro NCAP's current test speed of 72 kph
(44.7 mph) would be indicative of system performance when tested at
higher speeds, NHTSA is requesting comment on whether it would be
beneficial to incorporate additional, higher test speeds to assess the
performance of lane keeping systems in NCAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
    \74\ For data where the travel speed was known, 63 and 65
percent of the data is unknown or not reported in FARS for road
departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively. For road
departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, 3 and 1
percent of the posted speed data is unknown or not reported in FARS.
    \75\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To date, NHTSA has only performed test track LKS evaluations using
the straight road test configuration specified in the Euro NCAP test
procedure. However, the Agency recognizes that a significant portion of
road departure and opposite direction crashes resulting in fatalities
and injuries occur on curved roads. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data
set \76\ showed that for road departure crashes, 37 percent of
fatalities and 20 percent of injuries occurred on curved roads. For
opposite direction crashes, 30 percent of fatalities and 31 percent of
injuries occurred on curved roads. NHTSA is not certain how LKS
performance observed during straight road trials performed on a test

track would correlate to real-world system performance on curved roads.
However, NHTSA believes, based on on-road performance testing
experience of newer model year vehicles, that some current system
designs include provisions to address lane departures on curved roads.
The Agency observed that some LKS systems engage by providing limited
operation throughout a curve--which may offer little (if any) safety
benefits. However, other more sophisticated LKS systems maintain
engagement longer and offer more directional authority throughout a
curve. These systems may provide additional safety gains because the
driver has more time to re-engage (i.e., restore effective manual
control of the vehicle).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In NHTSA's study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \77\ from
NMVCCS, crashes that occurred on curved roads \78\ where the driver
departed the travel lane were analyzed. The analysis showed that,
unlike for straight roads where LKS systems may provide smaller
corrective steering inputs to prevent the vehicle from departing the
lane, LKS systems would have to provide sustained lateral correction
(i.e., corrective steering) on a curved road to prevent the vehicle
from departing the lane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., &
Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane
crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to
assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan.
June 2017, Paper Number 17-0220.
    \78\ It should be noted that the paper identified crashes where
lane markings were not present on the side of the departure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, in fleet testing of select model year 2012 through
2018 vehicles equipped with LDW and LKS (referenced in the report as
LKA), Transport Canada \79\ found variability in test results and
generally unpredictable system behavior on curved roads. Thus,
Transport Canada stated that it was not possible to gather enough data
to assess the potential safety benefits associated with the technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Meloche, E., Charlebois, D., Anctil, B., Pierre, G., &
Saleh, A. (2019), ADAS testing in Canada: Could partial automation
make our roads safer? 26th International Technical Conference on the
Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Eindhoven, Netherlands, June 2019,
Paper Number 19-0339.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address these unknowns and further understand the potential
effectiveness of LKS systems in the real world, the Agency is
considering additional research to study whether testing on curved
roads should be considered for objective evaluation of LKS systems, and
collect a combination of test track and real-world data to quantify how
LKS systems will operate when exposed to different combinations of
curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing (e.g., at curve onset
or midway through the curve).
    With respect to LDW and LKS, NHTSA is seeking comment on the
following:
    (1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW
systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type? Why
or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-only
warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when
determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test criteria?
If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert modalities
(such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective at re-
engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If so,
which one(s) and why?
    (2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods
from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure,
should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program entirely
and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test procedure
instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW and LKS
capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to conduct the LDW
test if both systems are to be assessed separately. What tolerances
would be appropriate for each test, and why?
    (3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to address
lane departures (e.g., when a driver is distracted).\80\ To help re-
engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must be
provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?
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    \80\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2016, October), Prevalence of
driver physical factors leading to unintentional lane departure
crashes, Traffic Injury Prevention, 18(5), 481-487, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2016.1247446.
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    (4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts'
Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this lane
marking type is being removed from use in California? \81\ If not, why?
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    \81\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County
Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
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    (5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.)
over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of
the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be
reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited shoulder
width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance would be
appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for LDW in
addition to LKS? Why or why not?
    (6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m
(3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to
establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane line
it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that use of
a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer indication of when
an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the baseline tests
performed without LKS, a process specified by the Euro NCAP LSS
protocol. This is because the small curve radius allows the desired SV
lateral velocity to be more quickly established; requires less initial
lateral offset within the travel lane; and allows for a longer period
of steady state lateral velocity to be realized before an LKS
intervention occurs. Is use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather
than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.), acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS
test procedure? Why or why not?
    (7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to
evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may
require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency
use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?
    (8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection
test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane
markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be
added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?
    (9) The LKS and ``Road Edge'' recovery tests defined in the Euro
NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from 0.2
to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system performance, and
that this range is representative of the lateral velocities associated
with unintended lane departures (i.e., not an intended lane change).
However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also specifies a range of
lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to 2.0 ft./s) be used to
represent unintended lane departures during ``Emergency Lane Keeping--
Oncoming vehicle'' and ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Overtaking vehicle''
tests. To encourage the most robust LKS system performance, should
NHTSA consider a combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure
ranges, lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for
inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?
    (10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS
performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the

Agency correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral
velocities on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why
or why not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does
not exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on
straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared to a
vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral
velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the
Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is
negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-engage?
If not, why?
    (11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is
redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane departure
when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker on the side
not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a secondary lane
departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion limit established
for the first side. To prevent potential secondary lane departures,
should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP ``lane keep assist''
evaluation criteria to be consistent with language developed for
NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this issue? Why or why not?
NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI intervention shall not cause
the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more beyond the inboard edge of the
lane line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to
the right of it within the validity period. To assess whether this
occurs, a second lane line is required (only one line is specified in
the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a
second lane line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why
not?
    (12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes
occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the LKS test
speed be increased, or does the current test speed adequately indicate
performance at higher speeds, especially on straight roads? Why or why
not?
    (13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently
contains many test conditions (i.e., line type and departure
direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test
conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test
only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance, should
the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for only one
departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to
assure comparable system performance for the other direction? Or,
should the Agency consider adopting only the most challenging test
conditions? If so, which conditions are most appropriate? For instance,
do the dashed line test conditions provide a greater challenge to
vehicles than the solid line test conditions?
    (14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for
each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass
rate for the LKS tests, and why?
    (15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS
test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so,
what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?

B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies

    NHTSA's 2019 target population study showed that blind spot
detection technologies such as blind spot warning (BSW), blind spot
intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge warning (LCM) (which is
essentially a BSI warning system), can help prevent or mitigate five
pre-crash lane change/merge scenarios. These pre-crash movements
represented, on average, 503,070 crashes annually, or 8.7 percent of
all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 542
fatalities and 188,304 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-3. This
equated to 1.6 percent of all fatalities and 6.7 percent of all
injuries recorded.\82\
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    \82\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
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    Currently, NCAP does not include any ADAS technology that is
designed to address blind spot pre-crash scenarios. NHTSA requested
comment on the inclusion of BSW as part of its upgrade to the program
in its 2015 notice. Although the Agency did not recommend BSI for
inclusion at that time, the Agency is proposing that both BSW and BSI
technologies be adopted as part of this program update.
    Although the target population for blind spot detection technology
may not be as large as the populations for AEB or lane keeping
technologies, NHTSA believes there is merit to including blind spot
technologies in NCAP. Consumer Reports found in its 2019 survey that 82
percent of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW technology, 60
percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 68 percent
stated that they trusted the system to work every time.\83\ The Agency
believes the technology's high consumer acceptance rate, in addition to
its potential safety benefits discussed later in this section, supports
its inclusion in the Agency's signature consumer information program.
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    \83\ Monticello, M. (2017, June 29), The positive impact of
advanced safety systems for cars: The latest car-safety technologies
have the potential to significantly reduce crashes, Consumer
Reports, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/positive-impact-of-advanced-safety-systems-for-cars/.
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1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
    A BSW system is a warning-based driver assistance system designed
to help the driver recognize that another vehicle is approaching, or
being operated within, the blind spot of their vehicle in an adjacent
lane. In these driving situations, and for all production BSW systems
known to NHTSA, the BSW alert is automatically presented to the driver,
and is most relevant to a driver who is contemplating, or who has just
initiated, a lane change. Depending on the system design, additional
BSW features may be activated if the system is presenting an alert and
then the driver operates their turn signal indicator.
    BSW systems use camera-, radar-, or ultrasonic-based sensors, or
some combination thereof, as their means of detection. These sensors
are typically located on the sides and/or rear of a vehicle. BSW alerts
may be auditory, visual (most common), or haptic. Visual alerts are
usually presented in the side outboard mirror glass, inside edge of the
mirror housing, or at the base of the front a-pillars inside the
vehicle. When another vehicle enters, or approaches, the driver's blind
spot while operating in an adjacent lane, the BSW visual alert will
typically be continuously illuminated. However, if the driver engages
the turn signal in the direction of the adjacent vehicle while the
visual alert is present, the visual alert may transition to a flashing
state and/or be supplemented with an additional auditory or haptic
alert (e.g., beeping or vibration of the steering wheel or seat,
respectively).
    NHTSA requested comment on a draft research blind spot detection
(BSD) test procedure (referred to in this notice as BSW) published on
November 21, 2019 \84\ to assess systems' performance and capabilities
in blind spot related pre-crash scenarios. This test procedure
exercises the BSW system in two different scenarios on the test track:
the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test, and the Straight Lane
Pass-by Test. These two tests assess whether the BSW system displays a
warning when other vehicles, referred to as principal other

vehicles (POVs), are within the driver's blind spot. The test occurs
without activation of the tested vehicle's, referred to as the subject
vehicle (SV), turn signal. Neither the SV nor POV turn signals are to
be activated at any point during any test trial. A short description of
each test scenario and the requirements for a passing result is
provided below:
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    \84\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
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     Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test--The POV and SV
are driven parallel to each other at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45
mph) such that the front-most part of the POV is 1.0 m (3.3 ft.) ahead
of the rear-most part of the SV in the outbound lanes of a three-lane
straight road. After 2.5 s of steady-state driving, the POV enters
(i.e., converges into) the SV's blind zone \85\ by making a single lane
change into the lane immediately adjacent to the SV using a lateral
velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). The period of steady-
state driving resumes for at least another 2.5 s and then the POV exits
(i.e., diverges from) the SV's blind zone by returning to its original
travel lane using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5
ft./s). This test is repeated for a POV approach from both the left and
the right side of the SV.
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    \85\ SV blind zones are defined by two rectangular regions that
extend to the side and rear of the SV. Each rectangle is 8.2 ft.
(2.5 m) wide and is represented by lines parallel to the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle but offset 1.6 ft. (0.5 m)
from the outermost edge of the SV's body excluding the side view
mirror(s). The rearward projection begins at the rearmost part of
the SV side mirror housing and ends at a rearward boundary that is
dependent on the relative speed between the SV and POV. The blind
zone is fully described in the test procedure.
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    --To pass a test trial: during the converge lane change, the BSW
alert must be presented by a time no later than 300 ms after any part
of the POV enters the SV blind zone and must remain on while any part
of the POV resides within the SV blind zone; and during the diverge
lane change, the BSW alert may remain active only when the lateral
distance between the SV and POV is greater than 3 m (9.8 ft.) but less
than or equal to 6 m (19.7 ft.). The BSW alert shall not be active once
the lateral distance between the SV and POV exceeds 6 m (19.7 ft.).
     Straight Lane Pass-by Test--The POV approaches and then
passes the SV while being driven in an adjacent lane. For each trial,
the SV is traveling at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) whereas
the POV is traveling at one of four constant speeds--80.5, 88.5, 96.6,
or 104.6 kph (50, 55, 60, or 65 mph). The lateral distance between the
two vehicles, defined as the closest lateral distance between adjacent
sides of the polygons used to represent each vehicle, shall nominally
be 1.5 m (4.9 ft.) for the duration of the trial. This test is repeated
for a POV approach towards the SV from an adjacent lane to the left and
to the right of the SV.
    --To pass a test trial, the BSW alert must be presented by a time
no later than 300 ms after the front-most part of the POV enters the SV
blind zone and remain on while the front-most part of the POV resides
behind the front-most part of the SV blind zone. The BSW alert shall
not be active once the longitudinal distance between the front-most
part of the SV and the rear-most part of the POV exceeds the BSW
termination distance specified for each POV speed.
    For the BSW tests, each scenario is tested using seven repeated
trials for each combination of approach direction (left and right side
of the SV) and test speed. This translates to a total of 14 tests
overall for the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test and 56 tests
overall for the Straight Lane Pass-by Test. NCAP is proposing that to
pass the NCAP system performance requirements, the SV must pass at
least five out of seven trials conducted for each approach direction
and test speed.
    The proposed BSW tests represent pre-crash scenarios that
correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed
in real-world lane change crashes. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data
set showed that approximately 28 percent of fatalities and 57 percent
of injuries in lane change crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds
of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\86\ For crashes where the travel speed
was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 14 percent of fatalities
and 24 percent of injuries occurred at speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or
lower.\87\ Furthermore, Volpe found that speeding was a factor in only
18 percent of the fatal lane change crashes and 3 percent of lane
change crashes that resulted in injuries. This suggests that posted
speed corresponds well to travel speed in most lane change
crashes.88 89
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    \86\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was
unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
    \87\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in
60 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 68 percent of lane
change crashes that resulted in injuries.
    \88\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
    \89\ It was unknown or not reported whether speeding was a
factor in 3 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 7 percent of
lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
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    As noted earlier, market research conducted by Consumer Reports
(CR) indicated that BSW systems are desirable in consumer interest
surveys of various ADAS technologies. In fact, CR found not only that
an overwhelming majority of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW
technology, but also that 60 percent of them believed BSW technology
had helped them avoid a crash. However, in its study to evaluate the
real-world effectiveness of ADAS technologies in model year 2013-2017
General Motors' (GM) vehicles, UMTRI found that GM's Side Blind Zone
Alert produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane change
crashes. When the Side Blind Zone Alert technology was combined with an
earlier generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the
corresponding effectiveness increased to 26 percent.\90\ UMTRI
attributed this increase to substantially longer vehicle detection
ranges for the Lane Change Alert with Side Blind Zone Alert system
compared to GM's earlier generation Side Blind Zone Alert system.\91\
An Agency study of three BSW-equipped vehicles also showed that that
currently available BSW systems may likely exhibit differences in
detection capabilities and operating conditions such that their
effectiveness estimates could vary significantly.\92\ For instance, one
vehicle's system may simply augment a driver's visual awareness whereas
another may effectively prevent crashes by warning of higher speed lane
change events. In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, Bosch
provided similar insight. The company stated that some BSW systems may
only provide benefit for shorter detection distances, such as 7 m (23.0
ft.) rearward, whereas other systems may provide detection for
distances up to 70 m (229.7 ft.) rearward, which would help the driver
avoid collisions with vehicles approaching from the rear in adjacent
lanes at high speeds. The Agency plans to study these performance
differences in its testing.
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    \90\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, C.
A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
    \91\ For GM's Lane Chane Alert systems, sensors in the vehicle's
rear bumper are utilized to warn the driver of vehicles approaching
from the rear on either the left or right side.
    \92\ Forkenbrock, G., Hoover, R.L., Gerdus, E., Van Buskirk,
T.R., & Heitz, M. (2014, July), Blind spot monitoring in light
vehicles--System performance (Report No. DOT HS 812 045),
Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

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    NHTSA is proposing to conduct BSW tests in NCAP in accordance with
the Agency's BSW test procedure. The Agency believes that the Straight
Lane Pass-by Test scenario, which stipulates incrementally higher test