[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 223 (Tuesday, November 21, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 80997-81019]
[FR Doc No: 2023-24936]

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Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 223 / Tuesday, November 21, 2023 /
Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 91, 135, and 136

[Docket No. FAA-2023-2250; Notice No. 24-02]
RIN 2120-AL37

Use of Supplemental Restraint Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This proposed rule would prohibit civil aircraft operations
conducted with supplemental restraint systems (SRS) unless operators
meet certain requirements for ensuring passenger safety during all
phases of the operation. The FAA expects these proposed requirements
would increase the safety of passengers during civil aircraft
operations conducted with SRS. This proposal addresses recommendations
from the National Transportation Safety Board and the Department of
Transportation Office of Inspector General. Additionally, this proposed
rule would codify, with updates, an Emergency Order currently in effect
addressing safety concerns regarding the use of supplemental
restraints. The proposed rule would apply to all civil aircraft
operations conducted with use of SRS. The rule as proposed would not
apply to parachute operations or rotorcraft external-load operations.
Additionally, the proposed rule would not apply to operations conducted
as public aircraft operations.

DATES: Send comments on or before January 22, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2023-2250
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Raymond Plessinger, General Aviation
and Commercial Division, Flight Standards Service, AFS-830, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC
20591; Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Authority for This Proposed Rulemaking
III. Background
    A. Statement of the Problem
    B. History
IV. Discussion of the Proposed Rule
    A. Identified Safety Gaps
    B. How This Rule Enhances the Emergency Order of Prohibition
    C. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed
Flight Operations (Sec.  91.108(a) and (b))
    D. SRS Design Requirements (Sec.  91.108(c)(1) Through (4))
    E. Who May Provide the SRS (Sec.  91.108(d))
    F. SRS Operational Requirements (Sec.  91.108(e)(1) and (2))
    G. Pilot in Command (Sec.  91.108(f)(1) Through (5))
    H. Enhanced Passenger Briefing and Demonstration (Sec.
91.108(g) and (h))
    I. Individuals Not Permitted To Use SRS (Sec.  91.108(i)(1)
Through (4))
    J. Lap-Held Child (Sec.  91.108(j)(1) and (2))
    K. Excluded Operations (Sec.  91.108(k)(1) Through (3))
    L. Definition (Sec.  91.108(l))
    M. Additional Comments Invited
V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
    A. Summary of the Regulatory Evaluation
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
    C. International Trade Impact Assessment
    D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
    E. Paperwork Reduction Act
    F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
    G. Environmental Analysis
VI. Executive Order Determinations
    A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
    B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
    C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
VII. Additional Information
    A. Comments Invited
    B. Electronic Access and Filing

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

AAIB--Danish Accident Investigation Board
FMVSS--Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
FOIA--Freedom of Information Act
FSOL--Fuel Shutoff Lever
ICR--Information Collection Request
InFO--Information for Operators
IRFA--Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
LOA--Letter of Authorization
NAICS--North American Industry Classification System
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
PIC--Pilot in Command
RFA--Regulatory Flexibility Act
SBA--Small Business Administration
SOPs--Standard Operating Procedures
SPRS--Supplemental Passenger Restraint System(s)
SRS--Supplemental Restraint System(s)

I. Executive Summary

    This proposed rule addresses the use of supplemental restraint
systems (SRS) in civil aircraft operations. On March 22, 2018, the FAA
issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition titled ``Operators and Pilots
of `Doors Off' Flights for Compensation or Hire'' \1\ to all operators
and pilots of flights for compensation or hire with the doors open or
removed in the United States or using aircraft registered in the United
States for doors-off flights. The Emergency Order of Prohibition
prohibits the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems (SPRS)
that cannot be released quickly in an emergency.\2\ This was in

response to an open door helicopter accident on March 11, 2018, in
which passengers were secured with SPRS and were unable to exit the
aircraft before they drowned. At the time of the accident, no rules
specifically addressed civil aircraft operations conducted with the use
of SRS,\3\ including during operations with doors opened or removed. As
a result of preliminary information discovered during the investigation
of this accident, on March 19, 2018, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) issued Urgent Safety Recommendation A-18-012, which
recommended that the FAA prohibit all open-door aircraft operations
using passenger harness systems, unless the harness system allows
passengers to rapidly release the harness with minimal difficulty and
without having to cut or forcefully remove the harness.\4\
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    \1\ Emergency Order of Prohibition, ``Operators and Pilots of
``Doors Off'' Flights for Compensation or Hire'' available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2018-0243-0001.
    \2\ The term ``supplemental passenger restraint system,'' as
defined in the March 22, 2018, Emergency Order of Prohibition, means
any passenger restraint that is not installed on the aircraft
pursuant to an FAA approval, including (but not limited to)
restraints approved through a Type Certificate, Supplemental Type
Certificate, or as an approved major alteration using FAA Form 337.
    \3\ The FAA uses the term supplemental restraint system (SRS) to
refer to the device in general, but, for the purposes of this
rulemaking document, uses the term supplemental passenger restraint
system (SPRS) when quoting or referring to documents that use the
term ``SPRS'' (e.g., The Emergency Order of Prohibition). The FAA
considers the two terms to be synonymous.
    \4\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-18-012, https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-18-012.
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    An SRS is a device used to secure an individual inside an aircraft
when that person is not properly secured by an FAA-approved seat belt
and, if installed, shoulder harness or an approved child restraint
system. SRS are not installed on the aircraft pursuant to a Type
Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, approved major alteration
(FAA Form 337), or other FAA approval. An SRS consists of a harness
secured around the torso of the individual using the SRS and a lanyard
that connects the harness to an approved airframe attachment point
inside the aircraft.
    To mitigate identified risks and ultimately prevent future
fatalities, the FAA proposes to issue regulations regarding the use of
SRS, including during operations with doors opened or removed. This
proposed rule would establish requirements for use of SRS. This
proposed rule would also prohibit flight operations with doors opened
or removed except under two scenarios. The first scenario is when each
individual \5\ occupies an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness properly secured about them or
an approved child restraint system properly secured to an approved seat
or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness in
accordance with Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(iii) or Sec.  135.128(a)(2), during
the entire flight. The second scenario is if each individual occupies
an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness, properly secured about them during movement on the
surface, takeoff, and landing; during other phases of flight, if
permitted by the pilot in command (PIC),\6\ the passenger may use an
SRS that meets all requirements proposed in this rule. The operator
generally will provide the SRS to individuals who seek to use the SRS
during the flight, but in some cases, an individual may opt to provide
their own SRS as long as it meets the requirements proposed in this
rule and the PIC approves the SRS.
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    \5\ The FAA uses two categories to define those who travel on
airplanes: crewmember and passenger. In this proposal, the agency
uses that distinction when referring specifically to a crewmember or
passenger. When the distinction between a crewmember and a passenger
is not applicable, the agency uses the word ``individual'' when
referring to anyone who occupies an SRS.
    \6\ Under 14 CFR 91.3, the PIC is the final authority as to the
operation of the aircraft. The PIC may determine it is unsafe to
allow the use of SRS during a phase of flight that would otherwise
be allowed.
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    This proposed rule would require the SRS to have a release
mechanism that can be operated quickly by the passenger using the SRS
with minimal difficulty. As proposed, the release mechanism must be
located on the front or side of the harness in a place easily
accessible to and visible by the passenger using the SRS and must
prevent inadvertent release. Also, as proposed, the release mechanism
cannot require the use of a knife to cut the restraint, the use of any
other additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to
release the SRS.
    As explained in section IV.E.2 of this preamble, the FAA proposes
that the SRS must be connected to an aircraft attaching point or points
with a rated strength equal to or greater than the combined weight of
all the passengers using an SRS attached to that same point, but it
cannot be connected to any airframe attachment point located in the
flightdeck. Additionally, as proposed, the rule requires the SRS to
have a lanyard that ensures the torso of the passenger using the SRS
remains inside the aircraft at all times.
    This proposed rule would also require operators conducting flight
operations where passengers use an SRS to provide an enhanced passenger
safety briefing. Further, this proposal would require passengers who
seek to use an SRS during flight operations to demonstrate their
ability to occupy, secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and,
if installed, shoulder harnesses, as well as the ability to release
quickly the SRS with no assistance, and with minimal difficulty. A
passenger who could not meet the demonstration requirements of the
enhanced safety briefing would be prohibited from using an SRS;
however, they would be permitted to participate in the flight if they
occupy an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about them during
operations when the doors are opened or removed or when otherwise
required by regulations. Only those passengers who have reached their
fifteenth birthday could use an SRS during flight operations, and no
individual using an SRS could occupy a seat in the flightdeck. In
addition to prohibiting individuals who occupy a child restraint system
from also using an SRS, this proposed rule would prohibit a child from
being held by an adult who is using an SRS. This proposed rule would
also prohibit a child from being held when the aircraft doors are
opened or removed.
    This proposed rule would mitigate identified safety risks to
passengers who use an SRS and would help ensure safety of the
operation, including when the doors of the aircraft are opened or
removed.

II. Authority for This Proposed Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle I of 49
U.S.C., specifically section 106, describes the authority of the FAA
Administrator. Subtitle VII of 49 U.S.C., Aviation Programs, describes
in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    The FAA promulgates this rulemaking under the authority described
in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the authority of the
Administrator to promulgate regulations and rules, and 49 U.S.C.
44701(a)(5), which requires the Administrator to promote safe flight of
civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and setting
minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedures
necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

III. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

    The FAA operational regulations pertaining to passenger restraints
currently address only FAA-approved seat belts and, if installed,
shoulder harnesses and child restraint systems approved for use on
aircraft. They require individuals to be secured during movement on the
surface, takeoff, and landing, or as instructed by the flight crew.
Current regulations do not address passenger safety in operations
conducted with doors opened or removed, except for parachute operations
and rotorcraft external-load operations.
    The proposed rule would mitigate the risk of harm to an individual
using an SRS, including during operations with doors opened or removed.
Specifically, the proposed rule is expected to mitigate the risk that
an individual could fall out of the aircraft when the doors are opened
or removed if they are not occupying an FAA-approved seat or berth with
a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured
about them during the entire flight. It also mitigates the risk that a
passenger cannot quickly egress after an accident because the SRS they
use is difficult to release. By limiting where the passenger can sit
when using an SRS and where the attachment point to which the SRS is
attached is located, this rule proposes to mitigate the risk that a
component of the SRS may inadvertently move a flight control mechanism,
which could impact the operation of the aircraft. The proposed rule
would provide minimum requirements for all flight operations when an
SRS is used, including those with doors opened or removed. If adopted,
this proposed rule will result in safer flight operations and reduce
the risk of harm to individuals, whether passengers or crewmembers.

B. History

1. Liberty Helicopters Accident
    On March 11, 2018, an Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2 lost engine power
during cruise flight, and the pilot performed an autorotative descent
and ditching on the East River in New York, New York. The pilot
sustained minor injuries, the five passengers drowned, and the
helicopter was substantially damaged. The FlyNYON-branded flight was
operated by Liberty Helicopters Inc. (Liberty), per a contractual
agreement with NYONair.\7\
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    \7\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019.
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
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    Liberty operated the accident flight as a FlyNYON-branded, doors-
off helicopter flight that allowed the five passengers (one in the
front seat, four in the rear seats) to take photographs of various
landmarks while extending their legs outside the helicopter during
portions of the flight. For the accident flight (and other FlyNYON
flights that Liberty operated), Liberty configured its Airbus AS350 B2
helicopter with the two right and the front left doors removed and the
left sliding door locked open. Before departure, each passenger was
fitted with a NYONair-provided harness/tether system that NYONair
developed with the intent to prevent passengers from falling out of the
helicopter. The harness/tether system used on the accident flight
consisted of a full-body, workplace fall-protection harness that was
secured (with a locking carabiner) to a tether, the other end of which
was secured (with another locking carabiner) to an anchor point in the
cabin. Each passenger also used the helicopter's installed, FAA-
approved restraints. The pilot (who was seated in the front right seat)
used only an installed, FAA-approved restraint.\8\
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    \8\ Id. at ix.
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    Under normal circumstances, at the conclusion of each flight,
operator personnel would unscrew a locking carabiner located on the
back of each passenger's harness so that the passenger could exit the
helicopter. The operator provided each individual secured by an SPRS
with a cutting tool, stored in a pouch attached to the harness, for use
in freeing themselves from the harness/tether system in case of an
emergency.\9\ Prior to flight, each passenger viewed a passenger safety
video that addressed general safety topics and emergency safety
procedures, such as cutting-tool use.\10\ The video narrative for
releasing from the harness/tether system in the event of an emergency
stated that ``the harness can be released by opening the quick release
clip in the back of the harness'' and the visual that accompanied the
narrative showed one person releasing another person's carabiner. The
video also instructed passengers that ``a cutter [cutting tool] is also
secured to one of your chest straps and will allow you to quickly cut
through the harness if you are unable to reach the quick release
clip.'' \11\
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    \9\ Id. at 19.
    \10\ Id. at 44.
    \11\ Ibid.
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    Consistent with the standard operating procedures (SOPs) used for
FlyNYON flights, the passengers were allowed (when instructed by the
pilot) to position themselves to extend their legs outside the
helicopter. The two passengers who had been seated in the rear inboard
seats removed their installed, FAA-approved restraints and sat on the
cabin floor, wearing their harness/tether systems. The passengers
seated in the outboard seats were allowed to rotate outboard in their
seats. To enable such freedom of movement, the SOPs allowed the
passengers to wear their installed, FAA-approved restraint with the lap
belt adjusted loosely and the shoulder harness routed under the
arm.\12\
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    \12\ Id. at ix.
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    During the flight, the aircraft lost engine power and the pilot
conducted an emergency landing on the East River. The helicopter's
floats did not fully inflate, and the helicopter rolled right in the
water and became fully inverted and submerged about 11 seconds after it
touched down. Despite receiving a briefing on how to self-egress from
the SPRS using the provided cutting tool, none of the passengers were
able to egress. All five passengers drowned. The pilot was able to
release his installed, FAA-approved restraint after he was under water
and successfully egress from the helicopter.\13\
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    \13\ Id. at x.
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2. National Transportation Safety Board Reports and Recommendations
    The NTSB investigated the accident.\14\ On March 19, 2018, the NTSB
issued an Urgent Safety Recommendation Report, Additional Harness
Systems that Allow for Rapid Egress, ASR-18-02, to ``prohibit all open-
door commercial passenger-carrying aircraft flights that use passenger
harness systems, unless the harness system allows passengers to rapidly
release the harness with minimal difficulty, and without having to cut
or forcefully remove the harness.'' \15\
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    \14\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019.
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \15\ NTSB Urgent Recommendation, ASR-18-02, accessed at https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-18-012 on February 23,
2021.
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    The NTSB published its final accident report, Inadvertent
Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty
Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, following a
board meeting held on

December 10, 2019, in which the Board issued additional safety
recommendations.\16\ The accident docket includes a detailed summary of
the pilot interview.\17\ The pilot reported that when he reached down
for the emergency fuel shutoff lever, he realized that it was in the
off position. He also noted that a portion of the front seat
passenger's tether was underneath the lever.\18\ A review of radar data
and onboard video showed that when the flight was proceeding northwest
over Manhattan toward Central Park at an altitude of 1,900 feet mean
sea level, the front passenger, who was facing outboard in his seat
with his legs outside the helicopter, leaned back several times to take
photographs using a smartphone. The onboard video showed that each time
he leaned back, the tail of the tether attached to the back of his
harness hung down loosely near the helicopter's floor-mounted controls.
At one point, when he pulled himself up to adjust his seating position,
the tail of his tether remained taut but appeared to pop upward. Two
seconds later, the helicopter's engine sounds decreased, and the
helicopter began to descend.\19\ The NTSB determined the probable cause
of this accident was Liberty Helicopters Inc.'s use of a NYONair-
provided passenger harness/tether system, which caught on and activated
the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever (FSOL) and resulted in the
in-flight loss of engine power and the subsequent ditching.\20\ NTSB
also stated that Liberty and NYONair's use of the harness and tether
system hindered passenger egress and contributed to the severity of the
accident.\21\
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    \16\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019.
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \17\ Factual Report--Attachment 1, Interview Summaries,
Operational Factors, accessed at https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40476009&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%20Attachment%201%20-%20Interview%20Summaries-Master.PDF on February 23, 2021.
    \18\ Id. at 6.
    \19\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019.
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \20\ Id. at x.
    \21\ Id. at x, xii, 67, 83, 85.
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3. FAA Actions
    The FAA carefully considered the information and recommendations
from the NTSB. Following the issuance of the NTSB Urgent Safety
Recommendation Report ASR-18-02, the FAA concluded that the SPRS each
passenger wore, while intended as a safety measure when the aircraft
was in flight, might have prevented the passengers' quick egress from
the aircraft. Although the fatalities that occurred on March 11, 2018,
involved an aircraft ditching on the water, the FAA determined that
other situations, such as smoke and fire emergencies, might also result
in injuries and fatalities unless passengers can release quickly their
SPRS. Under 49 U.S.C. 46105(c), the Acting Administrator of the FAA
determined that an emergency existed related to safety in air commerce
based on the threat to passenger safety presented by the use of SPRS
not approved by the FAA, which may prevent a passenger from exiting the
aircraft quickly in an emergency. To address this emergency, on March
22, 2018, the FAA issued Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-
0243 to all operators and pilots of flights for compensation or hire
with the doors open or removed in the United States or using aircraft
registered in the United States for doors-off flights.\22\ The
Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits the use of SPRS that cannot be
released quickly in an emergency in doors-off flight operation. The
Emergency Order of Prohibition provides that persons may operate doors-
off flights for compensation or hire involving SPRS if the
Administrator has determined that the restraints to be used can be
quickly released by a passenger with minimal difficulty and without
impeding egress from the aircraft in an emergency, and provides
information for operators to apply to seek such approvals. The
Emergency Order of Prohibition also prohibits passenger-carrying doors-
off flight operations unless the passengers are at all times properly
secured using FAA-approved restraints.\23\
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    \22\ Emergency Order of Prohibition, ``Operators and Pilots of
``Doors Off'' Flights for Compensation or Hire'' available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2018-0243-0001.
    \23\ Ibid.
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    The FAA also posted to its website FAA Notice N 8900.456, Emergency
Order of Prohibition Pertaining to ``Doors Off'' Flight Operations for
Compensation or Hire, which provides guidance to FAA Aviation Safety
Inspectors (ASIs) and others regarding the Emergency Order of
Prohibition and its implementation.\24\ Notice N 8900.456 directed ASIs
to coordinate with the FAA's Aircraft Certification Service to ensure a
restraint system, previously granted an approval by an FAA Form 337, is
properly evaluated prior to use.\25\ That notice was subsequently
revised to FAA Notice N 8900.457 \26\ and then FAA Notice N
8900.506,\27\ before finally being established as FAA Order 8900.4.\28\
That order sets out the application process to request a Letter of
Authorization (LOA) from the FAA's Flight Standards Service to conduct
operations using an SPRS. As a part of that process, the applicant must
demonstrate that the restraints can be released quickly by a passenger
with minimal difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft
in an emergency. In reviewing a request for an LOA, the FAA reviews the
design, manufacture, installation, and operations.
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    \24\ https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1032926.
    \25\ Id. at 2.
    \26\ http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_8900.457.pdf.
    \27\ http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_8900.506.pdf.
    \28\ Although FAA orders typically serve as guidance material
for FAA personnel only, FAA Order 8900.4 provides information to
individuals, pilots, and operators. http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8900.4.pdf.
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    In addition, the Agency published Information for Operators (InFO)
18003, Supplemental Passenger Restraint Systems (SPRS) for ``Doors-
Off'' Flight Operations Conducted for Compensation or Hire, on May 9,
2018, which informs operators of the procedure for obtaining an LOA for
use of an SPRS for ``Doors-Off'' flight operations conducted for
compensation or hire.\29\
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    \29\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/InFO18003.pdf.
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    In evaluating whether to authorize an operation with SPRS, the FAA
requires the applicant to submit to the FAA the following items: a
completed and signed FAA Form 7711-2, Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization Application; a completed Attachment A, Request for FAA
Letter of Authorization, Supplemental Passenger Restraint System--
Supporting Information; a link to a video that shows an occupant
demonstrating the method of release from the device; and, if the
operator has been issued a Motion Picture and Television Filming
certificate of waiver, a signed FAA Form 7711-1. In reviewing the
request, the FAA also evaluates the applicant's preflight

briefing procedures and/or step-by-step instructions, which must
clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the SPRS can be released
quickly by the SPRS user with minimal difficulty and without impeding
egress from the aircraft in an emergency.
    Additionally, the evaluation includes confirmation that the
components (harness and lanyard) were manufactured in accordance with
credible certification standards.\30\ The FAA recognizes that
acceptable and established minimum standards for supplemental
restraints already exist and are in use in other FAA evaluation
scenarios and in many occupations. The FAA accepts these standards
since there is no single certification standard that is best for every
SPRS, due to the unique activities in which the applicant seeks to
engage during doors opened flight operations. The FAA considers these
existing standards when reviewing submission packages. Credible
certification standards include TSO-167 (for personnel carrying device
systems), OSHA 1926.502 (fall protection), NFPA 1983-2017 (life safety
rope and equipment), and EN 361:2002 (full body harness). Further
discussion about credible certification standards can be found in
section IV.D. of this proposal.
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    \30\ For the purposes of this evaluation, the FAA considers a
certification standard to be credible when it ensures that
materials, products, processes, and services are fit for their
purpose.
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    Non-certificated individuals may also request authorization to use
SPRS. For example, passengers seeking to use SPRS may seek FAA
authorization of their own equipment. They may include but are not
limited to net gunners or aerial photographers. The FAA issues an LOA
specific to that individual, the identified components of the SPRS, and
the submitted operational procedures when the individual is a passenger
on a doors opened/removed flight operated for compensation or hire.
    The FAA reviews each submission to ensure the submitted
documentation adequately demonstrates the ability of a user to release
quickly the SPRS with minimal difficulty. Consistent with the Emergency
Order of Prohibition, the ability for rapid release and egress must be
inherent in the design of the SPRS. Additionally, each SPRS must not
require the use of a cutting tool, or any other additional tool, or the
assistance of any other person to release the restraint. The FAA also
considers whether a user would have the ability to release the SPRS
without any additional training beyond what would be provided in a
preflight briefing, as discussed in the Emergency Order of Prohibition.
    Once issued, the pilot or operator must ensure the LOA is available
on the aircraft whenever any SPRS is used on any flight operation with
doors opened or removed for compensation or hire. If issued to a non-
certificated individual, the LOA requires that individual to provide a
copy of the LOA to the pilot or operator prior to participating in a
flight operation conducted with doors off for compensation or hire
using an SPRS. The pilot or operator makes the final decision as to
whether to accept the LOA and whether to permit the passenger to use
the authorized SPRS on that flight.
    Between March 26, 2018, and October 15, 2019, the FAA issued 41
LOAs to operators and 13 LOAs to non-certificated individuals. Through
the application process, the FAA learned SPRS could be used on both
fixed wing and rotorcraft aircraft.
    If this rule is finalized as proposed, it would supersede existing
processes for authorizing SPRS.
4. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Report and
Recommendations
    Following the fatal Liberty Helicopters crash, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), in
consultation with the NTSB, reviewed FAA's oversight of helicopter air
tours and how FAA approved the supplemental passenger restraint systems
used during the crash.\31\ The OIG objectives were to assess FAA's
processes for (1) review and approval of supplemental restraints for
open-door helicopter operations, and (2) oversight of company use of
supplemental restraints.\32\ The OIG findings included that the FAA did
not maintain effective and consistent oversight of open-door helicopter
operations to maintain the safety of air tour passengers. The OIG
issued recommendations to the FAA to improve the SPRS authorization
process and oversight regarding SPRS use and to increase the safety of
helicopter air tour passengers. Specifically, the OIG recommended the
FAA issue a notice of proposed rulemaking and a final rule, if found to
be in the public interest, that address operations using SPRS. This
proposed rule addresses the OIG recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The FAA notes that both the NTSB and OIG used the term
``supplemental passenger restraint system'' (SPRS).
    \32\ Weaknesses in FAA's Supplemental Passenger Restraint System
Authorization Process Hinder Improvements to Open-Door Helicopter
Operations, Audit Report AV2021010, issued December 8, 2020.
Available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38140.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Discussion of the Proposed Rule

A. Identified Safety Gaps

    Although the Emergency Order of Prohibition fills safety gaps that
existed prior to the Liberty Helicopters accident, the FAA identified
residual safety gaps that still exist and that this proposed rule seeks
to address. Discussed below are the primary residual safety gaps the
FAA identified.
1. Limited Regulatory Oversight
    Prior to March 11, 2018, no rules specifically addressed civil
aircraft operations conducted with the use of SRS, including during
operations with doors opened or removed. The Emergency Order of
Prohibition sought to address this issue by imposing SPRS requirements;
however, it only addresses doors-off operations for compensation or
hire. This proposed rule would apply to all civil aircraft operations
conducted in the U.S. with the use of SRS, including during operations
with doors opened or removed and regardless of whether they are for
compensation or hire. Moreover, the Emergency Order of Prohibition did
not address operations where doors remain closed but where individuals
use SRS. This proposed rule addresses those operations as well.
2. Ability To Release and Inadvertent Release of the Supplemental
Restraint System
    As explained above, the NTSB stated that the passengers' inability
to release from the SPRS hindered their egress from the aircraft and
contributed to the severity of the accident.\33\ The Emergency Order of
Prohibition sought to address this concern by imposing certain SPRS
release mechanism design requirements; however, the FAA determined
after the Emergency Order of Prohibition was put into place that there
is no requirement to prevent inadvertent release of the mechanism.
Although quick release is vital, it is equally important to ensure an
SRS does not inadvertently release, particularly during operations
where doors are opened or removed. This proposed rule addresses that
concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See id. at x, xii, 67, 83, 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Lap-Held Children
    Current regulations permit a person to be held by an adult who is
occupying an approved seat or berth, provided that the person being
held has not reached his or her second birthday and does not occupy or
use any restraining device.

See 14 CFR 91.107(a)(3)(i) and 135.128(a)(1). The Emergency Order of
Prohibition does not address lap-held children, leaving an unacceptable
risk of children falling out of an aircraft with doors opened or
removed or otherwise being injured when an adult is holding a lap-held
child while using only an SRS. This proposed rule seeks to eliminate
that risk to lap-held children.

B. How This Rule Enhances the Emergency Order of Prohibition

    This proposed rule would enhance safety for individuals who use an
SRS during all flight operations. As mentioned above, no regulations
existed regarding the use of supplemental restraints prior to March 22,
2018. After the Liberty Helicopters accident, the NTSB found ``that
minimally trained passengers would have great difficulty extricating
themselves from the harness/tether system, each of which was equipped
with locking carabiners and an ineffective cutting tool, during an
emergency requiring a rapid egress.'' \34\ The FAA issued Emergency
Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-0243 to all operators and pilots of
flights for compensation or hire with the doors open or removed in the
United States or using aircraft registered in the United States for
doors-off flights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New
York, March 11, 2018 at x. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10,
2019. Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits the use of SPRS that
cannot be released quickly in an emergency in doors-off flight
operations. The Emergency Order of Prohibition provides that persons
may operate doors-off flights for compensation or hire involving SPRS
if the Administrator has determined that the restraints to be used can
be quickly released by a passenger with minimal difficulty and without
impeding egress from the aircraft in an emergency, and provides
information for operators to apply to seek such authorization. The
Emergency Order of Prohibition also prohibits passenger-carrying doors-
off flight operations unless the passengers are at all times properly
secured using FAA-approved restraints.
    The term ``supplemental passenger restraint system,'' as defined in
the March 22, 2018, Emergency Order of Prohibition, means any passenger
restraint that is not installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA
approval, including (but not limited to) restraints approved through a
Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, or as an approved
major alteration using FAA Form 337. For this rulemaking, the FAA uses
the term supplemental restraint system (SRS) instead of supplemental
passenger restraint system (SPRS) used in the Emergency Order of
Prohibition. The FAA finds the terms ``supplemental restraint system''
(SRS) and ``supplemental passenger restraint system'' (SPRS) to be
synonymous, except ``supplemental restraint system'' is more precise as
the restraint could be worn by either a passenger or a crew member.
Therefore, for accuracy, the FAA uses the term ``supplemental restraint
system'' (SRS) throughout this document, except when quoting or
referring to documents that use the term ``SPRS.''
    Below is a table showing (1) the regulatory landscape after the FAA
issued the Emergency Order of Prohibition, (2) identified safety gaps
the Emergency Order did not address, and (3) a brief summary of the
proposed Sec.  91.108 requirements, including the requirements that
seek to close the gaps identified after the Emergency Order of
Prohibition was issued.

             Table 1--Comparison of Requirements for Operations Using Supplemental Restraint Systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Emergency order of prohibition
   (current) Letter of authorization     Identified safety gaps     Performance-based requirements (proposed)
                process                                           91.108--Use of supplemental restraint systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-  Emergency Order of      The SRS proposed rule applies to:
 2018-0243, issued March 22, 2018,        Prohibition did not     All operations where the doors are
 applies to operations for compensation   address:                opened or removed, regardless of whether they
 or hire with doors open or removed.      Flight          are for compensation or hire;
It prohibits the use of SPRS that         operations not          All operations, regardless of whether
 cannot be released quickly and           conducted for           the doors are opened or removed, where
 prohibits doors-off operations unless    compensation or hire;   passengers use an SRS; and
 passengers are at all times secured      or                      Passengers and crew members.
 using FAA-approved restraints or         Operations     Proposed Requirement: Flight operations with
 restrained by an authorized SPRS.        where the doors         doors opened or removed are prohibited unless
                                          remain closed, but      each individual either occupies:
                                          passengers use an       An FAA-approved seat or berth with a
                                          SRS.                    safety belt/shoulder harness or an approved
                                         In addition, the         child restraint system during all phases of
                                          Emergency Order of      flight; or
                                          Prohibition only        An approved seat or berth with a
                                          applies to passengers   safety belt/shoulder harness during critical
                                          and does not address    phases of flight and is secured during the
                                          crew members.           cruise portion of flight with an SRS.
The supplemental restraint must have a   Emergency Order of      The SRS proposed rule includes the same design
 release mechanism that:                  Prohibition did not     requirements for the SRS release mechanism as
 Can be released quickly by the   address inadvertent     the Emergency Order of Prohibition but adds a
 person using the SPRS with minimal       release of the SRS.     requirement about inadvertent release.
 difficulty, without excessive force                             Proposed Requirement: The supplemental
 and without impeding egress from the                             restraint must have a release mechanism that:
 aircraft;                                                        Can be quickly operated with minimal
 Is located on the front or                               difficulty;
 side of the harness, easily accessible                           Is attached to the front or side of
 to and visible by the person using the                           the harness in a location easily accessible to
 SPRS;                                                            and visible by the individual using the SRS;
 Does not require the use of a                            Prevents inadvertent release; and
 knife to cut the restraint, any other                            Does not require the use of a knife to
 additional tool, or the assistance of                            cut the restraint, any other additional tool,
 any other person to release the SPRS.                            or the assistance of any other individual to
                                                                  release the SRS.

Operators, pilots, or individuals        Other than addressing   The SRS proposed rule adds more detailed design
 desiring authorization to use an SPRS    the release             and operational requirements and other
 must submit the following items for      mechanism, the          requirements/prohibitions not addressed in the
 evaluation:                              Emergency Order of      Emergency Order of Prohibition:
 Completed FAA Form 7711-2,       Prohibition did not    Proposed Design Requirements: The supplemental
 Certificate of Waiver or Authorization   address detailed        restraint system must:
 Application;                             design or operational   Have a harness that secures around the
 Completed ATTACHMENT A,          requirements.           individual's torso;
 Request for FAA Letter of                                        Have a lanyard that connects the
 Authorization; and                                               harness to the airframe attachment point and
 A link to at least one video                             that ensures the individual's torso remains
 that shows an occupant demonstrating                             inside the aircraft;
 the method of release from the SPRS.                             Not impede egress from the aircraft in
If the submitter seeks to use                                     an emergency after being released; and
 authorized SPRS for Motion Picture and                           Identify the sizing criteria for which
 Television Filming (MP/TF) operations,                           the SRS is rated.
 the submission must also include a                              Proposed Operational Requirements:
 scanned copy of the operators or                                 A qualified person must:
 pilot's issued FAA Form 7711-1,                                 [cir] Connect the SRS to an attachment point
 Certificate of Waiver or                                         with rated strength for the individual using
 Authorization.                                                   the SRS; and
                                                                 [cir] Not connect the SRS to an attachment
                                                                  located in the flightdeck.
                                         The Emergency Order of  Additional Proposed Requirements: The proposed
                                          Prohibition did not     rule adds requirements for:
                                          address other           Individuals providing their own SRS;
                                          requirements outlined   Pilot in Command's responsibilities
                                          in the right-hand       and authority;
                                          column, ``additional    Passenger briefings;
                                          proposed                Passengers demonstrating their ability
                                          requirements.''         to occupy FAA-approved safety belt/shoulder
                                                                  harness and accomplish actions required for
                                                                  SRS quick release without assistance.
                                         The Emergency Order of  Proposed Prohibitions:
                                          Prohibition did not     The proposed rule prohibits the
                                          address individuals     following individuals from using an SRS:
                                          who are prohibited     [cir] Passengers who cannot demonstrate their
                                          from using an SRS or    ability to occupy a safety belt/shoulder
                                          lap-held children       harness or to release quickly their SRS;
                                          during certain         [cir] Individuals under 15 years of age;
                                          operations.            [cir] Individuals seated in flightdeck;
                                                                 [cir] Passengers occupying a CRS;
                                                                  The proposed rule also prohibits lap-
                                                                  held children from being held by an adult
                                                                  using an SRS or during doors-open or -removed
                                                                  operations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed Flight
Operations (Sec.  91.108(a) and (b))

    The FAA is proposing to add a new Sec.  91.108 to address the use
of supplemental restraint systems. Proposed Sec.  91.108(a) establishes
the general prohibition against using SRS. Specifically, paragraph (a)
would prohibit any operations in a registered civil aircraft if any
individual is secured with an SRS except as described in Sec.  91.108.
This is a change from the status quo. The FAA determined that, even
after the issuance of the Emergency Order of Prohibition following the
Liberty Helicopters accident, safety gaps continue to exist. This
proposal intends to eliminate these safety gaps for all individuals who
use an SRS. For example, the Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits
operations with passengers using an SPRS unless certain conditions
exist, including authorization from the FAA. Proposed paragraph (a)
would apply the prohibition to everyone on board, including crew
members. In addition, currently, an individual can use an SRS without
FAA authorization both during operations conducted with doors closed
and operations conducted not for compensation or hire. Proposed
paragraph (a) would extend the prohibition to these additional types of
operations as well. Proposed Sec.  91.108(b) builds on the prohibition
in paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) would prohibit operations with doors
opened or removed with two exceptions. The first exception, under Sec.
91.108(b)(1)(i), is when each individual on board is properly secured
in an approved seat or berth or in an approved child restraint system
during all phases of flight. The second exception, under Sec.
91.108(b)(1)(ii), is when an individual is properly secured in an
approved seat or berth during movement on the surface, takeoff, and
landing, and is secured during other phases of flight using an SRS in
accordance with, and that meets the requirements of, Sec.  91.108.
    The FAA proposes these requirements to ensure that during
operations with doors opened or removed, all individuals are at all
times properly secured using restraints that meet the requirements of
the proposed rule and at no time are unrestrained during operations. As
proposed, all SRS would be required to be properly secured on each
individual and properly secured to an FAA-approved airframe attaching
point prior to the removal of the FAA-approved seat belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness. The proposed rule requires the attachment
point(s) to be rated at a strength equal to or greater than the total
combined weight of the occupants secured to the attachment point to
ensure that the attachment point has adequate strength.
    To ensure each individual is properly secured at all times during
flight operations in which doors are opened or removed, operators may
choose to require compliance with procedures that ensure both the FAA-
approved aircraft seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness and the
SRS are secured prior to ground movement or that the SRS is secured
after takeoff. In either case, the proposed rule requires each person
to be properly secured by the SRS before releasing the FAA-approved
seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness. The FAA reiterates that
an individual must be secured by an FAA-approved seat belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness during movement on the surface, takeoff,
and landing. Moreover, the FAA proposes

that an individual cannot release their safety belt and shoulder
harness until the PIC authorizes them to do so. As discussed in more
detail in Section IV.G., the PIC is the final authority on whether SRS
may be used during flight operations. In addition, the PIC is in the
best position to know when flight conditions are appropriate to
authorize SRS use.
    Finally, the FAA notes that proposed Sec.  91.108 compliments the
safety belt provisions in Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128. Each of these
regulations requires individuals to be properly secured in FAA-approved
safety belts and, if installed, shoulder harnesses during critical
phases of flight (i.e., movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing).
Section 91.108 simply allows individuals to release their safety belts
and shoulder harnesses during the cruise portion of flight if they are
appropriately harnessed by an SRS and as authorized by the PIC.

D. SRS Design Requirements (Sec.  91.108(c)(1) Through (4))

    As the FAA determined the possible scope of this rulemaking, the
FAA considered developing certification requirements for SRS.
Specifically, the FAA considered a requirement that the SRS be
installed pursuant to an FAA approval or that the SRS be separately
approved by the FAA. However, the FAA's development of the current LOA
review process based on the safety concerns identified by the NTSB
following the Liberty Helicopters' accident has not indicated that a
physical review of the SRS itself is necessary. In the minutes before
the Liberty Helicopters accident, the passengers disconnected their
FAA-approved lap belts and shoulder harnesses and moved about the
helicopter's interior, secured only by their SRS, which kept them
secured within the opened door cabin. The SRS does not need to meet
restraint crashworthiness standards because it is intended as a fall
protective device, and the proposed rule requires the use of restraints
installed pursuant to an FAA approval during critical phases of flight
only. For these reasons, the FAA determined that requiring that the SRS
be installed pursuant to an FAA approval based on a new set of
certification standards would create an unnecessary burden when the
approach in this proposed rule would achieve the safety objectives.
    The SRS is intended as a fall protective device and not as a
crashworthy restraint as mentioned previously. The FAA is aware that
standards currently exist that ensure SRS component materials will
maintain their integrity and efficacy when used during cruise phases of
flight. For instance, the FAA determined that components that meet
National Fire Protection Association, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, or American Society for Testing and Materials standards
are adequate to prevent an individual using the SRS from falling out of
an aircraft being operated with doors opened or removed. Although these
standards help ensure an SRS provides adequate fall protection, they do
not address whether a particular SRS is designed and operated in a way
that ensures the ability to rapidly egress from an aircraft during an
emergency. Therefore, this proposed rule does not recommend or require
one standard over another.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Design characteristics of some manufactured devices might
not meet the rigorous and necessary safety requirements that would
allow for rapid egress in an aircraft emergency. For example, a fall
arrest harness which meets its appropriate standard would be able to
safely bear the occupant's weight and prevent a fall. However, it
still could entangle the occupant and would not be permissible under
this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would establish minimum requirements for the
utilization of an SRS to ensure that each SRS has an appropriately
designed harness and lanyard, as well as an appropriately designed
release mechanism that can be released quickly, and will not impede
egress in an emergency. Specifically, these minimum requirements
include a quick release mechanism that must be operated without the use
of a cutting tool, any other tool, or the assistance of another person,
and require that the device, when released, does not impede egress from
the aircraft as described in section IV, D, 2 below.
    This proposed rule would also allow operators flexibility in
determining which make or model of SRS to permit for their operations,
as long as the SRS meets the requirements in the proposed rule.
Moreover, the proposed performance-based design requirements would
allow innovation in design and manufacturing for manufacturers to
develop new SRS components to meet aviation-specific needs. Each SRS
design requirement is discussed in more detail below.
1. Harness and Lanyard (Sec.  91.108(c)(1) and (2))
    The FAA proposes that each SRS have a harness that secures around
the individual's torso and a lanyard that connects the harness to an
airframe attachment point or points, ensuring that the individual's
torso remains inside the aircraft. An SRS consists of two components: a
body harness secured around a person's torso; and a lanyard that
connects to the harness and to an airframe attachment point in the
aircraft that is not within the flightdeck. The harness is attached to
a lanyard through the use of a quick release mechanism. As proposed, an
SRS lanyard would be required to meet specific criteria to ensure the
safety of the occupant using the SRS. This proposed rule would require
the lanyard's length ensures the person's torso remains inside the
aircraft at all times to prevent the person from becoming human
external cargo and, thus, an external load. Pursuant to the definition
in 14 CFR 1.1, an external load means a load that is carried, or
extends, outside of the aircraft fuselage. The pertinent regulations
for human and nonhuman external cargo, which pertain to any load that
is carried, or extends outside a rotorcraft, are found in part 133.
    An SRS must comply with the provisions of proposed Sec.  91.108 and
is distinct from child restraints approved for use on aircraft, as
described in Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128. A child restraint system
does not have a body harness secured around a person's torso, and it is
not connected to an airframe attachment point in the aircraft by a
lanyard. In the United States, federal regulations for child restraint
systems use on aircraft are governed by Federal Motor Vehicles Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, which ensures that child restraint systems
for aircraft use not only are crashworthy in a typical motor vehicle
frontal crash scenario, but also must pass an inversion test to ensure
the occupant is contained in the event an aircraft encounters
turbulence.\36\ In contrast to an SRS, the characteristics of a child
restraint system meeting the criteria of FMVSS No. 213 include that the
child restraint system should have a solid back and seat, internal
restraint straps installed to securely hold the child in the device,
and a label showing approval for aviation use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ 49 CFR 571.213 S8.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Impede Egress in an Emergency After Being Released (Sec.
91.108(c)(3))
    The FAA proposes that an SRS must not impede egress from the
aircraft during an emergency after being released. The use of an SRS
may complicate the emergency egress of passengers. This could occur if
an SRS is used in conjunction with a corded headset, for instance, or
when multiple SRS users' lanyards are attached to

multiple securement points in the cabin. It could also occur if an SRS
requires the user to exit the aircraft while using the harness with the
lanyard attached to it, which could cause a tripping hazard or
interfere with the ability of any other person on the aircraft to
evacuate in an emergency. Even though the user may be able to
disconnect themselves from the aircraft while still using the harness
with the lanyard attached, this configuration would not meet the
regulation since the lanyard could become entangled and impede egress
from the aircraft. A retractable lanyard, however, that would not
become entangled or impede egress would comply with the proposed
requirement.
3. Quick Release Requirements (Sec.  91.108(c)(4))
    The FAA proposes to require that each SRS have a release mechanism
that the individual using the SRS can operate quickly with minimal
difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft in an
emergency. This is important because emergency evacuation conditions
may include an environment where egress is already difficult due to
smoke, fire, or water.
    This proposed rule would require the quick release mechanism to be
located on the front or side of the harness, in a location easily
accessible to, and visible by, the individual using the SRS. This
release could work in several ways. A mechanism located on the front or
side of the harness that releases the harness from the lanyard,
allowing the individual to egress from the aircraft while continuing to
wear the harness, would fulfill this proposed requirement. Similarly, a
mechanism located on the front or side of the harness that releases the
harness from the individual's torso, allowing the individual to egress
the aircraft while leaving the entire SRS behind, would also comply
with the proposed requirement.
    Although the release mechanism of the SRS must be able to be
operated quickly with minimal difficulty, it must also prevent
inadvertent release while in use. The proposed term ``inadvertent
release'' means unintentional activation of the quick release system.
Complying with this standard could consist of having a dual actuation
device, which is a sequential control that requires two distinct
actions in series for actuation. For example, an operator may use
protective covers or flaps that a person must open or remove prior to
operating the release mechanism. Another example would be a release
mechanism of the SRS that could include a press-gate carabiner that
requires two distinct actions.
    Additionally, the FAA is aware of certain buckles that cannot be
opened when under load, such as could occur when the user is upside
down or sideways following an accident. Although this feature would
prevent inadvertent release, this feature would not meet the
requirement to allow the release mechanism to be operated quickly with
minimal difficulty if rapid egress from the aircraft were required.
    Additionally, this proposed rule would require that the quick
release mechanism be capable of release without the use of a knife, any
additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to cut or
release the SRS. In the Liberty Helicopters accident, passengers used
harnesses that included interconnected shoulder straps and leg straps,
a chest strap that spanned the two front shoulder straps, and a dorsal
D-ring (used on the accident flight for attaching a tether) between the
wearer's upper shoulder blades. NYONair attached a pouch containing an
emergency cutting tool on either the right or left upper shoulder strap
of each harness.\37\ The dorsal D-ring on each passenger's harness was
secured with a locking carabiner to a tether, which consisted of
several loops of 11 mm webbing of varying lengths (manufactured by a
climbing-gear supplier). The other end of each tether was secured to a
cabin anchor point with a second locking carabiner.\38\ First
responders reported that they found the passengers strapped in the
cabin, and they had to cut various straps to free them. Part of one
passenger's harness was found in the helicopter with the D-ring secured
to the tether (and the tether secured to the cabin floor fitting) with
locking carabiners. The NTSB inspected portions of two harnesses and
found that one had a pouch attached that contained a cutting tool; the
other had a pouch attached, but no cutting tool was present. Post-
accident examination of a harness removed from another passenger
revealed a cutting tool contained inside a pouch attached to the front
of the left shoulder strap.\39\ A ceiling-mounted camera in the
helicopter captured video and audio information of emergency egress-
related events. It showed that, despite receiving instruction on how to
remove or cut their harnesses, the passengers were unable to release
themselves.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019.
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf at page 18.
    \38\ Id. at 19.
    \39\ Id. at 21.
    \40\ See id. at 28-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NTSB found that minimally trained passengers would have great
difficulty extricating themselves from the harness/tether system, each
of which was equipped with locking carabiners and an ineffective
cutting tool, during an emergency requiring a rapid egress.
Additionally, the NTSB concluded that Liberty's ``. . . decision to use
locking carabiners and ineffective cutting tools as the primary means
for passengers to rapidly release from the harness/tether system was
inappropriate and unsafe.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Id. at xii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In an emergency, rapid egress from the aircraft is essential.
Passengers who have never used a cutting tool, or who don't pay
attention to a safety briefing or take it seriously, could have
difficulty using a tool to cut themselves from an SRS, especially in an
environment that may include smoke, fire, or water. They could forget
where the tool is located on the harness or have difficulty in removing
the tool from the storage pouch. Also, they could drop the tool,
rendering it useless. Relying on another person to assist in detachment
could also be ineffectual if that person becomes injured or
unresponsive in an emergency and cannot help.

E. Who May Provide the SRS (Sec.  91.108(d))

    The FAA proposes to allow an operator or an individual to provide
an SRS for use during a flight. In some cases, an individual (e.g.,
professional photographer, fire suppression technician, wildlife net
gunner) may own their own SRS and want to use it on different
operators' aircraft. In other cases, the operator or PIC will provide
the SRS to individuals who seek to use SRS during the flight. For an
individual providing their own SRS, the FAA proposes that they must
confirm with the PIC, either verbally or in writing, as determined by
the PIC, the system's continued serviceability and readiness for its
intended purposes. One way an individual providing their own SRS can
meet this requirement is by ensuring the SRS is inspected and
maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
    In addition, the proposed rule would require that each individual
providing their own SRS comply with the sizing criteria for which the
SRS is rated. This requirement would ensure that the SRS is properly
sized for the individual using the SRS. The manufacturer's sizing
criteria may include different

measurements such as height, weight, chest circumference, or other
specified sizing criteria. Requiring that the SRS be used within the
limitations for which the SRS is rated will help ensure safe and
appropriate use of the system.\42\ This requirement supplements an SRS
operational requirement in section IV.F.3., below, stating that the SRS
must fit the individual using it based on the sizing criteria for which
the SRS is rated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ For similar requirements imposed on the PIC regarding the
SRS's continued serviceability and sizing criteria, see section IV.G
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. SRS Operational Requirements (Sec.  91.108(e)(1) and (2))

    As discussed in more detail below, the FAA proposes specific SRS
operational requirements to help ensure individuals are using the SRS
safely and appropriately.
1. Airframe Attachment Points (Sec.  91.108(e)(1)(i))
    This proposed rule would require a qualified person designated by
the operator to connect each SRS lanyard to an airframe attachment
point or points with a rated strength equal to or greater than the
total weight of the occupant (or the combined weight if there is more
than one occupant attached to an attachment point).\43\ There is no
requirement for a specific number of attachment points. The number and
location vary by each aircraft type design. Attachment points in the
cabin may be existing hard points, with weight capabilities documented
on existing placards or in appropriate aircraft flight manuals. If
multiple harnesses are attached to a single location, the proposed rule
requires the attachment point to be rated at a strength equal to or
greater than the total combined weight of the occupants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ The weight limits for aircraft attachment points are
placarded within the aircraft, and the aircraft weight and center of
gravity limitations are outlined in the aircraft flight manual.
Under Sec.  91.103 (Preflight action), prior to flight, each pilot
is responsible for being familiar with pertinent information
concerning the flight--that typically includes information outlined
in the aircraft flight manual. In addition, Sec.  91.9 (Civil
aircraft flight manual, marking, and placard requirements) requires
persons to comply with the operating limitations specified in the
approved aircraft flight manual. Consequently, it is the PIC's
responsibility to ensure that all occupants on board meet the
attachment point limitations outlined for that aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All aircraft are designed for both emergency landing conditions and
all flight loads. The FAA is not proposing that an SRS be designed or
intended for restraining an occupant in an emergency landing condition
because the FAA expects occupants to be in an FAA-approved seat with
the seat belt fastened prior to an emergency landing. Therefore, the
FAA is not proposing that SRS be subject to the emergency landing load
factors applicable to the FAA-approved seats and seatbelts. SRS are
designed to keep an individual inside the aircraft, while approved
seats and seatbelts are designed for emergency landing conditions. The
proposed rule would require each airframe attachment point used for the
attachment of SRS to have a rated strength equal to or greater than the
total weight of each occupant (or the combined weight if there is more
than one occupant attached to an attachment point). This proposed
requirement regarding airframe attachment point(s) would ensure that
the attachment point has adequate strength under all flight conditions.
2. SRS Attachment Location (Sec.  91.108(e)(1)(ii))
    The FAA proposes that no SRS may be connected to any airframe
attachment point located in the flightdeck. During the Liberty
Helicopters accident flight, the front passenger, who was facing
outboard in his seat with his legs outside the helicopter, leaned back
several times to take photographs using a smartphone. The onboard video
showed that, each time he leaned back, the tail of the tether attached
to the back of his harness hung down loosely near the helicopter's
floor-mounted controls. At one point, when he pulled himself up to
adjust his seating position, the tail of his tether remained taut but
appeared to pop upward. Two seconds later, the helicopter's engine
sounds decreased, and the helicopter began to descend. The pilot
reported that when he reached down for the emergency fuel shutoff
lever, he realized that it was in the off position. He also noted that
a portion of the front seat passenger's tether was underneath the
lever.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During its investigation of the Liberty Helicopters accident, the
NTSB evaluated the certification basis for the accident helicopter's
fuel shutoff lever, which did not require protection from inadvertent
activation due to external influences, such as interference from a
passenger.\45\ The NTSB found that the tail of the front passenger's
tether caught on the fuel shutoff lever during the flight, which
resulted in the inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever,
interruption of fuel flow to the engine, and loss of engine power.\46\
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was Liberty
Helicopters' use of a NYONair-provided passenger harness/tether system,
which caught on and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff
lever and resulted in the in-flight loss of engine power and the
subsequent ditching.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Id. at ix.
    \46\ Id. at xii.
    \47\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the FAA developed this NPRM, it considered previous accidents
and incidents in addition to the Liberty Helicopters accident that
involved inadvertent operation of flight controls. Reports from these
incidents indicate in each that a passenger inadvertently manipulated
controls (e.g., fuel flow control lever) in the flightdeck. For
example, on April 4, 1994, an A[eacute]rospatiale AS 350B Ecureuil air
ambulance crashed in Alberta, Canada, following loss of engine power.
After an investigation, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
issued its final report, Engine Failure, Hard Landing, Turbowest
Helicopters Limited, Aerospatiale AS350B Astar (Helicopter) C=FHBG,
High Prairie, Alberta, 62nm NE, 04 April 1994.\48\ The report stated
that a strap from a knapsack got caught on the fuel control lever and
moved it out of the ``flight'' position resulting in fuel starvation to
the engine, a total loss of engine power, and low rotor revolutions per
minute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Engine Failure, Hard Landing, Turbowest Helicopters
Limited, Aerospatiale AS350B Astar (Helicopter) C=FHBG, High
Prairie, Alberta, 62nm NE, 04 April 1994, Report Number A94W0037
(Gatineau, Quebec, Canada: Transportation Safety Board of Canada,
1994) accessed at http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1994/a94w0037/a94w0037.pdf on June 24, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 13, 1996, an A[eacute]rospatiale AS 350B1 Ecureuil,
under contract to carry out a number of flights in connection with the
filming of scenes for a feature film, crashed in Greenland following
loss of engine power, killing the single passenger/photographer and
seriously injuring the pilot. Following completion of its
investigation, the Danish Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) opined
that during movements in and around the lefthand seat, while
troubleshooting problems with his photographic equipment, the
photographer may unintentionally have pushed the fuel control lever
toward idle/shut down. During its investigation, the Danish AAIB became
aware of an almost identical incident that happened in 1993. The
mission was also photography, and the straps of the photography
equipment became caught in the fuel control lever and moved it toward
the idle position, resulting in the loss of engine power. The pilot was
able to restart the engine and landed the helicopter normally.

    On April 15, 2008, a Eurocopter AS350B2 helicopter crashed 34 miles
east of Chickaloon, Alaska, killing the pilot and three passengers and
seriously injuring one passenger. The NTSB determined that the probable
cause of the accident was the loss of engine power due to an overspeed
of the helicopter's turbine engine, precipitated by the inadvertent
movement of the fuel flow control lever by a passenger in the front
seat. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to properly
secure or stow the passenger's backpack. During its investigation, the
NTSB interviewed two large helicopter operators, Era and Eurocopter,
about incidents of passengers interfering with floor-mounted engine
controls on helicopters--specifically, the fuel flow control lever.
Both operators informed the NTSB that they had anecdotal information
about passengers placing items such as purses and camera bags on the
floor-mounted engine controls. The operators also mentioned incidents
of bag straps snagging on the fuel and other control levers.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ NTSB Accident Number ANC08FA053, released 2/17/2010,
available at: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=67841.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The airworthiness standards for 14 CFR 23.2600, 25.1143(e),
27.1143(d), and 29.1143(e) \50\ require that flight and engine controls
not be subject to inadvertent operation. This requirement is based on
the assumption that only crewmembers and/or pilots will interact with
the aircraft controls. When the FAA codified these airworthiness
standards, the FAA did not anticipate crewmembers or passengers in the
flightdeck would be attached to or carry equipment that is not part of
the approved type design that could snag on controls. Generally, flight
manual procedures \51\ require that all items be secured prior to
flight. These procedures reinforce the assumptions made when the
airworthiness standards were codified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The airworthiness standards in parts 23, 25, 27, and 29 are
organized by aircraft category. Part 23 applies to normal category
airplanes; part 25 applies to transport category airplanes; part 27
applies to normal category rotorcraft; and part 29 applies to
transport category rotorcraft.
    \51\ See Sec.  91.9 (Civil aircraft flight manual, marking, and
placard requirements) requiring persons to comply with the operating
limitations specified in the approved aircraft flight manual; see
also Sec.  21.5 (Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual) requiring the
aircraft flight manual to contain the operating limitations and
other information required by applicable regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would prohibit any person who occupies a seat in
the flightdeck from using an SRS. In addition, this proposed rule would
require an SRS to be connected to an aircraft attaching point or points
that are not in the flightdeck. These proposed limitations would
prevent inadvertent operation of the flight controls, as was
experienced by the crew and passengers of the Liberty Helicopters
accident flight. The operator would be responsible for ensuring that
both of these requirements are met.
3. Sizing Criteria (Sec.  91.108(e)(2))
    This proposed rule would also require that the SRS fit the
individual using it based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is
rated. As discussed above in section IV.E (``Who May Provide the
SRS''), sizing criteria may include different measurements such as
height, weight, chest circumference, or other specified sizing
criteria. For example, SRS size requirements may be listed as small,
medium, and large; however, the size may actually be based on a
combination of height and weight. To illustrate, a ``small'' SRS may
have minimum criteria of 4 feet 10 inches in height and a weight of 100
pounds and a maximum of 6 feet in height and 170 pounds. Requiring that
the SRS fit the individual using it will help ensure safe and
appropriate use of the system. This requirement is supplemented by the
additional requirements under Sec.  91.108(d)(2) and (f)(3) found in
Sections IV.E. and IV.G, respectively.

G. Pilot in Command (Sec.  91.108(f)(1) Through (5))

    In accordance with Sec.  91.3(a), the PIC of an aircraft is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the
operation of that aircraft. As a result, this proposed rule imposes
several responsibilities on the PIC.
    First, the FAA proposes that regardless of who provides the SRS,
the PIC has the overall responsibility to ensure that the SRS meets the
requirements of proposed Sec.  91.108. As the final authority of the
aircraft operation, the PIC is best suited to make this determination.
In addition, the FAA proposes that if the SRS does not meet the
requirements outlined in Sec.  91.108, the PIC must not permit the
individual to use the SRS. For example, if the PIC determines that an
SRS is not safe for continued use or that an individual does not meet
the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated (if the operator or PIC
provided the SRS), the PIC must not permit the individual to use that
SRS.
    Second, for any SRS provided by either the operator or the PIC, the
FAA proposes that the PIC must ensure the SRS's continued
serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose. As discussed in
the section pertaining to individuals providing their own SRS, this
requirement may be met by inspecting and maintaining the SRS in
accordance with the SRS manufacturer's instructions. Ensuring the SRS
is serviceable and ready for its intended purpose will help ensure the
SRS is safe for continued use.
    Third, the FAA proposes that the PIC may only permit an individual
to use an SRS that is provided by either the operator or the PIC if
that individual complies with the sizing criteria for which the SRS is
rated. As discussed in sections IV.E (``Who May Provide the SRS'') and
IV.F.3 (``Sizing Criteria''), a manufacturer's sizing criteria may
include different measurements such as height, weight, chest
circumference, or other specified sizing criteria. This requirement
would ensure safe and appropriate use of the system and that the SRS is
properly sized for the individual using the SRS.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ For similar requirements imposed on individuals providing
their own SRS, regarding the SRS's continued serviceability and use
limitations, see section IV.E above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, the FAA proposes that the PIC has final authority regarding
whether the SRS may be used during flight operations. If the PIC
determines an individual should not use an SRS during an operation, the
PIC may prohibit use of the SRS. This stipulation is in addition to the
PIC's obligation to prohibit the use of an SRS if it does not meet the
requirements in Sec.  91.108. For example, the PIC may determine that
aircraft operations, outside the requirements of Sec.  91.108, render
conditions unsafe to use an SRS. In that case, the PIC may prohibit
individuals from using the SRS during the flight.
    Finally, the FAA proposes that the PIC has final authority to
authorize an individual to release the FAA-approved safety belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness and remain secured only by the supplemental
restraint system. The PIC is in the best position to determine when
appropriate flight conditions exist so as to allow individuals to move
about the aircraft using only an SRS.

H. Enhanced Passenger Briefing and Demonstration (Sec.  91.108 (g) and
(h))

1. Passenger Briefing (Sec.  91.108(g)(1) and (2))
    The FAA proposes to require a passenger briefing on how to use SRS
during a flight. Existing regulations require operators to provide all
passengers a safety briefing prior to departure. When a passenger
onboard an aircraft will use an SRS, the rule as proposed requires that
passenger to receive additional information in an enhanced safety
briefing. In addition, any passenger using an SRS provided by

either the operator or PIC would have to demonstrate the ability to
occupy, secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and, if
installed, shoulder harnesses, as well as the ability to release
quickly the SRS with no assistance and with minimal difficulty.
Individuals providing their own SRS do not have to meet this specific
requirement, but they must still meet the other briefing requirements,
and they must meet the demonstration requirements under Sec.
91.108(h), as discussed in Section IV.H.2, below. Therefore, under the
proposed requirements, in addition to the standard briefing
requirements codified at Sec. Sec.  91.107, 91.519, 91.1035, and
135.117, an operator or PIC conducting operations that involve the use
of SRS would provide an enhanced briefing prior to the flight to all
passengers using an SRS during the flight.
    This proposed rule would require the enhanced safety briefing to
include information about the proper use, securing, and releasing of
the SRS and the means of direct communication among crewmembers and
passengers during normal and emergency operating procedures. This
proposed rule would require the provision of information about use of
any headset and intercom systems, how a passenger will be notified of
an event requiring action, including emergencies, egress procedures,
and other unforeseen circumstances, and how crewmembers would notify
the passenger that they can release the FAA-approved seat belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness and move within the aircraft using the SRS.
The briefing would also describe how a passenger will be notified when
to return to their seat and secure the FAA-approved seat belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness, and when to notify the pilot of safety
concerns. Each such aspect of this proposed briefing requirement is
important because it provides the individual with additional
information specific to the unique characteristics of using an SRS
during normal and emergency flight operations that would enhance the
individual's safety. The proposed briefing helps inform the individual
SRS user of the behavioral expectations during the flight and may
provoke clarifying dialogue, if necessary, that ensures the individual
understands these expectations. These elements are critical to ensuring
the safety of the operation.
    Finally, to ensure clarity between the existing passenger briefing
requirements outlined under Sec. Sec.  135.117 and 136.7 and the
passenger briefing requirements in this proposed rule, the FAA proposes
to add a cross-reference to Sec.  91.108 in those sections. Adding this
cross-reference will help ensure that the proposed briefing
requirements in Sec.  91.108 are not overlooked when considering the
other passenger briefing requirements in Sec. Sec.  135.117 and 136.7.
2. Passenger Demonstration (Sec.  91.108(h)(1) and (2))
    After receiving this enhanced briefing, prior to ground movement of
the aircraft, this proposed rule would require all passengers using an
SRS to demonstrate their comprehension of the information presented in
the briefing. To this end, the proposed rule requires all passengers
using an SRS to demonstrate to the operator their ability to occupy,
secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and, if installed,
shoulder harnesses, as well as their ability to release the SRS quickly
without assistance and with minimal difficulty. As noted in the
proposed regulatory requirements, the passenger must demonstrate their
ability to accomplish all actions required for quick release of the SRS
with no assistance, regardless of whether the individual will use the
individual's own SRS or will use an SRS the operator provides.
    The proposed requirement for the user of the SRS to demonstrate the
ability to occupy, secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and,
if installed, shoulder harnesses would ensure that, in an inflight
emergency while using SRS at low altitude, the individual can quickly
re-secure themself with the FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness. It would also establish that the individual can
accomplish all actions required for quick release of the SRS without
assistance to egress the aircraft in case of an emergency.

I. Individuals Not Permitted To Use SRS (Sec.  91.108(i)(1) Through
(4))

    During operations when SRS are in use, there might be instances
when not all individuals are using an SRS, either by choice or because
they do not meet the requirements of the proposed rule. This would
include, but is not limited to, any passenger who is unable to
demonstrate that the individual is able to occupy, secure, and release
the FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or
release quickly the SRS with no assistance and with minimal difficulty.
Passengers under the age of 15, individuals occupying a seat in the
flightdeck, and passengers occupying or using an approved child
restraint system are not permitted to use an SRS.
1. Individuals Unable To Meet the Demonstration Requirements of the
Enhanced Safety Briefing (Sec.  91.108(i)(1))
    If an individual cannot demonstrate that they are able to occupy,
secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness, and able to release quickly the SRS with no
assistance and with minimal difficulty, this proposed rule would
prohibit the individual from occupying or using an SRS during the
flight. The individual must remain secured in their FAA-approved seat
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness for the entire flight.
2. Individuals Under the Age of 15 (Sec.  91.108(i)(2))
    The FAA is proposing that an individual may not use an SRS during
operations unless the individual has reached their fifteenth birthday.
In determining this proposal, the FAA referred to the ``Exit Row
Seating'' final rule,\53\ which evaluated various criteria to determine
individuals who are capable of performing certain functions during an
emergency. As explained below, limiting the age to 15 or older for
those who use an SRS helps maximize the chances of survival for the
user should an emergency evacuation occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See Exit Row Seating, Final Rule, 55 FR 8054, 8066 (Mar. 6,
1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the ``Exit Row Seating'' final rule, many children
do not have the skills or capabilities necessary to perform the
required functions of an emergency evacuation from an aircraft and
would likely require the assistance of an adult during an
emergency.\54\ The same is true for children using SRS. It is likely a
child would need assistance in releasing from the SRS in order to
egress the aircraft safely and quickly during an emergency. Similarly,
it is likely that some children, due to their age and/or size, would
not have the cognitive or physical ability to safely release from an
SRS during an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has stated that it is difficult to establish a clear cut-
off point between childhood and adolescence when individuals may be
more capable of handling emergency situations.\55\ Notwithstanding, a
number of existing laws, regulations, and practices point to the age of
15 as a turning point into adulthood. For example, in many states it is
the age when driver's licenses and

work permits become available.\56\ After considering several options
for an age requirement to use an SRS, the FAA determined that the
reasoning in the ``Exit Row Seating'' final rule applies in this
proposed rule. Fifteen is an objective criterion that will enable
operators to comply with clear SRS requirements. Moreover, most
children at that age can accomplish the functions required to release
from an SRS safely and quickly during an emergency. The FAA has
determined that individuals who have reached this age are less likely
to need assistance from an adult during an emergency. Consequently, the
FAA proposes that passengers under the age of 15 are prohibited from
using an SRS and must occupy either an approved seat or berth with a
safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or an approved child
restraint system that complies with Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(iii) or Sec.
135.128(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Id. (discussing various dictionary definitions of
``child.'') In the Exit Row Seating NPRM, the FAA did not propose a
specific age limit, but one commenter requested a defined age to
facilitate the operators' abilities to establish objective criteria.
Exit Row Seating, NPRM, 54 FR 10484 (Mar. 13, 1989).
    \56\ 55 FR 8066.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Individuals Seated in the Flightdeck (Sec.  91.108(i)(3))
    This proposed rule would prohibit individuals using an SRS from
sitting in the flightdeck. As discussed in section IV.F.3 of this
preamble, this proposed prohibition is based on a review of past
accidents and incidents where unsecured items, including those with
straps and lanyards, have a history of interfering with flight and
engine controls. In the Liberty Helicopters accident, a tether caught
on and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever, resulting
in the in-flight loss of engine power and subsequent ditching.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019.
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described above, airworthiness standards codified at 14 CFR
parts 23, 25, 27 and 29 require that flight and engine controls not be
subject to inadvertent operation. These standards do not address
circumstances when carry-on objects, tethers, or straps would
inadvertently move a control. Consequently, crewmembers or passengers
in the flightdeck should not be attached to or carry equipment that
could snag on controls.
4. Passengers Who Occupy or Use an Approved Child Restraint System
(Sec.  91.108(i)(4))
    The FAA proposes to prohibit anyone occupying or using a child
restraint system from also using an SRS. Current regulations under 14
CFR parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 allow a child, who by definition is any
individual under 18 years of age, to occupy or use an FAA-approved
child restraint system, provided certain conditions exist, including
that the child is accompanied by a parent, guardian, or attendant
designated by the child's parent or guardian to attend to the safety of
the child during the flight.\58\ As a result, there may be
circumstances where an individual occupying an approved child restraint
system is 15 years old or older and is otherwise eligible to use an
SRS. As explained in more detail below, an SRS may not be used by an
individual occupying a child restraint system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See Sec.  91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses,
and child restraint systems, Sec.  135.128 Use of safety belts and
child restraint systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The use of a child restraint system is incompatible with the use of
an SRS. As described above, this proposed rule would require each SRS
to consist of a body harness secured around the torso of the individual
using the SRS and a lanyard that connects the body harness to an
airframe attachment point inside the aircraft. The SRS would have a
release mechanism that the individual can quickly operate with minimal
difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft in an
emergency. Additionally, the release mechanism cannot require the
assistance of any other individual to release the SRS. It is illogical
to permit a child who occupies a child restraint system, and who must
be accompanied by a parent, guardian, or attendant tasked to attend to
the safety of the child during the flight, to be permitted to also use
an SRS. Therefore, this proposed rule would prohibit all individuals
occupying or using a child restraint system from also using an SRS. The
FAA notes that this proposed rule permits the use of an approved child
restraint system on a flight where the doors are opened or removed as
long as the child restraint system is properly secured to an approved
seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness,
and complies with Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(iii) (for part 91 operations) or
Sec.  135.128(a)(2) (for part 135 operations).

J. Lap-Held Child (Sec.  91.108(j)(1) and (2))

    The proposed rule would prohibit a child who has not reached their
second birthday from being held by an adult during civil aircraft
operations when the adult uses an SRS or during any operation in which
the doors are opened or removed. Specifically, the proposed rule would
prohibit a child from being held by an adult using an SRS during civil
aircraft operations even when the aircraft doors are not opened or
removed. The intent of using an SRS is to provide support to the user
when they are out of their required safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness. Unexpected turbulence can cause an airplane to
suddenly jolt, possibly injuring passengers who are not restrained. If
turbulence occurs when the SRS user is not secured by a safety belt,
they would require the use of their hands to steady themselves or to
hold onto an aircraft seat or structure to prevent themselves from
falling, particularly if they are out of their seat. Holding a lap
child would prevent the SRS user from being able to use their hands to
steady themselves or to grasp onto something if necessary. Further, in
the event of an emergency, time is critical. Using an SRS requires
additional steps to release. Holding a lap child while trying to
quickly release the SRS and the required safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness, could cause the SRS user additional time to evacuate
the aircraft.
    In addition, this rule would prohibit a lap-held child during
operations where the aircraft doors are opened or removed. As currently
permitted by Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128, a child who has not reached
their second birthday may be held by an adult who occupies an approved
seat or berth. However, it is contrary to this proposed rule, the
intent of which is to mitigate risks to all occupants during operations
conducted anytime an SRS is in use, to permit a child to remain
unrestrained during all phases of flight, including during movement on
the surface, takeoff, and landing, when the aircraft doors are opened
or removed. During an operation with doors opened or removed, a lap-
held child would be at high risk of falling out of the aircraft--an
unacceptable risk this rule seeks to prevent.
    For the above reasons, the FAA proposes that lap-held children may
not be held by anyone using an SRS, regardless of whether the doors are
opened or removed, and they are not permitted on flights where the
doors are opened or removed.
    Finally, to ensure clarity between the lap-held child permissions
outlined under Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128 and the lap-held child
restrictions in this proposed rule, the FAA proposes to add a cross-
reference to Sec.  91.108 in those sections. Adding this cross-
reference will help ensure that proposed Sec.  91.108 is not overlooked
when considering whether lap-held children are permitted on a flight.

K. Excluded Operations (Sec.  91.108(k)(1) Through (3))

    The FAA determined that this proposed rule should not apply to
certain other regulations if the rule would otherwise conflict with the
intent of those regulations. As a result, this proposed rule would not
apply to operations conducted under part 105, Parachute Operations, nor
would it apply to the persons described in Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(ii),
which allows person(s) on board an aircraft for the purpose of engaging
in sport parachuting to use the floor of the aircraft as a seat.
    Additionally, this proposed rule would not apply to rotorcraft
external-load operations conducted under part 133. Title 14 CFR 1.1
defines external load as a load that is carried, or extends, outside of
the aircraft fuselage. Section 133.11(a) states that no person subject
to part 133 may conduct rotorcraft external-load operations within the
United States without, or in violation of the terms of, a Rotorcraft
External-Load Operator Certificate issued by the Administrator under
Sec.  133.17.
    This proposed rule also would not interfere with or contradict the
requirements of Sec.  91.105, Flight crewmembers at stations, or Sec.
135.171, Shoulder harness installation at flight crewmember stations.
As proposed, the regulation would allow an operator to conduct a flight
with doors opened or removed under Sec.  91.108(b)(1) even if there are
flight crewmembers on board who are subject to the requirements of
Sec. Sec.  91.105 or 135.171 and to the extent that the flight
crewmembers must unfasten their shoulder harnesses in accordance with
those sections. Similarly, the FAA proposes that Sec.  91.108(b)(2) not
apply to any flight crewmembers subject to Sec. Sec.  91.105 or 135.171
to the extent they need to unfasten their shoulder harnesses in
accordance with those sections. Sections 91.105 and 135.171 allow a
flight crewmember to unfasten or not use the installed shoulder harness
if the crewmember cannot perform the required duties with the shoulder
harness fastened.
    The proposed SRS rule could inhibit, or otherwise conflict with,
the aforementioned operations; therefore, the FAA proposes the
aforementioned exclusions under Sec.  91.108.

L. Definition (Sec.  91.108(l))

    This proposed rule would define an SRS as a device that is not
installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA approval used to secure an
individual inside an aircraft when that person is not properly secured
by an FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness or an
approved child restraint system.\59\ An SRS consists of a harness
secured around the torso of the individual using the supplemental
restraint system and a lanyard that connects the harness to an approved
airframe attachment point inside the aircraft. Examples of FAA-approved
devices include (but are not limited to) restraints approved through a
Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, or as an approved
major alteration using FAA Form 337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ As explained previously, there may be circumstances where
an individual occupying an approved child restraint system is 15
years old or older and is otherwise eligible to use an SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

M. Additional Comments Invited

    This proposed rule would apply to operations conducted under parts
91 and 135 and does not include an option for waiving the proposed
requirements of Sec.  91.108 in accordance with Sec.  91.905, List of
rules subject to waivers. The FAA cannot envision a scenario in which
operations conducted with doors opened or removed could occur safely
without complying with the proposed requirements of Sec.  91.108. The
FAA seeks input, however, on its proposal that Sec.  91.108 not be
listed in the rules subject to waivers under Sec.  91.905.

V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Federal agencies consider impacts of regulatory actions under a
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563, as amended by Executive Order
14094 (``Modernizing Regulatory Review''), direct that each federal
agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354)
requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes
on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39)
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, this Act requires agencies to consider international
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S.
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by state, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. The
current threshold after adjustment for inflation is $177 million using
the most current (2022) Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic
Product. The FAA has provided a detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA) in the docket for this rulemaking. This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this proposed
rule.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
proposed rule: (1) has benefits that justify its costs. This rule is
not a significant regulatory action, as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866. The proposed rule, if adopted, would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
would not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade, and
would not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal
governments, or on the private sector.

A. Summary of the Regulatory Evaluation

    The FAA estimates that for safety benefits to equal or exceed the
costs of the proposed rule, based on a 20-year analysis, two accidents
of the same severity as the Liberty Helicopters accident would need to
be mitigated. The estimated safety benefit in present value, from
mitigating one part 91 and one part 135 helicopter accident (i.e., an
accident in year 10 and an accident in year 20 of the analysis period),
would range from $26.8 million to $40.2 million, at a 7 percent
discount rate, and $45.4 million to $68.0 million at a 3 percent
discount rate.
    The cost of the proposed rule to operators, pilots, and passengers
comes from purchasing harnesses and lanyards that meet specific
requirements as set forth in this rule, conducting a pre-flight safety
briefing on the use of the SRS, and requiring passengers to demonstrate
their ability to remove the SRS in the event of an emergency. The FAA
would also incur costs for periodic surveillance of parts 91 and 135
SRS operations. The estimated present value cost to the FAA, over 20
years, is $1,240 at a 7 percent discount rate and $1,263 at a 3 percent
discount rate. The estimated present value total cost to industry and
the FAA, for these requirements, over 20 years, is $22.3 million at a 7
percent discount rate and $31.7 million at a 3 percent discount rate.
Estimated safety

benefits and costs are shown in the table below.

                                                     Table 2--Total Benefits and Costs Over 20 Years
                                                                   [Millions of USD] *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Safety benefits                        Safety benefits
             Provisions                       Affected population          --------------------------    Costs    --------------------------    Costs
                                                                                Low          High                      Low          High
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     .....................................         7 Percent present value
                                                         3 Percent present value
                                                                           -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
91.108--Use of supplemental          Part 91 Operations...................        $17.8        $26.7        $19.4        $26.0        $39.0        $27.5
 restraint systems \60\.             Part 135 Operations..................          9.0         13.6          2.9         19.4         29.0          4.1
                                                                           -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..........................  .....................................         26.8         40.2         22.3         45.4         68.0         31.7
    Annualized.....................  .....................................          2.5          3.8          2.1          3.0          4.6          2.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.

    In 2018, in response to the Liberty Helicopters accident, the FAA
issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition, which prohibited the use of
supplemental passenger restraint systems (SPRS) that cannot be released
quickly in an emergency in doors-off flight operations. The FAA also
estimates the cost and benefit of the proposed rule using the Emergency
Order of Prohibition as the baseline. The FAA estimates that the
undiscounted cost of the rule, above the Emergency Order of
Prohibition, is $22.9 million ($11.8 million at 7 percent present
value, or $16.8 million at 3 percent present value). When annualized,
at either a 7 percent or 3 percent discount rate, the cost is
approximately $1.1 million. The costs come entirely from the
demonstration by passengers of the ability to release the device. The
FAA considers that a passenger demonstrating the ability to release
themselves from the device adds to the efficacy of the rule above the
Emergency Order of Prohibition. However, the FAA is unable to quantify
the incremental safety benefits gained by the passenger demonstration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Assumes a part 91 accident occurs in year 10 and a part 135
accident occurs in year 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Who is potentially affected by this rule?
    This proposed rule would affect all flights with doors opened or
removed and all operations with individuals on board who choose to use
an SRS, except for operations conducted under part 105, Parachute
Operations, or conducted under part 133, Rotorcraft External-Load
Operations, and public aircraft operations. The FAA identified the
following, from Flight Standards' Web-based Operations Safety System
(June 2021), as the population that could be affected:

                                      Table 3--Potential Affected Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Number of       Number of       Number of       Number of
                       CFR                           operators      rotorcraft       operators       aircraft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Rotorcraft
                                                            Fixed wing
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
91..............................................             405           1,051             716           1,894
135.............................................             472           2,917           1,728           8,411
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, based on the number of requests for SRS LOAs, the FAA
narrowed the population to 26 part 91 operators and 40 part 135
operators over the next 20 years.
    General Assumptions:
     The present value discount rate of three and seven percent
is used as required by the Office of Management and Budget.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-4 (2003),
guidance for the development of regulatory analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Period of Analysis: 20 years to capture replacement of an
SRS occurring every 10 years.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ A sample of harnesses provided for consideration of an SRS
LOA, such as Yates 363 and 338, have a maximum life span of 10
years. See Product manuals. available at http://yatesgear.com/en/special-forces-full-body-spie-harness and http://yatesgear.com/en/ars-heli-ops-harness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The estimated average number of passengers per flight is
between 3 to 5 passengers. The FAA used 4 passengers in the analysis.
     Estimated time to create and update content for enhanced
passenger safety briefing: \63\ 2 hours per operator. Assume updates
occur every 10 years to align with the replacement cycle of harnesses
and lanyards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Part 135--Operating Requirements: Commuter and on-Demand
Operations and Rules Governing Persons on Board such Aircraft,
Paperwork Reduction Act Supporting Statement, (OMB No. 2120-0039):
Sec.  at 8 (Apr. 9, 2019) (estimate of time and volume of operators
and passenger briefings pursuant to Sec.  135.117, Briefing of
passengers before flight), available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=86383102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Estimated pilot time to complete enhanced safety briefing:
\64\ 0.03 hours (2 minutes)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Estimated time for passenger competency demonstration:
\65\ 0.02 hours (1 minute)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ This estimate is a combination of the time identified in
the Emergency Order and the FAA's assertion that a passenger will
need to release the SRS in under a minute to be able to evacuate a
helicopter in an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Baseline: There were no requirements for an SRS prior to 2018 when
the FAA issued Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-0243. Since
the Emergency Order of Prohibition is temporary, the baseline used in
this analysis is pre-Emergency Order. However, the Emergency Order
requires harnesses and lanyards that fulfill the same requirements
required in the

proposed rule; therefore, operators already incur the cost of the
harness and lanyard. Operators would primarily incur the additional
cost of the passenger demonstration briefing under the proposed rule.
This is analyzed as a second baseline. The extension of the Emergency
Order of Prohibition was considered as an alternative, and cost and
benefits are estimated in the alternative section below.
2. Benefits of This Rule
    Benefits of this rule include preventing future accidents similar
to the Liberty Helicopters accident. The NTSB final safety report
identified the probable cause of this accident as Liberty Helicopters'
use of an SRS system. The SRS caught on and activated the engine fuel
shutoff lever, located in the flightdeck, and resulted in the loss of
engine power and the subsequent ditching. That same SRS, worn by
passengers on that flight, also contributed to the severity of the
accident by hindering the passengers' quick egress from the aircraft.
This proposed rule would prohibit use of an SRS in the flightdeck,
address the inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever, and
propose SRS requirements that would reduce the likelihood of passengers
being unable to remove an SRS when needed in an emergency.
    The Liberty Helicopters accident resulted in five fatalities, one
minor injury, and a substantially damaged aircraft. The analysis
assumes that another accident of similar magnitude would occur in the
20-year time horizon. While the SRS operation requirements, passenger
briefing, and passenger demonstration set forth in the proposed rule
would have lessened the severity of the accident, the NTSB determined
the probable cause of the accident to be the inadvertent activation of
the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever by the passenger harness/
tether system.\66\ Prohibiting the use of an SRS in the flightdeck
would help mitigate the risk factor that initiated the accident. The
benefits include avoided casualties and aircraft damage. Multiplying
the five casualties by a value of statistical life (VSL) of $11.6
million yields a total of $58.0 million as the social cost of these
fatalities.\67\ The pilot also sustained minor injuries at an avoided
minor injury rate of $34,800, and the helicopter, an Airbus AS350 B2,
suffered substantial damage valued at $210,243.\68\ Adding the value of
avoided casualties, including the pilot's injuries, to aircraft damage
gives a total potential loss of $58.2 million that enhanced safety
measures could avert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ National Transportation Safety Board. (March 11, 2018)
Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent
Ditching Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off
Flight Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH (Report No. NTSB/AAR-19/
04 or PB2020-100100). Retrieved from https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \67\ Departmental Guidance on Valuation of a Statistical Life in
Economic Analysis, Issued Date: 3/23/2021 https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis.
    \68\ Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory
Decisions, A Guide: 2021 Update, Section 5, Table 5-10: General
Aviation Restoration Costs ($2018). These numbers are adjusted to
reflect 2020 dollars. https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention evaluated
how effective the proposed requirements would be at addressing the NTSB
urgent safety recommendation and any other factors that may have
contributed to the Liberty Helicopters accident, previously described
in section III. of this proposed rule. Based on that assessment, the
FAA used a range for the effectiveness rate of 0.6 to 0.9.\69\
Multiplying the effectiveness rates by the estimated potential loss of
$58.2 million, mentioned above, yields an estimated range of $34.9 to
$52.4 million for one averted accident. Assuming an accident occurs
every 10 years over a 20-year time horizon (i.e., an accident in year
10 and year 20 of the analysis period), the present value of benefits
would range from $26.8 million to $40.2 million, at a 7 percent
discount rate, and $45.4 million to $68.0 million at 3 percent discount
rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Id. at Appendix A at 61 (stating, High effectiveness--The
JIMDAT-assigned values in which enhancements that are judged to have
a ``low'' probability of preventing an accident receive a numerical
value ranging from 0.1 to 0.4, reflecting a one in ten chance of
preventing the accident to a 40% chance. Similarly, ``medium'' may
receive numerical ratings of 0.4 to 0.6 and ``high'' may receive up
to 0.95).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Costs Relative to Pre-Emergency Order of Prohibition
    This proposed rule would prohibit flight operations with an SRS
unless the SRS meets specific requirements. Although these requirements
are being proposed under part 91, they would affect any operation with
an SRS except for operations conducted under part 105, parachute
operations, and operations conducted under part 133, Rotorcraft
External-Load Operations. This subsection examines the costs relative
to the regulatory environment before the Emergency Order of
Prohibition, when no rules specifically addressed civil aircraft
operations conducted with the use of SRS.
    This proposed rule would require the SRS (which would consist of a
harness and lanyard, at a minimum) to have an accessible front or side
release mechanism that can be quickly operated with minimal difficulty
during an emergency. The rule would require the lanyard be connected to
an aircraft attaching point or points that are not in the flightdeck,
with a rated strength equal to or greater than the weight of the
occupant (or the combined weight if there is more than one occupant
attached to an attachment point), and ensures the torso of the person
using the SRS remains inside the aircraft at all times. Additionally,
for operations with doors opened or removed, each person would need to
occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness, properly secured about the individual during all
phases of flight; or occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about the
individual during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing, in