Class 1 and Class 2 mishaps--the more severe events. The FAA replaces
the mishap classes referenced in Sec.  450.173(a) with the term,
``mishap.'' Finally, the FAA replaces the mishap classes referenced in
Sec.  450.219(b) with a reference to the portion of the mishap
definition that corresponds to the proposed requirement: Events listed
in paragraphs (1) through (5) and (8).
    The removal of the mishap classes dispenses with commenters'
requests for clarification or guidance in ACs on applying and
differentiating the proposed mishap classes.
    The final rule adds three changes to sections that cross-reference
the mishap-related terms that the FAA proposed to replace with the
revised mishap definition: Sec. Sec.  420.61(b), 437.87(b), and
460.45(d). The FAA replaces the term ``launch or launch site accident''
in Sec.  420.61(b) with a reference to the portions of the mishap
definition that replace these terms: Paragraphs (1), (5), and (8). The
FAA also replaces the word ``shall'' with the word ``must'' in Sec.
420.61 because ``shall'' is no longer used in FAA regulations.
Similarly, in Sec.  437.87(b), the FAA replaces the phrase, ``launch or
reentry accident or incident,'' with a reference to corresponding
portions of the mishap definition in paragraphs (1) through (3), (5),
and (8). As noted in the section of this preamble discussing the
compliance period for legacy licenses (Sec.  450.1(b)), the FAA revises
Sec.  460.45(d) to require part 415, 431, and 435 licensees to apply
the mishap-related definitions in Sec.  401.5, and part 450 licensees
to apply the definitions in Sec.  401.7 when describing the safety
record of the vehicle to space flight participants. Specifically, Sec.
460.45(d)(1) requires that part 450 licensees identify events that meet
paragraphs (1), (4), (5), and (8) of the definition of a mishap in
Sec.  401.7, which occur during and after vehicle verification
performed in accordance with Sec.  460.17.
    The FAA also revises Sec.  420.59 to identify the portions of the
mishap definition applicable to launch site operators licensed under
part 420. Not all of the events described under the definition of
``mishap'' apply to part 420 licenses, which do not authorize launch or
reentry activities, though the NPRM did not state this fact expressly.
Nor did the FAA intend the revised definition of ``mishap'' to expand
the scope of the previous ``launch site accident'' definition under
part 420. The FAA therefore revises Sec.  420.59(a) to state that a
licensee must report, respond to, and investigate mishaps that meet
paragraph (1) or (5) of the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7.
The FAA specified in the final rule that part 420 licensees must
prepare mishap plans that meet Sec.  450.173(b) through (f), including
allocation of roles and responsibilities between the launch operator
and site operator for reporting, responding to, and investigating any
mishap during ground activities at the site, to specify the scope of
the mishap plan more accurately. The FAA also deletes the word
``response'' in Sec.  420.59(a) since Sec.  450.173 and the rest of
Sec.  420.59 refer to a ``mishap plan,'' not a ``mishap response
plan.''
    AIA and Virgin Galactic commented that the term ``failure of a
safety organization'' in the ``mishap'' definition was unclear. The FAA
notes this term previously appeared under ``launch incident'' and
``reentry incident'' in Sec.  401.5. ``Failure of a safety
organization'' occurs when an operator fails to complete an action
expected or required by the safety organization, or when the
organization stops functioning normally, such that it creates a public
safety risk. For example, the FAA would consider an operator's failure
to follow existing safety processes or procedures, thereby placing the
public at risk, a failure of a safety organization. Additional examples
include (1) the failure of operator personnel to communicate a hold
condition upon a violation of launch commit criteria, (2) a safety
official failing to report potential safety matters to the mission
director, or (3) the failure of an organization to recognize and
mitigate a hazard, resulting in a public safety risk. No change was
made to the regulation based on this comment.
    SpaceX and Virgin Galactic sought clarification on the meaning of
``high risk'' of causing serious or fatal injury and ``substantial
damage'' to property. SpaceX requested examples of high risk versus
non-high risk events. AIA asked how the FAA would determine whether an
event rises to the level of ``high risk.'' Virgin Galactic recommended
``high risk'' be defined in Sec.  401.5 as an event that would have
caused a casualty had one or more humans been present.
    The FAA has used ``high risk'' of causing serious or fatal injury
to define ``human space flight incident'' in Sec.  401.5. As stated in
the FAA's ``Answers to Clarifying Questions

Received by June 28, 2019,'' \184\ the FAA would consider any off-
nominal event during pre-flight or flight operations that posed a high
probability of fatality or serious injury to spaceflight participants,
crew, government astronauts, or the public, to be ``high risk.'' The
FAA stated in the NPRM that it would determine on a case-by-case basis
whether damage to property not associated with the licensed activity is
``substantial damage,'' based on such factors as direct replacement
cost, repair cost, and the property's intended use and functionality.
When making a substantial damage determination, the FAA will include
damage caused by debris impacts, toxic plumes, and fires ignited by the
vehicle or its debris. The FAA provided, as an example, structural
damage to public property exceeding 50 percent of its market value,
such as a failed launch attempt with debris impacts outside a defined
hazard area resulting in a post-impact fire and loss of a residential
structure. The FAA will evaluate unplanned damage to property
associated with a licensed or permitted activity on the same bases.
Examples might include a major repair or replacement of launch
facilities due to an unsuccessful launch attempt, including processing
facilities, launch pads, or propellant tanks, based on cost of repair
or replacement or loss of use. Similar to the NTSB's definition of
``substantial damage'' (49 CFR 830.2), under paragraph (6) of the
``mishap'' definition in Sec.  401.7, the FAA may deem any damage that
adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight
characteristics of a launch or reentry vehicle which normally require
major repair or replacement of the affected component, to be
substantial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ See FAA-2019-0229-0106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA declines Virgin Galactic's suggested definition of ``high
risk'' because the suggested standard is too narrow and would exclude
serious injury short of fatality. As noted above, the FAA would
consider any off-nominal event during pre-flight or flight operations
that pose a high probability of fatality or serious injury to
spaceflight participants, crew, government astronauts, or the public,
to be high risk. The FAA intends ``high risk'' to cover events akin to
a near miss or close-call. This approach is consistent with USAF and
NASA practices. Virgin Galactic's suggestion would prove impracticable,
requiring near certainty that a casualty would have occurred.
    Virgin Galactic recommended the FAA prescribe a timeline and
specific process for determining whether ``high risk'' or ``substantial
damage'' occurred. Virgin Galactic suggested the FAA develop such a
process and incorporate it elsewhere in the regulations, not in the
definition of ``mishap.'' Virgin Galactic argued the FAA should have no
more than 14 days to make these determinations in order to minimize
operational impacts.
    It would not be appropriate to limit the time frame or implement
procedures to determine whether an event posed a high risk of causing
serious or fatal injury or resulted in substantial damage to property.
Although the FAA will begin to evaluate a mishap upon receiving notice
and details of the event, the rate at which the FAA can make these
determinations will necessarily depend on the attendant circumstances
and information supplied by the licensee. Moreover, the FAA retains the
ability to modify its determination upon receipt of new information
about the mishap.
    SpaceX recommended the FAA remove ``government astronauts'' from
the ``mishap'' definition because, unlike the uninvolved public, those
individuals accept risk by virtue of their informed involvement in a
vehicle's flight. Acceptance of risk does not preclude a fatality or
serious injury from being considered a mishap. The FAA removes the
references to space flight participants, government astronauts, and
crew from the ``mishap'' definition to make it clear that the FAA will
deem any fatality or serious injury associated with licensed or
permitted activity a mishap irrespective of whether persons are
involved in the licensed activity.
    SpaceX recommended the Class 2 definition be limited to events
``during a licensed or permitted activity,'' rather than events
``associated with'' licensed or permitted activity. The commenter
offered no rationale for temporally limiting the criteria now described
in paragraphs (2) through (5) of the ``mishap'' definition, and the FAA
sees no reason to do so. The FAA would only deem a mishap those events
that are within the scope of the FAA's statutory authority. No change
to the regulation is made based on this comment.
    Sierra Nevada commented that treating the impact of a vehicle,
payload, or components thereof ``outside the designated area'' as a
mishap was overly prescriptive and unrealistic. Sierra Nevada commented
that since hazard areas are generated as probability contours, not
contours of total containment, debris could realistically exist outside
the hazard area that would not warrant segregation in the event of a
breakup scenario. Sierra Nevada also recommended removing from proposed
Sec.  450.173(d) the requirement to report vehicle or debris impact
points outside the hazard area to the FAA, which it claimed was
burdensome, cost prohibitive, and unreasonable.
    The criterion cited by Sierra Nevada, now captured in paragraph (8)
of the mishap definition, does not require licensees to track every
possible piece of debris in an off-nominal scenario, but rather only
debris that presents a hazard to the public. The proposed criterion
closely followed the definitions of ``launch accident'' and ``reentry
accident'' in Sec.  401.5, but used ``hazard area'' in lieu of ``impact
limit lines'' and ``designated'' landing or reentry site, to be
consistent with the hazard analysis framework set forth in part 450. To
clarify the scope of this mishap criterion, the FAA replaces the term
``vehicle or debris'' in paragraph (8) with the term ``hazardous
debris,'' which is defined in Sec.  401.7. Thus, this criterion applies
to the impact of hazardous debris (i.e., debris capable of causing a
casualty or loss of functionality to a critical asset) outside the
planned landing site or hazard area. The occurrence of debris outside
the hazard area that does not meet the definition of ``hazardous
debris'' in Sec.  401.7 is not a mishap.
    The FAA similarly revises Sec.  450.173(c)(3)(iv) to require that
operators identify ``hazardous debris'' impact points as part of a
preliminary mishap report, so that the FAA can assess potential public
safety risks. The FAA makes this change to be consistent with the new
definition of ``hazardous debris,'' and it is consistent with the
intent of the proposed regulation. The FAA also replaces the term
``impact area'' with the term ``designated hazard area'' to be
consistent with the terminology used in the mishap definition. This
revision does not change the scope of the requirement from the NPRM;
the FAA only requires an operator to report the hazardous debris impact
locations, not all debris impact locations. Use of the term ``hazard
area'' is also consistent with requirements for an operator to
establish ``hazard areas'' under part 450 to protect the public from
hazards associated with their operations.
    The requirement to track and report hazardous debris is reasonable,
given that operators must employ vehicle tracking for normal flight,
and hazardous debris falling outside the designated area poses a
serious risk to public safety. In the event of a vehicle breakup,
operators should be able to approximate any hazardous debris impacts in
relation to the designated landing site or hazard area based on the

vehicle's last-known state vector or other tracking resources required
for normal flight.
ii. Mishap Plan (Sec.  450.173)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate mishap planning,
reporting, response, and investigation requirements under proposed
Sec.  450.173. The FAA also proposed to revise Sec. Sec.  420.59 and
437.41 to require an applicant to submit a mishap plan that meets the
requirements of Sec.  450.173. Proposed Sec.  450.173(c) required an
operator to report to and cooperate with FAA and NTSB investigations
and designate one or more points of contact for the FAA and NTSB.
Proposed Sec.  450.173(d) required operators to notify the FAA of
mishaps and submit a preliminary report within certain time frames.
Proposed Sec.  450.173(f) required that, in the event of a mishap, an
operator must investigate the root causes of the mishap and report
investigation results to the FAA.
    Virgin Galactic broadly expressed support for the proposed rule.
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended adding
to proposed Sec.  450.173(f) a requirement for licensees to support any
NTSB or government agency-led mishap investigation and to cooperate
with any other government investigative agencies.
    The FAA declines to incorporate the suggested addition. Upon review
of the NPRM and comments received, the FAA determines that the
requirement originally proposed in Sec.  450.173(c) regarding NTSB and
FAA cooperation is unnecessary. Section 450.13 (Rights Not Conferred by
a Vehicle Operator License) plainly states that issuance of a license
does not relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply with all
applicable requirements of law or regulation. The duty of operators to
comply with lawful investigations, whether conducted by the FAA or
another entity with investigative authority, exists irrespective of the
language proposed in Sec.  450.173(c). Accordingly, the FAA removes
proposed Sec.  450.173(c) from the final rule. For the same reason, the
FAA also removes paragraph (b)(2) from proposed Sec.  420.59 (Mishap
Plan). Operators remain responsible for reporting investigation results
to the FAA under Sec.  450.173(e).
    Sierra Nevada asked whether licensees must coordinate with the FAA
and NTSB for all mishaps. For the reasons stated above, the FAA removed
the requirement proposed in Sec.  450.173(c).
    The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) recommended the FAA
revise proposed Sec.  450.173(e), which contained emergency response
requirements, to require a level of safety based on its spaceport fire
safety and emergency response standards. The FAA supports the
development of industry consensus standards for fire safety and
emergency response, but disagrees that it would be appropriate to
prescribe such a code or standard in this performance-based rule.
    In addition to removing proposed Sec.  450.173(c), the FAA replaces
the term ``vehicle and debris impact points, including those outside a
planned landing or impact area'' in proposed Sec.  450.173(d)(3)(iv)
with the term ``hazardous debris impact points, including those outside
a planned landing site or designated hazard area'' in Sec.
450.173(c)(3)(iv).\185\ This change is consistent with changes
previously discussed in the preamble. Lastly, the FAA revises the
emergency response requirements in Sec.  450.173(d)(1) to include the
term ``property'' because, as discussed in this preamble, the FAA
removed the reference to ``property'' from the definition of ``public''
in Sec.  401.7. The FAA adopts the rest of this section of the proposed
rule without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ The FAA removes proposed Sec.  450.173(c) from the final
rule and re-designates Sec.  450.173(d) through (h) as Sec.
450.173(c) through (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Test-Induced Damage (Sec.  450.175)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to give license applicants and
licensees the option to pre-coordinate testing activities with the FAA.
This pre-coordination would take place during FAA-licensed activities
to prevent the FAA from labeling test failures or associated damage as
mishaps.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.175 with a
modification. Section 450.175 will only apply to licensees or license
applicants seeking this exception. The FAA will consider test failures
and damage covered by this section, including damage to ground support
equipment, ground support systems, and flight hardware, as test-induced
damage and not a mishap, so long as the failure falls within the pre-
coordinated scope and FAA-approved testing profile. Any mishap
resulting in a serious injury or fatality, damage to property not
associated with the licensed activity, or hazardous debris leaving the
pre-defined hazard area, will be treated as a mishap and not test-
induced damage, and will be subject to the reporting, response, and
investigation requirements of Sec.  450.173.
    Several commenters expressed confusion about the effect of proposed
Sec.  450.175 on the part 450 licensing process. Boeing, Leo Aerospace,
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA asked how test-induced
damage would impact the licensing process. Boeing also commented that
all planned test operations within the scope of a license should be
assessed for public risk during the application process. Blue Origin
asked what type of test is contemplated by ``test-induced damage,'' and
if it would include tests conducted at a launch site with co-located
test facilities, as opposed to integrated vehicle tests that
traditionally happen at a launch site. Sierra Nevada and Microcosm
commented that testing was outside the FAA's jurisdiction, and the
proposed regulation should only apply to damage induced by a test
performed under a license.
    The test-induced damage exception set forth in Sec.  450.175 only
applies to license applicants or licensees seeking a mishap exception
for test activities conducted during licensed activities. The test-
induced damage exception is optional. To clarify that the test-induced
damage exception is optional, the FAA adds paragraph (a)
(Applicability), which states that Sec.  450.175 only applies to
license applicants or licensees who choose to pre-coordinate and apply
for an optional test-induced damage exception. The FAA also replaces
the word ``operator'' with the term ``license applicants or licensees''
to clarify that this provision is only available through the part 450
licensing process. Experimental permittees under part 437, by contrast,
cannot seek to pre-coordinate test-induced damage with the FAA.
    The exception does not apply to test activities that are not
associated with FAA-licensed activities, nor to any activities outside
FAA jurisdiction. The information submitted by the applicant will
define the scope and type of test activities considered for test-
induced damage. The FAA confirms that all planned test operations
occurring during the scope of a license will be assessed for public
safety risks. As stated in the FAA's ``Answers to Clarifying Questions
Received by June 28, 2019,'' test-induced damage refers to damage
expected to occur as part of a licensed activity approved by the FAA
prior to the operation. An applicant must identify expected outcomes
and potential risks associated with the proposed test activity. The FAA
expects an applicant to identify potential failure outcomes and their
consequences or risks, and plan for them appropriately. In order to
except damage from becoming a mishap, the applicant needs to identify
that potential damage to the

FAA. Unanticipated test damage may be excepted if it results from
activities conducted within the scope of the FAA approval, and does not
result in any of the events listed in Sec.  450.175(b)(2).
    To seek an exception, an applicant must submit the information
listed in Sec.  450.175(c) to the FAA in advance with sufficient time
to evaluate the proposal. Although the FAA anticipates the amount of
time required to evaluate an applicant's proposal will be minimal, the
scope of review required will vary based on the proposed test
activities and completeness of information provided.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended
without explanation that the subheading for proposed Sec.  450.175(a)
be changed to, ``Coordination of risk of test-induced damage.'' The FAA
declines to incorporate this recommendation, as it does not accurately
describe the coordination set forth in Sec.  450.175. The possibility
of test-induced damage is assumed under Sec.  450.175. Identification
of potential risks associated with a testing activity is but one of the
items applicants must submit to seek an exception under this section.
The FAA agrees, however, that the proposed text was unclear, as the
heading used the term, ``anticipated,'' which does not appear in Sec.
450.175. Accordingly, the FAA revises the subheading for Sec.
450.175(b) to clarify that operators would be coordinating
``potential,'' rather than ``anticipated,'' test-induced damage.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA also
recommended, without explanation, that applicants be required to
coordinate test-induced damage with any affected third parties or
public authorities, in addition to the FAA. The FAA declines to
incorporate this recommendation. Section 450.175 provides a process for
license applicants and licensees to pre-coordinate with the FAA test-
induced damage that would otherwise fall under the FAA's definition of
``mishap.'' The FAA is the only entity with whom coordination will be
needed to seek exception from the FAA's ``mishap'' definition. It
should be noted, however, that pre-coordination of test-induced damage
under this section will not affect the duty of licensees to comply with
all other requirements of their license, and with all other applicable
laws and regulations.
    In reference to what is now Sec.  450.175(b)(2), Boeing recommended
the FAA take into consideration insight gleaned from near-misses,
noting that while a test may not have resulted in damage, the same
anomaly could induce significant damage in a similar operational
sequence. The FAA acknowledges the commenter's concern for the net
effect of unreported anomalies but finds it unnecessary to change the
regulatory text. Section 450.175 provides an exception to the
``mishap'' definition. Test-induced damage that exceeds the scope of
FAA-approved activities will be treated as a mishap. It is possible for
an anomaly to occur during pre-coordinated test activities. Any
condition during licensed or permitted activity (including pre-
coordinated test activity) that deviates from what is standard, normal,
or expected during verification or operation of a system, process,
facility, or equipment is an anomaly under Sec.  401.7. Given that
Sec.  450.215 (Post-flight Reporting) requires operators to identify
anomalies and corrective actions taken in response in their post-flight
report, the FAA finds it will have notice of the ``near-miss''
anomalies referenced by the commenter.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended that
proposed Sec.  450.175(c) be made consistent with ground hazard
analysis requirements in proposed Sec.  450.185 or be deleted
altogether. The FAA disagrees with this comment because the
requirements of Sec.  450.185 apply to the entire launch and reentry
vehicle lifecycle, and are therefore much more comprehensive than the
information requirements for test-induced damage. Imposing ground
hazard analysis requirements would place an undue burden on applicants
seeking a test-induced damage exception. Moreover, the test-induced
paradigm is intended for the testing of a specific system, function, or
component during licensed activities. As stated in the NPRM, the test-
induced damage exception is not available for the operation of an
entire vehicle, but rather the testing of specific components and
systems. Lastly, unlike the ground hazard analysis requirements, the
information requirements of Sec.  450.175(c) only apply to applicants
seeking a mishap exception for damage resulting from specific test
activities taking place within a defined time-period, as coordinated
with and approved by the FAA.
pp. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements and Practices (Sec.  450.177)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirements under Sec.  450.177 for
operators to implement unique policies, requirements, and practices
needed to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and
the national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States. Proposed Sec.  450.177(a) would require an operator to review
operations, system designs, analysis, and testing, and to identify any
unique launch or reentry hazards not otherwise addressed by proposed
part 450. Proposed Sec.  450.177(b) would provide that the FAA may
identify and impose a unique policy, requirement, or practice, as
needed, to protect the public health and safety, safety of property,
and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.177 (Unique Safety
Policies, Requirements and Practices) with two revisions. For the
reasons discussed below, the FAA removes the references to property
protection and national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States, and adds ``safety'' to the section title.
    CSF, Sierra Nevada, and Spaceport Strategies commented that
proposed Sec.  450.177(b) expanded regulatory uncertainty by allowing
the FAA to impose new requirements when needed to protect public health
and safety, safety of property, and national security or U.S. foreign
policy interests. CSF noted that part 417 previously allowed the FAA to
impose new requirements when needed ``to protect the public.'' CSF and
Sierra Nevada commented that proposed Sec.  450.177(b) expanded the
FAA's ability to impose requirements on an operator outside of
regulatory process even if the operator met all other criteria. The
commenters suggested that the ability to impose unknown requirements as
a result of innovation will adversely impact costs and could have a
chilling effect on innovation and investments in U.S. space industries
if the FAA's discretion under proposed Sec.  450.177 was unbounded.
They further contended that the proposed requirement would give the FAA
discretion to impose new requirements ``as-needed'' and result in no
cost savings. CSF also expressed concern that such requirements could
be inequitably imposed on a singular licensee or disparately among
licensees developing similar technologies or operational approaches.
CSF recommended the FAA be required to collaborate with the operator or
with industry before requiring a unique policy, rule, or practice. CSF
and Sierra Nevada recommended the rule be bounded to limit the scope
and timeline for the FAA to impose restrictions, and give applicants
due process.
    The FAA agrees that it is unnecessary to include hazards to the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States
under this section because those considerations are adequately covered
under policy and

payload reviews in part 450. In the final rule, the FAA removes
``national security and foreign policy interests of the United States''
from Sec.  450.177(b) and (c)(2).
    In the final rule, the FAA also removes ``safety of property'' from
Sec.  450.177(b) and (c). As explained in other parts of this preamble,
the FAA is retaining in the final rule only specific requirements for
property protection (e.g. critical assets, property on orbit), which
have specific safety criteria. Operators may be required to mitigate
hazards to property through emergency response requirements in Sec.
450.173(d), but otherwise, the FAA declines to impose a more specific
property protection requirement at this time. Removal of the references
to property protection and national security and foreign policy
interests largely dispenses with the commenters' concerns that Sec.
450.177 would expand the scope of Sec.  417.127. Although the final
rule retains the provision in Sec.  450.177(b) regarding FAA's ability
to impose a unique requirement, policy, or practice needed to protect
public health and safety, the FAA does not foresee a substantive change
for operators from Sec.  417.127, which provides that FAA may impose
such unique requirements as needed to protect the public.
    The FAA's authority to impose a unique requirement, policy, or
practice is bounded, as it is in Sec.  417.127, by the FAA's statutory
authority to protect public health and safety. The FAA understands the
concern expressed by Spaceport Strategies and others that the
imposition of unique policies, requirements, or practices deemed
necessary by the FAA to protect public health and safety has the
potential to impose additional costs on the operator. However, given
the rarity of the FAA's invocation of Sec.  417.127, and the prosperity
of today's commercial space industry under part 417, the FAA does not
foresee any additional costs to operators or a chilling of innovation
resulting from Sec.  450.177.
    Moreover, as discussed in the NPRM preamble, the necessity for
Sec.  450.177 is the same as that for Sec.  417.127: The FAA expects
that advances in technology and implementation of innovations by launch
and reentry operators will likely introduce new and unforeseen safety
challenges. These advances and innovations can present regulatory
challenges that are unforeseen in existing regulations. In this case,
the FAA must work with operators on a case-by-case basis to identify
and mitigate those unique hazards posed to public health and safety,
which are not addressed by part 450. The FAA expects the need for the
use of this provision to be rare, as has the need to use Sec.  417.127,
due to the comprehensiveness and performance-based nature of part 450.
In the rare instance that it is used, the FAA will work with the
operator to reach a mutually satisfactory solution that allows the
activity while protecting public health and safety, but the FAA
declines to require collaboration in the regulation, as CSF suggests.
qq. Ground Safety (Sec.  450.179 to Sec.  450.189)
i. Ground Safety General (Sec.  450.179)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to
protect the public from the adverse effects of hazardous operations and
systems associated with preparing a launch vehicle for flight,
returning a launch or reentry vehicle to a safe condition after flight,
or after an aborted launch attempt, and returning a site to a safe
condition.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.179 with
revisions.\186\ This final rule moves proposed subsections (b) and (c)
to Sec.  450.179(a)(1) through (3) and adds new subsections (b) and
(c). These additions are discussed in more detail in the preamble
section addressing Launch and Reentries from a Federal Launch or
Reentry Site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ Proposed Sec.  450.179 required an operator at a U.S.
launch or landing site to protect the public from adverse effects of
hazardous operations and systems. The FAA changed ``protect the
public'' to ``protect the public and property'' in the final rule.
This change is because, as discussed earlier in this preamble,
property was removed from the definition of ``public.'' Thus,
``property'' was added to this section to keep the requirement
equivalent to what was proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Coordination With a Licensed Launch or Reentry Site Operator (Sec.
450.181)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to
coordinate with site operators as both entities have public safety
obligations during ground operations. Operators would be required to
coordinate with site operators to ensure that access to public sites is
controlled and prevent unsafe interference of ground hazards. For a
launch or reentry conducted from or to an FAA licensed site, an
operator would be required to coordinate mishap reporting, response,
and investigations with the site operator for any mishap during ground
activities at the site.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.181 as proposed with
two exceptions. In Sec.  450.181(a)(3), the ground hazard areas must be
coordinated with a site operator during the designation of those ground
hazard areas. In the final rule, the FAA changes the language used to
describe this coordination to ``[t]he designation of any ground hazard
area that affects the operations of a launch or reentry site is
coordinated with the Federal or licensed launch or reentry site
operator.'' This amended language is a minor grammatical change and is
consistent with the intent of the proposed requirement. In addition,
proposed Sec.  450.181(a)(4) required an operator to coordinate with a
site operator to ensure, in part, prompt and effective response in the
event of a mishap that could impact ``public safety.'' In the final
rule, the FAA changes this phrasing to require that a prompt and
effective response ``is undertaken'' in the event of a mishap that
could impact ``the safety of the public and property.'' The FAA changes
``public safety'' to ``the safety of the public and property'' in the
final rule because, as discussed earlier in this preamble, property was
removed from the definition of ``public.'' Thus, the FAA makes this
wording change to keep the requirement equivalent to what was proposed.
The FAA adds ``is undertaken'' as a minor grammatical change that is
consistent with the intent of the proposed requirement.
    Sierra Nevada commented that proposed Sec.  450.181 seems to be
duplicative of proposed Sec.  450.147 (Agreements) and thus should be
removed. While agreements made with a Federal or licensed site operator
may satisfy the requirements of Sec.  450.181, the FAA finds the
requirement to coordinate with a site operator specifies what
coordination must be in place to prevent unsafe interference among
users of a site and ensure clear lines of responsibility for related
aspects of public safety. The FAA concurs that an applicant may be able
to show compliance with both requirements by providing an agreement
that shows compliance with the specific criteria in Sec.  450.181.
However, the two requirements are different and intentionally separate.
Specifically, Sec.  450.181 provides additional detail about
coordination that is necessary for public safety because improperly
coordinated neighboring operations that occur on or near the launch
site have the ability to create hazards to the public. In addition, the
agreement required by Sec.  450.147 is not an application deliverable,
whereas Sec.  450.181 requires an application deliverable. Accordingly,
the FAA adopts both Sec. Sec.  450.181 and 450.147.
    Denver International Airport commented that, although it supported
the proposed requirements for

coordination with site operators, these requirements were too narrow to
keep site operators and surrounding communities properly informed.
Denver International Airport also commented that operators should be
required to coordinate on launch and reentry activities and mishaps
with a wider group of interested and affected stakeholders, including
first responders and local governments. Similarly, AAAE proposed that
licensed operators be required to notify contingent landing sites and
nearby airports of safety hazards, including providing them with the
ground safety hazard analysis. AAAE suggested such notifications could
be accomplished as part of the notifications required in proposed Sec.
450.147 or as part of a broader public disclosure.
    The FAA notes that the notification requirements in Sec.  420.57
require licensed site operators to notify local officials and adjacent
landowners of flight schedules. In addition, Sec.  450.147 requires
vehicle operators to have agreements with any sites or services that
are necessary to meet the safety requirements for a license. These
requirements serve to notify the necessary entities about licensed
operations. Including notification requirements beyond those in
Sec. Sec.  420.57 and 450.147 is outside the needs of this rulemaking
to protect public health and safety, safety of property, and national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA recommended the
FAA revise proposed Sec.  450.181(a)(3) to require only that
coordination ensure that any ground hazard areas are identified. The
FAA does not find the commenters' recommendation sufficient to protect
public safety and avoid adverse impacts on neighboring space
operations. The vehicle operator must take an active role in ensuring
the site operator is aware of ground hazard areas and how they may
impact other site operations.
iii. Explosive Site Plan (Sec.  450.183)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require an applicant to include an
explosive site plan as part of its vehicle operator license application
for a launch or reentry from or to a site exclusive to its own use.
This plan would be required to demonstrate compliance with the
explosive siting requirements in part 420.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.183 (Explosive Site
Plan) as proposed. The FAA received no comments on this section.
iv. Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec.  450.185)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an operator would be required to
complete a ground hazard analysis that would include an assessment of
the launch or reentry vehicle, the launch or reentry integrated
systems, ground support equipment, and other site hardware. In its
analysis, an applicant must identify hazards; include a risk
assessment; and identify and describe mitigations, controls, and
provisions for hazard control verification and validation. Although the
analysis might incorporate aspects of employee safety and mission
assurance, an applicant would only be required to identify the hazards
that affect the public and describe how those hazards are mitigated.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.185 as proposed, with
minor edits to remove the reference to ``public property'' because
``property'' has been removed from the final rule's definition of
``public,'' as discussed in the preamble section for Neighboring
Operations Personnel. Instead, the FAA refers to ``property not
associated with the launch or reentry.''
    In response to the proposed requirements, NFPA suggested its own
standards as guidance for complying with proposed Sec. Sec.  450.179,
450.185, and 450.189. Space Florida also commented that the FAA did not
provide clear guidance on what standards would be acceptable and how
the agency would judge the sufficiency of the ground hazard analysis.
Space Florida did not recommend a specific change to proposed Sec.
450.185.
    In response to NFPA's comment, the FAA notes that applicants are
free to explore the use of any industry standard to demonstrate
compliance with these sections. If the industry standard has not
already been accepted by the FAA, the FAA would review the proposed
standard as part of an applicant's application. NFPA is also welcome to
submit its standards to the FAA for acceptance at any time.
    In response to Space Florida, the FAA recommends that the applicant
identify proposed standards and common practices during pre-application
consultation to reach an agreement with the FAA on their applicability
for proposed operations. For items that may deviate from current
standards and practices, the FAA may seek additional justification or
analysis to determine whether ground hazards pose a risk to public
safety.
    Virgin Galactic asked the FAA to retain the ground safety analysis
practices used under part 431 and not to impose proposed Sec.  450.185.
Virgin Galactic also asked that existing launch vehicles be
``grandfathered.'' Finally, Virgin Galactic commented that conducting a
ground hazard analysis would place a cost burden on hybrid vehicle
operators and asked the FAA to outline its reasoning for imposing the
requirement on hybrid operators.
    The FAA discusses Virgin Galactic's question regarding cost burden
in the preamble section addressing Responses to Regulatory Impact
Analysis Comments. Part 431 does not have an explicit ground safety
requirement, and as a result it is often difficult for applicants to
ascertain how to meet the safety standard for pre-flight operations.
Concurrently, the ground safety requirements in part 417 are overly
prescriptive and onerous. The ground hazard analysis requirements in
part 450 strike a balance between the two parts, providing additional
guidance to applicants, while at the same time preserving flexibility.
    An operation that was licensed prior to the effective date of this
rulemaking will be permitted to continue under its license for five
years from the effective date or when the license expires if the
operator does not seek a renewal. For further discussion, please see
the preamble section on Legacy Licenses. All regulated operators,
including hybrid launch or reentry systems operators, will need to
prepare a ground hazard analysis to ensure public safety is protected.
Hybrid launch or reentry vehicles may still pose a risk to the public;
therefore, the FAA imposes its ground hazard analysis requirements on
hybrid launch vehicles in order to identify and mitigate those risks.
Some launch or reentry systems will have very limited ground hazards,
and thus the ground hazard analysis will be similarly limited. An
operator would not need its ground hazard analysis to include carrier
aircraft activities that do not constitute launch or reentry.\187\
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    \187\ Such activities may include, for example, activities
conducted by a carrier aircraft without a rocket attached when the
carrier aircraft plus rocket constitutes the launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop, and the ULA recommended the FAA
modify proposed Sec.  450.185(a) by adding that a ground hazard
analysis must identify system and operation hazards posed by the
vehicle ``and any of its components.'' The FAA does not adopt this
change because any requirement levied on the vehicle also necessarily
includes the vehicle's components.
    CSF, Sierra Nevada, and Space Florida recommended that the FAA
consider an alternative regulatory approach giving site operators more

authority over ground safety. Specifically, CSF and Sierra Nevada
recommended that the FAA consider an alternative regulatory approach
that would give the responsibility for assessing and controlling ground
safety and hazards mitigations to the site operator.
    Historically, the launch or reentry operator has been responsible
for ground safety and, as reflected in the NPRM, the FAA determined
that this allocation of responsibility was appropriate given that the
operator has the most comprehensive understanding of the parameters of
the licensed activity. The FAA expects that the launch or reentry
operator will work closely with the site operator to ensure all
requirements are met. Accordingly, the FAA retains the proposed
language in the final rule.
v. Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls (Sec.  450.189)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to
implement certain prescribed hazard controls during the ground
operations period of launch or reentry. These prescribed hazard
controls would require that an operator document how it would protect
members of the public who enter areas under the operator's control, and
mitigate hazards created by a countdown abort. They would also require
the operator to establish plans for controlling fires and emergency
procedures. In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.189 as
proposed.
    AAAE suggested licensed operators be required to notify nearby
airports and contingent landing sites of potential safety hazards and
their controls, including those described under this section and
proposed Sec.  450.185. The notification requirements in Sec.  420.57
require licensed site operators to notify local officials and adjacent
landowners of flight schedules. In addition, Sec.  450.147 requires
vehicle operators to have agreements with any sites or services that
are necessary to meet the safety requirements for a license. These
requirements serve to notify the necessary entities about licensed
operations.
5. Part 450 Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle Operator
License
a. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, Financial
Responsibility, Human Spaceflight Requirements (Sec. Sec.  450.201 to
450.207)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirements addressing how a
licensee is responsible for ensuring public safety and safety of
property during the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry in proposed
Sec.  450.201, how a licensee would be required to comply with a
license in proposed Sec.  450.203 (Compliance with License), with
financial responsibility requirements of part 440 in proposed Sec.
450.205 (Financial Responsibility Requirements), and with human
spaceflight requirements in part 460 in proposed Sec.  450.207 (Human
Spaceflight Requirements).
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the requirements as proposed. The
FAA received no comments on these proposals.
b. Compliance Monitoring (Sec.  450.209)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to combine the compliance monitoring
requirements of Sec. Sec.  417.23 and 431.83 in Sec.  450.209. The FAA
also proposed to allow an operator the option to provide the FAA with
means other than a console for monitoring the communication and
countdown channels. The compliance monitoring requirements of proposed
Sec.  450.209 would apply to all launch and reentry operations.
Finally, proposed Sec.  450.209 codified the FAA practice for
conducting compliance monitoring of part 435 operations. In final rule,
the FAA adopts Sec.  450.209 as proposed.
    Virgin Galactic expressed concern regarding proposed Sec.
450.209(b), which stated a licensee must provide the FAA with the
capability to communicate with the mission director. Virgin Galactic
suggested replacement language that gave the operator the
responsibility for assigning a radio communications point-of-contact
for the FAA during operations. The FAA does not adopt this suggestion
because the FAA must have direct contact with the mission director
during licensed operations to ensure any risk to public safety during
ongoing operations is immediately addressed. It will continue to be FAA
practice not to contact the mission director unless there is an
immediate and urgent risk to public safety.
    The FAA also deletes Sec.  450.209(c) because it imposed a
requirement only on the FAA and was unnecessary legacy language.
c. Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application for
Modification of License (Sec.  450.211)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to preserve the continuing accuracy
requirements in Sec. Sec.  417.11 and 431.73, and consolidate them in
proposed Sec.  450.211. In addition, the FAA proposed to allow an
applicant to request approval of an alternate method for requesting
license modifications during the application process.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.211 as proposed with
only a minor revision to split the second requirement in proposed Sec.
450.211(a) into a new Sec.  450.211(b). Accordingly, proposed Sec.
450.211(b) and (c) were renumbered to become Sec.  450.211(c) and (d)
in the final rule, respectively.
    CSF and SpaceX suggested that the FAA could update Sec.  413.17(a)
to clarify that it would agree to a modification to an existing license
when the FAA accepts and approves a continuing accuracy submission. CSF
requested that the FAA clarify its use of these terms in an AC.
    Virgin Galactic noted that operators may have separate definitions
for continuing accuracy and license modifications. Virgin Galactic
proposed what it believed to be simpler requirements for continuing
accuracy updates and license modifications, which in Virgin Galactic's
experience aligned with how the FAA has processed Virgin Galactic's
license and license application updates over the past three years.
Specifically, Virgin Galactic recommended that proposed Sec.
450.211(a)(1) be rewritten to change the requirement so that after a
license has been issued, a licensee would be required to apply to the
FAA for modification of the license if the licensee proposes to make
changes that affect the license, as issued by the FAA. It also proposed
to add the term ``continuing accuracy updates'' for changes that a
licensee proposes that do not affect the license but do affect the
license application. Virgin Galactic maintained that this approach
would provide schedule assurance for operators, as license modification
usually involves time-intensive coordination between the FAA and an
operator.
    Sierra Nevada commented that general edits to the listed documents
should not trigger the requirement of continuing accuracy, as such a
requirement would create an extremely burdensome amount of document
overhead an applicant would be required to maintain that is not
necessary for maintaining public safety.
    The FAA does not agree that the suggested changes are necessary;
however, the FAA has split the two requirements in Sec.  450.211(a) so
that the application for modification of license is in Sec.  450.211(b)
for added clarity. The regulation states that a licensee is responsible
for the continuing accuracy of representations contained in its
application. A license modification is

required only if the licensee proposes to conduct a launch or reentry
in a manner not authorized by the license; or, if any representation
contained in the license application that is material to public health
and safety or the safety of property is no longer accurate and
complete, or does not reflect the licensee's procedures governing the
actual conduct of a launch or reentry. For representations that do not
meet either of these criteria, such as administrative information,
Sec.  450.211(b) continues to require an applicant to inform the FAA of
the change in order to ensure the representations made in the
application are accurate.
    The NPRM preamble identified the following as areas that constitute
a material change: Reuse, after an earlier launch or reentry, of
safety-critical systems or components, requiring refurbishment, re-
qualification testing, and re-acceptance testing. Virgin Galactic
believed performing refurbishment and pre-flight testing of reusable
safety-critical systems or components would not constitute a material
change that affects public safety. Both vehicles of a hybrid RLV launch
system are reused, and pre-flight testing and refurbishment are
performed prior to each mission. Virgin Galactic recommended this reuse
language be stricken from the preamble because it is not a material
change to public safety.
    The FAA clarifies that normal pre-flight testing and refurbishment
that are evaluated and accepted during a license application are not
considered a material change. The FAA further clarifies that only pre-
flight testing and refurbishment that is not evaluated during a
licensing process will be considered a material change. As discussed
above, a material change is a change that affects public safety that
has not been evaluated and authorized by the FAA during the licensing
process.
    Virgin Orbit commented that some of the changes noted in preamble,
such as retesting a valve or changing a safety officer, should not
require a modification to a license. Virgin Orbit recommended that what
constituted a material change should be based on how the change
affected public safety elements contained within the FSA and PSA.
Virgin Orbit further recommended that the FAA allow operators to
determine how the areas that constituted a material change as
identified in the preamble affected the public safety elements.
    As noted earlier, a material change is a change that affects public
safety that has not been evaluated and authorized by the FAA during the
licensing process. These changes may go beyond just the FSA and any PSA
\188\ as suggested by Virgin Orbit. All public safety requirements in
part 450 are applicable. The FAA does agree with Virgin Orbit that the
burden lies on the operator to determine what constitutes a material
change. The FAA notes, however, that an operator should consult with
the FAA regarding those changes for which an operator is unsure whether
the change is material or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ As discussed earlier, the FAA removed the requirement for
a PSA from the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virgin Orbit requested a definition of a ``minor'' change. It
further requested that minor changes would not require a full 180-day
review period, and that the regulation define a maximum review time for
minor changes. The FAA does not distinguish between major and minor
changes, only those changes that will or will not have a material
impact on public safety. Categorizing all potential changes that have a
material impact on public safety into only two categories is
problematic due to the variety of potential changes. The FAA does
agree, however, that not all requests for modification would require
extensive review. Although the statutory 180-day review period does not
apply to modifications, the FAA makes every effort to act upon all
requests for modifications in a timely manner. The FAA is able to
respond quickly if a change is indeed minor.
d. Pre-Flight Reporting (Sec.  450.213)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a licensee to provide the
FAA with the following information prior to each launch or reentry:
Mission-specific information, FSA products, FSS test data, data
required by the FAA to conduct a collision avoidance analysis, and a
launch or reentry schedule.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.213 with four
revisions. First, in Sec.  450.213(d)(2), the FAA replaces the term
``flight information'' with ``planned mission information'' because the
information required includes launch site information, and the term
``planned mission information'' is used in the final Sec.
450.208(d)(6). Second, the FAA revises Sec.  450.213(d) to allow an
operator the flexibility to identify an appropriate time frame in
coordination with the FAA. Third, in Sec.  450.213(e) the FAA removes
the reference to the time frames to submit LCOLA data, which the FAA
has revised in the final rule, so that Sec.  450.213(e) simply requires
operators to submit LCOLA data in accordance with Sec.  450.169(f).
Lastly, the FAA replaces ``operator'' with ``licensee'' throughout the
section to be consistent with the rest of subpart D. The FAA makes
similar changes in Sec.  450.450.215.
    Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA commented that
they appreciated the streamlining of pre-flight reporting. CSF
recommended that the FAA allow the submittal of test reports in
accordance with proposed Sec.  450.213(d) less than 30 days before
flight. SpinLaunch also stated that the proposed Sec.  450.213(d)
requirement to submit test reports 30 days prior to launch was too
burdensome.
    The FAA agrees that not all test reports for the FSS, such as end-
to-end tests and pre-flight tests, can be delivered 30 days before
flight. The FAA therefore revises Sec.  450.213(d) to allow an operator
the flexibility to identify an appropriate time frame in coordination
with the FAA. The FAA discusses this flexibility in more detail in the
preamble section on Time Frames.
    AAAE noted that, under proposed Sec.  450.213(f), launch schedules
would be required to be provided to the FAA in advance. AAAE
recommended that these schedules, including any changes to the
schedule, should also be distributed to nearby airports (within at
least five nautical miles of the launch site or along the vehicle's
trajectory), contingent landing sites, and any emergency responders
supporting the launch operation.
    The FAA declines to adopt this recommendation. Section 450.147
requires that an operator establish written agreements with any entity
that provides a service that meets a requirement. The FAA notes that
these written agreements will include any agreements necessary to
ensure the safety of airspace. The FAA has drafted Sec.  450.147 to be
as performance-based as possible; therefore, the specificity
recommended by AAAE is unnecessary. That said, the FAA agrees that such
notifications would usually be required.
    CSF noted that proposed Sec.  450.213 would require that the
licensee provide payload details to the FAA 60 days in advance of a
launch or reentry. CSF commented that operators often cannot meet that
time frame due to changes in manifests for passive or minor payloads
that occur inside of 60 days before flight. Proposed Sec.  404.15 would
not allow an operator to request that the time frame for payload
notification be changed unless it knew more than 60 days in advance of
flight that the manifest was going to change. CSF considered the
proposal inflexible and requested that FAA allow proposed Sec.  404.15
be made more flexible. The FAA disagrees with the comment, as Sec.
404.15 currently allows for an

applicant to request the FAA to relax the 60-day pre-flight reporting
requirement for payload information.
e. Post-Flight Reporting (Sec.  450.215)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an operator be required to provide
the actual trajectory flown by the vehicle and, for an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle, the actual impact location of all impacting
stages and impacting components, if requested by the FAA. In the final
rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.215 as proposed.
    SpaceX generally agreed with the provisions of proposed Sec.
450.215 but suggested that the FAA remove proposed Sec.  450.215(b)(4)
because it contended that post-flight auditing was already an option
for the FAA and that the specific reference to a potential request for
a flown trajectory was redundant and unnecessary. Although the FAA
agrees with SpaceX that the FAA can request these data as part of its
inspection, the FAA finds that the explicit reference in the regulatory
text is necessary to ensure compliance. The FAA included this
requirement in the proposed rule because some operators failed to
provide flown trajectory information when the FAA requested it as part
of an inspection or post-flight review. The FAA will only ask for flown
trajectory data when necessary to verify models and assess vehicle
performance.
f. Registration of Space Objects (Sec.  450.217)
    In the NPRM, the FAA consolidated and updated the requirements for
registration of space objects in proposed Sec.  450.217. The FAA
proposed to remove the caveat excluding foreign payloads and to add the
requirement to notify the FAA when removing objects placed in orbit.
The FAA noted that it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to
register objects and launch operator data is used to make relevant
decisions on what to register. Proposed Sec.  450.217(c) retained Sec.
431.85's requirement that an operator notify the FAA when it removes a
space object.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec.  450.217 as proposed.
    NZSA asked if operators would have to report the reentry of an
object due to atmospheric reentry, presumably much later than launch.
NZSA supported the requirement of information on foreign-owned space
objects to determine who would register the objects, which NZSA also
requires. NZSA recommended the FAA clarify whether removal would relate
only to active removal or if it would include passive deorbiting. NZSA
viewed the latter to be in alignment with the terms of the Registration
Convention.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space provides that the United Nations maintains a registry of
objects left in space by on data provided by the launching state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA did not intend the requirement to notify the FAA of objects
removed from orbit to cover eventual decays through atmospheric
reentry. NZSA is correct that the Registration Convention requires the
notification of objects removed from space. Yet, the FAA does not
believe there is a need to require launch operators to track the
orbital status of all objects previously launched in perpetuity.
6. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 433, 437, and 440
Part 401--Organization and Definitions
i. Sec.  401.5
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed new and amended definitions to Sec.
401.5 (Definitions). The new proposed definitions in proposed Sec.
401.5 were: ``anomaly,'' ``casualty area,'' ``command control system,''
``control entity,'' ``countdown,'' ``critical asset,'' ``crossrange,''
``data loss flight time,'' ``deorbit,'' ``disposal,'' ``dose-response
relationship,'' ``downrange,'' ``effective casualty area,'' ``expected
casualty,'' ``explosive debris,'' ``flight abort,'' ``flight abort
crew,'' ``flight abort rules,'' ``flight hazard area,'' ``flight safety
limit,'' ``gate,'' ``hazard control,'' ``launch or reentry system,''
``launch window,'' ``liftoff,'' ``limits of a useful mission,''
``mishap, class 1,'' ``mishap, class 2,'' ``mishap, class 3'',
``mishap, class 4,'' ``neighboring operations personnel,'' ``normal
flight,'' ``normal trajectory,'' ``operating environment,'' ``operation
hazard,'' ``orbital insertion,'' ``physical containment,''
``probability of casualty,'' ``public,'' ``reentry window,'' ``service
life,'' ``software function,'' ``sub-vehicle point,'' ``system
hazard,'' ``toxic hazard area,'' ``tracking icon,'' ``uncontrolled
area,'' ``unguided suborbital launch vehicle,'' ``uprange,'' and
``vehicle response modes,'' ``wind weighting safety system,'' and
``window closure.''
    The amended definitions in proposed Sec.  401.5 were ``contingency
abort,'' ``flight safety system,'' ``instantaneous impact point,''
``launch,'' ``mishap,'' ``reenter; reentry,'' ``safety critical,'' and
``State and United States''. These new and revised definitions were
necessary additions to accompany the proposed part 450 requirements.
    The FAA also proposed to remove a number of definitions from Sec.
401.5 that were no longer used in the regulations: ``emergency abort,''
``human space flight incident,'' ``launch accident,'' ``launch
incident,'' ``public safety,'' ``reentry accident,'' ``reentry
incident,'' and ``vehicle safety operations personnel.''
    In the final rule, the FAA does not make any immediate changes to
Sec.  401.5. Instead, Sec.  401.5 will remain in effect for five years
after the effective date of this final rule, and its definitions will
be applied to parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. After five years, Sec.
401.5 will be removed from part 401 and all operators will use the
definitions in the new Sec.  401.7.
ii. Sec.  401.7
    In the final rule, existing and proposed definitions from Sec.
401.5 are adopted as new Sec.  401.7 (Definitions) specifically
applicable to part 450 requirements, with the exception of the
following proposed definitions: ``control entity,'' ``data loss flight
time,'' ``dose-response relationship,'' ``flight abort crew,''
``gate,'' ``mishap, class 1,'' ``mishap, class 2,'' ``mishap, class
3'', ``mishap, class 4,'' ``tracking icon,'' and ``vehicle response
modes.'' In addition, Sec.  401.7 does not contain the definitions for
``Federal launch range'' and ``launch site safety assessment'' that
exist in Sec.  401.5. These definitions are not adopted because they
are no longer used in the regulations. Section 401.7 will apply to all
of Chapter III except parts 415, 417, 431, 435, and 440, where Sec.
401.5 will continue to apply until five years after the effective date
of this rule.
    The FAA notes that the proposed definition of ``probability of
casualty'' uses the phrase ``serious injury or worse.'' Consistent with
current practice for launch and reentry safety analyses, as well as
other DOT modal administrations, the FAA maintains that the use of the
Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) Level 3 or greater (of the Association
for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine) is appropriate for
describing a medical condition sufficiently to allow modeling of
casualties for purposes of determining whether a launch or reentry
satisfies the public risk criteria. For additional information
regarding casualty modeling, the FAA refers the reader to the preamble
of a previous rulemaking.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ See 67 FR 49464 (July 30, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA adds new definitions for ``critical payload,'' ``hazardous
debris,'' ``key flight safety event,'' and ``useful mission,'' which
were not proposed in the NPRM. These definitions and the rationale to
remove, adopt, or amend them are discussed in the relevant topic
sections of this preamble.
    Sierra Nevada suggested including a specific reference to ground
safety for

the public in the definition of ``reentry.'' The FAA declines to adopt
this suggestion because public safety is the core of the FAA's
statutory mission, and including additional reference to public safety
for the definition of ``reentry'' is unnecessary.
Part 413--Application Procedures
    In the NPRM, to enable incremental application submission and
review, the FAA proposed to modify Sec.  413.1 to clarify the term
``application'' to mean either an application in its entirety, or a
portion of an application for incremental review and determination in
accordance with proposed Sec.  450.33.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the provision as proposed. This
decision is further discussed in the Incremental Review section of the
preamble. The FAA did not receive any comments on this part.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise the table in Sec.  413.1 by
replacing parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, with part 450. The FAA adopts
the proposed table with revisions as discussed in the preamble section
for Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend Sec.  413.7(a)(3) to allow
an applicant the option to submit its application by email as a link to
a secure server and removed the requirement that an application be in a
format that cannot be altered. The FAA adopts Sec.  413.7(a)(3) as
proposed and this decision is further discussed in the Application
Process section of the preamble.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise Sec.  413.11(a) by removing
the reference to initiate a review ``required to make a decision about
the license or permit.'' This revision would enable incremental
application submission and review. In the final rule, the FAA adopts
the change as proposed.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a change to Sec.  413.15 to allow the
FAA to establish a time frame for any incremental review with an
applicant on a case-by-case basis during pre-application consultation.
In the final rule, the FAA adopts this change with a revision. The FAA
revises the explicit time frames in Sec.  413.15 to reference the time
frames specified in 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1) and 50906(a) so that a future
rulemaking will not be required if the time frames are modified in the
statute. This decision is further discussed in the Incremental Review
section of the preamble.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to correct the section heading of
Sec.  413.21 to reflect the content of the section, and to correct
Sec.  413.21(c) to reference both license and permit applications. The
FAA adopts these changes as proposed.
    In the NPRM, the FAA included license and permit renewals in the
flexible time frames table in Appendix A to Part 404. The FAA
inadvertently omitted making the same change in the corresponding
regulatory text in Sec.  413.21. The FAA adopts the change as proposed,
and revises Sec.  413.21 to allow flexible time frames for license and
permit renewals. This decision is further discussed in the Time Frames
section of the preamble.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed conforming changes in part 413 where
a part 414 safety approval is referenced, to change those references to
``safety element approval.'' The FAA adopts the changes as proposed.
This decision is further discussed in the Safety Element Approval
section of the preamble.
Part 414--Safety Element Approvals
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to change the part 414 term ``safety
approval'' to ``safety element approval,'' to distinguish it from the
term ``safety approval'' as used in parts 415, 431, and 435, and
proposed part 450. Also, the FAA proposed to modify part 414 to enable
applicants to request a safety element approval in conjunction with a
license application in accordance with proposed part 450.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the changes as proposed with
minor editorial corrections. The FAA did not receive any comments on
this part.
Part 420--License To Operate a Launch Site
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed multiple changes in part 420.
Specifically, the FAA proposed changes in Sec. Sec.  420.5, 420.15,
420.51, 420.57, 420.59, and 420.61 to align with requirements in part
450.
    In Sec.  420.5, the FAA proposed to remove the definitions of
``instantaneous impact point,'' ``launch site accident,'' and
``public'' from Sec.  420.5. The FAA did not receive comments on these
changes and adopts them as proposed.
    In Sec.  420.15(b), the FAA proposed to revise the environmental
review requirements under part 420 to match the environmental review
requirements proposed in Sec.  450.47. As discussed in the
Environmental Review section of this preamble, the FAA adopts this
change as proposed, with revisions that affirmatively state the
responsibilities of the FAA and an applicant in accordance with FAA
Order 1050.1.
    The FAA proposed a minor edit to Sec.  420.51, and proposed to
allow alternate time frames in Sec.  420.57. The FAA adopts these
changes as proposed.
    In Sec.  420.59, the FAA proposed changing the heading from
``Launch Site Accident Investigation Plan'' to ``Mishap Plan,'' and
modifying the requirements for Mishap Plans to match the requirements
for ``mishap plans'' in Sec.  450.173. As discussed in the Mishap
section of this preamble, the FAA revises Sec.  420.59(a) to state that
the requirements of this section only apply in the event of a mishap
that meets paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(5) of the definition of ``mishap''
in Sec.  401.7 and removes the requirement for the licensee to
cooperate with an FAA or NTSB investigations of a mishap for launches
launched from the launch site.
    Lastly, in Sec.  420.61(b), the FAA replaces the word ``shall''
with the word ``must,'' and replaces the term ``launch or launch site
accident'' with a reference to the portions of the ``mishap''
definition that replace this term: paragraphs (1), (5), and (8). As
explained in the Mishap section of this preamble, the NPRM
inadvertently omitted these changes necessitated by the revised
definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7.
Part 433--License To Operate a Reentry Site
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed changes to the environmental
requirements in Sec.  433.7 to align them with the environmental
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.47 and removed and reserved Sec.
433.9.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed requirements in
Sec.  433.7 with revisions to align with the revisions in Sec.  450.47.
The revisions are discussed in the Environmental Review section of the
preamble. The FAA also adopts the proposal to remove and reserve Sec.
433.9. The FAA did not receive any comments on these proposals.
Part 437--Experimental Permits
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed the following changes to part 437
(Experimental Permits).
     First, the FAA proposed to remove the definition of
``anomaly'' from Sec.  437.3 and include a modified version in proposed
Sec.  401.5.
     Second, the FAA proposed to modify the environmental
requirements in Sec.  437.21(b)(1) to match the environmental
requirements proposed in Sec.  450.47.
     Third, the FAA proposed to change the name of ``safety
approval'' to ``safety element approval'' in Sec.  437.21.
     Fourth, the FAA proposed to modify the mishap plan
requirements in Sec.  437.41 to require that they meet the

requirements of proposed Sec.  450.173 and remove and reserve the
requirements in Sec.  437.75.
     Fifth, the FAA proposed to change the requirements in
Sec.  437.65 for collision avoidance to match proposed Sec.  450.169.
     Finally, the FAA proposed allowing for alternate time
frames for pre-flight reporting in Sec.  437.89.
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed requirements with
the following exceptions. The FAA revises the environmental
requirements in Sec.  437.21 to align with Sec.  450.47, and replaces
the word ``envelope'' with the word ``scope.'' ``Scope'' more
accurately captures ``envelope, parameter, or situation'' as used in
the definition of ``safety element approval.'' The rationale for this
revision is discussed in the Environmental Review section of the
preamble. The FAA also aligns the recordkeeping requirements in Sec.
437.87(b) for an event that meets paragraph (a)(1) through (a)(3),
(a)(5), or (b)(3) of the definition of ``mishap'' in Sec.  401.7, for
which a permittee must preserve all records related to the mishap
event. The FAA removes the definition of ``anomaly'' from Sec.  437.3
and includes a revised definition of ``anomaly'' in Sec.  401.7 instead
of in Sec.  401.5 as proposed. The FAA also amends the language in
Sec.  437.87(b) to state that records must be retained until completion
of any Federal investigation and the FAA advises the permittee that the
records need no longer be retained. These changes will clarify the
records retention requirements and ensure consistency with part 450.
The changes do not modify the scope of the requirements. The FAA did
not receive any comments on this portion of the proposed rule.
Part 440--Financial Responsibility
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to modify Sec.  440.15 to allow for
alternate time frames. The FAA also proposed to modify the definition
of ``maximum probable loss'' in Sec.  440.3 to exclude neighboring
operations losses from losses to third parties that are reasonably
expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity and that have
a probability of occurrence of no less than one in ten million (1 x
10-\8\), and to include those losses to neighboring
operations personnel that have a probability of occurrence of no less
than one in one hundred thousand (1 x 10-\5\).
    In the final rule, the FAA adopts these changes as proposed. The
FAA did not receive any comments on this proposal.
7. Miscellaneous Comments
i. General Support/Opposition
    Several commenters generally supported the proposed rule as a much-
needed effort to consolidate and update the licensing process in a way
that would foster innovation and growth of the space industry.
Individual commenters supported streamlined licensing as a way for
space startups to enter the industry.
    The FAA also received comments stating the NPRM fell short in
streamlining rules and procedures, as directed by SPD-2. The FAA
received comments that the proposed rules made obtaining launch
licenses too difficult or expensive for small companies because they
require legal or technical experts for small, low-risk launches. An
individual commenter asserted the FAA should ease restrictions for
space startups. Another individual commenter stated the NPRM added
administrative requirements that the FAA would not be able to manage.
Virgin Galactic requested that the safety, efficiency, and clarity of
the current regulatory regime for suborbital, reusable vehicles be
maintained in any new rulemaking.
    Individual commenters asserted the NPRM did not contain adequate
standards to evaluate the adverse effects of licensed activities on
public safety and the environment. The Center for a Sustainable Coast
(Center) stated the FAA should require applicants to analyze risks to
private or public property, including infrastructure and natural
resources. Without such a requirement, the Center and other commenters
argued the proposed rule would make it easier to launch over
residential areas, environmental preserves, or other areas presenting a
high risk of harm to persons, property, and natural resources. The FAA
also received comments raising concerns about Camden Spaceport, citing
the proposed rule's lack of noise limitations, emissions requirements,
and attention to the effects on the environment and residential areas.
    The FAA notes that the commenters did not recommend specific
changes to the proposed rule, nor did they provide cost data to
substantiate the economic concern for small companies. As such, the FAA
cannot provide a specific response to these comments but notes its
general disagreement with the claim that the new rule will make it too
difficult or expensive for small companies to secure commercial space
launch and reentry licenses from the FAA. In fact, publicly available
means of compliance will assist small companies in entering the market
by providing multiple options for complying with the regulations.
Similarly, the FAA disagrees that it would be necessary or feasible to
create an exception in the licensing process for ``space startups.''
    The FAA disagrees further that the administrative requirements to
be placed on the FAA will prove impracticable to administer. The final
rule upholds the FAA's responsibility to protect public safety and
safety of property. In addition, the final rule makes no change to the
FAA's assessment of environmental impacts. As such, the FAA disagrees
that the final rule will enable operators to secure licenses for
launches or reentries that do not satisfy the FAA's public safety or
environmental review criteria.
    Finally, commenters' concerns regarding Camden Spaceport are beyond
the scope of this rulemaking.
ii. Miscellaneous Comments
    Starfighters Aerospace asked if all present restrictions on
compensation or hire would be removed for licenses and certificates
developed collaboratively between AVS and AST.
    The FAA notes that this rule will not change any current practice
or regulation regarding compensation or hire restrictions under
aviation regulations. Changes to compensation or hire are outside the
scope of this rulemaking.
    An individual commenter stated that the FAA should have
incorporated the proposed regulatory text the ARC included at the end
of its report, or, alternatively, the FAA should reconvene the SLR2
ARC. Two individuals commented that the FAA did not provide sufficient
public engagement for this rule. SpaceX and two individuals commented
that the proposed rule did not adequately address stakeholder concerns.
Several commenters, including SpaceX and Virgin Orbit, requested a
public meeting.
    As noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not address the ARC's
recommended regulatory text because the recommended text did not
receive broad consensus within the ARC. The FAA also disagrees that
commenters did not have sufficient opportunity to comment on the NPRM.
Although the FAA did not hold a public meeting, as some commenters
requested, the FAA accepted written questions seeking clarification on
the NPRM and, upon publication of the FAA's responses to those
questions, extended the comment period to allow commenters sufficient
time to review the FAA's clarifications. Similarly, while the FAA did
not reconvene the SLR2 ARC, the FAA

relied heavily upon the recommendations of the ARC, in addition to
industry and other public comments, in promulgating this rule.
    Relativity Space commented that the NPRM preamble and proposed rule
diverged from stakeholder expectations and appeared contradictory.
Sierra Nevada requested that the FAA identify in the docket any
contractor support used to develop and draft the NPRM.
    The FAA generally disagrees that the preamble contradicted the
proposed regulation, but notes that, as explained herein, the FAA has
revised particular provisions that commenters specifically identified
as unclear or impracticable. The question of contractor support is
irrelevant to this rule or its promulgation by the FAA.
    CSF and SpaceX commented that the FAA should revise Sec.  440.15(c)
so that operators would not need to submit proof of insurance, as
required by Sec.  440.9, more than once if the insurance policy covered
multiple licensed activities.
    CSF, Rocket Lab, and SpaceX requested the FAA revise Sec.
440.15(c)(1)(iv) through (c)(1)(vi) to allow use of electronic
signatures, in lieu of original signatures, for each party to the
required waiver of claims.
    Denver International Airport asked the FAA to broaden the scope of
financial responsibility required by part 440 to include employees,
site operators, neighboring communities, and other stakeholders.
    Boeing and Northrop Grumman recommended the FAA add to Sec.
404.5(b) a requirement that petitions for waivers specify the duration
or specific mission for which petitioner seeks relief, noting the FAA
should not assume a waiver applies to the entire license.
    The FAA notes that the previous four issues raised by the
commenters are all beyond the scope of this rule because they contained
comments on areas of the commercial space transportation regulations
that were not part of the proposal.
    CSF commented that the NPRM was anti-competitive and discouraged
operations from U.S. Government ranges, thereby favoring operators
located elsewhere, including outside the United States.
    The FAA notes that CSF does not explain why it thinks the rule will
discourage operations from U.S. Government ranges and favor operators
located elsewhere, including outside the United States. Based on
applications received by the FAA, the locations of operations are
ultimately determined by the scale and complexity of operations,
including the size and type of launch vehicle, resource inputs,
infrastructure requirements, and payload considerations. The net cost
savings provided by this rule do not significantly change the relative
costs of operating from U.S. Government ranges in favor of locations
elsewhere given these considerations of scale and complexity of
operations. In addition, U.S. companies need a license from the FAA for
a commercial space launch regardless of where the launch occurs--this
rule does not change that. Currently, and prior to this rule, U.S.
companies operate at locations outside of U.S. Government ranges in
remote locations and abroad, such as New Zealand.
iii. Advisory Circulars (ACs)
    CSF, Sierra Nevada, Space Florida, SpaceX, and two individuals
(including Congressman Steven M. Palazzo) commented that the FAA had
failed to provide sufficient accompanying guidance documents and ACs to
allow industry to provide meaningful input on the proposed regulations.
CSF and SpaceX both commented that the FAA's approach to publish many
ACs with the final rule did not allow industry to consider the proposed
rules and the draft ACs as a complete package. Virgin Galactic
recommended that the FAA release updated ACs and guidelines to coincide
with the new rule's going into effect, or allow a grace period for
applicants and currently licensed operators to be compliant.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenters' concerns, but disagrees that
the lack of draft ACs, which are necessarily rooted in the text of
regulations, prevented commenters from substantively commenting on the
proposed rule. The preamble and table of accepted means of compliance
provided sufficient detail to support the proposal. The ACs will be
non-binding guidance documents designed to provide specific examples of
means of compliance and recognized practices without prescribing
regulatory requirements. The public and interested parties will have an
opportunity to provide comment on the ACs.
    As noted under the performance-based regulations discussion, CSF
and SpaceX stated that some of the proposed rules may be performance-
based, but it was difficult to make that determination without
reviewing the accompanying ACs. Space Florida commented that there was
an absence of performance criteria and guidance providing acceptable
approaches.
    The FAA does not agree that the absence of additional draft ACs
prevented members of the public from understanding the performance-
based requirements as proposed. The proposed requirements, along with
discussions in the preamble, provided ample notice to the public. An AC
would provide one means, but not the only means, of meeting any
particular requirement.
iv. Designated Engineering Representative Model
    Blue Origin recommended the Designated Engineering Representative
(DER) model to determine compliance with the FAA's launch and reentry
regulations.
    Delegating the agency's authority to make engineering compliance
findings to qualified individuals (DERs) in the context of licensing
commercial space transportation is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
The FAA may consider such a recommendation in the future.
v. Request for SNPRM
    The FAA received a number of comments requesting that the FAA issue
an SNPRM. Denver International Airport commented that the FAA should
wait to issue this rule until Congress adopts the Space Frontier Act,
and then, if required, issue an SNPRM.
    One individual commenter asked the FAA to restart the rulemaking
process and work closely with industry and the ARC to produce a final
rule that would meet industry needs and would comply with the
Commercial Space Launch Act and SPD-2.
    The FAA disagrees that the final rule is inconsistent with either
the Commercial Space Launch Act or SPD-2. Through this rule, the FAA
streamlines the licensing process for commercial launch and reentry
operations, and replaces many prescriptive requirements with
performance-based criteria, as directed by SPD-2. To forego rulemaking
until Congress passes additional legislation on commercial space
operations, as Denver International Airport suggested, would contravene
the President's policy directive.
    The FAA finds no circumstances that would justify a second round of
notice and comment or SNPRM. The FAA provided ample opportunity for
members of the public to submit comments and supporting evidence to the
administrative record, as shown by the large volume of substantive,
diverse comments received. The FAA also provided two sets of written
responses to clarifying questions, and extended the comment period
following publication of those responses. Although the FAA has adjusted
and revised parts of the NPRM in light of the

comments received and interagency review, the final rule does not
materially differ from the proposed rule such that an SNPRM would have
been warranted. Nor does the FAA view the presence of the circumstances
that might otherwise necessitate publishing an SNPRM (e.g.,
availability of new studies or experiments affecting the agency's
analysis; supervening legal developments that significantly affect the
rulemaking; or any other important change to the agency's analytical
framework in the rulemaking).
vi. Airspace
    The FAA received a number of comments on the effect of space
operations on the NAS. A4A, AAAE, ACI, ALPA, AOPA, CAA, NATCA, and RAA
recommended the FAA implement tools to integrate commercial space
activities safely and expeditiously into the NAS and to harmonize the
regulatory regime governing aviation and commercial space. These
commenters argue that greater communication and coordination with NAS
users was needed to reduce delays and obstacles faced by both
industries (e.g., coordinated vehicle surveillance, traffic management,
and hazard mitigation plans).
    The same commenters recommended the FAA incorporate into the rule
the recommendations of the ongoing Airspace Access ARC. AOPA stated the
COMSTAC and SLR2 ARC should have included general aviation
representation.
    A4A and Southwest Airlines asked that aviation stakeholders be
given an opportunity to identify potential NAS impacts during the
licensing process. A4A, AAAE, ACI, ALPA, CAA, NATCA, and RAA
recommended the FAA require licensees to identify and mitigate negative
operational and financial impacts to NAS users resulting from licensed
activities. A4A added that hazard mitigation plans and the FAA's
accepted means of compliance should be subject to public comment, or
otherwise allow NAS users the opportunity to identify airspace and
ground safety risks.
    The FAA did not propose any changes for the protection of aircraft
other than the aircraft risk criteria proposed in Sec.  450.101(a)(3).
As such, these comments are beyond the scope of this rule.
Recommendations from the Airspace Access ARC, which included commercial
space and aviation industry representatives, may inform future actions
addressing aircraft protection.
8. Responses to Regulatory Impact Analysis Comments
i. Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses
    CSF commented that if the FAA required holders of licenses issued
under current regulations to seek renewals under part 450, operators
and the FAA would experience significant additional cost and regulatory
burdens because currently licensed operators under parts 431 and 435
would have to come into compliance with certain additional requirements
in part 450. Blue Origin also expressed concern that, without
grandfathering, there would be a cost to transition a license to part
450. Blue Origin pointed out that, according to the NPRM, upon license
renewal, an existing operation would have to comply with part 450. Blue
Origin disagreed with the FAA's conclusion that operators would not
have great difficulty transitioning existing programs to part 450. It
cited, in particular, proposed CEC and associated
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.145.
    The FAA notes that any request to renew a current license submitted
after the effective date of the rule will result in a license valid for
no more than five years after the effective date of this rule. However,
upon the effective date, the operator will be required to come into
compliance with COLA and critical asset requirements. The FAA does not
estimate additional costs for those two requirements because the
operator will provide the same information the operator currently
provides, and the U.S. Government will perform the necessary analyses,
as discussed in the preamble sections for Critical Asset and COLA.
    After five years from the effective date of the final rule, all
vehicle operators must be in compliance with part 450, but information
previously submitted to the FAA in obtaining a license under parts 417
and 431 may be referenced as means of compliance to meet the
requirements of part 450. Concerns over costs of proposed
CEC and FSS requirements in Sec.  450.145 are discussed in
the remainder of this section. There may be costs to transition
licenses following the 5-year period after the rule's effective date.
However, as mentioned previously, the FAA anticipates few, if any,
additional requirements that could not be fulfilled by referencing
previous submittals.
ii. Sec.  450.47 Environmental Review
    Several commenters stated that the proposed requirements would
impose added costs for which the FAA did not account. Space Florida
expressed concern that the FAA may determine that new or supplemental
environmental analyses would be necessary for operators opting for a
single vehicle license with vehicle and site flexibility. The commenter
was concerned that such analyses would be required before the
determination to add multiple vehicle configurations, operational
parameters, or launch site locations to an operator's single license.
Spaceport Strategies also expressed concern that the FAA had not
analyzed the cost to launch operators or to launch site operators for
additional or redundant environmental reviews that the FAA would likely
require of an operator under the new rule in order for an operator to
obtain a single license covering multiple launch or reentry sites or
multiple vehicle configurations and flight operations. Spaceport
Strategies noted that the added costs of repetitive or redundant
environmental reviews would cause unquantified cost impacts on
licensees, including State and local launch site license applicants.
CSF stated that applicants using the licensing option to include
multiple sites under one license may be vulnerable to time and cost
uncertainty resulting from these environmental review requirements.
    The FAA does not agree that the final rule will impose additional
costs beyond what is currently required of applicants for environmental
reviews, including applications for a single vehicle license or
licenses that include multiple sites, as the final rule codifies
current practice. NEPA requires that an environmental review be
completed for each site covered by the FAA license. As such, the final
rule makes no change to the existing requirement that applicants submit
information allowing the FAA to fulfill its responsibility under NEPA
to assess the environmental impacts associated with the proposed
activities, at each site where the licensed activities will occur. An
applicant must submit these materials to allow the FAA to conduct site-
specific reviews regardless of whether multiple sites or vehicles are
covered under one license or several licenses. This could be
accomplished by including multiple sites into one NEPA document, or
separating them into individual NEPA documents.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA did not consider the
offsetting costs of environmental reviews for the new vehicles and
launch sites for which cost savings were assessed. The FAA notes it did
not include offsetting costs for new vehicles and launch sites because
the same costs for environmental reviews will be imposed

under the current regulations. There will be no change in costs.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA's re-write of
environmental review requirements was more than a simple
``consolidation'' as reported in the Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Assessment. The commenter stated that the proposed requirements had
unquantified cost impacts upon licensees, including State and local
launch site license applicants, for the additive costs of repetitive or
redundant environmental reviews.
    As discussed in the Environmental Review section of this preamble,
the final rule codifies existing environmental review requirements. The
commenter did not identify the environmental reviews it deems
repetitive or redundant. However, the FAA confirms that in codifying
existing practice, the final rule will not impose additional costs for
environmental review.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that licensees would face
significant costs to redo environmental analyses for previously studied
and permitted sites. As an example, the commenter referred to Space
Florida's being required to spend almost $239,000 for another
environmental assessment for its Launch Site Operator License for
horizontal launch at the former Shuttle Landing Facility, when NASA had
completed two previous environmental assessments on the same facility.
    The FAA notes this rule will impose no additional environmental
reviews nor require a redo of an environmental assessment if an
operator's operation remains within the scope of the original
assessment. However, consistent with NEPA, an operator will be required
to do additional environmental reviews if the scope of its operation
has changed.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA did not address
environmental review regulations derived from practices and policies
being codified into rules as potential federalism issues with the State
and local jurisdictions that operate the part 420-licensed sites. The
commenter stated that the FAA also did not consider that some, if not
all, of the local and State authorities are small governmental entities
for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    The FAA determines that this rule codifies existing requirements in
FAA Order 1050.1 and will not affect the applicability of NEPA or any
other Federal environmental law to non-Federal launch or reentry sites.
Therefore, the FAA finds that the final rule will not have an
additional cost impact on small governmental jurisdictions.
iii. Sec.  450.101(a)(b) Neighboring Operations
    Virgin Orbit believed the costs of the additional EC
analysis to use in determination of neighboring operations personnel
would be $10,000. As discussed in the preamble section for Neighboring
Operations Personnel, the FAA acknowledges that this requirement will
require additional analysis; however, the FAA expects that this
analysis will involve minor additional effort because the operator
already has to perform a similar analysis for the public and will only
need to account for the population of neighboring operations personnel,
if any.
    Blue Origin expressed concern that the FAA might implement a
requirement for which compliance would be impossible, or would lead to
the creation of a sole source provider for a service necessary to
demonstrate compliance, if the FAA does not explain how the transfer of
neighboring operations personnel population data would take place.
Sierra Nevada expressed concern regarding an applicant's ability to
perform calculations to determine which neighboring operations
personnel could remain on a launch site, because the applicant would
need to get accurate data regarding the populations and locations of
neighboring operations. Sierra Nevada pointed out that, because data
could be on personnel performing operations for competing companies,
the data could be proprietary or sensitive. Sierra Nevada suggested the
FAA could perform this function to guard the proprietary nature of the
data.
    In the final rule, the FAA notes that the Federal or licensed site
operator will determine those personnel who are eligible for
neighboring operations personnel status in coordination with the launch
operators, because the site operator is in the best position to
identify which personnel are required to perform safety, security, or
critical tasks at the launch site. Further, as previously discussed,
both the launch or reentry operator and the neighboring site operator
benefit from this treatment of neighboring operations personnel.
    Spaceport Strategies faults the FAA for not comparing the estimated
marginal productivity improvement created by allowing certain personnel
of neighboring operators to remain at work during nearby operations
with adverse schedule and competitiveness losses if the FAA did not
adopt the alternative approaches suggested by the ARC and CSF.
    The alternative chosen by the FAA provides cost savings compared to
the current regulations, and the FAA believes that this approach is
consistent with the intent of SPD-2. The FAA acknowledges that other
approaches exist, and considered three alternatives that are discussed
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act section of this preamble.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the labor categories used to
calculate neighboring operations personnel savings (engineers and
technicians) did not align with the restricted categories of work
functions allowed to remain (such as personnel required for safety,
security, or critical tasks), indicating that the FAA's savings
estimates may not actually be realized.
    The FAA received input from licensed operators on the labor
categories that might be allowed to remain on the launch site and,
based on that input, is confident that these are reasonable labor
categories.
iv. Sec.  450.101(a) Incorporate Waterborne Vessels Into Collective
Risk Criteria
    To incorporate waterborne vessels into collective risk assessment,
Virgin Orbit requested the FAA and other regulators work with launch
service providers by providing databases on global marine traffic.
Virgin Orbit also requested guidance on debris size/fragment velocities
that would result in injury to marine traffic, in an appendix or AC.
Virgin Orbit asserted that this requirement is not found in the
existing regulations, and estimated that the additional cost to analyze
and document the effort would be approximately $20,000 per launch,
which would become significant costs for a large number of launches.
    The FAA does not agree that there will be additional costs of any
significance from the requirement to incorporate waterborne vessels
into collective risk criteria. The operator can continue its current
practice and demonstrate compliance in accordance with the RCC 321-20
Supplement. The FAA does not find a need to provide databases on global
marine traffic because there are several public sources of data on ship
traffic available through the internet which aggregate near real-time
Automatic Identification System (AIS) \191\ data from satellites and
ground stations. The FAA notes that all vessels over 300 tons on an
international voyage, all domestic vessels over 500 tons, and all
passenger carriers, are

required to operate ``Class A'' AIS transponders, broadcasting
continually-updated data, such as identity, position, course, speed,
ship characteristics, cargo, and voyage information, to other vessels
and the shore. The United States Coast Guard requires AIS Class A
transponders on all U.S. vessels engaged in commercial service that are
(1) self-propelled and over 65 feet in length, or (2) towing vessels of
26 feet or more in length and more than 600 horsepower. The USCG also
requires AIS Class B transponders on smaller vessels, such as fishing
industry vessels.\192\ Detection of smaller vessels, which tend to
remain close to shore, can be accomplished without AIS by fixed ground-
based and ship-board radar, as well as surveillance aircraft. The FAA
will publish an AC on population exposure analyses that includes
details about available databases that provide valid data on ship
traffic, including near real-time ship traffic useful for EC
analyses. The forthcoming RCC 321 Supplement will also include this
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ AIS is a standardized maritime navigation safety
communications system that provides vessel information automatically
to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships, and aircraft.
    \192\ USGC regulations regarding AIS are given in 33 CFR 164.46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ship probability of impact contours (PI) and
individual risk contours are already required and computed based on
current practice to establish ship hazard areas. The FAA Office of
Commercial Space Transportation will facilitate access to the ship
traffic densities so that the EC contribution from ships can
be computed with a spreadsheet.
v. Sec.  450.101(a)(3) Aircraft Risk
    Virgin Orbit commented on the proposed requirement for an operator
to establish aircraft hazard areas necessary to ensure the probability
of impact with debris capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does
not exceed 1 x 10-\6\. To incorporate airborne vessels into
the collective risk assessment, Virgin Orbit requested FAA databases on
civil and general aircraft, predicted air traffic, and debris size and
velocities that would result in aircraft casualties in order to comply
with this requirement. Virgin Orbit stated guidance on debris size and
fragment velocities could be added in an appendix or AC. Virgin Orbit
indicated that this is a new requirement relative to the existing
regulations and estimated that the additional cost to analyze and
document the effort would be $20,000 per launch. While not significant
by itself, Virgin Orbit stated that the additional cost for a large
number of launches becomes significant.
    The FAA does not agree that this is a new requirement. Current part
431 regulations require an operator to demonstrate that the risk level
to an individual does not exceed 1 x 10-\6\ probability of
casualty per mission. The part 431 requirement is equivalent to the
corresponding part 450 requirement, which requires that the probability
of impact with debris capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does
not exceed 1 x 10-\6\. Because people in aircraft are not
excluded from the part 431 requirement, part 450 is not adding a new
requirement to demonstrate risk level for aircraft. In addition, Sec.
417.107(b)(4) is identical to the requirement in Sec.  450.101(a)(3).
Part 450 does not require a collective risk assessment for aircraft, so
aircraft traffic densities, data on civil and general aircraft, and
predicted air traffic, are not necessary.
vi. Sec.  450.101(a)(4) Critical Assets
    Blue Origin commented that because operators on non-Federal launch
or reentry sites would be required to comply with USAF Federal site
requirements, the FAA would need either to confirm it had considered
private and licensed spaceports in its cost assessment and that those
operators would not need to complete any critical asset analyses, or to
confirm they were not included. The commenter also stated that it was
possible the new requirement would impose costs for operators not at
Federal sites.
    Spaceport Florida voiced concern about the creation of a new
category of property designated as a ``critical asset,'' which would be
required to be protected against ``loss of functionality'' by
prescribed risk criteria limiting each designated asset's exposure to
launch or reentry hazards. The commenter indicated concerns about
extraordinary analysis requirements, unknown costs, and program risks
asking what limits the types and numbers of assets that may be
designated by multiple parties within proximity to a licensed launch
activity.
    Spaceport Strategies commented that the FAA had not conducted
certain analyses. These included analyzing the cost to a licensee to
perform a risk assessment on each FAA-identified critical asset to be
incorporated into a flight safety risk analysis, analyzing the cost to
identify critical assets to be evaluated as a property at risk, and
analyzing operator time to process waivers required for an operator's
own critical assets or for an asset that may be at risk for a
particular critical licensed activity. Spaceport Strategies expressed
concern that the proposed requirements duplicated existing standards
imposed by NASA and the USAF, and noted that there was only brief
mention of this newly proposed requirement in the FAA's Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis, which identified no costs associated with
its implementation. As proposed, this requirement would apply to all
licensed launches and reentries wherever they may occur, at any site in
the United States. The commenter noted that in the Baseline Analysis of
the cost impacts and cost savings of proposed Sec.  450.101, the FAA
claimed no cost impact for a new requirement that clearly would add
cost burden to every licensee, as well as to the FAA itself.
    The FAA notes that under the final rule the U.S. Government will
perform the identification and analysis of critical assets. The FAA
expects these costs to be relatively small. The Federal launch or
reentry site will perform the analysis for launch or reentry operations
from Federal sites, and the FAA will perform the analysis for
operations from non-Federal launch or reentry sites. Therefore,
operators should incur no costs for determination of critical assets.
vii. Sec.  450.101(c) High Consequence Event Protection
    Spaceport Strategies stated that the proposed requirement to use
the CEC analysis tool would be prohibitively expensive--even
technologically infeasible--to use, and faulted the Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis for not including these costs. The commenter
also criticized the FAA for not including the costs for operators to
learn the skills or contract for the analysis. In addition, they stated
that the FAA did not include its cost to hire in-house personnel or
contractor skills to validate that the operator's analysis justifies
not needing an FSS.
    CSF found the CEC to be a new and costly calculation
that may require significant resources, including possible reliance on
contracts for expensive modeling capabilities. The commenter feared
that meeting the CEC may result in substantial increase in
cost to those operators currently able to show compliance. Based on its
understanding of the proposed rule, CSF concluded that the majority, if
not all, of the operators would be captured by proposed Sec.
450.145(a)(1) and would be required to implement an FSS of the highest
reliability. CSF disagreed with the FAA's estimated FSS cost savings
and indicated there would be cost increases.
    Virgin Orbit stated that CEC, as a new requirement,
would be burdensome to implement and would require changes to its in-
house algorithm to compute flight corridors with associated
EC. According to Virgin Orbit, this new burden would impact
timelines for future launches and would have

significant costs to implement. The commenter recommended
CEC be included as one method to determine whether an FSS
was needed and not as a required calculation. The commenter further
noted that CEC, as proposed, would be better suited in an
AC. Blue Origin described the proposed CEC as a complicated
analysis with debatable accuracy. Several commenters disagreed with the
FAA's conclusion that this new ``consequence risk'' methodology aligned
with current practices.
    Rocket Lab explained that, because proposed CEC
disregarded demonstrated reliability and experience, it appeared almost
impossible for any orbital launch vehicle to meet the prescribed
CEC thresholds. Preliminary calculations suggested that the
majority of orbital launch vehicle operators would be directed toward a
flight abort system of the highest prescribed reliability.
    The FAA does not agree that the cost to use CEC is
prohibitive or that Virgin Orbit will be required to make significant
changes to its in-house algorithm. Additional costs associated with
modifications of analysis tools, adjustments to data development,
additional analysis runtime, and interpretation of the results as
detailed below, should not be significant.
    The modification of existing analysis tools is expected to take
only a few hours. As explained earlier, CEC is inherent in
the calculation of total casualty expectation. If the capability to
output the CEC values is not already part of the calculation
tool, adding the output of this value for each scenario should require
no more than a few hours of effort. This estimate is included in the
Regulatory Impact Analysis for those operators who choose to do the
analysis.
    Because the CEC metric is more sensitive to the input
data and to numerical sampling approaches than the collective
EC metric, more rigor needs to be applied to the analysis or
more uncertainty accepted in the result. Some data development may need
to be of higher fidelity and more computation samples run to achieve a
statistically meaningful answer. Therefore, the FAA finds there will be
additional cost to perform the analysis. To comply with Sec.
450.101(c), the operator first calculates the CEC, assuming
no FSS is present, to determine whether flight abort with an FSS
meeting the requirements of Sec.  450.108(b) is needed. These
calculations will incur 5 percent of the debris analysis costs.\193\
These estimates are included in the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ Debris cost analysis is estimated to cost $50,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Applicants using an FSS can use hazard containment or analysis of
CEC as key criteria in the determination of flight safety
limits. The cost to interpret CEC results for flight safety
limit development is expected (after the debris analysis is run) to
reduce the costs nominally compared to existing containment approaches.
    Using its CEC tool, ACTA, under contract to the FAA, has
identified several launches in the launch forecast that will not need
an FSS. The Regulatory Impact Analysis includes more information on
these launches, as well as an updated estimate of cost savings
anticipated because these launches will not need an FSS.
    The FAA notes that any operator that agrees to have a Sec.
450.145-compliant FSS does not have to do a CEC analysis to
determine the required reliability level of the FSS. However, a
CEC analysis may still be needed to determine the flight
safety limits. As discussed in the High Consequence Event Protection
preamble section, the final rule now has a number of flexibilities in
Sec.  450.101(c). Nevertheless, an operator could opt to use the flight
safety limits approach in current Sec.  417.213 as a means of
compliance with Sec.  450.108(5), and thus avoid any costs associated
with CEC analysis.
viii. System Safety Program, Post-Flight Data Review, Post-Flight
Reporting
    CSF disagreed with the FAA's rationale that any added burden of
this section would be minimal because industry practice was to review
post-flight data for reliability and mission success. CSF maintained
that the proposed post-flight data requirement extended beyond industry
practice. The commenter also stated that it was not clear whether the
process for evaluating post-flight data would be subject to FAA review
and approval, which would create an even larger burden. Sierra Nevada
also commented that the proposed requirements extended beyond the
industry practice of reviewing post-flight data for reliability and
mission success, to requiring an operator to develop and employ a
process for evaluating post-flight data to ensure consistency between
the assumptions used for preliminary safety assessment, any flight
hazard or FSA, and associated mitigation and control measures. Rocket
Lab and Sierra Nevada stated the proposed Sec.  450.103(d) would
require the operator to address any anomaly identified and resolve
inconsistencies prior to the next flight of the vehicle. Rocket Lab
pointed out that this was overly burdensome.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenters. The FAA is only concerned
with ensuring consistency between the assumptions used for any safety
analysis and associated mitigation and hazard control measures. It is
industry practice to review post-flight data to address vehicle
reliability and mission success.
    The FAA further notes that current regulations already require that
any representation contained in the license application that is
material to public health and safety or the safety of property be kept
accurate and complete, therefore any additional burden from Sec.
450.103(d) will be minimal. Currently, operators review the post-flight
data because it provides valuable information on future operations. At
a minimum, in the final rule, Sec.  450.103(d)(1) will require that an
operator employ a process for evaluating post-flight data to ensure
consistency between the assumptions used for the hazard control
strategy determination, any hazard or FSA, and associated mitigation
and hazard control measures. With respect to Sec.  450.103(d), the FAA
will evaluate the post-flight data review process during the
application evaluation. Applicants will not be required to provide
information obtained from the post-flight data review to the FAA unless
specifically requested to do so during the compliance monitoring
process. The FAA finds that it has always been the operator's
responsibility to ensure the accuracy of the relevant safety analyses.
Operators must review flight data in order to ensure that the operation
is conducted as predicted, and to inform necessary safety analysis
changes for future flights.
    Section 450.215 will continue to require licensees to submit a
post-flight report no later than 90 days after an operation if there
are any anomalies in the flight environment material to public health
and safety and the safety of property, and if there is a need for
associated corrective actions. This practice is currently required by
Sec.  417.25(c). While RLV operators licensed under part 431 are not
currently required to submit a post-flight report, they are required to
ensure that all assumptions and representations made in their
application that are material to public health and safety or the safety
of property are kept accurate and complete, in accordance with
Sec. Sec.  413.7 and 431.73(b)(2). As such, the FAA expects the added
burden to be minimal because launch and reentry operators regularly
track anomalies and

implement corrective actions for mission assurance, continuing license
accuracy, and safety purposes. The FAA is normally made aware of any
anomalies and corrective actions that are material to public health and
safety through its inspection program.
ix. Sec.  450.141 (Proposed Sec.  450.111) Computing Systems and
Software Systems
    Several commenters expressed concern that the NPRM proposed a
prescriptive approach to the software hazard, which would impose a
significant burden on operators to meet all of the proposed
requirements and structure.
    An individual commenter estimated that changing the review process
and structure of software would require a substantial new effort and
add costs of over $40,000 per launch. Blue Origin faulted the FAA for
proposing overly prescriptive regulations governing how the operator
would design and test software. Blue Origin also contended that the
prescriptive proposed requirements did not integrate well with most
industry applications and best practices and failed to address critical
aspects of safety sufficiently for aeronautical databases, complex
distributed software systems, new techniques, and machine learning.
Blue Origin indicated that these would threaten progress being made
towards safer, lower cost and higher quality software approaches. CSF
maintained that the requirements of proposed Sec.  450.111 prescribing
how the operator would design and test software, and providing only one
way to demonstrate that software was safe, failed to allow development
of new technologies that could lead to safer solutions, and would
greatly increase costs. Leo Aerospace stated that the testing
requirements of proposed Sec.  450.111(d)(2) and (f)(1) were so
prescriptive that they would be cost-prohibitive.
    In the final rule, the FAA revises Sec.  450.111 to mirror the
typical structure of computing system safety application data
submissions and adds flexibility in the means of compliance for key
aspects of safe computing system development. The FAA notes that these
revisions address the key aspects of commenters' concerns. The final
rule on computing and software systems, now located in Sec.  450.141,
aggregates the requirements in proposed Sec.  450.111 into performance-
based objectives set in the context of the appropriateness of each
element for the system as a whole. This aggregation removes any
prescriptive requirements and replaces them with the performance-based
objectives. The performance-based objectives are the elements of
software development and testing processes that enable an understanding
of the public safety implications of each software component, and the
objectives are structured to mirror typical software safety application
data submissions to minimize or eliminate the need to adapt existing
software safety processes to fit the new regulations. The final
performance-based objectives expand the range of software safety
approaches that could meet the regulation to enable more innovation
while keeping the compliance burden at or below the level proposed in
the NPRM.
x. Proposed Sec.  450.113(a)(5) Flight Safety Analysis Requirements
    Virgin Galactic commented that its launch system had an FSS in the
form of its pilot, rendering the need for ``demonstrated reliability''
unnecessary. In addition, unlike the ELVs addressed by part 417, Virgin
Galactic's launch system does not have a large effective casualty area,
which raised the question of whether the risks truly justified the
costs of the proposed requirement, particularly to small businesses.
    Under this rule, currently licensed hybrid systems will not have to
do an FSA for phases of flight that have a flight history to
demonstrate reliability based on operational and flight history in lieu
of a traditional risk analysis. This allowance is discussed in greater
detail in the Hybrid Vehicles section of the preamble.
xi. Sec.  450.115 Flight Safety Analysis Methods
    CSF commented that prescriptive FSA requirements are inappropriate
for some vehicles and operations. An applicant would have to propose an
alternative method of compliance or submit a waiver request, resulting
in an increase in the amount of work. The lack of tool-availability
might also cause some applicants to incur costs of performing these
analyses themselves. CSF noted these costs had not been included in the
cost analysis. The FAA agrees that prescriptive requirements are not
appropriate and revises the requirements to be more performance-based.
x. Independent Analyses
    CSF stated that the NPRM's Flight Safety Analysis sections
(proposed Sec. Sec.  450.119 and 450.135) include multiple references
to an applicant submitting any additional products that allow an
independent analysis as requested by the Administrator. CSF stated that
this behavior of recreating an applicant's analysis was already an
expensive and burdensome aspect of the current rules that should be
ended. A couple of commenters provided estimates of additional hours of
work that might be required to conduct independent analyses.
    As mentioned previously, the goal is for the FAA to evaluate, in an
efficient and thorough manner, the validity of the analysis. The FAA
finds that conducting an independent analysis is typically the most
efficient and thorough means to verify compliance with the FSA
requirements for novel launch or reentry operations or operators that
propose to use substantially new FSA methods. Furthermore, the FAA
plans to provide benchmarks for comparison purposes that operators can
reference to as part of the validation and verification of their
analysis methods.
    Therefore, the FAA does not anticipate this rule will impose an
additional cost burden for independent analyses because conducting
independent analyses is current practice.
xi. Sec.  450.135 Debris Risk Analysis
    An individual commenter indicated that the proposed rule would add
significant work in additional debris risk analysis beyond what the
operator was doing to comply with the current regulations. The
commenter specified that the proposed rule would add requirements on
explosive debris, toxic release effects from the debris, accounting for
sheltering of individual from buildings and vehicles, a casualty mode
that included ricochet fragments, and impacts to critical assets. It
would also add reporting requirements for the top ten impacted
population centers and the need to perform conditional probability
calculations in the FSA.
    The FAA notes that an explosive debris or toxic release effects
analysis will not be required if the vehicle does not have explosive
debris and toxics. Explosive debris or toxic release effects analysis
are currently required for ELVs under Sec.  417.107(b)(1) and for RLVs
under Sec.  431.35(b)(1)(ii), so the requirement for those analyses
under part 450 would not impose additional costs. The final rule
requirements allow operators to determine how to conduct their debris
risk analysis. For example, an operator will not need to update the
debris risk analysis to account for sheltering or ricochet if it uses a
conservative estimate of the casualty area for people in the open
pursuant to Sec.  450.101(g). Under the final rule, the FAA or Federal
launch or reentry site will do any critical asset risk assessment. The
cost of the CEC

assessment is addressed in the High Consequence Event Protection
preamble section. Reporting the top ten population centers is a minimal
amount of additional paperwork.
xii. Sec.  450.143 Safety-Critical System Design, Test, and
Documentation
    An individual commenter expressed concern that the proposed rule
would constrain the design by prescribing fault tolerance where an
operational mitigation solution might exist, and stated that this would
result in a large burden.
    The FAA finds that industry interpreted this regulation to be
burdensome due to a misunderstanding of the breadth of possible means
of compliance to the ``fault-tolerant'' requirement in Sec.
450.143(b). In the NPRM, the FAA noted that while redundancy was a