The FAA has communicated with State EMS medical directors, advising
them of the problem of helicopter shopping. We will continue this
outreach to emphasize the importance of obtaining the reasons for
flight refusal by helicopter air ambulance operators.

We will also work with emergency dispatchers and certificate holders in
sharing this information.
    Two commenters, including the Society of Aviation and Flight
Educators, agreed with the requirement to obtain concurrence on the
preflight risk analysis from someone other than the flightcrew during
marginal weather. Air Methods said the requirement for managerial
approval of the preflight risk analysis when flight risk exceeds a
predetermined level is unfeasible. PHI said it has its own risk
assessment, which requires operational control management approval for
flight requests above a preset risk matrix level.
    PHI requested eliminating the requirement for the pilot's signature
on the risk assessment before takeoff. Another commenter asked whether
an electronic signature would be sufficient.
    The rule requires operators to establish and document, and include
in their FAA-approved preflight risk analysis, a procedure for
determining ``whether another helicopter air ambulance operator has
refused or rejected a flight request.'' The FAA understands the
commenters' concerns regarding the ability to obtain information about
flight refusals and rejections from other operators. To clarify, it is
not the intent of this rule to require a definitive declaration on the
preflight risk assessment as to whether the flight has been refused or
rejected by another operator. Rather, it would be acceptable for a
certificate holder that is called for a flight to ask the dispatcher
offering the flight if another operator has turned it down. If the
person offering the flight (emergency dispatcher, 911 operator, etc.)
does not know or cannot give the reason why the flight was turned down,
the certificate holder need only make note of that in the preflight
risk analysis and factor in that information as deemed appropriate.
Compliance with this rule does not require certificate holders to call
other operators to ask if the flight was refused or rejected or to
inform other operators that they have refused or rejected a flight. A
flight would not be presumed high risk just because there was no
definitive response from an emergency dispatcher about whether the
flight was refused or rejected by another operator. An operator
following this procedure will have fulfilled its duty with respect to
the rule.
    The FAA has determined that although the flight refusal or
rejection information need not be definitive, it can yield useful
information about the potential risk of a flight. Additionally, the FAA
believes that this requirement will encourage certificate holders to
tell dispatchers why a flight is refused or rejected to provide
valuable safety information to other operators. It may also encourage
emergency dispatchers to develop procedures for obtaining this
information.
    In the final rule, the FAA did not change the requirement for
management approval of flights in situations where a predetermined risk
level is exceeded. The FAA has determined that management input
provides an important second opinion on whether to conduct a flight if
the risk is not clear cut. The FAA reiterates that management
involvement must not be used to pressure pilots into conducting a
flight that the pilot has determined to be unsafe. Likewise, the FAA
emphasizes that the rule permits certificate holders leeway to develop
preflight risk assessment procedures that work for them within the
parameters set by the rule. Operators like PHI, which have established
procedures, may comply with this requirement by incorporating their
existing procedures into the mandated risk assessment.
    Regarding whether an electronic signature on the preflight risk
assessment would be accepted, the final rule does not specify the
method by which a pilot must sign a preflight risk assessment. The
purpose of the risk analysis requirement is to ensure that pilots
examine the risks associated with an operation and get information to
mitigate those risks. The signature is important because it is the
pilot's verification that the information in the risk analysis is
accurate and complete. Therefore, an electronic signature would be
acceptable. FAA guidance on electronic signatures is found in Advisory
Circular (AC) 120-78 (October 29, 2002).
Other Comments
    A few commenters, including Metro Aviation and REACH, stated that
the proposal for the risk assessment was unclear and left significant
room for interpretation and inconsistent or uneven enforcement. Many
commenters asked that the FAA revise its previous guidance on risk
assessment to more adequately reflect current industry best practices
and provide more consistency to the risk assessment and mitigation
process.
    Some commenters asked the FAA to develop and improve the preflight
risk analysis worksheets so they can be more meaningful and useful to
pilots, crews, and operations center personnel. Four commenters,
including Air Methods, Metro Aviation, and AMOA, asked that the
requirement for FAA approval of the risk analysis procedures be
deleted. An individual commented that the requirement to retain the
records of the risk analysis for 90 days is inconsistent with the load
manifest and flight log data retention requirements.
    This requirement is based on FAA Notice 8000.301, Operational Risk
Assessment Programs for Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, which,
in part, provides practical examples of preflight risk assessments. The
FAA has determined that these examples, along with this rule, provide
adequate direction to certificate holders for implementation of this
rule. The FAA will provide guidance to inspectors on how to enforce
this rule. Nevertheless, the rule has been designed to allow
flexibility so that certificate holders can develop procedures
appropriate for their operations.
    Finally, the FAA is not modifying the 90-day data retention
requirement. The 90-day retention will allow the operator to conduct a
quarterly review to identify trends in its operations to further
mitigate risks in future flights. This requirement is adopted as
proposed.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Section 306(d)(1) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that provides for a flight risk evaluation program in helicopter air
ambulance operations. Additionally, section 306(c)(1) requires the
rule to address flight request and dispatch procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Operations Control Centers (OCCs) (Sec. Sec.  135.619, 120.105, and
120.215)
    The proposal included a new requirement that certificate holders
with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances establish OCCs staffed with
operations control specialists. These specialists would take part in
preflight risk analysis required by Sec.  135.617, maintain two-way
communications with pilots, give pilots weather information, and
monitor the progress of the flight. They would ensure that the pilot
has completed the preflight risk analysis worksheet, confirm and verify
the entries on the worksheet, and work with the pilot to mitigate any
identified risk. The specialist would also sign the risk assessment
worksheet along with the pilot. Certificate holders would be required
to train and provide enough staff for their OCCs to make sure these
services could be provided.
Applicability of the Rule
    A number of commenters (including AMOA, NTSB, LifeFlight of Maine,
AAMS, Air Evac EMS, NEMSPA, PHI, and ACCT) addressed the proposed
requirement for certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air
ambulances to have an OCC.

    These commenters objected to applying this requirement only to
operators with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances. One commenter said
that fleet size has no bearing on the stated risks a pilot faces. AMOA,
Air Evac EMS, ACCT, and PHI called the distinction ``arbitrary and
subjective'' and said this distinction does not recognize the
complexity of operating less than 10 helicopter air ambulances that are
geographically separated. All of these commenters suggested that if
there are clear benefits to the use of an OCC, then the requirements
should be applicable to all.
    The NTSB commented that if operators with less than 10 helicopters
are not included in this requirement, then they ``will transport
approximately 100,000 patients or more per year without the added
safety benefit of an OCC.'' Commenters explained that while the
requirement should apply to all operators, it should be scalable for
those with less than 10 helicopters. Comments referenced AC 120-96,
which provides guidance for setting up OCCs for four levels of
operators based on size.
    LifeFlight of Maine commented that all air ambulances (both rotor
and fixed wing) should have an OCC and that while 24 large certificate
holders operate 70 percent of the aircraft in the industry (as stated
in the NPRM), operators with less than 10 aircraft, who make up 68
percent of the certificate holders, are not immune to accidents and
need the extra layer of protection given by an OCC.
    AAMS recommended allowing smaller operators to subcontract OCC
services from larger providers or private vendors for certain flight
tracking and communication services, while maintaining ultimate
operational control of the flight. Med-Trans and REACH asked for the
ability to contract for certain functions of an OCC with another OCC.
REACH commented that contracting would allow more operators to take
advantage of the many safety benefits of an OCC but also share the
cost. It noted that each operator would retain management authority and
operational control responsibility.
    Med-Trans and REACH also suggested an alternate way of applying the
OCC requirements. They said that ``[s]everal companies currently
operate aircraft on several different certificates but only utilize one
[OCC]. Several air medical operators operate air ambulances on multiple
certificates. Operations control center functions can be conducted
without imposing a requirement for an [OCC] for each certificate.''
They stated that the rule must allow air medical operators to combine
OCC functions for multiple certificate holders that are under the same
management. They said that this will achieve the benefits of an OCC
without the additional cost. They also noted that this change would
prevent companies from establishing multiple certificates with 9 or
fewer helicopters on each to avoid the OCC requirement.
    Angel One Transport, a hospital-based pediatric critical care
transport in Little Rock, Arkansas, commented that the proposed
exclusion of fixed-wing air ambulances and air ambulance operators with
less than 9 helicopters creates an ``at risk'' group in the air medical
industry. Angel One Transport said that ``as a small operator, our
program has many of the same characteristics of an OCC established in
our program's operations though we do not meet the stated letter of the
law in the NPRM.'' Angel One Transport asked the FAA to consider adding
language that allows smaller operators to have the ``functional
capabilities'' of an operations control center, noting that ``the
functions of an OCC are invaluable but the financial obligations for a
small operator to comply with such requirements are cost prohibitive.''
    Another small operator, A.L.E.R.T. in Kalispell, Montana, operates
with only one helicopter. The commenter stated that the requirement for
OCCs is a good idea, but that it should be based on the number of
aircraft and not the number of dispatches or flights. It further
asserted that ``an operational control center would be very costly,
which could easily be absorbed by a larger operation but prohibitive to
a small one and not necessary.''
    NEMSPA said that ``for smaller operations with a dispatch or
communications center, placing personnel in that facility who meet the
requirements for an operational control specialist should satisfy the
requirements for the facility to be an operational control center.''
    LifeFlight of Maine supported extending the OCC requirements to all
operators of an air ambulance, including rotor or fixed wing, to have
an OCC regardless of size. Only one commenter, AAMS, suggested that
this compliance requirement should be based on number of hours flown
and geographical area covered rather than number of helicopters.
    It is possible that a small operator with only one or two
helicopters could reach a set hourly limit, but would not have the same
level of operational complexity as a certificate holder flying the same
number of hours but with 10 or more helicopters. Nevertheless, the FAA
is requiring an OCC only for certificate holders with 10 or more
helicopter air ambulances, as proposed. As discussed in the NPRM, these
larger certificate holders will gain the most benefit from an OCC
because their operations are more complex. This requirement will cover
approximately 83 percent of the U.S. helicopter air ambulance fleet.
    The FAA specifically asked for comments on whether the
applicability of this requirement should be based on the number of
operations or hours flown by each aircraft, rather than fleet size.
After evaluating the comments, the FAA has concluded that fleet size is
the best method for determining whether the OCC requirement would
apply. The fleet size requirement is easily observed and evaluated by
industry and the FAA. Additionally, the FAA does not have data that
would allow us to determine how many hours or number of operations
would constitute a complex operation, nor has the FAA received such
information during the comment period.
    The FAA acknowledges that one company may hold several certificates
for helicopter air ambulance operations. In these circumstances, each
certificate would be evaluated independently rather than in the
aggregate. Provided that each certificate holder has fewer than 10
helicopters used for air ambulances in its fleet, then no OCC would be
required.
Other OCC Comments
    PHI noted that OCCs were originally an invention of air medical
operators to more effectively manage operations control. PHI said its
Enhanced Operations Control Center has become a critical component in
the company's safety and risk management process as well as the OCC
within the company. PHI, however, along with AMOA, Air Evac EMS, and
ACCT, does not believe the requirement as proposed is consistent with
the highest industry standards. These commenters also believe that the
OCC requirements are too much like those for part 121 air traffic
control and dispatch functions and are not compatible with part 135 on-
demand operations. They suggested delaying implementation of the rule
until a minimum operating standard based on industry best practices
could be developed. They recommend the FAA conduct an additional study
of existing OCCs.
    LifeFlight of Maine commented that AC 120-96 is inadequate for
principal operations inspectors and recommended additional guidance in
line with industry best practices. The National

Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists (NAACS) sought
clarification on the meaning of ``formalized dispatch'' and ``enhanced
operational procedures.''
    As noted in the NPRM, the duties and training requirements of
operations control specialists are based on AC 120-96, Integration of
Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services
Operations (May 2008), which provides recommendations to assist
helicopter air ambulance operators with the development and
implementation of an OCC. Also as noted, AAMS, HAI, and AMOA commented
to the NTSB that the AC is a ``product of a survey of best practices in
the air medical industry and gives guidance to other air medical
services as to the benefits of this type of operation.'' \12\ These
requirements found in the AC and in the rule are intentionally similar
to part 121, but as noted in the AC, helicopter air ambulance
operations are unique and therefore the FAA did not adopt the full part
121 aircraft dispatch requirements. We also note that the standard
adopted in this rule is a baseline that can be augmented by an
operator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Statement from the Association of Air Medical Services,
Helicopter Association International, and Air Medical Operators
Association to the NTSB 14 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09SH001/default.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Operations Control Specialists
    One commenter said that the FAA should require a dispatch center
staffed with part 121 certificated dispatchers. This commenter said
that the FAA should certify dispatchers, and those dispatchers should
plan and evaluate the entire flight before contacting the pilot and
then monitor the flight's progress to destination.
    The NTSB also supported FAA certification of operations control
specialists and commented that such a requirement will ensure that the
FAA has oversight over training, testing, and certification, and will
provide quality control. By requiring operations control specialists
with standard certification, NTSB asserts that this may facilitate
development of OCCs that will be able to subcontract their services to
smaller HEMS entities.
    NEMSPA recommended a standard for operations control specialist
training set by the industry and approved by the FAA before any
requirement is put in place. Med-Trans, REACH, Air Evac EMS, AMOA,
California Shock Trauma Air Rescue (CALSTAR), Omniflight Helicopters,
Inc. (Omniflight), and Intermountain Life Flight do not believe that
operations control specialists should be required to obtain
certification in order to do their work. However, one individual
questioned why a certified dispatcher is not qualified to act in an
operations control position but a graduate of a company-sponsored
program is.
    The FAA received comments stating that the operations control
specialist training proposed in the NPRM too closely follows the
training program for part 121 dispatchers. The FAA acknowledges that
the requirements of this rule were based on part 121 dispatcher
training rules. The topics selected for training, however, were derived
from FAA AC 120-96, which provides a recommended training curriculum
for communications specialists. The certificate holder may contract for
operations control specialist training or testing in accordance with
Sec.  135.324. The certificate holder may use a part 142 training
center or another certificate holder for operations control specialist
training and testing.
    Commenters also asked for a clearer distinction between the
operations control specialists required by this rule and ``CommSpecs,''
the communication specialists currently employed in the air ambulance
industry. NAACS asked whether the aviation base curriculum for
operations control specialists would enhance safety benefits beyond the
current ``Certified Flight Communicator'' program offered by NAACS. In
response to this question, the FAA notes that the areas of required
training for an operations control specialist, derived from AC 120-96,
are specified in the rule. Compliance with this rule will enhance
safety because the training will be required and standardized for all
operations control specialists. The FAA does not believe that a
distinction between operations control specialists and CommSpecs is
necessary. This rule requires that an OCC be staffed by an operations
control specialist at all times while helicopter air ambulance flights
are being conducted. The number of persons functioning in this capacity
is not mandated, but there must be a sufficient number of them to
ensure operational control of each flight. An operator may also staff
an OCC with CommSpecs, but these persons are not mandated and they may
not perform the functions of an operations control specialist as listed
in Sec.  135.619(a)(1)-(4) unless they satisfy the qualification and
training requirements of an operation controls specialist.
    Thirty-four commenters, including Air Evac EMS, Intermountain, Med-
Trans, Metro Aviation, Inc. (Metro Aviation), National Air
Transportation Association (NATA) and REACH, objected to the proposed
10-hour duty time limitation for operations control specialists. They
commented that this operations control specialist work shift limit
reflects regulations applied to part 121 dispatchers and does not
reflect any best practice or proven standard in the air medical
community. Air ambulance pilots, although only permitted to fly 8
hours, work a 12-hour shift. These commenters, including AMOA, PHI, Air
Evac EMS, and ACCT, described situations where the differences in shift
hours could interfere with completion of a mission. PHI believes that
requiring a duty day for these specialists that is less than that
required of pilots is both arbitrary and unnecessary. PHI said that the
operations control specialist requirement for a 10-hour workday
effectively adds an additional full-time employee to the OCC and
significant costs to the operator without a demonstrated benefit. REACH
remarked that it is unclear why OCC personnel should be more limited in
their duty time than flight or medical crews.
    After reviewing these comments, the FAA has determined that the
proposed operations control specialist duty time is appropriate. The
FAA acknowledges that these standards may be different than what some
communications specialists may currently be practicing. However, as
discussed in the NPRM, the operations control specialist duty time
limitation is based on the duty time requirements for part 121 aircraft
dispatchers. The FAA has determined that, based on the similarities of
these positions, it is appropriate to use the same duty time
limitation. Finally, although pilots may have a longer duty period than
operations control specialists under this rule, the flight time
limitations placed on pilots within their duty periods (or subsequent
rest requirements) limits the pilot's exposure to risk.
    In conjunction with the proposal for OCCs, the FAA proposed
revising Sec. Sec.  120.105 and 120.215 to add operations control
specialists to the list of persons who must be tested for drugs and
alcohol. Eleven commenters, including Air Methods, Metro Aviation, and
several individuals affiliated with REACH, argued that operations
control specialists should be exempt from part 120 drug and alcohol
testing.
    Operations control specialists will be performing safety-sensitive
functions such as providing preflight weather assessment, assisting
with fuel planning and alternate airport weather minimums, and
communicating with pilots about operational concerns during flight.
These duties are similar to those

of an aircraft dispatcher, and thus operations control specialists
would be subject to the same restrictions on drug and alcohol use, and
to a certificate holder's drug and alcohol testing program, as
described in 14 CFR part 120.
    An operations control specialist who failed a drug test, functioned
as an operations control specialist without completing training or
passing examinations, or verified false entries on a preflight analysis
worksheet, could be subject to enforcement action or civil
penalties.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See Sec. Sec.  13.14 (Civil Penalties: General); 13.16
(Civil Penalties); 120.33 (Use of Prohibited Drugs); 120.37 (Misuse
of Alcohol).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA's reference to ``formalized dispatch'' in the NPRM refers
to an established consistent process that certificate holders will use
when dispatching a flight. The term ``enhanced operational control''
involves more people than only the pilot in the flight release process.
For example, it may include the pilot and an operational control
specialist, the chief pilot, or the director of flight operations.
    Section 135.619 is adopted as proposed. The wording has been
modified to ensure clarity.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Section 306(d)(2) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that requires operations control centers for helicopter air
ambulance services with 10 or more helicopters. Additionally,
section 306(c)(1) requires the rule to address flight request and
dispatch procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Briefing of Medical Personnel (Sec. Sec.  135.117 and 135.621--
Proposed Sec.  135.619)
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that medical personnel on
board a helicopter air ambulance flight receive a supplemental
preflight safety briefing with information specific to helicopter air
ambulance flights.\15\ This information would be in addition to the
passenger briefing currently required by Sec.  135.117. As an
alternative to the proposed preflight safety briefing, certificate
holders would be permitted to provide training every 2 years to medical
personnel through an FAA-approved training program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct rulemaking on
helicopter air ambulance operations to address ``flight request and
dispatch procedures.'' Though the benefits are less than costs for
this provision, it satisfies the Congressional mandate as required
by the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NTSB, A.L.E.R.T., LifeFlight of Maine, AAMS, and Angel One
Transport supported the requirement. LifeFlight of Maine noted that
continual educational opportunities for medical personnel will further
enhance situational awareness and promote operational safety.
    AAMS, while supporting this proposal, suggested that the FAA work
with industry to develop standardized briefing criteria and procedures
in order to avoid confusion and inconsistent enforcement of this
provision. Several commenters also suggested that accommodations should
be made to permit briefings that are not as extensive as those proposed
for the rare instances when medical personnel not associated with air
medical operations are transported.
    Several commenters, including the NTSB, NEMSPA, and the Society of
Aviation and Flight Educators, suggested that medical personnel safety
training be conducted on an annual basis because much of their
knowledge will degrade over time. A.L.E.R.T. made a similar suggestion,
noting that it conducts training when it hires new personnel and
annually after. AMOA, PHI, NEMSPA, the Health Care District of Palm
Beach County and Air Evac EMS recommended that the FAA develop a
standard and an approval process for a medical crew training program.
Several commenters suggested that the medical personnel training
program should be consistent with the Air Medical Resource Management
(AMRM) program supported by FAA and industry. AMOA, PHI and Air Evac
EMS also commented that it is unnecessary to require medical personnel
training record retention for an additional 60 days beyond the 24
months.
    AMOA, PHI, and Air Evac EMS expressed several concerns with this
provision. They commented that a lack of formal guidance would lead to
misunderstanding of the requirements along with inconsistent
application and enforcement.
    The FAA finds that medical personnel on helicopter air ambulance
flights will benefit from an increased familiarity with the helicopter
and emergency procedures due to their unique role of providing patient
care while simultaneously working around an operating helicopter. The
preflight briefing and training is intended to prevent medical
personnel from inadvertently introducing risk to the operation when
outfitting the passenger compartment for the purpose of providing
medical treatment and when providing medical care to a patient.
    The FAA notes that medical personnel preflight briefing and
training is distinct from AMRM training. The AMRM program is not a
preflight safety briefing, but rather a tool used by operators to
improve communication and teambuilding skills among its employees
during air medical operations. While the FAA supports the use of the
AMRM program, it is a distinct program and unrelated to the medical
personnel preflight safety briefing/training proposed in the NPRM and
adopted in the rule.
    As proposed in the NPRM and contained in the final rule, this
provision requires a briefing for medical personnel on the
physiological aspects of flight, patient loading and unloading, safety
in and around the helicopter, in-flight emergency procedures, emergency
landing procedures, emergency evacuation procedures, efficient and safe
communications with the pilot, and operational differences between day
and night operation. The FAA concludes that these requirements will
provide certificate holders with sufficient guidance on how to conduct
briefings, which will lead to consistent application and enforcement of
this provision. Additionally, as proposed in the NPRM and contained in
the final rule, this provision mandates that any certificate holder
that chooses to conduct a medical personnel training program in lieu of
preflight briefings must have an FAA-approved training program in
place. This will also ensure consistency in application and enforcement
of this provision.
    The FAA will not provide exceptions or accommodations to permit
briefings that are not as extensive as those proposed for the rare
instances when medical personnel not associated with air medical
operations are transported. All medical personnel onboard a helicopter
air ambulance flight who have not received the optional training
provided for by this rule must receive the preflight safety briefing.
Medical personnel not associated with that particular operation may
still inadvertently introduce risk to the operation when on board the
flight. The preflight safety briefing will provide these medical
personnel with familiarity with the helicopter and emergency
procedures, thus reducing the risk that those personnel will affect the
overall safety of the operation. If medical personnel are not being
transported during a ``helicopter air ambulance operation'' as defined
in Sec.  135.601, the operator would only need to provide the standard
part 135 passenger briefing as found in Sec.  135.117.
    The FAA has determined that medical personnel safety training will
be conducted every 24 months. The NPRM proposed training every 24
months, and although commenters suggested that training occur on an
annual basis, the FAA has determined that the required 4

hours of ground training and 4 hours of training in and around the air
ambulance helicopter every 24 months will provide a sufficient amount
of familiarity with the aircraft and emergency procedures.
Final Rule
    Based on the comments received, the FAA is adopting the rule as
proposed with changes. The FAA concludes that requiring medical
personnel training record retention for an additional 60 days beyond
the 24 months is unnecessary and has amended the final rule to require
that records be maintained for only 24 months following the
individual's completion of training. If an incident occurs near the end
of the retention period, the FAA expects that these relevant documents
will be retained per NTSB regulation 49 CFR Sec.  380.10(d).
Additionally, we removed redundant briefing topics in Sec.  135.621
based on existing briefing requirements of Sec.  135.117.
9. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) (Sec.
135.605)
    The FAA proposed a requirement for equipping helicopter air
ambulances with HTAWS. There is no existing requirement for this
equipment. One commenter stated that installation of HTAWS has been
``the single most effective technology for reducing helicopter
mishaps'' among U.S. military helicopters. The NTSB concurred with the
proposal and noted that it would meet Safety Recommendation A-06-15.
However, commenters also raised concerns over the effectiveness of
HTAWS, the need for flexibility, and the cost of the rule.
    A number of commenters, including NEMSPA, questioned why the FAA
would propose mandating HTAWS, saying that its technology has not been
proven in helicopters. Commenters assert that terrain awareness and
warning systems (TAWS), the predecessor to HTAWS technology, has only
been truly tested with airplanes operating in the high altitude
instrument flight rules environment and that there is no evidence to
show that HTAWS is effective in low-level visual flight operations.
Other commenters said that this equipment is more effective in
mountainous areas than in less challenging terrain, is a ``distraction
in the cockpit,'' ``doesn't give the pilot the ability to see and avoid
weather,'' and ``doesn't keep you from spatial disorientation.'' A
number of commenters said that requiring operators to invest in this
technology today might preclude them from acquiring more effective
technology as it becomes available in the future.
    EADS Cassidian Electronics stated that air ambulance operators are
the most prominent part of the flying community for which HTAWS can
assist in preventing controlled flight into terrain and obstacle strike
accidents, but the FAA should be clear about the limitations of current
HTAWS systems caused by the reliance on databases. It stated that the
vertical accuracy of the ground altitude of a database is approximately
60 feet, which does not include objects like trees, ``which seems to be
insufficient for take-off and landing.'' Databases, according to the
commenter, only include a fraction of man-made obstacles, such as power
lines, antenna masts, and wind turbines which are not included in the
database in real time. To resolve these problems, the commenter stated
that the best solution would be to require equipment with a real-time
forward-looking sensor system that would issue warnings for every
obstacle in the flight.
    AAMS commented that HTAWS and night vision goggles (NVGs) should be
required together as each provides benefits that complement the other.
LifeFlight of Maine commented that HTAWS and NVGs should be a minimum
standard for night operations. Max-Viz Inc. (Max-Viz) and several
individuals commented that NVGs provide better protection from
controlled flight into terrain than HTAWS. Additionally, one individual
recommended requiring an autopilot rather than HTAWS because it is less
expensive and more effective. Several members of ACCT also stated that
autopilots are more effective than HTAWS. They claimed that HTAWS only
provides a warning to a pilot of an impending collision or altitude
loss, but the pilot's corrective actions with the flight controls
prevent controlled flight into terrain. They stated that an autopilot
would decrease the risk of controlled flight into terrain and accidents
from IIMC by holding the aircraft flight path steady and reducing a
pilot's susceptibility to spatial disorientation during IIMC recovery
maneuvers. The reasons that the FAA did not adopt NVG or autopilot
requirements in this rule are addressed in the discussion of pilot
instrument ratings, Sec.  135.603, below.
    The FAA disagrees with comments that HTAWS is not proven technology
as it relates to helicopters and that it would not be effective in
preventing controlled-flight-into-terrain accidents. RTCA/DO-309
Minimum Operational Performance Standards for HTAWS and Airborne
Equipment TSO-C194 set the standards for HTAWS. The FAA and
manufacturers have installed, evaluated and certified HTAWS in
helicopters and the systems have been shown to perform their intended
function as designed in low altitude environments.
    The FAA concludes that the use of HTAWS would create a safer
environment for emergency medical services flight operations by
preventing controlled flight into terrain at night or during bad
weather. As noted in the NPRM, the NTSB cites 17 accidents in its
Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations
(Jan. 25, 2006) \16\ that may have been prevented if the helicopters
had been equipped with TAWS. The FAA maintains that HTAWS will make
helicopter air ambulance pilots more aware of surrounding terrain and
obstacles and keep them from collisions. It may prevent the accidents
that happen when a pilot must take sudden and quick action to avoid a
collision and then loses control of the helicopter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The report can be accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safetystudies/sir0601.html (December, 10, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA acknowledges that there may be lags between the time when
new obstacles are erected and the time when they are put into an HTAWS
database. However, the FAA has determined that the VFR flight planning
and the VFR altitude requirements adopted here will help to offset such
a lag by providing increased situational awareness to pilots. Likewise,
the radio altimeter required under these rules will provide increased
situational awareness by providing pilots with additional information
about their altitude above the ground.
    The FAA received several comments addressing the flexibility in the
rule and whether the implementation timeline is appropriate. Commenters
including AMOA and PHI expressed the need for minimum equipment list
(MEL) relief for HTAWS in the event that the unit is inoperable. Air
Methods stated that the rule's reliance on the technical standard order
(TSO) process would ``inhibit future technological benefits without a
lengthy rule changing process.'' The Health Care District of Palm Beach
County stated that, in the future, HTAWS may not be the most effective
way to achieve terrain and obstacle avoidance. AMOA commented that the
rule should be performance based to allow flexibility for incorporation
of later technology.
    LifeFlight of Maine and other members of the ACCT stated that they
believed that the 3-year timeline for

implementation provides ample time to comply with the rule and to
finance the costs. They did not agree with extending the time to comply
or limiting the applicability of this requirement. FreeFlight Systems
also commented that the 3-year implementation period seemed reasonable.
    Bristow Group noted its support for requiring all helicopters
engaged in commercial service to be equipped with HTAWS if not already
equipped with a radio-altimeter-based warning system.
    The FAA acknowledges that technology could be improved over time,
but does not agree that mandating this particular type of equipment
will constrain the ability to embrace new technologies. Incorporation
by reference of new TSO requirements allows the agency to adopt revised
technological standards. The need to incorporate new TSOs into the
regulation, due to technological innovation, will not hinder adoption
of that technology in helicopter air ambulances.
    In response to comments on the need for flexibility should an HTAWS
unit become inoperable, the FAA agrees that an HTAWS may meet the
requirements for MEL relief with certain conditions on the types of
operations that could be conducted while the HTAWS was inoperable. The
exact scope of such relief will be addressed through the FAA's standard
MEL process.
    Based on the comments received, the FAA has determined that the
compliance date for the HTAWS requirement does not need to be extended.
Extending the HTAWS requirement to the entire commercial helicopter
population would be outside the scope of this rulemaking.
    Finally, West Michigan Air Care estimated that its cost of
compliance with the HTAWS requirement would be $75,000 for its two-
helicopter air ambulance operation. The FAA notes that this estimate is
consistent with the FAA's estimate of $35,000 per helicopter for
equipment and installation, plus $7,000 for revenue loss for equipment
downtime. Additionally, while the FAA recognizes the financial burden
new equipment requirements impose on operators, providing 3 years from
the effective date of the final rule for installation will allow
certificate holders to spread the cost of compliance over that period
of time and take advantage of scheduled downtime for maintenance.
    This rule is adopted as proposed with minor edits for
clarification.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Section 306(c)(3) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that addresses use of HTAWS in helicopter air ambulance operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Flight Data Monitoring System (Sec.  135.607) \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) directs the FAA to conduct rulemaking on
helicopter air ambulance operations to address ``safety enhancing
technology and equipment,'' including ``devices that perform the
function of flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders.''
Though the benefits are less than costs for this provision, it
satisfies the Congressional mandate as required by the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, the FAA stated it was considering requiring helicopter
air ambulance operators to install a flight data monitoring system,
referred to in the NPRM as a light weight aircraft recording system
(LARS).\19\ Currently, Sec.  135.151 requires a cockpit voice recorder
(CVR) system in rotorcraft with a passenger seating configuration of
six or more seats and for which two pilots are required. Section
135.152 requires flight data recorders (FDRs) in rotorcraft with a
passenger seating configuration of 10 or more seats. Most helicopters
used in air ambulance operations are configured with fewer than six
passenger seats, and thus are not required to be equipped with either
CVRs or FDRs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Although the NPRM did not contain proposed rule text, the
FAA provided a detailed discussion of the proposals under
consideration and asked for comments in anticipation of including an
FDMS requirement in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, the FAA invited comments on the flight data monitoring
system proposal under consideration. The FAA proposed that the flight
data monitoring system ``would be required to capture data according to
a broadly defined set of parameters including information pertaining to
the aircraft's state (such as heading, altitude, and attitude),
condition (such as rotors, transmission, engine parameters, and flight
controls), and system performance (such as full authority digital
engine control, and electronic flight instrumentation system).''
Further, as proposed, the flight data monitoring system would have to
be operated from the application of electrical power before takeoff
until the removal of electrical power after termination of flight. It
would be required to receive electrical power from the bus that
provides the maximum reliability for operation without jeopardizing
service to essential or emergency loads. Under the proposal,
certificate holders would have had 3 years to comply with the rule. The
FAA noted a flight data monitoring system can be used to promote
operational safety, and that, because so few certificate holders are
using such systems, it may be necessary to require them. Likewise, the
FAA stated that these systems can provide critical information to
investigators in the event of an accident.
    The FAA received numerous comments on this proposal regarding
flight data monitoring system use in accident investigation and Flight
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs, the standards for the
flight data monitoring system, the rule's implementation date, and the
FAA's cost estimate.
Accident Investigation/Use in a FOQA Program
    Many commenters supported a requirement for FOQA. LifeFlight of
Maine and members of ACCT support both a requirement to install a
flight data monitoring system and a requirement to participate in the
FOQA program, and commented that flight data monitors can assist with
accident investigation. They recommended that the FAA conduct a joint
technical study with the NTSB and air ambulance operators who are using
a FOQA program to determine the data capture rate needed to meet NTSB
accident investigation needs and what data feedback requirements would
best support FOQA programs. Eurocopter commented that FOQA use is
preferable to use in accident investigation, and the Global Helicopter
Flight Data Monitoring Steering Group commented that accident
investigation use is only reactive, but FOQA use can be proactive.
    PHI supports installation and use of a flight data monitoring
system in air ambulance aircraft. It suggested requiring operators to
develop an internal process for using data collected by the system for
analysis, identification and mitigation of at-risk behaviors across the
organization, as well as development of supplemental educational
opportunities for air ambulance pilots. PHI said that the focus of the
flight data monitoring system should be to prevent accidents. It said
the emphasis should be placed on FOQA and flight data management
implementation and benefits. HAI supports and encourages flight data
monitoring technology because it has obvious safety benefits for
accident investigation and the potential for development of FOQA and
other safety programs. Alakai Technologies Corporation commented that
the requirement should be extended across all helicopter operations.
    An individual commented that satellite tracking, currently in use
by his company, records flight information that can be used to help
rescue the aircraft and provides the necessary information on aircraft
operations making a flight

data monitoring system unnecessary. Kestrel Air stated that the cause
of most air ambulance accidents is already known and that flight data
monitoring systems do not record flight visibility data, thus adding
little value to analyzing IIMC encounters.
    A FOQA program is meant to improve flight safety by providing more
information about, and greater insight into, the total flight
operations environment. This is accomplished with selective automated
recording and analysis of data generated during flight operations.
Analysis of FOQA data can reveal situations that require improvement--
in operations, in training, and in maintenance procedures, practices,
equipment, or infrastructure.
    In response to comments about mandatory FOQA participation, the FAA
notes that 14 CFR part 13, Investigative and Enforcement Procedures,
states conditions under which information obtained from an approved
voluntary FOQA program will not be used in enforcement actions against
an operator or its employees. Part 193, Protection of Voluntarily
Submitted Information, contains provisions for certain protections from
public disclosure of voluntarily submitted safety-related information
when such information has been designated by an FAA order as protected
under that part. As stated in the NPRM, these protections are available
only if the data is collected by the operator as part of a voluntary
FAA-approved program. In support of this public safety objective, the
FAA has endorsed the development and implementation of voluntary FOQA
programs as a tool for continuously monitoring and evaluating
operational practices and procedures, but maintaining the voluntary
nature of the program is paramount and does not allow the FAA to
mandate FOQA for any operator.
    As discussed in the NPRM, this equipment may be used to provide
significant information for investigators to determine accident
causation, which may help to prevent future accidents. In addition, the
data can be used proactively by an operator to modify operational and
maintenance procedures for increased efficiency and lower costs, to
provide immediate feedback to pilots in training, and to highlight
areas where additional training may be needed.
    The final rule requires certificate holders operating helicopter
air ambulances to install and operate a flight data monitoring system
in their helicopters. The FAA is not extending this requirement to all
helicopter operations because that option was not presented in the
NPRM. Although the FAA encourages operators to take advantage of the
many uses of this data, this final rule does not require data
collection because mandating it would open up that data to FAA
surveillance, amounting to a required submission. The FAA is concerned
that such an action would discourage operators from participating in a
FOQA program.
    Although operators will not be required to collect data from the
flight data monitoring system, the FAA encourages them to gather this
information and analyze it for use in improving safety in their day-to-
day operations. Based on current practice, some will choose to use the
system this way. The rule will not preclude operators from
participation in an FAA-approved FOQA program, and data submitted
voluntarily as part of a FOQA program will be protected under part 193.
    The FAA anticipates that the information that this equipment can
gather may be used as a supplement to a certificate holder's training
program.
Flight Data Monitoring System Capabilities
    The FAA received many comments on the flight data monitoring system
standards discussed in the NPRM, including several stating that a
regulation is not appropriate at this time. However, the FAA also
received comments in support of flight data monitoring system,
including from the NTSB.
    AAMS supports installation of a flight data monitoring system on
air ambulance helicopters but says the proposal was not specific enough
to justify a regulation at this time. NORTH Flight Data Systems stated
a regulation would slow technological development of these systems. PHI
recommended that the FAA conduct a comprehensive outreach process in
partnership with certificate holders who currently have a flight data
monitoring system installed and are participating in flight data
monitoring FOQA programs. The commenter suggested this as a way to
determine what data is needed for flight data management and what are
realistic cost estimates for installing those systems and operating a
fully functional flight data monitoring FOQA program.
    AMOA suggested waiting to establish a regulation until there is a
more thorough understanding of current products, but also noted the
need for MEL relief if a rule were adopted. HAI stated the technology
is not sufficiently mature at this time to justify a regulation.
Eurocopter recommended defining the required parameters in conjunction
with aircraft manufacturers before regulating. Honeywell International
also suggested the development of minimum performance specifications.
The General Aviation Safety Network commented that what was proposed,
with respect to required parameters, is too close to an FDR.
    The FAA also received several comments on whether the flight data
monitoring system under the rule would need to comply with European
Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-155 or
TSO-C197.
    NTSB said that a recorder that complies with ED-155 would be a
valuable aid to accident investigations and would be fully capable of
supporting a structured flight data monitoring program. The NTSB notes
that a considerable amount of work has been done by EUROCAE (with full
participation by both the FAA and the NTSB) to develop standards for
light-weight flight recording devices that would fulfill the
requirements outlined in the NPRM. The ED-155 standard covers FDR-like
data recording, CVR-like audio recording, cockpit video, and data-link
message recording. Several manufacturers are producing recorders to
this standard at a cost of less than $10,000.
    FreeFlight Systems, an avionics manufacturer, said that TSO-C197
will drive up costs because it does not allow commercial-grade
operating systems. This commenter said that, rather than using a TSO, a
parts manufacturer approval (PMA) should suffice, since a flight data
monitor failure does not endanger the airframe or other systems in the
aircraft. For accident investigation purposes, FreeFlight indicated
that it produces a hardened memory unit which provides protection of
vital information in the event of a crash. It has significant
ballistics protection and can withstand a temperature of 1,100 degrees
Celsius for up to an hour.
    The General Aviation Safety Network commented that no certification
should be required, except for RTCA DO-160E environmental
categorization. NORTH Flight Data Systems commented that the
``crashworthy focus'' of the NPRM will make many products undergo
redesign to meet the TSO or ED-155 standards.
    The FAA agrees with the NTSB that several manufacturers have
recording systems able to record flight performance data, audio,
images, and data-link messages. This final rule is performance based
and compliance with this rule does not necessarily require

installation of a TSO-approved system. However, TSO-C197-approved
articles are an acceptable means of compliance with new Sec.  135.607.
This equipment must be capable of recording flight performance data.
Considering the availability of such technology, the FAA has determined
that a final rule requiring all air ambulance helicopters to equip with
a flight data monitoring system is justified. This final rule requires
installation and operation of a flight data monitoring system, but it
does not require collection of data from that equipment or development
of data collection processes.
    In response to these comments, the FAA offers clarification. The
parameters described in the NPRM were meant to illustrate the type of
data that could be collected by this equipment. In the final rule, the
FAA does not specify parameters of data or specifically identify a set
of performance standards that must be met. The final rule also does not
require data collection or data analysis. It requires only that a
flight data monitoring system capable of recording flight performance
data be installed. This final rule simply requires equipment--not data
collection. The rule does not establish standards for crashworthiness
or environmental testing. This final rule uses a cost model for an
approved flight data monitoring system designed and produced under a
TSO-C197 authorization.
    It would be outside the scope of the rule to require satellite
tracking of helicopter air ambulances because it was not proposed in
the NPRM. In developing the 2010 NPRM, the FAA intended that compliance
with Sec.  135.607 would be met by an FDR-like system installed and
recording on the helicopter. An operator may demonstrate that a
satellite tracking system, combined with onboard reporting, has the
capability to meet the standards in Sec.  135.607.
    The FAA anticipates that relief could be granted for operations
with an inoperable flight data monitoring system. While a flight data
monitoring system is a valuable tool that can be used for accident
investigation, it is a passive device that collects information and is
not essential for safe operation in the way an oil pressure gauge would
be. The particular requirements relating to operations with an
inoperable flight data monitoring system would be developed by FAA's
Flight Standards Service for its MEL program.
Implementation Date for the Flight Data Monitoring System
    AMOA recommended that the FAA not issue a rule requiring flight
data monitoring systems until there is a better understanding of
current products. PHI said that a 3-year implementation time is too
ambitious. HAI strongly supports flight data monitoring technology, but
does not believe it is sufficiently mature at this time to serve as the
basis for a regulatory equipment mandate. HAI and LifeFlight of Maine
recommend establishment of a joint FAA/industry work group to collect
relevant data and conduct a study on which to base long term guidance.
The NTSB, in discussing the work that EUROCAE has done to develop
standards for light-weight flight recording systems, said an ED-155-
compliant recorder would be an aid to accident investigation and
encouraged the FAA to include a requirement for a flight data
monitoring system in the final rule. AMOA commented that operators have
reported significant delays in the approval process for all types of
equipment installations. It asked for expedited approval for any
required new equipment
    The FAA has carefully reviewed the comments that industry needs
sufficient time to manufacture, obtain and install equipment that meets
the required performance standards. After considering comments, the FAA
has determined that it is appropriate to allow 4, rather than 3 years
from the effective date of the rule for compliance. This extra year is
warranted to provide additional time for operators to obtain and
install equipment.
Cost Estimate for Flight Data Monitoring Systems
    In the NPRM, the FAA estimated that the cost of a flight data
monitoring system would be $6,450 for equipment and installation, and
accompanying software would cost $750 per year. There was also a $1,913
average 10-year cost estimate for evaluation, analysis, and use of the
recorded data. The FAA asked the public to evaluate the accuracy of
this cost information and those comments are summarized below.
    Bristow Group stated that this equipment is affordable and
effective and that the FAA should mandate it for all commercial
helicopters that are not already required to have FDR. It asserts that
this equipment is proven to bring safety and financial benefits to all
types of commercial helicopter operations.
    Some commenters, including AMOA, PHI, LifeFlight of Maine, AAMS,
and Air Evac EMS, said that cost estimates for the flight data
monitoring system presented in the NPRM were unrealistic. They said
that equipment bought at that price would not be able to perform all
the functions mentioned in the NPRM. They also said that the FAA's
estimates had not included the cost of installation, the cost of time
out of service, or the cost of reviewing data collected by the device.
AMOA contended that there is no current device that can perform all the
functions listed in the proposal. AMOA estimated that flight data
monitoring system costs are more than $30,000, plus costs associated
with the development of supplemental type certificates, installation,
and time out of service. PHI estimated the actual cost of a complete
flight data monitoring software platform can range from $50,000 to in
excess of $120,000--a cost that does not include hardware, manpower, or
recurring service/support and training. LifeFlight of Maine stated that
one member, who is a part 135 certificate holder with an FAA approved
FOQA and a flight data monitoring system, found the costs for purchase,
installation and data collection/analysis to be $27,250 per aircraft.
AAMS stated that reports from its providers already using flight data
monitoring systems suggested that the FAA estimates for equipment
purchase and installation are 4 to 5 times too low and did not account
for program maintenance, data storage, and report development. Air Evac
EMS estimated the total cost to be more than $40,000, plus costs
associated with the development of supplemental type certificates,
installation, time out of service, and very expensive service
contracts.
    PHI agreed with AMOA on the cost analysis, saying that the FAA had
``grossly underestimated'' the cost of flight data monitoring
equipment, accompanying analysis software, and flight data monitoring
FOQA program development and maintenance costs. These commenters argued
that no system on the market could accomplish all the tasks specified
in the NPRM at the price of $6,450. PHI also commented that ``another
cost driver for LARS will be the level of crash survivability
specified.'' PHI strongly urged the FAA to develop unique specific
minimum operational performance specifications (MOPS) or a TSO for
helicopter flight data monitoring systems. PHI contended that if this
equipment is held to the crashworthiness called for in ED-155, some
operators will not be able to afford it.
    In response to these comments, we note that the FDM capability
described in the NPRM was meant to illustrate the type of data that
could be collected by this equipment. We did not intend to propose an
FDM system that must record all information pertaining to the
aircraft's state (such as heading, altitude, and attitude), condition
(such

as rotors, transmission, engine parameters, and flight controls), and
system performance (such as full authority digital engine control, and
electronic flight instrumentation system) that was discussed in the
NPRM. Under this rule, the operator would be able to determine the
parameters that the FDM would record. Our estimate of $6,450 ($5,950
plus $500 for installation) was based on a device that could meet the
intent of the proposal, not one that could capture every parameter
listed as examples in the NPRM.
    However, based on the comments received, the FAA reviewed and
revised the FDMS cost estimates. In the final rule, the FAA
specifically identifies a set of performance standards that must be
met. While these performance standards are based on certain
requirements in TSO-C197 and ED-155, the final rule does not require
equipment that is compliant with TSO-C197 or ED-155. The FAA is aware
of equipment that meets TSO-C197 requirements that is currently
available for $7,000 and uses this estimate in the final rule. The FAA
also now estimates that installation would cost $8,000 (80 hours x $100
per hour) which would include time to run operational performance tests
on the FDMS. We estimate a one-time revenue loss of $7,000 per day for
installation. Therefore, the FAA estimates the total cost per
helicopter to be $22,000 ($7,000 equipment, $8,000 installation, $7,000
revenue loss). Additionally we estimate that operators will incur two,
one-time, hardware and software license fee costs of $2,500 and $750,
respectively. For detailed cost information see the accompanying
regulatory evaluation.
Final Rule
    This final rule will require installation of a flight data
monitoring system capable of recording helicopter flight performance
and operational data.\20\ It will not require data collection or
prescribe standards or parameters for data collection. The flight data
monitoring system must be activated and operative from the time
electrical power is turned on before takeoff until it is turned off
after the end of the flight. Helicopter air ambulance operators will
have 4 years to comply with the rule. Helicopters equipped with an
operational FDR that meets the requirements of Sec.  135.607(a)-(b)
will be in compliance with this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Section 306(d)(2) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to conduct a rulemaking
that addresses use of devices that perform the function of flight
data recorders and cockpit voice recorders, to the extent feasible,
in helicopter air ambulance operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule addresses parts of NTSB Safety Recommendations A-06-17
and A-09-90.
11. Pilot Instrument Ratings (Sec.  135.603)
    The FAA proposed to add Sec.  135.603 to require a helicopter air
ambulance pilot to hold a helicopter instrument rating. Currently,
Sec.  135.243(b) requires the pilot in command of a helicopter air
ambulance to hold, at a minimum, a commercial pilot certificate.
Helicopter air ambulance pilots are not currently required to hold
instrument ratings unless they will be flying under instrument flight
rules (IFR) or, when flying under visual flight rules (VFR), they will
be flying above a cloud layer (commonly called ``VFR over-the-top'').
    The FAA received comments expressing support for the proposal from
commenters including the NTSB, AMOA, AAMS, Air Evac EMS, NEMSPA, and
Safety and Flight Evaluations, International.
    The NTSB agreed with the requirement for a helicopter air ambulance
pilot to hold an instrument rating, but stated that helicopter air
ambulance pilots should maintain instrument currency. It commented that
instrument currency is generally acknowledged to be a skill that
deteriorates rapidly without continued practice and use. AMOA, NEMSPA,
Safety and Flight Evaluations, International and numerous individual
commenters also suggested that the FAA require helicopter air ambulance
pilots to maintain currency or routinely demonstrate the ability to
recover from IIMC. Several commenters noted that this requirement
should be applied to all commercial pilots.
    Identical comments from two individuals suggested requiring
frequent short training sessions involving unplanned entry into IMC
followed by an instrument approach to landing at least quarterly in an
approved aircraft or simulator. They suggested a requirement that a
table-top PC-based navigation system trainer or similar device be used
at least monthly. They commented that the FAA should not require using
a non-motion visual flight simulator with wrap-around visual display.
They requested that the FAA prohibit flight assignment within 24 hours
of training in a non-motion visual flight simulator with wrap-around
visual display.
    The FAA notes that IIMC is a common factor in helicopter air
ambulance accidents and the intent of the instrument rating requirement
is to ensure that helicopter air ambulance pilots are better equipped
to handle these situations. A pilot who receives this rating is better
equipped to maintain situational awareness and maneuver the helicopter
into a safe environment. Requiring an instrument rating, without a
requirement to maintain instrument currency, will allow a VFR operator
to expend fewer resources than required to meet full currency
requirements while ensuring that pilots have the skills necessary to
extract themselves from IIMC. Additionally, mandating instrument
currency for all commercial pilots is beyond the scope of the current
rulemaking.
    To prevent IIMC accidents, Sec.  135.293 requires that pilots
demonstrate the ability to recover from IIMC during their annual
competency checks. The FAA notes that the IIMC-recovery portion of the
competency check could be performed in a simulator or flight training
device, provided that it is consistent with that device's specific
approval. Pilots who obtain the instrument rating supplemented by the
preparation for the annual competency check will be adequately prepared
to recover from IIMC.
    This rule is adopted as proposed.

E. General Comments

FAA Oversight Resources/Delay in Approval/Expedited Approval Process
    AMOA commented that numerous operators report significant delays in
the approval process for all types of equipment installations. It
expressed concern about the FAA's ability to inform and educate field
personnel, such as Flight Standards District Offices (FSDOs) and
headquarters inspectors, about new rule requirements. It maintained
that there are a wide range of interpretations and implementations of
rules, resulting in a lack of standardization throughout the FAA.
    The FAA understands the commenter's concern and has issued guidance
for inspectors to ensure uniform application of the rule's
requirements. This rule also contains delayed compliance dates for
several of its provisions, which will give certificate holders time to
purchase and install the required equipment and to develop and
implement required procedures.
Night Vision Goggles and Autopilots
    The NPRM did not propose requiring night vision goggles (NVGs) or
night vision imaging systems (NVIS). The NPRM included a statement
explaining that the FAA considered allowing NVGs as an alternate method
of compliance for the HTAWS requirement, but

decided that this technology might not be appropriate for all
operations and that the FAA required further study on this equipment
before allowing its use instead of HTAWS.
    Numerous commenters, including AMOA, PHI, Air Evac EMS, NEMSPA,
LifeFlight of Maine, FreeFlight Systems, and AAMS expressed support for
an NVG or night vision imaging system requirement in this rule. Many
commented that night vision technology should be mandated in lieu of
HTAWS. AAMS commented that HTAWS and NVGs should be required together
as each provides benefits that complement the other. LifeFlight of
Maine commented that HTAWS and NVG should be a minimum standard for
night operations. The FAA did not receive any comments stating that the
FAA should not require NVGs or night vision imaging systems.
    As stated in the NPRM, the FAA considered allowing certificate
holders to use NVGs or night vision imaging systems as an alternative
to HTAWS but did not include such a proposal in the NPRM for numerous
reasons. Night vision goggles may not be appropriate for all
operations, such as inadvertent flight into IMC. Additionally, the FAA
stated that it must conduct further research to determine the most
appropriate use of NVGs before allowing operators to use them as an
alternate means of compliance. See 75 FR 62654. The FAA is, however,
currently investigating the benefits, uses and limitations of NVGs.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Section 318 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(Pub. L. 112-95) requires the FAA to study the ``feasibility of
requiring pilots of helicopters providing air ambulance services
under part 135 . . . to use NVGs during nighttime operations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly the FAA received comments questioning why this rule did
not mandate an autopilot requirement. The NTSB commented that the NPRM
did not address Safety Recommendation A-09-96, which recommended that
the FAA require all EMS helicopters to be equipped with an autopilot
for single-pilot operations. NTSB believes that an autopilot is a
significant aid for unexpected high workload situations, such as IIMC.
LifeFlight of Maine, Boston MedFlight, Life Flight Network, Angel One
Transport, NEMSPA, Safety and Flight Evaluations, International,
members of ACCT, and several individual commenters also expressed
support for an autopilot requirement. Association of Air Medical
Services supported the added safety benefits of autopilot technology
but commented that further research, development, and industry
collaboration is necessary before a regulatory requirement is
considered.
    The FAA did not include an autopilot requirement in the NPRM.
Therefore, mandating an autopilot unit is outside the scope of this
current rulemaking. Furthermore, the FAA concluded that requiring
autopilots on helicopter air ambulances in this current rulemaking
would be premature. Autopilot units may be cost prohibitive and not
widely available, and may pose space and weight issues for helicopters
not equipped to handle the units.
Public Aircraft Operations
    The FAA received several comments from public safety organizations,
including the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the
Department of California Highway Patrol, asking about the applicability
of this rule to ``public safety operations'' or stating their
understanding that the part 135 provisions would not be applicable to
such operations. The San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
commented that applying the proposed rules to its public safety
operations would limit its ability to conduct its operations and
``render unusable 50% of the helicopter EMS aircraft'' in the county.
    In contrast, several commenters, including AMOA, PHI, and West
Michigan Air Care, expressed support for extending the provisions of
this rule to include public aircraft operations. PHI expressed support
for requiring public aircraft operations to comply with the rules
proposed in the NPRM, stating that the thousands of passengers
transported every year by government operators should benefit from the
safety enhancements in the proposed rule. It stated that the FAA has
been inconsistent in providing civil aircraft regulatory oversight of
government operators engaged in air ambulance operations. PHI also
highlighted NTSB Safety Recommendation, A-09-130, which calls for the
FAA to seek specific legislative authority to achieve safety oversight
of helicopter air ambulance operations conducted using government-owned
aircraft. The Airborne Law Enforcement Association suggested that the
FAA establish a definition of ``public safety HEMS aircraft.''
    In response, the FAA clarifies that the part 135 provisions of this
rule do not apply to public aircraft operations. The FAA has statutory
authority to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce. See
49 U.S.C. 44701(a). This authority does not extend to public aircraft
operations.
    Public aircraft operation is limited by statute to certain
government operations within U.S. airspace. See 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(41),
40125. Although these operations must comply with certain general
operating rules (including those applicable to all aircraft in the
National Airspace System), other civil certification and safety
oversight regulations do not apply. Whether an operation may be
considered a public aircraft operation is determined on a flight-by-
flight basis, under the terms of the statute. The FAA considers the
following factors in making these determinations: aircraft ownership,
the purpose of the flight, and the persons on board the aircraft.
    Specifically, 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(41)(C) includes as a public
aircraft ``an aircraft owned or operated by the government of a State .
. . or a political subdivision of [one of these] governments, except as
provided in section 40125(b).'' See Legal Interpretation to Ray
Borrato, from Rebecca B. MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for
Regulations (July 14, 2011). Section 40125(b) states that an aircraft
included in Sec.  40102(a)(41)(C) ``does not qualify as a public
aircraft . . . when the aircraft is used for commercial purposes or to
carry an individual other than a crewmember or a qualified non-
crewmember.'' ``Commercial purposes'' under the statute means ``the
transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire. . . .''
If an operator receives compensation for conducting operations it would
not be providing the service as a public aircraft operation, but as a
commercial vendor. Those flights would not qualify as public aircraft
operations and the operator would be required to comply with the
certification and operating rules of 14 CFR part 135.
    To that end, we note that the part 135 provisions of this rule
would apply only to civil aircraft operations and would not apply to
public aircraft operations. Accordingly, an aircraft operator that only
performs public aircraft operations would not need to hold a part 119
operating certificate permitting part 135 operations. An operator that
conducts both public aircraft operations and civil operations would
need to hold a part 119 operating certificate and conduct its civil
operations pursuant to part 135 rules. We also note that public
aircraft operations must adhere to part 91 airspace rules; therefore,
the provisions of Sec.  91.155 would apply to both public and civil
operations.
    The FAA encourages government entities that conduct public aircraft
operations to inform the local FSDO that they conduct public aircraft
operations in the FSDO's area to avoid confusion

about the oversight of those operations. The FAA conducts surveillance
and oversight of part 119 certificates holders, including government
entities that hold such certificates, to verify that they are complying
with appropriate rules during civil operations.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analysis

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563
directs that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact
of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies
to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they
be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written
assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or
final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this rule. We
suggest readers seeking greater detail read the full regulatory
evaluation, a copy of which we have placed in the docket for this
rulemaking.
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this final
rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is not an
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is ``significant'' as defined in
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) will not
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States; and (6) will not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local,
tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold
identified above. These analyses are summarized below.
Total Benefits and Costs of This Rule
    The estimated mean benefit value for the rule will be about $821
million, or $577 million present value, over ten years. The FAA
estimates the cost of this rule will be approximately $311 million, or
$243 million present value, over ten years.
Who is potentially affected by this rule?
    Helicopter air ambulance operators, commercial helicopter
operators, helicopter aerial application operators, and helicopter
external load operators.
    Assumptions:
     The rule is expected to take effect in 2013. The time
horizon for these potential benefits is 10 years, 2013 through 2022.
     All monetary values are expressed in constant 2013
dollars. We calculated the present value of the potential benefit
stream by discounting the monetary values using a 7 percent interest
rate from 2013 to 2022.
     The FAA estimated that the helicopter fleet would grow at
2.8 percent per year.
Benefits of This Rule
    Benefits will accrue from the implementation of new operational
procedures and additional equipment requirements for helicopter air
ambulances. This final rule also increases safety for commercial
helicopter operations by revising requirements for equipment, pilot
training, and alternate airports and it increases weather minimums for
helicopters operating under part 91. The estimated mean benefit value
for these provisions will be $821 million, or $577 million present
value, over ten years.
Costs of This Rule
    The FAA estimates the cost of this rule will be approximately $311
million, or $243 million present value, over ten years.
Regulatory Flexibility Determination
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes,
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in
the Act.
    Based on the criteria used in the initial regulatory flexibility
analysis and used again here, this rule will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The FAA's
usual threshold for economic significance is a 2 percent annual
compliance cost to operating revenue. However, we elected to use a more
conservative threshold of 1 percent annual compliance cost to operating
revenue in this rulemaking. In the initial regulatory flexibility
analysis, we stated that the proposed rule would cause small air
ambulance operators to incur compliance costs such that the ratio of
annual compliance cost to annual revenue ranged between 1.76 and 1.88
percent, which we considered significant. We did not receive any
comments on this determination. In the final regulatory flexibility
analysis, we have updated the ratio of annual compliance costs to
annual revenue to a range between 1.80 to 1.87 percent, but our
determination has not changed--this rule will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small air ambulance
operators.
    This final rule will impact air ambulance, air tour, on demand,
aerial application, and external load operators. The U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) classifies businesses as small based on
size standards, typically expressed as annual revenue or number of
employees. SBA publishes a table of small business size standards
matched to North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes.
Table 5 shows the size standards for the entities that will be affected
by this rule.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.001

Air Ambulance Operators
    Because we did not have actual annual revenues for air ambulance
operators, we estimated them using helicopter counts as a revenue
driver. We assumed an average of 367 operations per year for each
helicopter and a charge of $7,000 per operation. The FAA estimated 35
small air ambulance operators (with estimated revenues lower than $7
million) out of the 73 air ambulance operators that will be affected by
this regulation, which we consider a substantial number of small
entities. Their ratio of annualized cost to annual revenue ranges from
1.80 to 1.87 percent. Based on the criteria used in the initial
regulatory flexibility analysis and used again here, this rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small air
ambulance operators. Accordingly, the FAA prepared a regulatory
flexibility analysis for small air ambulance operators, as described in
the next section.
Air Tour Operators
    We assumed an average of 747 air tour operations per year for each
helicopter and a charge of $1,689 \22\ per air tour operation. As such,
the FAA identified 31 small air tour operators (with estimated revenues
lower than $7 million) out of the 46 air tour operators that will be
affected by this regulation, which we consider a substantial number of
small entities. Their ratio of annualized cost to annual revenue for
air tour operators ranges from 0.08 to 0.26 percent, which is not
significant. While this rule will affect a substantial number of small
air tour operators, they will not incur a significant economic impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ We multiplied the average revenue per person for 5
different operators ($380.56/person) by the average hours per
operation (0.7396 hours/operation) and by the average revenue
passengers per helicopters (6 passengers/helicopter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

On Demand Operators
    The FAA identified 370 small on- demand operators (with 1,500 or
fewer employees) out of the 379 that will be affected by this
regulation, which we consider a substantial number of small entities.
Although their annualized compliance costs range from $980 to $72,784,
we were unable to estimate their annual revenues because average
revenue per flight for these entities is not meaningful. There are a
number of factors (e.g., length of flight, type of helicopter) that
determine the revenue for an individual flight. These factors are not
likely to result in a distribution around a meaningful average revenue.
At the higher end of the compliance cost range, the economic impact may
well be significant, but again, we cannot validate such an estimate. In
the NPRM, we asked on-demand operators to provide financial data
pertaining to the rule's impact on their operations, but we did not
receive any comments in response to this request. Therefore we still
have no annual revenue data for these operators.
Aerial Application Operators (Part 137)
    We assumed an average of 81 aerial application operations per year
for each helicopter and a charge of $500 per aerial application
operation. The FAA identified 224 small aerial application operators
(with estimated revenues lower than $7 million) out of the 224 aerial
application operators that will be affected by this regulation, which
we consider a substantial number of small entities. Their ratio of
annualized cost to annual revenue is 0.01 percent, which is not
significant. While this rule will affect a substantial number of small
aerial application operators, they will not incur a significant
economic impact.
External Load Operators (Part 133)
    We assumed an average of 1,159 external load operations per year
for each helicopter and a charge of $625 per external load operation.
The FAA identified 197 small external load operators (with estimated
revenues lower than $7 million) out of the 219 external load operators
that will be affected by this regulation, which we consider a
substantial number of small entities. Their ratio of annualized cost to
annual revenue is less than 0.01 percent, which is not significant.
While this rule will affect a substantial number of small external load
operators, they will not incur a significant economic impact.
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    Under section 603(b) of the RFA (as amended), each regulatory
flexibility analysis is required to address the following points: (1)
Reasons the agency considered the rule, (2) the objectives and legal
basis for the rule, (3) the kind and number of small entities to which
the rule will apply, (4) the reporting, recordkeeping, and other
compliance requirements of the rule, and (5) all Federal rules that may
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the rule.
Reasons the FAA Considered the Rule
    Helicopter air ambulance accidents reached the highest levels in
history during the years from 2003 through 2008.\23\ The year 2008 was
the deadliest. In 2008, five air ambulance accidents killed 21 people,
including pilots, patients, and medical personnel. A total of 62
helicopter air ambulance accidents occurred during the period from 1991
through 2010, and this number included 125 fatalities and a midair
collision between two helicopter air ambulances. Commercial helicopters
other than air ambulances had accidents as well. From 1991 through
2010, these helicopters had 20 accidents and 39 fatalities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ GAO, Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to Address Air
Ambulance Safety Concerns (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There were four common factors in these accidents--night
conditions, inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological
conditions, loss of control, and controlled flight into terrain.
    The impetus for this rulemaking is the number of helicopter
accidents, noted above. Helicopter air ambulances operate under unique
conditions. Their flights are often time-sensitive, putting pressure on
the pilots. Helicopter air ambulances operate at low altitudes and
under varied weather conditions. These pilots fly year-round in rural
and urban settings, over mountainous and non-

mountainous terrain, during the day and during the night, and in
conditions where visibility is good and in conditions where it is not.
They must often land at unfamiliar, remote, or unimproved sites with
hazards like trees, buildings, towers, wires, and uneven terrain.
    In an emergency, many patients will not have a choice of whether
they want to be transported in a helicopter. They may be in a medical
condition that prevents them from making decisions about transportation
or indicating what they want. They cannot choose between competing
carriers because the company that responds to the scene may be either
the only one in the area or the first one called. For these reasons,
and those discussed previously, the FAA is establishing more stringent
safety regulations to protect patients, medical personnel and flight
crewmembers onboard helicopter air ambulances.
The Objectives and Legal Basis for the Rule
    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(4), which requires
the Administrator to promulgate regulations in the interest of safety
for the maximum hours or periods of service of airmen and other
employees of air carriers, and 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires
the Administrator to promulgate regulations and minimum standards for
other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for safety in air
commerce and national security.
The Kind and Number of Small Entities to Which the Rule Will Apply
    The FAA identified 35 small air ambulance operators on which the
rule will have a significant economic impact. We estimate that the
small air ambulance operators have annual revenues between $2.6 million
and $5.1 million.
The Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements of the
Rule
    As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA will submit a copy of these sections to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for its review. The following provisions
apply to the Paperwork Reduction Act.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.002

All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Rule
    The FAA is unaware of any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or
conflict with this rule.
Other Considerations
Affordability Analysis
    For the purpose of this analysis, the degree to which small
entities can afford the cost of the rule is predicated on the
availability of financial resources. Costs can be paid from existing
assets such as cash, by borrowing, through the provision of additional
equity capital, by accepting reduced profits, by raising prices, or by
finding other ways of offsetting costs.
    One means of assessing the affordability is by determining the
ability of each of the small entities to meet its short-term
obligations by looking at net income, working capital and financial
strength ratios. However, the FAA was unable to find this type of
financial information for the affected entities, and so used an
alternative way of analyzing affordability. The approach used by the
FAA was to compare estimated revenues with the annualized compliance
costs.
    The average ratio of annualized costs to estimated annual revenues
for small air ambulance operators ranges from 1.80% percent to 1.87
percent. Thus, the FAA expects that small air ambulance operators will
not have trouble affording this rule.
Competitiveness Analysis
    For small air ambulance operators, the average ratio of annualized
cost to estimated annual revenue ranges from 1.80 percent to 1.87
percent. For large air ambulance operators, it ranges from 0.90 percent
to 1.94 percent. For 33 out of the 38 large air ambulance operators, it
ranges from 1.74 percent to 1.94 percent. The FAA expects that, based
on these overlapping results, there will be no change in the
competitiveness of these 33 small air ambulance operators with large
air ambulance operators. However, for the remaining 5 large operators,
the average ratio of annualized compliance cost to estimated annual
revenue ranges from 0.90 percent to 0.93 percent, and this gives them a
competitive advantage over small air ambulance operators.
Alternatives
    Alternative One--This alternative considers excluding the
Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) unit from the
rulemaking. Although this alternative would reduce the ratio of
annualized compliance cost to annual revenue from a range of 1.80
percent to 1.87 percent to a range of 1.61 percent to 1.68 percent,
there would also be a significant reduction in safety.

    Conclusion--The HTAWS is a tool for situational awareness and for
helping helicopter air ambulance pilots during night operations. This
equipment enhances situational awareness in all aspects of flying
including day or night flight, and flight in instrument meteorological
conditions. The FAA believes that this equipment is a significant
safety enhancement for all aspects of helicopter operations. The
accident data shows that the HTAWS provision could have prevented many
air ambulance accidents if this equipment had been installed in the
helicopter. Also, HTAWS is a Congressional mandate under Public Law
112-95. The Act requires the FAA to conduct rulemaking on helicopter
air ambulance operations to address ``safety-enhancing technology and
equipment, including HTAWS. . . .'' Thus the FAA does not consider
excluding this requirement to be an acceptable alternative in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. Sec.  603(d).
    Alternative Two--This alternative would affect the requirement for
certificate holders engaged in helicopter air ambulance operations to
have an OCC. The population affected would change from operators with
10 or more helicopters to those with 15 or more.
    Conclusion--The FAA believes that operators with 10 or more
helicopters engaged in air ambulance operations comprise 83 percent of
the total air ambulance fleet in the U.S. The FAA believes that
changing the requirement to apply to operators with 15 or more
helicopters would decrease the coverage of the population to 78
percent. Furthermore, the complexity of operations considerably
increases for operators of 10 or more helicopters. Thus the FAA does
not consider this to be an acceptable alternative in accordance with 5
U.S.C. 603(d).
Minimizing the Burden on Small Entities
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to consider the
impact of their regulatory proposals on small entities and to analyze
one or more significant alternatives to minimize the rule's burden on
small entities. The FAA analyzed two alternatives to minimize the
burden on small entities. We considered excluding the HTAWS unit
requirement from the final rule. Next, we considered increasing the
number of helicopters required to trigger the OCC requirement to 15.
The FAA, however, did not consider these to be acceptable alternatives
due to the significant enhancement for safety that HTAWS provides to
helicopter operations. Therefore, the FAA did not adopt this
alternative.
Conclusion
    This rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small air ambulance operators. The FAA identified 35 small
air ambulance operators on which the rule will have a significant
economic impact.

D. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this final rule and determined the
regulations will improve safety, which is a legitimate domestic
objective and therefore not an unnecessary obstacle to foreign
commerce.

E. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $143.1 million in lieu of $100
million. This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore,
the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

F. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995
amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an
agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor
may it impose an information collection requirement unless it displays
a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
    The final rule will impose the following new information collection
requirements.
Private Sector Costs
    (1) Require all rotorcraft used in part 135 operations to be
equipped with radio altimeters (Sec.  135.160). Certificate holders may
apply for a deviation from the requirement for helicopters in which a
radio altimeter cannot physically be installed in the flight deck.
Estimated number of applications for deviations from on-demand
helicopters = 94. Estimated number of applications for air tour
helicopters = 13. Time needed per deviation application = 1 hour.
Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.003

    (2) Establish VFR ceiling and visibility requirements for
helicopter air ambulance operations conducted in class G airspace
(Sec.  135.609). These operators may designate local flying areas.
Certificate holders electing to do so would document the local flying
area in a manner acceptable to the administrator. We estimate that 50
percent of the air ambulance operators will designate local flying
areas.
    Air ambulance operators = 73.
    Air ambulance operators affected = 50%.
    Time needed to develop local flying area = 2 hours.
    Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.004

    (3) Require air ambulance operators to document the highest
obstacle along the planned route prior to a VFR flight (Sec.  135.615).
Affected operators must document the procedures for performing this
task in their operations manuals.
    Air Ambulance Helicopters = 1,073-1,371.
    Air Ambulance operations per helicopter = 367 per year.
    Flight planning time = 5 minutes per operation.
    Salary of pilot = $75 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.005

    (4) Require each certificate holder performing helicopter air
ambulance operations to implement an FAA-approved pre-flight risk-
analysis program documented in its operations manual (Sec.  135.617).
    Air ambulance operators = 73.
    Time for chief pilot to develop risk analysis program = 30 hours.
    Time for clerk to develop risk analysis worksheet and insert
program into operations manual = 30 hours.
    Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
    Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.006

    (5) Require pilots in command to conduct a pre-flight risk
analysis, including completion of a risk analysis worksheet before a
helicopter air ambulance operation (Sec.  135.617).
    Air Ambulance Helicopters = 1,073-1,371.
    Air Ambulance operations per helicopter = 367 per year.
    Flight planning time = 10 minutes per operation.
    Salary of pilot = $75 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.007

    (6) Require operations control specialists to participate in the
pre-flight risk analysis required by Sec.  135.617, including
acknowledging in writing the date and time the risk analysis was
completed and that the flight can be conducted safely (Sec.  135.619).
    Air Ambulance Helicopters operated by certificate holders with an
OCC = 895-1,144.
    Air Ambulance operations per helicopter = 367 per year.
    Time spent by OCS per pilot's worksheet = 5 minutes.
    Salary of operations control specialist (OCS) = $42 per hour.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.008

    (7) Require certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air
ambulances to establish operational control centers and document
operations control specialist duties and training in their operations
manuals. (Sec.  135.619).
    Operators that need to develop the OCS training = 13.
    Operators that need to change their manuals = 2.
    Time for chief pilot to develop OCS training = 60 hours.
    Time for clerk to develop OCS training = 30 hours.
    Time for chief pilot to change manual = 1 hour.
    Time for clerk to change manual = 0.5 hour.
    Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
    Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.009

    (8) Require certificate holders that do not currently have
operations control centers but will be required to have them to retain
records of the training given to operations control specialists (Sec.
135.619).
    Operations control specialists = 119-152.
    Time per OCS training record = 5 minutes.
    Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.010

    (9) Require certificate holders with operations control centers to
retain operations control specialist training records (Sec.  135.619).
    Operations control specialists = 369-472.
    Time per OCS training record = 5 minutes.
    Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.011

    (10) Require that medical personnel on board helicopter air
ambulance flights receive either a supplemental safety briefing or
safety training in lieu of a pre-flight briefing (Sec.  135.621).
    Affected air ambulance operators = 37.
    Time for chief pilot to develop training = 10 hours.
    Time for clerk to incorporate training into operations manual = 10
hours.
    Salary of chief pilot = $79 per hour.
    Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.012

    (11) Certificate holders choosing the option to provide safety
training would be required to retain training records for persons
receiving the training (Sec.  135.621).
    Medical personnel = 5,858.
    Time per medical personnel training record = 5 minutes.
    Training: every 24 calendar months.
    Salary of clerk = $25 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.013

    Note:
    Operations control specialists would be subject to certificate
holders' drug and alcohol testing programs (Sec. Sec.  120.5, 120.15).
The FAA believes that, because certificate holders currently administer
and maintain records for drug and alcohol testing for other employees
(approved under OMB Control Number 2120-0535), the cost for a clerical
person to maintain the records would be negligible.
Summary of All Burden Hours and Costs
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.014

Cost to the Federal Government
    (1) Radio altimeters for rotorcraft operations (Sec.  135.160).
    Applications for deviations from radio altimeter requirement = 107.
    Time needed for review and operations specification = 1.5 hour.
    Salary of inspector at headquarters = $76 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.015

    (2) Local Flying Area (Sec.  135.609).
    Air ambulance operators = 73.
    Air ambulance operators affected = 50%.
    Time needed to review request = 1 hour.
    Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.016

    (3) Review pre-flight risk analysis procedure and worksheet (Sec.
135.617).
    Air ambulance operators = 73.
    Time to review = 1 hour.
    Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.017

    (4) OCS training/amendment to existing manual (Sec.  135.619).
    Operators = 15.
    Time to review OCS training = 1 hour.
    Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.018

    (5) Review Medical Personnel Training (Sec.  135.621).
    Air ambulance operators = 73.
    Time to review = 1 hour.
    Salary of inspector at field office = $48 per hour.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.019

Summary of All Burden Hours and Costs Over 10 Year Period
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21FE14.020

    As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA has submitted these information collection amendments
to OMB for its review. Notice of OMB approval for this information
collection will be published in a future Federal Register document.

G. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable.
The FAA has reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices and has identified the following differences.
    ICAO Annex 6 Part III, Section II, Chapter 4 sets standards for
helicopter overwater equipment requirements based on performance class
and distance from land based on time at normal cruise speed. The FAA
did not adopt this requirement but instead bases the rule on existing
FAA helicopter performance criteria and distances from shore.
    Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.

H. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f. Additionally, the FAA reviewed
paragraph 304 of Order 1050.1E and determined that this rulemaking
involves no extraordinary circumstances.

I. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner

affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation,
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, the
FAA requested comments on whether the proposed rule should apply
differently to intrastate operations in Alaska.
    The agency received comments pertaining to this rule's application
in Alaska which are discussed in sections III.C.1 (the radio altimeter
requirement) and III.C.3 (pilot testing on recovery from inadvertent
flight into IMC, flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions) of this
final rule document. To the requirement for a radio altimeter,
NorthStar Trekking commented that this equipment can give erroneous
readings on snow-covered surfaces. In response, as discussed in
III.C.1, the FAA has determined that the safety benefits of this
equipment outweigh the possibility of infrequent inaccurate readings.
In response to the comment about pilot testing, the FAA reiterates that
pilots will benefit from demonstrating knowledge of procedures for
aircraft handling in all three conditions, because these conditions may
occur year-round in many places. As a result, the agency has determined
that there is no need to make any regulatory distinctions applicable to
intrastate aviation in Alaska.

V. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency determined
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the
States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and, therefore, does not have Federalism
implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
is not a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order and it
is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.

VI. How To Obtain Additional Information

A. Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained by
using the Internet--
    1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visit the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ or
    3. Access the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling<PHONE_NUMBER>.

B. Comments Submitted to the Docket

    Comments received may be viewed by going to http://www.regulations.gov and following the online instructions to search the
docket number for this action. Anyone is able to search the electronic
form of all comments received into any of the FAA's dockets by the name
of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).

C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document,
may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble.
To find out more about SBREFA on the Internet, visit http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 91

    Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

 14 CFR Part 120

    Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Alcoholism, Alcohol testing, Aviation
safety, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Operators, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Safety-sensitive, Transportation.

14 CFR Part 135

    Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

0
1. Revise the authority citation for part 91 to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 1155, 40103, 40113, 40120,
44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716,
44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508,
47528-47531, articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180).

0
2. Amend Sec.  91.155 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) to read as
follows:

Sec.  91.155  Basic VFR weather minimums.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and Sec.
91.157, no person may operate an aircraft under VFR when the flight
visibility is less, or at a distance from clouds that is less, than
that prescribed for the corresponding altitude and class of airspace in
the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Distance from
            Airspace               Flight visibility        clouds
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class A.........................  Not Applicable....  Not Applicable.
Class B.........................  3 statute miles...  Clear of Clouds.
Class C.........................  3 statute miles...  500 feet below.
                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  2,000 feet
                                                       horizontal.
Class D.........................  3 statute miles...  500 feet below.
                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  2,000 feet
                                                       horizontal.
Class E:
    Less than 10,000 feet MSL...  3 statute miles...  500 feet below.

                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  2,000 feet
                                                       horizontal.
    At or above 10,000 feet MSL.  5 statute miles...  1,000 feet below.
                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  1 statute mile
                                                       horizontal.
Class G:
    1,200 feet or less above the
     surface (regardless of MSL
     altitude)
For aircraft other than
 helicopters:
    Day, except as provided in    1 statute mile....  Clear of clouds.
     Sec.   91.155(b).
    Night, except as provided in  3 statute miles...  500 feet below.
     Sec.   91.155(b).
                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  2,000 feet
                                                       horizontal.
For helicopters:
    Day, except as provided in    \1/2\ statute mile  Clear of clouds.
     Sec.   91.155(b).
    Night, except as provided in  1 statute mile....  Clear of clouds.
     Sec.   91.155(b).
    More than 1,200 feet above
     the surface but less than
     10,000 feet MSL
        Day.....................  1 statute mile....  500 feet below.
                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  2,000 feet
                                                       horizontal.
        Night...................  3 statute miles...  500 feet below.
                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  2,000 feet
                                                       horizontal.
    More than 1,200 feet above    5 statute miles...  1,000 feet below.
     the surface and at or above
     10,000 feet MSL.
                                  ..................  1,000 feet above.
                                  ..................  1 statute mile
                                                       horizontal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (b) * * *
    (1) Helicopter. A helicopter may be operated clear of clouds in an
airport traffic pattern within \1/2\ mile of the runway or helipad of
intended landing if the flight visibility is not less than \1/2\
statute mile.
* * * * *

PART 120--DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAM

0
3. The authority citation for part 120 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101-40103, 40113, 40120,
41706, 41721, 44106, 44701, 44702, 44703, 44709, 44710, 44711,
45101-45105, 46105, 46306.

0
4. Amend Sec.  120.105 by adding paragraph (i) to read as follows:

Sec.  120.105  Employees who must be tested.

* * * * *
    (i) Operations control specialist duties.

0
5. Amend Sec.  120.215 by adding paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows:

Sec.  120.215  Covered employees.

    (a) * * *
    (9) Operations control specialist duties.
* * * * *

PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATIONS
AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT

0
6. The authority citation for part 135 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 41706, 40113, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709, 44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722, 44730, 45101-45105;
Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 58 (49 U.S.C. 44730).

0
7. Amend Sec.  135.1 by adding paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows:

Sec.  135.1  Applicability.

    (a) * * *
    (9) Helicopter air ambulance operations as defined in Sec.
135.601(b)(1).
* * * * *

0
8. Amend Sec.  135.117 by adding paragraph (a)(9) to read as follows:

Sec.  135.117  Briefing of passengers before flight.

    (a) * * *
    (9) If a rotorcraft operation involves flight beyond autorotational
distance from the shoreline, as defined in Sec.  135.168(a), use of
life preservers, ditching procedures and emergency exit from the
rotorcraft in the event of a ditching; and the location and use of life
rafts and other life preserver devices if applicable.
* * * * *

0
9. Add Sec.  135.160 to read as follows:

Sec.  135.160  Radio altimeters for rotorcraft operations.

    (a) After April 24, 2017, no person may operate a rotorcraft unless
that rotorcraft is equipped with an operable FAA-approved radio
altimeter, or an FAA-approved device that incorporates a radio
altimeter, unless otherwise authorized in the certificate holder's
approved minimum equipment list.
    (b) Deviation authority. The Administrator may authorize deviations
from paragraph (a) of this section for rotorcraft that are unable to
incorporate a radio altimeter. This deviation will be issued as a
Letter of Deviation Authority. The deviation may be terminated or
amended at any time by the Administrator. The request for deviation
authority is applicable to rotorcraft with a maximum gross takeoff
weight no greater than 2,950 pounds. The request for deviation
authority must contain a complete statement of the circumstances and
justification, and must be submitted to the nearest Flight Standards
District Office, not less than 60 days prior to the date of intended
operations.

0
10. Add Sec.  135.168 to read as follows:

Sec.  135.168  Emergency equipment: Overwater rotorcraft operations.

    (a) Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following
definitions apply--
    Autorotational distance refers to the distance a rotorcraft can
travel in autorotation as described by the

manufacturer in the approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual.
    Shoreline means that area of the land adjacent to the water of an
ocean, sea, lake, pond, river, or tidal basin that is above the high-
water mark at which a rotorcraft could be landed safely. This does not
include land areas which are unsuitable for landing such as vertical
cliffs or land intermittently under water.
    (b) Required equipment. After April 24, 2017, except as provided
for in paragraph (c), when authorized by the certificate holder's
operations specifications, or when necessary only for takeoff or
landing, no person may operate a rotorcraft beyond autorotational
distance from the shoreline unless it carries:
    (1) An approved life preserver equipped with an approved survivor
locator light for each occupant of the rotorcraft. The life preserver
must be worn by each occupant while the rotorcraft is beyond
autorotational distance from the shoreline, except for a patient
transported during a helicopter air ambulance operation, as defined in
Sec.  135.601(b)(1), when wearing a life preserver would be inadvisable
for medical reasons; and
    (2) An approved and installed 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter
(ELT) with 121.5 MHz homing capability. Batteries used in ELTs must be
maintained in accordance with the following--
    (i) Non-rechargeable batteries must be replaced when the
transmitter has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour or when 50%
of their useful lives have expired, as established by the transmitter
manufacturer under its approval. The new expiration date for replacing
the batteries must be legibly marked on the outside of the transmitter.
The battery useful life requirements of this paragraph (b)(2) do not
apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are
essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals; or
    (ii) Rechargeable batteries used in the transmitter must be
recharged when the transmitter has been in use for more than 1
cumulative hour or when 50% of their useful-life-of-charge has expired,
as established by the transmitter manufacturer under its approval. The
new expiration date for recharging the batteries must be legibly marked
on the outside of the transmitter. The battery useful-life-of-charge
requirements of this paragraph (b)(2) do not apply to batteries (such
as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during
probable storage intervals.
    (c) Maintenance. The equipment required by this section must be
maintained in accordance with Sec.  135.419.
    (d) ELT standards. The ELT required by paragraph (b)(2) of this
section must meet the requirements in:
    (1) TSO-C126, TSO-C126a, or TSO-C126b; and
    (2) Section 2 of either RTCA DO-204 or RTCA DO-204A, as specified
by the TSO complied with in paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
    (e) ELT alternative compliance. Operators with an ELT required by
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, or an ELT with an approved deviation
under Sec.  21.618 of this chapter, are in compliance with this
section.
    (f) Incorporation by reference. The standards required in this
section are incorporated by reference into this section with the
approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)
and 1 CFR part 51. To enforce any edition other than that specified in
this section, the FAA must publish notice of change in the Federal
Register and the material must be available to the public. All approved
material is available for inspection at the FAA's Office of Rulemaking
(ARM-1), 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591 (telephone
(202) 267-9677) and from the sources indicated below. It is also
available for inspection at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER> or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
    (1) U.S. Department of Transportation, Subsequent Distribution
Office, DOT Warehouse M30, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th
Avenue, Landover, MD 20785; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>. Copies are also
available on the FAA's Web site. Use the following link and type the
TSO number in the search box: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/Frameset?OpenPage.
    (i) TSO-C126, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Dec. 23,
1992,
    (ii) TSO-C126a, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Dec.
17, 2008, and
    (iii) TSO-C126b, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), Nov.
26, 2012.
    (2) RTCA, Inc., 1150 18th Street NW., Suite 910, Washington, DC
20036, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, and are also available on RTCA's Web
site at http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/index.cfm.
    (i) RTCA DO-204, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs), Sept. 29, 1989, and
    (ii) RTCA DO-204A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT), Dec. 6, 2007.

0
11. Revise Sec.  135.221 to read as follows:

Sec.  135.221  IFR: Alternate airport weather minimums.

    (a) Aircraft other than rotorcraft. No person may designate an
alternate airport unless the weather reports or forecasts, or any
combination of them, indicate that the weather conditions will be at or
above authorized alternate airport landing minimums for that airport at
the estimated time of arrival.
    (b) Rotorcraft. Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator,