[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 186 (Wednesday, September 27, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 44945-44965]
[FR Doc No: 2017-20350]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2017-0085]
RIN 2127-AL68

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered
Vehicles: Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: NHTSA is issuing this final rule to amend Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 305, ``Electric-powered vehicles:
Electrolyte spillage and electrical shock protection,'' to adopt
various electrical safety requirements found in Global Technical
Regulation (GTR) No. 13, ``Hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles,'' and other
sources. This final rule updates FMVSS No. 305 using modern and
harmonized safety requirements and facilitates the introduction of new
technologies, including hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs) and 48-volt
mild hybrid technologies. This final rule is a deregulatory action. It
imposes no costs and adjusts FMVSS No. 305 to give more flexibility to
manufacturers not only to use modern electrical safety designs to
produce electric vehicles, but also to introduce new technologies to
the U.S. market. To expand FMVSS No. 305's performance requirements
beyond post-crash conditions, NHTSA adopts electrical safety
requirements to protect against direct and indirect contact of high
voltage sources during everyday operation of electric-powered vehicles.
Also, NHTSA adopts an optional method of meeting post-crash electrical
safety requirements, consistent with that in GTR No. 13, involving use
of physical barriers to prevent direct or indirect contact (by
occupants, emergency services personnel and others) with high voltage
sources.

DATES:
    Effective date: This final rule is effective September 27, 2017.
    Compliance date: The compliance date for the amendments in this
final rule is September 27, 2018. Optional early compliance is
permitted.
    Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions for reconsideration of
this final rule must be received not later than November 13, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule must refer
to the docket and notice number set forth above and be submitted to the
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Note that all petitions
received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov,
including any personal information provided.
    Privacy Act: Please see the Privacy Act heading under Rulemaking
Analyses and Notices.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may call
William J. S[aacute]nchez, Office of Crashworthiness Standards
(telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>) (fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>). For legal issues, you
may call Deirdre Fujita, Office of Chief Counsel (telephone: 202-366-
2992) (fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>). Address: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., West Building, Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
    a. Overview
    b. Summary of the Final Rule and Highlighted Differences With
the NPRM
    1. Every Day (Normal) Vehicle Operations
    i. Direct Contact Protection From High Voltage Sources
    ii. Indirect Contact Protection From High Voltage Sources
    iii. Electrical Isolation of High Voltage Sources
    iv. Monitoring Systems
    v. Electrical Safety During Charging
    vi. Mitigating Driver Error
    2. Post-Crash Safety

    i. Direct and Indirect Contact Protection From High Voltage
Sources
    ii. Electrical Isolation
    3. Definitions, Figures, and Test Procedures
    4. Compliance Date
II. Background
    a. Overview of the GTR Process
    b. Overview of GTR No. 13
    c. Physical Barrier Option
    d. Petitions for Rulemaking
III. Overview of the Comments
IV. Response to the Comments
    a. Definitions and Terminology (General)
    b. Clarification of Application of Requirements
    c. Electrical Safety for Connectors and the Vehicle Charge Inlet
    d. Markings
    e. Indirect Contact Protection
    f. Electrical Isolation Requirements
    g. Electrical Safety During Charging
    h. Mitigating Driver Error
    i. Test Procedures and Figures in FMVSS No. 305
    j. Compliance Date
V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

I. Executive Summary

a. Overview

    NHTSA is issuing this final rule to update FMVSS No. 305,
``Electric-powered vehicles: Electrolyte spillage and electrical shock
protection.'' As indicated in its title, one purpose of FMVSS No. 305
is to reduce deaths and injuries from electrical shock. Currently, the
standard focuses on post-crash safety, requiring vehicles with high
voltage sources to protect vehicle occupants, rescue workers and others
who may contact the vehicle after a crash. To protect against electric
shock, FMVSS No. 305 currently requires that, during and after the
crash tests specified in the standard, high voltage sources in the
vehicle must be either (a) electrically isolated from the vehicle's
chassis \1\ or (b) their voltage must be at levels considered safe from
harmful electric shock.\2\ This final rule amends the standard to adopt
a physical barrier compliance option that prevents direct and indirect
contact \3\ of high voltage sources post-crash by way of ``electrical
protection barriers.'' An electrical protection barrier is a physical
barrier that encloses a high voltage source to prevent direct contact
(by occupants, emergency services personnel and others) of the high
voltage source from any direction of access.
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    \1\ Since the physiological impacts of direct current (DC) are
less than those of alternating current (AC), the standard specifies
lower minimum electrical isolation requirements for DC high voltage
sources with electrical isolation monitoring systems (100 ohms/volt)
than for AC components (500 ohms/volt).
    \2\ Under this low voltage option, electrical components are low
voltage if their voltage is less than or equal to 60 VDC or 30 VAC.
VDC is the voltage for direct current sources and VAC is voltage for
alternating current sources. These low voltage levels will not cause
electric shock.
    \3\ Contact of a conductive part that is energized due to loss
of electrical isolation of a high voltage source is an indirect
contact of a high voltage source.
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    This final rule is a deregulatory action as it imposes no costs and
adjusts FMVSS No. 305 to give more flexibility to manufacturers not
only for current electric vehicle designs, but also for introducing new
technologies to the U.S. market, including hydrogen fuel cell vehicles
(HFCVs) and 48-volt mild hybrid technologies. In adopting the physical
barrier option, this final rule adjusts the standard to remove an
obstruction that prevented HFCVs from being offered for sale in the
U.S. Adopting the physical barrier option also enables manufacturers to
produce 48-volt mild hybrid systems without having to use electrical
isolation safety measures that involve more complexity, higher consumer
costs, and higher mass, without an incremental safety benefit. This
rule responds to petitions for rulemaking from Toyota Motor North
America Inc. (Toyota) \4\ and the Auto Alliance (Alliance).\5\
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    \4\ Petitioner Toyota requested the physical barrier option to
allow HFCVs to be offered for sale in the U.S. After its submission
of the petition for rulemaking, Toyota pursued and was granted a
temporary exemption from FMVSS No. 305 for an HFCV (see grant of
petition, January 2, 2015 (80 FR 101)). Toyota incorporates
electrical protection barriers (conductively connected to the
electric chassis with low resistance) and maintains at least a 100
ohms/volt electrical isolation into its design. NHTSA granted the
petition for exemption on the basis that the exemption would make
the development or field evaluation of a low emission (zero
emission) vehicle easier and would not unreasonably reduce the
safety of the vehicle.
    \5\ Petitioner Alliance requested the physical barrier option to
facilitate the production of 48volt mild hybrid technologies as well
as HFCVs.
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    NHTSA is also issuing this final rule as part of the agency's
ongoing effort to avoid unnecessary differences in the vehicle safety
standards of different countries through a harmonization process under
the United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 1998 Global
Agreement (``1998 Agreement''). The efforts of the U.S.\6\ and other
contracting parties to the 1998 Agreement culminated in the
establishment of GTR No. 13, ``Hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles.'' NHTSA
voted in June 2013 in favor of establishing GTR No. 13.\7\ This final
rule adopts requirements based on the electrical safety requirements of
GTR No. 13.\8\
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    \6\ The U.S. was one of several contracting parties to the 1998
Agreement that proposed the development and establishment of GTR No.
13.
    \7\ Each Contracting Party that voted for a new GTR that has
been established under the 1998 Agreement is obligated by that
Agreement to initiate its process for adopting the GTR into national
law. However, the Agreement does not obligate such a Contracting
Party to adopt the GTR. The Contracting Party retains full
discretion under the Agreement to decide for itself whether to adopt
the GTR.
    \8\ NHTSA is considering initiating rulemaking in the future on
other aspects of GTR No. 13 directly pertaining to the fuel system
integrity of HFCVs.
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    Similar to FMVSS No. 305, GTR No. 13 has requirements intended to
reduce deaths and injuries from electrical shock, but addresses both
normal vehicle operation and post-crash safety. Also, while the various
post-crash compliance options in GTR No. 13 are like those in FMVSS No.
305, GTR No. 13 includes the physical barrier option to prevent direct
and indirect contact \9\ of high voltage sources.
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    \9\ Contact of a conductive part that is energized due to loss
of electrical isolation of a high voltage source is an indirect
contact of a high voltage source.
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    On March 10, 2016, NHTSA issued the notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) on which this final rule is based (81 FR 12647). The NPRM
proposed adopting GTR No. 13's normal vehicle operation requirements,
and proposed adopting a post-crash physical barrier compliance option
like that in GTR No. 13.
    Comments on the NPRM were generally supportive of the proposed
changes. Some commenters requested modifying the proposed regulatory
text to clarify the wording of requirements and test procedures or to
align the text with GTR No. 13 and ECE R.100, ``Uniform provisions
concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to specific
requirements for the electric power train,'' and some suggested NHTSA
should not adopt some requirements for lack of safety need.
    This final rule adopts most aspects of the proposal, with some
parts changed in response to commenters. The final rule improves motor
vehicle safety by expanding FMVSS No. 305's protections to normal
vehicle operations. The updated post-crash performance requirements
ensure that new power train configurations provide a comparable level
of post-crash safety as that of existing electric vehicles.
    This final rule reflects the state-of-the art in vehicle electrical
safety. It draws from the findings from the agency's research on the
physical barrier compliance option in GTR No. 13 (Battelle study),\10\
ECE R.100, and the

electrical safety requirements in a January 2014 version of SAE
J1766.\11\
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    \10\ NHTSA contracted with the Battelle Memorial Research
Institute to research failure modes associated with physical
barriers that could result in electric shock. Battelle identified
different scenarios involving failure of electrical isolation,
direct contact protection, or indirect contact protection and a
combination of failure of two or more these protection measures.
Battelle then evaluated the possibility of electric shock in each of
these scenarios. Battelle's evaluation noted that multiple failures
in protection measures were needed for a person to experience
electric shock. The final report is available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2016-0029-0003.
    \11\ SAE J1766, ``Recommended practice for electric, fuel cell,
and hybrid electric vehicle crash integrity testing,'' January 2014,
SAE International, http://www.sae.org.
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    The rule not only gives more flexibility to manufacturers to use
modern electrical safety designs to produce electric vehicles and
introduce new vehicle technologies, but also paves the way globally for
future innovations on vehicle electrical safety. A new GTR is under
development \12\ for electric vehicle safety (EVS-GTR) which includes
specifications for high voltage electrical components and rechargeable
electric energy storage systems. In November 2016, NHTSA and other
parties developing the new draft GTR completed the document's high
voltage electrical safety provisions. The parties designed the draft
GTR to reflect the provisions of GTR No. 13, ECE R.100, and the
requirements proposed in the March 2016 NPRM and adopted by this final
rule.
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    \12\ In November 2011, the Executive Committee of the 1998
Agreement established a working group to develop a GTR for electric
vehicle safety. The United States is a co-chair of this working
group, along with the European Union, Japan, and China. See, draft
Global Technical Regulation on Electric Vehicle Safety, September
2016. https://www2.unece.org/wiki/display/trans/EVS+12th+session.
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    We estimate that the final rule will result in essentially no cost
to consumers in the U.S. This rule adopts requirements that closely
mirror the electrical safety provisions of GTR No. 13, which have
already been implemented by manufacturers in this country.

b. Summary of the Final Rule and Highlighted Differences With the NPRM

    This section summarizes the requirements adopted by this final
rule. For the convenience of the reader, we also note the few notable
differences between this rule and the NPRM. The reasons underlying our
decisions are explained in the body of this preamble and in the NPRM.
1. Every Day (Normal) Vehicle Operations
    This final rule adds electrical safety requirements for vehicle
performance during every day (normal) vehicle operations to mitigate
the risk of electric shock due to direct or indirect contact of high
voltage sources or loss in electrical isolation. We also adopt
requirements to assure electrical safety during refueling and to
mitigate driver error in vehicle operation.
i. Direct Contact Protection From High Voltage Sources
    The rule specifies:
    A. IPXXD protection degree for high voltage sources inside
passenger and luggage compartments, and IPXXB protection degree for
high voltage sources outside passenger and luggage compartments.\13\
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    \13\ IPXXB and IPXXD ``protection degrees'' refer to the ability
of the physical barriers to prevent entrance of a probe into the
barrier, to ensure no direct contact with high voltage sources.
``IPXXB'' is a probe representing a small human finger. ``IPXXD'' is
a slender wire probe. Protection degrees IPXXB and IPXXD are
International Electrotechnical Commission specifications for
protection from direct contact of high voltage sources.
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    B. IPXXB protection degree for service disconnects that can be
opened or removed without tools.\14\
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    \14\ A service disconnect is a device for deactivation of an
electrical circuit when conducting checks and services of the
electric battery, fuel cell stack, or other high voltage source.
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    C. Markings on certain electrical protection barriers of high
voltage sources (i.e., barriers that can be physically accessed,
opened, or removed without the use of tools) and on or near electric
energy storage devices. As to the latter, the NPRM also proposed to
require markings on or near electric energy conversion devices (fuel
cells), but the agency concludes conversion devices are benign in and
of themselves in that they are not high density energy sources. Thus,
conversion devices do not need to be marked. (Note that the electric
protection barrier around a fuel cell is required to be marked.) In
another change from the NPRM, markings are not required on electrical
connectors and on the vehicle charge inlet \15\ because of a lack of a
need for the markings.
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    \15\ The vehicle charge inlet is the device on the electric
vehicle into which the charge connector is inserted for the purpose
of transferring energy and exchanging information from an external
electric power supply.
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    D. In a change from the NPRM, this rule has distinct direct contact
protection requirements for connectors and the vehicle charge inlet.
First, it requires that the IPXXB/IPXXD protection levels be met by
each connector when connected to its mating component. IPXXD protection
degree is required for connectors located inside the passenger and
luggage compartments. IPXXB protection degree is required for
connectors and vehicle charge inlets located outside these
compartments. Second, connectors must meet at least one of the
following three requirements: (1) If a connector or vehicle charge
inlet can be separated from its mating component without the use of
tools, the IPXXB/IPXXD protection level must be provided when the
connector is uncoupled from its mating component; (2) if a connector or
vehicle charge inlet can be separated from its mating component without
the use of tools, the voltage of live parts of the connector or vehicle
charge inlet becomes less than or equal to 60 VDC or 30 VAC within one
second of separating from its mating component; or, (3) the connector
has a locking mechanism (at least two distinct actions are needed to
separate the connector from its mating component), and there are other
components that must be removed to separate the connector from its
mating component and these cannot be removed without the use of tools.
    E. This rule requires orange color outer coverings for cables of
high voltage sources that are located outside electrical protection
barriers.
ii. Indirect Contact Protection From High Voltage Sources
    This rule requires exposed conductive parts of electrical
protection barriers to be conductively connected to the chassis with a
resistance less than 0.1 ohms, and the resistance between two
simultaneously reachable exposed conductive parts of electrical
protection barriers that are within 2.5 meters of each other must be
less than 0.2 ohms.\16\
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    \16\ This ensures that in the event of loss in electrical
isolation, no dangerous voltage potentials are produced between
exposed conductive parts of electrical protection barriers and the
electrical chassis, and therefore very low levels of current would
flow through a human body contacting different parts of the vehicle.
Since current flows through the path of least resistance, most of
the current flow will be through the chassis than through the human
body which has a significantly higher resistance.
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iii. Electrical Isolation of High Voltage Sources
    A. This rule requires 500 ohms/volt or higher electrical isolation
for AC high voltage sources and 100 ohms/volt or higher for DC high
voltage sources.
    B. Where AC and DC buses are connected, this rule permits AC high
voltage sources to have electrical isolation of 100 ohms/volt or
higher, provided they also have the direct and indirect contact
protection described in i and ii, above.
iv. Monitoring Systems
    This rule requires an electrical isolation monitoring system for DC
high voltage sources on fuel cell vehicles.

v. Electrical Safety During Charging
    This final rule requires:
    A. Electrical isolation greater than or equal to 500 ohms/volt
between the electrical chassis and other high voltage sources connected
to the vehicle charge inlet (for connecting to the AC external power
supply). Note that this is a change from the 1 million ohms isolation
resistance requirement proposed in the NPRM.
    B. IPXXB/IPXXD protection level for the vehicle charge inlet when
connected to the charge connector and IPXXB/IPXXD protection level or
low voltage when separated from the charge connector.
    C. Conductive connection of the electric chassis to earth ground
before and during the application of exterior voltage to the
vehicle.\17\
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    \17\ Current will flow through the path of least resistance and
therefore most of the current resulting from a loss of electrical
isolation would flow through the ground connection rather than
through the human body.
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vi. Mitigating Driver Error
    This final rule includes requirements for--
    A. Providing at least a momentary indication to the driver when the
vehicle is first placed in ``possible active driving mode'' after
manual activation of the propulsion system.\18\ This is a change from
the NPRM to clarify when the momentary indication must be provided.
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    \18\ Vehicles with an internal combustion engine that directly
or indirectly provides the vehicle's propulsion power on start up
are excluded from this requirement.
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    B. Informing the driver if the vehicle is still in a possible
active driving mode,\19\ by an audible or visual signal when he or she
leaves the vehicle; and,
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    \19\ I.e., the vehicle mode when application of pressure to the
accelerator pedal or release of the brake system causes the electric
power train to move the vehicle.
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    C. Preventing vehicle movement of more than 150 millimeters (mm) by
its own propulsion system when the vehicle charging system is connected
to the external electric power supply in such a way that charging is
possible. (The 150 mm limit is a change from the NPRM, which did not
specify a distance.)
2. Post-Crash Safety
    This final rule also amends FMVSS No. 305's post-crash electrical
safety requirements.
i. Direct and Indirect Contact Protection From High Voltage Sources
    The rule adds an optional method of meeting post-crash electrical
safety requirements through physical barrier protection of high voltage
sources. The specifications of this optional method of electric safety
include requirements ensuring that:
    A. High voltage sources are enclosed in barriers that prevent
direct human contact with high voltage sources (IPXXB protection
level),
    B. Exposed conductive parts of electrical protection barriers are
conductively connected to the chassis with a resistance less than 0.1
ohms. The resistance between any two simultaneously reachable exposed
conductive parts of electrical protection barriers that are less than
2.5 meters from each other must be less than 0.2 ohms.
    C. Voltage between exposed conductive parts of an electrical
protection barrier and the electrical chassis, and between two
simultaneously reachable exposed conductive parts of the electrical
protection barrier that are less than 2.5 meters from each other, must
be less than or equal to 60 VDC or 30 VAC (low voltage). (The NPRM was
worded to apply this requirement to voltage between any exposed
conductive parts of the vehicle.)
ii. Electrical Isolation
    An AC high voltage source that is conductively connected to a DC
high voltage source may meet an electrical isolation requirement of 100
ohms/volt or greater, provided the AC high voltage source also has
physical barrier protection specified in i(A) and i(B), above.\20\ (The
NPRM had proposed requiring all three elements i(A), i(B), and i(C) of
physical barrier protection for such AC high voltage sources.)
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    \20\ I.e., they provide IPXXB protection degree and indirect
contact protection of resistance between exposed conductive parts of
the electrical protection barrier and electric chassis of 0.1 ohms
and between two simultaneously reachable exposed conductive parts
within 2.5 meters of each other of 0.2 ohms.
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3. Definitions, Figures, and Test Procedures
    We make minor changes to a number of proposed definitions to
clarify the standard and to achieve consistency with other definitions.
We adopt terms such as ``high voltage live parts,'' ``exposed
conductive parts of electrical protection barriers,'' and ``possible
active driving mode'' in place of proposed terms that were less clear.
    We make a minor correction to Figure 7b and clarify Figure 8.
    We clarify several test procedures, including how we will use the
IPXXB and IPXXD protection degree probes and how we determine the
voltage between various conductive parts. We provide manufacturers the
option of choosing between two methods for measuring resistance, and,
in a change from the NPRM, provide that resistance between two exposed
conductive parts of the electrical protection barrier may be computed
from measured resistances.
4. Compliance Date
    The compliance date for this final rule is one year from the date
of publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. Optional
early compliance is permitted. (The NPRM proposed a compliance date of
180 days after the publication of the final rule in the Federal
Register.)

II. Background

a. Overview of the GTR Process

    The United States is a contracting party to the 1998 Agreement,
which was entered into force in 2000 and is administered by the UN
ECE's Working Party (WP).29. The purpose of this agreement is to
establish GTRs.
    GTR No. 13 addresses hydrogen fuel cell vehicle technology. NHTSA
closely collaborated with experts from contracting parties to the 1998
Agreement, particularly Germany and Japan, to develop a GTR for
hydrogen fueled vehicles that establishes levels of safety that are
equivalent to or exceeds those for conventional gasoline fueled
vehicles. The collaborative effort in this process led to the
establishment of GTR No. 13 in June 2013.
    The U.S. voted on June 27, 2013 in favor of establishing GTR No.
13. In voting yes to establishing the GTR, NHTSA is obligated to submit
the technical regulation to the process used in the U.S. to adopt the
requirement into our law or regulation.\21\ By issuance of the March
10, 2016 NPRM preceding this final rule, NHTSA initiated the process
for considering adoption of GTR No. 13.
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    \21\ As noted above, under the terms of the 1998 Agreement,
NHTSA is not obligated to adopt the GTR after initiating this
process. In deciding whether to adopt a GTR as an FMVSS, we follow
the requirements for NHTSA rulemaking, including the Administrative
Procedure Act, the National Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(Vehicle Safety Act) (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.) Presidential
Executive Orders, and DOT and NHTSA policies, procedures and
regulations. Among other things, FMVSSs issued under the Vehicle
Safety Act ``shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle
safety, and be stated in objective terms.'' 49 U.S.C. 30111.
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    This final rule addresses the electrical safety requirements in GTR
No. 13 (i.e., the electrical isolation requirements, physical barrier
requirements, etc.) and not GTR No. 13's hydrogen fuel system and fuel
container integrity requirements. NHTSA will commence a

separate proceeding on incorporating the latter portions of GTR No. 13
into the relevant FMVSSs.

b. Overview of GTR No. 13

    HFCVs have an electric drive-train powered by a fuel cell that
generates electric power electrochemically using hydrogen. The hydrogen
is electrochemically combined with oxygen (from air) within the fuel
cell system to produce high-voltage electric power. The electric power
is supplied to the electric drive motors and/or used to charge
batteries and capacitors. HFCVs may also be equipped with batteries to
supplement the output of fuel cells and may also recapture energy
during stopping through regenerative braking, which recharges batteries
and thereby improves efficiency.
    The fuel cell provides DC power while the drive motors typically
operate on AC. Therefore, the power train has: (a) Inverters to convert
DC power to AC to run the motors and (b) converters to convert AC power
generated in the drive motor during regenerative braking to DC to store
energy in the batteries. In many respects, the electric power train of
an HFCV is like that of electric and hybrid electric vehicles.
    GTR No. 13 specifies electrical safety requirements during normal
vehicle operation and after a crash test, to protect against electric
shock in the event of a failure in the high voltage propulsion system.
GTR No. 13 includes a compliance option for electrical vehicle safety
that prevents direct and indirect contact of high voltage sources by
way of ``physical barriers.'' \22\
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    \22\ A detailed description of GTR No. 13 can be found in the
NPRM. See 81 FR at 12651-12654.
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c. Physical Barrier Option

    The industry has long requested NHTSA to adopt a physical barrier
option into FMVSS No. 305. In 2010, NHTSA decided against adoption of a
physical barrier option because the agency believed not enough was
known about the option.\23\ Commenters to an NPRM to upgrade FMVSS No.
305's electrical shock protection requirements had asked NHTSA to adopt
the option in the final rule. NHTSA declined the request,\24\
explaining that (a) sufficient notice might not have been provided for
the provision, (b) the agency was uncertain whether the option would
sufficiently account for indirect contact failure modes, and (c) the
agency wished to pursue research on this safety approach. NHTSA
undertook a research program (later known as the Battelle study,
discussed in detail in the NPRM, 81 FR at 12656-12659) to better
understand the issues related to a physical barrier option for
electrical safety.
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    \23\ See final rule, 75 FR 33515, June 14, 2010; response to
petitions for reconsideration, 76 FR 45436, July 29, 2011.
    \24\ Id.
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    Since that decision in 2010, several milestones ensued. GTR No. 13
was established, a product of shared data and knowledge from governing
bodies and international experts around the world. The Battelle study
was completed and the physical barrier countermeasure design was made
more robust in response to its findings, with SAE International
revising SAE J1766 in January 2014 to set forth more protective safety
practices than it had before. Importantly, there have now been years of
worldwide recognition of the physical barrier option as an acceptable
means of providing electrical safety in electric powered vehicles, with
years of experience in design labs and in the field showing no evidence
of associated safety problems.

d. Petitions for Rulemaking

    This final rule responds not only to GTR No. 13 but also to
petitions for rulemaking from Toyota and the Alliance. The petitions
are discussed in detail in the March 10, 2016 NPRM. See 81 FR at 12659-
12663.
    Petitioner Toyota believes that an additional compliance option
that includes elements of the physical barrier option in GTR No. 13 is
needed to allow HFCVs to be offered for sale in the U.S.
    HFCVs and other electric powered vehicles operate with their DC
high voltage sources (e.g. high voltage battery) connected to the AC
high voltage sources (e.g. electric motor). In a moderate to severe
crash (e.g., crash speeds at which an air bag would deploy), electric
powered vehicles are generally designed with an automatic disconnect
mechanism that activates and breaks the conductive link between the
electrical energy storage system and the rest of the power train. Under
these crash conditions in which an automatic disconnect mechanism
activates, Toyota states that its HFCVs would be able to meet the
current electrical safety requirements of FMVSS No. 305. However, in
low speed crashes where the automatic disconnect mechanism is not
designed to activate--so that the vehicle can be driven away after a
minor crash (fender-bender)--Toyota states that its HFCVs would not be
able to meet the electrical safety requirements in FMVSS No. 305. The
electrical isolation for fuel cell stacks would need to be 500 ohms/
volt or greater to comply with FMVSS No. 305, which may not be
technically feasible. The petitioner believes that the additional
compliance option requested in its petition would solve this problem
and would not cause any reduction in the level of electrical safety now
required by FMVSS No. 305.
    Petitioner Alliance requests a physical barrier compliance option
to facilitate the production of 48-volt mild hybrid technologies as
well as hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The petitioner asks NHTSA to amend
FMVSS No. 305 to adopt a physical barrier option incorporated in the
SAE J1766 January 2014,\25\ section 5.3.4, for 48-volt mild hybrid
systems. The Alliance believes that the provisions for physical
barriers in section 5.3.4 incorporate the requirements of GTR No. 13
and provide for physical barriers that ensure equal levels of safety as
that afforded by the current FMVSS No. 305 electrical safety
requirements.
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    \25\ SAE J1766, ``Recommended practice for electric, fuel cell,
and hybrid electric vehicle crash integrity testing,'' January 2014,
SAE International, http://www.sae.org.
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    The Alliance states that while vehicles with 48-volt mild hybrid
systems use mostly low-voltage components that do not present any
danger of harmful electric shock, AC voltage sources contained within
the system can exceed the 30 volt threshold in FMVSS No. 305 for
consideration as a high voltage source. Since these systems are
grounded to the vehicle chassis, they cannot meet FMVSS No. 305's
existing electrical isolation option. The petitioner states that, while
it is feasible to design a 48-volt mild hybrid system that is isolated
from the chassis and meets FMVSS No. 305's electrical isolation
requirements, such designs involve more complexity, higher consumer
costs, and higher mass resulting in reduced fuel economy and increased
emissions. The petitioner believes that these consequences are
inappropriate when there would be no incremental safety benefit gained
beyond that associated with SAE J1766's physical barrier option.

III. Overview of the Comments

    NHTSA received six comments on the NPRM. Comments were received
from two motor vehicle manufacturer associations (the Alliance and the
Association of Global Automakers (Global)), three vehicle manufacturers
(Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (Mercedes-Benz), Tesla Motors Inc. (Tesla), and
Fuji Heavy Industries on behalf of Subaru of America Inc. (Subaru)),
and one individual.
    The commenters strongly support that FMVSS No. 305 should include

requirements for normal vehicle operation and incorporate a physical
barrier option for electrical safety. They request changes to the
proposed regulatory text to improve clarity of or correct wording and
to align the regulatory language, including definitions, to that in GTR
No. 13 and ECE R.100. Some commenters suggest NHTSA not adopt or reduce
the stringency of particular requirements for lack of safety need, such
as the marking of connectors and the vehicle charge inlet, and a ``one
million ohms'' isolation requirement for charging electrical energy
storage devices. Several commenters suggest NHTSA adopt separate
performance requirements for connectors and for the vehicle inlet, that
include direct contact protection when connected and separated from its
mating component. Some commenters request NHTSA change how the agency
will conduct compliance tests, such as by limiting the number of
resistance and voltage measurements between exposed conductive parts.
Several commenters request the compliance date for the amendments be
longer than 180 days.

IV. Response to the Comments

a. Definitions and Terminology (General)

    Commenters request modifications to certain definitions and terms
generally used in the regulatory text. The Alliance believes that the
definition of ``exposed conductive part'' should be revised to clarify
that the part is not normally energized (that energization can occur
under a fault condition). The Alliance also requests replacing the
term, ``exposed conductive parts'' in the regulatory text with
``exposed conductive parts of electrical protection barriers,'' so as
to exclude conductive parts that are not part of the electrical
protection barriers and the electric power train, such as hose clamps.
Similarly, Global suggests the term be replaced with ``exposed
conductive part of the electrical protection barrier enclosing the high
voltage source,'' throughout the regulatory text. Commenters suggest
``electrical barriers,'' should be replaced with ``electrical
protection barriers,'' in the regulatory text for consistency and to
reduce ambiguity. The Alliance requests a broadened definition for
``external electric power supply,'' to refer to ``electric energy
storage device,'' in part because the proposed definition uses the term
``propulsion battery,'' which is not defined. The Alliance requests
replacing the term, ``live parts'' with ``high voltage live parts'' in
the regulatory text since electrical safety requirements apply to high
voltage sources.
    NHTSA reviewed these comments and generally agrees with revising
the definitions and terms at issue, to clarify the text of FMVSS No.
305. We summarized our decisions in Table 1 and have incorporated
appropriate changes into the regulatory text.
    The Alliance asks that we amend the definition of ``high voltage
source'' to make clear that a component is a high voltage source based
on its working voltage. The current definition states: ``High voltage
source means any electric component contained in the electric power
train or conductively connected to the electric power train that has a
working voltage greater than 30 VAC or 60 VDC.'' The commenter states
that the definition can be read in two different ways because ``it is
not clear if the component or the electric power train is being
modified by the given voltage limits.'' (Emphasis in text.) NHTSA's
intent was to modify the ``component.'' \26\ We have clarified the
definition in the regulatory text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ In FMVSS No. 305, an electric component that is contained
in the electric power train or is conductively connected to it is
considered to be a high voltage source if its working voltage is
greater than 30 VAC or 60 VDC. Working voltage is defined in FMVSS
No. 305 as the highest root mean square voltage of the voltage
source, which may occur across its terminals or between its
terminals and any conductive parts in open circuit conditions or
under normal operating conditions. Therefore, the reference to
working voltage in the definition of ``high voltage source'' in
FMVSS No. 305 is that for the electrical component and not the power
train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Alliance and Global point out that the definition of luggage
compartment mistakenly refers to ``protecting the power train'' instead
of ``protecting the occupant.'' We note that the definition's reference
to ``hood'' should also refer to ``trunk lid,'' as in the U.S. luggage
compartments are usually thought of as trunks, which are thought to
have ``trunk lids.'' We have made the corrections in the text.
    The Alliance requests adding a definition for the term
``connector,'' assuming NHTSA will adopt separate electrical safety
requirements for connectors (this issue is discussed in a section
below). The Alliance states that a connector is a device that provides
mechanical connection and disconnection of high voltage electrical
conductors to a suitable mating component, including its housing. Since
this final rule adopts such separate requirements for connectors, the
agency agrees to add a definition for ``connector'' to the regulatory
text.
    The Alliance states that ``electric energy storage device'' in
proposed S<IP_ADDRESS> is too specific and thereby restrictive, and that
``electric circuit'' should be used instead. We concur the proposed
term is overly specific, but since ``electric circuit'' is not used or
defined in FMVSS No. 305, we will use ``electric component'' in place
of the term at issue.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ The term, ``electric component,'' is currently used in the
definition of a ``high voltage source'' in FMVSS No. 305.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subaru requests clarification of the meaning of the term ``normal
vehicle operation.'' Subaru asks whether the term refers to anytime the
vehicle is being driven under its own power or to any vehicle operation
when no system faults or abnormalities are present. Subaru asks whether
the reference to normal vehicle operation in the definition of the
term, ``live parts,'' \28\ includes the vehicle's driving under its own
electric power and static charging modes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The NPRM proposed to define live part to mean a conductive
part of the vehicle that is electrically energized under normal
vehicle operation (S4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA believes that ``normal vehicle operation'' includes operating
modes and conditions that can reasonably be encountered during typical
operation of the vehicle, such as driving, parking and standing in
traffic, as well as, charging using chargers that are compatible with
the specific charging ports installed on the vehicle. It does not
include conditions where the vehicle is damaged, either by a crash or
road debris, subjected to fire or water submersion, or in a state where
service and or maintenance is needed or being performed.
    The Alliance, Global and Subaru ask about adding a definition for
an ``enclosure,'' since in the NPRM the agency used the term
``enclosure'' as though an enclosure was distinct from an electrical
protection barrier. We meant the terms to be synonymous. However,
rather than add the definition, for simplicity we have removed the term
``enclosure'' from the standard and only use the term ``electrical
protection barrier.''
    For the convenience of the reader, Table 1 below shows the notable
added and revised terms.

        Table 1--Notable Terms and Definitions the Commenters Ask To Be Added or Amended; NHTSA Response
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Does NHTSA
        Term at issue            Requested change     Reason for request        agree          NHTSA response
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connector....................  NHTSA should define   Clarity; enables      Yes............  Defining the term
                                the term \29\.        distinct                               will clarify the
                                                      requirements for                       standard.
                                                      ``connectors''.
Electrical barriers..........  Use ``electrical      Consistency and       Yes............  NHTSA agrees the
                                protection            reduces ambiguity.                     same term should be
                                barriers''.                                                  used throughout the
                                                                                standard.
Electrical protection barrier  Change the NPRM's     Clarity.............  No.............  See ``enclosure''
                                definition to make                                           (below). The change
                                clear the term                                               is unnecessary.
                                includes
                                ``enclosures''.
Enclosure....................  NHTSA should define   This term should be   No, the change   Revised the text to
                                the term.             defined since it is   is unnecessary.  remove references
                                                      used several times.                    to ``enclosure''
                                                                                and use electrical
                                                                                protection barrier
                                                                                instead.
Exposed conductive part......  Add to the NPRM's     Clarify that the      Yes............  NHTSA concurs, to
                                definition to         part is not                            clarify the
                                clarify that the      normally energized;                    standard. Also, we
                                part is not           energization can                       clarify the term
                                normally energized;   occur under fault                      ``cover'' in the
                                Use ``exposed         condition. This                        definition. NHTSA
                                conductive part of    also excludes                          agrees to replace
                                the electrical        conductive parts                       ``exposed
                                protection            that are not part                      conductive part,''
                                barrier'' \30\.       of the electric                        with ``exposed
                                                      power train, such                      conductive part of
                                                      as hose clamps.                        the electrical
                                                                                protection
                                                                                barrier,'' in the
                                                                                standard.
External electric power        Revise definition to  To improve accuracy   Yes............  The change clarifies
 supply.                        refer to ``electric   of the definition.                     the standard.
                                energy storage
                                device'' rather
                                than to
                                ``propulsion
                                battery''.
High voltage source..........  Revise definition as  Should make clearer   Yes............  We agree the change
                                ``means any           what is being                          clarifies the
                                electric component    modified.                              standard.
                                which is contained
                                in the electric
                                power train or
                                conductively
                                connected to the
                                electric power
                                train and has a
                                working voltage
                                greater than 30 VAC
                                or 60 VDC''.
Live parts...................  Use ``High voltage    To clarify the        Yes............  Clarifies the
                                live parts''.         applicability of                       standard.
                                                      the term.
Luggage compartment..........  Correct the           Correction..........  Yes............  We correct the
                                reference to                                                 error, and add
                                ``power train''.                                             ``trunk lid.''
Normal vehicle operation.....  NHTSA should clarify  To clarify if it      Yes............  We clarify the term
                                the term.             includes driving                       in the preamble.
                                                      and charging modes.
Electric energy storage        Use ``electric        Term is too specific  Yes, but use     ``Electric circuit''
 device (specific to.           circuit''.            and restrictive.      ``electric       is not defined.
S<IP_ADDRESS>)....................                                               component''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Clarification of Application of Requirements
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The Alliance suggests ``a connector is a device that
provides mechanical connection and disconnection of high voltage
electrical conductors to a suitable mating component, including its
housing.'' This definition was suggested by the Alliance and added
in the draft EVS-GTR available at https://www2.unece.org/wiki/display/trans/EVS+13th+session.
    \30\ Similar to the Alliance's request, Global requests
replacing ``exposed conductive part'' with ``exposed conductive part
of the electrical protection barrier enclosing the high voltage
source'' in the regulatory text. Due to the similarity with the
Alliance's request and because there is no need to specify that
electrical protection barriers enclose high voltage sources,
Global's request was not adopted in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Alliance requests we add paragraphs to the regulatory text
explicitly stating that the electrical safety requirements (S5.3) and
the monitoring system requirement (S5.4) of FMVSS No. 305 do not apply
to the DC part of a 48-volt mild hybrid system. (This pertains to the
DC part that is conductively connected to the electrical chassis and
that has a working voltage less than or equal to 60 VDC, and the
maximum voltage between the DC live part and any other live part is
less than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC.) The commenter states that the
draft EVS-GTR includes such a statement.
    We do not believe there is a need for such a provision in FMVSS No.
305, for several reasons.
    First, as discussed in a previous section, we are amending the
definition of ``high voltage source,'' as the Alliance requests, to
make clear that a component is a high voltage source based on its
working voltage. That change provides the clarification the commenter
seeks.
    Second, the Alliance asks that NHTSA provide in the preamble the
following statement for further clarification. The commenter's
statement is: ``Where electrical circuits, that are galvanically
connected to each other, and fulfilling the condition, that the maximum
voltage between a DC live part and any other live part (DC or AC) is
less [than] or equal [to] 30 VAC and 60 VDC, only the components or
parts of the electric circuit that operate on high voltage are
classified as high voltage sources.'' We concur that the statement is
consistent with NHTSA's intent.
    Third, the agency does not believe the above-quoted text is needed
in FMVSS No. 305 because of a fundamental difference between the
standard and the draft EVS-GTR. (This difference also exists between
FMVSS No. 305 and GTR No. 13 and ECE R.100.) The electrical safety
requirements in FMVSS No. 305 apply to each high voltage source in the
power train, while the electrical safety requirements in the draft EVS-
GTR would apply to high voltage buses and electric circuits. This means
that NHTSA determines whether the electrical safety requirements of
FMVSS No. 305 apply to electric components that are connected to or
part of the electric power train by individually assessing each
component separately, analyzing its working voltage.\31\ To illustrate,
in a 48-volt mild hybrid system, NHTSA will assess the working voltage
of each DC component. If the working voltage of the component is not
greater than 60 VDC, NHTSA does not subject it to the electrical safety
requirements in FMVSS No. 305, regardless of whether it is galvanically
connected to other electrical components that would be considered high
voltage sources.\32\ Accordingly, the

additional text for excluding the DC part of 48-volt mild hybrid
systems from electrical safety requirements requested by the Alliance
is not necessary in FMVSS No. 305.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Working voltage is defined in FMVSS No. 305 as the highest
root mean square voltage of the voltage source which may occur
across its terminals or between its terminals and any conductive
part in open circuit conditions or under normal operating systems.
    \32\ In contrast, the draft EVS-GTR applies to high voltage
buses and electric circuits. In a 48-volt mild hybrid system, the DC
electrical sources are low voltage (working voltage is less than or
equal to 60 VDC). The DC high voltage sources are conductively
connected to AC electrical components such as the motor than can be
a high voltage source (working voltage is greater than 30 VAC).
Since the EVS draft GTR applies to high voltage buses and circuits,
the electrical safety requirements for the high voltage source in a
48-volt system would also apply to the DC source though it is
considered low voltage. For this reason, specific statements are
needed in the EVS GTR to exclude these low voltage sources from
electrical safety requirements that are intended for high voltage
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Electrical Safety for Connectors and the Vehicle Charge Inlet

    GTR No. 13 specifies direct contact protection requirements for
high voltage connectors separately. Per GTR No. 13, connectors do not
need to meet IPXXB protection if they are located underneath the
vehicle floor and are provided with a locking mechanism, or require the
use of tools to separate the connector, or the voltage reduces to below
30 VAC or 60 VDC within one second after the connector is separated.
    In the NPRM, NHTSA expressed disagreement with the GTR's exclusion
of connectors under the floor. (See 81 FR at 12654-12655; id. at
12664.) NHTSA believed that if connectors are high voltage sources and
if they can be accessed, opened, or removed without the use of tools,
regardless of whether they are located under the floor, they should be
required to meet the same requirements for direct contact protection as
other high voltage sources, including barriers providing protection
degree IPXXD or IPXXB, based on whether they are located inside or
outside the passenger or luggage compartment areas, respectively.
Additionally, the agency noted that ``vehicle floor'' and ``connector''
are not defined in GTR No. 13.

Comments Received

    The agency received several comments on this issue. The Alliance
and Global request the regulatory text include a separate section
setting forth direct contact protection requirements that connectors
and the vehicle charge inlet must meet. The Alliance suggests the
following definition for ``connector'': ``A connector is a device that
provides mechanical connection and disconnection of high voltage
electrical conductors to a suitable mating component, including its
housing.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ This definition was added in the draft EVS-GTR available at
https://www2.unece.org/wiki/display/trans/EVS+13th+session.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Alliance and Global suggest that the separate section specify
that connectors and the vehicle charge inlet must provide protection
degree IPXXD or IPXXB, as appropriate, when connected to its mating
component. Further, each connector or vehicle charge inlet must also
meet one of the following: (1) It must provide, in an uncoupled state,
protection degree IPXXD or IPXXB, as appropriate, if the connector or
vehicle charge inlet can be uncoupled from its mating component without
a tool; (2) the voltage of the live parts become equal to or less than
60 VDC or 30 VAC within 1 second after separating from its mating
component; or (3) it has a locking mechanism that prevents the
connector or vehicle charge inlet from being uncoupled from its mating
component without a tool.
    In its comment, Tesla asks NHTSA to confirm whether various
scenarios involving its connectors underneath the floor of its vehicles
would meet the proposed requirements.\34\ Tesla requests that NHTSA
clarify what we consider ``acceptable'' for connectors underneath the
floor.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Tesla indicates that the high voltage source in its
vehicles is located underneath the vehicle's floor, in the form of a
battery. The commenter states this is unlike hybrid-electric
vehicles, in which the high voltage source is located in or near the
vehicle trunk.
    \35\ While the commenter suggested incorporating Table 4 of ISO
6439-3, it later corrected that it meant to refer to the 2001
version of ISO 6469-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Agency Response

    NHTSA has reviewed the comments and agrees with the recommendations
to include separate requirements for direct contact protection of
connectors and vehicle charge inlets. In drafting the NPRM, we
determined that connectors were high voltage sources and that they
should meet all the requirements for high voltage sources. However, the
commenters provide more information about connectors, pointing out that
they connect high voltage cables to high voltage sources through a
mating component. Like high voltage conductors (cables), connectors
need to have direct contact protection. But, commenters point out,
connectors are unique in that they are designed to be disconnected from
their mating component. Therefore, additional safety provisions are
required to ensure the safety of this coupling and re-coupling design
mechanism. For this reason, we have decided there is a need to specify
unique safety provisions for connectors and vehicle charge inlets.
    We have based our final rule on the requirements suggested by the
Alliance and Global. The requirements are harmonized with GTR No. 13,
ECE R.100, and the draft EVS-GTR for electric vehicles. When a
connector is connected to its mating component, it should have direct
contact protection IPXXD or IPXXB based on whether the connector is
inside or outside the passenger or luggage compartment, respectively.
Additionally, connectors are required to meet at least one of the three
following requirements: (1) It must provide protection degree IPXXD or
IPXXB, as appropriate, in the uncoupled state, if the connector or
vehicle charge inlet can be uncoupled from its mating component without
a tool; (2) the voltage of the high voltage live parts become equal to
or less than 60 VDC or 30 VAC within 1 second after separating from its
mating component; or (3) it has a locking mechanism (at least two
distinct actions are needed to separate the connector from its mating
component) \36\ and there are other components that must be removed in
order to separate the connector from its mating component and these
cannot be removed without the use of tools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Locking mechanisms on connectors are intended to prevent
inadvertent disconnection of the connector from its mating
component. Locking mechanism designs include locking levers and
screw locking. In these types of locking mechanisms, two distinct
actions are needed to uncouple the connector. For a locking lever,
the lever would need to be pressed down and then the connector
pulled out. For screw locking, the connector would need to be
unscrewed and then pulled out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding Tesla's recommendation that we incorporate Table 4 of ISO
6469-3 for connectors, we believe there is no need for such an
amendment. ISO 6469-3 was revised in 2011 and its requirements for
connectors are similar to those in this final rule.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ The requirements for connectors in GTR No. 13, ECE R.100,
and the draft EVS-GTR are also consistent with the 2011 revision of
ISO 6469-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding Tesla's inquiry about connectors underneath the floor,
connectors and electrical protection barriers located under the
vehicle's floor are treated the same as other connectors and electrical
protection barriers located outside of the passenger and luggage
compartments.\38\ A connector located

under the floor that has IPXXB protection level and that cannot be
separated from its mating component without tools would comply with the
above direct contact protection requirements for connectors. (If it can
be separated from its mating component without tools, it must provide
protection degree IPXXB in the uncoupled state or the live parts must
be equal to or less than 60 VDC or 30 VAC within 1 second from
separating from its mating component). Regarding a connector located
under the vehicle's floor where the access point to the connector is
smaller than a finger could fit through, the connector would need to
meet IPXXB protection degree if parts surrounding the connector (that
limit access to the connector) can be opened, disassembled or removed
without the use of tools.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ In the NPRM, NHTSA noted that electrical protection
barriers and connectors located under the vehicle floor should not
be excluded from IPXXB direct contact protection and marking
requirements because it is possible that the high voltage sources
enclosed by these barriers and connectors may be accessed following
a rollover crash or during vehicle maintenance. 81 FR at 12654-
12655. The agency stated in the NPRM that if connectors and
electrical protection barriers located under the vehicle floor can
be accessed, opened, or removed without the use of tools they should
be required to meet the same requirements for high voltage markings
and direct contact protection as electric protection barriers and
connectors not located under the vehicle floor. Id.
    \39\ The test method to evaluate protection from direct contact
with high voltage sources (S9.1) specifies that before assessing
IPXXB or IPXXD protection degree for high voltage components, parts
surrounding the high voltage source are opened, disassembled, or
removed without the use of tools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Markings

    NHTSA proposed marking requirements (yellow high voltage symbol) on
or near electric energy storage/conversion devices, and on electrical
protection barriers in general. We proposed that the markings would not
be required for electrical protection barriers that cannot be
physically accessed, opened, or removed without the use of tools. The
proposed provisions were based on GTR No. 13 requirements, but unlike
GTR No. 13, the NPRM did not exclude from the marking requirement (1)
electrical protection barriers or high voltage sources located under
the vehicle floor; (2) connectors generally; or (3) the vehicle charge
inlet. NHTSA also proposed that cables for high voltage sources that
are not located within electrical protection barriers must be
identified by an orange colored outer covering.

Comments Received

    The agency received multiple comments on this issue.
    The Alliance, Global and Subaru request that connectors be excluded
from the marking requirement. The Alliance and Global state that some
connectors can be so small that the markings on these connectors would
be not easily read and that high voltage cables going into the
connectors are required to have orange outer covers, which should
signal that the cables and their connectors are high voltage. The
Alliance also notes that high voltage connectors do not necessarily
carry high current. The Alliance states that the inclusion of a marking
requirement for connecters would necessitate product development
efforts, increased economic cost and compliance burden, without a
commensurate increase in safety.
    Subaru believes that markings should not be necessary on or near
electric storage/conversion devices which are not in plain view of
vehicle occupants during normal vehicle operation. Subaru states that a
device that is mounted under a seat, and that is not visible without
first removing the seat, should not have to be marked.
    Tesla believes that high voltage sources underneath the vehicle are
subject to a harsh physical environment, and that the markings on them
are not likely to survive the vehicle's life. Tesla asks NHTSA to allow
for alternative placement of high voltage markings when a vehicle's
high voltage source is located under the vehicle's floor.

Agency Response

    The agency agrees with the Alliance and Global request to exclude
connectors from requiring markings. The agency is persuaded by the
commenters that connectors do not necessarily carry high current and
that the increased economic cost and compliance burden resulting from a
marking requirement are not warranted. The connectors are small, so
markings on them would not be easily read. Further, we agree that since
high voltage cables going into the connectors are required to have
orange outer covers, those covers will sufficiently indicate that the
cables and their connectors are high voltage. Importantly, the markings
are also not needed because, in a change from the NPRM, we have decided
to require connectors to have direct contact protection when connected
and disconnected from their mating component. (As discussed above, the
direct contact protection consists of IPXXD or IPXXB protection when
connected to the mating component, and at least one of the following:
(1) IPXXD or IPXXB protection when separated from its mating component
if the connector can be uncoupled without a tool; (2) a low voltage
requirement within 1 second after separation from its mating component;
or (3) it cannot be uncoupled from its mating component without the use
of tools. Thus, we conclude that connectors will sufficiently protect
against the risk of electrical shock without the markings.
    Similarly, the agency also agrees with the Alliance and Global
request to exclude the vehicle charge inlet from requiring markings.
The markings are not necessary because this final rule requires vehicle
charge inlets to have direct contact protection when connected and
disconnected from their mating component, like connectors.
    The agency does not agree with Subaru's request to omit the high
voltage marking on electric energy storage/conversion \40\ devices that
are not in plain view of vehicle occupants during normal vehicle
operation. GTR No. 13, ECE R.100, and the draft EVS-GTR require the
high voltage symbol on or near electric energy storage devices. Since
an electric energy storage device is a high density energy source, we
believe there is a safety need for the marking, as persons (such as
maintenance, repair and rescue personnel and consumers working on their
vehicles) encountering the electric energy storage device should be
warned of the electrical shock risks. However, we are revising the
proposed regulatory text to indicate that the marking on electric
energy storage devices ``shall be present'' rather than ``shall be
visible.'' This terminology is consistent with the draft EVS-GTR. The
final rule's wording (``shall be present'') acknowledges that the
marking is not, and does not have to be, ``visible'' on an electric
energy storage device when the device is located under the floor away
from view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ We do not agree with the idea of excluding a device from
the marking requirements simply because the device is not in plain
view of the occupants. However, as discussed further below, we are
omitting the marking requirement generally for electric energy
conversion devices. The rest of this response to Subaru pertains to
marking electric energy storage devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, under this final rule, the electric energy storage device
must be marked, and the electrical protection barrier for the device
must also be marked with a visible high voltage symbol if it can be
accessed, opened, and removed without the use of tools. To illustrate,
if an electric energy storage device is accessible when the floor mat
is pulled out and a floor panel is opened (without the use of tools),
the floor panel has to have a high voltage symbol that is visible to
the person when he/she pulls out the floor mat.
    NHTSA has decided not to require electric energy conversion devices
to be marked with the high voltage symbol. Electric energy conversion
devices include fuel cells which convert chemical energy to electric
energy. A fuel cell only becomes a high voltage source when hydrogen is
supplied to it. Since conversion devices (e.g., fuel cells) are not
high density energy sources, we are not requiring them to be

marked. However, the electric protection barrier around a conversion
device (e.g., fuel cell) will have to be marked, and the mark is
required to be visible.
    NHTSA does not agree with Tesla's request to allow alternative
positions for the high voltage symbol mark on high voltage sources that
are located underneath the vehicle's floor. We do not believe there is
a need for the change as the regulatory text requires that the mark be
``on or near'' electric energy storage devices without providing
specifics for the location of the high voltage marking. We note also
that this final rule provides that electrical protection barriers that
cannot be physically accessed, opened, or removed without the use of
tools are excluded from the marking requirement,\41\ which may bear on
Tesla's labeling of its devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Markings are not required on electrical protection barriers
that cannot be physically accessed, opened, or removed without the
use of tools. The persons who will access the powertrain with tools
will be maintenance personnel technically aware of the vehicle's
electrical system, and not first responders. We believe that
maintenance personnel will have basic knowledge of the workings of
the electrical system, so the electrical shock warning symbol is not
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Indirect Contact Protection

    Exposed conductive parts of electrical protection barriers must be
protected against indirect contact \42\ during normal vehicle operation
and post-crash. The NPRM proposed that the resistance between exposed
conductive parts of electrical protection barriers and the electrical
chassis must be less than 0.1 ohms and that the resistance between any
two simultaneously reachable exposed conductive parts of electrical
protection barriers that are within 2.5 meters of each other be less
than 0.2 ohms (proposed S5.3(c)(2)). The NPRM also proposed
(S5.3(c)(3)) that the voltages between an electrical protection barrier
and other exposed conductive parts must be less than or equal to 30 VAC
or 60 VDC (``low voltage requirement''). These proposed requirements
would protect against electric shock if any electrically charged
components lose isolation within the protective barrier and two exposed
conductive parts of the electrical protection barrier are contacted
simultaneously, by shunting \43\ any harmful electrical current to the
vehicle chassis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Indirect contact refers to the contact of persons with
exposed conductive parts.
    \43\ Shunting is when a low-resistance connection between two
points in an electric circuit forms an alternative path for a
portion of the current. If a human body contacts an electrical
protection barrier that is energized due to loss in electrical
isolation of a high voltage source enclosed in the barrier, most of
the current would flow through the chassis rather than through the
human body because the current path through the chassis has
significantly lower resistance (less than 0.1 ohm) than the
resistance of the human body (greater or equal to 500 ohm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments Received

    Global comments that the reference to ``any two simultaneously
reachable exposed conductive parts'' in proposed S5.3(c)(2) ``would
result in excessive testing requirements, due to the number of
potential combinations of two simultaneously reachable exposed parts.''
The commenter recommends that manufacturers be authorized to identify a
``worst case'' pair of conductive parts for testing under the provision
to reduce the potential number of combinations. Global also recommends
that greater specification for the phrase ``any two simultaneously
reachable,'' be provided, such as a measured distance.

Agency Response

    NHTSA believes that the regulatory text already provides the
specification that the simultaneously reachable exposed conductive
parts of electrical protection barriers must be located within 2.5
meters of each other. Thus, we do not believe the requirement results
in an excessive number of resistance measurements. However, NHTSA is
correcting the reference to ``exposed conductive parts of the
electrical protection barriers'' in S5.3(c)(2) to qualify that they are
exposed conductive parts of the electrical protection barrier of the
high voltage source under consideration in S5.3.

Comments Received

    Global comments that the low voltage requirement (S5.3(c)(3)) is
too broad in scope and recommends limiting this testing requirement to
exposed conductive parts of the electrical protection barriers. Global
states that in the event of a barrier failure, a voltage differential
could exist with regard to all exposed conductive parts of the chassis
and all metal parts connected to the chassis. The Alliance comments
that the requirements in S5.3(c)(3) should be consistent with the
requirement in S5.3(c)(2). I.e., the Alliance believes that the voltage
measurements for S5.3(c)(3) between exposed conductive parts should be
made on the same exposed conductive parts of electrical protection
barriers for which resistance measurements are made for S5.3(c)(2).

Agency Response

    The agency agrees with the comments of Global and the Alliance and
has worded S5.3(c)(3) to reflect the recommended changes. As adopted,
S5.3(c)(3) specifies that the voltage between exposed conductive parts
of the electrical protection barrier and the electrical chassis must be
less than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC.\44\ In addition, the voltage
between an exposed conductive part of the electrical protection barrier
and any other simultaneously reachable exposed conductive parts of
electrical protection barriers within 2.5 meters of it must be less
than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ In the NPRM, S5.3(c)(3) was worded such that the voltage
measurements were between the electrical protection barrier and
``other exposed conductive parts,'' which includes the electrical
chassis. Since in this final rule we have modified the proposed
wording of S5.3(c)(3) to make the voltage measurements between
exposed conductive parts of electrical protection barriers (in
response to Global's comment), the agency has separately added a
requirement to S5.3(c)(3) to account for the voltage measurement
between exposed conductive parts of the electrical protection
barrier and the electrical chassis. This change in the language of
S5.3(c)(3) makes it more consistent with the language of S5.3(c)(2)
and is not a substantive change from the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

f. Electrical Isolation Requirements

    Under FMVSS No. 305's current post-crash safety requirements,
vehicles must meet either electrical isolation requirements or low
voltage requirements. The current requirements for electrical isolation
are that the electrical isolation of the high voltage source must be
greater than or equal to: 500 ohms/volt for an AC high voltage source;
500 ohms/volt for a DC high voltage source without electrical isolation
monitoring during vehicle operation; or 100 ohms/volt for a DC high
voltage source with an electrical isolation monitoring system during
vehicle operation.
    The NPRM proposed to change these requirements (S5.3(a)) and add
specifications that high voltage sources must have electrical isolation
during normal vehicle operation (S<IP_ADDRESS>). Briefly, the proposed
electrical isolation requirements are: AC high voltage sources have 500
ohms/volt or higher electrical isolation from the electric chassis; DC
high voltage sources have 100 ohms/volt or higher electric isolation
from the electric chassis; or, AC high voltage sources that are
conductively connected to the DC high voltage sources may have 100
ohms/volt or higher electrical isolation from the electric chassis
provided they also provide physical barrier protection.

Comments Received and Agency Response

    The Alliance first requests that the regulatory text of the
electrical isolation option under post-crash conditions (S5.3(a)) and
during normal vehicle operating conditions (S<IP_ADDRESS>) be replaced by
the language in GTR No. 13.
    The agency declines this request. The requirements of the
electrical isolation option in FMVSS No. 305 and GTR No. 13 are
identical, while the text in FMVSS No. 305 is more concise.
    Second, the Alliance requests changes to the proposed physical
barrier protection requirements for AC high voltage sources that are
conductively connected to DC high voltage sources and that comply with
the lower electrical isolation limit of 100 ohms/volt under post-crash
conditions (S5.3(a)(2)). The proposed text in the NPRM permits an AC
high voltage source to have an isolation resistance of only 100 ohms/
volt if three physical protection requirements are met.\45\ The
Alliance suggests that the low voltage requirement is ``not logically
needed.'' It states that the electric shock scenario identified in
NHTSA's Battelle study \46\ of physical barriers will never happen if
it maintains a minimum electrical isolation of more than 100 ohms/volt,
protection against direct contact (IPXXB), and protection against
indirect contact (resistance between exposed conductive parts and the
electrical chassis and between two exposed conductive parts of less
than 0.1 ohms and 0.2 ohms, respectively).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ These are proposed as: (1) IPXXB protection level
(S5.3(c)(1)), (2) resistance between exposed conductive parts of the
electrical protection barrier and chassis of less than 0.1 ohms and
between any two simultaneously reachable exposed conductive parts of
barriers less than 2.5 m apart of less than 0.2 ohms (S5.3(c)(2)),
and (3) the voltage between electrical protection barrier enclosing
the high voltage source and other exposed conductive parts of less
than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC (``low voltage requirement'')
(S5.3(c)(3)).
    \46\ Supra. The NPRM discusses the Battelle study in detail, see
81 FR at 12656.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has carefully analyzed electrical safety implications under
the conditions of a minimum electrical isolation of 100 ohms/volt,
resistance between exposed conductive parts of electrical protection
barriers and the chassis of 0.1 ohms, and electrical isolation between
two exposed conductive parts of 0.2 ohms. The results of the analysis
\47\ showed that under these conditions, the electric current through
the body would be significantly lower than 10 milliamps (mA) DC and 2
mA AC, which are considered safe levels of current for protection from
electric shock. Therefore, the agency agrees to this change in the
regulatory text requested by the Alliance. Accordingly, S5.3(a)(2) is
modified so that AC high voltage sources that are conductively
connected to DC high voltage sources may comply with the lower
electrical isolation limit of 100 ohms/volt provided they meet the
physical protection requirements of S5.3(c)(1) and S5.3(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ We have docketed a memorandum showing our analysis. See the
docket for this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Electrical Safety During Charging

    Like GTR No. 13, the NPRM proposed (S5.4.5) to require electric
vehicles whose rechargeable energy storage system are charged by
conductively connecting to a grounded external power supply to have a
device to enable conductive connection of the electrical chassis to the
earth ground during charging. This proposal was to ensure that in the
event of electrical isolation loss during charging, a person contacting
the vehicle does not form a ground loop with the chassis and sustain
significant electric shock. Additionally, like GTR No. 13, the NPRM
proposed (S<IP_ADDRESS>) to require the isolation resistance between the
high voltage source and the electrical chassis to be at least 1 million
ohms when the charge coupler is disconnected. This proposal was to
ensure that the magnitude of current through a human body when a person
contacts a vehicle undergoing charging is low and in the safe zone.

Comments Received

    The agency received many comments regarding the requirement for
isolation resistance of 1 million ohms during charging.
    The Alliance states that the requirement should only be applicable
to conductive charging with an AC external electric power supply,
noting that the isolation resistance of one million ohms should be
required for the high voltage source (high voltage buses) that are
conductively connected to the contacts of the vehicle charge inlet, and
not to the vehicle charge inlet itself.
    Mercedes-Benz states that the 1 million ohms isolation resistance
specification--

    is intended as a system reliability requirement, not a safety
requirement. The safety relevant requirements on an isolation
resistance are already specified in S<IP_ADDRESS>. . . . [T]he regulatory
text [should] explicitly remove the `one million ohm' specification
and instead state that the isolation resistance, measured at the
vehicle charge inlet, must comply with the requirements stated in
S<IP_ADDRESS>.

    Tesla states that it does not believe the insulation resistance
requirement for the vehicle's inlet is aligned with the associated high
voltage hazards that the NPRM proposes to mitigate. Tesla believes that
the intent of the insulation resistance requirement is to prevent high
voltage current from flowing through the human body. Tesla believes
that Section 11.7 of the IEC 61851-1:2010 \48\ more accurately captures
this prevention for AC equipment because it specifically applies to
cord and plug-connected equipment. Tesla also recommends that NHTSA
``provide clear requirements for off-board (including charging)
equipment(s)'' since any fault current that is generated while charging
would be a function of both the vehicle as well as the electric vehicle
supply equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ IEC 61851-1:2010, ``Electric vehicle conductive charging
system--Part I: General Requirements,'' https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/6029.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Agency Response

    To evaluate these comments, NHTSA requested information from
technical experts in the working group for the draft EVS-GTR on
electric vehicle safety, in which NHTSA participates. Technical
information was provided by Mr. Takahiko Miki \49\ from the
Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles (OICA).\50\
Mr. Miki noted that the one million ohms electrical isolation
requirement is from IEC 61851-1. Mr. Miki also noted that the
requirements in IEC 61851-1 apply to conductive charging of electric
vehicles with an AC external electric power supply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Miki, T., ``Personal Protection during Charging.''
Submitted at the 12th EVS GTR meeting in Paris on September 15,
2016, EVSTF09-32-TF2-04.docx. https://www2.unece.org/wiki/display/trans/9th+Task+Force+meetings+in+Paris.
    \50\ OICA is an international organization of motor vehicle
manufacturers whose members include 39 national trade associations
around the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Miki provided the following detailed explanation of protective
measures in vehicles during charging to prevent electric shock. Mr.
Miki noted that protection against electric shock during charging by
connecting to an AC external electric power supply is provided by the
vehicle and the off-board electric vehicle supply equipment (i.e.
charge connector) and provided a description of these protection
systems. Protection systems in the vehicle include: (1) Protection
against direct contact with high voltage live parts and (2) indirect
contact protection from high voltage sources (equipotential bonding--
earthing/grounding). Protection systems in the electric vehicle supply
equipment (charge connector) include: (1) Earthing/grounding conductor
between the electrical chassis of a vehicle and the

earth/ground, (2) earthing/grounding continuity monitor, and (3)
automatic disconnection of supply (residual current device (RCD),\51\
charging circuit interrupting device (CCID) \52\ located in the charge
electric vehicle supply equipment or in the fixed electrical
installation, or both) operated by the fault current that disconnects
one or more of the line conductors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ RCD is a mechanical switching device designed to make,
carry and break currents under normal service conditions and to
cause the opening of the contacts when the residual current attains
a given value under specified conditions. A residual current device
can be a combination of various separate elements designed to detect
and evaluate the residual current and to make and break current.
[Source: IEC 61851-1, IEV 442-05-02]
    \52\ CCID is a device that continuously monitors the
differential current among all of the current-carrying line
conductors in a grounded system and rapidly interrupts the circuit
under conditions where the differential current exceeds the rated
Measurement Indication Unit (MIU) value of a charging circuit
interrupting device. The device is identified by the letters CCID
followed by the differential trip current rating of either 5 or 20
indicating the tripping rating in MIU. [Source: UL 2231-1]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The AC external electric power supply is grounded to earth ground.
When an electric vehicle is connected to the AC external electric power
supply by the charge connector, the vehicle electrical chassis is
connected to the earth/ground through the earthing/grounding conductor.
If electrical isolation/insulation is lost during charging, the leakage
current (residual current) \53\ would flow to the earth/ground through
the earthing/grounding conductor. Under such conditions, a human body
contacting high voltage-exposed conductive parts of the vehicle would
not experience electric shock if the leakage current is less than or
equal to maximum current levels considered to be safe. If the leakage
current reaches or exceeds specified safety threshold levels, the RCD/
CCID would open the circuit to interrupt the supply of electric energy.
A similar form of this type of electric shock protection measure is
provided in homes for use of common household electric equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Leakage current is the current flowing through ground due
to a fault condition. The magnitude of leakage current is determined
as the difference in the current flowing through the positive
terminal and that returning on the negative terminal. Therefore, it
is also referred to as residual current.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The electrical isolation of high voltage sources that are connected
to the vehicle charge inlet during charging by connecting the AC
external electric power supply is determined based on the
characteristics of the RCD/CCID to ensure that leakage current would be
significantly lower than the leakage current level that would trip the
RCD/CCID to open the circuit. This electrical isolation requirement is
not for electric shock protection but to ensure that charging is not
interrupted under normal charging conditions. Mr. Miki recommends that
the electrical isolation between the electrical chassis and high
voltage sources that are conductively connected to the vehicle charge
inlet during AC charging be greater than or equal to 500 ohms/volt
because with this level of electrical isolation, the leakage current
would be sufficiently lower than the leakage (residual) current level
that would trip the RCD/CCID to open the circuit and interrupt the
electric energy supply.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ For DC charging, the power input to the vehicle is isolated
from the ground by the isolation transformer. Therefore, electric
shock protection is maintained even if isolation resistance is
reduced (fault condition), because the current loop to the ground is
not established. Additionally, DC charging stations monitor the
combined isolation resistance of the vehicle and the electric
vehicle supply equipment. If the DC charging station detects that
the combined isolation resistance is lower than the specified value
(for electric shock protection), the DC output cable is not
energized (power supply is terminated).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of the new information provided by Mr. Miki and the
commenters, the agency is modifying the proposed isolation resistance
requirement for high voltage sources for charging the electric energy
storage device (S<IP_ADDRESS>). High voltage sources conductively connected
to the vehicle charge inlet during charging (through conductive
connection to the AC external electric supply) are required to have
electrical isolation from the electric chassis of 500 ohms/volt when
the charge connector is disconnected.
    We believe the modified language responds to the comments from the
Alliance, Mercedes-Benz, and Tesla. Additionally, the modified
requirement is consistent with that developed in the draft EVS-GTR for
electric vehicles.
    Regarding Tesla's recommendation for NHTSA to provide clear
requirements for off-board (including charging) equipment, the agency
is looking into this matter. The safety measures in the electric
vehicle supply equipment, such as the RCD/CCID in the charge connector,
are specified in the National Electric Code (NEC)--Article 625:
Electric Vehicle Charging System and in the Underwriters Laboratory
(UL) 2954, ``Electric vehicle supply equipment.'' Adding requirements
for off-board equipment is not in scope of this final rule since the
agency did not include any such requirements in the NPRM. The agency
may consider the need for and the feasibility of requirements for off-
board electric vehicle equipment in the future.

h. Mitigating Driver Error

    NHTSA proposed three provisions for mitigating the likelihood of
driver error in operating electric vehicles (S5.4.6). First, the
heading and text of proposed S<IP_ADDRESS> proposed that at least a
momentary indication shall be given at ``start up'' when the vehicle is
in a possible active driving mode.\55\ (``Start up'' is also used in
GTR No. 13.) Second, the NPRM proposed that drivers be provided an
audible or visual signal if the vehicle is still in the possible active
driving mode when the driver leaves the vehicle. Third, for vehicles
that have on-board electric energy storage devices that can be charged
externally, the NPRM proposed to prohibit vehicle movement by the
vehicle's own propulsion system when the external electric power supply
is physically connected to the vehicle charge inlet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ ``Possible active driving mode'' is the vehicle mode when
the application of pressure to the accelerator pedal or release of
the brake system causes the electric power train to move the
vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments Received and Agency Response

    The agency received comments from Global, the Alliance and Tesla on
the proposal. Global requests a clarification of the meaning of ``start
up'' used in the first provision. Global asks if ``start up'' refers to
the time of engine start or some other meaning.
    NHTSA meant ``start up'' to refer to the time when the vehicle is
first placed in a possible active driving mode (e.g., reverse, drive,
or other driving gears) after manual activation of the propulsion
system. The provision at issue is intended to reduce operational errors
that could have safety implications. For example, a driver might not
realize the vehicle is in an active driving mode when he or she pressed
on the accelerator pedal, which could result in a potential crash
condition. However, to reduce ambiguity, we have modified the final
rule regulatory text by replacing the phrase, ``upon start up,'' with
the phrase, ``when the vehicle is first placed in possible active
driving mode after manual activation of the propulsion system.'' Once
driving is initiated, notification is not needed when the vehicle is
put in neutral to change gears (for manual-drive vehicles).
    The Alliance believes the heading of the third provision for
mitigating driver error should be revised from ``Prevent drive-away
during charging'' to ``Prevent drive-away'' to reflect that the concern
is that the driver may drive the vehicle away after charging is

completed without disconnecting the charge connector. The Alliance also
notes that a simple physical connection without any conductive
connection may not be detected by vehicle systems. The commenter
recommends changing the phrase, ``physically connected to the vehicle
charge inlet,'' to ``physically connected to the vehicle charge inlet
in such a way that charging is possible.''
    The agency agrees generally with the Alliance's recommended changes
and has changed the proposed regulatory text. We believe the changes
improve clarity and removes ambiguity about when and under what
conditions the requirement to prevent vehicle movement applies.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ If the charge connector is not connected correctly to the
vehicle charge inlet, then charging may not even initiate and
driving away with the charge connector physically connected would
not result in an electric safety hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Tesla states that the phrase, ``preventing physical vehicle
movement by its own power,'' is vague and needs clarification. Tesla
requests that the agency draw a clear distinction between when a
vehicle is considered stationary and when it is in ``movement under its
own power.'' The commenter suggests using a provision in FMVSS No. 114,
``Theft protection and rollaway prevention.'' S5.2.5 of FMVSS No. 114
specifies that a vehicle must not move more than 150 mm on a 10 percent
grade when the gear selection control is locked in ``park.''
    The agency sees merit in Tesla's suggestion to improve objectivity
of the requirement for preventing vehicle movement when the charge
connector is connected to the vehicle charge inlet. S5.2 in FMVSS No.
114 specifies provisions to prevent rollaway in vehicles equipped with
a transmission with a ``park'' position. One provision is that when the
vehicle is resting on a 10 percent grade and the vehicle's gear
selection control is locked in ``park,'' the vehicle must not move more
than 150 mm when the brakes are released. To distinguish minor
vibrations of the vehicle when it is idling from vehicle movement
``under its own power,'' the agency is modifying the proposed
regulatory text to state that the vehicle must not move more than 150
mm \57\ by its own propulsion system when the charge connector is
physically connected to the vehicle charge inlet in such a way that
charging is possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Vehicle movement of 150 mm is deemed sufficiently low such
that the charge connector would not disengage from the vehicle inlet
or damage the charging equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Test Procedures and Figures in FMVSS No. 305

    The NPRM proposed test procedures for evaluating IPXXB and IPXXD
direct contact protection (S9.1), measuring resistance between exposed
conductive parts and between an exposed conductive part and the
electrical chassis to evaluate indirect contact protection (S9.2), and
measuring voltage between exposed conductive part of an electrical
protection barrier and the electrical chassis or any other exposed
conductive part of the vehicle for indirect contact protection (S9.3).
    For evaluating direct contact protection, the proposed test
procedure in S9.1 detailed how the IPXXB and IPXXD probes are used and
manipulated to determine if high voltage live parts are contacted.
Subaru comments that the description of manipulating the IPXXB finger
probe does not specifically note that it is only applicable to the
IPXXB probe and not the IPXXD probe. NHTSA agrees and has corrected
this omission to indicate that the described manipulation of the finger
probe only applies to the IPXXB probe.
    In proposed S9.1 the NPRM did not explicitly provide criteria for
assessing whether high voltage live parts were contacted, though such
information is provided in GTR No. 13. To make S9.1 clearer, and to
better harmonize the test procedure in FMVSS No. 305 with that in GTR
No. 13, the criteria for verification of IPXXD and IPXXB protection
degree in GTR No. 13 are included in the regulatory text.
    For measuring resistance between two exposed conductive parts, the
NPRM at S9.2 provided two methods that could be used. Global states
that the two methods were provided in GTR No. 13 as compliance options
for manufacturers to select for evaluating indirect contact protection.
The commenter recommends we include regulatory text to make clear that
it is at the manufacturer's option to choose either test method to
certify compliance. The agency agrees that the two methods were
provided as compliance test options for manufacturers and has included
the recommended regulatory text in S9.2 of FMVSS No.305.
    Global expresses concern that provisions for indirect contact
protection in S9.2 create an inordinate certification burden on
manufacturers due to the phrase, ``any two exposed conductive parts.''
The commenter requests that instead of measuring the resistance between
two exposed conductive parts, resistance may be calculated using the
separately measured resistances of the parts of the electrical chassis.
    NHTSA agrees with this requested change from Global. The agency
notes that GTR No. 13, ECE R.100, and the draft EVS-GTR permit
resistances to be calculated using the separately measured resistances
of the relevant parts in the electric path. NHTSA believes that a
calculation option is acceptable for the requirement at issue because
resistances can be computed from other measured resistances on an
actual vehicle in a straightforward manner, and do not involve
potentially subjective judgment calls on the part of evaluators as to
whether assumptions underlying a calculation are merited.
    For measuring voltage between exposed conductive parts of
electrical protection barriers, the NPRM specified a method in which
the DC power supply, voltmeter, and ammeter are connected between
measuring points. The Alliance and Global point out that the DC power
supply should not be connected in this test (S9.3a). The agency agrees
and has corrected the regulatory text. Additionally, NHTSA believes
that calculating the voltage between two exposed conductive parts from
the measured voltages between the exposed conductive parts and the
electrical chassis is straightforward and unambiguous and so is
permitting a calculation option for determining voltage between exposed
conductive parts.
    The proposal provided specifications of the IPXXB probe in Figure
7b of the regulatory text. The Alliance and Global note errors in the
specification for R2 and R4. The agency has corrected the errors in
Figure 7b.
    The Alliance and Global provide an improved Figure 8 in which the
text is clearer than the NPRM's Figure 8. The agency has included the
new figure in FMVSS No. 305.

j. Compliance Date

    The NPRM proposed a compliance date of 180 days after the date of
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register, with optional
early compliance permitted.
    The Alliance states that, although the proposed amendments to FMVSS
No. 305 are vital to enable the production of advanced fuel cell and
48-volt mild hybrid vehicles, the ``in use'' requirements may require
some modification of currently-certified electric vehicles. The
commenter asks that the compliance date be modified to align it with
the first September 1st that is at least 180 days after the publication
of the final rule in the Federal Register, with optional early
compliance

permitted. An individual, Mr. Albert Torres, also believes that a
longer compliance date should be provided.

Agency Response

    The agency believes that most, if not all, electric-powered
vehicles currently sold in the United States would be able to comply
with the updated requirements in FMVSS No. 305 by the proposed
compliance date. However, as noted by the Alliance, some vehicles may
need some minor modifications to comply with some of the modifications
in FMVSS No. 305, such as the marking requirements. Therefore, the
agency finds good cause to provide more time to comply with this final
rule. The agency believes one year from the date of publication of the
final rule is sufficient time for vehicle manufacturers to comply with
the updated FMVSS No. 305 requirements. Therefore, the compliance date
for the amendments in FMVSS No 305 is one year after publication of the
final rule. We permit optional early compliance with this final rule.
    We note that in the ``DATES'' section at this beginning of this
document NHTSA indicates that the ``effective date'' of this final rule
is the date of publication of the rule. The ``effective date'' in the
DATES section is the date the amendments should be incorporated into
the CFR. That date is different from the ``compliance date'' discussed
above. As stated above, NHTSA is permitting optional early compliance
with this final rule. Because of this, we are amending 49 CFR 571.305
(FMVSS No. 305) on the date of publication of this final rule so that
interested manufacturers can begin certifying the compliance of their
vehicles with the amended standard from that date.

V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This rulemaking document was not reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) under Executive Order (E.O.) 12866. It is
not considered to be significant under E.O. 12866 or the Department's
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The amendments made by this final
rule will have no significant effect on the national economy, as most
of the requirements are already in voluntary industry standards and
international standards that current electric powered vehicles
presently meet.
    This final rule updates FMVSS No. 305 to incorporate the electrical
safety requirements in GTR No. 13. This final rule also responds to
petitions for rulemaking from Toyota and the Alliance to facilitate the
introduction of fuel cell vehicles and 48-volt mild hybrid technologies
into the vehicle fleet. The final rule adds electrical safety
requirements in GTR No. 13 that involve electrical isolation and direct
and indirect contact protection of high voltage sources to prevent
electric shock during normal operation of electric powered vehicles.
Today's final rule also provides an additional optional method of
meeting post-crash electrical safety requirements that involve physical
barriers of high voltage sources to prevent electric shock due to
direct and indirect contact with live parts. Since there is widespread
conformance with the requirements that would apply to existing
vehicles, we anticipate no costs or benefits associated with this
rulemaking.

Executive Order 13771

    Executive Order 13771 titled ``Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs,'' directs that, unless prohibited by law, whenever an
executive department or agency publicly proposes for notice and comment
or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall identify at least
two existing regulations to be repealed. In addition, any new
incremental costs associated with new regulations shall, to the extent
permitted by law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs. Only
those rules deemed significant under section 3(f) of Executive Order
12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' are subject to these
requirements. As discussed above, this rule is not a significant rule
under Executive Order 12866 and, accordingly, is not subject to the
offset requirements of 13771.
    NHTSA has determined that this rulemaking is a deregulatory action
under E.O. 13771, as it imposes no costs and, instead, amends FMVSS No.
305 to give more flexibility to manufacturers not only to use modern
electrical safety designs to produce electric vehicles, but also to
introduce new technologies to the U.S. market, including hydrogen fuel
cell vehicles and 48-volt mild hybrid technologies. Although NHTSA was
not able to quantify any cost savings for this rule, in adopting an
optional method of meeting post-crash electrical safety requirements
involving use of physical barriers to prevent direct or indirect
contact (by occupants, emergency services personnel and others) with
high voltage sources, this final rule adjusts the standard to remove an
obstruction that prevented HFCVs to be offered for sale in the U.S. Use
of the physical barrier option will also enable manufacturers to
produce 48-volt mild hybrid systems without having to use electrical
isolation safety measures that involve more complexity, higher consumer
costs, and higher mass, without an incremental safety benefit.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    NHTSA has considered the effects of this final rule under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996). I
certify that this final rule will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities. Any small
manufacturers that might be affected by this final rule are already
subject to the requirements of FMVSS No. 305. Further, the agency
believes the testing associated with the requirements added by this
final rule are not substantial and to some extent are already being
voluntarily borne by the manufacturers pursuant to SAE J1766.
Therefore, to the extent there is an economic impact on the
manufacturers, it will only be minor.

National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that
implementation of this action will not have any significant impact on
the quality of the human environment.

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    NHTSA has examined today's final rule pursuant to Executive Order
13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional
consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives
is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded
that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement. The final rule does not have
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.''
    NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express
preemption provision:
    When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or

motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the
standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1).
    It is this statutory command that preempts any non-identical State
legislative and administrative law \58\ addressing the same aspect of
performance, not today's rulemaking, so consultation would be
inappropriate.
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    \58\ The issue of potential preemption of state tort law is
addressed in the immediately following paragraph discussing implied
preemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some
instances, of implied preemption of State requirements imposed on motor
vehicle manufacturers, including sanctions imposed by State tort law.
That possibility is dependent upon there being an actual conflict
between a FMVSS and the State requirement. If and when such a conflict
exists, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution makes the State
requirements unenforceable. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (2000), finding implied preemption of state tort law on the
basis of a conflict discerned by the court,\59\ not on the basis of an
intent to preempt asserted by the agency itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ The conflict was discerned based upon the nature (e.g., the
language and structure of the regulatory text) and the safety-
related objectives of FMVSS requirements in question and the impact
of the State requirements on those objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has considered the nature (e.g., the language and structure
of the regulatory text) and objectives of today's final rule and does
not discern any existing State requirements that conflict with the rule
or the potential for any future State requirements that might conflict
with it. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied
preemption of state law, including state tort law.

Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

    With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation,
section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform'' (61 FR
4729; Feb. 7, 1996), requires that Executive agencies make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies
the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing
Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for
affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction;
(4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) specifies
whether administrative proceedings are to be required before parties
file suit in court; (6) adequately defines key terms; and (7) addresses
other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship
under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General. This document is
consistent with that requirement.
    Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes as follows. The issue of
preemption is discussed above. NHTSA notes further that there is no
requirement that individuals submit a petition for reconsideration or
pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in
court.

Privacy Act

    Please note that anyone can search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or online at http://www.dot.gov/privacy.html.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), a person is not
required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency
unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. There are no
information collection requirements associated with this NPRM.

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Public Law 104-113, as amended by Public Law 107-
107 (15 U.S.C. 272), directs the agency to evaluate and use voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory activities unless doing so would
be inconsistent with applicable law or is otherwise impractical.
Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards (e.g., materials
specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business
practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies, such as the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).
The NTTAA directs us to provide Congress (through OMB) with
explanations when the agency decides not to use available and
applicable voluntary consensus standards. The NTTAA does not apply to
symbols.
    FMVSS No. 305 has historically drawn largely from SAE J1766, and
does so again for this current rulemaking, which updates FMVSS No. 305
to facilitate the development of fuel cell and 48-volt mild hybrid
technologies. It is based on GTR No. 13 and the latest version of SAE
J1766 January 2014.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA),
Pub. L. 104-4, requires Federal agencies to prepare a written
assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or
final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995). Adjusting this amount by the
implicit gross domestic product price deflator for the year 2013
results in $142 million (106.733/75.324 = 1.42). This final rule will
not result in a cost of $142 million or more to either State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or the private sector. Thus, this
final rule is not subject to the requirements of sections 202 of the
UMRA.

Executive Order 13609 (Promoting Regulatory Cooperation)

    The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609
provides, in part: the regulatory approaches taken by foreign
governments may differ from those taken by U.S. regulatory agencies to
address similar issues. In some cases, the differences between the
regulatory approaches of U.S. agencies and those of their foreign
counterparts might not be necessary and might impair the ability of
American businesses to export and compete internationally. In meeting
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation
can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that
are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation.
International regulatory cooperation can also reduce, eliminate, or
prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.
    The agency participated in the development of GTR No. 13 to
harmonize the standards of fuel cell vehicles. As a signatory member,
NHTSA is obligated to initiate rulemaking to incorporate electrical
safety requirements and options specified in GTR No. 13 into FMVSS No.
305. The agency has initiated rulemaking by way of the March 10, 2016
NPRM and completes it with this final rule.

Regulation Identifier Number

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in

the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information
Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of
each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the
beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

Plain Language

    Executive Order 12866 requires each agency to write all rules in
plain language. Application of the principles of plain language
includes consideration of the following questions:
     Have we organized the material to suit the public's needs?
     Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated?
     Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that
isn't clear?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections,
use of headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand?
     Would more (but shorter) sections be better?
     Could we improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or
diagrams?
     What else could we do to make the rule easier to
understand?
    If you have any responses to these questions, please write to us
with your views.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Motor vehicles, Motor vehicle safety.

    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as
follows:

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.

0
2. In Sec.  571.305:
0
a. Revise S1 and S2;
0
b. Under S4:
0
i. Add in alphabetical order definitions for ``Charge connector,''
``Connector,'' ``Direct contact,'' ``Electrical protection barrier,''
``Exposed conductive part,'' ``External electric power supply,'' and
``Fuel cell system'';
0
ii. Revise the definitions of ``High voltage source'';
0
iii. Add in alphabetical order definitions for ``Indirect contact,''
``Live part,'' ``Luggage compartment,'' ``Passenger compartment,'' and
``Possible active driving mode'';
0
iv. Revise the definition of ``Propulsion system''; and
0
v. Add in alphabetical order definitions for ``Protection degree
IPXXB,'' ``Protection degree IPXXD,'' ``Service disconnect,'' and
``Vehicle charge inlet'';
0
c. Revise S5.3 and S5.4; and
0
d. Add S5.4.1, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>.1, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>,
S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S5.4.2, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S5.4.3, S<IP_ADDRESS>,
S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S5.4.4, S5.4.5, S5.4.6, S<IP_ADDRESS>, S<IP_ADDRESS>,
S<IP_ADDRESS>, S9, S9.1, S9.2, S9.3, and figures 6, 7a, 7b, and 8.
    The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec.  571.305  Standard No. 305; Electric-powered vehicles: electrolyte
spillage and electrical shock protection.

    S1. Scope. This standard specifies requirements for limitation of
electrolyte spillage and retention of electric energy storage/
conversion devices during and after a crash, and protection from
harmful electric shock during and after a crash and during normal
vehicle operation.
    S2. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to reduce deaths and
injuries during and after a crash that occur because of electrolyte
spillage from electric energy storage devices, intrusion of electric
energy storage/conversion devices into the occupant compartment, and
electrical shock, and to reduce deaths and injuries during normal
vehicle operation that occur because of electric shock or driver error.
* * * * *
    S4. * * *
    Charge connector is a conductive device that, by insertion into a
vehicle charge inlet, establishes an electrical connection of the
vehicle to the external electric power supply for the purpose of
transferring energy and exchanging information.
    Connector means a device providing mechanical connection and
disconnection of high voltage electrical conductors to a suitable
mating component, including its housing.
    Direct contact is the contact of persons with high voltage live
parts.
* * * * *
    Electrical protection barrier is the part providing protection
against direct contact with high voltage live parts from any direction
of access.
    Exposed conductive part is the conductive part that can be touched
under the provisions of the IPXXB protection degree and that is not
normally energized, but that can become electrically energized under
isolation fault conditions. This includes parts under a cover, if the
cover can be removed without using tools.
    External electric power supply is a power supply external to the
vehicle that provides electric power to charge the electric energy
storage device in the vehicle through the charge connector.
    Fuel cell system is a system containing the fuel cell stack(s), air
processing system, fuel flow control system, exhaust system, thermal
management system, and water management system.
    High voltage source means any electric component which is contained
in the electric power train or conductively connected to the electric
power train and has a working voltage greater than 30 VAC or 60 VDC.
    Indirect contact is the contact of persons with exposed conductive
parts.
    Live part is a conductive part of the vehicle that is electrically
energized under normal vehicle operation.
    Luggage compartment is the space in the vehicle for luggage
accommodation, separated from the passenger compartment by the front or
rear bulkhead and bounded by a roof, hood or trunk lid, floor, and side
walls, as well as by electrical protection barriers provided for
protecting the occupants from direct contact with high voltage live
parts.
    Passenger compartment is the space for occupant accommodation that