[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 5 (Friday, January 8, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1180-1233]
[FR Doc No: E9-31411]

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Part III

Department of Transportation

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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Part 238

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front End Strength of Cab Cars
and Multiple-Unit Locomotives; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 5 / Friday, January 8, 2010 / Rules
and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 238

[Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AB80

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front End Strength of Cab
Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule is intended to further the safety of passenger
train occupants by amending existing regulations to enhance
requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars
and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives. These enhancements include the
addition of requirements concerning structural deformation and energy
absorption by collision posts and corner posts at the forward end of
this equipment. The requirements are based on standards specified by
the American Public Transportation Association (APTA). FRA is also
making clarifying amendments to existing regulations for the structural
strength of passenger equipment and is clarifying its views on the
preemptive effect of this part.

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective March 9, 2010.
Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule must be received not
later than February 22, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration of the final rule should
reference Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, Notice No. 2, and be submitted by
any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal. Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Instructions: Note that all petitions for reconsideration received
will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including
any personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading,
below.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents,
comments, or petitions for reconsideration received, go to http://www.regulations.gov anytime, or to the Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Follow the online
instructions for accessing the dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary G. Fairbanks, Specialist, Motive
Power and Equipment Division, Office of Railroad Safety, RRS-14, Mail
Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>); Eloy E. Martinez,
Program Manager, Equipment and Operating Practices Division, Office of
Railroad Development, Federal Railroad Administration, 55 Broadway,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>); or Daniel L.
Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal
Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC
20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Statutory Background
II. Proceedings to Date
    A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial 1994 Rulemaking Mandate
    B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking
    C. RSAC Overview
    D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group in May
2003
    E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force in
November 2003
    F. Development of the NPRM Published in August 2007
    G. Development of This Final Rule
III. Technical Background
    A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service
    B. Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    C. Accident History
    D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front End Frame Structures of
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    E. Testing of Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU
Locomotives
    1. FRA-Sponsored Dynamic Testing in 2002
    a. Test Article Designs
    b. Dynamic Impact Testing
    c. Analysis
    2. Industry-Sponsored Quasi-Static Testing in 2001
    a. Test Article Design
    b. Quasi-Static Testing
    c. Analysis
    3. FRA-Sponsored Dynamic and Quasi-Static Testing in 2008
    a. Test Article Design
    b. Dynamic Testing of a Collision Post
    c. Quasi-Static Testing of Collision and Corner Posts
    d. Analysis
    F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements
    G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front End Frame
Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    H. European Standard EN 15227 FCD, Crashworthiness Requirements
for Railway Vehicle Bodies
IV. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions
    A. Technical Comments
    1. Crash Energy Management
    2. Dynamic Performance Requirements
    3. Alternative Corner Post Requirements for Designs With
Stepwells
    4. Use of Testing and Analysis To Demonstrate Compliance
    5. Submission of Test Plans for FRA Review
    6. Whether the Requirements Affect Vehicle Weight
    7. System Safety
    8. Other Comments
    B. Preemption
    1. Whether FRA Characterized Its Views on Preemption as the RSAC
Consensus
    2. Whether FRA's Views Are Consistent With 49 U.S.C. 20106, as
Amended
    3. Whether FRA's Views on Preemption Affect Safety
    4. Whether FRA's Views on Preemption Affect Recovery for Victims
of Railroad Accidents
    5. How a State May Act as the Owner and Not the Regulator of a
Railroad
    6. How State Regulation of Push-Pull Operations Is Preempted
    7. Whether It Was Necessary To Discuss Preemption in the NPRM
    8. Whether FRA Has Authority To Express Its Views on Preemption
    9. What Impelled FRA's Views on Preemption
    10. Whether FRA's Views on Preemption Affect FELA
    11. Whether Preemption Applies Under the Locomotive (Boiler)
Inspection Act
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Trade Impact
    I. Privacy Act

I. Statutory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary)
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the
initiatives arising from this Rail Safety

Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin developing safety
standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-year period. In
November of 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for
implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations and included
it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act),
Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994).
Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult with various
organizations involved in passenger train operations for purposes of
prescribing and amending these regulations, as well as issuing orders
pursuant to them. Section 215 of the Act is codified at 49 U.S.C.
20133.

II. Proceedings to Date

A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial 1994 Rulemaking Mandate

    The Secretary delegated these rulemaking responsibilities to the
Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, see 49 CFR
1.49(m), and FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Working Group to provide FRA with advice in developing the regulations.
On June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety
standards for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM
provided background information on the need for such standards, offered
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented
questions on various passenger safety topics. Following consideration
of comments received on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on
September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive safety standards for
railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to
requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment
at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the
comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule establishing
comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, which was
published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540.
    After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the
following subject areas: Structural design; fire safety; training;
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective
equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and
published in the Federal Register three sets of amendments to the final
rule. Each set of amendments summarized the petition requests at issue,
explained what action, if any, FRA decided to take in response to the
issues raised, and described FRA's justifications for its decisions and
any action taken. Specifically, on July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response
to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of
defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions
related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR
41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised
in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those
relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002,
FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by
publishing a response to the petitions for reconsideration concerning
the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more
detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's
response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The
product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238
and secondarily at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.
    Meanwhile, another rulemaking on passenger train emergency
preparedness produced a final rule codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63
FR 24629 (May 4, 1998). The rule addresses passenger train emergencies
of various kinds, including security situations, and requires the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains.
The emergency preparedness plans must include elements such as
communication, employee training and qualification, joint operations,
tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board emergency
equipment, and passenger safety information. The rule requires each
affected railroad to instruct its employees on the applicable
provisions of its plan, and the plan adopted by each railroad is
subject to formal review and approval by FRA. The rule also requires
each railroad operating passenger train service to conduct emergency
simulations to determine its capability to execute the emergency
preparedness plan under the variety of emergency scenarios that could
reasonably be expected to occur. In addition, in promulgating the rule,
FRA established specific requirements for passenger train emergency
systems, e.g., to mark all emergency window exits and all windows
intended for rescue access by emergency responders, to light or mark
all door exits intended for egress, to mark all door exits intended for
rescue access by emergency responders, and to provide instructions for
the use of such exits and means of rescue access.

B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking

    Although FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be
addressed following the completion of additional research, the
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of
industry standards, or all three. One such issue concerned enhancing
the requirements for corner posts on cab cars and MU locomotives. See
64 FR 25607. FRA requirements for corner posts were based on
conventional industry practice at the time, which had not proven
adequate in then-recent side swipe collisions with cab cars leading.
Id. FRA explained that those requirements were being adopted as an
interim measure to prevent the introduction of equipment not meeting
the requirements, that FRA was assisting APTA in preparing an industry
standard for corner post arrangements on cab cars and MU locomotives,
and that adoption of a suitable Federal standard would be an immediate
priority. Id. In broader terms, this issue concerned the behavior of
cab car and MU locomotive end frames when overloaded, as during an
impact with maintenance-of-way equipment or with a highway vehicle at a
highway-rail grade crossing, and thus concerned collision post strength
as well. FRA and interested industry members also began identifying
other issues related to the passenger equipment safety standards and
the passenger train emergency preparedness regulations. FRA decided to
address these issues with the assistance of FRA's Railroad Safety
Advisory Committee (RSAC).

C. RSAC Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for
developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes
representation from all of the agency's major stakeholders, including
railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other

interested parties. A list of member groups follows:
     American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners
(AARPCO);
     American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO);
     American Chemistry Council;
     American Petroleum Institute;
     APTA;
     American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association
(ASLRRA);
     American Train Dispatchers Association;
     Association of American Railroads (AAR);
     Association of Railway Museums;
     Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
     Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
     Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division;
     Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
     Chlorine Institute;
     Federal Transit Administration (FTA);*
     Fertilizer Institute;
     High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA);
     Institute of Makers of Explosives;
     International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers;
     International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
     Labor Council for Latin American Advancement;*
     League of Railway Industry Women;*
     National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
     National Association of Railway Business Women;*
     National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
     National Railroad Construction and Maintenance
Association;
     National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
     NTSB;*
     Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
     Safe Travel America (STA);
     Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte;*
     Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
     Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
     Transport Canada;*
     Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
     Transportation Communications International Union/BRC
(TCIU/BRC);
     Transportation Security Administration (TSA);* and
     United Transportation Union (UTU).
    *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a
given task. The individual task force then provides that information to
the working group for consideration. If a working group comes to
unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is
presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a
simple majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA.
FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because
FRA staff play an active role at the working group level in discussing
the issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the
recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on
whether the recommendation achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC
recommendation in developing an actual regulatory proposal or final
rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the
rulemaking document issued by FRA. If the working group or RSAC is
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, FRA moves
ahead to resolve the issue(s) through traditional rulemaking
proceedings or other action.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group in May 2003

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. RSAC established the
Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task and
develop recommendations for the full RSAC body to consider. Members of
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF),
CSX Transportation, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
     AAPRCO;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., LDK
Engineering, Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Long Island Rail Road
(LIRR), Metro--North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
     BLET;
     BRS;
     FTA;
     HSGTA;
     IBEW;
     NARP;
     RSI;
     SMWIA;
     STA;
     TCIU/BRC;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to
the technical discussions. In addition, staff from the NTSB met with
the Working Group. The Working Group has held 13 meetings on the
following dates and locations:
     September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
     November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
     May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     October 26-27, 2004 in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
     March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 7, 2005 in Chicago, IL;
     March 21-22, 2006 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 12-13, 2006 in Orlando, FL;
     April 17-18, 2007 in Orlando, FL;
     December 11, 2007 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     June 18, 2008, in Baltimore, MD;
     November 13, 2008, in Washington, DC; and
     June 8, 2009, in Washington, DC.
    At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with
representatives of Tri-Rail (the South Florida Regional Transportation
Authority) and Metra, respectively, and toured their passenger
equipment. The visits were open to all members of the Working Group and
FRA believes they have added to the collective understanding of the
Group in identifying and addressing passenger equipment safety issues.

E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force in November
2003

    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting
the Working Group established four task forces--smaller groups to
develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's
particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces included
various representatives from the respective organizations that were
part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was assigned
the job of identifying and developing issues and recommendations
specifically related to the inspection, testing, and operation of
passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the attachment of
safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on these topics was
published on December 8, 2005, see 70 FR 73069, and a final rule was
published on October 19, 2006, see 71 FR 61835. Another of these task
forces was established to identify issues and develop recommendations
related to emergency systems, procedures, and equipment, and helped to
develop an NPRM on these topics that was published on August 24, 2006,
see 71 FR 50276, and a final rule that was published on February 1,
2008, see 73 FR 6370. Another task force, the Crashworthiness/Glazing
Task Force (Task Force), was assigned the job of developing
recommendations related to glazing integrity, structural
crashworthiness, and the protection of occupants during accidents and
incidents. Specifically, this Task Force was charged with developing
recommendations for glazing qualification testing and for cab car and
MU locomotive end frame optimization. (Glazing and cab car/MU
locomotive end frame issues are being handled separately, and glazing
is not a subject of this final rule.) The Task Force was also given the
responsibility of addressing a number of other issues related to
glazing, structural crashworthiness, and occupant protection and
recommending any research necessary to facilitate their resolution.
Members of the Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., General
Electric Transportation Systems, General Motors-Electro-Motive
Division, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LDK Engineering, LIRR, LTK
Engineering Services, Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern
Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD), Hyundai Rotem
Company, Saint Gobian Sully NA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad
(Coaster), SEPTA, and STV, Inc.;
     BLET;
     California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
     NARP;
     RSI; and
     UTU.
    While not voting members of the Task Force, representatives from
the NTSB attended meetings and contributed to the discussions of the
Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center attended all of
the meetings and contributed to the technical discussions.
    The Task Force held seven meetings on the following dates and
locations:
     March 17-18, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
     May 13, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     November 9, 2004, in Boston, MA;
     February 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     April 21-22, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     August 11, 2005, in Cambridge, MA; and
     September 9-10, 2008, in Cambridge, MA.

F. Development of the NPRM Published in August 2007

    The NPRM was developed to address concerns raised and issues
discussed about cab car and MU locomotive front end frame structures
during the Task Force meetings and pertinent Working Group meetings.
Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the docket in
this proceeding and are available for public inspection. Except for one
issue, which is discussed below, the Working Group reached consensus on
the principal regulatory provisions contained in the NPRM at its
meeting in September 2005. After the September 2005 meeting, the
Working Group presented its recommendations to the full RSAC body for
concurrence at its meeting in October 2005. All of the members of the
full RSAC in attendance at its October 2005 meeting accepted the
regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group. Thus, the
Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC's recommendations
to FRA.
    After reviewing the full RSAC's recommendations, FRA agreed that
the recommendations provided a good basis for a proposed rule, but that
test standards and performance criteria more suitable to cab cars and
MU locomotives without flat forward ends or with energy absorbing
structures used as part of a crash energy management design (CEM), or
both, should be specified. The NPRM therefore provided an option for
the dynamic testing of cab cars and MU locomotives as a means of
demonstrating compliance with the rule. However, FRA made clear that
the proposal was not the result of an RSAC recommendation. Otherwise,
FRA adopted the RSAC's recommendations with generally minor changes for
purposes of clarity and formatting in the Federal Register.
    The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on August 1, 2007,
see 72 FR 42016, and FRA solicited public comment on it. FRA notified
the public of its option to submit written comments on the NPRM and to
request a public, oral hearing on the NPRM. FRA also invited comment on
a number of specific issues related to the proposed requirements for
the purpose of developing the final rule.

G. Development of This Final Rule

    This final rule is the product of FRA's review and consideration of
the recommendations of the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC,
and the written comments to the docket. FRA received written comments
in response to the publication of the NPRM from a wide array of
interested parties. Specifically, FRA received three separate comments
from members of the U.S. Congress: (1) From Senator Kent Conrad,
Senator Byron Dorgan, and Congressman Earl Pomeroy; (2) from
Congressman James Oberstar, Chairman, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, and Congressman Bennie Thompson, Chairman, House
Committee on Homeland Security; and (3) from Congressman Adam Schiff.
FRA also received comments from the AAR and APTA, which represent
freight and passenger railroads, respectively, as well as comments from
Caltrans and the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain),
which are involved in providing passenger rail service. The BLET and
UTU submitted comments on behalf of the railroad employees whom they
represent. In addition, FRA received comments from rail car
manufacturers Bombardier and Colorado Railcar Manufacturing (CRM), as
well as from the firm of Raul V. Bravo + Associates, Inc. (RVB). FRA
also received comments from other interested parties: the American
Association for Justice (AAJ), formerly known as the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America, and the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC). All Aboard Washington (AAWA), an advocacy
organization for promoting

rail service in the Pacific Northwest, and a private citizen also
commented on the NPRM. At about the same time as the written comment
period closed on October 1, 2007, management of DOT rulemaking dockets
was transitioning from DOT to the Federal Docket Management System at
http://www.regulations.gov. This transition led to some delay in the
posting of comments to the Web site; however, FRA has considered all
such comments in preparing this final rule.
    FRA notes that Congressman Adam Schiff made a request that FRA hold
public hearings to receive oral comment on the NPRM in Los Angeles or
Glendale, CA, so that those who have a ``deeply-felt'' concern for rail
safety could be heard. As stated in a January 30, 2008 letter to
Congressman Schiff, FRA discussed this request with the Congressman's
staff and was informed that the Congressman had decided to reserve his
request that FRA convene public hearings on the NPRM. (A copy of this
letter has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.) No
public hearing was held in response to the NPRM.
    Throughout the preamble discussion of this final rule, FRA refers
to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by members of
the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC. FRA does so to show the
origin of certain issues and the nature of discussions concerning those
issues at the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA
believes this serves to illuminate factors that it has weighed in
making its regulatory decisions, as well as the logic behind those
decisions. The reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the
full RSAC makes recommendations to FRA and that it is the consensus
recommendation of the full RSAC on which FRA acts. However, as noted
above, FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the
agency exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended
rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly supported, and
is in accordance with policy and legal requirements.

III. Technical Background

    Transporting passengers by rail in the U.S. is very safe. Since the
beginning of 1978, about 12.5 billion passengers have traveled by rail,
based on reports filed monthly with FRA. The number of rail passengers
has steadily increased over the years, and since the year 2000 has
averaged more than 525 million passengers per year. On a passenger-mile
basis, with an average of about 16.1 billion passenger-miles per year
since 2000, rail travel is about as safe as scheduled airline service
and intercity bus transportation, and it is far safer than private
motor vehicle travel. Passenger rail accidents--while always to be
avoided--have a very high passenger survival rate.
    Yet, as in any form of transportation, there are risks inherent in
passenger rail travel. For this reason, FRA continually works to
improve the safety of passenger rail operations. FRA's efforts include
sponsoring the research and development of safety technologies,
providing technical support for industry specifications and standards,
and engaging in cooperative rulemaking efforts with key industry
stakeholders. FRA has focused in particular on enhancing the
crashworthiness of passenger trains.
    In a passenger train collision or derailment, the principal
crashworthiness risks that occupants face are the loss of safe space
inside the train from crushing of the train structure and, as the train
decelerates, the risk of secondary impacts with interior surfaces.
Therefore, the principal goals of the crashworthiness research
sponsored by FRA are twofold: First, to preserve a safe space in which
occupants can ride out the collision or derailment, and, then, to
minimize the physical forces to which occupants are subjected when
impacting surfaces inside a passenger train as the train decelerates.
Though not a part of this final rule, other crashworthiness research
focuses on related issues such as fuel tank safety, for equipment with
a fuel tank, and the associated risk of fire if the fuel tank is
breached during the collision or derailment.
    The results of ongoing research on cab car and MU locomotive front
end frame structures help demonstrate both the effectiveness and the
practicality of the structural enhancements in this final rule to make
this equipment more crashworthy. This research is discussed below,
along with other technical information providing the background for
this rulemaking.

A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service

    FRA's focus on cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness should be
considered in the context of the predominant types of passenger rail
service in North America. The first involves operation of passenger
trains with conventional locomotives in the lead, typically pulling
consists of passenger coaches and other cars such as baggage cars,
dining cars, and sleeping cars. Such trains are common on long-
distance, intercity rail routes operated by Amtrak. On a daily basis,
however, most passenger rail service is provided by commuter railroads,
which typically operate one or both of the two most predominant types
of service: Push-pull service and MU locomotive service.
    Push-pull service is passenger train service typically operated, in
one direction of travel, with a conventional locomotive in the rear of
the train pushing the consist (the ``push mode'') and with a cab car in
the lead position of the train; and, in the opposite direction of
travel, the service is operated with the conventional locomotive in the
lead position of the train pulling the consist (the ``pull mode'') and
with the cab car in the rear of the train. (A cab car is both a
passenger car, in that it has seats for passengers, and a locomotive,
in that it has a control cab from which the engineer can operate the
train.) Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical
lines providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes.
    MU locomotive service is passenger rail service involving trains
consisting of self-propelled electric or diesel MU locomotives. MU
locomotives may operate individually but typically operate semi-
permanently coupled together as a pair or triplet with a control cab at
each end of the consist. During peak commuting hours, multiple pairs or
triplets of MU locomotives, or a combination of both, are typically
operated together as a single passenger train in MU service. This type
of service does not make use of a conventional locomotive as a primary
means of motive power. MU locomotive service is very similar to push-
pull service as operated in the push mode with the cab car in the lead.
    By focusing on enhancements to cab car and MU locomotive
crashworthiness, FRA seeks to enhance the safety of the two most
typical forms of passenger rail service in the U.S.

B. Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

    Structurally, MU locomotives and cab cars built in the same period
are very similar. Both are designed to be occupied by passengers and to
operate as the lead units of passenger trains. The principal
distinction is that cab cars do not have motors to propel themselves.
Unlike MU locomotives and cab cars, conventional locomotives are not
designed to be occupied by passengers--only by operating crewmembers.
Concern has been raised about the safety of cab car-led and MU
locomotive train service due to the closer proximity of the engineer
and

passengers to the leading end of the train than in conventional
locomotive-led service.
    The principal purpose of cab car and MU locomotive front end frame
structures is to provide protection for the engineer and passengers in
the event of a collision where the superstructure of the vehicle is
directly engaged and the underframe is either not engaged or only
indirectly engaged in the collision. In the event of impacts with
objects above the underframe of a cab car or MU locomotive, the end
frame members are the primary source of protection for the engineer and
the passengers. There are various types of cab cars and MU locomotives
in current use. As discussed below, flat-nosed, single-level cab cars
have been used for purposes of FRA-sponsored crashworthiness research.
(The cab cars were originally constructed as MU locomotives but had
their traction motors removed for testing.) Flat-nosed designs are
representative of a large portion of the cab car and MU locomotive
fleet.
    In a typical flat-nosed cab car, the end frame is composed of
several structural elements that act together to resist inward
deformations under load. The base of the end frame structure is
composed of the end/buffer beam, which is directly connected to the
draft sill of the vehicle. For cars that include stepwells, the side
sills of the underframe generally do not directly connect to the end/
buffer beam. There are four major vertical members connected to the
end/buffer beam: two collision posts located approximately at the one-
third points along the length of the beam; and two corner posts located
at the outermost points of the beam. These structural elements are also
connected together through two additional lateral members: a lateral
member/shelf located just below the window frame structure; and an
anti-telescoping plate at the top. The attachment of the end frame
structure to the rest of the vehicle typically occurs at three
locations. The first location is at the draft sill at the level of the
underframe. This is the main connection where a majority of any
longitudinal load applied to the end frame is reacted into the
underframe of the vehicle. There are two other connections at the cant/
roof rail located at each side of the car just below the level of the
roof. When a longitudinal load is applied to the end frame, it is
reacted by the draft sill and the cant rails into the main car body
structure. A schematic of a typical arrangement is depicted in Figure 1
(although not every cab car or MU locomotive necessarily has every
component shown).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08JA10.000

C. Accident History

    In a collision involving the front end of a cab car or an MU
locomotive, it is vitally important that the end frame behaves in a
ductile manner, absorbing some of the collision energy in order to
maintain sufficient space in which the engineer and passengers can ride
out the event. Several collisions have occurred where the
superstructure of a leading cab car has been loaded but the underframe
of the car has not. These collisions demonstrate a need for better
protecting the cab engineer and passengers from external threats. One
example of a collision where the end frame did not effectively absorb
collision energy occurred in Portage, IN, in 1998 when a NICTD train
consisting of MU locomotives struck a tractor-tandem trailer carrying
steel coils that had become immobilized on a grade crossing.\1\ The
leading MU locomotive impacted a steel coil at a point centered on one
of its collision posts, the collision post failed, and the steel coil
penetrated into the interior of the locomotive, resulting in three
fatalities. Little of the collision energy was absorbed by the
collision post, because the post had failed before it could deform in
any significant way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision of
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Train 102 with a
Tractor-Trailer Portage, Indiana, June 18, 1998,'' RAR-99-03, 07/26/
1999. This report is available on the NTSB's Web site at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/RAR9903.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are additional examples of incidents where the end frame of a
cab car or an MU locomotive was engaged during a collision and a loss
of survivable volume ensued due to the failure of end frame structures.
In a collision in Secaucus, NJ, in 1996, a cab car-led New Jersey
Transit Rail Operations (NJTR) train impacted a conventional
locomotive-led NJTR

train.\2\ At the collision interface, the conventional locomotive
pushed in or tore loose the collision and corner posts of the cab car.
The underframe of the cab car was not loaded. The engineers of both
trains and one passenger in the cab car were fatally injured. Also in
1996 in Silver Spring, MD, a collision occurred between a cab car-led
Maryland Area Rail Commuter (MARC) train and a conventional locomotive-
led Amtrak train. In the collision, the front left collision and corner
posts of the cab car were pushed in and torn loose. The underframe of
the cab car was not loaded.\3\ Three crewmembers and eight passengers
on the MARC train were fatally injured as result of the collision and
ensuing fire. Earlier, on January 18, 1993, near Gary, IN, two NICTD
trains collided corner-to-corner on intersecting tracks that shared a
bridge. One of the trains was at rest and the other had a speed
estimated to be 32 mph. The left front corner posts and adjacent car
body sidewall structures were destroyed on the leading MU locomotive of
each train. Seven passengers were fatally injured.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Near Head-On
Collision and Derailment of Two New Jersey Transit Commuter Trains
Near Secaucus, New Jersey, February 9, 1996,'' RAR-97-01, 03/25/
1997. This report is available on the NTSB's Web site at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/RAR9701.pdf.
    \3\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision and
Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC Train 286 and National
Railroad Passenger Corporation AMTRAK Train 29 Near Silver Spring,
Maryland, on February 16, 1996,'' RAR-97-02, 06/17/1997. This report
is available on the NTSB's Web site at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/RAR9702.pdf.
    \4\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision between
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Eastbound Train 7
and Westbound Train 12 Near Gary, Indiana, on January 18, 1993,''
RAR-93-03, 12/7/1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The preceding collisions were used to characterize types of loading
conditions, which led to the development of a simplified, generalized
test scenario, in furtherance of the goal of establishing methods for
measuring the crashworthiness performance of end frame structures and
developing strategies for incrementally improving their survivability
under a range of impact conditions. Although the speeds associated with
certain past events are greater than the speed at which full protection
can currently be provided, and even though enhancements to passenger
train emergency features and other requirements unrelated to
crashworthiness, such as fire safety, may overall do as much or more to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of these types of events, these
collisions do provide indicative loading conditions for developing
structural enhancements that can improve crashworthiness performance.
    FRA also notes that on January 26, 2005, in Glendale, CA, a
collision involving an unoccupied sport utility vehicle (SUV) (that was
intentionally parked on the track by a private citizen), two Metrolink
commuter trains, and a standing freight train resulted in 11 fatalities
and numerous injuries. Eight of the fatalities occurred on a cab car-
led commuter train, which derailed after striking the SUV, causing the
cab car to be guided down a railroad siding, which resulted in an
impact at an approximate speed of 49 mph with the standing freight
train. After the collision with the standing freight train, the rear
end of the lead cab car buckled laterally, obstructing the right-of-way
of an oncoming, conventional locomotive-led commuter train. The rear
end of the cab car raked the side of the conventional locomotive-led
train, which was moving at an approximate speed of 51 mph, crushing
occupied areas of that train. This incident involved enormous
quantities of kinetic energy, and the underframe of the leading cab car
crushed more than 20 feet inward. Because the strength of the end frame
ultimately depends on the strength of the underframe, which failed
here, stronger collision posts and corner posts on the front end of the
leading cab car would have been, in themselves, of little benefit in
absorbing the collision energy. For this reason, as discussed below,
FRA has been exploring other crashworthiness strategies, such as CEM,
to help mitigate the effects of collisions involving higher impact
speeds. Nevertheless, CEM will also require proper end frame
performance in order to function as intended.

D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front End Frame Structures of Cab
Cars and MU Locomotives

    Both the Federal government and the passenger railroad industry
have been working together to improve the crashworthiness of cab cars
and MU locomotives. As noted above, in 1999, after several years of
development and in consultation with a working group comprised of key
industry stakeholders, FRA promulgated the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards final rule. The rule included end frame structure
requirements and additional crashworthiness-related requirements for
cab cars, MU locomotives, and other passenger equipment. In particular,
the final rule provided for strengthened collision posts for new cab
cars and MU locomotives (i.e., those ordered on or after September 8,
2000, or placed in service for the first time on or after September 9,
2002).
    APTA also issued industry standards in 1999, in furtherance of its
initiative to continue the development and maintenance of voluntary
industry standards for the safety of railroad passenger equipment. In
particular, APTA Safety Standard (SS)-C&S-013-99, Standard for Corner
Post Structural Strength for Railroad Passenger Equipment, and SS-C&S-
014-99, Standard for Collision Post Structural Strength for Railroad
Passenger Equipment, included provisions on end frame designs for cab
cars and MU locomotives. (Copies of these standards have been placed in
the public docket for this rulemaking.) Specifically, these APTA
standards included increased industry requirements for the strength of
cab car and MU locomotive vertical end frame members--collision posts
and corner posts. The 1999 APTA standards also included industry
requirements for the deformation of these end frame vertical members,
specifying that they must be able to sustain ``severe deformation''
before failure of the connections to the underframe and roof structures
occurs.
    In January 2000, APTA requested that FRA develop information on the
effectiveness of APTA's then-recently introduced Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices for Rail Passenger Equipment, which included
APTA SS-C&S-013-99 and APTA SS-C&S-014-99, and FRA's then-recently
issued Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule. This review was
intended to look in particular at what increase in crashworthiness was
obtained for cab cars and MU locomotives through the combination of
these standards and regulations. FRA shared APTA's interest and
included full-scale impact tests and associated planning and analysis
activities in its overall research plan to gather this information. FRA
then developed the details of the testing process in conjunction with
APTA's Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Construction
and Structural (C&S) Subcommittee.
    Around this same time, questions arose in the passenger rail
industry in applying the APTA standards for collision posts and corner
posts to new cab cars and MU locomotives. Views differed as to what the
standards actually specified--namely, the meaning of ``severe
deformation'' in the provisions calling for corner and collision posts
to sustain ``severe deformation'' before failure of the posts'
attachments. Consequently, there was not common agreement as to whether

particular designs met the standards. On May 22, 2003, APTA's PRESS
Committee accepted the recommendation of its C&S Subcommittee to
replace these provisions in the standards concerning ``severe
deformation'' with a recommended practice that the corner and collision
post attachments be able to sustain minimum prescribed loads with
negligible deformation. APTA SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 were then
incorporated in their entirety into APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 1,
Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling
Stock. (A copy of APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 1, has been placed in the
public docket for this rulemaking. As discussed below, the latest
revision, Rev. 2, of APTA SS-C&S-034-99 is available on APTA's Web site
at http://www.aptastandards.com/portals/0/PRESS_pdfs/Construcstruct/construcstruct%20reaffirm/APTA%20SS-CS-034-99%20Rev%202-Approved.pdf.
The larger compilation of standards and recommended practices for rail
passenger equipment of which this standard is a part, APTA's Manual of
Standards and Recommended Practices for Rail Passenger Equipment, is
available on APTA's Web site at http://aptastandards.com/PublishedDocuments/PublishedStandards/PRESS/tabid/85/Default.aspx.)
    When the decision to turn the provisions concerning ``severe
deformation'' into a recommended practice was made, ongoing research
from full-scale impact tests was showing that a substantial increase in
cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness could be achieved by
designing the posts to first deform and thereby absorb collision energy
before failing.\5\ As discussed below, in August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S
Subcommittee accepted a revised ``severe deformation'' standard for
collision and corner posts. The standard includes requirements for
minimum energy absorption and maximum deflection. The standard thereby
eliminates a deficiency in the 1999 APTA standards by specifying test
criteria to objectively measure ``severe deformation'' (or large
deformation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Mayville, R., Johnson, K., Tyrell, D., Stringfellow, R.,
``Rail Vehicle Cab Car Collision and Corner Post Designs According
to APTA S-034 Requirements,'' American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Paper No. IMECE2003-44114, November 2003. This document
is available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2003/rail_cw_2003_11.pdf. All of the
published Volpe Center papers and reports on rail equipment
crashworthiness can be found at: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/pubs-crash.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM in this rulemaking was based on APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Rev.
1, and proposed dynamic performance requirements in the alternative to
the quasi-static, large deformation criteria in the APTA Standards. In
response to the NPRM, members of industry disagreed with including
FRA's proposed dynamic performance requirements in the rule and
requested that FRA demonstrate actual compliance with both the quasi-
static and the dynamic large deformation requirements that were
proposed. As detailed below, these tests were performed in the spring
and summer of 2008. FRA has sought to retain the dynamic performance
requirements as an alternative to the quasi-static requirements, in
particular because the dynamic performance requirements facilitate
evaluation of equipment without a flat front-end or traditional corner
or collision posts. After discussion within the Task Force, consensus
was reached on including dynamic performance requirements in appendix F
to part 238 as an alternative to the enhanced collision and corner post
requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.211 and 238.213 of this final rule. As
discussed below, the enhanced requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.211 and
238.213 essentially codify the current APTA standards.

E. Testing of Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

    This section summarizes the work done by FRA and the passenger rail
industry on developing the technical information to support regulations
requiring that corner and collision posts in cab car and MU locomotive
front end frames fail in a controlled manner when overloaded. Due to
the collaborative work of FRA with the passenger rail industry, APTA's
current passenger rail equipment standards include deformation
requirements, which prescribe how these vertical members should perform
when overloaded quasi-statically.
1. FRA-Sponsored Dynamic Testing in 2002
    Two full-scale, grade-crossing impact tests were conducted in June
2002 as part of an ongoing series of FRA-sponsored crashworthiness
tests of passenger rail equipment carried out with the support of the
Volpe Center at FRA's Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo,
CO. The purpose of these two tests was to evaluate incremental
improvements in the crashworthiness performance, in highway-rail grade-
crossing collision scenarios, of modern corner and collision post
designs when compared against the performance of older designs. The
grade-crossing tests were intended to address the concern of occupant
vulnerability to bulk crushing resulting from offset/oblique collisions
where the primary load-resisting-structure is the equipment's end frame
design.
a. Test Article Designs
    Two end frame designs were developed. The first end frame design
was representative of typical designs of passenger rail vehicles in the
1990s prior to 1999. The first end frame design is referred to as the
``1990s design.'' The second end frame design incorporated all the
enhancements required beginning in 1999 by FRA's Passenger Equipment
Safety Standards in part 238 and also recommended beginning in 1999 by
APTA's standards for corner post and collision post structures,
respectively, SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99. The second end frame
design is referred to as the State-of-the-Art (SOA) design. The two end
frame designs developed were then retrofitted onto two Budd Pioneer
passenger rail cars for testing.
    The SOA design differed principally from the 1990s design by having
higher values for static loading of the end frame structure and by
specifically addressing the performance of the collision and corner
posts when overloaded. As noted above, the 1999 APTA standards for cab
car and MU locomotive end frame structures included the following
statement for both corner and collision posts:

    [The] post and its supporting structure shall be designed so
that when it is overloaded * * * failure shall begin as bending or
buckling in the post. The connections of the post to the supporting
structure, and the supporting car body structure, shall support the
post up to its ultimate capacity. The ultimate shear and tensile
strength of the connecting fasteners or welds shall be sufficient to
resist the forces causing the deformation, so that shear and tensile
failure of the fasteners or welds shall not occur, even with severe
deformation of the post and its connecting and supporting structural
elements.

(See paragraph 4.1 of APTA SS-C&S-013-99, and paragraph 3.1 of APTA SS-
C&S-014-99.) Although the term ``severe deformation'' was not
specifically defined in the APTA standards, discussions with APTA
technical staff led to specifying ``severe deformation'' in the SOA
design as a horizontal crush of the corner and collisions posts for a
distance equal to the posts' depth. Some failure of the parent material
in the posts was allowable, but no failure would be

allowed in the welded connections, as the integrity of the welded
connections prevents complete separation of the posts from their
connections.
    An additional difference in the designs was the exclusion of the
stepwells for the SOA design, to allow for extended side sills from the
body bolster to the end/buffer beam. By bringing the side sills forward
to support the end/buffer beam directly at the corners, the end/buffer
beam can be developed to a size similar to the one for the 1990s
design. In fact, recent cab car procurements have provided for
elimination of the stepwells at the ends of the cars.
    As compared to the 1990s design, the SOA design had the following
enhancements: more substantial corner posts; a bulkhead sheet
connecting the collision and corner posts, extending from the floor to
the transverse member connecting the posts; and a longer side sill that
extended along the engineer's compartment to the end beam, removing the
presence of a stepwell. In addition to changes in the cross-sectional
sizes and thickness of some structural members, another change in the
SOA design was associated with the connection details for the corner
posts. In comparison to the corner posts, the collision posts of both
the 1990s and SOA designs penetrated both the top and bottom flanges of
both the end/buffer beam and the anti-telescoping plate. This was based
upon typical practice in the early 1990s for the 1990s design, and a
provision in the APTA standard for the SOA design. Yet, the corner
posts differed in that the corner posts for the 1990s design did not
penetrate both the top and bottom flanges of the end/buffer and anti-
telescoping beams, while those in the SOA design did. The SOA design
therefore had a significantly stiffer connection that was better able
to resist torsional loads transferred to the anti-telescoping plate.
b. Dynamic Impact Testing
    As noted, two full-scale, grade-crossing impact tests were
conducted in June 2002. In each test a single cab car impacted a
40,000-pound steel coil resting on a frangible table at a nominal speed
of 14 mph. The steel coil was situated such that it impacted the corner
post above the cab car's end sill. The principal difference between the
two tests involved the end frame design tested: In one test, the cab
car was fitted with the 1990s end frame design; in the other, the cab
car was fitted with the SOA end frame design.
    Prior to the tests, the crush behaviors of the cars and their
dynamic responses were simulated with car crush and collision dynamics
models. The car crush model was used to determine the force/crush
characteristics of the corner posts, as well as their modes of
deformation.\6\ The collision dynamics model was used to predict the
extent of crush of the corner posts as a function of impact velocity,
as well as predict the three-dimensional accelerations, velocities, and
displacements of the cars and coil.\7\ Pre-test analyses of the models
were used in determining the initial test conditions and
instrumentation test requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J., ``Rail-Car Impact
Tests with Steel Coil: Car Crush,'' American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1656, April 2003. This document is
available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2003/rail_cw_2003_4.pdf.
    \7\ Jacobsen, K., Tyrell, D., Perlman, A.B., ``Rail Car Impact
Tests with Steel Coil: Collision Dynamics,'' American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1655, April 2003. This
document is available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2003/rail_cw_2003_3.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The impact speed of approximately 14 mph for both tests was chosen
so that there would be significant intrusion (more than 12 inches) into
the engineer's cab in the test of the 1990s design, and limited
intrusion (less than 12 inches) in the test of the SOA design. This 12-
inch deformation metric was chosen to demarcate the amount of intrusion
that would leave sufficient space for the engineer to ride out the
collision safely.
    During the full-scale test of the 1990s design, the impact force
transmitted to the end structure exceeded the corner post's predicted
strength, and the corner post separated from its upper attachment. Upon
impact, the corner post began to hinge near the contact point with the
coil; subsequently, tearing at the upper connection occurred. The
intensity of the impact ultimately resulted in the failure of the upper
connection of the corner post to the anti-telescoping plate. More than
30 inches of deformation occurred and the survivable space for the
engineer was lost.
    By contrast, during the test of the SOA end frame design, the
corner post remained attached. The maximum rearward deformation
measured was approximately 9 inches. The results of this test showed
that the SOA end frame design is sufficient to prevent the engineer
from being crushed in such an impact.
c. Analysis
    The SOA design performed very closely to pre-test predictions made
by the finite element and collision dynamics models. See Figure 2,
below. As noted, the SOA design crushed approximately 9 inches in the
longitudinal direction.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08JA10.001

    Pre-test analyses for the 1990s design using the car crush model
and collision dynamics model were in close agreement with the
measurements taken during the actual testing of the cab car end frame
built to this design. The pre-test analyses also nearly overlay the
test results for the force/crush characteristic of the SOA design. As a
result, FRA believes that both sets of models are capable of predicting
the modes of structural deformation and the total amount of energy
consumed during a collision. Careful application of finite-element
modeling allows accurate prediction of the crush behavior of rail car
structures.
    Both the methodologies used to design the cab car end frames and
the results of the tests show that significant increases in rail
passenger equipment crashworthiness can be achieved if greater
consideration is given to the manner in which structural elements
deform when overloaded. Modern methods of analysis can accurately
predict structural crush (severe deformation) and consequently can be
used with confidence to develop structures that collapse in a
controlled manner. Modern testing techniques allow the verification of
the crush behavior of such structures.
2. Industry-Sponsored Quasi-Static Testing in 2001
    While FRA's full-scale, dynamic testing program was being planned
and conducted with input from key industry representatives, several
passenger railroads were incorporating in procurement specifications
the then-newly promulgated Federal regulations and industry standards
issued in 1999. Specifically, both LIRR and Metro-North had contracted
with Bombardier for the development of a new MU locomotive design, the
M7 series. Bombardier conducted a series of qualifying quasi-static
tests on a mock-up, front-end structure of an M7, including a severe
deformation test of the collision post. In addition to the severe
deformation test, the other end frame members were also tested
elastically at the enhanced loads specified in the APTA standards. The
severe deformation qualification test was conducted on February 20,
2001.
a. Test Article Design
    The mock-up test article was developed for the front end of an M7
cab car. The first 19.25 feet of the car was fabricated with great
fidelity between the car's body bolster and the extreme most forward
end. The mock-up contained all structural elements, but did not contain
the corner post rub plates, the plymetal floor, any interior finishing,
windows, doors, bonnet, or similar components.
b. Quasi-Static Testing
    Load was applied at incrementally increasing levels with hydraulic
jacks while being measured by load cells at the rear of the
longitudinal end frame members. Initially, the elastic limit was
determined for the post, and then the large deformation test was
conducted. The test was stopped, for safety considerations, prior to
full separation of the collision post with the end/buffer beam.
    The maximum deflection in the collision post before yielding
occurred at a position 42 inches above the end beam, near the top of
the plates used to reinforce the collision post. The plastic shape the
collision post acquired during testing was `V'-shaped, with a plastic
hinge occurring at 42 inches above the end beam. Some cracking and
material failure occurred at the connection of the post with the end
beam. The anti-telescoping plate was pulled down roughly three inches,
and load was shed to the corner post via the shelf member and the
bulkhead sheet. The shape that

the collision post experienced was very similar to what was observed
from the dynamic testing of the SOA corner post, as discussed above.
c. Analysis
    Under FRA sponsorship, the Volpe Center, with cooperation from
Bombardier, conducted non-linear, large deformation analyses to
evaluate the performance of the cab car corner and collision posts of
the SOA end frame design and the Bombardier M7 design under dynamic
test conditions. One of the purposes of this research was to determine
whether the level of crashworthiness demonstrated by the SOA prototype
design could actually be achieved by a general production design--here,
the M7 design. Pre-test analysis predictions of the dynamic performance
of the SOA corner post closely matched test measurements.\8\ A similar
analysis of the corner post was performed on the M7 design, and the
results compared closely with the SOA design test and analysis results.
Overall, the crashworthiness performance of the collision posts of the
SOA and M7 designs were found to be essentially the same, and the M7
corner post design was even found to perform better than the SOA corner
post design. This latter difference in performance was attributable to
the sidewall support in the M7 design, which was not present in the SOA
design.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J. Brassard, J., ``Review
of Severe Deformation Recommended Practice Through Analyses--
Comparison of Two Cab Car End Frame Designs,'' American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. RTD2005-70043, March 2005. This
document is available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2005/rail_cw_2005_03.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Having established the fidelity of the models and modeling
approach, a number of comparative simulations were conducted of both
the SOA end frame and the M7 end frame under both dynamic and quasi-
static test conditions to assess the equivalency of the two different
tests for demonstrating compliance with the severe deformation
criteria. For both sets of tests, the modes of deformation were very
similar at the same extent of longitudinal displacement, and the
locations where material failure occurred were also similar. In
addition, the predicted force-crush characteristics showed reasonable
agreement within the repeatability of the tests. Figure 3, below, shows
a comparison of the deformation mode for the M7's collision post, as
observed from the quasi-static testing that was conducted and as
predicted for the dynamic loading condition.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08JA10.002

3. FRA-Sponsored Dynamic and Quasi-Static Testing in 2008
    In 2008, a full-scale dynamic test and two quasi-static tests were
performed on the posts of an SOA end frame. These tests were designed
to evaluate the dynamic and quasi-static methods for demonstrating
energy absorption of the collision and corner posts. The tests focused
on the collision and corner posts individually because of their
critical positions in protecting the engineer and passengers in a
collision where only the superstructure, not the underframe, is loaded.
a. Test Article Design
    The SOA design was originally developed for the Budd Pioneer car
for the 2002 dynamic impact testing. For the testing in 2008, only a
Budd M1 car was available, so the design had to be modified to fit a
Budd M1. The design

of an end frame for retrofit onto the cab end of a Budd Pioneer car was
modified to account for differences between the two car designs. In
addition, reinforcements to the M1 car body and connections from the
end frame to the car body were designed and fabricated.
    The design of the SOA end frame itself required only a few
modifications to adapt to the M1 car body. Due to the rounded nature of
the M1 car body as compared to the Pioneer car body, the lateral extent
of the anti-telescoping beam was changed slightly so that it extended
beyond the corner post by 1.5 inches, as compared to 1.0 inches for the
Pioneer car.
b. Dynamic Testing of a Collision Post
    For this test, a 14,000-pound cart impacted a standing car at a
speed of 18.7 mph. The cart had a rigid coil shape mounted on the
leading end that concentrated the impact load on the car's collision
post. The test was conducted against the NPRM's proposed requirements
for protecting the engineer's space--namely, that there be no more than
10 inches of permanent, longitudinal deformation and none of the
attachments of any of the structural members separate.
    During the test, the collision post deformed approximately 7.4
inches and absorbed approximately 138,000 foot-pounds of energy. The
attachment between the post and the anti-telescoping beam remained
intact. The connection between the post and the buffer beam did not
completely separate; however, the forward flange and both side webs
fractured. The post itself did not completely fail. There was material
failure in the back and the sides of the post at the impact location.
Overall, the end frame was successful in absorbing energy and
preserving space for the engineer and the passengers. Figure 4 depicts
three deformation states from the dynamic test: initial contact of the
crash cart with the end frame, the greatest intrusion of the end frame,
and the final deformation state.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08JA10.003

c. Quasi-Static Testing of Collision and Corner Posts
    A quasi-static collision post test was run to compare the quasi-
static and the dynamic performance requirements proposed in the NPRM
and to demonstrate the efficacy of the quasi-static test method. The
NPRM proposed that the collision post absorb at least 135,000 foot-
pounds of energy in no more than 10 inches of longitudinal, permanent
deformation. Load was applied with the same fixture for the dynamic
test. This fixture had a diameter of 48 inches and a width of 36
inches. The fixture was made of a thick, stiff material and reinforced
so that it did not deform or absorb energy. Longitudinal string
potentiometers at several locations recorded the deformation of the
post. Four load cells, connected in parallel, measured the load being
applied into the post. The force and the displacement were cross-
plotted and the integral was used to calculate the energy absorbed
during the test.
    The test car was coupled to a reaction car. As the load from the
hydraulic ram was introduced to the car through the collision post, it
was reacted through the couplers. The mode of deformation in the quasi-
static collision post test was very similar to the mode of deformation
seen in the dynamic collision post test. The collision post pulled down
on the anti-telescoping beam. The post was loaded past 15 inches of
deformation and did eventually fail completely in the middle. The
collision post fractured as it separated from the buffer beam. After 11
inches of crush, the post had absorbed 110,000 foot-pounds of energy.
Based on the unloading characteristic measured during the test, 11
inches of crush is approximately equal to 10 inches of permanent
deformation. Since the collision post and end frame were supposed to
absorb 135,000 foot-pounds of energy in 10 inches of permanent
deformation, but only absorbed 110,000 foot-pounds of energy for that
distance, the test article did not pass the test requirements.
    Design details warranted a closer look in determining why the test
was unsuccessful. The specimens taken at the location of the fracture
revealed that an internal gusset on the post coincided with an exterior
shelf tab. The gusset locations were within specification for these
posts. However, there is some flexibility with the location of the
gusset relative to the location to the shelf tab. In both the dynamic
and quasi-static tests, the fracture occurred at the location of both
the gusset and the shelf welds. The rigid gusset did not allow the post
to oval as it deformed, causing the fracture at the back of the post.
    Attention turned to conducting a test of the corner post. The NPRM
proposed that the corner post absorb at least 120,000 foot-pounds of
energy with no more than 10 inches of permanent, longitudinal
deformation. The same fixture was used for this test as for the
collision post testing. The fixture was centered on the corner post. In
response to the results of the quasi-static test of the collision post,
the shelf was redesigned so that the tab was removed and the depth of
the shelf was decreased. This reduced the number of welds at the corner
and back of the post. However, because the corner post was not designed
with internal gussets, gusset design details did not need to be
addressed.

    In the quasi-static corner post test, the end frame deformed as
expected and absorbed energy while deforming. The anti-telescoping beam
was pulled down significantly and the shelf and bulkhead were deformed.
The connection between the corner post and the buffer beam fractured,
but the post did not separate completely. Also, the connection between
the shelf and the post fractured, but the post itself did not fracture.
The post and end frame absorbed 136,000 foot-pounds of energy in 11
inches of crush. After elastic recoil, 11 inches of crush is the
equivalent of 10 inches of permanent deformation; thus, the test was
successful.
    The testing program demonstrated repeatable methods for assessing
the energy-absorbing capability of end frame structures. These methods
include both dynamic and quasi-static tests where energy absorption and
permanent deformation are used as limiting criteria. The tests also
show the improved crashworthiness of the SOA design.
d. Analysis
    Analysis is a crucial part of conducting a full-scale test. Based
on the results of the 2002 full-scale dynamic test in which a heavy
steel coil impacted the corner post of an SOA end frame design, some
fracture was expected in certain key end frame components during the
2008 tests. For this reason, a material failure model, based on the
Bao-Wierzbicki fracture criterion, was implemented in the finite
element model of the car end frame using ABAQUS/Explicit. The finite
element model with material failure was used to assess the effect of
fracture on the deformation behavior of car end structures during
quasi-static loading and dynamic impact and, in particular, the ability
of such structures to absorb energy.
    The material failure model was implemented in ABAQUS/Explicit for
use with shell elements. A series of preliminary calculations was first
conducted to assess the effects of element type and mesh refinement on
the deformation and fracture behavior of structures similar to those
found on cab car and MU locomotive end frames, and to demonstrate that
the Bao-Wierzbicki failure model can be effectively applied using shell
elements.
    Model parameters were validated through comparison to the results
of the 2002 testing. Material strength and failure parameters were
derived from test data for A710 steel. The model was then used to
simulate the three full-scale tests that were conducted during 2008 as
part of the FRA program--dynamic impact testing of a collision post,
and quasi-static load testing of a collision post and a corner post.
Analysis of the results of the two collision post tests revealed the
need for revisions to both the design of some key end frame components
and to key material failure parameters. Using the revised model, pre-
test predictions for the outcome of the corner post test were found to
be in very good agreement with the actual test results.
    Overall, the results of the tests in comparison with their pretest
analyses show that, at this time, actual testing is necessary to
demonstrate performance. However, as modeling methods improve and are
shown to predict failure and energy absorption more accurately, there
is the potential that use of analysis alone will in the future be
acceptable for demonstrating crashworthiness performance.

F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements

    As discussed above, APTA's initial ``severe deformation'' standard
for corner and collision posts, published in 1999, did not contain
specific methodologies or criteria for demonstrating compliance with
the standard. Consequently, the dynamic tests performed by FRA and the
Volpe Center, static tests performed by members of the rail industry,
and analyses conducted by the Volpe Center and its contractors all
helped to develop the base of information needed to identify the types
of analyses and test methodologies to use. Further, evaluation of the
test data, with the analyses providing a supporting framework, allowed
development of appropriate criteria to demonstrate compliance.
    The principal criteria developed involve energy absorption through
end frame deformation and the maximum amount of that deformation. As
shown by FRA and industry testing, energy can be imparted to
conventional flat-nosed cab cars and MU locomotives either dynamically
or quasi-statically. As shown by Volpe Center analyses, currently
available engineering tools can be used to predict the results of such
tests. Given the complexity of such analyses, and commensurate
uncertainties, there is a benefit to maintaining dynamic testing as an
alternative for evaluating compliance with any ``severe deformation''
standard.
    There are tradeoffs between quasi-static and dynamic testing of cab
car and MU locomotive end frames. Both sets of tests prescribe a
minimum amount of energy for end frame deformation. However, the manner
in which the energy is applied is different, and the setup of the two
types of tests is different. As demonstrated by the tests conducted by
Bombardier, quasi-static tests can be conducted by rail equipment
manufacturers at their own facilities. Dynamic tests require a segment
of railroad track with appropriate wayside facilities; there are few
such test tracks available. Nevertheless, dynamic tests do not require
detailed knowledge of the car structure to be tested, and allow for a
wide range of structural designs. Quasi-static tests require intimate
knowledge of the structure being tested, to assure appropriate support
and loading conditions, and development of quasi-static test protocols
requires assumptions about the layout of the structure, confining
structural designs. In addition, dynamic tests more closely approximate
accident conditions than quasi-static tests do.
    In August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S Subcommittee accepted a revised
``severe deformation'' standard for collision and corner posts. The
standard includes requirements for minimum energy absorption and
maximum deflection. The form of the standard is largely based on the
testing done by Bombardier, and therefore is quasi-static. The standard
eliminates a deficiency of the 1999 standard by specifying test
criteria to objectively measure ``severe deformation.'' The standard
can be readily applied to conventional flat-nosed cab cars and MU
locomotives but is more difficult to apply to shaped-nosed cab cars and
MU locomotives or those with CEM designs, or both.
    In addition, APTA as well as several equipment manufacturers have
expressed an interest in maintaining the presence of a stairwell on the
side of the cab car or MU locomotive opposite from where the locomotive
engineer is situated. This feature enables multi-level boarding from
both low and higher platforms. As such, FRA and the APTA PRESS C&S
Subcommittee worked together to develop language associated with
providing a safety equivalent to the requirements stipulated for cab
car and MU locomotive corner posts in terms of energy absorption and
end frame deformation. The Subcommittee agreed that for this
arrangement there is sufficient protection afforded by the presence of
two corner posts (an end corner post ahead of the stepwell and an
internal corner post behind the stepwell) that are situated in front of
the occupied space. The load requirements stipulated for such posts
differ in that the longitudinal requirements are not equal to the
transverse requirements.

This in effect changes the shape of these posts so that they are not
equal in both width and height. For the end corner post ahead of the
stepwell, the longitudinal loading requirements are smaller than the
transverse ones. The opposite is true for the corner post behind the
stepwell. It was agreed to allow for the combined contribution of both
sets of corner posts, together, to provide an equivalent level of
protection to that required for corner posts in standard cab car and MU
locomotive configurations. See the discussion in the Section-by-Section
Analysis on the structural requirements for cab cars and MU locomotives
with a stairwell located on the side of the equipment opposite from
where the locomotive engineer controls the train.

G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front End Frame Structures
of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

    Research has shown that passenger rail equipment crashworthiness in
train-to-train collisions can be significantly increased if the
equipment structure is engineered to crush in a controlled manner. One
manner of doing so is to design sacrificial crush zones into unoccupied
locations in the equipment. These zones are designed to crush
gracefully, with a lower initial force and increased average force.
With such crush zones, energy absorption is shared by multiple cars
during the collision, consequently helping to preserve the integrity of
the occupied areas. While developed principally to protect occupants in
train-to-train collisions, such crush zones can also potentially
significantly increase crashworthiness in highway-rail grade-crossing
collisions.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Tyrell, D.C., Perlman, A.B., ``Evaluation of Rail Passenger
Equipment Crashworthiness Strategies,'' Transportation Research
Record 1825, pp. 8-14, National Academy Press, 2003. This document
is available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2003/rail_cw_2003_12.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The approach of including crush zones in passenger rail equipment
is termed CEM, and it extends from current, conventional practice.
Current practice for passenger equipment operated at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph (i.e., Tier I passenger equipment under part 238)
requires that the equipment be able to support large loads without
permanent deformation or failure, but does not specifically address how
the equipment behaves when it crushes. CEM prescribes that car
structures crush in a controlled manner when overloaded and absorb
collision energy. In fact, for passenger equipment operating at speeds
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph (i.e., Tier II passenger
equipment under part 238), the equipment must be designed with a CEM
system to dissipate kinetic energy during a collision, see Sec.
238.403, and Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets were designed with a CEM
system complying with this requirement.
    FRA notes that Metrolink is in the process of procuring a new fleet
of cars utilizing CEM technology. As part of its response to the
Glendale, CA train incident on January 26, 2005, Metrolink determined
that CEM design specifications should be included in this planned
procurement, and, in coordination with APTA, approached FRA and FTA to
draft such specifications. In turn, FRA and FTA formed the ad hoc Crash
Energy Management Working Group in May 2005. This working group
included government engineers and participants from the rail industry,
including passenger railroads, suppliers, labor organizations, and
industry consultants, many of whom also participated in the
Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force. The working group developed a
detailed technical specification for crush zones in passenger cars for
Metrolink to include in its procurement specification, as well as for
other passenger railroads to include in future procurements of their
own. Metrolink released its specification as part of an invitation for
bid, and then awarded the contract to manufacture the equipment to
Rotem, a division of Hyundai, now Hyundai Rotem Company (Rotem).
    Rotem has developed a shaped-nose, CEM design for new Metrolink cab
cars. Because of the shaped-nose, it is more difficult to engineer
structural members identifiable as full-height collision posts and
corner posts that extend from the underframe to the cantrail or
roofline at the front end, as specified in the current APTA standard.
Consequently, to meet the APTA standard, Rotem has to locate the
collision and corner posts inboard of the crush zone, rather than place
them at the extreme front end of the cab car. Further, as currently
written, the APTA quasi-static standard does not expressly take into
account the energy-absorption capability of the crush zone, even if the
crush zone would likely be engaged in a grade-crossing impact. Although
the APTA standard acknowledges the use of shaped-nose and CEM designs,
there remains uncertainty in the standard associated with demonstration
of compliance by such designs. (The APTA standard does provide that on
cars with CEM designs, compliance may be demonstrated either through
analysis or testing as agreed to by the vehicle builder and purchaser,
but no test methodology or criteria are provided.)
    Dynamic performance criteria place fewer constraints on the layout
of the cab car or MU locomotive end structure and allow the energy-
absorption capability of the crush zone(s) to be expressly taken into
account in the design of the collision and corner post structures. As
noted, this final rule allows for the application of dynamic
performance requirements for collision and corner post structures of
cab cars and MU locomotives. FRA believes that the results of the
crashworthiness research discussed above provide strong support for
including dynamic performance requirements as alternatives to the
quasi-static requirements for collision and post requirements in this
rule, and that it is particularly necessary to address what FRA
believes will be a growing number of cab cars and MU locomotives
utilizing CEM designs.

H. European Standard EN 15227 FCD, Crashworthiness Requirements for
Railway Vehicle Bodies

    In the NPRM, FRA discussed that then-preliminary European standard
prEN 15227 FCD, Crashworthiness Requirements for Railway Vehicle
Bodies, included four collision scenarios. This standard is no longer
preliminary and is consequently referred to throughout this document as
EN 15227, without the preliminary ``pr'' designation. Collision
Scenario 3 of the European standard involves a ``train unit front end
impact with a large road vehicle on a level crossing.'' The standard
requires commuter and intercity trains to be able to sustain an impact
with a deformable object weighing 33 kips (15,000 kg) at a speed up to
68 mph (110 kph). Calibration tests on components and numerical
simulations of the scenario are recommended for showing compliance.
    FRA has noted key differences between the European standard and the
dynamic testing collision scenarios that FRA proposed for both
collision posts and corner posts, below, including the amount of energy
involved and the character of the object. Assuming that the mass of the
train is more than about 25 times as great as the mass of the object
(in that the mass of the train roughly corresponds to the mass of a
commuter train made up of a cab car, four coaches, and a locomotive; or
made up of six MU locomotives), then the total energy dissipated in an
EN 15227 Collision Scenario 3-impact is 5.0 million foot-pounds. The
total energy absorbed in the collision scenarios included in this final
rule are 135,000

foot-pounds for the collision post and 120,000 foot-pounds for the
corner post. However, in the European standard, the impacted object is
deformable and potentially absorbs a significant amount of the
available energy; in the collision scenarios included in this final
rule, the object is rigid, and virtually all of the energy is absorbed
by the cab car or MU locomotive.
    A recent paper describes the performance of the SOA end frame in
both the FRA and the EN grade-crossing collision scenarios.\10\
Specifically, testing and analysis of the SOA end frame's performance
in appendix F's collision post test scenario was compared to an
analysis of the SOA end frame's performance in EN15227's Collision
Scenario 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Llana, P., ``Structural Crashworthiness Standards
Comparison: Grade-Crossing Collision Scenarios,'' American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. RTDF2009-18030, October, 2009.
This document is available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2009/09-18030.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 1
    Table 1 summarizes a few key crashworthiness parameters and results
from the testing and analysis conducted. Application of the FRA
scenario involved only one car; whereas the EN 15227 scenario involved
a complete consist or train unit. The difference in weight of one car,
80 kips, versus that of a complete consist, 767 kips, was an order of
magnitude. In the FRA scenario, the 14-kip impact object was tested
striking the car at 19 mph, resulting in 170 ft-kips of initial kinetic
energy. Whereas in the EN 15227 scenario, the 767-kip consist was
analyzed striking the deformable lorry at 53 mph, resulting in 72,000
ft-kips of initial kinetic energy. The difference in the amount of
initial kinetic energy involved between the two scenarios was two
orders of magnitude. Similarly, the impacting objects were quite
different. As noted earlier, the FRA scenario provides for a rigid
impact object; whereas in the EN 15227 scenario, the impact object is
deformable. In the FRA scenario, this resulted in the energy being
mostly absorbed by the impacted collision post, with virtually no
energy absorbed by the impact object. Whereas in the EN 15227 scenario,
both the first car and the impact object absorbed large amounts of
energy, with very little energy absorbed by one collision post.

  Table 1--Comparison of SOA End Frame Performance Applying Appendix F
        Collision Post Standard and EN 15227 Collision Scenario 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Application of EN
                                 Application of        15227 collision
          Parameter           Appendix F collision       scenario 3
                                  post standard         specification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Train...............  Single car: 80 kips.  Complete train unit:
                                                     767 kips.
Impact Object...............  Rigid cart: 14 kips.  Deformable lorry: 33
                                                     kips.
Impact Speed................  19 mph (cart).......  53 mph (consist).
Initial Kinetic Energy......  170 ft-kips.........  72,000 ft-kips.
Energy Absorbed.............  End frame: 138 ft-    Leading car: 1370 ft-
                               kips; Cart: ~0;       kips; Lorry: 950 ft-
                               Collision post: 105   kips; Collision
                               ft-kips.              post: 89 ft-kips.
Pass/Fail Criteria..........  Intrusion <= 10 in.,  Preserve survival
                               no separation.        spaces, mean
                                                     deceleration <
                                                     7.5g.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the table shows in summary form, the key parameters of these two
scenarios are very different, though they are both grade-crossing
collision scenarios involving rail vehicles with impact objects.
Additionally, comparing the complexity of the analysis required for
each scenario, application of the FRA scenario is simpler to analyze.
In analyzing the FRA scenario, fewer vehicles are involved, initial
kinetic energy is lower, deformations are less, and the deformations
that result are virtually all in the car and not the impact object.
    Overall, FRA believes that the following conclusions can be drawn
about the standards in appendix F and those specified in EN 15227's
Collision Scenario 3. The appendix F standards concentrate the load on
a single post, above the underframe; can be applied to both CEM and
non-CEM equipment; and can potentially be used to demonstrate
compliance either through analysis or testing. The EN 15227 grade-
crossing collision specification distributes the load across the entire
end structure; imparts a significant amount of load in the underframe
and roof structure; assumes the use of CEM equipment; and can be used
to demonstrate compliance through analysis only. Moreover, FRA believes
that its dynamic collision scenario is not only easier to analyze, but
easier to test than the EN 15227 scenario and imparts more energy to
the impacted post than in the EN 15227 scenario.

IV. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions

    As noted above, FRA received written comments on the NPRM from
representatives of government; various organizations, including
railroad labor; railroads; railroad car manufacturers; railroad
engineering firms; and as well as private citizens. The comments can
principally be divided into two groups: comments of a technical nature
affecting the substance of the requirements proposed, and comments as
to the preemptive effect of the requirements proposed. FRA found that
these groupings serve the organization of this final rule, even though
some comments do not fit neatly into either grouping. Please note that
certain comments are not discussed in either of these two groupings;
instead, they are discussed directly in the Section-by-Section Analysis
or in the Regulatory Impact and Notices portion of this final rule.

A. Technical Comments

    This section contains the discussion of technical comments on the
NPRM, as well as comments closely associated with these technical
comments. FRA has endeavored to group the comments together by issue to
the extent possible, rather than by commenter. Please note that the
order in which the comments are discussed, whether by issue or by
commenter, is not intended to reflect the significance of the comment
raised or the standing of the commenter.
    Please also note that following the submission of these written
comments, FRA convened the Task Force and Working Group to consider and
discuss the comments and to help achieve consensus on recommendations
for this final rule. As a result, certain of these comments have been
superseded by changes made in the rule text from the NPRM to this final
rule, and they should not necessarily be understood to reflect the
positions of the commenters with

respect to the requirements of the final rule. Nevertheless, FRA is
setting out all of the comments received and is responding to each of
them here so that FRA's positions are clearly understood.
1. Crash Energy Management
    Caltrans raised concern with FRA's mention of CEM designs in the
NPRM, believing that no rail equipment that features a CEM design has
been built, that including CEM in the preamble implied that the NPRM
included a CEM requirement, and that the implication that CEM designs
may provide for a higher level of safety would expose those railroads
not employing CEM designs to litigation for not selecting the ``safer''
design as identified by FRA.
    FRA notes that Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets use CEM, and CEM is
used in European and other vehicles. FRA does believe that, all other
things being equal, CEM designs are superior in crashworthiness to
conventional designs. Yet, as FRA stated in the preamble to the NPRM,
FRA's recognition that fuller application of CEM technologies to cab
cars and MU locomotives could enhance their safety would not nullify
the preemptive effect of the standards arising from the rulemaking. FRA
continually strives to enhance railroad safety, has an active research
program focused on doing so, and sets safety standards that it believes
are necessary and appropriate for the time that they are issued with a
view to amending those standards as circumstances change. FRA has
imposed, and will continue to impose, the requirements that it deems
necessary for the safe operation of cab cars and MU locomotives in all
of the configurations in which they will be operated. FRA is not
requiring CEM in this final rule.
    RVB also raised concerns with the NPRM for its application to CEM
designs. RVB asked why the ``static strength'' requirements had to be
met if the CEM requirements for energy absorption are met. RVB stated
that the required amount of energy can be absorbed by CEM structures
using considerably smaller collision and corner posts.
    FRA understands that there are potential alternative arrangements
using CEM that may place the end frame structure outboard of the crush
elements or behind the crush elements. If the end frame is situated
outboard of the crush elements (or crash energy absorbers), then the
end frame will likely serve as the means for assuring planar
introduction of the load into the crush elements, allowing them to
react in a progressive, controlled collapse. To accomplish this energy
transfer to the crush elements, the end frame must be very rigid, which
can make meeting the severe deformation requirements for the end frame
more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, as long as the system of
structural and CEM elements protecting the occupied volume performs
well under the dynamic performance requirements provided in appendix F
of this final rule, FRA is confident that sufficient protection is
provided to passengers and crewmembers alike. For end frame members
inboard of the crush elements, it is likely that they will serve as the
reaction points for the crush elements. As in the case of end frame
members outboard of the crush elements, to support the load introduced
by the crush elements the end frame may have to be very rigid. As a
result, meeting the severe deformation requirements for the end frame
may also be more difficult to achieve. Yet, again, as long as the
system of structural and CEM elements protecting the occupied volume
performs well under the dynamic performance requirements provided in
appendix F of this final rule, FRA is confident that the system
provides sufficient protection for passengers and crewmembers.
    Additionally, FRA would like to make clear that the energy-
absorption requirements in this rulemaking should not be confused with
energy absorption as part of a CEM approach. While inclusion of energy-
absorption requirements is consistent with FRA's approach to
incrementally build on traditional crashworthiness requirements, and
whereas CEM is an advanced crashworthiness approach, FRA did not intend
that the energy-absorption requirements in this rulemaking be
considered part of a CEM approach. Instead, FRA's inclusion of energy-
absorption requirements in this rulemaking is intended to address
traditional cab car and MU locomotive designs that have very strong
underframes with relatively weaker superstructures, for which it is
vitally important to provide protection to crewmembers and passengers
in the event that the superstructure is impacted. FRA is incorporating
mature technology and design practice to extend from linear-elastic
requirements to elastic-plastic requirements together with descriptions
of allowable deformations without complete failure of the system.
    RVB additionally commented that in the NPRM the collision and
corner posts must be designed for yield strength in the case where the
posts are behind the CEM structure and used as support for the CEM
structure. RVB believed that this proposed requirement conflicted with
the allowance in the NPRM for the posts to resist loads up to their
ultimate strength. RVB believed that, by requiring yield strength in
such case, the ultimate strength of the post would be much greater than
the amount specified.
    FRA understands the complexities introduced by using a CEM design
that behaves significantly differently than a conventional cab car or
an MU locomotive because of its crush zone(s). This is one of the
reasons FRA proposed the option to test such designs dynamically, and
one of the reasons why FRA has included alternative, dynamic
performance requirements in this final rule. FRA has modified the
dynamic performance requirements in the final rule from those proposed
in the NPRM, and FRA believes that these modifications will help to
address concerns with applying the requirements to CEM designs.
    RVB also commented that since, by definition, a CEM system requires
a structure that facilitates controlled collapse of the crush zone(s),
the proposal would result in a much higher load imparted to the
underframe than by the 800,000-pound compression load requirement,
exceeding the yield strength of the structure. RVB claimed that this
was another area of significant over-design that was unaddressed in the
NPRM. RVB added that by disallowing correction of static strength
requirements as they are taken up by CEM systems, a vehicle would be
heavier than it needs to be, use more energy to operate, and exert more
force on wheels and rails that would increase maintenance costs for
equipment and track.
    FRA believes that the commenter is incorrect in its assertions. FRA
agrees that for CEM designs the overall average load that the structure
must resist may exceed 800,000 pounds. However, this load is typically
spread over a significantly larger area than just the line of draft of
the vehicle, as specified for vehicles not utilizing CEM designs.
Because the capacity of a vehicle incorporating a CEM design to resist
compression loads elastically may be taken into account, FRA does not
believe that this will result in over-design of the vehicle. In
addition, FRA wishes to dispel the belief that a heavier vehicle would
be necessary to meet the requirements proposed in the NPRM and those
contained in this final rule. Crashworthiness features from clean-sheet
designs can occupy the same space as other material and not weigh in
excess of the structure(s) being replaced. There is considerable leeway
in

designing such systems so that no additional weight is required.
Moreover, the vehicle body structure itself typically accounts for only
between 25 to 35 percent of the final weight of a vehicle, which
minimizes the significance of any weight added to the vehicle to comply
with the requirements of this final rule.
    RVB further commented that one means of recognizing a CEM vehicle
addressing the static end strength requirements would be for this part
238 to specify the minimum amount of energy that must be absorbed by
each end of a vehicle in a train in a specified collision scenario.
According to RVB, dynamic testing of the entire crush zone or testing
of the critical crush zone elements, in conjunction with suitable
analysis, would be required to confirm compliance, and acceptance
criteria would include verification that (i) the required minimum
energy has been absorbed, (ii) the occupied volume is not compromised,
and (iii) climbing/telescoping does not occur under the collision
scenario. For a CEM vehicle, RVB believed that this should be in place
of the specific strength requirements for the collision and corner
posts, and allow evaluation of the car ends as a system.
    FRA recognizes the possibilities raised by the commenter. FRA
intends to work with the APTA PRESS C&S Subcommittee to consolidate
knowledge gained from the Metrolink CEM design effort to support
development of such criteria. Inclusion of such criteria in this part
238 would be the subject of a separate rulemaking activity, however,
and such criteria are not included in this final rule.
    RVB additionally commented that the NPRM suggested that a
manufacturer with a CEM system may choose to conduct two dynamic tests
instead of conducting quasi-static tests on the individual components.
RVB believed the practical situation is that the structure needed to
support the CEM system would almost certainly meet the quasi-static
requirements proposed in the NPRM. According to RVB, if a dynamic test
were to be conducted for a CEM system, it would seem to serve the
public better to conduct a dynamic test that verifies the performance
of the entire CEM system, not just for how it protects against a steel
coil.
    As noted above, FRA plans on working with the industry to address
the issue of more comprehensive requirements for CEM systems. However,
with regard to specific application of the requirements of this final
rule, a dynamic test of a CEM structural system as contemplated by the
commenter may not in itself demonstrate that the superstructure has the
strength to protect against the collision scenarios addressed in this
rulemaking. In such a dynamic test of a CEM structural system, the
entire end structure of the vehicle would potentially absorb all of the
collision load. Yet, this final rule specifically targets grade-
crossing collision scenarios where only portions of the superstructure
are loaded. It is therefore believed that analysis and component
testing, not a full-scale test alone, would be necessary to verify the
design of a complete CEM system.
    In its comments, RVB stated that the NPRM introduced requirements
that would make manufacturers design to the actual strength of some
components rather than rely on the yield stress as a measure of
strength. RVB believed that this approach is sensible, particularly as
CEM systems are introduced, in that such systems rely on controlled
(plastic) deformation and operation at the maximum strength (load)
capacity of structural members in collisions. Nevertheless, RVB
believed that there are still numerous transportation requirements that
are based on yield strength and that these impose constraints on the
design of CEM members that may not be sensible, including the anti-
climbing arrangement and the collision and corner post load cases for
application points well above the underframe. According to RVB, FRA
should consider moving to a true strength approach for all components
as it stated is being done in much of the structural engineering
community.
    FRA notes that the commenter is focused on CEM systems for which
the rule will probably not be applied for some time, and, if sooner,
for systems FRA would have to review individually because such systems
are sufficiently different from conventional designs. The requirements
based on yield strength work well for non-CEM designs and facilitate
their testing and use.
    RVB also commented on FRA's statement in the NPRM that an energy-
absorption requirement of 5 megajoules (MJ) will effectively prevent a
cab car from being used in the lead position for Tier II equipment. RVB
believed that this magnitude of energy absorption is feasible for cab
cars.
    FRA recognizes that advancements have been made in the ability of
CEM systems to absorb energy. However, FRA continues to believe that
for operational speeds in excess of 125 mph, as a rule of general
applicability for our nation's railroads, no passengers should be
allowed in the lead vehicle. Tier II passenger equipment can operate at
speeds where the amount of energy required to be dissipated is too
large for any vehicle design to survive a direct impact. Yet, with use
of advanced system designs such as Positive Train Control (PTC) and
CEM, the risk may potentially be minimized, and FRA would consider such
cases individually in the context of the particular environment in
which the equipment would operate.
    In its comments on the NPRM, Caltrain stated that it would be far
more appropriate for FRA to define a risk assessment methodology and
prescriptions for addressing risk, letting designers provide
alternatives such as CEM that deliver the required performance.
Caltrain asked why a collision post inboard of a CEM system would be
required to resist the same load as a collision post where there is no
CEM system. Caltrain stated that presumably the load would be reduced
as the CEM system performs its function, so that a substantially
lighter collision post could be used to protect the passenger space, if
the CEM system does not otherwise eliminate altogether the need for an
interior collision post. Caltrain believed that if it is the intent of
FRA to provide this level of flexibility, FRA should make this clear.
    It is indeed FRA's intent to provide flexibility for vehicle
designs with CEM features. In the final rule, FRA has added appendix F
to part 238 to provide dynamic performance requirements as alternatives
to both the collision and corner post quasi-static requirements. These
dynamic performance requirements specify the performance of the end
frame, were prepared with CEM designs in mind, and provide the designer
leeway in choosing how that performance will be achieved. Nonetheless,
FRA is not defining a risk assessment methodology and prescriptions for
addressing risk, as an alternative to the collision and corner post
quasi-static requirements. FRA believes that appendix F to part 238
provides the flexibility needed while assuring safety with more
certainty than by performance of a risk assessment alone.
2. Dynamic Performance Requirements
    FRA received a number of comments on its proposal to include
dynamic performance requirements as an option to demonstrate compliance
with the severe deformation requirements for collision and corner
posts. In addition to inviting general comment on the proposal, FRA
invited specific comment on the dynamic testing collision scenarios
included in the proposed rule, including suggestions for any
alternative

collision scenario or way to address possible future designs. FRA also
invited specific comment whether this final rule should provide for all
cab cars and MU locomotives to be tested dynamically to demonstrate
compliance--whether or not they have a shaped-nosed design or a CEM
design--and, if so, whether the collision scenarios included in the
proposed rule are appropriate or whether another collision scenario
would be.
    CPUC supported FRA's intent to allow full-scale crash testing as an
alternative to quasi-static testing to determine the crashworthiness of
a prototype cab car or MU locomotive. APTA expressed support for FRA's
approach to bring the Federal structural requirements for cab cars and
MU locomotives up to current industry standards, including quasi-static
tests with specific pass/fail requirements to demonstrate the ability
of collision and corner posts to undergo severe deformations prior to
failure. (APTA did advise that FRA make sure to reference in the
preamble and section-by-section analysis APTA's most current industry
standard, APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 2--not Rev. 1.) APTA appreciated
FRA's concern that future vehicles utilizing CEM designs may require
different treatment in Federal structural regulations than those with
traditional flat-nosed designs. However, APTA had several concerns
about including the proposed dynamic test option to accommodate such
designs in the final rule. Noting that FRA has conducted an extensive
full-scale collision test program to gain confidence in predictive,
finite element analysis models and to support development of industry
standards and rulemaking, APTA believed that FRA should not include a
dynamic test scenario in the regulation unless and until similar
testing supports it. APTA urged FRA to conduct appropriate testing and
defer inclusion of dynamic testing in the regulation, even as an
option, until those test results are available and validate the model.
    As discussed in the ``Technical Background'' portion of this
preamble, the testing described by APTA has been completed. In 2008 a
full-scale dynamic test and two full-scale quasi-static tests were
performed on the posts of an SOA end frame. These tests were designed
to evaluate the dynamic and quasi-static methods for demonstrating
energy absorption by--and graceful deformation of--the collision and
corner posts. FRA believes that these tests support inclusion of the
quasi-static and dynamic performance requirements of this final rule
and address APTA's concerns.
    APTA also mentioned that in the NPRM FRA stated that alternative,
dynamic performance requirements are necessary because shaped-nose
designs may not have readily identifiable, full-height corner and
collision posts. APTA stated that, although FRA referred to the CRM and
Rotem designs as potential examples of shaped-nose designs, both these
designs include easily identifiable, full-height collision and corner
posts behind the shaped nose. According to APTA, all evidence points to
having collision and corner posts up to their full height as key design
features to protect the engineer and passengers from front-end
collisions.
    FRA believes that the dynamic performance requirements in this
final rule allow in particular for innovative designs that protect the
occupied volume for its full height, even without what would be
identified as full-height collision and corner posts. Whether or not
the Rotem and CRM designs have full-height collision and corner post
structures does not address FRA's underlying concern that the
requirements in this final rule would otherwise be too restrictive
without the alternative standards based on dynamic testing. For
instance, the Stadler Rail equipment procured by the Capital
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (CMTA) in Austin, TX, has no
readily identifiable collision or corner post structures and yet has
been found to behave well under analysis using the dynamic performance
requirements in this final rule. By not allowing for such design
innovation, potential use of alternative designs that could demonstrate
compliance would be unnecessarily restricted.
    Further, APTA questioned the safety implications of allowing such
key features as full-height collision and corner posts to be optional.
APTA stated that all the full-scale testing done by FRA, all the model-
validation testing, and all the knowledge gained of how the end frame
performs in collisions pertain to equipment with these design features.
Until such safety implications are better understood, APTA believed the
inclusion of alternative, dynamic performance requirements to be
premature. Overall, APTA was not convinced that the proper foundation
has been established for adding these dynamic performance requirements
to the final rule, nor was APTA convinced that a single dynamic test
demonstrates full equivalency for the range of protections provided by
traditional full-height collision and corner posts.
    As provided in the final rule, FRA makes clear that the occupied
volume must be protected for its full height, utilizing either the
quasi-static or the dynamic performance requirements. FRA expects that
for traditional flat-nosed designs, the occupied volume will be
protected for its full height by means of full-height collision and
corner posts. Yet, for other designs, this protection of the occupied
volume for its full height could be achieved by the performance of the
entire end frame acting together to prevent intrusion and absorb
energy. FRA believes that there are many potential ways of providing
protection for the full height of the occupied volume, and this is
reflected in the final rule.
    In its comments on the NPRM, RVB stated that use in dynamic testing
of a proxy object that is essentially a steel coil has a historical
basis resulting from only a few accidents. RVB believed that the
European approach of using a proxy vehicle would be more sensible and
that it was not clear why FRA would resist adopting aspects of that
approach that are in widespread use in Europe and other countries.
    As discussed earlier, FRA notes that use of a proxy object that
deforms (a deformable lorry, e.g.) adds undue complexity to the
analysis of impacts. In addition, development of a proxy object with a
repeatable crush response is, in itself, a daunting task, and the cost
of developing such an object for each car manufacturer is not cost
beneficial. Nevertheless, FRA has modified from the NPRM the manner in
which the dynamic testing is conducted, to address related concerns
about use of the proxy object. Further, FRA believes that the grade-
crossing collision scenarios on which the dynamic testing is based
challenges the end frame members in a way that can clearly demonstrate
the ability of the end frame to resist significant impact loads.
    RVB also commented that it was unclear why FRA decided to position
the proxy object 19 inches from the car center in the collision post
dynamic test. RVB stated that not all collision posts are located 19
inches from the centerline, and believed it would seem better to center
the proxy object at the post itself.
    FRA notes that the location of the collision posts is dictated by
the need to place the posts at the one-third points laterally, along
the end of the vehicle. With this in mind, positioning the proxy object
19 inches from the car center is intended to engage the end frame where
the collision post structure will be. Nevertheless, because the
alternative, dynamic performance requirements

more fully test the end frame as an integrated whole rather than as
individual structural elements, and are not intended to test the
strength of an individual element quasi-statically, it is not necessary
to specify that the impact be centered on the collision post structure.
    RVB further commented that the NPRM seemed to impose essentially
the same energy-absorption requirements on both the collision and the
corner posts in the alternative, dynamic performance requirements, and
RVB was unclear if this was FRA's intent. RVB claimed that there is
practically no difference between the 20 and 21 mph impact speeds that
were proposed for the dynamic performance requirements, asserting that
the target speeds used for actual testing would need to be higher than
these values to ensure that the speeds are achieved.
    FRA notes that in conducting a dynamic test there are alternative
means of imparting impact energy into the front end of the cab car or
MU locomotive. Speed is only one of the elements that make up impact
energy. FRA has taken this fact into account in preparing the final
rule and restated the dynamic performance requirements in terms of the
amount of collision energy imparted. No specific test speeds are
stated. Yet, the amount of collision energy is specific for each test
of the two types of post structures, and each amount of collision
energy was carefully chosen based upon input from industry
stakeholders. FRA makes clear that it is not necessary to impart higher
levels of energy than specified in this final rule to assure that the
requirements are met. Of course, these requirements are minimum
standards and may be exceeded by the manufacturer.
    Additionally, RVB commented that the top of the deformable anti-
climber of the FRA CEM-design is approximately 24 inches above the top
of the underframe. RVB believed that an impact with a circular proxy
object centered 30 inches above the top of the underframe, as proposed
in the NPRM, could result in a ramp and alter the trajectory of the
object in an undesirable manner. As a result, RVB believed it unclear
how much energy would actually be imparted as intended to the
structural elements, and that it may not be prudent to conduct a
dynamic test in this manner for such a design to demonstrate its
compliance.
    FRA notes that the FRA CEM-design is intended to act as a complete
system so that even if a ramp were to form on the deformable anti-
climber, the end frame structure would be able to resist intrusion by
the proxy object into the occupied space of the vehicle. The deformable
anti-climber can absorb a significant amount of energy prior to
bottoming out even when loaded in an offset manner. Nevertheless, to
minimize the potential for off-axis rotations, FRA has reconsidered use
of the standing proxy object specified in the NPRM to be struck by a
moving cab car or MU locomotive, and has specified instead use of a
proxy object connected to a moving crash cart to strike a standing cab
car or MU locomotive.
    In its comments on the NPRM, Caltrain raised concern with the
testing performed by FRA to validate the effectiveness of the proposed
collision and corner post requirements. Caltrain stated that the 1998
NICTD grade-crossing accident in Portage, IN, was recreated with a
40,000-pound steel coil at an impact test speed of 14 mph. Caltrain
stated that the test speed used to recreate this accident was far lower
than in most grade-crossing accidents, and that the test did not
actually compare the proposed design to one that was compliant with
part 238. Caltrain believed that data from a higher-speed test, using
equipment that is compliant with part 238, would be more useful in
evaluating potential solutions.
    As discussed earlier, the SOA design is compliant with part 238 and
has been tested. Further, the test cited by the commenter was carefully
designed to overload only the structure of interest, and was not
intended to replicate the actual collision speed. Moreover, FRA
emphasizes that in this rulemaking the agency is taking an incremental
approach to improving safety by enhancing the current end frame design
of cab cars and MU locomotives. As noted, FRA is separately exploring
the application of CEM to provide protection against even higher speed
events.
    In its comments on the NPRM, Caltrans stated that any dynamic
testing requirement, even as an option, should be founded in actual
testing and validation of the variables and proposed design criteria.
Caltrans mentioned that although FRA has conducted tests that simulate
a collision with a highway vehicle carrying a roll of coiled steel, the
actual tests as conducted had significantly lower impact speeds and
greater allowable deformation requirements. Caltrans maintained that
until a real-time crash test has been conducted and analyzed by FRA
that uses identical testing variables, inclusion of a standard for
dynamic testing of end frame designs is premature.
    FRA notes that the energy involved in the earlier testing
supporting the NPRM was in fact equivalent to that proposed in the
NPRM. Nevertheless, additional dynamic testing has been performed in
support of the requirements in this final rule. Specifically, as
discussed in the ``Technical Background'' section, a dynamic test was
successfully conducted on April 16, 2008, and the dynamic performance
requirements in this final rule are based on the actual test conditions
and amount of collision energy imparted.
    Caltrans also commented that FRA needs to clarify whether full-
height collision and corner post tests are required if the alternative,
dynamic performance requirements are used, and if not, whether FRA has
performed a structural analysis showing that safety may be maintained
in the absence of full-height posts. Caltrans cited FRA's statement
that dynamic testing is essential as an option for validating car
designs that feature non-flat front ends. Yet, Caltrans believed that
current car designs that feature non-flat front ends, CRM's diesel MU
locomotive and Metrolink's new Rotem cab car, both feature full-height
collision and corner posts.
    FRA makes clear that the fact that testing collision and corner
posts dynamically is provided as an alternative in the final rule does
not mean that protecting the full height of the occupied volume is
optional under such circumstances. For traditional end frame designs
(i.e., flat-nosed designs) tested dynamically, full-height collision
and corner posts are certainly not optional. Yet, FRA believes that the
rule must continue to allow flexibility for other design approaches
that may use different shapes and structures to protect the full height
of the occupied volume. For example, FRA notes that novel designs may
effectively prevent intrusion into the occupied volume through
application of the concept of deflection--to deflect objects away from
the vehicle. For such design approaches, full-height collision and
corner posts are not necessarily required, provided, of course, that
the occupied volume is nonetheless protected for its full height. FRA
has conducted analysis to show that safety can be maintained in the
absence of full-height collision and corner posts. Manufacturers
attempting to meet the requirements of this final rule must perform the
detailed structural analyses to show that safety is maintained in the
absence of these structures.
    In its comments on the NPRM, Bombardier raised a number of concerns
with the proposal to include an option for a dynamic method of
demonstrating compliance with the proposed severe-

deformation requirements for collision and corner posts. Bombardier
believed the proposal to be contrary to the recommendation of the Task
Force in developing the NPRM. Bombardier stated that it supported the
general industry consensus that such dynamic performance requirements
should not be included as an option, contending that the proposed
dynamic tests were impractical, had not been fully validated, did not
adequately test a realistic production design end structure, raised
safety concerns, and would be costly. FRA will address each comment in
turn.
    Bombardier stated that due to the significantly higher static load
design requirements for collision posts (compared to corner posts),
collision posts would be much more substantial in size and strength