[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 230 (Friday, November 29, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 71785-71816]
[FR Doc No: 2013-27731]

Vol. 78

Friday,

No. 230

November 29, 2013

Part III

Department of Transportation

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 Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Parts 238 and 239

Passenger Train Emergency Systems II; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 230 / Friday, November 29, 2013 /
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 238 and 239

[Docket No. FRA-2009-0119, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AC22

Passenger Train Emergency Systems II

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule is intended to further the safety of passenger
train occupants through both enhancements and additions to FRA's
existing requirements for emergency systems on passenger trains. In
this final rule, FRA is adding requirements for emergency passage
through vestibule and other interior passageway doors and enhancing
emergency egress and rescue access signage requirements. FRA is also
establishing requirements for low-location emergency exit path markings
to assist occupants in reaching and operating emergency exits,
particularly under conditions of limited visibility. Further, FRA is
adding standards to ensure that emergency lighting systems are provided
in all passenger cars, and FRA is enhancing requirements for the
survivability of emergency lighting systems in new passenger cars.
Finally, FRA is clarifying requirements for participation in debriefing
and critique sessions following emergency situations and full-scale
simulations.

DATES: This final rule is effective January 28, 2014. The incorporation
by reference of certain publications listed in the rule is approved by
the Director of the Federal Register as of January 28, 2014. Petitions
for reconsideration must be received on or before January 28, 2014.
Comments in response to petitions for reconsideration must be received
on or before March 14, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions for reconsideration
related to Docket No. FRA-2009-0119, Notice No. 2, may be submitted by
any of the following methods:
     Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for
submitting comments, to include petitions for reconsideration.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all petitions and comments received will be
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act
information related to any submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents, any
petition for reconsideration submitted, or comments received, go to
http://www.regulations.gov at any time or visit the Docket Management
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room W12-140 on the ground
level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Masci, Trial Attorney, Office
of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., RCC-12, Mail Stop
10, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>); Michael Hunter,
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-
0368); or Brenda Moscoso, Director, Office of Safety Analysis, Office
of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., RRS-20, Mail Stop
25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Abbreviations Frequently Used in This Document

CFR Code of Federal Regulations
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
U.S.C. United States Code

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. History
    A. Statutory Background
    B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Equipment Safety
Rulemaking Mandate
    C. Tasking of Passenger Safety Issues to the Railroad Safety
Advisory Committee
    D. 2008 Passenger Train Emergency Systems Final Rule
    E. Passenger Train Emergency Systems II Rulemaking
III. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions
IV. Technical Background and General Overview of Final Rule
Requirements
    A. Doors
    B. Identification of Emergency Systems
    C. Emergency Lighting
    D. Marking and Instructions for Emergency Egress and Rescue
Access
    E. Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking
    F. Photoluminescent Marking Materials
    G. Emergency Communications
    H. Debriefing and Critique Session Following Emergency
Situations and Full-Scale Simulations
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
    A. Amendments to Part 238, Subparts B, C, and E
    B. Amendments to Part 239, Subpart B
VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, and DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Trade Impact
    H. Privacy Act

I. Executive Summary

    Having considered the public comments in response to FRA's January
3, 2012, proposed rule on passenger train emergency systems, see 77 FR
153, FRA issues this final rule amending the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards, 49 CFR part 238, and the Passenger Train Emergency
Preparedness regulations, 49 CFR part 239. This rule establishes
enhanced or new requirements related to the following subject areas:
doors, emergency lighting, markings and instruction for emergency
egress and rescue access, emergency communication, low-location
emergency exit path markings, and debriefing and critique of emergency
situations and simulations. As part of these amendments, FRA is
incorporating by reference three American Public Transportation
Association (APTA) standards for passenger train emergency systems. A
brief overview of the final rule is provided below, organized by
subject area:

Door Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Systems

    This rule as it relates to vestibule doors (and other interior
passageway doors) requires such doors in new passenger cars to be
fitted with a removable panel or removable window for use in accessing
and exiting the passenger compartment through the vestibule in the
event that the vestibule door is inoperable. Additionally, FRA is
establishing distinct requirements for bi-parting vestibule doors (and
other bi-parting, interior passageway doors),

including provisions for a manual override and retention mechanisms.
For security reasons, an exception is included to allow railroads
discretion when deciding whether to include a removable panel or
removable window in a door leading to a cab compartment. This rule also
sets forth requirements for the inspection, testing, reporting, and
repairing of the door safety mechanisms.

Emergency Lighting

    This rule establishes requirements for minimum emergency light
illumination levels within all passenger cars, supplementing
requirements that have applied generally to new passenger cars. The
rule also provides standards for the number and placement of power
sources for the emergency lighting system in newer cars and specifies
requirements for testing lighting fixtures and power sources that are
part of the emergency lighting system for all cars.
    Emergency lighting power sources that include batteries located
under passenger cars may not be reliable following a collision or
derailment due to their location. This rule helps to ensure that in
both new and certain existing passenger cars these essential back-up
power sources are able to function as intended by requiring that the
batteries are located in the passenger compartment, where they are
better protected.

Emergency Communications

    This rule makes clear that public address (PA) and intercom systems
on newer passenger cars are required to have back-up power to remain
operational for at least 90 minutes when the primary power source
fails. This rule also establishes more specific requirements for the
luminescent material used to mark intercoms, enhancing regulations that
have required the location of each intercom to be clearly marked with
luminescent material.

Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Markings and Instructions

    This rule enhances current signage requirements by specifying
requirements for signage recognition, design, location, size, color and
contrast, and materials used for emergency exits and rescue access
locations. This additional detail helps to ensure that emergency egress
points and systems can be easily identified and operated by passengers
and train crewmembers needing to evacuate a passenger car during an
emergency. The enhancements also help to ensure that emergency response
personnel can easily identify rescue access points and then facilitate
their access to the passenger car. This rule establishes more
comprehensive requirements for marking emergency roof access locations
and providing instructions for their use to facilitate emergency
responder access to passenger cars.

Photoluminescent Materials

    Specifically, the rule enhances requirements related to the use of
high-performance photoluminescent (HPPL) material, i.e., a
photoluminescent material that is capable of emitting light at a very
high rate and for an extended period of time, as well as policies and
procedures for ensuring proper placement and testing of
photoluminescent materials. These revisions are intended to help ensure
greater visibility of signage and markings in an emergency situation so
that train occupants can identify emergency exits and the path to the
nearest exit in conditions of limited visibility, which include, but
are not limited to conditions when all lighting fails, or when smoke is
present in the passenger car. Existing emergency egress signage inside
some passenger compartment areas within passenger cars has been
ineffective due to its inability to absorb sufficient levels of ambient
or electrical light. The requirements in this rule improve the
conspicuity of signage and markings in the passenger compartment, and
thus increase the discernability of the exit signs and markings.

Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking (LLEEPM)

    This rule establishes minimum requirements for photoluminescent and
electrically-powered LLEEPM systems to provide visual guidance for
passengers and train crewmembers when the emergency lighting system has
failed or when smoke conditions obscure overhead emergency lighting.
The rule also requires railroads to conduct periodic inspections and
tests to verify that all LLEEPM system components, including power
sources, function as intended.

Debriefing and Critique

    FRA is modifying the existing debriefing and critique requirements
to clarify that passenger train personnel who have first-hand knowledge
of an emergency involving a passenger train are intended to participate
in a debriefing and critique session after the emergency, or an
emergency simulation, occurs.

Economic Impact

    FRA has assessed the cost to railroads that is expected to result
from the implementation of this rule. For the 20-year period analyzed,
the estimated quantified cost that will be imposed on industry totals
$21.8 million, with a present value (PV, 7 percent) of $13.4 million.

                       20-Year Cost for Final Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Door Removable Panels or Windows, and Bi-Parting Doors..      $4,399,223
Emergency Lighting......................................       2,450,213
Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Marking and                 4,730,631
 Instructions...........................................
Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Markings...............       1,377,615
Debriefing and Critique.................................             N/A
Inspection, Testing, and Recordkeeping..................         405,296
                                                         ---------------
  Total.................................................     $13,362,979
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Dollars are discounted at a present value rate of 7 percent.

    This rule is expected to improve railroad safety by promoting the
safe resolution of emergency situations involving passenger trains,
including the evacuation of passengers and crewmembers in the event of
an emergency. The primary benefits include a heightened safety
environment for egress from a passenger train and rescue access by
emergency response personnel after an accident or other emergency. This
corresponds to a reduction of casualties and fatalities in the
aftermath of collisions, derailments, and other emergency situations.
FRA believes the value of the anticipated safety benefits will justify
the cost of implementing this rule.

II. History

A. Statutory Background

    In September 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary)
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the
initiatives arising from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary
announced that DOT would begin developing safety standards for rail
passenger equipment over a five-year period. In November 1994, Congress
adopted the Secretary's schedule for implementing rail passenger
equipment safety regulations and included it in the Federal Railroad
Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Public Law 103-440, 108
Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). Congress also authorized the
Secretary to consult with various organizations

involved in passenger train operations for purposes of prescribing and
amending these regulations, as well as issuing orders pursuant to them.
Section 215 of the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133).

B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Equipment Safety Rulemaking
Mandate

    On May 4, 1998, pursuant to Section 215 of the Act, FRA published
the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness (PTEP) final rule. See 63 FR
24629. This rule contains minimum Federal safety standards for the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains,
including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail
service. Elements of the required emergency preparedness plan include:
communication; employee training and qualification; joint operations;
tunnel safety; liaison with emergency responders; on-board emergency
equipment; and passenger safety information. The rule also established
specific requirements for passenger train emergency systems. The
requirements include: Conspicuous marking of all emergency window exits
with luminescent material on the interior, along with instructions
provided for their use, and marking on the exterior of all windows
intended for rescue access by emergency responders with retroreflective
material, along with instructions provided for their use; lighting or
marking of all door exits intended for egress on the interior along
with instructions for their use; and marking of all door exits intended
for rescue access by emergency responders, on the exterior along with
providing instructions for their use. In addition, the rule contains
specific requirements for participation in debrief and critique
sessions following emergency situations and full-scale simulations.
    On May 12, 1999, FRA published the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards (PESS) final rule. See 64 FR 25540. The rule established
comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. The
standards established various requirements for emergency systems,
including requirements for the size, location, and operation of
exterior side doors used for emergency egress or access for all
passenger cars and for emergency lighting for new passenger cars. After
publication of the PESS final rule, interested parties filed petitions
seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the
rule. These petitions generally related to the following subject areas:
Structural design; location of emergency exit windows; fire safety;
training; inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of
defective equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues
together and published three sets of amendments to the final rule in
2000 and 2002. See 65 FR 41284; 67 FR 19970; and 67 FR 42892.

C. Tasking of Passenger Safety Issues to the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee

    While FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be
addressed following the completion of additional research, the
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of
industry standards, or all three. FRA decided to address these issues
with the assistance of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC).
FRA established the RSAC in March 1996, and it serves as a forum for
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety
program issues. The RSAC includes representation from all of the
agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations,
suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties. A list of
member groups follows:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO);
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO);
American Chemistry Council;
American Petroleum Institute;
APTA;
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA);
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
Association of American Railroads (AAR);
Association of Railway Museums (ARM);
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
Chlorine Institute;
Federal Transit Administration (FTA);*
Fertilizer Institute;
High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA);
Institute of Makers of Explosives;
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA);*
League of Railway Industry Women;*
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
National Association of Railway Business Women;*
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association;
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);*
Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
Safe Travel America (STA);
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte (Mexico);*
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
Tourist Railway Association Inc.;
Transport Canada;*
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC);
Transportation Security Administration;* and
United Transportation Union (UTU).
    * Indicates associate membership. (Please see 77 FR 156 for
additional discussion of the RSAC process.)

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented the RSAC with the task of reviewing
existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending
consideration of specific actions that could be useful in advancing the
safety of rail passenger service. In turn, the RSAC accepted the task
and established the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to
handle the task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to
consider. Members of the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the
following:

AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company, CSX
Transportation, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
APRCO;
AASHTO;
Amtrak;
APTA, including members from: Bombardier, Inc., Herzog Transit
Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology Inc., Long Island Rail Road
(LIRR), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North),
Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra),
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
BLET;
BRS;
FTA;
HSGTA;
IBEW;
NARP;
NTSB;
RSI;
SMWIA;
STA;
TCIU/BRC;
TWU; and
UTU.
    The Working Group met 14 times between September 9, 2003, and
September 16, 2010. Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the
Working Group meetings and

contributed to the technical discussions. See 77 FR 157. Due to the
variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting, the Working
Group established four task forces: Emergency Systems, Vehicle/Track
Interaction, Crashworthiness/Glazing, and Mechanical. Each task force
was formed as a smaller group to develop recommendations on specific
issues within each group's particular area of expertise. Members of the
Emergency Systems Task Force (Task Force), in addition to FRA, include
(or have included) the following:

Amtrak;
APTA, including members from Bombardier, Ellcon National, Go
Transit, Interfleet Technology, Inc, Jacobs Civil Engineering,
Jessup Manufacturing Company, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LIRR, LTK,
Luminator, Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern
Indiana Commuter Transit District (NICTD), SEPTA, San Diego Northern
Commuter Railroad (Coaster), Permalight, Po's Ability USA, Inc.,
Prolink, Transit Design Group (TDG),Transit Safety Management (TSM),
Translite, STV Inc., and Visual Marking Systems, Inc.;
BLET;
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
FTA;
NARP;
RSI, including Globe Transportation Graphics;
TWU; and
UTU.

    Representatives from TSA, of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), while an advisory member and not a voting member of the
Task Force, attended certain meetings and contributed to the
discussions of the Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center
attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical
discussions through their comments and presentations and by setting up
various lighting, marking, and signage demonstrations.
    The Task Force held 17 meetings between February 25, 2004, and
March 31, 2009. Associated with these meetings were site visits where
FRA met with representatives of Metrolink, MBTA, Amtrak, LIRR, Coaster,
SEPTA, and Caltrans, respectively, and toured their passenger
equipment. See 77 FR 157-158. The visits were open to all members of
the Task Force (and Working Group) and included a demonstration of
emergency system features. As in the case of Working Group visits to
Metra and the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority, FRA
believes they have added to the collective understanding of RSAC
members in identifying and addressing passenger train safety issues for
not only this rulemaking, but for other RSAC initiatives as well.

D. 2008 Passenger Train Emergency Systems Final Rule

    With the RSAC's assistance, FRA published a final rule on Passenger
Train Emergency Systems (PTES) on February 1, 2008. See 73 FR 6370. The
rule addressed a number of concerns raised and issues discussed during
the various Task Force and Working Group meetings, and was a product of
the RSAC's consensus recommendations. The rule expanded the
applicability of requirements for PA systems to all passenger cars, and
also expanded the applicability of requirements for intercom systems
and emergency responder roof access to all new passenger cars. Further,
the rule enhanced requirements for emergency window exits and
established requirements for rescue access windows used by emergency
responders. See 73 FR 6370.

E. Passenger Train Emergency Systems II Rulemaking

    To address additional concerns raised, and issues discussed, during
the various Task Force and Working Group meetings, FRA initiated the
Passenger Train Emergency Systems II (PTES II) rulemaking. In addition
to clarifying the nature of participation in debriefing and critique of
emergency situations and full-scale simulations, the purpose of the
rulemaking was to address the following emergency systems: door
emergency egress and rescue access, emergency lighting, marking and
instruction for emergency egress and access, emergency communication,
and low-location emergency exit path markings. The Working Group
reached full consensus on recommendations related to these emergency
systems and issues at its December 11, 2007 meeting. The Working Group
presented its consensus recommendations to the full RSAC body for
concurrence at its meeting on February 20, 2008. All of the members of
the full RSAC body in attendance at that February 2008 meeting accepted
the regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group. Thus,
the Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC body's
recommendations to FRA. FRA subsequently met with the Task Force twice
after that to make some non-substantive technical clarifications and
review technical research findings related to potential enhancements of
emergency systems. A Tier II sub-task force also met to discuss the
requirements affecting Tier II equipment, i.e., passenger equipment
operating at speeds in excess of 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph.
This sub-task force did not recommend any changes to the
recommendation. After reviewing the full RSAC body's recommendations,
FRA agreed that the recommendations provided a sound basis for a rule
and adopted the recommendations with generally minor changes for
purposes of clarity and Federal Register formatting. On January 3,
2012, FRA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and opened
the comment period. 77 FR 154.

III. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions

    FRA received nine comments in response to the NPRM during the
comment period from the following parties: Metra, Caltrans, NTSB, City
of Seattle, students from the Quinnipiac University School of Law (the
Students), and four individual commenters. FRA appreciated and
carefully considered all comments. The comments generally raised issues
related to doors, emergency lighting, emergency markings, and
instructions for emergency egress and rescue access. FRA also received
comments that were outside the scope of this rule. The final rule text
differs from the proposed rule in part because of the concerns raised
by Metra in relation to the emergency lighting requirement. Please note
that the order in which the comments are discussed in this document is
not intended to reflect the significance of the comment raised or the
standing of the commenter.
    Please also note that following the issuance of the NPRM and the
close of the comment period, as part of improvements to the APTA
Standards Program, APTA comprehensively changed the numbering
nomenclature for its standards, including the standards FRA proposed to
incorporate by reference in this rule. However, these nomenclature
changes do not affect the substantive content or the revision histories
of the standards FRA proposed to incorporate in this rule. Accordingly,
in this final rule FRA has updated the numbering nomenclature of these
APTA standards as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Standard title                      Previous standard No.                 New standard No.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard for Emergency Lighting System    SS-E-013-99.......................  PR-E-S-013-99
 Design for Passenger Cars, Rev. 1,
 October 2007.
Standard for Emergency Signage for        SS-PS-002-98......................  PR-PS-S-002-98
 Egress/Access of Passenger Rail
 Equipment, Rev. 3, October 2007.
Standard for Low-Location Exit Path       SS-PS-004-99......................  PR-PS-S-004-99
 Marking, Rev. 2, October 2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Metra submitted comments stating that the proposed emergency
lighting requirement, which would incorporate by reference APTA
Standard PR-E-S-013-99 (previously SS-E-013-99), Rev. 1, ``Standard for
Emergency Lighting Design for Passenger Cars,'' October 2007, would
require Metra to expend $4,700,000.00 to bring its equipment into
compliance with the rule as proposed. When the NPRM was published,
Metra had 386 cars that would have been considered non-compliant under
the rule as proposed. Metra provided FRA with a schedule for bringing
the cars into compliance. While Metra supports the emergency lighting
requirement, it suggests that the applicability date be extended two
years until January 1, 2017, to allow Metra to bring its 386 cars into
compliance. Metra also believes that extending the applicability date
would allow additional research and development that may yield an
industry-wide standard with added benefits of energy and maintenance
savings. To mitigate the expense of compliance and permit time for
additional research and development, FRA is modifying the proposal
related to the emergency lighting requirement to phase-in compliance.
The phased-in compliance schedule requires that by December 31, 2015,
railroads retrofit 70% of their passenger cars that are not in
compliance with the emergency lighting requirements as of the date of
publication of the final rule, and that by January 1, 2017, all cars
comply with the emergency lighting requirements.
    Caltrans submitted comments stating that the proposed requirement
that vestibule doors and certain other interior doors be equipped with
removable panels is confusing based on the examples that are provided
in the NPRM and Caltrans's understanding of the Working Group's
discussions and agreements related to this issue. Caltrans points out
that based on the examples, it appears that end-frame doors would be
required to be equipped with a removable panel, while noting that the
definition of vestibule door that is contained in Sec.  238.5 excludes
an end-frame door. Caltrans suggests that this is confusing, because
there was no agreement within the Working Group to require end-frame
doors to be equipped with a removable panel.
    FRA agrees that, at this time, removable panels or windows should
not be required in end-frame doors because, ultimately, no design was
identified that would address three overriding concerns related to end-
frame doors. Those concerns are: (1) unintentional removal of the panel
or window, which would result in a safety hazard for occupants while
the train is in operation; (2) crashworthiness of the door containing
the panel or window; and (3) prevention of fluids, such as fuel, from
entering the car during an accident. Therefore, the Task Force
developed a recommendation that was limited to vestibule doors, and
certain other interior passageway doors. An interior passageway door is
a door used to pass through a passenger car to the vestibule to exit
the car from a side door exit or to pass through the car to exit the
car into an adjoining car, or both. In addition to end-frame doors,
doors separating sleeping compartments or similar private compartments
from a passageway are neither vestibule doors nor other interior
passageway doors. FRA believes that the examples that are provided in
the NPRM have caused inadvertent confusion about this issue. FRA did
not intend to propose a requirement to equip end-frame doors with a
removable panel or window, and FRA does not intend to establish such a
requirement in this final rule.
    To clarify the removable panel or window requirement related to
vestibule doors and certain other interior passageway doors, the
following example supersedes and replaces the examples that were
provided in the NPRM. Amtrak Acela Express (Acela) passenger cars that
are not at the end of the train consist have no end-frame doors, as the
cars are semi-permanently coupled to other Acela passenger cars (not
the power cars). In the case of two business class cars that are
coupled together in the interior of the consist, moving from one of
these passenger cars to the next, an occupant would pass the end-frame
(collision posts/corner posts), then pass through the vestibule where
there are exterior side door exits, and, depending on the end of the
car, move through a passageway adjacent to a restroom accessible under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) before arriving at an
interior bi-parting door that leads to the seating area. Because that
interior door does not directly lead to the vestibule when moving from
the seating area, but to the passageway where the ADA-accessible
restroom is located and then to the vestibule, the door is an interior
passageway door but not a vestibule door. Certain foreign trainsets
have a similar layout that includes interior passageway doors that are
not vestibule doors.
    The NTSB submitted a comment that recounts the various safety
recommendations issued by the NTSB following the February 16, 1996,
collision of two passenger trains near Silver Spring, MD, and the
status of many of those recommendations. The comment states that FRA
has addressed many of the recommendations through its various
rulemakings, but highlights that two of the recommendations--Safety
Recommendation R-97-15, regarding removable windows, kick panels, or
other suitable means for emergency exiting through interior and
exterior passageway doors where the door could impede passengers
exiting in an emergency; and R-97-17, regarding fitting each emergency
lighting fixture with a self-contained independent power source--are
currently classified as ``Open-Unacceptable Response.'' The comment
notes that proposed Sec.  238.112, ``Door emergency egress and rescue
access systems,'' and the proposed revisions to Sec.  238.115,
``Emergency lighting,'' are considered consistent with the intent of
Safety Recommendations R-97-15, and R-97-17, respectively. While the
NTSB stated that it is ``encouraged that the various actions indicated
in the NPRM are under consideration'' and expresses support for the
intent of the NPRM, the comment noted that it is unfortunate that no
design changes have yet been required for passenger car doors or
emergency lighting more than 17 years after the Silver Spring accident.
The NTSB also commented that it ``remains concerned about the
significant length of time it is taking to make a modification
available to [railroad] operators.''
    In response to the Silver Spring accident, FRA has focused on some
of

the broader issues of passenger train safety, emergency egress and
rescue access, to ensure that there is a means of egress and rescue
access in every passenger compartment of a passenger rail car. With
respect to NTSB's specific concerns related to passenger car doors, FRA
points out that it has required design changes in Tier II passenger
trains. In the 1997 PESS NPRM, FRA stated that for Tier II passenger
equipment that is operated as a fixed unit, having kick-panels to allow
emergency egress through the length of the train has merit, so long as
the panels do not interfere with the normal operation of the doors in
which they are installed. 62 FR 49735. As such, in the 1999 PESS final
rule, FRA required that Tier II passenger railroads must equip
passenger compartment end doors (other than those leading to the
exterior of the train) with removable windows or kick-panels, unless
the doors have a negligible probability of becoming inoperable. 64 FR
25642, 25689. For Tier I passenger rail cars, FRA stated in the 1997
PESS NPRM that ``the interchangeable use of some cab cars and MU
locomotives as leading and trailing units on a Tier I passenger train
will complicate analyzing the efficacy of installing such panels on
Tier I equipment,'' and reserved the issue for future consideration. 62
FR 49735. FRA is not aware of any design changes that would safely
mitigate the additional safety concerns raised by requiring kick-panels
or other removable panels or windows in doors leading to the exterior
of a passenger car, such as end-frame doors, as discussed above.
    With respect to emergency lighting, FRA required in the 1999 PESS
final rule that new passenger cars have a ``back-up power feature
capable of operating the lighting for a minimum of 90 minutes after
loss of normal power.'' See 64 FR 25598. This back-up feature assists
occupants of the rail cars to discern their immediate surroundings and
thereby minimize or avoid panic in an emergency, if normal lighting is
lost, because fully-equipped emergency response forces can take an hour
or more to arrive at a remote accident site, with additional time
required to deploy and reach people trapped or injured in a train. Even
passenger train emergencies in urban areas can pose significant rescue
problems, especially in the case of tunnels, and operations during
hours of limited visibility or inclement weather. In either situation,
emergency lighting should help emergency responders extricate occupants
that may be injured and assist with an orderly evacuation. FRA also
addressed design concerns in the 1999 PESS final rule and stated that
its ``findings in recent accidents support NTSB's implied concern that
placement of electrical conduits and battery packs below the floor of
passenger coaches can result in damage that leads to the unavailability
of emergency lights precisely at the time they are most needed,'' but
that ``the concept of a power source at each fixture, as a regulatory
requirement, is novel.'' 64 FR 25598. Moreover, FRA questioned
``whether current `ballast' technology provides illumination of
sufficient light level quality with reliable maintainability.'' 64 FR
25598. FRA therefore reserved the issue of independent power sources
for future consideration.
    While this final rule is being issued many years after the Silver
Spring accident, the underlying concerns expressed by NTSB in issuing
recommendations R-97-15 and R-97-17 have not gone unaddressed; rather,
they have been reflected in FRA final rules issued following this
accident, as codified in FRA regulations. For example, the 2008 PTES
final rule established requirements that improve passenger emergency
egress and rescue access that are consistent with the intent of NTSB's
recommendations. Specifically, the rulemaking enhanced the emergency
window exits requirements, established roof access requirements, and
added rescue access window requirements to improve the means by which
occupants can quickly and safely egress when exit doors are inoperable
or inaccessible. See 73 FR 6376-78. During the development of the 2008
PTES final rule, FRA realized that there was a potential safety gap in
the then-existing regulatory requirements that could result in
passenger trains not being equipped with rescue access windows. The
requirements established by the 2008 PTES rulemaking, which considered
NTSB's recommendations, remedy this potential safety gap. In this
regard, FRA has been actively addressing the underlying concerns
expressed by NTSB recommendations R-97-15 and R-97-17 since they were
issued.
    The City of Seattle submitted comments suggesting that FRA consider
adding roof access requirements for passenger cars. The NPRM did not
raise the issue of roof access for passenger cars, other than for their
marking and instructions for their use. Accordingly, FRA believes that
the City of Seattle's comment is outside of the scope of this
rulemaking proceeding to the extent it concerns the development of more
substantive requirements for roof access systems. However, FRA believes
that roof access is an important safety feature for passenger cars, and
it is addressed by FRA regulation at Sec. Sec.  238.123 and 238.441.
    The 2008 PTES final rule established a roof access requirement for
all new passenger cars by adding Sec.  238.123, ``Emergency roof
access,'' requiring that all new passenger cars be equipped with two
roof access locations (roof hatches or structural weak points). Section
238.441 continues to contain specific requirements for Tier II
passenger equipment. See 73 FR 6403. FRA recognizes that roof access
locations can be especially useful in emergency situations where
passenger cars have rolled onto their sides following certain collision
and derailment scenarios. All else being equal, car rollover or tilt
should result in more severe injuries than when a car remains upright,
as occupants may be thrown greater distances inside the car. In turn,
this risk increases the potential need for access to rescue the car's
occupants because of the reduced likelihood that the occupants can
evacuate the car on their own. In addition, when there is a rollover,
doors, which are the preferred means of access under normal
circumstances, may be blocked or otherwise rendered inoperable due to
structural damage to the door or the door pocket. In particular, end
doors, which due to the direction they face, would normally be better
suited for use than side doors when a car has tilted or rolled onto its
side, may also be blocked, jammed, or otherwise unavailable for use.
Moreover, although emergency responders may be able to enter a car that
is on its side via a rescue access window, the removal of an injured
occupant through a side window in such circumstances can be difficult
or complicated, especially depending upon the condition of the
occupant. Nonetheless, the Task Force that helped to develop the
existing requirements determined that having more than two roof access
locations could jeopardize the structural integrity of passenger cars.
    At this time, FRA believes that the requirements contained in
Sec. Sec.  238.123 and 238.441 adequately address the important need
for roof access for passenger cars. FRA is therefore not modifying or
expanding the existing regulations based on this comment, other than
for enhancing requirements for the marking of roof access locations and
provision of instructions for their use.
    The Students submitted comments stating that they agree with many
aspects of the NPRM, but they also have

general concerns related to: The door panel requirement; the emergency
lighting requirement; the emergency communications requirement; and the
cost of the rulemaking. The Students recommend requiring removable
panels or removable windows in vestibule doors and other interior
passageway doors to be shatter-proof. While FRA believes that such a
regulatory requirement would be too prescriptive at this time, the
potential maintenance and replacement costs associated with removable
panels or windows that shatter during normal operations will drive the
industry to use sufficiently shatter-resistant materials. In fuller
context, of course, these removable panels or removable windows are to
be used as one of a number of possible means of egress.
    The Students also ask whether a floor hatch may be an effective
alternative method for emergency egress. FRA believes that a floor
hatch would likely cause a tripping hazard when not in use, and further
believes that it may present significant challenges to maintaining the
integrity of the carbody structure, and its design. Openings large
enough for egress though the carbody underframe would have a greater
impact on the structural integrity of the car than the soft spots on
the roof and windows/doors on the sides of the car that are currently
required. In addition, a floor hatch may reduce the ability of the car
to protect passengers from an under-car fire and, as such, would be
inconsistent with FRA's fire safety regulations. See, e.g., appendix B
to part 238, note 16, concerning fire resistance requirements for the
structural flooring assembly separating the interior of a vehicle from
its undercarriage.
    The Students further suggest supplementing the required emergency
lighting with a hearing sensory device that will guide passengers and
train crews to emergency exits when the emergency lighting is obscured
by smoke. FRA believes that the addition of a hearing sensory device
for safety purposes may be reasonable, but it was not part of FRA's
proposal in the NPRM. FRA would need to pursue this suggestion in a
future rulemaking with full notice and comment, including the gathering
of information related to the capabilities and cost of such devices, as
well as power supply needs.
    In addition, the Students commented in favor of requiring an
automated safety announcement played by the on-board train crew each
time new passengers board the train. Such announcements may be
worthwhile for some operations. However, FRA has addressed this type of
passenger safety awareness requirement in the Passenger Train Emergency
Preparedness rule, codified at Sec.  239.101(a)(7), and believes that
each railroad is in the best position to decide which additional
required safety awareness medium to use--one of which is on-board
announcements--in conjunction with the conspicuous positing of
emergency procedures.
    The last comment from the Students raises concerns about the costs
of implementing the rule. FRA believes that the costs of investing in
the safety systems required by this rule should have a nominal impact
on ticket fares. According to the APTA Fact Book for 2012, all capital
investment is funded only by government funds, and capital investment
is defined as expenses related to the purchase of equipment. Passenger
railroads have a dedicated funding source for capital investment that
can be used to implement certain requirements of this rule. FRA
recognizes that there may be an indirect impact on passenger fares due
to potential increases in maintenance costs for the upkeep of the new
safety systems. However, users of passenger rail take into account many
things when determining their mode of transportation, in addition to
fare price. Many value avoidance of traffic congestion associated with
driving, or the convenience of being able to read or work. For peak-
hour commuters who are less responsive to fare changes, it would take a
significant increase in fares for such riders to switch modes of
travel.
    As part of their comment, the Students also sought clarification as
to the costs associated with enforcing the rule as proposed. By law,
FRA is responsible for promoting the safety of railroads throughout the
Nation, and FRA's enforcement policy is carried out through the support
of its approximately 470 Federal inspectors and technical specialists
who also coordinate their efforts with approximately 172 State
inspectors. These inspectors work with railroads, shippers of hazardous
materials, and other regulated entities to help ensure a safe railroad
environment. The Students recommended random inspections to verify
proper installation and use of the new systems that would be required
by the proposed rule. FRA and State inspectors routinely conduct
inspections of railroad operations, property, and records to determine
that safety is being properly maintained. Unannounced inspections are
an important part of their work. Consequently, any costs associated
with the enforcement of this and other regulations have been accounted
for in FRA's budgeting process, and will not be impacted due to the
issuance of this regulation.
    One individual submitted a comment suggesting that FRA require an
independent power source for illuminated exit signs in the event that
an accident disrupts the normal power supply to a car. In the NPRM, FRA
proposed to incorporate by reference APTA Standard PR-PS-S-002-98
(previously SS-PS-002-98), ``Standard for Emergency Signage for Egress/
Access of Passenger Rail Equipment,'' October 2007. The APTA standard
specifically requires that emergency exit signs and markings located on
vestibule, end-frame, and side-door exits leading to the outside of the
passenger car for emergency egress have electrically powered fixtures
that have an independent power source to power either the internally
illuminated sign, or the light fixture that is externally illuminating
the non-HPPL sign when there is disruption to the normal power supply
to the car. FRA notes that alternatively under this standard, railroads
are able to employ HPPL material that provides an adequate level of
conspicuity, when there is disruption to the normal power supply to a
car, and this specifically includes dual-mode HPPL signs.
    Wherever illumination from the normal lighting system is less than
required for charging, dual-mode sign systems can be used to achieve
greater conspicuity. Dual-mode signs have an active component (an
active light source to properly charge the HPPL) and a passive
component (the HPPL material itself). FRA notes that the use of HPPL
material would obviate the need for an independent power source, as the
properly charged HPPL material will luminesce, and in-turn, provide the
desired conspicuity under conditions of limited visibility or darkness,
when there is a disruption to the normal power supply to a car.
Moreover, the emergency lighting requirement that was also proposed in
the NPRM, incorporating APTA Standard PR-E-S-013-99 (previously SS-E-
013-99), ``Standard for Emergency Lighting Design for Passenger Cars,''
October 2007, is being retained in the final rule, which helps to
ensure that the independent power source is effective when the normal
power supply to a car is disrupted.
    Another individual submitted comments stating that the proposed
rule is extremely warranted, highlighting the general need for
emergency exit lighting. In addition, this commenter disagrees with
providing passengers the ability to apply the emergency brake whenever
they deem it necessary,

although the NPRM did not raise this issue. As such, FRA believes that
this comment is outside of the scope of this rulemaking proceeding.
Making the emergency brake accessible to passengers is a longstanding
industry practice and an important safety feature that was codified as
a Federal regulatory requirement for all passenger cars in 1999. See 64
FR 25540. FRA is not modifying the existing regulation based on this
comment.
    Two comments in favor of the proposed changes that are contained in
the NPRM were received from two other individual commenters. Both
stated that the proposed rule is a good idea because it will enhance
passenger rail safety and it should be adopted as a final rule. FRA
appreciates the positive feedback and has considered it in the
formulation of this final rule.

IV. Technical Background and General Overview of Final Rule
Requirements

    Experience with passenger train accidents and simulations of
emergency situations, and technological advances in emergency systems
are the main impetus for the enhancements and additions in this final
rule to FRA's existing requirements related to passenger train
emergency systems, as highlighted below.

A. Doors

    In February 1996, as a result of a near head-on collision between a
Maryland Mass Transit Administration MARC (MARC) train and an Amtrak
train in Silver Spring, MD, and subsequent fire, eight passengers and
three crewmembers died in one car. This incident raised concerns that
at least some of the passengers in the MARC train tried unsuccessfully
to exit via the exterior side doors in the rear vestibule of the lead,
passenger-occupied cab car. Following its post-collision investigation,
the NTSB expressed concern regarding passengers' ability to exit
through interior and exterior passageway doors. During the accident,
the front end of the cab car that led the MARC train suffered extensive
structural damage, and fire destroyed the controls for the left- and
right-side rear exterior doors. The left-side exterior door's interior
emergency release handle was also damaged by the fire and could not be
pulled down to operate the door. The right-side door's interior
emergency release handle was in a secured cabinet in the lavatory and
it failed to open the door when later tested by the NTSB. The NTSB did
note in its investigation report of the Silver Spring train collision
that ``[e]xcept for those passengers who died of blunt trauma injuries,
others may have survived the accident, albeit with thermal injuries,
had proper and immediate egress from the car been available.'' NTSB/
RAR-97/02 at page 63. NTSB explained in its explicit findings on the
collision that ``the emergency egress of passengers was impeded because
the passenger cars lacked readily accessible and identifiable quick-
release mechanisms for the exterior doors, removable windows or kick
panels in the side doors, and adequate emergency instruction signage.''
Id. at 73.
    Specifically, NTSB recommended that FRA ``[r]equire all passenger
cars to have either removable windows, kick panels, or other suitable
means for emergency exiting through the interior and exterior
passageway doors where the door could impede passengers exiting in an
emergency and take appropriate emergency measures to ensure corrective
action until these measures are incorporated into minimum passenger car
safety standards.'' R-97-15. In addition, in the development of this
rulemaking, the Task Force identified concerns related to door egress
from a car that is not upright. Emergency egress simulations organized
by the Volpe Center confirmed this. Such simulations at the FRA-funded
``roll-over rig,'' an emergency evacuation simulator located at the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) training
facility, demonstrated that egress from a passenger rail car that is
not upright can be very challenging. The simulations have demonstrated
that emergency egress from a car that is on its side could present a
significant challenge related to the operation of the pocket doors. If
the pocket for a door is situated on the side of the car that is above
the door when the car comes to rest on its side, gravity would work
against opening the door and maintaining it in place for occupants to
egress. Although passenger rail cars with single-panel vestibule doors
are usually designed such that on the two ends of a car the pockets are
on opposite sides of the panel, emergency situations may affect either
end of the car rendering one or more of the vestibule and end-frame
doors unavailable for emergency egress. In addition, doors could be
rendered inoperable due to structural deformation of the doors or their
frames and surrounding structures following a collision or derailment,
blocking the egress pathways.
    The Task Force gave thoughtful consideration to the issue of
vestibule and end-frame door egress. With assistance from the Task
Force, FRA explored the feasibility of designing removable panels or
windows in passenger car interior passageway doors and exterior end-
frame doors that could be used for emergency egress, and funded
research to develop and evaluate various designs. Interior door egress
was examined first. In some passenger cars, exterior side or end-frame
doors, or both, are located in vestibule areas that are separated from
the seating area(s) by a vestibule door. Structural deformation or
malfunctioning of vestibule doors could inhibit or unduly delay egress
to the vestibules from the passenger compartments. End-frame door
egress was examined next. Ultimately, no design was identified that
would address three overriding concerns related to end-frame doors: (1)
Unintentional removal of the panel or window, which present a clear
safety hazard for occupants while the train is in operation; (2)
crashworthiness of the door containing the panel or window; and (3)
prevention of fluids, such as fuel, from entering the car during an
accident. Therefore, the Task Force developed a recommendation that was
limited to vestibule doors and other interior passageway doors. For new
passenger cars, the Task Force generally recommended requiring a
removable panel or removable window in each vestibule door and other
interior passageway doors. In the case of a vestibule, for example,
occupants could use a removable panel or removable window in the
vestibule door to gain access from the seating area to the exterior
doors in the vestibule. Alternatively, this panel or window could also
facilitate passage in the opposite direction from the vestibule area to
the seating area. Given the unique circumstances surrounding passenger
train accidents, the Task Force considered it prudent to recommend that
access be available from both areas.
    The Task Force specifically evaluated kick-panels and ultimately
decided that such panels could be partially or fully removed
unintentionally, creating a safety hazard, particularly for small
children who could get caught in the opening and become injured by the
door sliding into its pocket. For security reasons, the Task Force also
recommended an exception to the removable panel or removable window
requirement for a vestibule door that leads directly into a cab
compartment. The Task Force believed that each railroad is best
situated to determine whether equipping such a vestibule door with a
removable panel or removable window would be

appropriate for its specific equipment and operation.
    In particular, FRA believes that to require vestibule doors to be
equipped with a removable panel or removable window will, in the event
that vestibule doors are not operable, provide a means for occupants in
the passenger seating area to reach the vestibule area where exterior
doors are located, facilitating their egress. Additionally, the
removable panel or removable window will provide an additional means
for emergency responders to access the passenger seating area to aid
and assist occupants. FRA further believes that the rule satisfies the
safety concerns expressed in the NTSB's recommendation without raising
other safety concerns both during normal operations and in emergency
situations.
    The Task Force considered requiring that existing passenger cars be
retrofitted to comply with the removable panel/window requirement for
vestibule and other interior passageway doors. Because of limitations
posed by the design of existing doors, the Task Force decided not to
recommend that the equipment be retrofitted. For example, vestibule
doors are designed with a horizontal structural member, located
approximately at the vertical center of the door, which provides
rigidity. The design would significantly limit both the size and
location of a properly functioning removable panel or removable window.
Although there are existing windows in the upper half of certain
vestibule doors, the windows are not sufficiently large for adults to
pass through and would be difficult to access in many situations. In
addition, the existing door pockets would require modification.
Removable windows would likely be designed similarly to emergency
windows that are equipped with a handle to facilitate the removal of
the gasket that holds the emergency window in place. The doors would
need to be modified to accommodate the protrusions in the door that
would be created by adding the handle. The Task Force also reviewed
additional issues related to the emergency operation of these doors and
developed recommendations applicable to manual override devices and bi-
parting doors, including door retention systems, which are addressed in
this final rule.
    As noted above, the Task Force also examined the emergency egress
issue as it relates to exterior end-frame doors. After much
deliberation, the Task Force recommended not to proceed with a
removable window or panel requirement for end-frame doors, due to
remaining concerns related to the crashworthiness of the exterior end-
frame doors, the prevention of fluids entering the passenger car in an
accident, and unintentional removal of the panel or window while the
train is in operation. These concerns remain. The Task Force did,
however, extend the removable window or panel requirement to ``any
other interior door used for passage through a passenger car'' to
further expand options for emergency egress, as well as rescue access.
    The Task Force also reviewed the APTA emergency signage standard,
as discussed below, to develop recommendations for sign and instruction
marking to assist passengers and crewmembers in locating and operating
removable panels and windows in vestibule and other interior passageway
doors, as well as operating bi-parting vestibule and other interior
passageway doors in an emergency situation.

B. Identification of Emergency Systems

    An overturned rail car, or a rail car located on a narrow bridge or
in a tunnel can greatly complicate passenger train evacuation in an
emergency situation. Evacuation can be further complicated when
multiple rail cars are affected, or when conditions of limited
visibility or adverse weather are present. Such circumstances
necessitate enhanced systems for use in emergency evacuations. The 1999
PESS rule highlighted a systems approach to effective passenger train
evacuation that takes into consideration the interrelationship between
features such as the number of door and window exits in a passenger
car, lighted signs that indicate and facilitate the use of the door and
window exits, and floor exit path marking, in addition to the general
emergency lighting level in a car. 64 FR 25598. In particular, in the
PESS final rule FRA stated that it was investigating emergency lighting
requirements, as part of a systems approach to effective passenger
train evacuation.
    As FRA was issuing comprehensive Federal requirements for passenger
train safety in the late 1990s, APTA was also developing and
authorizing complementary passenger rail equipment safety standards
applicable to equipment operated by its commuter and intercity
passenger railroad members. In this regard, FRA stated in the 1999 PESS
final rule that it would examine the APTA emergency lighting standard
to determine whether the standard satisfactorily addresses matters
related to emergency signage, exit path marking, and egress capacity.
See 64 FR 25598. Through the development and issuances of multiple
standards, APTA developed a systems-based approach to facilitate the
safe evacuation of a passenger car in an emergency under various
circumstances. These APTA standards, which address emergency lighting,
signage, and low-location exit path markings, were designed to work
together to provide a means for passengers and crewmembers to identify,
reach, and operate passenger car emergency exits.
    The most recent, revised versions of the APTA standards, all
authorized on October 7, 2007, are listed below; copies are included in
the docket.
     PR-E-S-013-99 (previously SS-E-013-99), Rev. 1, Standard
for Emergency Lighting System Design for Passenger Cars.
     PR-PS-S-002-98 (previously SS-PS-002-98), Rev. 3, Standard
for Emergency Signage for Egress/Access of Passenger Rail Equipment.
     PR-PS-S-004-99 (previously SS-PS-004-99), Rev. 2, Standard
for Low-Location Exit Path Marking.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Please note that although the title of the APTA standard
does not contain the word ``emergency,'' FRA considers low-location
exit path markings and low-location emergency exit path markings to
be one in the same for purposes of this final rule and can be used
interchangeably. For ease of reference, both terms are referred to
with the acronym ``LLEEPM.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The APTA approach recognizes that, in the majority of emergencies,
the safest place for passengers and crewmembers is to remain on the
train. Should evacuation from a particular rail car be required, the
safest course of action for passengers and crewmembers is normally to
move into an adjacent car. This evacuation strategy avoids or minimizes
the hazards inherent with evacuating passengers onto the railroad
right-of-way. It is only in unavoidable or life-threatening situations
that it would be necessary for passengers and crewmembers to leave the
train to reach a place of safety.
    The Task Force was charged with reviewing the three APTA standards
and recommending revisions that would enhance the existing emergency
lighting requirements contained in Sec.  238.115 and the window egress
and rescue access marking requirements contained in Sec. Sec.  238.113
and 238.114, respectively. In addition, the Task Force was charged with
adding a new requirement for LLEEPM systems. After careful review, the
Task Force recommended that the three APTA standards be revised to
address relevant advances in technology, and that these standards be
incorporated by reference in their entirety in Federal regulations.
With assistance from the Task Force, and an investment of considerable
time and

effort, APTA revised the three standards to enable FRA to incorporate
them by reference and take advantage of certain technological advances
that allow for certain other desired enhancements. In addition, the
Task Force recommended applying the requirements of APTA's emergency
lighting, emergency signage, and LLEEPM standards (as revised in 2007),
to both new and existing equipment. Incorporation by reference of these
APTA standards into part 238 extends their applicability to all
commuter and intercity passenger railroads and makes them enforceable
by FRA. FRA has reviewed these industry standards and has determined
that they contain appropriate specifications for passenger train
emergency systems to be incorporated into this final rule.

C. Emergency Lighting

    Section 238.115 has contained emergency lighting requirements
applicable for new passenger cars since the 1999 PESS final rule. As
noted in that final rule, experience gained from emergency response to
several passenger train accidents indicated that emergency lighting
systems either did not work or failed after a short time, greatly
hindering rescue operations. See 64 FR 25596. Emergency lighting system
failures, or low levels of illumination during these accidents, or
both, have been cited as a cause for confusion and contributing to
injuries and casualties in emergency situations. For example, according
to the NTSB report, two passengers in a coach car of the MARC train
involved in the 1996 Silver Spring, MD, accident stated that emergency
lighting was not available following the accident and that, along with
one passenger's injuries and another's loss of eyeglasses, made it more
difficult to move in the darkness. See NTSB/RAR-97/02 at 61-62. The
coach car's tilted position also contributed to their disorientation
and hindered mobility. Id. at 62. Post-accident investigation by the
NTSB also revealed that the main car battery powering the emergency
lighting had been damaged as a result of the derailment. Id.
    The NTSB expressed concern regarding emergency lighting
survivability because the location of the battery supplying power to
the emergency lighting system below the car made it susceptible to
damage from the rail, the car's trucks, and the ground surface in the
event of a derailment. The NTSB concluded that ``a need exists for
Federal standards requiring passenger cars be equipped with reliable
emergency lighting fixtures with a self-contained independent power
source when the main power supply has been disrupted to ensure
passengers can safely egress.'' Id. The NTSB issued recommendation R-
97-17 to FRA, as follows:

    Require all passenger cars to contain reliable emergency
lighting fixtures that are each fitted with a self-contained
independent power source and incorporate the requirements into
minimum passenger car safety standards.

    In addition, on May 16, 1994, in Selma, NC, an Amtrak train
derailed after colliding with an intermodal trailer from a freight
train on an adjacent track. This accident resulted in 1 fatality and
121 injuries. According to the NTSB accident report, three of the
injured passengers reported difficulty exiting the passenger cars
because they could not identify the emergency exit windows in the
darkness. NTSB/RAR-95/02. When they were finally able to escape through
the doors leading outside, they said that they were not sure how far
they were above a surface, which may not have been solid ground,
because they could not see below the steps of the car. The NTSB found
that fixed emergency lighting systems were not operating inside several
passenger cars because the batteries and the wiring connecting the
batteries to the lights were damaged as a result of the derailment.
    In the 1999 PESS final rule, FRA established performance criteria
for emergency lighting, including minimum illumination levels in new
passenger car door locations, aisles, and passageways, to help enable
the occupants of the passenger cars to discern their immediate
surroundings (be situationally aware) and thereby minimize or avoid
panic in an emergency. Establishing an illumination requirement at
floor level adjacent to doors was intended to permit passenger car
occupants to see and negotiate thresholds and steps that are typically
located near doors. The illumination requirement 25 inches above the
floor for aisles and passageways was intended to permit passenger car
occupants to see and make their way past obstacles as they exit a train
in an emergency. FRA also required that the emergency lighting system
remain operational on each car for 90 minutes.
    With respect to existing equipment, FRA noted in the 1999 PESS
final rule that it desired achievable emergency lighting enhancements
and that it would evaluate an APTA emergency lighting standard when
completed. Subsequently, the Task Force helped develop a revised APTA
emergency lighting standard that would enhance the FRA emergency
lighting requirements in Sec.  238.115 by: (1) Applying the
requirements to existing equipment; and (2) improving the back-up power
supply survivability requirement (with application to both new and
certain existing cars). The Task Force recommended revisions to the
APTA emergency lighting standard to address older equipment not covered
by the emergency lighting requirements contained in original Sec.
238.115. The revised APTA standard specifies minimum emergency lighting
performance criteria for all passenger cars (new and existing). The
levels of illumination and duration required for equipment ordered
before September 8, 2000, and placed in service before September 9,
2002, are half the levels that are required for newer equipment by the
APTA standard. This takes into consideration the more limited
capabilities of older electrical lighting systems. The APTA emergency
lighting standard provides that these illumination and duration
requirements be implemented by January 1, 2015, or when the equipment
is transferred, leased, or conveyed to another railroad for more than 6
months of operation, whichever occurs first. Some railroads indicated
their intention to retire certain equipment by 2015. The Task Force
agreed it would not be cost-justified to retrofit such equipment. It
should be noted that, although the APTA standard provides for
compliance by January 1, 2015, FRA requires compliance by January 1,
2017, to allow those railroads not already in compliance sufficient
time to comply with the requirements.
    In addition, the APTA emergency lighting standard provides that
emergency lighting systems installed on each passenger car ordered on
or after April 7, 2008, or placed in service for the first time on or
after January 1, 2012, meet minimum illumination levels by means of an
independent power source that is located in or within one-half of a car
length of each light fixture it powers, and that operates when normal
power is unavailable. As previously noted, these illumination levels
are the same as the ones originally specified in Sec.  238.115 for
doors, aisles, and passageways. The independent power source
requirement was not originally contained in Sec.  238.115, and is being
incorporated into this final rule. The Task Force evaluated the
feasibility of equipping emergency lighting fixtures with self-
contained power sources, as a back-up power source, independent of the
main car battery. After deliberation, the Task Force concluded that
maintenance would be very costly due

to the high number of power sources. The Task Force examined other
methods for addressing the issue of emergency lighting system
reliability and assisted APTA in revising the APTA emergency lighting
standard to better address those situations in which an emergency
lighting system may be most beneficial. For example, in the event of a
derailment resulting in a car rollover, the importance of situational
awareness is heightened. Occupants are likely not in the same location
as they were before the incident and, in conditions of darkness, are
likely unaware as to where in the passenger car they are located in
relation to the nearest exit. APTA added four requirements that address
the NTSB's recommendation to FRA regarding emergency lighting
survivability for new passenger cars, as described below.
    First, the APTA emergency lighting standard was revised to require
an independent power source within the car body located no more than
one-half of a car length away from the fixture it powers. For most
passenger car designs, this translates into a minimum of two batteries,
one in each end of the car. In the Silver Spring accident, passenger
cars incurred collision and derailment damage to under-floor battery
boxes, causing the wet-cell batteries contained in those boxes to leak
electrolyte. Because of the damage and leakage, the batteries failed to
provide power to the emergency lighting on board the passenger cars.
Placing the batteries within the car body will reduce the risk of
damage to the batteries during a collision, and increase the likelihood
that the batteries will be capable of providing power to the emergency
lighting.
    Second, each of these independent power sources is required to have
an automatic, self-diagnostic module to perform a discharge test to
ensure timely detection and notification of a malfunction.
    Third, emergency lighting systems in new cars are required by the
APTA standard to be capable of operating in all equipment orientations
to address accident situations resulting in the rollover of a car.
During an accident, passenger cars may tilt, causing wet-cell batteries
contained in those cars to leak electrolyte and, as a consequence, fail
to provide power to the emergency lighting on board the passenger cars.
Wet-cell batteries will likely leak when tilted in a rollover, because
wet-cell batteries have a gas vent on top, which allows liquid to
escape when tipped over. Alternatively, a sealed battery is capable of
functioning as intended, regardless of the battery's orientation. When
a sealed battery is tilted during an accident, it will not fail to
provide power to emergency lighting merely as a result of being tilted.
    Finally, the APTA standard provides that emergency lighting systems
must be designed so that at least 50 percent of the light fixtures
operate, notwithstanding the failure of any single fixture or power
source. Additionally, augmenting this requirement, FRA notes that the
APTA emergency signage standard that FRA is incorporating by reference
into this rule requires a minimum of 144 square-inches of HPPL material
placed either on, or in the immediate vicinity of, side door exits that
are intended to be used as emergency exits, to provide some
illumination at the floor for passengers and crewmembers as they exit.
    In support of revising the APTA emergency lighting standard, the
Volpe Center researched various alternative, cost-effective
technologies for addressing the reliability of emergency lighting
systems. The Volpe Center found that the development of emergency
lighting systems that can function reliably for a decade or more with
minimal maintenance and that can withstand passenger train collision/
derailment forces has been greatly facilitated by two technologies:

     Solid-state lighting (SSL)--most commonly known as light
emitting diodes (LEDs); and
     Super capacitors--devices that store about 100 times as
much electrical charge per unit volume as previous types of capacitors.

Solid-state lighting includes conventional LEDs and other light
technologies to produce illumination without the use of legacy methods
such as incandescent filaments or excited gases in glass containers.
Compared with other lighting technologies, the SSL devices are much
smaller, are able to withstand hundreds or thousands of times as much
shock forces, and have much longer service lives. LED and other SSL
devices use approximately only half as much energy to produce a given
amount of light as the best fluorescent lamps. The light output of
current white LEDs ranges from 25 to 90 lumens per watt, which means
that a large area can be illuminated to a required minimum value (one
lumen per square foot) with only one watt of power. Use of LEDs also
makes it easier to shape the light output to concentrate it in areas
such as an aisle or at door locations and permits meeting the
illumination requirements with less power than would be needed if LEDs
were omnidirectional (like incandescent or fluorescent lamps).
    Capacitors are devices that store energy in an electrical field (as
opposed to a battery, in which the energy is stored chemically).
Chemicals that store and release energy in amounts that are useful in
batteries are inherently corrosive, which limits battery life to about
a thousand charge-discharge cycles, or about seven years in
applications where the battery is rarely discharged. By avoiding use of
corrosive chemicals, capacitors are far more durable. Super capacitors
are rated for 500,000 charge-discharge cycles, and their service lives
are expected to extend to at least ten years. Currently, commercial
super capacitors are available that store as much as 5 watt-hours of
energy. Combined with very efficient LEDs or other SSL devices, they
allow the manufacture of emergency lighting systems using self-
contained power with the ability to withstand collision forces of much
greater magnitude than traditional emergency lighting systems currently
in use. As discussed in sections VII.D through F, below, the brightness
of newer photoluminescent materials that can be used for emergency
egress signs and exit path marking can be a cost-effective means of
addressing concerns regarding the survivability of emergency lighting
systems, particularly for older equipment in operation, until retired
from service.

D. Marking and Instructions for Emergency Egress and Rescue Access

    To initially address emergency egress and rescue access, as well as
other issues related to the 1996 Silver Spring, MD, accident cited
earlier, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (EO 20). 61 FR 6876. In
addition to other requirements, EO 20 required commuter and intercity
passenger railroads to mark the location, and provide instructions for
the use, of emergency window exits by no later than April 20, 1996. In
an effort to respond to this requirement as effectively as possible in
the timeframe provided, affected railroads that had not done so began
to install photoluminescent emergency exit markings to mark emergency
window exits, as well as doors intended for emergency egress, using
photoluminescent materials that were available at the time for this
purpose.
    On May 4, 1998, FRA issued the PTEP final rule that required door
exits that are intended for emergency egress to be lighted or
conspicuously marked with luminescent material, and that instructions
for their use be provided. The rule also required that emergency

window exits be conspicuously marked with luminescent material, and
that instructions for their use be provided as well. See 63 FR 24630.
Similarly, the rule required that doors and windows intended for
emergency access by emergency responders for extrication of passengers
also be marked with retroreflective material and instructions for their
use posted.
    Notably, the 1998 PTEP rule did not specify criteria for minimum
luminance levels, letter size, or sign color. Yet, FRA stated that the
marking of the door and window exits must be conspicuous enough so that
a reasonable person, even while enduring the stress and panic of an
emergency evacuation, could determine where the closest and most
accessible route out of the car is located. See 63 FR 24669. Many
railroads installed signs made of zinc-sulfide, which were capable of
providing luminance for only a period of less than 10 minutes in many
cases. Subsequently, photoluminescent sign technology evolved, and
other materials began to be used, such as strontium-aluminate, which is
capable of providing high levels of luminance for much longer periods.
    The original APTA emergency signage standard was revised in 1999 to
require the installation of emergency exit signs with specific minimum
``higher performance'' photoluminescent material, in terms of
brightness and duration, as well larger minimum letter sizes, color
contrast, etc., for emergency exit signs. The second revision,
authorized in 2002, included a reorganization of certain sections,
citation of the American Society for Testing and Materials
International (ASTM) retroreflectivity standards, as well as the
revision of annex guidance to evaluate the performance characteristics
of the emergency exit signs. FRA considered incorporating elements of
the APTA standard into the PTES final rule in 2008 so that emergency
exit signs and intercom markings in passenger cars would be required to
be made of photoluminescent material with higher levels of brightness
for longer duration. However, the Task Force recommended that certain
requirements in the APTA emergency signage standard be revised to
address technical issues with the performance characteristics of
certain types of photoluminescent materials already installed in
existing passenger rail cars, as well as other necessary clarifications
concerning sign size, color, and contrast, etc., before the standard
would be incorporated by reference by FRA. See 63 FR 6886.
    Accordingly, APTA further revised its emergency signage standard to
incorporate the Task Force recommendations. The recommendations were
based on Volpe Center research findings and technological advances in
photoluminescence (as discussed in Section VII.F, below).
Substantively, the revised APTA emergency signage standard required
that each passenger rail car have interior emergency signage to assist
passengers and train crewmembers in more readily locating, reaching,
and operating emergency exits in order to safely evacuate from the
passenger rail car or train. The standard also required that each car
have exterior signage to assist emergency responders in more readily
locating and utilizing emergency access points during an emergency
situation warranting immediate passenger rail car or train evacuation.
To ensure visibility to passengers, signs used to mark the location of
vestibule doors were required to meet the brightness and duration
performance requirements for photoluminescent material, as specified in
the APTA standard.
    Although the APTA emergency signage standard does not address
emergency communications system signage, the Task Force recommended
applying certain criteria for photoluminescent marking specified in
that standard to intercom systems, as further described in Section
VII.G, below. The APTA standard also includes specifications for
retroreflective marking and material, which are consistent with FRA
requirements for rescue access point marking for doors, windows, and
roof access location. In addition, the APTA standard is more detailed
than the relevant FRA requirements that have previously been specified
in this part, for example addressing minimum letter sizes for doors and
emergency window exits and including specific criteria for color, color
contrast, etc.
    The revised APTA emergency signage standard requires periodic
testing of certain system components and contains procedures to ensure
compliance. APTA designed its emergency signage standard to offer
flexibility in application, as well as to achieve the desired goal of
facilitating passenger and crew egress from potentially life-
threatening situations in passenger rail cars. Accordingly, an
individual railroad would have the responsibility to design, install,
and maintain an emergency signage system that is compatible with its
internal safety policies for emergency evacuation, while complying with
the performance criteria specified in this APTA standard.
    The Task Force previously recommended that FRA adopt the specific
retroreflective material criteria contained in the APTA emergency
signage standard related to rescue access windows and doors intended
for access by emergency responders. See Sec.  238.114 of the 2008 PTES
rule, which added requirements for the installation of a minimum number
of rescue access windows in specified locations on all passenger cars.
Thus, in that rule, FRA added a definition of ``retroreflective
material'' that incorporates by reference criteria from ASTM's Standard
D 4956-07 for Type 1 Sheeting, which is consistent with the APTA
emergency signage standard. FRA also made other revisions related to
rescue access marking, consistent with the other rescue access marking
requirements specified in the APTA standard. See 73 FR 6389.

E. Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking

    A review of past passenger rail accidents involving passenger and
train crew emergency evacuation has indicated that, in certain cases,
both passengers and emergency responders lacked sufficient information
necessary for expedient emergency egress and responder access due to
the absence of identifiable markings. A lack of adequate markings
indicating the location of emergency exits, in conjunction with
lighting system failures, or low levels of illumination, or both,
during conditions of limited visibility when these accidents occurred
caused confusion and contributed to casualties. In addition, the
presence of fire or smoke may substantially increase the difficulty of
evacuating passenger train occupants.
    To avoid the many hazards associated with evacuation onto the
right-of-way, the preferred means of egress from a passenger car that
is not located at a station is via the end door(s) to the next car.
Under conditions of limited visibility, or when illumination from
emergency lighting fixtures located at or near the ceiling are obscured
by smoke, such LLEEPM (including exit signs) must remain discernible.
Particularly when smoke is present, the most viable escape path is the
more visible escape path, which is likely to be at or near the floor,
towards where occupants are forced to lower themselves (where the
pathway markings are located) to avoid inhaling the smoke.
    The 1999 APTA LLEEPM standard required HPPL material to be
installed on all new passenger rail cars. Such

markings are intended to provide a visible pathway for passenger rail
car occupants to locate and reach emergency exits under conditions of
limited visibility, even if the emergency lighting system fails. The
standard includes requirements for marking aisles, stairways, and
passageways to indicate the path to the primary exit for both existing
and new cars, using either HPPL material for marking, or lighting
having an independent power source with a duration of at least 90
minutes. Certain revisions were made to the original LLEEPM standard,
which consisted primarily of additional definitions, reorganization and
revision of certain sections, and the addition of annexes used to
evaluate the performance of HPPL material used for LLEEPM.
    In December 2006, with the participation of the Task Force, the
Volpe Center conducted a series of emergency egress simulations at the
WMATA training facility, which demonstrated that egress from a
passenger rail car can be very challenging. Initially, some
photoluminescent emergency exit sign materials commonly found in
passenger rail cars and some HPPL sign and LLEEPM materials were placed
in a single-level passenger rail car that was darkened to demonstrate
the difference in performance between the two types of materials. Next,
the car was filled with theatrical smoke, which quickly rose and filled
most of the car, obscuring photoluminescent signs, including HPPL
markings, except for door exit location markings located near the floor
and LLEEPM. Members of the Task Force participating in the simulation
attempted to exit the car via an end door by moving along the aisle in
a crouching position and using an HPPL LLEEPM system as guidance. The
LLEEPM system was covered in one end (half) of the car to demonstrate
the noticeable effectiveness of the LLEEPM system that remained visible
in the other end (half) of the car, in terms of brightness and
duration. Then, the darkened car was tilted to a 15-degree angle. This
car orientation was used to demonstrate firsthand the potential
difficulties associated with trying to maintain one's balance and walk
through the car to a door exit.
    The LLEEPM system complements the emergency signage system by
identifying all primary door exits with HPPL and complements the
emergency lighting system by providing a visible path to emergency
exits that is not dependent on a power source outside of the passenger
compartment, so that all primary emergency exits in a passenger car can
be identified from every seat in the car. The Task Force initially
reviewed the 2002 version of the APTA LLEEPM standard and recommended
that certain revisions be made to address the same type of issues
related to photoluminescent material as in the emergency signage
standard, as well as recommended other technical revisions for
consistency with the emergency signage standard, to enable FRA to
incorporate the standard by reference.

F. Photoluminescent Marking Materials

    As mentioned above, as a result of the NTSB's investigation of the
February 1996 Silver Spring, MD, accident, the NTSB expressed concern
that at least some of the passengers in the MARC train involved in the
collision were unable to locate, reach, or operate doors and emergency
window exits due to the failure of emergency lighting. Shortly after,
FRA issued EO 20 requiring commuter and intercity passenger railroads
to mark emergency window exits with luminescent material. See 61 FR
6876. The most conspicuous and visible markings related to emergency
egress are either internally illuminated (illuminated by a self-
contained source), or made of HPPL materials.
    Since the issuance of EO 20, Volpe Center research has provided
extensive information to FRA and the Task Force for different types of
photoluminescent materials and their performance characteristics when
installed in passenger rail cars. The brightness levels for many of the
emergency exit signs and LLEEPM using zinc sulfide material, originally
installed in response to EO 20, are low and the duration is short, and
thus do not perform as well as newer HPPL materials using strontium
aluminate, which are capable of a much higher initial brightness and
longer duration time. In addition, Volpe Center research shows that
placement of the photoluminescent sign and marking materials relative
to sources of light is key to proper performance in terms of brightness
and duration. Other factors that affect the ability of occupants to see
and read signs and markings include the size of the letters and their
distance from the sign or marking.
    Separately, and in conjunction with industry representatives, the
Volpe Center conducted tests in various in-service passenger cars of
different design and age by measuring illumination and luminance
levels, and demonstrated that some of the photoluminescent markings
were not as bright as they were intended to be. Photoluminescent signs
and LLEEPM materials certified to be capable of achieving certain
brightness levels were found not to meet those criteria due to
inadequate charging light levels. The presence of shadows cast by
nearby structures and fixtures, the location of light fixtures relative
to emergency exit signs and photoluminescent LLEEPM materials, the
condition of light diffusers, and the type of lamps used to provide the
charging light were all causes for why either the zinc sulfide or the
HPPL products were unable to charge sufficiently and thus achieve
expected brightness levels.
    The Task Force considered the use of HPPL material to be an
important improvement over the previous photoluminescent materials that
were designed to less stringent criteria for duration and brightness,
and also a cost-effective means of addressing concerns regarding the
survivability of emergency lighting systems, particularly for older
equipment in service. To develop a more effective photoluminescent
standard that would address the Volpe Center findings, the Task Force
developed HPPL material specifications with technical assistance from
the Volpe Center, which APTA included in its 2007 revision of both the
emergency signage standard and the LLEEPM standard. FRA notes that the
Task Force revisions to the emergency signage and LLEEPM standards: (1)
Allow flexibility for use of different types of charging light sources;
(2) require that new HPPL signs meet the same luminance requirements
with lower charging light levels; (3) allow alternative testing
criteria using meters that do not measure off-axis illuminance
accurately; (4) grandfather signs that are likely to perform as
intended for 60 minutes; and (5) in small areas, allow for lower
luminance levels and in some cases the use of larger signs to
compensate for even lower light levels. APTA revised the two APTA
standards which now establish more stringent minimum requirements for
the HPPL material performance criteria to provide visual guidance for
passengers and train crewmembers to locate, reach, and operate door
exits and emergency window exits, especially during conditions of
limited visibility when the emergency lighting system has failed (or
when smoke conditions obscure overhead emergency lighting).

G. Emergency Communications

    The NTSB accident investigation report for the February 9, 1996
collision near Secaucus, New Jersey, that involved two New Jersey
Transit Rail Operations (NJTR) trains and resulted in three fatalities
and numerous injuries, illustrates the importance of emergency
communication systems to prevent

panic and further injuries. According to the NTSB report (NTSB/RAR-97/
01, at p. 27):

    Although the train crews said that they went from car to car
instructing passengers to remain seated, passengers said that they
were not told about the severity of the situation and were concerned
about a possible fire or being struck by an oncoming train. They
therefore left the train and wandered around the tracks waiting for
guidance, potentially posing a greater hazard because of the leaking
fuel from train 1107.
    No crewmember used the public address system to communicate with
passengers. By using the public address system, all passengers would
have received the same message in less time than it would have taken
the NJT employees to walk from car to car.

The NTSB report also stated:

    Information about the possibility of a fire or a collision with
an oncoming train could have been provided to passengers over the
public address system to address their concerns and prevent them
from leaving the train. The Safety Board concludes that the lack of
public announcements addressing the passengers' concerns caused them
to act independently, evacuate the train, and wander along the
tracks, thus potentially contributing to the dangerous conditions at
the collision site.

    To help address such concerns, FRA issued the PESS final rule in
1999, which established requirements for two-way emergency
communication systems and markings for Tier II passenger equipment. See
64 FR 25641. PA systems allow the train crew to keep passengers
informed in an emergency situation and provide instructions to them in
a timely manner. The train crew can provide instructions to passengers
to not take an action that could place them or other passengers in any
greater danger, such as instructing the passengers, as appropriate, to
remain on the train and not endanger themselves by unnecessarily
evacuating the train on their own. Conversely, passengers could use the
intercom feature of a two-way communication system to report security
issues as well as other pertinent information to the train crew, such
as injuries resulting from an accident, other forms of medical
emergencies, or serious mechanical problems with the passenger rail
car. The 2008 PTES final rule established emergency communication (PA
and intercom) system requirements for Tier I passenger equipment and
replaced the previous emergency communication system requirements in
Sec.  238.437 for Tier II passenger equipment. See 73 FR 6370, 6389.
    When there is a disruption to the normal power supply to a car,
having markings that remain conspicuous allow passengers to locate and
use the intercom to communicate with the train crew. During the
development of the PTES final rule, some railroad representatives on
the Task Force noted that although instructions were posted at the
intercom locations on their passenger cars, luminescent markings
indicating the intercom location were not used. The Task Force
therefore recommended that luminescent markings be required for that
purpose.
    It should be noted that FRA proposed to adopt a requirement for
luminescent markings of intercom locations in the 2008 PTES final rule,
and invited comment on whether the luminescent material should be HPPL
material. See 71 FR 50293. As noted above, in the discussion concerning
emergency window exit signage, the APTA emergency signage standard
contains specific criteria for luminescent markings. The Task Force
focused on revisions to this APTA standard in order to recommend
whether to incorporate some or all of its contents into part 238 by
reference and thereby require that luminescent markings for intercoms
comply with the standard as it relates to luminescent markings. The
APTA Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Task Force had
also indicated that they intended to revise then-APTA Standard SS-PS-
001-98 (re-designated as PR-PS-S-001-98), ``Standard for Passenger
Railroad Emergency Communications,'' to include more specific
requirements for marking emergency communication systems.
    The 2008 PTES final rule required luminescent marking of each
intercom location to ensure that the intercom can be easily identified
for use in the event that both normal and emergency lighting are not
functioning. The posted operating instructions, however, are not
required to be luminescent as some Task Force members indicated that
the instructions may be easier to read when not luminescent.
    As noted previously, the Task Force discussed at length issues
associated with the development of HPPL material component
requirements. Due to the APTA revision of the performance criteria for
HPPL material, the Task Force recommended that emergency communication
system markings comply with the performance criteria for brightness and
duration of HPPL material in the emergency signage standard.
Accordingly, FRA believes that applying the luminescent marking
requirements in the revised APTA emergency signage standard to intercom
systems will further address the emergency communication concerns
raised in the NTSB report.

H. Debriefing and Critique Session Following Emergency Situations and
Full-Scale Simulations

    As an illustration of the importance of train crew participation in
a debrief and critique session, FRA notes that on May 25, 2006, a power
outage disrupted all rail traffic on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor
between Washington and New York during the morning rush hour, stranding
approximately 112 trains with tens of thousands of passengers on board.
Part 239 has required that train crewmembers participate in a
debriefing and critique session of such incidents. However, the
managers of the train crew of at least one train participated in the
debriefing and critique session for that train, rather than the train
crew.
    The Task Force recognized the importance of the participation in
the debriefing and critique session of train crewmembers and other
employees who actually have first-hand knowledge of the emergency that
occurred. Accordingly, the Task Force reviewed the debriefing and
critique requirements in Sec.  239.105 and recommended that
clarifications be made to ensure that, to the extent practicable, all
onboard crewmembers, control center personnel, and any other employees
actually involved in emergency situations and full-scale simulations,
be included in the debriefing and critique sessions. In addition,
flexibility was recommended to be provided to railroads by permitting
participation in the required debriefing and critique sessions of the
employees either by appearing in person or by the use of alternative
methods. As such, FRA clarifies Sec.  239.105 to reflect this necessary
participation.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

    This section-by-section analysis explains the provisions included
in the rule. A number of the issues and provisions involving this rule
have been discussed and addressed in detail in the preamble, above.
Accordingly, these preamble discussions should be considered in
conjunction with those below and will be referenced as appropriate.
Notably, as indicated above, there has been a change in the final rule
text from the NPRM in relation to emergency lighting based on comments
received from Metra.

A. Amendments to Part 238, Subparts B, C, and E

Section 238.5 Definitions
    In this section, FRA is introducing a set of new definitions into
the

regulation, as well as revising certain existing definitions. FRA
intends these definitions to clarify the meaning of important terms as
they are used in the text of the rule, in an attempt to minimize the
potential for misinterpretation of the rule.
    ``APTA'' means the American Public Transportation Association, the
present name of APTA.
    ``End-frame door'' means an end-facing door normally located
between or adjacent to the collision posts or similar end-frame
structural elements. This term refers to exterior doors only. This term
is added for use in the definition of a vestibule door to make clear
that an end-frame door is not a vestibule door.
    ``Vestibule'' means an area of a passenger car that normally does
not contain seating, is adjacent to a side door, and is used for
passing from a seating area to a side exit door. Passageways located
away from side door exits are not considered vestibules.
    ``Vestibule door'' means a door separating a seating area from a
vestibule. End-frame doors and doors separating sleeping compartments
or similar private compartments from a passageway are not vestibule
doors. This term is referenced in Sec.  238.112(f) as one type of door
that is required to have removable panels or windows for emergency
egress use in new passenger cars. Please note that Sec.  238.112 also
applies to other interior doors intended for passage through a
passenger car, and not only vestibule doors.
Section 238.112 Door Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Systems
    FRA revised this new section heading from the NPRM to make clear
that the requirements of this section concern systems for door use
during an emergency. FRA notes that this clarification will be
particularly helpful in light of FRA's intent to propose enhancements
to the requirements for passenger train exterior side door safety
systems in the near future.
    This section consolidates certain existing door requirements that
apply to both Tier I and Tier II passenger cars, adds new requirements
related to removable panels or windows in vestibule and other interior
doors, and clarifies that an exterior side door is required ``in each
side'' of a passenger car ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or
placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002.
These door requirements were formerly located in Sec. Sec.  238.235 for
Tier I equipment and 238.439 for Tier II equipment. Section 239.107
also contained interior and exterior marking and instruction
requirements, respectively, for all doors intended for emergency egress
and all doors intended for emergency access by emergency responders.
All door emergency egress and rescue access system requirements that
apply both to Tier I and Tier II passenger cars have been moved to this
new Sec.  238.112. Notably, the new vestibule door requirements enhance
passenger safety by requiring an additional means of access to the
vestibule area from the passenger seating area, and vice versa.
    Paragraphs (a) through (c) contain the requirements formerly
located in paragraphs Sec.  238.235(a) through (c), respectively.
Paragraph (a), moved from former 238.235(a) and concerning manual
override devices, is being modified slightly to remove the December 31,
1999 compliance date. Having this date written in the rule is no longer
necessary, as the scope of subpart B in which this section is located
does not limit application of its requirements to equipment ordered on
or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time on
or after September 9, 2002, unless otherwise specified, as subpart C
does. See Sec.  238.201(a). A manual override device allows a passenger
during an emergency to open or unlock a passenger car door that has
been closed or locked by the railroad for operational purposes. Without
the manual override device, a key or other tool or implement is
typically needed to open or unlock the door. By making the door easier
to unlock, the manual override device expedites passenger egress during
an emergency.
    A minor modification to paragraph (b) makes clear that of the
minimum two exterior side doors required in each passenger car ordered
on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time
on or after September 9, 2002, one must be located in each side of the
car. Moreover, paragraph (b) makes clear that a set of dual-leafed (or
bi-parting) exterior doors is considered a single door for purposes of
this paragraph.
    Paragraphs (d) and (e) contain requirements for interior and
exterior door exit markings and instructions, respectively, which were
formerly contained in Sec. Sec.  238.235(d) and 239.107(a). Both
paragraphs reference the requirements for marking and instructions for
emergency egress and rescue access in new Sec.  238.125.
    Paragraph (f) requires a removable panel or removable window in
each vestibule door, as well as in any other interior door intended for
passage through a passenger car. A vestibule door, or other interior
passageway door or the door pocket, may become deformed or otherwise
inoperable during an emergency. The additional means of egress would be
used in the event that the door cannot be opened, or it becomes
difficult to retain the door in an open position, as in the case of a
vestibule door to allow for passage from the seating area to the
exterior doors in the vestibule. The latter circumstance is of
particular concern when a passenger car is on its side where the pocket
for the door would now be located above the door, making it difficult
to keep the door in the open position. In the case of other interior
doors intended for passage through a passenger car (see discussion
above related to the definition of vestibule door in the section-by-
section analysis of Sec.  238.5), the removable panel or removable
window facilitates passage through the car to the vestibule to exit the
car from a side door exit or through the car to exit the car into an
adjoining car, or both.
    Specifically, in addition to the requirements for removable panels
or removable windows, paragraph (f)(1) requires a manual override
device for a vestibule door or other interior passageway door if it is
powered, so that occupants can open the door in the event power is lost
and the door or its pocket is not deformed. Moving through the open
door is, of course, the preferred means of passage; a removable panel
or window is provided in the door as an alternative means of passage,
should the manual override device not be able to open the door. As
further described, below, paragraph (f)(2) contains requirements for
the ease of operability, dimensions, and location of the removable
panels or windows in doors. In addition, distinct requirements in
paragraph (f)(3) apply to bi-parting doors; because such individual
door panels or leaves are very narrow, they cannot reasonably contain
removable panels or windows that would allow occupants to pass through.
    To allow sufficient time for railroads and manufacturers of
passenger cars to implement these requirements without costly
modifications to existing car orders, the requirements in this
paragraph apply to equipment ordered on or after January 28, 2014, or
placed in service for the first time on or after January 29, 2018.
Railroad representatives on the Task Force indicated that such a 4-year
time period is consistent with the time between the placement of an
order and delivery of the ordered equipment.
    This section makes clear that doors providing access to a control
compartment are exempt from the requirement for removable panels or

windows. The doors to such compartments are usually locked,
particularly in newer cars that have door lock override mechanisms, to
prevent unauthorized access to the control compartment. Railroads may,
at their discretion, include removable panels or other additional means
of egress in these doors, but they are not required to do so.
    Paragraph (f)(2)(i) requires that each removable panel or removable
window be designed to permit rapid and easy removal from both sides of
the door without the use of a tool or other implement. For example, in
the case of a vestibule door, rapid and easy removal is required from
the vestibule side and the seating area side of the door. Access from
both sides of the door is consistent with the preferred means of car
evacuation, which is to the next car and not onto the right-of-way. The
designs for removable windows or panels in the doors would likely be
very similar to the removable gasket design and other designs generally
used for dual-function windows, which serve both as emergency window
exits and rescue access windows and therefore can be opened and removed
from inside or outside of the car. This requirement in paragraph
(f)(2)(i) is intended to be consistent with the ease of operability
requirement currently applicable to emergency window exits in Sec.
238.113, which dual-function windows must meet. For example, the design
presented by Kawasaki for a removable panel in a vestibule door,
described in the 2008 PTES final rule, would satisfy the requirements
for ease of operability. See 73 FR 6370.
    Paragraph (f)(2)(ii) requires that removal of the panel or window
in the door create an unobstructed opening with minimum dimensions of
21 inches horizontally by 28 inches vertically. The Task Force
consulted with passenger car and door manufacturers to ensure that the
dimensions could be met without sacrificing the basic structural design
and integrity properties of vestibule doors, including firmness,
balance, and stability. Manufacturers agreed that the maximum width
that could be reasonably achieved is 21 inches. The 28-inch vertical
dimension allows for the door to have a vertically-centered horizontal
structural member, as well as retain a window in the upper half, which
is common to many existing door designs and a feature that railroads
are interested in retaining.
    Paragraph (f)(2)(iii) requires that the removable panel or
removable window in the door be located so that the lowest point of the
opening is no higher than 18 inches from the floor. This requirement
provides ease of use for passing through after removal of the panel or
window. The opening should be located close to the floor so that car
occupants can crawl through without undue difficulty or undue delay.
    Paragraph (f)(3) contains distinct requirements for bi-parting
doors. Each powered, bi-parting vestibule door and any other interior,
powered bi-parting door intended for passage through a passenger car
must be equipped with a manual override device and a mechanism to
retain each door leaf in the open position. Examples of a retention
mechanism include a ratchet and pawl system, which allows movement in
one direction but locks it in the other, and a sprag. The retention
mechanism is intended to expedite egress by holding the door panels in
place once they are opened. The override mechanism provides a means to
operate the doors in the event that power is lost. It must be located
adjacent to the door leaf it controls and be designed and maintained so
that a person can readily access and operate it from each side of the
door without the use of any tool or other implement. Access from both
sides of the door is consistent with the preferred means of car
evacuation, which is to the next car, and not onto the right-of-way.
    Paragraph (f)(4) specifically contains requirements relating to the
capabilities of manual override devices for vestibule doors and other
interior doors intended for passage through a passenger car, including
such doors that are bi-parting. See the discussion relating to manual
override devices in paragraph (a).
    Paragraph (f)(5)(i) contains requirements for marking and operating
instructions for removable panels and windows in vestibule and other
interior passageway doors. Paragraph (f)(5)(ii) contains particular
requirements for marking and providing operating instructions for door
override devices and retention mechanisms in vestibule and other
interior passageway doors that are bi-parting.
    To ensure that each removable panel or removable window in a door
can be identified in conditions of limited visibility, the panel or
window must be conspicuously and legibly marked with HPPL material on
both sides of the vestibule or other interior passageway door in which
it is installed, in accordance with section 5.4.2 of the APTA emergency
signage standard that FRA is incorporating by reference in Sec.
238.125. Use of such material is consistent with requirements for
emergency window exit and door exit signage. Legible and understandable
operating instructions for each removable panel or removable window
must also be provided on each side of the door. For example, in the
case of a vestibule door, these instructions need to be provided on
both the vestibule side and the seating area side of the door. Marking
and instruction requirements also apply to bi-parting door manual
override devices and retention mechanisms.
    Paragraph (f)(6) contains requirements for testing a representative
sample of door removable panels and windows, manual override devices,
and door retention mechanisms to determine that they operate as
intended. In particular, FRA believes that it is important to inspect,
maintain, and repair manual vestibule and other interior passageway
door override devices and door retention mechanisms to ensure that they
function properly in the event of an emergency. FRA believes that
testing of a representative sample of manual override devices and door
retention mechanisms no less frequently than once every 184 days to
verify that they are operating properly is reasonable and appropriate
for safety. This frequency is consistent with existing requirements
contained in Sec.  238.113 for the testing of emergency window exits.
However, because emergency window exits are subject to different
service conditions than removable panels and removable windows located
in vestibule doors and other interior passageway doors, including bi-
parting doors, separate tests are needed. Following each test,
defective systems must be repaired as appropriate in accordance with
the requirements of this part.
Section 238.113 Emergency Window Exits
    Requirements in parts 223 and 239 for the marking of emergency
exits, as well as in part 238 for the marking of emergency
communications transmission points, have specified the use of
luminescent materials. (Door exits intended for emergency egress may
also be lighted, in accordance with Sec.  239.107(a)(1).) Part 238
defines ``luminescent material'' as material that absorbs light energy
when ambient levels of light are high and emits this stored energy when
ambient levels of light are low, making the material appear to glow in
the dark. See Sec.  238.5. However, Sec.  238.113 has not specified
minimum requirements for the initial levels of brightness of the
markings (i.e., luminance levels) or how long the markings must
maintain the same or reduced levels of brightness.
    Accordingly, paragraph (d) of this section is amended to require
markings, as well as instructions, for emergency

window exits to comply with the APTA emergency signage standard that
FRA is incorporating by reference in Sec.  238.125. The inspection
requirement related to marking of emergency window exits formerly
contained in Sec.  239.107(b) is also added as paragraph (e) of this
section. By helping to ensure that the markings appear conspicuous and
legible, FRA believes that these changes enhance the capability and
benefit of the markings in guiding passenger train occupants to locate
and operate emergency window exits.
    Specifically, as further discussed below, in Sec.  238.125 FRA is
incorporating by reference APTA Standard PR-PS-S-002-98 (previously SS-
PS-002-98), Rev. 3, ``Standard for Emergency Signage for Egress/Access
of Passenger Rail Equipment.'' The APTA standard establishes specific
criteria for luminescent material, including how bright the material
must be and for how long. The APTA standard also contains specific
design requirements to facilitate recognition and reliability,
including letter size and color contrast requirements as well as
requirements for door locator signs to facilitate identification of
door locations that may not be easily seen by seated passengers.
    As noted above, FRA is moving the emergency window exit testing
requirements formerly contained in Sec.  239.107(b) to a new paragraph
(e) in this section. Generally, emergency window exits are intended to
supplement door exits, which are normally the preferred means of egress
in an emergency situation. Emergency windows provide an alternative
means of emergency egress should doors intended for egress be rendered
inoperable or inaccessible. Emergency windows also provide an
additional means of egress in life-threatening situations requiring
very rapid exit, such as an on-board fire or submergence of the car in
a body of water. The requirement to periodically test a representative
sample of emergency window exits arose from EO 20 and is being carried
forward from Sec.  239.107 into this new paragraph.
Section 238.114 Rescue Access Windows
    This section includes requirements for the location and
retroreflective marking of rescue access windows. Paragraph (d) of this
section continues to require that retroreflective material be used to
mark rescue access windows. However, as further discussed below, in
Sec.  238.125 FRA is incorporating by reference APTA Standard PR-PS-S-
002-98 (previously SS-PS-002-98), Rev. 3, ``Standard for Emergency
Signage for Egress/Access of Passenger Rail Equipment.'' FRA believes
that adopting the APTA standard enhances the effectiveness of the
retroreflectivity requirements in identifying rescue access locations
for emergency responders, taking into consideration the environment in
which passenger trains operate. This section was originally prompted in
part by the April 23, 2002 collision involving a Metrolink passenger
train near Placentia, CA, and the ensuing NTSB Safety Recommendation
(R-03-21) to FRA, which illustrated the potential importance of having
rescue access windows on each level of a passenger car. The general
intent of the provision is to provide a means for emergency responders
to quickly identify and effectively operate rescue access windows in
order to gain access directly into every passenger compartment on every
level of a passenger car, in the event that a stairway or interior door
is compromised and any exterior doors are blocked.
    The same APTA emergency signage standard discussed previously
related to emergency window exit marking contains detailed criteria for
marking rescue access windows, including the use of certain
retroreflective material. FRA notes that, consistent with this
standard, in the 2008 PTES final rule it added the definition of
``retroreflective material'' for marking doors, windows, and roof
locations intended for rescue access. See Sec.  238.5; 73 FR 6370,
6380. As used in this rule, ``retroreflective material'' means a
material that is capable of reflecting light rays back to the light
source and that conforms to the specifications for Type I Sheeting, as
specified in ASTM International's (ASTM) Standard D 4956-07, ``Standard
Specification for Retroreflective Sheeting for Traffic Control.'' ASTM
International defines Type I Sheeting as ``medium-intensity
retroreflective sheeting referred to as `engineering grade' and
typically enclosed lens glass-bead sheeting,'' and FRA has previously
incorporated the ASTM definition by reference. FRA is now incorporating
by reference the APTA emergency signage standard, and notes that the
standard also requires that the retroreflective material be tested
according to ASTM's Standard E 810-03, ``Standard Test Method for
Coefficient of Retroreflective Sheeting Utilizing the Coplanar
Geometry.'' Further, the APTA standard provides that, in order to
maintain the optimum retroreflective properties of the base material,
any retroreflective markings that have ink or pigment applied shall
utilize a translucent or semi-translucent ink, as per the
manufacturer's instructions. In addition, a clear coat that protects
against ultra-violet light may be added to prevent fading. Finally,
retroreflectivity requirements shall be met if protective coatings or
other materials for the enhancement of sign durability are used. Please
see section 6 of the APTA emergency signage standard for design
requirements addressing rescue access information for emergency
responders.
Section 238.115 Emergency Lighting
    This section formerly contained requirements for emergency lighting
in passenger cars only ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed
in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002. These
requirements continue to apply to this equipment. Yet, to enhance the
performance of emergency lighting in passenger cars, FRA is amending
this section to expand its application to all passenger cars, both new
and existing, and is also modifying the emergency lighting
requirements. Specifically, this section now incorporates by reference
APTA Standard PR-E-S-013-99 (previously SS-E-013-99), Rev. 1,
``Standard for Emergency Lighting Design for Passenger Cars.'' All
passenger cars must comply with this standard by January 1, 2017, or an
alternative standard providing at least an equivalent level of safety
if approved by FRA pursuant to Sec.  238.21. Moreover, in advance of
the January 1, 2017 compliance deadline, this section requires that by
December 31, 2015, each railroad must ensure that 70% of its passenger
cars comply. Incorporating and phasing-in this APTA emergency lighting
standard for all passenger cars not only enhances the standards for new
passenger cars but also establishes standards for passenger cars both
ordered before September 8, 2000, and placed in service before
September 9, 2002, i.e., passenger cars not previously subject to this
section.
    This section continues to require minimum emergency illumination
levels at doors, aisles, and passageways. In addition to these
locations, the APTA emergency lighting standard requires minimum levels
of emergency illumination for stairways, crew areas of multiple-unit
(MU) locomotives and cab cars, toilets, and other areas.
    This section has required a ``back-up power system'' capable of
operating in all equipment orientations within 45 degrees of vertical,
as well as after the initial shock of certain collision or derailment
scenarios. The car's main battery has also been considered an
acceptable ``back-up power system.'' However, a traditional main
battery is

limited in its ability to provide power in equipment orientations
greater than 45 degrees of vertical. Additionally, because it is common
for such batteries to be at least partially located below the car body,
it would not be unusual for the main car battery to be damaged in the
event of a derailment, which would render the emergency lighting system
inoperable, as occurred in the MARC train cab car that was involved in
the 1996 accident in Silver Spring, MD. Accordingly, for equipment