[Federal Register: March 14, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 51)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 13800-13802]
[DOCID:fr14mr08-15]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0299; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-254-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Gulfstream Aerospace LP Model Astra SPX
and 1125 Westwind Astra Airplanes and Gulfstream 100 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:

    Two of the fasteners used to attach the ``scissors'' to the
horizontal and the vertical stabilizers were found broken during
routine maintenance. The highest loads on the ``scissors'' occur
when using high reverse thrust. Therefore, the reverse thrust must
be limited to idle in order to keep the loads at a sufficiently low
level to preclude any structural problem. * * *

Failure of the attachment fasteners could result in possible in-flight
loss of a horizontal or vertical stabilizer and consequent loss of
control of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions that are
intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 14, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Borfitz, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-2677; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2008-0299;
Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-254-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The Civil Aviation Authority of Israel (CAAI), which is the
aviation authority for Israel, has issued Israeli Airworthiness
Directive 55-07-06-07R1, dated June 26, 2007 (referred to after this as
``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified
products. The MCAI states:

    Two of the fasteners used to attach the ``scissors'' to the
horizontal and the vertical stabilizers were found broken during
routine maintenance. The highest loads on the ``scissors'' occur
when using high reverse thrust. Therefore, the reverse thrust must
be limited to idle in order to keep the loads at a sufficiently low
level to preclude any structural problem. It was established that on
model 1125 Astra, alternate fasteners of inferior strength were
sometimes installed. When the originally specified fasteners are
installed, the limitations on reverse thrust used may be lifted. For
models Astra SPX and G100, however, the limitation remains in effect
till further revision of this AD.

    Failure of the attachment fasteners could result in possible in-
flight loss of a horizontal or vertical stabilizer and consequent loss
of control of the airplane. Corrective actions include revising the
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM); inspections for damage of the bolts and
replacing the bolt, if necessary; and doing related investigative and
other corrective actions (eddy current inspection for bolt hole
diameter and damage, contact Gulfstream for repair and do repair). You
may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information

    Gulfstream has issued Alert Service Bulletin 100-55A-293, dated
June 22, 2007. Gulfstream also issued Astra SPX AFM Temporary Revision
(TR) No. 8, Astra AFM TR No. 15, and Gulfstream 100 AFM TR No. 1, all
dated June 14, 2007; to the Astra SPX, Astra, or Gulfstream 100 AFMs,
as applicable. The actions described in this service information are
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a Note within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect about 129 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that
it would take about 10 work-hours per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per
work-hour. Required parts would cost about $33 per product. Where the
service information lists required parts costs that are covered under
warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs.
As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some
parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these
figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to
be $107,457, or $833 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Gulfstream Aerospace LP (Formerly Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.):
Docket No. FAA-2008-0299; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-254-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by April 14, 2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Gulfstream Aerospace LP Model Astra SPX
and 1125 Westwind Astra airplanes and Gulfstream 100 airplanes;
certificated in any category; serial numbers 004 through 158.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 55:
Stabilizers.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
    Two of the fasteners used to attach the ``scissors'' to the
horizontal and the vertical stabilizers were found broken during
routine maintenance. The highest loads on the ``scissors'' occur
when using high reverse thrust. Therefore, the reverse thrust must
be limited to idle in order to keep the loads at a sufficiently low
level to preclude any structural problem. It was established that on
model 1125 Astra, alternate fasteners of inferior strength were
sometimes installed. When the originally specified fasteners are
installed, the limitations on reverse thrust used may be lifted. For
models Astra SPX and G100, however, the limitation remains in effect
until further revision of this AD.

Failure of the attachment fasteners could result in possible in-
flight loss of a horizontal or vertical stabilizer and consequent
loss of control of the airplane. Corrective actions include revising
the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM); inspections for damage of the
bolts and replacing the bolt, if necessary; and doing related
investigative and other corrective actions (eddy current inspection
for bolt hole diameter and damage, contact Gulfstream for repair and
do repair).

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
    (1) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD: Revise
the Limitations section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by
incorporating the information in the applicable Temporary Revisions
(TR): Astra AFM TR No. 15; Astra SPX AFM TR No. 8; or Gulfstream 100
AFM TR No. 1; all dated June 14, 2007; into the limitations section
of the Astra SPX, Astra, or Gulfstream 100 AFM, as applicable. The
TRs limit the normal use of reverse thrust to idle.

    Note 1: The actions required by paragraph (f) of this AD may be
done by inserting a copy of Astra AFM TR No. 15; Astra SPX AFM TR
No. 8; or Gulfstream 100 AFM TR No. 1; all dated June 14, 2007; as
applicable; into the limitations section of the Astra SPX, Astra, or
Gulfstream 100 AFM, as applicable. When the applicable TR has been
included in the general revisions of the AFM, the general revisions
may be inserted in the AFM.

    (2) For all airplanes: Within 25 flight hours or 30 days after
the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first, do the
inspections specified in paragraphs (f)(2)(i) and (f)(2)(ii) of this
AD in accordance with Part A of Gulfstream Alert Service Bulletin
100-55A-293, dated June 22, 2007.
    (i) Visually inspect the attachment bolts and replace any
damaged bolt before further flight.
    (ii) Perform a detailed visual inspection of fittings with P/N
25W357222-501-51, and fillers with P/N 25W4011001-003, and
surrounding structure for damage. If blind bolts with P/N
MS21141U0612 are installed and no damage is found, no further action
is required. If any damage is found, before further flight, repair
using a method approved in accordance with the procedures specified
in paragraph (g)(2) of this AD. If any bolt with P/N AN173C11 is
installed and damage is found, replace the bolt and do all related
investigative and applicable corrective actions before further
flight.
    (3) For Model 1125 Westwind Astra airplanes (serial numbers 004,
011 through 072 inclusive, and 073 through 078 inclusive): Within 12
months after the effective date of this AD, replace all AN173C11
bolts, and do all related investigative and applicable corrective
actions before further flight, as detailed in Part B of Gulfstream
Alert Service Bulletin 100-55A-293, dated June 22, 2007.
Accomplishment of Part B of the alert service bulletin constitutes
terminating action for paragraph (f)(1) of this AD. TR No. 15 may be
deleted and unlimited use of reverse thrust is allowed per the AFM.

    Note 2: Reverse thrust limitations remain in effect for Model
Astra SPX and Gulfstream 100 airplanes.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 3: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows:
    Compliance Time: The compliance time required by the MCAI or
service information for performing the AFM revision is immediate on
receipt of this AD; however, to avoid inadvertently grounding
airplanes, this AD requires performing the AFM revision within 30
days after the effective date of this AD.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Mike
Borfitz, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI CAAI Airworthiness Directive 55-07-06-07R1,
dated June 26, 2007; Gulfstream Alert Service Bulletin 100-55A-293,
dated June 22, 2007; and Astra SPX AFM Temporary Revision (TR) No.
8; Astra AFM TR No. 15; and Gulfstream 100 AFM TR No. 1, all dated
June 14, 2007; for related information.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 7, 2008.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E8-5147 Filed 3-13-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


91 Given that we only have normal feedrate and emissions data for mercury for cement kilns, we do not believe it is appropriate to establish a hazardous waste thermal emissionsbased standard. We prefer to establish emission standards under the hazardous waste thermal emissions format using compliance test data because the metals feedrate information from compliance tests that we use to apportion emissions to calculate emissions attributable to hazardous waste are more reliable than feedrate data measured during testing under normal, typical operations. emissions of mercury to 64 and 35 ug/ dscm, respectively. If we were to adopt these standards, then sources would comply with the limit on an annual basis because the standards are based on normal emissions data. 1. What Is the Rationale for the MACT Floor for Existing Sources? Mercury emissions for existing cement kilns are currently limited to 120 ug/ dscm by § 63.1204( a)( 2). 90 This standard was promulgated in the Interim Standards Rule ( See 67 FR at 6796). None of the cement kilns burning hazardous waste use a dedicated control device to remove mercury from the gas stream; however, kilns control the feed concentration of mercury in the hazardous waste. We have emissions data for all sources. All of these data are best classified as from normal operations, although, as explained below, there is a substantial range within these data. For most sources, we have normal emissions data from more than one test campaign. The normal mercury stack emissions in our data base range from less than 2 to 118 ug/ dscm. These emissions are expressed as mass of mercury ( from all feedstocks) per unit volume of stack gas. To identify the MACT floor, we evaluated all normal emissions data using the SRE/ Feed Approach. We considered normal emissions data from all test campaigns. 91 For example, one source in our data base has normal emissions data for three different testing campaigns: 1992, 1995, and 1998. Under this approach we would consider the emissions data from the three separate years or campaigns. We believe this approach better captures the range of average emissions for a source than only considering the most recent normal emissions. Given that no cement kilns burning hazardous waste use a control device which captures mercury from the flue gas stream, for purposes of this analysis we assumed all sources achieved a SRE of zero. The effect of this assumption is that the sources with the lowest mercury concentrations in the hazardous waste were identified as the best performing sources. The calculated floor is 64 ug/ dscm, which considers emissions variability, based on a hazardous waste maximum theoretical emissions concentration ( MTEC) of 26 ug/ dscm. This is an emission level that the average of the best performing sources could be expected to achieve in 99 of 100 future tests when operating under conditions identical to the compliance test conditions during which the emissions data were obtained. We estimate that this emission level is being * OMB Review Draft*

92 Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition is a trade organization that represents cement companies that burn hazardous wastes as a fuel. CKRC also represents companies that manage and market hazardous waste fuels used in cement kilns. achieved by 59% of sources and would reduce mercury emissions by 0.23 tons per year. If we were to adopt such a floor level, we are proposing that sources comply with the limit on an annual basis because it is based on normal emissions data. Under this approach, compliance would not be based on the use of a total mercury continuous emissions monitoring system because these monitors have not been adequately demonstrated as a reliable compliance assurance tool at cement kiln sources. Instead, a source would maintain compliance with the mercury standard by establishing and complying with limits on operating parameters ( e. g., limit on maximum total mercury feedrate in all feedstreams) on an annual basis. We did not use the stack emissions data of preheater/ precalciner kilns in the floor analysis because we believe the mercury emissions are biased low when the in line raw mill is on line and biased high when the in line raw mill is off line. ( See earlier discussion on why we are proposing not to subcategorize hazardous waste burning cement kilns for mercury between wet process kilns and preheater/ precalciner kilns with in line raw mills.) For either case, we believe the normal mercury data are not representative of average emissions and, therefore, not appropriate to include in the floor analysis. We request comment on this data handling decision. In the September 1999 final rule, we acknowledged that a cement kiln using properly designed and operated MACT control technologies, including controlling the levels of metals in the hazardous waste, may not be capable of achieving a given emission standard because of mineral and process raw material contributions that might cause an exceedance of the emission standard. To address this concern, we promulgated a provision that allows kilns to petition for alternative standards provided they submit site specific information that shows raw material hazardous air pollutant contributions to the emissions prevent the source from complying with the emission standard even though the kiln is using MACT control. See § 63.1206( b)( 10). Today's proposed floor of 64 ug/ dscm, which was based on a hazardous waste MTEC of 26 ug/ dscm, may likewise necessitate such an alternative because contributions of mercury in the raw materials and fossil fuels at some sources may cause an exceedance of the emission standard. Therefore, we are considering retaining the alternative standard; however, we also request comment on whether to delete the alternative standard petitioning process of § 63.1206( b)( 10) and instead allow sources to comply either with the stack emission standard or hazardous waste MTEC level ( without a requirement to submit a petition). This approach would establish the mercury standard as either 64 ug/ dscm or a hazardous waste MTEC of 26 ug/ dscm. If we were to adopt such an approach, we would require sources to comply with either limit they select on an annual basis because it is based on normal emissions data. In June 2003, the Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition ( CKRC) 92 submitted to EPA information on actual mercury concentrations in the hazardous waste burn tanks of all 14 cement facilities for a three year period covering 1999 to 2001. In general, the information shows the * OMB Review Draft*

93 For two cement facilities, the mercury concentration data are only available on a monthly averaged basis.

94 Data from three of the facilities had a significant number of individual measurements reported as not detectable and also had relatively high analysis detection limits ( compared to levels achieved by other cement plants). The detection limit for most cement kilns was typically 0.1 ppm or less. For purposes of today's preamble discussion, the measurements from these three cement plants are excluded from the data characterization conclusions.

95 USEPA, " Draft Technical Support Document for HWC MACT Replacement Standards, Volume III: Selection of MACT Standards and Technologies," March 2004. mercury concentration ( in parts per million) in the hazardous waste for each burn tank. 93 In total, approximately 20,000 mercury burn tank concentration data points are included in CKRC's submission. 94 The data show that approximately 50% of the individual burn tank measurements are 0.6 ppmw or less, 75% are less than 1.1 ppmw, 88% are less than 2 ppmw, and 97% of all burn tank measurements are less than 5 ppmw. For a hypothetical wet process cement kiln that gets 50% of its required heat input from hazardous waste, a hazardous waste with a mercury concentration of 0.6 ppmw equates approximately to an uncontrolled ( i. e., a system removal efficiency of zero) stack gas concentration of 24 ug/ dscm. This estimated stack gas concentration, of course, does not include contributions to emissions from other mercury containing feedstocks including raw materials and fossil fuels. Mercury concentrations of 1.1, 2, and 5 ppmw in the hazardous waste equate to uncontrolled stack gas concentrations of approximately 43, 79, and 196 ug/ dscm. 95 We compared the concentration of mercury in the hazardous waste associated with the normal emissions data in our data base to the 3 year historical burn tank concentration data to estimate whether the normal data in our data base   the basis of today's proposed floor of 64 ug/ dscm   are likely to represent the high end, low end, or close to average emissions. Mercury feed concentration information is not available for every test condition; however, the mercury concentrations in the hazardous waste burned by the best performing sources during the tests that generated the normal emissions ranged from 0.1 to 0.44 ppmw. For the best performing sources comprising the MACT pool for which we can make a comparison, it appears that the normal concentrations in the hazardous waste during testing represent the low end ( 15th percentile or less) of average mercury concentrations. We invite comment on whether the normal emissions data in our data base are representative of average emissions in practice and whether evaluating the data to identify a floor level is appropriate. In addition, we request comment on how to identify a floor level using the 3 year hazardous waste mercury concentration data. One potential approach would be to establish a hazardous waste feed concentration standard expressed in ppmw. To identify a floor level expressed as a hazardous waste feed concentration in ppmw, we identified and evaluated the 3 year historical burn tank concentration data of the five best performing facilities ( those sources with the lowest mean concentration considering variability). The calculated alternative floor level is 2.2 ppmw in the hazardous waste. To put this in context for a hypothetical wet process cement * OMB Review Draft*

96 USEPA, " Draft Technical Support Document for HWC MACT Replacement Standards, Volume III: Selection of MACT Standards and Technologies", March 2004.

97 USEPA, " Draft Technical Support Document for HWC MACT Replacement Standards, Volume III: Selection of MACT Standards and Technologies", March 2004. kiln that gets 50% of its required heat input from hazardous waste, a mercury concentration of 2.2 ppmw in the hazardous waste equates approximately to an uncontrolled stack gas concentration of 86 ug/ dscm. 96 This estimated stack gas concentration, of course, does not include contributions to emissions from other mercury containing feedstocks such as raw materials and fossil fuels. If we were to adopt such an approach, we would require sources to comply with the feed concentration standand on a short term basis ( e. g., 12 hour average). We also invite comment on whether we should judge an annual limit of 64 ug/ dscm as less stringent than either the current emission standard of 120 ug/ dscm or the hazardous waste MTEC of mercury of 120 ug/ dscm for cement kilns ( so as to avoid any backsliding from a current level of performance achieved by all sources, and hence, the level of minimal stringency at which EPA could calculate the MACT floor). In order to comply with the current emission standard, generally a source must conduct manual stack sampling to demonstrate compliance with the mercury emission standard and then establish a maximum mercury feedrate limit based on operations during the performance test. Following the performance test, the source complies with a limit on the maximum total mercury feedrate in all feedstreams on a 12 hour rolling average ( not an annual average). Alternatively, a source can elect to comply with a hazardous waste MTEC of mercury of 120 ug/ dscm that would require the source to limit the mercury feedrate in the hazardous waste on a 12 hour rolling average. The floor level of 64 ug/ dscm proposed today would allow a source to feed more variable mercury containing feedstreams ( e. g., a hazardous waste with an mercury MTEC greater than 120 ug/ dscm) than the current 12 hour rolling average because today's proposed floor level is an annual limit. For example, we estimated a hazardous waste MTEC for each burn tank measurement associated with the 3 year historical concentration data submitted by CKRC. We found that approximately 5% of burn tank measurements would exceed a hazardous waste MTEC of 120 ug/ dscm, including sources upon which the proposed floor is based. 97 2. EPA's Evaluation of Beyond the Floor Standards for Existing Sources We identified three potential beyond the floor techniques for control of mercury: ( 1) activated carbon injection; ( 2) control of mercury in the hazardous waste feed; and ( 3) control of mercury in the raw materials and auxiliary fuels. For reasons discussed below, we are not proposing a beyond the floor standard for mercury. Use of Activated Carbon Injection. We evaluated activated carbon injection as beyondthe floor control for further reduction of mercury emissions. Activated carbon has been demonstrated for controlling mercury in several combustion applications; however, currently no cement kiln that burns hazardous waste uses activated carbon injection. Given this lack of experience using activated carbon injection, we made a conservative assumption that the use of activated carbon injection will provide 70% mercury control and evaluated a beyond the floor level of 19 ug/ dscm. In addition, for costing purposes we assumed that cement kilns needing activated carbon injection to achieve the beyond the floor level would install the activated carbon injection * OMB Review Draft*

98 USEPA, " Draft Technical Support Document for HWC MACT Replacement Standards, Volume V: Emission Estimates and Engineering Costs", March 2004 system after the existing particulate matter control device and add a new, smaller baghouse to remove the injected carbon with the adsorbed mercury. We chose this costing approach to address potential concerns that injected carbon may interfere with cement kiln dust recycling practices. The national incremental annualized compliance cost for cement kilns to meet this beyondthe floor level rather than comply with the floor controls would be approximately $ 16.8 million and would provide an incremental reduction in mercury emissions beyond the MACT floor controls of 0.41 tons per year. Nonair quality health and environmental impacts and energy effects were evaluated to estimate the impacts between activated carbon injection and controls likely to be used to meet the floor level. We estimate that this beyond the floor option would increase the amount of solid waste generated by 4,400 tons per year and would require sources to use an additional 21 million kW hours per year beyond the requirements to achieve the floor level. The costs associated with these impacts are accounted for in the national annualized compliance cost estimates. Therefore, based on these factors and costs of approximately $ 41 million per additional ton of mercury removed, we are not proposing a beyond the floor standard based on activated carbon injection. Feed Control of Mercury in the Hazardous Waste. We also evaluated a beyond the floor level of 51 ug/ dscm, which represents a 20% reduction from the floor level. We chose a 20% reduction as a level representing the practicable extent that additional feedrate control of mercury in hazardous waste ( beyond feedrate control that may be necessary to achieve the floor level) can be used and still achieve modest emissions reductions. 98 The national incremental annualized compliance cost for cement kilns to meet this beyond the floor level rather than comply with the floor controls would be approximately $ 3.7 million and would provide an incremental reduction in mercury emissions beyond the MACT floor controls of 180 pounds per year. Nonair quality health and environmental impacts and energy effects were also evaluated. Therefore, based on these factors and costs of approximately $ 42 million per additional ton of mercury removed, we are not proposing a beyond the floor standard based on feed control of mercury in the hazardous waste. Feed Control of Mercury in the Raw Materials and Auxiliary Fuels. Cement kilns could achieve a reduction in mercury emissions by substituting a raw material containing lower levels of mercury for a primary raw material with a higher level. We believe that this beyond the floor option would be even less cost effective than either of the options discussed above, however. Given that sources are sited near the supply of the primary raw material, transporting large quantities of an alternate source of raw materials is likely to be cost prohibitive, especially considering the small expected emissions reductions that would result. We also considered whether fuel switching to an auxiliary fuel containing a lower concentration of mercury would be an appropriate control option for sources. Given that most cement kilns burning hazardous waste also burn coal as a fuel, we considered switching to natural gas as a potential beyond the floor option. We are concerned about the availability of natural gas to all cement kilns because natural gas pipelines are not available in all regions of the United States. See 68 FR 1673. Moreover, even where pipelines provide access to natural gas, supplies of natural gas may not be adequate. For example, it is common practice in cities during winter * OMB Review Draft*

months ( or periods of peak demand) to prioritize natural gas usage for residential areas before industrial usage. Requiring cement kilns to switch to natural gas would place an even greater strain on natural gas resources. Consequently, even where pipelines exist, some sources may not be able to use natural gas during times of limited supplies. Thus, natural gas may not be a viable control option for some sources. Therefore, we are not proposing a beyond the floor standard based on limiting mercury in the raw material feed and auxiliary fuels. For the reasons discussed above, we propose not to adopt a beyond the floor standard for mercury and propose to establish the emission standard for existing cement kilns at 64 ug/ dscm. If we were to adopt such a standard, we are proposing that sources comply with the standard on an annual basis because it is based on normal emissions data. 3. What Is the Rationale for the MACT Floor for New Sources? Mercury emissions from new cement kilns are currently limited to 120 ug/ dscm by § 63.1204( b)( 2). New cement kilns can comply with an alternative mercury standard that limits the hazardous waste maximum theoretical emissions concentration or MTEC of mercury of 120 ug/ dscm. This standard was promulgated in the Interim Standards Rule ( See 67 FR at 6796). The MACT floor for new sources for mercury would be 35 ug/ dscm, which considers emissions variability, based on a hazardous waste MTEC of 5.1 ug/ dscm. This is an emission level that the single best performing source identified with the SRE/ Feed Approach could be expected to achieve in 99 of 100 future tests when operating under conditions identical to the test conditions during which the emissions data were obtained. As for existing sources, we assumed all sources equally achieved a SRE of zero. The effect of this assumption is that the single source with the lowest mercury concentration in the hazardous waste was identified as the best performing source. We also invite comment on whether we should judge an annual limit of 35 ug/ dscm as less stringent than either the current emission standard of 120 ug/ dscm or the hazardous waste MTEC of mercury of 120 ug/ dscm for cement kilns ( so as to avoid any backsliding from a current level of performance achieved by all sources). 4. EPA's Evaluation of Beyond the Floor Standards for New Sources We identified the same three potential beyond the floor techniques for control of mercury: ( 1) use of activated carbon; ( 2) control of mercury in the hazardous waste feed; and ( 3) control of the mercury in the raw materials and auxiliary fuels. Use of Activated Carbon Injection. We evaluated activated carbon injection as beyondthe floor control for further reduction of mercury emissions. We made a conservative assumption that the use of activated carbon injection will provide 70% mercury control and evaluated a beyond the floor level of 11 ug/ dscm. The incremental annualized compliance cost for a new cement kiln to meet this beyond the floor level, rather than comply with the floor level, would be approximately $ 1.0 million and would provide an incremental reduction in mercury emissions of approximately 88 pounds per year. We also estimate that this option would increase the amount of solid waste generated by 400 tons per year and would require sources to use an additional 1.9 million kW hours per year. Nonair quality health and environmental impacts and energy effects are accounted for in the national annualized compliance cost estimates. Therefore, based on these factors and costs of $ 23 million per ton of mercury removed, we are not proposing a beyond thefloor standard based on activated carbon injection for new cement kilns. Feed Control of Mercury in the Hazardous Waste. We also believe that the expense for * OMB Review Draft*

99 A greenfield cement kiln is a kiln constructed at a site where no cement kiln previously existed; however, a newly constructed or reconstructed cement kiln at an existing site would not be considered as a greenfield cement kiln. further reduction in mercury emissions based on further control of mercury concentrations in the hazardous waste is not warranted. A beyond the floor level of 28 ug/ dscm, which represents a 20% reduction from the floor level, would result in little additional mercury reductions. For similar reasons discussed above for existing sources, we conclude that a beyond the floor standard based on controlling the mercury in the hazardous waste feed would not be justified because of the costs coupled with estimated emission reductions. Feed Control of Mercury in the Raw Materials and Auxiliary Fuels. Cement kilns could achieve a reduction in mercury emissions by substituting a raw material containing lower levels of mercury for a primary raw material with a higher level. For a new source at an existing cement plant, we believe that this beyond the floor option would not be cost effective due to the costs of transporting large quantities of an alternate source of raw materials to the cement plant. Given that the plant site already exists and sited near the source of raw material, replacing the raw materials at the plant site with lower mercury containing materials would be the source's only option. For a new cement kiln constructed at a new site   a greenfield site99   we are not aware of any information and data from a source that has undertaken or is currently located at a site whose raw materials are low in mercury which would consistently decrease mercury emissions. Further, we are uncertain as to what beyond the floor standard would be achievable using a lower, if it exists, mercury containing raw material. Although we are doubtful that selecting a new plant site based on the content of metals in the raw material is a realistic beyond the floor option considering the numerous additional factors that go into such a decision, we solicit comment on whether and what level of a beyond the floor standard based on controlling the level of mercury in the raw materials is appropriate. We also considered whether fuel switching to an auxiliary fuel containing a lower concentration of mercury would be an appropriate control option for sources. We considered using natural gas in lieu of a fossil fuel such as coal containing higher concentrations of mercury as a potential beyond the floor option. As discussed for existing sources, we are concerned about the availability of the natural gas infrastructure in all regions of the United States and believe that using natural gas would not be a viable control option for all new sources. Therefore, we are not proposing a beyond the floor standard based on limiting mercury in the raw material feed and auxiliary fuels. Therefore, we propose a mercury standard of 35 ug/ dscm for new sources. If we were to adopt such a standard, we are proposing that sources comply with the standard on an annual basis because it is based on normal emissions data.


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 29 (Monday, February 12, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 5906-5912]
[FR Doc No: 2018-02359]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2017-0707; Product Identifier 2016-NM-014-AD; Amendment
39-19185; AD 2018-03-12]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Airbus Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319 series airplanes; Model
A320-211, -212, -214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-
111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. This AD
was prompted by reports of fatigue damage in the structure for the door
stop fittings on certain fuselage frames (FR). This AD requires
repetitive rototest inspections for cracking of the fastener holes in
certain door stop fittings, and repair if necessary. We are issuing
this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective March 19, 2018.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of March 19,
2018.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Airbus, Airworthiness Office--EIAS, 1 Rond Point Maurice
Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone: +33 5 61 93 36 96;
fax: +33 5 61 93 44 51; email: [email protected];
internet: http://www.airbus.com. You may view this referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport Standards Branch, 1601 Lind Avenue
SW, Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>. It is also available on the internet at
http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2017-0707.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2017-
0707; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone:
800-647-5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer,
International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW, Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax: 425-
227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus Model A318
series airplanes; Model A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -
214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -
211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. The NPRM published in the
Federal Register on July 25, 2017 (82 FR 34449) (``the NPRM''). The
NPRM was prompted by reports of fatigue damage in the structure for the
door stop fittings on certain fuselage frames. The NPRM proposed to
require repetitive rototest inspections for cracking of the fastener
holes in certain door stop fittings, and repair if necessary. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking at the door stop fitting
holes of fuselage FR66 and FR68. Such cracking could result in reduced
structural integrity of the airplane due to the failure of structural
components.
    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD
2016-0238, dated December 2, 2016; corrected January 4, 2017 (referred
to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or
``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for certain Airbus Model
A318 series airplanes; Model A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -
212, -214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -
131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. The MCAI states:

    During an A320 fatigue test campaign, it was determined that
fatigue damage could appear at the door stop fitting holes of
fuselage frame (FR) 66 and FR 68 on left hand (LH) and right hand
(RH) sides.
    This condition, if not detected and corrected, could affect the
structural integrity of the airframe.
    Two inspections, Airworthiness Limitations Item (ALI) tasks
534129 and 534130, were introduced in the Airworthiness Limitations
Section (ALS) Part 2 with the April 2012 revision and with some
compliance time changes with Revision 3 of ALS Part 2 of October
2014.
    Since these ALI tasks were implemented, a significant number of
reports [were] received concerning non-critical damage and early
crack findings. Prompted by these reports, Airbus published SB A320-
53-1288 and SB A320-53-1290, providing inspection instructions to
improve damage management and modification instructions.
    Consequently, EASA issued AD 2016-0015, requiring repetitive
rototest inspections of the affected door stop fitting holes and,
depending on findings, repair of any cracked area(s).
    Since that [EASA] AD was issued, ALS Part 2 Revision 04 and
later on Revision 05 were published, introducing updated thresholds
and/or intervals for some tasks as specified in Airbus SB A320-53-
1288, introducing new configuration of aeroplane with RETRO WING
having accomplished SB A320-57-1193 (mod 160080), and keeping the
threshold or interval only in flight cycles (FC).
    For the reasons described above, this [EASA] AD retains the
requirements of EASA AD 2016-0015, which is superseded, but requires
those actions within the updated thresholds and intervals. In
addition, a corrected threshold for pre-mod 160021 A321 aeroplanes
is introduced and the Applicability is reduced to exclude
configurations that are not affected.
    This [EASA] AD is republished to clarify some requirements in
Appendix 1 [in this EASA AD].

    You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2017-
0707.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and
the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Add a Grace Period for Certain Repetitive Inspections

    United Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise paragraph (h) of the
proposed AD to allow a 60-day grace period after

the effective date of this AD to give operators time to update their
maintenance programs. UAL noted that for airplanes on which inspections
were previously accomplished as specified in airworthiness limitation
item (ALI) task 534129 or 534130, paragraph (h) of the proposed AD
requires future inspections be done in accordance with Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and
03, dated October 3, 2016. UAL noted that operators who are not yet
incorporating Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01,
including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016, may have to
schedule special inspection visits instead of doing the inspections
during scheduled maintenance.
    We agree with the commenter's request to add a grace period to
paragraph (h) of this AD to allow operators to plan for the new
inspection interval. However, since the commenter did not provide
adequate justification to support a 60-day grace period, we have
determined that a 30-day grace period is appropriate. Additionally,
under the provisions of paragraph (q)(1) of this AD, we will consider
requests for approval of an extension of the compliance time if
sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the new compliance
time would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have revised
paragraph (h) of this AD to include a 30-day grace period.

Request To Allow Deviations From the Service Information for Certain
Modified Airplanes

    UAL requested that either the service information or the proposed
AD be revised to provide alternate instructions for airplanes with
modified hardware. UAL noted that ``paragraph (i)'' of the proposed AD
requires repetitive inspections on airplanes modified by cold working
fastener holes, which includes installing oversize hardware. UAL
pointed out that the inspections must be done in accordance with Airbus
Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes 01,
02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016, which requires using nominal size
hardware that no longer exists on modified airplanes.
    We infer that the commenter meant to refer to paragraph (j) of the
proposed AD, which discusses post-modification inspections, rather than
paragraph (i) of the proposed AD, which discusses an optional
modification. We agree with the commenter's request. We acknowledge
that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including
Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016, does not specifically
address oversize hardware; however, EASA has stated that ``the same
inspection principle applies for post SB [Service Bulletin] 53-1290
configuration.'' Therefore, we have retained Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated
October 3, 2016, in paragraph (j) of this AD. We have also revised
paragraph (j) of this AD to include an option for operators to obtain
inspection instructions using a method approved by the Manager,
International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA; or
Airbus's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA).

Request To Remove a Reference to a Non-Terminating Action

    UAL requested that we remove the statement ``repair of an airplane
as required by this paragraph does not constitute terminating action
for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (g) or (j) of this
AD for that repair, unless specified otherwise'' from paragraph (k) of
the proposed AD. UAL suggested that statement be replaced with one
instructing operators to accomplish inspections as specified in the
repair instructions.
    UAL noted that paragraph (k) of the proposed AD states that a crack
repair must be done using a method approved by the Manager,
International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA; or
Airbus's EASA DOA and says that such a repair does not constitute
terminating action for the repetitive inspections done in accordance
with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including
Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016, unless specified
otherwise.
    UAL pointed out that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision
01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016,
contains language to allow operators to accomplish crack repairs in
accordance with structural repair manual (SRM) 53-41-12, and then
perform inspections of the repaired area in accordance with SRM 53-41-
12. UAL noted that the SRM repair instructions do not state that they
terminate the inspections in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288,
Revision 01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3,
2016. UAL further noted that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288,
Revision 01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3,
2016, only applies to unrepaired areas with nominal size holes (the
repaired areas would have oversized holes).
    We disagree with the commenter's request. We acknowledge that
Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes
01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016, allows repairs to be done using
an SRM. However, this AD does not include that allowance since SRMs
published before the effective date of this AD might not address the
unsafe condition identified in this AD. Therefore, paragraph (k) of
this AD requires repairs to be done using a method approved by the
Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or
EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA.
    Additionally, the statement that the commenter requested us to
remove from paragraph (k) of this proposed AD aligns with the MCAI. The
statement is meant to clarify that doing a repair does not necessarily
terminate the repetitive inspections; the repetitive inspections would
only be terminated if the repair approved by the Manager, International
Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA
specifically states that the inspections are terminated. If the
approved repair does not state that the inspections are terminated,
operators must continue to inspect using Airbus Service Bulletin A320-
53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated
October 3, 2016, or using a method approved by the Manager,
International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA; or
Airbus's EASA DOA. Therefore, we have not changed the requirements in
paragraph (k) of this AD nor have we removed the statement identified
by the commenter. However, we have revised paragraph (g) of this AD to
include an option for operators to obtain inspection instructions using
a method approved by the Manager, International Section, Transport
Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA.

Request To Remove Requirement To Obtain Certain Inspection Instructions

    UAL requested that we remove paragraph (l)(2) of the proposed AD
because it has no real purpose. UAL noted that paragraph (l)(2) of the
proposed AD requires operators to obtain inspection instructions and
corrective actions for all repaired fastener holes by contacting the
Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or
EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA. UAL claimed that if a repair was
accomplished using the instructions in an SRM or repair design approval
sheet (RDAS), the repair approval contains, at a minimum, the initial
compliance threshold. UAL added that it is standard

practice for operators to contact Airbus prior to the inspection
threshold if the compliance method and intervals are not yet defined.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. Airbus intends to provide
specific instructions for airplanes inspected in accordance with ALI
task 534129 or task 534130 and repaired in accordance with an SRM or
RDAS published before the effective date of this AD. Since repair
instructions published before the effective date of this AD might not
address the unsafe condition identified in this AD, the SRM or RDAS
instructions might need to be re-evaluated or revised to address the
unsafe condition. In addition, we do not rely on an operator's standard
practices, and instead require operators to obtain inspections and
corrective actions to address the unsafe condition. We have not revised
this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Actions for Airplanes With Certain Repairs

    UAL requested that we delete paragraph (n) of the proposed AD. UAL
noted that paragraph (n) of the proposed AD requires operators to
determine if a repair was done using an RDAS that is unrelated to ALI
task 534129 or task 534130. UAL suggested that the repair instructions
would have to state that the damage was found as a result of the
applicable ALI, but noted that the ALI task is an inspection that may
not be referenced in a documented repair. UAL questioned the relevance
of whether or not a repair was related to ALI task 534129 or task
534130, noting that the same considerations are given to repair
instructions, regardless of how damage was found. UAL stated that
operators would know to seek an alternative method of compliance (AMOC)
if they cannot inspect a previously repaired area in accordance with
Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes
01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. The intent of paragraph
(n) of the proposed AD is to require operators to re-evaluate existing
repairs performed using an Airbus RDAS unrelated to ALI task 534129 or
task 534130 because those repairs may not address the findings from the
specific inspection types required by the ALI tasks. Therefore, the
corresponding repairs might not address the unsafe condition and
operators might need new instructions. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.

Request To Verify the Latest Service Information is Referenced

    UAL requested that, prior to the release of this final rule, we
verify that we are referencing the latest revisions of Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and
03, dated October 3, 2016; and Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1290,
Revision 01, dated October 3, 2016.
    We agree with the commenter's request. We have verified that no
later revisions of the service information have been issued, and no
change is needed to this AD.

Explanation of Change to the Final Rule

    In the proposed AD, Table 1 to paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD
and Table 2 to paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD included a compliance
time that stated ``. . . or before November 30, 2017. . . .'' Since
this final rule will become effective after November 30, 2017, we have
changed this statement to read ``. . . or within 30 days after the
effective date of this AD. . . .'' We have determined that this revised
compliance time addresses the unsafe condition.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    Airbus has issued the following service information.
     Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01,
including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016. This
service information describes procedures for rototest inspections for
cracking of the fastener holes in the airframe structure for the door
stop fittings installation in FR66 and FR68.
     Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1290, Revision 01, dated
October 3, 2016. This service information describes procedures for cold
working the fastener holes in the airframe structure for the door stop
fittings installation in FR66 and FR68.
    This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 1,084 airplanes of U.S. registry.
    We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost on U.S.
           Action                  Labor cost         Parts cost       Cost per product          operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspections................  23 work-hours x $85                $0  $1,955 per inspection  $2,119,220 per
                              per hour = $1,955                      cycle.                 inspection cycle.
                              per inspection cycle.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We estimate the following costs to do any necessary repairs that
would be required based on the results of the required inspection. We
have no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need this
repair.

                                               On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost per
                   Action                                 Labor cost                Parts cost        product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repair.....................................  27 work-hours x $85 per hour =                 $610          $2,905
                                              $2,295.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
    This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by
FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is
normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but
during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the
authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes to
the Director of the System Oversight Division.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
    3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and
    4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13   [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

2018-03-12 Airbus: Amendment 39-19185; Docket No. FAA-2017-0707;
Product Identifier 2016-NM-014-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective March 19, 2018.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Airbus Model A318-111, -112, -121, and -122
airplanes; Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -
133 airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, 231, -232, and -233
airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231,
and -232 airplanes; certificated in any category; all manufacturer
serial numbers, except airplanes specified in paragraphs (c)(1),
(c)(2), and (c)(3) of this AD.
    (1) Airplanes on which Airbus modification (Mod) 157039 has been
embodied in production.
    (2) Model A319 series airplanes on which Mod 28238, Mod 28162,
and Mod 28342 have been embodied in production.
    (3) Model A318 series airplanes on which Mod 39195 has been
embodied in production or Airbus Service Bulletin A320-00-1219 has
been embodied in service.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53, Fuselage.

(e) Reason

    This AD was prompted by reports of fatigue damage in the
structure for the door stop fittings on certain fuselage frames
(FR). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking at the
door stop fitting holes of fuselage FR66 and FR68. Such cracking
could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane due to
the failure of structural components.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Repetitive Rototest Inspections

    Within the applicable compliance times specified in table 1 to
paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD and table 2 to paragraphs (g) and
(j) of this AD: Do a rototest inspection of all holes below each
door stop fitting at fuselage FR66 and FR68, both left-hand (LH) and
right-hand (RH) sides, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01,
including Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016; or using
a method approved by the Manager, International Section, Transport
Standards Branch, FAA; or the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA); or Airbus's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). Repeat
the inspections thereafter at the applicable compliance times
specified in table 1 to paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD and table
2 to paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD, until the modification
specified in paragraph (i) of this AD is done. Where the
``Threshold'' column of table 1 to paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD
and table 2 to paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD, specifies
compliance times in ``FC'' (flight cycles), those compliance times
are total flight cycles since the first flight of the airplane.
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(h) Airworthiness Limitations Item (ALI) Inspections Accomplished
Before the Effective Date of This AD

    Inspections accomplished as specified in ALI task 534129 or task
534130 before the effective date of this AD are acceptable for
compliance with the initial inspection required by paragraph (g) of
this AD. As of 30 days after the effective date of this AD,
repetitive inspections must be continued as required by paragraph
(g) of this AD.

(i) Optional Modification

    For airplanes on which no cracks were detected during any
rototest inspection required by paragraph (g) of this AD: Modifying
the affected area by cold working the fastener holes before further
flight after no cracks were detected, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1290,
Revision 01, dated October 3, 2016, terminates the repetitive
inspections required by paragraph (g) of this AD for the modified
area only.

(j) Post-Modification Repetitive Inspections

    For airplanes on which the modification specified in paragraph
(i) of this AD has been done: At the compliance time specified in
paragraphs (j)(1), (j)(2), or (j)(3) of this AD, as applicable,
accomplish a rototest inspection of all holes at the door stop
fitting locations at fuselage FR66 and FR68, both LH and RH sides,
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service
Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including Appendixes 01, 02, and
03, dated October 3, 2016; or using a method approved by the
Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); or Airbus's EASA Design
Organization Approval (DOA). Repeat the inspection thereafter at
intervals not to exceed the applicable compliance times specified in
table 1 to paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD and table 2 to
paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD.
    (1) For airplanes with less than 1,800 flight cycles accumulated
since first flight of the airplane at the time of accomplishing the
modification specified in paragraph (i) of this AD: At the
applicable initial compliance time specified in table 1 to
paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD and table 2 to paragraphs (g) and
(j) of this AD.
    (2) For airplanes with 1,800 flight cycles or more and less than
13,800 flight cycles accumulated since first flight of the airplane
at the time of accomplishing the modification specified in paragraph
(i) of this AD: Before the accumulation of 48,000 flight cycles
since first flight of the airplane.
    (3) For airplanes with 13,800 flight cycles or more accumulated
since first flight of the airplane at the time of accomplishing the
modification specified in paragraph (i) of this AD: Before the
accumulation of 60,000 flight cycles since first flight of the
airplane.

(k) Repair

    If, during any inspection required by paragraph (g) or (j) of
this AD, any crack is detected, before further flight, repair using
a method approved by the Manager, International Section, Transport
Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA. Repair of an
airplane as required by this paragraph does not constitute
terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by
paragraph (g) or (j) of this AD for that airplane, unless specified
otherwise in instructions obtained using a method approved by the
Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or
EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA.

(l) Post-Repair Actions for Certain Airplanes

    For an airplane that has been inspected as specified in ALI task
534129 or task 534130 and repaired before the effective date of this
AD as specified in the applicable structural repair manual (SRM) or
as specified in an Airbus repair design approval sheet (RDAS):
Comply with the requirements of paragraphs (l)(1) and (l)(2) of this
AD.
    (1) For all fastener holes where no damage or cracks were
detected (i.e., those not repaired), accomplish the actions required
by paragraph (g) of this AD, unless the terminating action specified
in paragraph (m) of this AD has been done.
    (2) For all repaired fastener holes: Within 30 days after the
effective date of this AD, or within a compliance time approved by
the Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA;
or EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA, whichever occurs later, contact the
Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or
EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA; for inspection instructions and
applicable corrective actions, and do the inspections and applicable
corrective actions accordingly.

(m) Terminating Action for Certain Airplanes

    For airplanes that have been inspected, as specified in ALI task
534129 or task 534130, and repaired before the effective date of
this AD, as specified in the applicable SRM, or as specified in an
Airbus RDAS: Modification of the four fastener holes at door stop
locations where no damage or crack was detected (i.e., door stop
locations not repaired) by cold working holes before further flight
after no cracks were detected, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1290, Revision 01,
dated October 3, 2016, constitutes terminating action for the
repetitive inspections of those four fastener holes at those door
stop locations as required by paragraphs (g) or (l)(1) of this AD
for that airplane.

(n) Actions for Airplanes With Certain Repairs

    For an airplane that has been repaired before the effective date
of this AD in the areas described in this AD using an Airbus RDAS
unrelated to ALI task 534129 or task 534130: Before exceeding the
compliance times specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, contact the
Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or
EASA; or Airbus's EASA DOA; for corrective action instructions and
accomplish those instructions accordingly. Accomplishment of
corrective action(s) on an airplane, as required by this paragraph,
does not constitute terminating action for the repetitive
inspections as required by paragraphs (g) or (j) of this AD for that
airplane, as applicable, unless specified otherwise in the
instructions.

(o) Terminating Action for ALI Tasks

    (1) Accomplishment of inspections on an airplane, as required by
paragraphs (g), (j), or (l) of this AD, as applicable, constitutes
terminating action for the inspection requirements of ALI task
534129 or task 534130, as applicable, for that airplane.
    (2) Modification of the four fastener holes at a door stop
location of an airplane as specified in paragraphs (i) or (m) of
this AD, as applicable, and subsequent initial inspection required
by paragraph (j) of this AD, constitutes terminating action for the
inspection requirements of ALI task 534129 or task 534130, as
applicable, for those holes for that airplane. Subsequent repetitive
inspections are required by paragraph (j) of this AD.

(p) Credit for Previous Actions

    (1) This paragraph provides credit for actions required by
paragraphs (g) and (j) of this AD, if those actions were performed
before the effective date of this AD using Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-53-1288, including Appendixes 01 and 02, dated October 10,
2014.
    (2) This paragraph provides credit for actions required by
paragraphs (i) and (m) of this AD, if those actions were performed
before the effective date of this AD using Airbus Service Bulletin
A320-53-1290, dated October 10, 2014.

(q) Other FAA AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the International Section, send it to the attention of
the person identified in paragraph (r)(2) of this AD. Information
may be emailed to: [email protected]. Before using any
approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or
lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight
standards district office/certificate holding district office.
    (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD
to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the action must be
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, International
Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus's EASA
DOA. If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-
authorized signature.
    (3) Required for Compliance (RC): If any service information
contains procedures or tests that are identified as RC, those
procedures and tests must be done to comply with this AD; any
procedures or tests that are not identified as RC are recommended.
Those procedures and tests that are not identified as RC may be
deviated from using accepted methods in accordance with the
operator's maintenance or inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the procedures and tests identified as
RC can be done and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition. Any substitutions or changes to procedures or tests
identified as RC require approval of an AMOC.

(r) Related Information

    (1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information
(MCAI) EASA AD 2016-0238, dated December 2, 2016; corrected January
4, 2017, for related information. This MCAI may be found in the AD
docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching
for and locating Docket No. FAA-2017-0707.
    (2) For more information about this AD, contact Sanjay Ralhan,
Aerospace Engineer, International Section, Transport Standards
Branch, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone:
425-227-1405; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (3) Service information identified in this AD that is not
incorporated by reference is available at the addresses specified in
paragraphs (s)(3) and (s)(4) of this AD.

(s) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1288, Revision 01, including
Appendixes 01, 02, and 03, dated October 3, 2016.
    (ii) Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1290, Revision 01, dated
October 3, 2016.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Airbus, Airworthiness Office--EIAS, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone: +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax: +33
5 61 93 44 51; email: [email protected]; internet:
http://www.airbus.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport
Standards Branch, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, Renton, WA. For information
on the availability of this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 29, 2018.
Michael Kaszycki,
Acting Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2018-02359 Filed 2-9-18; 8:45 am]
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[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 75 (Monday, April 20, 2015)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 21691]
[FR Doc No: 2015-08890]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 136

[EPA-HQ-OW-2014-0797; FRL-9926-38-OW]
RIN 2040-AF48

Clean Water Act Methods Update Rule for the Analysis of Effluent;
Comment Extension

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of the public comment period.

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SUMMARY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received requests for an
extension of the period for providing comments on the proposed rule
entitled, ``Clean Water Act Methods Update Rule for the Analysis of
Effluent,'' published in the Federal Register on February 19, 2015. EPA
extends the comment period in order to provide the public additional
time to submit comments and supporting information.

DATES: EPA extends the public comment period for the proposed rule
published February 19, 2015, (80 FR 8956) to May 20, 2015.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the proposed rule may be submitted to
the EPA electronically, by mail, by facsimile or through hand delivery/
courier. Please refer to the proposal (80 FR 8956) for the addresses
and detailed instructions.
    Docket. Publically available documents relevant to this action are
available for public inspection either electronically at http://www.regulations.gov or in hard copy at the Water Docket in the EPA
Docket Center, EPA/DC, EPA West, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Ave. NW.,
Washington, DC. The Public Reading Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30
p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. The telephone
number for the Public Reading Room is<PHONE_NUMBER>, and the telephone
number for the Water Docket is<PHONE_NUMBER>. The EPA has established
the official public docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2014-0797.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Adrian Hanley, Engineering and
Analysis Division (4303T), Office of Water, Environmental Protection
Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20460-0001;
telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comment Period

    The EPA is extending the previously announced public-comment
period. The public comment period will end on May 20, 2015, rather than
April 20, 2015. This will ensure that the public has sufficient time to
review and comment on all of the information available, including the
proposed rule and other materials in the docket.

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 136

    Environmental protection, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Test procedures, Water pollution control.

    Dated: April 9, 2015.
Kenneth J. Kopocis,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water.
[FR Doc. 2015-08890 Filed 4-17-15; 8:45 am]
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