record that would allow for a meaningful review of the challenged page
700 inputs. If the complaint is successful, the Commission would direct
the pipeline to revise its page 700 to correct any errors or
inaccuracies. These revisions, in turn, could alter the cost and
revenue data on which shippers and the Commission rely in evaluating
cost-of-service complaints against the pipeline's rates and challenges
to the pipeline's annual index rate changes. Thus, although we
recognize the burden and expense associated with filing a complaint, we
disagree with Liquids Shippers' claim that there would be no commercial
benefits to filing a complaint against a pipeline's page 700 inputs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ The instructions on page 700 require pipelines to
determine their page 700 inputs consistent with the Opinion No. 154-
B cost-of-service methodology. To comply with this instruction, a
pipeline must adhere to the Commission's application of the Opinion
No. 154-B methodology in proceedings involving the pipeline's rates.
    \200\ Liquids Shippers Request for Rehearing at 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Liquids Shippers' Proposal To Adopt Standardized ROEs for 2014 and
2019

    70. Liquids Shippers argued in their comments that the reported
page 700 ROEs conflict with the Commission's cost-of-service ratemaking
methodology because they are self-reported and vary substantially.\201\
In addition, Liquids Shippers maintained that uncertainty surrounding
the Commission's oil pipeline ROE policy at the time pipelines
submitted their page 700 filings for 2019 undermined the reliability of
the reported ROEs for 2019.\202\ Thus, Liquids Shippers urged the
Commission to replace pipelines' reported page 700 ROEs for 2014 and
2019 with standardized ROEs for purposes of calculating the index
level. For 2014, Liquids Shippers proposed a standardized ROE of
10.29%, which 54 pipelines reported in their 2014 page 700
filings.\203\ For 2019, Liquids Shippers proposed to use the 10.02% ROE
that Trial Staff proposed in an ongoing Colonial rate proceeding based
upon data for the six-month period ending in November 2019.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ Liquids Shippers Initial Comments at 21-23.
    \202\ Id. at 25-28. In support of this argument, Liquids
Shippers contend that two pipelines submitted updated Form No. 6
filings in July 2020 indicating that the page 700 ROEs they reported
in April 2020 did not comply with the Commission's then-applicable
policy relying solely upon the DCF model. Liquids Shippers Request
for Rehearing at 76-77 (citing Liquids Shippers Initial Comments at
25-28) (referring to updated Form No. 6 filings of Plains Pipeline,
LP, and Rocky Mountain Pipeline System LLC).
    \203\ Ms. Crowe stated that 45 pipelines reported a 10.29% ROE
on their page 700s for 2014. Crowe Initial Aff. at 11-12. However,
based upon a review of Form No. 6 filings submitted in 2016, the
Commission found in the December 2020 Order that 54 pipelines
reported this ROE for 2014 in the column on page 700 for previous
year data. December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 43 n.97.
    \204\ Liquids Shippers Initial Comments at 30-31; Crowe Initial
Aff. at 11 (citing Trial Staff, Exhibit S-00057 (Direct and
Answering Cost-Based Rate Testimony of Commission Trial Staff
Witness Robert J. Keyton), Docket Nos. OR18-7-002 et al. (filed Jan.
14, 2020)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. December 2020 Order
    71. The December 2020 Order declined to adopt standardized ROEs for
2014 and 2019 and concluded that Liquids Shippers have not demonstrated
that the reported page 700 ROEs are unreliable or inconsistent with
Commission policy.\205\ First, the Commission rejected Liquids
Shippers' argument that page 700 ROEs are unreliable simply because
they are self-reported, reasoning that the instructions on page 700
required pipelines to determine ROE consistent with the Commission's
then-applicable policy of relying solely upon the DCF model.\206\
Second, the Commission found that variation among page 700 ROEs does
not indicate that this data is unreliable and that such variation may
result from differences in proxy group composition and relative
risk.\207\ Third, the Commission rejected Liquids Shippers' contention
that pipelines were uncertain as to the Commission's oil pipeline ROE
policy when they submitted their 2019 Form No. 6 filings. The
Commission found that pipelines had adequate notice of the prevailing
policy through the page 700 instruction requiring pipelines to
determine ROE consistent with the then-current Opinion No. 154-B
methodology.\208\ Fourth, the Commission found that Liquids Shippers
have not supported their proposed standardized ROEs.\209\ Finally, the
Commission concluded that determining standardized ROEs would
complicate the five-year review process and undermine indexing's
purpose as a simplified and streamlined ratemaking regime.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 45.
    \206\ Id. P 46.
    \207\ Id. P 47.
    \208\ Id. P 48.
    \209\ Id. P 49.
    \210\ Id. P 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rehearing Request
    72. Liquids Shippers contend that the December 2020 Order erred by
failing to replace the reported 2014 and 2019 page 700 ROEs with
Liquids Shippers' proposed standardized ROEs. They repeat their
argument that the reported page 700 ROEs cannot be consistent with the
Commission's cost-of-service methodology because they vary
substantially.\211\ Liquids Shippers

emphasize that these ROEs were selected by the pipelines themselves.
Furthermore, Liquids Shippers contend that the page 700 ROEs fail to
accurately capture changing market conditions between 2014 and 2019
because some pipelines reported a 2019 page 700 ROE that was
significantly higher than their 2014 page 700 ROE, while other
pipelines reported a 2019 ROE that was significantly lower than their
2014 ROE.\212\ Liquids Shippers state that to the extent there is
limited evidence addressing whether the page 700 ROEs conflict with the
Commission's policy, the absence of more concrete evidence ``does not
give rise to a negative inference that such evidence does not exist.''
\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ Liquids Shippers Request for Rehearing at 70-72 (citing El
Paso Nat. Gas Co., Opinion No. 528, 145 FERC ] 61,040, at P 592
(2013)). For instance, Liquids Shippers state that among the 160
pipelines in the untrimmed data set, the reported page 700 ROEs for
2019 range from 0.9% to 22.3%. Among the pipelines in the middle
50%, Liquids Shippers state that the 2019 page 700 ROEs range from
7.2% to 18.8%. Id.
    \212\ Id. at 73 (citing Liquids Shippers Initial Comments at 23-
24; Crowe Initial Aff. at 9-10).
    \213\ Id. at 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    73. Liquids Shippers also challenge the Commission's finding that
variations in the reported page 700 ROEs could result from differences
in proxy group composition and relative risk. Liquids Shippers claim
that the December 2020 Order cites no evidence for this conclusion,
despite the fact that the Commission has access to the workpapers
underlying pipelines' page 700 ROE calculations.\214\ In addition,
Liquids Shippers contend that the Commission overstates the degree of
variation that can result from these factors. Regarding proxy group
composition, Liquids Shippers state that there is a small number of
eligible oil pipeline proxy group members, such that there is limited,
if any, potential for variation in the proxy group that may be used
from pipeline to pipeline.\215\ Regarding differences in risk, Liquids
Shippers contend that the Commission has recognized that most pipelines
fall within the same broad range of average risk, such that the median
of the proxy group results is sufficient to compensate most pipelines
for their investments.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ Id. at 81 (citing December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245
at PP 46-47; Revisions to & Electronic Filing of the FERC Form No. 6
& Related Uniform Sys. of Accounts, Order No. 620, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,115, at 31,959-60 (2000) (cross-referenced at 93 FERC ]
61,262), reh'g denied, Order No. 620-A, 94 FERC ] 61,130 (2001)).
    \215\ Id. at 82-83 (citing Opinion No. 528, 145 FERC ] 61,040 at
P 595; AOPL, Comments, Docket No. PL19-4-000, at 15 (filed June 26,
2019)).
    \216\ Id. at 83 (citing Opinion No. 528, 145 FERC ] 61,040 at P
592; Composition of Proxy Groups for Determining Gas and Oil
Pipeline Return on Equity, 123 FERC ] 61,048 (2008) (Proxy Group
Policy Statement)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    74. Furthermore, Liquids Shippers reiterate their earlier argument
that uncertainty surrounding the Commission's oil pipeline ROE
methodology in April 2020 undermines the reliability of the reported
page 700 ROEs for 2019.\217\ Liquids Shippers dispute the Commission's
finding that pipelines received adequate notice of the Commission's
prevailing ROE policy through the page 700 instruction requiring
pipelines to determine ROE consistent with the then-current Opinion No.
154-B methodology.\218\ They argue that the ``mere existence of a rule
does not guarantee compliance with that rule'' and that the Commission
had an affirmative obligation to investigate whether ambiguities in its
prevailing ROE policy affected the 2019 page 700 ROEs.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ As discussed in the December 2020 Order, Liquids Shippers
assert that the Commission initiated a review of its ROE policy in
Docket No. PL19-4-000 on March 21, 2019, but did not clarify its
policy until it issued a policy statement revising its ROE
methodology for natural gas and oil pipelines on May 21, 2020. Id.
at 74-75 (citing Inquiry Regarding the Commission's Policy for
Determining Return on Equity, 171 FERC ] 61,155 (2020) (ROE Policy
Statement); Inquiry Regarding the Commission's Policy for
Determining Return on Equity, 166 FERC ] 61,207 (2019)). Because oil
pipelines were required to submit page 700 cost-of-service data for
2019 in April 2020, Liquids Shippers allege that pipelines were not
certain of the Commission's prevailing policy when pipelines
reported their 2019 ROEs. Id. at 75-76.
    \218\ Id. at 85-86 (citing December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ]
61,245 at P 48).
    \219\ Id. at 86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    75. In addition, Liquids Shippers contend that the Commission
applied an unreasonably strict standard in rejecting their proposed
standardized ROEs. Liquids Shippers state that in order to determine an
ROE that ``accurately measures the investor-required cost of equity for
all pipelines in the data set,'' \220\ Liquids Shippers would need to
provide evidence establishing the financial and business risks for more
than 100 pipelines.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 49.
    \221\ Liquids Shippers Request for Rehearing at 87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    76. Liquids Shippers also disagree with the Commission's conclusion
that replacing reported page 700 ROEs with standardized ROEs would
improperly complicate the five-year review. Liquids Shippers state that
because standardized ROEs would only serve as benchmarks for measuring
pipeline cost changes,\222\ ``establishing a standardized ROE may not
require the same rigor as, e.g., determining an allowable ROE to be
included in an oil pipeline's just and reasonable rates.'' \223\
Liquids Shippers contend, moreover, that determining standardized ROEs
in each five-year review would not be a prohibitive undertaking.
Because most pipeline ROEs would fall at the median of the oil proxy
group, Liquids Shippers state that the Commission would not have to
perform an individualized analysis of every oil pipeline to determine a
standardized ROE.\224\ Additionally, Liquids Shippers observe that
Commission Trial Staff regularly develops proposed ROEs in cost-of-
service rate proceedings. Finally, Liquids Shippers contend that it is
inconsistent for the Commission to reject their proposal to adopt
standardized ROEs as incompatible with simplified and streamlined
ratemaking while also adopting Pipelines' proposals to adjust the
reported page 700 data to remove the effects of the Income Tax Policy
Change.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ Id. at 88-89.
    \223\ Id. at 89.
    \224\ Id. at 89-90.
    \225\ Id. at 90-91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    77. We deny rehearing and sustain the Commission's determination in
the December 2020 Order. We continue to find that Liquids Shippers have
not adequately demonstrated that the reported page 700 ROEs for 2014
and 2019 are unreliable or inconsistent with Commission policy such
that the Commission should revise the Kahn Methodology to replace those
figures with standardized ROEs.\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ As discussed, Liquids Shippers, as the proponent of a
change to the Kahn Methodology, bears the burden of justifying that
change. See supra note 129.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    78. As an initial matter, Liquids Shippers fail to present usable
alternatives to the ROEs that pipelines reported on page 700. As the
Commission concluded in the December 2020 Order, we find that Liquids
Shippers have not supported their proposed standardized ROEs.\227\
Regarding their proposed industry-wide 2014 ROE, Liquids Shippers'
arguments on rehearing do not explain why an ROE figure that only 29%
of pipelines reported for that year accurately measures the investor-
required cost of equity for all pipelines in the data set.\228\
Likewise, for the 2019 ROE, we reject Liquids Shippers' proposal to use
an ROE that one participant proposed in an ongoing hearing for use in
Colonial's rates. Neither the Presiding Judge nor the Commission have
opined on this

ROE proposal.\229\ Moreover, this proposal was challenged by the other
litigants in that proceeding and Liquids Shippers have presented no
evidence that this particular ROE was more appropriate than the other
litigants' proposed ROEs.\230\ In addition, even if the Commission had
adopted a proposed ROE for Colonial in that rate case, the December
2020 Order explains that given the diversity of the oil pipeline
industry, we cannot simply assume that any single ROE could reflect the
investor-required return for all pipelines in the data set.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ Not only do Liquids Shippers fail to justify their
proposed standardized ROEs, but they also fail to correctly
incorporate those ROEs into pipelines' page 700 cost-of-service
calculations. Because ROE forms part of the return on rate base for
which non-MLP pipelines may recover an income tax allowance, any
adjustment to the page 700 ROEs should include corresponding changes
to the pipeline's page 700 income taxes. However, in adjusting the
reported page 700 ROEs, Ms. Crowe fails to reflect the resulting
income tax changes in pipelines' page 700 cost-of-service
calculations. See Crowe Initial Aff. at App. 4.
    \228\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 49.
    \229\ Id. The initial decision addressing Colonial's cost-based
rates, including its just and reasonable ROE, is scheduled to issue
by April 29, 2022. Epsilon Trading, LLC v. Colonial Pipeline Co.,
Docket No. OR18-7-002 (Dec. 2, 2021).
    \230\ Although this figure was proposed in the ongoing hearing
by Commission Trial Staff, Trial Staff are non-decisional employees
for purposes of that proceeding. 18 CFR 385.2201(c)(3) (2021)
(defining ``decisional employee'' to exclude ``an employee
designated as part of the Commission's trial staff in a
proceeding''); Separation of Functions, 101 FERC ] 61,340, at P 7
(2002) (``A `non-decisional employee' is a member of the
Commission's trial staff in a proceeding . . . .'').
    \231\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    79. We conclude, moreover, that Ms. Crowe determines her proposed
standardized ROEs using an inconsistent approach that deflates the
index level. Ms. Crowe asserts that the Commission should adopt 10.29%
as the standardized ROE for 2014 because 54 of 184 filing pipelines
reported that figure on page 700. Liquids Shippers also acknowledge
that an even greater percentage of filing pipelines reported a 10.85%
ROE on page 700 for 2019.\232\ However, rather than adopt this widely
reported figure as the standardized ROE for 2019, Ms. Crowe instead
proposes to use an untested 10.02% ROE that remains subject to
Commission evaluation in the ongoing Colonial rate proceeding. This
unexplained inconsistency materially affects the index level: Whereas
using a 10.85% ROE for 2019 with the proposed 10.29% ROE for 2014 would
reduce the index level by 11 basis points, using a 10.02% ROE for 2019
as Ms. Crowe proposes with the same ROE for 2014 would reduce the index
level by 55 basis points.\233\ Liquids Shippers neither acknowledge
these effects nor justify their proposal to use a widely reported ROE
as the standardized ROE for 2014 but not for 2019.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ Whereas approximately 29% of filing pipelines reported a
10.29% ROE for 2014 (54/184 = 0.293), Liquids Shippers state that 69
of 160, or approximately 43%, of filing pipelines reported a 10.85%
ROE for 2019. Liquids Shippers Request for Rehearing at 80 (citing
Liquids Shippers Initial Comments at 29-32; Crowe Initial Aff. at
10-11)).
    \233\ Using the 10.85% ROE for 2019 with the 10.29% ROE for 2014
reduces the index from PPI-FG-0.21% to PPI-FG-0.32%, whereas using
the 10.02% ROE for 2019 with the same ROE for 2014 reduces the index
level from PPI-FG-0.21% to PPI-FG-0.76%. Attach. A, Exhibit 12.
    \234\ Ms. Crowe states that the widely reported 10.85% ROE
should not be used as the standardized ROE for 2019 because it ``is
unsupported by any explanation or derivation, and there is no
evidence this ROE was derived in a manner consistent with Commission
policy.'' Crowe Initial Aff. at 11. It is unclear, however, why this
critique would not apply with equal force to the 10.29% ROE that she
proposes to use for 2014. To the extent that Ms. Crowe proposes to
use a widely reported ROE for 2014 on the understanding that Trial
Staff had not proposed an ROE based upon 2014 data in an oil
pipeline rate proceeding, this understanding is incorrect. To the
contrary, in a rate proceeding involving SFPP, L.P., in Docket No.
OR16-6-000, Trial Staff proposed an ROE of 10.24% based upon 2014
data. Trial Staff, Exhibit S-24 (Direct and Answering Testimony of
Commission Trial Staff Witness Robert J. Keyton), Docket No. OR16-6-
000, at 61:15-17 (filed Sept. 14, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    80. In addition, we reject Liquids Shippers' claim that the
Commission applied an unreasonably strict standard in requiring them to
demonstrate that their proposed standardized ROEs ``accurately measure[
] the investor-required cost of equity for all pipelines in the data
set.'' \235\ As Liquids Shippers acknowledge,\236\ ROE is a major
component of the page 700 summary cost of service and therefore
significantly affects the Commission's measurement of industry-wide
cost changes in the five-year review. Thus, where a commenter proposes
to replace the reported page 700 ROEs of every pipeline in the data set
with standardized, industry-wide figures, it is not unreasonable to
require commenters to demonstrate that those standardized figures
accurately measure the cost of equity for all pipelines in the data
set. Otherwise, a standardized ROE that does not accurately reflect the
costs of equity of pipelines in the data set could skew the index
calculation by distorting the measurement of those pipelines' per
barrel-mile equity cost changes during the review period. To the extent
that satisfying this standard would impose significant evidentiary
burdens, this supports maintaining the Commission's simplified approach
of measuring equity cost changes using reported page 700 ROEs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 49.
    \236\ Liquids Shippers Initial Comments at 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    81. Liquids Shippers' remaining arguments for replacing the
reported page 700 ROEs with standardized ROEs are unavailing. Contrary
to Liquids Shippers' argument, we again conclude that the fact that
page 700 ROEs are self-reported (like all other page 700 data used in
this proceeding) does not demonstrate that this data is unreliable or
fails to capture the returns that investors demand in the market. As
the December 2020 Order explains, the instructions on page 700 required
pipelines to determine their ROE for each year during the 2014-2019
period using the DCF model. Pipelines submitted page 700 under oath and
subject to sanction if there were purposeful errors in their reported
data.\237\ Moreover, the Commission's five-year review process reduces
the incentive or ability for pipelines to report inaccurate data in an
effort to skew the index calculation. The Commission calculates the
index level based upon changes in cost over the applicable review
period, rather than total costs in a given year. Because the last year
of any particular review period (e.g., 2014-2019) is the first year of
the next review period (e.g., 2019-2024), an attempt by pipelines to
distort the index calculation by reporting inflated cost data in the
last year of one period would harm their interests by establishing a
higher cost baseline in the first year of the next period.\238\ Given
these facts, we continue to find that Liquids Shippers have not
demonstrated that the reported page 700 ROE data is unreliable merely
because pipelines self-reported.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 46 (citing BP
W. Coast Prods. LLC v. SFPP, L.P., 121 FERC ] 61,243, at P 9
(2007)).
    \238\ Id. n.103. Along similar lines, reporting overly low cost
data in the last year of one review period in an effort to skew the
index calculation downward would similarly harm pipelines' interests
by establishing a lower cost baseline in the first year of the next
period.
    \239\ Id. P 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    82. We also remain unpersuaded that variation among page 700 ROEs
indicates that the reported ROE data is unreliable. As an initial
matter, it is not clear from the record that the level of a pipeline's
page 700 ROE correlates with that pipeline's annualized cost changes
such that variations in ROE would materially affect the index
calculation.\240\ In any event, however, the D.C. Circuit has
recognized that ``the zone of reasonableness creates a broad range of
potentially lawful ROEs rather than a single just and reasonable ROE.''
\241\ Thus, mere variation in the page 700 ROEs does not establish that
those ROEs are not just and reasonable. Rather, as the Commission found
in the December 2020 Order, multiple factors can cause the DCF model to
yield different results for different

pipelines.\242\ Contrary to Liquids Shippers' claim, we disagree that
the December 2020 Order overstates the degree to which pipeline ROEs
may vary as a result of differences in proxy group composition. In
forming proxy groups, the Commission applies specific criteria to
ensure that the proxy group members are risk-appropriate and comparable
to the pipeline whose rate is being determined.\243\ Although the
number of companies satisfying the Commission's historical proxy group
criteria in pipeline proceedings has declined in recent years,\244\
this does not support the conclusion that a single proxy group would be
appropriate for every oil pipeline. Rather, the Commission has
explained that it will apply its proxy group criteria flexibly
depending upon the particular record in each proceeding when necessary
to form a proxy group of sufficient size.\245\ Thus, even under current
market conditions, the appropriate proxy group can vary from pipeline
to pipeline based upon the specific facts in the proceeding. Any
difference in proxy group composition can cause the DCF model to
produce different results for different pipelines.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ See Shehadeh Reply Decl. at 18-19 (comparing annualized
cost changes of pipelines in middle 80% that reported 10.85% ROE for
2019 and pipelines that reported ROEs other than 10.85% and
concluding that ``cost change and ROE are not positively
correlated'').
    \241\ Emera Maine v. FERC, 854 F.3d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
    \242\ Id. P 47. For instance, in a recent oil pipeline cost-of-
service rate proceeding, the potential proxy group member companies
included three pipelines with DCF returns near 10%, one pipeline
with a DCF return of 21.17%, and one pipeline with a DCF return of
51.14%. Chevron Prods. Co. v. SFPP, L.P., Opinion No. 571, 172 FERC
] 61,207, at P 152 (2020).
    \243\ Historically, the Commission has required that each proxy
group company satisfy the following criteria. First, the company's
stock must be publicly traded. Second, the company must be
recognized as an oil pipeline company and its stock must be
recognized and tracked by an investment information service such as
Value Line. Third, pipeline operations must constitute at least 50%
of the company's assets or operating income over the most recent
three-year period (50% standard). E.g., ROE Policy Statement, 171
FERC ] 61,155 at P 58 (citing Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC
] 61,048 at P 8). In addition to these criteria, the Commission has
historically declined to include Canadian companies in pipeline
proxy groups. Id. (citing Opinion No. 528, 145 FERC ] 61,040 at P
626; Kern River Gas Transmission Co., Opinion No. 486-B, 126 FERC ]
61,034 at P 60, order on reh'g and compliance, Opinion No. 486-C,
129 FERC ] 61,240 (2009)).
    \244\ Id. PP 60, 65.
    \245\ The Commission maintains a flexible approach to forming
natural gas and oil pipeline proxy groups. For example, the
Commission retains the discretion to enforce or relax the 50%
standard based upon the record in each proceeding. Id. PP 64-65.
Similarly, the Commission has explained that it will consider
proposals to include Canadian companies in pipeline proxy groups on
a case-by-case basis. Id. P 66. Furthermore, given the ongoing
difficulties in forming pipeline proxy groups of sufficient size,
the Commission has stated that it ``will consider adjustments to
[its] ROE policies where necessary.'' Id. P 64.
    \246\ For example, in Opinion No. 571, the Commission adopted a
proxy group of Buckeye Partners LP, Magellan Midstream Partners LP,
Enterprise Products Partners, LP, and Enbridge Energy Partners, LP,
which produced a median DCF result of 10.54%. Opinion No. 571, 172
FERC ] 61,207 at P 52. However, substituting Kinder Morgan Inc. in
the place of Enbridge would have reduced the median DCF result to
10.195%, a difference of over 30 basis points. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    83. Similarly, we continue to find that variation among page 700
ROEs may result from differences in relative risk. The December 2020
Order explains that although the Commission typically sets an oil
pipeline's real ROE at the median of the DCF results, it may set the
ROE above or below the median where the record demonstrates that the
pipeline faces anomalously high or low risks.\247\ Thus, even when
using an identical proxy group, the appropriate placement of a
pipeline's ROE within the proxy group results turns upon an
individualized, fact-specific analysis of its business and financial
risks relative to the risk profiles of the proxy group members. Because
oil pipelines' risk levels may differ based upon factors such as
location, size, and business model, it is unsurprising that ROEs would
vary to some degree across the oil pipeline industry.\248\ Contrary to
Liquids Shippers' argument, this variation does not demonstrate that
the page 700 ROEs are inaccurate or inconsistent with Commission
policy. In addition, to the extent a particular pipeline's per barrel-
mile equity cost changes departed substantially from industry norms,
that pipeline would not be among the middle 50% used to calculate the
index level.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 47 (citing BP
Pipelines (Alaska) Inc., Opinion No. 502, 123 FERC ] 61,287 at P
195, order on reh'g and compliance, 125 FERC ] 61,215 (2008), reh'g
denied, 127 FERC ] 61,317 (2009), aff'd sub nom. Flint Hills Res.
Alaska, LLC v. FERC, 726 F.3d 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
    \248\ This is particularly true where, due to the declining
number of proxy group companies, it may become necessary for the
Commission to include Canadian companies or companies that do not
satisfy the 50% standard to form a proxy group of sufficient size.
Including these more diverse companies in the proxy group could
necessitate setting the subject pipeline's ROE above or below the
median due to differences in risk.
    \249\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 47 (citing
2015 Index Review, 153 FERC ] 61,312 at P 17).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    84. We conclude, moreover, that Liquids Shippers' have not
supported their argument that the Commission should have audited
pipelines' page 700 workpapers to review their ROE calculations. As the
December 2020 Order explains, the Commission does not scrutinize the
inputs underlying individual pipelines' page 700 data.\250\ Thus,
analyzing individual pipeline page 700 workpapers would depart from the
Commission's established practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ Id. P 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    85. Furthermore, we reject Liquids Shippers' claim that the page
700 ROEs fail to capture changing market conditions because some
pipelines reported ROE increases from 2014 to 2019 while other
pipelines reported ROE decreases. As discussed above, oil pipelines
have diverse business models and risk levels that can cause page 700
ROEs to vary from pipeline to pipeline. Merely because two entities are
part of the same industry does not dictate that they will experience
market changes in similar ways such that their ROEs will shift in the
same direction over a given five-year period. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the page 700 ROEs fail to adequately track changing
market conditions over the review period simply because some pipelines'
ROEs increased from 2014 to 2019 while other pipelines' ROEs decreased.
    86. In addition, we remain unpersuaded by Liquids Shippers'
assertion that pipelines were uncertain as to the Commission's
prevailing oil pipeline ROE methodology when they submitted their 2019
Form No. 6 filings in April 2020. Because the Commission had not yet
revised its longstanding policy of determining ROE using only the DCF
model at the time of those filings, the Form No. 6 instructions
requiring pipelines to complete page 700 in accordance with the then-
applicable Opinion No. 154-B methodology provided pipelines with
adequate notice of the requirement to determine their 2019 ROEs using
only the DCF model.\251\ We again conclude that the fact that two
pipelines (out of 254 pipelines that submitted Form No. 6 filings in
2020) later indicated that they did not adhere to the page 700
instructions in developing their ROEs does not present sufficient
evidence of widespread uncertainty regarding the Commission's
applicable policy that would undermine our confidence in the
reliability of the data set.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 48. As
discussed above, we find that the Commission's five-year review
process reduces the incentive or ability for pipelines to report
inaccurate data in an effort to skew the index calculation. See
supra P 82.
    \252\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    87. Finally, Liquids Shippers' arguments on rehearing do not refute
the Commission's finding that replacing reported page 700 ROEs with
standardized ROEs would improperly complicate and prolong the five-year
review process in violation of EPAct 1992's mandate for simplified and
streamlined ratemaking.\253\ We are

unpersuaded by Liquids Shippers' claim that determining a standardized
ROE may not require the ``same rigor'' as determining an ROE in a
litigated cost-of-service rate proceeding. Liquids Shippers do not
describe what this less rigorous determination would resemble or how it
would differ from the ROE analysis the Commission performs using the
Opinion No. 154-B methodology. In addition, the fact that Trial Staff
regularly performs ROE analyses in litigated rate proceedings has no
bearing on whether it would be appropriate or feasible for the
Commission to do so for every pipeline whose page 700 data is examined
in the five-year review. Accordingly, Liquids Shippers do not
persuasively rebut the Commission's finding that determining a just and
reasonable ROE on an industry-wide basis would be a complex and fact-
intensive inquiry that could require considerable time and resources to
resolve.\254\ Moreover, we reject as irrelevant Liquids Shippers'
comparison of their standardized ROE proposal to Pipelines' proposal to
adjust the data set to remove the effects of the Income Tax Policy
Change, as we decline on rehearing to adopt Pipelines' proposed
adjustments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ Id. P 50 (citing NOI, 171 FERC ] 61,239 at P 11).
    \254\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. CAPP's Argument Regarding Negotiated Rate Contracts

    88. CAPP argued in its comments that the Commission should quantify
the effects of negotiated rate contracts upon oil pipelines' reported
costs of equity. CAPP stated that these contracts typically contain
provisions such as shipper volume commitments that serve to transfer
risk from the pipeline to its shippers and that failing to reflect
pipelines' reduced risks in the page 700 data could improperly inflate
the index calculation. CAPP recognized that the Commission found in the
2015 Index Review that the page 700 total cost of service would reflect
any reduction in the pipeline's risk. However, CAPP argued that the
page 700 data in this proceeding does not indicate whether this
occurred over the 2014-2019 period. To provide increased transparency,
CAPP requested that the Commission require pipelines to provide
shippers with the workpapers underlying their page 700
calculations.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ CAPP Initial Comments at 2-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. December 2020 Order
    89. The December 2020 Order rejected CAPP's arguments as
unpersuasive. First, the Commission reiterated its conclusion in the
2015 Index Review that ``[t]o the extent that volume commitments in
[negotiated rate] agreements have reduced the pipeline's risk, the page
700 total costs of service would reflect this reduction in the embedded
costs of equity and costs of debt.'' \256\ The Commission explained
that these effects would tend to reduce pipeline costs and thereby
produce a lower index level, rendering CAPP's concerns unfounded. The
Commission further determined that CAPP provided no basis for the
Commission to conclude that the reported page 700 data fails to
adequately account for pipelines' risks in measuring changes in cost of
equity and cost of debt.\257\ Second, the Commission found that CAPP
had not supported its request for the Commission to review individual
pipeline data to evaluate the effects of contract rates on the
pipeline's risk.\258\ In addition, the Commission found that such a
review would exceed the scope of the five-year review and conflict with
streamlined and simplified ratemaking.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 52 (quoting
2015 Index Review, 153 FERC ] 61,312 at P 28).
    \257\ Id.
    \258\ Id. P 53.
    \259\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rehearing Request
    90. CAPP challenges the Commission's determination in the December
2020 Order in several respects. First, CAPP asserts that the Commission
cited no evidence to support its conclusion that reduced pipeline risks
resulting from negotiated rate contracts are embedded in the reported
page 700 data.\260\ CAPP argues that the December 2020 Order
acknowledged that differences in risk can produce variations in ROE but
nonetheless declined to investigate whether pipelines' reported page
700 ROEs appropriately reflect their risks.\261\ CAPP further states
that without reviewing the page 700 workpapers, the Commission cannot
evaluate pipelines' reported capital structures, identify the proxy
group companies used to determine each pipeline's page 700 ROE, or
evaluate the placement of the pipeline's ROE within the DCF
results.\262\ CAPP claims that it would not be complicated for the
Commission to verify whether the reported ROEs accurately reflect
reduced pipeline risks. Thus, CAPP states that its request to require
pipelines to provide their page 700 workpapers is modest.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ CAPP Request for Rehearing at 24-25.
    \261\ Id. at 21. CAPP argues that the Commission has recognized
in other proceedings that negotiated rate contracts with shipper
volume commitments have become more prevalent in the oil pipeline
industry and serve to transfer risk from the pipeline to its
shippers and reduce the pipeline's cost of equity. Id. at 23-24
(quoting Enbridge Pipelines (S. Lights) LLC, 144 FERC ] 61,044, at P
71 n.209 (2013) (``[T]here is no disagreement that most of the
business and financial risks of the Southern Lights Pipeline have
been transferred to the Committed Shippers through the TSAs during
their term.'')). Thus, CAPP argues that the impacts of negotiated
rate contracts upon pipeline risks are a documented reality and
warrant investigation in the five-year review. Id. at 26.
    \262\ Id. at 22-23.
    \263\ Id. at 24-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    91. Second, CAPP asserts that the range of the reported page 700
ROEs during the 2014-2019 period exceeds the range of a reasonable DCF
analysis. CAPP maintains that this disparity in reported ROEs provides
a sufficient basis for the Commission to investigate how pipelines
determined these figures.\264\ In addition, CAPP argues that the fact
that ROEs may vary due to differences in proxy group composition and
relative risk supports its proposal.\265\ Regarding proxy group
composition, CAPP argues that if a pipeline charges contract rates, its
page 700 ROE would only reflect the pipeline's reduced risk if the
proxy group it uses to perform the DCF analysis includes pipelines that
also charge contract rates.\266\ Because page 700 does not disclose the
proxy group that the pipeline used to determine its reported ROE, CAPP
argues that the Commission should examine the page 700 workpapers to
determine whether pipelines construed their DCF proxy groups in
accordance with Commission policy. Along similar lines, CAPP states
that if the Commission believes that variation in reported ROEs results
from differences in relative risk, the Commission should investigate
how pipelines' risk levels are affecting their page 700 data.\267\ CAPP
states, moreover, that credit ratings of oil pipelines do not reflect a
wide divergence of risks.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ Id. at 28.
    \265\ Id. at 31.
    \266\ Id. at 31-32.
    \267\ Id.
    \268\ Id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    92. Third, CAPP objects to the Commission's finding that CAPP
provided no basis for determining that the reported page 700 data fails
to adequately account for pipelines' risks. CAPP states that because
page 700 does not include information necessary to evaluate the
pipeline's ROE analysis, CAPP cannot make this showing without access
to pipelines' page 700 workpapers.\269\ CAPP states that to the extent
the December 2020 Order suggests that shippers should attempt to

perform DCF analyses of pipelines known to charge contract rates and
compare the results with those pipelines' reported ROEs, it would be
more efficient for the Commission to investigate the reported ROEs as
part of the five-year review.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ Id. at 21-22.
    \270\ Id. at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    93. Finally, CAPP challenges the Commission's conclusion that
investigating pipelines' page 700 ROEs would conflict with Commission
precedent declining to scrutinize the inputs underlying individual
pipelines' page 700 data.\271\ CAPP contends that this argument is
inconsistent with the Commission's decision to adjust MLP pipelines'
reported page 700 data to remove the effects of the Income Tax Policy
Change.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ Id. at 33 (citing December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245
at P 50).
    \272\ Id. at 30, 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    94. We deny rehearing. First, CAPP provides no basis for altering
the Commission's conclusion that ``[t]o the extent that volume
commitments in [negotiated rate] agreements have reduced the pipeline's
risk, the page 700 total cost of service would reflect this reduction
in the embedded costs of equity and costs of debt.'' \273\ Although
CAPP emphasizes that variation in the page 700 ROEs indicates that
``something may be amiss'' with this data,\274\ we again conclude that
such variation may result from legitimate factors such as differences
in proxy group composition and relative risk and does not demonstrate
that the reported data is inaccurate or inconsistent with Commission
policy.\275\ Accordingly, we continue to find that CAPP has not
substantiated its claim that the reported ROEs fail to adequately
account for pipelines' risks in measuring changes in costs of equity
and costs of debt.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 52 (quoting
2015 Index Review, 153 FERC ] 61,312 at P 28). Reflecting these
reduced risks would tend to reduce pipeline costs and thereby
produce a lower index level, rendering CAPP's concerns unfounded.
Id.
    \274\ CAPP Request for Rehearing at 28.
    \275\ As discussed above, to the extent a particular pipeline's
per barrel-mile equity cost changes departed substantially from
industry norms, that pipeline would not be among the middle 50% used
to calculate the index level. Moreover, even if a pipeline with
outlying equity cost changes is included in the middle 50%, that
pipeline's cost changes would likely not significantly affect the
central tendency of that 80-pipeline sample. Finally, as discussed
above, it is not clear from the record that the level of a
pipeline's page 700 ROE correlates with that pipeline's annualized
cost changes such that variations in ROE would materially affect the
index calculation. See Shehadeh Reply Decl. at 18-19.
    \276\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    95. Second, in any case, CAPP has not rebutted the Commission's
conclusion that reviewing individual pipeline data would exceed the
scope of the five-year review and conflict with EPAct 1992's mandates
for simplified and streamlined ratemaking. The Kahn Methodology
measures cost changes on a generic, industry-wide basis. Thus, in
calculating the index level, the Commission does not scrutinize the
inputs underlying individual pipelines' page 700 data.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \277\ Id. P 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    96. Third, we continue to find that CAPP's request to review
individual pipeline data to evaluate the effects of contract rates upon
the pipeline's risk is unsupported. As CAPP acknowledges,\278\ the
Commission has declined to require pipelines to provide workpapers to
shippers \279\ and explained that the dissemination of this data would
impose considerable industry-wide costs upon pipelines \280\ and raise
potential confidentiality concerns.\281\ CAPP's arguments do not
address these issues. Accordingly, we continue to find that CAPP has
not provided a basis for the Commission to depart from existing policy
to require pipelines to provide page 700 workpapers in the five-year
review.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \278\ CAPP Initial Comments at 5.
    \279\ Revisions to Indexing Policies and Page 700 of FERC Form
No. 6, 170 FERC ] 61,134, at P 6 (2020).
    \280\ Id.
    \281\ These potential confidentiality concerns relate to shipper
information protected by section 15(13) of the Interstate Commerce
Act and the pipeline's competitive business information. Revisions
to Indexing Policies and Page 700 of FERC Form No. 6, 157 FERC ]
61,047, at P 49 (2016).
    \282\ As discussed above, the proponent of a change in
Commission policy bears the burden of justifying that change. See
supra note 129.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    97. Fourth, we are not persuaded that an intensive review of
individual pipeline page 700 data would be appropriate even if the
reported ROEs for 2014 and 2019 do not fully reflect reductions in risk
resulting from contract rates. As an initial matter, the Commission
calculates the index level based upon pipeline cost changes over the
prior five-year period, rather than pipeline costs at a particular
time. Thus, to the extent that a pipeline reported an ROE that does not
reflect the risks it faces charging contract rates in both 2014 and
2019, those errors would tend to cancel out without distorting the
measurement of industry-wide cost changes. More broadly, CAPP has not
demonstrated why the index should reflect the lower risks associated
with contract rates. The five-year review calculates the index level
used to adjust non-contract rates,\283\ and under CAPP's own argument,
pipelines with non-contract rates face higher risks than pipelines with
contract rates. Thus, we are unpersuaded that the page 700 data used to
calculate the index level should reflect the lower risks associated
with contract rates.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ Negotiated committed shipper contracts only incorporate
indexing when both the pipeline and the committed shippers accept
such terms. 2015 Index Review, 153 FERC ] 61,312 at P 49 n.94.
    \284\ To the extent that the index should be adjusted in light
of the reduced risks associated with contract rates, CAPP's argument
would support adopting an adder to increase the ROE of pipelines
that charge contract rates to reflect the higher risks faced by
pipelines with non-contract rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Appropriate Source of 2014 Page 700 Data

1. Background
    98. Page 700 includes columns for reporting both current-year and
previous-year summary cost-of-service data. Thus, for example,
pipelines reported cost-of-service data for 2014 in their page 700s
submitted in April 2015 (in the current-year column) and in April 2016
(in the previous-year column). The more recently filed data reported in
the previous-year column often updates the data that was filed in the
prior year. Accordingly, for the first year of the index review period
in the five-year review, the Commission uses updated page 700 data
filed in the following year's Form No. 6, where available.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 114
FERC ] 61,293, at P 40 (2006) (2005 Index Review) (finding that a
witness was ``correct to use the data contained in [a] resubmitted
FERC Form No. 6'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    99. Pipelines assert that the December 2020 Order errs by relying
upon outdated page 700 data for 2014.\286\ Pipelines state that
although 38 pipelines filed updated 2014 page 700 data in April 2016,
the December 2020 Order erroneously relied upon those pipelines'
originally filed 2014 data as reported in April 2015.\287\ Pipelines
state that because the December 2020 Order did not discuss this
departure from past practice, the use of these pipelines' originally
filed data appears

to have been inadvertent.\288\ Thus, Pipelines request rehearing and/or
clarification to correct this apparent departure from past
practice.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ AOPL Request for Rehearing at 2-3; Designated Carriers
Request for Rehearing at 7-8, 11.
    \287\ AOPL Request for Rehearing at 2-3; Designated Carriers
Request for Rehearing at 4, 7; see also AOPL Request for Rehearing,
Shehadeh Aff. at attach. A (listing 38 pipelines that filed updated
page 700 data for 2014).
    \288\ AOPL Request for Rehearing at 3; Designated Carriers
Request for Rehearing at 7-9.
    \289\ AOPL Request for Rehearing at 1-3. Designated Carriers
request that the Commission clarify that it intended to calculate
the index level using updated page 700 data for 2014 as reported in
the previous-year column in page 700 filings submitted in April
2016. Designated Carriers Request for Rehearing at 1-2, 4-5. If the
Commission denies this request for clarification, Designated
Carriers request rehearing of the December 2020 Order to the extent
that it does not rely upon this updated data. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    100. We agree with Pipelines' arguments and grant rehearing to rely
upon updated page 700 data for 2014, as reported in the previous-year
column of page 700 filings submitted in April 2016. This adjustment
ensures that the index calculation reflects the most current page 700
data for 2014 and accords with the Commission's prior practice of
relying upon updated data reported in the previous-year column of the
following year's Form No. 6, where available.\290\ Accordingly, we
grant Pipelines' requests for rehearing and clarify that where a
pipeline updates its page 700 data for the first year of the index
review period in the previous-year column of the following year's Form
No. 6, it is the Commission's policy to calculate the index level using
that updated data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ E.g., NOI, 171 FERC ] 61,239 at Workpapers, COSsort Tab,
Column C; 2015 Index Review, 153 FERC ] 61,312 at Workpapers,
COSdata Tab (noting that ``[w]here available, data for given year is
taken from the `Previous Year Amount' column of the following year's
Form 6 (e.g., 2009 data is from column (c) of the 2010 Form 6'');
2005 Index Review, 114 FERC ] 61,293 at P 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Application of Adjustments to 2014 Page 700 Data

1. Request for Clarification or Rehearing
    101. Designated Carriers assert that in adopting their proposal to
eliminate the effects of the Income Tax Policy Change from the index
calculation, the December 2020 Order failed to adjust the 2014 page 700
data for two MLP pipelines, MPLX Ozark Pipe Line LLC and Lambda Energy
Gathering, LLC.\291\ Designated Carriers state that neither of these
pipelines filed Form No. 6 in 2014 because they formed as a result of
mergers or acquisitions of MLP predecessor entities that occurred
during the 2014-2019 period.\292\ However, because these pipelines' MLP
predecessor entities filed page 700 data for 2014, Designated Carriers
assert that the Commission should have adjusted the predecessor
entities' 2014 page 700 data to remove the effects of the Income Tax
Policy Change.\293\ Designated Carriers state that the December 2020
Order does not explain why the Commission did not adjust the 2014 page
700 data for the predecessor entities as it did for all other pipelines
that were MLPs in 2014.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \291\ Designated Carriers Request for Rehearing at 18-19.
    \292\ Id. at 19.
    \293\ Id.
    \294\ Id. at 20-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    102. Thus, Designated Carriers request that the Commission clarify
that it intended to adjust the 2014 page 700 data of the predecessor
entities of MPLX Ozark Pipe Line LLC and Lambda Energy Gathering, LLC,
to eliminate the 2014 income tax allowance and adjust the 2014 return
on rate base to reflect the removal of ADIT.\295\ If the Commission
denies this request for clarification, Designated Carriers request
rehearing of the December 2020 Order to the extent that it fails to
adopt the foregoing adjustments.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ Id. at 4-5.
    \296\ Id. at 12-14, 18-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commission Determination
    103. We deny Designated Carriers' request for clarification or
rehearing. As discussed above, we grant rehearing of the December 2020
Order to incorporate the effects of the Income Tax Policy Change in the
index calculation using unadjusted page 700 data. Given that we do not
adopt Pipelines' proposed adjustments to the data set to remove the
effects of the Income Tax Policy Change, we deny Designated Carriers'
request to apply those adjustments to the predecessor entities of MPLX
Ozark Pipe Line LLC and Lambda Energy Gathering, LLC.

III. 2021-2026 Oil Pipeline Index

    104. Based upon the foregoing, we grant rehearing of the December
2020 Order, in part, deny rehearing, in part, and establish an index
level of PPI-FG-0.21% for the five-year period beginning July 1, 2021.

IV. Interim Rate Change Filings

    105. Consistent with the Commission's action in this order, oil
pipelines must recompute their ceiling levels and rates to be effective
March 1, 2022. Specifically, pipelines must revise the ceiling levels
that became effective July 1, 2021, to reflect an index level of PPI-
FG-0.21% instead of the index level adopted in the December 2020
Order.\297\ Any oil pipeline with a filed rate that exceeds its
recomputed ceiling level must file to reduce that rate to bring it into
compliance with the pipeline's recomputed ceiling level as required by
Sec.  342.3(e) of the Commission's regulations.\298\ We direct such
pipelines to submit these filings to be effective March 1, 2022.\299\
To the extent that pipelines are unable to submit these filings 30 days
in advance of the March 1, 2022 effective date, pipelines may seek
waiver of the 30-day notice requirement.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ Concurrently with this order, the Commission is issuing a
Notice of Annual Change in the Producer Price Index for Finished
Goods in Docket No. RM93-11-000. Revisions to Oil Pipeline
Regulations Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 178 FERC ]
61,046 (2022) (Notice). As described in the Notice, oil pipelines
must recompute their ceiling levels for July 1, 2021 through June
30, 2022 by multiplying their ceiling levels for July 1, 2020
through June 30, 2021 by 0.984288. Id.
    \298\ 18 CFR 342.3(e). The filing requirements of 18 CFR
342.3(e) are included in the FERC-550 information collection and
approved by the Office of Management and Budget (under OMB Control
No. 1902-0089).
    \299\ Oil pipelines that filed to revise their rates effective
on or after July 1, 2021 using one of the Commission's alternative
ratemaking methodologies are not required to recompute their ceiling
levels or make an interim rate change filing. See id. 342.3(d)(5)
(``When an initial rate, or rate changed by a method other than
indexing, takes effect during the index year, such rate will
constitute the applicable ceiling level for that index year.'').
    \300\ Id. 341.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission Orders

    (A) The requests for clarification or rehearing of the December
2020 Order are granted in part and denied in part, as discussed in the
body of this order.
    (B) Oil pipelines are directed to recompute their ceiling levels
for July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022 based upon an index level of
PPI-FG-0.21%, as discussed in the body of this order.
    (C) Oil pipelines with filed rates that exceed their recomputed
ceiling levels must file to reduce the rate to bring it into compliance
with the recomputed ceiling level to be effective March 1, 2022, as
discussed in the body of this order.

    By the Commission. Commissioner Danly is concurring in part and
dissenting in part with a separate statement attached.
    Commissioner Christie is concurring in part and dissenting in
part with a separate statement attached.

    Issued: January 20, 2022.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

Department of Energy

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Five-Year Review of the Oil Pipeline Index

Docket No. RM20-14-001
(Issued January 20, 2022)
DANLY, Commissioner, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
    1. Today's order grants rehearing of the December 2020 Order,\1\ in
part, denies rehearing, in part, and establishes an index level of PPI-
FG-0.21%. My separate statement focuses only on the aspects of today's
order that depart from the Commission's December 2020 Order.\2\ I
dissent from the Commission's decision \3\ to grant rehearing and
depart from the December 2020 Order by (1) trimming the data set to the
middle 50% of cost changes, as opposed to the middle 80%; and (2)
incorporating the effects of the Commission's 2018 policy change
requiring Master Limited Partnership (MLP)-owned pipelines to eliminate
the income tax allowance and previously accrued Accumulated Deferred
Income Taxes balances from their page 700 summary costs of service
(Income Tax Policy Change).\4\ I concur in the Commission's decision to
grant rehearing for the purpose of correcting the index calculation
based upon updated page 700 cost data for 2014.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Five-Year Rev. of the Oil Pipeline Index, 173 FERC ] 61,245
(2020) (December 2020 Order).
    \2\ This does not mean that I agree with all of the reasoning
provided for the aspects of rehearing that are denied. Therefore, I
concur in the result for the parts of the Commission's decision that
deny rehearing.
    \3\ Five-Year Rev. of the Oil Pipeline Index, 178 FERC ] 61,023,
at P 2 (2022) (Oil Index Rehearing Order).
    \4\ Inquiry Regarding the Commission's Policy for Recovery of
Income Tax Costs, 162 FERC ] 61,227, at P 8 (2018 Income Tax Policy
Statement), reh'g denied, 164 FERC ] 61,030, at P 13 (2018), request
for clarification dismissed, 168 FERC ] 61,136 (2019); petitions for
review dismissed sub nom. Enable Miss. River Transmission, LLC v.
FERC, 820 F. App'x 8 (2020).
    \5\ Oil Index Rehearing Order, 178 FERC ] 61,023 at P 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. We must ask a threshold question every time we make a decision:
Does the Commission have the legal authority to do what it is doing? In
some cases, the Commission, acting within its authority, may take any
of a number of approaches so long as it adequately explains its
decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. In such instances, a
robust record may provide substantial evidence for several legitimate
approaches and the Commission's ultimate decision then turns on a
collective judgment call. This is such a case.
    3. As an initial matter, I agree that the Commission is obligated
to ensure that the pipelines charge just and reasonable rates and I
remain convinced that the December 2020 Order's decisions to trim the
data set to the middle 80% and not to incorporate the effects of the
Income Tax Policy Change would have resulted in just and reasonable
indexed rates. In my view, based on the ample record before us, the
Commission could have sustained that decision in both respects. Nothing
in parties' arguments on rehearing, or in the record compel the
Commission to find otherwise.
    4. First, I dissent from the Commission's decision to trim the data
set to the middle 50% of cost changes \6\ and disagree with the
Commission's conclusion that ``the record in this proceeding does not
justify departing from the Commission's established practice of
calculating the index level based solely upon the middle 50%.'' \7\ I
would have sustained the Commission's decision to trim the data set to
the middle 80% for the reasons articulated in the December 2020 Order:
It is consistent with the purpose of the statute, when possible, to use
a ``broader sample of data [in order to] enhance the Commission's
calculation of the central tendency of industry cost experience.'' \8\
I simply do not agree with the Commission's assertion that, in order to
ensure just and reasonable rates, ``it remains necessary to use the
middle 50% to avoid including outlying data.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See id. PP 43-58.
    \7\ See id. P 43.
    \8\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 26 (explaining
that the Commission's use of ``the middle 50% would exclude 48
pipelines from the Commission's review of industry-wide cost changes
over the 2014-2019 period'') (citation omitted).
    \9\ Oil Index Rehearing Order, 178 FERC ] 61,023 at P 57
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Second, I dissent from the Commission's decision to incorporate
the effects of the Income Tax Policy Change. I would have sustained the
Commission's decision in the December 2020 Order to adopt Designated
Carriers' proposed adjustment to remove the effects of the Income Tax
Policy Change from the page 700 data used to calculate the index. I
acknowledge that the Commission previously stated that it ``will
incorporate the effects of this Revised Policy on industry-wide oil
pipeline costs in the 2020 five-year review of the oil pipeline index
level.'' \10\ A prior Commission, however, cannot bind a future
Commission's decisions.\11\ Further, I disagree with the Commission's
repeated statements in today's order that the Commission's decision to
incorporate the effects of the Income Tax Policy Change in the index is
required to ensure just and reasonable rates.\12\ In my view, the
reasons provided in the Commission's December 2020 Order remain
persuasive, including the following: (1) ``The purpose of indexing is
to allow the indexed rate to keep pace with industry-wide cost changes,
not to reflect alterations to the Commission's Opinion No. 154-B cost-
of-service methodology;'' \13\ (2) ``[t]he index allows for incremental
rate adjustments to enable pipelines to recover normal cost changes in
future years;'' \14\ (3) the index ``is not a true-up designed to
remedy prior over-or under-recoveries in pre-existing rates resulting
from cost-of-service policy changes during the prior five-year
period;'' \15\ and (4) it remains unclear ``that the double recovery of
MLP pipelines' income tax costs was ever incorporated into the index.''
\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 2018 Income Tax Policy Statement, 162 FERC ] 61,227 at P 8.
    \11\ My colleagues acknowledge that the ``2018 Income Tax Policy
Statement provided non-binding guidance regarding the Commission's
future intentions.'' Order Index Rehearing Order, 178 FERC ] 61,023
at P 21 n.55.
    \12\ See id. P 17 (``The index must reflect the Income Tax
Policy Change in order to produce just and reasonable oil pipeline
rates.''); id. (``Because indexing is the Commission's primary oil
pipeline ratemaking methodology and because indexed oil pipeline
rates must be just and reasonable, we conclude that the index
calculation must now address the Income Tax Policy Change.''); id. P
20 (``Thus, as the Commission's Opinion No. 154-B methodology
evolves, oil pipeline rates adjusted via indexing must reflect those
changes in order to remain just and reasonable.'').
    \13\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 17 (footnotes
omitted).
    \14\ Id. P 18.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ Id. P 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. Third, I concur with the Commission's decision to grant
rehearing to correct the index calculation such that it relies on
updated page 700 cost data for 2014 and with the Commission's
clarification that ``where a pipeline updates its page 700 data for the
first year of the index review period in the previous-year column of
the following year's Form No. 6, it is the Commission's policy to
calculate the index level using that updated data.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See Oil Index Rehearing Order, 178 FERC ] 61,023 at P 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. While it would have been better for the Commission to reaffirm
the December 2020 Order as discussed above, it is necessary for me to
acknowledge that the Commission is acting in accordance with the law
and the majority's decision to reverse parts

of the December 2020 Order will likely withstand judicial review. I am
surprised, however, to see the majority's seeming vitriol over what
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
amounts to a judgment call.

    For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in
part.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

James P. Danly,

Commissioner.

Department of Energy

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Five-Year Review of the Oil Pipeline Index

Docket No. RM20-14-001
(Issued January 20, 2022)
CHRISTIE, Commissioner, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
    1. I concur with most of today's order,\1\ most significantly the
restoration of the use of the middle 50% of the data set for
determining the index. As today's order notes, the December 2020
Order's move to the middle 80% was an unjustified departure from the
Commission's settled practice of relying on the middle 50%.\2\ Because
the 50% range represents the established practice over the past decade,
restoring it is more consistent with the principle of regulatory
certainty than the December 2020 Order's reliance on the 80% range
without sufficient justification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Five-Year Review of the Oil Pipeline Index, 178 FERC ]
61,023 (2022) (Order).
    \2\ Id. P 37 & n.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Consistent with this principle of regulatory certainty, however,
I dissent from the portion of today's order that reverses the
determination in the December 2020 order declining to incorporate the
effects of the Income Tax Policy Change into the 2020 index
calculation. In what it described as ``an issue of first impression,''
the Commission, in that order, adopted a proposal submitted by
Designated Carriers in response to a previously issued NOPR.\3\ The
December 2020 Order explained the Commission's reasoning.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ December 2020 Order, 173 FERC ] 61,245 at P 16.
    \4\ Id. PP 16-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. The Income Tax Policy Change presented a unique factual
circumstance that had yet to be considered by the Commission's indexing
policies. It thus constitutes a ``one-off.'' It fell to a differently
constituted Commission to determine whether, and if so how, the index
calculation must be adjusted to address the Income Tax Policy Change.
That Commission made its decision. I was not on the Commission in
December 2020. If I had been, I may have voted for a different
treatment of the tax issue, but unlike the change of the data set
range--which disturbed without adequate justification an established
practice--this unique tax issue was one in which there were valid
arguments on both sides. What I or other members of this Commission
might have done, however, if we had been given the opportunity in 2020,
matters much less than what the Commission sitting in December 2020
actually did do: Namely, consider the pros and cons of an issue and
make a decision based on the arguments and evidence in the record.
Accordingly, I believe that the principle of regulatory certainty
argues for leaving that ``one-off'' decision on the tax issue alone.

    For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in
part.
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Mark C. Christie,

Commissioner.

[FR Doc. 2022-01544 Filed 1-27-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 183 (Friday, September 20, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 57847]
[FR Doc No: 2013-22937]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings 1

    Take notice that the Commission received the following electric
rate filings:

    Docket Numbers: ER11-2780-015.
    Applicants: Safe Harbor Water Power Corporation.
    Description: Notice of Change in Status of Safe Harbor Water Power
Corporation.
    Filed Date: 9/9/13.
    Accession Number: 20130909-5420.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/30/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER11-4649-001.
    Applicants: PacifiCorp.
    Description: BPA ASC Filing for FY 2014-2015 to be effective N/A.
    Filed Date: 8/14/13.
    Accession Number: 20130814-5103.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/18/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2146-001.
    Applicants: Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.
    Description: Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc. submits
Amendments to Rate Schedules--Amended Filing to be effective 9/15/2013.
    Filed Date: 9/10/13.
    Accession Number: 20130910-5119.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2364-000.
    Applicants: PacifiCorp.
    Description: PacifiCorp submits OATT Order No. 764 & 764-A
Compliance Filing to be effective 11/12/2013.
    Filed Date: 9/10/13.
    Accession Number: 20130910-5081.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/1/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2365-000.
    Applicants: Tucson Electric Power Company.
    Description: UNSE Interconnection Agreement to be effective 11/11/
2013.
    Filed Date: 9/10/13.
    Accession Number: 20130910-5120.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/1/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2366-000.
    Applicants: Cogentrix of Alamosa, LLC.
    Description: First Revised MBR to be effective 11/9/2013.
    Filed Date: 9/10/13.
    Accession Number: 20130910-5142.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/1/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2367-000.
    Applicants: Raven Power Marketing LLC.
    Description: Revised Market-Based Rate Tariff to be effective 9/11/
2013.
    Filed Date: 9/10/13.
    Accession Number: 20130910-5149.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/1/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2368-000.
    Applicants: Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
    Description: Notice of Termination for the Green Volts SGIA, WDT SA
No. 34 Volume No. 4 of Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
    Filed Date: 9/10/13.
    Accession Number: 20130910-5168.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/1/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2369-000.
    Applicants: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
    Description: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. submits Notice of
Cancellation of PJM Service Agreement No. 3346 to be effective 9/1/
2013.
    Filed Date: 9/11/13.
    Accession Number: 20130911-5035.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/2/13.

    Docket Numbers: ER13-2370-000.
    Applicants: PacifiCorp.
    Description: PacifiCorp submits BPA Two-way Operation and
Maintenance Agreement 4th Revised to be effective 11/11/2013.
    Filed Date: 9/11/13.
    Accession Number: 20130911-5053.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/2/13.

    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system by
clicking on the links or querying the docket number.
    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the
proceeding.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call<PHONE_NUMBER>
(toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: September 11, 2013.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-22937 Filed 9-19-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 3, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60413-60414]
[FR Doc No: 2012-24364]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 12958-002]

Uniontown Hydro, LLC; Notice of Application Accepted for Filing,
Soliciting Motions To Intervene and Protests, Ready for Environmental
Analysis, and Soliciting Comments, Recommendations, Preliminary Terms
and Conditions, and Preliminary Fishway Prescriptions

    Take notice that the following hydroelectric application has been
filed with the Commission and is available for public inspection.
    a. Type of Application: Original Major License.
    b. Project No.: 12958-002.
    c. Date filed: April 29, 2011.
    d. Applicants: Uniontown Hydro, LLC.
    e. Name of Project: Uniontown Hydroelectric Project.
    f. Location: The project would be located on the Ohio River at the
existing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) John T. Myers Locks and
Dam in Union County, Kentucky and Posey County, Indiana.
    g. Filed Pursuant to: Federal Power Act 16 U.S.C. .791(a)--825(r).
    h. Applicant Contacts: Brent L. Smith, COO, Symbiotics LLC, 371
Upper Terrace, Suite 2, Bend, OR 97702,<PHONE_NUMBER>; Dr. Vincent A.
Lamarra, CEO, Symbiotics LLC, 975 South State Highway, Logan, UT 84321,
(435) 752-2580.
    i. FERC Contact: Jennifer Adams,<PHONE_NUMBER>, or
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    j. Deadline for filing motions to intervene and protests, comments,
recommendations, preliminary terms and conditions, and preliminary
prescriptions: 60 days from the issuance date of this notice; reply
comments are due 105 days from the issuance date of this notice.
    Motions to intervene, protests, comments, recommendations,
preliminary terms and conditions, and preliminary fishway prescriptions
may be filed electronically via the Internet. See 18 CFR
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's Web

site http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp. Commenters can submit
brief comments up to 6,000 characters, without prior registration,
using the eComment system at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/ecomment.asp. You must include your name and contact information at the
end of your comments. For assistance, please contact FERC Online
Support at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or toll free at 1-866-208-3676,
or for TTY,<PHONE_NUMBER>. Although the Commission strongly encourages
electronic filing, documents may also be paper-filed. To paper-file,
mail an original and seven copies to: Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington,
DC 20426.
    The Commission's Rules of Practice require all intervenors filing
documents with the Commission to serve a copy of that document on each
person on the official service list for the project. Further, if an
intervenor files comments or documents with the Commission relating to
the merits of an issue that may affect the responsibilities of a
particular resource agency, they must also serve a copy of the document
on that resource agency.
    k. This application has been accepted for filing and is now ready
for environmental analysis.
    l. The existing John T. Myers Locks and Dam is a 3,504-foot-long,
119-foot-high dam containing 10 Taintor gates, each 110 feet high by 32
feet wide, and a concrete fixed weir. The main and auxiliary locks are
on the Indiana side of the river. The main lock is 110 feet wide by
1,200 feet long and the auxiliary lock is 110 feet wide by 600 feet
long. The impoundment above the John T. Myers Locks and Dam has a
surface area of 19,350 acres and a storage capacity of 543,862 acre-
feet.
    The proposed Uniontown Project would consist of: (1) A 250-foot-
long forebay; (2) a 144-foot-long, 69-foot-high trashrack, with 4-inch
openings; (3) a 215-foot-long by 167-foot-wide powerhouse containing
three Kaplan turbine-generators, each with an installed capacity of
22.2 megawatts (MW), for a total capacity of 66.6 MW; (4) a 200-foot-
long tailrace; (5) a 411-foot-long, 102-foot-wide submerged dike in the
downstream river channel for navigational purposes; (6) a 0.5 mile-long
transmission line from the powerhouse to; (7) a switchyard; (8) a 32.0-
mile-long, 138-kilovolt transmission line leading to an existing
substation; (9) a 2,495-foot-long access road; and (10) appurtenant
facilities. The estimated average annual generation for the project
would be 224,000 megawatt hours. The project would operate run-of-
river, utilizing the flows released under the current Corps operation
guidelines.
    m. A copy of the application is available for review at the
Commission in the Public Reference Room or may be viewed on the
Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov using the ``eLibrary''
link. Enter the docket number excluding the last three digits in the
docket number field to access the document. For assistance, contact
FERC Online Support. Copies are also available for inspection and
reproduction at the address in item h above.
    Register online at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/esubscription.asp to be notified via email of new filings and issuances
related to this or other pending projects. For assistance, contact FERC
Online Support.
    n. Anyone may submit comments, a protest, or a motion to intervene
in accordance with the requirements of Rules of Practice and Procedure,
18 CFR 385.210, .211, and .214. In determining the appropriate action
to take, the Commission will consider all protests or other comments
filed, but only those who file a motion to intervene in accordance with
the Commission's Rules may become a party to the proceeding. Any
comments, protests, or motions to intervene must be received on or
before the specified comment date for the particular application.
    All filings must (1) Bear in all capital letters the title
``PROTEST'', ``MOTION TO INTERVENE'', ``COMMENTS,'' ``REPLY COMMENTS,''
``RECOMMENDATIONS,'' ``PRELIMINARY TERMS AND CONDITIONS,'' or
``PRELIMINARY FISHWAY PRESCRIPTIONS;'' (2) set forth in the heading the
name of the applicant and the project number of the application to
which the filing responds; (3) furnish the name, address, and telephone
number of the person protesting or intervening; and (4) otherwise
comply with the requirements of 18 CFR 385.2001 through 385.2005. All
comments, recommendations, terms and conditions or prescriptions must
set forth their evidentiary basis and otherwise comply with the
requirements of 18 CFR 4.34(b). Agencies may obtain copies of the
application directly from the applicant. A copy of any protest or
motion to intervene must be served upon each representative of the
applicant specified in the particular application. A copy of all other
filings in reference to this application must be accompanied by proof
of service on all persons listed in the service list prepared by the
Commission in this proceeding, in accordance with 18 CFR 4.34(b) and
385.2010.
    o. Procedural Schedule:
    The application will be processed according to the following
revised Hydropower Licensing Schedule. Revisions to the schedule may be
made as appropriate.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Milestone                           Target date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Filing of recommendations, preliminary   November 2012.
 terms and conditions, and preliminary
 fishway prescriptions.
Commission issues EA...................  March 2013.
Comments on EA.........................  April 2013.
Modified terms and conditions..........  June 2013.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    p. Final amendments to the application must be filed with the
Commission no later than 30 days from the issuance date of this notice.
    q. A license applicant must file no later than 60 days following
the date of issuance of the notice of acceptance and ready for
environmental analysis provided for in 18 CFR 5.22: (1) A copy of the
water quality certification; (2) a copy of the request for
certification, including proof of the date on which the certifying
agency received the request; or (3) evidence of waiver of water quality
certification.
    r. Any qualified applicant desiring to file a competing application
must submit to the Commission, on or before the specified intervention
deadline date, a competing development application, or a notice of
intent to file such an application. Submission of a timely notice of
intent allows an interested person to file the competing development
application no later than 120 days after the specified intervention
deadline date. Applications for preliminary permits will not be
accepted in response to this notice.
    A notice of intent must specify the exact name, business address,
and telephone number of the prospective applicant, and must include an
unequivocal statement of intent to submit a development application. A
notice of intent must be served on the applicant(s) named in this
public notice.

    Dated: September 26, 2012.
 Kimberly D. Bose,
 Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-24364 Filed 10-2-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 133 (Friday, July 10, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41623-41624]
[FR Doc No: 2020-14922]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-3525-EM; Docket ID FEMA-2020-0001]

Michigan; Amendment No. 3 to Notice of an Emergency Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of an emergency declaration for
the State of Michigan (FEMA-3525-EM), dated May 21, 2020, and related
determinations.

DATES: This amendment was issued June 16, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dean Webster, Office of Response and
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW,
Washington, DC 20472,<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that the incident
period for this emergency is closed effective May 22, 2020.

    The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers
(CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030,
Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster
Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance
Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and
Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049,
Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing
Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially
Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other
Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants--Public Assistance

(Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation
Grant.

Pete Gaynor,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2020-14922 Filed 7-9-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P