[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 148 (Friday, August 1, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 45015-45079]
[FR Doc No: 2014-17764]

Vol. 79

Friday,

No. 148

August 1, 2014

Part III

Department of Transportation

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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

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49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, et al.

Hazardous Materials: Proposed Rules

Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 2014 /
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, 174, and 179

[Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251)]
RIN 2137-AE91

Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA or we), in coordination with the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), is proposing: new operational requirements for certain trains
transporting a large volume of Class 3 flammable liquids; improvements
in tank car standards; and revision of the general requirements for
offerors to ensure proper classification and characterization of mined
gases and liquids. These proposed requirements are designed to lessen
the frequency and consequences of train accidents/incidents (train
accidents) involving certain trains transporting a large volume of
flammable liquids. The growing reliance on trains to transport large
volumes of flammable liquids poses a significant risk to life,
property, and the environment. These significant risks have been
highlighted by the recent instances of trains carrying crude oil that
derailed in Casselton, North Dakota; Aliceville, Alabama; and Lac-
M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada. The proposed changes also address
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendations on
the accurate classification and characterization of such commodities,
enhanced tank car construction, and rail routing.

DATES: Comments must be received by September 30, 2014.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number
(Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251)) and any relevant petition number
by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management System; U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing
Symbol M-30, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: To the Docket Management System; Room W12-
140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number for this document at the beginning of the comment. To
avoid duplication, please use only one of these four methods. All
comments received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov and will include any personal information you
provide. All comments received will be posted without change to the
Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), including any personal
information.
    Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket
Operations Office located at U.S. Department of Transportation, West
Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing Symbol M-30, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comments (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement at: http://www.dot.gov/privacy.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ben Supko or Michael Stevens, (202)
366-8553, Standards and Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration or Karl Alexy,<PHONE_NUMBER>, Office
of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration,
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Frequently Used Abbreviations and Shortened Terms

AAR Association of American Railroads
ANPRM Advance notice of proposed rulemaking or PHMSA's ANPRM
published September 6, 2013 in this rulemaking, depending on context
App. Appendix
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CPC Casualty Prevention Circular
Crude oil Petroleum crude oil
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
DP Distributed power, an alternative brake signal propagation system
ECP brakes Electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, an
alternative brake signal propagation system
EO 28 FRA Emergency Order No. 28 (78 FR 54849; August 7, 2013)
EOT device Two Way End-of-train device
FR Federal Register
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
GRL Gross Rail Load
HHFT High-Hazard Flammable Train
HMT Hazardous Materials Table at 49 CFR 172.101
HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations at 49 CFR Parts 171-180
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
NAR Non-accident release, the unintentional release of a hazardous
material while in transportation, including loading and unloading
while in railroad possession, that is not caused by a derailment,
collision, or other rail-related accident
NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OTMA One-time movement approval
PG Packing Group (see 49 CFR 171.8)
PIH Poison Inhalation Hazard
RIA Regulatory impact analysis
RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration, the predecessor
of PHMSA
SERCs State Emergency Response Commissions
T87.6 Task
Force A task force of the AAR Tank Car Committee
TIH Toxic inhalation hazard or Toxic-by-Inhalation
TTC Tank Car Committee
TSA Transportation Security Administration
U.S.C. United States Code

Table of Contents of Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Overview of Current Regulations Relevant to This Proposal
    A. Classification and Characterization of Mined Liquids and
Gases
    B. Packaging
    C. Track Integrity and The Safety of Freight Railroad Operations
    D. Oil Spill Response Plans
    E. Rail Routing
III. Background
    A. Regulatory Actions
    B. Emergency Orders and Non-Regulatory Actions
    C. NTSB Safety Recommendations
IV. Comments on the ANPRM
    A. Commenter Key
    B. Summary of Comments Relevant to the Proposed Amendments in
This NPRM
    C. Summary of Comments on Possible Amendments Not in This NPRM
V. Discussion of Comments and Section-by-Section Review
    A. High-Hazard Flammable Train
    B. Notification to SERCs of Petroleum Crude Oil Train
Transportation
    C. Rail Routing
    D. Classification and Characterization of Crude Oil of Mined
Liquids and Gases

    E. Additional Requirements for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
    a. Speed Restriction
    b. Alternative Brake Signal Propagation Systems
    F. New Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
    a. DOT Specification 117--Prescribed Car
    b. DOT Specification 117--Performance Standard
    G. Existing Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
    H. Forthcoming FRA NPRM on Securement and Attendance
VI. Regulatory Review and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order
13610, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
    B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    C. Executive Order 13132
    D. Executive Order 13175
    E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Policies and Procedures
    F. Paperwork Reduction Act
    G. Environmental Assessment
    H. Privacy Act
    I. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
    J. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
    K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

I. Executive Summary

    Expansion in United States (U.S.) energy production has led to
significant challenges in the transportation system. Expansion in oil
production has led to increasing volumes of product transported to
refineries. Traditionally, pipelines and oceangoing tankers have
delivered the vast majority of crude oil to U.S. refineries, accounting
for approximately 93 percent of total receipts (in barrels) in 2012.
Although other modes of transportation--rail, barge, and truck--have
accounted for a relatively minor portion of crude oil shipments,
volumes have been rising very rapidly. With a growing domestic supply,
rail transportation, in particular, has emerged as a flexible
alternative to transportation by pipeline or vessel. The volume of
crude oil carried by rail increased 423 percent between 2011 and
2012.1 2 Volumes continued to increase in 2013, as the
number of rail carloads of crude oil surpassed 400,000.\3\ U.S. ethanol
production has also increased considerably during the last 10 years and
has generated similar growth in the transportation of ethanol by
rail.\4\ The increase in shipments of large quantities of flammable
liquids by rail has led to an increase in the number of train
accidents, posing a significant safety and environmental concern.
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    \1\ See U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and
Issues for Congress; http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf.
    \2\ See also ``Refinery receipts of crude oil by rail, truck,
and barge continue to increase'' http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12131.
    \3\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
    \4\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Railroads and
Ethanol. Available online at https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf.
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    In this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing revisions to the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) that establish
requirements for ``high-hazard flammable train'' (HHFT). This proposed
rule defines a HHFT as a train comprised of 20 or more carloads of a
Class 3 flammable liquid and ensures that the rail requirements are
more closely aligned with the risks posed by the operation of these
trains. As discussed further in this preamble and in our analysis, this
rule primarily impacts unit train shipments of ethanol and crude oil;
because ethanol and crude oil are most frequently transported in high
volume shipments, typically in trains with 20 or more cars of those
commodities. Currently, as shipped, crude oil and ethanol are typically
classified as Class 3 flammable liquids. The primary intent of this
rulemaking is to propose revisions to the HMR that update and clarify
the regulations to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a train
accident involving flammable liquids, should one occur. Table 1
identifies those affected by this NPRM and describes the regulatory
changes.

               Table 1--Affected Entities and Requirements
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           Proposed requirement                    Affected entity
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Better classification and characterization  Offerors/Shippers of all
 of mined gases and liquids.                 mined gases and liquids.
 Written sampling and testing
 program for all mined gases and liquids,
 such as crude oil, to address:
    (1) frequency of sampling and testing;
    (2) sampling at various points along
     the supply chain;
    (3) sampling methods that ensure a
     representative sample of the entire
     mixture;
    (4) testing methods to enable complete
     analysis, classification, and
     characterization of material;
    (5) statistical justification for
     sample frequencies; and,
    (6) duplicate samples for quality
     assurance.
    Require offerer to certify that
     program is in place, document the
     testing and sampling program, and
     make program information available to
     DOT personnel, upon request.
Rail routing risk assessment..............  Rail Carriers, Emergency
                                             Responders.
     Requires carriers to perform
     a routing analysis that considers 27
     safety and security factors. The
     carrier must select a route based on
     findings of the route analysis. These
     planning requirements are prescribed
     in Sec.   172.820 and would be
     expanded to apply to HHFTs.
Notification to SERCs.
     Require trains containing one
     million gallons of Bakken crude oil
     to notify State Emergency Response
     Commissions (SERCs) or other
     appropriate state delegated entity
     about the operation of these trains
     through their States.
Reduced operating speeds.
     Restrict all HHFTs to 50-mph
     in all areas.
     PHMSA is requesting comment
     on three speed restriction options
     for HHFTs that contain any tank cars
     not meeting the enhanced tank car
     standards proposed by this rule:

        (1) a 40-mph maximum speed
         restriction in all areas
        (2) a 40-mph speed restriction in
         high threat urban areas\5\; and,
        (3) a 40-mph speed restriction in
         areas with a 100K+ population.
     PHMSA is also requesting
     comment on a 30-mph speed restriction
     for HHFTs that do not comply with
     enhanced braking requirements.
Enhanced braking.
     Require all HHFTs be equipped
     with alternative brake signal
     propagation systems. Depending on the
     outcome of the tank car standard
     proposal and implementation timing,
     all HHFTs would be operated with
     either electronic controlled
     pneumatic brakes (ECP), a two-way end
     of train device (EOT), or distributed
     power (DP).
Enhanced standards for both new and         Tank Car Manufacturers, Tank
 existing tank cars.                         Car owners, Shippers and
                                             Rail Carriers.
     Require new tank cars
     constructed after October 1, 2015
     (that are used to transport flammable
     liquids as part of a HHFT) to meet
     criteria for a selected option,
     including specific design
     requirements or performance criteria
     (e.g., thermal, top fittings, and
     bottom outlet protection; tank head
     and shell puncture resistance). PHMSA
     is requesting comment on the
     following three options for the DOT
     Specification 117:
        1. FRA and PHMSA Designed Car, or
         equivalent
        2. AAR 2014 Tank Car,\6\ or
         equivalent
        3. Jacketed CPC-1232,\7\ or
         equivalent
     Require existing tank cars
     that are used to transport flammable
     liquids as part of a HHFT, to be
     retrofitted to meet the selected
     option for performance requirements,
     except for top fittings protection.
     Those not retrofitted would be
     retired, repurposed, or operated
     under speed restrictions for up to
     five years, based on packing group
     assignment of the lading.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 2 further summarizes the three options for the DOT
Specification 117. As noted in Table 1, PHMSA proposes to require one
of these options for new tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015,
if those tank cars are used as part of HHFT. In addition, for all three
Options, PHMSA proposes the following timelines for tank cars used as
part of HHFT: (1) For Packing Group I, DOT Specification 111 tank cars
are not authorized after October 1, 2017; (2) for Packing Group II, DOT
Specification 111 tank cars are not authorized after October 1, 2018;
and (3) for Packing Group III, DOT Specification 111 tank cars are not
authorized after October 1, 2020.
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    \5\ As defined in 49 CFR 1580.3--High Threat Urban Area (HTUA)
means an area comprising one or more cities and surrounding areas
including a 10-mile buffer zone, as listed in appendix A to Part
1580 of the 49 CFR.
    \6\ On March 9, 2011 AAR submitted petition for rulemaking P-
1577, which was discussed in the ANPRM. In response to the ANPRM, on
November 15, 2013, AAR and ASLRAA submitted as a comment
recommendations for tank car standards that are enhanced beyond the
design in P-1577. For the purposes of this rulemaking this tank car
will be referred to as the ``AAR 2014 tank car.'' See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0090.
    \7\ In 2011, the AAR issued Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC)
1232, which outlines industry requirements for additional safety
equipment on certain DOT Specification 111 tanks ordered after
October 1, 2011, and intended for use in ethanol and crude oil
service.

                                                                           Table 2--Safety Features by Tank Car Option
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                                                                                Thermal
           Tank car              Bottom outlet     GRL      Head shield    Pressure relief  Shell thickness       Jacket      Tank material *    Top fittings      protection        Braking
                                    handle        (lbs)         type            valve                                                           protection **        system
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Option 1: PHMSA and FRA        Bottom outlet        286k  Full-height, \1/ Reclosing        \9/16\ inch      Minimum 11-      TC-128 Grade B,  TIH Top          Thermal          ECP brakes.
 Designed Tank Car.             handle removed             2\ inch thick    pressure         Minimum.         gauge jacket     normalized       fittings         protection
                                or designed to             head shield.     relief device.                    constructed      steel.           protection       system in
                                prevent                                                                       from A1011                        system and       accordance
                                unintended                                                                    steel or                          nozzle capable   with Sec.
                                actuation                                                                     equivalent.                       of sustaining,   179.18.
                                during a train                                                                The jacket                        without
                                accident.                                                                     must be                           failure, a
                                                                                weather-tight.                    rollover
                                                                                accident at a
                                                                                speed of 9 mph.

Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank Car..  Bottom outlet        286k  Full-height, \1/ Reclosing        \9/16\ inch      Minimum 11-      TC-128 Grade B,  Equipped per     Thermal          In trains with
                                handle removed             2\ inch thick    pressure         Minimum.         gauge jacket     normalized       AAR              protection       DP or EOT
                                or designed to             head shield.     relief device.                    constructed      steel.           Specifications   system in        devices.
                                prevent                                                                       from A1011                        Tank Cars,       accordance
                                unintended                                                                    steel or                          appendix E       with Sec.
                                actuation                                                                     equivalent.                       paragraph        179.18.
                                during a train                                                                The jacket                        10.2.1.
                                accident.                                                                     must be
                                                                                weather-tight.
Option 3: Enhanced CPC 1232    Bottom outlet        286k  Full Height \1/  Reclosing        \7/16\ inch      Minimum 11-      TC-128 Grade B,  Equipped per     Thermal          In trains with
 Tank Car.                      handle removed             2\ inch thick    pressure         Minimum.         gauge jacket     normalized       AAR              protection       DP or EOT
                                or designed to             head shield.     relief device.                    constructed      steel.           Specifications   system in        devices.
                                prevent                                                                       from A1011                        Tank Cars,       accordance
                                unintended                                                                    steel or                          appendix E       with Sec.
                                actuation                                                                     equivalent.                       paragraph        179.18.
                                during a train                                                                The jacket                        10.2.1.
                                accident.                                                                     must be
                                                                                weather-tight.
DOT 111A100W1................  Bottom Outlets       263K  Optional; Bare   Reclosing        \7/16\ inch      Jackets are      TC-128 Grade B,  Not required,    Optional.......  Not required.
Specification (Currently        are Optional.              Tanks half       pressure         Minimum.         optional.        normalized       but when
 Authorized).                                              height; Jacket   relief valve.                                      steel.*          Equipped per
                                                           Tanks full                                                                           AAR
                                                           height.                                                                              Specifications
                                                                                Tank Cars,
                                                                                appendix E
                                                                                paragraph
                                                                                10.2.1.
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* For the purposes of this figure, TC-128 Grade B normalized steel is used to provide a consistent comparison to the proposed options. Section 179.200-7 provides alternative materials which
  are authorized for the DOT Specification 111.
** Please note that the PHMSA does not propose to require additional top fittings protection for retrofits, because the costs are not supported by corresponding benefits. Newly constructed
  cars, however, are required to have additional top fittings protection. Except for additional top fittings protection, the requirements for newly constructed tank cars and retrofits are the
  same.

    The transportation of large volumes of flammable liquids poses a
risk to life, property, and the environment. The volume of flammable
liquids shipped by rail and in HHFTs has been increasing rapidly since
2006, representing a growing risk. Therefore, we are reevaluating the
structure of the HMR as they pertain to rail transportation.
Approximately 68 percent of the flammable liquids transported by rail
are comprised of crude oil or ethanol. The U.S. is now the global
leader in crude oil production growth. According to the rail industry,
in 2009, there were 10,800 carloads of crude oil originations
transported by Class I railroads, and in 2013, there were over 400,000
carloads of crude oil originations by Class I railroads, or 37 times as
many in the U.S. \8\ Crude oil production from the Bakken region of the
Williston Basin is now over one million barrels per day.\9\
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    \8\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Moving Crude by
Rail. December. Available online at: http://dot111.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Crude-oil-by-rail.pdf.
    \9\ Information regarding oil and gas production is available at
the following URL: http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/#tabs-summary-2.
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    U.S. ethanol production has increased considerably during the last
10 years and has generated similar growth in the transportation of
ethanol by rail, according to a recent white paper by the Association
of American Railroads (AAR).\10\ In 2008 there were around 292,000 rail
carloads of ethanol. In 2011, that number increased over 40 percent, to
409,000.\11\ Not surprisingly, this growth in rail traffic has been
accompanied by an increase in the number of rail derailments and
accidents involving ethanol.
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    \10\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Railroads and
Ethanol. Available online at https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf.
    \11\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
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    As the number of shipments of crude oil in HHFTs has increased, the
number of mainline train accidents involving crude oil has increased
from zero in 2010 to five in 2013 and thus far five in 2014.\12\ This
increase comes at a time when, across the entire rail network, the
number of train accidents and hazardous materials releases are
decreasing; while total shipment volume has increased, the total number
of train accidents has declined by 43 percent since 2003, and accidents
involving a hazardous materials release has declined by 16 percent
since 2003.\13\ The projected continued growth of domestic crude oil
production, and the growing number of train accidents involving crude
oil, PHMSA concludes that the potential for future severe train
accidents involving crude oil in HHFTs has increased substantially.
Such an increase raises the likelihood of higher-consequence train
accidents.
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    \12\ Source: PHMSA Hazmat Inelegance Portal (HIP), February
2014.
    \13\ Data from compiled by FRA's Office of Safety Analysis.
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    Recent accidents highlight the potentially severe consequences of
accidents involving HHFTs carrying crude oil. On December 30, 2013, a
train transporting grain derailed onto another track into the path of a
train transporting crude oil, which had too little time to stop before
it collided with the grain train, and then itself derailed and
unintentionally released product, which ignited near Casselton, North

Dakota, prompting authorities to issue a voluntary evacuation of the
city and surrounding area. On November 8, 2013, a train transporting
crude oil to the Gulf Coast from North Dakota derailed in Aliceville,
Alabama, spilling crude oil in nearby wetlands ignited. On July 6,
2013, a catastrophic railroad accident occurred in Lac-M[eacute]gantic,
Quebec, Canada, when an unsecured and unattended freight train
transporting crude oil rolled down a descending grade and subsequently
derailed, resulting in the unintentional release of lading from
multiple tank cars. The subsequent fires and explosions, along with
other effects of the accident, resulted in the deaths of 47
individuals. In addition, the derailment caused extensive damage to the
town center, a release of hazardous materials resulting in a massive
environmental impact that will require substantial clean-up costs, and
the evacuation of approximately 2,000 people from the surrounding area.
    Accidents involving HHFTs transporting ethanol can also cause
severe damage. On August 5, 2012, a train derailed 18 of 106 cars, 17
of which were carrying ethanol, near Plevna, MT. Twelve of the 17 cars
released lading and began to burn, causing two grass fires, a highway
near the site to be closed, and over $1 million in damages. On October
7, 2011, a train derailed 26 loaded freight cars (including 10 loaded
with ethanol) approximately one-half mile east of Tiskilwa, IL. The
release of ethanol and resulting fire initiated an evacuation of about
500 residents within a \1/2\-mile radius of the accident scene, and
resulted in damages over $1.8 million. On June 19, 2009, near Rockford,
IL, a train derailed 19 cars, all of which contained ethanol, and 13 of
the derailed cars caught fire. The derailment destroyed a section of
single main track and an entire highway-rail grade crossing. As a
result of the fire that erupted after the derailment, a passenger in
one of the stopped cars was fatally injured, two passengers in the same
car received serious injuries, and five occupants of other cars waiting
at the highway/rail crossing were injured. Two responding firefighters
also sustained minor injuries. The release of ethanol and resulting
fire initiated a mandatory evacuation of about 2,000 residents within a
\1/2\-mile radius of the accident scene and damages of approximately
$1.7 million. The EPA estimated that 60,000 gallons of ethanol spilled
into an unnamed stream, which flowed near the Rock and Kishwaukee
Rivers.
    The following table highlights the risk of HHFTs by summarizing the
impacts of selected major train accidents involving trains of Class 3
flammable liquid.

                                              Table 3--Major Crude Oil/Ethanol Train Accidents in the U.S.
                                                                       [2006-2014]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Product
                                                          Number of     Speed at                            loss
                                  Date (MM/  Number  of   crude oil/   derailment   Material  and type    (gallons                       Type of train
            Location                 YY)      tank cars    ethanol      in miles         of train         of crude         Fire        accident or cause
                                              derailed       cars       per hour                             or                        of train accident
                                                          penetrated     (mph)                            ethanol)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LaSalle, CO.....................      05/14           5            1            9  Crude Oil..........        5,000  No.............  To Be Determined
                                                                                (unit).............                                 (TBD).
Lynchburg, VA...................      04/14          17            2           23  Crude Oil..........       30,000  Yes............  TBD.
                                                                                (unit).............
Vandergrift, PA.................      02/14          21            4           31  Crude Oil..........       10,000  No.............  TBD.
New Augusta, MS.................      01/14          26           25           45  Crude Oil..........       90,000  No.............  TBD.
Casselton, ND...................      12/13          20           18           42  Crude Oil..........      476,436  Yes............  Collision.
                                                                                (unit).............
Aliceville, AL..................      11/13          26           25           39  Crude Oil..........      630,000  Yes............  TBD.
                                                                                (unit).............
Plevna, MT......................      08/12          17           12           25  Ethanol............      245,336  Yes............  TBD.
Columbus, OH....................      07/12           3            3           23  Ethanol............       53,347  Yes............  TBD--NTSB
                                                                                Investigation.
Tiskilwa, IL....................      10/11          10           10           34  Ethanol............      143,534  Yes............  TBD--NTSB
                                                                                Investigation.
Arcadia, OH.....................      02/11          31           31           46  Ethanol............      834,840  Yes............  Rail Defect.
                                                                                (unit).............
Rockford/Cherry Valley, IL......      06/09          19           13           19  Ethanol............      232,963  Yes............  Washout.
                                                                                (unit).............
Painesville, OH.................      10/07           7            5           48  Ethanol............       76,153  Yes............  Rail Defect.
New Brighton, PA................      10/06          23           20           37  Ethanol............      485,278  Yes............  Rail Defect.
                                                                                (unit).............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1. The term ``unit'' as used in this chart means that the train was made up only of cars carrying that single commodity, as well as any required
  non-hazardous buffer cars and the locomotives.
Note 2. All accidents listed in the table involved HHFTs.
Note 3. All crude oil or crude oil/LPG accidents involved a train transporting over 1 million gallons of oil.

    While not all accidents involving crude oil and ethanol release as
much product or have as significant consequences as those shown in this
table, these accidents indicate the potential harm from future
releases. Table 4 provides a brief summary of the justifications for
each provision in this NPRM, and how each provision will address the
safety risks described previously.

        Table 4--Rulemaking Provisions and Safety Justifications
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Provision                          Justification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rail Routing.........................  PHMSA is proposing routing
                                        requirements to reduce the risk
                                        of a train accident. This
                                        proposal requires railroads to
                                        balance the risk factors to
                                        identify the route that poses
                                        the lower risk. As such, they
                                        may, in certain cases, choose a
                                        route that eliminates exposure
                                        in areas with high population
                                        densities but poses a risk for
                                        more frequent events in areas
                                        with very low densities. In
                                        other cases the risk of
                                        derailment may be so low along a
                                        section of track that, even
                                        though it runs through a densely
                                        populated area, it poses the
                                        lowest total risk when severity
                                        and likelihood are considered.
Classification of Mined Gas and        PHMSA is proposing to require a
 Liquid.                                sampling and testing program for
                                        mined gas and liquid, such as
                                        crude oil. PHMSA expects the
                                        proposed requirements would
                                        reduce the expected non-
                                        catastrophic damages and ensure
                                        that materials are properly
                                        classified in accordance with
                                        the HMR.
Notification to SERCs................  PHMSA is proposing to codify the
                                        May 7, 2014, DOT issued an
                                        Emergency Restriction/
                                        Prohibition Order in Docket No.
                                        DOT-OST-2014-0067 (EO or Order).
                                        Recent accidents have
                                        demonstrated the need for action
                                        in the form of additional
                                        communication between railroads
                                        and emergency responders to
                                        ensure that the emergency
                                        responders are aware of train
                                        movements carrying large
                                        quantities of crude oil through
                                        their communities.
Speed Restrictions...................  PHMSA is proposing to restrict
                                        the speed of HHFTs. Speed is a
                                        factor that may contribute to
                                        derailments. Speed can influence
                                        the probability of an accident,
                                        as lower speeds may allow for a
                                        brake application to stop the
                                        train before a collision. Speed
                                        also increases the kinetic
                                        energy of a train, resulting in
                                        a greater possibility of the
                                        tank cars being punctured in the
                                        event of a derailment. The
                                        proposed restrictions will
                                        reduce the frequency and
                                        severity of train accidents.
Braking..............................  To reduce the number of cars and
                                        energy associated with train
                                        accidents, PHMSA is proposing to
                                        require alternative brake signal
                                        propagation systems: Distributed
                                        power (DP), or two-way end of
                                        train devices (EOT); for tank
                                        car Option 1, electronic
                                        controlled pneumatic brakes
                                        (ECP)
Tank Car Specifications..............  PHMSA is proposing a new DOT
                                        Specification 117 tank car to
                                        address the risks associated
                                        with the rail transportation of
                                        ethanol and crude oil and the
                                        risks posed by HHFTs. All tank
                                        car Options for the DOT
                                        Specification 117 incorporate
                                        several enhancements to increase
                                        puncture resistance; provide
                                        thermal protection to survive a
                                        100-minute pool fire; and
                                        protect top fitting (new
                                        construction only) and bottom
                                        outlets during a derailment.
                                        Under all Options, the proposed
                                        system of design enhancements
                                        would reduce the consequences of
                                        a derailment of tank cars
                                        carrying crude oil or ethanol.
                                        There would be fewer car
                                        punctures, fewer releases from
                                        the service equipment (top and
                                        bottom fittings), and delayed
                                        release of flammable liquid from
                                        the tank cars through the
                                        pressure relief devices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The consequences of train accidents and increase in the rail
transportation of flammable liquids highlight the need to review
existing regulations and industry practices related to such
transportation. PHMSA and FRA are focused on reducing the risks posed
by HHFTs and are taking action to prevent accidents from occurring and
to mitigate the consequences when accidents do occur. PHMSA and FRA's
actions to date demonstrate their focus on reducing risk associated
with the rail transportation of large quantities of flammable liquids.
PHMSA and FRA actions include: (1) Issuing FRA's Emergency Order No. 28
(EO 28) (78 FR 48218) published on August 7, 2013 stressing train
securement; (2) issuing two Joint Safety Advisories published on August
7, 2013 (78 FR 48224) and November 20, 2013 (78 FR 69745) stressing the
importance of security planning and proper characterization and
classification of crude oil; (3) initiating a comprehensive review of
operational factors that impact the transportation of hazardous
materials by rail in a public meeting held on August 27-28, 2013 (78 FR
42998); (4) referring safety issues related to EO 28 and the August 7,
2013 Joint Safety Advisory to FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
(RSAC); (5) issuing an emergency order on February 25, 2014, which was
revised and amended on March 6, 2014 requiring that all rail shipments
of crude oil that is properly classed as a flammable liquid in Packing
Group (PG) III material be treated as a PG I or II material; \14\ (6)
issuing an emergency order on May 7, 2014, requiring all railroads that
operate trains containing one million gallons of Bakken crude oil to
notify SERCs about the operation of these trains through their States;
\15\ (7) issuing a Safety Advisory on May 7, 2014, urging carriers
transporting Bakken crude oil by rail to select and use tank cars of
the highest integrity to transport the material; \16\ and (8)
publishing the September 6, 2013, advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) responding to eight petitions for rulemaking and four NTSB
Safety Recommendations related to the transportation of hazardous
materials by rail (78 FR 54849).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0025. See also http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Amended_Emergency_Order_030614.pdf.
    \15\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_D9E224C13963CAF0AE4F15A8B3C4465BAEAF0100/filename/Final_EO_on_Transport_of_Bakken_Crude_Oi_05_07_2014.pdf.
    \16\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_9084EF057B3D4E74A2DEB5CC86006951BE1D0200/filename/Final_FRA_PHMSA_Safety_Advisory_tank_cars_May_2014.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these eight actions, PHMSA issued a Safety Alert on
January 2, 2014, warning of potential crude oil variability and
emphasizing the proper and sufficient testing to ensure accurate
characterization and classification. The Safety Alert expressed PHMSA's
concern that unprocessed crude oil may affect the integrity of
packaging or present additional hazards related to corrosivity, sulfur
content, and dissolved gas content.\17\ To address these risks, this
NPRM is proposing additional requirements for a sampling plan that
would include proper characterization, classification, and selection of
a hazardous material's Packing Group. Further, the NPRM is proposing to
expand the routing requirements under subpart I of part 172 of the HMR
to include HHFTs. Through its speed, tank car, braking, and
notification requirements, this NPRM is intended to take a
comprehensive approach to the risks of HHFTs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_111F295A99DD05D9B698AE8968F7C1742DC70000/filename/1_2_14%20Rail_Safety_Alert.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA has prepared and placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) addressing the economic impact of this proposed rule.
Table 5 shows the costs and benefits by affected section and rule
provision over a 20 year period, discounted at a 7% rate. Please note
that because there is overlap in the risk reduction achieved between
some of the proposed requirements listed in

Table 5, the total benefits and costs of the provisions cannot be
accurately calculated by summing the benefits and costs of each
proposed provision. For example, the benefits for tank car Option 1,
the PHMSA and FRA Designed Car, include benefits that are also
presented as part of the benefits for the proposed ``Braking''
requirements at 49 CFR 174.130. Table 6 shows an explanation of the
comprehensive benefits and costs (i.e., the combined effects of
individual provisions), and the estimated benefits, costs, and net
benefits of each proposed scenario.
    Please also note that, given the uncertainty associated with the
risks of crude oil and ethanol shipments, Table 5 contains a range of
benefits estimates. The low end of the range of estimated benefits
estimates risk from 2015 to 2034 based on the U.S. safety record for
crude oil and ethanol from 2006 to 2013, adjusting for the projected
increase in shipment volume over the next 20 years. Absent this
proposed rule, we predict about 15 mainline derailments for 2015,
falling to a prediction of about 5 mainline derailments annually by
2034. The high end of the range of estimated benefits includes the same
estimate of 5 to 15 annual mainline derailments predicted, based on the
U.S. safety record, plus an estimate that the U.S. would experience an
additional 10 safety events of higher consequence--nine of which would
have environmental damages and monetized injury and fatality costs
exceeding $1.15 billion per event and one of which would have
environmental damages and monetized injury and fatality costs exceeding
$5.75 billion--over the next 20 years.

        Table 5--20 Year Costs and Benefits by Stand-Alone Proposed Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \18\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Costs (7%)
            Affected section \19\                     Provision                Benefits (7%)         (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR 172.820..............................  Rail Routing+............  Cost effective if routing          $4.5
                                                                          were to reduce risk of
                                                                          an incident by 0.17%.
49 CFR 173.41...............................  Classification of Mined    Cost effective if this             16.2
                                               Gas and Liquid.            requirement reduces risk
                                                                          by 0.61%.
49 CFR 174.310..............................  Notification to SERCs....  Qualitative..............             0
                                              Speed Restriction: Option  $199 million-$636 million         2,680
                                               1: 40 mph speed limit
                                               all areas*.
                                              Speed Restriction: Option  $33.6 million-$108                  240
                                               2: 40 mph 100k people*.    million.
                                              Speed Restriction: Option  $6.8 million-$21.8                 22.9
                                               3: 40 mph in HTUAs*.       million.
                                              Braking: Electronic        $737 million-$1,759                 500
                                               Pneumatic Control with     million.
                                               DP or EOT.
49 CFR Part 179.............................  Option 1: PHMSA and FRA    $822 million-$3,256               3,030
                                               designed car @.            million.
                                              Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank    $610 million-$2,426               2,571
                                               Car.                       million.
                                              Option 3: Jacketed CPC-    $393 million-$1,570               2,040
                                               1232 (new const.).         million.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ``*'' indicates voluntary compliance regarding crude oil trains in high-threat urban areas (HTUA).
``+'' indicates voluntary actions that will be taken by shippers and railroads.
``'' indicates that only tank car Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car, has a requirement for ECP
  brakes. However, all HHFTs would be required to have DP or two-way EOT, regardless of which tank car Option is
  selected at the final rule stage.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ All costs and benefits are in millions over 20 years, and
are discounted to present value using a 7 percent rate.
    \19\ All affected sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) are in Title 49.

Table 6--20 Year Benefits and Costs of Proposal Combinations of Proposed
                  Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \20\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Benefit Range          Cost
              Proposal                    (millions)        (millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40   $1,436-$4,386......          $5,820
 MPH System Wide.
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40   $1,292-$3,836......           3,380
 MPH in 100K.
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40   $1,269-$3,747......           3,163
 MPH in HTUA.
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH System    $794-$3,034........           5,272
 Wide.
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K.  $641-$2,449........           2,831
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA.  $616-$2,354........           2,614
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH System    $584-$2,232........           4,741
 Wide.
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K.  $426-$1,626........           2,300
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA.  $400-$1,527........           2,083
------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ All costs and benefits are in millions, and are discounted
to present value using a 7 percent rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Overview of Current Regulations Relevant to This Proposal

    Federal hazardous materials transportation law (Federal hazmat law;
49 U.S.C. 5101-5128) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation
(Secretary) to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation,
including security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate,
and foreign commerce.'' The Secretary has delegated this authority to
PHMSA. 49 CFR 1.97(b). PHMSA is responsible for overseeing a hazardous
materials safety program that minimizes the risks to life and property
inherent in transportation in commerce. The HMR provide safety and
security requirements for shipments valued at

more than $1.4 trillion annually.\21\ The HMR are designed to achieve
three goals: (1) To ensure that hazardous materials are packaged and
handled safely and securely during transportation; (2) to provide
effective communication to transportation workers and emergency
responders of the hazards of the materials being transported; and (3)
to minimize the consequences of an incident should one occur. The
hazardous material regulatory system is a risk management system that
is prevention-oriented and focused on identifying a safety or security
hazard, thus reducing the probability and quantity of a hazardous
material release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ 2007 Commodity Flow Survey, Research and Innovative
Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the HMR, hazardous materials are categorized by analysis and
experience into hazard classes and packing groups based upon the risks
that they present during transportation. The HMR specify appropriate
packaging and handling requirements for hazardous materials based on
such classification, and require an offeror to communicate the
material's hazards through the use of shipping papers, package marking
and labeling, and vehicle placarding. The HMR also require offerors to
provide emergency response information applicable to the specific
hazard or hazards of the material being transported. Further, the HMR
mandate training for persons who prepare hazardous materials for
shipment or who transport hazardous materials in commerce and require
the development and implementation of plans to address security risks
related to the transportation of certain types and quantities of
hazardous materials in commerce, including additional planning
requirements for transportation by rail (e.g., the routing of the
material).
    The HMR also include operational requirements applicable to each
mode of transportation. The Secretary has authority over all areas of
railroad transportation safety (Federal railroad safety laws,
principally 49 U.S.C. chapters 201-213), and delegates this authority
to FRA. 49 CFR 1.89. FRA inspects and audits railroads, tank car
facilities, and offerors for compliance with both FRA and PHMSA
regulations. FRA also has an extensive, well-established research and
development program to enhance all elements of railroad safety
including hazardous materials transportation.
    As a result of the shared role in the safe and secure
transportation of hazardous materials by rail, PHMSA and FRA work very
closely when considering regulatory changes. Regarding rail safety and
security, PHMSA and FRA take a system-wide, comprehensive approach
consistent with the risks posed by the bulk transport of hazardous
materials by rail. To address our concerns regarding the risks
associated with mined liquids and gases (like crude oil), and HHFTs, we
are focusing on three areas: (1) Proper classification and
characterization; (2) operational controls to lessen the likelihood and
consequences of accidents; and (3) improvements to tank car integrity.
This approach is designed to minimize the occurrence of train accidents
and mitigate the damage caused should an accident occur.
    As described throughout this NPRM, PHMSA and FRA have relied on a
variety of regulatory and non-regulatory methods to address concerns
regarding HHFTs. These efforts have included issuing guidance,
initiating rulemakings, participating in transportation safety
committees, holding public meetings with the regulated community and
other stakeholders, enhancing enforcement efforts, reaching out to the
public, and addressing tank car integrity and freight rail safety in
general. All of these efforts have been consistent with our system
safety approach. We are confident that collectively these actions have
provided and will continue to provide valuable rail safety
enhancements, information and guidance to the regulated community, and
improve overall safety for the public.
    This overview section provides a general discussion of the current
regulations that affect the safety of HHFTs. These issues include: (1)
Proper classification and characterization of the hazardous materials
offered for transportation; (2) packagings authorized for the materials
transported in HHFTs; (3) the role of track integrity in preventing
train accidents; (4) oil spill response plans; and (5) routing of
trains based on an assessment of the safety and security risks along
routes.

A. Classification and Characterization of Mined Liquids and Gases

    The proper classification and characterization of a hazardous
material is a key requirement under the HMR, as it dictates which other
requirements apply, such as specific operational controls and proper
packaging selection. Classification is simply ensuring the proper
hazard class and packing group (if applicable) are assigned to a
particular material. Characterization is a complete description of the
properties of a material during the transportation cycle.
Characterization includes the identification of the effects a material
has on both the reliability and safety of the packaging that contains
it. Proper classification and characterization is especially important
when dealing with a material such as mined liquids and gases, including
crude oil, as these materials' properties are variable. Crude oil's
properties are not easily understood and the characterization may vary
considerably based on time, location, method of extraction, temperature
at time of extraction or processing, and the type and extent of
processing of the material. In contrast, the classification and
characterization of manufactured products is generally well understood
and consistent.
    Under Sec.  173.22 of the HMR, it is the offeror's responsibility
to properly ``class and describe the hazardous material in accordance
with parts 172 and 173 of the HMR.'' When a single material meets more
than one hazard class, it must be classed based on the hazard
precedence table in Sec.  173.2a. Once an offeror determines the hazard
class of a material, the offeror must then select the most appropriate
proper shipping name from the Sec.  172.101 Hazardous Materials Table
(HMT).
    In the case of crude oil, relevant properties to properly classify
a flammable liquid include: Flash point, and boiling point (See section
173.120). The HMR does not specifically provide requirements for
characterization tests however; relevant properties that may affect the
characterization of crude oil include corrosivity, vapor pressure,
specific gravity at loading and reference temperatures, and the
presence and concentration of specific compounds such as sulfur.
Characterization of certain properties enables an offeror to select the
most appropriate shipping name, and identify key packaging
considerations. Based on the shipping name the HMT provides the list of
packagings authorized for use by the HMR. As indicated in Sec.
173.24(e), even though certain packagings are authorized, it is the
responsibility of the offeror to ensure that such packagings are
compatible with their lading. Such information and determination of the
authorized packaging also ensure that the appropriate outage is
maintained in accordance with Sec.  173.24(a).
    Crude oil transported by rail is often derived from different
sources and is then blended, complicating proper classification and
characterization of the material. PHMSA and FRA audits of crude oil
loading facilities, prior to the issuance of the February 26, 2014
Emergency Restriction/Prohibition

Order, indicate that the classification of crude oil being transported
by rail was often based solely on a generic Safety Data Sheet (SDS).
The data on these sheets only provide a material classification and a
range of material properties. This SDS information is typically
provided by the consignee (the person to whom the shipment is to be
delivered) to the offeror. In these instances, it is possible no
validation of the crude oil properties took place. Further, FRA's
audits indicate that SDS information is often not gleaned from any
recently conducted analyses or from analyses of the many different
sources (wells) of the crude oil.
    Improper classification and characterization can also impact
operational requirements under the HMR. Offerors and carriers must
ensure that outage is considered when loading a tank car. Section
173.24b(a) of the HMR prescribes the minimum tank car outage for
hazardous materials at one percent at a reference temperature that is
based on the existence of tank car insulation. A crude oil offeror must
know the specific gravity of the hazardous material at the reference
temperature as well as the temperature and specific gravity of the
material at that temperature when loaded. This information is then used
to calculate the total quantity that can be safely loaded into the car
to comply with the one percent outage requirement. If the outage is not
properly calculated because the material's specific gravity is unknown
(or is provided as a range), the tank car could be loaded such that if
the temperature increases during transportation, the tank will become
shell-full, increasing the likelihood of a leak from the valve fittings
or manway, and increase risk during a train accident.
    Since 2004, approximately 10 percent of the one-time movement
approval (OTMA) requests that FRA has received under the requirements
of 49 CFR 174.50 have been submitted to move overloaded tank cars. Of
these requests, 33 percent were tank cars containing flammable liquids.
FRA notes that tank cars overloaded by weight are typically identified
when the tank cars go over a weigh-in-motion scale at a railroad's
classification yard. As previously indicated, crude oil and ethanol are
typically moved in HHFTs, and the cars in these trains are generally
moved as a single block in a ``through'' priority or ``key train.''
\22\ As a result, the train is not broken up in a classification yard
for individual car routing purposes, and cars do not typically pass
over weigh-in-motion scales in classification yards. Therefore, it is
unlikely that FRA would receive many OTMA requests for overloaded tank
cars containing crude oil, suggesting that there is a potential of
underreporting. Overloads of general service flammable liquid tank cars
should not be confused with any excess capacity issues. We do not have
information that shippers are filling the excess capacity available to
them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ On August 5, 2013, AAR published Circular No. OT-55-N. This
document supersedes OT-55-M, issued October 1, 2012. The definition
of a ``key train'' was revised to include ``20 car loads or portable
tank loads of any combination of hazardous material.'' Therefore,
the maximum speed of these trains is limited to 50 MPH. The document
is available in the public docket for this proceeding and at the
following URL: http://www.aar.com/CPC-1258%20OT-55-N%208-5-13.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, crude oil accounted for the most non-accident releases
(NARs) \23\ by commodity in 2012, nearly doubling the next highest
commodity (alcohols not otherwise specified, which accounts for a
comparable annual volume transported by rail). FRA's data indicate that
98 percent of the NARs involved loaded tank cars. Product releases
through the top valves and fittings of tank cars when the hazardous
material expands during transportation. This suggests that loading
facilities may not know the specific gravity of the hazardous materials
loaded into railroad tank cars, resulting in a lack of sufficient
outage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ According to the AAR, a non-accident release (NAR) is the
unintentional release of a hazardous material while in
transportation, including loading and unloading while in railroad
possession, which is not caused by a derailment, collision, or other
rail-related accident. NARs consist of leaks, splashes, and other
releases from improperly secured or defective valves, fittings, and
tank shells and also include venting of non-atmospheric gases from
safety release devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters to the ANPRM noted incidents involving damage to tank
cars in crude oil service in the form of severe corrosion of the
internal surface of the tank, manway covers, and valves and fittings. A
possible cause is contamination of the crude oil by materials used in
the fracturing process that are corrosive to the tank car tank and
service equipment. Therefore, when crude oil is loaded into tank cars,
it is critical that the existence and concentration of specific
elements or compounds be identified, along with the corrosivity of the
materials to the tank cars and service equipment. Proper identification
also enables an offeror, in coordination with the tank car owner, to
determine if there is a need for an interior coating or lining,
alternative materials of construction for valves and fittings, and
performance requirements for fluid sealing elements, such as gaskets
and o-rings. These steps will help ensure the reliability of the tank
car until the next qualification event.
    For the reasons outlined above, proper classification and
characterization of hazardous materials is critical to ensuring that
materials are packaged and transported safely. The HMR do not prescribe
a specific test frequency for classification and characterization of
hazardous materials. However, as provided in Sec.  173.22, the
regulations clearly intend for the frequency and type of testing to be
based on an offeror's knowledge of the hazardous material, with
specific consideration given to the volume of hazardous material
shipped, the variety of the sources of the hazardous material, and the
processes used to generate the hazardous material. Once an offeror has
classified and characterized the material; selected the appropriate
packaging; loaded the packaging; and marked, labeled, and placarded in
accordance with the HMR, the offeror must ``certify'' the shipment.
    Section 172.204 of the HMR currently requires the offeror of the
hazardous material to ``certify that the material is offered for
transportation in accordance with this subchapter.'' Certification is a
very important step in the transportation process. The certification
indicates the HMR was followed and that all requirements have been met.
The shipper's certification must include either of the following
statements:

    This is to certify that the above-named materials are properly
classified, described, packaged, marked and labeled, and are in
proper condition for transportation according to the applicable
regulations of the Department of Transportation.

or--

    I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment are fully
and accurately described above by the proper shipping name, and are
classified, packaged, marked and labeled/placarded, and are in all
respects in proper condition for transport according to applicable
international and national governmental regulations.

    As such, ultimately, the offeror is responsible for certifying a
correct classification, and while the HMR do not specifically prescribe
a frequency for classification, it requires an offeror to consider each
hazard class in accordance with the defined HMR test protocol. As
previously discussed, improper classification and characterization can
have serious ramifications that could impact transportation safety.
    On January 23, 2014, in response to its investigation of the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident, the NTSB issued three recommendations to
PHMSA and FRA.

Safety Recommendation R-14-6 requested that PHMSA require shippers to
sufficiently test and document the physical and chemical
characteristics of hazardous materials to ensure the proper
classification, packaging, and record-keeping of products offered in
transportation. These and other NTSB Safety Recommendation and the
corresponding PHMSA responses are discussed in further detail in
Section C of the background portion of this document.

B. Packaging

    For each proper shipping name, bulk packaging requirements are
provided in Column (8C) of the HMT. For most flammable liquids, the
authorized packaging requirements for a PG I material are provided in
Sec.  173.243 and for PGs II and III in Sec.  173.242. The following
table is provided as a general guide for the packaging options for rail
transport provided by the HMR for a flammable and combustible liquids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Additional information on tank car specifications is
available at the following URL: http://www.bnsfhazmat.com/refdocs/1326686674.pdf.

                     Table 7--Tank Car Options \24\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Flammable liquid,
     Flammable liquid, PG I         PG II  and III    Combustible Liquid
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 103.........................  DOT 103...........  DOT 103.
DOT 104.........................  DOT 104...........  DOT 104.
DOT 105.........................  DOT 105...........  DOT 105.
DOT 109.........................  DOT 109...........  DOT 109.
DOT 111.........................  DOT 111...........  DOT 111.
DOT 112.........................  DOT 112...........  DOT 112.
DOT 114.........................  DOT 114...........  DOT 114.
DOT 115.........................  DOT 115...........  DOT 115.
DOT 120.........................  DOT 120...........  DOT 120.
                                  AAR 206W..........  AAR 206W.
                                  ..................  AAR 203W.
                                  ..................  AAR 211W.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1. Sections 173.241, 173.242, and 173.243 authorize the use of the
  above tank cars.
Note 2. DOT 103, 104,105, 109, 112, 114, and 120 tank cars are pressure
  tank cars (HMR; Part 179, Subpart C).
Note 3. DOT 111 and 115 tank cars are non-pressure tank cars (HMR; Part
  179, Subpart D).
Note 4. AAR 203W, AAR 206W, and AAR 211W tank cars are non-DOT
  specification tank cars that meet AAR standards. These tank cars are
  authorized under Sec.   173.241 of the HMR (see Special Provision B1,
  as applicable).
Note 5. DOT 114 and DOT 120 pressure cars are permitted to have bottom
  outlets and, generally, would be compatible with the DOT 111.

    The offeror must select a packaging that is suitable for the
properties of the material and based on the packaging authorizations
provided by the HMR. With regard to package selection, the HMR require
in Sec.  173.24(b) that each package used for the transportation of
hazardous materials be ``designed, constructed, maintained, filled, its
contents so limited, and closed, so that under conditions normally
incident to transportation . . . there will be no identifiable (without
the use of instruments) release of hazardous materials to the
environment [and] . . . the effectiveness of the package will not be
substantially reduced.'' Under this requirement, offerors must consider
how the properties of the material (which can vary depending on
temperature and pressure) will affect the packaging.
    The DOT Specification 111 tank car is one of several cars
authorized by the HMR for the rail transportation of many hazardous
materials, including ethanol, crude oil and other flammable liquids.
For summary of the design requirements of the DOT Specification 111
tank car see table 2 in the executive summary. Provided in table 8
below, are estimates of the types of tank car tanks and corresponding
services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Source: RSI presentation at the NTSB rail safety forum
April 22, 2014, update provided on June 18, 2014.

       Table 8--Estimates for Current Fleet of Rail Tank Cars \25\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Tank car category                       Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total  of Tank Cars............................         334,869
Total  of DOT 111..............................         272,119
Total  of DOT 111 in Flammable Liquid Service..          80,500
Total  of CPC 1232 in Flammable Liquid Service.          17,300
Total  of Tank Cars hauling Crude Oil..........          42,550
Total  of Tank Cars Hauling Ethanol............          29,780
CPC 1232 (Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service................           4,850
CPC 1232 (Jacketed) in Ethanol Service..................               0
CPC 1232 (Non-Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service............           9,400
CPC 1232 (Non-Jacketed) in Ethanol Service..............             480
DOT 111 (Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service.................           5,500
DOT 111 (Jacketed) in Ethanol Service...................             100
DOT 111 (Non-Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service.............          22,800
DOT 111 (Non-Jacketed) in Ethanol Service...............          29,200
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rising demand for rail carriage of crude oil \26\ and ethanol \27\
increases the risk of train accidents involving those materials. Major
train accidents often result in the release of hazardous materials.
These events pose a significant danger to the public and the
environment. FRA closely monitors train accidents involving hazardous
materials and documents the damage sustained by all cars involved in
the accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ In 2013 there were approximately 400,000 originations of
tank car loads of crude oil. In 2012, there were nearly 234,000
originations. In 2011 there were nearly 66,000 originations. In 2008
there were just 9,500 originations. Association of American
Railroads, Moving Crude Petroleum by Rail, http://dot111.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Crude-oil-by-rail.pdf (December 2013).
    \27\ In 2011 there were nearly 341,000 originations of tank car
loads of ethanol, up from 325,000 in 2010. In 2000 there were just
40,000 originations. Association of American Railroads, Railroads
and Ethanol, https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf. (April 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In published findings from the June 19, 2009, incident in Cherry
Valley,

Illinois, the NTSB indicated that the DOT Specification 111 tank car
can almost always be expected to breach in the event of a train
accident resulting in car-to-car impacts or pileups.\28\ In addition,
PHMSA received numerous petitions encouraging rulemaking and both FRA
and PHMSA received letters from members of Congress in both parties
urging prompt, responsive actions from the Department. The Association
of American Railroads (AAR) created the T87.6 Task Force to consider
several enhancements to the DOT Specification 111 tank car design and
rail carrier operations to enhance rail transportation safety.
Simultaneously, FRA conducted research on long-standing safety concerns
regarding the survivability of the DOT Specification 111 tank cars
designed to current HMR standards and used for the transportation of
ethanol and crude oil, focusing on issues such as puncture resistance
and top fittings protection. The research indicated that special
consideration is necessary for the transportation of ethanol and crude
oil in DOT Specification 111 tank cars, especially in HHFTs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ National Transportation Safety Board, Railroad Accident
Report--Derailment of CN Freight Train U70691-18 With Subsequent
Hazardous Materials Release and Fire, http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2012/RAR1201.pdf (February 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, PHMSA and FRA reviewed the regulatory history
pertaining to flammable liquids transported in tank cars. Prior to
1990, the distinction between authorized packaging, for flammable
liquids in particular, was described in far more detail in Sec.
173.119. Section 173.119 indicated that the packaging requirements for
flammable liquids are based on a combination of flash point, boiling
point, and vapor pressure. The regulations provided a point at which a
flammable liquid had to be transported in a tank car suitable for
compressed gases, commonly referred to as a ``pressure car'' (e.g., DOT
Specifications 105, 112, 114 tank cars).
    On December 21, 1990, the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), PHMSA's predecessor agency, published a final
rule (Docket HM-181; 55 FR 52402), that comprehensively revised the HMR
with regard to hazard communication, classification, and packaging
requirements based on the United Nations (UN) Recommendations on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations). Under Docket HM-181,
RSPA aimed to simplify and streamline the HMR by aligning with
international standards and implementing performance-oriented packaging
standards. As previously stated, Sec.  173.119 specified that the
packaging requirements for flammable liquids are based on a combination
of flash point, boiling point, and vapor pressure. Section 173.119(f)
specified that flammable liquids with a vapor pressure more than 27
pounds per square inch absolute (psia) but less than 40 psia at 100
[deg]F (at 40 psia, the material met the definition of a compressed
gas), were only authorized for transportation in certain pressure cars.
The older regulations recognized that flammable liquids exhibiting high
vapor pressures, such as those liquids with dissolved gases, posed
significant risks and required a more robust packaging.
    The packaging authorizations are currently indicated in the HMT and
part 173, subpart F. DOT Specification 111 tank cars are authorized for
low, medium and high-hazard liquids and solids (equivalent to Packing
Groups III, II, I, respectively). Packing groups are designed to assign
a degree of danger presented within a particular hazard class. Packing
Group I poses the highest danger (``great danger'') and Packing Group
III the lowest (``minor danger'').\29\ In addition, the general
packaging requirements prescribed in Sec.  173.24 provide additional
consideration for selecting the most appropriate packaging from the
list of authorized packaging identified in column (8) of the HMT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Packing groups, in addition in indicating risk of the
material, can trigger levels of varying requirements. For example
packing groups can indicate differing levels of testing requirements
for a non-bulk packaging such or the need for additional operational
requirements such as security planning requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2011, the AAR issued Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC) 1232,
which outlines industry requirements for certain DOT Specification 111
tanks ordered after October 1, 2011, intended for use in ethanol and
crude oil service (construction approved by FRA on January 25, 2011--
see the Background below for information regarding a detailed
description of PHMSA and FRA actions to allow construction under CPC-
1232). Key tank car requirements contained in CPC-1232 include the
following:
     PG I and II material tank cars to be constructed to AAR
Standard 286; AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices,
Section C, Car Construction Fundamentals and Details, Standard S-286,
Free/Unrestricted Interchange for 286,000 lb. Gross Rail Load (GRL)
Cars (AAR Standard 286);
     Head and shell thickness must be \1/2\ inch for TC-128B
non jacketed cars and \7/16\ inch for jacketed cars;
     Shells of non-jacketed tank cars constructed of A5l6-70
must be \9/16\ inch thick;
     Shells of jacketed tank cars constructed of A5l6-70 must
be \1/2\ inch thick;
     New cars must be equipped with at least \1/2\ inch half-
head shields;
     Heads and the shells must be constructed of normalized
steel;
     Top fittings must be protected by a protective structure
as tall as the tallest fitting; and
     A reclosing pressure relief valve must be installed.
    The CPC-1232 requirements are intended to improve the
crashworthiness of the tank cars and include a thicker shell, head
protection, top fittings protection, and relief valves with a greater
flow capacity.

C. Track Integrity and the Safety of Freight Railroad Operations

    Train accidents are often the culmination of a sequence of events
that are influenced by a variety of factors and conditions. Broken
rails or welds, track geometry, and human factors such as improper use
of switches are leading causes of derailments. For example, one study
found that broken rails or welds resulted in approximately 670
derailments between 2001 and 2010, which far exceed the average of 89
derailments for all other causes.\30\ Rail defects have caused major
accidents involving HHFTs, including accidents New Brighton, PA and
Arcadia, OH.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ See ``Analysis of Causes of Major Train Derailment and
Their Effect on Accident Rates'' http://ict.illinois.edu/railroad/CEE/pdf/Journal%20Papers/2012/Liu%20et%20al%202012.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA and FRA have a shared responsibility for regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail and take a system-wide,
comprehensive approach to the risks posed by the bulk transport of
hazardous materials by rail. This approach includes both preventative
and mitigating measures. In this rulemaking PHMSA is proposing
amendments to directly address the safe transportation of HHFTs. The
focus of this NPRM is on mitigating the damages of train accidents, but
the speed restriction, braking system and routing provisions could also
prevent train accidents. This NPRM does not directly address
regulations governing the inspection and maintenance of track. PHMSA
and FRA find that existing regulations and on-going rulemaking
efforts--together with this NPRM's proposals for speed, braking, and
routing--sufficiently address safety issues involving rail defects and
human

factors. Specifically, the expansion of routing analysis to include
HHFTs would require consideration of the 27 safety and security factors
(See table 10). These factors include track type, class, and
maintenance schedule (which would address rail defects) as well as
training and skill level of crews (which would address human factors).
    Pursuant to its statutory authority, FRA promulgates railroad
safety regulations (49 CFR subtitle B, chapter II (parts 200-299)) and
orders, enforces those regulations and orders as well as the HMR and
the Federal railroad safety laws, and conducts a comprehensive railroad
safety program. FRA's regulations promulgated for the safety of
railroad operations involving the movement of freight address: (1)
Railroad track; (2) signal and train control systems; (3) operating
practices; (4) railroad communications; (5) rolling stock; (6) rear-end
marking devices; (7) safety glazing; (8) railroad accident/incident
reporting; (9) locational requirements for the dispatch of U.S. rail
operations; (10) safety integration plans governing railroad
consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions of control; (11) alcohol and
drug testing; (12) locomotive engineer and conductor certification;
(13) workplace safety; (14) highway-rail grade crossing safety; and
other subjects.
    The FRA has many initiatives underway to address freight rail
safety. Key regulatory actions are outlined below:
     Risk Reduction Program (2130-AC11)-FRA is developing an
NPRM that will consider appropriate contents for Risk Reduction
Programs by Class I freight railroads and how they should be
implemented and reviewed by FRA. A Risk Reduction Program is a
structured program with proactive processes and procedures developed
and implemented by a railroad to identify hazards and to mitigate, if
not eliminate, the risks associated with those hazards on its system. A
Risk Reduction Program encourages a railroad and its employees to work
together to proactively identify hazards and to jointly determine what
action to take to mitigate or eliminate the associated risks. The ANPRM
was published on December 8, 2010, and the comment period ended on
February 7, 2011.
     Track Safety Standards: Improving Rail Integrity (2130-
AC28)--FRA published this rule on January 24, 2014 (79 FR 4234). FRA's
final rule prescribes specific requirements for effective rail
inspection frequencies, rail flaw remedial actions, minimum operator
qualifications, and requirements for rail inspection records. The bulk
of this regulation codified the industry's current good practices. In
addition, it removes the regulatory requirements concerning joint bar
fracture reporting. Section 403(c) of the Rail Safety Improvement Act
of 2008 (RSIA) (Pub. L. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848 (October 16, 2008)) (49
U.S.C. 20142 note)) mandated that FRA review its existing regulations
to determine if regulatory amendments should be developed that would
revise, for example, rail inspection frequencies and methods and rail
defect remedial actions and consider rail inspection processes and
technologies. The final rule became effective on March 25, 2014. PHMSA
and FRA seek public comment on the extent to which additional changes
to track integrity regulations are justified for HHFT routes. When
commenting, please include a specific proposal, explain the reason for
any recommended change, and include the source, methodology, and key
assumptions of any supporting evidence.
     Positive Train Control (PTC) (multiple rulemakings)--PTC
is a processor-based/communication-based train control system designed
to prevent train accidents. The RSIA mandates that PTC be implemented
across a significant portion of the Nation's rail system by December
31, 2015. See 49 U.S.C. 20157. PTC may be voluntarily developed and
implemented by a railroad following the requirements of 49 CFR part
236, Subpart H, Standards for Processor-Based Signal and Train Control
Systems; or, may be, as mandated by the RSIA, developed and implemented
by a railroad following the requirements of 49 CFR part 236, Subpart I,
Positive Train Control Systems. With limited exceptions and exclusions,
PTC is required to be installed and implemented on Class I railroad
main lines (i.e., lines with over 5 million gross tons annually) over
which any poisonous- or toxic-by-inhalation (PIH/TIH) hazardous
materials are transported; and, on any railroad's main lines over which
regularly scheduled passenger intercity or commuter operations are
conducted. It is currently estimated this will equate to approximately
70,000 miles of track and will involve approximately 20,000
locomotives. PTC technology is capable of automatically controlling
train speeds and movements should a train operator fail to take
appropriate action for the conditions at hand. For example, PTC can
force a train to a stop before it passes a signal displaying a stop
indication, or before diverging on a switch improperly lined, thereby
averting a potential collision. PTC systems required to comply with the
requirements of Subpart I must reliably and functionally prevent:
     Train-to-train collisions;
     Overspeed derailments;
     Incursion into an established work zone; and
     Movement through a main line switch in the improper
position.

D. Oil Spill Response Plans

    PHMSA's regulations (49 CFR part 130) prescribe prevention,
containment and response planning requirements of the Department of
Transportation applicable to transportation of oil \31\ by motor
vehicles and rolling stock. The purpose of a response plan is to ensure
that personnel are trained and available and equipment is in place to
respond to an oil spill, and that procedures are established before a
spill occurs, so that required notifications and appropriate response
actions will follow quickly when there is a spill. We believe that
most, if not all, of the rail community transporting oil, including
crude oil transported as a hazardous material, is subject to the basic
response plan requirement of 49 CFR 130.31(a) based on the
understanding that most, if not all, rail tank cars being used to
transport crude oil have a capacity greater than 3,500 gallons.
However, a comprehensive response plan for shipment of oil is only
required when the oil is in a quantity greater than 42,000 gallons per
package. Tank cars of this size are not used to transport oil. As a
result, the railroads do not file a comprehensive oil response plan. A
comparison of a basic and comprehensive plan can be seen below in Table
9. The shaded rows of the table indicate requirements that are not part
of the basic plan but would be included in the comprehensive plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ For purposes of 49 CFR part 130, oil means oil of any kind
or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil,
sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with the wastes other than dredged
spoil. 49 CFR 130.5. This includes non-petroleum oil such as animal
fat, vegetable oil, or other non-petroleum oil.

                    Table 9--Comparison of Basic and Comprehensive Spill Plans by Requirement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Type of plan
             Category                     Requirement        ---------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Basic                 Comprehensive
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preparation......................  Sets forth the manner of   Yes.....................  Yes.
                                    response to a discharge..
Preparation......................  Accounts for the maximum   Yes.....................  Yes.
                                    potential discharge of
                                    the packaging..
Personnel/Equipment..............  Identifies private         Yes.....................  Yes.
                                    personnel and equipment
                                    available for response..
Personnel/Coordination...........  Identifies appropriate     Yes.....................  Yes.
                                    persons and agencies
                                    (including telephone
                                    numbers) to be
                                    contacted, including the
                                    NRC.
Documentation....................  Is kept on file at the     Yes.....................  Yes.
                                    principal place of
                                    business and at the
                                    dispatcher's office.
Coordination.....................  Reflects the requirements  No......................  Yes.
                                    of the National
                                    Contingency Plan (40 CFR
                                    Part 300) and Area
                                    Contingency Plans.
Personnel/Coordination...........  Identified the qualified   No......................  Yes.
                                    individual with full
                                    authority to implement
                                    removal actions, and
                                    requires immediate
                                    communications between
                                    the individual and the
                                    appropriate Federal
                                    official and the persons
                                    providing spill response
                                    personnel and equipment.
Personnel/Equipment/Coordination.  Identifies and ensures by  No......................  Yes.
                                    contract or other means
                                    the availability of
                                    private personnel, and
                                    the equipment necessary
                                    to remove, to the
                                    maximum extent
                                    practicable, a worst-
                                    case discharge
                                    (including that
                                    resulting from fire or
                                    explosion) and to
                                    mitigate or prevent a
                                    substantial threat of
                                    such a discharge.
Training.........................  Describes the training,    No......................  Yes.
                                    equipment, testing,
                                    periodic unannounced
                                    drills, and response
                                    actions of personnel, to
                                    be carried out under the
                                    plan to ensure safety
                                    and to mitigate or
                                    prevent discharge or the
                                    substantial threat of
                                    such a discharge.
Documentation....................  Is submitted (and          No......................  Yes.
                                    resubmitted in the event
                                    of a significant
                                    change), to the
                                    Administrator of FRA.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Rail Routing

    For some time, there has been considerable public and Congressional
interest in the safe and secure rail routing of security-sensitive
hazardous materials (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
directed the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, to publish a rule governing the rail routing of security-
sensitive hazardous materials. On December 21, 2006, PHMSA, in
coordination with FRA and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), published an
NPRM under Docket HM-232E (71 FR 76834), which proposed to revise the
current requirements in the HMR applicable to the safe and secure
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Specifically, we
proposed to require rail carriers to compile annual data on specified
shipments of hazardous materials, use the data to analyze safety and
security risks along rail routes where those materials are transported,
assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions based on
those assessments.
    In that NPRM, we solicited comments on whether the proposed
requirements should also apply to flammable gases, flammable liquids,
or other materials that could be weaponized, as well as hazardous
materials that could cause serious environmental damage if released
into rivers or lakes. Commenters who addressed this issue indicated
that rail shipments of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives; PIH
materials; and highway-route controlled quantities of radioactive
materials pose significant rail safety and security risks warranting
the enhanced security measures proposed in the NPRM and adopted in a
November 26, 2008 final rule (73 FR 20752). Commenters generally did
not support enhanced security measures for a broader list of materials
than were proposed in the NPRM.
    The City of Las Vegas, Nevada, did support expanding the list of
materials for which enhanced security measures are required to include
flammable liquids; flammable gases; certain oxidizers; certain organic
peroxides; and 5,000 pounds or greater of pyrophoric materials. While
DOT and DHS agreed that these materials pose certain safety and
security risks in rail transportation, the risks were not as great as
those posed by the explosive, PIH, and radioactive materials specified
in the NPRM, and PHMSA was not persuaded that they warranted the
additional safety and security measures. PHMSA did note, however, that
DOT, in consultation with DHS, would continue to evaluate the
transportation safety and security risks posed by all types of
hazardous materials and the effectiveness of our regulations in
addressing those risks and would consider revising specific
requirements as necessary.
    The 2008 final rule requires rail carriers to select a practicable
route posing the least overall safety and security risk to transport
security-sensitive hazardous materials (73 FR 72182). The final rule
implemented regulations requiring rail carriers to compile annual data
on certain shipments of explosive, toxic by inhalation, and radioactive
materials; use the data to analyze safety and security risks along rail
routes where those materials are transported; assess alternative
routing options; and make routing decisions based on those assessments.
In accordance with Sec.  172.820(e), the carrier must select the route
posing the least overall safety and security risk. The carrier must
retain in writing all route review and selection decision
documentation. Additionally, the rail carrier must identify a point of
contact on routing issues involving the movement of covered materials
and provide the contact information to the following:
    1. State and/or regional Fusion Centers that have been established
to coordinate with state, local, and tribal officials on security
issues and which are located within the area encompassed by the rail
carrier's rail system; \32\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. State, local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that may be
affected by a

rail carrier's routing decisions and who have contacted the carrier
regarding routing decisions.
    Rail carriers must assess available routes using, at a minimum, the
27 factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172 of the HMR to determine the
safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive hazardous materials.

Table 10--Factors To Be Considered in the Performance of This Safety and
                         Security Risk Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume of hazardous material  Rail traffic density  Trip length for
 transported.                                        route.
Presence and characteristics  Track type, class,    Track grade and
 of railroad facilities.       and maintenance       curvature.
                               schedule.
Presence or absence of        Presence or absence   Number and types of
 signals and train control     of wayside hazard     grade crossings.
 systems along the route       detectors.
 (``dark'' versus signaled
 territory).
Single versus double track    Frequency and         Proximity to iconic
 territory.                    location of track     targets.
                               turnouts.
Environmentally sensitive or  Population density    Venues along the
 significant areas.            along the route.      route (stations,
                                                     events, places of
                                                     congregation).
Emergency response            Areas of high         Presence of
 capability along the route.   consequence along     passenger traffic
                               the route,            along route (shared
                               including high        track).
                               consequence targets.
Speed of train operations...  Proximity to en-      Known threats,
                               route storage or      including any
                               repair facilities.    threat scenarios
                                                     provided by the DHS
                                                     or the DOT for
                                                     carrier use in the
                                                     development of the
                                                     route assessment.
Measures in place to address  Availability of       Past accidents.
 apparent safety and           practicable
 security risks.               alternative routes.
Overall times in transit....  Training and skill    Impact on rail
                               level of crews.       network traffic and
                                                     congestion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These factors address safety and security issues, such as the
condition of the track and supporting infrastructure; the presence or
absence of signals; past incidents; population density along the route;
environmentally-sensitive or significant areas; venues along the route
(stations, events, places of congregation); emergency response
capability along the route; measures and countermeasures already in
place to address apparent safety and security risks; and proximity to
iconic targets. The HMR require carriers to make conscientious efforts
to develop logical and defendable systems using these factors.
    FRA enforces the routing requirements in the HMR and is authorized,
after consulting with PHMSA, TSA, and the Surface Transportation Board,
to require a railroad to use an alternative route other than the route
selected by the railroad if it is determined that the railroad's route
selection documentation and underlying analysis are deficient and fail
to establish that the route chosen poses the least overall safety and
security risk based on the information available (49 CFR 209.501).
    On January 23, 2014, in response to its investigation of the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident, the NTSB issued three recommendations to both
PHMSA and FRA. Recommendation R-14-4 requested PHMSA work with FRA to
expand hazardous materials route planning and selection requirements
for railroads to include key trains transporting flammable liquids as
defined by the AAR Circular No. OT-55-N and, where technically
feasible, require rerouting to avoid transportation of such hazardous
materials through populated and other sensitive areas.

III. Recent Actions Addressing HHFT Risk

    PHMSA and FRA have used a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory
methods to address the risks of the bulk transport of flammable
liquids, including crude oil and ethanol, by rail in HHFTs. These
efforts include issuing guidance, conducting rulemakings, participating
in rail safety committees, holding public meetings with the regulated
community, enhancing enforcement efforts, and reaching out to the
public. All of these efforts are consistent with our system-wide
approach. We are confident these actions provide valuable information
and guidance to the regulated community and enhance public safety. In
the following, we discuss in detail these efforts and the NTSB
recommendations related to HHFTs.

A. Regulatory Actions

    On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule under Docket HM-233A
(75 FR 27205) that amended the HMR by incorporating provisions
contained in certain widely used or longstanding special permits having
an established safety record. As part of this rulemaking, PHMSA
authorized certain rail tank cars, transporting hazardous materials, to
exceed the gross weight on rail limitation of 263,000 pounds (263,000
lb. GRL) upon approval of FRA.
    On January 25, 2011, FRA published a Federal Register notice of
FRA's approval (76 FR 4250) pursuant to PHMSA's May 14, 2010 final
rule. The notice established detailed conditions for the manufacturing
and operation of certain tank cars in hazardous materials service,
including the DOT-111, that weigh between 263,000 and 286,000 pounds.
Taken as a whole, the PHMSA rulemaking and the FRA notice serves as the
mechanism for tank car manufacturers to build a 286,000-pound tank car.
As such, rail car manufacturers currently have the authority to
manufacture the enhanced DOT Specification 111 tank car (e.g., CPC-1232
tank car outlined in ``II. Overview of Current Regulations Relevant to
this Proposal'') under the conditions outlined, in the January 25, 2011
notice.
    The notice grants a blanket approval for tank cars to carry up to
286,000 lb. GRL, when carrying non-PIH materials, subject to certain
requirements. FRA divided these additional requirements into the
following three categories:
    1. Existing tank cars that were authorized under a PHMSA special
permit for greater than 263,000 lb. GRL, FRA's approval requires the
following:
    a. Compliance with various terms of the existing special permits;
    b. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-259 \33\ must be operated only in controlled interchange;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Both S-259 and S-286 are mechanical (underframes, trucks,
wheels, axles, brake system, draft system, a car body fatigue)
design requirements for operation of tank cars at a gross rail load
of 286,000 pounds. S-259 preceded S-286.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    c. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-286 may operate in unrestricted interchange; and
    d. Tank car owners must determine which standard applies, ensure
tank

cars are marked appropriately, and maintain and file associated
records.
    2. Tank cars that have been built, rebuilt, or otherwise modified
pursuant to AAR Standards S-259 or S-286 for greater than 263,000
pounds gross weight on rail, but are not authorized under a PHMSA
special permit, FRA's approval requires the following:
    a. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-259 must be operated only in controlled interchange;
    b. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-286 may operate in unrestricted interchange;
    c. Tank cars must satisfy design specifications listed in the
notice, including materials of construction, thickness, and jacketing;
and
    d. Tank car owners must determine which standard and additional
specification requirements apply, ensure tank cars are marked
appropriately, and maintain and file associated records.
    3. New tank cars, manufactured after the notice was published, to
carry more than 263,000 pounds gross weight on rail, FRA's approval
requires the following:
    a. Tank cars must be constructed in accordance with AAR Standard S-
286; and
    b. Tank cars must satisfy design specifications listed in the
notice, including puncture resistance and service equipment.
    Any manufacturer choosing to design a car that does not meet the
conditions of FRA's 2011 approval must request a new approval from FRA
in accordance with Sec.  179.13 of the HMR.
    Following the publication of the PHMSA rule and the subsequent FRA
approval notice, PHMSA received a petition for rulemaking (P-1577) from
the AAR on March 9, 2011, requesting changes to PHMSA's specifications
for tank cars (namely the DOT Specification 111 tank car) used to
transport PG I and II materials. DOT recognized the improvements of the
P-1577 tank car relative to the DOT Specification 111 tank car, but
challenged the industry to consider additional improvements in puncture
resistance, thermal protection, top fitting protection, bottom outlet
protection, and braking, as well as railroad operations. As a result,
the AAR Tank Car Committee (TCC) constituted the T87.6 Task Force. The
task force was charged with (1) reevaluating the standards in P-1577
and considering additional design enhancements for tank cars used to
transport crude oil, ethanol and ethanol/gasoline mixtures as well as
(2) considering operating requirements to reduce the risk of train
accidents involving tank cars carrying crude oil classified as PG I and
II, and ethanol.
    FRA chaired this task force and expected the activity would lead to
a more comprehensive approach than requested by P-1577. The task force
promised to address the root cause, severity, and consequences of train
accidents, and its recommendations were finalized on March 1, 2012. The
T87.6 Task Force recommended requirements for a pressure relief device
with a start of discharge setting of 75 psig, and a minimum flow
capacity of 27,000 SCFM.
    The task force did not address many of the recommendations provided
by FRA, including the following:
    Tank car design and use:
     Thermal protection to address breaches attributable to
exposure to fire conditions;
     Roll-over protection to prevent damage to top and bottom
fittings and limit stresses transferred from the protection device to
the tank shell;
     Hinged and bolted manways to address a common cause of
leakage during accidents and Non-Accident Releases (NARs);
     Bottom outlet valve elimination; and
     Increasing outage from 1 percent to 2 percent to improve
puncture resistance.
    Rail Carrier Operations:
     Rail integrity (e.g., broken rails or welds, misaligned
track, obstructions, track geometry, etc.) to reduce the number and
severity of train accidents;
     Alternative brake signal propagation systems ECP, DP, and
two-way EOT device to reduce the number of cars and energy associated
with train accidents;
     Speed restrictions for key trains containing 20 or more
loaded tank cars (on August 5, 2013, AAR issued Circular No. OT-55-N
addressing this issue); and
     Emergency response to mitigate the risks faced by response
and salvage personnel, the impact on the environment, and delays to
traffic on the line.
    After considering the disparity between the various stakeholders
and the lack of actionable items by the task force, PHMSA and FRA
initiated the development of an ANPRM to consider revisions to the HMR
by improving the crashworthiness of railroad tank cars and improve
operations. The ANPRM would respond to petitions for rulemaking
submitted by industry and safety recommendations issued by the NTSB.
Between April 2012 and October 2012, PHMSA received an additional three
petitions (P-1587, P-1595 and P-1612) and one modification of a
petition (P-1612) on rail safety issues. The additional petitions were
submitted by concerned communities and various industry associations
requesting further modification to the tank car standards.
    On September 6, 2013, PHMSA published the ANPRM (78 FR 54849)
seeking public comments on whether issues raised in eight petitions
\34\ and four NTSB Safety Recommendations would enhance safety, revise,
and clarify the HMR with regard to rail transport. Specifically, we
requested comments on important amendments that would do the following:
(1) Enhance the standards for DOT Specification 111 tank cars used to
transport PG I and II flammable liquids; (2) explore the feasibility of
additional operational requirements to enhance the safe transportation
of Packing Group I and II flammable liquids; (3) afford FRA greater
discretion to authorize the movement of non-conforming tank cars; (4)
correct regulations that allow an unsafe condition associated with
pressure relief valves (PRV) on rail cars transporting carbon dioxide,
refrigerated liquid; (5) revise outdated regulations applicable to the
repair and maintenance of DOT Specification 110, DOT Specification 106,
and ICC 27 tank car tanks (ton tanks); and (6) except rupture discs
from removal if the inspection itself would damage, change, or alter
the intended operation of the device.
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    \34\ In addition to the four tank car related petitions, PHMSA
also received four additional petitions relating to rail operational
requirements which were contained in the September 2013 ANPRM.
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    On November 5, 2013, PHMSA published a 30-day extension of the
comment period for the ANPRM (78 FR 66326). We received a request to
extend the comment period to 90 days from the Sierra Club on behalf of
Climate Parents, Columbia Riverkeeper, ForestEthics, Friends of Earth,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Oil Change International, San
Francisco Baykeeper, Spokane Riverkeeper, Washington Environmental
Council, and the Waterkeeper Alliance. The request indicated that the
primary basis for extension was to allow the public a meaningful review
of these proposed changes in rail safety requirements, especially
regarding tank cars transporting crude oil and tar sands, while
highlighting several recent tank car train accidents. The request also
indicated that the government shutdown in October 2013 prevented
communication with DOT staff for review of the technical proposals
during

the initial 60-day comment period. Although PHMSA normally considers an
initial 60-day comment period sufficient time to review and respond to
rulemaking proposals, due to PHMSA's desire to collect meaningful input
from a number of potentially affected stakeholders, PHMSA extended the
comment period by 30 days.
    Comments submitted in response to the ANPRM indicate that public
interest in the issues raised by the ANPRM is significant. PHMSA
received over 100 individual submissions of comments, including the
signatures of over 152,000 stakeholders, expressing views regarding
tank car and operational standards for flammable liquids. The comments
were from local communities, cities, and towns; rail carriers;
offerors; suppliers of equipment; tank car manufacturers; environmental
groups; NTSB; and the U.S. Congress. PHMSA reviewed the public comments
and used the information gathered to aid in the development of this
proposed rule.

B. Emergency Orders and Non-Regulatory Actions

    In addition to the rulemaking activity described above, FRA took
action, in the form of an emergency order, following the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic derailment. On August 7, 2013, FRA published EO 28 (78
FR 48218) to address safety issues related to securement of certain
hazardous materials trains; specifically, trains with--
    (1) Five or more tank carloads of any one or any combination of
materials poisonous by inhalation as defined in Title 49 CFR 171.8, and
including anhydrous ammonia (UN1005) and ammonia solutions (UN3318); or
    (2) 20 rail carloads or intermodal portable tank loads of any one
or any combination of materials listed in (1) above, or, any Division
2.1 flammable gas, Class 3 flammable liquid or combustible liquid,
Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosive,\35\ or hazardous substance listed in 49 CFR
173.31(f)(2).
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    \35\ Should have read ``Division'' instead of ``Class.''
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    EO 28 prohibits railroads from leaving trains or vehicles
transporting the specified quantities of the specified types of
hazardous materials unattended on mainline track or siding outside of a
yard or terminal unless the railroad adopts and complies with a plan
that provides sufficient justification for leaving them unattended
under specific circumstances and locations. The order also requires
railroads to develop specific processes for securing, communicating,
and documenting the securement of unattended trains and vehicles
subject to the Order, including locking the controlling locomotive cab
door or removing the reverser and setting a sufficient number of hand
brakes before leaving the equipment unattended. In addition, the order
requires railroads to review, verify, and adjust as necessary existing
requirements and instructions related to the number of hand brakes to
be set on unattended trains; conduct train securement job briefings
among crewmembers and employees; and develop procedures to ensure
qualified employees inspect equipment for proper securement after
emergency response actions that involve the equipment.
    The quantities of specific hazardous materials addressed in EO 28
were further addressed under the AAR Circular No. OT-55-N, Recommended
Railroad Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials,
effective August 5, 2013.\36\ AAR Circular No. OT-55-N supersedes AAR
Circular No. OT-55-M, issued October 1, 2012. In OT-55-N, AAR revised
the definition of ``key train'' in two specific areas.
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    \36\ The document is available in the public docket for this
proceeding and at the following URL: http://www.aar.com/CPC-1258%20OT-55-N%208-5-13.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) The definition of ``key train'' was revised from ``five tank
carloads of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard (PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone
A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia (UN1005), or ammonia solutions
(UN3318)'' to one tank carload.
    (2) The ``key train'' definition was amended by adding ``20
carloads or portable tank loads of any combination of hazardous
material.''
    Any train that meets the ``key train'' definition is limited to a
50-mph speed restriction under AAR Circular No. OT-55-N. In addition,
any route defined by a railroad as a key route shall meet certain
standards described in OT-55-N, including the following:
     Wayside defective wheel bearing detectors at a maximum of
40 miles apart, or an equivalent level of protection;
     Main track on key routes should be inspected by rail
defect detection and track geometry inspection cars or by any
equivalent level of inspection at least twice each year;
     Sidings on key routes should be inspected at least once a
year, and main track and sidings should have periodic track inspections
to identify cracks or breaks in joint bars; and
     Track used for meeting and passing key trains should be
FRA Class 2 track or higher.
    As previously discussed, EO 28 prohibits railroads from leaving
trains or vehicles transporting the specified hazardous materials
unattended on mainline track or siding outside of a yard or terminal
unless the railroad adopts and complies with a plan that provides
sufficient justification for leaving them unattended under specific
circumstances and locations.
    EO 28 was supplemented with a PHMSA and FRA joint safety advisory
published the same day (78 FR 48224). The joint safety advisory
addressed causes of the Lac-M[eacute]gantic derailment, provided DOT
safety and security recommendations, and announced PHMSA and FRA
participation in an Emergency RSAC meeting to address rail safety
concerns.
    On August 27-28, 2013, PHMSA and FRA held a public meeting to
review the requirements in the HMR applicable to rail operations (78 FR
42998). PHMSA and FRA conducted this meeting as part of a comprehensive
review of operational factors that impact the safety of the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. This meeting provided
the opportunity for public input on a wide range of rail safety
requirements including operational rail requirements. PHMSA and FRA
reviewed the transcript and public comments, all of which support a
comprehensive review of these requirements. Additional information
gathered from the public meeting, particularly regarding the
modernization of Part 174 of the HMR, will be addressed in a future
rulemaking.
    On August 29, 2013, FRA convened an emergency meeting to initiate a
series of RSAC working groups to discuss and work through specific
tasks resulting from the Lac-M[eacute]gantic derailment. RSAC members
discussed the formulation of task statements regarding appropriate
train crew size, hazard classes, and quantities of hazardous materials
that should trigger additional operating procedures, including
attendance and securement requirements. On April 9, 2014 RSAC approved
by a majority vote the Hazardous Materials Working Group's consensus
recommendations.\37\ Table 11 provides the RSAC recommendations.
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    \37\ https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/Railroad%20Safety%20Advisory%20Committee%20Hazardous%20Materials%20Issues%20Recommendation%20VOTE.pdf.

  Table 11--RSAC Consensus Recommendations From the Hazardous Materials
                          Issues Working Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Subject                          Recommendation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Definition of residue.............  Propose to amend the definition of
                                     Residue as follows:
                                    Residue means the hazardous material
                                     remaining in a packaging, including
                                     a tank car, after its contents have
                                     been unloaded to the maximum extent
                                     practicable and before the
                                     packaging is either refilled or
                                     cleaned of hazardous material and
                                     purged to remove any hazardous
                                     vapors. The extent practicable
                                     means an unloading facility has
                                     unloaded a bulk package using
                                     properly functioning service
                                     equipment and plant process
                                     equipment.
Guidance document language for      Proposed wording for a recommended