[Federal Register: August 10, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 152)]
[Notices]
[Page 39991-39992]
[DOCID:fr10au09-74]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[U.S. DOT Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0142]

Reports, Forms, and Recordkeeping Requirements

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Request for public comment on proposed collection of
information.

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SUMMARY: Before a Federal agency can collect certain information from
the public, it must receive approval from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Under procedures established by the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), before seeking OMB approval,
Federal agencies must solicit public comment on proposed collections of
information, including extensions and reinstatements of previously
approved collections.
    This document describes one collection of information for which
NHTSA intends to seek OMB approval.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before October 9, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments to the U.S. Department of
Transportation Dockets, 1200 New Jersey Ave, SE., W46-474, Washington,
DC 20590. Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0142.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Roberts, PhD, Contracting
Officer's Technical Representative, Office of Behavioral Safety
Research (NTI-132), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
1200 New Jersey Ave, SE., W46-495, Washington, DC 20590. Dr. Roberts'
phone number is<PHONE_NUMBER> and his e-mail address is
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, before an agency submits
a proposed collection of information to OMB for approval, it must
publish a document in the Federal Register providing a 60-day comment
period and otherwise consult with members of the public and affected
agencies concerning each proposed collection of information. The OMB
has promulgated regulations describing what must be included in such a
document. Under OMB's regulations (at 5 CFR 1320.8(d)), an agency must
ask for public comment on the following:
    (i) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have practical utility;

    (ii) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
    (iii) How to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; and
    (iv) How to minimize the burden of the collection of information on
those who are to respond, including the use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic
submission of responses.
    In compliance with these requirements, NHTSA asks public comment on
the following proposed collection of information:

Evaluation Surveys for Distracted and Unsafe Driving Interventions

    Type of Request: New information collection requirement.
    OMB Clearance Number: None.
    Form Number: This collection of information uses no standard forms.
    Requested Expiration Date of Approval: December 31, 2012.
    Summary of the Collection of Information: The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) proposes to conduct a series of
telephone surveys that will examine the effectiveness of high
visibility enforcement demonstration programs to increase public
awareness of the dangers of distracted and unsafe driving behaviors
associated with mobile electronic devices like cell phones.
Participation by respondents would be voluntary. Survey topics would
include awareness of program activities, awareness of enforcement
activities, attitudes towards distracted driving, understanding of
relevant traffic laws, and the frequency of various unsafe driving
behaviors.
    In conducting the proposed survey, the interviewers would use
computer-assisted telephone interviewing to reduce interview length and
minimize recording errors. A Spanish-language translation and bilingual
interviewers would be used to minimize language barriers to
participation. The proposed survey would be anonymous; the survey would
not collect any personal information that would allow anyone to
identify respondents. Participant names would not be collected during
the interview and the telephone number used to reach the respondent
would be separated from the data record prior to its entry into the
analytical database.
    Description of the Need for the Information and Proposed Use of the
Information--The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
was established by the Highway Safety Act of l970 (23 U.S.C. 101) to
carry out a Congressional mandate to reduce the mounting number of
deaths, injuries, and economic losses resulting from motor vehicle
crashes on the Nation's highways. In support of this mission, NHTSA
proposes to conduct information collections to assess the effectiveness
of interventions designed to assess the public's awareness of the
dangers of distracted driving and of using mobile electronic devices
including cell phones. An essential part of this evaluation effort is
to compare baseline and post-intervention measures of attitudes,
intervention awareness, and (relevant) self-reported behavior to
determine if the interventions were associated with changes on those
indices. The proposed study, to be administered in the first quarter of
2010, and in each of the next three quarters thereafter, will collect
data on topics included in NHTSA's annual studies on the effectiveness
of Click It or Ticket safety belt campaigns (and some additional
topics), including: whether the driving public saw or heard paid media
advertising about the high visibility enforcement campaign, whether
they saw or heard increased law enforcement about the high visibility
enforcement campaign, frequency of engaging in electronic mobile
communication devices while driving, understanding of cell phone laws,
attitudes about driving risk, and whether they had personally
experienced increased law enforcement.
    The findings from this proposed collection of information will
assist NHTSA in addressing the problem of distracted driving and in
formulating programs and recommendations to Congress. NHTSA will use
the findings to help focus current programs and activities to achieve
the greatest benefit, to develop new programs to decrease the
likelihood of distracted driving, and to provide informational support
to States, localities, and law enforcement agencies that will aid them
in their efforts to reduce distracted driving crashes.
    Description of the Likely Respondents (Including Estimated Number,
and Proposed Frequency of Response to the Collection of Information)--
Under this proposed effort, the Contractor would conduct pre-
intervention and post-intervention surveys four times over the course
of a year in demonstration sites and comparison sites. A total of 18
telephone pretest interviews averaging 10 minutes in length would be
administered to test the computer programming of the questionnaire, and
to determine if any last adjustments to the questionnaire are needed.
Following any revisions carried out as a result of the pretest, the
Contractor would conduct telephone interviews averaging approximately
10 minutes in length with 9,600 randomly selected member of the general
public residing in the State(s) in which the demonstration program is
taking place, age 16 and older, in telephone households and in cell
phone only households. Interviews would be conducted with persons at
residential phone numbers selected through random digit dialing.
Federal law prohibits the use of auto dialing to call cell phones.
Businesses are ineligible for the sample and would not be interviewed.
No more than one respondent would be selected per household. Each
member of the sample would complete one interview.
    Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
Resulting From the Collection of Information--NHTSA estimates that the
pretest interviews would require an average of 10 minutes apiece, or a
total of 3 hours for the 18 respondents. Each respondent in the final
survey sample would require an average of 10 minutes to complete the
telephone interview or a total of 1,600 hours for the 9,600
respondents. Thus, the number of estimated reporting burden hours a
year on the general public would be 1,603 for the proposed survey. The
respondents would not incur any reporting cost from the information
collection. The respondents also would not incur any record keeping
burden or recordkeeping cost from the information collection.

    Authority: 44 U.S.C. Section 3506(c)(2)(A).

Jeff Michael,
Associate Administrator, Research and Program Development.
[FR Doc. E9-19029 Filed 8-7-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P


[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 5, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 19627-19629]
[FR Doc No: 2022-07156]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket Number USCG-2022-0229]
RIN 1625-AA00

Safety Zone; Tennessee River, Chattanooga, TN

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Temporary final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is establishing a temporary safety zone for
all navigable waters of the Tennessee River on mile marker (MM) 464.0
to 464.5. The safety zone is needed to protect personnel, vessels, and
the marine environment from potential hazards created by Vision
Hospitality 25th Anniversary Fireworks. Entry of vessels or persons
into this zone is prohibited unless specifically authorized by the
Captain of the Port Sector Ohio Valley or a designated representative.

DATES: This rule is effective from 9:30 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on
April 21, 2022.

ADDRESSES: To view documents mentioned in this preamble as being
available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov, type USCG-
2022-0229 in the search box and click ``Search.'' Next, in the Document
Type column, select ``Supporting & Related Material.''

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this rule,
call or email Petty Officer Third Class Joshua Rehl, Marine Safety
Detatchment Nashville, U.S. Coast Guard; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, email
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Table of Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FR Federal Register
NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking
Sec.  Section
U.S.C. United States Code

II. Background Information and Regulatory History

    The Coast Guard is issuing this temporary rule without prior notice
and opportunity to comment pursuant to authority under section 4(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This
provision authorizes an agency to issue a rule without prior notice and
opportunity to

comment when the agency for good cause finds that those procedures are
``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.''
Under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists
for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect
to this rule because it is impracticable . We must establish this
safety zone immediately and lack sufficient time to provide a
reasonable comment period and then consider those comments before
issuing the rule.

III. Legal Authority and Need for Rule

    The Coast Guard is issuing this rule under authority in 46 U.S.C.
70034 (previously 33 U.S.C. 1231). The Captain of the Port Sector Ohio
Valley (COTP) has determined that potential hazards associated with the
Vision Hospitality Group 25th Anniversary Fireworks starting April 21,
2022, will be a safety concern for anyone within mile marker 464.0 to
464.5 on the Tennessee River. This rule is needed to protect personnel,
vessels, and the marine environment in the navigable waters within the
safety zone during the firework display.

IV. Discussion of the Rule

    This rule establishes a temporary safety zone from 9:30 p.m. until
10:30 p.m. on April 21, 2022. The safety zone will cover all navigable
waters between Mile Marker (MM) 464.0 to 464.5 on the Tennessee River,
extending the entire width of the river. The duration of the zone is
intended to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment in
these navigable waters while the fireworks display is occuring. No
vessel or person will be permitted to enter the safety zone without
obtaining permission from the COTP or a designated representative. A
designated representative is a commissioned, warrant, or petty officer
of the U.S. Coast Guard assigned to units under the operational control
of USCG Sector Ohio Valley.
    Vessels requiring entry into this safety zone must request
permission from the COTP or a designated representative. To seek entry
into the safety zone, contact the COTP or the COTP's representative by
telephone at<PHONE_NUMBER> or on VHF-FM channel 16.
    Persons and vessels permitted to enter this safety zone must
transit at their slowest safe speed and comply with all lawful
directions issued by the COTP or the designated representative.
    The COTP or a designated representative will inform the public
through Broadcast Notices to Mariners (BNMs), Local Notices to Mariners
(LNMs), and Marine Safety Information Bulletins (MSIBs) about this
safety zone, enforcement period, as well as any changes in the dates
and times of enforcement.

V. Regulatory Analyses

    We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and
Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses
based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders, and we
discuss First Amendment rights of protestors.

A. Regulatory Planning and Review

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits. This rule has not been designated a ``significant
regulatory action,'' under Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, this
rule has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB).
    This regulatory action determination is based on the size,
location, duration, and time-of-day of the safety zone. This safety
zone restricts transit on a point five segment of the Tennessee River
for 1 hour on one day. Moreover, the Coast Guard would issue Broadcast
Notices to Mariners (BNMs), Local Notices to Mariners (LNMs), and
Marine Safety Information Bulletins (MSIBs) about this safety zone so
that waterway users may plan accordingly for this short restriction on
transit, and the rule allows vessels to request permission to enter the
zone.

B. Impact on Small Entities

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, as
amended, requires Federal agencies to consider the potential impact of
regulations on small entities during rulemaking. The term ``small
entities'' comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations
that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than
50,000. The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
    While some owners or operators of vessels intending to transit the
safety zone may be small entities, for the reasons stated in section
V.A above, this rule will not have a significant economic impact on any
vessel owner or operator.
    Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), we want to assist small
entities in understanding this rule. If the rule would affect your
small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have
questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please
call or email the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section.
    Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal
employees who enforce, or otherwise determine compliance with, Federal
regulations to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory
Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory
Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and
rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to
comment on actions by employees of the Coast Guard, call 1-888-REG-FAIR
(1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small
entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or
action of the Coast Guard.

C. Collection of Information

    This rule will not call for a new collection of information under
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

D. Federalism and Indian Tribal Governments

    A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. We have analyzed this rule under that Order and have
determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism
principles and preemption requirements described in Executive Order
13132.
    Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive
Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on
one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538)
requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary
regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may
result in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in
the

aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (adjusted for
inflation) or more in any one year. Though this rule will not result in
such an expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this rule elsewhere
in this preamble.

F. Environment

    We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security
Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and
Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast
Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f), and have determined that this action is one of
a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment. This rule involves a
safety zone lasting only 1 hour that will prohibit entry between MM
464.0 to 464.5 on the Tennessee River for the fireworks display. It is
categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L60 of
Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1.
Due to the emergency nature of this rulemaking, a Record of
Environmental Consideration is not required.

G. Protest Activities

    The Coast Guard respects the First Amendment rights of protesters.
Protesters are asked to call or email the person listed in the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section to coordinate protest activities so
that your message can be received without jeopardizing the safety or
security of people, places or vessels.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165

    Harbors, Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Waterways.

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends
33 CFR part 165 as follows:

PART 165--REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS

0
1. The authority citation for part 165 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  46 U.S.C. 70034, 70051; 33 CFR 1.05-1, 6.04-1, 6.04-
6, and 160.5; Department of Homeland Security Delegation No.
0170.1., Revision No. 01.2.Inserting required closing tag for E.

0
2. Add Sec.  165.T08-0223 to read as follows:

Sec.  165.T08-0223  Safety Zone; Tennessee River, Chattanooga, TN.

    (a) Location. The following area is a safety zone: All navigable
waters of the Tennessee River, Mile Markers 464.0 to 464.5, extending
the entire width of the river.
    (b) Periods of enforcement. This section will be enforced from 9:30
p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on April 21, 2022.
    (c) Regulations. (1) Under the general safety zone regulations in
subpart C of this part, you may not enter the safety zone described in
paragraph (a) of this section unless authorized by the Captain of the
Port Sector Ohio Valley (COTP) or the COTP's designated representative.
A designated representative is a commissioned, warrant, or petty
officer of the U.S. Coast Guard assigned to units under the operational
control of USCG Sector Ohio Valley.
    (2) Vessels requiring entry into this safety zone must request
permission from the COTP or a designated representative. To seek entry
into the safety zone, contact the COTP or the COTP's representative by
telephone at<PHONE_NUMBER> or on VHF-FM channel 16.
    (3) Persons and vessels permitted to enter this safety zone must
transit at their slowest safe speed and comply with all lawful
directions issued by the COTP or the designated representative.
    (d) Informational broadcasts. The COTP or a designated
representative will inform the public through Broadcast Notices to
Mariners (BNMs), Local Notices to Mariners (LNMs), and Marine Safety
Information Bulletins (MSIBs) about this safety zone, enforcement
period, as well as any changes in the dates and times of enforcement.

    Dated: March 30, 2022.
A.M. Beach,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port Sector Ohio Valley.
[FR Doc. 2022-07156 Filed 4-4-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 80 (Wednesday, April 28, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22458-22466]
[FR Doc No: 2021-08812]

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2020-0001]

STP Nuclear Operating Company; Grant of Permanent Variance

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to South
Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STP Nuclear) from the OSHA
standard that requires the isolation of permit-required confined
spaces.

DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice becomes
effective on May 28, 2021 and shall remain in effect until it is
modified or revoked, whichever occurs first.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>;
email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, phone:
(202) 693-2110 or email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Copies of this Federal Register notice: Electronic copies of this
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov.
This Federal Register notice and other relevant information are also
available at OSHA's web page at http://www.osha.gov.

I. Notice of Application

    On February 18, 2019, South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company
(STP Nuclear or the applicant), 12090 FM 521, Wadsworth, Texas 77483,
submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (OSH Act; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and
other relief under section 6(d)'') an application for a permanent
variance from the provision of the OSHA standard that regulates
ensuring isolation of permit-required confined spaces, as well as a
request for an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the application
for variance (OSHA-2020-0001-0001) at its Wadsworth, Texas facility.
Specifically, STP Nuclear seeks a variance from the provision of 29 CFR
1910.146 that requires ``isolation of permit space,'' meaning the
process by which a permit-required space is removed from service and
completely protected against the release of energy and material into
the space (29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii)). STP
Nuclear's application also requested an interim order pending OSHA's
decision on the application for a variance.
    According to the application, STP Nuclear operates two pressurized
water reactor nuclear power plants at its Wadsworth, Texas location.
STP Nuclear's description of its operation indicates that these nuclear
power plants use steam to drive turbine generators, which is cooled by
circulating water through a condenser to convert the steam back into
water. STP Nuclear uses a circulating water system (CWS) that cools the
steam by pumping water from the main cooling reservoir (MCR), through
the condenser and back to the reservoir. The MCR is 7,000 acres and
includes an intake structure where pumps that provide cooling to the
units are located. These pumps include the circulating water (CW)
pumps, of which there are a total of eight (four per unit). The flow
from each CW pump discharges through a motor operated valve into a 96
foot diameter pipe which passes over the reservoir embankment at 59
feet elevation. The four pump discharge pipes combine into two 138 inch
underground pipes that feed a manifold in the Turbine Generator
Building (TGB). The circulating water flows through condenser tubes
inside what STP Nuclear refers to as the ``water box.'' The manifold
supplies water to each of the six main condenser water boxes with an 84
inch motor-operated valve at the inlet and outlet of each water box.
The water exiting the water boxes enters a discharge manifold which
then splits into two underground 138 inch pipes returning the water to
the MCR passing over the reservoir embankment at 58 feet elevation. The
applicant asserts that the design of the CWS is such that it cannot be
completely removed from service for water box cleaning or tube repair,
and that maintenance activities occur when one of the two Power Plants
are removed from service for refueling, which happens once every
eighteen months.
    The condenser water box is a permit-required confined space that
under STP Nuclear's procedures and OSHA's standard at 29 CFR 1910.146
require a confined-space permit and security alerts prior to entry.
Employees can enter the water boxes to clean condenser tubes and to
repair or plug leaking tubes only after being cleared by the STP
Nuclear Entry Supervisor in accordance with STP Nuclear's confined
space procedure. STP Nuclear performs maintenance on condenser water
boxes prior to the summer months to ensure maximum efficiency, and
therefore, maximum generation during the peak electric generating
period in Texas. This maintenance activity (tube cleaning) minimizes
fouling and blocking of the condenser tubes. Employees entering the
water box to perform maintenance and repair activities could be exposed
to the hazard of engulfment by water that could flow into the water box
if condenser isolation valves were to rotate or otherwise fail during
the maintenance or repair activity.
    STP Nuclear asserts that without frequent maintenance, the
condenser tubes could leak and introduce contaminants, such as sodium,
into plant systems that can erode barriers that prevent release of
radioactive materials. Further, STP Nuclear asserts that if the water
box cannot be timely isolated to repair tubes, it may have to shut down
the nuclear power plant, which will cause interruption to the power
supply. STP Nuclear previously believed that procedures already in
place--lockout/tagout of the isolation valve, continuous monitoring for
leakage past the valve and standby attendant--were adequate to protect
employees.
    On March 22, 2018, OSHA received a complaint alleging that STP
Nuclear failed to ensure isolation of the condenser water box as
required by OSHA's permit-required confined space standard. In response
to this complaint, STP Nuclear submitted a letter, dated March 28,
2018, to OSHA's Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office (OSHA-2020-0001-
0002), asserting its belief that they are in full compliance with 29
CFR 1910.146 and describing their current practices to comply with the
standard. On April 20, 2018, the Corpus Christi, Texas OSHA Area Office
provided a response to STP Nuclear's explanation stating that it was
feasible to install two 5,000 pound blank flanges to isolate the system
and directed STP Nuclear to take corrective action (OSHA-2020-0001-
0003).
    In STP Nuclear's February 18, 2019, variance application, the
applicant asserts that isolating the water box using blank flanges
creates a greater hazard and significant risk for injury. Further, the
applicant believes that installing blank flanges has the potential to
compromise the structural integrity of the system. To ensure isolation
of the condenser water box prior to maintenance activities, STP Nuclear
proposes in its variance application an alternative safety measure--
drilling four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve flange,
and fabrication of 20 three-fourth inch diameter mechanical stops (stop
pins), which will be installed to block movement of the butterfly valve
disc to ensure isolation of the water boxes during maintenance work.
    OSHA initiated a technical review of STP Nuclear's variance
application and developed a set of follow-up questions on June 9, 2019
(OSHA-2020-0001-0003), regarding the assertions of equivalent worker
protection included

in the application. On June 27, 2019, STP Nuclear provided written
answers to the follow-up questions, (OSHA-2020-0001-0004) as well as
supplemental materials to support the variance application including: A
Hazard and Operability Study report and recommendations (hazard
analysis using a ``HAZOP'' methodology); a copy of all detailed
procedures used when employees are entering or inside the water box;
and a copy of emergency procedures and equipment used while employees
are working inside the water box.
    In reviewing the application, OSHA evaluated the use of two blank
flanges, a 99.5 inch diameter, 2.5 inch thick steel blank weighing
5,563 pounds each to isolate the condenser water boxes during
maintenance activities. The applicant asserted in the variance
application that installing a blank flange to isolate a condenser water
box creates a greater hazard and significant risk for injury to both
personnel and the physical building. STP Nuclear asserts that
installing a blank flange requires removal of the water box inlet and
outlet expansion joints and installation of two steel blanks.
Installing the blank flanges as described above entails a high degree
of risk, as it would require moving these heavy objects from the
building entrance to the water box, using rigged chain falls to trapeze
the blanks to the water box, as well as construction of a support
structure for the water box, in order to support the additional weight
of the 5,563 pound blanks and ensure the water box and/or inlet pipe
does not misalign from removal of the expansion joint. Further, OSHA
carefully reviewed the administrative and engineering controls outlined
in the variance application and supplemental materials as part of the
proposed alternative work practices identified in the variance
application.
    OSHA reviewed STP Nuclear's application for the variance and
interim order and determined that they were appropriately submitted in
compliance with the applicable variance procedures in Section 6(d) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.
655(d)) and OSHA's regulations at 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and other
relief under section 6(d)''), including the requirement that the
applicant inform workers and their representatives of their rights to
petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health for a hearing on the variance application.
    Following this review and discussions with STP Nuclear, OSHA
determined that STP Nuclear's proposed alternative, subject to the
conditions in the request and imposed by the Interim Order, provides a
workplace as safe and healthful as that required by the permit-required
confined space standard. On September 1, 2020, OSHA published a Federal
Register notice announcing STP Nuclear's application for a permanent
variance, stating the preliminary determination along with the basis of
that determination, and granting the Interim Order (86 FR 54424). OSHA
requested comments on each.
    OSHA did not receive any comments or other information disputing
the preliminary determination that the alternative was at least as safe
as OSHA's standard, nor any objections to OSHA granting a permanent
variance. Accordingly, through this notice OSHA grants a permanent
variance subject to the conditions set out in this document.

II. The Variance Application

A. Background

    STP Nuclear's variance application and the responses to OSHA's
follow-up questions provided the following: Detailed descriptions of
the condenser water box maintenance process; the proposed work
alternative to isolate the condenser water box using stop pins while
performing maintenance activities; and procedures developed to manage
the permit-required confined space. Additionally, STP Nuclear provided
a HAZOP study as technical evidence supporting STP Nuclear's assertion
of equivalency of worker protection.
    As an alternative to installation of blank flanges, STP Nuclear
proposes a comprehensive engineered system and appropriate
administrative controls to satisfy the isolation requirement. The
engineered system uses mechanical stops (stop pins) to block the
movement of the butterfly valve disk in combination with administrative
procedures to isolate the condenser water box in order to perform
maintenance activities. The stop pins function as the isolation device,
in that utilizing the stop pins prevents the engagement of the
condenser water box, thus interrupting the flow of water to the
condenser water boxes to allow maintenance activities. STP Nuclear
asserts that using stop pins to isolate butterfly valve disks in
condenser water boxes match the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii).
    Further, STP Nuclear asserts that its mechanical stop system has
been evaluated via a HAZOP study, which is a process that seeks to
identify potential operating hazards and risks in systems/processes.
The HAZOP study included a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
that was developed and documented. The FMEA is an assessment of the 84
inch butterfly valves in the closed position, with stop pins installed,
to physically isolate the condenser water box while the remainder of
the CWS remains in operation. The HAZOP study seeks to identify the
potential hazardous scenarios, as they relate to personnel entry into
the isolated water box, to determine potential areas of concern,
especially regarding a possible engulfment hazard. Issued June 20, 2019
(OSHA-2020-0001-0004), the HAZOP study included eight recommendations
for additional engineering and administrative controls, all of which
have been adopted by STP Nuclear. These recommendations are described
in Proposed Condition D of this notice.
    STP Nuclear contends that the administrative and engineering
controls comprising the alternative safety measures included in the
variance application provide the workers with a place of employment
that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain under the
provisions of OSHA's permit-required confined space standard.

B. Variance From 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii)

    As an alternative means of compliance with the isolation
requirements of Sec. Sec.  1910.146(b) and 1910.146(d)(3)(iii), STP
Nuclear is proposing to use a comprehensive system of engineering and
administrative control procedures. The engineering controls include (1)
a modification of the condenser isolation valves to drill four holes
into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve flange, to allow the
installation of mechanical stops (``stop pins'') which block rotation
of the isolation valve disks, (2) utilizing a physical lock on the 6
inch cross-tie valves, and (3) utilization of automated drains that
provide a secondary means of evacuating water leakage from the isolated
water box connected piping. STP Nuclear has also established
administrative controls to support the use of the stop pin system,
including: (1) Continuous monitoring for leakage past the isolation
valve, (2) utilizing a dedicated water box drain pump operator while
personnel are inside the isolated water box, (3) utilizing a standby
attendant to aid in the evacuation of an employee working in the
condenser water box in the event of an emergency, and (4) a dedicated
emergency evacuation procedure.
    Further, the applicant asserts that: (1) Full isolation of the
water boxes would create a greater hazard to its employees,

and (2) the continuous water system makes shutdown of the water supply
impossible. Shutting down the circulating water system could
potentially cause the nuclear power plant to leak radiation, which is a
significant public health hazard.

C. Technical Review

    OSHA conducted a review of STP Nuclear's application and the
supporting technical documentation. After completing the review of the
application and supporting documentation, OSHA concludes that STP
Nuclear:
    1. Has a permit-required confined space entry program;
    2. Performed a hazard analysis using the Hazard and Operability
Study (``HAZOP'') methodology to assess the risks of entering condenser
water boxes to perform maintenance on condenser tubes;
    3. Implemented controls recommended in the HAZOP study (outlined in
Proposed Condition D of this notice);
    4. Established procedures for condenser water box online isolation
and restoration;
    5. Has developed the Condenser Water Box Online Isolation and
Restoration procedure to remove condenser water boxes from service for
maintenance;
    6. Has modified or will modify the isolation valve seats in
condenser water boxes by installing specified mechanical stops (``stop
pins''). These stop pins are inserted downstream of the inlet disc and
upstream of the outlet disc following condenser water box isolation and
drain down;
    7. Implemented detailed administrative procedures designed to
provide additional safety measures for all employees working on or near
condenser water boxes, which include having a watch stander present at
all times, as well as emergency evacuation procedures in the event that
water begins flowing into isolated condenser water boxes;
    8. Procured and provided appropriate equipment and supplies;
    9. Made the alternative isolation control policies and procedures
available to employees;
    10. Trained authorized and affected employees on the application of
the alternative work practice and associated isolation control policies
and procedures;
    11. Developed additional administrative controls and procedures to
minimize the potential for authorized and affected employees to work
around isolated condenser water boxes;
    12. Conducted a comparison of the blank flange versus use of stop
pins, which mechanically limits disc travel providing additional
personnel safety against engulfment;
    13. Has effective emergency rescue procedures to quickly and
effectively evacuate workers within the condenser water box, including
a rescue team present on site during maintenance activities; and
    14. Conducted a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, which was an
assessment of the 84 inch butterfly valves in the closed position.

III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Permanent Variance

    As previously indicated in this notice, OSHA conducted a review of
STP Nuclear's application and supporting documentation. OSHA determined
that STP Nuclear developed and proposed to implement effective
alternative means of protection that provides protection to their
employees ``as safe and healthful'' as protections required within
paragraph 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of OSHA's permit-required confined
space isolation standard during the process of performing maintenance
on condenser water boxes. Therefore, on September 1, 2020, OSHA
published a Federal Register notice announcing STP Nuclear's
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an
interim order, and request for comments (86 FR 54424). The agency
requested comments by October 1, 2020, and OSHA received no comments in
response to this notice.
    During the period starting with the September 1, 2020, publication
of the preliminary Federal Register notice announcing grant of the
Interim Order until the agency modifies or revokes the Interim Order or
makes a decision on the application for a permanent variance, the
applicant was required to comply fully with the conditions of the
Interim Order as an alternative to complying with the requirements of
paragraph 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii). As of the effective date of this
notice, OSHA is revoking the Interim Order granted to the employer on
September 1, 2020.
    This section describes the conditions that comprise the alternative
means of compliance with 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii). These conditions form the basis of the permanent
variance that OSHA is granting to STP Nuclear.
Condition A: Scope
    The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the working
conditions specified under this condition. Clearly defining the scope
of the permanent variance provides STP Nuclear, their employees,
potential future applicants, other stakeholders, the public, and OSHA
with necessary information regarding the work situations which the
permanent variance will cover. To the extent that STP Nuclear conducts
work outside the scope of this variance, it will be required to comply
with OSHA standards, including the isolation of permit-required
confined spaces.
    Pursuant to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of
employers) may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace or
workplaces. When OSHA approves a permanent variance, it applies only to
the specific employer(s) that submitted the application and only to the
specific workplace or workplaces designated as part of the project. In
this instance, OSHA's grant of a permanent variance applies only to the
applicant, STP Nuclear, and only at the Wadsworth, Texas nuclear plant.
The permanent variance does not apply to any other employers or STP
Nuclear locations outside of the Wadsworth, Texas facility.
Condition B: List of Abbreviations
    The following abbreviations apply to this permanent variance:

1. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
2. CWS--Circulating Water System
3. ECO--Equipment Clearance Order
4. FMEA--Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
5. HAZOP--Hazard and Operability Study
6. MCR--Main Cooling Reservoir
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
9. RRP--Rope Rescue Program
10. TGB--Turbine Generator Building
Condition C: List of Definitions
    The permanent variance includes definitions for a series of terms.
Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and the
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent
variance.
    1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of
his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has the
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
    2. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the

surroundings or working conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or
dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt
corrective measures to eliminate them.
    3. Engulfment--the surrounding and effective capture of a person by
a liquid or finely divided (flowable) solid substance that can be
aspirated to cause death by filling or plugging the respiratory system
or that can exert enough force on the body to cause death by
strangulation, constriction, or crushing.
    4. Hazard and Operability Study--an evaluation of tasks or
operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary
controls.
    5. Isolation--the process by which a permit space is removed from
service and completely protected against the release of energy and
material into the space by such means as: Blanking or blinding;
misaligning or removing sections of lines, pipes, or ducts; a double
block and bleed system; lockout or tagout of all sources of energy; or
blocking or disconnecting all mechanical linkages.
    6. Permit-required confined space--a confined space that has one or
more of the following characteristics: (1) Contains or has a potential
to contain a hazardous atmosphere; (2) Contains a material that has the
potential for engulfing an entrant; (3) Has an internal configuration
such that an entrant could be trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly
converging walls or by a floor which slopes downward and tapers to a
smaller cross-section; or (4) Contains any other recognized serious
safety or health hazard.
    7. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to
maintenance of condenser water boxes.
Condition D: Safety Practices and Procedures
    This condition requires that STP Nuclear (1) adhere to the
Condenser Water Box Online Isolation and Restoration Procedure provided
to OSHA with the Variance application and (2) implement the hazard
prevention and control requirements provided with the Variance
application to ensure the continued effective functioning of the
alternate work practice (use of stop pins) to isolate condenser water
boxes before performing maintenance activities. Further, STP Nuclear
must implement the following additional administrative controls
identified in the HAZOP study:
    1. Close the cycle inlet and butterfly valves with a local
handswitch.
    2. Remove power from the inlet and isolation valve and hang Danger
Tags on the local handswitch and the breaker.
    3. Drain the condenser water box to another condenser water box
using the permanent installed condenser drain down pumps.
    4. Check for leakages past the isolation valve seat. In the event
that a leak is found, STP Nuclear will use a handwheel to manually
achieve proper disk seating and ensure that a Danger Tag is hung on the
handwheel.
    5. Establish and implement a procedure to ensure that no other
maintenance will be performed on the condenser water box, unless
permit-required confined space measures are used.
    6. Modify each of the 12 condenser water box isolation valves to
drill four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve range, which
will be plugged when the condenser water box is in service and
fabricate 20 three-fourth inch diameter stop pins, which will be
installed to block movement of the butterfly valve disk and hang Danger
Tags on the pins.
    7. Confirm that lineup changes (i.e., pump switching, valve
position changes) within the CWS are prohibited while personnel are
within the water box.
    8. Limit the number of personnel occupying the isolated water box
to no more than 3 in the inlet or outlet and no more than 4 persons in
total during condenser water box maintenance activities.
    9. Utilize technology-based level measurement instruments with
local audible alarms to alert the personnel working in the isolated
water box of a rising water level in the CWS piping beneath the water
box. This instrument serves as a secondary means of monitoring the
water level, in addition to the manual level monitoring via Tygon
tubing.
    10. Utilize hydraulic calculations to analyze the potential leak
paths into an isolated water box and quantify the inflow rates and
durations to fill the water box. This will identify how much time
personnel have to evacuate the water box in the event of a water leak
into the isolated water box.
    11. Utilize a physical lock on the 6 inch cross-tie valve (or
replace the valve with a design that allows physical locking) to
prevent any unauthorized operation of the valve during the condenser
water box maintenance activity.
    12. Monitor the water levels in the supply side water box (and
return water box) regardless of when personnel are present. Continuous
monitoring for water leakage on the supply and return water boxes of an
isolated segment of the system as water leakage from either side could
present a hazard to personnel even if they are not in the water box
where the leakage is occurring.
    13. Require the presence of a dedicated water box drain pump
operator while personnel are occupying the isolated water box.
    14. Utilize the water box low-point drains (6 inches for Unit 1 and
8 inches for Unit 2) to provide secondary means of evacuating water
leakage from the isolated water box connected CWS piping.
    15. Install a level indicator that will alarm to alert the employee
in the water box to evacuate because of rising water levels and auto
start the two drain pumps. This level indicator alarm is in addition to
the portable system being used in monitoring the levels.
    16. In addition to the watch stander attendant required under 29
CFR 1910.146, the rescue team members must be present at the water box
throughout duration of the maintenance activities.
Condition E: Communication
    This condition requires the applicant to implement an effective
system of information sharing and communication to provide workers
performing maintenance activities within condenser water boxes of any
hazards that may affect their safety. Effective information sharing and
communication are intended to ensure that affected workers receive
updated information regarding any safety-related hazards and incidents,
and corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each shift. This
condition also requires the applicant to ensure reliable means of
emergency communications are available and maintained for affected
workers and support personnel during maintenance activities within the
condenser water box. Availability of such reliable means of
communications enables affected workers and support personnel to
respond quickly and effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies
that may develop during water box maintenance operations.
Condition F: Worker Qualification and Training
    This condition requires STP Nuclear to implement an effective
permit-required isolation qualification and training program for
authorized employees who perform maintenance

activities within condenser water boxes. Additionally, Condition F
requires the applicant to train each affected employee on the purpose
and use of the permit-required confined space procedures.
    The condition specifies the factors that an affected worker must
know how to perform safely during maintenance operations within the
condenser water box, including how to enter, work in, and exit from a
condenser water box under both normal and emergency conditions. Having
well-trained and qualified workers performing condenser water box
maintenance activities is intended to ensure that they can recognize
and respond appropriately to electrical safety and health hazards.
These qualification and training requirements enable affected workers
to handle emergencies effectively, thereby preventing worker injury,
illness, and fatalities. Additionally, Condition F requires the
applicant to train each affected employee in the purpose and use of the
alternative permit-required confined space isolation procedures
identified in the permanent variance application.
Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
    This condition requires the applicant to implement and operate an
effective program for completing inspections, tests, program
evaluations, and accident prevention for performing maintenance and
cleaning activities within the condenser water box and associated work
areas. This condition will help to ensure the safe operation and
physical integrity of the condenser water boxes and the work areas
necessary to safely conduct maintenance operations.
    This condition also requires the applicant to conduct tests,
inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving the use of the
alternative isolation process used to perform maintenance activities on
condenser water boxes identified in the variance application. Further,
this requirement provides the applicant with information needed to
schedule tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe operation
of the equipment and systems and to determine that the actions taken to
correct defects are appropriate. These tests, inspections, corrective
actions, and repairs shall be conducted in concert with the Condenser
Water Box Online Isolate and Restoration Procedure submitted to OSHA by
STP Nuclear with the Variance application.
Condition H: Additional Recordkeeping Requirement
    Under OSHA's recordkeeping requirements in 29 CFR part 1904
Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, STP
Nuclear must maintain a record of any recordable injury, illness, or
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904) resulting from the task of
cleaning and performing maintenance activities within the condenser
water box by completing OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report and OSHA Form 300, Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses.
In addition, STP Nuclear must maintain records of all maintenance
activities performed at condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear site,
as well as associated hazardous condition corrective actions and
repairs.
Condition I: Notifications
    Under this condition, the applicant is required, within specified
periods of time, to: (1) Notify OSHA of any recordable injury, illness,
in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an eye, or fatality
that occurs as a result of cleaning or maintenance activities around
the condenser water box; (2) provide OSHA a copy of the incident
investigation report (using OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report) of these events within 24 hours of the incident; (3) include on
OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report, information on the
conditions associated with the recordable injury or illness, the root-
cause determination, and preventive and corrective actions identified
and implemented; (4) provide the certification that affected workers
were informed of the incident and the results of the incident
investigation; (5) notify OSHA's Office of Technical Programs and
Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area
Office at least 15 working days in advance, should the applicant need
to revise the permit-required confined space isolation procedures
related to condenser water box cleaning or maintenance affecting STP
Nuclear's ability to comply with the conditions of this permanent
variance; and (6) provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area
Office, by January 31 of each calendar year, with a report covering the
previous calendar year, evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate
permit-required confined space isolation procedures set forth in the
conditions of the permanent variance.
    Additionally, this condition requires the applicant to notify OSHA
if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for the main
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that the
transfer of the permanent variance to a successor company must be
approved by OSHA. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate
effectively with the applicant regarding the status of the permanent
variance, and expedite the agency's administration and enforcement of
the permanent variance. Stipulating that an applicant is required to
have OSHA's approval to transfer a variance to a successor company
provides assurance that the successor company has knowledge of, and
will comply with, the conditions specified by this permanent variance,
thereby ensuring the safety of workers involved in performing the
operations covered by the permanent variance.

IV. Decision

    As described earlier in this notice, after reviewing the proposed
alternative, OSHA determined that STP Nuclear developed, and proposed
to implement, effective alternative means of protection that protect
its employees as effectively as paragraph 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of
OSHA's standard governing isolation of permit-controlled confined space
during the task of maintenance of condenser water boxes. Further, under
section 6(d) of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on the record
discussed above, the agency finds that when the employer complies with
the conditions of the variance, the working conditions of the
employer's workers are at least as safe and healthful as if the
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraph 29
CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of OSHA's standard for isolation of permit-
controlled confined space. Therefore, under the terms of this variance,
STP Nuclear must: (1) Comply with the conditions listed below under
section V of this notice (``Order'') for the period between the
effective date of this notice and until the agency modifies or revokes
this final order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13; (2) comply fully
with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1910; and (3)
provide a copy of this Federal Register notice to all employees
affected by the conditions using the same means it used to inform these
employees of the application for a permanent variance.

V. Order

    As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the
Interim Order granted to the employer on September 1, 2020 (86 FR
54424).

    OSHA issues this final order authorizing South Texas Project
Nuclear Operating Company (STP Nuclear or the applicant) to comply with
the following conditions instead of complying with the requirements of
paragraphs 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of OSHA's isolation requirements
of permit-controlled confined space. This final order applies to all
STP Nuclear employees located at 12090 FM 521, Wadsworth, Texas 77483.
The standard defines ``isolation of permit space'' in 29 CFR
1910.146(b) as: The process by which a permit-space is removed from
service and isolated, and completely protected against the release of
energy and material into the space by such means as: . . . Blocking or
disconnecting all mechanical linkages. Further, 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii) requires isolation of the permit-required confined
space.

A. Scope

    1. This permanent variance applies only to the task of performing
maintenance activities within condenser water boxes at STP Nuclear's
Wadsworth, Texas facility. This work is to be performed by authorized
employees under the alternative isolation procedures submitted to OSHA
as part of this application for a permanent variance.
    2. No other servicing and/or maintenance work, including electrical
maintenance, may be performed at the STP Nuclear facility using the
conditions of this order. These activities are to be performed in full
compliance with all applicable provisions of 29 CFR 1910.146.
    3. No construction work (i.e., work for construction, alteration,
and/or repair, including painting and decorating) may be performed
within the condenser water boxes under the conditions of this order.
    4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and
29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii), STP Nuclear must comply fully with all
other applicable provisions of 29 CFR 1910.146 during maintenance
activities of condenser water boxes.
    5. The interim order granted to STP Nuclear on September 1, 2020
(86 FR 54424), is hereby revoked as of the effective date of this final
order.

B. List of Abbreviations

    The following abbreviations apply to this permanent variance:

1. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
2. CWS--Circulating Water System
3. ECO--Equipment Clearance Box
4. FMEA--Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
5. HAZOP--Hazard and Operability Study
6. MCR--Main Cooling Reservoir
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
9. RRP--Rope Rescue Program
10. TGB--Turbine Generator Building

C. Definitions

    The following definitions apply to this permanent variance:
    1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of
his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has the
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
    2. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.
    3. Engulfment--the surrounding and effective capture of a person by
a liquid or finely divided (flowable) solid substance that can be
aspirated to cause death by filling or plugging the respiratory system
or that can exert enough force on the body to cause death by
strangulation, constriction, or crushing.
    4. Hazard and Operability Study--an evaluation of tasks or
operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary
controls.
    5. Isolation--the process by which a permit space is removed from
service and completely protected against the release of energy and
material into the space by such means as: Blanking or blinding;
misaligning or removing sections of lines, pipes, or ducts; a double
block and bleed system; lockout or tagout of all sources of energy; or
blocking or disconnecting all mechanical linkages.
    6. Permit-required confined space--a confined space that has one or
more of the following characteristics:
    (1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere;
    (2) Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an
entrant;
    (3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be
trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which
slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or
    (4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard.
    7. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to
maintenance of condenser water boxes.

D. Safety Practices and Procedures

    1. STP Nuclear shall adhere to the Condenser Water Box Online
Isolation and Restoration Procedure provided to OSHA with the Variance
application while performing cleaning or maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes, in accordance with STP Nuclear's permit-required
confined space program.
    2. STP Nuclear shall implement the hazard prevention and control
requirements identified in the Variance application (use of stop pins)
to isolate condenser water boxes before performing maintenance
activities within condenser water boxes.
    3. STP Nuclear shall close the cycle inlet and butterfly valves
with a local handswitch.
    4. STP Nuclear shall remove power from the inlet and isolation
valve and hang Danger Tags on the local handswitch and the breaker.
    5. STP Nuclear shall drain the condenser water box to another
condenser water box using the permanently installed condenser drain
down pumps.
    6. STP Nuclear shall check for leakages past the isolation valve
seat. In the event that a leak is found, STP Nuclear will use a
handwheel to manually achieve proper disk seating and ensure that a
Danger Tag is hung on the handwheel.
    7. STP Nuclear shall establish and implement a procedure to ensure
that no other maintenance will be performed on the condenser water box,
unless permit-required confined space measures are used.
    8. STP Nuclear shall modify each of the 12 condenser water box
isolation valves to drill four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper
valve range, which will be plugged when the condenser water box is in
service and fabricate 20 three-fourth inch diameter stop pins, which
will be installed to block movement of the butterfly valve disk and
hang Danger Tags on the pins.
    9. STP Nuclear shall confirm that lineup changes (i.e., pump
switching, valve position changes) within the CWS are prohibited while
personnel are within the water box.
    10. STP Nuclear shall limit the number of personnel occupying the
isolated water box to no more than 3

people in the inlet or outlet and no more than 4 people in total during
condenser water box maintenance activities.
    11. STP shall utilize technology-based level measurement
instruments with local audible alarms to alert the personnel working in
the isolated water box of a rising water level in the CWS piping
beneath the water box. The instrument serves as a secondary means of
monitoring the water level, in addition to the manual level monitoring
via Tygon tubing.
    12. STP Nuclear shall utilize hydraulic calculations to analyze the
potential leak paths into an isolated water box and quantify the inflow
rates and durations to fill the water box. This will identify how much
time personnel have to evacuate the water box in the event of a water
leak into the isolated water box.
    13. STP Nuclear will utilize a physical lock on the 6 inch cross-
tie valve (or replace the valve with a design that allows physical
locking) to prevent any unauthorized operation of the valve during the
condenser water box maintenance activity.
    14. STP Nuclear shall monitor the water levels in the supply side
water box (and return water box) regardless of when personnel are
present. Continuous monitoring for water leakage on the supply and
return water box of an isolated segment of the system is required as
water leakage from either side could present a hazard to personnel even
if they are no in the water box where the leakage is occurring.
    15. STP Nuclear shall require the presence of a dedicated water box
drain pump operator while personnel are occupying the isolated water
box.
    16. STP Nuclear shall utilize the water box low-point drains (6
inch for Unit 1 and 8 inch for Unit 2) to provide secondary means of
evacuating water leakage from the isolated water box connected CWS
piping.
    17. STP Nuclear shall install a level indicator that will alarm to
alert the employee in the water box to evacuate because of rising water
levels and auto start the two drain pumps. This level indicator alarm
is in addition to the portable system being used in monitoring the
levels.
    18. STP Nuclear shall ensure that rescue team members be present at
the condenser water box throughout the duration of the maintenance
activities.

E. Communication

    STP Nuclear must:
    1. Implement a system that informs workers performing maintenance
activities within condenser water boxes of any hazardous occurrences or
conditions that might affect their safety.
    2. Provide a means of communication among affected workers and
support personnel in energy isolation where unassisted voice
communication is inadequate.
    (a) Use an independent power supply for powered communication
systems, and these systems must operate such that use or disruption of
any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the operation of the
system from any other location.
    (b) Test communication systems at the start of each shift and as
necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.

F. Worker Qualifications and Training

    STP Nuclear will implement an effective permit-required confined
space isolation qualification and training program for authorized
employees involved in performing maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes. All training must be provided in a language that
the employees can understand. STP Nuclear must:
    1. Utilize the permit-required confined space isolation training
program submitted to OSHA as part of this Variance application, and
train each authorized employee on the isolation process for condenser
water boxes, and the procedures required under it;
    2. Develop a training program and train each affected employee in
the purpose and use of the alternative permit-required confined space
isolation procedures used for maintenance of condenser water boxes
under this interim order and document this instruction;
    3. Ensure that workers performing maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes know how to enter, work in, and exit from a
condenser water box under both normal and emergency conditions;
    4. Ensure that each authorized and affected employee has effective
and documented training in the contents and conditions covered by this
permanent variance and interim order; and
    5. Ensure that only trained and authorized employees perform
permit-required confined space isolation procedures for the task of
performing maintenance of condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear
site.

G. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    STP Nuclear must implement the detailed program for completing
inspections, tests, program evaluations, and incident prevention for
the isolation of condenser water boxes for maintenance purposes in
accordance with its permit-required confined space procedure submitted
to OSHA as part of STP Nuclear's Variance application. STP Nuclear
must:
    1. Ensure that a competent person (authorized employee) conducts
daily visual checks and monthly inspections and functionality tests of
condenser water boxes and permit-required confined space isolation
procedures that ensure the procedure and conditions of this permanent
variance and interim order are being followed.
    2. Ensure that a competent person conducts daily inspections of the
work areas associated with the maintenance of the condenser water
boxes.
    3. Develop a set of checklists to be used by a competent person in
conducting daily inspections of the condenser water boxes and permit-
required confined space procedures used while performing maintenance
activities at condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear facility.
    4. STP Nuclear will remove from service any equipment that
constitutes a safety hazard until STP Nuclear corrects the hazardous
condition and has a qualified person approve the correction.
    5. STP will maintain records of all maintenance activities of the
condenser water box, as well as associated corrective actions and
repairs, at the job site for the duration of the variance. Where
available, the maintenance, servicing, and installation of replacement
parts must strictly follow the manufacturer's specifications,
instructions, and limitations.

H. Additional Recordkeeping Requirement

    STP Nuclear must maintain a record of any recordable injury,
illness, or fatality (as defined by 29 CFR 1904) resulting from the
task of cleaning and performing maintenance activities within the
condenser water box by completing OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness
Incident Report, and OSHA Form 300, Log of Work-Related Injuries and
Illnesses. In addition, STP Nuclear must maintain records of all
maintenance activities performed at condenser water boxes at the STP
Nuclear site, as well as associated hazardous condition corrective
actions and repairs.

I. Notifications

    To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
STP Nuclear must:
    1. Notify OSHA's Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities (OTPCA) and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office of any
recordable injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization,

amputation, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed
OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report) resulting from
implementing the alternative isolation procedures of this permanent
variance conditions while completing the tasks of cleaning and/or
maintenance of the condenser water box, in accordance with 29 CFR 1904.
STP Nuclear shall provide the notification within 8 hours of the
incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury,
illness, or fatality; and a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA
Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report) must be submitted to OSHA
within 24 hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware of a
recordable injury, illness, or fatality.
    2. Provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office a copy
of the incident investigation report (using OSHA Form 301, Injury and
Illness Incident Report) of these events within 24 hours of the
incident;
    3. Include on the OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report, information on the conditions associated with the recordable
injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and the preventive and
corrective actions identified and implemented.
    4. Provide certification to OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas
Area Office within 15 working days of any engulfment incident that STP
Nuclear has informed affected workers of the incident and the results
of the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination
and preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
    5. Notify OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office at least
15 working days in advance, should STP Nuclear need to revise the
permit-required confined space isolation procedures related to
condenser water box cleaning or maintenance affecting its ability to
comply with the conditions of this permanent variance.
    6. Provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office, by
January 31 of each calendar year, with a report covering the previous
calendar year, identifying the maintenance activities performed on the
condenser water boxes and evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate
permit-required confined space isolation procedures set forth in the
conditions of the permanent variance.
    7. Inform OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office as soon
as possible, but no later than 7 days, after it has knowledge that it
will:
    (i) Cease doing business; or
    (ii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
    6. Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the
same means required to inform them of the application for a variance.
Authority and Signature
    James S. Frederick, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, Washington, DC 20210, authorized the
preparation of this notice. Accordingly, the agency is issuing this
notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 657(g)(2)), Secretary of Labor's Order No.
8-2020 (85 FR 58393, Sept. 18, 2020), and 29 CFR 1910.7.

    Signed at Washington, DC, on April 22, 2021.
James S. Frederick,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2021-08812 Filed 4-27-21; 8:45 am]
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[Federal Register: September 16, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 180)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 53359]
[DOCID:fr16se08-3]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 73

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0939; Airspace Docket No. 08-ASW-7]
RIN 2120-AA66

Change of Using Agency for Restricted Area R-3807, Glencoe, LA

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action changes the using agency of R-3807, Glencoe, LA,
from ``USAF, Southeast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall AFB, FL,'' to
``Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), McChord AFB, WA.'' The FAA is
taking this action in response to a request from the United States Air
Force (USAF) to reflect an administrative change of responsibility for
the restricted area. There are no changes to the boundaries; designated
altitudes; time of designation; or activities conducted within the
affected restricted area.

DATES: Effective Dates: 0901 UTC, November 20, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Colby Abbott, Airspace and Rules
Group, Office of System Operations Airspace and AIM, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

History

    On March 13, 2008, the USAF requested that the FAA change the using
agency for R-3807 from, ``USAF, Southeast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall
AFB, FL,'' to ``Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), McChord AFB, WA.''
The USAF request was based on the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)
transitioning to a new mission and the WADS unit assuming
responsibility for the SEADS area of responsibility, including all
special use airspace within that area. Coordination between the two air
defense sector airspace management offices, as well as Houston Air
Route Traffic Control Center, was effected prior to this using agency
change request being submitted by the USAF.
    Section 73.63 of Title 14 CFR part 73 was republished in FAA Order
7400.8P, effective February 16, 2008.

The Rule

    This action amends Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)
part 73 by revising the using agency listed for R-3807, Glencoe, LA;
transferring using agency responsibility for R-3807 from ``USAF,
Southeast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall AFB, FL'' to ``Western Air
Defense Sector (WADS), McChord AFB, WA.'' This is an administrative
change and does not affect the boundaries, designated altitudes, or
activities conducted within the restricted area; therefore, notice and
public procedures under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) are unnecessary.
    The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an
established body of technical regulations for which frequent and
routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current.
Therefore, this regulation: (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory
action'' under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule''
under Department of Transportation (DOT) Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant
preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so
minimal. Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air
traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule,
when promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the
FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of the
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient
use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority
as it is amending the using agency for R-3807, Glencoe, LA.

Environmental Review

    The FAA has determined that this action qualifies for a categorical
exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act in accordance
with 311d., FAA Order 1050.1E, ``Environmental Impacts: Policies and
Procedures.'' There are no extraordinary circumstances that would
require additional environmental analysis.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 73

    Airspace, Prohibited areas, Restricted areas.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration
amends 14 CFR part 73 as follows:

PART 73--SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE

0
1. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40120; E.O. 10854, 24
FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389.

Sec.  73.38  [Amended]

0
2. Section 73.38 is amended as follows:
* * * * *

R-3807 Glencoe, LA [Amended]

    Under using agency, remove ``USAF, Southeast Air Defense Sector,
Tyndall AFB, FL'' and insert the words ``Western Air Defense Sector
(WADS), McChord AFB, WA.''
* * * * *

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 4, 2008.
Edith V. Parish,
Manager, Airspace and Rules Group.
 [FR Doc. E8-21522 Filed 9-15-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P