[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 244 (Monday, December 21, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 79423-79453]
[FR Doc No: 2015-31880]

Vol. 80

Monday,

No. 244

December 21, 2015

Part II

Department of Transportation

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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

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49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, et al.

 Hazardous Materials: Requirements for the Safe Transportation of Bulk
Explosives (RRR); Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 80 , No. 244 / Monday, December 21, 2015 /
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, and 177

[Docket No. PHMSA-2011-0345 (HM-233D)]
RIN 2137-AE86

Hazardous Materials: Requirements for the Safe Transportation of
Bulk Explosives (RRR)

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) is amending the Hazardous Materials Regulations by establishing
standards for the safe transportation of explosives on cargo tank motor
vehicles and multipurpose bulk trucks transporting materials for
blasting operations. This rulemaking is responsive to two petitions for
rulemaking submitted by industry representatives: P-1557, concerning
the continued use of renewal applications, and P-1583, concerning the
incorporation of an industry standard publication. Further, developing
these requirements provides wider access to the regulatory flexibility
currently only offered by special permits and competent authorities.
    The requirements of this final rule mirror the majority of
provisions contained in nine widely-used longstanding special permits
that have established safety records. These requirements eliminate the
need for future renewal requests, thus reducing paperwork burdens and
facilitating commerce while maintaining a commensurate level of safety.
This final rule authorizes the transportation of certain explosives,
ammonium nitrates, ammonium nitrate emulsions, and other specific
hazardous materials in both non-bulk and bulk packagings, which are not
otherwise authorized under current regulations. These hazardous
materials are used in blasting operations on cargo tank motor vehicles
and specialized vehicles, known as multipurpose bulk trucks, which are
used as mobile work platforms to create blends of explosives that are
unique to each blast site. Finally, this rulemaking addresses the
construction of new multipurpose bulk trucks.

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective January 20, 2016.
    Incorporation by reference date: The incorporation by reference of
the publication listed in this rule is approved by the Director of the
Federal Register as of January 20, 2016.

ADDRESSES: You may find information on this rulemaking (Docket No.
PHMSA-2011-0345) at Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matthew Nickels,<PHONE_NUMBER>,
Standards and Rulemaking Division, Office of Hazardous Materials
Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents of Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
    A. Special Permits
    B. Petitions for Rulemaking
III. Incorporation by Reference Discussion Under 1 CFR Part 51
IV. List of Commenters
V. Summary and Discussion of Public Comments
    A. Incorporation by Reference
    B. Hazardous Materials Table and Special Provision 148
    C. New Section 173.66 on the Requirements for Bulk Explosives
    D. Loading and Unloading Language for Class 1 (Explosive)
Materials
VI. Section-by-Section Review of Amendments
    A. Part 171
    B. Part 172
    C. Part 173
    D. Part 177
VII. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
    A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
    B. Executive Order 13610, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order
12866, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
    C. Executive Order 13132
    D. Executive Order 13175
    E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Procedures and Policies
    F. Paperwork Reduction Act
    G. Regulatory Identifier Number (RIN)
    H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    I. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
    J. Privacy Act
    K. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
    L. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
    M. Executive Order 13211

I. Executive Summary

    The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
is issuing this final rule, titled ``Hazardous Materials: Requirements
for the Safe Transportation of Bulk Explosives (RRR),'' in order to
establish standards for the safe transportation of explosives on cargo
tank motor vehicles (CTMV) and multipurpose bulk trucks (MBTs)
transporting materials for blasting operations. This final rule is
responsive to two petitions for rulemaking submitted by industry
representatives: P-1557, concerning the continued use of renewal
applications, and P-1583, concerning the incorporation of an industry
standard publication. Further, codifying these new requirements
provides wider access to the regulatory flexibility currently offered
only by special permits and competent authority approvals. This final
rule will eliminate the need for future renewal requests of nine
special permits (the transportation of certain explosives, ammonium
nitrates, ammonium nitrate emulsions, and other specific hazardous
materials in bulk packaging) that have established safety records.
These amendments will reduce paperwork burdens and facilitate commerce
while maintaining an appropriate level of safety.
    PHMSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on July 15,
2014, under Docket HM-233D (PHMSA-2011-0345). See 79 FR 41185.\1\ This
final rule addresses comments to the NPRM and amends the existing
hazardous materials regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180) pertaining
to the following:
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    \1\ https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/07/15/2014-16382/hazardous-materials-requirements-for-the-safe-transportation-of-bulk-explosives-rrr.
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     Incorporating by reference (IBR) the Institute of Makers
of Explosives' (IME) Safety Library Publication No. 23
``Recommendations for the Transportation of Explosives, Division 1.5,
Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions, Division 5.1, Combustible Liquids, Class 3
and Corrosives, Class 8 in Bulk Packaging'' (referred to as IME
Standard 23).
     Establishing requirements directing manufacturers of newly
constructed or modified MBTs to comply with certain National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) requirements known as the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) found in 49 CFR part 571.
    PHMSA is confident that this final rule is of benefit to both the
public and the industry, as it will: (1) Eliminate the need for firms
to apply individually for the transportation of certain classes of bulk
materials in MBTs, (2) provide regulatory flexibility and relief while
maintaining a high level of safety, (3) promote safer transportation
practices, (4) facilitate commerce, (5) reduce paperwork burdens, (6)
protect the

public health, welfare, safety, and environment, and (7) eliminate
unnecessary regulatory requirements.
    In the NPRM, PHMSA encouraged all interested parties, particularly
the holders of the nine currently active special permits (discussed in
Section II. Background), to submit comments on the proposals discussed.
Additionally, we asked that commenters give feedback on the NPRM's
preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis \2\ (RIA) and the underlying
proposed benefit-cost estimates, and provide additional recommendations
to improve the final rule language and increase regulatory flexibility.
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    \2\ See http://www.regulations.gov and insert PHMSA-2011-0345-
0004 into the ``Search for:'' box.
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II. Background

A. Special Permits

    In this final rule, PHMSA is amending the HMR by establishing
standards for the safe transportation of explosives on CTMVs and MBTs
transporting materials for blasting operations. These standards for
bulk explosives mirror the majority of provisions contained in nine
widely-used longstanding special permits issued by PHMSA under 49 CFR
part 107, subpart B (Sec. Sec.  107.101 to 107.127). A special permit
sets forth alternative requirements (variances) to the requirements in
the HMR in a way that achieves a safety level at least equal to that
required under the regulations or that is consistent with the public
interest. Congress expressly authorized DOT to issue these variances in
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975 as amended. For an
in-depth discussion on what special permits are and why incorporating
them into the HMR is necessary, please review the Section II.
Background preamble discussion in the NPRM (July 15, 2014; 79 FR 41185;
41187).\3\
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    \3\ http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-07-15/pdf/2014-16382.pdf.
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    This final rule incorporates elements of nine special permits (by
way of incorporating IME Standard 23) that authorize multipurpose bulk
truck operations not specifically permitted under the HMR. These
amendments eliminate the need for hundreds of current grantees to
reapply for renewal of nine special permits every four years and for
PHMSA to process those renewal applications. These nine special permits
are:
     DOT-SP 4453: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.5D explosives contained in non-DOT specification
bulk, hopper-type tanks. This special permit was issued in 1980 and is
utilized by 22 grantees with acceptable safety performance.
     DOT-SP 5206: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.5D explosives contained in privately operated bulk
hopper-type units. This special permit has been in effect since 1980
and is utilized by one grantee with acceptable safety performance.
     DOT-SP 8453: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.5D explosives and Division 5.1 materials contained
in DOT specification cargo tanks and certain non-DOT specification
cargo tanks and portable tanks. This special permit has been in effect
since 1980 and is utilized by 33 grantees with acceptable safety
performance.
     DOT-SP 8554: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.5D explosives and/or Division 5.1 oxidizers in the
bulk motor vehicles described in the special permit. This special
permit has been in effect since 1981 and is utilized by at least 38
grantees with acceptable safety performance.
     DOT-SP 8723: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.5 explosives and/or Division 5.1 oxidizers, in bulk,
in DOT specification and non DOT specification packagings described in
the special permit. This special permit has been in effect since 1981
and has been utilized by at least 31 grantees with acceptable safety
performance.
     DOT-SP 9623: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.5D explosives and Division 5.1 oxidizers in a cargo
tank with a dromedary compartment (cargo compartments) containing
Division 1.1 explosives mounted directly behind the trailer cab subject
to the limitations specified in the special permit. This special permit
was issued in 1986 and is utilized by seven grantees with acceptable
safety performance.
     DOT-SP 10751: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.1, 1.4, and 1.5 explosives, Division 5.1 oxidizers,
and Class 3 combustible liquids in separate containers mounted on the
same vehicle frame structure. This special permit was issued in 1994
and is utilized by 16 grantees with acceptable safety performance.
     DOT-SP 11579: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.1B, 1.1D, 1.4B, 1.4D, 1.4S, and 1.5D explosives,
Division 5.1 oxidizers, Class 8 materials, and Class 3 combustible
liquids in separate containers secured on the same vehicle frame
structure. This special permit was issued in 1996 and is utilized by 65
grantees with acceptable safety performance.
     DOT-SP 12677: Authorizes the transportation in commerce of
certain Division 1.1, 1.4, and 1.5D explosives, Division 5.1 oxidizers,
Class 8 corrosive liquids, and Class 3 combustible liquids in separate
containers secured on the same vehicle frame structure. This special
permit was issued in 2001 and is utilized by eight grantees with
acceptable safety performance.
    This final rule benefits the regulated community by incorporating
into the HMR these nine special permits (221 grantees) with well-
established safety records \4\ thus reducing paperwork burdens and
facilitating commerce while maintaining an appropriate level of safety.
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    \4\ Over the past 10 years, there have been 43 reported
transportation incidents in the U.S. involving multipurpose bulk
trucks. During this same period, there has never been a death or
major injury attributed to the hazardous materials while in
transportation when there was compliance with the regulations. While
there has been one incident that resulted in a fatality in that 10
year period, it involved a vehicular crash and human error, and was
not attributed to the transportation of the hazardous materials.
Overall most incidents (90 percent) resulted in spillage; fewer
incidents resulted in vapor dispersion (3 percent), environmental
damage (0.5 percent), fire (0.5 percent), waterway infringement (0.4
percent), and explosion (0.1 percent.) Most of the time, the
closures or covers in portable tanks failed, causing leaks. Detailed
hazardous materials incident reports for hazardous materials
incidents specified in Sec.  171.16 may be found at the PHMSA Web
site at the following URL: https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Search.aspx.
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B. Petitions for Rulemaking

    Two components in this final rule were presented to PHMSA in
petitions for rulemaking.
1. Petition No. P-1557
    The petition from R&R (P-1557) dated March 23, 2010, asked PHMSA to
eliminate the need to operate under the terms and conditions of a
special permit for deliveries of certain types of bulk explosives, and
to develop bulk explosive requirements in the HMR. R&R Trucking stated
that ``the request is limited to Explosives, blasting, type E, 1.5D,
UN0332, PG [Packing Group] II and Ammonium nitrate emulsion, 5.1,
UN3375, PG II, transported on articulated DOT specification CTMVs.''
Further, the petition stated that ``no other hazardous material may be
loaded into or carried on the vehicle or any vehicle in a combination
of vehicles when transporting either of these materials in the approved
bulk packaging.'' A more detailed description

of P-1557 is available in the Section II. Background preamble
discussion in the NPRM (July 15, 2014; 79 FR 41185; 41188).\5\
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    \5\ http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-07-15/pdf/2014-16382.pdf.
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    PHMSA agrees with the petitioner on the merit of establishing
requirements for the transportation of bulk explosives in commerce.
With the incorporation of IME Standard 23 in this final rule, PHMSA is
establishing all relevant and appropriate requirements set out in the
current multipurpose bulk transportation special permits,\6\ including
the special permits under which R&R Trucking operates. It should be
noted that while we are not incorporating every provision in all nine
special permits, we have established criteria to transport these
commodities in conformance with the HMR.
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    \6\ DOT-SP 4453, DOT-SP 5206, DOT-SP 8453, DOT-SP 8554, DOT-SP
8723, DOT-SP 9623, DOT-SP 10751, DOT-SP 11579, and DOT-SP 12677.
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2. Petition No. P-1583
    The petition from IME (P-1583) dated May 13, 2011, asked PHMSA to
develop bulk explosive requirements in the HMR by incorporating by
reference IME Safety Library Publication No. 23, Recommendations for
the Transportation of Explosives Division 1.5, Ammonium Nitrate
Emulsions Division 5.1, Combustible Liquids Class 3, and Corrosives
Class 8 in Bulk Packagings. IME's petition stated that: (1) The long-
term, ubiquitous, and safe transport of explosives in bulk form,
including the use of MBT technology, warrant expansion of the HMR to
include established requirements of general applicability governing
these transportation practices; and (2) the recommendations included in
IME Standard 23 represent industry-wide best practices that,
collectively, prescribe a higher standard of safety than the
requirements included in the special permits currently used to
authorize this transportation. A more detailed description of P-1583 is
available in the Section II. Background preamble discussion in the NPRM
(July 15, 2014; 79 FR 41185; 41189).\7\
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    \7\ http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-07-15/pdf/2014-16382.pdf.
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    PHMSA agrees with the petitioner's request to develop bulk
explosive requirements in the HMR by proposing to incorporate by
reference IME Standard 23. Codifying these new requirements in this
final rule and incorporating IME Standard 23 into the HMR provides
wider access to the regulatory flexibility currently offered only by
special permits and competent authority approvals.
    Access to the petitions referenced in this final rule can be found
at http://www.regulations.gov under Docket Numbers ``PHMSA-2010-0101''
(P-1557), and ``PHMSA-2011-0137'' (P-1583).\8\
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    \8\ http://www.regulations.gov/.
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III. Incorporation by Reference Discussion Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The Institute of Makers of Explosives' (IME) Safety Library
Publication No. 23 ``Recommendations for the Transportation of
Explosives, Division 1.5, Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions, Division 5.1,
Combustible Liquids, Class 3 and Corrosives, Class 8 in Bulk
Packaging'' (referred to as IME Standard 23) is free and easily
accessible to the public via the Web site provided by the parent
organization. Access to the IME Standard 23 publication incorporated by
reference is also available for public download and review at: http://www.ime.org/. Under the ``Publications & Products'' tab, click the
``Safety Library Publications'' link \9\ and either order a physical
copy or download a free PDF copy via email. Also, a copy of the IME
Standard 23 publication has been added to the Docket \10\ under
``PHMSA-2011-0345'' at http://www.regulations.gov. IME Standard 23 is
discussed in VI. Section-by-section Review of Amendments (A. Part 171-
Section 171.7) of this final rule.
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    \9\ https://www.ime.org/products/category/safety_library_publications_slps.
    \10\ http://www.regulations.gov/.
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IV. List of Commenters

    In response to PHMSA's July 15, 2014 NPRM (79 FR 41185), PHMSA
received comments from various stakeholders. The organizations who
commented are listed in Table 1:

      Table 1--List of Organizations Commenting on the HM-233D NPRM
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   Assigned docket Number             Name               Docket URL
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PHMSA-2011-0345-0005........  Institute of Makers   http://
                               of Explosives (IME).  www.regulations.gov/
                                                     #!documentDetail;D=
                                                     PHMSA-2011-0345-
                                                     0005.
PHMSA-2011-0345-0006........  Dangerous Goods       http://
                               Advisory Council      www.regulations.gov/
                               (DGAC).               #!documentDetail;D=
                                                     PHMSA-2011-0345-
                                                     0006.
PHMSA-2011-0345-0007........  R&R Trucking (R&R)..  http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
                                                     PHMSA-2011-0345-
                                                     0007.
PHMSA-2011-0345-0008........  Council on Safe       http://
                               Transportation of     www.regulations.gov/
                               Hazardous Articles    #!documentDetail;D=
                               (COSTHA).             PHMSA-2011-0345-
                                                     0008.
PHMSA-2011-0345-0009........  Council on Safe       http://
                               Transportation of     www.regulations.gov/
                               Hazardous Articles    #!documentDetail;D=
                               (COSTHA) IME          PHMSA-2011-0345-
                               Support.              0009.
PHMSA-2011-0345-0010........  IME Supplemental      http://
                               Comments.             www.regulations.gov/
                                                     #!documentDetail;D=
                                                     PHMSA-2011-0345-
                                                     0010.
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V. Summary and Discussion of Public Comments

    Discussed in the following sections is a list of the major
amendments PHMSA proposed for adoption into the HMR in the NPRM, a
brief synopsis of the comments we received in response to those
proposals, and our position regarding those comments received to the
NPRM. Furthermore, the amendments we are finalizing in this final rule
are addressed in Section VI. Section-by-section Review of Amendments.

A. Incorporation by Reference

    In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to incorporate by reference the latest
edition of the technical standard published by IME, known as ``Safety
Library Publication No. 23 Recommendations for the Transportation of
Explosives, Division 1.5, Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions, Division 5.1,
Combustible Liquids, Class 3 and Corrosives, Class 8 in Bulk
Packaging'' (referred to as IME Standard 23). The intent behind
proposing to incorporate by reference IME Standard

23 was to establish general requirements of: (1) A single bulk
hazardous material for blasting by CTMV; and (2) CTMVs capable of
transporting multiple hazardous materials for blasting in bulk and non-
bulk packagings. PHMSA received general support from the commenters on
the principle of utilizing industry consensus standards as a necessary
and effective approach, with IME, Dangerous Goods Advisory Council
(DGAC), and R&R specifically, endorsing IME Standard 23. We did not
receive any comments that opposed our proposals to incorporate this
standard and we are adopting it as proposed.

B. Hazardous Materials Table and Special Provision 148

    As previously discussed, in the NPRM PHMSA proposed to incorporate
IME Standard 23 into the HMR and establish requirements of general
applicability governing the transportation of: (1) A single bulk
hazardous material for blasting by CTMV; and (2) CTMVs capable of
transporting multiple hazardous materials for blasting in bulk and non-
bulk packagings. However, as noted in the NPRM, the HMR does not permit
the transportation in bulk packaging of certain Class 1 and Class 5
hazardous materials that are used in commercial blasting operations.
This type of transportation is only permitted under a PHMSA special
permit. In the NPRM, we proposed that a new Special Provision 148 be
added to each entry under Column 7 of the Hazardous Materials Table
(HMT) for HMT entries that are listed in IME Standard 23. These HMT
entries include certain hazardous materials from the following hazard
classes and divisions: Divisions 1.1B, 1.1D, 1.4B, 1.4D, 1.4S and 1.5D
explosives; Division 5.1 oxidizers; Class 8 corrosive liquids; and
Class 3 combustible liquids. In the NPRM, Special Provision 148 was
proposed in order to direct readers to Sec.  173.66, therefore only
specific explosives, oxidizers, etc. will be eligible.
    PHMSA received general support from the commenters on the principle
of revising the HMT and adding a new Special Provision 148 to
appropriate HMT entries, with IME offering one suggestion. IME stated
that: ``IME inadvertently included `Detonator assemblies, non-electric,
for blasting, Division 1.1B, UN0360' in a pre-publication version of
IME Standard 23, but removed it from the final copy. This should be
removed from the HMT changes in the final rule.'' We reviewed the
comment and agree with IME's suggestion and will revise the regulatory
text in this final rule as needed.
    We did not receive any comments that opposed our proposals to
revise the appropriate HMT entries and add new Special Provision 148.
Therefore, in this final rule, we are amending the regulatory text and
also removing the HMT entry IME noted in its comments.

C. New Section 173.66 on the Requirements for Bulk Explosives

    In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to add a new section to 49 CFR part 173
(Sec.  173.66), which included specific requirements for newly
constructed MBTs and modifications to existing trucks.
1. Section 173.66 Preamble
    In the preamble of the new section, prior to paragraph (a), PHMSA
proposed requirements for MBTs. We proposed that when Sec.  172.101
allowed that a Class 1 (explosive) material may be packaged in
accordance with this section, only the bulk packagings specified for
these materials in IME Standard 23 (IBR, see Sec.  171.7 of this
subchapter) would be authorized, subject to the requirements of
subparts A and B of this part and the special provisions in Column 7 of
the Sec.  172.101 table. Therefore, as proposed in the NPRM, an entity
operating a MBT under current conditions, such as a special permit,
would be subject to operating under the IME Standard 23 document.
Furthermore, as proposed in the NPRM, the additional requirements in
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) would apply to: (1) A new MBT constructed
after December 31, 2014, or (2) an old MBT that requires modifications
due to wear and tear (i.e., re-chassis, etc.).
    PHMSA received general support from the commenters on the principle
of establishing a new Sec.  173.66 that outlined the requirements for
bulk explosives, but the commenters had concerns with specific aspects
of the regulations. Regarding compliance dates, IME commented that:

    Compliance Date: PHMSA proposes to trigger requirements for
compliance with the FMVSS, FSS, and EBDD standards for newly
constructed MBTs after December 31, 2014. While we can hope that HM-
233D is finalized by December 31, 2014, we request that the
mandatory compliance date be triggered by a threshold such as 120
days after the rule is finalized. Additionally, we note that no
future effective date is specified for MBTs that are modified. We
would suggest that the mandatory compliance date be the same.

    Additionally, COSTHA echoed those thoughts in its comment ``We
would also like to encourage PHMSA to grant the IME request that the
mandatory compliance date with the standards for newly constructed MBTs
be transitioned with a threshold such as 120 days after the rule is
finalized and that it be aligned with the effective date for MBTs that
are modified.'' In regards to the compliance dates issue, we reviewed
the comments and agree with IME's suggestion and will revise the
regulatory text in this final rule as needed.
    Regarding the overall structure and language prior to paragraph (a)
of the new section, R&R commented that:

    R&R supports the need for differentiation between transport of:
(1) A single bulk hazardous material for blasting by cargo tank
motor vehicles and (2) transport by MBT capable of transporting
multiple hazmats for blasting in bulk and non-bulk packaging. Two
distinctly different types of transportation. Distinction between
the two types of transport must be clearly maintained. SLP-23 makes
the distinction by having separate sections. In the NPRM, Special
Provision 148 makes this distinction, but Sec.  173.66 is vague on
the distinction. For clarification Sec.  173.66 should refer to
Section 1 of SLP-23 for the standards for transporting a single bulk
hazardous material for blasting by cargo tank motor vehicle and to
Section 2 of SLP-23 for the standards for cargo tank motor vehicles
capable of transporting multiple hazardous materials for blasting in
bulk and non-bulk packagings.

    In regards to the clarification of single bulk CTMVs differing from
MBTs, we reviewed the comments and agree with R&R's suggestion and will
revise the regulatory text in this final rule as needed.
2. Fire Suppression Systems
    In the NPRM, in paragraph (a) of Sec.  173.66, we proposed
additional requirements regarding fire suppression systems (FSS) for
newly constructed and modified MBTs. In addition to complying the usual
requirements of the HMR (e.g., placarding, shipping papers, etc.), and
the IME Standard 23 per Sec.  171.7 of the HMR, the NPRM proposed that
these vehicles would be required to have a FSS that is an engineered
system connected to the engine and transmission compartments. The
system would be activated by manual switch or passive means in the
event of a fire. Additionally, all fire extinguishers used as
components of the system would be required to meet the requirements of
49 CFR 393.95(a) and the applicable National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) codes and standards. Further, the NPRM proposed that
the FSS's design would be required to be verified and certified by the
Design Certifying Engineer (DCE) of the vehicle, and the design would
have to be tested through engineering analysis or physical testing to
verify the initial design or future modification(s) to the current FSS.
The NPRM proposed that the FSS would be

visually inspected annually for defects, flaws, damage, etc., to ensure
none are present, and the system would be pneumatically tested every
five years to ensure the system is free of debris, leaks, and damage,
and to ensure the system will function properly. Finally, the NPRM
proposed the DCE must prepare a test report and provide it to the
manufacturer of the vehicle and the manufacturer must provide a copy to
the owner of the vehicle.
    Commenters generally did not support the additional requirements
regarding FSS for newly constructed and modified MBTs proposed in the
NPRM. For example, IME commented that:

    PHMSA acknowledges that ``there are too few incident data to
estimate and monetize the benefits from a fire suppression system.''
Unaware of any death or serious injury attributable to hazmat
carried on MBTs since this technology was introduced in the 1970s.
There is no off-the-shelf FSS technology; IME isn't supportive of
allowing MBTs to be guinea pigs for field testing FSS technology.
SLP-23 already provides a FSS which far exceeds that required for
other commercial motor vehicles, including trucks transporting
hazmat for which fire is an inherent risk. SLP-23 requires that MBTs
be equipped with two fire extinguishers with an Underwriters'
Laboratories (UL) rating of at least 4-A:40-B:C. Current federal
regulations require that trucks used to transport placarded
quantities of hazmat be equipped with one fire extinguisher having
an UL rating of 10B:C. There is no assurance, in an accident where
the driver is incapacitated and unable to use the fire extinguishers
on the vehicle, that the FSS will have survived the crash and be
operational. Every ounce of unnecessary weight added to a vehicle is
an ounce of lost payload, this adds up to more trucks on the road to
carry the same volume of material, increasing crash risk and
generate other societal impacts such as wasted fuel and more air
emissions. PHMSA's requirement is similar to but not the same as the
NRCan standard. Given the lack of incident data to show that such
systems would increase safety commensurate with the cost, we do not
support the NRCan standard or the more onerous PHMSA proposal. IME
questions whether PHMSA, instead of NHTSA, is the agency to propose
such a vehicle modification. NHTSA is responsible for setting and
enforcing safety performance standards for motor vehicles and motor
vehicle equipment.

    Furthermore, in a set of supplemental comments, IME commented that:

    Safety: Safety benefits of MBTs have long been demonstrated.
There has never been a death or a major injury attributed to
blasting agents and oxidizers transported in bulk. We have not been
able to identify a single instance where a FSS would have made a
difference to the outcome of the incident. No one would guarantee
that such a system would be operational in a crash. A FSS would be
of no value in suppressing an engine fire fueled by a tire fire. In
a non-crash situation, the driver will already have access to at
least two fire extinguishers with a 4-A:40-B:C rating, a standard of
safety already surpassing that required on any other commercial
motor vehicle operating in the United States.
    Insurance Rates: The largest insurer of MBTs in the US told IME
that adding FSSs to MBTs would have no effect on rates because there
is no statistically significant loss experience.
    FSSs in Canada: We discussed the evolution of and experience
with FSSs in Canada. First, industry had little involvement in the
FSS standard imposed by Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) through its
Mobile Process Unit (MPU) permit system. Thus, it is not correct to
represent Canadian industry as ``supporting'' this standard. Second,
it is not correct to represent the PHMSA FSS proposal as being
aligned or harmonized with the NRCan standard. The NRCan standard is
vastly different than that proposed in HM-233D. The NRCan standard
reads in full, ``MPUs are also required to have an engineered fire
suppression system for the engine compartment. . . . [E]ngineered
fire suppression systems must be inspected every 6 months (or sooner
if required by other jurisdiction). These systems must be inspected
by a qualified and approved facility or person (reg.: NFPA 17, Chap.
11).'' NFPA 17 is the National Fire Protection Association's
standard on ``Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems'', and chapter 11,
covers the inspection, maintenance and recharging of such systems.
While not referenced, chapter 9 of this standard states that ``only
pre-engineered systems . . . shall be installed on mobile
equipment.'' PHMSA's standard is paragraphs long requiring vehicle
specific designs that have been verified and certified by a Design
Certifying Engineer, including physical testing or engineering
analysis. Pre-engineered systems are not allowed. Additionally,
PHMSA requires periodic inspections and detailed recordkeeping and
retention requirements that differ from the NRCan standard. Based on
the NRCan requirement, we can report that installation costs of FSSs
in Canada run between $4,000 and $6,000, and add between 300-500
pounds to the weight of the vehicle. A typical payload on an MBT is
25,000 pounds, and the cost of a new MBT ranges from $250,000 to
$500,000. Thus, a NRCan-type FSS would reduce payload between 1.2%
and 2%, and would add between 1.2% and 1.6% to the cost of a new
MBT. Costs of periodic inspections average $800 in remote areas and
$150 in more populated areas. NRCan allows companies to obtain NFPA
certification for their own employees to conduct inspections.

    PHMSA's position in the NPRM was that fire was a potential hazard
in an MBT incident. IME has highlighted the safety record of MBTs which
indicates that fire is not typically common with an incident involving
these vehicles.\11\ PHMSA's engineered FSS as proposed was more
stringent and cost prohibitive than a pre-engineered FSS or the NRCan
requirement. PHMSA agrees with IME that the FSS proposed in the NPRM
exceeded the level of safety established. However, we disagree that
PHMSA does not have the authority to include a FSS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Over the past 10 years, there have been 43 reported
transportation incidents in the U.S. involving multipurpose bulk
trucks. During this same period, there has never been a death or
major injury attributed to the hazardous materials while in
transportation when there was compliance with the regulations. While
there has been 1 incident that resulted in a fatality in that 10
year period, it involved a vehicular crash and human error, and was
not attributed to the transportation of the hazardous materials
themselves. Overall most incidents (90 percent) resulted in
spillage; fewer incidents resulted in vapor dispersion (3 percent),
environmental damage (0.5 percent), fire (0.5 percent), waterway
infringement (0.4 percent), and explosion (0.1 percent.) Most of the
time, the closures or covers in portable tanks failed, causing
leaks. Detailed hazardous materials incident reports for hazardous
materials incidents specified in Sec.  171.16 may be found at the
PHMSA Web site at the following URL: https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Search.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA acknowledges that the proposed FSS would add weight to the
MBT, and that the increased weight would decrease the payload, thereby
increasing the number of MBTs on the road. Furthermore, we do agree
that the established safety record of MBTs stand for itself and that
IME Standard 23 does exceed the federal requirements for fire
extinguishers. As such, we have reviewed the comments regarding FSS for
newly constructed and modified MBTs and agree with IME's position. We
will revise the regulatory text in this final rule as needed. In
addition, PHMSA may revisit the FSS requirement in the future, if a
future review of incident data indicates a need.
3. Emergency Shut-Off/Battery Disconnect Devices
    In the NPRM, in paragraph (b) of Sec.  173.66, we proposed
additional requirements for emergency shut-off/battery disconnect for
newly constructed and modified MBTs. The NPRM proposed that for these
trucks, the batteries for the chassis would be required to have three
easily accessible manual disconnect switches. One manual disconnect
switch would be located inside the driver's cab and would not include
the ignition; the remaining two manual disconnect switches would be
located on each side of the vehicle. Further, the NPRM proposed all
three switches would be connected to the positive battery terminal and
the line of the switch would be protected from rubbing and abrasion
that could cause a short circuit. Finally, the NPRM proposed that the
battery disconnect would be required to isolate all manufacturing
equipment

except critical instrumentation that requires the maintenance of the
electrical supply, and that the battery disconnect is tested monthly to
ensure proper operation.
    Commenters generally did not support the additional requirements of
emergency shut-off/battery disconnect devices (EBDD) for newly
constructed and modified MBTs. For example, IME commented that:

    We agree that any EBDD standard included in a final rule
promulgated under this docket should apply only to newly constructed
or modified MBTs. However, we disagree with the EBDD standard as
proposed. PHMSA's proposal would require MBTs to be equipped with
three manual EBDDs, not to include the ignition switch. The cost/
benefit of this standard cannot be justified. First, MBT's are the
only type of specialized vehicle that is already required to have a
manual EBDD in addition to the ignition switch. Yet, PHMSA provides
no data to support the need to triple the current EBDD requirement.
In fact, PHMSA acknowledges that no death or major injury has been
attributed to hazardous materials carried by MBTs--a record that
cannot be matched by other bulk hazardous materials that are
sensitive to electric charge. Second, in the years since this
requirement has been imposed, we are unaware of any instance where
EBDDs have been used in an emergency, irrespective of the
consequence. Rather, emergency responders simply cut the battery
cable as they are trained to do. Third, PHMSA's cost justification
does not include the cost to train all emergency responders on the
existence and operation of the EBDDs. We would expect these costs to
be significant. There are over one million firefighters, alone, in
the United States, and over 70 percent of fire departments are
volunteer with relatively high-rates of turnover. Fifth, the
proposed EBDD standard is inconsistent with the standard required in
Canada. PHMSA should not pass up this opportunity to advance the RCC
initiative with regard to EBDD requirements. We would support
including an EBDD requirement for MBTs that is equivalent to the
Canadian EBDD standard.

    Additionally, COSTHA echoed those thoughts in its comment that
harmonization is essential and that it would be better to harmonize
with an equivalent Canadian EBDD standard than impose an entirely new
one.
    While the cost/benefit of the additional two switches was adequate
to justify this requirement, PHMSA agrees with IME that the triple EBDD
is redundant. Also, the triple EBDD is not harmonized with the NRCan
requirements or IME Standard 23. As such, we have reviewed the comments
regarding EBDD for newly constructed and modified MBTs and agree with
the commenters' position. We are revising the regulatory text in this
final rule as needed. In addition, PHMSA may revisit the EBDD
requirement in the future, if a future review of incident data
indicates a need.
4. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
    In the NPRM, in paragraph (c) of Sec.  173.66 we proposed that for
newly constructed and modified MBTs, those trucks must be in compliance
with the applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) found
in 49 CFR part 571. Furthermore, in the NPRM we proposed that the MBT
manufacturer must maintain a certification record ensuring the final
manufacturing is in compliance with the FMVSS, per the certification
requirements found in 49 CFR part 567, and these certification records
must be available to DOT representatives upon request.
    PHMSA received general support from the commenters on the
requirements to be in compliance with the applicable FMVSS found in 49
CFR part 571, with IME offering one comment that: ``PHMSA proposes that
newly constructed and modified MBTs be in compliance with applicable
FMVSS, and that MBT manufacturers maintain a record ensuring that these
vehicles are in compliance with the FMVSS certification requirements
found in 49 CFR part 567. IME supports these requirements.'' We did not
receive any comments that opposed this requirement, and we are adopting
it as proposed.
5. Modified Vehicles
    In paragraph (d) of Sec.  173.66 of the NPRM we proposed a
definition for the term modification. We proposed that ``modification''
means any change to the original design and construction of a MBT that
affects its structural integrity or lading retention capability (e.g.
rechassising, etc.). In the NPRM, we proposed to exclude: (1) A change
to the MBT equipment such as lights, truck or tractor power train
components, steering and brake systems, and suspension parts, and
changes to appurtenances, such as fender attachments, lighting
brackets, ladder brackets; and (2) replacement of components such as
valves, vents, and fittings with a component of a similar design and of
the same size.
    PHMSA received general support from the commenters on the addition
of a new term for modification, with IME offering one suggestion. IME
stated that: ``We fully support the proposed definition. However, we
suggest that the definitional term be changed to `Modified' since this
is the term PHMSA uses in proposed Sec.  173.66 and the preamble.'' We
agree with IME's suggestion and are revising the regulatory text in
this final rule as needed.

D. Loading and Unloading Language for Class 1 (Explosive) Materials

    In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to revise Sec.  177.835 paragraph (a)
to state that no Class 1 (explosive) materials may be loaded into, on,
or unloaded from any motor vehicle with the engine running, except that
the engine of a MBT may be used for the operation of the pumping
equipment of the vehicle during loading or unloading. Furthermore, in
the NPRM we proposed to add a new paragraph (d) which discussed MBTs
and specified that Class 1 (explosive) materials may be packaged in
accordance with Sec.  173.66 of this subchapter. However, these
materials would be permitted to be transported on the same vehicle with
Division 5.1 oxidizers, or Class 8 corrosive materials, and/or Class 3
combustible liquid, n.o.s., NA1993 only under the conditions and
requirements set forth in IME Standard 23 (IBR, see Sec.  171.7) and
paragraph (g) of Sec.  177.835.
    PHMSA received general support from the commenters on the principle
of revising loading and unloading language for Class 1 explosive
materials in the highway part of the HMR, with DGAC stating that it
``supports the proposed revision to Sec.  177.835 which would authorize
the engine of the MBT to remain running when used for the operation of
pumping equipment during loading and unloading.'' Additionally, IME
states that it ``is supportive of the proposed revision to 49 CFR
177.835(a) that seeks to address that vehicles need to run engines to
run equipment on MBTs.'' However, IME did offer one suggestion in that
as proposed, ``the NPRM only authorized the ability to use a vehicle
engine for MBTs, and that pumping equipment is also used to load/unload
material from cargo tanks transporting single commodity blasting agents
or oxidizers. As such, IME requests that the proposed 49 CFR 177.835(a)
provision be modified to provide the same option for these cargo tank
vehicles.''
    We reviewed the comment and agree with IME's suggestion and are
thus revising the regulatory text in this final rule as needed.
Therefore, single commodity CTMVs are similarly eligible to use the
vehicle's engine while operating the pumping equipment of the vehicle
during loading or unloading, and it ensures overall regulatory clarity
for these specific types of operations.

VI. Section-by-Section Review of Amendments

    The following is a section-by-section review of the amendments
adopted in this final rule:

A. Part 171

Section 171.7
    Section 171.7 provides a listing of all standards incorporated by
reference into the HMR. For this rulemaking, we evaluated a consensus
industry standard pertaining to the standards for transporting a single
bulk hazardous material for blasting by CTMVs and for CTMVs capable of
transporting multiple hazardous materials for blasting in bulk and non-
bulk packaging. These standards include parts on: General requirements;
modes of transportation; additional provisions; qualifications,
maintenance, and repair of packagings; qualifications of individuals
certifying non-DOT specification bulk packaging; placarding and marking
requirements; and security and safety of the bulk hazardous materials
transported. These standards also include parts on: Purpose and
limitations; hazardous materials covered; packagings; operational
controls; qualifications, maintenance, and repair of packagings;
special provisions; and emergency response, reporting, and training
requirements. We determined that the standards provide an enhanced
level of safety without imposing significant compliance burdens. These
standards have a well-established and documented safety history and
their adoption will maintain the high safety standard currently
achieved under the HMR. Therefore, we are adding and revising the
incorporation by reference material under the following organization:
    Paragraph (r)(2) is revised to add the Institute of Makers of
Explosives IME Standard 23, IME Safety Library Publication No. 23 (IME
Standard 23), Recommendations for the Transportation of Explosives,
Division 1.5, Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions, Division 5.1, Combustible
Liquids, Class 3, and Corrosives, Class 8 in Bulk Packagings, October
2011 Edition.

B. Part 172

Section 172.101
    Section 172.101 provides the instructions for using the HMT and the
HMT itself. In this final rule, PHMSA is revising ``Column (7) Special
Provisions'' of the HMT by adding Special Provision 148 to the list of
entries. In this final rule, new Special Provision 148 is added to
Sec.  172.102(c)(1) and assigned to the HMT entries in Table 2:

        Table 2--List of HMT Entries Adding Special Provision 148
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Hazardous materials descriptions and
           proper shipping names                 Identification Nos.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acetic acid solution, not less than 50      UN2790
 percent but not more than 80 percent
 acid, by mass.
Acetic acid solution, with more than 10     UN2790
 percent and less than 50 percent acid, by
 mass.
Ammonium nitrate based fertilizer.........  UN2067
Ammonium nitrate emulsion or Ammonium       UN3375
 nitrate suspension or Ammonium nitrate
 gel, intermediate for blasting explosives.
Ammonium nitrate-fuel oil mixture           NA0331
 containing only prilled ammonium nitrate
 and fuel oil.
Ammonium nitrate, liquid (hot concentrated  UN2426
 solution).
Ammonium nitrate, with not more than 0.2%   UN1942
 combustible substances, including any
 organic substance, calculated as carbon,
 to the exclusion of any other added
 substance.
Articles, explosive, n.o.s................  UN0349
Boosters, without detonator...............  UN0042
Combustible liquid, n.o.s.................  NA1993
Cord, detonating, flexible................  UN0065
Cord, detonating, flexible................  UN0289
Corrosive liquid, acidic, organic, n.o.s..  UN3265
Detonator assemblies, non-electric, for     UN0361
 blasting.
Detonator assemblies, non-electric, for     UN0500
 blasting.
Detonators, electric, for blasting........  UN0030
Detonators, electric, for blasting........  UN0255
Detonators, electric, for blasting........  UN0456
Detonators, non-electric, for blasting....  UN0455
Explosive, blasting, type A...............  UN0081
Explosive, blasting, type B or Agent        UN0331
 blasting, Type B.
Explosive, blasting, type E...............  UN0241
Explosive, blasting, type E or Agent        UN0332
 blasting, Type E.
Hypochlorite solutions....................  UN1791
Nitrites, inorganic, aqueous solution,      UN3219
 n.o.s.
Oxidizing liquid, n.o.s...................  UN3139
Oxidizing solid, n.o.s....................  UN1479
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 172.102 Special Provisions
    Section 172.102 lists special provisions applicable to the
transportation of specific hazardous materials. Special provisions
contain packaging requirements, prohibitions, and exceptions applicable
to particular quantities or forms of hazardous materials. PHMSA is
adopting the following revision to Sec.  172.102, special provisions:
Special Provision 148
    In this final rule, PHMSA is adding new Special Provision 148 to
Sec.  172.102(c)(1) and assigning it to numerous HMT entries (see the
previous section: Section 172.101). Special Provision 148 states that
for domestic transportation, the HMT entries that are assigned Special
Provision 148 are directed to Sec.  173.66 for: (1) The standards for
transporting a single bulk hazardous material for blasting by cargo
tank motor vehicles (CTMV); and (2) the standards for CTMVs capable of
transporting multiple hazardous materials for blasting in bulk and non-
bulk packagings.
Special Provision 163
    Special Provision 163 currently requires ``UN3375, Ammonium nitrate
emulsion or Ammonium nitrate suspension or Ammonium nitrate gel,
intermediate for blasting explosives'' to ``satisfactorily pass Test
Series 8 of the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, Part I, Section 18
(IBR, see Sec.  171.7 of this subchapter).'' For bulk packages, Test
8(d) of Test Series 8 applies. This testing is in addition to the
requirements in Special Provision 147 and therefore must be completed
prior to approval by the Associate Administrator. Although not
addressed in the HM-233D NPRM or this final rule's regulatory text, we
included this non-substantive clarification in order to highlight the
requirement to pass Test 8(d) when transporting applicable substances
in a bulk packaging.

C. Part 173

Section 173.66
    In this final rule, PHMSA is adding a new Sec.  173.66 that
provides the requirements for a hazardous material to be permitted for
transport in accordance with this section (per Special Provision 148 in
Sec.  172.102(c)(1)), and only the bulk packagings specified for these
materials in IME Standard 23 (IBR, see Sec.  171.7 of this subchapter)
are authorized, subject to the requirements of subparts A and B of this
part and the special provisions in Column 7 of the Sec.  172.101 table.
(See Section I of IME Standard 23 for the standards for transporting a
single bulk hazardous material for blasting by CTMVs, and Section II of
IME Standard 23 for the standards for CTMVs capable of transporting
multiple hazardous materials for blasting in bulk and non-bulk
packagings.) As provided by this new section, an entity operating these
types of vehicles would no longer operate under a special permit, and
would instead be subject to operating

under the IME Standard 23 document. Furthermore, the additional
requirements in paragraph (a) would apply to: (1) A new multipurpose
bulk truck constructed after 120 days from publication of the final
rule in the Federal Register, or (2) an old multipurpose bulk truck
that is modified due to wear and tear (i.e., re-chassis, etc.) after
120 days from publication of the final rule in the Federal Register.
    In paragraph (a), we require that for newly constructed and
modified MBTs, those trucks must be in compliance with the applicable
FMVSS found in 49 CFR part 571. Furthermore, the multipurpose bulk
truck manufacturer must maintain a certification record ensuring the
final manufacturing is in compliance with the FMVSS, per the
certification requirements found in 49 CFR part 567, and these
certification records must be available to DOT representatives upon
request.
    In paragraph (b), we state that the term ``modified'' means any
change to the original design and construction of a MBT that affects
its structural integrity or lading retention capability, (e.g.
rechassising, etc.). Excluded from this category are the following: (1)
A change to the MBT equipment such as lights, truck or tractor power
train components, steering and brake systems, and suspension parts, and
changes to appurtenances, such as fender attachments, lighting
brackets, ladder brackets; and (2) replacement of components such as
valves, vents, and fittings with a component of a similar design and of
the same size.
    By finalizing these requirements, PHMSA is echoing the majority of
provisions contained in nine widely-used longstanding special permits
that have established safety records. These requirements will eliminate
the need for future renewal requests, thus reducing paperwork burdens
and facilitating commerce while maintaining an appropriate level of
safety.

D. Part 177

Section 177.835
    Section Sec.  177.835 provides the loading and unloading
requirements for Class 1 explosive materials. In this final rule, we
are revising paragraph (a) to state that no Class 1 explosive materials
may be loaded into, on, or unloaded from any motor vehicle with the
engine running, except that the engine of a MBT (see paragraph (d) of
this section) and the engine of a cargo tank motor vehicle transporting
a single bulk hazardous material for blasting may be used for the
operation of the pumping equipment of the vehicle during loading or
unloading. Furthermore, we are adding a new paragraph (d) which
provides requirements for MBTs and specifies that Class 1 explosive
materials may be packaged in accordance with Sec.  173.66 of this
subchapter. However, these materials would be permitted to be
transported on the same vehicle with Division 5.1 oxidizing materials,
or Class 8 corrosive materials, and/or Class 3 combustible liquid,
n.o.s., NA1993 only under the conditions and requirements set forth in
IME Standard 23 (IBR, see Sec.  171.7 of this subchapter) and paragraph
(g) of this section (Sec.  177.835).

VII. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking

    This final rule is published under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
5103(b), which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe
regulations for the safe transportation, including security, of
hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce. The
49 U.S.C. 5117(a) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue a
special permit from a regulation prescribed in 5103(b), 5104, 5110, or
5112 of the Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Law to a person
transporting, or causing to be transported, hazardous material in a way
that achieves a safety level at least equal to the safety level
required under the law, or consistent with the public interest, if a
required safety level does not exist. The final rule amends the
regulations by incorporating IME Standard 23 and provisions from
certain widely-used longstanding special permits that have established
a history of safety and which may, therefore, be converted into the
regulations for general use.

B. Executive Order 13610, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 12866,
and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This final rule is not considered a significant regulatory action
under Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and
Review''), as supplemented and reaffirmed by E.O. 13563 (``Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review''), stressing that, to the extent
permitted by law, an agency rulemaking action must be based on benefits
that justify its costs, impose the least burden, consider cumulative
burdens, maximize benefits, use performance objectives, and assess
available alternatives, and the Regulatory Policies and Procedures of
the Department of Transportation (44 FR 11034). Both the preliminary
NPRM and the final rule regulatory impact assessments discussing the
benefits and costs of this action are available for review in the
public docket for this rulemaking (filed under ``PHMSA-2011-0345'' at
http://www.regulations.gov).
    Executive Order 13563 is supplemental to and reaffirms the
principles, structures, and definitions governing regulatory review
that were established in Executive Order 12866 Regulatory Planning and
Review of September 30, 1993. Executive Order 13563, issued January 18,
2011,\12\ notes that our nation's current regulatory system must not
only protect public health, welfare, safety, and our environment but
also promote economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job
creation.\13\ Further, this executive order urges government agencies
to consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain
flexibility and freedom of choice for the public. In addition, federal
agencies are asked to periodically review existing significant
regulations, retrospectively analyze rules that may be outmoded,
ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and modify,
streamline, expand, or repeal regulatory requirements in accordance
with what has been learned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf.
    \13\ See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/18/improving-regulation-and-regulatory-review-executive-order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Executive Order 13610, issued May 10, 2012, urges agencies to
conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether
they remain justified and whether they should be modified or
streamlined in light of changed circumstances, including the rise of
new technologies.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-14/pdf/2012-11798.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By building off of each other, these three Executive Orders require
agencies to regulate in the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to make a
``reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs,'' and to develop regulations that ``impose the least
burden on society.''
    In this final rule, PHMSA amends the HMR to incorporate
alternatives this agency has permitted under widely-used longstanding
special permits and competent authority approvals with established
safety records that we have determined meet the safety criteria for
inclusion in the HMR. Incorporation of IME Standard 23 into the
regulations of general applicability will provide

shippers and carriers with additional flexibility to comply with
established safety requirements, thereby reducing transportation costs
and increasing productivity. In addition, the final rule will reduce
the paperwork burden on industry and this agency resulting from putting
an end to the need for renewal applications for special permits. As
such, nine special permits with 221 grantees will no longer be needed.
Taken together, the provisions of this final rule will promote the
continued safe transportation of hazardous materials while reducing
transportation costs for the industry and administrative costs for the
agency.
    In accordance with the guidance provided by OMB Circular A-4 \15\
on the development of regulatory analysis as required under Section
6(a)(3)(c) of Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act,
and a variety of related authorities, the Final Rule regulatory impact
assessment addresses the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.

 Describes the need for the regulatory action
 Defines the baseline
 Sets the timeframe of analysis
 Identifies a range of regulatory alternatives
 Identifies the consequences of regulatory alternatives
 Quantifies and monetizes the benefits and costs or
evaluates non-quantified costs and benefits
 Discounts future benefits and costs

    This analysis discusses the individual (requirement area by
requirement area) costs and benefits. The remainder of this section
presents an overview of the factors considered for the analysis in
accordance with OMB guidelines. As this is the regulatory analysis for
the final rule, only the alternative adopted is analyzed.
1. Need for the Regulatory Action
    Our agency's mission is to protect people and the environment from
the risks of hazardous materials transportation. To do this, PHMSA
establishes national policy; sets and enforces standards, educates, and
conducts research to prevent incidents; and prepares the public and
first responders to reduce consequences if an incident does occur.
    PHMSA's vision is that no harm results from the transportation of
hazardous materials, and it is committed to reducing the risk of harm
to people and the environment resulting from the transportation of
hazardous materials. PHMSA does not accept death as an inevitable
consequence of transporting hazardous materials and works continuously
to find new ways to reduce risk of death, injury, environmental and
property damage, and transportation disruptions.
    This rulemaking action is necessary to provide regulatory
flexibility and eliminate the need for future renewal requests, thus
reducing paperwork burdens and facilitating commerce while maintaining
an appropriate level of safety. The final rule would be beneficial to
stakeholders by reducing paperwork and providing regulatory flexibility
for industry; reducing administrative costs for the Federal Government
while maintaining an appropriate level of safety; and facilitating
commerce.
    This rulemaking adopts a combination of features including
incorporating into the HMR by reference IME Standard 23, and complying
with certain NHTSA requirements. PHMSA believes this final rule will
benefit both the public and the industry, as it will:

 Eliminate the need for firms to apply individually for the
transportation of certain classes of bulk materials in CTMVs
 Provide regulatory flexibility and relief while maintaining
a high level of safety
 Promote safer transportation practices
 Facilitate commerce
 Reduce paperwork burdens
 Protect the public health, welfare, safety, and environment
 Eliminate unnecessary regulatory requirements

    Finally, with this rulemaking amending the HMR by incorporating IME
Standard 23, the majority of provisions from nine special permits will
be incorporated since those permits were used as the basis to create
IME Standard 23.
2. Baseline
    Explosives are used for many purposes. According to the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, explosives are used ``in
areas such as mining, oil and gas exploration; demolition; avalanche
control; and the use of explosives in special industrial tools, fire
extinguishers, air bag inflators, fireworks; and specials effects in
the entertainment industry.'' \16\ The largest user is the mining
industry, where coal mining alone accounts for 67 percent of total U.S.
explosives consumption.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
Explosives Industry. Retrieved from http://www.nibin.gov/content/Explosives/explosives-industry.
    \17\ GlobalSecurity.org. Explosives--Mining Types. Retrieved
from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/explosives-mining1.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Bulk explosives are transported by MBTs and Articulated Cargo Tank
Vehicles (ACTVs). According to IME, there are approximately 1,500 MBTs
on highways in any given year.\18\ These trucks make, on average,
350,000 trips covering tens of millions of miles. The average truck
payload is 12.5 tons.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.
    \19\ Supplemental comments from the Institute of Makers of
Explosives on PHMSA HM-233D Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Retrieved
from http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2011-0345-
0010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The IME estimates are confirmed by the information in the Commodity
Flow Survey (CFS) published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
and the U.S. Census Bureau.\20\ The most recent CFS shows the value,
amount, and hazardous materials weight-distance traveled by truck
(referred to as ``ton-miles'') for shipments of Hazard Class 1, Hazard
Class 5, and Hazard Class 8 commodities considered under this analysis
(see Table 3).\21\ CTMVs transported 8.2 million tons of commodities
worth $8.1 billion more than 1.7 billion ton-miles in 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Bureau of Transportations Statistics, & U.S. Census Bureau.
2012 Commodity Flow Survey. Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/econ/cfs/.
    \21\ Includes: UN2790, UN2067, UN3375, NA0331, UN2426, UN1942,
UN0349, UN0042, UN0065, UN0289, UN3265, UN0361, UN0500, UN0030,
UN0255, UN0456, UN0455, UN0081, UN0331, UN0241, UN0332, UN1791,
UN3219, UN3139, and UN1479. UN0360 was not included due to a request
by IME to remove this commodity from consideration. NA1993 is a
Class 3 commodity that was not included either. This gives an
underestimate of the total values, which is counterbalanced by the
fact that not all shipments of the above commodities will be subject
to HM-233D.

  Table 3--Hazardous Material Shipped by Private and For-Hire Trucks by Hazard Class in the United States \22\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Value 2012       Tons 2012    Ton-miles 2012   Average miles
                  Hazard class                      (million $)     (thousands)      (millions)    per shipment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard Class 1, Explosives......................           5,282           3,225             535             166
Hazard Class 5, Oxidizers and Organic Peroxides.           1,651           4,471             998             223
Hazard Class 8, Corrosive Materials.............           1,215             547             200             366
    Total.......................................           8,148           8,243           1,733             210
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 2012 CFS Hazardous Materials tables.

    On average, trucks travel 210 miles per shipment, which falls
inside the 200-500 mile range in the Federal Highway Administration's
(FHWA) Freight Facts and Figures 2011. Trucks in the 200-500 mile range
average 76,000 miles of travel a year.\23\ With an average load of 12.5
tons, each CTMV accounts for 950,000 ton-miles annually (76,000 miles *
12.5 tons). Therefore, we estimate that there were 1,824 CTMVs in 2012
(1.7 billion ton-miles/950,000 ton-miles).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Some commodities subject to HM-233D were not listed in the
2012 CFS, and other HM-233D subject commodities with missing values
were filled by sharing out the residual for the aggregate hazard
class.
    \23\ FHWA. Freight Facts and Figures 2011, Table 3-7. Retrieved
from http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/freight_analysis/nat_freight_stats/docs/11factsfigures/table3_7.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three of the commodities (UN0331/NA0331, UN0332, and UN3375) with
an annual ton-mileage of 539 million were transported by both ACTVs and
MBTs,\24\ while the remaining commodities were transported by MBT only.
Therefore, commodities UN0331/NA0331, UN0332, and UN3375 are the only
impacted commodities not exclusively transported by MBT. Sharing out
the ton-miles equally between ACTVs and MBTs for those three
commodities results in an ACTV population estimate of 284 ((0.5 * 539
million ton-miles)/950,000 ton-miles per CTMV). We estimate that there
are 1,540 MBTs (1,824 CTMVs--284 ACTVs), which is close to IME's 1,500
estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ IME Standard 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimates derived from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) Motor Carrier Management Information System
(MCMIS) Catalog can confirm the 2012 CFS estimate of 1,824 trucks.\25\
MCMIS data from 2015 show that firms that transport explosives and
oxidizers have the following number of hazardous material vehicles in
their fleet: \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ FMCSA. Online safety data resources. Retrieved from http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety/research-and-analysis/online-safety-data-resources.
    \26\ The census identifies those trucks that transport hazardous
materials in quantities large enough to require a placard under the
HMR at 49 CFR 177.823.

 19 percent of the firms transporting hazardous materials
have 1 vehicle in their fleet
 34 percent have between 2 and 5 vehicles
 11 percent have between 6 and 9 vehicles
 15 percent have between 10 and 24 vehicles
 13 percent have between 25 and 99 vehicles
 8 percent have 100 vehicles or more

    PHMSA data detailing the applications for the special permits show
that 100 firms were involved in obtaining permits for the nine special
permits referred to above.\27\ All were applications for renewals,
party-to status, or modifications. By sharing the 100 firms using the
percentages from MCMIS data, we can assume that the 100 firms have the
number of vehicles in the fleet as illustrated in the following Table
4:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Accessed and downloaded for the nine special permits
impacted by HM-233D in May 2015 (http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/regs/sp-a/special-permits/search).
    \28\ For the ``High Estimate'' to the firms having 100 or more
vehicles, PHMSA approximated 125 vehicles in order to estimate a
plausible range.

                                          Table 4--CTMV Fleet Estimates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of          Number of
                                              MCMIS-based estimate of the    vehicles in the    vehicles in the
              Number of firms                 number of vehicles per firm       fleet--low        fleet--high
                                                                                estimate           estimate
A                                            B............................          C = A * B          D = A * B
                                                                                [lower bound]      [upper bound]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19.........................................  1............................                 19                 19
34.........................................  2 to 5.......................                 68                170
11.........................................  6 to 9.......................                 66                 99
15.........................................  10 to 24.....................                150                360
13.........................................  25 to 99.....................                325               1287
8..........................................  100 or more \28\.............                800               1000
                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................................  .............................              1,428              2,935
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If we assume that 100 firms use the special permits under
consideration, the fleet of vehicles transporting the classes of
hazardous materials that are under these special permits has
approximately between 1,428 and 2,935 vehicles. The estimate of 1,824
CTMVs falls into this range.
    Incidents associated with the transportation of explosives. Based
on analysis of the incident data from 2005 through 2014 that are
associated with the special permits under consideration, the
transportation of bulk explosives that were granted special permits do
not have a high rate of accidents, especially considering the number of
trips completed and the miles driven per year. According to PHMSA
incident data from 2005 through 2014, there were

43 incidents associated with the nine special permits considered in
this analysis.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Over the past 10 years, there have been 43 reported
transportation incidents in the U.S. involving multipurpose bulk
trucks. During this same period, there has never been a death or
major injury attributed to the hazardous materials while in
transportation when there was compliance with the regulations. While
there has been 1 incident that resulted in a fatality in that 10
year period, it involved a vehicular crash and human error, and was
not attributed to the transportation of the hazardous materials
themselves. Overall most incidents (90 percent) resulted in
spillage; fewer incidents resulted in vapor dispersion (3 percent),
environmental damage (0.5 percent), fire (0.5 percent), waterway
infringement (0.4 percent), and explosion (0.1 percent.) Most of the
time, the closures or covers in portable tanks failed, causing
leaks. Detailed hazardous materials incident reports for hazardous
materials incidents specified in Sec.  171.16 may be found at the
PHMSA Web site at the following URL: https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Search.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Risks from incidents. The risks to the public and/or the
environment from the transportation of explosives are difficult to
estimate because there are few incidents. A FMCSA report on cargo tank
rollovers notes CTMVs are less prone to rollover than similar
vehicles.\30\ The report estimates a rollover rate of 0.34 rollovers
per million miles traveled for vehicles with a lower center of gravity
(similar to CTMVs) and 0.39 rollovers per million miles for nominal
vehicles. Vehicles with a center of gravity height and wheel width
similar to those of CTMVs (e.g., those with a lower center of gravity)
may experience 87 rollovers, while vehicles with a higher center of
gravity wheel height and wheel width (e.g., nominal vehicles)
experience 100 rollovers.\31\ Incidents associated with vehicles
covered by the special permits included in this analysis are rare. In
fact, according to a DOT study on intermodal explosives, the authors
noted, ``The risk of transporting explosives by highway compares
favorably with transportation of other hazardous materials.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ FMCSA. (2007). Cargo tank roll stability study: Final
report. Washington, DC: Battelle. Retrieved August 6, 2015, from
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Cargo%20Tank%20Roll%20Stability%20Study%20Final%20Report%20April%202007.pdf.
    \31\ FMCSA. (2007). Cargo tank roll stability study: Final
report. Washington, DC: Battelle. Retrieved August 6, 2015, from
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Cargo%20Tank%20Roll%20Stability%20Study%20Final%20Report%20April%202007.pdf.
    \32\ DOT. (2003, February). Intermodal explosives working group
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For transporting explosives safely, the United Nations devised a
``Hazard Divisions classification system.'' \33\ The hazardous
materials considered under this final rule are Class 5 Oxidizers,\34\
Class 8 Corrosive substances, other combustible explosives (not
elsewhere classified), and Class 1 explosives that are categorized into
six different divisions that indicate their main hazard
characteristics. The Class 1 divisions and their main hazard
characteristics are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Retrieved June 18, 2012, from http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/docs/IATG01.50-UN_Explosive_Classification_System_and_Codes(V.1).pdf.
    \34\ These are not technically explosives but can explode under
certain circumstances.

 Division 1.1 for explosives with mass explosion hazard
 Division 1.2 for explosives with a projection hazard
 Division 1.3 for explosives with a fire hazard
 Division 1.4 for explosives with no significant explosion,
projection, or fire hazard
 Division 1.5 for explosives with a mass explosion hazard
but are so insensitive, there is very low probability of initiation
or of transition from burning to detonation under normal transport
conditions
 Division 1.6 for extremely insensitive articles that do not
have a mass explosive hazard. This division is composed of articles
that contain only extremely insensitive detonating substances and
that demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental initiation
or propagation

    The transport of industrial explosives in some instances can
increase the risk of death, injury, product loss, and property and
environmental damage.
    Impact on the local economy and community resources: Incidents that
cause fires, explosions, road closures, evacuations, or other such
events have the potential to increase the demand for community
resources. There is typically an increased demand for assistance from
first responders and firefighters to control fires, and from police and
other law enforcement personnel to control traffic and assist in
possible evacuations. These releases may also prompt demand for
services from engineers or other public workers to address utility and
infrastructure problems. Releases can cause business interruptions or
loss of fuel supplies, such as natural gas, gasoline, and home heating
oil. Although the potential for releases to cause displacement of
populations near or around fires or explosions is remote, these
releases could cause the need for permanent or temporary shelter,
putting more strain on community resources. Combined effects on
businesses, transportation, and other economic resources can exacerbate
response and recovery issues.
    Impact on the environment: Spills and releases can cause
environmental damage, impact wildlife, and contaminate drinking water
supplies.
    Health hazards: Releases, depending on their mode and severity, can
cause many health hazards, including toxicity, dizziness, asphyxiation,
irritation, and burns. Accidents and incidents have commanded attention
from Congress, stakeholders, constituents, and environmental groups.
    Factors contributing to failures. Many factors can contribute to
failures. Of the 43 incidents reported to PHMSA from 2005 through 2014
involving the nine special permits in the rulemaking, 12 incidents
involved one or more vehicles crashing and 14 involved vehicle
rollovers (see Table 5). Other factors included human error and loose
closure components. This was out of the 34 incidents for which the
factors of failure were recorded, while for the other nine incidents,
factors of failure were either not applicable or not recorded. There
was spillage in 32 recorded incidents involving at least one hazardous
material, and six incidents affected the environment. There were no
injuries, fatalities, or hospitalizations related to hazardous
materials. There were two fatalities, one of which was related to a
rollover accident while the other was of an unknown cause.
    Each incident report includes data on up to three parts that
failed, how they failed, and the cause of failure(s) for each hazardous
material. In total, data was recorded for 35 incidents on the parts
that failed and for 35 incidents on how they failed. The part that
failed most frequently was the closure or cover. Leaking or torn off/
damaged closures were the most common methods of failure. In eight
incidents, the description of how they failed was not recorded or not
applicable, and in eight incidents, failure of parts was not recorded
or not applicable.

          Table 5--Factors Contributing to Failures, 2005-2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Number of
           Factors of failures               incidents      Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover accident.......................              14           41.18
Vehicular crash or accident damage......              12           35.29
Loose closure component.................               2            5.88
Human error.............................               2            5.88
Other \35\..............................               4           11.76
                                         -------------------------------
    Total...............................              34          100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: PHMSA Incident Reports Database.\36\

           Table 6--Parts Contributing to Failures, 2005-2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Number of
              Parts failed                   incidents      Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cover/body/closure......................              20           57.14
Discharge valve or coupling.............               4           11.43
Vent....................................               4           11.43
Hose adaptor or coupling................               2            5.71
                                         -------------------------------
Other \37\..............................               5           14.28
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: PHMSA Incident Reports Database.\38\

                    Table 7--How It Failed, 2005-2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Number of
               How failed                    incidents      Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leaked..................................              13           37.14
Torn off or damaged.....................              11           31.42
Burst or ruptured.......................               4           11.43
Ripped or torn..........................               2            5.71
Vented..................................               2            5.71
Other \39\..............................               3            8.57
                                         -------------------------------
    Total...............................              35          100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: PHMSA Incident Reports Database.\40\

3. Timeframe for the Analysis
    PHMSA estimates that the economic effects of this rulemaking, once
finalized and adopted, will be sustained for many years into the
future. Notwithstanding this, because of the difficulty of and
uncertainty associated with forecasting industry effects into the far
future, PHMSA assumes a 10-year period to quantify and monetize the
costs and benefits and demonstrate net effects of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ All other factors--including corrosion, deterioration or
aging, and dropped or misaligned material component/device--had 1
incident out of the 34 incidents (2.94 percent).
    \36\ https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Welcome.aspx.
    \37\ All other parts--including bottom outlet valves, hoses,
liquid valves, manway or dome covers/gaskets, and tank shells--had 1
incident out of 35 incidents (2.86 percent).
    \38\ https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Welcome.aspx.
    \39\ All other factors including structural, failed to operate,
and cracked had 1 incident out of 35 incidents (2.86 percent).
    \40\ https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Welcome.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Calculating Costs and Benefits
    Costs to the public and PHMSA accrue from the requirements set
forth in the regulations and the enforcement methods and procedures
adopted to carry out the objectives of the rules and regulations.
Examples of costs include (but are not limited to) goods and services
required to comply with the regulation; measures of productivity, such
as losses related to work time; incident-related death, illness, or
disability; and payments to standard-setting organizations for the
standards.
    Typically, the benefits of rules are derived from health and safety
factors. Since the federal regulatory agencies often design regulations
to reduce risks to life, evaluation of the benefits of reducing
fatality risks can be the key part of the analysis. In this case, the
societal costs (e.g., death, injuries, property damage, other losses)
are minimal, since there are no deaths or injuries. The societal costs
in this analysis are derived solely from property damage and other
losses associated with the incidents. Most of the benefits from the
rule will be related to cost savings. Examples of benefits in the form
of reduced expenditures include (but are not limited to) private-sector
savings, government administrative savings, gains in work time, and
reduced costs of compliance.
5. Societal Costs and Potential Benefits
    The value of lives saved, injuries prevented, and property damage
avoided serve as the basis for calculating societal costs, which in
turn represent the potential benefits of a regulation. To determine the
cost to society of incidents, we use pertinent historical incident
data.
    According to PHMSA incident data from 2005 through 2014, there were
43 incidents associated with the nine special permits being considered
in this analysis, including two vehicular crash fatalities that were
not hazardous material related. PHMSA does not include the incidents
that were deemed

not related to hazardous materials in the calculation of societal
costs. For this analysis, the societal costs and potential benefits
accrue from the material loss, carrier damage, property damage, and
remediation costs (heretofore referred to as damages and losses). Table
8 lays out the damages and losses (over a 10-year period) related to
the nine special permits under consideration.

     Table 8--Value of Material Loss, Carrier Damages, Property Damages, Response, and Cleanup Costs Related to the Nine Special Permits, 2005-2014
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Carrier        Property
                                                           Material loss      damage          damage       Response cost   Cleanup cost      All costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total amount reported...................................        $314,504      $3,894,903         $94,667        $321,256        $286,286      $4,911,616
Average amount per year.................................          31,450         389,490           9,466          32,125          28,928         491,162
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: PHMSA Incident Reports Database.\41\

    The total annual societal costs (potential benefits), associated
damages, and losses for the nine special permits being considered under
this analysis are approximately $491,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Welcome.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Summary of Comments Relating to Costs and Benefits Estimates
    For the HM-233D NPRM, PHMSA received two sets of comments from IME
and one set of comments from R&R.42 43 Comments relevant to
the preliminary NPRM RIA included comments on the FSSs and EBDDs
requirements of the proposed rule as well as comments concerning the
differences between MBTs and ACTVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Retrieved from http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=PHMSA-2011-0345.
    \43\ Other comments received from the Dangerous Goods Advisory
Council and the Council on Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles
are supportive of the rulemaking and IME's comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comments related to FSSs. In their comments dated September 11,
2014, and November 21, 2014, IME outlined arguments against including a
FSS requirement in the HM-233D rulemaking. IME stated that MBTs, which
are subject to the FSS requirement in the proposed rule, have a proven
safety record and that they would not want their MBTs to be the
``guinea pigs'' for field testing the FSS technology. Further, IME
stated that there have been no deaths or serious injuries attributable
to hazardous materials carried on MBTs since the technology was
introduced in the 1970s and that the safety benefits of FSS may be
negligible, as there is no guarantee that a FSS will be operational
after a crash. Also, IME Standard 23 already requires MBTs to be
equipped with two fire extinguishers with an Underwriters' Laboratories
(UL) rating of at least 4-A:40-B:C, stronger than the current
requirement of one fire extinguisher with a UL rating of 10B:C.
Finally, IME stated that consequently, Nobel Insurance Services, the
largest insurer of MBTs in the U.S., told IME that adding FSSs to MBTs
would not have an effect on rates because there would be no significant
loss of experience.
    Regarding the implementation of the FSS requirement in Canada, IME
notes that it is not correct to represent Canadian industry as
``supporting'' this standard; the FSS standard was imposed by NRCan
through its Mobile Process Unit permit system and did not include the
industry in the process.\44\ Furthermore, IME states the PHMSA FSS
requirement is different from the NRCan standard. In Canada, pre-
engineered FSS technology is permitted, while the PHMSA standard does
not permit this type of technology and the standard requires vehicle-
specific designs that have already been certified by a DCE, including
physical testing or engineering analysis. IME states that unlike the
NRCan standard, PHMSA also requires periodic inspections and detailed
recordkeeping and retention requirements. Ultimately, given the lack of
incident data to show that FSSs would increase safety commensurate with
the cost, IME does not support the NRCan FSS standard or the more
onerous PHMSA FSS proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ A Mobile Process Unit is the Canadian equivalent of a MBT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimating the costs based off the NRCan requirement, IME reports
that installation costs of FSSs in Canada are between $4,000 and
$6,000, which does not include periodic maintenance, testing
requirements, or recordkeeping. IME states each FSS would add 300-500
pounds of weight to the vehicle, and a typical payload of an MBT is
25,000 pounds, and a new MBT ranges from $250,000 to $500,000.
Therefore, IME states an NRCan-type FSS would reduce payload between
1.2 percent and 2 percent, and the cost of a new MBT would increase by
1.2 percent to 1.6 percent. Periodic inspections cost an average of
$800 in remote areas and $150 in more populated areas.
    IME questioned if PHMSA has the jurisdiction to impose a truck
safety standard on MBTs or any motor vehicle. Congress delegated PHMSA
with the authority to develop regulations and standards for packaging
to ensure the safe transportation of hazardous materials, while NHTSA
has the authority to set safety performance standards for motor
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, per 49 U.S.C. chapter 301.
    Comments related to EBDDs. In comments dated September 11, 2014,
IME agreed that in a final rule, the EBDD standard should apply only to
newly constructed or modified MBTs. IME, however, did not believe that
the proposal for a requirement of three EBDDs was justified. MBTs are
already required to have a manual EBDD in addition to the ignition
switch, a requirement that no other specialized vehicle has. Moreover,
PHMSA acknowledged that no death or major injury has been attributed to
hazardous materials carried by MBTs,\45\ which is a record that cannot
be matched by other bulk hazardous materials that are sensitive to
electric charge. IME was unaware of any instance where an emergency has
warranted the use of EBDDs, irrespective of the consequence. IME states
the battery cable is cut by emergency responders as they are trained to
do, and that the cost of training all emergency responders is not
included in PHMSA's cost calculation. Finally, IME states these costs
would be significant given there are more than 1 million firefighters
in the U.S., and more than 70 percent of fire departments are
volunteer-based, with relatively high rates of turnover. The proposed
standard for EBDDs is inconsistent with Canada's standard requirements.
IME would support an EBDD requirement that harmonizes with the Canadian
EBDD standard.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 79 FR 41188 (July 15, 2014), FN 2.
    \46\ NRCan. (2011, September). Requirements for Bulk Mobile
Process Units. pp. 11.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comments on MBT and ACTV differences. In the comments submitted on
September 15, 2014, R&R argued for a clearer distinction in the
rulemaking between cargo tank motor vehicles transporting single bulk
hazardous materials (e.g., ACTVs) and MBTs. Regarding commodity
transportation, ACTVs transport single bulk hazardous materials for
blasting while MBTs transport multiple hazardous materials for blasting
in bulk and non-bulk packaging. In IME Standard 23, IME clarifies the
distinction by having two separate sections for the two types of
vehicles and transports. Further, although Special Provision 148 makes
this distinction, Sec.  173.66 is not clear in this distinction because
it only refers to bulk packaging and not to the type of transport.
According to R&R, this portion should refer back to Sections 1 and 2 of
IME Standard 23 for the standards for transporting a single bulk
hazardous material for blasting by cargo tank motor vehicle and for
MBTs capable of transporting multiple hazardous materials for blasting
in bulk and non-bulk packaging, respectively. Furthermore, R&R
requested clarification on the status of UN3375 ammonium nitrate (AN)
emulsion, 5.1 oxidizer, an explosive precursor. If ``these materials''
refer back to Class 1 explosive materials, UN3375 is not included in
the authorization to transport in bulk without a special permit, and
therefore, R&R states that clarification is needed on the status of
UN3375.
    Comments summary. IME strongly opposed including the FSS
requirement in the HM-233D rulemaking and provided numerous arguments
and data to back up their point of view. Consequently, PHMSA decided
not to include the FSS requirement in the final rule. Therefore,
discussion of it is not a cost or benefit component of the Final Rule
RIA, and costs estimates of the FSS--taking comment input into
account--are outlined in Appendix A of the Final Rule regulatory
analysis in the docket.
    IME also opposed the specifics of the EBDD requirement in the HM-
233D rulemaking, stating that they would support an EBDD requirement
that harmonizes with the Canadian standard. As IME Standard 23 already
includes an EBDD requirement, PHMSA decided to remove this requirement
from the final rule as well. Therefore, discussion of this is not
included in the Final Rule regulatory analysis in the docket.
    R&R argued for clarifications to be made to the HM-233D rulemaking,
in particular, to draw a clearer delineation between ACTVs and MBTs.
PHMSA incorporated these clarifications into their rulemaking, and the
Final Rule regulatory analysis in the docket was updated to make a
clearer distinction between ACTVs and MBTs.
7. The Final Rule
a. Definition of the Scope and Parameters of the Analysis
    PHMSA is amending the HMR by establishing standards for the safe
transportation of bulk explosives. This rulemaking is responsive to two
petitions for rulemaking submitted by industry representatives: P-1557,
concerning the continued use of renewal applications, and P-1583,
concerning the incorporation by reference into the HMR of an industry
standard publication. Further, developing these requirements would
provide wider access to the regulatory flexibility currently only
offered by special permits and competent authorities.
    By implementing these requirements, PHMSA will be mirroring the
majority of provisions contained in nine widely-used longstanding
special permits that have established safety records.

     The driver qualification and training program audits
text in IME Standard 23 (page 14) mirrors that of DOT-SP 10751 (page
4), DOT-SP 11579 (page 7), and DOT-SP 12677 (page 5). This text
covers the driver's license, endorsement, and training requirements
for drivers transporting explosive materials. Similar text also
appears in IME Standard 23 Section 1.
     The packaging requirements for transport of Division
1.5 and Division 5.1 hazardous materials in IME Standard 23 (pages
12-13) excerpts text from DOT-SP 10751 (page 3), DOT-SP 11579 (page
4), and DOT-SP 12677 (page 3).
     IME Standard 23 (page 13) outlines the operational
controls dealing with carriage restrictions, the placement of
materials and containers inside cargo tanks, and the handling and
maintenance of cargo tanks. These are mirrored in DOT-SP 12677 (page
4), DOT-SP 10751 (page 3), and DOT-SP 11579 (page 6).
     Tire specification and tire pressure monitoring
standards in IME Standard 23 (page 14) are mirrored in DOT-SP 12677
in (pages 6-7). Tire specification requirements stipulate that the
tire be no more than six years old and outline the minimum tread
depth of both the steering axle and other tires. Tire pressure
standards describe when they should be replaced and when tire
pressure should be measured. However, text specifying the frequency
of tire pressure checks in the special permits is not equivalent to
that in IME Standard 23.
     Emergency battery disconnect standards covered in IME
Standard 23 (page 15) are covered in DOT SP-12677 (page 8) and DOT
SP-11579 (page 10). Stipulations include that the switch needs to be
located 24 inches from the battery terminal, and each switch must be
tested once per calendar month and be repaired in the event of
malfunction and failure.
     The emergency response, reporting, and training
provision in IME Standard 23 (page 15) is described in DOT-12677
(page 10) and DOT-11579 (page 12). This provision describes
procedures for reporting and investigation accidents. A slight
difference in reporting requirements between IME Standard 23 and the
special permits is that IME Standard 23 requires an incident report
forwarded to PHMSA within 45 days, while the special permits
stipulate that the incident report must be completed within 30 days
and then sent to PHMSA within 15 days of its completion.

    In this final rule, PHMSA is revising the HMR by amending the
regulations to establish standards for the safe transportation of bulk
explosives. These final rule requirements include the following:

     Incorporation of IME Standard 23 into the HMR. PHMSA
will incorporate IME Standard 23 and establish requirements of
general applicability governing the transportation of bulk explosive
materials. As such, PHMSA will revise the 49 CFR 171.7 material
incorporated by reference to include IME Standard 23, and establish
a new section for the bulk explosives requirements.
     Requirements for both existing CTMVs and new
construction of CTMVs, including modifications.

    By incorporating these requirements, PHMSA will be echoing the
majority of provisions contained in nine widely-used longstanding
special permits that have established safety records. These revisions
are intended to eliminate the need for future renewal requests, thus
reducing paperwork burdens and facilitating commerce while maintaining
an appropriate level of safety.
b. IME Standard 23
    IME Standard 23 recommends standards for MBT straight trucks that
typically transport multiple hazardous materials in support of blasting
operations and articulated cargo tanks that carry a single bulk
blasting agent or oxidizer. The analysis presented here mainly
addresses the costs and benefits associated with the operation of MBTs.
Where applicable, it also addresses the costs and benefits associated
with the operation of ACTVs.
    IME Standard 23 was developed with input from IME members,
stakeholders, and PHMSA. Federal agencies often incorporate standards,
especially if the standards do not compromise the level of safety.\47\
PHMSA typically incorporates non-consensus standards (as was the case
with the incorporation

of the rail special permits) \48\ through an NPRM that is published in
the Federal Register, providing the regulated community and the public
an opportunity to comment. This ensures transparency in the rulemaking
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ OMB Circular A119. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119/.
    \48\ For example, in June 2012, PHMSA published a final rule to
incorporate provisions contained in certain widely used or
longstanding rail special permits that have general applicability
and established safety records rail special permits into the HMR.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
foregoing the rule was previously approved by the Director of the
Federal Register on October 1, 2003, and March 16, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The adoption of IME Standard 23 in the HMR affords the following
advantages:

     IME Standard 23 is more comprehensive and has stricter
standards than the special permits, and it may eliminate some
duplicative functions, such as tire pressure inspections under
special permits, which are already included in Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance standards that FMCSA uses but have not incorporated
into the HMR. IME Standard 23 requires tire pressure checks before
each day at the start of the trip but does not require firms to
perform the tire pressure checks before each departure onto a public
road.
     IME Standard 23 has a provision that prevents caking of
AN into a solid mass.
     IME Standard 23 eliminates the need for special permits
and the need for renewals, party-to status, or modifications, thus
saving industry and agency resources because it lessens burdens
common to applying for and reviewing special permits.
     IME Standard 23 is explicit, unambiguous, targeted, and
simple to understand and follow.
    The major disadvantages are the following:
     Regulations may need to be reevaluated and changed at
appropriate intervals to keep pace with technological enhancements
and other matters. However, IME will perform this at no charge to
PHMSA. IME will also publish the revised standards free of charge to
the public.\49\
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    \49\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     PHMSA will not be evaluating the applicant firm's
fitness as it currently does in Phase 2 of the special permit
application process.
     PHMSA may have to invest more time on compliance
inspections.

c. Analysis of Costs
    Below is an analysis of costs associated with the various
provisions under IME Standard 23 that affect its incorporation into the
HMR.
    Costs associated with fire extinguishers. IME Standard 23 requires
a minimum of two fire extinguishers rated 4-A:40B:C for MBTs. Current
Federal regulations require a minimum of one fire extinguisher rated
10B:C. Fire extinguishers rated 4-A:40B:C are more powerful than 10B:C
fire extinguishers and can be used for more types of fires.\50\ IME
makes the following estimates: \51\
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    \50\ Portable fire extinguishers. Retrieved from http://www.ci.garden-grove.ca.us/fire/extinguishers.

    \51\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Fire extinguishers could be affixed in 8 hours.
     The cost for 2 fire extinguishers is approximately
$250.
     The labor costs for installing the fire extinguishers
are estimated at $280.
     The cost associated with the MBT downtime is
approximately $560.
     Approximately 25 percent of MBTs would need to acquire
and affix the extinguishers.

    Using IME data, we estimate that the cost to equip 385 MBTs (25
percent of the 1,540 MBTs in service) with fire extinguishers would be
approximately $419,650 (($250 for the fire extinguishers + $280 labor
costs + $560 vehicle downtime) * 385 MBTs). This would be a one-time
cost. There will be annual maintenance costs, but we believe these
costs will be negligible (somewhere between $0 and $5 per MBT over a
10-year period). Each vehicle should already have at least one fire
extinguisher on board per DOT regulations.\52\ IME estimates that the
fire extinguisher has a longer life than the MBT; therefore, we
estimate that there would be no annual costs to industry resulting from
this requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ FMCSA. Part 393: Parts and accessories necessary for safe
operation. Retrieved from http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/title49/section/393.95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costs associated with working pressure limits. IME Standard 23
limits the maximum allowable working pressure of an MBT cargo tank to
35 pounds per square inch. This measure is intended to help prevent a
buildup of pressure in the tank, which could result in a mass
detonation of the contents in a fire.\53\ IME estimates that most MBTs
already meet this standard and that, at most, 10 percent of the MBTs
(or 154 MBTs) would need a retrofit.\54\ According to IME, the cost of
retrofitting each MBT would be about $3,000.\55\ The cost to industry
to retrofit 154 MBTs would be approximately $462,000, a one-time cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ This does not have an effect on the capacity of an MBT.
    \54\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.
    \55\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costs associated with periodic tests and inspections of non-DOT
specification cargo tanks. IME Standard 23 requires that non-DOT
specification cargo tanks be inspected essentially in the same way as
specification tanks. This requires competence training of inspectors
and physical inspections as described in Appendix B of IME Standard 23.
IME estimates that 75 percent of the MBTs with non-specification tanks
are in substantial compliance with IME Standard 23 in this regard.
According to IME, the annual cost of performing inspections and testing
for noncompliant vehicles is approximately $3,500 per vehicle.\56\
Assuming that 25 percent of MBTs (or 385 vehicles) would need to
comply, the annual cost of complying is $1,347,500 (385 MBTs not in
compliance * $3,500 for inspection and tests per vehicle).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costs associated with the nameplate. IME Standard 23 requires that
a nameplate be affixed to the vehicle describing its design
characteristics. According to IME, virtually all MBTs will need a
retrofit, costing an average of about $125 per truck for a total cost
of $192,500 ($125 * 1,540 MBTs).\57\ This is a one-time cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costs associated with accident investigations. IME Standard 23
requires companies to provide PHMSA with an incident investigation
report of all CTMV crashes. This report may be an internal
investigation because: (1) Some companies are self-insured, and (2)
some insurance companies will not allow their reports to be released.
An independent accident investigation of a CTMV crash would be
conducted only if PHMSA requests it. IME estimates that this would be
necessary once a year under IME Standard 23. An independent accident
investigation of an MBT crash costs about $10,000.\58\ Therefore, the
annual cost associated with accident investigations would be $10,000
per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives. Similar inferences can be made for ACTVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costs associated with driver training after preventable accidents.
IME Standard 23 requires that drivers involved in preventable accidents
(as defined in 49 CFR 385.3) while operating a CTMV be retrained if the
driver remains employed by the motor carrier. The IME Standard 23
requirement is similar to the requirement in the current applicable
special permits, even though IME Standard 23 clarifies that the carrier
does not have a responsibility to

continue to employ the driver. Driver training costs are variable,
depending on the amount of training needed and required by the rule.
Truck driver courses cost about $5,000 per driver.\59\ As noted
earlier, there are on average approximately four incidents per year
under special permits. If the trend continues in future years under IME
Standard 23, the cost of driver training to the industry is expected to
be about $20,000 per year (4 * $5,000), providing the drivers are not
terminated; however, if the firm has to train new drivers, the cost is
expected to be the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ Professional Truck Driver Institute. Frequently asked
questions by prospective students, schools & the general public.
http://www.ptdi.org/errata/FAQs.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costs associated with maintaining and updating IME Standard 23. The
cost of standard development is spread among many standards that IME
makes available to the public. Some standards require more resources
than others do. IME estimates that the annual cost for maintaining and
updating IME Standard 23 is about $50,000. IME is prepared to bear the
cost of maintaining IME Standard 23 and updating it at no cost to
PHMSA, once it is incorporated into the HMR. This cost is included in
the total cost to industry; this is an ongoing expenditure that is an
integral part of industry's management and operation.
    Summary of all costs associated with the final rule. Incorporating
IME Standard 23 into the HMR will result in a one-time cost of
approximately $1.1 million and an annual cost of approximately $1.4
million. The following Table 9 details the expected costs:

              Table 9--Costs Associated With the Final Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Recurring
               Cost items                 One-time costs   annual costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire Extinguishers......................        $419,650              $0
Work Pressure Limit.....................         462,000               0
Periodic Inspections....................               0       1,347,500
Nameplate...............................         192,500               0
Accident Investigation..................               0          10,000
Driver Training.........................               0          20,000
Maintaining/Updating IME Standard 23....               0          50,000
                                         -------------------------------
    Total...............................       1,074,150       1,416,500
------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Analysis of Benefits
    The benefits associated with the final rule are the sum of the
benefits of incorporating IME Standard 23 into the HMR and any benefits
that may accrue from existing and new trucks meeting the additional
requirements described above. The annual benefits from the
incorporation of IME Standard 23 into the HMR are described below.
    Cost savings to industry from no longer having to apply for the
nine special permits. According to PHMSA data from May 2015, 305
requests for the nine special permits were submitted, with an average
life span of 3.132 years (approximately 97 [305 requests/3.132 years]
requests per year).\60\ There were no requests for new permits; all 305
were party-to special permits, modifications, or renewals. According to
IME, the industry spends approximately $825 for each renewal, party-to
status, or modification special permit request. Since none of the
applications involved new permits, the annual cost to industry would be
$80,025 (97 permit applications per year * $825).
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    \60\ Accessed and downloaded for the nine special permits
impacted by HM-233D in May 2015 from http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/regs/sp-a/special-permits/search.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Cost savings to PHMSA from no longer having to review and approve
applications for the nine Special Permits. PHMSA spends approximately
$414 per application.\61\ The annual total cost to PHMSA for the
application and review process is $40,158 ($414 per application * 97).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Estimate provided by the Special Permits and Approvals
Division via email on July 17, 2012.
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    Cost savings to industry associated with not having to check tire
pressure before each departure onto the public roads. The special
permits contain a requirement to check and record the pressure in each
tire before each regulated movement on a public road, while IME
Standard 23 contains a requirement to only check tire pressure before
the initial trip of the day, which would be part of a routine pre-trip
inspection and should not add any additional cost.\62\ For the
calculation of costs ensuing from the requirement to check tire
pressure before each departure onto public roads (based on information
from IME and using inferences for CTMVs), PHMSA assumes the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Santis, L. Cost analysis of SLP-23, special permits, and
Canadian standards for bulk trucks. Institute of Makers of
Explosives.

     Drivers of CTMVs earn approximately $35 per hour,
including overhead.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ According to the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) May 2014 occupational wage statistics for ``53-3032
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers,'' the mean hourly wage is
$20.16 per hour or $30.24 per hour, using a 50-percent overhead
factor. See: http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes533032.htm. The BLS
wage estimate is less than the IME estimate because the BLS estimate
includes drivers of all tractor trailers and trucks with a capacity
of 26,000 pounds. PHMSA is using IME's wage estimate for this cost
analysis because the IME wage estimate relates to MBT drivers
considered under this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Drivers perform work-related activities about 250 days
per year for approximately 14 hours for each of those 250 days. The
14-hour day consists of driving (which, under current U.S.
regulations, is restricted to 11 driving hours during a 14-hour
workday),\64\ non-driving (such as loading, unloading, performing
required tire checks, and doing paperwork), and rest breaks.
According to a DOT study, commercial motor vehicle drivers spend
approximately 66 percent of their workday driving; 23 percent
performing non-driving activities; and the remaining 11 percent
resting, eating, and sleeping while on duty.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ DOT. (2013, July 1). New hours-of-service safety
regulations to reduce truck drive fatigue begin today [Press
release]. Retrieved from http://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/new-hours-service-safety-regulations-reduce-truck-driver-fatigue-begin-today.
    \65\ Blanco, M., Hanowski, R.J., Olson, R.L., Morgan, J.F.,
Soccolich, S.A., Wu, S., & Guo, F. (2011, May). The impact of
driving, non-driving work, and rest breaks on driving performance in
commercial motor vehicle operations. Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University & FMCSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In 2014, a gallon of diesel fuel cost $3.83.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2015, August).
Weekly retail gasoline and diesel prices. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_dcus_nus_a.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The cost per day to operate a CTMV in compliance with
special permits is $560.
     Checking tire pressure takes approximately 30 minutes
per day, according to an IME estimate. PHMSA believes this

may be an overestimation but has included it in the absence of an
alternative value.

    Under the assumptions above, the cost per year for the tire checks
is approximately $4,375 per year per CTMV ($35 driver wage per hour of
work * 0.5 hours per tire pressure check * 250 work days/year).
    Vehicles idle during the tire check, and PHMSA estimates that they
consume 1 gallon of fuel per hour. The fuel costs per year per vehicle
are $479 ($3.83 per gallon of diesel * 0.5 hours per tire pressure
check * 250 workdays).
    Additionally, the industry estimates that the daily time needed to
check tire pressure (i.e., 30 minutes per day) translates to a lost
time equivalent of approximately 0.036 workdays (0.5 hours per day/14-
hour workday). Thus, the lost productive time of CTMVs costs $5,040
(0.036 lost time per workday * 250 workdays/year * $560 to operate a
CTMV per day) per year. See the following Table 10:

                     Table 10--Annual Costs per Vehicle Associated With Tire Pressure Checks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Labor cost per   Fuel cost per    CTMV downtime     Total annual
       Average amount of time per day          year per CTMV    year per CTMV       per year      cost per CTMV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 minutes..................................          $4,375             $479           $5,040           $9,894
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The annual cost per vehicle associated with the tire-pressure check
requirement is $9,894, which is an annual cost to industry from the
tire pressure test requirement of approximately $18,046,656 ($9,894
total cost per vehicle per year * 1,824 CTMVs).
    Cost savings to industry from reduced caking incidence. There is a
savings from the IME Standard 23 requirement relating to caking. If
left sitting for several days, ammonium nitrate (AN) can absorb
moisture from the air, allowing it to cake into a solid mass that is