adopt viable alternative processing technologies, system safeguards, or
process modifications to make new and existing processes and operations
inherently safer.'' \40\ Additionally, the structure of the
applicability provisions of the RMP rule, with TQs, encourages
minimizing the presence of regulated substances in processes. Thus,
EPA's historic approach to safer technology and alternatives under CAA
section 112(r) has encouraged many chemical plant operators to
introduce safer technology and alternatives to help reduce the overall
risk of their facilities but has not mandated their use or analysis. As
we noted in the preamble to the 1996 final RMP rule, ``Application of
good PHA techniques often reveals opportunities for continuous
improvement of existing processes and operations without a separate
analysis of alternatives'' (61 FR 31674, June 20, 1996). In addition,
in CAA Section 112(r) enforcement cases, facilities have occasionally
entered into consent agreements involving implementation of safer
alternatives. As a result of the Executive Order 13650 Report for the
President,\41\ EPA and other agencies will be considering various
additional actions related to safer technologies and alternatives.
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    \38\ In this document, ``safer technology and alternatives''
refer to risk reduction strategies developed through an analysis
using a hierarchy of controls.
    \39\ http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/gdcregionalguidance.pdf.
    \40\ See 61 FR 31700.
    \41\ Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group,
Executive Order 13650 Report to the President--Actions to Improve
Chemical Facility Safety and Security--A Shared Commitment, May
2014; https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.
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    In July of 2012, a coalition representing 54 organizations and
individuals petitioned EPA to use its rulemaking authority under CAA
section 112(r)(7)(A), ``to require the use of inherently safer
technologies, where feasible, by facilities that use or store hazardous
chemicals.'' The petitioners also requested that ``pending completion
of a rulemaking under section CAA 112(r)(7)(A), EPA revise its guidance
concerning the enforcement of the Clean Air Act's general duty clause,
section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(1), to make clear that the duty to
prevent releases of extremely hazardous substances includes the use,
where feasible, of safer technologies to minimize the presence and
possible release of hazardous chemicals.''\42\ While EPA shares the
petitioner's goal of preventing hazardous chemical releases and
minimizing their risk to communities, the Agency requests additional
information on possible approaches to promoting risk reduction through
safer technology and alternatives.
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    \42\ https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/404584-petition-to-epa-to-prevent-chem-disasters-filed.html, at 10.
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    A July 2010 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report prepared
by CCPS \43\ described inherently safer technology (IST) as a
philosophy and an iterative process, including eliminating a hazard,
reducing a hazard, substituting a less hazardous material, using less
hazardous process conditions, and designing a process to reduce the
potential for, or consequences of, human error, equipment failure, or
intentional harm. It stated that there is no clear boundary between IST
and other strategies, that ISTs are relative and can only be described
as inherently safer when compared to a different technology, including
a description of the hazard or set of hazards being considered, their
location, and the potentially affected population. Because an option
may be inherently safer with regard to some hazards and inherently less
safe with regard to others, the decision process must consider the
entire life cycle, the full spectrum of hazards and risks, and the
potential for transfer of risk from one impacted population to another.
This report also noted that there is currently no consensus on either a
quantification method for IST or a scientific assessment method for
evaluation of IST options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ CCPS Final Report: Definition for Inherently Safer
Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use, July
2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CCPS has also published a guideline book \44\ intended to
provide

tools and guidance on approaches to implementing inherent safety. Among
other information, the book contains an extensive checklist intended to
assist industrial facilities with reviewing existing hazards and their
safeguards, evaluating the feasibility of inherently safer
alternatives, and documenting the results of this analysis.
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    \44\ American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for
Chemical Process Safety, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life
Cycle Approach, Second Edition, New York, Wiley, 2009.
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    A 2012 National Academy of Sciences report \45\ found that while
inherently safer process assessments can be valuable components of
process safety management, inherently safer process assessments will
not always result in a clear, well-defined, and feasible path forward.
Although one process alternative may be inherently safer with respect
to one hazard--toxicity of byproducts, for example--the process may
present other hazards, such as an increased risk of fire or more severe
environmental impacts. Choosing between options for process design
involves considering a series of tradeoffs and developing appropriate
combinations of inherent, passive, active, and procedural safety
systems to manage all hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/MIC-Summary-Final.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are some state and local governments that have included
inherent safety requirements in their regulations. An IST Review Rule
was adopted under the New Jersey TCPA program in May 2008. It requires
IST reviews of all facilities covered by the TCPA by evaluating the
four IST principles: Minimization, substitution, moderation, and
simplification. The rule includes a checklist developed under the
direction of the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force.
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection recommends three
methods for IST analysis: \46\ (1) Reviewing and completing a checklist
containing a number of practical inherent safety considerations, (2)
avoiding a particular hazard at a part of the process by employing a
particular inherently safety strategy and (3) integrating IST into the
facility's PHA study. A facility must determine an identified
alternative's feasibility, and must provide written justification based
on both qualitative and quantitative evaluations of environmental,
human health and safety, legal, technological, and economic factors if
it decides not to implement it. For IST alternatives implemented, an
implementation schedule must be provided. A January, 2010 report
prepared by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to
summarize the Department's review of 85 IST reports indicated that
approximately 48% of facilities reported that they had implemented or
scheduled to implement IST measures as a result of conducting the IST
review.\47\
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    \46\ See: http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_guidance.pdf; http://www.njwec.org/PDF/Factsheets/CS_IST_FactSheet.pdf.
    \47\ See: http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_SUMWEB.pdf.
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    California's Contra Costa County's Industrial Safety Ordinance \48\
requires stationary sources to consider IST in the development and
analysis of mitigation systems resulting from a process hazard analysis
for each covered process, and in the design and review of new processes
and facilities. The stationary source must select and implement
inherently safer systems to the greatest extent feasible, documenting
in detail a determination that an inherently safer system is not
feasible. A February, 2013 report prepared by Contra Costa County
Health Services indicated that 4 of 7 facilities covered under the
ordinance's IST provision implemented at least one inherently safer
measure within the previous year.\49\
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    \48\ See: http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/2006_iso_official_code_complete.pdf.
    \49\ See: http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/iso-report.pdf.
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    The CSB has released reports for two recent accidents that the
Board indicated could have been avoided if safer technologies had been
employed. CSB found that the use of a safer material, such as high-
chromium steel, would have prevented the accelerated corrosion and
failure of carbon steel involved in the equipment rupture at the Tesoro
Refinery in Anacortes, Washington in 2010, which resulted in an
explosion and fire that killed seven employees.\50\ CSB also cited the
failure to use more corrosion resistant high-chromium steel as a factor
in the 2012 Chevron Refinery accident in Richmond, CA which released
hydrocarbons that ignited, endangering 19 employees.\51\
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    \50\ See: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014-May-01.pdf.
    \51\ See: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Chevron_Interim_Report_Final_2013-04-17.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An additional complication to assessing safer technologies and
alternatives is the varying amount and quality of information available
regarding their implementation by industry. While some facilities have
converted to processes considered to be inherently safer, other
facilities may not have sufficient information available to effectively
assess the impacts from changing existing processes to ones considered
inherently safer. The differences that exist among chemical facilities,
in terms of chemical process, facility layout, and ability to finance
implementation, may challenge mandatory implementation of safer
technologies and alternatives at regulated entities.
    EPA is planning the following steps to advance safer technologies
and alternatives:
     Publishing a joint alert with OSHA illustrating the
concepts, principles and examples of safer technology and alternatives
to make industry more aware of this information, while providing
sources of information for further investigation and review,
     Publishing a voluntary guidance document with OSHA for
operators on how to reduce risks by employing safer technology and
alternatives, by offering a more thorough examination of alternative
measures and safety techniques, including examples of safer technology
and alternatives or practices,
     Based on the evaluation of feedback from the alert,
guidance, and this RFI, EPA would consider proposing an amendment to
the RMP regulations that requires:
    [cir] An analysis and documentation of safer technologies and
alternatives
    [cir] Integration of the safer technologies and alternatives
analysis into the PHA
    [cir] Implementation of safer technologies and alternatives where
feasible; EPA would not make any determination regarding the specific
analysis, technology, design, or process selection by chemical facility
owners or operators.
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    a. Should EPA require a safer alternatives options analysis either
as a new prevention program element, as part of the existing PHA/Hazard
Review element, or as a separate new requirement under CAA section
112(r)?
    b. How should safer alternatives be defined if it were to be a
requirement under CAA section 112(r) regulations? What specifically
should a safer alternatives analysis require and how would this differ
from what is already required under other provisions of the RMP?
    c. How should industries determine if a safer alternative exists
for their particular process? What safer alternative chemicals are
available for the listed RMP chemicals and for ammonium nitrate?
    d. What should facilities consider when determining if such
technologies, when identified, are effective, available, and
economically justified for their particular process or facility? Can
the RMP national database, Lessons Learned

Information System \52\ or other federal databases be structured to
promote the exchange of information both within industry and with other
stakeholders on potentially safer technologies?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    e. If EPA were to require facilities to undertake an evaluation of
the potential to incorporate safer alternatives, what minimum criteria
should this evaluation be required to meet? How would the evaluation
determine if a particular alternative is feasible, cost effective and
results in less risk? What requirements or incentives, if any, should
there be for implementation of identified safer alternatives? How
should any such requirements be structured and enforced?
    f. Should EPA require facilities to use a safer alternatives
evaluation method such as the CCPS Inherently Safer Technology
Checklist? \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ CCPS, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle
Approach, Second Edition (2009), Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    g. How should EPA and facilities address the risk tradeoffs that
could result when changing a process to incorporate safer alternatives?
    h. Should EPA consider requirements similar to those used by the
State of New Jersey or Contra Costa County, California, and if so, why?
What have been the benefits of such programs in risk reduction or
process safety for the facilities covered under these requirements?
What have been the limitations or drawbacks of these programs?
    i. If EPA were to develop regulatory requirements for safer
alternatives, which facilities should be subject to those requirements?
Should all RMP facilities be subject to such requirements, or only
``high risk'' facilities, such as refineries and large chemical plants?
How would ``high risk'' be defined? Are there particular processes or
chemicals that should be targeted or prioritized for implementation of
such requirements?
    j. What barriers exist for industry to adopt safer alternatives?
What incentives can be used by government to have facilities implement
safer alternatives? Should the Agency provide special recognition to
companies that implement safer alternatives?
    k. What are other options (other than regulatory requirements)
exist to encourage facilities to investigate, develop or implement
safer alternatives and how can EPA further these efforts?
    l. If RMP facilities are required to perform safer alternative
options analyses and implementation plans, should EPA require that the
analyses and/or implementation plans be submitted to the Agency? Should
EPA have any role in approving such analyses or plans? In lieu of an
approval, can EPA promote safer alternatives through reporting and the
dissemination of information on potentially applicable practices?
    m. If RMP facilities are required to consider safer alternative
options, what role should local communities have in these analyses?
Should facilities be required to disclose these analyses or
recommendations resulting from such analyses to local authorities or
the public prior to the selection of options? Are there any other
disclosure options that will ensure that decisions on implementing
safer technologies are made with transparency? Are there any means of
oversight other than disclosure that would ensure that safer
alternatives analyses are thorough and implementation decisions are
appropriate?
    n. What would be the economic impacts of requiring facilities to
analyze safer alternative options? Are there any special circumstances
involving small entities that EPA should consider?
2. Emergency Drills To Test a Source's Emergency Response Program or
Plan
    Under Subpart E of 40 CFR part 68, RMP-covered facilities are
required to coordinate emergency response actions with local emergency
planning and response agencies. RMP facilities with Program 2 and
Program 3 processes must also develop and implement an emergency
response program in accordance with Sec.  68.95 if facility personnel
will respond to accidental releases. As part of the emergency response
program, an emergency response plan must be maintained at the
stationary source; the program must include procedures for the use of
emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and
maintenance; training for all employees in relevant procedures; and
procedures to review and update, as appropriate, the emergency response
plan to reflect changes at the stationary source and ensure that
employees are informed of changes. For those Program 2 and Program 3
facilities at which facility employees will not respond to accidental
releases, coordination with community emergency planners and responders
is required and an appropriate mechanism must be in place to notify
responders when there is a need for a response.
    Exercising response plans is critical to ensure that response
personnel understand their roles, local emergency responders are
familiar with the hazards at the facility, and that the emergency
response plan is appropriate and up to date. It ensures that personnel
are properly trained and can be used to identify future training needs.
Other EPA and Federal agency programs require exercises and drills as
an element of their emergency response programs. For example, under the
Oil Pollution Prevention regulation (40 CFR part 112), Facility
Response Plan (FRP) holders are required to conduct drills and
exercises, including evaluation procedures (Sec.  112.21). Exercises at
FRP facilities may follow the National Preparedness for Response
Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines \54\ which were developed to provide
a mechanism for compliance with EPA, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S.
Department of the Interior (DOI) exercise requirements for oil
pollution response. The PREP guidelines include both internal and
external exercise components. Internal exercises include notification
exercises, emergency procedures exercises, spill management team
tabletop exercises, and equipment deployment exercises. External
exercises include area exercises, that include members of the response
community, and government-initiated unannounced exercises.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ A copy of the National Preparedness for Response Exercise
Program (PREP) Guidelines, August 2002, can be accessed on the USCG
Web site at http://www.uscg.mil/vrp/faq/oil.shtml under ``Additional
References.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another example are exercises that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and State and local government perform at nuclear power
plants. The exercises evaluate both on-site and off-site emergency
preparedness capabilities. The NRC also requires Research and Test
Reactor (RTR) emergency plans to address the necessary provisions for
coping with radiological emergencies at each facility in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. Operators of RTRs are
required to train personnel and perform emergency preparedness
exercises in order to ensure the feasibility of the emergency
preparedness plan.
    Finally, industry guidelines recommend conducting exercises and
drills. The CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety \55\
recommend periodically testing the adequacy of emergency response plans
and level of

preparedness of responders, including contractors and local response
agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk
Based Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New
York, New York, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to improve coordination with community responders and
ensure that facility personnel have practice responding to accidental
releases, EPA is considering requiring RMP-regulated facilities to
perform exercises or drills as an element of the emergency response
program identified under Subpart E of the RMP regulation.
    In considering this issue, EPA requests information on the
following questions:
    a. Are RMP-regulated facilities currently exercising their
emergency response plans? If so, are they doing these exercises to
comply with other federal, state or local regulatory requirements? What
references or guidelines were used to develop the exercise program?
    b. What should be the scope of an exercise/drill program? Should
the exercise/drill program include internal (emergency response,
notifications, and evacuation) and external elements (involving
community and federal and state responders, as appropriate)? What
elements should be exercised as part of the drill/exercise program? For
example, should the program include communications, coordination,
logistics, and evacuations/accounting for personnel, etc? What response
scenarios should be considered for the exercise/drill program?
    c. How frequently should drills/exercises be performed?
    d. Who should be involved in the exercise program? How should the
management team be engaged as part of the drills/exercises? How should
contractors be included in the exercise/drill planning and when
conducting exercises/drills? Who should be the designated official
responsible for coordinating the exercises and drills conducted at the
RMP facility? How should other federal, state and local agencies be
included in the exercise/drill program?
    e. Should all RMP facilities be required to participate in some
type of exercise/drill program or only those who are required to
develop an emergency response program? Should Program 1 facilities (and
Program 2/Program 3 facilities that do not respond to accidental
releases with their own employees) be required to conduct external
exercises with community responders and test notification procedures?
Should Program 2 and Program 3 facilities whose employees respond to
accidental releases conduct both internal and external exercises?
    f. How should lessons learned and recommendations be documented and
addressed? What timeframe should be considered for completing such
records? How long should records of exercises/drills be maintained?
    g. Should stationary source operators be required to document and
address lessons learned and recommendations when they respond to an
actual accidental release?
    h. Should information such as the date of the most recent exercise
involving the emergency response plan be required to be reported to EPA
in the facility's RMP?
    i. What would be the economic impacts and paperwork burden of
requiring an exercise/drill program for all or a subset of RMP
facilities? Would such a requirement substantially improve preparedness
for dealing with emergency situations? Are there any special
circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with
respect to an exercise/drill program?
3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated
Substances
    A process hazards analysis is intended not only to identify
existing hazards, but also the likelihood that safety and mitigating
systems, including detection and monitoring equipment, would function
properly to eliminate or reduce the consequences that may occur as a
result of those hazards. The RMP Program 3 Prevention Program requires
regulated facilities to conduct a process hazard analysis (Sec.
68.67). The rule specifically requires a facility's hazard analysis to
address engineering and administrative controls applicable to the
hazards and their interrelationships, such as appropriate application
of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases.
Examples of acceptable detection methods identified in this requirement
include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and
detection hardware. Likewise, emergency response procedures can reduce
the severity of a release and protect employees, emergency responders,
and the public from harmful exposure to the regulated substances. RMP-
regulated facilities must have procedures or mechanisms in place for
informing the public and local emergency response agencies about
accidental releases. These process hazards analysis and emergency
program elements, while addressing detection methodologies, early
warnings, and incident notifications, include no specific requirements
for automated detection and monitoring systems to be installed. The
active use of such systems may enhance both the prevention of and the
response to accidental releases. However, the Agency understands that
the need for and appropriate deployment of such systems is likely to be
highly site-specific, and that facilities may already have appropriate
incentives to deploy such systems where warranted and cost-effective.
    The Agency recognizes that even equipment that is properly designed
and maintained can sometimes fail. Automated detection and monitoring
systems can be used not only to assess the effectiveness of existing
control measures, but also to provide early warning of system upsets
which could be acted upon to prevent a more serious or catastrophic
incident. Linking these with alert systems and proper communications
with the public and first responders may enhance emergency response
efforts in the event of an incident, resulting in better protection of
human health and the environment. For example, large increases in
emissions due to a piping leak, a significant tear in a storage vessel
seal, or other similar event can signal a process upset. Systems in
place to detect leaks (or the conditions that might result in leaks) in
a timely manner would allow for corrective measures to be taken more
rapidly than if a facility relied solely on traditional monitoring and
inspection methods. RMP inspection and enforcement history has shown
this to be of concern, particularly for facilities that are not staffed
on a full-time basis and which may also be located in close proximity
to population centers or environmentally sensitive areas.
    While facilities may identify the benefits of installing automated
detection and monitoring systems as they conduct their process hazards
analysis, or as they develop their emergency response plan, the
decision to invest in such equipment may be influenced by many factors.
For example, automated detection and monitoring technologies may not be
available for particular chemical hazards, or industry standards may
not address their proper use. They may also be costly. Nevertheless,
the Agency is requesting information on the need for new or expanded
requirements for automated detection and monitoring systems that would
supplement either the existing process hazard analysis and/or emergency
response requirements. Specifically, EPA requests information on the
following questions:
    a. Should facilities be required to install monitoring equipment or
sensors to detect releases of RMP regulated substances, or the
conditions that could lead to such a release? Should the systems
provide for continuous

detection and monitoring? How should any such requirements be crafted
to provide appropriate site-specific flexibility?
    b. Are there specific issues that need to be considered for
unmanned and/or remote facilities?
    c. Should an automated mechanism to notify, alert and warn the
local responders and surrounding public of an incident be considered as
part of any detection and monitoring system requirement? If so, how
should the potential for false alarms be addressed within such a
requirement?
    d. How can a requirement for automated detection and monitoring
systems be best coordinated with the community emergency response plan?
What are the advantages/disadvantages between continuous monitoring
conducted by automated systems in contrast to third-party alarm
agencies?
    e. How would a requirement for appropriate detection thresholds be
best established for activating alarms and/or alerts?
    f. How would the significance and appropriate protective response
action of the alarms/alerts be best communicated to responders and the
public (including shelter-in-place and evacuations)?
    g. What involvement should LEPCs and SERCs have in the development
of the emergency response plan, particularly with respect to what
actions are to be taken in the event of an incident where and alarm/
alert is activated?
    h. How frequently should monitoring equipment or sensors to detect
releases of RMP-regulated substances be tested? How should these tests
be documented? How long should records of such tests be maintained?
Should automated monitoring records for periods of normal operations be
maintained, so that past records may serve as an aid in determining
what may have gone wrong prior to an accident (e.g., a gradual increase
in emissions)? Should EPA specify requirements in this area, or are
these aspects of program implementation best left to the facility?
    i. Leak detection and repair programs are common under the CAA's
routine emission programs. Can these programs be integrated with the
accidental release prevention program to reduce accidental releases and
to simplify requirements for stationary sources subject to both the RMP
and these other programs? Are there jurisdictional issues that prevent
integration?
    j. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional
monitoring and detection requirements in the RMP? Are there any special
circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with
respect to such monitoring and detection requirements?
4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements
    EPA is considering whether to amend 40 CFR part 68 to provide more
specific requirements to address stationary source siting. In 2005, a
series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas City refinery during the
restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerization unit. Fifteen workers were
killed and 180 others were injured. Many of the victims were in or
around work trailers located near an atmospheric vent stack. The CSB
investigation identified the siting of the trailers as a key factor
that led to the fatalities. The PSM standard and RMP rule both require
that facility siting be addressed as one element of a PHA (see 29 CFR
1910.11 9(e)(2) and (3)(v)), and 40 CFR 68.67(c)). While EPA has not
provided any guidance on how to adequately address stationary source
siting in the PHA. RMP facility owner/operators can refer to industry
guidance on siting considerations. The following publications provide
guidance on facility siting:
     American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice
752, Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant
Buildings, 3rd Edition, December 2009;
     API Recommended Practice 753, Management of Hazards
Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings, First
Edition, June 2007
     CCPS, Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout (2003);
and
     CCPS, Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings
for External Explosions and Fires, and Toxic Releases, 2nd Edition
(2012).
    Both the siting of processes within a stationary source and the
siting of the stationary source itself can affect the impact of an
accidental release. Siting within a stationary source can impact the
surrounding community not only by the proximity of the accidental
release to off-site receptors adjacent to the facility boundary (e.g.,
people, infrastructure, environmental resources) but also by increasing
the likelihood of a secondary ``knock-on'' release through compromising
nearby processes.
    Siting of a stationary source itself may allow the potential impact
of an accidental release to dissipate depending on the distance from
the source to receptors. The lack of sufficient distance between the
source boundary and neighboring residential areas was a significant
factor in the severity of several major chemical accidents, including,
among others, the Bhopal disaster and the recent West Fertilizer
accident. Facility designers have long recognized the potential
benefits of adding buffer or safety zones--controlled areas separating
the public and other facilities from the consequences of process
incidents--when selecting the location for new chemical facilities
(see, e.g., CCPS (2003)). For existing facilities, owners have
sometimes compensated nearby residents to relocate away from the
facility boundary in order to create a buffer zone where one did not
previously exist, or where adjacent residential areas had been
developed after the facility itself was constructed.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See Matthews, Joe. ``Paying neighbors to move Mossville:
Residents of this Louisiana town, like those in Wagner's Point here,
faced a showdown with Condea Vista. Their experience is
instructive.'' The Baltimore Sun 6 Dec. 1998, and Gallagher, John.
``Marathon offers to buy out Detroit homeowners near refinery amid
$2.2B expansion.'' The Detroit Free Press 2 Nov 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Should EPA amend the RMP rule to include more specific siting
requirements as part of the PHA by, for example, establishing buffer or
setback zone requirements for new covered stationary sources, or by
establishing safety criteria for siting of occupancies inside the
facility? Would such requirements provide significant incremental
protection over current industry practice based on the references cited
above? In considering this issue, EPA requests information on the
following questions:
    a. Would additional specifics on stationary source siting and
occupancy siting under the RMP minimize the impacts of chemical
accidents to local communities? How should RMP stationary source siting
requirements relate to OSHA PSM and other industry standards?
    b. What guidance should EPA consider in the development of
stationary source siting requirements?
    c. What information should EPA consider in the development of
stationary source buffer or setback zones for different risks? How
should EPA address siting when limited space is available?
    d. What administrative processes and controls should be
incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?
    e. What safety and process devices, instruments and controls should
be incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?
    f. What criteria are appropriate for siting of occupancies (such as
offices, control rooms, cafeterias, etc.) near an RMP-regulated
process?

    g. How often should stationary source siting be evaluated for
effectiveness? What criteria should be used?
    h. What documentation should be required for evaluating stationary
source siting determinations?
    i. Is it appropriate to reflect the environmental burden of the
surrounding community in siting criteria for either new facilities or
expansions within an existing site? Is it appropriate to consider
chronic burdens or only burdens associated with accidental releases?
    j. What challenges would the agency face in specifying uniform
siting requirements for the wide variety of covered sites? What site
specific factors would need to be addressed?
    k. If EPA mandated siting criteria, how should EPA account for
local zoning codes when establishing such criteria? Would setting
federal requirements overstep into the normal state and local zoning
process, or would it act as a supplemental measure ensuring minimal
safety standards across the country?
    l. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional
siting requirements? Are there any special circumstances involving
small entities that EPA should consider with respect to siting
requirements?
5. Compliance With Emergency Response Program Requirements in
Coordination With Local Responders
    Subpart E of the RMP regulation offers owners and operators of RMP-
covered facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes two emergency response
options. For facilities whose employees will respond to accidental
releases of regulated substances, section 68.95 of the regulation
requires owners or operators to implement an emergency response program
that includes an emergency response plan, procedures for the use of
emergency response equipment, training for employees, procedures to
review and update the response plan, and other elements. These
``responding'' facilities are also required to coordinate their
emergency plan with local response authorities.
    For facilities whose employees will not respond to releases, the
RMP regulation states that owners and operators of these sources need
not comply with the provisions of section 68.95 provided that the
source is included in the community emergency response plan (for
sources with regulated toxic substances) or has coordinated response
actions with the local fire department (for sources with only regulated
flammable substances), and that appropriate notification mechanisms are
in place to notify emergency responders when there is a need for a
response.
    Subpart E can be read as offering owners or operators the choice of
whether to be a responding or non-responding facility. RMP-regulated
facilities indicate within their risk management plan whether or not
they are a ``responding'' facility (i.e., by indicating compliance with
mandatory elements of emergency response plans required in section
68.95(a)(1)), and EPA has found that the majority of RMP facilities
claim to be ``non-responding'' facilities. However, during facility
inspections, EPA has often found that facilities are either not
included in the community emergency plan or have not properly
coordinated response actions with local authorities. This problem
occurs with both responding and non-responding facilities, but it is
particularly troublesome for non-responding facilities, because if the
facility itself does not maintain the capability to respond to
emergencies, and local authorities are not able to respond, then a
proper response to an accidental release at the facility may not occur
or may be significantly delayed. EPA requests comment on whether this
problem could be addressed through better enforcement of existing
requirements, and if so, how best to do this.
    In some cases, accidental releases have been made significantly
worse due to poor emergency response planning and coordination. For
example, following the August 2008 explosion and fire at the Bayer
CropScience facility in Institute, West Virginia, poor coordination
between the facility incident commander and local authorities prevented
important information, including a shelter-in-place order, from being
timely communicated to local authorities. Additionally, facility
authorities initially prevented local responders from gaining access to
the site of the incident.
    EPA is considering whether the Emergency Response provisions in
Subpart E of the RMP regulation should be revised to state more
explicitly that owners and operators of RMP-regulated facilities must
comply with the emergency response program requirements of section
68.95 unless local public responders both have the means and agree to
respond to releases of regulated substances at the facility, and to
describe what facility owners or operators must do to coordinate with
local authorities on the development of community emergency response
plans.
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    a. Do you own or operate an RMP-regulated facility that relies on
public authorities to respond to accidental releases of regulated
substances at the facility? What steps do you take to ensure that
public responders are prepared to properly respond to accidental
releases at your facility? Should EPA clarify what steps RMP facilities
should take in order to properly coordinate their emergency response
plan with the community emergency response plan?
    b. If your facility uses its own employees or response contractors
provided by the facility to respond to emergencies, what factors led to
your decision to use your own employees or contractors to conduct
emergency response operations? What steps have you taken to coordinate
with local responders on emergency response planning?
    c. Are you a member of an LEPC, municipal fire department or
municipal hazardous materials response team? If so, do you believe that
``non-responding'' RMP facilities in your jurisdiction have generally
provided the appropriate information and support to your organization
to ensure an appropriate response to hazardous substance emergencies at
those facilities? Is your organization capable of responding
appropriately to such events at RMP facilities? How often do you visit
RMP facilities in your jurisdiction? Do you conduct emergency drills at
RMP facilities? Do you believe that RMP facilities should generally
respond to emergencies using their own employees, or rely on public
responders? Should EPA clarify what is necessary for RMP facilities to
adequately coordinate their emergency response plan with the community
emergency response plan? Would new regulations in this area
significantly improve emergency response planning in your area?
    d. Are there certain substances or types of facilities that present
particular response challenges for local authorities? If so, which
substances or types of facilities? Should such facilities be required
to prepare and implement comprehensive emergency response programs
instead of relying primarily on public responders? Do public responders
in your area have adequate existing authority to require this now?
    e. If public responders are not capable of responding to a
particular type of chemical or release event at an RMP-regulated
facility, should the owner or operator of the facility be required to
provide for an effective response, either with the facility's own
employees, response contractors, a mutual aid

agreement with nearby facilities, or some other means?
    f. What would be the economic impacts of expanding the emergency
response requirements as discussed above? Are there any special
circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with
respect to modifying emergency response requirements?
6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements
    Incident investigations and accident history reporting can provide
valuable information about potential hazards and the steps needed to
prevent future events. Many times, the cause of an incident is the
result of a series of other problems that need to be addressed to
prevent recurrences. For example, an operator's mistake may be the
result of poor training, inappropriate procedures, or poor design of
control systems; equipment failure may result from improper
maintenance, misuse of equipment (e.g., operating at too high a
temperature), or use of incompatible materials. Through incident
investigation a facility owner or operator would determine not only the
initiating event that led to the release, but more importantly its root
cause(s). Accident history reporting provides an avenue to disseminate
that information. Thorough investigations and reporting may help
facilities identify and address root causes.
    The RMP's incident investigation requirements closely track those
established in OSHA's PSM accident investigation requirements.
Likewise, EPA's hazard assessment requirements include a five-year
accidental release history, which has some overlap with similar OSHA
process hazard analysis requirements. While most catastrophic releases
affect workers first, there are incidents where workers are protected
but the public and the environment may be threatened, e.g. emergency
relief devices working as designed to vent hazardous atmospheres away
from the workplace and into the air where they may be carried downwind.
Although the PHA process may have recognized and addressed the
potential off-site impact associated with safety measures that protect
workers (e.g. an emergency vent scrubber system), the RMP requires that
facilities consider such possibilities and integrate the protection of
workers, the public, and the environment into one program. Thus, RMP
facilities must investigate each significant incident which resulted
in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. A
catastrophic release is defined for purposes of the RMP as one where a
major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or more
regulated substances presents an imminent and substantial endangerment
to public health and the environment. Imminent and substantial
endangerment includes off-site consequences such as death, injury, or
adverse effects to human health or the environment, or the need for the
public to shelter-in-place or be evacuated to avoid such consequences.
In contrast, the accident history requirement includes a five-year
record of only those accidents from covered processes that resulted in
deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on-site, or known off-
site deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property
damage, or environmental damage. Near-miss accidents or accidents with
only the potential for consequences are not required to be included,
and the accident history requirement applies only to covered processes.
    EPA has encouraged facilities to investigate all accidental
releases. However, the focus of the current incident investigation and
accident history reporting requirements is limited. EPA's experiences
with RMP facility inspections and incident investigations show there
have been incidents that were not investigated, even though under
slightly different circumstances, the incident could have resulted in a
catastrophic release. While these unplanned ``near miss'' events did
not result in deaths, injuries, adverse health or environmental
effects, or sheltering-in-place, only a fortunate break in the chain of
events prevented a catastrophic release of a regulated substance from
happening. For example, a runaway reaction that is brought under
control by operators is a near miss that may need to be investigated to
determine why the problem occurred, even if it does not directly
involve a covered process. Similarly, fires and explosions near or
within a covered process, any unanticipated release of a regulated
substance, and process upsets that could have led to a release of a
regulated substance may also be one step away from initiating a chain
of events leading to a catastrophic release. Additionally, there have
been some cases where the facility chose not to conduct an
investigation because the owner/operator elected to decommission the
process involved, or because the process was destroyed in the incident.
While an investigation would have no impact on a decommissioned or
destroyed process, other similar processes or operations at the
facility, or at similar facilities, could potentially benefit from its
findings. In other instances, facilities have failed to investigate
serious releases because they determined there were no actual or
potential off-site consequences. Investigating these types of incidents
and including them as part of the RMP accident history report could
provide facilities with important information on what problems could
lead to an incident, and allow for the facility to address them before
a catastrophic release occurs. Further, including some of these
incidents as part of the accident history could also improve process
safety at facilities with similar processes, where operators could
learn from the shared information.
    Incident investigations may result in improved process safety
through the dissemination of lessons learned and the implementation of
recommended corrective actions. Conducting these investigations as soon
as possible after an incident may yield better quality data and
information, though time may also be required to collect, validate, and
integrate data from a range of sources. EPA has discovered situations
where incident investigations by regulated facilities have been
indefinitely delayed. Delays could result in an increased risk of
incident recurrence as root causes and the appropriate corrective
actions are not necessarily promptly identified or implemented. The
value of conducting incident investigations and communicating lessons
learned in a timely manner was also recognized by the CSB. In
recommendations to the Agency, the CSB called for RMP accident
histories to be updated on a more timely basis in view of the valuable
information they provide for chemical accident prevention and
preparedness efforts by government, industry and the public.\57\ EPA
agreed with the CSB recommendation and amended the RMP accident history
requirements to require that facilities who have had an accident
meeting the criteria for the five-year accident history to update their
RMP accident history to include the new accident history information
within six months of the date of the accident.
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    \57\ Joint Chemical Safety Board, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, and EPA Roundtable on Developing Improved Metrics on
Accidental Chemical Process Releases, November 14, 2002.
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    The Agency is considering whether broadening the incident
investigation and accident history requirements to include clear
requirements to investigate near misses and determine root causes of
accidents, near misses, and process upsets would promote

increased safety. The Agency is requesting information on the
appropriateness of requiring root cause investigations of incidents,
process upsets and near-misses, and of establishing specific time
frames for incident investigations to be completed. Specifically, the
Agency requests detailed information on the following questions:
    a. Are the RMP incident investigation requirements too narrowly
focused? Would identifying a broader range of incidents requiring
investigation (e.g., near misses) help prevent additional accidental
releases? Please provide specific examples where possible. EPA requests
information on alternative definitions or incident classifications that
could be included within the rule's incident investigation
requirements.
    b. Are there any data or information on process upsets, near misses
or other incidents that were not required to be investigated, but where
an investigation and resulting changes in management systems might
prevent accidental releases?
    c. Does your facility routinely investigate incidents not required
to be investigated under part 68? If so, please describe the types of
incidents investigated, and the effects these investigations have had
on facility operations.
    d. Would a specific time frame for incident investigations to be
completed benefit overall safety? What should be the basis for
establishing an appropriate timeframe requirement for an incident
investigation to be completed? What are the challenges and limitations
to completing an incident investigation within a specified timeframe?
    e. Are there benefits from requiring that investigations must be
performed even in cases where the owner/operator elects to decommission
the process involved, where the process is destroyed in the incident,
or where a facility determines there were no actual or potential off-
site consequences? Would such a requirement provide a disincentive to
decommission potentially risky processes?
    f. Would a modification of the definition of ``catastrophic
release'' assist in addressing the concerns regarding the appropriate
scope of incidents that require investigation?
    g. Would a modification of the accident history reporting
requirements to reflect a broader range of incidents being investigated
assist in disseminating lessons learned across industry?
    h. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses
to conduct a full compliance audit under Sec.  68.58 and Sec.  68.79?
    i. Is it appropriate for facilities to share the results of
accident investigations with the local community or alternatively a
summary of the accident, and its root cause? Is there an appropriate
role for the local community in conducting investigations?
    j. What would be the economic impact of broadening the RMP incident
investigation requirements to require root cause investigations of near
misses? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities
that EPA should consider? Would small businesses have the capacity to
investigate near miss incidents?
7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes
Involving Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together
    Section 68.25(b) of the RMP rule requires the owner or operator to
determine a worst-case release quantity. The regulation states that
``the worst case release quantity shall be the greater of the
following: (1) For substances in a vessel, the greatest amount held in
a single vessel, taking into account administrative controls that limit
the maximum quantity; or (2) For substances in pipes, the greatest
amount in a pipe, taking into account administrative controls that
limit the maximum quantity.'' Based on a review of past RMP submissions
and facility inspections, EPA believes that in most cases the current
requirements result in a reasonable estimate of worst case releases.
However, for certain categories of facilities, like chemical
warehouses, where large numbers of regulated chemical containers are
stored closely together, the Agency has questions about whether a
different approach would better characterize the potential process
hazards and associated risks. This is of particular concern for those
cases where each storage container may only contain a few pounds of a
regulated substance, but there are numerous such containers stored in
close proximity to one another.
    This type of situation occurred on June 24, 2005, where a fire
involving propylene cylinders occurred at the St. Louis Praxair
Distribution site. A small fire that began in one propylene cylinder
spread to other nearby propylene cylinders and then to acetylene and
propane cylinders. The exploding cylinders flew up to 800 feet in the
air, started fires, and damaged property in the community. The fire
consumed 8,000 cylinders, or almost the entire inventory of flammable
gases at the facility. Similar accidents have occurred at Air Liquide
in Phoenix, Arizona in June 1997, Airgas in Tulsa, Oklahoma in August
2003, and Praxair in Fresno, California in July 2005. An October 2006
accident in Apex, North Carolina, involving numerous small containers
of flammable and toxic materials stored at a hazardous waste disposal
facility caused a fire, multiple explosions, and the release of a toxic
vapor cloud that resulted in the evacuation of 16,000 nearby residents.
    EPA seeks information on whether to revise section 68.25(b) of the
RMP regulation to better account for processes involving numerous small
vessels stored together, such as on pallets, cylinder racks, and in
groups. EPA is looking for information on whether including the entire
quantity in one location or one process, instead of just the single
largest vessel or pipe, would better represent the true worst case
scenario quantity, and thereby increase protection to human health and
the environment and help prevent future accidents from occurring. EPA
also requests comment on whether there are ways of grouping vessels or
pipes short of including all the vessels or pipes at a facility that
would be appropriate for worst case scenario analysis. EPA is also
interested in receiving information on whether worst-case scenario
requirements should account for the potential cascading effects of
separate facilities that are interconnected (e.g., a manufacturer that
provides product to an adjacent source through an interconnecting
pipeline). Specifically, EPA requests information on the following
questions:
    a. Should EPA revise Sec.  68.25(b) to require the owner or
operator of any regulated process involving numerous small containers
stored together to consider as the worst case release quantity the sum
of the quantity of all containers in the process, or a subset of such
containers, or the containers within one storage area of the process?
    b. Would revising the worst case scenario quantity determination
requirement in this manner better represent the true worst case
scenario for such processes?
    c. Would this change promote stronger process safety controls and
help prevent accidents?
    d. In situations where numerous small containers are stored
together, are there any kinds of protective barriers or other methods
of storage that would reduce the likelihood of a release from one
container causing additional releases from adjacent or nearby
containers? Should such barriers or storage methods be incorporated
into the rule's worst

case scenario requirements, and if so, how? Would revising Sec.
68.25(b) cause any type of additional burden on facilities where large
amounts of chemicals are stored together?
    e. If EPA were to revise Sec.  68.25(b) to take into account
numerous small vessels being stored together, what types/kinds of
vessels should be covered? Should there be any limits on the size of
containers subject to the aggregation requirement? What would such
limits be based on? Similarly, should there be a specific distance
between vessels established in order to consider them as grouped
together for purposes of worst case scenario calculations? What would
that distance be based on?
    f. Should EPA revise Sec.  68.25 to require the owner or operator
of a regulated process to consider the potential for worst case release
scenarios to involve adjacent facilities or other nearby facilities
that are interconnected through pipelines? Would this change raise any
confidentiality or security issues? How would EPA adjust its worst case
scenario modeling requirements to account for such a change?
    g. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the worst case
scenario analysis requirements as discussed above? Are there any
special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider
with respect to worst case scenario analysis?
8. Public Disclosure of Information To Promote Regulatory Compliance
and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks
    EPA is seeking public comment on whether there are additional steps
the Agency could take to improve compliance through increased
information disclosure to the public and local authorities. For
example, would requiring RMP-covered facilities to post on a company
Web site unrestricted (i.e., non-off-site consequence analysis) RMP
information, such as the facility's RMP executive summary, emergency
contact information, identity of the LEPC, or links to the local
emergency response plan and/or the facility's most recent EPCRA Tier II
report, lead to improvements in facility safety and better regulatory
compliance? Would disclosing a summary of the facility's compliance
audit, PHA, or incident investigation reports to the LEPC result in
improvements in emergency planning and response? Would such disclosures
raise any concerns regarding facility security or proprietary business
information?
    We note that the RMP rule was published in 1996 before many of the
current information-sharing technologies were conceived. While the
Agency has modernized mechanisms for reporting and handling risk
management plans, we have made only minor adjustments to the RMP rule
for new information technologies. We have not systematically reviewed
the rule to see if enhanced facility and community interaction through
the use of these technologies can promote safer operations, perhaps at
a reduced cost of compliance and oversight.
    Ensuring that communities, local planners and local first
responders have appropriate facility chemical hazard information is
critical to the health and safety of the responders and the local
community. In response to Executive Order 13650, EPA seeks to find ways
to enhance information sharing and collaborative planning between
chemical facility owners and operators, tribal and local emergency
planning committees and first responders. EPA is interested in
identifying ways to make RMP-regulated facility information more
readily available to local responders and local communities without
creating additional security concerns. EPA requests information on the
following questions:
    a. Should EPA amend the RMP regulation to require RMP-regulated
facilities to post chemical hazard-related information on their Web
sites (if they have one) such as RMP chemical names, chemical
quantities, executive summaries, links to LEPCs, community emergency
plans, Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for hazardous chemicals present on
site, EPCRA Tier 2 reports, release notification reports, accident
history and cause and other similar information? What requirements
should be considered for facilities that do not have a Web site?
    b. Would requiring facilities to make this information available on
the company Web site promote improved regulatory compliance? What
additional economic burden would be associated with such a requirement?
    c. Do RMP-regulated facility owners/operators have any safety or
security concerns with posting the executive summary from the RMP, or
linking to EPCRA reports and community response plans on the company
Web sites? Please explain any concerns regarding specific elements of
this information.
    d. Would posting the RMP executive summary on a Web site cause
facility owner/operators to remove important information from the
executive summary? Does EPA need to better define the contents of an
executive summary in order to allay security concerns?
    e. Is there other information (web-based or otherwise) that would
assist local communities, emergency planners, and responders in
understanding facility risks that should be made publicly available?
For example, would disclosure of the facility's PHA or compliance audit
to local authorities such as the LEPC result in improved safety?
    f. Does your facility interact with community groups (e.g., a
citizen advisory panel)? If so, what information do you provide to such
groups?
    g. Are there other activities or measures that RMP-facility owner/
operators can use to ensure that communities, planners, and responders
have access to appropriate information?
    h. Can the use of social media or other forms of community outreach
be incorporated into hazard assessment, prevention, and response to
leverage community involvement in oversight? For example, would
increased public disclosure of RMP-related information, such as
accidental releases, near misses, and subsequent safety enhancements,
or increased community involvement in facility emergency response
planning, lead to improvements in facility safety? Please identify
aspects of the RMP rule where there are opportunities for community
involvement.
9. Threshold Quantities and Off-Site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for
Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity
Values
    EPA is considering the use of Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
(AEGLs)\58\ developed by the National Advisory Committee (NAC) for
AEGLs for Hazardous Substances (NAC/AEGL Committee) to recalculate RMP
reporting thresholds and toxic endpoints for off-site consequence
analyses in order to better reflect the potential for adverse effects
of an accidental release upon a community.
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    \58\ http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/.
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    EPA originally set the TQs for the RMP toxic substances using a
ranking method similar to that used in developing the threshold
planning quantities (TPQs) for the EPCRA EHSs. A factor for each toxic
chemical based on its toxicity level of concern ``LOC'' and its
potential to become airborne and disperse ``V'', was derived and used
to develop a ranking factor equal to LOC divided by V. Chemicals with
lower ranking factors were assigned lower thresholds. A low numerical
LOC value

represents a high toxicity and a high value of V represents a high
potential for air dispersion. Therefore, the ranking factor was
designed such that lower LOC values or higher V values (or both)
resulted in lower ranking factors. For example, the V for all gases is
assigned a value of 1, which is higher than the calculated values of V
for all liquids. For the RMP substances, thresholds were assigned based
on order of magnitude ranges in the ranking factor, using TQ categories
of 500 pounds, 1,000 pounds, 2,500 pounds, 5,000 pounds, 10,000 pounds,
15,000 pounds and 20,000 pounds (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994).
    The toxicity LOC was the maximum short term exposure concentration
level in air for each chemical that would not lead to serious
irreversible health effects in the general population when exposed for
a relatively short duration. The Immediately Dangerous to Life and
Health (IDLH) value developed by the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) or an approximation of the IDLH based on
animal toxicity data was used as the basis for the LOC.
    The IDLH is defined as the maximum concentration from which one
could escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing symptoms or
any irreversible health effects. The IDLH was presented in the 1990
edition of the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards and was used
where available to develop the LOC toxicity levels for RMP toxic
substances. For substances without a published IDLH value, a value
equivalent to the IDLH was derived from mammalian toxicity data using a
methodology described in Appendix D of the Technical Guidance for
Hazard Analysis, Emergency Planning for Hazardous Substances.\59\
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    \59\ USEPA/FEMA/DOT, Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis,
Emergency Planning for Hazardous Substances, December 1987, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/documents/technical_guidance_for_hazard_analysis.pdf.
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    In some cases, revised or updated toxicity data were used, based on
the December 1990 Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances
(RTECS) rather than the toxicity data used to derive TPQs for EHSs.
    EPA is considering recalculating the current IDLH-based TQs for the
following reasons:
     The IDLH is based upon response of healthy male worker-
population and does not take into account the exposure of more
sensitive individuals, such as the elderly, pregnant women, children or
people with various health problems.
     The IDLH is based upon a maximum 30-minute exposure period
which may not reflect (may underestimate) actual exposures to
accidental airborne releases.
     The IDLH may not reflect the concentration that could
result in serious but reversible injury because IDLHs were designed
only to protect workers against concentrations that would prevent death
or irreversible health effects or would prevent other deleterious
effects (e.g. disorientation or incoordination) that would prevent
escape.
    EPA recognized the limitation of using the IDLH values when it
developed the TPQs for the EHSs in 1986 and 1987, but the agency was
only just beginning the development of more appropriate chemical
emergency exposure levels for the general public. Therefore, EPA chose
to continue using the IDLH because there were many more published IDLH
values available than other potential exposure limits and because there
was already a method available for deriving an IDLH equivalent from
toxicity data.\60\
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    \60\ USEPA. June 21, 1992. Technical Background Document:
Development of Threshold Quantities for List of Regulated Substances
for Accidental Release Prevention, Document No. II-B-2, Docket No.
A-91-74, page 7.
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    Due to the limitations outlined above, EPA is now considering the
use of AEGLs to recalculate RMP TQs. AEGLs represent threshold exposure
limits (exposure levels below which adverse health effects are not
likely to occur) for the general public and are applicable to emergency
exposures ranging from 10 minutes to 8 hours. AEGLs are developed by
the National Advisory Committee (NAC) for AEGLs for Hazardous
Substances (NAC/AEGL Committee), which was established to identify,
review, and interpret relevant toxicologic and other scientific data
and develop AEGLs for high-priority acutely toxic chemicals.\61\ AEGLs
are developed for five exposure periods (10 and 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4
hours, and 8 hours) and distinguished by varying degrees of severity of
toxic effects. AEGLs are designed to protect the general population,
including susceptible subpopulations, such as infants, children, the
elderly, persons with asthma, and those with other illnesses, which are
groups not generally considered in the development of workplace
exposure levels. AEGLs have been developed or are now under development
for 471 priority chemicals.
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    \61\ see: http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/.
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    A chemical may have up to three AEGLs values, each of which
corresponds to a specific tier of health effects. The three AEGL tiers
are defined as follows:
     AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration, expressed as parts
per million or milligrams per cubic meter (ppm or mg/m\3\) of a
substance above which it is predicted that the general population,
including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort,
irritation, or certain asymptomatic nonsensory effects. However, the
effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon
cessation of exposure.
     AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or
mg/m\3\) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience
irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or
an impaired ability to escape.
     AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or
mg/m\3\) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-
threatening health effects or death.
    The use of AEGLs to recalculate RMP reporting thresholds would
better reflect the potential for adverse effects of an accidental
release upon individuals in a community compared to IDLHs because AEGLs
take into account the potential exposure of more sensitive individuals,
the potential for longer periods of exposure, and the potential for
serious but reversible injuries.
    In situations where no AEGL exists for a chemical, EPA would use
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs), if available, to
recalculate reporting thresholds. ERPGs estimate the concentrations at
which most people will begin to experience health effects if they are
exposed to a hazardous airborne chemical for 1 hour. (Similar to IDLH
values, however, sensitive members of the public--such as old, sick, or
very young people--aren't covered by these guidelines and may
experience adverse effects at concentrations below the ERPG values.)
ERPGs are developed by the Emergency Response Planning committee of the
American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA). ERPGs could be used to
help protect the public when AEGLs aren't available and there has been
a chemical release that is short-term in duration. There are about 145
chemicals with ERPGs.\62\ A chemical may have up to three ERPG values,
each of which corresponds to a specific tier of health effects.
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    \62\ http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/erpgs.

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    The three ERPG tiers are defined as follows:
     ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which
it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1
hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health
effects.
     ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which
it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1
hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious
health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability
to take protective action.
     ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which
it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1
hour without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or
perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor.
    EPA previously used EPRG values in 1996 (61 FR 31668, June 20,
1996) to establish toxic endpoints (i.e., air concentrations) for each
RMP toxic chemical to be used when conducting the off-site consequence
analysis (OCA). The endpoints chosen were the ERPG-2 values developed
by AIHA; the toxic endpoint was the level of concern (LOC) from EPA's
1987 Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis for those substances that
did not have an established ERPG-2, updated where necessary to reflect
new toxicity data. EPA chose ERPG-2 values first because they were
specifically developed by a scientific committee for emergency planning
to protect the general public in emergency situations and are subject
to peer review. EPA had rejected use of the ERPG-3, which is a lethal
exposure level, because it is not protective enough of the public in
emergency situations.
    One consequence however, of the agency using separate toxicity
values for TQs (based upon IDLH) and toxic endpoints (based upon EPRG-
2) for the RMP regulations as a whole is some inconsistency in the
representation of the relative toxicities of certain substances
compared to others. For example, chlorine and sulfur dioxide have
relatively similar ERPG-2 toxic endpoints, 0.0087 mg/L and 0.0078 mg/L,
respectively, but chlorine is listed with a reporting threshold of
2,500 pounds while sulfur dioxide has a reporting threshold of 5,000
pounds. As gases, both chlorine and sulfur dioxide have the same air
dispersion factor (V) of 1. The difference in thresholds is due to the
use of 1990 IDLH values, with chlorine having an IDLH (0.087 mg/L or 30
ppm), that suggests it is three times more toxic than sulfur dioxide
(IDLH of 0.261 mg/L or 100 ppm). To remedy such issues, EPA is
considering the use of AEGLs as the basis for determining both the RMP
reporting thresholds and the toxic endpoints. Furthermore, in those
cases where an AEGL is not available, using EPRG-2 values to calculate
both the reporting threshold and toxic endpoint will also remove such
inconsistencies. Finally, using AEGLs when available to recalculate
current toxic endpoints will also take into account the potential
exposure of more sensitive individuals, which is not addressed when
using ERPG-2 values.
    With few exceptions, AEGL-2 values are significantly lower than LOC
values for a given substance, and generally somewhat lower than the
corresponding ERPG-2 value. However, this does not necessarily mean
that TQs would always decrease. As indicated above, when originally
developing TQs, EPA used the LOC value divided by the V factor for each
chemical to develop a ranking index. Substituting AEGL-2 values for LOC
values and recalculating the ranking index values would generally
result in much lower index values. However, index values do not
correlate directly to a TQ. Instead, a range of index values was
assigned a TQ. For example, all substances with index values less than
0.01 were assigned a TQ of 500 pounds, substances with index values
greater than or equal to 0.01 and less than 0.05 were assigned a TQ of
1000 pounds, substances with index values greater than or equal to 0.05
and less than 0.1 were assigned a TQ of 2500 pounds, and so on, up to
the maximum TQ value of 20,000 pounds. If EPA used the new index values
to assign TQs based on these current ranges, then TQs for substances
that currently have higher TQs would tend to drop, while TQs for
substances with lower TQs would generally remain unchanged. Therefore,
under this scenario, most substances would be grouped into the lower
TQs.
    Alternatively, if EPA established TQs by redefining the index value
ranges for each TQ according to the new range of index values alone
(i.e., disregarding the old index ranges), then the change would have
the effect of reshuffling substances into new TQs. In this scenario,
incorporating AEGL values would likely result in reducing the TQ for
some substances (those with the lowest AEGL-to-LOC ratio), while
raising it (or causing no change) for others. As the purpose of
assigning TQs according to a distribution of index values was to assign
lower TQs to the more toxic and easily dispersed substances and higher
TQs to less toxic and less easily dispersed substances, this approach
may be more appropriate.
    Adopting AEGL-2 values in place of ERPG-2 values to establish new
toxic endpoints would have a more direct effect. AEGL-2 values are
often, but not always, lower than the existing toxic endpoints. Where
the AEGL value is lower than the current toxic endpoint for a
particular substance, the new toxic endpoint would likewise be lower,
and vice versa. The practical effect of changing toxic endpoints would
be to change the off-site consequence analysis distance to endpoint for
a given substance and release quantity. For all processes containing
substances with new lower toxic endpoints, larger worst case and
alternative release scenario zones would result, whereas processes
containing substances with new higher toxic endpoints would have
smaller off-site consequence zones. If most toxic endpoints were to
either decrease or remain the same, another result would likely be that
fewer regulated processes would be eligible for Program 1.
    EPA requests information on the following questions regarding
recalculating reporting thresholds and/or toxic endpoints using AEGLs
(or EPRG values when AEGLs are not available):
    a. Would revising the RMP rule to incorporate AEGL-2 and ERPG-2
values (when an AEGL is not available), as the basis for TQs and toxic
endpoints make the RMP rule more protective of human health and the
environment? Would it result in significant changes to the universe of
RMP-regulated facilities due to potential changes in TQs? If so, what
number and types of facilities would be most affected and what changes
would occur?
    b. The IDLH values used for setting the existing TQs are based on
an exposure period of 30 minutes. If the IDLH was not available, the
acute toxicity data used to determine the equivalent IDLH varied
depending on the chemical and actual study, and these numbers typically
ranged from 1 to 8 hours. The ERPG-2 values used for the toxic
endpoints represent an exposure period of 1 hour. Given that AEGLs are
established with five different exposure periods (10 minutes, 30
minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours), which exposure time should be
used if the AEGL is used to determine the TQs and/or toxic endpoints?
    c. What should be the hierarchy for developing an alternative or
equivalent LOC when an AEGL value has not been established for a toxic
substance? Should ERPG values be used instead if they exist? If no ERPG
value exists, should an LOC based on the IDLH value

be used instead if it exists? If there is no IDLH value, how should the
LOC be calculated for either the TQ or toxic endpoint? Is there an
alternate method for establishing an equivalent LOC for those chemicals
not having an AEGL or ERPG that will result in an appropriate TQ?
    d. Currently, RMP worst-cast scenarios can be based on 10-minute or
60-minute release times. Because many AEGL-2 values are established for
1-hour, 4-hour and 8-hour exposure periods, should requirements for
determining the worst-case and alternative release scenarios also
incorporate four and eight hour release times using the 4-hour and 8-
hour AEGL-2 values for a particular toxic chemical?
    e. Should EPA consider using AEGL-1 rather than AEGL-2 values for
calculating reporting thresholds and toxic endpoints in order to
address acute effects that are transient and reversible (such as
discomfort and irritation)?
    f. What would be the economic impacts of recalculating TQs as
discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving small
entities that EPA should consider with respect to recalculating TQs?
10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data
    When developing the RMP, the Agency scaled the regulatory
requirements based on the potential risk posed by a source and the
steps needed to address the risk, rather than imposing identical
requirements on all sources. To this end, processes subject to RMP
requirements were divided into three tiers: Programs 1, 2, and 3 (see
section I.C). Eligibility for any given Program is based on process
criteria so that classification of one process in a Program does not
influence the classification of other processes at the source. The
Agency established the most stringent RMP requirements under Program 3
for those industry sectors that represented a potentially higher risk
of accidental releases.
    Industry accident records represent a reasonable criterion for
identifying high risk sources. If an entire industry has a long history
of accidental releases, it may indicate that the materials handled and
handling conditions generate a higher potential for serious releases,
or that the government or industry standards applicable to that
industry area are not effectively minimizing risks. Additionally,
accident history associated with industry sectors was identified by EPA
as a better surrogate for underlying risk than individual source
accident histories because accidents are rare events; a source with no
accidental releases over the previous five years is not necessarily
safe. Further, serious chemical accidents occur infrequently even at
sources with poor process safety practices.
    Program 3 eligibility is based in part on the NAICS associated with
the covered process.\63\ The specific codes identified for Program 3
were based on an analysis of reported accident histories within
industry areas, selecting those that evidenced a higher risk
potential.\64\ EPA selected the industry sectors that showed a high
frequency of the most serious accidents across a significant percentage
of all sources within the sector to avoid mischaracterizing an industry
based on isolated, problematic sources. Accounting for the number of
reports from individual sources was intended to avoid selecting a
sector because of a small number of sources with serious safety
problems. The analysis included not only off-site impacts, but also
accidental releases that caused death, hospitalizations, or injuries on
site, as these may serve as an indicator of significant safety problems
that could lead to releases with off-site impacts. Program 3 applies to
processes not eligible for Program 1 and in NAICS 32211 (pulp mills),
32411 (petroleum refineries), 32511 (petrochemical manufacturing),
325181 (alkalies and chlorine), 325188 (all other inorganic chemical
manufacturing), 325192 (other cyclic crude and intermediate
manufacturing), 325199 (all other basic organic chemical
manufacturing), 325211 (plastics and resins), 325311 (nitrogen
fertilizer), and 32532 (pesticide and other agricultural chemicals).
Program 3 also applies to all processes subject to the OSHA PSM
standard, unless the process is eligible for Program 1.
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    \63\ The 1996 final RMP rule based Program 3 eligibility on the
old Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code system, which
assigned four-digit codes to different industry sectors. However, in
1997, the U.S. Government, in cooperation with the governments of
Canada and Mexico, adopted a new industry classification system, the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), to replace
the SIC codes. NAICS codes are either five or six digits, depending
on the degree to which the sector is subdivided. As a result, in
1999 EPA revised RMP requirements whose applicability was originally
based on SIC codes (64 FR 964, January 6, 1999). All ``SIC code''
references were replaced with ``NAICS code'' and the nine SIC codes
subject to Program 3 prevention program requirements were replaced
with ten NAICS codes.
    \64\ EPA Report: Development of Decision Criteria For Accident
History by SIC Code Approach and 100 or More Employee Approach, EPA
Docket Number HQ-OAR-2004-0365, February 28, 1995.
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    The RMP national database now contains nearly two decades of
accident history reports from covered sources, and the Agency believes
that these reports represent a more comprehensive picture of the
relative accident risks associated with different industry sectors
regulated under the rule than was available to the Agency prior to the
rule's publication. Based on these accident reports, the ten NAICS
codes most frequently associated with accidents in RMP-regulated
processes are 32411 (petroleum refineries), 325199 (all other basic
organic chemical manufacturing), 325188 (all other basic inorganic
chemical manufacturing), 22131 (water supply and irrigation systems),
42491 (farm supplies merchant wholesalers), 22132 (sewage treatment
facilities), 325181 (alkalies and chlorine manufacturing), 311615
(poultry processing), 49312 (refrigerated warehousing and storage), and
32211 (pulp mills).\65\ The Agency is requesting information on the
appropriateness of reevaluating the NAICS industry sectors originally
identified to determine Program 3 applicability based on the collected
RMP data. Specifically, EPA requests information on the following
questions:
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    \65\ We note that for purposes of categorizing RMP processes
based on accident frequency, some different NAICS codes represent
essentially the same type of chemical process. For example,
facilities in NAICS 311615 (poultry processing) and 49312
(refrigerated warehousing and storage) generally become RMP-
regulated as a result of using large anhydrous ammonia refrigeration
systems. Similarly, there are several NAICS codes for RMP-regulated
processes that represent bulk storage of anhydrous ammonia by
agricultural chemical distribution facilities. EPA could account for
this by aggregating accidents from similar process types when
updating Program 3 NAICS codes.
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    a. Should industry sectors represented in RMP data as those with
the most accidental releases be used to update and replace the existing
set of Program 3 NAICS codes with a new set?
    b. How can the RMP accident history data best be used to update the
current list of NAICS codes that trigger Program 3 requirements? Should
the agency take into account the number of sources in each sector, or
the severity of reported accidents, or other factors, in selecting
updated Program 3 NAICS codes? Is the methodology used to develop the
SIC/NAICS code list applicable to the RMP accident history database?
    c. Would limiting the data analysis or the selection of NAICS codes
to only those industry sectors represented in the RMP data provide a
complete and accurate picture of high risk industry sectors?
    d. Should an analysis of the RMP data be combined with an analysis
of other

current accident history databases to inform any revisions/updates? If
so, what other databases should be used? How much weight should be
given to the RMP data set in comparison to other sources?
    e. Should the original NAICS codes continue to be included? Would
not including the NAICS codes historically identified under Program 3
cause increase risks to those industry sectors by having them no longer
subject to the more stringent measures?
    f. Should an analysis of accident history data be limited to a
specific time frame?
    g. Would it cause confusion within the regulated community to
change the list of NAICS codes for which Program 3 is required?
    h. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the list of
NAICS codes for which Program 3 is required? Are there any special
circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with
respect to modifying the list of covered NAICS codes?
11. The ``Safety Case'' Regulatory Model
    The ``safety case'' regulatory model \66\ is a framework for
regulating high-risk industries where owners or operators of industrial
facilities are required to demonstrate to the regulator that they have
reduced risks to a level that is ``as low as reasonably practicable'',
or ALARP. In the safety case model, operators must present to
regulators a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that
provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is
safe for a given application in a given operating environment. This
regulatory approach is used in the chemical and refining industries by
some countries outside the U.S., including the United Kingdom,
Australia, Norway, and others, and is similar in practice to the U.S.
regulatory regime for nuclear reactor facilities regulated by the NRC.
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    \66\ http://www.csb.gov/working-papers-on-the-safety-case-regulatory-model-and-its-attributes/.
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    In its December 2013 Draft Regulatory Report on the Chevron
Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, the CSB advocates the safety
case approach as a safety management framework for U.S. refineries.\67\
The CSB specifically recommends that the California legislature adopt
the safety case approach for refineries in California, and that OSHA,
as part of that Agency's response to Executive Order 13650, ``develop
questions and evaluate issues raised from the findings and conclusions
in this report concerning the safety case regime.'' As the CSB report
was published after OSHA published its RFI under Executive Order 13650,
OSHA was not able to include questions concerning the CSB's safety case
recommendation within its RFI. However, because the OSHA PSM standard
and EPA RMP regulation are closely linked, and together constitute the
federal regulatory framework for chemical process safety management
regulation in the U.S., EPA believes it is appropriate for the Agency
to raise this issue within this RFI.
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    \67\ At its January 15, 2014, meeting, the Board refused to
endorse this aspect of the draft report. The majority directed the
CSB staff to revise the report within 120 days. http://www.contracostatimes.com/rss/ci_24922079.
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    Completely replacing the current RMP regulation (and PSM standard)
with a safety case approach would require significant changes to the
existing regulatory regime for chemical process safety in the United
States. Nevertheless, EPA is requesting public comment on whether EPA
and OSHA should consider these actions. As an alternative to a
wholesale adoption of the safety case approach, EPA and/or OSHA could
potentially implement selected aspects of the approach within the
current regulatory framework. For example, EPA and OSHA could require
owners and operators to submit a PHA or a similar document to EPA and
OSHA, and require Agency approval of the PHA. Also, EPA and OSHA could
limit the applicability of the safety case approach to selected
categories of high-risk facilities, such as petroleum refineries.
    EPA requests information on the advantages and disadvantages of
adopting a safety case approach to replace the RMP regulation and PSM
standard, or alternatively, of incorporating aspects of the approach
into current regulations or for selected categories of facilities. In
particular, EPA requests information on the following questions:
    a. If you own or operate any RMP or PSM-covered facilities and also
own or operate facilities in countries that use a safety case
regulatory regime, please describe the process of developing and
obtaining approval for your safety case. How long does development and
approval of a safety case take for a large petroleum refinery or
chemical processing facility? What are the advantages and disadvantages
of the safety case approach in comparison to the existing U.S.
regulatory regime for chemical process safety? Is there any evidence
that the safety case approach reduces the frequency and severity of
accidental releases and near misses? If so, please provide any
information, data, or studies to EPA that demonstrate these effects.
How expensive is it for facility owners to implement the safety case
approach in comparison to implementing RMP or PSM? Do you already
incorporate aspects of the safety case approach in your risk management
program?
    b. The CSB Draft Regulatory Report on the Chevron Richmond Refinery
Pipe Rupture and Fire \68\ highlights the NRC as a U.S. regulator that
has established a safety case approach for licensing and oversight of
commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The NRC oversees
approximately 100 nuclear reactor and 3000 nuclear materials facilities
in the U.S.\69\; the NRC has nearly 4000 employees and an annual budget
of over $1 billion.\70\ What additional resources would be required by
EPA and OSHA in order to establish and oversee a safety case regulatory
regime for RMP and PSM-covered facilities?
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    \68\ http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Chevron_Richmond_Refinery_Regulatory_Report.pdf.
    \69\ http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder.html.
    \70\ http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v29/fy2014-cbj.pdf.
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    c. Is the safety case approach suitable for all RMP and PSM covered
facilities, or, if adopted, should it be limited to only the most high-
risk facilities, such as petroleum refineries and other high-risk
chemical processing facilities?
    d. What would be the economic impacts of moving to a safety case
based regulatory regime for chemical facility safety? Are there any
special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider
with respect to safety case based approach?
12. Streamlining RMP Requirements
    In addition to the items listed above, EPA is interested in
gathering information on any other areas within part 68 that should be
modernized, strengthened, or clarified. In particular, EPA invites
comment on any potential revisions to the RMP rule that would make it
easier for regulated sources to comply with its requirements. EPA also
requests information on the following questions:
    a. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the process of
determining whether the RMP rule applies to particular facilities? Are
there other potential revisions to the rule that would make it easier
for regulated entities to comply with its provisions?
    b. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the RMP
submission process? For example, are there advances in electronic
reporting or information technology that EPA could use in order to make
RMP submissions easier?

    c. Should EPA require that RMP submissions be certified by a senior
corporate official, such as the Chief Executive Officer, Chief
Financial Officer, Chief Operations Officer, or the equivalent to
ensure corporate-wide awareness and accountability in the RMP
submission?
    d. Is the three-tiered program level structure of the RMP
regulation appropriate, or should EPA consider simplifying the rule to
make only two program tiers, or only a single prevention program
applicable to all facilities?
    e. Are the accident prevention program elements clearly defined?
Should EPA further clarify any of the existing elements?
    f. Are the regulatory terms and definitions contained in section
68.3 sufficiently clear? Are there additional terms that EPA should
define in this section?

    Dated: July 24, 2014.
Mathy Stanislaus,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response.
[FR Doc. 2014-18037 Filed 7-30-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P