interconnection requests so that they are representative of ``current
system

conditions.'' \191\ APS also asks the Commission to clarify that such
language simply requires that the posted network models and underlying
assumptions reasonably represent those anticipated future system
conditions that the transmission provider utilizes to evaluate
interconnection requests.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ APS Rehearing Request at 17.
    \192\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    87. APS notes that there are often significant differences between
``current system conditions'' and those conditions utilized in the base
cases and models to evaluate interconnection requests. More
specifically, APS states that current system conditions would not
include those facilities, equipment, configurations, relay settings,
etc., unless they are built and operating. Conversely, APS states that
``models and base case data utilized to evaluate Interconnection
Request[s] incorporate planned, future facilities, equipment,
configurations, relay settings, etc.'' \193\ For this reason, APS
argues that the network models and underlying assumptions utilized to
evaluate interconnection requests will, and should, always differ from
those models and assumption utilized to ``approximate or evaluate
`current system conditions,' which do not, and should not, incorporate,
or rely upon, planned, future facilities, equipment, configurations,
[and] relay settings.'' \194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ Id.
    \194\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    88. We grant APS' request for clarification. In Order No. 845, the
Commission did not require that transmission providers modify the
network models and the underlying assumptions used in interconnection
studies. Rather, the purpose of the revisions to section 2.3 of the pro
forma LGIP is to make transparent the base case data, network models,
and underlying assumptions that transmission providers use to conduct
interconnection studies. Therefore, we clarify that the phrase
``current system conditions'' does not require transmission providers
to maintain network models that reflect current real-time operating
conditions of the transmission provider's system. Instead, the network
model information should reflect the system conditions currently used
in interconnection studies.
D. Congestion and Curtailment Information
    89. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require that
transmission providers post congestion and curtailment information in
one location on their OASIS sites so that interconnection customers
could more easily access information that may aid in their decision
making.\195\ In Order No. 845, however, the Commission declined to
adopt this proposal after considering the comments on the NOPR. The
Commission stated that it found ``persuasive those comments that assert
that, in some instances, generating information on the causes of
congestion or on unit-specific or constraint-specific curtailment
information is technically infeasible or would require significant
additional effort.'' \196\ The Commission also noted that many
transmission providers already publish congestion and curtailment data
and that other pertinent information is otherwise available.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 247.
    \196\ Id. P 270.
    \197\ Id. P 271.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Request for Rehearing
    90. Generation Developers seek rehearing of the Commission's
decision not to require the posting of congestion and curtailment
information. They assert that transmission providers should want to
post this information to improve siting decisions, but few transmission
providers do so, and, even when they do, there is a lack of uniformity.
Generation Developers add that non-disclosure agreements would address
any confidentiality concerns.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ Generation Developers Rehearing Request at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    91. Generation Developers also assert that the Commission did not
explain why it concluded that posting the information is ``technically
infeasible'' when the transmission provider already knows this
information.\199\ Generation Developers argue that the need for
additional effort on the part of the transmission provider should not
outweigh the need for making this information available. Finally,
Generation Developers state that posting the information furthers the
Commission's goal for improving transparency, and failure to do so
increases uncertainties in the interconnection process.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ Id. at 16.
    \200\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Determination
    92. We deny Generation Developers' request for rehearing. First, we
reiterate that many transmission providers already publish some
congestion and curtailment data such as locational marginal price data
and dispatch reports.\201\ Furthermore, we again note that a
significant amount of publicly available information for the Eastern
Interconnection is contained in the NERC Transmission Loading Relief
(TLR) Logs, including the duration, direction, and MW of
curtailments.\202\ We also note that multiple commenters made a
credible argument that imposing the proposed requirements would not
provide information that would be useful for interconnection
customers.\203\ We disagree with Generation Developers that the
Commission did not explain why providing such information is
technically infeasible. As noted in Order No. 845, PJM Interconnection
L.L.C. (PJM), for example, explained that it lacked the software
capability to determine congestion causes.\204\ The Commission decided
not to proceed with its proposal in light of the limited usefulness,
difficulty, and technical infeasibility of complying with the proposed
requirements. For these reasons, we continue to believe that it was not
appropriate to proceed with the proposed requirement. Additionally, we
note that, in a rulemaking proceeding, the agency is ``accorded
considerable deference in evaluating information presented and reaching
decisions based upon its expertise,'' and ``the agency's decision to
refrain from amending the elaborate, established regulatory scheme
cannot be disturbed absent a strong showing that such action was
unreasonable.'' \205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 271.
    \202\ Id.
    \203\ See id. P 264.
    \204\ Id. PP 258, 270.
    \205\ Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Safety,
706 F.2d 1216, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also New York v. FERC,
535 U.S. 1, at 28 (2002) (finding the Commission's choice not to
assert jurisdiction represents a statutorily permissible policy
choice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Definition of Generating Facility in the Pro Forma LGIP and Pro
Forma LGIA

    93. In Order No. 845, the Commission revised the definition of
``Generating Facility'' to include electric storage resources and to
allow electric storage resources to interconnect pursuant to large
generator interconnection processes. Specifically, the Commission
revised the definition of a generating facility in the pro forma LGIP
and pro forma LGIA as follows (with additions in italics): ``Generating
Facility shall mean Interconnection Customer's device for the
production and/or storage for later injection of electricity identified
in the Interconnection Request, but shall not include the

interconnection customer's Interconnection Facilities.'' \206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 273.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    94. APS requests that the Commission revise the definition of
``Generating Facility'' to recognize the load characteristics of
electric storage resources.\207\ APS's concern is that the definition
adopted by Order No. 845 could narrow the scope of studies that a
transmission provider will perform, create ambiguity regarding the
upgrades necessary to accommodate the load characteristics of electric
storage resources, and create inconsistencies with the definition of
``electric storage resource'' in Order No. 841.\208\ APS also states
that neither the pro forma LGIP nor the pro forma LGIA allow the
transmission provider to study the load characteristics of electric
storage resources and are not specific as to how the transmission
provider should recover the costs for those studies or how the
transmission provider should classify the upgrades needed to
accommodate the load characteristics of electric storage resources for
cost allocation purposes.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \207\ APS Rehearing Request at 18.
    \208\ Id. (citing Electric Storage Participation in Markets
Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent
System Operators, Order No. 841, 83 FR 9,580 (Mar. 6, 2018), 162
FERC ] 61,127 (2018)). Order No. 841 defines an electric storage
resource as ``a resource capable of receiving electric energy from
the grid and storing it for later injection of electric energy back
to the grid.'' Order No. 841, 162 FERC ] 61,127 at n.1.
    \209\ APS Rehearing Request at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Determination
    95. We deny APS' rehearing request. We reiterate that the
definition change in Order No. 845 allows electric storage resources
that wish to interconnect pursuant to the pro forma LGIP and pro forma
LGIA to do so, and the revised definition is consistent with Order No.
792's revisions to the definition of ``small generating facility'' in
the pro forma Small Generator Interconnection Procedures (SGIP) and pro
forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement (SGIA).\210\ While
Order No. 845 revised the definition of generating facility, it did not
define ``electric storage resource.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 273.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    96. Moreover, we find it is not necessary to impose requirements
regarding the scope of studies needed to account for the load
characteristics of electric storage resources and the upgrades required
to accommodate those load characteristics here. In Order No. 845, the
Commission did not take a position regarding, or impose requirements
pertaining to, the load characteristics of electric storage resources.
Instead, the Commission observed that transmission providers have the
flexibility to address the load characteristics of electric storage
resources and that electric storage resources have already
interconnected pursuant to Commission-jurisdictional LGIPs and
LGIAs.\211\ The Commission also stated that, if a transmission provider
finds that the terms of its pro forma LGIA are insufficient to
accommodate a particular resource, ``the LGIP permits a transmission
provider to enter into non-conforming LGIAs when necessary.'' \212\
Because the requirement in Order No. 845 is to allow electric storage
resources to interconnect under the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA,
APS's request and discussion of the load characteristics of electric
storage resources are beyond the scope of Order No. 845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ Id. P 285.
    \212\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Interconnection Study Deadlines

    97. In Order No. 845, the Commission modified the pro forma LGIP to
institute quarterly reporting requirements for transmission providers
to report interconnection study performance data on their OASIS sites
or public websites. The Commission also adopted requirements for
transmission providers to file informational reports with the
Commission if a transmission provider exceeds its interconnection study
deadlines for more than 25 percent of any study type for two
consecutive calendar quarters (Filed Report Requirement).
    98. In adopting these reporting requirements, the Commission found
that the reporting requirements provide increased transparency and
information to interconnection customers and do not unduly burden
transmission providers.\213\ It also found that the increased
transparency resulting from these new requirements should provide for
``improved queue management and better informed interconnection
customer planning--results that may be important enough to support some
corresponding burden on transmission providers.'' \214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ Id. P 307.
    \214\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Adoption of Order No. 845 Interconnection Study Metric Reporting
Requirements
a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    99. Southern requests rehearing, arguing that the Commission failed
to account for events outside of a transmission provider's control and
that the Filed Report Requirement could subject transmission providers
to additional reporting requirements and penalties for circumstances
beyond their control.\215\ Southern contends that ``this failure to
make a rational connection between the facts and the requirement[s]
adopted'' is arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the law.\216\
Southern contends that the Commission has adopted skewed metrics that
inappropriately suggest that delays are the fault of the transmission
provider without regard to possible interconnection customer action.
Southern contends that this approach could lead to a determination that
a transmission provider is not using reasonable efforts and result in a
possible penalty.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ Southern Rehearing Request at 3, 10-11.
    \216\ Id. at 10-11.
    \217\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    100. Southern also seeks rehearing on the start date for measuring
interconnection study performance metrics. It asserts that the date
that a transmission provider receives an executed study agreement from
the interconnection customer is not the appropriate start date. In
support of this argument, it points out that the transmission provider
may not receive additional items required for an interconnection
request, such as study deposits and technical data, for some time after
the execution of the study agreement. Southern states that, if the
Commission does not adopt ``a revised start date that commences with
the receipt of the study deposit and provision of complete and valid
data, then . . . [it] should clarify that an Interconnection Customer
is required to provide the study deposit and complete and valid
technical data before the Transmission Provider is required to begin
the study.'' \218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    101. We deny Southern's rehearing request that the Commission
reconsider the requirement for transmission providers to quarterly post
interconnection study metrics. The purpose of the study reporting
requirements is to improve

interconnection customer planning, transmission provider queue
management, and Commission oversight. As noted in Order No. 845, we
believe that the increased transparency provided through the reported
study information could ``allow interconnection customers to assess
whether a transmission provider is using `reasonable efforts' to
process interconnection studies'' and allow them ``to develop informed
expectations about how long the interconnection study portion of the
process actually takes'' within a particular transmission system.\219\
The Commission has acknowledged that interconnection study delays may
not be the result of the transmission provider's actions, and, in
recognition of this possibility, it declined to implement automatic
penalties for study delays.\220\ While we understand that Southern has
concerns that posting data on transmission providers' consistency with
tariff study timeframes may result in parties attempting to place blame
on transmission providers, we note that the reported metric data in
itself does not determine drivers for possible study data variance. The
reported metrics are simply a transparency tool into the results, but
not the drivers, of study completion. The posted study metrics indicate
the proportion of interconnection studies a transmission provider is
able to complete in the time frames established in its LGIP. We note
that transmission providers are able to provide the rationale for and
details regarding interconnection study delays to relevant
interconnection customers under the provisions of sections 6.3, 7.4,
and 8.3 in the pro forma LGIP and to other stakeholders as part of the
information in the reports submitted under the Filed Report
Requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 306 (quoting Pro
forma LGIP Section 1 (Definition)).
    \220\ Id. P 309.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    102. As the Commission noted in Order No. 845, the detailed
information provided to the Commission through the Filed Report
Requirement should be particularly beneficial in identifying process
deficiencies and the causes of delays in regions that persistently
experience significant delays.\221\ This requirement also creates some
consistency in the process for interconnection customers to obtain
certain interconnection study information from transmission providers,
and they will create a record that will allow the Commission to better
assess the reasons for interconnection study delays.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ Id. PP 308, 310.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    103. We also deny Southern's request for rehearing regarding the
start date for measuring interconnection study performance metrics,
which Order No. 845 specifies as beginning with the execution of the
relevant interconnection study agreement. Pursuant to the study
performance metrics established in Order No. 845, the Commission uses
the period between the execution of an interconnection study agreement
and the date that the transmission provider provides the completed
interconnection study to the interconnection customer as a time period
for comparison \222\ against the study time frame specified for that
interconnection study in the pro forma LGIP, as established in Order
No. 2003.\223\ For purposes of consistency, the Commission chose to use
the execution of an interconnection study agreement as the starting
point for this comparison period because the pro forma LGIP uses the
execution of an interconnection study agreement as the starting point
for determining the time frame for completing an interconnection
study.\224\ In response to Southern's expressed concern, we note,
however, that, as established in Order No. 2003, an executed
interconnection study agreement is submitted concurrently with a study
deposit and the provision of technical data called for in the
interconnection study agreement.\225\ As such, the timing for these
components and their relationship with submission of an executed
interconnection agreement has already been established and was not
changed by Order No. 845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ See Pro Forma LGIP, Sections <IP_ADDRESS>(D), <IP_ADDRESS>(D), &
<IP_ADDRESS>(D).
    \223\ See Pro Forma LGIP, Section 6.3, 7.4, & 8.3.
    \224\ See, e.g., Pro Forma LGIP, Section 6.3: ``The Transmission
Provider shall use Reasonable Efforts to complete the
Interconnection Feasibility Study no later than forty-five (45)
Calendar Days after the Transmission Provider receives the fully
executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement.'' See also Pro
Forma LGIP, Sections 7.4 & 8.3.
    \225\ See, e.g., Pro Forma LGIP, Section 6.1: ``The
Interconnection Customer shall execute and deliver to the
Transmission Provider the Interconnection Feasibility Study
Agreement along with a $10,000 deposit no later than thirty (30)
Calendar Days after its receipt. On or before the return of the
executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement to the
Transmission Provider, the Interconnection Customer shall provide
the technical data called for in Appendix 1, Attachment A.'' See
also Pro Forma LGIP, Sections 7.2 & 8.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Interconnection Study Data Posting Requirements
a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    104. EEI requests clarification on two issues related to reporting
interconnection study metrics. First, EEI requests clarification that
the interconnection study metric reporting requirement begins with data
for 2018, because Order No. 845 became effective on July 23, 2018.\226\
EEI notes that Order No. 845 adopts the NOPR language requiring the
posting of quarterly metrics beginning with 2017. In response, EEI
expresses concern that the study data required may not be available
retroactively to the beginning of calendar year 2017 in the detail
required by Order No. 845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ EEI Rehearing Request at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    105. Second, EEI seeks clarification on the timing for filing
reports if a transmission provider triggers the Filed Report
Requirement.\227\ Specifically, EEI asks how to comply with the Filed
Report Requirement to submit a report ``within 45 days of the end of
the calendar quarter'' if posted data from 2017 indicate that the Filed
Report Requirement was triggered even though Order No. 845 ``did not go
into effect until Q2 2018.'' \228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ Id.
    \228\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    106. To clarify that the events that would trigger the Filed Report
Requirement begin after Order No. 845 became effective, EEI recommends
that the Commission revise section 3.5.3 of the pro forma LGIP as
follows (with proposed deletions in brackets from and proposed
additions in italics):

    3.5.3 Transmission Provider is required to post on OASIS or its
website the measures in paragraph <IP_ADDRESS>(A) through paragraph
<IP_ADDRESS>(F) for each calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of
the calendar quarter. Transmission Provider will keep the quarterly
measures posted on OASIS or its website for three calendar years
with the first required [reporting year to be 2017] quarterly report
to be for the first calendar quarter after the effective date of
Order No. 845. If Transmission Provider retains this information on
its website, a link to the information must be provided on
Transmission Provider's OASIS site.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ Id.

b. Determination
    107. We grant EEI's request for clarification and confirm that the
date for measuring study performance metrics and the reporting
requirements do not require transmission providers to post 2017
interconnection study metrics. EEI requested that the posting
requirement begin in the 2018 calendar quarter after Order No. 845
becomes effective.\230\ However, in light of the Commission's granting
of a compliance

extension to a date 90 days after issuance of this order,\231\ we
likewise extend the commencement of the retention and posting
requirements. The reporting requirement shall commence in the first
calendar quarter of 2020. This applies to both the study metrics
reporting requirement and the Filed Report Requirement. To effectuate
this clarification, we revise section 3.5.3 of the pro forma LGIP as
follows (with deletions from and additions to the language from Order
No. 845 in brackets and in italics, respectively):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ As noted below in Section J.1. Compliance and Effective
Dates, EEI requested an extension of the Order No. 845 Compliance
deadline.
    \231\ Notice of Extension of Compliance Date, Docket No. RM17-8-
000 (Oct. 3, 2018).

    Transmission Provider is required to post on OASIS or its
website the measures in paragraph <IP_ADDRESS>(A) through paragraph
<IP_ADDRESS>(F) for each calendar quarter within 30 days of the end of
the calendar quarter. Transmission Provider will keep the quarterly
measures posted on OASIS or its website for three calendar years
with the first required [reporting year to be 2017] report to be in
the first quarter of 2020. If Transmission Provider retains this
information on its website, a link to the information must be
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provided on Transmission Provider's OASIS site.

G. Requesting Interconnection Service Below Generating Facility
Capacity

    108. In Order No. 845, the Commission modified the pro forma LGIP
to allow interconnection customers to request interconnection service
that is lower than the proposed generating facility capacity,\232\
recognizing the need for proper control technologies and flexibility
for transmission providers to propose penalties to ensure that the
generating facility does not inject energy above the requested level of
service.\233\ The Commission also clarified that interconnection
customers may either request interconnection service below generating
facility capacity in their interconnection requests, or reduce their
levels of requested interconnection service by up to 60 percent and 15
percent, respectively, at two subsequent points in the interconnection
process: (1) Prior to returning an executed system impact study
agreement; and (2) prior to returning an executed facilities study
agreement.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ The term generating facility capacity means ``the net
capacity of the Generating Facility and the aggregate net capacity
of the Generating Facility where it includes multiple energy
production devices.'' Pro forma LGIA Art. 1.
    \233\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 367.
    \234\ Id. PP 405-06.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    109. With respect to the need to enforce limits on energy injection
through monitoring and control technologies, and the related issue of
penalties for over-generation, the Commission largely relied on
existing provisions of the pro forma LGIA to address these needs. These
include any provisions related to system protection facilities and any
provisions that allow a transmission provider to curtail service or
terminate an LGIA in response to an interconnection customer exceeding
its energy injection limit.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ Id. PP 369-72, 396, 416-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    110. The Commission also required transmission providers to study
interconnection requests at the level of interconnection service
requested by the interconnection customer for purposes of identifying
interconnection facilities and network upgrades. Furthermore, the
Commission stated that transmission providers may, if determined
necessary to ensure safety and reliability, perform studies at the full
generating facility capacity. The Commission clarified that, in such
circumstances, the transmission provider must provide a detailed
written explanation for such a determination to the interconnection
customer.\236\ The Commission also required that, if the transmission
provider determines that additional network upgrades are necessary
based on these studies, it must specify which additional network
upgrade costs are based on which studies and provide a detailed
explanation of why the additional network upgrades are necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ Id. PP 383-84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    111. APS argues that the indemnification and liability provisions
of the pro forma LGIA would not protect transmission providers where
the action or inaction of an interconnection customer resulted in
damage to or loss of use of the transmission provider's equipment or
facilities or where such damage resulted in increased costs or loss of
revenue for transmission providers. APS asks the Commission to clarify
that transmission providers may propose stronger indemnification
provisions in their LGIPs or LGIAs for interconnection service that is
less than a generating facility's generating facility capacity.
According to APS, operational controls can fail, and without explicit
provisions addressing interconnection customer liability, the reform
inequitably allocates consequential risk (which is directly
attributable to a generating facility's operation) to transmission
providers. For these reasons, APS requests clarification that
transmission providers may propose LGIP/LGIA provisions to protect
themselves from these risks or costs. APS also asks the Commission to
explicitly define the interconnection customer's responsibilities for
security, liability, indemnification, and overall reliability if an
interconnection customer is interconnecting at a capacity lower than
the full generating facility capacity.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ APS Rehearing Request at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    112. AWEA requests clarification regarding the timing of when a
transmission provider must inform the interconnection customer of its
election to perform additional studies at the full generating facility
capacity. Specifically, AWEA argues that the transmission provider
should inform the interconnection customer before performing these
additional studies so that the interconnection customer can provide
additional information or otherwise alleviate transmission provider
concerns without the loss of time and money it may otherwise spend on
additional studies. AWEA notes that the interconnection customer may
bear the cost of additional studies and may seek to pursue dispute
resolution if there is no agreement on the adequacy of control
technologies or the need for additional study at the full generating
facility capacity.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ AWEA Request for Clarification at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    113. AWEA also asks the Commission to clarify that there should be
flexibility for the interconnection customer to wait until a facilities
study is complete before the interconnection customer has to specify
any required control technologies. It argues that this clarification is
necessary to reconcile ambiguity in Order No. 845 concerning whether it
is the interconnection customer's or transmission provider's
responsibility to propose control technologies for a generating
facility seeking service below generating facility capacity. In
particular, AWEA is unable to reconcile two statements made by the
Commission: (1) ``any control technologies proposed by the
interconnection customer to restrict the generating facility's output
to the requested interconnection service levels must be identified in
the project description at the beginning of the study process,'' and
(2) the Commission sees ``no reason to preclude a customer from relying
on the transmission provider to identify protection and control
technologies in the first instance.'' \239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ Id. at 7 (quoting Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P
396).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Determination
    114. We deny APS's request for clarification because existing
provisions in the pro forma LGIA are sufficient to

address APS's concerns. More specifically, we find that article 18.1 of
the pro forma LGIA in combination with articles 9.3 (Transmission
Provider Obligations) and 9.4 of the pro forma LGIA (Interconnection
Customer Operations), are adequate to address APS's concerns. Article
18.1 indemnifies a party from ``any and all damages, losses, claims . .
. , demand, suits, recoveries, costs and expenses, court costs,
attorney fees, and all other obligations by or to third parties,
arising out of or resulting from the other Party's action or inactions
of its obligations under this LGIA'' \240\ and covers ``the amount of
such Indemnified Person's actual loss, net of any insurance or other
recovery.'' \241\ Pro forma LGIA article 9.4 requires the
interconnection customer ``to operate, maintain and control the Large
Generating Facility . . . in a safe and reliable manner . . . in
accordance with this LGIA'' and ``all applicable requirements of the
Control Area of which it is part, as such requirements are set forth in
Appendix C, Interconnection Details, of this LGIA.'' The phrase
``action or inactions of its obligations under this LGIA'' in article
18.1 would include failure by the interconnection customer to abide by
article 9.4 and Appendix C to the LGIA. Therefore, if the
interconnection customer requests interconnection service below
generating capacity, it commits to operate consistent with such a
request under section 3.1 of the pro forma LGIP, which states that
``[t]he necessary control technologies and protection systems . . . for
exceeding the level of Interconnection Service established in the
executed, or requested to be filed unexecuted, LGIA shall be
established in Appendix C of that executed, or requested to be filed
unexecuted, LGIA.'' \242\ Moreover, Appendix C of the LGIA, which
contains interconnection details specific to the interconnection
request, must memorialize the interconnection customer's commitment to
operate consistent with its request for interconnection service below
generating facility capacity. We note that the Commission has
previously required the inclusion of such operating requirements in
Appendix C.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ Pro forma LGIA Art. 18.1.
    \241\ Id. Art. 18.1.2 (emphasis added).
    \242\ See Pro Forma LGIP Section 3.1.
    \243\ See, e.g., Essential Reliability Services and the Evolving
Bulk-Power System--Primary Frequency Response, Order No. 842, 83 FR
9,636 (Mar. 6, 2018), 162 FERC ] 61,128, at P 180 (2018) (requiring
interconnection customer and transmission providers to establish in
Appendix C of an LGIA the operating range for an interconnecting
electric storage resource that considers the system needs for
primary frequency response and the physical limitations of the
electric storage resource).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    115. It is the transmission provider's responsibility to ensure
that Appendix C of the LGIA includes these operational requirements.
More specifically, under pro forma LGIA article 9.3 (Transmission
Provider Obligations), the transmission provider ``has the
responsibility for establishing the Interconnection Customer's
operating instructions and operating protocols and procedures'' and
because ``these instructions, protocols, and procedures . . . include
reliability requirements, article 9.3 . . . gives the Transmission
Provider responsibility for modifications to Appendix C.'' \244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ Bonneville Power Admin., 112 FERC ] 61,195, at P 20
(2005), order on reh'g, 113 FERC ] 61,005 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    116. Accordingly, we find the existing indemnification provision in
pro forma LGIA article 18.1 would cover an action or inaction by the
interconnection customer related to overgeneration because the
interconnection customer would have failed to operate its generating
facility consistent with its LGIA obligations. Because of this finding,
we revise the last sentence of section 3.1 of the pro forma LGIP to now
read ``[t]he necessary control technologies and protection systems
shall be established in Appendix C of the executed, or requested to be
filed unexecuted, LGIA.'' \245\ In Order No. 845, the Commission
declined to generically adopt into the pro forma LGIP any additional
financial penalties for exceeding the limitations for interconnection
service established in the interconnection agreements. However, the
Commission did allow a transmission provider to propose and justify a
need for additional penalties in a section 205 filing. We note that, if
a transmission provider were to propose additional penalties, then
information on the additional penalties should also be included in
Appendix C of the LGIA. On a different but related note, it is worth
pointing out that an interconnection customer's failure to abide by the
operating requirements contained in Appendix C may constitute a breach
of the LGIA and may trigger the default and termination provisions in
articles 17.1.1 and 17.1.2 of the pro forma LGIA, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \245\ Pro Forma LGIP Section 3.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    117. In response to AWEA's request to require a transmission
provider to inform the interconnection customer before performing
additional studies at the full generating facility capacity, we grant
clarification and clarify that a transmission provider must provide a
detailed explanation of its determination to perform additional studies
at the full generating facility capacity to an interconnection customer
prior to performing the additional studies. This explanation will allow
the interconnection customer to understand the transmission provider's
reasoning for determining that additional studies are necessary before
the studies are conducted. We also reiterate Order No. 845's
requirement that, if after the additional studies are complete, the
transmission provider determines that additional network upgrades are
necessary, then the transmission provider must: (1) Specify which
additional network upgrade costs are based on which studies; and (2)
provide a detailed explanation of why the additional network upgrades
are necessary.\246\ Accordingly, we revise the paragraph at the end of
section 3.1 in the pro forma LGIP to include the following sentence
(with new additions from Order No. 845 in italics):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \246\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 P 384.

    These requests for Interconnection Service shall be studied at
the level of Interconnection Service requested for purposes of
Interconnection Facilities, Network Upgrades, and associated costs,
but may be subject to other studies at the full Generating Facility
Capacity to ensure safety and reliability of the system, with the
study costs borne by the Interconnection Customer. If after the
additional studies are complete, Transmission Provider determines
that additional Network Upgrades are necessary, then Transmission
Provider must: (1) Specify which additional Network Upgrade costs
are based on which studies; and (2) provide a detailed explanation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of why the additional Network Upgrades are necessary.

    118. We deny AWEA's request for clarification to allow an
interconnection customer the flexibility to propose control
technologies to the transmission provider after the completion of the
facilities study because allowing such flexibility could cause delays
in the processing of the transmission provider's queue. However, we
reiterate that the interconnection customer may propose control
technologies when it submits its interconnection request at the
beginning of the interconnection process, or, if it chooses not to,
then it may rely on the transmission provider to identify the necessary
control technologies. Additionally, Order No. 845 stated that an
interconnection customer may request to reduce its interconnection
service by up to 60 percent before it returns an executed system impact
study agreement to the transmission provider and by up to an additional
15 percent prior to the return of an executed facilities study

agreement.\247\ Because Order No. 845 permits the interconnection
customer to reduce its interconnection service below generating
facility capacity at these two other points in the generator
interconnection process,\248\ we grant rehearing in part to find that
an interconnection customer may propose control technologies at both of
these points as well. We note that this clarification still preserves
the transmission provider's ability to ensure system protection under
the existing pro form LGIA.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ Id. P 396.
    \248\ Id. P 406; see also pro forma LGIP Sections 4.4.1 & 4.4.2.
    \249\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 372; see also pro
forma LGIA Section <IP_ADDRESS>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service

    119. In Order No. 845, the Commission adopted pro forma LGIP and
pro forma LGIA provisions to enable a new interconnection customer to
utilize the unused portion of an existing interconnection customer's
interconnection service within specific parameters. The intent was to
reduce costs for interconnection customers and improve wholesale market
competition by increasing the utilization of existing interconnection
facilities and network upgrades rather than requiring new ones. These
reforms were also intended to improve capabilities at existing
generation facilities, to prevent stranded costs, and to improve access
to the transmission system.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ See Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 467.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    120. As relevant to the requests for rehearing and clarification,
in Order No. 845, the Commission modified the pro forma LGIP and pro
forma LGIA to: (1) Add a definition for ``Surplus Interconnection
Service'' to section 1 of the pro forma LGIP and to article 1 of the
pro forma LGIA; \251\ and (2) add a new section 3.3 to the pro forma
LGIP that requires the transmission provider to establish a process for
the use of surplus interconnection service.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ Id. (``Surplus Interconnection Service shall mean any
unneeded portion of Interconnection Service established in a Large
Generator Interconnection Agreement, such that if Surplus
Interconnection Service is utilized the total amount of
Interconnection Service at the Point of Interconnection would remain
the same.'').
    \252\ Id. (``Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service--
Transmission Provider must provide a process that allows an
Interconnection Customer to utilize or transfer Surplus
Interconnection Service at an existing Point of Interconnection. The
original Interconnection Customer or one of its affiliates shall
have priority to utilize Surplus Interconnection Service. If the
existing Interconnection Customer or one of its affiliates does not
exercise its priority, then that service may be made available to
other potential interconnection customers.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    121. Also relevant to the requests for rehearing, Order No. 845
required ``transmission providers to provide an expedited process for
interconnection customers to utilize or transfer surplus
interconnection service at a particular point of interconnection. This
process would be expedited in the sense that it would take place
outside of the interconnection queue.'' \253\ It also clarified that
the use or transfer of surplus interconnection service does not entail
queue jumping.\254\ Finally, Order No. 845 permitted a limited,
continuation of surplus interconnection service for up to one year
following the retirement and permanent cessation of commercial
operations of the original interconnection customer's generating
facility.\255\ Below, we address the issues raised in requests for
rehearing or clarification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ Id. P 486.
    \254\ Id. PP 487.
    \255\ Id. PP 505-06.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. Original Interconnection Customer's Ability To Utilize or
Transfer Surplus Interconnection Service
    a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    122. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations state that the
Commission's surplus interconnection service decision builds on the
premise that transmission providers, when considering interconnection
applications, must study the implications of generation output at full
capacity, and assume that each interconnection customer is fully using
its interconnection service when studying new requests. Non-Profit
Utility Trade Associations note that, on that basis, the Commission
then built a ``right'' under the tariff for interconnection customers
to market surplus interconnection capacity.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations Rehearing Request at
9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    123. However, Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations allege that
Order No. 845 fails to account for the ``dynamic nature of the
transmission planning and operating environment.'' \257\ In particular,
they argue that the Commission explicitly recognized that transmission
planners build certain assumptions into their models when it stipulated
that studies for the use of surplus interconnection capacity will focus
on available reactive power studies, short circuit fault duty analyses,
stability analyses, and any other appropriate studies.\258\ Non-Profit
Utility Trade Associations argue that, for planning models, assuming
that interconnection customers may at any time market capacity that has
long been idle alters the planning environment and will likely require
additional investment.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ Id. at 9.
    \258\ Id. at 9-10 (citing Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P
461).
    \259\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    124. According to Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations, while
``the interconnection capacity needed by any interconnection customer
may be effectively free . . . when initially secured,'' it may later
become valuable when a subsequent interconnection customer submits an
interconnection request. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations argue,
however, that permitting an interconnection customer an ongoing
opportunity to remarket interconnection service permits the value of
the associated capacity to be set at the cost of system expansion,
regardless of the cost to the interconnection customer. According to
Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations, such a result would be an
unearned windfall for the initial interconnection customer, and holds
the potential for it to assess monopoly rent meaningfully in excess of
its cost. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations further contend that,
if the original interconnection customer does not release ``its
capacity,'' a transmission provider would have ``to build out the grid
for an ensuing customer,'' with the resulting cost to be borne
ultimately by the system as a whole as costs are rolled into system-
wide rates under the Commission's generic interconnection pricing
policy.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ Id. at 9-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    125. Furthermore, Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations argue that,
under Order No. 2003, all system customers are ultimately responsible
for network upgrade costs associated with interconnection applications
on a rolled-in cost basis.\261\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations
assert that this fact ``undermines any equitable claim that
interconnection customers may have to the financial benefit of
transmission capacity associated with network upgrades for which they
have provided initial funding.'' \262\ For this reason, Non-Profit
Utility Trade Associations argue that the Commission should withdraw
the surplus interconnection service provisions because they will drive
up system-wide costs, permit interconnection process gaming, and will
not increase system efficiency.\263\ Non-Profit Utility Trade
Associations

concede that, after an interconnection is complete, some surplus
capacity may exist. For this reason, Non-Profit Utility Trade
Associations do not oppose modifications to permit the transfer of
surplus capacity for a period of five years after the interconnection's
energization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \261\ Id. at 10-11 (citing Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ] 61,103 at
PP 130-33).
    \262\ Id. at 11.
    \263\ Id. at 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    126. We deny Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations' request for
rehearing. First, we disagree with Non-Profit Utility Trade
Associations that the establishment of surplus interconnection service
fails to account for the ``dynamic nature of the transmission planning
and operating environment.'' \264\ While transmission planners may make
reasonable assumptions as to future transmission system use to plan for
transmission system maintenance, the transmission provider has no right
to assume in all circumstances that unused interconnection service will
remain unused indefinitely. In fact, Order No. 845 explained that,
``even if a generating facility only operates a few days a year, or
routinely operates at a level below its maximum capacity, the
remaining, unused interconnection service is assumed to be unavailable
to other prospective interconnection customers.'' \265\ As long as the
original interconnection customer remains in compliance with its LGIA,
it retains the right to make full use of its contracted for
interconnection service, and, so long as any necessary transmission
service has been obtained, it may inject at the full level contracted
for under its LGIA.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ Id. at 9.
    \265\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 468.
    \266\ See id PP 468-72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    127. As to the remainder of Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations'
arguments, while we agree that, where transmission providers follow the
Commission's Order No. 2003 crediting policy, transmission customers
ultimately pay for interconnection-related network upgrades,\267\ this
fact does not undermine the rationale for surplus interconnection
service. The amount of interconnection service that was granted to the
original interconnection customer remains the same throughout the term
of its LGIA, whether or not that original interconnection customer
ultimately receives credits for the cost of any network upgrades that
may have been needed to accommodate its original interconnection
request. Accordingly, the amount of surplus interconnection service
that can be offered by the original interconnection customer likewise
does not depend on whether the original interconnection customer
receives or received credits for the cost of any network upgrades that
may have been needed to accommodate its original interconnection
request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ Specifically, under the pro forma LGIA of Order No. 2003,
an interconnection customer only provides up-front financing of
network upgrades that enable interconnection service. After the
interconnection customer enters commercial operation, the
transmission provider reimburses the interconnection customer
through transmission service credits and rolls the cost of the
network upgrades into its transmission rates over time. Order No.
2003, 104 FERC ] 61,103 at PP 693-96. See also LGIA Art. 11.4.1
(``Interconnection Customer shall be entitled to a cash refund,
equal to the total amount paid to Transmission Provider and Affected
System Operator, if any, for the Network Upgrades, including any tax
gross-up or other tax-related payments, and not refunded to
Interconnection Customer pursuant to Article 5.17.8 or otherwise, to
be paid to Interconnection Customer on a dollar-for-dollar basis for
the non-usage sensitive portion of transmission charges, as payments
are made under the Transmission Provider's Tariff and Affected
System's Tariff for transmission services with respect to the Large
Generating Facility'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    128. In addition, we continue to find that these surplus
interconnection service requirements serve to ``enhance access to the
transmission system at [a specific] point of interconnection'' and are
necessarily ``limited in nature,'' as stated in Order No. 845.\268\
These requirements are consistent with the fact that, once an original
interconnection customer commences operation, nothing in its LGIA
prohibits it from operating at the full amount of interconnection
service established in its LGIA,\269\ taking into account any
curtailment for temporary reliability reasons, even if it has not
historically done so.\270\ In other words, rather than encouraging the
withholding of interconnection capacity as asserted by Non-Profit
Utility Trade Associations, the surplus interconnection service
requirements make it easier for the original interconnection customer
to utilize or transfer surplus interconnection service at a particular
point of interconnection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \268\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at PP 480-81.
    \269\ For purposes of this argument, we assume that any
necessary transmission service has been obtained to allow such
operation of the generation facility at the full amount of
interconnection service established in its LGIA.
    \270\ Id. P 480.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    129. Similarly, we disagree with Non-Profit Utility Trade
Associations' argument that ``[p]ermitting an original interconnection
customer an ongoing opportunity to remarket interconnection service''
may allow it ``to assess monopoly rent meaningfully in excess of its
cost.'' \271\ As noted in Order No. 845, new interconnection customers
retain the ``ability to submit an interconnection request for any
requested point of interconnection directly with the transmission
provider, rather than seeking surplus interconnection service with
respect to an original interconnection customer's point of
interconnection.''\272\ Furthermore, as also explained in Order No.
845, surplus interconnection service is, by definition, more limited in
nature than new interconnection service provided by the transmission
provider because: (1) The total output of the original interconnection
customer plus the surplus interconnection service customer behind the
same point of interconnection will be limited to the maximum total
amount of interconnection service granted to the original
interconnection customer; (2) the original interconnection customer
will be able to stipulate the amount of surplus interconnection service
that is available, to designate when that service is available, and to
describe any other conditions under which surplus interconnection
service at the point of interconnection may be used; and (3) it will
only be available at the preexisting point of interconnection of the
original interconnection customer.\273\ Thus, surplus interconnection
service is an inherently more limited service than non-surplus
interconnection service. For these reasons, the original
interconnection customer cannot assess monopoly rents through the sale
of surplus interconnection service because a potential purchaser of
surplus interconnection service can always opt instead for non-surplus
interconnection service from the transmission provider. That said, we
note that making surplus interconnection service available when it was
not available before provides a new option for interconnection
customers that are willing to accept the limitations associated with
surplus interconnection service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations Rehearing Request at
9.
    \272\ See, e.g., Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 482; see
also id. PP 490 & 507.
    \273\ See, e.g., id. P 481.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Effect of Expedited Surplus Interconnection Service Process on the
Queue and on Transmission Planning
a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    130. Some rehearing requests argue that the Commission has not
adequately addressed the impact that the expedited surplus
interconnection service process may have on the non-surplus
interconnection queue. APS argues that the studies associated with
surplus interconnection service must compete

for the same transmission provider resources, including personnel, as
other interconnection studies. Further, APS states that ``where interim
facilities are necessary . . . it is not clear how and when such
facilities would become `contingent facilities' in the normal
interconnection study process.'' \274\ APS adds that, where studies
from a request for surplus interconnection service identify additional
impacts, those impacts could affect interconnection customers that are
already in the queue.\275\ As a result, APS asks the Commission to
clarify that transmission providers may incorporate into their pro
forma LGIAs and LGIPs provisions that are necessary to ensure that
these issues, when they arise, can be resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ APS Rehearing Request at 14.
    \275\ Id. at 13-15. APS raises the same issues with respect to
provisional interconnection service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    131. Similarly, EEI and Southern argue that the Commission's
rationale for the surplus interconnection service provisions fails to
consider the impact to the transmission planning process if more than
two customers seek to use the same interconnection service. They argue
that, while the transmission provider can study the original
interconnection customer and the surplus interconnection customer for a
safe and reliable interconnection, transmission providers may find it
increasingly difficult to reliably study subsequent interconnection
requests and plan for future transmission system expansion.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ EEI Rehearing Request at 15; Southern Rehearing Request at
15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    132. EEI also argues that, in all transmission planning studies,
when considering safety and reliability evaluations such as breaker
duty, grounding, or stability, the transmission provider considers all
other transmission system components at full load even though most of
these components do not operate at full capacity all the time. It
argues that this methodology allows transmission providers to
efficiently plan the transmission system to operate safely and reliably
under stressed conditions and that the Commission should account for
this planning consideration when implementing Order No. 845.\277\
Finally, EEI seeks guidance to address these implementation and
operational issues and requests a technical conference or workshop to
address these issues.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \277\ EEI Rehearing Request at 15.
    \278\ Id. at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    133. We deny the requests by EEI, Southern, and APS for
clarification and technical conference with respect to the potential
impact on the queue of the expedited surplus interconnection service
process, both with respect to interconnection requests and to
transmission planning. While the Commission agrees with APS that, for a
given transmission provider, the same personnel that would be
responsible for processing the non-surplus interconnection queue would
likely also be responsible for administering the surplus
interconnection service process, this fact does not justify granting
the requests for clarification. As noted in Order No. 845, transmission
providers routinely conduct similar studies outside of the
interconnection process without causing significant delays to other
interconnection customers.\279\ None of the rehearing requests provided
evidence refuting this assertion. We find it reasonable to assume that
transmission providers will be able to similarly study surplus
interconnection service requests without creating significant delays in
the non-surplus interconnection process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \279\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 488 (citing, e.g.,
MISO FERC Electric Tariff, Attachment X (76.0.0), Section 11.5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    134. Additionally, we are not persuaded by the argument that
transmission providers may find it increasingly difficult to reliably
study later interconnection requests and plan for future transmission
system expansion due to the need to assess multiple scenarios for
surplus interconnection service at the same point of interconnection.
This issue exists irrespective of whether surplus interconnection
service is an available option, as there are always uncertainties and
complexities surrounding transmission system modeling. These
uncertainties require making assumptions as to future conditions that,
by their very nature, cannot be predicted in the present with 100
percent accuracy.\280\ Considering all of the limitations associated
with surplus interconnection service described elsewhere in this
section, particularly the fact that it cannot be granted if it would
require new network upgrades, we see no evidence that the mere
existence of surplus interconnection service would fundamentally or
significantly increase the difficulty of making assumptions as to
future conditions in connection with transmission system modeling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \280\ For example, it will always be difficult for a given
transmission provider to know with certainty how much unaffiliated
generation will retire in the future and how much new unaffiliated
generation may ultimately be built to replace it, and making
reasonable assumptions in order to address these and other
uncertainties is a necessary and intrinsic part of transmission
system modeling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    135. APS requests clarification as to how and when interim
facilities would become ``contingent facilities'' in the normal
interconnection study process. APS also requests clarification
concerning additional impacts identified in surplus interconnection
service studies affecting the determination of what upgrades are
necessary for interconnection customers that are already in the queue.
As discussed in more detail in the next section below, surplus
interconnection service cannot be granted if doing so would require new
network upgrades. Accordingly, surplus interconnection service should
have no additional impacts affecting the determination of what upgrades
are necessary for interconnection customers that are already in the
queue. Similarly, because surplus interconnection service will not be
granted if it requires new network upgrades, there should be no interim
facilities that need to be considered contingent facilities in the
normal interconnection study process. Accordingly, we find no basis to
grant clarification.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ Similarly, APS raised this issue in regards to provisional
interconnection service, and we deny clarification with respect to
provisional interconnection on the same basis. Furthermore,
provisional interconnection is only available when available studies
or additional studies as necessary indicate that there is a level of
interconnection that can occur without any additional
interconnection facilities and/or network upgrades. See id. P 441.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Impact of Differences in Electrical Characteristics Between the
Surplus and Original Interconnection Customers
a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    136. EEI states that where two generators with different electrical
characteristics (e.g., short circuit contribution, fault current,
harmonic profile) share a point of interconnection, if the transmission
provider receives a third interconnection request on the same
transmission line, the transmission provider will have to either (1)
choose one of the two original generators to include for the third
generator's interconnection evaluation or (2) perform multiple
evaluations to consider all potential generator operation scenarios.
Under the first scenario, according to EEI, it is possible that the
study could miss potential upgrades that could be necessary, and under
the second scenario, the transmission provider's study and the
transmission planning process become more complex. As a result, EEI
requests that the Commission convene a

technical conference or staff-led workshop to address these issues
prior to requiring implementation.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \282\ EEI Rehearing Request at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    137. For similar reasons, Southern asks the Commission to clarify
that transmission providers are only obligated to provide surplus
interconnection service up to the amount that can be provided without
building new network upgrades.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ Southern Rehearing Request at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    138. We clarify that, by definition, surplus interconnection
service is only available up to the level that can be accommodated
without requiring the construction of new network upgrades. We agree
that a surplus interconnection service customer may have significantly
different electrical characteristics (e.g., short circuit contribution,
fault current, harmonic profile) than the original interconnection
customer, and that those differences may sometimes result in the need
to take actions up to and potentially including the construction of new
network upgrades to maintain the reliable operation of the system in
order to accommodate the new surplus interconnection request. This
could be true even if the total injections of energy from the original
and surplus interconnection customers are limited to the level of
interconnection service contracted for by the original interconnection
customer. Thus, in recognition of the Commission's stated objective of
increasing efficiency in the interconnection process through this
reform, we clarify that surplus interconnection service is only
available up to the amount that can be accommodated without requiring
new network upgrades.\284\ This clarification should address concerns
regarding the potential impact of differences in electrical
characteristics, and therefore, no additional technical conference or
staff-led workshop is necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ We note that surplus interconnection service will likely
require new directly assignable interconnection facilities to
connect the surplus interconnection service customer to the original
interconnection customer's interconnection facilities. However,
interconnection facilities are always the sole cost responsibility
of the relevant interconnection customer, so requiring more of those
for a surplus interconnection request will not impact others in the
interconnection queue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Independent Entity Variations
a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    139. New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO) asks the
Commission to clarify that Order No. 845 does not limit the manner in
which RTOs/ISOs demonstrate independent entity variations with respect
to surplus interconnection service. Specifically, NYISO cites paragraph
477 of Order No. 845, which appears to create highly prescriptive
surplus interconnection service requirements with regard to RTO's/ISO's
interconnection procedures. However, NYISO argues that the assumptions
concerning the need for, and benefits of, surplus interconnection
service are not applicable to NYISO, whose rules are ``fundamentally
different'' from other transmission providers' rules.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ NYISO Request for Rehearing at 6-19. NYISO provides
examples of these regional rules that it asserts are incompatible
with the surplus interconnection service requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    140. We grant NYISO's request for rehearing because the Commission
did not intend to limit the manner in which RTOs/ISOs may seek
independent entity variations with respect to surplus interconnection
service. Order No. 845 states that:

for a process to be consistent with or superior to, or an
independent entity variation from, the Final Rule's surplus
interconnection service requirements, the transmission provider must
demonstrate, at a minimum, that its tariff: (1) Includes a
definition of surplus interconnection service consistent with the
Final Rule; (2) provides an expedited interconnection process
outside of the interconnection queue for surplus interconnection
service, consistent with the Final Rule; (3) allows affiliates of
the original interconnection customers to use surplus
interconnection service for another interconnecting generating
facility consistent with the Final Rule; (4) allows for the transfer
of surplus interconnection service that the original interconnection
customer or one of its affiliates does not intend to use; and (5)
specifies what reliability-related studies and approvals are
necessary to provide surplus interconnection service and to ensure
the reliable use of surplus interconnection service.\286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 477 (emphasis
added).

    141. Upon further consideration, we find that it was not
appropriate to limit the flexibility of independent entities to request
independent entity variations. This passage from the preamble of Order
No. 845 should have been limited to discussing whether a process is
``consistent with or superior to'' Order No. 845 requirements and
should not have referred to independent entity variations. Therefore,
we modify this portion of the preamble of Order No. 845 to eliminate
the phrase ``or an independent entity variation from.'' As NYISO
correctly notes, requesting an independent entity variation provides
more flexibility than requesting a variation that is ``consistent with
or superior to'' a final rule's requirements.\287\ Nevertheless, we
will not otherwise address any specific independent entity variation
arguments in NYISO's request for clarification at this time. Such
arguments are more appropriate in a proceeding on a particular
transmission provider's Order No. 845 compliance filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ] 61,103 at P 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Additional Requests for Clarification Regarding Surplus
Interconnection Service
a. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    142. Some of the rehearing requests argue more narrowly that the
surplus interconnection service requirements are inconsistent with
particular Commission-approved provisions in transmission providers'
own tariffs. In this regard, Southern argues that no LGIA to which
Southern is a party obligates it to maintain an interconnection
customer's capability to be designated as a network resource after the
original generating facility's commercial operation date. It explains
that any preservation of capacity would instead ``be done under an
appropriate transmission delivery service arrangement.'' \288\
Therefore, Southern asks for clarification that the statement ``that if
the original LGIA is for [Network Resource Interconnection Service
(NRIS)], the surplus interconnection customer could be either [Energy
Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS)] or NRIS'' does not apply to
Southern.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \288\ Southern Rehearing Request at 16 (citing to a portion of
Attachment J-1 to Southern's tariff).
    \289\ Id. at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    143. AWEA requests clarification on two issues regarding the
implementation of the surplus interconnection service requirements.
First, AWEA seeks clarification that the Commission intends to
accommodate a ``Multi-Phase model,'' which according to AWEA differs
from the MISO Net Zero Interconnection Service Model. AWEA describes
the Multi-Phase Model as a situation where a developer that planned to
build a plant with a higher generating facility capacity enters a
contract for a lower capacity during its development process. It argues
that this situation could ``leave[] excess capacity in the
interconnection service that is not immediately used,'' and the
developer ``may wish to build an additional generating plant at that
same site,'' or ``may wish to sell the excess capacity to

another party.'' \290\ AWEA contends that this Multi-Phase model would
fit under the Commission's definition of surplus interconnection
capacity.\291\ AWEA also states that some RTOs/ISOs have procedures
that allow the initial party to reassign or transfer surplus
interconnection capacity to another party consistent with this Multi-
Phase model.\292\ AWEA therefore requests clarifications that the
situations ``similar to that of the Multi-Phase model described above,
in addition to the Net Zero model, are . . . an intended use of surplus
interconnection capacity, and that transmission providers should also
provide a process by which the Multi-Phase model can allow the
efficient use of existing interconnection capacity.'' \293\ It argues
that both approaches to the use of surplus capacity could be
accomplished through the same process or in two different
processes.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ AWEA Request for Clarification at 3.
    \291\ Id.
    \292\ Id. at 4.
    \293\ Id.
    \294\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    144. Second, regarding retirement of the original generator
associated with a surplus interconnection service agreement, AWEA
requests that the Commission clarify that, during the one-year grace
period prior to the retirement of the original generator, a new
generator can apply for repowering or replacement at the point of
interconnection, with the agreement of the original interconnection
customer, under the RTO/ISO's existing rules. Further, AWEA requests
that the Commission clarify that, if the retirement and replacement
process is successful, the surplus interconnection customer could
continue to operate after that one-year grace period.\295\ AWEA also
asks the Commission to clarify that the rules and processes that exist
for replacement or repowering are also available to surplus
interconnection service customers.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ Id. at 5.
    \296\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    145. We deny the requests for clarification by Southern and AWEA,
as discussed further below. We deny Southern's request for
clarification regarding whether the statement ``that if the original
LGIA is for NRIS, the surplus interconnection customer could be either
ERIS or NRIS'' applies to Southern. Southern argues that, under its
tariff, it is not obligated under any LGIA to maintain an
interconnection customer's capability to be designated as a network
resource after the original generating facility's commercial operation
date because of a certain provision it added to its tariff. However,
Southern fails to acknowledge the concerns the Commission identified
when Southern first proposed this provision. Specifically, the
Commission stated that ``[a]lthough Southern states on rehearing that
it was `not trying to nullify, avoid, or evade the requirements of
Order Nos. 2003 and 2003-A in adopting Attachment J-1,' we continue to
find that, without the conditions discussed below, revised Attachment
J-1 has not been shown to be consistent with or superior to the pro
forma LGIA and LGIP.'' \297\ Among the referenced conditions was that
Southern must add language stating that ``other provisions of these
sections notwithstanding, [the relevant analyses and studies] will be
conducted in a manner that preserves the NRIS status of existing
generators.'' \298\ Accordingly, we deny Southern's request for
clarification on this issue. Where a particular original
interconnection customer's interconnection service is NRIS, if a
surplus interconnection customer seeks to interconnect at the same
point of interconnection, then it may seek either ERIS or NRIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ See Southern Company Services, Inc., 109 FERC ] 61,014, at
P 18 (2004).
    \298\ See id. P 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    146. We find that AWEA's description of the Multi-Phase model is
inconsistent with the surplus interconnection service described in
Order No. 845. In Order No. 845, the Commission described the use of
surplus interconnection service as appropriate when interconnection
customers do not use the full generating facility capacity of their
interconnection service due to the nature of their operations.\299\ The
Commission also agreed with CAISO's argument that ``where the original
interconnection customer . . . reduces the generating facility capacity
of its facility from what was originally proposed for interconnection,
it would not retain rights indefinitely to any excess interconnection
capacity thus created.'' \300\ Furthermore, in finding that there are
no significant concerns regarding the potential for hoarding
interconnection service, we relied on the fact that, currently, an
original interconnection customer can only secure interconnection
service based on the generating facility capacity of the generating
facility that it constructs and continues to operate.\301\ In light of
these findings, because AWEA's proposed ``Multi-Phase'' model is based
on the idea that the original interconnection customer would
intentionally secure an amount of interconnection service in excess of
the size of the generating facility that it constructs and continues to
operate, we find that this concept would not be consistent with surplus
interconnection service as defined in Order No. 845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \299\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 480.
    \300\ Id. P 493.
    \301\ Id. P 490.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    147. We also deny clarification with respect to AWEA's requests
related to repowering or replacement. To the extent that a particular
transmission provider has repowering/replacement provisions in its
tariff, nothing in Order No. 845 would alter those provisions.\302\
Furthermore, if a particular repowering/replacement process is
successful, any continued operation from that point forward would then
be under a new interconnection agreement associated with the outcome of
the successful repowering/replacement process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \302\ Similarly, to the extent that a particular transmission
provider lacks such provisions, nothing in Order No. 845 creates a
new obligation for the transmission provider to add them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Material Modification Definition and Incorporation of Advanced
Technology

    148. In the pro forma LGIP, section 4.4 states that an
interconnection customer that has requested a modification in writing
to a transmission provider ``shall retain its Queue Position if the
modifications are in accordance with [pro forma] Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2
or 4.4.5, or are determined not to be Material Modifications pursuant
to 4.4.3.'' \303\ In Order No. 845, the Commission modified section
4.4.2(c) of the pro forma LGIP to allow an interconnection customer to
incorporate certain technological changes to its interconnection
request without risking the loss of its queue positon. In addition, the
Commission modified section 4.4.4 of the pro forma LGIP to require
transmission providers to include a technological change procedure that
includes the requisite information and process that the transmission
provider will follow to assess whether an interconnection customer's
proposed technological change is a material modification. Further,
Order No. 845 required that transmission providers develop a definition
of permissible technological advancement that would define a category
of technological changes that will not result in the loss of queue

position pursuant to the pro forma material modification
provision.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \303\ Pro forma LGIP Section 4.4 (Modifications). Material
modification ``shall mean those modifications that have a material
impact on the cost or timing of any Interconnection Request with a
later queue priority date.'' Pro forma LGIP Section 1 (Definitions);
pro forma LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions).
    \304\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 518.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    149. EEI requests that the Commission clarify that it is not
changing the definition of material modification established in Order
No. 2003. It argues that the material modification procedure focuses on
the entire interconnection queue, while the process for determining if
a technological change is a material modification would only focus on
electrical performance, even though improved or increased electrical
performance ``can and will have an impact on lower-queued resources.''
\305\ EEI states that this issue is a concern because transmission
providers must focus on grid reliability, and not all technological
changes will have the same impact on the grid.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \305\ EEI Rehearing Request at 17; see also Southern Rehearing
Request at 13.
    \306\ EEI Rehearing Request at 17. To illustrate its point, EEI
argues that two different interconnection customers in different
areas of the electric system may propose to incorporate the same
technology changes. However, it contends that one technological
change may not affect other interconnection customers in the queue
(if, for example, no other interconnection requests are related to
the same line or substation bus), while the other interconnection
customer may impact the cost and timing for others in the queue (if,
for example, other interconnection requests are related to the same
line or substation bus). Thus, the latter would be considered a
material modification, while the former would not. As another
example, Southern offers that an interconnection customer may
``replace [its] inverters to decrease a generating facility's short
circuit contribution . . . which could be considered `greater or
equal electrical performance' '' but that this change could result
in a breaker upgrade originally identified for this interconnection
request to be triggered instead by a later-queued interconnection
request. Thus, Southern reasons, this change would be a material
modification. Southern Rehearing Request at 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    150. EEI also asks whether the Commission created a new standard
for evaluating what constitutes a material modification.\307\ EEI
requests that the Commission clarify that the intent is not to change
the definition of material modification as defined in Order No. 2003,
which is related to one interconnection customer's impact on another
customer in the queue.\308\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \307\ Id. at 17.
    \308\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    151. Southern argues that, because the NOPR did not indicate that
the Commission was proposing to revise the definition of material
modification, this failure would contravene the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \309\ Southern Rehearing Request at 14 (citing 5 U.S.C. 553
(2012); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. Block, 744 F.2d 1098, 1104
(1985)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Determination
    152. In response to Southern and EEI, Order No. 845 did not change
the existing material modification definition, which determines whether
an interconnection customer's proposed change will cause it to lose its
queue position based on whether it has a material impact on the cost or
timing of any interconnection request with a later queue priority
date.\310\ Order No. 845's requirement that transmission providers
develop a definition of permissible technological advancement does not
alter the definition of a material modification in the pro forma LGIP
or conflict with the existing construct. Rather, Order No. 845 requires
transmission providers to develop a definition of permissible
technological advancements that the interconnection process will
accommodate without triggering the loss of queue position pursuant to
the material modification provision of the pro forma LGIP.\311\ For
purposes of clarity, we explain further how this revision will fit in
with the existing provisions. Permissible technological advancements,
as determined by the transmission provider, will be added to the
existing list of modifications in section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP
that do not require a material modification assessment and thus do not
result in the loss of an interconnection customer's queue
position.\312\ While the Commission included the correct pro forma LGIP
language in section 4.4.2 of Appendix B, in the text, the Commission
neglected to include the word ``permissible.'' Therefore, we clarify
that section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP should include the following
language as subpart (c) (with emphasis supplied in italics):

    \310\ Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.5 of the pro forma LGIP
enumerate modifications that an interconnection customer may make
without losing its queue position.
    \311\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 530.
    \312\ See id. App. B at Section 4.4.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a Permissible Technological Advancement for the Large Generating
Facility after the submission of the interconnection request.
Section 4.4.4 specifies a separate technological change procedure
including the requisite information and process that will be
followed to assess whether the Interconnection Customer's proposed
technological advancement under Section 4.4.2(c) is a Material
Modification. Section 1 contains a definition of Permissible
Technological Advancement.

    153. It is noteworthy that existing interconnection customer
modifications permitted under section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP may
affect lower-queued customers but do not result in loss of queue
position.\313\ Thus, this requirement is similar to the existing
exemptions laid out in section 4.4.2 of the pro forma LGIP, which allow
for the identification in the tariff of specific changes to an
interconnection request that do not result in the interconnection
customer losing its queue position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \313\ For example, the modifications listed in section 4.4.2 of
the pro forma LGIP include a 15 percent decrease of electrical
output (MW) that could have a material impact on the cost of a
lower-queued interconnection request. Pro forma LGIP Section 4.4
(Modifications).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    154. We deny rehearing regarding Southern's assertion that the
Commission did not provide notice of its proposal to revise the
definition of material modification. The NOPR did not propose, and
Order No. 845 did not adopt, any revisions to the definition to
material modification.
    155. In response to EEI's and Southern's arguments that the
requirements for a new technological change procedure and definition of
permissible technological advancement are inconsistent with the
definition of material modification, we clarify that the requirement
that transmission providers develop a definition for permissible
technological advancement is distinct from the other Order No. 845
requirement that transmission providers develop a technological change
procedure for determining whether or not a proposed technological
change is a material modification. In particular, we note that a
transmission provider's technological change procedure must specify the
conditions under which a study will or will not be necessary to
determine whether a proposed technological change is a material
modification.\314\ When studies are necessary, the interconnection
customer's technological change request must demonstrate that the
proposed incorporation of the technological change would result in
electrical performance that is equal to or better than the electrical
performance expected prior to the technological change and would not
cause any reliability concerns (i.e., materially impact the
transmission system with regard to short circuit capability limits,
steady-state thermal and voltage limits, or dynamic system stability
and response).\315\ If the interconnection customer cannot demonstrate
in its technological change request that the proposed technological
change would result in equal or better electrical performance, the
change will be assessed pursuant to the existing material modification
pro forma LGIP

provisions. We clarify that information regarding electrical
performance submitted by the interconnection customer is an input into
the technological change study and that this factor alone is not
determinative of whether a proposed technological change is a material
modification. We also clarify that the determination of whether a
proposed technological change (that the transmission provider does not
otherwise include in its definition of permissible technological
advancements) is a material modification should include an analysis of
whether the proposed technological change materially impacts the timing
and costs of lower-queued interconnection customers.\316\ Accordingly,
the final decision as to whether or not a proposed technological change
is a material modification will remain with the transmission provider.
Consistent with Order No. 845, the transmission provider must make such
a determination no more than 30 days after an interconnection customer
submits a formal technological change request.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \314\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 519.
    \315\ Id. P 520.
    \316\ Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ] 61,103 at P 166.
    \317\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 535.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Process Concerns

1. Compliance and Effective Dates
    156. Order No. 845 was issued in the Federal Register on May 9,
2018, and its effective date was seventy-five days after that, or July
23, 2018. In Order No. 845, the Commission stated that all public
utility transmission providers were to submit compliance filings to
adopt the requirements of Order No. 845 ``as revisions to the LGIP and
LGIA in their [Open Access Transmission Tariffs (OATT)] no later than
90 days after the issuance of'' Order No. 845 in the Federal
Register.\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \318\ Id. P 555.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Motions for Extension of Time
    157. The ISO/RTO Council \319\ and Southern filed motions to extend
the compliance date of Order No. 845. The ISO/RTO Council requested
that the Commission extend the compliance deadline by seventy days to
October 16, 2018.\320\ The New England Power Pool Participants
Committee filed comments in support of this motion. Southern requested
that the Commission extend the compliance period to a total of 180 days
so that the compliance filing deadline would be November 5, 2018.\321\
On June 1, 2018, the Office of the Secretary issued a notice extending
the compliance deadline to November 5, 2018.\322\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \319\ The ISO/RTO Council is comprised of the Alberta Electric
System Operator (AESO), CAISO, the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas, Inc. (ERCOT), the Independent Electricity System Operator
(IESO), ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM, and Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
AESO, ERCOT, and IESO are not Commission-jurisdictional public
utilities and did not join in this motion.
    \320\ ISO/RTO Council May 17, 2018 Motion to Extend the Time
Period to Comply at 1.
    \321\ Southern May 22, 2018 Motion to Extend the Period of Time
to Comply at 1.
    \322\ Notice of Extension of Compliance Date, Docket No. RM17-8-
000 (June 1, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    158. On September 24, 2018, EEI submitted a motion requesting an
extension of the compliance deadline for Order No. 845 up to and
including ninety (90) days after the Commission's issuance of an order
addressing the pending requests for rehearing of Order No. 845. On
September 26, 2018, AWEA filed an answer in opposition to EEI's motion.
On October 3, 2018, the Office of the Secretary issued a notice
granting EEI's motion and requiring that transmission providers submit
the compliance filings directed in Order No. 845 within ninety days of
the Commission's issuance of this order.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \323\ Notice of Extension of Compliance Date, Docket No. RM17-8-
000 (Oct. 3, 2018). On October 15, 2018, AWEA requested rehearing of
this notice, which the Commission dismissed in a November 13, 2018
order. Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and
Agreements, 165 FERC ] 61,090 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    159. Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) and EEI request rehearing of
the Commission's decision to establish an effective date seventy-five
days after publication in the Federal Register and a compliance
deadline ninety days after publication. Duke argues that Order No. 845
``represents the most significant change to the generator
interconnection process . . . since Order No. 2003'' and that the
Commission should therefore grant rehearing and establish an effective
date and compliance deadline of November 5, 2018, 180 days after
publication in the Federal Register.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \324\ Duke Rehearing Request at 8-9; see also EEI Rehearing
Request at 21. EEI also states that it does not object to the ISO/
RTO Council's request for an additional 70 days for the compliance
period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    160. Duke and EEI also argue that the Commission erred by failing
to justify the variation in the compliance and effective date, arguing
that this failure to align the dates is arbitrary and capricious
because it departs from the NOPR proposal and past precedent.\325\ EEI
argues that having an effective date in advance of the compliance date
creates regulatory uncertainty as to the provisions that are in
effect.\326\ Duke states that the NOPR proposed to require each public
utility to submit a compliance filing ``within 90 days of the effective
date of the final rule'' but that it was silent with regard to a
proposed effective date.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \325\ Duke Rehearing Request at 10; EEI Rehearing Request at 21.
    \326\ EEI Rehearing Request at 21.
    \327\ Duke Rehearing Request at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Determination
    161. We deny rehearing regarding the compliance deadline for Order
No. 845. Duke and EEI's arguments as to the original compliance filing
set forth in Order No. 845 are moot in light of the October 3, 2018
notice, which extended the compliance deadline until ninety days after
the issuance of this order. We also deny Duke's and EEI's requests for
rehearing regarding the effective date. In response to the arguments
that the compliance date and effective date should align, we note that
there is no such statutory or regulatory requirement and that the
Commission has previously required effective dates that do not coincide
with compliance deadlines.\328\ Further, we remind Duke and EEI that
the effective date is the effective date of Order No. 845 itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ See, e.g., Order No. 841, 162 FERC ] 61,127 at P 344
(effective date within 90 days of publication in the Federal
Register and compliance deadline within 270 days of publication in
the Federal Register); see also Standards of Conduct for
Transmission Providers, 125 FERC ] 61,291, at P 1 (2008) (stating
that Order No. 717 would become effective 30 days after publication
in the Federal Register and that transmission providers must be in
full compliance no later than 60 days from publication in the
Federal Register).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    162. Nonetheless, in light of the confusion created by the multiple
motions and rehearing requests that pertain to the compliance deadline
and effective dates, we provide guidance regarding the compliance
process and the effective dates of the LGIP/LGIA and forma LGIP/LGIA
revisions required by Order No. 845 and Order No. 845-A. The effective
date of Order No. 845 was July 23, 2018 (75 days after its publication
in the Federal Register). The effective date of this order (Order No.
845-A) will be 75 days after the publication of this order in the
Federal Register. Each public utility transmission provider must submit
a single compliance filing within 90 days of the issuance of this order
that includes revisions to its pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA
necessary to comply with Order Nos. 845 and 845-A. Order No. 845 was
silent regarding the effective date of the required tariff revisions,
so we address such effective dates here. In doing so, we find that it
is appropriate to follow the approach taken with regard to Order No.
2003 and its progeny as closely as possible. We describe that approach
and the

approach we are taking with regard to Order No. 845 and Order No. 845-A
below.
    163. The Commission issued Order No. 2003 on July 24, 2003. In
response to requests to do so, the Commission extended the Order No.
2003 compliance deadline for RTOs/ISOs and non-RTO/ISO transmission
providers to January 20, 2004.\329\ On January 8, 2004, the Office of
the Secretary issued a notice clarifying the compliance procedures in
the Order No. 2003 proceeding. The notice stated that all non-RTO/ISO
transmission providers' tariffs were ``deemed to include [the pro forma
LGIP and the pro forma LGIA] on'' the date of the compliance deadline
and ``directed [the non-RTO/ISO transmission providers] to make
ministerial filings reflecting those revisions to their OATT[s] in
their next filings with the Commission.'' \330\ For RTOs/ISOs, the
Commission stated that ``[u]ntil the Commission acts on [their]
compliance filings, the [RTOs'/ISOs'] existing Commission-approved
interconnection standards and procedures will remain in effect.''\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \329\ Notice Clarifying Compliance Procedures, 69 FR 2,135 (Jan.
14, 2004), Docket Nos. RM02-1-000 & RM02-1-001, at P 1.
    \330\ Id. P 2.
    \331\ Id. P 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    164. In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission deemed the non-RTO/ISO
transmission providers' OATTs to ``be revised to adopt [the revised]
pro forma LGIA and LGIP on [Order No. 2003-A's] effective date'' and
directed all such transmission providers to make ministerial filings
reflecting such revisions ``upon their next filing(s) with the
Commission.'' \332\ For RTOs/ISOs, the Commission required each RTO/ISO
to file ``on or before the effective date of [the] Order on Rehearing
either (1) a notice that it intends to adopt the [revised] pro forma
LGIP and LGIA, or (2) new standard interconnection procedures and
agreements developed according to Order No. 2003's `independent entity
variation' standard.'' \333\ The Commission stated that, in ``either
event, the [RTOs'/ISOs'] currently effective OATT will remain in effect
pending any necessary Commission action.'' \334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ] 61,220 at P 43.
    \333\ Id. P 49.
    \334\ Id. P 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    165. For Order No. 2003-B, however, the Commission, in recognition
that ``it has taken longer than anticipated for all [non-RTO/ISO
transmission providers] to make the necessary changes,'' adopted a
``different procedure.'' \335\ The Commission once again deemed each
non-RTO/ISO transmission provider's tariff ``to be amended to adopt the
revisions . . . contained [in Order No. 2003-B] on the effective date
of [that] order,'' but the Commission required each non-RTO/ISO
transmission providers to file an amendment to include such revisions
within 60 days of Order No. 2003-B's issuance.\336\ The Commission also
required each RTO/ISO to submit revised tariff sheets with 60 days of
Order No. 2003-B's issuance.\337\ For Order No. 2003-C, the Commission
deemed each non-RTO/ISO transmission provider's tariff ``to be amended
to adopt the [Order No. 2003-C revisions] 30 days after the issuance of
[that] order'' and required each non-RTO/ISO transmission provider to
``amend its OATT to include the [new] clarifications . . . within 60
days after issuance of'' Order No. 2003-C.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \335\ Order No. 2003-B, 109 FERC ] 61,287 at P 139.
    \336\ Id. P 4.
    \337\ Id. P 139.
    \338\ Order No. 2003-C, 111 FERC ] 61,401 at P 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    166. Because the Commission is only requiring a single compliance
filing from transmission providers to comply with the combined
requirements of Order Nos. 845 and Order No. 845-A, the effective date
for each compliance filing's proposed tariff revisions should be the
same date. Consistent with the distinction made by Order No. 2003 and
its progeny regarding the compliance requirements for non-RTO/ISO
transmission providers and RTOs/ISOs, we will deem the tariff
provisions to be effective for non-RTO/ISO transmission providers on
the effective date of this order (seventy-five days from publication in
the Federal Register) or the compliance deadline (ninety days from the
issuance of this order), whichever is later, and we require each non-
RTO/ISO transmission provider to file an amendment to their tariffs to
include such provisions by the compliance deadline (ninety days from
the issuance of this order). For each RTO/ISO, the effective date of
the proposed revisions shall be the date established in the
Commission's order accepting that RTO's/ISO's compliance filing, which
will be no earlier than the issuance date of such an order.

K. Interconnection Request Withdrawals

    167. In Order No. 845, the Commission recognized that, in addition
to significant interconnection queue backlogs and long timelines, in
some regions, there is a ``recurring problem of late-stage
interconnection request withdrawals that lead to interconnection
restudies and consequent delays for lower-queued interconnection
customers.'' \339\ The Commission stated, however, that the reforms
adopted in Order No. 845 ``will benefit both interconnection customers
and transmission providers.'' \340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 24.
    \340\ Id. P 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    168. Southern contends that Order No. 845 fails to address delays
and inefficiencies caused by ``speculative'' interconnection
requests.\341\ It argues that, currently, a speculative interconnection
customer can ``sit in the queue for years'' and withdraw ``at the last
moment.'' \342\ Southern asserts that this is a cause for concern
because, since 2014, interconnection customers have suspended or
terminated (at their request) half the interconnection agreements
executed under Southern's OATT. Southern asserts, however, that, while
the Commission acknowledges this concern, Order No. 845 ``fails to
address solutions on the customer side.'' \343\ Southern further
objects to Order No. 845's imposition of requirements on transmission
providers to provide additional information and flexibility, because
such revisions ``do little to nothing to address'' the problem of
speculative generation.\344\ Southern states further that Order No. 845
therefore ``fails to make a rational connection with the underlying
problem caused not by transmission providers, but by speculative
interconnection customers'' and that is therefore ``arbitrary and
capricious.'' \345\ Similarly, MISO TOs argue that, with regard to the
option the build, the Commission failed to ``meaningfully respond'' to
assertions that the main reason for increased costs, delays, and cost
uncertainty are late-stage withdrawals and that this omission renders
the Commission's findings ``arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent
with reasoned decision-making.'' \346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \341\ Southern Rehearing Request at 3-6.
    \342\ Id. at 3-4.
    \343\ Id. at 5.
    \344\ Id.
    \345\ Id. at 5-6.
    \346\ MISO TOs Rehearing Request at 11 (citing Motor Vehicle
Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 41, 43; Ameren, 880 F.3d at 581; PSEG Energy &
Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d 203, 208, 210 (2011)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Determination
    169. We deny Southern's and MISO TOs requests for rehearing on this
issue. Regarding the issue of speculative projects, we note that the
Commission designed some of the Order No. 845 reforms to provide more
and better information so that interconnection

customers will be more likely to submit interconnection requests that
achieve commercial operation. For instance, the purpose of the reform
on transparency regarding study models and assumptions is to reduce the
likelihood that interconnection customers will submit multiple
interconnection requests to figure out which request has the most
suitable point of interconnection. Thus, this reform will likely result
in more accurate and informed decision-making by the interconnection
customer, which will, in turn, reduce the likelihood of late-stage
withdrawals.\347\ For this reason, we continue to find that, on
balance, the reforms adopted by Order No. 845 will improve the
interconnection process for both interconnection customers and
transmission providers. We also disagree with Southern's argument that
the Commission's exercise of its discretion in developing Order No.
845's requirements was arbitrary and capricious. As the Commission has
noted on other occasions, it has ``broad discretion to choose how best
to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its
delegated responsibilities'' and therefore, the Commission is not
required to expand this rulemaking proceeding to impose additional
requirements upon interconnection customers.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ See Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at P 239.
    \348\ See, e.g., Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized
Electric Markets, Order No. 719-A, 74 FR 37775 (Jul. 29, 2009), 128
FERC ] 61,059, at P 118 (2009) (responding to a rehearing request
arguing that the Commission ``shirk[ed] its duty under the FPA in
confining the scope of [the] proceeding to four specific areas of
reform'') (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984)), order on reh'g, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ]
61,252 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

L. Wholesale Distribution Tariffs

1. Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
    170. Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), SoCal Edison, and San
Diego Gas & Electric Company (collectively, California Utilities)
request that the Commission clarify, as it did for the SGIA and SGIP,
that the new requirements in Order No. 845 do not apply to wholesale
distribution access tariffs (WDAT).\349\ California Utilities comment
that the Commission did not directly address these issues as raised in
comments by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) and SoCal Edison
filed in response to the NOPR.\350\ In support of their request,
California Utilities comment that, under their respective WDATs, they
process a very small number of requests to interconnect wholesale
generation projects to distribution facilities, which are radial in
nature and not part of the CAISO-controlled grid.\351\
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    \349\ California Utilities Request for Clarification at 2.
    \350\ Id.
    \351\ Id.
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    171. California Utilities state that the interconnection of
wholesale generation to the distribution system may trigger the need
for upgrades to the distribution system considered to be distribution
facilities for purposes of the WDATs.\352\ California Utilities note
that the interconnection of wholesale generation to the distribution
grid could also trigger an upstream need for reliability network
upgrades on the CAISO-controlled grid but contend that there could not
be stand alone network upgrades as defined under Order No. 845 for
generation connected to the distribution system.\353\ Therefore, the
California Utilities argue, these limited projects should not subject
the WDATs to these requirements, such as OASIS site postings, which do
not exist for the California Utilities' distribution systems.\354\
California Utilities maintain that the administrative burden and costs
of complying outweigh any benefits. Moreover, many of the proposed new
requirements concern transmission information that is available on
CAISO's website.\355\ Alternatively, California Utilities suggest that
any potential reforms to the WDATs should be considered together in a
separate rulemaking.\356\
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    \352\ Id.
    \353\ Id.
    \354\ Id.
    \355\ Id.
    \356\ Id. at 4.
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2. Determination
    172. We clarify that the requirements of Order No. 845 will not
apply to WDATs at this time. We find that the distinct engineering and
jurisdictional implications of an interconnection with a distribution
system should be further evaluated before requiring California
Utilities or other entities with a WDAT to apply the requirements of
Order No. 845 to their WDATs.

III. Information Collection Statement

    173. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) provides that an agency may
not conduct or sponsor the collection of information unless the agency
has published an estimate of the burden that shall result from the
information collection in advance of adopting or revising such
collection. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that OMB
approve certain information collection and data retention requirements
imposed by agency rules.\357\ However, this order on rehearing contains
no additional reporting requirements, and is, therefore, not subject to
OMB approval. Moreover, the Commission submitted to OMB the information
collection requirements arising from Order No. 845, and OMB approved
those requirements. In this order, the Commission is making no
substantive changes to those requirements, but has provided
clarifications that requires no additional information. Therefore, the
Commission does not find it necessary to make a formal submission to
OMB for review and approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA. This
order will be submitted to OMB for informational purposes only.
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    \357\ 5 CFR 1320.11(b) (2018).
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    174. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen
Brown, Office of the Executive Director], email:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    175. Comments concerning the collection of information and the
associated burden estimate(s) in Order No. 845 should be sent to the
Commission in this docket and may also be sent to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget,
725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission].
    176. Due to security concerns, comments should be sent
electronically to the following email address:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Comments submitted to OMB should refer to
Docket No. RM17-8-001.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    177. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \358\ generally
requires a description and analysis of rules that will have significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The RFA does
not mandate any particular outcome in a rulemaking. It only requires
consideration of regulatory alternatives that accomplish the stated
objectives of a rule and that minimize any significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities. The Commission has
determined that Order No. 845 will not have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities;

therefore these requirements under the RFA do not apply.\359\
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    \358\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12 (2012).
    \359\ See Order No. 845, 163 FERC ] 61,043 at PP 564-65.
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V. Document Availability

    178. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in
the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours
(8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A,
Washington, DC 20426.
    179. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number of this document, excluding the last three digits, in
the docket number field.
    180. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's
website during normal business hours from the Commission's Online
Support at<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
VI. Effective Date

    181. This order on rehearing and clarification is effective May 20,
2019.

    By the Commission. Commissioner McNamee is not participating.

    Issued: February 21, 2019.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.

    Note:  Appendices A, B, and C do not publish in the Federal
Register. These appendices can be found on FERC's eLibrary
System.\360\

    \360\ Go to http://elibrary.ferc.gov:0/idmws/file_list.asp?document_id=14746111 and select the file link to view
the document.

[FR Doc. 2019-03402 Filed 3-5-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P