velocity applies.
    FRA also received comments from APTA concerning paragraph (b) of
this section, which contains the crashworthiness and occupant
protection performance requirements the individual vehicles in the
initially-moving trainset involved in the dynamic collision scenario
must meet as described in paragraph (a). Specifically, FRA proposed in
paragraph (b)(2) that if the option to use GM/RT2100 is exercised to
demonstrate compliance with any of the requirements in Sec. Sec.
238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then the average longitudinal
deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of each vehicle during the
dynamic collision scenario shall not exceed 5g in any 100-millisecond
(ms) time period. FRA explained that a plot of the 100-ms average
longitudinal deceleration versus time, in which the curve never exceeds
5g, would suffice to demonstrate compliance with paragraph (b)(2).
APTA, in its comment, noted that proposed paragraph differed slightly
from the consensus agreement. However, APTA expressed its agreement
with the proposal if FRA intends the rule to allow the use of a moving
window of a 5g average deceleration within 100 ms.
    FRA makes clear that the differences between the consensus rule
text and the proposed rule text were merely editorial in nature and in
no way changed the substantive intent that the average longitudinal
deceleration of the CG of each vehicle of the initially-moving trainset
during the dynamic collision scenario not exceed 5g in any 100-ms time
period. Additionally, FRA disagrees with APTA's characterization of the
intent of this section. The average deceleration in any 100-ms period
was never intended to be comprised of the most favorable data points
during the time period, e.g., selecting only those decelerations that
are at or below 5g, to demonstrate compliance. It has always been FRA's
intent that a representative data set be used to calculate the average
deceleration. However, because FRA recognizes the possibility that this
intent may be overlooked, or otherwise not followed, FRA is including
text in paragraph (b)(2) specifying that the maximum interval between
the data points averaged in the 100-ms time period shall be no greater
than 1 ms. This means that each deceleration experienced during each
millisecond of the 100-ms period must now be used to calculate the
average deceleration under paragraph (b)(2) of this section. FRA
believes this provision will help assure that the average taken during
the 100-ms time period is based on a sufficient data set, so that there
is a high degree of confidence and accuracy supporting the calculated
average deceleration.

    FRA has otherwise adopted this section as proposed in the NPRM, and
the complete analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.
Section 238.707 Override Protection
    This section contains the requirements for analyzing the ability of
a Tier III passenger trainset to resist vertical climbing or override
at its collision interface locations during a dynamic collision
scenario. This section examines the vertical displacement behavior of
colliding equipment under an ideal impact scenario where an initially-
moving Tier III trainset and an initially-standing train are aligned.
This section also prescribes an impact scenario where the interface of
the colliding equipment is translated both laterally and vertically by
3 inches to ensure that override is resisted during an impact when the
two trains are not perfectly aligned. Evaluating the colliding
equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition
helps to demonstrate that the override features are robust. As
proposed, Tier III passenger trainsets must comply with both paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this section.
    FRA received comments from Alstom on this section on proposed
paragraphs (a)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(ii). Alstom stated that the direction
of the vertical perturbation required in each paragraph was not defined
(i.e., whether the perturbation is upwards or downwards). Alstom
recommended that the rule specify which direction the initially-moving
trainset is to be perturbed, to remove any confusion on how the dynamic
collision scenario under Sec.  238.705(a) is applied to properly
evaluate the equipment's resistance to override.
    FRA agrees with Alstom's comment, and for the reasons discussed
below, paragraph (a)(1) in the final rule contains three sets of
initial conditions for analyzing the ability of the evaluated trainset
to resist vertical climbing or override during a dynamic collision
scenario. Paragraph (a)(1) also states these conditions must be applied
using the dynamic collision scenario in Sec.  238.705(a). The criteria
for evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of initial
conditions are provided in paragraph (a)(2), and remain unchanged from
the NPRM. Because the same model may be used both to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements of Sec.  238.705 and the requirements
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, the model must be validated
with test data in such a way as to provide confidence in the validity
of the results of the collision analyses. In this regard, if the
components that experience large deflection or permanent deformation in
the analysis described in Sec.  238.705 also experience large
deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, then the same test results may be
used to validate the model. If the performance of the components that
undergo large deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2)
of this section is not validated with test data as part of the
validation of the model used in Sec.  238.705, then additional
validation testing must be performed to validate the model being used
to demonstrate performance under paragraph (a)(2).
    Paragraph (a)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used in the
collision simulation to demonstrate anti-climbing performance, and
remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph still provides that all
vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the initially-
standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal running
heights with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and
initially-standing train aligned. Because the centerlines of the
colliding vehicles are aligned with one another, a longitudinally half-
symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, as
appropriate. FRA intends for this initial condition to represent an
ideal collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially
aligned with one another.
    As proposed, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) described the second condition to
be used in the collision simulation as a 3-inch lateral and 3-inch
vertical offset of the interface of the colliding equipment, without
defining the direction of the perturbance. It is here where Alstom's
comment was focused. FRA notes that implicit in the proposed regulatory
text for this paragraph was an assumption that, to demonstrate
compliance with this section, a railroad or manufacturer would choose
the more unfavorable arrangement (upwards or downwards perturbance)
with respect to override (the arrangement most likely to lead to
override) to be evaluated. However, FRA recognizes that this assumption
was not made clear. Therefore, in the final rule, FRA has provided more
detail in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) and included new paragraph (a)(1)(iii).
Although FRA is being more prescriptive with respect to the
requirements of this section to remove ambiguity on its application,
FRA still expects that when a scenario arises where there are multiple
arrangements that can be evaluated, the most severe scenario (the
scenario most likely to lead to override) will be evaluated and the
results used to determine whether compliance with the requirements of
this section has been achieved.
    Accordingly, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) specifies that the initially-
moving trainset must be perturbed 3-inches laterally and 3-inches
vertically upwards relative to the initially-standing train. Further,
paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires that the initially-moving trainset must
be perturbed 3-inches laterally and 3-inches vertically downwards
relative to the initially-standing train. The lateral and vertical
offsets still must be applied simultaneously in the same simulation.
Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner will demonstrate that
the anti-climb features are of a robust design, capable of preventing
climbing when the colliding vehicles are not perfectly aligned. Because
these simulations require a lateral offset between the initially-
standing train and initially-moving trainset, a symmetric boundary
condition may not be employed (i.e., the full width of each consist
must be modeled).
    Paragraph (a)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of
the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' to remain consistent with
use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph
explains the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to
demonstrate a trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features for its
colliding interface. The criteria must be met for each set of initial
conditions in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)-(iii) for demonstrating appropriate
resistance to override between colliding equipment.
    Paragraph (b) contains the evaluation methodology for demonstrating
the appropriate level of override protection for connected equipment in
a Tier III trainset. This paragraph requires examination of the
vertical displacement behavior of coupled equipment under an ideal
impact scenario where the vehicles within the initially-moving trainset
are aligned. It also prescribes an impact scenario where the first
coupled interface of the initially-moving trainset is translated both
laterally and vertically by 2 inches. Evaluating the connected
equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition is
necessary to demonstrate the override features are robust and can
resist override during an impact where the coupled vehicles are not
perfectly aligned.
    Paragraph (b)(1) explains the conditions for analyzing the ability
of connected equipment to resist vertical climbing or override at the
coupled interfaces during a dynamic collision

scenario, using the scenario described in Sec.  238.705(a). Like
paragraph (a) of this section, each set of conditions in paragraphs
(b)(1)(i)-(iii) must be evaluated independently. Criteria for
evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of conditions
are in paragraph (b)(2). As noted in the discussion of paragraph (a),
because the same model may be used to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of Sec.  238.705 and the requirements of this section, the
model must be validated with test data in a way that provides
confidence in the validity of the results of the collision analyses.
The discussion of model validation in paragraph (a) applies equally to
model validation for purposes of paragraph (b).
    Paragraph (b)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used for
collision simulation to demonstrate override protection for connected
equipment, and remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph provides
that all vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the
initially-standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal
running heights, with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset
and initially-standing train aligned. Because the centerlines of the
colliding vehicles will be aligned with one another, a longitudinally
half-symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario,
as appropriate. This initial condition is meant to represent an ideal
collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially aligned
with one another.
    As proposed, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) described the second condition to
be used in the collision simulation as a 2-inch lateral and 2-inch
vertical offset of the first connected interface between vehicles in
the initially-moving train. As discussed above, Alstom raised concern
that the proposed paragraph did not define the direction of the
vertical offset. Accordingly, FRA is employing the same approach here
as under paragraph (a)(1)(ii) to clarify the direction of the vertical
offset and is also including a new paragraph (b)(1)(iii).
    In the final rule, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) specifies that the first
connected vehicle behind the lead unit of the initially-moving trainset
must be perturbed 2-inches laterally and 2-inches vertically upwards,
relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface.
Further, paragraph (b)(1)(iii) requires that the first connected
vehicle behind the lead unit of the initially-moving trainset must be
perturbed 2-inches laterally and 2-inches vertically downwards,
relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface. The
lateral and vertical offsets must still be applied simultaneously in
the same simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner
will demonstrate that the anti-climb features are of a robust design,
capable of preventing climbing when the vehicles in the initially-
moving trainset are not perfectly aligned. Because these simulations
require a lateral offset between the vehicles of the initially-moving
consist, a symmetric boundary condition may not be used (i.e., the full
width of each consist must be modeled).
    Paragraph (b)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of
the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' to remain consistent with
use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph
sets out the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to
demonstrate a Tier III trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features
to protect the vehicles connected in the trainset from overriding each
other. The criteria must be met for each set of initial conditions
provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)-(iii) to demonstrate appropriate
resistance to override between connected equipment.
    Under appendix G to this part, a Tier I alternative passenger
trainset may demonstrate an appropriate level of override protection by
complying with the requirements of this section instead of the
requirements applicable to Tier I passenger train in Sec.  238.205,
Anti-climbing mechanism, and Sec.  238.207, Link between coupling
mechanism and car body, as proposed. In general, the requirements in
this section were developed as an alternative to demonstrating anti-
climbing capabilities in Sec.  238.205 and the capability of the link
between the coupling mechanism and carbody to resist the loads in
current Sec.  238.207. While compliance with both Sec. Sec.  238.205
and 238.207 requires meeting a set of quasi-static, vertical load
cases, the requirements in this section were developed as a dynamic
performance standard.
Section 238.709 Fluid Entry Inhibition
    This section contains the requirements for fluid entry inhibition
for the skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset.
FRA received one comment on this section from APTA which agreed with
the language of this section, noting that compliance with this section
can be demonstrated during a design review of the equipment. As this
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88026, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed.
Section 238.711 End Structure Integrity of Cab End
    This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of cab
ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to
alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a
minimum level of protection for the engineer and other cab occupants,
equivalent to the collision post and corner post requirements for Tier
I equipment in subpart C. FRA did not receive any comments on these
requirements and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly,
as this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version,
the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88027.
Section 238.713 End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End
    This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of the
non-cab ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to
alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a
minimum level of protection for occupants equivalent to that required
for Tier I equipment in subpart C. These requirements help ensure the
integrity of the components that make up any non-cab end of a passenger
trainset unit. FRA did not receive any comments on these requirements
and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88027.
Section 238.715 Roof and Side Structure Integrity
    To demonstrate sufficient roof and side structure integrity, Tier
III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to alternative
crashworthiness standards under appendix G) must comply with the
requirements in Sec.  238.215, ``Rollover strength,'' and Sec.
238.217, ``Side structure.'' These Tier I requirements in Sec. Sec.
238.215 and 238.217 are thereby broadly applicable to both new trainset
classifications in this final rule. FRA did not receive any comments on
this section and FRA is adopting it as proposed. Accordingly, as this
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88029.
Section 238.717 Truck-to-Carbody Attachment
    This section contains requirements to demonstrate the integrity of
truck-to-carbody attachments on a Tier III trainset (or a Tier I
trainset designed to

alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) during a
dynamic impact. In commenting on the NPRM, Alstom recommended FRA
clarify that the performance metric in paragraph (c) of this section is
the ultimate strength of the truck materials. Paragraph (c) provides an
alternative to demonstrating compliance with the quasi-static load
requirements applied on the mass of the truck at its CG in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section. Instead, paragraph (c) requires demonstrating
the truck remains attached after a dynamic impact under the nominal
conditions in the dynamic collision scenario described in Sec.
238.705(a). Because paragraph (b)(3) limits demonstrating compliance to
a truck and carbody meeting deceleration requirements specified in
paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii), respectively, paragraph (c) may
alternatively be used to demonstrate truck-to-carbody attachment when
the requirements in paragraph (b)(3) are exceeded. To comply with
paragraph (c), it must be demonstrated that the truck undergoing
evaluation has remained attached to the carbody after the trainset has
been subjected to a dynamic collision scenario as described in Sec.
238.705(a). FRA recognizes that the collision scenario in Sec.
238.705(a) results in deformation of the carbody structure, and
allowance for such deformation is consistent with an evaluation of the
truck-to-carbody attachment that is based on ultimate strength, as FRA
intended for paragraph (c). Accordingly, in response to Alstom's
comment, FRA makes clear that the required performance metric in
paragraph (c) is based on ultimate strength.
    As a separate comment, Alstom requested that FRA make clear this
section ``supersedes'' the requirements contained in Sec.
229.141(a)(5) of this chapter, which applies to MU locomotives built
new after April 1, 1956, that are operated in trains having a total
empty weight of 600,000 pounds or more. Section 229.141(a)(5) of this
chapter provides that the strength of the means of locking the truck to
the body shall be at least the equivalent of an ultimate shear value of
250,000 pounds. However, FRA notes that the required truck attachment
strength in Sec.  238.717 is intended to be equivalent to an ultimate
shear value of 250,000 pounds. Consequently, the requirements of Sec.
238.717 are harmonious with the requirements of Sec.  229.141(a)(5) of
this chapter. Nonetheless, in response to Alstom's comment, FRA makes
clear that the requirements of Sec.  229.141(a)(5) of this chapter are
inapplicable to Tier III and Tier I alternative trainsets subject to
Sec.  238.717.
    FRA did not receive any other comments on this section and FRA is
adopting it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical
to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being
repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88029-88030.
Glazing
Section 238.721 Glazing
    This section contains the requirements for exterior glazing (i.e.,
side- and end-facing exterior windows and windshields) to be installed
on Tier III trainsets. APTA and TCRR both commented on this section as
proposed in the NPRM. The comments focused on three discrete areas:
Conduct of a comprehensive analysis, ballistic impact resistance
requirements, and certification of the glazing material. Having
considered the comments received, this section of the final rule
reflects several changes from the NPRM, as explained below. Otherwise,
FRA has adopted the requirements as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is
not repeating the analysis in the NPRM supporting and explaining those
provisions remaining the same, see 81 FR 88006, 88030-88032.
Comprehensive Analysis
    Both APTA and TCRR recommended deleting as unnecessary the
requirement in proposed paragraph (a) of this section to conduct a
comprehensive analysis identifying and addressing glazing safety issues
associated with operating in a Tier III environment as part of the
railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment. APTA
stated that specific requirements for Tier III glazing were adequately
defined in the other paragraphs of this section, and were based on the
operating environment for Tier I passenger equipment and the protected
ROW required by FRA regulations under 49 CFR parts 213 and 236 for the
dedicated high-speed portions. APTA also commented that compliance with
the other paragraphs of this section will permit Tier III trainsets to
be interoperable on the national rail network. Similarly, TCRR believed
that compliance with the performance requirements contained in the
other paragraphs proposed in this section should be the only regulatory
requirements necessary to demonstrate suitability for Tier III trainset
glazing and will assure interoperability throughout the national rail
network. TCRR added that even if proposed paragraph (a) was intended to
ensure that the ROW is adequately protected against potential hazards
to the glazing there is no need to specify such a requirement here as
other provisions of FRA's regulations adequately cover the topic,
citing FRA's requirement for a ROW barrier plan, under 49 CFR 213.361,
and the HSR-125 plan, under 49 CFR 236.1007.
    In the final rule, FRA has not adopted the requirement proposed in
paragraph (a) for railroads to conduct a comprehensive analysis of
their systems to identify and address glazing safety issues their
systems present for Tier III operations. Moreover, as explained further
in the discussion under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section
IV, neither this section nor any section in the final rule text refers
to analyses required under a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. However,
this section does require railroads to properly support and document
glazing safety determinations, notably for the ballistic-resistance
properties of the glazing material and for use of alternative
requirements in a non-cab, side-facing window intended to be a
breakable emergency window exit, for which specific FRA approval is
required. FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards
developing procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval, as
discussed under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV,
above. FRA will of course also work with any proposed Tier III
operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly
implemented.
    Separately, because FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (a), the
paragraph ordering in this final rule begins with proposed paragraph
(b), which is designated paragraph (a). Subsequent paragraphs proposed
in the NPRM are designated accordingly in conformance, with the
exception of the certification requirements in paragraph (e) in this
final rule, discussed below.
Ballistic Penetration Resistance Requirements
    In its comments on this section, APTA disagreed with FRA's proposal
under paragraph (b)(5) of the NPRM that ballistic penetration
resistance be sufficient to protect cab occupants from the risks and
hazards identified by the railroad as part of its Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, at a minimum meeting the protection requirements in
appendix A to part 223 of this chapter. Instead, APTA suggested the
regulation should require compliance with the ballistic impact
protection requirement in appendix A to part 223, specifically in
paragraphs (b)(10)(i) or (11)(i) of that

appendix, as appropriate. APTA stated that due to the interoperability
requirements for Tier III equipment, the ballistic impact requirements
must be standardized rather than vary for each railroad. APTA also
stated that FRA has previously indicated the current 22 caliber bullet
requirement in appendix A to part 223 has proven effective, and
therefore APTA recommended retaining the current requirement for Tier
III equipment. Further, in line with its comments on proposed paragraph
(a), and noting that the existing requirement has shown through a long
history to be adequate for conventional equipment, APTA suggested that
no reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is necessary. In
addition, APTA expressed concern that changing the ballistic
requirement has implications not just for Tier III equipment but for
everything that is currently operating in North America and needs to be
evaluated in another forum that involves all affected stakeholders.
    In its comments, TCRR agreed with APTA and stated it did not see
the merits of requiring each railroad to perform a risk assessment to
form the basis for any performance requirements for glazing as
suggested in proposed Sec.  238.721(b)(5). Instead, TCRR recommended
that the regulation include specific ballistic impact requirements that
are applicable to glazing on all Tier III trainsets, to assure
compatibility and interoperability of Tier III trainsets over the
general railroad network. Additionally, TCRR stated that the current 22
caliber bullet requirement should apply to both end-facing and side-
face exterior glazing in the cab, as well as in non-cab areas, to
assure that both the passengers and crew in a Tier III trainset are
afforded the same protection.
    FRA notes that ballistic protection for cab glazing was discussed
in detail during the RSAC glazing task group meetings, as stated in the
NPRM. In particular, during those meetings, labor representatives
asserted that ballistic protection from a larger diameter projectile,
differing from the size required for Type I glazing by part 223, would
enhance the overall safety of the cab occupants. Much discussion was
focused on this point, but a review of the available information on the
impact characteristics of reasonable ballistic scenarios (projectile
size and terminal velocity), and a review of the statistics related to
glazing failure due to ballistic impact, proved inconclusive. This is
one area where the task group could not agree on a consensus approach.
Therefore, the decision on ballistic requirements for cab glazing was
referred to FRA.
    At this time, FRA does not have sufficient evidence to suggest a
particular risk or hazard exists facing all potential Tier III systems
to warrant a change from current ballistic requirements in part 223.
However, even without such a risk or hazard facing all Tier III systems
in common, the circumstances of a specific Tier III operation may
warrant additional consideration and protection for that operation. To
be consistent with the approach to Tier III safety in this rule,
railroad safety elements subject to elements present within a specific
Tier III operation need to be addressed in a manner appropriate to that
operation, reflecting the level of service, operating environment,
operational conditions, etc. Accordingly, while the ballistic
penetration resistance requirement in paragraphs (b)(10)(i) and (11)(i)
of appendix A to part 223 remains the minimum requirement in this final
rule--namely, protection from a 22 caliber long rifle lead bullet of 40
grains in weight impacting at a minimum velocity of 960 feet per
second, this final rule allows for the use of a ballistic penetration
resistance standard that provides greater protection. Nor would use of
a more stringent standard necessarily affect equipment interoperability
any more than in any situation where a particular operation uses a
standard more stringent than the minimum standard specified in the
regulation. Consequently, even though FRA has not adopted the reference
to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan in proposed paragraph (b)(5), a Tier
III operation is in no way restricted from protecting against only a 22
caliber long-rifle bullet if circumstances known to the railroad
warrant additional protection--whether for end-facing glazing in
paragraph (a)(5) of this final rule or for side-face glazing in
paragraph (b)(2) of this final rule (proposed paragraph (c)(2)).
    FRA has continued to examine the appropriateness of the ballistic
impact requirement with the ETF, but no consensus within the ETF was
reached on this topic. FRA has also engaged in additional research. At
the behest of ETF industry members, FRA has subjected representative
samples of forward- and side-facing glazing to 22 caliber long rifle
and 9 mm ballistic impact tests. The use of a 9 mm bullet for ballistic
impact testing reflects the alternative ballistic penetration
resistance requirement in 49 CFR 238.421(c)(3)(i) for Tier II equipment
ordered prior to May 12, 1999, which FRA believes provides an
equivalent level of ballistic protection. However, the results of the
testing were not sufficient to confirm whether use of the different
caliber bullets results in a different level of test severity or
whether the tests are indeed equivalent.
Glazing Certification
    Commenters APTA and TCRR also raised concern over the NPRM's
approach to the certification of glazing material in proposed Sec.
238.721(b)(6). As a threshold matter, APTA requested that the rule make
clear the glazing manufacturer is responsible for certification of each
type of glazing material supplied. APTA then stated that the rule, in
turn, require testing to be done either by an independent laboratory or
the manufacturer with allowance for FRA to witness the testing.
Similarly, TCRR believed that the proposal would create unnecessary
confusion regarding glazing certification and instead recommended FRA
continue with the current approach to glazing certification in part
223. TCRR stated that the current requirements under appendix A to part
223 have worked very well and provide the railroads and carbuilders
assurance that all glazing materials they receive are produced from a
lot that has been properly tested. TCRR cautioned that before taking a
new approach to glazing certification, discussions are needed involving
the glazing manufacturers and possible testing agencies to better
understand both how any proposed changes would be addressed and the
practical realities and consequences of the proposed changes.
    FRA recognizes that the proposed regulatory language created
confusion regarding who is ultimately responsible for certifying that
the glazing material is compliant with FRA's requirements. As such, the
final rule text makes clear that the glazing manufacturer is ultimately
responsible for this certification. In the NPRM, FRA had intended to
convey that the glazing manufacturer can certify the glazing material
based on tests performed by an independent third party (e.g., a
laboratory, facility, or underwriter), or tests performed by the
glazing manufacturer itself. FRA did not intend to imply that another
party was ultimately responsible for certifying the glazing materials.
Further, for clarity, the glazing certification requirements are
contained in their own paragraph (paragraph (e)) in this section of the
final rule, rather than combined with other glazing requirements. These
glazing certification requirements apply to all glazing material used
on Tier III trainsets.

Demonstrating Alternative Safety for Breakable, Emergency Window Exits
    Finally, consistent with APTA's comments concerning the NPRM's
proposal for a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, APTA commented that
proposed paragraph (d)(2)'s alternative requirements for non-cab, side-
facing exterior window glazing should not reference a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan. APTA stated that during the design review process
information would be available that is necessary to demonstrate an
equivalent level of glazing safety for a side-facing exterior window
intended to be breakable and serve as an emergency window exit, and
that its proposal for a new Sec.  238.110 would specifically reference
this design review requirement to be included in the pre-revenue
qualification plan.
    As discussed above, this Sec.  238.721 does require railroads to
properly support and document glazing safety determinations.
Specifically, paragraph (c)(2) of this section requires such support
and documentation for use of alternative glazing requirements in a non-
cab, side-facing exterior window intended to be a breakable emergency
window exit. FRA approval is also required. Nonetheless, as noted above
and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of Comments
and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by the ETF,
is working towards developing procedures and processes to provide such
FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III
operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly
implemented.
Brake System
Section 238.731 Brake System
    This section introduces brake system requirements for Tier III
passenger trainsets. As articulated in the NPRM, development of these
requirements was identified as one of the goals for this first Tier III
rulemaking to facilitate planned equipment acquisitions. These
requirements represent a balance between maintaining compatibility with
existing Tier I equipment and the adoption of service-proven techniques
to protect against potential risks encountered with high-speed
operations. A concerted effort was made to develop technology-neutral
requirements, and the NPRM identified various requirements to be
determined by a railroad and included in the railroad's Tier III Safe
Operation Plan or ITM Plan.
    In response to the comments received, FRA is making changes to this
section from the NPRM's proposal, as explained below. Additionally, FRA
is making a minor editorial change to reference an ITM ``program''
rather than ITM ``plan.'' Otherwise, FRA has adopted the requirements
as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is not repeating the analysis in the
NPRM supporting and explaining those provisions remaining the same, see
81 FR 88006, 88032-88034.
    In its comment on this section, APTA recommended that the
determinations identified in the NPRM to be included in a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan be left to the railroad to address at various stages of
equipment design reviews. APTA offered in support of this position that
certain determinations to be included in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan
are already required under other FRA regulations. As discussed earlier,
the requirements of this final rule do not reference a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, and this section contains no such references as
proposed in the NPRM. However, this section does provide for FRA
approval of various determinations made by the railroad, consistent
with FRA's closer oversight of high-speed train operations.
    Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires the railroad to define the
worst-case adhesion conditions under which each Tier III trainset's
brake system must stop the passenger trainset from its maximum
operating speed within the prevailing signal spacing, as approved by
FRA. The paragraph is intended to ensure that the railroad formally
establish the worst case-adhesion conditions for use in procuring
individual trainsets. Similarly, paragraph (c)(2) requires the railroad
to specify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a
crewmember can initiate an irretrievable emergency brake application,
as approved by FRA.
    FRA approval of railroad determinations is required in several
provisions under paragraph (d). Paragraph (d)(1) requires the railroad
to identify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a
mechanism to initiate the passenger brake alarm is installed. Paragraph
(d)(4) requires the railroad to define the timeframe in which engineers
must acknowledge a passenger brake alarm after the trainsets have
safely cleared the boarding platform, for the engineer to retain full
control of the trainset, and to define the method used to confirm that
the trainsets did in fact safely clear the boarding platform. In
addition, paragraph (d)(6) requires the railroad to specify the
procedures for engineers to retrieve full service brake application if
the timeframe to acknowledge a passenger brake alarm has passed and a
brake application has been automatically initiated.
    FRA approval of railroad determinations is also required under
paragraph (e), which addresses how trainsets without fully functional
electric braking are to be safely operated, particularly to ensure
thermal-related brake system damage does not occur. Paragraph (e)(1)
requires that the railroad specify the allowable stopping distance not
to be exceeded in the event of a power loss or failure of the dynamic
or regenerative brake. FRA expects the railroad to provide a means for
automatically reducing the maximum allowable train speed, based on
feedback from the on-board monitoring and diagnostic system specified
in Sec.  238.731(n), so the trainset can safely stop using friction
braking alone within the allowable stopping distance. Additionally,
paragraph (e)(2) requires the railroad to define the operating
conditions under which the available friction braking effort alone can
safely stop the trainset. For discussion of paragraph (e)(4), please
see below.
    FRA approval of railroad determinations is required under paragraph
(f)'s main reservoir system requirements. Paragraph (f)(1) requires
that main reservoirs be designed and tested using a recognized industry
standard specified by the railroad and approved by FRA. This paragraph
also provides that the railroad shall define the working pressure and
rated temperature for main reservoirs in accordance with the designated
standard, if different from the pressure and temperature otherwise
specified in this paragraph. Further, paragraph (f)(2) requires the
railroad to identify a recognized industry standard governing the
drilling of steel main reservoirs.
    FRA approval is required under paragraph (j)'s brake application/
release requirements. Specifically, paragraph (j)(2) requires that the
railroad establish the minimum brake cylinder pressure necessary to
adjust from minimum service to full service brake application for
proper train operation.
    FRA approval is required under paragraph (m)'s slide protection and
alarm requirements. Paragraph (m)(3) requires the railroad to specify
the operational restrictions that apply when the wheel slide protection
system fails to function as intended within pre-established, allowable
parameters.
    As noted above, the railroad determinations specified under
paragraphs (b), (c)(2), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(6), (e)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-(2),
(j)(2), and (m)(3) do not reference a Tier III Safe Operation Plan but
do require FRA approval. However, as discussed under Discussion of
Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, FRA

approval oversight was a major tenet of the proposed Tier III Safe
Operation Plan requirement, and those requirements identified for
inclusion in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan were selected to allow
FRA to have some specific approval oversight of the railroad's
determinations. Accordingly, those plan elements the NPRM identified in
this section as needing specific FRA approval do require FRA approval
in this final rule. Nonetheless, FRA will work with any proposed Tier
III operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are
properly implemented.
    FRA notes that proposed paragraph (l), Leakage, did refer to the
Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (l) of the final rule contains
no such reference. Specifically, the Air Consumption Analysis required
under this paragraph shall be developed as part of the railroad's ITM
program.
    Based on APTA's comments, FRA is taking a somewhat different
approach regarding the proposed reference in paragraph (n) to a Tier
III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (n) requires each Tier III trainset
to be equipped with a brake system health monitoring and diagnostic
system to automatically assesses the functionality of the brake system
for the entire trainset, both before the trainset departs and while it
is en route. As proposed, the railroad must document the details of the
monitoring system and diagnostic system, and the means for
communicating trainset brake system functionality to the engineer. In
its comment, APTA recommended that rather than include this information
in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, a railroad should include this
information in its ITM program. FRA agrees with and is adopting APTA's
recommendation. It accomplishes the goals of this paragraph, and
trainset monitoring and diagnostics relate to inspection, testing, and
maintenance. It will also provide FRA approval oversight through the
ITM program approval process.
    In other comments on this section, APTA recommended that FRA
include in paragraph (e)(4) a requirement that railroads conduct
additional analysis and testing to determine the maximum safe operating
speed for various percentages of operative friction brakes.
    As proposed, paragraph (e)(4) requires railroads to determine
through analysis and testing the maximum speed for safely operating and
stopping their Tier III trainsets using the friction brake system alone
without causing thermal-related damage to the equipment or
infrastructure. APTA recommended the additional analysis and testing to
adequately quantify the braking performance for movement of defective
equipment. TCRR's comments on the NPRM were in agreement with APTA's on
this paragraph. TCRR cautioned that the movement of defective equipment
requirements must refer to paragraph (e) of this section and require
railroads to conduct appropriate analysis and testing to determine the
maximum safe operating speed for various percentages of operative
friction brakes. FRA agrees with APTA's and TCRR's comments.
    Accordingly, FRA is adopting the recommendation in paragraph (e) to
make clear further testing and analysis is required to determine the
safe maximum operating speed for various percentages of friction brakes
less than 100-percent operative. FRA expects the railroad to include
these determination in its ITM program.
    FRA also received comments on paragraph (o) of this section from
APTA and Alstom. As proposed, this paragraph requires Tier III
equipment to be equipped with a means to secure unattended equipment
against unintentional movement. Because the securement technique may be
technology-specific to a particular trainset, FRA proposed that the
procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment based
on the grade conditions be included in the Tier III Safe Operation
Plan, which in turn could be used to help demonstrate the effectiveness
of the securement method(s). FRA further proposed to define the term
``unattended equipment'' to have the same meaning as in Sec.
238.231(h)(4), which provides that unattended equipment is equipment
left standing and unmanned in such a manner that a qualified person
cannot readily control the brake system of the equipment. FRA intended
the cross reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4) to be limited specifically
to the definition of ``unattended equipment,'' for consistency and to
remove any ambiguity as to the meaning of the term, because FRA has
already defined the term in this part 238.
    In APTA's comment on paragraph (o), APTA objected to the cross
reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4). APTA raised concern that its
inclusion in the regulatory text could sweep in the Tier I requirement
that Tier III trainsets be equipped with a parking or handbrake. APTA
stated that was not part of the consensus agreement on the proposed
rule text presented to FRA in which wheel chocks could be used to
secure unattended equipment under certain circumstances. Nonetheless,
APTA did agree to FRA's use of the modifier ``unattended'' in this
paragraph to describe the type of equipment to be secured, noting that
technical specifications normally state that the equipment can be left
for an indefinite time period, which corresponds to unattended.
Further, consistent with its other comments, APTA stated that this
paragraph's reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary
because the physical means for securing the trainset will be addressed
during the design review and the procedures for securing the trainset
will be defined in the railroad's operating rules. In its comments on
this paragraph, Alstom similarly objected to the addition of the cross
reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4), stating it was not consistent with
the consensus agreement on the proposed regulatory text to permit the
use of wheel chocks to secure unattended equipment under certain
conditions.
    FRA makes clear that the reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4) was not
intended to mean that Sec.  238.231(h)(4)'s requirements for parking or
hand brakes apply to this Sec.  238.731(o). As explained above, the
reference was intended to capture only the definition of ``unattended''
and not sweep into this paragraph requirements concerning parking or
hand brakes. However, to guard against ambiguity and for consistent
application of the term, in this paragraph of the final rule FRA has
incorporated Sec.  238.231(h)(4)'s definition of ``unattended.''
Further, FRA agrees with APTA's recommendation not to include the
reference to the Tier III Safe Operation Plan, and it is not included
in this paragraph. Yet, FRA believes it necessary to approve the
procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment on the
grade conditions identified, and this paragraph requires such approval.
Inclusion in the railroad's operating rules alone is not sufficient as
FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part 217 of this
chapter. Further, issues surrounding how equipment will be properly
secured while unattended are operational in nature and thus capturing
those issues in a design review is not sufficient. In the interim, FRA
will of course work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that
the specific procedures and means of securing unattended equipment as
required under this paragraph are properly addressed and documented. In
this regard, and as FRA made clear in the NPRM, certain brake system
requirements are imposed by Federal statute, 49 U.S.C. ch. 203.
Specifically, 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B) requires ``efficient
handbrakes.'' Railroads must

ensure that those statutory requirements are addressed.
Interior Fittings and Surfaces
Section 238.733 Interior Fixture Attachment
    This section contains requirements for interior fixture attachment
strength for Tier III trainsets. This section relates to strength
requirements for seats and luggage racks in Sec. Sec.  238.735 and
238.737, respectively, to help prevent and mitigate hazards associated
with occupants impacting interior objects and surfaces during a
collision.
    In its comments on this section and Sec. Sec.  238.735 and 238.737,
APTA recommended that FRA not reference the attachment strength
requirements in Sec.  238.233, Interior fittings and surface, for Tier
I equipment. The NPRM proposed to allow compliance with those strength
requirements, specifically, 8g longitudinal, 4g vertical, and 4g
lateral, as an option instead of using Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100
and 5g longitudinal, 3g vertical, and 3g lateral attachment strength
requirements. As discussed in the ETF's May 2017 meeting, APTA believes
the 5g, 3g, and 3g attachment strength requirements are sufficient to
serve as the minimum safety requirements and are consistent with the
dynamic collision requirements in Sec.  238.705(b)(2), which provides
that, if GM/RT2100 is used, the average deceleration experienced by
each vehicle in a Tier III trainset may not exceed 5g during any 100-ms
period. APTA added that, in developing the NPRM, the ETF consensus for
use of the strength requirements in Sec.  238.233 was for Tier I
alternative trainsets, as reflected in proposed paragraphs (i) though
(k) of appendix G to this part. According to APTA, the ETF's consensus
was for Tier III trainsets to comply with the relevant strength
requirements in Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, with the
additional requirement to apply a 3g vertical load rather than a 1g
vertical load. As noted above, APTA contends that the 5g, 3g, and 3g
attachment strength requirements are more harmonious with the Tier III
requirements because they are tied to a maximum crash pulse
requirement, unlike the 8g, 4g, and 4g requirements in Sec.  238.223.
    FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation. FRA always intended to
provide the two options for compliance, as discussed in the NPRM. The
first option, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, allows compliance
with the requirements of Sec.  238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1,
``Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger
Railroad Equipment,'' Authorized September 2005. The second option, in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, allows compliance with section 6.1.4,
``Security of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group
Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle
Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010,
provided: The test conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met; interior
fixture attachment strength is based on a minimum of 5g longitudinal,
3g vertical, and 3g lateral acceleration resistance; and use of the GM/
RT standard is carried out in accordance with any conditions identified
by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (This last condition has been
modified from the NPRM consistent with FRA's discussion regarding
proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above.)
    The acceleration-based performance standards in Sec.  238.233 and
APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, were established after years of
industry practice designing interior fittings to withstand the forces
due to accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g vertically, and 3g
laterally, which FRA specifically found to be inadequate to protect
against occupant injury (see 64 FR 25540, 25614).\16\ The accident
performance of interior fixtures designed to comply with Sec.  238.233
and the APTA standard support their continued use for interior
attachment strength. However, FRA continues to recognize that some Tier
III passenger equipment may not experience accelerations of 8g
longitudinally, 4g vertically, or 4g laterally during the dynamic
collision scenario in Sec.  238.705, or at higher-speed collisions
resulting in collapse of the occupied volume. FRA acknowledges that
equipment that does not experience large decelerations during
collisions does not need to be designed to these standards in Sec.
238.233 and APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1. Accordingly, FRA
developed an alternative attachment strength option consistent with
international design standards, in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
FRA views the alternative as providing an equivalent level of safety to
the now longstanding acceleration resistance requirements in Sec.
238.233 and the APTA standard, with the qualification that no
acceleration-based load higher than 5g is experienced as provided in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section. FRA finds no additional burden is
imposed by providing two options to demonstrate compliance with this
section, and therefore declines to adopt APTA's suggestion to remove
the first option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ When developing the requirements of the 1999 final rule,
FRA concluded that due to the injuries caused by broken seats and
other loose fixtures, which were designed to withstand the forces
due to accelerations of 6g in the longitudinal direction, 3g in the
vertical direction, and 3g in the lateral direction, as revealed in
FRA and NTSB investigations of passenger train accidents, the design
practice was inadequate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, paragraph (a)(2)(iii) provides for use of the GM/RT
standard in accordance with any conditions identified by the railroad
and approved by FRA. According to APTA, in its comments on this NPRM,
the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation plan in this
paragraph was unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration
pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be met as provided in
Sec.  238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to
a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA
approval of the conditions involving the option to comply with
paragraph (a)(2) rather than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary. FRA seeks
to ensure that compliance with paragraph (a)(2) provides an equivalent
level of safety to the existing requirements in Sec.  238.233 and the
APTA standard, and that no acceleration-based load higher than 5g is
experienced. Nonetheless, as noted above and discussed under proposed
subpart J in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV,
FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing
procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA
will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the
requirements of this section are properly implemented. Because FRA has
otherwise adopted the substantive requirements of this section as
proposed in the NPRM, FRA is not repeating the full analysis in the
NPRM supporting and explaining the requirements of this section, see 81
FR 88006, 88034-88036.
    FRA does note it is incorporating by reference APTA PR-CS-S-006-98,
Rev. 1 (previously designated as SS-C&S-006), ``Standard for Attachment
Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,''
Authorized September 2005, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in
paragraph (i) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.1.4, ``Security
of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/
RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail
Safety and Standards

Board Ltd., December 2010 in paragraph (a)(2) of this section and Sec.
238.741(b)(2).
    APTA PR-CS-S-006-98 addresses fittings used in commuter and
intercity railcar and locomotive cab interiors. It specifies the
minimum strength and attachment strength for interior sub-systems,
including overhead luggage racks, stanchions and handholds, windscreen
and partitions, food service equipment, and miscellaneous interior
fittings. This standard also contains recommendations for design
requirements and design practices for such interior sub-systems. APTA
PR-CS-S-006-98 is available to all interested parties online at
www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for
review.
    Section 6.1.4 of GM/RT2100 contains requirements for securement of
furniture, on-board equipment, and other trainset features to help
mitigate against injuries to passengers and crew from secondary impacts
within the occupied volume. GM/RT2100 is available to all interested
parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards.
Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review.
Section 238.735 Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Cab Crew)
    This section contains the seat strength requirements for Tier III
trainsets and relates to the strength requirements for interior
fixtures and luggage racks in Sec. Sec.  238.733 and 238.737,
respectively, as noted above. APTA and Alstom both commented on this
section. Specifically, APTA commented on the proposed passenger seating
requirements in paragraph (a) based on the same premise as its comment
on Sec.  238.733(a), as discussed above. APTA recommended that the
option in proposed paragraph (a)(1) to comply with Sec.  238.233 and
APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested
that the sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on
section 6.2, ``Seats for passengers, personnel, or train crew,'' of
Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail
Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December
2010, under the same acceleration resistance conditions APTA
recommended for Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA
raises applies equally for both sections, FRA is not repeating the full
discussion here. For the reasons discussed under Sec.  238.733(a),
above, FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation and is therefore
retaining both compliance options under paragraph (a).
    Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a
Tier III Safe Operation Plan under paragraph (a)(2)(iii) was
unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier
III collision scenario must be met as provided in Sec.  238.705(b)(2).
Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the
conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (a)(2) rather
than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph
(a)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier
III Safe Operation Plan. Please see Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(iii), above,
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this
requirement. FRA notes that Alstom, in commenting on this section in
the NPRM, stated that paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are not fully
equivalent in terms of scope of application. Although the requirements
of the paragraph are different, FRA has always intended these
requirements to provide an equivalent level of safety, given the
different circumstances surrounding their application. FRA will work
with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of
paragraph (a) are properly implemented.
    FRA notes it is incorporating by reference APTA PR-CS-S-016-99,
Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,''
Authorized October 2010, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in
paragraph (j) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.2, ``Seats for
passengers, personnel, or train crew,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/
RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail
Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (a)(2) of
this section.
    APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 addresses row-to-row passenger seating in
commuter and intercity railcars. APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 is available to
all interested parties online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will
maintain a copy available for review. However, FRA makes clear the rule
does not require compliance with section 6.0, ``Seat durability
testing,'' of this APTA standard. Seat durability testing is beyond the
scope of this regulation because the testing focuses on the optimal
life of the seats--not their safety performance.
    Section 6.2 of GM/RT2100 contains design specifications and
tolerances for passenger and crew seating. GM/RT2100 is available to
all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy
available for review.
    Paragraph (b) contains requirements for the crashworthiness of
seats provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III trainset.
Unlike passenger seating, FRA proposed in paragraph (b)(1) that cab
seats must comply with the requirements in Sec.  [thinsp]238.233(e),
(f), and (g), and the performance, design, and test criteria of AAR-RP-
5104, ``Locomotive Cab Seats,'' April 2008, which FRA proposed to
incorporate by reference in paragraph (b)(2) and paragraph (k)(2) of
appendix G to this part. Although not submitted as a comment, AAR made
FRA aware that it is archiving AAR-RP-5104. FRA therefore requested
assistance from the ETF during the May 2017 meeting, and a small work
group was convened to address the problem. The group recommended back
to the ETF to excerpt language from section 3 of AAR-RP-5104 that
prescribes minimum loading requirements for the seat itself, and place
that language into the final rule. When the recommendation was
presented to the ETF, industry members were adamantly opposed, stating
that the requirements in section 3 of AAR-RP-5104 were durability
standards and not safety-related. In fact, APTA, in a comment submitted
after the close of the comment period, recommended deleting the
reference to AAR-RP-5104 and its proposed paragraph (b)(2) entirely,
stating that proposed paragraph (b)(1) adequately defines the
requirements for Tier III cab seating.
    Resultantly, FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (b)(2) and FRA
is not including a requirement to comply with any portion of AAR-RP-
5104. In turn, proposed paragraph (b)(1) is designated as (b) of this
section. As proposed, paragraph (b) requires compliance with Sec.
238.233(e), (f), and (g). However, with respect to the acceleration-
based loading requirements specified in Sec.  238.233(f), FRA makes
clear in paragraph (b) that it expects for Tier III (and Tier I
alternative) trainsets the cab seat to remain attached to the trainset
structure when subjected to an 8g longitudinal acceleration-based load
applied to the combined mass of the seat and a 95th-percentile male.
FRA recognizes that this constitutes the more severe scenario to be
tested. It is more severe than an 8g acceleration-based load applied
solely to the mass of the cab seat. It is also more severe than testing
under AAR-RP-5104, which provides for testing the seat with 250 pounds
impacting the seatback at 3g. FRA concludes that if the cab seat can
remain attached when subjected to an 8g acceleration-based load applied
to the combined mass of the cab seat and

a 95th-percentile male, then the seat should remain attached under
foreseeable collision scenarios.
Section 238.737 Luggage Racks
    This section contains requirements to constrain the longitudinal
and lateral motion of articles stowed in luggage racks, and relates to
the strength requirements for interior fixtures and seats in Sec. Sec.
238.733 and 238.735, respectively, as noted above.
    FRA received no comments on paragraph (a) and has adopted it as
proposed. Please see the discussion of paragraph (a) in the NPRM (81 FR
88006, 88036). Nonetheless, APTA commented on the proposed luggage rack
strength requirements in paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its
comments on Sec. Sec.  238.733(a) and 238.735(a), as discussed above.
APTA recommended that the option in proposed paragraph (b)(1) to comply
with Sec.  238.233 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested that the
sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on section 6.8,
``Luggage stowage,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four,
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards
Board Ltd., December 2010, specifically under the same acceleration
resistance conditions APTA recommended for Sec. Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(ii)
and 238.735(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises applies
equally here, FRA is not repeating the full discussion. For the reasons
discussed under Sec. Sec.  238.733(a) and 238.735(a), above, FRA is not
adopting APTA's recommendation and is therefore retaining both
compliance options under paragraph (b).
    Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a
Tier III Safe Operation plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was
unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier
III collision scenario must be met as provided in Sec.  238.705(b)(2).
Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the
conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (b)(2) is
necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for
such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan.
Please see Sec. Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(iii) and 238.735(a)(2)(iii), above,
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this
requirement. Further, FRA expects that in demonstrating compliance with
this requirement, the railroad must address how the mass of the luggage
was considered when applied to the loading conditions defined in
paragraph (b)(2)(ii).
    FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.8, ``Luggage
stowage,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four,
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards
Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section
6.8 contains requirements for luggage stowage, either on the floor or
in overhead racks. As noted above, GM/RT2100 is available to all
interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy
available for review.
Emergency Systems
Section 238.741 Emergency Window Egress and Rescue Access
    This section establishes requirements for emergency egress and
rescue access through windows or alternative openings in passenger cars
as part of an emergency window egress and rescue access plan for Tier
III trainsets. The ETF recognized that any regulation would need to
allow multiple approaches to facilitate the adoption of service-proven,
high-speed trainset technology. Specifically, the methods used to
manufacture high-speed trainsets are often governed by consideration of
the effects of aerodynamics and noise; together with the potential need
to pressurize occupied compartments, these can affect the way window
glazing is installed and mounted in some trainset designs. Therefore,
the ETF recommended performance-oriented requirements to allow
necessary flexibility where an appropriate safety case can be made.
    FRA did not receive any comments on the requirements of this
section as described in the NPRM. However, FRA is clarifying in
paragraph (b) the reference to a Tier III ITM program, rather than to a
Tier III ITM plan, as proposed in the NPRM. Otherwise, FRA is adopting
this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this section of the final
rule is virtually identical to the proposed version, the full analysis
and discussion of this section provided in the NPRM is not repeated
here (see 81 FR 88006, 88019-88020).
Section 238.743 Emergency Lighting
    This section contains the emergency lighting requirements for Tier
III trainsets. As proposed, paragraph (a) provides that the
requirements are the same as the emergency lighting requirements in
Sec.  238.115, except for those specific to emergency lighting back-up
power systems in paragraph (b). Paragraph (b), in turn, permits
compliance with alternative, crash loading resistance requirements, to
demonstrate the capability of back-up power systems to function after
the initial shock caused by a collision or derailment.
    APTA commented on the proposed back-up power requirements in
paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its comments on Sec. Sec.
238.733, 238. 735, and 238.737, above. APTA recommended that the option
in proposed paragraph (b)(1) of this section to comply with the
acceleration resistance requirements in Sec.  238.115 not be included.
Instead, APTA suggested that the sole option to demonstrate compliance
be based on section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and
features,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four,
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards
Board Ltd., December 2010, under the same conditions APTA recommended
for Sec. Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(ii), 238.735(a)(2)(ii), and
238.737(b)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises generally
applies equally for all sections, FRA is not repeating the full
discussion here, and generally for the reasons discussed under these
sections, above, FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation. This
paragraph retains both compliance options. Further, FRA makes clear
that Sec.  238.115 is contained in subpart B of part 238, and the scope
of subpart B applies to all passenger equipment, regardless of
operating speed. Consequently, FRA could have included specific back-up
power requirements for Tier III trainsets in subpart B's Sec.  238.115
but chose instead to place them here in subpart H for ease of
reference.
    FRA notes Sec.  238.743(b)(1) in the final rule references the
acceleration-based loads in Sec.  238.115(a)(4)(ii), which are 8g,
longitudinally, and 4g, laterally and vertically. In the NPRM, FRA
inadvertently referenced Sec.  238.115(b)(4)(ii), which was clear error
because there is no such paragraph in Sec.  238.115. FRA has corrected
the reference.
    Paragraph (b)(2) provides the second option for demonstrating the
crashworthiness of emergency lighting back-up power systems. A railroad
may use the loading requirements defined in section 6.1.4, ``Security
of furniture, equipment and features,'' of GM/RT2100, under specified
conditions. In the NPRM, FRA proposed that back-up power systems have
an attachment strength sufficient to resist minimum loads of 5g
longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically. However, FRA's

proposal was inadvertently overbroad. FRA intended for the back-up
power supply to remain functional after being subjected to the initial
shock of a collision or derailment, whether or not remaining attached
in place.
    Consistent with its comments on similar proposed provisions, APTA
also commented that the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation
plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was unnecessary because the criteria
for the acceleration pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be
met as provided in Sec.  238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to
include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to
believe that FRA approval of the conditions involving the option to
comply with paragraph (b)(2) is necessary for safety. Accordingly,
paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer
to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Please see Sec. Sec.
238.733(a)(2)(iii), 238.735(a)(2)(iii), and 238.737(b)(2)(iii), above,
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this
requirement.
    FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.1.4,
``Security of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group
Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle
Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, into
paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section 6.1.4 contains requirements
for the securement of furniture, equipment, and other features. As
noted above, GM/RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at
www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will
maintain a copy available for review.
Cab Equipment
Section 238.751 Alerters
    This section contains requirements for alerters on Tier III
passenger trainsets. In commenting on this section in the NPRM, APTA
recommended removal of the proposed references to a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, consistent with its comments on proposed subpart J. As
discussed below, this section does not include references to a Tier III
Safe Operation Plan but does ensure FRA oversight. Otherwise, FRA has
adopted this section as proposed and has therefore not repeated the
full analysis of this section in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88037-
88038).
    As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (b) would have required the
railroad to determine the appropriate time period within which the
engineer must acknowledge the alerter and include that determination in
the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan for review and approval by
FRA. In its comment, APTA stated that inclusion in the Safe Operation
Plan was unnecessary because the basis for setting the alerter control
timing would be addressed during the design review process and FRA
could review the railroad's alerter timing determination then. Although
FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation
Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the periodicity of
the alerter alarm, as well as the time period within which the engineer
must react to that alarm, is necessary for safety. Nonetheless, as
noted above and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of
Comments and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by
the ETF, is working towards developing procedures and processes to
provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed
Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this paragraph
and this section are properly implemented. In this regard, FRA makes
clear it intends alerter control timing to be set by the railroad
taking into consideration maximum train speed and capabilities of the
signal system.
    As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (d) would have required
specifying in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan the necessary
actions of the engineer responding to a full-service brake application
initiated after the engineer failed to properly acknowledge the
alerter. APTA, in its comment, stated that this was also unnecessary as
these required actions would be contained in the railroad's operating
rules and the ``engineer's training program.'' Again, although FRA
agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan,
FRA continues to believe that FRA approval is necessary, namely, of the
actions specified for the engineer to recover the full-service brake
application. Inclusion in the railroad's operating rules is not
sufficient as FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part
217 of this chapter. Additionally, these procedures are not intended to
be specified in the locomotive engineer certification program required
under part 240 of this chapter. Thus, simple inclusion in a training
program does not provide the necessary review and approval mechanism
FRA desires. Nonetheless, as FRA, based on input provided by the ETF,
is working towards developing specific procedures and processes for
obtaining such approval, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III
operation to ensure the requirements of this paragraph are properly
implemented.
    Finally, as proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (e) would have required
a railroad electing to use alternate technology to an alerter, to
provide the function(s) of an alerter, to conduct a hazard analysis as
part of its Tier III Safe Operation Plan. The intent behind the
analysis was to demonstrate that the alternate alerter technology
provided an equivalent level of safety. APTA, in its comment, stated
that inclusion in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary
because the demonstration of an equivalent level of safety would be
performed during the design review process, with the results of the
safety analysis being used to support the determination. Although FRA
agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan,
FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the equivalency
determination is necessary for safety, and FRA will work with any
proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this
paragraph are properly implemented, as discussed above. In this regard,
FRA has clarified that the required analysis is not limited to a
``hazard analysis,'' as proposed in the NPRM, but provides for a
broader evaluation.
Section 238.753 Sanders
    This section introduces requirements for sanders on Tier III
trainsets. In their comments on the NPRM, APTA and TCRR objected to
inclusion of this section in the final rule. According to APTA and
TCRR, in the international market, sanders are not considered a safety
critical component but rather only performance enhancing and not
critical to the safe operation of the trainset. Both APTA and TCRR
further stated that if a railroad were to determine that sanders were
critical to the safe operation of the trainset, then the sanders would
be defined and addressed in the railroad's ITM program; under these
circumstances, a trainset with defective sanders could move only under
the regulatory provisions dealing with movement of defective equipment.
Thus, APTA and TCRR believed that providing specific requirements for
sanders in this section is unnecessary.
    FRA disagrees with this recommendation. As explained in the NPRM,
this section does not require Tier III trainsets to be equipped with
sanders; this section applies only if the railroad determines sanders
are a required trainset component. Some railroads may determine that
sanders

are necessary for the safe operation of Tier III trainsets, whereas
other railroads may not. Nonetheless, FRA agrees that if the railroad
deems the sanders safety critical, they would be so identified in the
railroad's ITM program. No reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan
is necessary. Accordingly, trainsets equipped with such sanders that
are defective could move only in compliance with the requirements
covering movement of defective equipment. Please also see the
discussion of this proposed section in the NPRM (81 FR 88006, 88038).
As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure
the requirements of this section are properly implemented.
Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties
    The final rule includes an amended schedule of civil penalties
under appendix A to this part. Specifically, the schedule includes
civil penalty amounts for violations of the requirements of subpart H
of this part. Because the penalty schedule is a statement of policy,
notice and comment was not required prior to its revision. See 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(3)(A). Accordingly, FRA has amended the penalty schedule to
reflect the addition of subpart H.
Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs
    FRA is revising this appendix to clarify the application of the
floor fire test in the table of ``Test Procedures and Performance
Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of
Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs'' in paragraph (c)
to Tier III passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this
clarification and has adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the
final rule is identical to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating
the analysis provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039).
Appendix F to Part 238--Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements
for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    FRA is revising this appendix so that it applies to Tier III
passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this change and has
adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical
to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating the analysis of this
change provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039).
Appendix G to Part 238--Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the
Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of a Tier I
Passenger Trainset
    As proposed, FRA is adding appendix G to this part to provide
alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance
requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets instead of the conventional
requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a),
238.211, 238.213, and 238.219 in subpart C of this part. The technical
contents of appendix G remain materially unchanged from those developed
for the original Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
    FRA intends for these alternative requirements to be applied to a
Tier I trainset as a whole. Accordingly, compliance must be
demonstrated either through application of the conventional
requirements in subpart C, or through application of the requirements
in this appendix G, not a combination of both. They also apply in
addition to the requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.209(b), 238.215,
238.217, and 238.233, and APTA standards for occupant protection, as
specified in this appendix. Although the appendix may refer to specific
units of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in
this appendix apply only to a Tier I trainset as a whole, as noted
above. Further, use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance for Tier I
passenger trainsets is subject to FRA review and approval under Sec.
238.201.
    In general, where alternatives to the conventional Tier I
requirements are given in this appendix G, those requirements are also
identified in the Tier III requirements in subpart H--Specific
Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment. See the discussion in
the section-by-section analysis for subpart H, which applies to Tier I
trainsets seeking qualification under this appendix. As FRA did not
receive any comments on this appendix, FRA is not repeating the full
analysis of this appendix provided in the NPRM, see 81 FR 88006, 88039-
88040.
    However, FRA does highlight that in paragraph (i) of this appendix,
FRA is incorporating by reference APTA standard PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2,
``Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad
Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June 2006, for interior fixtures. The
standard is intended to address forces applied to the carbody and truck
structures during collisions, derailments, and other accident
conditions. APTA PR-CS-S-034-99 is available to all interested parties
online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy
available for review.
    Further, in paragraph (j) of this appendix, FRA is incorporating by
reference APTA standard PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for
Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 2010, with
the exception of Section 6 of the standard, which relates to the
durability testing of seats. FRA considers the durability testing of
seats to be beyond the scope of this final rule for the same reasons
discussed under Sec.  238.735, above.
Appendix H to Part 238--Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input
Data and Geometrical Depiction
    FRA is adding this appendix to part 238 to formally provide input
data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a computer model
of the rigid locomotive design in Sec.  238.705(a)(4) for use in
evaluating the occupied volume integrity of a Tier III trainset (and a
Tier I alternative passenger trainset under appendix G) in a dynamic
collision scenario. Section 238.705(a) outlines the required conditions
for performing a dynamic collision scenario involving an initially-
moving trainset impacting an initially-standing train having the rigid
locomotive leading its consist. As explained in Sec.  238.705(a)(4),
the initially-standing train is made up of a rigid locomotive and five
identical passenger coaches having the following characteristics: The
locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach weighs 95,000 pounds;
the locomotive and each coach crush in response to applied force as
specified in Table 1 to Sec.  238.705; and the locomotive has a
geometric design as depicted in Figure 1 to this appendix H.
    This appendix is intended to establish a consistent definition for
locomotive geometry for use in conducting dynamic computer simulations.
The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the geometry for
approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive design. Because
this input file is for a half-symmetric model, a locomotive mass
corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is provided for modeling
purposes--half the 260,000 pounds of weight specified for the
locomotive in Sec.  238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to this appendix provides
two views of the locomotive's geometric depiction. The input data is
contained in Appendix C to FRA's Technical Criteria and Procedures
Report, available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.

VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures

    This final rule is an economically significant regulatory action
within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and
procedures. See 44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26, 1979).
    FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) addressing the economic impacts of this final rule. The
RIA estimates the costs of this final rule that are likely to be
incurred over a 30-year period. FRA estimated the costs of this final
rule using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent, respectively. For the 30-
year period analyzed, the present value of the estimated high-range
quantified net cost savings for this final rule is $837.8 million when
discounted at 3 percent and $541.9 million when discounted at 7
percent. Annualized net cost savings total approximately $42.7 million
when discounted at 3 percent and $43.7 million when discounted at 7
percent.
    This final rule addresses several limitations in the Code of
Federal Regulations pertaining to passenger equipment. Prior to
publication of this final rule, the PESS in 49 CFR part 238 did not
comprehensively address safety requirements for passenger rail
equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the regulatory framework
established Tier I safety compliance through equipment requirements
that were more design-based, and therefore limited the application of
contemporary design techniques and innovative technology.
    This final rule amends FRA's PESS and adds a new equipment tier
(Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of high-speed rail at
speeds up to 220 mph. The final rule also establishes alternative
crashworthiness performance standards to qualify passenger rail
equipment for Tier I operations (Tier I alternative). In addition, FRA
is increasing the maximum allowable speed for Tier II operations from
150 mph to 160 mph, making it consistent with prior changes in 49 CFR
parts 213 and 238 for Vehicle/Track Interaction (VTI) Safety Standards.
    There are several HSR projects in development, such as Amtrak's
next-generation Acela, Texas High-Speed Rail, and California's high-
speed rail project, which are all expected to benefit from
implementation of the rule. Additionally, FRA believes that other HSR
operations may be initiated due to the publication of this final rule.
The costs, cost savings, and benefits associated with the Tier III
requirements of this rule were developed looking at all possible
operations in the United States. FRA researched HSR projects that were
most viable, focusing on all publicly available business models for HSR
projects. FRA developed an economic analysis that could be applied to
any individual Tier III operation in the United States, including
Amtrak's next-generation Acela. The main costs savings result from
minimizing the costs of right-of-way acquisition, especially in high
population urban areas, such as New York, Washington, Miami, and other
large metropolitan areas. The provisions of the final rule's Tier III
passenger equipment safety standards allow the service to use existing
rights-of-way, permitting the use of track shared with other rail
service (i.e., blended track).
    FRA estimates that between $227.7 million and $523.3 million (when
discounted at a 7-percent rate) or between $351.3 million and $808.8
million (when discounted at a 3-percent rate) in quantifiable costs
will be borne by the industry over a future 30-year period in availing
itself of the rule's new regulatory framework. Note that industry will
only incur these costs if it chooses to test to demonstrate compliance
with either the Tier I alternative, or decides to implement Tier III
operations. The added alternative Tier I standards provide an option
for railroads to use different types or designs of passenger equipment
in Tier I service and will not impose any cost on existing rolling
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. The new
Tier III requirements will not impose any cost on existing rolling
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations (existing
passenger rolling stock is Tier I and II; there is no Tier III rolling
stock in operation in the U.S.).

                    Table 1--Regulatory Cost Summary
                             [$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                      3%              7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range: \17\
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs..           $59.6           $39.1
    Tier III Infrastructure Costs.......           749.2           484.2
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           808.8           523.3
            Annualized Costs............            41.3            42.2
Low Range: \18\
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs..            51.6            34.1
    Tier III Infrastructure Costs.......           299.7           193.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           351.3           227.7
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Costs............            17.9            18.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule will result in significant cost savings for the
industry. Estimated infrastructure-related cost savings comprise the
most significant driver of cost savings compared to other quantified
cost savings (i.e., equipment design and engineering, manufacturing
benefits, etc.). Infrastructure cost savings will be generated by the
ability of railroad operators to take advantage of a blended operating
environment--avoiding costly new construction, maintenance of dedicated
track, and acquisition of new rights-of-way. This

cost savings is especially attractive to railroad operators that
provide service in areas with high population density, where right-of-
way acquisition and new railroad construction are significantly more
expensive and complex. This rule will increase the probability that new
services are introduced and reduce the need for new construction in
densely populated areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ High-range costs represent costs at a high funding level
with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust for the upper bound
confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more
detailed description of the high-range costs, please refer to
Section 3 of the RIA.
    \18\ Low-range costs represent costs at a low funding level with
a 10-percent multiplier to adjust for the lower bound confidence
level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more detailed
description of the low-range costs, please refer to Section 3 of the
RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The U.S. passenger rail industry will experience cost savings from
this regulatory action because it permits manufacturers to adapt
existing designs of rolling stock to meet the new standards and will
allow operators to take advantage of a wider variety of trainset
designs. Further, the rule will allow Tier I and Tier III operations to
use service-proven platforms with the latest technology available.
These cost savings will be achieved by adapting technology that exists
on the international market to meet FRA's safety requirements and
ensuring that all equipment suppliers comply with the same safety
standards.
    Table 2 provides the estimated industry equipment and
infrastructure cost savings and their discounted values at the 3- and
7-percent levels, respectively. High-range cost savings represent cost
savings at a high funding level with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust
for the confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. Low-
range cost savings represent cost savings at a low funding level with a
10-percent multiplier to adjust for the confidence level of an HSR
system becoming operational. For a more detailed description of the
low- and high-range cost savings, please refer to the RIA.

             Table 2--Regulatory Cost Savings Range Summary
                             [$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                      3%              7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range:
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost             $315.4          $205.8
     Savings............................
    Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings         1,331.3           859.4
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............         1,646.7         1,065.2
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Cost Savings.....            84.0            85.8
Low Range:
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost              257.5           168.8
     Savings............................
    Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings           532.5           343.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............           790.1           512.5
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Cost Savings.....            40.3            41.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 3 below displays the net cost savings of this final rule,
categorized by either Tier I alternative or Tier III costs and cost
savings. Discounted net regulatory cost savings will be between $438.8
million (low range) and $837.8 million (high range) at the 3-percent
level, and between $284.8 million (low range) and $541.9 million (high
range) at the 7-percent level. Annualized net regulatory cost savings
are between $22.4 million and $42.7 million when discounted at 3
percent and between $22.9 million and $43.7 million when discounted at
7 percent.

                  Table 3--Net Regulatory Cost Savings
                             [$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                      3%              7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range:
    Tier I Alternative Costs............           $59.6           $39.1
    Tier III Costs......................           749.2           484.2
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           808.8           523.3
    Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.....           315.4           205.8
    Cost Savings Tier III...............         1,331.3           859.4
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............         1,646.7         1,065.2
    Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.           255.8           166.7
    Net Cost Savings Tier III...........           582.1           375.2
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Net Cost Savings..........           837.8           541.9
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Net Cost Savings.            42.7            43.7
Low Range:
    Tier I Alternative Costs............            51.6            34.1
    Tier III Costs......................           299.7           193.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           351.3           227.7
    Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.....           257.5           168.8
    Cost Savings Tier III...............           532.5           343.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............           790.1           512.5
    Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.           205.9           134.7

    Net Cost Savings Tier III...........           232.8           150.1
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Net Cost Savings..........           438.8           284.8
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Net Cost Savings.            22.4            22.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule is considered an Executive Order 13771 deregulatory
action. Details on the estimated cost savings of this final rule can be
found in the RIA.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), as amended
by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA), generally requires an agency to prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis describing the impact of the regulatory action on
small entities as part of the rulemaking. Small entities include small
businesses, small organizations, and governmental jurisdictions. An
agency must conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis unless it
determines and certifies that the rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
FRA developed this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13272,
``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking,'' and
DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act to ensure potential impacts of rules on small entities
are properly considered.
    Prior to this final rule, the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
in part 238 did not comprehensively address safety requirements for
passenger rail equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the former
regulatory framework generally set Tier I safety compliance through
equipment design requirements, which limited the application of new
technology. This final rule changes the passenger rail equipment safety
regulatory framework by introducing a new tier of equipment safety
standards (Tier III) and also establishes more performance-based
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the alternative
to those specified for Tier I equipment. Additionally, the final rule
increases the maximum allowable speed for Tier II equipment to make it
consistent the corresponding speed range in FRA's Track Safety
Standards for the track over which the equipment operates. This Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is presented to comply with Executive
Order 13272 and with the Regulatory Flexibility Act as part of the
rulemaking process required by law.
    FRA initiated the rulemaking using recommendations made by FRA's
RSAC. In general, the rulemaking amends 49 CFR part 238, to reflect new
or modified safety requirements for Tier I and Tier III equipment, and
to increase the authorized speed limit for Tier II equipment.
1. Description of Regulated Entities and Impacts
    The ``universe'' of the entities under consideration includes only
those small entities that can reasonably be expected to be directly
affected by the provisions of this final rule. For the rule, there is
only one type of small entity that will be affected: Small passenger
railroads. ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the
same meaning as ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of
operation. Under 5 U.S.C. 601(5) ``small entities'' is defined as
governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts with populations less than 50,000.
    The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates ``size
standards'' for small entities. It provides that industry sectors
relevant for the rulemaking must not exceed the limits listed below
(and still classify as a ``small entity''): \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ U.S. Small Business Administration, ``Table of Small
Business Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification
System Codes,'' effective January 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     1,500 employees for railroad rolling stock manufacturing.
     1,500 employees for line haul operating railroads.
     1,250 employees for motor and generator manufacturing.
     1,250 employees for switchgear and switchboard apparatus
manufacturing.
    Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small
entities in consultation with SBA, and in conjunction with public
comment. Under the authority provided to it by SBA, FRA published a
final policy, which formally establishes small entities as railroads
that meet the line haulage revenue requirements of a Class III
railroad.\20\ Currently, the revenue requirements are $20 million or
less in annual operating revenue, adjusted annually for inflation. The
$20 million limit (adjusted annually for inflation) is based on the
Surface Transportation Board's threshold of a Class III railroad, which
is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue deflator adjustment.\21\
FRA uses this definition for the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See 68 FR 24891, May 9, 2003.
    \21\ For further information on the calculation of the specific
dollar limit, please see 49 CFR part 1201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Railroads
    For purposes of this analysis, there are only two intercity
passenger railroads, Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad. Neither is
considered a small entity. Amtrak is a Class I railroad and the Alaska
Railroad is a Class II railroad. The Alaska Railroad is owned by the
State of Alaska, which has a population well in excess of 50,000. There
are currently 30 commuter or other short-haul passenger railroad
operations in the U.S., most of which are part of larger transportation
organizations that receive Federal funds and serve major metropolitan
areas with populations greater than 50,000. However, one of these
railroads does not fall in this category and is considered a small
entity: The Hawkeye Express. The Hawkeye Express provides service to
Iowa City, Iowa, and is owned by a Class III railroad, a small entity.
FRA notes that it has not analyzed the Saratoga & North Creek Railway
as a small entity under this final rule. Because of operational changes
subsequent to the NPRM's publication, FRA considers the Saratoga &
North Creek Railway a tourist railroad, not subject to this rule.

    It is important to note that the small railroad being considered in
this analysis uses passenger rolling stock that is different from the
equipment covered by the rulemaking. Further, the Hawkeye Express would
be able to find their current type of train equipment in the market if
they decide to acquire new rolling stock over the next 30 years. This
final rule does not increase costs for this small passenger railroad.
FRA expects the cost to acquire passenger rail equipment will drop as a
result of the rulemaking. There will be more variety in trainset models
available for passenger operations and options in companies supplying
equipment in the U.S. market. Additionally, the railroad may enjoy
lower prices as the U.S. passenger rail market is enlarged as a result
of the rulemaking, enhancing economies of scale and increasing
predictability for equipment orders.
Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
    The passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment manufacturing
sector in the United States has a fairly small number of firms with no
more than 15 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and a few hundred
component and subcomponent suppliers.\22\ However, for this flexibility
analysis, FRA is taking a broader approach by assessing the effect of
the regulation on the railroad rolling stock manufacturing sector as
defined by the North American Classification System (NAICS), which
includes the passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment
manufacturing industry but goes beyond by also covering freight and
maintenance-of-way vehicles. This approach includes firms that
currently do not manufacture passenger rail equipment but can
potentially enter the market. Based on data from the U.S. Census
Bureau, employment in these industries is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Lowe, M., Tokuoka, S., Dubay, K., and Gereffi, G., ``U.S.
Manufacture of Rail Vehicles for Intercity Passenger Rail and Urban
Transit: A Value Chain Analysis,'' Center on Globalization,
Governance & Competitiveness, June 24, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     NAICS code 336510, Railroad rolling stock manufacturing,
159 firms in the industry, and 137 firms with less than 500 employees.
     NAICS code 335312, Motor and generator manufacturing, 428
firms in the industry, and 384 firms with less than 500 employees.
    The main impact of the rule affecting these industries is the
qualification costs for Tier I alternative and Tier III trainsets. FRA
worked with the industry to develop new safety criteria to evaluate
passenger equipment designed to standards differing from those
historically used for procurements in the U.S. As noted in the RIA,
companies supplying new trainsets covered by the rulemaking will be
required to submit test and analysis results to demonstrate compliance
with these new safety standards. However, in the case of rolling stock
manufacturing, this cost will only be incurred by the OEM when
submitting a qualification package, which would include details
regarding the performance of the trainset model under the required
tests and analyses. Therefore, small and very small firms supplying
OEMs are not expected to be required to submit that information. Small
firms could be expected to benefit from existing requirements for
minimum domestic content as more trainsets are purchased by U.S.
railroad operators. Small businesses have the opportunity to supply
OEMs with domestic inputs and to partner with larger firms to allow
small domestic producers to meet the needs of the market being created
by this final rule. Consequently, FRA expects the rulemaking to have
only a positive impact on these small entities as more of them are
provided with the opportunity to enter the passenger railroad equipment
manufacturing industry.
Significant Economic Impact Criteria
    Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue
averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One
percent of average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. FRA
realizes that some railroads will have revenue lower than $4.7 million.
However, FRA estimates that small railroads will not have any
additional expenses over the next ten years to comply with the
requirements in this rule. Based on this, FRA concludes that the
expected burden of this rule will not have a significant impact on the
competitive position of small entities, or on the small entity segment
of the railroad industry as a whole.
Substantial Number Criteria
    This final rule will likely affect any small railroad that is not
exempt from its scope or application (see 49 CFR 238.3). Thus, as noted
above, this final rule will impact a substantial number of small
railroads.
2. Certification
    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the
Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration certifies that
this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. In the NPRM, FRA requested comments on its
certification made as a result of its Regulatory Flexibility Act
analysis, see 81 FR 88006, 88044. FRA received no comments. FRA
therefore stands with its previous Regulatory Flexibility Act
certification.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this final rule are
being submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review
and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The sections that contain the new, revised, and
current information collection requirements and the estimated time to
fulfill each requirement are as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Total
                                                                Total annual       Average time per     annual
            CFR section              Respondent universe         responses             response         burden
                                                                                hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.47--Emergency Brake Valve--     32 railroads.........  32 markings..........  1 minute.........            1
 Marking brake pipe valve as such.
238.7--Waivers....................  32 railroads.........  5 waivers............  2 hours..........           10
238.15--Movement of passenger       32 railroads.........  1,000 tags...........  3 minutes........           50
 equipment with power brake defect.
    --Movement of passenger         32 railroads.........  288 tags.............  3 minutes........           14
     equipment--defective en route.
    --Conditional requirement--     32 railroads.........  144 notices..........  3 minutes........            7
     Notice.
238.17--Limitations on movement of  32 railroads.........  200 tags.............  3 minutes........           10
 passenger equipment--defects
 found at calendar day insp. & on
 movement of passenger equipment--
 develops defects en route.
    --Special requirements--        32 railroads.........  76 tags..............  3 minutes........            4
     movement of passenger equip.
     with safety appliance defect.
    --Crew member notifications...  32 railroads.........  38 radio               30 secs..........          .32
                                                            notifications.
238.21--Petitions for special       32 railroads.........  1 petition...........  16 hours.........           16
 approval of alternative standards.

    --Petitions for special         32 railroads.........  1 petition...........  40 hours.........           40
     approval of pre-revenue
     service acceptance testing
     plan.
    --Comments on petitions.......  Public/RR Industry...  4 comments...........  1 hour...........            4
238.103--Fire Safety:
    --Procuring new pass.           2 new railroads......  1 analysis...........  150 hours........          150
     equipment--Fire Safety
     Analysis.
    --Transferring existing         32 railroads/APTA....  3 analyses...........  20 hours.........           60
     equipment--Revised Fire
     Safety Analysis.
238.107--Inspection/testing/        32 railroads.........  32 reviews...........  60 hours.........        1,920
 maintenance plans--RR review.
238.109--Employee/Contractor Tr.:
    --Training employees--Mech.     7,500 employees/100    2,500 empl./100        1.33 hours.......        3,458
     insp.                           trainers.              trainers.
    --Recordkeeping--Employee/      32 railroads.........  2,500 records........  3 minutes........          125
     Contractor current
     qualifications.
238.111--Pre-revenue service        9 equipment            1 plan...............  16 hours.........           16
 acceptance testing plan:            manufacturers.
 Passenger equipment that has
 previously been used in service
 in the U.S.
    --Passenger equipment that has  9 equipment            1 plan...............  192 hours........          192
     not been previously used in     manufacturers.
     revenue service in the U.S.
    --Subsequent equipment orders.  9 equipment            1 plan...............  60 hours.........           60
                                     manufacturers.
    --Tier II & Tier III Passenger  32 railroads.........  1 report.............  60 hours.........           60
     Equipment: Report of test
     results to FRA (Revised
     Requirement).
    --Plan submitted to FRA for     32 railroads.........  1 plan...............  20 hours.........           20
     Tier II or Tier III equipment
     before being placed in
     service (Revised Requirement).
238.131--Exterior side door safety  6 passenger car        2 analyses...........  4 hours..........            8
 systems--new passenger cars/        builders.
 locomotives used in passenger
 service: Failure Modes, Effects,
 Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
238.133--Exterior side door safety  32 railroads.........  32 plan updates......  4 hours..........          128
 systems--passenger cars/
 locomotives used in passenger
 service: Functional test plans.
    --Notification to designated    32 railroads.........  9,994 radio            30 secs..........           84
     RR authority by train                                  notifications.
     crewmember of unsealed door
     by-pass device.
    --Safety briefing by train      32 railroads.........  320 safety briefings.  2 minutes........           11
     crew when door by-pass device
     is activated.
    --Notification to designated    32 railroads.........  320 radio              30 secs..........            3
     RR authority by train                                  notifications.
     crewmember that door by-pass
     device has been activated.
    --On-site qualified person      32 railroads.........  320 QP descriptions..  5 minutes........           27
     (QP) description to a
     qualified maintenance person
     (QMP) off-site that equipment
     is safe to move for repairs.
    --QP/QMP notification to        32 railroads.........  320 notices + 320      30 seconds + 10             56
     crewmember in charge that                              safety briefings.      min..
     door by-pass has been
     activated + safety briefing
     by train crew.
    --RR record of each door by-    32 railroads.........  320 records..........  2 minutes........           11
     pass activation.
    --RR record of unintended       32 railroads.........  20 records...........  2 hours..........           40
     power door openings.
    --RR record of by-pass          32 railroads.........  20 records...........  4 hours..........           80
     activations found unsealed.
238.135--RR request to FRA for      32 railroads.........  2 requests...........  25 hours.........           50
 special consideration to operate
 passenger trains with exterior
 side doors or trap doors, or
 both, open between stations.
    --FRA request to RR for         32 railroads.........  1 additional document  12 hours.........           12
     additional information
     concerning special
     consideration request.
    --RR Operating rule to          32 railroads.........  10 operating rules...  42 hours.........          420
     override a door summary
     circuit or no motion system,
     or both, in the event of an
     en route exterior side door
     failure or malfunction on a
     passenger train.
    --RR copy of written operating  32 railroads.........  10,000 op. rule        1 minute.........          167
     rules to train crew members                            copies.
     and control center personnel.
    --RR training of train crew     32 railroads.........  3,383 RR trained       30 mins..........        1,692
     members on requirements of                             employees.
     this section.
    --RR training of new employees  32 railroads.........  150 workers..........  30 mins..........           75
    --RR operational/efficiency     32 railroads.........  3,383 tests..........  2 minutes........          113
     tests of train crew members &
     control center employees.
238.201--New Requirements--         32 railroads.........  1 plan...............  40 hours.........           40
 Alternative Compliance: Tier I
 Passenger equipment--Test plans +
 supporting documentation
 demonstrating compliance.
    --Notice of tests sent to FRA   32 railroads.........  1 notice.............  30 mins..........            1
     30 days prior to commencement
     of operations.
238.229--Safety Appliances:
    --Welded safety appliances:     32 railroads.........  32 lists.............  1 hour...........           32
     Lists.
    --Defective welded safety       32 railroads.........  4 tags...............  3 minutes........          .20
     appliance--Tags.
    --Notification to crewmembers   32 railroads.........  2 notices............  1 minute.........        .0333
     about non-compliant equipment.
    --Inspection plans
    --Inspection personnel--        32 railroads.........  1 plan...............  16 hours.........           16
     Training.
    --Remedial action: Defect/      32 railroads.........  60 workers...........  4 hours..........          240
     crack in weld--record.         32 railroads.........  1 record.............  2.25 hours.......            2
    --Petitions for special         32 railroads.........  1 petition...........  4 hours..........            4
     approval of alternative
     compliance--impractical
     equipment design.
    --Records of inspection/repair  32 railroads.........  3,264 records........  12 mins..........          653
     of welded safety appliance
     brackets/supports/training.
238.230--Safety Appliances--New     32 railroads.........  100 records..........  6 minutes........           10
 Equipment--Inspection record of
 welded equipment by qualified
 Employee.
    --Welded safety appliances:     32 railroads.........  1 document...........  4 hours..........            4
     Documentation for equipment
     impractically designed to
     mechanically fasten safety
     appliance support.
238.231--Brake System--Inspection   32 railroads.........  2,500 forms..........  21 mins..........          875
 and repair of hand/parking brake:
 Records.
    --Procedures verifying hold of  32 railroads.........  1 procedure..........  2 hours..........            2
     hand/parking brakes.
238.237--Automated monitoring:
    --Documentation for alerter/    32 railroads.........  1 document...........  2 hours..........            2
     deadman control timing.
    --Defective alerter/deadman     32 railroads.........  25 tags..............  3 minutes........            1
     control: Tagging.
238.303--Exterior calendar day      32 railroads.........  32 notices...........  1 minute.........            1
 mechanical inspection of
 passenger equipment: Notice of
 previous inspection.
    --Dynamic brakes not in         32 railroads.........  50 tags..............  3 minutes........            3
     operating mode: Tag.
    --Conventional locomotives      32 railroads.........  50 tags..............  3 minutes........            3
     equipped with inoperative
     dynamic brakes: Tagging.
    --MU passenger equipment found  32 railroads.........  4 documents..........  2 hours..........            8
     with inoperative/ineffective
     air compressors at exterior
     calendar day inspection:
     Documents.
    --Written notice to train crew  32 railroads.........  100 notices..........  3 minutes........            5
     about inoperative/ineffective
     air compressors.

    --Records of inoperative air    32 railroads.........  100 records..........  2 minutes........            3
     compressors.
    --Record of exterior calendar   32 railroads.........  1,959,620 records....  10 minutes + 1         359,264
     day mechanical inspection.                                                    minute.
238.305--Interior calendar day      32 railroads.........  540 tags.............  1 minute.........            9
 mechanical inspection of
 passenger cars--Tagging of
 defective end/side doors.
    --Records of interior calendar  32 railroads.........  1,959,620 records....  5 minutes + 1          359,264
     day inspection.                                                               minute.
238.307--Periodic mechanical        32 railroads.........  2 notices/             5 hours..........           10
 inspection of passenger cars and                           notifications.
 unpowered vehicles--Alternative
 inspection intervals:
 Notifications.
    --Notice of seats/seat          32 railroads.........  200 notices..........  2 minutes........            7
     attachments broken or loose.
    --Records of each periodic      32 railroads.........  19,284 insp./records.  200 hours/2          3,857,443
     mechanical inspection.                                                        minutes.
    --Detailed documentation of     32 railroads.........  5 documents..........  100 hours........          500
     reliability assessments as
     basis for alternative
     inspection interval.
238.311--Single car test:
    --Tagging to indicate need for  32 railroads.........  50 tags..............  3 minutes........            3
     single car test.
238.313--Class I Brake Test:
    --Record for additional         32 railroads.........  15,600 insp./records.  30 minutes.......        7,800
     inspection for passenger
     equipment that does not
     comply with Sec.
     238.231(b)(1).
238.315--Class IA brake test:
    --Notice to train crew that     32 railroads.........  18,250 notices.......  5 seconds........           25
     test has been performed
     (verbal notice).
    --Communicating signal tested   32 railroads.........  365,000 op.            15 seconds.......        1,521
     and operating as intended.                             sufficiency tests.
238.317--Class II brake test:
    --Communicating signal tested   32 railroads.........  365,000 op.            15 seconds.......        1,521
     and operating as intended.                             sufficiency tests.
238.321--Out-of-service credit--    32 railroads.........  1,250 notes..........  2 minutes........           42
 Passenger car: Out-of-use
 notation.
238.445--Automated Monitoring:
    --Performance monitoring:       1 railroad...........  10,000 alerts/alarms.  10 secs..........           28
     Alerters/alarms.
    --Monitoring system: Self-test  1 railroad...........  21,900 notices.......  20 secs..........          122
     feature: Notifications.
238.703--Quasi-static Load          2 railroads..........  1 analysis...........  40 hours.........           40
 Requirements--Document/analysis
 for Tier III Trainsets showing
 compliance with this section (New
 Requirement).
238.705--Dynamic Collision          2 railroads..........  1 model validation/    40 hours.........           40
 Scenario--Demonstration of                                 analysis.
 Occupied Volume Integrity for
 Tier III Trainsets--Model
 validation document (New
 Requirement).
238.707--Override Protection--Anti- 2 railroads..........  1 test/analysis......  40 hours.........           40
 climbing performance test/
 analysis for Tier III Trainsets
 (New Requirement).
238.709--Fluid Entry Inhibition--   2 railroads..........  1 compliance document/ 20 hours.........           20
 Information to demonstrate                                 analysis.
 compliance with this section--
 Tier III Trainsets (New
 Requirement).
238.721--New Requirements--Tier     5 glass manufacturers  1 data document/       60 hours.........           60
 III Trainsets--End-facing                                  analysis.
 document/analysis for exterior
 windows of Tier III Trainsets.
    --Marking of End-facing         5 glass manuf........  60 markings..........  2 minutes........            2
     exterior windows Tier III
     Trainsets.
    --Cab Glazing; Side-facing      5 glass manuf........  1 document analysis..  10 hours.........           10
     exterior windows in Tier III
     cab--document showing
     compliance with Type II
     glazing.
    --Marking of side-facing        5 glass manuf........  120 window markings..  2 minutes........            4
     exterior windows in Tier III
     Trainsets.
    --Non-Cab Glazing; Side-facing  5 glass manuf........  1 data document/       20 hours.........           20
     exterior windows--Tier III--                           analysis.
     compliance document for Type
     II glazing.
    --Marking of side-facing        5 glass manuf........  1, 200 glass markings  2 minutes........           40
     exterior windows--Tier III
     Trainsets--non-cab cars.
    --Alternative standard to FRA   5 glass manuf........  1 alternative          5 hours..........            5