[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 146 (Tuesday, July 30, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Page 37004]
[FR Doc No: 2019-16137]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2019-0137]

Pipeline Safety: Information Collection Activities

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, PHMSA
invites comments on an information collection that is due to expire on
March 31, 2020. PHMSA will request a renewal with no change for the
information collection identified by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) control number 2137-0631.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before
September 30, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted in the following ways:
    E-Gov Website: http://www.regulations.gov. This site allows the
public to enter comments on any Federal Register notice issued by any
agency.
    Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
    Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, Room W12-140,
Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the ground level of DOT, West
Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9:00 a.m.
and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: Identify the docket number PHMSA-2019-0137 at the
beginning of your comments. Note that all comments received will be
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. You should know that anyone is able to
search the electronic form of all comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). Therefore, you may want to review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19476) or visit http://www.regulations.gov before
submitting any such comments.
    Docket: For access to the docket or to read background documents or
comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or to Room W12-
140 on the ground level of DOT, West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE, Washington, DC, between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. If you wish to receive confirmation of
receipt of your written comments, please include a self-addressed,
stamped postcard with the following statement: ``Comments on PHMSA-
2019-0137.'' The Docket Clerk will date stamp the postcard prior to
returning it to you via the U.S. mail. Please note that due to delays
in the delivery of U.S. mail to federal offices in Washington, DC, we
recommend that persons consider an alternative method (internet, fax,
or professional delivery service) of submitting comments to the docket
and ensuring their timely receipt at DOT.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Angela Hill by telephone at 202-366-
1246, by fax at<PHONE_NUMBER>, or by mail at DOT, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, PHP-30, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal
Regulations, requires PHMSA to provide interested members of the public
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information
collection and recordkeeping requests. This notice identifies an
information collection request that PHMSA will submit to OMB for
renewal. The following information is provided for each information
collection: (1) Title of the information collection; (2) OMB control
number; (3) Current expiration date; (4) Type of request; (5) Abstract
of the information collection activity; (6) Description of affected
public; (7) Estimate of total annual reporting and recordkeeping
burden; and (8) Frequency of collection. PHMSA will request a three-
year term of approval for this information collection activity. PHMSA
requests comments on the following information collection:
    1. Title: Customer Notifications for Installation of Excess Flow
Valves.
    OMB Control Number: 2137-0631.
    Current Expiration Date: 3/31/2020.
    Type of Request: Renewal without change.
    Abstract: This information collection will cover the reporting and
recordkeeping requirements for gas pipeline operators associated with
the requirement of operators to notify customers of their right to
request the installation of excess flow valves.
    Affected Public: Gas pipeline operators.
    Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden:

Estimated number of responses: 4,381.
Estimated annual burden hours: 4,381.

    Frequency of Collection: On occasion.
    Comments are invited on:
    (a) The need for the collection of information, including whether
the information has practical utility in helping the agency to achieve
its pipeline safety goals;
    (b) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the
collection of information, including the validity of the methodology
and assumptions used;
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; and
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on
those who respond, including the use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques.
    Authority: The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995; 44 U.S.C. Chapter
35, as amended; and 49 CFR 1.48.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on July 24, 2019, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
John A. Gale,
Director, Standards and Rulemaking Division.
[FR Doc. 2019-16137 Filed 7-29-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-60-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 50 (Wednesday, March 15, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 16006]
[FR Doc No: 2023-05318]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-10789-01-OA; EPA-HQ-OEJECR-2023-0099]

White House Environmental Justice Advisory Council; Notice of
Charter Renewal

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice of charter renewal.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has determined that, in accordance with the provisions of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the White House
Environmental Justice Advisory Council (WHEJAC) is necessary and in the
public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on
the agency by law. Accordingly, WHEJAC will be renewed for an
additional two-year period. The purpose of the WHEJAC is to provide
independent advice and recommendations to the Chair of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and to the White House Environmental
Justice Interagency Council (IAC) on how to increase the Federal
Government's efforts to address current and historic environmental
injustice. The WHEJAC will provide advice and recommendations about
broad cross-cutting issues related, but not limited, to issues of
environmental justice and pollution reduction, energy, climate change
mitigation and resiliency, environmental health, and racial inequity.
The WHEJAC's efforts will include a broad range of strategic,
scientific, technological, regulatory, community engagement, and
economic issues related to environmental justice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Inquiries may be directed to Karen L.
Martin, WHEJAC Designated Federal Officer, U.S. EPA, 1200 Pennsylvania
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460; by telephone at<PHONE_NUMBER>; via
email at [email protected].

Matthew Tejada,
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Environmental Justice, Office of
Environmental Justice and External Civil Rights.
[FR Doc. 2023-05318 Filed 3-14-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 224 (Friday, November 20, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72779-72781]
[FR Doc No: 2015-29641]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Information and Guidance on the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Emergency Window Exits on Railroad Passenger Cars

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: FRA has become aware of occurrences when emergency window
exits on passenger cars did not operate

as intended because the emergency pull handle became detached from the
window gasket when pulled, the gasket tore into multiple pieces, or the
gasket was otherwise difficult to remove. While investigating these
occurrences, FRA discovered that some railroads were not following, or
did not clearly understand, the existing Federal regulations on the
inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) of these window exits,
particularly the requirement that a railroad must utilize a test
sampling method that conforms with a formalized statistical test
method. FRA does not believe any of these occurrences involved
passengers or precluded passengers from opening a window in an
emergency situation. However, in light of these concerns, FRA is
issuing this document to provide information and guidance to railroads
operating passenger train service on the existing regulatory
requirements regarding ITM of emergency window exits.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Daniel Knote, Staff Director,
Passenger Rail Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,<PHONE_NUMBER>; or Mr. Michael
Hunter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Historical Background on Existing Requirements

    The current ITM requirements for emergency window exit operability
are found in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 238.113(e) and
238.307(c)(4)(i)(B).\1\ These sections require each passenger railroad
to test (at an interval not to exceed 184 days, as part of the periodic
mechanical inspection) a representative sample \2\ of its passenger car
emergency window exits to determine they ``operate as intended'' and
``properly operate,'' respectively. Title 49 CFR 238.113(e) further
requires the sampling method to ``conform with a formalized statistical
test method.''
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    \1\ Before FRA's November 29, 2013, Passenger Train Emergency
Systems II final rule (78 FR 71786), the requirement to test a
representative sample of emergency window exits was in 49 CFR
239.107(b)(2) and required each passenger railroad ``to verify that
they are operating properly.''
    \2\ The requirement to test a representative sample of emergency
window exits, which was based in large part on Emergency Order No.
20 (EO 20), was codified by FRA's May 4, 1998, Passenger Train
Emergency Preparedness final rule (E-Prep final rule). See 63 FR
24630, 24669-24670; EO 20, Notice No. 1, 61 FR 6876, 6881, Feb. 22,
1996, and Notice No. 2, 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
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    As FRA explained in Emergency Order 20 (EO 20), a February 16,
1996, passenger train accident in Silver Spring, Maryland, involving a
cab car on fire that filled with smoke, raised concerns that at least
some of the train occupants could not exit through the windows.\3\ This
accident demonstrated why emergency windows must be readily
identifiable and operable when needed.
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    \3\ The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Railroad
Accident Report on this accident reported that it took a Safety
Board investigator several minutes to remove the left-side, front
emergency window exit of the last passenger coach in the train's
consist. See NTSB/RAR-97/02 report at 17 (July 3, 1997). An NTSB
investigator could not remove the same car's right-side, rear
emergency window exit, which was later removed by another
investigator after approximately 3 minutes of physical exertion. The
report further noted that the lubricant used to install these
windows had hardened over time.
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    FRA has continually reminded railroads that these windows ``provide
an additional means of egress in life-threatening situations requiring
very rapid exit, such as an on-board fire or submergence of the car in
a body of water.'' See Passenger Train Emergency Systems (PTES) II
final rule (78 FR 71786, 71802). In FRA's February 1, 2008, PTES final
rule, FRA reminded railroads of the requirement to test emergency
window exits using commonly accepted sampling techniques \4\ to
determine how many windows to test. See 73 FR 6370, 6384. In doing so,
FRA reemphasized that sampling should be conducted to meet a 95-percent
confidence level that no defective units remain after completing the
tests for the windows in the sample. See id. Further, in the Passenger
Train Emergency Preparedness (E-Prep) final rule, FRA stated that each
railroad should ``properly consider the nature and characteristics of
its operations and passenger equipment to plan for routine and
scheduled inspection, maintenance, and repair.'' 63 FR 24669. FRA also
made clear its expectations regarding the inspection and maintenance of
emergency exits:

    \4\ Railroads should conduct their sampling under either
Military Standard MIL-STD-105(E), ``Sampling for Attributes''
(formally cancelled by the U.S. Department of Defense, but still
acceptable for FRA's representative sampling purposes) or acceptable
non-Government, standard sampling procedures and tables for
inspection by attributes, such as the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI)/ASQC Z1.4-1993, ``Sampling Procedures for
Inspections by Attributes.'' See 73 FR 6370, 6384.

    Visual inspections must be performed periodically to verify that
no emergency exit has a broken release mechanism or other overt sign
that would render it unable to function in an emergency.
Maintenance, including lubrication or scheduled replacement of
depreciated parts or mechanisms, must be performed in accordance
with standard industry practice and/or manufacturer recommendations.
All emergency exits that are found during the course of an
inspection or maintenance cycle to be broken, disabled, or otherwise
incapable of performing their intended safety function must be
repaired before the railroad may return the car to passenger
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service.

Id.

II. FRA Review of Railroads' Emergency Window Testing Programs

    When FRA reviewed various railroads' emergency window exit testing
programs, it discovered that some railroads were not following, or did
not clearly understand, the Federal regulations on the ITM of emergency
window exits. This was particularly true with respect to adopting a
sampling method that conforms with a formalized statistical test method
and to recording window test failures. As a result, FRA is providing
this guidance to ensure all railroads have in place an appropriate
window testing program and understand which window tests they must
record as failures.
    Specifically, FRA considers a window to have failed testing if the
window or a window component (e.g., gasket, pull handle) does not
operate as intended, considering both the window design and whether the
window removal was ``rapid and easy'' when opened in a manner
simulating a passenger trying to remove the window in an emergency
(e.g., to escape a car on fire). Examples of window test failures some
railroads were not categorizing as such include situations where the
emergency pull handle separated from the gasket, or where the gasket
tore or needed to be removed in multiple pieces.\5\ In addition, FRA
observed one railroad testing its windows by carefully pulling out the
window gasket to try to avoid detaching the handle or damaging the
gasket. FRA recognizes that many railroads prefer to reinstall the same
gaskets and handles for the emergency windows after performing the
tests. However, FRA makes clear it does not consider such a careful
test to be properly conducted because a passenger would not act that
way in an emergency.
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    \5\ FRA makes clear that for any window that is intentionally
designed with one or more counter-intuitive features (such as an
emergency pull handle that separates from the gasket when pulled, or
a gasket that needs to be removed in multiple pieces), the railroad
must ensure that such features are clearly explained in the required
operating instructions posted for the affected emergency window
exits.
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    FRA also discovered that some railroads believed they were not
required to formally adopt a sampling program because they were testing
100 percent of their emergency window exits over a 1- to 2-year period.
FRA

appreciates these railroads' efforts for what they believed was going
above and beyond what is considered a reasonable sample size. However,
FRA makes clear that for a railroad to truly test 100 percent of its
windows, the railroad would need to test all of the emergency windows
in each of its cars at least once during a 184-day period. FRA also
clarifies that simply testing 100 percent of the emergency window exits
does not necessarily ensure that the windows will operate as intended
when needed in an emergency situation. As discussed in this document,
it is how a railroad characterizes the results of those tests and what
a railroad does with the results of those tests that will help ensure
the windows will operate as intended.
    Choosing the number of windows to test (whether it is 20 percent or
100 percent) is only the first step. Second, if testing fewer than 100
percent of the windows in a 184-day period, railroads must also ensure
the sample is representative of the various window types in its fleet
or fleets.\6\ Third, even if a railroad is testing 100 percent of its
emergency window exits, it must have a program in place that requires
monitoring of the tests to determine whether the test results
demonstrate a 95-percent confidence level that all emergency window
exits operate as intended. Although EO 20, Notice No. 1, would have
required testing all window exits on a specific series or type of car
if one such car had a defective window exit, the amended order, Notice
No. 2, permitted the use of commonly accepted sampling techniques to
determine how many additional windows to test. See 61 FR 8703, 8705. In
general, these principles require that the greater the percentage of
windows initially found defective, the greater the percentage of
windows the railroad will have to test.
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    \6\ Railroads can easily set up a simple spreadsheet (using off-
the-shelf software) to generate a random sample that includes
windows representing all of the window types in a railroad's fleet
or fleets.
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    FRA expects all railroads to: (1) Conduct periodic reviews of
records of window testing using an acceptable attribute sampling method
to determine whether they are achieving a 95-percent confidence level
that no defective units remain; \7\ (2) assess the probable cause of
any window test failures; and (3) address any such failures. In setting
up their testing programs, railroads must set the confidence level of
the sample at 95 percent or more and set the defect (failure) rate at
less than 5 percent.\8\ To perform their analyses, railroads must
review the test results at the end of a sampling period (at a minimum)
and take further action if the testing reveals that 5 percent or more
of the windows in the sample are defective. When assessing the probable
cause(s) of any window test failures, railroads should consider whether
the failures are a result of design issues, useful life issues, or
other systemic issues common to a particular window design or windows
in service of a similar age. If the test failure appears to be due to a
systemic issue, then the potential exists for the failure to repeatedly
present itself. In such cases, FRA strongly urges that the railroad
consider replacing all the emergency windows or window components of
like design or similar service age, as applicable.
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    \7\ Although the goal is to have no defective units remaining in
a railroad's emergency window population, FRA recognizes that
because the railroad is performing a statistical sample that
achieves a 95-percent confidence level, there will always be a
possibility that some defective units remain.
    \8\ These numbers are not intended always to add up to 100.
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    As stated in the E-Prep final rule, a railroad must repair any
window found to be broken, disabled, or otherwise incapable of
performing its intended safety function before the railroad may return
the car to passenger service. See 63 FR 24669. This remains true even
when the number of windows that failed is below the 5-percent defect
rate threshold. Railroads should also document the remedial action(s)
planned or taken to address the window test failures, and create a
timetable for window inspection and replacement for the window type or
car series to remedy the problem in the most expedient manner.

III. Maintenance of Emergency Window Exits

    As noted above, FRA expects railroads to periodically perform
visual inspections to verify no emergency window exit has a broken
release mechanism or other overt indication that would render it unable
to function in an emergency. Ideally, railroads would incorporate these
visual inspections as part of the interior calendar day mechanical
inspections of passenger cars, since they already need to inspect the
window markings daily to ensure that the safety-related signage is in
place and legible. See 49 CFR 238.305(c)(7). As demonstrated by the
1996 accident that led to EO 20 (in which some of the window gaskets
could not readily be pulled out due to lack of lubrication and
maintenance), it is important that maintenance, including lubrication
or scheduled replacement of degraded parts or mechanisms, be performed
using standard industry practice and/or manufacturer recommendations to
ensure that window exits will operate as intended during an emergency.
This will also help to prevent a situation where a passenger in an
emergency would panic or be delayed by trying to determine how to
remove a window after the pull handle breaks off or a piece of the
gasket tears off, for example.
    Finally, FRA discovered in its investigations that some employees
were installing the window gaskets with a sharp tool (such as a
screwdriver), which may have damaged the gaskets and may explain why,
when pulled, the gaskets were not coming out in one piece as designed.
Therefore, to ensure that railroads perform proper maintenance, the
railroads should ensure that employees have and use proper tools when
installing emergency windows to avoid damaging the window gaskets.
    As noted previously, FRA is issuing this document to provide basic
information and guidance to railroads operating passenger train service
to ensure that they understand the existing regulatory requirements
regarding the ITM of emergency window exits. FRA believes that
compliance with the existing emergency window exit regulatory
requirements will help ensure the safety of the Nation's railroad
employees, passengers, and the general public. FRA may take other
appropriate actions it deems necessary to ensure the highest level of
safety, including pursuing other corrective measures under its rail
safety authority.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on November 17, 2015.
Robert C. Lauby,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2015-29641 Filed 11-19-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 174 (Monday, September 11, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 42718-42720]
[FR Doc No: 2017-19139]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2016-0124; Notice 2]

General Motors LLC, Receipt of Second Petition for
Inconsequentiality and Notice of Consolidation

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Notice of receipt of petition.

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SUMMARY: On January 3, 2017, TK Holdings Inc. (Takata) filed a defect
information report (DIR), in which it determined that a defect existed
in certain passenger-side air bag inflators that it manufactured,
including passenger inflators that it supplied to General Motors, LLC
(GM) for use in certain GMT900 vehicles. GM has petitioned the Agency
for a decision that, because of differences in inflator design and
vehicle integration, the equipment defect determined to exist by Takata
is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety in the GMT900
vehicles, and that GM should therefore be relieved of its notification
and remedy obligations.

DATES: The closing date for comments is September 14, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written data,
views, and arguments regarding this petition for inconsequentiality.
Comments must refer to the docket and notice number cited in the title
of this notice and be submitted by one of the following methods:
     Internet: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the
online instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building, Room W12-
140, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building, Room W12-
140, Washington, DC 20590 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Facsimile:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    You may call the Docket at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Note that all comments received will be posted without change to
http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information
provided. Thus, submitting such information makes it public. You may
wish to read the Privacy Act notice, which can be viewed by clicking on
the ``Privacy and Security Notice'' link in the footer of http://www.regulations.gov. DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement is available
for review in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477-78).
    The petition, supporting materials, and all comments received
before the close of business on the closing date indicated above will
be filed in the docket and will be considered. Comments and supporting
materials received after the closing date will also be filed and will
be considered to the extent possible. When the petition is granted or
denied, notice of the decision will also be published in the Federal
Register pursuant to the authority indicated at the end of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    For legal issues: Stephen Hench, Office of the Chief Counsel, NCC-
100, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>).
    For general information regarding NHTSA's investigation into Takata
air bag inflator ruptures and the related recalls: http://www.safercar.gov/rs/takata/index.html.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:

I. Background

    On May 4, 2016, NHTSA issued, and Takata agreed to, an Amendment to
the November 3, 2015 Consent Order (the ``Amendment''), under which
Takata is bound to declare a defect in all frontal driver and passenger
air bag inflators that contain a phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate
(PSAN)-based propellant and do not contain a moisture-absorbing
desiccant. Such defect declarations will be made on a rolling basis,
with the first declaration due on May 16, 2016 and the second
declaration due on December 31, 2016. See Amendment at ] 14.

GM's May 27, 2016 DIRs

    Takata timely submitted the first scheduled equipment DIRs on May
16, 2016. See Recall Nos. 16E-042, 16E-043, and 16E-044. Those DIRs
included non-desiccated passenger inflators, designated as types SPI YP
and PSPI-L YD, that were installed as original equipment on certain
motor vehicles manufactured by GM (the ``covered passenger
inflators''), as well as other non-desiccated passenger inflators
installed as original equipment on motor vehicles manufactured by a
number of other automakers, which are not at issue here.
    The Takata filing triggered GM's obligation to file a DIR for the
affected GM vehicles. See 49 CFR part 573; Amendment at ] 16; November
3, 2015 Coordinated Remedy Order at ] 46. GM ultimately submitted two
DIRs on May 27, 2016. See Recall Nos. 16V-381 (for vehicles in Zone A)
and 16V-383 (for vehicles in Zone B).
    On November 15, 2016, GM petitioned the Agency, under 49 U.S.C.
30118(d), 30120(h) and 49 CFR part 556, for a decision that the
equipment defect determined to exist by Takata is inconsequential as it
relates to motor vehicle safety in the GMT900 vehicles. See GM's
Petition for Inconsequentiality and Request for Deferral of
Determination Regarding Certain GMT900 Vehicles Equipped with Takata
``SPI YP'' and ``PSPI-L YD'' Passenger Inflators (the ``First Petition
for Inconsequentiality'' or ``First Petition''). GM's First Petition
concluded that because the putative defect is inconsequential to safety
in the GMT900 vehicles, the company should be relieved of notification
and remedy obligations for Takata inflators in those GM vehicles. See
First Petition at p. 18. GM further requested that NHTSA defer its
decision on the petition until GM is able to complete its testing and
engineering analysis in August 2017. See id.
    In a Notice published in the Federal Register on November 28, 2016,
the Agency published notice of the First Petition and granted two
administrative requests. See 81 FR 85681. First, as a matter of its
enforcement discretion, NHTSA accepted the First Petition even though
it was filed outside the regulatory 30-day filing deadline. Second,
NHTSA found that GM had produced probative evidence to support its
inconsequentiality claim that--while not yet sufficient--tended to
support GM's Petition, at least with respect to the short-term safety
of the covered passenger inflators. Therefore, NHTSA elected to grant
GM until August 31, 2017 to develop and present further evidence, data,
and information, and defer the Agency's decision on the First Petition
for Inconsequentiality, unless additional evidence warrants an earlier
decision. NHTSA further required that GM submit monthly testing
updates, which would be made publicly available. Since then, GM has
submitted updates for December 2016 and January through August 2017,
which have been posted to the public docket. See Docket No. NHTSA-2016-
0124.

GM's January 10, 2017 DIRs

    Takata timely submitted the second scheduled equipment DIRs on
January 3, 2017. See Recall Nos. 17E-001, 17E-002, and 17E-003. Those
DIRs included additional covered passenger inflators. Again, the Takata
filing triggered GM's obligation to file a DIR for the affected GM
vehicles. See 49 CFR part 573; Amendment at ] 16; Third Amendment to
Coordinated Remedy Order at ] 32. GM ultimately submitted its DIRs on
January 10, 2017. See Recall Nos. 17V-010, 17V-019, and 17V-021.\1\
Therein, in accordance with 49 CFR 573.6(c)(8)(iii), GM notified NHTSA
of its intention to file a petition for an exemption from its recall
requirements (i.e., a petition for inconsequentiality). Contemporaneous
with its DIRs, GM submitted to the Agency a Petition for
Inconsequentiality and Request for Deferral of Determination Regarding
Certain GMT900 Vehicles Equipped with Takata ``SPI YP'' and ``PSPI-L
YD'' Passenger Inflators Subject to January 2017 Takata Equipment DIR
Filings (the ``Second Petition for Inconsequentiality'' or ``Second
Petition'').\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ When a manufacturer files a petition for inconsequentiality,
the affected DIR will not be made public unless and until the Agency
denies the petition.
    \2\ GM's Second Petition has been publicly available on NHTSA's
Web site since January. https://www.nhtsa.gov/recall-spotlight/takata-air-bags.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Class of Motor Vehicles Involved

    GM's Second Petition involves certain ``GMT900'' vehicles that
contain the covered passenger inflators (designated as inflator types
``SPI YP'' and ``PSPI-L YD''). GMT900 is a GM-specific vehicle platform
that forms the structural foundation for a variety of GM trucks and
sport utility vehicles, including: Chevrolet Silverado 1500, GMC Sierra
1500, Chevrolet Silverado 2500/3500, GMC Sierra 2500/3500, Chevrolet
Tahoe, Chevrolet Suburban, Chevrolet Avalanche, GMC Yukon, GMC Yukon
XL, Cadillac Escalade, Cadillac Escalade ESV, and Cadillac Escalade
EXT. The Second Petition involves the following GMT900 vehicles:
     In Zone A, model year 2012 GMT900 vehicles. Zone A
comprises the following states and U.S. territories: Alabama,
California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Texas, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands (Saipan), and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See Amendment at
] 7.a.
     In Zone B, certain model year 2009 GMT900 vehicles. Zone B
comprises the following states: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. See
Amendment at ] 7.b.
     In Zone C, certain model year 2007-2008 GMT900 vehicles.
Zone C comprises the following states: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut,
Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New
Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Amendment at ]
7.c.

III. Summary of GM's Second Petition for Inconsequentiality

    GM's Second Petition raises the same issues and arguments as its
First Petition. See Second Petition at p. 4. According to the Second
Petition, GM's engineering analysis supports the conclusion that the
covered passenger inflators in the subject GMT900 vehicles are
currently performing as designed, and will likely continue to perform
as designed for a number of years--i.e., that the covered passenger
inflators, as integrated into the GMT900 vehicles, do not present an
unreasonable risk to safety. See Second Petition at p. 10.
    According to the Petition, GM's position is based upon the
following: an estimated 55,000 Takata passenger inflator deployments in
GMT900 vehicles without a rupture; ballistic tests of 1,624 covered
passenger inflators without a rupture or sign of abnormal deployment;
test deployment of 12 inflators artificially exposed to additional
humidity and temperature cycling without a rupture or sign of abnormal
deployment; and analysis, through stress-strength interference,
indicating that the propellant in older covered passenger inflators has
not degraded to a sufficient extent to create rupture risk. See Second
Petition at pp. 13-16.
    GM further states that the covered passenger inflators are not used
by any

other original equipment manufacturer and that those inflators have a
number of unique design features that influence burn rates and internal
ballistic dynamics, including greater vent-area-to-propellant-mass
ratios, steel end caps, and thinner propellant wafers. See Second
Petition at p. 11-12. In addition, GM states that the physical
environment of the GMT900 vehicles better protects the covered
passenger inflators from temperature cycling that can cause rupture.
Id.
    Finally, to supplement its internal analysis, GM has retained a
third-party expert, Orbital ATK, to conduct a long-term aging study
that will estimate the service life expectancy of the covered passenger
inflators in the GMT900 vehicles. See Second Petition at pp. 17-18. GM
anticipates that this study will be complete in August 2017. Id.

IV. Consolidation

    GM's Second Petition for Inconsequentiality is virtually identical
to the Petition for Inconsequentiality submitted on November 15, 2016.
First, both petitions involve the same covered passenger inflators
(i.e., frontal passenger inflator types ``SPI YP'' and ``PSPI-L YD'').
Second, both petitions involve the same vehicle platform (i.e., the
GMT900). Third, both petitions rely upon the same purported evidence to
support the safety of the inflators (i.e., estimated field deployments,
ballistic testing, and stress-strength interference analysis). Fourth,
both petitions will rely upon the same forthcoming report by Orbital
ATK. According, it is appropriate to evaluate and dispose of the two
petitions simultaneously. In the interest of clarity, consistency, and
efficiency, the Agency is consolidating the Second Petition with the
First Petition under Docket No. NHTSA-2016-0124.

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 30101, et seq., 30118, 30120(h), 30162,
30166(b)(1), 30166(g)(1); delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95(a);
49 CFR parts 556, 573, 577.

    Issued: August 31, 2017.
Stephen P. Wood,
Acting Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2017-19139 Filed 9-8-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-59-P


			  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

		        DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

			  OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

			          WASHINGTON, D.C.

Issued by the Department of Transportation on April 22, 2003

NOTICE OF ACTION TAKEN -- DOCKET OST 2001-9518

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

This serves as notice to the public of the action described below, taken
by the Department official indicated (no additional confirming order
will be issued in this matter).

Applicant:  AEROVIAS de MEXICO, S.A. de C.V.
                          Date Filed:  April 4, 2003

Relief requested:  Exemption from 49 USC section 41301 to permit the
applicant to continue to conduct scheduled, combination service between
Acapulco, Mexico, and Los Angeles, California.

If renewal, date and citation of last action:  April 25, 2002, in this
Docket.

Applicant representative(s):  William C. Evans,<PHONE_NUMBER>      DOT
analyst:  Allen F. Brown,<PHONE_NUMBER>

Responsive pleadings:  None.

	DISPOSITION

Action:  Approved.			       			                            Action date:
April 22, 2003

Effective dates of authority granted:  April 22, 2003, through April 25,
2004.

Basis for approval:  United States-Mexico Air Transport Services
Agreement

Except to the extent exempted/waived, this authority is subject to the
terms, conditions, and limitations indicated: Standard exemption
conditions.

Special conditions/Remarks:

Action taken by:   Paul L. Gretch, Director

		      Office of International Aviation

________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________

Under authority assigned by the Department in its regulations, 14 CFR
Part 385, we found that (1) our action was consistent with Department
policy; (2) the applicant was qualified to perform its proposed
operations; (3) grant of the authority was consistent with the public
interest; and (4) grant of the authority would not constitute a major
regulatory action under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.
To the extent not granted/deferred/dismissed, we denied all requests in
the referenced Docket.  We may amend, modify, or revoke the authority
granted in this Notice at any time without hearing at our discretion.

Persons entitled to petition the Department for review of the action set
forth in this Notice under the Department’s regulations, 14 CFR
§385.30, may file their petitions within seven (7) days after the date
of issuance of this Notice.  This action was effective when taken, and
the filing of a petition for review will not alter such effectiveness.

An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide
Web at:

http://dms.dot.gov//reports/reports_aviation.asp


[Federal Register: September 9, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 174)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 54771]
[DOCID:fr09se10-5]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 117

[USCG-2010-0819]

Drawbridge Operation Regulation; Trent River, New Bern, NC

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of temporary deviation from regulations.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commander, Fifth Coast Guard District, has issued a
temporary deviation from the regulations governing the operation of the
US70 (Alfred C. Cunningham) Bridge across Trent River, mile 0.0, at New
Bern, NC, to accommodate a Bridge Run. This deviation allows the
drawbridge to be maintained in the closed position to vessels at
specific date and times.

DATES: This deviation is effective from 6 a.m. to 11 a.m. on Saturday,
October 16, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Documents mentioned in this preamble as being available in
the docket are part of docket USCG-2010-0819 and are available online
by going to http://www.regulations.gov, inserting USCG-2010-0819 in the
``Keyword'' box and then clicking ``Search. They are also available for
inspection or copying at the Docket Management Facility (M-30), U.S.
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this rule,
call or e-mail Sandra S. Elliott, Bridge Management Specialist, Fifth
Coast Guard District; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, e-mail
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>If you have questions on viewing the docket,
call Renee V. Wright, Program Manager, Docket Operations, telephone
202-366-9826.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The US70 (Alfred C. Cunningham) Bridge a
bascule lift bridge across Trent River, at mile 0.0, has a vertical
clearance in the closed position to vessels of approximately 14 feet
above mean high water.
    On behalf of the Neuse River Bridge Run Organization and the City
of New Bern NC, the North Carolina Department of Transportation has
requested a temporary deviation from the current operating regulations
of the bridge set out in 33 CFR 117.843 (a) to accommodate the Bridge
Run schedule for Saturday, October 16, 2010.
    Under this deviation, the drawbridge would be allowed to remain in
the closed-to-navigation position from 6 a.m. to 11 a.m. to vessels on
Saturday, October 16, 2010, to accommodate the Bridge Run.
    The Coast Guard will inform the users of the waterway through our
Local and Broadcast Notices to Mariners of the closure period for the
bridge so that vessels can arrange their transits to minimize any
impact caused by the temporary deviation. There are no alternate routes
for vessels transiting this section of the Trent River and the
drawbridge will be able to open in the event of an emergency.
    In accordance with 33 CFR 117.35(e), the drawbridge must return to
its regular operating schedule immediately at the end of the designated
time period. This deviation from the operating regulation is authorized
under 33 CFR 117.35.

    Dated: August 27, 2010.
Waverly W. Gregory, Jr.,
Chief, Bridge Administration Branch, Fifth Coast Guard District.
[FR Doc. 2010-22416 Filed 9-8-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P