included in the waivers are reflected in paragraphs (b)(1) through (5).
    The clearance requirement is intended to ensure that obstructions
are cleared from in front of the locomotive and to prevent the
locomotive from climbing and derailing. In FRA's experience, hump yards
contain few obstructions that present this potential risk. The
protections provided by a pilot, snowplow, or endplate are most
desirable at grade crossings where the requirement would remain without
change. This section also establishes various requirements to ensure
that the train crew is notified of the increased amount of clearance
and to prevent the improper use of the locomotive. Locomotives with
additional clearance are required to be stenciled at two locations; the
train crew must be notified of any restrictions being placed on the
locomotive; and, the amount of clearance must be noted on the Form FRA
6180-49a that is maintained in the cab of the locomotive.
    AAR submitted comments stating that FRA should not require the
increased amount of clearance to be noted on the Form FRA 6180-49a that
is maintained in the cab of the locomotive. AAR believes that
stenciling the increased amount of clearance on both ends of the
locomotive will provide sufficient notice of the clearance height. FRA
continues to believe that noting the increased amount of clearance on
the Form FRA 6180-49a that is maintained in the cab of the locomotive
will benefit safety. The Form FRA 6180-49a provides a routinely used,
centralized location for the railroad to record important information
about the locomotive. As a result, the information is made easily
accessible to train crew members and to FRA inspectors inside the
locomotive cab. The stenciling will provide additional notification to
train crew members and FRA inspectors who are on the ground during the
movement of the locomotive.
Section 229.125 Headlights and Auxiliary Lights
    To incorporate an existing waiver, this section permits a
locomotive to remain in the lead position until the next calendar day
inspection after an en route failure of one incandescent PAR 56, 74
Volt, 350 Watt lamp, if certain safety conditions are satisfied. FRA is
also extending the existing auxiliary intensity requirements at 7.5
degrees and 20 degrees to the headlight to clarify the criteria by
which equivalence of new design head-light lamps will be evaluated to
achieve the same safety benefit.
    When one of two lamps in a headlight utilizing PAR-56, 350-watt, 74
volt lamps is inoperative, the center beam illumination for that
headlight often drops below 200,000 candela due to manufacturing
tolerances. FRA issued a waiver that allowed a locomotive equipped with
these lamps to continue in service as a lead unit until the next
calendar day inspection, when one of the two lamps becomes inoperative.
Alternatively, when locomotives are handled under the general movement
for repair provision of Sec.  229.9, they are required to be repaired
or switched to a trailing position at the next forward location where
either could be accomplished. Paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section,
incorporates the waiver into the regulation. Conditions listed in
paragraphs (a)(2)(i)(A), (B), and (C) ensure that neither locomotive
conspicuity at grade crossings, nor the illumination of the right of
way will be compromised.
Section 229.133 Interim Locomotive Conspicuity Measures--Auxiliary
External Lights
    To update the regulations related to locomotive conspicuity, FRA is
removing the ditch light and crossing light requirements contained in
Sec.  229.133 that have been superseded by similar requirements in
Sec.  229.125. Section 229.133 currently contains interim locomotive
conspicuity measures that were incorporated into the regulations in
1993 while the final provisions related to locomotive auxiliary lights
were being developed. See 58 FR 6899; 60 FR 44457; and 61 FR 8881. The
requirements related to ditch lights and crossing lights in Sec.
229.133 were later superseded by similar requirements in Sec.  229.125,
published in 1996, and revised in 2003 and 2004. See 68 FR 49713; and
69 FR 12532. In 1996, locomotives equipped with ditch lights or
crossing lights that were in compliance with the requirements of Sec.
229.133 were temporarily deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  229.125
(i.e., grandfathered into the new regulation). However, that provision
expired on March 6, 2000. As a result, ditch lights and crossing lights
that comply with Sec.  229.133 have not satisfied the requirements of
Sec.  229.125 for more than 10 years. No substantive changes to the
auxiliary external light requirements were proposed in this section.
Section 229.140 Alerters
    This section requires locomotives that operate over 25 mph to be
equipped with an alerter and requires the alerters to perform certain
functions. Today, a majority of locomotives are equipped with alerters.
As an appurtenance to the locomotive, the alerters have been required
to function as intended, if installed in the locomotive cab. The
requirements contained in this final rule will increase the number of
locomotives equipped with an alerter, and provide specific standards to
ensure that the alerters are used and maintained in a manner that
increases safety.
    EMD and AAR submitted comments related to paragraph (a) stating
that the implementation period for this section should be 1 year,
rather than the 90 days that FRA proposed in the NPRM. FRA agrees that
it is reasonable to provide up to 1 year for the railroads to comply,
because the manufacturers need sufficient time to complete work on
existing orders that were made before the rule became effective and
would not comply with the rule. Accordingly, FRA is establishing an
implementation period of 1 year in paragraph (a)(1).
    During Working Group discussions, all parties agreed that an
alerter would be considered non-compliant if it failed to reset in
response to at least three of the commands listed in paragraphs (b)(1)
through (6) of this section, in addition to the manual reset. It is
important that locomotives equipped with an alerter adhere to minimum
performance standards to ensure that the alerter serves its intended
safety function. Utilizing several different reset options for the
warning timing cycle increases the effectiveness of the alerter, as it
will require differentiated cognitive actions by the operator. This
will help prevent the operator from repeating the same reset many times
as a reflex, without having full awareness of the action.
    BLET and UTU submitted comments stating that alerter requirements
for locomotives that operate at speeds less than 25 MPH would improve
safety. FRA believes that tailoring the alerter

standard to a minimum operational speed will permit operational
flexibility while maintaining safety. Many freight railroads only
operate over small territories. They generally move freight equipment
between two industries or interchange traffic with other, larger
railroads. For these operations, the advantages of and the ability to
move at higher speeds are non-existent. Moreover, movements at these
lower speeds greatly reduce the risk of injury to the public and damage
to equipment. For these reasons, there is a reduced safety need for
requiring alerters on locomotives conducting these shorter, low speed
movements. In addition, as an appurtenance to the locomotive, an
alerter must operate as intended when present on a locomotive. Section
20701 of Title 49 of the United States Code prohibits the use of a
locomotive unless the entire locomotive and its appurtenances are in
proper condition and safe to operate in the service to which they are
placed. Therefore, if a locomotive that operates at speeds less than 25
MPH is equipped with an alerter, the alerter will be required to
function. Under this authority, FRA has issued many violations against
railroads for operating locomotives equipped with a non-functioning
alerter.
    Paragraph (f) will ensure that the locomotive alerter on the
controlling locomotive is always tested prior to being used as the
controlling locomotive. The test is required during the trip that the
locomotive is used as a controlling locomotive. This requirement allows
the crew to know the alerter functions as intended each time a
locomotive becomes the controlling locomotive.

B. Part 229 Subpart E--Locomotive Electronics

    Comments on the proposed part 229 subpart E were received from the
AAR, GE, MTA, and CATRON/CHRQ. AAR noted that the requirements of Sec.
229.20 would more comprehensively satisfy the discussion of electronic
record keeping in Sec.  229.313(e). FRA agrees, and has revised Sec.
229.213(e) to reference the requirements of Sec.  229.20. FRA has
further modified Sec.  229.20 in this final rule to clarify the issue
of record accessibility raised by MTA raised in conjunction with Sec.
229.313(e) that was proposed in the NPRM.
    AAR also noted that the locomotive electronics section imposes very
technical obligations on railroads and that railroads will not possess
the technical expertise to carry out these obligations but would have
to rely on the suppliers of the equipment FRA believes that AAR and the
railroads are being much too modest regarding their technical
capabilities, and points to the AAR's own ``Manual of Recommended
Standards and Practices'' as an example of the outstanding technical
capabilities of the railroads. FRA does appreciate that there may be
areas where the railroads' expertise may not fully align with that of
their suppliers, and has modified the language in various portions
subpart E to reflect this reality.
    Both GE and MTA commented that the definition of ``product'' as
proposed in the regulatory text of Sec.  229.305 was overly broad, and
might be subject to misinterpretation as it could be interpreted to
cover locomotive functionality not directly required for the operation
of the locomotive, such as prime mover fuel injection, ventilation
louver, and fan control. While FRA believes that the intent not to
include such functionality is clear in the preamble to the NPRM and the
preamble to this final rule, FRA has modified the definition of
``product'' to more narrowly focus on the locomotive functionality
which is covered by this part. The final rule definition of ``product''
in Sec.  229.305 clarifies that a product, for the purposes of this
subpart, is related to train movement functions and interfaces between
man and machine, and it specifically excludes signal and train control
functions. The preamble language has also been modified to further
clarify applicability.
    GE, in its comments to the NPRM, requested additional guidance
related to the meaning of the terms ``interfaced,'' ``comingled,''
``integrated,'' ``loosely coupled,'' and ``primary train control
systems'' as used in part 229. FRA has added additional clarification
in the preamble to this final rule these terms that are consistent with
the RSAC working group discussions as well as Part 236 Subpart I.
Specifically, FRA has:
    1. Changed Sec.  229.301(b) to delete the term ``interfaces'' and
modified the preamble discussion accordingly.
    2. Modified the definition of ``new or next generation locomotive
control systems'' to include systems under development identified to
FRA within six months of date of publication of the final rule, and
implemented within 42 months after the date of publication of the final
rule.
    3. Modified the definition of ``product'' contained in Sec.
229.305, as discussed earlier.
    4. Provided a clearer definition of what is meant by ``comingle.''
Comingle is now defined in terms of coupling and cohesion, with new
definitions for tightly coupled, loosely coupled, and cohesion added to
Sec.  229.305
    In its comments, GE recommended the addition of ANSI/GEIA-STD-0010
as a recognized standard in terms of providing appropriate risk
analysis processes for incorporation into verification and validation
standards in proposed Appendix F. FRA agrees and has added ANSI/GEIA
STD 0010 to the list of appropriate risk analysis procedures. CATRON/
HCRQ also noted in their comments that ANSI/HFS 100-1988 referenced in
Appendix F has been superseded by ANSI 100-2007 and that ANSI 100-2007
accommodates additional new technology (LCD and luminescent displays).
FRA agrees and has changed the reference to identify ANSI/HFS 100-2007.
CATRON/HCRQ also noted that ``Railway Applications Specification and
Demonstration of Reliability Availability, Maintainability and Safety
(RAMS); Safety (RAMS) (ii) EN50128 (May 2001), Railway Applications:
Software for Railway Control and Protection Systems'' has been adopted
by the IEC as ``Railway Applications Specification and Demonstration of
Reliability Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) IEC
62279:2002 (May 2001), Railway Applications: Software for Railway
Control and Protection Systems;'' FRA agrees and has retained the
applicable CENLEC numbers and added the appropriate IEC numbers where
applicable.
    CATRON/HCRQ also made a large number of other recommendations
regarding the wording of the language in the preamble, the rule text,
and Appendix F to add clarity and accuracy. Generally, FRA agreed with
the proposed changes, and they have been incorporated in the final
rule.
    FRA, however, does not agree with some of the recommendations made
by CATRON/HCRQ in their comments. CATRON/HCRQ recommended removing the
requirement for conducting sensitivity analysis, stating the ``* * *
[s]ensitivity analysis places an undue burden on suppliers. It is
costly to perform in terms of the software tool and the effort
required. It does not comply with the Executive Order of January 18,
2011 which targets Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.'' FRA
believes that the sensitivity analysis is necessary to determine which
elements/factors have the greatest impact on the safety of a system if
assumptions are incorrect. Sensitivity analysis answers the question.
``[I]f these variables deviate from expectations, what will the effect
be (on the business, model, system, or whatever is being analyzed)?''
In more

general terms, uncertainty and sensitivity analysis investigate the
robustness of a design. Due to the importance of understanding the
potential impact on system safety if design assumptions are incorrect,
FRA declines to change the requirement for conducting a sensitivity
analysis. Without conducting such an analysis, FRA believes that it
would be difficult to assert with any degree of confidence that a
presumed risk metric and risk mitigation is appropriate. FRA believes
that the use of a sensitivity analysis is consistent with Section 5 of
E.O. 13563, issued on January 18, 2011, which requires that ``each
agency shall ensure the objectivity of any scientific and technological
information and processes used to support the agency's regulatory
actions.'' The revised section-by-section analysis for Subpart E
reflecting the received comments follows:
Section 229.301 Purpose and Scope
    The purpose of this subpart is to promote the safe design,
operation, and maintenance of safety-critical electronic locomotive
control systems, subsystems, and components. Safety-critical electronic
systems identified in proposed paragraph (a) would include, but would
not be limited to: directional control, graduated throttle or speed
control, graduated locomotive independent brake application and
release, train brake application and release, emergency air brake
application and release, fuel shut-off and fire suppression, alerters,
wheel slip/slide applications, audible and visual warnings, remote
control locomotive systems, remote control transmitters, pacing
systems, and speed control systems.
    In paragraph (b), FRA emphasizes that when a new or proposed
locomotive control system function interfaces or comingles with a
safety critical train control system covered by 49 CFR 236 Subpart H or
I, the locomotive control system functionality would be required to be
addressed in the train control systems Product Safety Plan or the
Positive Train Control Safety Plan, as appropriate. FRA recognizes that
advances in technology may further eliminate the traditional
distinctions between locomotive control and train control
functionalities. Indeed, technology advances may provide for
opportunities for increased or improved functionalities in train
control systems that run concurrent with locomotive control. Train
control and locomotive control, however, remain two fundamentally
different operations with different objectives. FRA does not intend to
restrict the adoption of new locomotive control functions and
technologies by imposing regulations on locomotive control systems
intended to address safety issues associated with train control.
Section 229.303 Applicability
    A safety analysis would be required for new electronic equipment
that is deployed for locomotives. However, FRA does not intend to
impose retroactive safety analysis requirements for existing equipment.
FRA recognizes that railroads and vendors may have already invested
large sums of time, effort, and money in the development of new
products that were envisioned prior to this proposed rule. Accordingly,
the requirements of this subpart are not retroactive and do not apply
to existing equipment that is currently in use, nor does it apply to
new products that are actively under development. For that reason, FRA
provides a grace period in paragraphs (a) and (b) to allow the
completion of existing new developments. This provides sufficient time
for railroads and vendors to realize profits on their investment in new
technologies made prior to the adoption of this rule. Any system that
has not been placed in use by the end of the grace period would be
required to comply with the safety analysis requirements. Vendors are
required to identify these projects to FRA within 6 months after the
effective date of this rule. FRA believes this will avoid
misunderstandings concerning which systems receive the grace period.
FRA will consider any systems not identified to FRA within the 6-month
window to be a new product start that would require a safety analysis.
    In paragraph (c), FRA makes clear that the exemption is limited in
scope. Products that result in degradation of safety or a material
increase in safety-critical functionality are not exempt. Products with
slightly different specifications that are used to allow the gradual
enhancement of the product's capabilities do not require a full safety
analysis as specified in Appendix F (or equivalent), but do require a
formal verification and validation to the extent that the changes
involve safety-critical functions.
Section 229.305 Definitions
    Generally, this section standardizes similar definitions between 49
CFR part 236 subpart H and I, and this part. Although 49 CFR part 236
subpart H and I addresses train control systems, and this subpart
addresses locomotive control systems, both reflect the adoption of a
risk-based engineering design and review process. The definition
section, however, does introduce several new definitions applicable to
locomotive control systems.
    ``Loosely coupled'' means an attribute of systems, specifically
referring to an approach to designing interfaces across systems,
subsystems, or components to reduce the interdependencies between
them--in particular, reducing the risk that changes within one system,
subsystem, or component will create unanticipated changes within other
system, subsystem, or component systems. Loosely coupled systems reduce
this risk by enforcing standards for behavior at the interfaces of
between systems, subsystems, or components while providing a great deal
of freedom to modify activity within the systems, subsystems, or
components. What happens within any one system, subsystem, or component
matters little to the other systems, subsystems, or components as long
as each system, subsystem, or component meets the specifications for
deliverables at the interface of the systems, subsystems, or
components. This is the opposite of ``tightly coupled''.
    ``New or next-generation locomotive control system'' refers to
locomotive control products using technologies or combinations of
technologies not in use on the effective date of this regulation,
products that are under development as of October 9, 2012, and are
placed in service prior to October 9, 2015, or without established
histories of safe practice. Traditional, non-microprocessor systems, as
well as microprocessor and software based locomotive control systems,
are currently in use. These systems have used existing technologies,
existing architectures, or combinations of these to implement their
functionality. Development of a safety analysis to accomplish the
requirements of this part would require reverse engineering these
products. Reverse engineering a product is both time consuming and
expensive. Requiring the performance of a safety analysis on existing
products would present a large economic burden on both the railroads
and the original equipment manufacturers (OEM). The economic burden
would likely be significantly less for new combinations of technology
and architectures that either implement existing functionality, or
implement new functionality. These types of systems lack a proven
service history and the safety analysis would be accomplished in the
normal course of system design to mitigate the lack of a proven service
history. The fundamental differences make it necessary to clearly

distinguish between the two classes of locomotive control systems
products.
    ``Product'' means any safety critical locomotive control system
processor-based system, subsystem, or component whose functions are
directly related to safe movement and stopping of the train as well as
the associated man-machine interfaces, regardless of the location of
the control system, subsystem, or component. It specifically excludes
safety critical processor based signal and train control systems. The
definition identifies the covered systems that would require a safety
analysis. Generally, locomotive manufacturers consider their product to
be the entire locomotive. This includes systems and subsystems. In this
situation, the manufacturers' extensive knowledge of the product allows
them to conduct a safety analysis on the safety critical elements,
including locomotive control systems. Similarly, major suppliers to
locomotive manufacturers are also familiar with their own products.
They too can clearly identify the safety critical elements and conduct
the safety analysis accordingly. However, the same is not necessarily
true for suppliers without extensive railroad domain knowledge. These
suppliers may not understand that their product requires a safety
analysis, or may lack experience to recognize that the subsystems or
components of the product are subject to the safety analysis of this
part. Accordingly, the definition of ``product'' indentifies the
covered systems requiring a safety analysis. The definition of
``product'' also clarifies the location of the functionality. As
advanced technologies like a remote control locomotive demonstrates the
system, subsystem, or components responsible for the safe movement and
stopping of the train need not be physically located on the locomotive.
    The definition of ``Safety Analysis'' refers to a formal set of
documentation that describes in detail all of the safety aspects of the
product, including but not limited to procedures for its development,
installation, implementation, operation, maintenance, repair,
inspection, testing, and modification, as well as analyses supporting
its safety claims. A Safety Analysis (SA) is similar to the Product
Safety Plan (PSP) required by 49 CFR part 236 subpart H or the Positive
Train Control Safety Plan (PTCSP) required by 49 CFR part 236 subpart I
for signal and train control systems. There is, however, a fundamental
difference between the PSP or PTCSP safety analysis, and the SA
contained in this subpart. The products covered by a PSP and PTCSP
require formal FRA approval prior to the product being placed in use,
and products covered by a SA do not. This difference is rooted in
fundamental differences between functionality of signal and train
control and locomotive control. Although developers of an SA and a PSP
or PTCSP may merge functions to operate together on a common platform,
different safety analyses would be required. In order to ensure that
there is no confusion between the safety analyses required by 49 CFR
part 236 subparts H or I, and the safety analysis required in this
subpart, a different definition is provided for the SA in this part.
    The definition of ``Safety-critical,'' as applied to a function, a
system, or any portion thereof, means an aspect of the locomotive
electronic control system that requires correct performance to provide
for the safety of personnel, equipment, environment, or any combination
of the three; or the incorrect performance of which could cause a
hazardous condition, or allow a hazardous condition which was intended
to be prevented by the function or system to exist. This definition is
substantially similar to that found in 49 CFR part 236 Subparts H and
I. FRA recognizes that functionality differs between locomotive control
systems and signal and train control systems, and further recognizes
that the failure modes, the probabilities of failure, and the specific
consequences of a failure differ. Despite the differences between
locomotive control systems and signal and train control systems, the
result of a safety critical failure is the same, creation of a
hazardous condition that could affect the safety of the personnel,
equipment, or the environment. The same is also true for systems
designed to prevent adverse hazards in locomotive control systems,
signal and train control systems, or both. The failure of these types
of systems would either create a new hazard, or allow a system intended
to prevent a hazard to occur, regardless of domain.
    ``Tightly coupled'' is an attribute of systems, referring to an
approach to designing interfaces across systems, subsystems, or
components to maximize the interdependencies between them--in
particular, increasing the risk that changes within one system,
subsystem, or component will create unanticipated changes within other
system, subsystem, or component. Tightly coupled systems offer the
potential for improved operational efficiencies compared to loosely
coupled systems because of reduced message and parameter creation,
transmission, translation and interpretation overhead and sharing of
critical systems, subsystems, and components. However tightly coupled
systems tend to exhibit the following characteristics, which are often
seen as disadvantages:
    1. A change in one system, subsystem, or component usually forces a
ripple effect of changes in other systems, subsystems, or components
    2. Assembly of system, subsystem, or component might require more
effort and/or time due to the increased inter- system, subsystem, or
component dependencies.
    3. A particular system, subsystem, or component might be harder to
reuse and/or test because dependent system, subsystem, or component
must be included.
    Cohesion is a measure of how strongly-related or focused are the
responsibilities of a system, subsystem, or component. There are a
number of different degrees of cohesion, of which the most desirable
are communicational, sequential cohesion, and functional cohesion.
Communicational cohesion is when system, subsystem, or components are
grouped because they operate on the same data. Sequential cohesion is
when parts of a system, subsystem, or component are grouped because the
output from one system, subsystem, or component is the input to another
part. It is analogous to an assembly line. Functional cohesion is when
systems, subsystems, or components are grouped because they all
contribute to a single well-defined task. While functional cohesion is
considered the most desirable type of cohesion for a system, subsystem,
or component, it may not be achievable. There are cases where
communicational cohesion is the highest level of cohesion that can be
attained under the circumstances. Low cohesion implies that a system,
subsystem, or component performs tasks which are not very related to
each other and hence can create problems as the system, subsystem, or
component becomes large.
    Comingle can be, therefore, expressed in terms the nature of the
coupling and cohesion between the relevant systems, subsystems, or
components. Comingle refers to the act of creating systems, subsystems,
or components where the systems, subsystems, or components are tightly
coupled and where the resulting systems, subsystems, or components
exhibit a low degree of cohesion.
Section 229.307 Safety Analysis
    The SA serves as the principal safety documentation for a safety-
critical locomotive control system product. Engineering best practice
today

recognizes that elimination of all risk is impossible. It recognizes
that the traditional design philosophy that eliminates all risk (risk
avoidance) adversely affects a product's cost and performance.
Consequently, designers have adopted a philosophy of risk management.
Under this philosophy, designers consider both the consequences of a
failure and the probability of a failure. Designers then select the
appropriate risk mitigation technique. The risk mitigation philosophy
reduces cost and improves performance compared to risk avoidance.
    Fundamental to the execution of the risk management philosophy is
the development and documentation of a SA that closely examines the
relationship between consequences of a failure, probability of
occurrence, failure modes, and their mitigation strategies. Paragraph
(a) of this section clearly recognizes this, and would address this
need by requiring the development of the SA documentation. It also
recognizes that some developers of SAs may have little experience in
risk-based design. Appendix F offers one approach. There are a number
of equally effective or better approaches. FRA encourages railroads and
OEMs to select an approach best suited to their business model. FRA
would consider as acceptable any approach that would be equal to, or
more effective than, the one outlined in Appendix F.
    Paragraph (b) along with paragraph (a) of this section, further
establish a regulatory mandate for risk management design. Railroads
that elect to allow a locomotive control system to be placed in use on
its property are required to ensure that an appropriate SA is completed
first.
    Generally, only a single SA would be required for a product.
Therefore, FRA would recognize as acceptable any appropriate SA done
under the auspices of one railroad, or a consortium of railroads. FRA
also recognizes that railroads may lack the necessary product
familiarity or technical expertise to prepare the SA. FRA anticipates
that vendors will accomplish the bulk of preparing the SA in the course
of the product development.
    FRA also recognizes that product vendors may develop a product
prior to its procurement by a railroad. In this situation, FRA would
provide review and comment as requested by the vendor. This review by
FRA would not represent an endorsement of the product. FRA expects that
the vendor would work with a railroad, or a consortium of railroads,
for final review and approval of the SA. FRA also wishes to make clear
that the SA would only be required for new or next generation
locomotive control systems, as defined in Sec.  229.305, or for
substantive changes to an existing product. The latter would include:
The addition or deletion of safety critical functionality to the
product; significant paradigm shifts in the underlying systems'
architecture or implementation technologies; or, significant departures
from widely accepted and service proven industry best past practices.
The half-life of microprocessor-based hardware is relatively short, and
the associated software is subject to change as technical issues are
discovered with existing functionality. FRA anticipates that there will
be maintenance-related changes of software, as well as replacement of
functionally identical hardware components as exiting hardware
undergoes repair or reaches the end of its useful service life. These
changes, which potentially may be extensive, do not change the safety
critical functionality, the underlying implementation paradigm shift,
or mark a significant departure from current industry practice. FRA
emphasizes that these non-safety critical products would not require a
SA.
    The railroads and vendors have generally demonstrated, with a high
degree of confidence, that existing systems can safely operate. In
response to potential liability issues, railroads have shown they
carefully examine the safety of a product prior to placing it in use.
FRA fully expects that the railroads would continue to apply the same
due diligence to new or next generation systems as they review the SA
for these more complex products. Paragraph (b) is intended to limit
FRA's review of the SAs. This, of course, would not restrict FRA review
where it appears that due diligence has not been exercised, there are
indications of fraud or malfeasance, or the underlying technology or
architecture represent significant departures from existing practice.
    In paragraph (b), FRA requires that the SA establish with a high
degree of confidence that safety-critical functions of the product will
operate in a fail-safe manner in the operating environment in which it
will be used. FRA anticipates that the railroad and vendor community
would exercise due diligence in the design and review process prior to
placing the product in use. Due diligence would typically be
demonstrated by the completion, review and internal approval of the SA.
The railroad will be required to determine that this standard has been
met, prior to a product change, or placing a new or next generation
product in use.
    Paragraph (b) also requires that the railroads identify appropriate
procedures to immediately repair safety-critical functions when they
fail. If the procedures are not followed, it would result in a
violation for failing to comply with the SA.
Section 229.309 Safety Critical Changes and Failures
    Safety critical microprocessors, like any electronics available
today, are subject to significant change. It is necessary for railroads
to ensure that safe system operations continue in the event of planned
changes to the software or hardware maintenance of hardware and
software configurations. Failure to maintain hardware and software
configurations increases the probability that unintended consequences
will occur during system operation. These unintended consequences do
not necessarily reveal themselves on initial installation and
operation, but may occur much later.
    Not all railroads may experience the same software or hardware
faults. The SA developer's software and hardware development,
configuration management, and fault tracking play an important role in
ensuring system safety. Without an effective configuration management
and fault reporting system, it is difficult, if not impossible to
evaluate the associated risks. The number of failures experienced by
one railroad may not exceed the number of failures identified in the
SA, but the aggregate from multiple railroads may. The vendor is best
positioned to aggregate identified faults, and is best able to
determine that the design and failure assumptions exceed those
predicted by the safety analysis. An ongoing relationship between a
railroad and its vendor is, therefore, essential to ensure that
problems encountered by the railroad are promptly reported to the
vendor for correction, and that problems encountered and reported by
other railroads to the vendor are shared with other railroads.
Furthermore, changes to the system developed by the vendor must be
promptly provided to all railroads in order to eliminate the reported
hazard. A formal, contractual relationship would provide the best
vehicle for ensuring this relationship. This section clearly identifies
the responsibility of railroads, and car owners, to establish such a
relationship for both reporting hazards.
    In order to accomplish their responsibilities, FRA expects that
each railroad would have a configuration tracking system that will
allow for the identification and reporting of hardware

and software issues, as well as promptly implementing changes to the
safety critical systems provided by the vendor, regardless of the
original reporting source of the problem. This section requires
railroads to identify, and create such a system if they have not
already done so.
    Paragraph (b) requires immediate notification to a railroad of real
or potential safety hazards identified by the private car suppliers and
private car owners. This allows affected railroads to take appropriate
actions to ensure the safety of rail operations.
    In paragraph (c), the private car owner's configuration/revision
control measures should be accepted by the railroad that would be using
the car and implementing the system. The private car owner may have
placed safety critical equipment on his car that is unfamiliar to the
railroad using that car, and the necessary contractual relationship
that would be required in paragraph (a)(3) of this section may not
exist because the equipment in question is not part of the railroad's
inventory. The private car owners are expected to communicate these
issues with the host railroads. This requirement is intended to ensure
that the safety-functional and safety-critical hazard mitigation
processes are not compromised by unknown changes to software or
hardware. Reporting responsibilities, as well as the configuration
management, and tracking responsibilities also extend to private car
owners.
Section 229.311 Review of SAs
    In paragraph (a), FRA requires railroads to notify FRA before
covered locomotive electronic products are placed in use. As discussed
above, FRA anticipates that review of the SA and amendments would be
the exception, rather than the normal practice. However, FRA believes
it is appropriate to have the opportunity to review products and
product changes to ensure safety. FRA requires that it have the
opportunity to have products and product changes identified to it, and
the opportunity to elect a review. FRA also realizes that development
of these products represents a significant financial investment, and
that the railroad would like to utilize the products as soon as
possible in order to recover its investment.
    Paragraph (b) reflects the expectation that FRA will decide whether
to review an SA within 60 days after receipt of the requested
information. Based on the information provided to FRA, the Associate
Administrator for Safety will evaluate the need and scope of any
review. Within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in
paragraph (a), FRA will either decline to review or request to review.
If FRA has not notified the railroad of its intent to review or audit
the SA within the 60 day period, the railroad may assume that FRA does
not intend to review or audit, and place the product in use. FRA
reserves the right to conduct a review at a later date. Examples of
causes for a review or audit prior to placing the product in use would
include: Products with unique architectural concepts; products that use
design or safety assurance concepts considered outside existing
accepted practices; and, products that appear to comingle the
locomotive control function with a safety-critical train control
processing function. FRA may convene technical consultations, as
necessary, to discuss issues related to the design and planned
development of the product. Causes for an audit of the SA after a
product is placed in service would include, but are not limited to,
such circumstances as a credible allegation of error or fraud, SA
assumptions determined to be invalid as a result of in-service
experience, one or more unsafe events calling into question the safety
analysis, or changes to the product.
    If FRA elects not to review a product's SA, railroads would be able
to put the product immediately in use after notification that FRA
elects not to review. In the event that FRA would elect to review, FRA
would attempt to complete the review within 120 days. FRA's ability to
complete the review within 120 days will depend upon various factors,
such as the complexity of the new product or product change, its
deviation from current practice, the functionality, the architecture,
the extent of interfaces with other systems, and the number of
technical consultations required. Products reviewed by FRA under these
circumstances may not be placed in use until FRA's review is complete.
Section 229.313 Product Testing Results and Records
    This section requires that records of product testing conducted in
accordance with this subpart be maintained. To effectively evaluate the
degree to which the SA reflects real, as opposed to predicted
performance, it is necessary to keep accurate records of performance
for the product. In addition to collecting these records, it is also
essential for regular comparison of the real performance results with
the predicted performance. Thus, in this section, FRA requires such
records to be maintained. Where the real performance, as measured by
the collected data, exceeds the predicted performance of the SA, FRA
requires no action. If the real performance is worse than the predicted
performance, this section requires that the railroad take immediate
action to improve performance to satisfy the predicted standard. Prompt
and effective action would be required to bring the non-compliant
system into compliance.
    FRA encourages, but does not require a railroad to proactively
evaluate their systems, and take corrective action prior to the system
becoming non-compliant with the predicted performance standard. If an
unpredicted hazard would occur, the system would be required to be
immediately evaluated, and the appropriate corrective action would need
to be taken. FRA would not expect a railroad to defer any corrective
action.
    This section establishes a requirement for a railroad to keep
detailed records to evaluate the system. However, the railroad may
elect to have the system supplier keep these records. There would be
many advantages to the later approach, primarily that the vendor would
receive an aggregate of the technical issues, making them better
positioned to analyze the system performance. Although a railroad may
delegate recordkeeping, the railroad would retain the responsibility
for keeping records of performance on their property. The railroads
would be responsible for ensuring the safe operation of systems on
their property, and would be required to have access to the performance
data if they are to carry out their responsibilities under this
proposed section.
    This section also requires detailed handling requirements for
required records. Paragraph (a) requires specific content in the
record. FRA will accept paper records or electronic records. Electronic
recordkeeping is encouraged, as it reduces storage costs, simplifies
collection of information, and allows data mining of the collected
information. However, to ensure that the electronic records provide all
required information, approval by the Associate Administrator for
Safety is required.
    Signatures on paper records are required to uniquely identify the
person certifying the information contained in the record in such a
manner that would enable detection of a forgery. Paragraph (a) ensures
that an electronic signature could be attributable to single individual
as reliably as paper records. It will be possible to meet the storage
requirement in several different ways. Physical paper records will be
expected to be kept at the physical location of the supervising
official. Electronic records

will be permitted to be either stored locally, or remotely. FRA has no
preference as long as the records are promptly accessible for FRA
review.
    Paragraph (b) specifies the required retention period for the
records. FRA recognizes that retaining records involves a cost to
railroads, and appreciates their desire to minimize both the number,
and the required retention period. To this end, FRA has identified two
different categories of records, and proposes differing retention
periods for each. The first category involves records associated with
installation or modification of a system and would contain data
required for evaluating the product's performance and compliance to the
safety case conditions throughout the life of the product. FRA will
consider the life of the product to begin when the product is first
placed in use and end with the permanent withdrawal of the product from
service. In the event of permanent transfer of the product to another
railroad, the receiving railroad would become responsible for
maintaining the records. This responsibility will continue until the
product is completely withdrawn from rail service. The second category
of records addresses periodic testing and will have a retention period
of at least one year, or the periodicity of the subsequent test,
whichever is greater. Results obtained by subsequent tests will
supersede the earlier test. The earlier test results will be moot for
evaluating the current condition.
    Regrettably, in some cases, the use of electronic records may not
meet the minimum standards required by FRA. Consequently, FRA
establishes procedural requirements related to withdrawing
authorization to use electronic records in paragraph (c). If FRA finds
it necessary to withdraw an authorization, FRA will explain the reason
in writing.
Section 229.315 Operation Maintenance Manual
    This section requires that each railroad have a manual covering the
requirements for the installation, periodic maintenance and testing,
modification, and repair of its safety critical locomotive control
systems. This manual can be kept in paper or electronic form. It is
recommended that electronic copies of the manual be maintained in the
same manner as other electronic records kept for this part and that it
be included in the railroad's configuration management plan (with the
master copy and dated amendments carefully maintained so that the
status of instructions to the field as of any given date can be readily
determined).
    Paragraph (a) requires that the manual be available to both persons
required to perform such tasks and to FRA. Paragraph (b) requires that
plans necessary for proper maintenance and testing of products be
correct, legible, and available where such systems are deployed or
maintained. The paragraph also requires that the manual identify the
current version of software installed, revisions, and revision dates.
Paragraph (c) requires that the manual identify the hardware, software,
and firmware revisions in accordance with the configuration management
requirement. Paragraph (d) requires the identification, replacement,
handling, and repair of safety critical components in accordance with
the configuration management requirements. Finally, paragraph (e)
requires the manual be ready for use prior to deployment of the
product, and that it be available for FRA review.
Section 229.317 Training and Qualification Program
    This section provides specific parameters for training railroad
employees and contractor employees to ensure they have the necessary
knowledge and skills to complete their duties related to safety-
critical products. Paragraph (a) requires the training to be formally
conducted and documented based on educational best practices.
Paragraphs (b) and (c) require the employer to identify employees that
will be performing inspection, testing, maintenance, repairing,
dispatching, and operating tasks related to the safety critical
locomotive systems, and develop a written task analysis for the
performance of duties. The employer is required to identify additional
knowledge and skills above those required for basic job performance
necessary to perform each task. Work situations often present
unexpected challenges, and employees who understand the context within
which the job is to be done would be better able to respond with
actions that preserve safety. Further, the specific requirements of the
job would be better understood, and requirements that are better
understood are more likely to be adhered to. Well-informed employees
would be less likely to conduct ad hoc trouble shooting; and therefore,
should be of greater value in assisting with trouble shooting.
    AAR submitted comments stating that it seems unnecessary to publish
training requirements that specifically address locomotive electronics,
and claiming that requiring a formal task analysis is overly
burdensome. Training for personnel that works with locomotive
electronics is technical and specialized. As such, FRA continues to
believe that the training requirements for locomotive electronics
should be addressed specifically in Sec. Sec.  229.17 and 229.19. FRA
also believes that a formal task analysis as part of training is vital
to preparing personnel to operate locomotive electronics safely. AAR
failed to explain why requiring a formal task analysis will be overly
burdensome and they failed to suggest any alternative training.
Accordingly, in this final rule, FRA retains the proposed training
requirements.
    Paragraph (d) requires the employer to develop a training
curriculum that includes either classroom, hands-on, or other formally-
structured training designed to impart the knowledge and skills
necessary to perform each task.
    Paragraph (e) adds a requirement that all persons subject to
training requirements and their direct supervisors must successfully
complete the training curriculum and pass an examination for the tasks
for which they are responsible. Generally, giving appropriate training
to each of these employees prior to task assignment will be required.
The exception would be when an employee, who has not received the
appropriate training, is conducting the task under the direct, on-site
supervision of a qualified person.
    Paragraph (f) requires periodic refresher training. This periodic
training must include classroom, hands-on, computer-based training, or
other formally structured training. The intent is for personnel to
maintain the knowledge and skills required to perform their assigned
task safely.
    Paragraph (g) adds a requirement to compare and evaluate the
effectiveness of training. The evaluation would first determine whether
the training program materials and curriculum are imparting the
specific skills, knowledge, and abilities to accomplish the stated
goals of the training program; and second, determine whether the stated
goals of the training program reflect the correct, and current,
products and operations.
    Paragraph (h) requires the railroad to maintain records that
designate qualified persons. Records retention is required until
recording new qualifications, or for at least one year after such
person(s) leave applicable service. The records are required to be
available for FRA inspection and copying.

Section 229.319 Operating Personnel Training
    This section contains minimum training requirements for locomotive
engineers and other operating personnel who interact with safety
critical locomotive control systems. ``Other operating personnel''
refers to onboard train and engine crew members (i.e., conductors,
brakemen, and assistant engineers).
    Paragraph (a) requires training program to cover familiarization
with the onboard equipment and the functioning of that equipment as
part of, and its relationship to, other onboard systems under that
person's control. The training program must cover all notifications by
the system (i.e., onboard displays) and actions or responses to such
notifications required by onboard personnel. The training is also
required to address how each action or response ensures proper
operation of the system and safe operation of the train.
    During system operations emergent conditions could arise which
would affect the safe operation of the system. This section also
requires operating personnel to be informed as soon as practical after
discovery of the condition, and any special actions required for safe
train operations.
    For certified locomotive engineers and conductors, paragraph (b)
requires that the training requirements of this section be integrated
into the training requirements of parts 240 and 242. Although this
requirement only addresses engineers, in the event of certification of
other operating personnel, the expectation is that these requirements
would be included in their training requirements.

Appendix F--Recommended Practices for Design and Safety Analysis

    Appendix F provides an optional set of criteria for performing risk
management design of locomotive control systems. FRA recognizes that
not all safety risks associated with human error can be eliminated by
design, no matter how well trained and skilled the designers,
implementers, and operators. The intention of the appendix is to
provide one set of safety guidelines distilled from proven design
considerations. There are numerous other approaches to risk management-
based design. The basic principles of this appendix capture the lessons
learned from the research, design, and implementation of similar
technology in other modes of transportation and other industries. The
overriding goal of this appendix is to minimize the potential for
design-induced error by ensuring that systems are suitable for
operators, and their tasks and environment.
    FRA believes that new locomotive systems will be in service for a
long period. Over time, there will be modifications from the original
design. FRA is concerned that subsequent modifications to a product
might not conform to the product's original design philosophy. The
original designers of products could likely be unavailable after
several years of operation of the product. FRA believes mitigating this
is most successful by fully explaining and documenting the original
design decisions and their rationale. Further, FRA feels that
assumption of long product life cycles during the design and analysis
phase will force product designers and users to consider long-term
effects of operation. Such a criterion would not be applicable if, for
instance, the railroad limited the product's term of proposed use.
    Translation of these guidelines into processes helps ensure the
safe performance of the product and minimizes failures that would have
the potential to affect the safety of railroad operations. The
identification of fault paths are essential to establishing failure
modes and appropriate mitigations. Failing to identify a fault path can
have the effect of making a system seem safer on paper than it actually
is. When an unidentified fault path is discovered in service which
leads to a previously unidentified safety-relevant hazard, the
threshold in the safety analysis is automatically exceeded, and both
the designer and the railroad must take mitigating measures. The
frequency of such discoveries relates to the quality of the safety
analysis efforts. Safety analyses of poor quality are more likely to
lead to in-service discovery of unidentified fault paths. Some of those
paths might lead to potential serious consequences, while others might
have less serious consequences.
    Given technology, cost, and other constraints, there are
limitations regarding the level of safety obtainable. FRA recognizes
this. However, FRA also believes that there are well-established and
proven design and analysis techniques that can successfully mitigate
these design restrictions. The use of proven safety considerations and
concepts is necessary for the development of products. Only by forcing
conscious decisions by the designer on risk mitigation techniques
adopted, and justifying those choices (and their decision that a
mitigation technique is not applicable) does the designer fully
consider the implications of those choices. FRA notes that in normal
operation, the product design should preclude human errors that cause a
safety hazard. In addition to documenting design decisions, describing
system requirements within the context of the concept of operations
further mitigates against the loss of individual designers. In summary,
the recommended approach ensures retention of a body of corporate
knowledge regarding the product, and influences on the safety of the
design. It also promotes full disclosure of safety risks to minimize or
eliminate elements of risk where practical.

C. Amendments to Part 238

Section 238.105 Train Electronic Hardware and Software Safety
    This section incorporates existing waivers and addresses certain
operational realities. Since the implementation of the Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards, FRA has granted two waivers from the
requirements of Sec.  238.105(d) (FRA-2004-19396 and FRA-2008-0139).
The first waiver is for 26 EMU bi-level passenger cars operated by
Northeastern Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (METRA).
The second waiver is for 14 new EMU bi-level passenger cars to be
operated by Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District. There
are over 1,000 EMU passenger cars (M-7) being operated by Long Island
Railroad & Metro-North Commuter Railroad (MNCW) for the past five years
that FRA has discovered will need a waiver to be in compliance with
Sec.  238.105(d). The MNCW has placed an order for additional 300 plus
options, EMU passenger cars (M-8) that will also need a waiver from the
requirements of existing Sec.  238.105(d).
    The portion of the requirements that these cars' brake systems
cannot satisfy is the requirement for a full service brake in the event
of hardware/software failure of the brake system or access to direct
manual control of the primary braking system, both service and
emergency braking. The braking system on these cars does not have the
full service function but does default to emergency brake application
in the event of hardware/software failure of the brake system, and the
operator has the ability to apply the brake system at an emergency rate
from the conductor's valve located in the cab. A slight change to the
language in Sec.  238.105, that will permit a service or emergency
braking, rather than requiring the capability to execute both a service
and emergency brake, will alleviate the need for these waivers and
would not reduce the braking rate of the equipment or the

stop distances. Accordingly, the language in Sec.  238.105(d)(1)(ii) in
this final rule has been modified to permit either a ``service or
emergency braking.''
Section 238.309 Periodic Brake Equipment Maintenance
    For convenience and clarity, FRA is consolidating locomotive air
brake maintenance for conventional locomotives into part 229.
Currently, because conventional locomotives are used in passenger
service, certain air brake maintenance requirements are included in the
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards contained in this section. Placing
all of the requirements for conventional locomotives in part 229 will
make the standards easier to follow and avoid confusion.
    The brake maintenance requirements that are included in this final
rule in part 229 extend the intervals at which required brake
maintenance is performed for several types of brake systems for non-
conventional locomotives. The length of the intervals reflects the
results of studies and performance evaluations related to a series of
waivers starting in 1981 and continuing to present day. Overall, the
type of brake maintenance required for passenger equipment will remain
the same.

VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures

    This final rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures, and determined to be non-significant under
both Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, and DOT policies and procedures
(44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the
docket a regulatory impact analysis addressing the economic impact of
this final rule. Document inspection and copying facilities are
available at Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    As part of the regulatory impact analysis, FRA has assessed
quantitative measurements of cost and benefit streams expected from the
adoption of this final rule. This analysis includes qualitative
discussions and quantitative measurements of costs and benefits in this
rulemaking. The primary costs or burdens in this final rule are from
the alerter and revised minimum (i.e., cold weather) cab temperature
requirements. There is also a cost associated with certain daily
inspections required when periodic inspections are conducted less
frequently. Although the final rule includes requirements for new
locomotives to have air conditioning units and cab securement there are
no additional costs for these requirements since they are current
industry practice. Safety benefits will accrue from fewer train
accidents. Cost savings will result from fewer waivers and waiver
renewals, a reduction in downtime for locomotives due to the changes to
headlight and brake requirements, and an increased interval between
periodic inspection of certain micro-processor based locomotives. This
last benefit consists of cost savings from a reduction of employee time
for the periodic inspections and saving from reduced locomotive down-
time. For the twenty year period the estimated quantified costs have a
Present Value (PV) 7% of $27.7 million. For this period the estimated
quantified benefits have a PV, 7% of $385 million.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

    FRA developed this final rule in accordance with Executive Order
13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking'')
and DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) to ensure potential
impacts of rules on small entities are properly considered.
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires an agency to review
regulations to assess their impact on small entities. An agency must
conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis unless it determines and
certifies that a rule is not expected to have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
    As discussed earlier, FRA has initiated this rulemaking in its
efforts to update and reevaluate current regulations. Therefore, FRA is
revising the Locomotive Safety Standards to update, consolidate and
clarify existing rules, incorporate existing industry and engineering
best practices, and incorporate former waivers into the regulation. FRA
believes this final rule will modernize and improve its safety
regulatory program related to locomotives. Pursuant to the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), FRA certifies that this final rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. Although a substantial number of small railroads will
be affected by this final rule, none will be significantly impacted.
FRA invited all interested parties to submit data and information
regarding the potential economic impact that will result from the
adoption of the final rule.
1. Description of Regulated Entities and Impacts
    The ``universe'' of the entities to be considered generally
includes only those small entities that are reasonably expected to be
directly regulated by this action. For this rulemaking, the types of
small entities that are potentially affected by this rulemaking are:
(a) small railroads and (b) governmental jurisdictions of small
communities.
    ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601 as having the same
meaning as ``small business concern'' under Section 3 of the Small
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of
operation. Section 601(4) includes nonprofit enterprises that are
independently owned and operated, and are not dominant in their field
of operations within the definition of ``small entities.''
Additionally, 5 U.S.C. 601(5) defines ``small entities'' as governments
of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or
special districts with populations less than 50,000.
    The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates ``size
standards'' for small entities. It provides that the largest for-profit
railroad business firm may be (and still classify as a ``small
entity'') 1,500 employees for ``line-haul operating'' railroads, and
500 employees for ``shortline operating'' railroads.
    Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small
entities in consultation with SBA and in conjunction with public
comment. Pursuant to the authority provided to it by SBA, FRA has
published a final policy, which formally establishes small entities as
railroads that meet the line haulage revenue requirements of a Class
III railroad. Currently, the revenue requirements are $20 million or
less in annual operating revenue, adjusted annually for inflation. The
$20 million limit (adjusted annually for inflation) is based on the
Surface Transportation Board's threshold of a Class III railroad
carrier, which is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue deflator
adjustment. The same dollar limit on revenues is established to
determine whether a railroad shipper or contractor is a small entity.
Governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts with populations less than 50,000 are
also considered small entities under FRA's policy. FRA is using this
definition for this rulemaking.

2. Small Entities
a. Railroads
    There are approximately 702 \1\ small railroads meeting the
definition of ``small entity'' as described above. FRA estimates that
all of these small entities could potentially be impacted by one or
more of the requirements in this final rule. Note, however, that
approximately fifty of these railroads are subsidiaries of large short
line holding companies with the technical multidisciplinary expertise
and resources comparable to larger railroads. It is important to note
that many of the changes or additions in this rulemaking will not
impact all or many small railroads. The nature of some of the changes
will dictate that the impacts primarily fall on large railroads that
purchase new and/or electronically advanced locomotives. Small
railroads generally do not purchase new locomotives, they tend to buy
used locomotives from larger railroads. Also, some of the final rule's
requirements, i.e., requirements for alerters, cab door securement and
air conditioning units, will be a burden to very few, if any, small
railroads. The most burdensome requirement for small railroads will be
the revisions to cab cold weather temperature requirements since older
locomotives are less likely to meet the revised standards and small
railroads tend to own older locomotives. However, even this burden not
significant. FRA has estimated the total burden for the cold weather
requirements is less than $900,000 (PV, 7%) over the 20 year analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ For 2010 there were 754 total railroads reporting to the
FRA. Total small railroads potentially impacted by this rulemaking
would equal 754-26 (commuter railroads)--2 (intercity railroads)--7
(Class I railroads)--12 (Class II railroads)--5 (Steam railroads) =
702.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is also important to note that this final rule only applies to
non-steam locomotives. There are some small railroads that own one or
more steam locomotives which these changes will not impact. There are a
few small railroads that own all or almost all steam locomotives. Most
of these entities are either museum railroads or tourist railroads. For
these entities, this final rule's regulations will have no impact. FRA
estimates that there are about five small railroads that only own steam
locomotives.
b. Governmental Jurisdictions of Small Communities
    Small entities that are classified as governmental jurisdictions
will also be affected by the requirements in this rulemaking. As stated
above, and defined by SBA, this term refers to governments of cities,
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts with populations of less than 50,000. FRA does not expect
this group of entities to be impacted. The final rule will apply to
governmental jurisdictions or transit authorities that provide commuter
rail service--none of which is small as defined above (i.e., no entity
serves a locality with a population less than 50,000). These entities
also receive Federal transportation funds. Intercity rail service
providers Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad Corporation will also be
subject to this rule, but they are not small entities and likewise
receive Federal transportation funds. While other railroads are subject
to this final rule by the application of Sec.  238.3, FRA is not aware
of any railroad subject to this rule that is a small entity that will
be impacted by this rule.
3. Economic Impacts on Small Entities (railroads)
    This certification is not intended to be a stand-alone document. In
order to get a better understanding of the total costs for the railroad
industry, which forms the base for these estimates or more cost detail
on any specific requirement, a review of FRA's RIA is recommended. FRA
has placed a copy of the RIA in the docket for this rulemaking.
    Based on information currently available, FRA estimates that the
average small railroad will spend approximately $1,000 over 20 years to
comply with this final rule. This is because most of the regulatory
changes in the Locomotive Safety Standards final rule are oriented
towards new and remanufactured locomotives. Most small railroads do not
purchase new or remanufactured locomotives. Therefore, the impact for
most, if not all small railroads will be minimal.
4. Significant Economic Impact Criteria
    Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue
averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One
percent of average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. FRA
estimates that the average small railroad will spend approximately
$1,000 over twenty years to comply with the requirements in this final
rule. Based on this, FRA concludes that the expected burden of this
final rule will not have a significant impact on the competitive
position of small entities, or on the small entity segment of the
railroad industry as a whole.
5. Substantial Number Criteria
    This final rule will likely burden all small railroads that are not
exempt from its scope or application. Therefore, as noted above this
rule will impact a substantial number of small railroads.
6. Certification
    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), FRA
certifies that this final rule is not expected to have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Although a
substantial number of small railroads will be affected by this final
rule, none of these entities will be significantly impacted.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this final rule have
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
The sections that contain the new and current information collection
requirements and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as
follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Respondent         Total annual      Average time per      Total annual
           CFR Section                 universe            responses           response          burden hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.9--Movement of Non-Complying  44 Railroads......  21,000 tags.......  1 minute..........  350 hours.
 Locomotives.
229.15--Remote Control
 Locomotives (RCL)--(New
 Requirements)
    --Tagging at Control Stand    44 Railroads......  3,000 tags........  2 minutes.........  100 hours.
     Throttle.
    --Testing and Repair of       44 Railroads......  200 testing/repair  5 minutes.........  17 hours.
     Operational Control Unit                          records.
     (OCU) on RCL--Records.

229.17--Accident Reports........  44 Railroads......  1 report..........  15 minutes........  .25 hour.
229.20--Electronic Recordkeeping
    --Electronic Record of        44 Railroads......  21,000              1 second..........  6 hours.
     Inspections and Maintenance                       notifications.
     and Automatic Notification
     to Railroad that Locomotive
     is Due for Inspection (New
     Requirement).
229.21--Daily Inspection........  754 Railroads.....  6,890,000 records.  16 or 18 min......  1,911,780 hours.
    --MU Locomotives: Written     754 Railroads.....  250 reports.......  13 minutes........  54 hours.
     Reports.
Form FRA F 6180.49A Locomotive    754 Railroads.....  4,000 forms.......  2 minutes.........  133 hours.
 Inspection/Repair Record.
229.23/229.27/229.31--Periodic    754 Railroads.....  9,500 insp./tests/  8 hours...........  76,000 hours.
 Inspection Annual. Biennial/                          forms.
 Main Reservoir Tests--FRA F
 6180.49A.
229.23/229.27/229.29/229.31--     754 Railroads.....  9,500 records.....  2 minutes.........  317 hours.
 Periodic Inspection/Annual
 Biennial Tests/Main Res. Tests--
 Secondary Records on Form FRA F
 6180.49A.
    --List of Defects and         754 Railroads.....  4,000 lists +       2 minutes.........  266 hours.
     Repairs on Each Locomotive                        4,000 copies.
     and Copy to Employees
     Performing Insp. (New
     Requirement).
    --Document to Employees       754 Railroads.....  9,500 documents...  2 minutes.........  317 hours.
     Performing Inspections of
     All Tests Since Last
     Periodic Inspection (New
     Requirement).
229.33--Out-of Use Credit.......  754 Railroads.....  500 notations.....  5 minutes.........  42 hours.
229.25(1)--Test: Every Periodic   754 Railroads.....  200 amendments....  15 minutes........  50 hours.
 Insp.--Written Copies of
 Instruction.
229.25(2)--Duty Verification      754 Railroads.....  4,025 records.....  90 minutes........  6,038 hours.
 Readout Rec.
229.25(3)--Pre-Maintenance Test-- 754 Railroads.....  700 notations.....  30 minutes........  350 hours.
 Failures.
229.135(A.)--Removal From         754 Railroads.....  1,000 tags........  1 minute..........  17 hours.
 Service.
229.135(B.)--Preserving Accident  754 Railroads.....  10,000 reports....  15 minutes........  2,500 hours.
 Data.
229.27--Annual Tests............  754 Railroads.....  700 test records..  90 minutes........  1,050 hours.
229.29--Air Brake System
 Maintenance and Testing (New
 Requirement).
    --Air Flow Meter Testing--    754 Railroads.....  88,000 tests/       15 seconds........  367 hours.
     Record.                                           records.
229.46--Brakes General
    --Tagging Isolation Switch    754 Railroads.....  2,100 tags........  2 minutes.........  70 hours.
     of Locomotive That May Only
     Be Used in Trailing
     Position (New Requirement).
229.85--Danger Markings on All    754 Railroads.....  1,000 decals......  1 minute..........  17 hours.
 Doors, Cover Plates, or
 Barriers.
229.123--Pilots, Snowplows, End   754 Railroads.....  20 stencilling....  2 minutes.........  1 hour.
 Plates--Markings--Stencilling
 (New Requirement).
    --Notation on Form FRA F      754 Railroads.....  20 notations......  2 minutes.........  1 hour.
     6180.49A for Pilot,
     Snowplows, or End Plate
     Clearance Above Six Inches
     (New Requirement).
229.135--Event Recorders
    229.135(b)(5)--Equipment      754 Railroads.....  1,000 Certified     2 hours...........  2,000 hours.
     Requirements--Remanufacture                       Memory Modules.
     d Locomotives with
     Certified Crashworthy
     Memory Module.
229.140--Alerters--Visual         600 Locomotives...  74,880,000 visual   4 seconds.........  83,200 hours.
 Indication to Locomotive                              indications.
 Operator before Alarm Sounds on
 New Locomotives (New
 Requirement).
NEW REQUIREMENTS--SUBPART E--
 LOCOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS

229.303--Requests to FRA for      754 Railroads.....  20 requests.......  8 hours...........  160 hours.
 Approval of On-Track Testing of
 Products Outside a Test
 Facility.
    --Identification to FRA of    754 Railroads/3     20 products.......  2 hours...........  40 hours.
     Products Under Development.   Manufacturers.
229.307--Safety Analysis by RR    754 Railroads.....  300 analyses......  240 hours.........  72,000 hours.
 of Each Product Developed.
229.309--Notification to FRA of   754 Railroads.....  10 notification...  16 hours..........  160 hours.
 Safety-Critical Change in
 Product.
    Report to Railroad by         3 Manufacturers...  10 reports........  8 hours...........  80 hours.
     Product Suppliers/Private
     Equipment Owners of
     Previously Unidentified
     Hazards of a Product.
229.311--Review of Safety
 Analyses (SA)
    --Notification to FRA of      754 Railroads.....  300 notifications.  2 hours...........  600 hours.
     Railroad Intent to Place
     Product In Service.
    --RR Documents That           754 Railroads.....  300 documents.....  2 hours...........  600 hours.
     Demonstrate Product Meets
     Safety Requirements of the
     SA for the Life-Cycle of
     Product.
    --RR Database of All Safety   754 Railroads.....  300 databases.....  4 hours...........  1,200 hours.
     Relevant Hazards
     Encountered with Product
     Placed in Service.
    --Written Reports to FRA If   754 Railroads.....  10 reports........  2 hours...........  20 hours.
     Frequency of Safety-
     Relevant Hazards Exceeds
     Threshold.
    --Final Reports to FRA on     754 Railroads.....  10 reports........  4 hours...........  40 hours.
     Countermeasures to Reduce
     Frequency of Safety-
     Relevant Hazard(s).
229.313--Product Testing          754 Railroads.....  120,000 records...  5 minutes.........  10,000 hours.
 Results--Records.
229.315--Operations and           754 Railroads.....  300 manuals.......  40 hours..........  12,000 hours.
 Maintenance Manual--All Product
 Documents.
    --Configuration Management    754 Railroads.....  300 plans.........  8 hours...........  2,400 hours.
     Control Plans.
    --Identification of Safety-   754 Railroads.....  60,000 components.  5 minutes.........  5,000 hours.
     Critical Components.
229.317--Product Training and     754 Railroads.....  300 programs......  40 hours..........  12,000 hours.
 Qualifications Program.
    --Product Training of         754 Railroads.....  10,000 trained      30 minutes........  5,000 hours.
     Individuals.                                      employees.
    --Refresher Training........  754 Railroads.....  1,000 trained       20 minutes........  333 hours.
                                                       employees.
    --RR Regular and Periodic     754 Railroads.....  300 evaluations...  4 hours...........  1,200 hours.
     Evaluation of Effectiveness
     of Training Program.
    --Records of Qualified        754 Railroads.....  10,000 records....  10 minutes........  1,667 hours.
     Individuals.
Appendix F--Guidance for          754 Railroads/3     1 assessment......  4,000 hours.......  4,000 hours.
 Verification and Validation of    Manufacturers.
 Product--Third Party Assessment.
    --Reviewer Final Report.....  754 Railroads/3     1 report..........  80 hours..........  80 hours.
                                   Manufacturers.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of FRA, including whether the information
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of
the paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Mr. Robert Brogan,
Office of Safety, Information Clearance Officer, at<PHONE_NUMBER>, or
Ms. Kimberly Toone, Office of Information Technology, at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the
collection of information requirements should direct them to Mr. Robert
Brogan or Ms. Kimberly Toone, Federal

Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 3rd Floor,
Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also be submitted via email to Mr.
Brogan or Ms. Toone at the following address<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this proposed rule between 30 and
60 days after publication of this document in the Federal Register.
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. The final rule will
respond to any OMB or public comments on the information collection
requirements contained in this proposal.
    FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information
collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control
number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control numbers
for any new information collection requirements resulting from this
rulemaking action prior to the effective date of the final rule. The
OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate notice
in the Federal Register.

D. Federalism Implications

    FRA has analyzed this rule in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 13132, issued on August 4, 1999,
which directs Federal agencies to exercise great care in establishing
policies that have federalism implications. See 64 FR 43255. This final
rule will not have a substantial effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among various levels of
government. This final rule will not have federalism implications that
impose any direct compliance costs on State and local governments.
    FRA notes that the RSAC, which endorsed and recommended the
majority of this final rule to FRA, has as permanent members, two
organizations representing State and local interests: AASHTO and the
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM). Both of these State
organizations concurred with the RSAC recommendation endorsing this
final rule. The RSAC regularly provides recommendations to the FRA
Administrator for solutions to regulatory issues that reflect
significant input from its State members. To date, FRA has received no
indication of concerns about the Federalism implications of this
rulemaking from these representatives or of any other representatives
of State government. Consequently, FRA concludes that this proposed
rule has no federalism implications, other than the preemption of state
laws covering the subject matter of this final rule, which occurs by
operation of law as discussed below.
    This final rule could have preemptive effect by operation of law
under certain provisions of the Federal railroad safety statutes,
specifically, the former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (former
FRSA), repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106, and the former
Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act at 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and
recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703. The former FRSA provides that
States may not adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or
order related to railroad safety or security that covers the subject
matter of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security
matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies
under the ``local safety or security hazard'' exception to section
20106. Moreover, the former LIA has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court as preempting the field concerning locomotive safety. See Kurns
v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U.S. -------- (2012); Kurns v.
Railroad Friction Products Corp., 132 S.CT. 1262; and Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).

E. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with its
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures)
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes,
Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA has
determined that this final rule is not a major FRA action (requiring
the preparation of an environmental impact statement or environmental
assessment) because it is categorically excluded from detailed
environmental review pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA's Procedures.
64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Section 4(c)(20) reads as follows: (c)
Actions categorically excluded. Certain classes of FRA actions have
been determined to be categorically excluded from the requirements of
these Procedures as they do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment. Promulgation of railroad
safety rules and policy statements that do not result in significantly
increased emissions or air or water pollutants or noise or increased
traffic congestion in any mode of transportation are excluded.
    In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's Procedures, the
agency has further concluded that no extraordinary circumstances exist
with respect to this final rule that might trigger the need for a more
detailed environmental review. As a result, FRA finds that this final
rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Pursuant to Section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless
otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector
(other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate
requirements specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act
(2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general
notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may
result in expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted
annually for inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any
final rule for which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was
published, the agency shall prepare a written statement'' detailing the
effect on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector.
For the year 2010, this monetary amount of $100,000,000 has been
adjusted to $140,800,000 to account for inflation. This final rule
would not result in the expenditure of more than $140,800,000 by the
public sector in any one year, and thus preparation of such a statement
is not required.

G. Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any comment or
petition received into any of FRA's dockets by the name of the
individual submitting the comment or petition (or signing the comment
or petition, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). Please visit http://www.regulations.gov/#!privacyNotice.
You may also review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), or you may
visit http://www.dot.gov/privacy.html.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 229

    Locomotive headlights, Locomotives, Railroad safety, Remote control
locomotives.

49 CFR Part 238

    Passenger equipment, Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

The Final Rule

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA amends parts 229 and
238 of chapter II, subtitle B of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,
as follows:

PART 229--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 20102-03, 20107, 20133, 20137-38, 20143,
20701-03, 21301-02, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2401, note; and 49 CFR 1.49.

0
2. Section 229.5 is amended by adding in alphabetical order the
following definitions to read as follows:

Sec.  229.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Alerter means a device or system installed in the locomotive cab to
promote continuous, active locomotive engineer attentiveness by
monitoring select locomotive engineer-induced control activities. If
fluctuation of a monitored locomotive engineer-induced control activity
is not detected within a predetermined time, a sequence of audible and
visual alarms is activated so as to progressively prompt a response by
the locomotive engineer. Failure by the locomotive engineer to
institute a change of state in a monitored control, or acknowledge the
alerter alarm activity through a manual reset provision, results in a
penalty brake application that brings the locomotive or train to a
stop.
* * * * *
    Assignment Address means a unique identifier of the RCL that
insures that only the OCU's linked to a specific RCL can command that
RCL.
* * * * *
    Controlling locomotive means a locomotive from where the operator
controls the traction and braking functions of the locomotive or
locomotive consist, normally the lead locomotive.
* * * * *
    Locomotive Control Unit (LCU) means a system onboard an RCL that
communicates via a radio link which receives, processes, and confirms
commands from the OCU, which directs the locomotive to execute them.
* * * * *
    Operator Control Unit (OCU) means a mobile unit that communicates
via a radio link the commands for movement (direction, speed, braking)
or for operations (bell, horn, sand) to an RCL.
* * * * *
    Qualified mechanical inspector means a person who has received
instruction and training that includes ``hands-on'' experience (under
appropriate supervision or apprenticeship) in one or more of the
following functions: troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance
or repair of the specific locomotive equipment for which the person is
assigned responsibility. This person shall also possess a current
understanding of what is required to properly repair and maintain the
locomotive equipment for which the person is assigned responsibility.
Further, the qualified mechanical inspector shall be a person whose
primary responsibility includes work generally consistent with the
functions listed in this definition.
* * * * *
    Remote Control Locomotive (RCL) means a remote control locomotive
that, through use of a radio link can be operated by a person not
physically within the confines of the locomotive cab. For purposes of
this part, the term RCL does not refer to a locomotive or group of
locomotives remotely controlled from the lead locomotive of a train, as
in a distributed power arrangement.
    Remote Control Operator (RCO) means a person who utilizes an OCU in
connection with operations involving a RCL with or without cars.
    Remote Control Pullback Protection means a function of a RCL that
enforces speeds and stops in the direction of pulling movement.
* * * * *

0
3. Section 229.7 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.7  Prohibited acts and penalties.

    (a) Federal Rail Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. 20701-20703) make it
unlawful for any carrier to use or permit to be used on its line any
locomotive unless the entire locomotive and its appurtenances--
    (1) Are in proper condition and safe to operate in the service to
which they are put, without unnecessary peril to life or limb; and
    (2) Have been inspected and tested as required by this part.
    (b) Any person (including but not limited to a railroad; any
manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a
railroad; any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad
equipment, track, or facilities; any employee of such owner,
manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or independent contractor) who violates
any requirement of this part or of the Federal Rail Safety Laws or
causes the violation of any such requirement is subject to a civil
penalty of at least $650, but not more than $25,000 per violation,
except that: Penalties may be assessed against individuals only for
willful violations, and, where a grossly negligent violation or a
pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death
or injury to persons, or has caused death or injury, a penalty not to
exceed $100,000 per violation may be assessed. Each day a violation
continues shall constitute a separate offense. Appendix B of this part
contains a statement of agency civil penalty policy.
    (c) Any person who knowingly and willfully falsifies a record or
report required by this part is subject to criminal penalties under 49
U.S.C. 21311.

0
4. Section 229.15 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  229.15  Remote Control Locomotives.

    (a) Design and operation. (1) Each locomotive equipped with a
locomotive control unit (LCU) shall respond only to the operator
control units (OCUs) assigned to that receiver.
    (2) If one or more OCUs are assigned to a LCU, the LCU shall
respond only to the OCU that is in primary command. If a subsequent OCU
is assigned to a LCU, the previous assignment will be automatically
cancelled.
    (3) If more than one OCU is assigned to a LCU, the secondary OCUs'
man down feature, bell, horn, and emergency brake application functions
shall remain active. The remote control system shall be designed so
that if the signal from the OCU to the RCL is interrupted for a set
period not to exceed five seconds, the remote control system shall
cause:
    (i) A full service application of the locomotive and train brakes;
and
    (ii) The elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
    (4) Each OCU shall be designed to control only one RCL at a time.
OCU's having the capability to control more than one RCL shall have a
means to lock in one RCL ``assignment address'' to prevent simultaneous
control over more than one locomotive.
    (5) If an OCU is equipped with an ``on'' and ``off'' switch, when
the switch is moved from the ``on'' to the ``off''

position, the remote control system shall cause:
    (i) A full service application of the locomotive train brakes; and
    (ii) The elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
    (6) Each RCL shall have a distinct and unambiguous audible or
visual warning device that indicates to nearby personnel that the
locomotive is under active remote control operation.
    (7) When the main reservoir pressure drops below 90 psi while the
RCL is moving, the RCL shall initiate a full service application of the
locomotive and train brakes, and eliminate locomotive tractive effort.
    (8) When the air valves and the electrical selector switch on the
RCL are moved from manual to remote control mode or from remote control
to manual mode, an emergency application of the locomotive and train
brakes shall be initiated.
    (9) Operating control handles located in the RCL cab shall be
removed, pinned in place, protected electronically, or otherwise
rendered inoperable as necessary to prevent movement caused by the
RCL's cab controls while the RCL is being operated by remote control.
    (10) The RCL system (both the OCU and LCU), shall be designed to
perform a self diagnostic test of the electronic components of the
system. The system shall be designed to immediately effect a full
service application of the locomotive and train brakes and the
elimination of locomotive tractive effort in the event a failure is
detected.
    (11) Each RCL shall be tagged at the locomotive control stand
throttle indicating the locomotive is being used in a remote control
mode. The tag shall be removed when the locomotive is placed back in
manual mode.
    (12) Each OCU shall have the following controls and switches and
shall be capable of performing the following functions:
    (i) Directional control;
    (ii) Throttle or speed control;
    (iii) Locomotive independent air brake application and release;
    (iv) Automatic train air brake application and release control;
    (v) Audible warning device control (horn);
    (vi) Audible bell control, if equipped;
    (vii) Sand control (unless automatic);
    (viii) Bi-directional headlight control;
    (ix) Emergency air brake application switch;
    (x) Generator field switch or equivalent to eliminate tractive
effort to the locomotive;
    (xi) Audio/visual indication of wheel slip, only if an audio/visual
indication is not provided by the RCL;
    (xii) Audio indication of movement of the RCL; and
    (xiv) Require at least two separate actions by the RCO to begin
movement of the RCL.
    (13) Each OCU shall be equipped with the following features:
    (i) A harness with a breakaway safety feature;
    (ii) An operator alertness device that requires manual resetting or
its equivalent. The alertness device shall incorporate a timing
sequence not to exceed 60 seconds. Failure to reset the switch within
the timing sequence shall cause a service application of the locomotive
and train brakes, and the elimination of locomotive tractive effort;
and,
    (iii) A tilt feature that, when tilted to a predetermined angle,
shall cause:
    (A) An emergency application of the locomotive and train brakes,
and the elimination of locomotive tractive effort; and
    (B) If the OCU is equipped with a tilt bypass system that permits
the tilt protection feature to be temporarily disabled, this bypass
feature shall deactivate within 60 seconds on the primary OCU and
within 60 seconds for all secondary OCUs, unless reactivated by the
RCO.
    (14) Each OCU shall be equipped with one of the following control
systems:
    (i) An automatic speed control system with a maximum 15 mph speed
limiter; or
    (ii) A graduated throttle and brake. A graduated throttle and brake
control system built after September 6, 2012, shall be equipped with a
speed limiter to a maximum of 15 mph.
    (15) RCL systems built after September 6, 2012, shall be equipped
to automatically notify the railroad in the event the RCO becomes
incapacitated or OCU tilt feature is activated.
    (16) RCL systems built prior to September 6, 2012, not equipped
with automatic notification of operator incapacitated feature may not
be utilized in one-person operation. (b) Inspection, testing, and
repair.
    (1) Each time an OCU is linked to a RCL, and at the start of each
shift, a railroad shall test:
    (i) The air brakes and the OCU's safety features, including the
tilt switch and alerter device; and
    (ii) The man down/tilt feature automatic notification.
    (2) An OCU shall not continue in use with any defective safety
feature identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
    (3) A defective OCU shall be tracked under its own identification
number assigned by the railroad. Records of repairs shall be maintained
by the railroad and made available to FRA upon request.
    (4) Each time an RCL is placed in service and at the start of each
shift locomotives that utilize a positive train stop system shall
perform a conditioning run over tracks that the positive train stop
system is being utilized on to ensure that the system functions as
intended.

0
5. Section 229.19 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.19  Prior waivers.

    Waivers from any requirement of this part, issued prior to June 8,
2012, shall terminate on the date specified in the letter granting the
waiver. If no date is specified, then the waiver shall automatically
terminate on June 8, 2017.

0
6. Section 229.20 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  229.20  Electronic recordkeeping.

    (a) For purposes of compliance with the recordkeeping requirements
of this part, except for the daily inspection record maintained on the
locomotive required by Sec.  229.21, the cab copy of Form FRA F 6180-
49-A required by Sec.  229.23, the fragmented air brake maintenance
record required by Sec.  229.27, and records required under Sec.
229.9, a railroad may create, maintain, and transfer any of the records
required by this part through electronic transmission, storage, and
retrieval provided that all of the requirements contained in this
section are met.
    (b) Design requirements. Any electronic record system used to
create, maintain, or transfer a record required to be maintained by
this part shall meet the following design requirements:
    (1) The electronic record system shall be designed such that the
integrity of each record is maintained through appropriate levels of
security such as recognition of an electronic signature, or other
means, which uniquely identify the initiating person as the author of
that record. No two persons shall have the same electronic identity;
    (2) The electronic system shall ensure that each record cannot be
modified, or replaced, once the record is transmitted;
    (3) Any amendment to a record shall be electronically stored apart
from the record which it amends. Each amendment to a record shall
uniquely identify the person making the amendment;
    (4) The electronic system shall provide for the maintenance of
inspection records as originally submitted without corruption or loss
of data; and

    (5) Policies and procedures shall be in place to prevent persons
from altering electronic records, or otherwise interfering with the
electronic system.
    (c) Operational requirements. Any electronic record system used to
create, maintain, or transfer a record required to be maintained by
this part shall meet the following operating requirements:
    (1) The electronic storage of any record required by this part
shall be initiated by the person performing the activity to which the
record pertains within 24 hours following the completion of the
activity; and
    (2) For each locomotive for which records of inspection or
maintenance required by this part are maintained electronically, the
electronic record system shall automatically notify the railroad each
time the locomotive is due for an inspection, or maintenance that the
electronic system is tracking. The automatic notification tracking
requirement does not apply to daily inspections.
    (d) Accessibility and availability requirements. Any electronic
record system used to create, maintain, or transfer a record required
to be maintained by this part shall meet the following access and
availability requirements:
    (1) Except as provided in Sec.  229.313(c)(2), the carrier shall
provide FRA with all electronic records maintained for compliance with
this part for any specific locomotives at any mechanical department
terminal upon request;
    (2) Paper copies of electronic records and amendments to those
records that may be necessary to document compliance with this part,
shall be provided to FRA for inspection and copying upon request http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?DB=1000547&DocName=49CFRS213%2E305&FindType=L&AP=&mt=Westlaw&fn=_top&sv=Split&vr=2.0&rs=. Paper copies shall be provided to FRA no
later than 15 days from the date the request is made; and,
    (3) Inspection records required by this part shall be available to
persons who performed the inspection and to persons performing
subsequent inspections on the same locomotive.

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7. Section 229.23 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.23  Periodic inspection: general.

    (a) Each locomotive shall be inspected at each periodic inspection
to determine whether it complies with this part. Except as provided in
Sec.  229.9, all non-complying conditions shall be repaired before the
locomotive is used. Except as provided in Sec.  229.33 and paragraph
(b) of this section, the interval between any two periodic inspections
may not exceed 92 days. Periodic inspections shall only be made where
adequate facilities are available. At each periodic inspection, a
locomotive shall be positioned so that a person may safely inspect the
entire underneath portion of the locomotive.
    (b) For each locomotive equipped with advanced microprocessor-based
on-board electronic condition monitoring controls:
    (1) The interval between periodic inspections shall not exceed 184
days; and
    (2) At least once each 31 days, the daily inspection required by
Sec.  229.21, shall be performed by a qualified mechanical inspector as
defined in Sec.  229.5. A record of the inspection that contains the
name of the person performing the inspection and the date that it was
performed shall be maintained in the locomotive cab until the next
periodic inspection is performed.
    (c) Each new locomotive shall receive an initial periodic
inspection before it is used.
    (d) At the initial periodic inspection, the date and place of the
last tests performed that are the equivalent of the tests required by
Sec. Sec.  229.27, 229.29, and 229.31 shall be entered on Form FRA F
6180-49A. These dates shall determine when the tests first become due
under Sec. Sec.  229.27, 229.29, and 229.31. Out of use credit may be
carried over from Form FRA F 6180-49 and entered on Form FRA F 6180-
49A.
    (e) Each periodic inspection shall be recorded on Form FRA F 6180-
49A. The form shall be signed by the person conducting the inspection
and certified by that person's supervisor that the work was done. The
form shall be displayed under a transparent cover in a conspicuous
place in the cab of each locomotive. A railroad maintaining and
transferring records as provided for in Sec.  229.20 shall print the
name of the person who performed the inspections, repairs, or certified
work on the Form FRA F 6180-49A that is displayed in the cab of each
locomotive.
    (f) At the first periodic inspection in each calendar year, the
carrier shall remove from each locomotive Form FRA F 6180-49A covering
the previous calendar year. If a locomotive does not receive its first
periodic inspection in a calendar year before April 2, or July 3 if
it's a locomotive equipped with advanced microprocessor-based on-board
electronic condition monitoring controls, because it is out of use, the
form shall be promptly replaced. The Form FRA F 6180-49A covering the
preceding year for each locomotive, in or out of use, shall be signed
by the railroad official responsible for the locomotive and filed as
required in Sec.  229.23(f). The date and place of the last periodic
inspection and the date and place of the last tests performed under
Sec. Sec.  229.27, 229.29, and 229.31 shall be transferred to the
replacement Form FRA F 6180-49A.
    (g) The railroad mechanical officer who is in charge of a
locomotive shall maintain in his office a secondary record of the
information reported on Form FRA F 6180-49A. The secondary record shall
be retained until Form FRA F 6180-49A has been removed from the
locomotive and filed in the railroad office of the mechanical officer
in charge of the locomotive. If the Form FRA F 6180-49A removed from
the locomotive is not clearly legible, the secondary record shall be
retained until the Form FRA F 6180-49A for the succeeding year is
filed. The Form F 6180-49A removed from a locomotive shall be retained
until the Form FRA F 6180-49A for the succeeding year is filed.
    (h) The railroad shall maintain, and provide employees performing
inspections under this section with, a list of the defects and repairs
made on each locomotive over the last ninety-two days;
    (i) The railroad shall provide employees performing inspections
under this section with a document containing all tests conducted since
the last periodic inspection, and procedures needed to perform the
inspection.

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8. Section 229.25 is amended by revising paragraphs (d) and (e) and
adding paragraph (f) to read as follows:

Sec.  229.25  Tests: Every periodic inspection.

* * * * *
    (d) Event recorder. A microprocessor-based self-monitoring event
recorder, if installed, is exempt from periodic inspection under
paragraphs (d)(1) through (5) of this section and shall be inspected
annually as required by Sec.  229.27(c). Other types of event
recorders, if installed, shall be inspected, maintained, and tested in
accordance with instructions of the manufacturer, supplier, or owner
thereof and in accordance with the following criteria:
    (1) A written or electronic copy of the instructions in use shall
be kept at the point where the work is performed and a hard-copy
version, written in the English language, shall be made available upon
request to FRA.
    (2) The event recorder shall be tested before any maintenance work
is performed on it. At a minimum, the

event recorder test shall include cycling, as practicable, all required
recording elements and determining the full range of each element by
reading out recorded data.
    (3) If the pre-maintenance test reveals that the device is not
recording all the specified data and that all recordings are within the
designed recording elements, this fact shall be noted, and maintenance
and testing shall be performed as necessary until a subsequent test is
successful.
    (4) When a successful test is accomplished, a copy of the data-
verification results shall be maintained in any medium with the
maintenance records for the locomotive until the next one is filed.
    (5) A railroad's event recorder periodic maintenance shall be
considered effective if 90 percent of the recorders on locomotives
inbound for periodic inspection in any given calendar month are still
fully functional; maintenance practices and test intervals shall be
adjusted as necessary to yield effective periodic maintenance.
    (e) Remote control locomotive. Remote control locomotive system
components that interface with the mechanical devices of the locomotive
shall be tested including, but not limited to, air pressure monitoring
devices, pressure switches, and speed sensors.
    (f) Alerters. The alerter shall be tested, and all automatic timing
resets shall function as intended.

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9. Section 229.27 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.27  Annual tests.

    (a) All testing under this section shall be performed at intervals
that do not exceed 368 calendar days.
    (b) Load meters that indicate current (amperage) being applied to
traction motors shall be tested. Each device used by the engineer to
aid in the control or braking of the train or locomotive that provides
an indication of air pressure electronically shall be tested by
comparison with a test gauge or self-test designed for this purpose. An
error greater than five percent or greater than three pounds per square
inch shall be corrected. The date and place of the test shall be
recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A, and the person conducting the test and
that person's supervisor shall sign the form.
    (c) A microprocessor-based event recorder with a self-monitoring
feature equipped to verify that all data elements required by this part
are recorded, requires further maintenance and testing only if either
of the following conditions exist:
    (1) The self-monitoring feature displays an indication of a
failure. If a failure is displayed, further maintenance and testing
must be performed until a subsequent test is successful. When a
successful test is accomplished, a record, in any medium, shall be made
of that fact and of any maintenance work necessary to achieve the
successful result. This record shall be available at the location where
the locomotive is maintained until a record of a subsequent successful
test is filed; or,
    (2) A download of the event recorder, taken within the preceding 30
days and reviewed for the previous 48 hours of locomotive operation,
reveals a failure to record a regularly recurring data element or
reveals that any required data element is not representative of the
actual operations of the locomotive during this time period. If the
review is not successful, further maintenance and testing shall be
performed until a subsequent test is successful. When a successful test
is accomplished, a record, in any medium, shall be made of that fact
and of any maintenance work necessary to achieve the successful result.
This record shall be kept at the location where the locomotive is
maintained until a record of a subsequent successful test is filed. The
download shall be taken from information stored in the certified
crashworthy crash hardened event recorder memory module if the
locomotive is so equipped.

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10. Section 229.29 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.29  Air brake system calibration, maintenance, and testing.

    (a) A locomotive's air brake system shall receive the calibration,
maintenance, and testing as prescribed in this section. The level of
maintenance and testing and the intervals for receiving such
maintenance and testing of locomotives with various types of air brake
systems shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs (d) through
(f) of this section. Records of the maintenance and testing required in
this section shall be maintained in accordance with paragraph (g) of
this section.
    (b) Except for DMU or MU locomotives covered under Sec.  238.309 of
this chapter, the air flow method (AFM) indicator shall be calibrated
in accordance with Sec.  232.205(c)(1)(iii) at intervals not to exceed
92 days, and records shall be maintained as prescribed paragraph (g)(1)
of this section.
    (c) Except for DMU or MU locomotives covered under Sec.  238.309 of
this chapter, the extent of air brake system maintenance and testing
that is required on a locomotive shall be in accordance with the
following levels:
    (1) Level one: Locomotives shall have the filtering devices or dirt
collectors located in the main reservoir supply line to the air brake
system cleaned, repaired, or replaced.
    (2) Level two: Locomotives shall have the following components
cleaned, repaired, and tested: brake cylinder relay valve portions;
main reservoir safety valves; brake pipe vent valve portions; and, feed
and reducing valve portions in the air brake system (including related
dirt collectors and filters).
    (3) Level three: Locomotives shall have the components identified
in this paragraph removed from the locomotive and disassembled, cleaned
and lubricated (if necessary), and tested. In addition, all parts of
such components that can deteriorate within the inspection interval as
defined in paragraphs (d) through (f) of this section shall be replaced
and tested. The components include: all pneumatic components of the
locomotive equipment's brake system that contain moving parts, and are
sealed against air leaks; all valves and valve portions; electric-
pneumatic master controllers in the air brake system; and all air brake
related filters and dirt collectors.
    (d) Except for MU locomotives covered under Sec.  238.309 of this
chapter, all locomotives shall receive level one air brake maintenance
and testing as described in this section at intervals that do not
exceed 368 days.
    (e) Locomotives equipped with an air brake system not specifically
identified in paragraphs (f)(1) through (3) of this section shall
receive level two air brake maintenance and testing as described in
this section at intervals that do not exceed 368 days and level three
air brake maintenance and testing at intervals that do not exceed 736
days.
    (f) Level two and level three air brake maintenance and testing
shall be performed on each locomotive identified in this paragraph at
the following intervals:
    (1) At intervals that do not exceed 1,104 days for a locomotive
equipped with a 26-L or equivalent brake system;
    (2) At intervals that do not exceed 1,472 days for locomotives
equipped with an air dryer and a 26-L or equivalent brake system and
for locomotives not equipped with an air compressor and that are semi-
permanently coupled and dedicated to locomotives with an air dryer; or
    (3) At intervals that do not exceed 1,840 days for locomotives
equipped

with CCB-1, CCB-2, CCB-26, EPIC 1 (formerly EPIC 3102), EPIC 3102D2,
EPIC 2, KB-HS1, or Fastbrake brake systems.
    (g) Records of the air brake system maintenance and testing
required by this section shall be generated and maintained in
accordance with the following:
    (1) The date of AFM indicator calibration shall be recorded and
certified in the remarks section of Form F6180-49A.
    (2) The date and place of the cleaning, repairing and testing
required by this section shall be recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A, and
the work shall be certified. A record of the parts of the air brake
system that are cleaned, repaired, and tested shall be kept in the
railroad's files or in the cab of the locomotive.
    (3) At its option, a railroad may fragment the work required by
this section. In that event, a separate record shall be maintained
under a transparent cover in the cab. The air record shall include: the
locomotive number; a list of the air brake components; and the date and
place of the inspection and testing of each component. The signature of
the person performing the work and the signature of that person's
supervisor shall be included for each component. A duplicate record
shall be maintained in the railroad's files.

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11. Section 229.46 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.46  Brakes: general.

    (a) Before each trip, the railroad shall know the following:
    (1) The locomotive brakes and devices for regulating pressures,
including but not limited to the automatic and independent brake
control systems, operate as intended; and
    (2) The water and oil have been drained from the air brake system
of all locomotives in the consist.
    (b) A locomotive with an inoperative or ineffective automatic or
independent brake control system will be considered to be operating as
intended for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, if all of the
following conditions are met:
    (1) The locomotive is in a trailing position and is not the
controlling locomotive in a distributed power train consist;
    (2) The railroad has previously determined, in conjunction with the
locomotive and/or airbrake manufacturer, that placing such a locomotive
in trailing position adequately isolates the non-functional valves so
as to allow safe operation of the brake systems from the controlling
locomotive;
    (3) If deactivation of the circuit breaker for the air brake system
is required, it shall be specified in the railroad's operating rules;
    (4) A tag shall immediately be placed on the isolation switch of
the locomotive giving the date and location and stating that the unit
may only be used in a trailing position and may not be used as a lead
or controlling locomotive;
    (5) The tag required in paragraph (b)(4) of this section remains
attached to the isolation switch of the locomotive until repairs are
made; and
    (6) The inoperative or ineffective brake control system is repaired
prior to or at the next periodic inspection.

0
12. Section 229.61 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.61  Draft system.

    (a) A coupler may not have any of the following conditions:
    (1) A distance between the guard arm and the knuckle nose of more
than 5 5/16 inches on D&E couplers.
    (2) A crack or break in the side wall or pin bearing bosses outside
of the shaded areas shown in Figure 1 or in the pulling face of the
knuckle.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR09AP12.000

    (3) A coupler assembly without anti-creep protection.
    (4) Free slack in the coupler or drawbar not absorbed by friction
devices or draft gears that exceeds one-half inches.
    (5) A broken or cracked coupler carrier.
    (6) A broken or cracked yoke.
    (7) A broken draft gear.
    (b) A device shall be provided under the lower end of all drawbar
pins and articulated connection pins to prevent the pin from falling
out of place in case of breakage.

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13. Section 229.85 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.85   High voltage markings: doors, cover plates, or barriers.

    All doors, cover plates, or barriers providing direct access to
high voltage equipment shall be marked ``Danger-High Voltage'' or with
the word ``Danger'' and the normal voltage carried by the parts so
protected.

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14. Section 229.114 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  229.114  Steam generator inspections and tests.

    (a) Periodic steam generator inspection. Except as provided in
Sec.  229.33, each steam generator shall be inspected and tested in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section at intervals not to
exceed 92 days, unless the steam generator is isolated in accordance
with paragraph (b) of this section. All non-complying conditions shall
be repaired or the steam generator shall be isolated as prescribed in
paragraph (b) of this section before the locomotive is used.
    (b) Isolation of a steam generator. A steam generator will be
considered isolated if the water suction pipe to the water pump and the
leads to the main switch (steam generator switch) are disconnected, and
the train line shut-off-valve is wired closed or a blind gasket is
applied. Before an isolated steam generator is returned to use, it
shall be inspected and tested pursuant to paragraph (d) of this
section.
    (c) Forms. Each periodic steam generator inspection and test shall
be recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A required by paragraph Sec.  229.23.
When Form FRA F 6180-49A for the locomotive is replaced, data for the
steam generator inspections shall be transferred to the new Form FRA
F6180-49A.
    (d) Tests and requirements. Each periodic steam generator
inspection and test shall include the following tests and requirements:
    (1) All electrical devices and visible insulation shall be
inspected.
    (2) All automatic controls, alarms, and protective devices shall be
inspected and tested.
    (3) Steam pressure gauges shall be tested by comparison with a
dead-weight tester or a test gauge designed for this purpose. The
siphons to the steam gauges shall be removed and their connections
examined to determine that they are open.
    (4) Safety valves shall be set and tested under steam after the
steam pressure gauge is tested.
    (e) Annual steam generator tests. Each steam generator that is not
isolated in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, shall be
subjected to a hydrostatic pressure at least 25 percent above the
working pressure and the visual return water-flow indicator shall be
removed and inspected. The testing under this paragraph shall be
performed at intervals that do not exceed 368 calendar days.

0
15. Section 229.119 is amended by revising paragraphs (d) and (e) and

adding paragraphs (g) through (i) to read as follows:

Sec.  229.119  Cabs, floors, and passageways.

* * * * *
    (d) Any occupied locomotive cab shall be provided with proper
ventilation and with a heating arrangement that maintains a temperature
of at least 60 degrees Fahrenheit 6 inches above the center of each
seat in the cab compartment.
    (e) Similar locomotives with open-end platforms coupled in multiple
control and used in road service shall have a means of safe passage
between them; no passageway is required through the nose of car body
locomotives. There shall be a continuous barrier across the full width
of the end of a locomotive or a continuous barrier between locomotives.
* * * * *
    (g) Each locomotive or remanufactured locomotive placed in service
for the first time on or after June 8, 2012, shall be equipped with an
air conditioning unit in the locomotive cab compartment.
    (h) Each air conditioning unit in the locomotive cab on a
locomotive identified in paragraph (g) of this section shall be
inspected and maintained to ensure that it operates properly and meets
or exceeds the manufacturer's minimum operating specifications during
the periodic inspection required for the locomotive pursuant to Sec.
229.23 of this part.
    (i) Each locomotive or remanufactured locomotive ordered on or
after June 8, 2012, or placed in service for the first time on or after
December 10, 2012, shall be equipped with a securement device on each
exterior locomotive cab door that is capable of securing the door from
inside of the cab.

0
16. Section 229.123 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  229.123  Pilots, snowplows, end plates.

    (a) Each lead locomotive shall be equipped with a pilot, snowplow,
or end plate that extends across both rails. The minimum clearance
above the rail of the pilot, snowplow or end plate shall be 3 inches.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the maximum
clearance shall be 6 inches. When the locomotive is equipped with a
combination of the equipment listed in this paragraph, each extending
across both rails, only the lowest piece of that equipment must satisfy
clearance requirements of this section.