Employers must deenergize circuits on the generation side of the
demarcation point in accordance with Sec.  1910.269(d) and the
remaining circuits in the substation in accordance with Sec.
1910.269(m). However, irrespective of any such demarcation, Sec.
1910.269(n) always applies to any lines or equipment still connected
to the transmission circuit after the employer deenergizes the
circuit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the second issue, OSHA agrees with TVA that
grounding of electric power generation circuits should comply with the
grounding requirements in final Sec.  1910.269(n) other than paragraph
(n)(2). These requirements serve two functions. First they protect
employees working on grounded circuits from electric shock should the
circuits become energized. Second, they protect employees from hazards
related to the installation and removal of protective grounds and to
the ability of the ground to carry current. For example, final
paragraphs (n)(6)(i) and (n)(6)(ii) ensure that employees are not
injured if the protective grounding equipment is installed on or
removed from an energized circuit. Also, paragraph (n)(4) ensures that
the protective grounding equipment can safely carry the current that
would flow if the circuit becomes energized. Applying these provisions
to electric power generation circuits will protect employees from these
hazards. Therefore, OSHA decided to apply the requirements of final
Sec.  1910.269(n), other than paragraph (n)(2), to electric generation
lines and equipment.
    Paragraph (b) of final Sec.  1926.962 sets the conditions under
which employers must ensure that lines and equipment are grounded as a
prerequisite to employees' working the lines or equipment as
deenergized.\410\ Generally, for lines or equipment to be treated as
deenergized, employers must deenergize the lines and equipment as
specified under Sec.  1926.961 and then ground them as well. An
employer may omit grounds on lines and equipment by demonstrating that
either installation of a ground is impracticable (such as during the
initial stages of work on underground cables, when the conductor is not
bare for grounding) or the conditions resulting from the installation
of a ground would present greater hazards than work without grounds.
OSHA expects that conditions warranting the absence of protective
grounds will be rare.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \410\ As previously noted, existing Sec.  1926.954(a) requires
conductors and equipment to be considered as energized until
determined to be deenergized or until grounded. Paragraph (c) of
existing Sec.  1926.954 requires bare communication conductors on
poles or structures to be treated as energized unless protected by
insulating materials. Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.  1926.960
covers the hazard addressed by these existing requirements, as
discussed earlier in this preamble.
    Existing Sec.  1926.954(b) addresses when to ground new lines
and equipment. When an employee installs equipment, it poses the
same hazard to the employee as any other conductive object
manipulated near exposed energized parts. Requirements contained in
final Sec.  1926.960(c) and (d) adequately address this hazard. The
installation of lines, however, poses additional hazards. First, the
lines may be subject to hazardous induced voltage. Second, because
of their length, new overhead lines are much more likely than other
new equipment to contact existing energized lines. This contact can
happen, for example, through failure of the stringing and tensioning
equipment used to install the new lines or through failure of the
existing lines or support structures. Final Sec.  1926.964(b)
addresses these hazards by specifically covering the installation
and removal of overhead lines. Lastly, new underground lines, which
are run as insulated cable, do not pose these electrical hazards.
    For these reasons, OSHA indicated in the preamble to the
proposal that the Agency would not include the provisions of
existing Sec.  1926.954(b) in the final rule (70 FR 34873). However,
OSHA requested comment on whether the proposal adequately protected
employees from hazards associated with the installation of new lines
and equipment. Only one commenter supported including the existing
requirements in the final rule, but that commenter did not provide
any rationale for its position (Ex. 0175). Therefore, OSHA is not
including the provisions of existing Sec.  1926.954(b) in the final
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When paragraph (b) does not require grounds, but the lines and
equipment are to be treated as deenergized, the employer must meet
certain conditions and ensure that employees use additional
precautions. The employer must still deenergize the lines and equipment
according to the procedures required by final Sec.  1926.961 (per final
paragraph (b)(1)). Also, there must be no possibility of contact with
another energized source (per final paragraph (b)(2)) and no hazard of
induced voltage

present (per final paragraph (b)(3)). Since these precautions and
conditions do not protect against the possible reenergizing of the
lines or equipment under all conditions, the standard requires
employers to ground lines and equipment in all but extremely limited
circumstances.
    Paragraph (f) of existing Sec.  1926.954 allows employers to omit
grounds without the additional restrictions specified in final Sec.
1926.962(b)(1) through (b)(3). However, the existing standard requires
the lines or equipment to be treated as energized in such cases. While
the final rule does not specifically permit omitting grounds for
conductors that are treated as energized, it does not require grounding
unless the equipment is to be considered as deenergized. (See also the
discussion of final Sec.  1926.960(b)(2), earlier in this section of
the preamble.)
    Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association
of Electric Cooperatives opposed requiring the grounding of lines
operating at 600 volts and less:

    We do not agree with [the requirement to ground lines operating
at 600 volts or less] and do not see how this is physically possible
in most cases. We typically open, isolate, [tagout], and test 600
volt lines deenergized prior to performing work. We do not see the
need for protective grounding in order to provide safety to
employees on these circuits. Further, operational methods do not
exist to ground 600 volt URD (underground residential distribution)
or insulated overhead circuits.
    Commercial electricians commonly work on 600 volt or less lines
and there is no industry standard from electricians or utilities to
ever ground such lines. The industry standard is to isolate, test,
and tag. This should be sufficient for personnel safety. It should
be noted that most 600 volt or less equipment has no provisions or
space for attaching protective grounds. [Ex. 0175]

    OSHA believes that the operating voltage on a distribution line is
immaterial. As explained earlier, these lines can not only become
energized by a failure of the clearance system, but also by a number of
external factors that the deenergizing procedures required by final
Sec.  1926.961 do not control. These factors include lightning, voltage
backfeed, and contact with other energized lines. Commercial
electricians working on systems operating at 600 volts or less do not
face these same hazards unless they are working on a distribution line;
in such cases, Sec.  1910.269 or Subpart V, which require grounding the
lines and equipment, would cover the electricians. Thus, OSHA concludes
that, regardless of voltage, it is necessary to ground transmission and
distribution lines and equipment that are to be treated as deenergized,
except when those external hazards are not present.
    Ms. Layton did not convince the Agency that it is impossible to
ground lines operating at 600 volts or less. Ms. Layton did not state
why it is not possible to ground these lines. Protective grounding
equipment is available in sizes down to No. 2 AWG, and this size should
be suitable for typical line conductor sizes at the 600-volt class (269
Ex. 8-5; Ex. 0054). Moreover, even if grounding were not possible, it
would be possible, and acceptable under the final rule, to work the
lines as though energized.
    Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services recommended that OSHA remove
the exceptions for installing grounds (Exs. 0169, 0234). He commented
that the exceptions are subject to possible abuse by workers,
explaining, ``Since it is easier not to ground, crews might attempt to
claim that the specified criteria for not grounding applies in their
situation'' (Ex. 0234). He suggested that employees should always work
lines and equipment as though energized if grounds cannot be provided
(id.).
    As noted earlier, OSHA believes that the conditions in which the
final rule will not require grounding are extremely rare. OSHA also
believes that the restrictions imposed by final Sec.  1926.962(b)
reduce the risk of electric shock to employees to an acceptable level.
The alternative suggested by Mr. Yancey seems compelling; however, it
relies on the assumption that working lines and equipment energized is
as safe as, or safer than, working them deenergized without grounds in
the limited conditions permitted under this final rule. OSHA concludes
that when the risk of electric shock is low, as it is under conditions
that satisfy final Sec.  1926.962(b)(1) through (b)(3), working the
lines and equipment energized poses more risk than working them
deenergized without grounds. The choice suggested by Mr. Yancey would
provide an incentive to work with the lines and equipment energized
(rather than deenergized, but treated as energized), which the Agency
believes is less safe. Therefore, OSHA is adopting paragraph (b)
without substantive change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (f) of existing Sec.  1926.954 addresses where employers
must place grounds. The existing standard requires employers to place
grounds between the work location and all sources of energy and as
close as practicable to the work location. Alternatively, employers can
place grounds at the work location. If employees are to perform work at
more than one location in a line section, the existing standard
requires them to ground and short circuit the line section at one
location and to ground the conductor they are working on at each work
location. Although these requirements are designed to protect employees
in case the line on which they are working becomes reenergized, OSHA
indicated in the preamble to the proposal that it did not believe that
these existing provisions ensure the use of grounding practices and
equipment that are adequate to provide this protection (70 FR 34874).
    OSHA proposed requirements similar to the requirements in existing
Sec.  1926.954(f) when it initially proposed Sec.  1910.269(n). In
developing final Sec.  1910.269(n), OSHA reviewed the accidents in 269-
Ex. 9-2 and 269-Ex. 9-2A for situations involving improper protective
grounding. There were nine accidents in these two exhibits related to
protective grounding. In three cases, inadequately protective grounds,
which did not protect the employee against hazardous differences in
potential, were present. Because grounding is a backup measure that
provides protection only when all other safety-related work practices
fail, OSHA concluded that this incidence of faulty grounding was
significant.
    In promulgating Sec.  1910.269 in 1994, OSHA concluded that
grounding practices that do not provide an equipotential zone (which
safeguards an employee from voltage differences) do not provide
complete protection (59 FR 4395-4396). In case the line becomes
energized inadvertently, the voltages could be lethal, as demonstrated
by some of the exhibits in the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record (269-
Exs. 6-27, 57). Absent equipotential grounding, the only protection an
employee will receive is if he or she does not contact the line until a
circuit protective device clears the energy source, thereby removing
the potentially lethal voltage on the line.
    For these reasons, OSHA proposed in this rulemaking to require
grounds that would protect employees in the event that the line or
equipment on which they are working becomes reenergized. OSHA took
proposed Sec.  1926.962(c) directly from existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3),
which provides that protective grounds must be so located and arranged
that employees are not exposed to hazardous differences in electric
potential. The Agency designed the proposal to allow employers and
employees to use any grounding method that protects employees in this
way. OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal that, for employees
working at elevated positions

on poles and towers, single-point grounding may be necessary, together
with grounding straps, to provide an equipotential zone for the worker
(70 FR 34874). OSHA also noted in the proposal that grounding at
convenient points on both sides of the work area might protect
employees in insulated aerial lifts working midspan between two
conductor-supporting structures (id.). Bonding the aerial lift to the
grounded conductor would ensure that the employee remains at the
potential of the conductor in case of a fault. The Agency also
explained that other methods may be necessary to protect workers on the
ground, including grounding mats and insulating platforms (id.). In the
preamble to the proposal, the Agency stated that it believed that the
proposed performance-oriented approach to grounding would provide
flexibility for employers, while still affording adequate protection to
employees (id.).
    Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association
of Electric Cooperatives argued that the requirement to provide an
equipotential zone is unnecessary:

    [W]e agree with the need to employ safe grounding practices.
However, we have concerns with the requirement for equipotential
grounding as the ``safe'' method for grounding when an employee is
working on the pole. Three incidents/injuries are referenced that
were a result of inadequate grounding. More information is needed to
determine the inadequacies with these grounds. That is, were there
high resistant ground connections, were the grounds placed as
described in 1926.954 (b), and were the grounds properly constructed
to provide maximum protection to the employee[.] [Ex. 0175]

    Ms. Layton recognized the importance of ``grounds properly
constructed to provide maximum protection to the employee'' (id.). The
accidents described in the 1994 rulemaking clearly indicate that the
grounds involved did not provide a working zone free of hazardous
differences in electric potential. As noted earlier, evidence in that
record also indicated that lethal voltages can develop when employees
use such inadequate grounds.
    In its posthearing brief, EEI maintained that existing Sec.
1910.269(n), and the identically worded proposed Sec.  1926.962(c), are
unenforceably vague (Ex. 0501). EEI argued as follows:

    [T]he proposed standards would require employers to place
grounds in such a manner ``as to prevent each employee from being
exposed to hazardous differences in electrical potential.'' See
proposed 1926.962(c). OSHA doubtless would characterize this as a
``performance'' standard that allows the employer to cho[o]se a
means of compliance. But there is a point at which the total absence
of objective criteria for achieving compliance takes a standard
beyond the legally safe harbor of a ``performance standard'' to the
constitutionally infirm area of ambiguity and vagueness. That is
where a requirement for ``equipotential grounding'' stands as of
now.
    First, the record allows no other conclusion. Mr. Tomaseski and
Mr. Brian Erga, who together are as knowledgeable as any in the
electric utility industry about transmission and distribution
grounding, agree that there are no guidelines, standards or other
sources to guide employers as to how to achieve equipotential
grounding (Tr. 1262-1266). Mr. Erga commented in particular that
IEEE 1048 is ``quite outdated.'' (Tr. 1262).
    Second, OSHA's enforcement experience under Section
1910.269(n)(3) confirms this conclusion. Several years ago, the
Department of Justice, on OSHA's recommendation, indicted an
electrical contractor for an alleged criminal violation of this
section. At trial, however, neither DOJ [nor] OSHA could produce
even a single expert witness to testify in support of the indictment
as to what constitutes equipotential grounding, and the contractor
was acquitted of this charge. There is no basis, therefore, now to
extend the ``equipotential zone'' requirement to Part 1926, and it
should be stricken from the final standards. Also, OSHA should issue
compliance advice to its field personnel that Section 1910.269(n)(3)
is unenforceable. [Ex. 0501]

    With respect to the hearing testimony referenced by EEI, OSHA notes
that the cited exchange involved Mr. Tomaseski, representing IBEW,
questioning Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI (Tr. 1262-1263). Mr. Tomaseski did
not testify during that exchange; he only asked questions.\411\
Although OSHA does not dispute Mr. Erga's expertise in equipotential
grounding, the Agency disagrees with his description of IEEE Std 1048
as ``outdated.'' IEEE Std 1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective
Grounding of Power Lines, was available at the time of the 2006 hearing
(Ex. 0046). At that point, it had been available for only 3 years, and
there is no evidence in the record that IEEE withdrew the consensus
standard or otherwise disavowed it. There also is no evidence that IEEE
Std 1048-2003 is inaccurate. On the basis of the rulemaking record
considered as a whole, that consensus standard represents the best
available guidance on what constitutes equipotential grounding.
Paragraph (c) of final Sec.  1926.962 requires employers to determine
the proper grounding method based on the system involved. An
engineering determination of the currents in the employee's body that
will occur if the lines or equipment become reenergized during work
generally is necessary for this purpose. IEEE Std 1048-2003 (previously
IEEE Std 1048-1990) provides detailed guidelines on how to determine
maximum body currents and how to calculate what those currents would be
for a particular protective grounding system on a particular circuit
(Ex. 0046). Consequently, OSHA concludes that there are guidelines
available that can assist employers in developing grounding methods
that will comply with final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(n)(3) and 1926.962(c).
However, as explained later, OSHA agrees that additional guidance from
the Agency on this issue will facilitate compliance, and Appendix C to
this final rule provides such guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \411\ Although Mr. Tomaseski did not testify about proposed
Sec.  1926.962(c), IBEW generally supported the proposed provision
in its posthearing comments (Ex. 0505).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EEI did not provide a citation for the case on which it relies to
support its assertion that existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3) is
unenforceable. However, OSHA assumes that EEI is referring to United
States v. L.E. Myers Co., 2005 WL 3875213 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 2, 2005),
rev'd on other grounds, 562 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2009), as that case was
a criminal prosecution involving, among other issues, the equipotential
grounding provision in existing Sec.  1910.269. EEI's reliance on this
case is misplaced. First, EEI incorrectly asserts that the Government
elected not to call an expert witness on equipotential grounding in
that case because the Government could not produce such an expert. In
fact, before the trial in that case, the Government designated an
expert witness who was prepared to describe the proper way to establish
an equipotential zone consistent with the facts of the case. Second,
the unfavorable decision in the case may mean simply that the jury
decided that the defendant did not violate Sec.  1910.269(n)(3), not
that the standard is unenforceable.
    The Agency concludes that the standard should explicitly state that
the employer has a duty to determine (and be able to demonstrate) that
the grounding practices in use provide an equipotential zone for the
worker. IBEW commented that ``[p]ersonal protective grounding is either
entirely misunderstood or just not thought of as much as other issues
involved [in electric power transmission and distribution] work'' (Ex.
0230). OSHA infers from this statement that employers are not fully
implementing the existing requirement for equipotential zones in Sec.
1910.269(n)(3). Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta

Services testified: ``We believe that the [equipotential grounding]
standard should be entirely performance-based and put both the burden
and responsibility on the employer, putting in place procedures and
practices that protect employees from electrical hazards'' (Tr. 1324-
1325). The Agency agrees with Mr. Yancey. Therefore, OSHA is revising
the proposed language to expressly require employers to demonstrate
that temporary protective grounds have been placed at such locations
and arranged in such a manner so as to prevent each employee from being
exposed to hazardous differences in electric potential.
    Two commenters objected to use of the phrase ``equipotential zone''
in the heading for proposed paragraph (c) and opposed a specific
requirement for the creation of an ``equipotential zone'' (Exs. 0201,
0212). Duke Energy commented:

    The OSHA standard should not include specific requirements for
the creation of an equipotential zone. There is not adequate
information available to employers about how to effectively
establish equipotential zones on distribution structures. Without
this information, OSHA should not specify the technique of
``equipotential'' on those structures. In addition, OSHA should
change the term ``equipotential grounding'' to ``temporary
protective grounding'' which will allow employers to determine
effective grounding techniques. [Ex. 0201]

Southern Company commented that the term ``equipotential zone'' is a
misnomer because it ``implies that the voltage difference between two
points within the zone will be zero, therefore allowing no voltage to
develop across the worker. This misconception eliminates consideration
of the other critical parameters such as impedance of the temporary
ground, fault levels, etc.'' (Ex. 0212). Like Duke Energy, Southern
Company advocated use of the phrase ``temporary protective grounding''
in lieu of ``equipotential zone'' (id.).
    In contrast, several commenters supported the requirement for an
equipotential zone. (See, for example, Exs. 0155, 0162, 0186, 0230,
0505; Tr. 899-900, 1253-1254.) For example, Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio
Rural Electric Cooperatives commented, ``These grounding requirement[s]
will be a major improvement. Equal-potential grounding/bonding should
be required where ever it is possible to do so'' (Ex. 0186). However,
many of those who supported the proposed requirement recommended that
OSHA provide more guidance on acceptable methods that employers can use
to achieve the equipotential zone called for in the proposal. (See, for
example, Exs. 0162, 0230, 0505; Tr. 899-900, 1253-1254.) For example,
Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW spoke to the need for guidance:

    [Protective grounding] is an essential procedure to ensure
employee safety when performing work associated with transmission
and distribution voltages. As important as it is, it is also a
procedure that is commonly misunderstood and many times misapplied.
    In particular, many people, for some reason, do not understand
the term ``equipotential'' and do not understand proper application
of grounds to create an equipotential zone. This needs to be
changed. Either in the rule itself or in existing Appendix C or a
new appendix devoted to equipotential zones, OSHA should better
describe what an equipotential zone actually is and how an
equipotential zone is created and offer examples for overhead
distribution, overhead transmission, and underground distribution of
how to accomplish that task of creating an equipotential zone. [Tr.
899-900]

Mr. Steven Theis with MYR Group ``strongly recommended that OSHA
attempt to clarify acceptable grounding methods and/or configurations
that would be considered adequate or acceptable'' (Ex. 0162). Mr. Erga
recommended that the Agency address grounding for underground systems
and provided information for that purpose (Exs. 0474, 0475; Tr. 1256-
1257).
    OSHA disagrees with the commenters who objected to the term
``equipotential zone.'' As used in paragraph (c) of the final rule, the
word ``equipotential'' means that conductive objects within the
worker's reach do not differ in electric potential to the point that it
could endanger employees.\412\ This definition differs slightly from
the dictionary definition of ``equipotential'' (that is, having the
same electric potential at every point), but the difference is clear
from the regulatory text in paragraph (c). OSHA uses the term
``equipotential zone'' only in the heading. The text of paragraph (c)
states the requirement precisely without using the term. In other
words, the standard does not require what Southern Company alleges,
that is, a zone of precisely equal electric potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \412\ See the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.964(b)(4)(i) for an explanation of what OSHA considers to be a
hazardous difference in electric potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA agrees, however, that some employers can use assistance
determining what an equipotential zone is. Appendix C to final Subpart
V contains information designed to help employers develop grounding
practices that will provide the equipotential zone required by the
final rule. OSHA culled this information from the record, primarily
IEEE Std 1048-2003 (Ex. 0046) and from determinations that the Agency
made in this rulemaking (see, for example, the summary and explanation
for final Sec.  1926.964(b)(4)) and other rulemakings on safe levels of
current in the body, including the 1994 preamble to final Sec.
1910.269 (59 FR 4406) and the preamble to the rule on ground-fault
protection (41 FR 55696-55704, Dec. 21, 1976). In addition, the Agency
decided to provide a safe harbor of the type requested by Mr. Theis, so
a new note in the final rule provides that grounding practices meeting
the guidelines in Appendix C will comply with Sec.  1926.962(c). This
note will enable employers to adopt safe grounding practices that
provide an equipotential zone without having to conduct a separate
engineering determination, which should be particularly useful to
contractors who perform work on many different systems. Following the
guidelines in Appendix C, employers will be able to adopt a uniform set
of grounding practices that will be acceptable for a wide range of
above-ground and underground transmission and distribution systems.
Employers may set their own grounding practices without following the
guidelines in Appendix C, but the Agency reminds employers that the
final rule requires them to be able to demonstrate that any practices
selected will prevent each employee from being exposed to hazardous
differences in electric potential.
    Paragraph (d) of the final rule contains requirements that
protective grounding equipment must meet. For the grounding equipment
to protect employees completely, it must not fail while the line or
electric equipment is energized. Thus, paragraph (d)(1)(i) requires
protective grounding to have an ampacity high enough so that the
equipment is capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could
flow at the point of grounding during the period necessary to clear the
fault. In other words, the grounding equipment must be able to carry
the fault current for the amount of time necessary to allow protective
devices to interrupt the circuit. OSHA adopted this provision from the
first sentence of existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i). There was broad
support in the record for this requirement (see, for example, Exs.
0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179). Consequently, OSHA is including it
in the final rule as proposed.
    As noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, the design of
electric power distribution lines operating at 600 volts or less can
present a maximum fault current and fault interrupting time

that exceeds the current carrying capability of the circuit conductors
(70 FR 34874). In other words, the maximum fault current on
distribution secondaries of 600 volts or less can be high enough to
melt the phase conductors carrying the fault current. If OSHA required
protective grounding equipment to carry the maximum amount of fault
current without regard to whether the phase conductors would fail, the
size of the grounding equipment would be impractical. OSHA does not
interpret existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i) to require protective
grounding equipment to be capable of carrying more current than
necessary to allow the phase conductors to fail. (See OSHA Instruction
CPL 02-01-038.) A protective grounding jumper sized slightly larger
than a phase conductor would be sufficient to meet the existing
standard.
    To clarify this requirement, OSHA proposed, in paragraph
(d)(1)(ii), to recognize certain conditions in which it would be
permissible to use protective grounding equipment that would not be
large enough to carry the maximum fault current indefinitely, but that
would be large enough to carry this current until the phase conductor
fails. First, the proposal would have required the grounding equipment
to be capable of carrying the maximum fault current until the conductor
protected by the grounding equipment failed. Second, the conductor
would have been considered grounded only where the grounding equipment
was protecting the employee after the conductor failed. In other words,
the portion of the phase conductor between the grounding equipment and
the employee protected by the grounding equipment would have had to
remain intact under fault conditions. Third, since the phase conductor
will likely fall once it fails, the proposal provided that ``[n]o
employees . . . be endangered by the failed conductor.'' OSHA requested
comments on proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii), including specifically
whether the Agency should restrict the provision to lines and equipment
operating at 600 volts or less.
    Some commenters supported proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii) (Exs. 0126,
0167, 0201, 0219, 0220). For example, Duke Energy supported this
change, contending that ``it relaxes overly restrictive rules'' (Ex.
0201). Mr. Allan Oracion with Energy United EMC commented that proposed
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) ``is needed for fault current of lines at 600
volts or less because, if not, the ground wire would be too big to
handle and use'' (Ex. 0219).
    However, most of the comments received on the proposed provision
opposed it. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179,
0227, 0230.) For instance, Ms. Wyla Wood with Mason County Public
Utility District Number 3 commented:

    [T]he requirement to size a grounding jumper to be able to
withstand the maximum fault current for the time necessary to have
the grounded conductor fail to the point of separation and fall to
the ground is impracticable in most situations due (1) to the
required size of the grounding jumper and (2) the lack of adequate
connection points at which to attach the grounding jumper. In a
transmission system there usually is no neutral conductor so the
grounding jumper must be attached to the tower or structure ground
which at the most is only a 4/0 conductor or less. In the National
Electric Safety Code and the National Electric[al] Code (NFPA 70),
the connection to ground is only required to be sized to withstand
the available fault current for the time required to have the
electrical protective equipment operate. This would include relays
seeing the fault current and opening breakers, tripping generating
units off line, and/or allowing proper fusing to fail thereby
creating an electrical opening in the system stopping the flow of
current. The design requirements for electrical circuits as found in
the NESC Section 9, 093.C1-9 and the NEC Chapter 2 Article 250 would
need to be changed so that all new construction would have the
ability to do what we believe you are asking in this section.
    Another consideration would be the physical size and weight of a
temporary grounding jumper. As loads are becoming greater, the size
of transmission and distribution conductors are becoming larger in
size. If, for instance, the conductor was 756 MCM,\[\\413\\]\ the
grounding jumper would be required to be equal in size or capable of
carrying the full fault current for the time necessary to have this
conductor fail to the point of separation. A temporary grounding
jumper of this size would be too heavy for a worker to lift and too
stiff to form into the proper configuration required by some
situations. OSHA should adhere to the requirements already in place
in the above referenced regulations. [Ex. 0125]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \413\ MCM is million circular mils.

EEI opposed the proposed requirement for similar reasons and argued
that crews ``would have to carry ten different sets of ground chains''
(Ex. 0227).\414\ IBEW also opposed the proposed provision, stating that
the ``requirement for properly sized grounds should not be [dependent]
on [the] size [of the] conductor [to which] the ground is attached''
(Ex. 0230). Noting that the size of grounds should not be a concern
with transmission circuits, the union recommended that, if the grounds
would be too large because of available fault current, employees should
work the circuit as energized (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \414\ OSHA believes that EEI intended to use the term
``grounding equipment'' rather than ``grounding chains.'' Grounding
chains are an outdated form of protective grounding equipment that
are unlikely to meet current design standards for protective
grounding equipment such as those in ASTM F855-09, Standard
Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds to Be Used on De-
energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It appears to the Agency that commenters that opposed proposed
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) did not understand that this provision was
intended as an exception to the requirement in proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(i) that protective grounding equipment ``be capable of
conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of
grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault.'' However, based
on the comments received, OSHA reconsidered the need for the proposed
exception. Based on IBEW's comment, there appears to be no need for it
on transmission circuits, and possibly even for any circuit of more
than 600 volts (Ex. 0230). In addition, the hazards posed by faulted
conductors that cannot carry fault current appear to be greater than
those from working those conductors as energized because, when a
faulted overhead conductor fails, it will drop. The ungrounded side may
be energized (depending on where the failure occurred) and may contact
the worker, who will not be protected against such contact as he or she
would be if the work were performed energized. Therefore, OSHA is not
adopting proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii) in the final rule. However, note
that, even though OSHA is not adopting proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii),
the final standard does not require protective grounding equipment to
be capable of carrying more current than necessary to allow the phase
conductors to fail.
    Paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of the final rule, which OSHA proposed as
paragraph (d)(1)(iii), requires protective grounding equipment to have
an ampacity of at least No. 2 AWG copper. This provision is equivalent
to language in existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4) and ensures that
protective grounding equipment has a suitable minimum ampacity and
mechanical strength. This proposed requirement received broad support.
(See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179.)
Consequently, OSHA is adopting the requirement in the final rule
without substantive change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (d)(2) requires the impedance of the grounding equipment
to be low enough so as not to delay the operation of protective devices
in case of accidental energization. Existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(ii)
requires protective grounding equipment to have ``an

impedance low enough to cause immediate operation of protective devices
in case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.'' As noted
in OSHA Instruction CPL 02-01-038, this requirement ensures that the
protective grounding equipment does not contribute to any delay in the
operation of the devices protecting the circuit. For certain lines and
equipment, the design of the system allows some ground faults to occur
without the operation of the circuit protection devices, regardless of
the impedance of the grounding equipment. According to the OSHA
Instruction, if the impedance of the grounding equipment does not
contribute to delay in the operation of the circuit protection devices
and if the impedance of this equipment is low enough to provide a safe
work zone for employees (as required by existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3)),
the employer is in compliance with existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(ii).
    The Agency proposed to include this interpretation in the
regulatory text of Sec. Sec.  1910.269(n)(4) and 1926.962(d) by
requiring the impedance of the grounding equipment to be low enough so
that it ``do[es] not delay the operation of protective devices,''
rather than low enough ``to cause immediate operation of protective
devices'' in case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.
OSHA did not receive any objection to the change in language and is
adopting it without change in the final rule.
    Paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) help ensure the prompt clearing of the
circuit supplying voltage to the point where the employee is working.
Thus, the grounding equipment limits the duration and reduces the
severity of any electric shock, though it does not prevent shock from
occurring. (As discussed earlier, Sec.  1926.962(c) of the final rule
requires employers to protect employees from hazardous differences in
electric potential.) OSHA included a note to paragraph (d) of the final
rule referencing the ASTM and IEEE standards on protective grounding
equipment (ASTM F855-09 and IEEE Std 1048-2003, respectively) so that
employers can find additional information that may be helpful in their
efforts to comply with the standard. Mr. Tom Chappell with Southern
Company maintained that, because the ASTM standard does not require
asymmetrical test current,\415\ grounding equipment that satisfies that
standard still might not be able to withstand the peak current and
forces of a fully offset asymmetrical current (Ex. 0212.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \415\ In an alternating current system, current varies over time
in a symmetrical pattern--the current forms a sine wave as a
function of time, in which current above the zero axis is equal in
magnitude and duration to current below the zero axis. In a fault
condition, a direct current offset is added to the normal
symmetrical current (still in the form of a sine wave), which
results in current that is not symmetrical about the zero axis. The
instantaneous current is higher due to this asymmetry than it would
be when the current is symmetrical. The higher current also leads to
higher mechanical forces on the protective grounding equipment. The
degree of asymmetry depends on the ratio of the reactance of the
circuit to its resistance, which is called the X/R ratio.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA agrees that ASTM F855-09 does not require testing using
asymmetrical current. However, that consensus standard provides for
reduced maximum current-carrying ratings for temporary protective
grounding equipment used with systems that present asymmetrical fault
current (Ex. 0054).\416\ In addition, there are other factors to
consider in the selection and installation of appropriate protective
grounding equipment, such as maximum forces imposed on protective
grounding cables during a fault, circuit reclosing, inductive and
capacitive coupling with adjacent energized lines, and clamp connection
considerations (Ex. 0046). These factors are not adequately addressed
in ASTM F855 because it is a specification standard for the design of
protective grounding equipment, not a guide for selecting and using
that equipment. However, IEEE Std 1048-2003 includes substantial useful
information on these factors, including information on derating
protective grounding equipment for systems with worst-case asymmetry
(id.). The Agency added a reference to the IEEE standard in the note to
address Mr. Chappell's concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \416\ ASTM F855-09 contains the same reduction in ratings as the
2004 edition that is in the rulemaking record as Ex. 0054.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Chappell also asked whether ``opening and locking a switch''
removes the possibility that the circuit would contribute to the fault
current and, thus, eliminates the need to account for that circuit in
calculating fault current (Ex. 0212). The procedures required by final
Sec.  1926.961 ensure that circuits are deenergized and that they
remain deenergized while employees are working on those circuits.
However, OSHA determined that these procedures do not eliminate the
risk that these circuits can become reenergized; in other words,
grounding is still necessary (Exs. 0002, 0004).\417\ The Agency does
not believe that installing a lock will substantially reduce the risk
of reenergization further. Tags required by final Sec.  1926.961(c)(2)
already would protect those switches, and a failure in the tagging
procedures would be nearly as likely to render a lock ineffective for a
person authorized to close the circuit.\418\ Therefore, lines and
equipment deenergized under the procedures required by final Sec.
1910.269(m) or final Sec.  1926.961 can still become reenergized
through a failure in those procedures, and protective grounding
equipment must be capable of withstanding the maximum current if the
circuits become reenergized. However, the employer generally may assume
that multiple (deenergized) sources of energy will not reenergize a
deenergized line simultaneously. This assumption would limit the
maximum current to the current from the highest capacity source.
Nevertheless, the employer must assume that additional sources can
contribute to the current through the protective grounding equipment
for any sources that automatic switches could reenergize
simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \417\ See, for example, the eight accidents described at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=566034&id=170000459&id=14198543&id=783118&id=170228035&id=14342513&id=14445399&id=768002.
    \418\ For example, the system operator could remove a tag or a
lock from the wrong switch when energizing or deenergizing a
circuit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Existing Sec.  1926.954(h), (i), and (j) contain requirements
relating to the impedance and ampacity of personal protective grounds.
Paragraph (i) requires tower clamps to have adequate ampacity, and
paragraph (j) establishes the same requirement for ground leads, with
an additional restriction that they be no smaller than No. 2 AWG
copper. Paragraph (h) requires the impedance of a grounding electrode
(if used) to be low enough to remove the danger of harm to employees or
to permit prompt operation of protective devices.
    OSHA believes that the entire grounding system should be capable of
carrying the maximum fault current and should have an impedance low
enough to protect employees. The existing standard does not specify the
impedance of grounding conductors or clamps, nor does it specify the
ampacity of grounding clamps other than tower clamps. By addressing
specific portions of the grounding systems but not addressing others,
the existing standard does not provide complete protection for
employees. Because the final rule's grounding requirements apply to the
entire grounding system, OSHA believes that the revised standard will
provide better protection for employees than the existing rule.
    Paragraph (e), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to ensure that employees test
lines and equipment

and verify that nominal voltage is absent before employees install any
ground on those lines or equipment. If a previously installed ground is
present, employees need not conduct a test. This provision prevents the
grounding of energized equipment, which could injure the employee
installing the ground. OSHA adopted this paragraph, which is equivalent
to existing Sec.  1926.954(d), from existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(5).
    Paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of the final rule set procedures for
installing and removing grounds. To protect employees in the event that
the ``deenergized'' equipment employees will ground is, or becomes,
energized, these paragraphs require employees to attach the ``equipment
end'' of grounding devices last and remove them first. These paragraphs
also generally require employees to use a live-line tool for both
procedures.
    These provisions are similar to existing Sec.  1926.954(e)(1) and
(e)(2), except that the existing standard recognizes the use of a
``suitable device'' in addition to a live-line tool. As noted in the
preamble to the proposal, OSHA expressed concern that this language
implied that employees could use rubber insulating gloves to install
and remove grounds under any circumstance (70 FR 34875). The Agency
also noted that it is unsafe for an employee to be too close when
connecting or disconnecting a ground (id.). Under the final rule, OSHA
will consider any device insulated for the voltage, and that allows an
employee to apply or remove the ground from a safe position, to be a
live-line tool for the purposes of paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2).
    OSHA based the corresponding paragraphs in the proposed rule on
existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(6) and (n)(7). Subsequent to the publication
of existing Sec.  1910.269 in 1994, some electric utilities complained
that lines and equipment operating at 600 volts or less cannot always
accommodate the placement and removal of a protective ground by a line-
line tool. OSHA, therefore, proposed alternatives to enable employees
to place protective grounds on this equipment in a manner that would
still provide adequate protection. The proposal would have permitted
the use of insulated equipment other than live-line tools for attaching
protective grounds to, and removing them from, lines and equipment
operating at 600 volts or less: (1) If the employer ensured that the
line or equipment was not energized at the time or (2) if the employer
could demonstrate that the employee would be protected from any hazard
that could develop if the line or equipment was energized. For example,
an employee could connect test equipment to a line to be grounded, and
than an employee wearing rubber insulating gloves could apply the
protective ground while the test equipment indicated that the line was
deenergized. After the ground was in place, an employee could remove
the test equipment.
    Two commenters supported the proposal's approach to grounding lines
and equipment operating at 600 volts or less (Exs. 0201, 0227). One
additional commenter, who apparently supported the proposal,
recommended that OSHA recognize the use of devices other than live-line
tools for removing grounds at voltages less than 600 volts (Ex. 0212).
This commenter cited the difficulty in ``situations such as a pad mount
transformer, [in which] the use of a live line tool is impractical due
[to] space constraints and equipment design'' (id.). There was no
opposition to this part of proposed paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2), so
OSHA is adopting the proposed exception for lines or equipment operated
at 600 volts or less in this final rule.
    Some rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA revise the
language in proposed paragraph (f)(2) to provide additional protection
for employees who are removing grounds from deenergized lines (Exs.
0162, 0230; Tr. 900-901). Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW described the
problem and recommended a solution as follows:

    The removal of protective grounds has caused many fatal
accidents over the years. As far back as the IBEW has maintained
accident records, removal of grounds in the wrong sequence has been
the principal factor in these grounding accidents.
    One might assume that the same hazard exists during installation
of the grounds, but the situation is actually different. The
accident always occurs when an employee is in the process of
removing a ground potential clamp from one of the number of grounds
that are connected in the same location on the pole or structure.
    Mistake is made when a ground end is removed and the other end
is connected to the phase conductor, and usually because of induced
voltage from a parallel or crossing energized circuit, the employee
ends up holding an energized ground clamp in his or her hand while
wearing only leather gloves.
    This can be rectified by prescribing a work rule that, when more
than one ground end connection is assembled in the same general area
on the pole or the structure, all phase conductor ends must be
removed first before any ground ends are removed. This is consistent
with the new code language that Subcommittee 8 of the National
Electric Safety Code has adopted to address this problem. [Tr. 900-
901]

    OSHA agrees that the process of removing grounds can be even more
dangerous than installing them. As noted earlier, if a worker removes
the grounded end of a grounding cable before the line end, the worker,
who typically will not be using a live-line tool or other form of
protective equipment, will be in contact with any residual voltage on
the ``deenergized'' line or equipment, which may be from induced
voltage or voltage backfeed. As Mr. Tomaseski notes, this situation has
resulted in fatal accidents (Ex. 0004 \419\). However, the final rule
prohibits the practice of removing the ground end after the line or
equipment end, including when the grounding cables are crossed or
parallel. Although the rule does not prescribe a particular method of
installing and removing parallel or crossed conductors, OSHA expects an
employer's work rules and training to adequately ensure the correct
order of removal of grounds however employees install them. Depending
on the circumstances, the employer may have to instruct employees to
remove all phase conductor ends first so as to avoid confusion between
multiple grounds. For the reasons explained by IBEW, the Agency does
not consider a work rule that simply repeats the OSHA standard to be
adequate to prevent employees from removing the grounded end of the
wrong cable in circumstances in which it is reasonably likely that
employees will mistake one ground for another during the removal
process. If the employer's work methods could cause confusion for
employees regarding the identity of a cable or cable end, then the
employer must design the work rules and training to prevent employees
from removing the ground ends of cables still attached at their line or
equipment ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \419\ See, for example, the two accidents described at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200780245&id=922914.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, note that, during the periods before employees install
all of the grounds and after employees remove the first end of a
ground, the line or equipment involved must be considered as energized
(under final Sec.  1926.960(b)(2)). As a result, the live work
provisions in final Sec.  1926.960(c) apply during these periods. The
employer's work rules and training must also account for this
requirement. For example, when an employee cuts a deenergized and
grounded conductor, unless both sides of the cut are grounded or
connected by a bonding jumper, the employee must treat as energized the
end that is not connected to ground when he or she is making the cut.
In this case, the employer's work rules must either provide for
grounding

both sides of the cut or ensure that the employee complies with the
minimum approach-distance requirements with respect to the ungrounded
end of the conductor.
    As the preamble to the proposal noted, with certain underground
cable installations, the current from a fault at one location along the
cable can create a substantial potential difference between the earth
at that location and the earth at other locations (70 FR 34875). Under
normal conditions, this is not a hazard. However, if an employee is in
contact with a remote ground (by being in contact with a conductor
grounded at a remote station), he or she can be exposed to the
difference in potential (because he or she also is in contact with the
local ground). To protect employees in such situations, final paragraph
(g) prohibits grounding cables at remote locations if a hazardous
potential transfer could occur under fault conditions. OSHA adopted
this provision from existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(8), which has no
counterpart in existing Subpart V. Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of
the Utility Workers Union of America expressed support for this
provision (Ex. 0197). OSHA is adopting paragraph (g) without
substantive change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (h) addresses the removal of grounds for test purposes.
Employers may permit employees to remove grounds for test purposes
following the procedure specified by paragraph (h). Existing Subpart V
contains a comparable requirement in Sec.  1926.954(g). However, the
existing standard simply requires employees to take extreme caution
when removing grounds for testing. In the preamble to the proposed
rule, OSHA indicated that it did not believe that the existing language
contains sufficient safeguards for employees (70 FR 34875). Therefore,
the Agency is adopting performance criteria for testing procedures.
OSHA took the language in final paragraph (h) from existing Sec.
1910.269(n)(9). During the test procedure, the employer must: (1)
Ensure that each employee uses insulating equipment, (2) isolate each
employee from any hazards involved, and (3) implement any additional
measures necessary to protect each exposed employee in case the
previously grounded lines and equipment become energized. OSHA believes
that the final rule protects employees better than the existing rule.
The Agency received no comments on this provision in the proposal and
is adopting it without substantive change from the proposal.
14. Section 1926.963, Testing and Test Facilities
    Section 1926.963 of the final rule contains safety work practices
covering electrical hazards arising from the special testing of lines
and equipment (namely, in-service and out-of-service, as well as new,
lines and equipment) to determine maintenance needs and fitness for
service. Generally, the NESC specifies the need to conduct tests on new
and idle lines and equipment as part of normal checkout procedures, in
addition to maintenance evaluations. As stated in paragraph (a), final
Sec.  1926.963 applies only to testing involving interim measurements
using high voltage, high power, or combinations of both high voltage
and high power, as opposed to testing involving continuous measurements
as in routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.
    OSHA adopted this section from existing Sec.  1910.269(o). Existing
Subpart V has no counterpart to the requirements in this section. In
the preamble to the proposal, the Agency stated its belief that
employees perform these high-voltage and high-current tests during
construction work and that employees and employers would benefit from
the inclusion of these provisions in the construction standard instead
of a reference to Sec.  1910.269 (70 FR 34876). However, in the
proposal, OSHA requested comments on the need to include proposed Sec.
1926.963 in Subpart V.
    The Agency received little response to this request for comments,
but commenters who did respond supported the inclusion of proposed
Sec.  1926.963 in the final rule. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0175,
0186, 0213.) TVA expressed its support as follows:

    Our experience shows that the tests performed before new
equipment and conductors are energized for electrical service on the
system may be performed by either the construction contractor or the
owner's maintenance and operations employees. It is recommended that
the requirements in 1910.269(o) be repeated in proposed Sec.
1926.963. [Ex. 0213]

    With the endorsement of these commenters, OSHA included Sec.
1926.963 on testing and test facilities in the final rule.
    For the purposes of this section, OSHA assumes that high-voltage
testing involves voltage sources having sufficient energy to cause
injury and having magnitudes generally in excess of 1,000 volts,
nominal. High-power testing involves sources of fault current, load
current, magnetizing current, or line dropping current for testing,
either at the rated voltage of the equipment under test or at lower
voltages. Final Sec.  1926.963 covers such testing in laboratories, in
shops and substations, and in the field. However, the Agency believes
that testing in laboratories and shops will almost always fall under
final Sec.  1910.269(o), rather than final Sec.  1926.963.
    Examples of typical special tests in which employees use either
high-voltage sources or high-power sources as part of operation,
maintenance, and construction of electric power transmission and
distribution systems include cable-fault locating, large capacitive
load tests, high current fault-closure tests, insulation-resistance and
leakage tests, direct-current proof tests, and other tests requiring
direct connection to power lines.
    Excluded from the scope of final Sec.  1926.963 are routine
inspection- and maintenance-type measurements made by qualified
employees for which the hazards associated with the use of intrinsic
high-voltage or high-power sources require only the normal precautions
specified by Subpart V. The work practices for these routine tests
would have to comply with the rest of final Subpart V. Because this
type of testing poses hazards that are identical to other types of
routine electric power transmission and distribution work, OSHA
believes that the requirements of final Subpart V, other than Sec.
1926.963, adequately protect employees performing these tests. Two
typical examples of such excluded test work procedures would be
``phasing-out'' testing and testing for a ``no voltage'' condition. To
clarify the scope of this section, OSHA included a note to this effect
after paragraph (a).
    Paragraph (b)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to establish and enforce work
practices governing employees engaged in certain testing activities.
These work practices delineate precautions that employees must observe
for protection from the hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing.
For example, if an employer uses high-voltage sources in the testing,
the employer must institute safety practices under paragraph (b)(1) to
protect employees against such typical hazards as inadvertent arcing or
voltage overstress destruction, as well as accidental contact with
objects that have induced voltage from electric field exposure. If an
employer uses high-power sources in the testing, the employer must
establish safety practices to protect employees against such typical
hazards as ground voltage rise, as well as exposure to excessive

electromagnetic forces associated with the passage of heavy current.
    These practices apply to work performed at both permanent and
temporary test areas (that is, areas permanently located in
laboratories or shops or in temporary areas located in the field). At a
minimum, the safety work practices include:
    (1) Safeguards for the test area to prevent inadvertent contact
with energized parts,
    (2) Safe grounding practices,
    (3) Precautions for the use of control and measuring circuits, and
    (4) Periodic checks of field test areas.
    Final paragraph (b)(2) complements the general rule on the use of
safe work practices in test areas with a requirement that employers
ensure that each employee involved in these safety test practices
receives training in safe work practices upon his or her initial
assignment to the test area. This paragraph simply makes explicit one
type of training required in any event by the general training
provisions in final Sec.  1926.950(b). Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.
1926.963 also requires the employer to provide retraining as required
by final Sec.  1926.950(b). OSHA is adopting paragraph (b)(2) of final
Sec.  1926.963 without substantive change from the proposal.
    Although specific work practices used in test areas generally are
unique to a particular test, three basic elements affecting safety are
commonly present to some degree at all test sites: Safeguarding,
grounding, and the safe use of control and measuring circuits. By
considering safe work practices in these three categories, OSHA
provided a performance-oriented standard applicable to high-voltage and
high-power testing and test facilities.
    OSHA believes that employers can best achieve safeguarding when
they provide it both around and within test areas. By controlling
access to all parts that are likely to become energized by either
direct or inductive coupling, the standard will prevent accidental
contact by employees. Within test areas, whether temporary or
permanent, employers can achieve a degree of safety by ensuring that
employees observe safeguarding practices that control access to test
areas. Therefore, paragraph (c)(1), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires that employers provide
such safeguarding if the test equipment or apparatus under test could
become energized as part of the testing by either direct or inductive
coupling. A combination of guards \420\ and barriers \421\ or
barricades \422\ can provide protection to all employees in the
vicinity of the testing. In final paragraph (c)(1) and elsewhere in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of final Sec.  1926.963, OSHA changed the words
``guarding'' and ``guarded'' to ``safeguarding'' and ``safeguarded,''
respectively, to clarify when employers may use protective measures
other than guards, such as barricades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \420\ A guard is a physical barrier to an area or hazard. It is
usually an enclosure.
    \421\ According to final Sec.  1926.968, a ``barrier'' is ``[a]
physical obstruction that prevents contact with energized lines or
equipment or prevents unauthorized access to a work area.'' Fences
and walls are examples of barriers.
    \422\ According to final Sec.  1926.968, ``barricade'' is ``[a]
physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame type wood or
metal structures that provides a warning about, and limits access
to, a hazardous area.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to guard permanent test areas,
such as laboratories, by having them completely enclosed by walls or
some other type of physical barrier. In the case of field testing,
paragraph (c)(3) provides a level of safety for temporary test sites
comparable to that achieved in permanent test areas. For these areas,
if employers do not provide permanent fences or gates, employers must
either (1) use distinctively colored safety tape--approximately waist
high--with safety signs attached or (2) station one or more observers
to monitor the test area. Paragraph (c)(3), which is being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, also accepts safeguarding
of test areas by any barriers or barricades that limit access to the
test area in a manner that is physically and visually equivalent to the
safety tape with signs that employers can use under paragraph
(c)(3)(i).
    Since failing to remove a temporary safeguarding means when it is
not required can severely compromise its effectiveness, employers must
make frequent safety checks of the safeguarding means to monitor its
use. For example, leaving barriers in place for a week when the
employer performs testing only an hour or two per day is likely to
result in disregard for the barriers. Accordingly, final paragraph
(c)(4) requires employers to ensure the removal of temporary safeguards
when they are no longer needed for the protection of employees.\423\
OSHA changed the word ``barrier'' in this paragraph to ``safeguards''
because ``safeguards'' more accurately describes the protective
measures required by paragraph (c)(3) than barriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \423\ Employees who serve as test observers under final
paragraph (c)(3)(iii) need not leave the area. However, they no
longer function as test observers when the protection they provide
is no longer needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Suitable grounding is another important work practice that
employers can use to protect employees from the hazards of high-voltage
or high-power testing. If employers use high currents in the testing,
they can use an isolated ground-return conductor, adequate for the
service, so that heavy current, with its attendant voltage rise, will
not pass in the ground grid or the earth. Another safety consideration
involving grounding is that employers should maintain at ground
potential all conductive parts accessible to the test operator while
the equipment is operating at high voltage. Final paragraph (d)
contains requirements for proper grounding at test sites.
    Final paragraph (d)(1) requires that employers establish and
implement safe grounding practices for test facilities that will ensure
proper grounding of conductive parts accessible to the test operator
and that will ensure that all ungrounded terminals of test equipment or
apparatus under test are treated as energized until determined to be
deenergized by tests. The final rule drops the exception for ``portions
of the equipment that are isolated from the test operator by guarding''
specified in proposed paragraph (d)(1) because guarded parts of
equipment are not accessible to the operator.
    Paragraph (d)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to ensure either that visible
grounds are applied automatically, or that employees using properly
insulated tools manually apply visible grounds, to the high-voltage
circuits. The grounds must be applied after the circuits are
deenergized but before employees perform work on the circuit or on the
item or apparatus under test. This paragraph also requires common
ground connections to be solidly connected to the test equipment and
apparatus under test.
    Paragraph (d)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, addresses hazards resulting from the use of
inadequate ground returns. Inadequate ground returns can result in a
voltage rise in the ground grid or in the earth whenever high currents
occur during the testing.\424\ This paragraph requires the use of an
isolated ground return so that no intentional passage of current, with

its attendant voltage rise, can occur in the ground grid or in the
earth. However, under some conditions, it may be impractical to provide
an isolated ground return. In such cases, it would not be reasonable to
require an isolated ground-return conductor system. Therefore, final
paragraph (d)(3) provides an exception to the requirement for an
isolated ground return if the employer cannot use isolated ground
returns because of the distance between the test site and the electric
energy source and if the employer protects employees from hazardous
step and touch potentials that may develop.\425\ Employers must always
consider the possibility of voltage gradients developing in the earth
during impulse, short-circuit, inrush, or oscillatory conditions.
Examples of acceptable protection from step and touch potentials
include suitable electrical protective equipment and the removal of
employees from areas that may expose them to hazardous potentials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \424\ High current can occur during high-voltage testing, in
which case the testing would also be high-power testing.
    \425\ The term ``step and touch potentials'' refers to voltages
that can appear between the feet of an observer or between his or
her body and a grounded object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A note following final paragraph (d)(3)(ii) indicates that Appendix
C contains information on measures employers can take to protect
employees from hazardous step and touch potentials. Mr. Brad Davis with
BGE noted that IEEE Std 80, Guide for Safety in AC Substation
Grounding, is a good reference for guidance on protecting against
hazardous step and touch potentials (Ex. 0126). OSHA reviewed IEEE Std
80-2000 and agrees that it does provide useful guidance on measures to
protect employees from hazardous differences in electric potential,
even though it applies to substation grounding rather than to high-
voltage and high-power testing. Therefore, OSHA included references to
this standard in both Appendix C, Protection from Step and Touch
Potentials, and Appendix G, Reference Documents.
    Final paragraph (d)(4) addresses situations in which grounding
through the power cord of test equipment would prevent employers from
taking satisfactory measurements or would result in greater hazards for
test operators. Normally, an equipment grounding conductor in the power
cord of test equipment connects it to a grounding connection in the
power receptacle. However, in some circumstances, this practice can
prevent satisfactory measurements, or current induced in the grounding
conductor can cause a hazard to employees. If these conditions exist,
the use of the equipment grounding conductor within the cord would not
be mandatory. In such situations, final paragraph (d)(4) requires the
employer to use a ground clearly indicated in the test set up (for
example, a ground with a distinctive appearance), and the employer must
demonstrate that the ground used affords safety equivalent to the
protection afforded by an equipment grounding conductor in the power
supply cord. OSHA reworded this paragraph in the final rule for
clarity.
    Final paragraph (d)(5) addresses grounding after tests and requires
the employer to ensure that a ground is placed on the high-voltage
terminal and any other exposed terminals when any employee enters the
test area after equipment is deenergized. In the case of high
capacitance equipment or apparatus, before any employee applies the
direct ground, the employer must discharge the equipment or apparatus
through a resistor having an adequate rating for the available energy.
A direct ground must be applied to exposed terminals after the stored
energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so. OSHA adopted this
paragraph substantially as proposed. The Agency reworded paragraph
(d)(5)(i) to explicitly require the employer to discharge equipment or
apparatus before a direct ground is applied. The proposed rule implied
this requirement by ordering paragraph (d)(5)(i), which required
employers to discharge the equipment or apparatus, before paragraph
(d)(5)(ii), which required the application of a direct ground.
    Paragraph (d)(6), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, addresses the hazards associated with field testing
in which employers use test trailers or test vehicles. This paragraph
requires that the chassis of such vehicles be grounded and further
requires employers to protect employees, by bonding, insulation, or
isolation, against hazardous touch potentials with respect to the
vehicle, instrument panels, and other conductive parts accessible to
the employees. The following examples describe the protection provided
by each of these methods:
    (1) Protection by bonding: Provide, around the vehicle, an area
covered by a metallic mat or mesh of substantial cross-section and low
impedance, with the mat or mesh bonded to the vehicle at several points
and to an adequate number of driven ground rods or, where available, to
an adequate number of accessible points on the station ground grid. All
bonding conductors must be of sufficient electrical size to keep the
voltage developed during maximum anticipated current tests at a safe
value. The mat must be of a size that precludes simultaneous contact
with the vehicle and with the earth or with metallic structures not
adequately bonded to the mat.
    (2) Protection by insulation: Provide, around the vehicle, an area
of dry wooden planks covered with rubber insulating blankets. The
physical extent of the insulated area must be sufficient to prevent
simultaneous contact between the vehicle, or the ground lead of the
vehicle, and the earth or metallic structures in the vicinity.
    (3) Protection by isolation: Provide an effective means to exclude
employees from any area where they could make simultaneous contact
between the vehicle (or conductive parts electrically connected to the
vehicle) and other conductive materials. Employers may use a
combination of barriers, together with effective, interlocked gates, to
ensure that the system is deenergized when an employee enters the test
area.
    Finally, a third category of safe work practices applicable to
employers performing testing work, which complements the first two
safety work practices of safeguarding and grounding, involves work
practices associated with the installation of control and measurement
circuits used at test facilities. Employers must adopt the practices
necessary for the protection of personnel and equipment from the
hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing for every test using
special signal-gathering equipment (that is, meters, oscilloscopes, and
other special instruments). In addition, special settings on protective
relays and reexamination of backup schemes may be necessary to ensure
an adequate level of safety during the tests or to minimize the effects
of the testing on other parts of the system under test. Accordingly,
final paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(4) address the principal safe work
practices associated with control and measuring circuits used in the
test area.
    Generally, control wiring, meter connections, test leads, and
cables should remain within the test area. Paragraph (e)(1), which is
being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, contains
requirements to minimize hazards involving test wiring routed outside
the test area. The employer may not run control wiring, meter
connections, test leads, or cables from a test area unless contained in
a grounded metallic sheath and terminated in a grounded metallic
enclosure or unless the employer takes other precautions that it can
demonstrate will provide employees

with equivalent safety, such as guarding the area so that employees do
not have access to parts that could be hazardous.
    Paragraph (e)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, prevents possible hazards that arise from
inadvertent contact with energized accessible terminals or parts of
meters and other test instruments. Employers must isolate meters and
instruments with such terminals or parts from employees performing
tests. If an employer provides isolation by locating test equipment in
metal compartments with viewing windows, the employer must also provide
interlocks that interrupt the power supply when someone opens the
compartment cover.
    Paragraph (e)(3) of the final rule addresses protecting temporary
wiring and its connections from damage. This paragraph requires the
employer to protect temporary wiring and its connections against
damage, accidental interruptions, and other hazards. This paragraph
also requires employers to keep the functional wiring used for the test
set-up (that is, signal, control, ground, and power cables) separate
from each other to the maximum extent possible, thereby minimizing the
coupling of hazardous voltages into the control and measuring circuits.
Paragraph (e)(3) in the proposal would have required employers to
secure ``[t]he routing and connections of temporary wiring'' against
hazards. Paragraph (e)(3) of the final rule clarifies that the employer
has to protect the temporary wiring and its connections against
hazards.
    Paragraph (e)(4) of the final rule identifies a final safety work
practice requirement related to control circuits. This paragraph, which
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires
the presence of a test observer in the test area during the entire test
period if employees will be in the area. The test observer must be
capable of immediately deenergizing all test circuits for safety
purposes.
    Since the conditions for conducting field tests differ in important
respects from those for laboratory tests, employers must take extra
care to ensure appropriate levels of safety. Under field test
conditions, employers usually do not provide permanent fences and gates
for isolating the field test area, nor is there a permanent conduit for
the instrumentation and control wiring. Additional hazards include
sources of high-voltage electric energy in the vicinity, other than the
source of test voltage.
    It is not always possible in the field for the employer to erect
fences and interlocked gates to prevent employee ingress into a test
area, as is possible during laboratory testing. Consequently, as
described earlier under the summary and explanation for final paragraph
(c)(3), employers must use readily recognizable means to discourage
such ingress during field testing. Accordingly, final paragraph (f)(1)
requires employers to adopt safety practices that provide for a safety
check of temporary and field test areas before employees begin each
group of continuous tests (that is, a series of tests conducted one
immediately after another). Final paragraph (f)(2) provides that the
test operator responsible for the testing verify, before the initiation
of a continuous period of testing, the status of several safety
conditions. These conditions include the state and placement of
barriers and safeguards, the condition of status signals, the marking
and availability of disconnects, the provision of clearly identifiable
ground connections, the provision and use of necessary personal
protective equipment, and the separation of signal, ground, and power
cables. OSHA adopted paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) without substantive
change from the proposal.
Section 1926.964, Overhead Lines and Live-Line Barehand Work
    As noted in paragraph (a)(1), Sec.  1926.964 of the final rule
applies to work performed on or near overhead lines and equipment. The
types of work performed on overhead lines and addressed by this section
include the installation and removal of overhead lines, live-line
barehand work, and work on towers and structures, which typically
expose employees to the hazards of falls and electric shock.
    Section 1926.955 of existing Subpart V covers overhead lines. As
OSHA noted in the preamble to the proposal, several requirements in the
existing standard are redundant, and the Agency believes the existing
section needs better organization (70 FR 34878). For example, existing
paragraphs (c) and (d) both apply to the installation of lines parallel
to existing lines. Existing paragraph (c)(3) requires the employer to
ground lines being installed where there is a danger of hazardous
induced voltage, unless the employer makes provisions to isolate or
insulate employees. Paragraph (d)(1) of existing Sec.  1926.955
contains a similar requirement, and the rest of paragraph (d) specifies
exactly how employers are to install the grounding.
    Paragraph (q) of existing Sec.  1910.269 also addresses work on
overhead lines. When OSHA proposed to revise Subpart V, the Agency
stated that it believed that ``the newer standard is much better
organized, contains no redundancies, and better protects employees than
the older construction standard'' (70 FR 34878). Therefore, the Agency
used existing Sec.  1910.269(q), rather than existing Sec.  1926.955,
as the base document in developing proposed Sec.  1926.964. However,
OSHA also proposed requirements for Sec.  1926.964 that the Agency took
from existing Sec.  1926.955 pertaining specifically to construction
work. (Paragraph (q) of existing Sec.  1910.269 does not contain these
requirements, because it does not apply to construction.) For example,
OSHA included the requirements of existing Sec.  1926.955(b), which
applies to metal-tower construction, in the proposed revision of
Subpart V.
    Paragraph (a)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to determine that elevated
structures such as poles and towers are strong enough to withstand the
stresses imposed by the work employees will perform on them. For
example, if the work involves removing and reinstalling an existing
line on a utility pole, the pole must withstand the weight of the
employee (a vertical force) and the forces resulting from the release
and replacement of the overhead line (a vertical and possibly a
horizontal force). The additional stress involved may cause the pole to
break, particularly if the pole is rotted at its base. If the pole or
structure cannot withstand the imposed loads, the employer must
reinforce the pole or structure so that failure does not occur. This
rule protects employees from hazards posed by the failure of a pole or
other elevated structure. OSHA took this requirement, which is
equivalent to existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4), from
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(1)(i).
    In ascertaining whether a wood pole is safe to climb, as required
under paragraph (a)(2), it is important to check the actual condition
of the pole for the presence of decay or other conditions adversely
affecting the strength of the pole.\426\ Appendix D to Subpart V
contains methods of inspecting and testing the condition of wood
structures before employees climb those structures. OSHA took these
methods,

which employers can use in ascertaining whether a wood structure is
capable of sustaining the forces imposed by an employee climbing it,
from Appendix D to existing Sec.  1910.269. Note that the employer also
must ascertain whether the pole is capable of sustaining any additional
forces imposed on it during the work, such as the weight of employees
working on it, the weight of any new or replaced equipment installed on
it, and forces resulting from putting tension on conductors and guys. A
note to this effect follows paragraph (a)(2). The note also references
Appendix D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \426\ In some cases, the host employer will know about the
condition of a pole, such as when the host employer has results from
a pole-inspection program. Host employers must pass any such
information to employees (as required by final Sec.  1926.952(a)(1))
and contractors (as required by final Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(ii)).
However, in most cases, the employee at the worksite will still need
to inspect the structure for deterioration to determine whether it
is safe to climb.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The employer can comply with final paragraph (a)(2) by ensuring
that the design of support structures can withstand the stresses
involved, training employees in proper inspection and evaluation
techniques, and enforcing company rules that adhere to the standard.
OSHA notes that employees in the field do not necessarily have
structural engineering skills, so in many situations--such as those
involving the installation of new, heavier, equipment in place of
older, lighter, equipment--the employer might need to have its
engineering staff conduct engineering analyses to ensure that the pole
can withstand the stresses involved. (Typically, utilities perform this
task in the initial design of the system or when they plan changes to
it.) In such situations, the Agency still expects the employer to have
the determination of the condition of the pole or structure made at the
worksite by an employee who is capable of making this determination.
    When employees handle a pole near overhead lines, it is necessary
to prevent the pole from contacting exposed, energized lines. Paragraph
(a)(3)(i) of final Sec.  1926.964 prohibits letting the pole come into
direct contact with exposed, energized overhead conductors. One measure
commonly used to prevent such contact involves pulling conductors away
from the area where the pole will go. OSHA took final paragraph
(a)(3)(i), which is equivalent to existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(5)(i),
from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(1)(ii).
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that OSHA revise this section
to specify the measures that employers must take if employees bring
poles within the minimum approach distance, explaining:

    Poles whether wood, steel or concrete are conductive, often very
conductive, and should never enter MAD without insulated cover-up.
However, the task of taking poles into MAD is conducted thousands of
times each day across the US. OSHA needs to insure that safe work
practices are used when working with poles. [Ex. 0155]

    Paragraph (a)(3)(i) of the final rule protects employees against
injury from contact with conductors knocked down by poles being set,
moved, or removed. OSHA did not design this paragraph primarily to
protect against electric shock caused by approaching too closely to
energized parts. OSHA agrees with Mr. Erga that poles are conductive
and that employees must not take them within the minimum approach
distance of energized parts. However, final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(iii)
already prohibits employees from taking any conductive object closer to
exposed energized parts than the employer's established minimum
approach distance, unless employers take certain protective measures.
The Agency believes that it is unnecessary to repeat those requirements
or alter them here. However, it is possible that the preamble to the
proposal prompted Mr. Erga's comment; the preamble indicated that
``[m]easures commonly used to prevent . . . contact [between poles and
lines] include installation of insulating guards on the pole'' (70 FR
34879). In light of Mr. Erga's apparent confusion, OSHA did not include
this example in the final explanation for paragraph (a)(3)(i). In any
event, Mr. Erga's recommendation does not protect employees from injury
by conductors knocked down by poles. Therefore, OSHA is adopting
paragraph (a)(3)(i) substantively as proposed.
    Paragraph (a)(3)(ii) requires the employer to ensure that employees
who handle a pole while setting, moving, or removing it near an exposed
energized overhead conductor use electrical protective equipment or
insulated devices and do not contact the pole with uninsulated parts of
their bodies. OSHA took this provision from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(1)(iii). NIOSH supported proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii),
noting that ``[e]lectrocutions have occurred when ground workers not
wearing PPE were guiding poles into holes and a powerline was
contacted'' (Ex. 0130). OSHA is adopting paragraph (a)(3)(ii) without
change from the proposal.
    Existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(6)(i), which OSHA did not adopt in final
Sec.  1926.964, requires employers to ensure that employees standing on
the ground do not contact equipment or machinery that is working
adjacent to energized lines or equipment, unless the employees are
using suitable electrical protective equipment. The final rule covers
the hazards of using mechanical equipment near energized parts in Sec.
1926.959, discussed earlier in this section of the preamble, and the
Agency does not believe that there is a need for redundancy in Sec.
1926.964. In fact, OSHA designed the final rule to eliminate the
redundant and conflicting requirements contained in existing Subpart V.
OSHA notes that it also left existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(5)(ii),
(a)(6)(ii), and (a)(8) out of final Sec.  1926.964 because final Sec.
1926.959 already adequately covers the hazards addressed by these
provisions (that is, hazards related to operation of mechanical
equipment near energized parts).
    Paragraphs (a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii) protect employees from hazards
caused by falling power lines and by the pole's contacting the line.
They apply in addition to other applicable provisions, including
requirements in final Sec.  1926.959(d) for operations involving
mechanical equipment and in final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(iii) for minimum
approach distances.
    To protect employees from falling into holes dug for poles,
paragraph (a)(3)(iii), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires employers to physically guard the
holes, or ensure that employees attend the holes, whenever anyone is
working nearby.\427\ OSHA took this provision, which is equivalent to
existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(7), from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(1)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \427\ For the purpose of Sec.  1926.964(a)(3)(iii), ``nearby''
means that an employee on the ground is near enough to the hole that
he or she could fall into it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b) addresses the installation and removal of overhead
lines. OSHA took the provisions contained in this paragraph from
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(2), which OSHA based in large part on
existing Sec.  1926.955(c) (stringing and removing deenergized
conductors) and Sec.  1926.955(d) (stringing adjacent to energized
lines). However, the final rule, as with existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(2),
combines these provisions into a single paragraph (b). OSHA believes
that these provisions, which combine and simplify the construction
requirements for stringing overhead lines, will be easier for employers
and employees to understand. OSHA added ``(overhead lines)'' after
``overhead conductors or cable'' in the introductory text to paragraph
(b) in the final rule to clarify that paragraph (b) uses these terms
synonymously.
    Paragraph (b)(1) requires employers to take precautions to minimize
the possibility that conductors and cables, during installation and
removal, will contact energized power lines or equipment. This
paragraph requires

employers to do so by stringing conductors using the tension-stringing
method (which keeps the conductors off the ground and clear of
energized circuits) or by using barriers, such as rope nets and guards
(which physically prevent one line from contacting another). Employers
also may use equivalent measures. This paragraph protects employees
against electric shock and against the effects of equipment damage
resulting from accidental contact between the line and energized parts
during line installation and removal.
    Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland and Delaware
Association of Electric Cooperatives asked the Agency to ``clarify that
this requirement is necessary to avoid hazards only when crossing or
paralleling existing energized cables and conductors'' (Ex. 0175).
    OSHA generally agrees with this comment, but notes that the
required precautions are necessary whenever the lines can contact any
energized parts, not just existing energized cables and conductors.
Therefore, to clarify the rule, the Agency added the clause ``[w]hen
lines that employees are installing or removing can contact energized
parts'' at the beginning of final paragraph (b)(1).
    Even though the precautions taken under paragraph (b)(1) minimize
the possibility of accidental contact, there is still a significant
residual risk that the line could contact energized parts during
installation or removal of the line. In the 1994 rulemaking on Sec.
1910.269, OSHA concluded that the hazards posed during line
installation or removal were equivalent to the hazards posed during the
operations of mechanical equipment near energized parts (59 FR 4406).
Employee exposure to hazardous differences in potential occurs if,
during installation or removal of the line, the conductor or the
equipment installing or removing the conductor contacts an energized
part. The methods of protection employers can apply also are the same
in both cases. Therefore, the Agency concluded that the approach
applied to the hazard associated with contact between mechanical
equipment and overhead lines also should apply to the hazard associated
with contact between an existing energized conductor and a line during
installation and removal of the line. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2) of
proposed Sec.  1926.964 adopted the requirements of proposed Sec.
1926.959(d)(3) by reference for conductors, cables, and pulling and
tensioning equipment in situations in which employees install or remove
conductors or cables close enough to energized conductors that certain
failures (in the pulling or tensioning equipment, the conductor or
cable being pulled, or the previously installed lines or equipment)
could energize the pulling or tensioning equipment, conductor, or
cable. Therefore, the proposal essentially provided that the employer
would have to institute measures to protect employees from hazardous
differences in potential at the work location. (See the discussion of
final Sec.  1926.959(d)(3) and Appendix C to Subpart V for acceptable
methods of compliance.)
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that the heading to paragraph
(b)(2) be shortened from ``Conductors, cables, and puling and
tensioning equipment'' to ``Pulling and Tensioning Equipment'' (Ex.
0155). Mr. Erga also proposed extensive new language for this
provision, explaining:

    [ESCI's] proposed changes to 1926.694(b)(2) [use] current
industry safe work practices accepted in the electrical industry and
supported by IEEE 516 Section 7.5 and IEEE 1048 Section 10. These
changes are the current thinking of the industry and should be
followed to protect workers near mechanical equipment. [Id.]

    As discussed earlier in this section of the preamble, Mr. Erga made
a similar proposal with respect to proposed Sec.  1926.959(d)(3) (id.).
OSHA rejected that proposal. (See the summary and explanation for final
Sec.  1926.959(d)(3), earlier in this section of the preamble.) The
Agency is declining to adopt Mr. Erga's proposal here for the same
reasons. In addition, OSHA believes that it is important for the final
rule to allow employers to set the same procedures for protecting
pulling and tensioning equipment as they set for other types of
mechanical equipment; the hazards, and the methods of protecting
employees, are the same. The Agency declines to change the heading for
this paragraph, as suggested by Mr. Erga, because this paragraph
applies not only to pulling and tensioning equipment, but to conductors
and cables as well. Therefore, OSHA adopted paragraph (b)(2)
substantially as proposed. In the final rule, OSHA replaced the word
``wire'' with ``conductor'' for consistency, as proposed Sec.
1926.964(b)(2) used these words interchangeably.
    Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of the Utility Workers Union of
America requested clarification of proposed paragraph (b)(2) as it
applies to pulling underground cables up a pole (Ex. 0197). First, he
asked if this provision addressed the stress that the pulling operation
puts on the pole (id.). OSHA notes that it addressed these hazards in
final paragraph (a)(2), which requires the employer to determine that
elevated structures such as poles and towers are strong enough to
withstand the stresses imposed by the work employees will perform. In
making that determination, the employer must consider the stresses
imposed by pulling underground cables up a pole.
    Second, Mr. Junga asked whether paragraph (b)(2) applies to pulling
operations when employees pull an underground cable up a pole between
energized conductors. OSHA considers an underground cable-pulling
operation to fall under the overhead line provisions whenever employees
pull the ``underground'' cable up a pole or other overhead structure
because the cable is an overhead line where the cable rises overhead.
Thus, the precautions in final paragraph (b)(2) apply when employees
pull an underground cable up a pole close enough to energized
conductors that the specified failures could energize the pulling or
tensioning equipment or the cable.
    Paragraph (b)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the disabling of the automatic-reclosing
feature of the devices protecting any circuit for conductors energized
at more than 600 volts and that pass under conductors employees are
installing or removing. If the employer did not make the automatic-
reclosing feature inoperable, it would cause the circuit protective
devices to reenergize the circuit after they had tripped, exposing the
employees to additional or more severe injury.
    Final paragraph (b)(1) requires the use of techniques that minimize
the possibility of contact between existing and new conductors. Final
paragraph (b)(2) requires the use of measures that protect employees
from hazardous differences in potential. These two paragraphs provide
the primary protection to employees installing conductors. Final
paragraph (b)(3) is a redundant form of protection; it provides an
additional measure of safety in case the employer violates the first
two provisions.\428\ Therefore, this paragraph applies only to circuit
reclosing devices designed to permit the disabling of the automatic-
reclosing feature. The Agency believes that the

combination of final paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) will provide
effective protection to employees against the electrical hazards
associated with installing or removing lines near energized parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \428\ Disabling the reclosing feature of circuit protective
devices does not provide any protection against initial contact with
the energized circuit involved. It only prevents the devices from
reenergizing the circuit after they open it on a fault condition as
would occur, for example, when a line an employee is stringing drops
onto an energized conductor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA proposed paragraph (b)(4) to protect workers from the hazard
of induced voltage on lines they are installing near (and usually
parallel to) other energized lines. Proposed paragraph (b)(4) contained
supplemental provisions on grounding that would have applied, in
addition to grounding requirements elsewhere in Subpart V. The proposed
paragraph generally would have required employers to ground these lines
to minimize the voltage and protect employees handling the lines from
electric shock when there was a hazard from induced voltage.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(4) provided that, before employees install
lines parallel to existing energized lines, the employer would have to
determine the approximate voltage to be induced in the new lines or
assume that the induced voltage would be hazardous. Additionally, the
proposal would have permitted employers to treat the line as energized
rather than comply with the grounding requirements contained in
proposed paragraph (b)(4). As proposed, paragraph (b)(4) contained five
requirements that would have applied unless: (a) The employer could
demonstrate that the lines being installed were not subject to the
induction of hazardous voltage or (b) the lines were treated as
energized. These provisions would have required employers to:
    (1) Install grounds on each bare conductor in increments of no more
than 2 miles (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(i));
    (2) Ensure that grounds remain in place until completion of the
installation between dead ends (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(ii));
    (3) Remove grounds as the last phase of aerial cleanup (proposed
paragraph (b)(4)(iii));
    (4) Install grounds at each work location and at all open dead-end
or catch-off points or the next adjacent structure when employees are
working on bare conductors (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(iv)); and
    (5) Bond and ground bare conductors before splicing them (proposed
paragraph (b)(4)(v)).
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI objected to the requirements in proposed
paragraph (b)(4), maintaining that the proposed provisions had serious
flaws that posed hazards to employees (Exs. 0155, 0471; Tr. 1254-1256).
He proposed alternative provisions to protect workers installing lines
from hazards associated with the lines becoming energized either
through contact with energized parts or by electromagnetic or
electrostatic induction (id.). He explained:

    [S]everal paragraphs in the current section of OSHA 1910.269(q)
and the proposed section of OSHA 1926.964 are simply wrong and ``old
school.'' Much of the current and proposed regulations rely on
theories and beliefs that have been found to be totally incorrect
and in some cases deadly wrong.
    OSHA 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) and 1926.964(b)(4)(i) requires:
    (i) Each bare conductor shall be grounded in increments so that
no point along the conductor is more than 3.22 km (2 miles) from a
ground.
    (ii) If employees are working on bare conductors, grounds shall
also be installed at each work location where these employees are
working and grounds shall be installed at all open dead-ends or
catch-off points or the next adjacent structure.
    OSHA 1926.964(b)(4)(i) through (b)(4)(iv) provides no protection
and cannot be justified with today's knowledge of equipotential
grounding procedures. These procedures are not supported in any
industry published documents and contradicts IEEE 1048.
    . . . ESCI has yet to find an industry expert who can explain
the reason for OSHA 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) and 1926.964(b)(4)(i). In
fact these procedures create lethal hazards on de-energized lines
and equipment for workers. Again, these rules are from the days when
we believed in safety of ``felt hats'' and the ``horse and buggy.''
    Documented fatal accidents prove multiple sets of grounds on the
same de-energized line can create electrostatic induction at lethal
levels. On December 18, 2000, Connecticut Light and Power sustained
a fatal accident when a qualified worker was electrocuted on a
grounded static wire, of a de-energized and grounded line that was
grounded in multiple locations along the lines route . . . .
    IEEE 1048-2003, Section 4.4.2 ``Magnetic coupling under normal
conditions'' discusses the hazard developed by closing the station
ground switches and installing grounds at the worksite (use of
multiple grounds at multiple locations along the line). This hazard
can be easily eliminated by grounding at one location; the worksite
with [an equipotential zone].
    Other industry studies have shown that more than one personal
protective ground, installed at the work location, does nothing but
create additional hazards. [Ex. 0471]

    Mr. Erga's comment convinced the Agency that multiple unnecessary
grounds can lead to injury and that proposed paragraph (b)(4), which
provided for multiple redundant grounds, is therefore insufficiently
protective. Furthermore, OSHA notes that other provisions in the
standard that require protective grounding impose performance
requirements that protect employees from hazardous differences in
potential. For example, final Sec.  1926.962(c) requires temporary
protective grounds to be placed on deenergized conductors to prevent
employee exposure to hazardous differences in electric potential.
Paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of final Sec.  1926.959 requires employers to
protect each employee from hazards that might arise from mechanical
equipment's contacting energized lines, including protection from
hazardous differences in electric potential. OSHA decided to adopt a
similar provision here. First, the Agency divided paragraph (b)(4) of
proposed Sec.  1926.964 into two paragraphs. Final paragraph (b)(4)(i),
which is described further later in this section of the preamble,
contains the first sentence from the introductory text to proposed
paragraph (b)(4) without substantive change. Paragraph (b)(4)(ii),
which replaces the last sentence of the introductory text to proposed
paragraph (b)(4) and proposed paragraphs (b)(4)(i) through (b)(4)(v),
sets the employer's obligation to protect employees from hazardous
differences in potential unless the lines employees are installing are
not subject to the induction of a hazardous voltage or unless the lines
are treated as energized. Paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of the final rule reads
as follows:

    Unless the employer can demonstrate that the lines that
employees are installing are not subject to the induction of a
hazardous voltage or unless the lines are treated as energized,
temporary protective grounds shall be placed at such locations and
arranged in such a manner that the employer can demonstrate will
prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous differences in
electric potential.

OSHA also added a note following this paragraph, similar to the notes
to final Sec. Sec.  1926.959(d)(3)(iii) and 1926.962(c), indicating
that Appendix C contains guidelines for protecting employees from
hazardous differences in electric potential.
    OSHA decided against adopting Mr. Erga's suggested regulatory
language. The Agency believes that his proposed language is too
detailed and that the requirement adopted in the final rule
appropriately states the objective in performance terms. OSHA, however,
considered Mr. Erga's suggested requirements and adopted several of
them as guidelines in Appendix C to final Subpart V for installing
protective grounding equipment to protect employees from hazardous
differences in potential.
    As noted earlier, paragraphs (b)(4)(i) and (b)(4)(ii) of the final
rule require the employer to determine whether existing energized lines
will induce hazardous voltage when lines are installed parallel

to the existing lines. OSHA notes that the final rule does not provide
specific guidance for determining whether a hazard exists due to
induced voltage. The hazard depends not only on the voltage of the
existing line, but also on the length of the line employees are
installing and the distance between the existing line and the new one.
Electric shock, whether caused by induced or other voltage, poses two
different hazards. First, the electric shock could cause an involuntary
reaction, which could cause a fall or other injury. Second, the
electric shock itself could cause respiratory or cardiac arrest. If the
employer takes no precautions to protect employees from hazards
associated with involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard
exists if the induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1
milliampere through a 500-ohm resistor. (The 500-ohm resistor
represents the resistance of an employee. The 1 milliampere current is
the threshold of perception.) If the employer protects employees from
injury due to involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard
exists if the resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes (the
let-go threshold for women \429\). OSHA included a note to this effect
following final paragraph (b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \429\ Electric current passing through the body has varying
effects depending on the amount of the current. At the let-go
threshold, the current overrides a person's control over his or her
muscles. At that level, an employee grasping an object will not be
able to let go of the object. The let-go threshold varies from
person to person; however, there are accepted values for women, men,
and children. At 6 milliamperes, 5 percent of women will not be able
to let go. Thus, this is the accepted let-go threshold for women.
(See 41 FR 55698.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(5) of the final rule requires reel-handling
equipment, including pulling and tensioning equipment, to be in safe
operating condition, as well as leveled and aligned. Proper alignment
of the stringing machines will help prevent failure of the equipment,
conductors, and supporting structures, which could result in injury to
workers. OSHA is adopting this provision without change from the
proposal.
    The purpose of final paragraphs (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8) is to
prevent failure of the line-pulling equipment and accessories. These
provisions, respectively, require the employer to ensure that employees
do not exceed load ratings (limits) of the equipment, require the
repair or replacement of defective pulling lines and accessories, and
prohibit the use of conductor grips on wire rope unless the
manufacturer designed such grips specifically for use in pulling wire
rope. OSHA considers equipment damaged beyond manufacturing
specifications or damaged to an extent that would reduce its load
ratings to be ``defective'' for the purposes of final paragraph (b)(7).
Manufacturers normally provide load limits and design specifications,
but employers also can find load limits and specifications in
engineering and materials handbooks (see, for example, The Lineman's
and Cableman's Handbook, 269-Ex. 8-5). OSHA adopted paragraphs (b)(6),
(b)(7), and (b)(8) without substantive revision from the proposal.
    When employers use the tension stringing method, the pulling rig
(which takes up the pulling rope and thereby pulls the conductors into
place) is separated from the reel stands and tensioner (which pay out
the conductors and apply tension to them) by one or more spans (the
distance between the structures supporting the conductors). In an
emergency, the pulling equipment operator may have to shut down the
operation. Paragraph (b)(9), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that
employees maintain reliable communication between the reel tender and
the pulling-rig operator through two-way radios or other equivalent
means. OSHA designed this provision to ensure that, in case of
emergency at the conductor supply end, the pulling rig operator can
shut the equipment down before injury-causing damage occurs.
    Paragraph (b)(10), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, prohibits the operation of the pulling rig
under unsafe conditions. OSHA included an explanatory note following
final paragraph (b)(10) providing examples of unsafe conditions.
    Paragraph (b)(11), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, generally prohibits employees from working
directly beneath overhead operations or on the crossarm while a power-
driven device is pulling the conductor or pulling line and the
conductor or pulling line is in motion. Employees may perform work in
such positions only as necessary to guide the stringing sock or board
over or through the stringing sheave. This provision minimizes employee
exposure to injury resulting from the failure of equipment, conductors,
or supporting structures during pulling operations.
    Under certain conditions, employees must perform work on
transmission and distribution lines while they remain energized.
Sometimes, employees use rubber insulating equipment or live-line tools
to accomplish this work. However, this equipment has voltage and other
limitations which make it impossible to insulate the employee
performing work on energized lines under all conditions. In such cases,
usually on medium- and high-voltage transmission lines, employees use
the live-line barehand technique to perform the work. When they perform
work ``bare handed,'' the employees work from an insulated aerial
platform and are electrically bonded to the energized line. In this
configuration, there is essentially no potential difference across the
worker's body, thereby protecting the employee from electric shock.
Final paragraph (c) addresses the live-line barehand technique.
    OSHA took paragraph (c) from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3).
Existing Sec.  1926.955(e) contains similar requirements for live-line
bare hand work. The following summary and explanation of final Sec.
1926.964(c) outlines the substantive differences between this final
rule and the existing rules.
    Because employees perform live-line barehand work on overhead
lines, OSHA proposed to place requirements for this type of work in the
section relating to work on overhead lines. This placement is
consistent with the placement of live-line barehand requirements in
existing Subpart V. However, it is technically possible to perform
live-line barehand work on other types of installations as well (in
substations, for example). In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA
requested comments on whether it should consolidate the live-line
barehand requirements with the other requirements relating to work on
energized lines contained in Sec.  1926.960.
    OSHA received few comments on this issue. Most of the commenters
recommended leaving the live-line barehand requirements in the section
on overhead line work. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0186, 0227.) TVA
recommended moving the live-line bare hand requirements to Sec.
1926.960 to place all requirements related to work on energized lines
in one location (Ex. 0213). BGE recommended that the live-line barehand
requirements stand alone (Ex. 0126).
    OSHA decided to keep the live-line barehand provisions with the
requirements for overhead line work. The Agency believes that nearly
all live-line barehand work is performed on overhead lines. In
addition, the inherent characteristics of the work and the required
minimum approach distances to grounded objects generally make it
difficult to use the live-line barehand technique on energized parts
not

installed overhead. However, OSHA is making changes to Sec.  1926.964
to clarify that paragraph (c) applies to all barehand work on energized
parts. The Agency is modifying the title of final Sec.  1926.964 and
the scope of this section, as set forth in paragraph (a)(1), to
indicate that this section applies to live-line barehand work, in
addition to overhead line work. Thus, final paragraph (c) applies to
live-line barehand work irrespective of whether employees perform this
work on overhead lines.
    Final paragraph (c)(1) requires employers to train each employee
using, or supervising the use of, the live-line barehand method on
energized circuits in the technique and safety requirements of final
Sec.  1926.964(c). The training must conform to Sec.  1926.950(b).
Without this training, employees would not be able to perform this
highly specialized work safely. Proposed paragraph (c)(1) incorrectly
implied that only refresher training needed to meet proposed Sec.
1926.950(b). OSHA revised the language in this provision in the final
rule to make it clear that the employee must complete training
conforming to final Sec.  1926.950(b) and that all of the training
requirements in Sec.  1926.950(b) apply.
    Before employees can start live-line barehand work, employers must
ascertain the voltage of the lines on which employees will be
performing work. This voltage determines the minimum approach distances
and the types of equipment that employees can use. If the voltage is
higher than expected, the minimum approach distance will be too small,
and the equipment may not be safe for use. Therefore, final paragraph
(c)(2) requires employers to make a determination, before any employee
uses the live-line barehand technique on energized high-voltage
conductors or parts, of the nominal voltage rating of the circuit, of
the clearances to ground of lines and other energized parts on which
employees will perform work, and of the voltage limitations of
equipment they will be using. OSHA is adopting this provision largely
as proposed. The Agency describes two key revisions in the following
paragraph.
    First, the final rule clarifies that this information is in
addition to the information about existing conditions that is required
by final Sec.  1926.950(d). Second, final Sec.  1926.964(c)(2)(ii) uses
the term ``clearances to ground'' in place of the proposed term
``minimum approach distances to ground.'' OSHA took this provision from
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B). OSHA took existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B), in turn, from existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(2)(ii),
which uses the term ``clearances to ground.'' \430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \430\ In fact, in 1989, OSHA used ``clearances to ground'' in
proposed Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B). The Agency mistakenly changed
the language from ``clearances to ground'' to ``minimum approach
distances to ground'' in the 1994 final rule promulgating Sec.
1910.269 because OSHA decided to replace the term ``clearance'' with
``minimum approach distance'' throughout Sec.  1910.269 where it
used the word ``clearances'' to refer to ``[t]he closest distance an
employee is permitted to approach an energized or a grounded
object'' (59 FR 4381).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The term ``clearances to ground'' in existing Sec.
1926.955(e)(2)(ii) refers to the clear distance between energized parts
and ground. That term, not ``minimum approach distances to ground,'' is
appropriate here. Therefore, in final Sec.  1926.964(c)(2)(ii), OSHA is
adopting the term from existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(2)(ii) in place of
the proposed term.
    Because an employee performing live-line barehand work is at the
same potential as the line on which he or she is working, the employee
has exposure to two different voltages. First, the employee is exposed
to the phase-to-ground voltage with respect to any grounded object,
such as a pole or tower. Second, the employee is exposed to the full
phase-to-phase voltage with respect to the other phases on the circuit.
Thus, there are two sets of minimum approach distances applicable to
live-line barehand work--one for the phase-to-ground exposure (the
distance from the employee to a grounded object) and one for the phase-
to-phase exposure (the distance from the employee to another phase).
The phase-to-phase voltage is higher than the phase-to-ground voltage.
Consequently, the phase-to-phase-based minimum approach distance is
greater than the phase-to-ground-based minimum approach distance. (See
the explanation of the basis for minimum approach distances in the
summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), earlier in this
section of the preamble.)
    Paragraph (c)(3)(i), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires that the employer ensure that the
insulated tools (such as live-line tools), insulated equipment (such as
insulated ladders), and aerial devices and platforms used by employees
in live-line barehand work are designed, tested, and made for live-line
barehand work. The Agency considers insulated equipment (such as live-
line tools) designed for long-duration contact with parts energized at
the voltage on which employees will use the equipment to meet this
requirement. Insulating equipment designed for brush contact only is
not suitable for live-line barehand work. Paragraph (c)(3)(ii), which
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires
that employers ensure that employees keep tools and equipment clean and
dry while they are in use. These provisions are important to ensure
that equipment does not fail under constant contact with high-voltage
sources.
    Paragraph (c)(4), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to render inoperable the
automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting devices protecting
the lines if the design of those devices so permits. In case of a fault
at the worksite, it is important for the circuit to be deenergized as
quickly as possible and for it to remain deenergized once the
protective devices open the circuit.\431\ Preventing the reclosing of a
circuit will reduce the severity of any possible injuries.
Additionally, this measure helps limit possible switching-surge
voltage, thereby providing an extra measure of safety for employees.
This provision is comparable to existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(5), which
requires the employer to render the automatic-reclosing feature
inoperable ``where practical.'' The proposal eliminates this phrase
because OSHA believes that it is essential that a line that becomes
deenergized on a fault not be reenergized if possible. During live-line
barehand work, employees have no other back-up system providing for
their safety as they would for work on deenergized lines.\432\ Thus, if
the employee causes a fault on the line, the line must not become
reenergized automatically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \431\ If the circuit protective devices do not provide an
autoreclosing feature, the circuit will remain deenergized by
design. In addition, voltage surges caused by circuit reclosing
would not occur.
    \432\ Protective grounding provides supplementary protection in
case the deenergized line is reenergized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sometimes the weather makes live-line barehand work unsafe. For
example, lightning strikes on lines can create severe transient
voltages against which the minimum approach distances required by final
paragraph (c)(13) (described later in this section of the preamble) may
not provide complete protection to employees working on the line.
Additionally, forces imposed by the wind can move line conductors and
reduce the clearance below the minimum approach distance. To provide
protection against environmental conditions that can increase the
hazards by an unacceptable degree, final paragraph (c)(5) prohibits
live-line barehand work under adverse weather conditions that make the
work

hazardous even after the employer implements the work practices
required by Subpart V. Also, employees may not work under any
conditions in which winds reduce phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground
clearances at the work location below the minimum approach distances
specified in final paragraph (c)(13), unless insulating guards cover
the grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
    Existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(6) prohibits live-line barehand work
only during electrical storms. OSHA believes that expanding the
prohibition to include any weather condition making it unsafe to
perform this type of work will increase employee protection. OSHA took
the language for paragraph (c)(5) in the final rule from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(3)(v), which prohibits live-line barehand work ``when
adverse weather conditions would make the work hazardous even after the
work practices required by this section are employed.'' (Emphasis
added.) OSHA included this language in proposed Sec.  1926.964(c)(5).
The Agency corrected paragraph (c)(5) in the final rule by replacing
the word ``section'' with ``subpart.'' In addition, the Agency revised
this provision in the final rule to clarify that employees may not
perform work when winds reduce the phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase
clearances (rather than ``minimum approach distances'') below the
required minimum approach distances.
    A note to final paragraph (c)(5) provides that thunderstorms in the
vicinity, high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of
adverse weather conditions that make live-line barehand work too
hazardous to perform safely, even after the employer implements the
work practices required by Subpart V. In the final rule, OSHA revised
the note from the proposal to more closely match the regulatory text in
paragraph (c)(5). In addition, the Agency changed ``immediate
vicinity'' to ``vicinity'' to clearly indicate that thunderstorms do
not need to be in the work area to pose hazards.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \433\ Section <IP_ADDRESS> of IEEE Std 516-2009 states: ``Energized-
line maintenance should not be started when lightning is visible or