Long duration flight exposure provides additional confidence that the
design accounts for cruise-related failure modes that cannot be
evaluated in a cyclic test environment.  Such failure modes could
include freezing of entrapped water condensation or binding of
propulsion system components, neither of which would likely occur in a
sea level test facility.

Based on these considerations, the FAA has determined that the airplane
demonstration test requirement should be refocused on those conditions
that are most prevalent in an ETOPS operating environment.  Those
conditions include long flights to a variety of airports with broad
variations of airport elevation, temperature, and humidity.  It is also
important that these flights expose the airplane to several enroute
climbs, such as may occur with a fully loaded 777-300ER on a long-range
flight, and a number of engine-inoperative diversions.  As such, the FAA
proposes that the specific test conditions described in the
sub-paragraphs to proposed paragraph II(b)(7) more clearly state the
objectives of the test program.  Those objectives include demonstrations
that the aircraft, its components, and equipment are capable of and
function properly during long-range operations and airplane diversions,
including engine-inoperative diversions.

This change in focus constitutes a significant departure from the
original purpose of the 1,000-cycle airplane demonstration test
requirement discussed in the preamble to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS
special conditions.  However, the proposed changes to the 3,000 cycle
test requirement and the airplane demonstration test that we propose for
this rule would provide an overall better evaluation of a new airplane
design for ETOPS approval.

The original ARAC proposal recommended the following wording for
paragraph II(b)(7)(i)(4): “Non-normal conditions to demonstrate the
airplane’s capability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under worst
case probable system failure conditions.”  This is similar language
for a flight test demonstration of non-normal operating conditions to
Section III – Airplanes with more than two engines that proposed for
paragraph II(a)(5).  For similar reasons to those in the explanation for
paragraph II(a)(5), we have deleted the word “probable” in proposed
paragraph II(b)(7)(i)(4) and replaced it with system failure conditions
“expected to occur in service” in the proposed rule.

Human error continues to be a major cause of engine in-flight shutdowns
and forced airplane diversions.  The proposed requirement in paragraph
II(b)(7)(iv) to operate and maintain the test airplane using the
recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures, combined with
the proposed maintenance validation requirement in paragraph II(b)(3),
are part of the FAA’s overall regulatory objective to minimize human
errors in the ETOPS rule.  The FAA intends that the proposed ETOPS type
design requirements would result in an airplane entering service with
validated maintenance and operational procedures that minimize the
possibility of human error in ETOPS operations.

During the certification of the B777 for early ETOPS, the special
conditions required that the airplane demonstration test be conducted
using the airline maintenance and operations manuals.  The purpose of
this requirement was three-fold:  1) to assure that the airplane test
was as close to an airline simulation as possible, 2) to assure that the
maintenance and operations products were mature at entry into service,
and 3) to assure that no maintenance or operations procedures would
erroneously contribute to system failures.

In developing their draft rule, the ARAC ETOPS Working Group fully
concurred with the proposed requirement to assure maintenance and
operational product maturity at entry into service.  However, the
working group also recognized that validation of these products could be
accomplished in different fashions.  Nonetheless, ARAC noted that the
proposed associated advisory circular (AC) recommends that the
maintenance manual should be used for all testing necessary for ETOPS
validation (component, engine and airplane).  Tasks such as LRU
replacement, testing following removal/replacement of parts, etc., must
be validated per the requirements of the rule.  The proposed AC does
provide amplification, however, on what maintenance manual sections
should be validated, namely only those sections pertinent to Groups 1
and 2 ETOPS significant systems.  For instance, while validation of a
landing gear maintenance task may be prudent for product readiness, the
landing gear is not considered ETOPS critical, and therefore validation
of related maintenance procedures would not be required.

As we said in the discussion for the proposed 3,000 cycle test
requirement in paragraph II(b)(4), the FAA has concluded from a review
of in-service experience of the Model 777 series airplanes that the
3,000-cycle engine and propulsion system test in proposed paragraph
II(b)(4) of Appendix L and § 33.200(c) provides an adequate opportunity
to discover cyclic-related failure modes associated with the design,
provided that the engine and airplane manufacturers conduct an adequate
post-test evaluation.  For similar reasons, proposed subparagraph
II(b)(7)(v) would require a post-test external and internal visual
inspection of the airplane demonstration test engines and propulsion
system hardware.  The applicant would have to identify, track and
resolve any abnormal conditions found during these inspections in
accordance with the provisions of the proposed problem tracking and
resolution system requirement of paragraph II(b)(8).

The proposed paragraph II(b)(7)(v) would require the manufacturer to
visually inspect the airplane ETOPS significant systems per the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of section 25.1529 following
the airplane demonstration test.  The stated objective for this
inspection in the proposed rule is to identify any abnormal conditions
that could result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion.  We have
proposed this paragraph as ARAC recommended.  However, many of the
airplane ETOPS significant systems have components that are not amenable
to visual inspection.  An example is an electronic controller for
airplane electrical load management.  We request comments on this
specific aspect of the proposed rule.  If a visual inspection alone is
not a sufficient post-test inspection requirement, what additional
post-test inspections or tests should be incorporated into the final
rule?  If certain ETOPS significant systems should not be covered by
this post-test inspection requirement, then what should be the criteria
in the final rule for their exclusion?  We invite commenters to respond
to other commenters’ suggestions because the FAA may select one or
more commenter recommended approaches for the final rule.

The FAA proposed a change to the airplane demonstration flight test
requirement in a revision to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions for the Model 777-300ER type certification program.  The ARAC
ETOPS Working Group had knowledge of our intent to revise the Model 777
ETOPS special conditions in this manner as they developed their
recommendations.  We have provided a more detailed justification of the
airplane demonstration test requirement changes proposed in this notice
in the preamble for that special conditions revision.

II(b)(8) Problem tracking and resolution system.

This paragraph would require the applicant to establish a problem
tracking and resolution system to address problems, as identified in
proposed 21.4(a)(5), encountered on ETOPS significant systems during
airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety of ETOPS
operations.

Explanation.  This paragraph would codify the problem tracking system
requirements of paragraph (f) from the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions.

The special conditions problem tracking system requirement is divided
into two parts:  the problem tracking/reporting required during type
certification testing, and that required during the “early ETOPS”
period of the first 250,000 hours of operation after the airplane enters
service.  The proposed paragraph II(b)(8) addresses the first part of
the special conditions requirement.  The second part is captured in the
proposed new §21.4(a).

The original ARAC recommendation would have required the problem
tracking and resolution system to address “relevant” problems
encountered.  The term “relevant” is subjective and may result in
inconsistent application of the proposed rule.  Furthermore, we have
identified the types of problems that must be reported in the post type
certification period in proposed new § 21.4(a)(5).  In order to assure
consistency with the companion post type certification problem reporting
requirement contained in proposed § 21.4(a), we have replaced the term
“relevant” with the phrase “as identified in § 21.4(a)(5)”.

In evaluating the importance of this proposed rule, the FAA has reviewed
the experience on the first early ETOPS airplane.  The FAA approved the
Model 777-200 powered by Pratt & Whitney PW4077 engines for ETOPS on May
30, 1995 and the airplane entered airline service in June 1995.  By all
accounts, it was a very successful new model introduction.  This was
followed by the FAA ETOPS approval of the Model 777-200 powered by
General Electric GE90-77B and Rolls-Royce RB211-Trent 877-17 engines in
October 1996.  Based on data supplied by Boeing, the in-flight shutdown
(IFSD) rate for all three-engine types was zero for at least the first
year in service.  The Pratt & Whitney PW4000 reached a peak 12-month
rolling average IFSD rate of 0.018/1,000 hours in October 1996.  The
General Electric GE90 reached a peak of 0.021 for one month in July 1998
and the Rolls-Royce Trent reached a peak of 0.016 in December 1997.

Although the in-flight shutdown rates stayed within the allowable
0.02/1,000 hour standard for 180 minute ETOPS, Boeing and the engine
manufacturers reported to the FAA new design problems that they
discovered on each engine type after ETOPS approval.  The FAA was
concerned that the design problems being discovered may have been an
indication of a failure of the early ETOPS process to identify these
failure modes before they occurred in service.  Some failure modes had
the potential of resulting in in-flight shutdowns had they occurred
under different circumstances or they had not been detected during
maintenance for unassociated reasons.  Had every one of these events
resulted in an engine in-flight shutdown, the resulting IFSD rates for
each engine type would have been significantly higher.  However, Boeing,
the engine manufacturers, the FAA, the airlines, and other regulatory
authorities worked together to prevent in-flight occurrences of these
failure types.

The FAA did not expect that the early ETOPS process would eliminate ALL
failures.  That is why the FAA required a problem tracking system in the
Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.  The actual in-flight shutdown rates
prove that Boeing and the engine manufacturers successfully managed
these early in-service problems to maintain the safety of B777 ETOPS
operations worldwide.  A robust problem tracking, reporting, and
resolution process was key to the continued safe operation of the Boeing
Model 777 and will be an essential component of future early ETOPS
programs.  The proposed problem reporting and resolution requirements in
paragraph II(b)(8) and new §21.4(a) are important to the continued
success of airplanes approved for ETOPS using the early ETOPS process
proposed in this notice.

II(b)(9) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria.

The applicant would have to show that the type and frequency of failures
that occur during the airplane flight test program and the airplane
demonstration test proposed by paragraph II(b)(7), are consistent with
the type and frequency of failures or malfunctions that would be
expected to occur on currently certified ETOPS airplanes.

Explanation.

This paragraph would codify paragraph (h)(1) of the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions.  This proposed paragraph is the so-called
“type and frequency” requirement that is the final indicator of
ETOPS suitability in the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.

The FAA’s intent for the type and frequency requirement is that it
would provide an objective standard that we could use to assess an
airplane’s suitability for ETOPS.  Significant propulsion system
failures occurring during type certification testing, including the
additional ETOPS testing that would be required in section II of
proposed Appendix L, are an indicator that an airplane may not yet be
ready to enter ETOPS service.  Our intent is that the proposed type and
frequency requirement would identify when an airplane is not suitable
based on available test data.

We did not intend that the proposed type and frequency requirement would
provide a meaningful measurement of reliability.  It is not possible to
measure system reliability with any degree of statistical confidence
with the limited amount of test experience obtained during a reasonable
type certification program.

A lack of significant failures during type certification testing does
not assure an ETOPS-suitable design at entry into service.  It is for
this reason that the proposed problem tracking system requirement
exists.  As we said in the explanation for proposed paragraph II(b)(8),
the FAA concludes from the Boeing Model 777 experience that a
manufacturer can successfully manage early in-service problems to
maintain the safety of worldwide ETOPS operations during the initial
introductory service period with the data provided by the enhanced
problem tracking system that would be required by proposed in paragraph
II(b)(8).

The combination of these two proposed requirements form the key supports
of the early ETOPS safety standard for two-engine airplanes proposed in
this notice.  The proposed type and frequency requirement gives the
basis for denying ETOPS approval for airplanes with known significant
design problems.  The proposed problem tracking and resolution system
gives the FAA confidence that we have the means to safely manage a fleet
of airplanes and engines that do not experience significant problems
until after ETOPS approval.

The original ARAC proposed wording for paragraph II(b)(9) referred to
failures that occur during the “airplane and engine validation
programs.”  This wording is inconsistent with the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions, which refers to failures that occur during
“the airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration
test.”  Nowhere does the proposed rule use the term “validation
program.”   We think that the special conditions wording more
accurately describes what testing is covered by this proposed
requirement and have changed the proposal accordingly.

The ARAC draft had an additional qualifying phrase on the airplane
models that the candidate airplane’s failures and malfunctions would
be compared to.  In addition to “presently certified ETOPS
airplanes,” the ARAC draft added the phrase “or any non-ETOPS
derivative models of those aircraft or engines.”  This added phrase is
not in the existing Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.  We are
proposing that the proposed type and frequency requirement for two
engine airplanes include a comparison with an existing fleet of ETOPS
approved airplanes that are currently operating at a stable level of
reliability in ETOPS service.  It would not be appropriate to make this
comparison with a non-ETOPS approved fleet.  The FAA does not require
the operators of non-ETOPS fleets to maintain a level of reliability
consistent with the ETOPS standard for two-engine airplanes.

We speculate that the ARAC may have intended that the added phrase “or
any non-ETOPS derivative models of those aircraft or engines” would
address a manufacturer that initially would have no previously approved
ETOPS airplanes in service from which to base a type and frequency
comparison.  The proposed rule would not specifically require that the
comparison be with currently certified ETOPS airplanes by that
manufacturer.  If an applicant does not currently have an existing ETOPS
approved airplane in service from which to base a type and frequency
comparison, the proposed rule would allow the manufacturer to use
available data for ETOPS approved airplanes of other manufacturers.  It
is not necessary that the applicant use a single existing airplane model
in the comparison that would be required by proposed paragraph II(b)(9).
 We have not included this phrase in proposed paragraph II(b)(9).

In finding compliance with the proposed type and frequency requirement,
we would be looking at the significance of the problems that occur
during the type certification testing and whether or not they would
require a design change prior to type certification of the airplane.
Manufacturers continually make improvements to enhance their designs
based on in-service experience.  These design improvements may eliminate
nuisance problems that are not, in themselves, safety related.  In
addition, certain failures that occur in service are expected during the
life of the product at a known low rate of occurrence and are not
indicative of a significant design shortcoming.  We could find
compliance with the proposed reliability demonstration acceptance
criteria even though we might expect that these types of failures or
problems occurring during airplane flight testing could also occur on a
mature ETOPS fleet.

In contrast, the types of failures or problems that would give the FAA
concern about compliance with the proposed reliability demonstration
acceptance criteria would fall into two categories:

(1) A major failure that would require a significant redesign before the
airplane could receive a basic part 25 type certificate.  In other
words, a problem that makes the airplane unsafe without a significant
redesign and testing.

(2) Random ETOPS significant failures occurring during the test program
at a frequency greater than would be expected on a mature ETOPS fleet.
ETOPS significant failures would be those that result in the events
listed in proposed § 21.4(a)(5).

II(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.

This proposed paragraph would allow an applicant to combine certain
elements of the early ETOPS process proposed in section II(b) with a
reduced amount of service experience from what would be required by
paragraph II(a)(1) to obtain ETOPS approval.

Explanation.

The early ETOPS process proposed in section II(b) of Appendix L would
define requirements for obtaining ETOPS type design approval without the
service experience that would be required by section II(a).  Proposed
sub-section II(c) would define requirements for obtaining ETOPS approval
with a combination of service experience and elements of the early ETOPS
process.

The FAA has accepted, in principle, the concept of trading a limited
amount of service experience for the airplane demonstration test
requirements contained in the 777 early ETOPS special conditions.  The
FAA did this based on a concept already contained in Advisory Circular
120-42A, which allows a reduction in the normal amount of service
experience if “adequate compensating factors exist which give a
reasonable equivalent database.”  The FAA considers that elements of
the early ETOPS process may be used to provide “adequate compensating
factors.”  Since the 777 early ETOPS process provides a method for
obtaining ETOPS approval without any service experience, a minimum
amount of actual service experience would provide an adequate evaluation
of if the applicant complies with the other elements of the early ETOPS
process.

Proposed section II(c) would codify this concept into the ETOPS rule.
The proposed rule would allow two methods of reduced service experience
in place of the complete early ETOPS process contained in section II(b).
 Paragraph II(c)(1) would specifically require only 15,000 engine hours
of service experience if the applicant complies with the following
elements of sections II(a) and (b):

(a)(5)  Airplane flight test requirements

(b)(1)  Relevant experience assessment,

(b)(2)  Propulsion system design,

(b)(3)  Maintenance and operational procedures,

(b)(4)  Propulsion system validation test,

(b)(5)  New technology demonstration testing

(b)(6)  APU validation test,

(b)(8)  Problem tracking and resolution system, and

(b)(9)  Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria

In addition to the airplane flight test requirement from the service
experience method, paragraph II(a)(5), these are all of the elements of
the early ETOPS process except for the airplane demonstration test in
proposed paragraph II(b)(7).  We have added three paragraphs to the
original ARAC proposal.  The first is the airplane flight test
requirement from the service experience method, paragraph II(a)(5).
Without some required airplane flight-testing, the ARAC proposal would
not result in an equivalent demonstration of a capability to safely
operate in an ETOPS environment.  Paragraph II(a)(5) would require an
applicant for ETOPS approval based on service experience to conduct a
flight test to validate the adequacy of the airplane’s flying
qualities, performance and the flight crew’s ability to deal with
engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system failure conditions
expected to occur in service.  The FAA considers that an applicant who
does not complete the airplane demonstration flight test requirement in
accordance with proposed paragraph II(b)(7) as part of a combined ETOPS
approval method must as a minimum complete the flight testing that would
be required if the applicant were using service experience only.

The second is proposed paragraph (b)(5), new technology testing.  We
have added the new technology testing requirement here and in section
III because we could find no valid reason to exclude it when every other
requirement of proposed early ETOPS section is included except for the
airplane demonstration test requirement.  Since ARAC overlooked the new
technology testing requirement in their original proposal as discussed
above for proposed paragraph II(b)(5), we assume that it would have been
included in proposed paragraph II(c)(a) had they not overlooked it.

The third paragraph we have added is the reliability demonstration
acceptance criteria in proposed paragraph II(b)(9).  In section II(a)
for a service experience based approval, in-flight shutdown rate
provides the FAA with a reliability objective to assess a design’s
suitability.  In the early ETOPS method proposed in section II(b), the
reliability demonstration acceptance criteria provides a way to compare
the airplane flight test history to existing ETOPS approved airplanes as
a way to assess design suitability.  Without some defined criteria for
assessing the suitability of a design for ETOPS approval, we would have
no way of determining if a candidate airplane were acceptable when an
applicant chooses to use the combined approach.  Therefore, we have
added the reliability demonstration acceptance criteria requirement to
proposed paragraph II(c)(1).  Since we consider this to be a significant
departure from ARAC’s original recommendation and ARAC did not clearly
state their intent for this section, we request specific comments on
this particular proposal.

The second method for reduced service experience proposed in paragraph
II(c)(2) would allow some level of service experience other than 15,000
engine hours, provided the applicant defines compensating factors that
provide an equivalent level of safety to that provided using any of the
other methods.  This method would allow an applicant some latitude to
create an ETOPS approval program tailored to the unique aspects of the
airplane model.

Section III – Airplanes with more than two engines.

In addition to the requirements of section I, an applicant for an
airplane with more than two engines would have to show compliance with
the proposed requirements of section III.

Explanation.

This section of Appendix L would define those specific requirements that
would be applicable to airplanes with more than two engines.  In order
to achieve an equivalent risk of a critical loss of thrust during an
ETOPS flight due to independent failure causes, the in-flight shutdown
rate for twins needs to be ten times lower than four engine airplanes
and 20 times lower than three engine airplanes to achieve an equivalent
level of safety for ETOPS.  For maximum diversion times greater than 180
minutes, the proposed standard for two engine airplanes is 0.01
shutdowns per 1,000 engine-hours.  The associated in-flight shutdown
rate to achieve the same level of safety would be 0.2 for three engine
airplanes and 0.1 for four engine airplanes.  These levels of
reliability are inherent in current generation turbine engines without
the need for specific propulsion system requirements beyond those now in
parts 33 and 25.   The FAA is concerned that we may inadvertently
encourage a lower standard than is already normally achieved by
specifying these high in-flight shutdown rates in the proposed rule for
three and four engine airplanes.  Therefore, we have not included any of
the proposed propulsion system requirements that would be applicable to
two engine airplanes into proposed Appendix L, section III.

What remains for section III are the proposed airplane level system
requirements from section II including a flight test demonstration of
airplane and propulsion system capability during a maximum ETOPS
diversion.  Since we are equally concerned about human error caused
critical multiple failures for airplanes with more than two engines as
we are for twins, we are also proposing a maintenance and operational
procedure validation requirement in section III.  Except as noted, the
explanation for each of the proposed paragraphs in section III is the
same as for section II.

III(a) Service experience method.

The applicant would have to demonstrate that the airplane and engine
combination for which approval is sought has the required airplane and
propulsion system capability to safely conduct an ETOPS mission and
maximum diversion and has achieved required airplane system reliability
based upon fleet in-service experience.

Explanation.

This proposed requirement is the same as in section II with the
exception that “propulsion system” has been removed from the last
phrase of the proposed requirement.  Otherwise, the explanation is the
same as for paragraph II(a).

III(a)(1) Required service experience.

This paragraph would require that an applicant who desires to obtain
ETOPS type design approval using service experience conduct a
reliability review after accumulating 250,000 worldwide fleet engine
hours on the airplane and engine combination for which approval is being
sought.  The number of hours would be allowed to be reduced if adequate
compensating factors are identified which give a reasonable equivalent
database.  A significant portion of the 250,000 engine hours would have
to be obtained on the candidate airplane.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(a)(1).

III(a)(2) Airplane systems assessment.

The applicant would have to show compliance with section 25.1535(a)
using available in-service reliability data for ETOPS significant
systems.  The applicant would have to identify corrective actions for
all causes or potential causes of ETOPS significant system failures
occurring in service that are shown to be effective in preventing future
occurrences.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(a)(3).

III(a)(3) Airplane flight test requirements.

This paragraph would require a flight test to validate the adequacy of
the airplane’s flying qualities, performance and the flight crew’s
ability to deal with engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system
failure conditions expected to occur in service.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(a)(5).

III(b) Early ETOPS method.

This part of section II defines requirements that an applicant would
have to comply with to certify an airplane for ETOPS without first
accumulating the service experience that would be required in section
III(a).

Explanation.

Proposed section III(b) is the same as proposed section II(b) except
that the relevant experience assessment and propulsion system design
requirements have been removed from the proposed section III
requirements.  Otherwise, the explanation is the same as for paragraph
II(b).

III(b)(1) Maintenance and operational procedures.

Under this proposed requirement, the applicant would have to validate
maintenance and operational procedures for ETOPS Significant Systems.
The applicant would have to track and resolve any problems discovered
during the validation process using the proposed Problem Tracking and
Resolution System as described by paragraph (b)(5).

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(3).

III(b)(2) New technology demonstration testing.

The applicant would have to validate all ETOPS significant systems
maintenance and operational procedures. Any problems found would have to
be tracked and resolved through the problem tracking system and
resolution system proposed in paragraph III(b)(5).

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(5).

III(b)(3) APU validation test.

This paragraph would require an applicant to complete a test consisting
of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles on an auxiliary power
unit that the applicant uses to comply with the electrical power supply
system requirements of paragraph I(a)(2) of this proposed appendix.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(6).

III(b)(4) Airplane demonstration test.

This paragraph would require the applicant to conduct an airplane flight
test to demonstrate that the airplane, its components and equipment are
capable of and function properly during ETOPS and ETOPS diversions. This
flight test may be coordinated with, but would not be in place of the
function and reliability flight testing required for compliance with §
21.35(b)(2).

The proposed requirement includes several conditions that the applicant
would have to comply with in conducting this test.  Among these are

(1) The flight test program would have to include:

(i) flights simulating actual ETOPS operation;

(ii) demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversions;

(iii) maximum time engine inoperative diversions;

(iv) non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplanes capability to
safely conduct and ETOPS diversion;

(v) diversions into representative operational diversionary airports;
and

(vi) repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the ground
followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.

(2) The flight testing would have to validate the adequacy of the
airplane’s flying qualities, performance and the flight crew’s
ability to deal with adverse operating conditions.

(3) The engine-inoperative diversions would have to be evenly
distributed among the number of engines in the applicant’s flight test
program.

(4) The test airplane would have to be operated and maintained using the
recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures during the
test.

(5) At the completion of the test, the ETOPS Group 1 significant systems
would have to undergo an airplane visual inspection and the engines
would have to also undergo an internal gas path inspection.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(7).

III(b)(5) Problem tracking and resolution system.

This paragraph would require the applicant to establish a problem
tracking and resolution system to address problems, as identified in
proposed section 21.4(a)(5), encountered on ETOPS significant systems
during airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety of ETOPS
operations.

Explanation.

The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for proposed
paragraph II(b)(8).

III(b)(6) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria.  The applicant
would have to show that the type and frequency of failures that occur
during the airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration
test proposed by paragraph III(b)(4), are consistent with the type and
frequency of failures or malfunctions that would be expected to occur on
presently certified ETOPS airplanes, or any non-ETOPS derivative models
of those aircraft or engines.

Explanation.

As discussed above for proposed paragraph II(b)(9), the original ARAC
draft did not differentiate between two engine airplanes from airplanes
with more than two engines in the applicability of the type and
frequency requirement.  The ARAC proposal for this paragraph included
the added phrase “or any non-ETOPS derivative models of those
airplanes or engines” for those airplanes and engines that could be
included in this comparison of reliability.  As we discussed above for
proposed paragraph II(b)(9), we have deleted this phrase from the
proposed rule for two engine airplanes because an applicant would not
necessarily have to do the comparison to previously approved airplanes
manufactured by that applicant.  We are now proposing to separately
state the requirements for airplanes with more than two engines in
proposed section III of Appendix L.We have retained this provision in
the proposed requirement for airplanes with more than two engines in
paragraph III(b)(6) since previous ETOPS experience may not exist on
airplanes with more than two engines at the time this proposed rule
becomes effective.

III(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.

Explanation.

With the exception of any specific propulsion system requirements that
are being applied to airplanes with more than two engines as discussed
above, the explanation for proposed section III(c) is the same as for
proposed section II(c).

Part 33

Global issues for part 33

The overall philosophy behind ETOPS type design approval is to build
upon the improved reliability observed in today’s engines, resulting
in an even higher level of reliability for future engine products.
However, the FAA recognizes that even with the advances in design and
manufacturing technology, loss of thrust control (LOTC), in-flight
shutdown (IFSD), or other power loss events will continue to occur.
Therefore the overall intent of these ETOPS type design requirements are
to minimize the likelihood of an engine power loss during ETOPS
operations.

Specifically, the part 33 ETOPS related amendments require the engine
manufacturers to use their best design and manufacturing practices,
skills and lessons learned in designing and manufacturing the new
product.  The intent is to eliminate from the design all known ETOPS
relevant failures, malfunctions, or design related maintenance errors
experienced in their other relevant FAA certified engine models.  These
failures include but are not limited to loss of thrust control,
in-flight shutdown, or other power loss events.

It is important to note that complying with the part 33 ETOPS
requirements for certification makes the product “eligible” for
ETOPS operation only, and in no way implies an approval separate from
the aircraft or operator.  Therefore, compliance with these requirements
does not constitute an operational or aircraft level approval for ETOPS
operations.

Discussion of general issues in part 33

ETOPS Engine Testing

A 3,000-cycle test would be required for ETOPS engine eligibility.  This
test simulates 3,000 flights from engine startup to engine shutdown.  A
3,000-cycle test was first required for the early ETOPS approval of
two-engine aircraft under an FAA Early ETOPS Special Condition.
However, prior to and subsequent to that Special Condition, other
aircraft types with new engines, and others with derivative engine
types, have successfully demonstrated the requisite level of reliability
in service for ETOPS using normal certification procedures.  However,
the FAA considers that new two-engine airplane-engine combinations
intended for immediate ETOPS operations should be required to undergo a
cyclic endurance ground test to give confidence that the requisite level
of reliability for such operations will be achieved at entry into
service.

The technical basis for applying this test to two-engine airplanes
rather than all airplanes, is that the allowable IFSD rate needed to
maintain safe flight throughout the diversion and landing is an order of
magnitude greater for a three or four engine aircraft as compared to a
two-engine aircraft (assuming equivalent risk and flight duration). This
also assumes that the aircraft can maintain safe flight throughout the
diversion and land with one engine inoperative.

The FAA has concluded from a review of in-service experience that the
3,000-cycle engine and propulsion system test provides an adequate
opportunity to discover cyclic-related failure modes associated with the
design.  However this is predicated upon an adequate post-test
evaluation to identify conditions that could result in an in-flight
shutdown, power loss, or inability to control engine thrust.  An FAA
review of the data from the 3,000-cycle tests for three new engine types
has shown that most of the early in-service engine failure modes could
have been discovered using a more thorough teardown inspection and
analysis of a 3,000-cycle test engine and propulsion system hardware.
This would include evaluating hardware condition against the required
lessons learned analysis, and also to evaluate abnormal or other wear or
distress conditions not currently addressed in the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness (ICA).

In light of the FAA experience certifying and monitoring the Boeing 777,
and in order to provide a consistent standard for post-test evaluation,
the FAA proposes to require a complete teardown inspection of the engine
hardware after completion of the test.  The inspection would include an
analysis of any abnormal conditions found.  The analysis would consider
the possible consequences of similar occurrences in service to determine
if they might become sources of engine in-flight shutdowns, power loss,
or inability to control engine thrust.  The intent of this requirement
is to identify potential sources of engine in-flight shutdowns or
diversions and prevent these from occurring in the future.

The basic premise behind the engine demonstration tests required by this
proposal is that the tests will provide a useful validation of the
inherent level of reliability that was the product of an enhanced design
and test process.  The FAA’s expectation for these tests is that
significant failures will not occur.  The probability of significant
failures occurring on a single engine test program is so low that if any
do occur, it would be indicative of a design that is not suitable for
ETOPS approval.  This expectation is addressed in the “type and
frequency” requirement of the rule.

FAA general changes to the ARAC proposal for part 33

The ARAC ETOPS recommendations for part 33 engine rulemaking addresses
the Tasking Statement objectives for part 33 and incorporates the
fundamental elements to achieve the Tasking Statement’s stated
objective.  The FAA has concluded that the fundamental elements of the
ARAC Recommendations, along with the identified changes, supports
achieving the target level of safety and reliability necessary for safe
ETOPS operations for engines installed in two-engine aircraft at
entry-into-service.

However the FAA has identified a number of areas where the level of
detail in the ARAC rule recommendation is not adequate to fully address
a fundamental element, or has details that the FAA believes are
inappropriate or lacking in adequate detail.  Also, for the purpose of
clarity, completeness, and terminology usage, and to follow required
rule format, the ARAC rule recommendation has been reorganized within
part 33.

FAA changes from the ARAC Part 33 Rule Recommendations

1. Format and Organization

The Rule has been reformatted and reorganized to include all early ETOPS
design, lessons learned, and test requirements under one specific rule.
The rule number is 33.200, which resides in new part 33 subpart G,
Special Requirements.  The ARAC recommendations divided the ETOPS
requirements between existing § 33.90 Initial Maintenance Inspection
(IMI) and a specific ETOPS rule.  Section 33.90 retains the provision to
utilize the ETOPS testing for compliance purposes.  The reorganization
is generally as follows:

ARAC Recommendation Paragraph Number	New Paragraph Number

33.90(a)	Same

33.90(b)	Same

33.90(b)(1)	33.200(c)(1)

33.90(b)(2)	33.200(c)(2)

33.90(b)(3)	33.200(f)

33.100(a)(1)	33.200(a)

33.100(a)(2)	33.200(b)

33.100(b)	33.200(c)/(d)/(e)

	2. Revision of the 10 year limit on service data to be reviewed for the
Lessons Learned analysis from section 33.200(b)

The ARAC proposal for section 33.200(b) limited the assessment of past
design problems that have resulted in loss of thrust control, in-flight
shutdown, or other power loss to “the applicant’s other relevant
type design approvals provided within the past ten years.”

“Ten years” as used in the rule, is considered to be the time frame
relevant to design/manufacture evolving technology for which the
applicant must show that problems especially relevant to ETOPS have been
addressed in the design for which early ETOPS eligibility is sought.
For example, an early 1980’s certified engine with a relatively lower
level of reliability, would not be appropriate to use the applicant’s
experience base of lessons learned for compliance with section 33.200(b)
for an engine certified in year 2000; a much better experience base
would be engines certified from 1990, which as an industry group have
very good reliability.  The intent is to continuously build upon the
improved reliability seen in today’s engines into even higher levels
of reliability.”

The corresponding part 25 requirement proposed by ARAC does not contain
such a time limit on the relevant experience assessment, nor does the
Boeing 777 ETOPS Special Condition, which is the basis for this proposed
requirement.  The relevant experience assessment that Boeing submitted
for compliance with the Special Condition’s requirement consisted of
data from a ten year time period immediately prior to the B777 design
development.  The FAA approved this ten-year period at the time because
it included three previous major airplane certification programs (Models
757, 767, and 737-300).  For the current Model 777-300ER type
certification program, the assessment was updated to include the
additional relevant experience that has occurred since the original
database was developed.  Coincidentally, this covers a ten-year time
period.  However, the FAA cannot draw a conclusion from this experience
that a ten-year period will always provide adequate data for all
manufacturers that may apply for an early ETOPS approval.  Therefore,
the FAA has included a provision that the 10-year limit applies if
adequate data exists to do the assessment.  If the FAA determines that
the applicant’s other relevant type design approvals provided within
the past ten years do not constitute an adequate database, the FAA will
determine the extent of additional data required to be included in the
relevant experience assessment based on the following factors:

a. The manufacturer’s level of experience in certifying engines
installed on Transport Category airplanes,

b. Recent experience certifying new engines,

c. Completeness of the manufacturer’s design practices/manuals used in
the development of new engines, and

d. Any other factors that the manufacturer may want to present to the
FAA for consideration.

3. Insertion of the word "independently" in the test section of section
33.200(c)(2)

The ARAC Recommendation 3,000 cycle test requires all rotors to be
unbalanced to 90% of a limit value, however the actual rule text is not
specific as to whether each rotor is to be unbalanced independently.
The FAA has verified that it was the ARAC’s intent that each rotor
must be unbalanced independently relative to its individual rotor limit.
 So the word "independently" is inserted to clarify that each individual
rotor must be unbalanced to the specified 90% limit value.

4. Addition of inspection criteria for post 3,000 test [See
33.200(e)(3)(i)(C)]

The ARAC Recommendations specify hardware layout inspections in
accordance with the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) and
the Lessons Learned analysis.  The FAA proposes to add a third
inspection criteria as follows: "Inspect in a manner to identify wear or
distress conditions which could result in IFSD, LOTC or other power
loss, and which are not specifically identified by 33.200(b) or
addressed within the current ICA."  It should be noted that the ARAC
Recommendation’s AC material discusses such an inspection method and
that the recent FAA B777 Special Condition for ETOPS also included a
similar inspection requirement.

5. Clarification of an incomplete statement relating to post-test
hardware condition [See § 33.200(e)(3)(ii)]

The ARAC Recommendation contains a requirement that post-test hardware
condition be such that no distress is observed that could result in a
power loss.  However many engine parts if distressed and operated long
enough will fail and potentially cause a power loss.  As written,
distress in many parts could be predicted to result in power loss over
an inappropriately long period of operation.  Therefore the FAA proposes
to define the period of operation to make this judgment as follows;
"...within a period of operation before the component, assembly or
system would likely have been inspected or functionally tested for
integrity while in service”.

6. Revision of interim inspection to be used for § 33.90 compliance

The ARAC Recommendations propose to use the 3,000-cycle test for §
33.90 compliance by means of an interim on-wing inspection method.  The
FAA concurs with the basic on-wing inspection approach.  However, the
ARAC Recommendations only specify a visual inspection for § 33.90
compliance purposes.  This Recommendation does not meet the most basic
existing Method of Compliance (MoC) for a § 33.90 inspection.  The FAA
proposes to revise the "visual only" inspection to be an inspection
acceptable to the Administrator, and specify an acceptable MoC within
the AC.  Currently for an on-wing type inspection for § 33.90
compliance, the FAA would accept an inspection that does all of the
following:

(1) Full borescope inspection of accessible gas path stages or areas of
the fan, compressor, combustor, and turbine modules, to the serviceable
limits of the ICA.

(2) For Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) equipped
engines, observe and interrogate the FADEC system for fault messages and
status messages, both current or previously recorded, to the serviceable
limits of the ICA.

(3) Inspect all oil system chip detectors and filters for contamination.

(4) Inspect all fuel system filters for contamination.

(5) Test a sample of main engine oil for contaminants that might
indicate impending internal failure.

(6) Conduct a complete visual inspection of the inlet, exhaust, and
externals, to the serviceable limits of the ICA.

(7) Conduct a power calibration to show that the engine can produce
power or thrust within established limits, and is free of surge or stall
when operated in accordance with the Operating Instructions.

General pass/fail criteria for the above items is serviceable in
accordance with the ICA, unless otherwise approved by the Administrator.

The above method of compliance has been established for conventionally
designed engines, and is discussed further in the companion AC.  Other
inspections or checks, or deletion of non-applicable items may be
necessary for new or unconventional designs.

7. Addition of Oil Tank Design Requirement

The FAA is proposing to revise the current requirements of §
33.71(c)(4), which addresses oil tank caps.  The proposed revision would
incorporate a new ETOPS eligibility design requirement for oil tanks
intended to prevent hazardous oil loss in the event of an oil tank cap
installation error.  The FAA is aware of a number of single and dual
engine oil loss events due to oil tank cap installation errors, and is
concerned that these types of problems will continue to occur,
potentially resulting in an unsafe condition during extended operations.
 The FAA believes it prudent to address this situation by requiring oil
tanks to be designed to accommodate cap installation errors without
hazardous oil loss.  The proposed rule would not allow compliance by
maintenance procedures; the necessary physical features or
characteristics must be part of the oil tank design. The rule is
intended to protect against hazardous oil loss when oil tank cap
installation errors occur.

8. Engine Endurance Test with Vibration

The ARAC Recommendations include a 3,000-cycle endurance test with main
rotor unbalance.  The Recommendations specify the minimum unbalance as
being an “average value” of the peak vibration level observed during
required vibration surveys.  In section 33.200(c)(2)(iv), the term
“average value” is being replaced by the term “equivalent value”
to better address the concept of cumulative damage.  For example,
utilizing an average value could result in less cumulative damage due to
vibration then if the 90% requirement was precisely maintained over the
test duration.  By computing and working to an equivalent value of rotor
unbalance, cumulative damage will always be equal to or greater then a
test conducted with a steady value of 90% unbalance.  The equivalent
value is a Miner’s rule summation calculation, and is further
described in the companion AC.

Section by section discussion of the proposal

Proposed New Appendix A, Paragraph A33.3(c), Extended Operations (ETOPS)
Requirements.

A proposed new Appendix A Paragraph A33.3(c) would define new engine
condition monitoring requirements necessary for obtaining ETOPS type
design eligibility approval.

Explanation.

This section requires inclusion of a power assurance check methodology
into the ICA for all engine models requiring ETOPS eligibility.  A
special requirement exists for engines to be installed in twin-engine
aircraft applications, that being the power assurance method must be
validated by test or experience.

Proposed Revision to Section 33.71(c)(4) – Oil Tanks

A proposed revision to section 33.71(c)(4) would define new oil tank
design requirements necessary for obtaining ETOPS type design
eligibility approval.

Explanation.

See the explanation in paragraph 7 of this section, above.

Proposed Revision to Section 33.90 – Initial maintenance inspection
(IMI).

A proposed revision of section 33.90 would define requirements for
utilizing ETOPS type design eligibility test data obtained during
section 33.200 testing for section 33.90 compliance purposes.

Explanation.

The fundamental requirements of section 33.90 are unchanged; except for
the inclusion of a provision to allow utilization of data obtained under
section 33.200 testing to show compliance to section 33.90 IMI.

Proposed New Section 33.200 – Early Extended Operations (ETOPS)
Eligibility and Test Requirements.

A proposed new section 33.200 would define overall requirements for
obtaining ETOPS type design eligibility approval.

Explanation.

Compliance with this section results in an engine model that is eligible
for two-engine ETOPS operation before the service experience required
under 14 CFR part 25, Appendix L, Section II, paragraph (a) is achieved.
The individual subparagraphs are discussed below:

Sections 33.200(a) and 33.200(b)

These sections require an applicant to establish a design quality
process acceptable to the Administrator that will ensure that the type
design minimizes the possibility of power loss failure events.

These rule sections require the applicant to use its best design
practices, including all its corporate knowledge, skills and lessons
learned in the design and manufacture of the engine.  The intent is to
eliminate from the design all known failures, malfunctions or design
related maintenance errors experienced in other relevant FAA certified
engines, and that are especially relevant to ETOPS.  Such events include
loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or other power loss events.

Compliance may be shown by evidence acceptable to the Administrator that
the applicant’s design quality assurance process has demonstrated the
capability to eliminate causes of engine failures, malfunctions, and
design related maintenance problems known to have occurred within the
applicant's commercial engine experience base.  The applicant should
also show that the design quality process would preclude the recurrence
of that cause in the new design.  Also, the design quality process and
design features must address all applicable failures, malfunctions, and
maintenance problems that could affect ETOPS even if they occurred on
taxi, if such an event could have occurred in-flight.

The FAA will determine the extent of data required to be included in the
relevant experience assessment based on the following factors:

(1) The manufacturer’s level of experience in certifying engines
installed on Transport Category airplanes;

(2) Recent experience certifying new engines;

(3) Completeness of the manufacturer’s design practices and manuals
used in the development of new engines; and

(4) Any other factors that the manufacturer may want to present to the
FAA for consideration.

If adequate data exists the time period of consideration will be the
prior 10 years of applicant experience.

Section 33.200(c)

The intent of this testing is to simulate in-service operation; and to
simulate the extent of time that the engine will operate at maximum
continuous power for the longest diversion time in an ETOPS scenario,
and at a level of engine vibration that exceeds expected service
operation.  The test is not intended to duplicate or repeat or replace
the endurance test required by section 33.87.

Explanation.

This 3,000-cycle test requirement simulates the typical field service
operation expected to be encountered in the first 250,000 fleet hours
(typically two years of service) and the extent of time that an engine
will operate in the event of a diversion at maximum continuous power for
the longest diversion time expected.  In addition, the test is required
to be conducted at a level of vibration for the complete test that
exceeds expected service exposure.  The new test is an important part of
the early ETOPS eligibility determination for both the engine and
propulsion system of the airplane.  No other type of engine vibration
testing can simulate the vibration induced by imbalance of its rotors
running through the speed and power ranges experienced in service.  The
test is required to simulate 3,000 cycles of service operation
(typically two years) in a short time span.  This test is similar to
that conducted for the original certification of the three engine types
used on the B777 under the Special Conditions.  Those tests were also a
combination of engine cyclic endurance with high cycle fatigue (HCF)
vibration induced by way of imbalancing the main rotors of the engine.

Section 33.200(d)

The purpose of this test is to establish thrust characteristics, and
ensure that the engine can deliver rated takeoff power or thrust within
approved limits prior to the start of the test.

	Section 33.200(e)

This section establishes what the required inspections are and what the
pass/fail criteria is for section 33.200 compliance.  Further detail on
a MoC for this section can be found in the companion advisory circular.

Section 33.200(f)

This section establishes the requirements for utilizing paragraph
33.200(c) 3,000-cycle test data to show compliance to section 33.90
Initial Maintenance Inspection.  The companion AC provides details of an
acceptable MoC.

Part 121

Global issues for part 121

FAA general changes to the ARAC proposal for part 121

(1) Section 121.368 has become 121.374

The ARAC proposed rule number had to be changed due to other FAA rule
writing projects.  The content and concepts from the proposal were
retained wherever possible within the new rule.  Specific format changes
and the differences between this proposed rule and the ARAC proposal are
discussed in each section below.

Section by section discussion of the proposed changes to part 121

Proposed New Section 121.7 Definitions and designations.

The FAA proposes to add a new section in part 121 for definitions
applicable to ETOPS.

Explanation.

Many of the terms used in the proposed regulatory and guidance material
for ETOPS under this part are unique to these operations.  Requirements
and concepts for ETOPS require precise definition to assure common
understanding and compliance.  Definitions are added for:

Adequate Airport

ETOPS Alternate

ETOPS Area of Operation

ETOPS Dual Maintenance

ETOPS Entry Point

ETOPS Maintenance Significant System

ETOPS Qualified Personnel

Maximum Diversion Time

One Engine Inoperative Cruise Speed (Approved)

The following areas are designated as ETOPS areas by the Administrator
in which the planning, operational, and equipage requirements for ETOPS
apply.  The areas are defined as:

NOPAC

North Pacific

Polar Areas

North Pole

South Pole

Proposed New Section 121.97 (b)(1)(ii) Airports: Required data

The FAA proposes to clarify the “public protection” requirement of
section 121.97 to include consideration of facilities available for
public safety, protection, and welfare during regular and irregular
operations (including diversions to the airport).

Explanation.

Airlines must consider passenger facilities when selecting an ETOPS
Alternate and in diversion planning.  The facilities at an airport or in
the immediate area must be sufficient to protect the passengers and crew
from the elements and to see to their welfare during the time required
to transport them onward.

By definition, ETOPS operations are those with long segments over water
or remote areas. Some of these remote areas are affected by severe
weather conditions such as, but not limited to, extreme cold or high
winds and cold temperatures.  Some of the airports that are well
positioned for use as enroute alternates are in remote areas.  These
airports may have only limited or seasonal facilities that could be used
to shelter passengers and crew after an unscheduled landing.  As ETOPS
operations have expanded in scope and extended in length, operations
over more remote areas with more extreme weather possibilities have
become routine.  Northern Canada and the Russian Far East are typical
examples.  Facilities at some of the airports in those areas have not
been maintained because of political, economic and military changes.  It
cannot be assumed that the passengers and crew of an aircraft will be
safe simply because a safe landing can be made at an airport.
Therefore, certificate holders are obligated to be aware of the
available facilities and satisfy them that there will be adequate
facilities to protect the passengers and crew should it be necessary to
make an unscheduled landing for any reason.

These are new requirements.  The FAA is proposing to add these
additional requirements to this regulation because it has learned that
not all certificate holders have planned for these contingencies in the
past, apparently because the current wording of the regulation did not
require them to do so.  The FAA believes regulations are needed to
prudently insure carriers recognize “the duty of an air carrier to
provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public
interest…” 49 U.S.C. sec. 44701 (d)(1)(A). The ARAC recommendation
included arguments that since ETOPS flights are generally international
flights, treaties limit damages for negligence that passengers on
international flights may recover from airlines.  The ARAC further
stated that absent the compelling motivation of unlimited liability for
proven damages available to domestic passengers, carrier motivation to
avoid findings of negligence may also be lessened somewhat.

Others have pointed out that in the Polar Policy letter the FAA has
already included instructions and requirements detailing the treatment
of passengers in case of diversions or accidents and the facilities to
be made available for them.  Further, the addition of passenger related
contingencies are based on rules, regulations and International
Treaties, which have been and are in the process of being enacted for
the protection of passengers well being such as: “Aviation Disaster
Family Assistance Act of 1996”, the DOT/NTSB Task Force Report on
Assistance to Families of Aviation Disasters of 1997, Public Law 105-148
of 1997 (105th Congress), ICAO Circular 285-AN166 (33rd Assembly, 2001),
European Union Regulation (EG) 2027/97, the “Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air” of
1999 and others.  Providing for the safety, security, comfort and well
being of all of the occupants of an airplane has become especially
important on long range flights because of increasing medical
consequences.  It was also pointed out that ignoring those requirements
expose the carriers to increasing liability claims and to loss of
business because of passengers’ discomfort.

Proposed New Sections 121.99(c) and (d) Communications Facilities

The FAA proposes to add sections 121.99(c) and 121.99(d).  Section
121.99(c) would create a baseline ETOPS equipage requirement for flag
operations.  Section 121.99(d) would create an additional equipage
requirement for operations beyond 180-minutes.

Explanation.

Under this proposal a certificate holder would have to provide for voice
communication between the crew and air traffic services and the crew and
the certificate holder wherever and whenever it is available.  In areas
where voice communication is not possible, the certificate holder would
have to provide a non-voice communication system, such as High Frequency
(HF) data link, to ensure communication capability.

Paragraph 121.99(d) would apply on to ETOPS flights planned on greater
than 180-minutes and would require the installation of an additional
communication system.    This communication system would have to be
capable of providing immediate satellite based voice communication of
land-line telephone-fidelity between the flight crew and air traffic
services and between the flight crew and the company.  The term
“immediate” in the context of this section would mean the time
period required to connect an ordinary land-line telephone call.  The
modifiers “land-line telephone-fidelity” are included as performance
standards to describe the faithful reproduction of sound.  The FAA is
essentially describing Satellite Communication (SATCOM).  At this time,
only SATCOM provides this capability and compliance with this proposed
rule.  The FAA acknowledges that technological innovation may create
alternatives to SATCOM or render the system obsolete.  Certificate
holders would be required to equip airplanes used in ETOPS beyond 180
minutes with SATCOM or other system that offers equivalent or enhanced
capability.  The FAA notes that the ARAC consolidated these requirements
in a single paragraph (c) in their recommendation.  The FAA elected to
reformat for clarity.

Both paragraphs (c) and (d) would require the certificate holder to
consider “potential routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to
ETOPS alternates” when assessing the availability of voice
communication facilities.  The ARAC recommended that the FAA amend
paragraph 121.99(a) to include the above-quoted language.  The FAA has
elected not to amend paragraph 121.99(a).  Paragraph 121.99(a) is the
baseline requirement for all domestic and flag certificate holders
operating under part 121.  The FAA believes the equipage and
communication performance requirements for ETOPS should be separate and
distinct from the baseline communication requirement for part 121.
Further, the FAA has proposed amending paragraph 121.99(a) in the Area
Navigation (RNAV) proposed rulemaking.  See 67 FR 77326 (December 17,
2002).

The origin of paragraph 121.99(d) is the 207-minute policy letter, which
conditioned extension of section 121.161 deviation authority upon the
installation SATCOM for operation on those routes.  See 65 FR 3520
(January 21, 2000).  The purpose of this proposal is to ensure that
flight crews have the best communication capability in the event of an
extended diversion.  During a diversion, crew workload increases
considerably.  The use of an unwieldy communication system during a
diversion would needlessly distract the crew from more important cockpit
duties.  SATCOM is not available in all regions of the world.  In those
regions, flight crews must have another means to communicate with the
certificate holder and air traffic services.

Proposed New Section 121.106 Required rescue fire fighting capability
at ETOPS alternate airports

The FAA proposes to add new section 121.106, requiring a rescue fire
fighting capability at an airport designated as an ETOPS alternate.

Explanation.

Currently, part 139 does not require any aircraft rescue fire fighting
(RFF) capability at airports designated as Takeoff and Destination
alternates.  Alternate airports are referred to in part 139 but not
defined.  The common perception of an alternate airport is that it is an
airport that is used infrequently, when diversions occur.  The original
use of the definition was limited to the destination or takeoff
airports.  There was no specific mention of the en route alternate until
Advisory Circular 120-42, Extended Range Operation With Two Engine
Airplanes (ETOPS), was issued in 1985.  The airport regulations
specified in part 139 were first published in 1972 prior to the
inception of ETOPS.  For these reasons, and as outlined further, we
propose new section 121.106 to include the requirement for RFF at an en
route alternate airport.

Normally a flight diverts to its destination alternate airport because
of poor weather at the destination airport or the aircraft having a low
fuel state.  In contrast, a diversion to an ETOPS en route alternate is
likely attributable to an engine or system failure or medical emergency.
 Throughout the ETOPS flight the designation of the en route alternate
may be revised, with consideration of the designated en route alternate
airport maintaining an adequate level of weather and runway conditions
to safely land the airplane.  At the most critical point of an ETOPS en
route diversion there is no other choice as to the diversion airport.
It remains necessary to ensure that all the facilities and services are
adequate to ensure that a safe landing can be made at the diversion
airport in the event that it is necessary to divert.  Thus, some have
argued that there is an increased importance of a rescue fire fighting
service at airports designated as an ETOPS en route alternate.  Further,
they have argued that establishing such a requirement in the Federal
Aviation Regulations is consistent with ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Attachment
E, wherein an “adequate alternate aerodrome” is defined.  The
definition includes a list of various facilities and services, including
‘rescue and fire fighting’, as being necessary.  (An attachment to
ICAO Annex is intended as a guide or supplementary material to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices and as such, is not a requirement.)

The fact that en route diversions have occurred in the past and will
continue to occur necessitates evaluation of the facts surrounding those
events and the needs they identify. ETOPS operators in the United States
(as well as Europe) operating across the North Atlantic have encountered
difficulties in being able to designate certain Canadian airports as
ETOPS en route alternates due to the reduction of RFF service capability
(Canadian airport privatization) and numerous military base closures.

History has shown that in-flight diversions occur for a variety of
reasons, other than In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD) of two engine aircraft.
Any aircraft conducting extended range operations could experience a
critical emergency requiring diversion to an en route alternate airport.
 Thus, it is proposed by some that a regulation be established to
require an en route alternate for all extended range flight operations
(aircraft with 2, 3, and 4 engines) because, in such an event requiring
a diversion, a simple emergency evacuation in a hostile environment (for
example, due to cold temperatures) could be deadly, or in a similar way,
a mechanical event requiring a need to land could result in an
unanticipated accident, such as a runway overrun and thus become
catastrophic. It is further argued by some that these considerations
have led to the conclusion that some level of accident mitigation
systems should be required for airports designated as en route alternate
airports.  This accident mitigation protection is provided for at
airports designated as origin and destination airports in the
regulations of part 121, and the appropriate levels of protection are
specified in the airport certification regulations designated as part
139.

Part 139 specifies the level of aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF)
as a function of aircraft size.  This level of protection is deemed the
‘Index’ and specifies the amount of agent for fire extinguishment
and the number of vehicles to deliver the agent proportionate to the
size of the largest airplane using the airport.  In the international
Standards of ICAO, the length and width of the aircraft fuselage
determines the “RFF Category”.  An allowance for reducing the
index/category is provided in the event that the aircraft only uses the
airport infrequently i.e., less than 700 movements in the busiest
consecutive three months with the airplane in the highest category. This
is termed a remission factor. Even though frequency of operations may
allow a reduction of service levels by 1 Category, this reduction will
no longer be allowed after January 2005 under the ICAO Standards.  ICAO
RFF category range from 1 to 10.  As an example, the ICAO category of
RFF 4, which is nearly equivalent to Index A in part 139, provides at
least 1 firefighter and 1 vehicle with the ability for immediate fire
suppression or ground assistance to occupants.

Contradicting the arguments of those who support RFF at enroute
alternates, some have stated that based on the last sixteen years of
ETOPS operations with well over 2.5 million ETOPS flights around the
world, there is no record of a single incident where a twin on an ETOPS
phase of flight with a mechanical event diverted to an ETOPS alternate
and the landing resulted in an unanticipated accident, such as a runway
overrun and thus became catastrophic, and required the RFF services.  It
was further argued that the probability of an ETOPS flight diverting on
the ETOPS portion of the flight, landing at an ETOPS alternate,
resulting in an accident or a catastrophic situation is very remote, and
need not be considered.  However, some have pointed out that the fact
that an event has not happened does not mean it will never happen, and
industry needs to be proactive and provide a level of safety as a
margin, should the situation arise.

Some have pointed out that requiring high levels of RFF protection for
the enroute alternate airports would either severely limit the selection
of diversion airports necessitating longer divert times, or demand the
communities supporting these enroute alternate airports increase their
level of emergency service beyond that currently available.  However, it
can be argued that for airplanes on long diversions a pad may need to be
built in so that a minimum level of RFF capability is assured at the
time of landing.

Even though currently not required by part 139, the FAA considers it
very desirable to have some minimum level of RFF protection at the ETOPS
alternates.  Taking into account the various opinions expressed in the
ARAC recommendations, the FAA proposes to establish a minimum RFF of 4
for ETOPS operations below 180 minutes, and a minimum RFF of 7 for
diversion times greater than 180 minutes.  This reflects the RFF
requirements stated in FAA Order 8400.10, Flight Standards Handbook
Bulletins for Air Transportation, HBAT 99-15 titled Level of Rescue and
Fire Fighting Services (RFFS) for ETOPS En Route Alternates, and the
207-Minute ETOPS Policy.

Similar to the allowance contained in HBAT 99-15, the proposed
regulation allows for an off airport response time of thirty minutes,
however, the required equipment must be available on-scene for the
arrival of the diverting airplane and should remain for as long as their
services are needed.  In contrast to a destination or departure airport,
the diversion airport has time to muster community emergency service
assets to provide the necessary emergency response following
notification of the aircraft diversion.  This provision for the use of
off-airport emergency services necessitates that a robust communications
link must be established in order to provide sufficient time to muster
the necessary RFF personnel and equipment.  Further, local community
emergency services support of required RFF response in providing
equipment and personnel is considered prudent.

In all cases the certificate holder must ensure that the flight crews
are provided current information (in plain language) concerning the RFF
capability for those airports designated as alternate airports

Proposed New Section 121.122 Communication  Facilities

The FAA proposes to add a communication facilities requirement for
supplemental operators.  This section would mirror section 121.99, which
applies to flag and domestic operators.

Explanation.

The FAA believes it is necessary to create comparable communication
requirement for supplemental operators to ensure consistency among part
121 operations.  To this end, the FAA proposes communication
requirements similar to those in section 121.99.  For example, paragraph
121.122(a) is based on the existing paragraph 121.99(a), which is the
basic communication requirement for domestic and flag operators.
Similarly paragraphs 121.122(b) and (c) are based on the proposed
sections 121.99(c) and (d) respectively which would establish
communication requirements for ETOPS.  See discussion above for
121.99(c) and (d) for the rationale of ETOPS communication requirements.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.135(b)(10) Contents

Add a new 14 CFR 121.135(b)(10) to require performance data to support
ETOPS.

Explanation.

The FAA proposes to insert a new requirement for performance data in the
manual required by this section to support ETOPS as paragraph (b)(10),
and to renumber existing paragraphs 121.135(b)(10) through (24) to new
paragraphs 121.135(b)(11) through (25).  Since ETOPS are conducted under
a special authorization, there is an additional performance data
requirement to support these operations.  The flight crew and
dispatchers should have available the engine inoperative and cabin
depressurization cruise data used by the certificate holder to plan
flights and operate under ETOPS.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.135(b)(26) Contents (new)

Add paragraph 121.135(b)(26) to require a passenger recovery plan for
flag and supplemental operations in the certificate holder’s manual.

Explanation.

The FAA proposes to add paragraph 121.135(b)(24) to require a passenger
recovery plan for flag and supplemental operations in the certificate
holder’s manual.  The FAA introduced the requirement for an airline to
develop and maintain a passenger recovery plan for flights authorized in
the North Pole area of operation by policy letter in March 2001.

It is incumbent that a carrier account for contingencies when diversions
occur to airports not normally served by the carrier.  When a diversion
occurs in an area where the carrier has a substantial operational
infrastructure, (that is, a carrier serves many destinations in Europe
but is forced by operational circumstances to divert to an airport not
served by the carrier but within the region) that diversion plan becomes
a simple matter of describing how the carrier’s assets within the
region can supply immediate logistical support to the diversion
aircraft.  This can be called a regional passenger recovery plan
applicable to a stated geographical area.

However, a carrier with an extensive route system extending over remote
areas has a responsibility to devise a plan of substance to recover the
passengers, crew, and aircraft in the event of a diversion within a
remote area.  The plan should be of sufficient detail to demonstrate
that the recovery operation can be readily affected, and the basic needs
of the diverted customers and crew can be provided for in the interim.

The certificate holder must demonstrate that a regional plan is robust
enough to handle diversion scenarios within that region by showing the
effectiveness and adequacy of communications; coordination; facilities;
accuracy of NOTAM and weather information; and operability of support
ground equipment.  The recovery plan should also address the care and
safety of passengers and crew at the diversion airport, and include the
plan of operation to extract the passengers and crew from that airport.
The certificate holder must maintain the accuracy and completeness of
its recovery plan as part of its annual audit.

Proposed change to Section 121.161 Airplane limitations: Type of route.

The FAA proposes to revise section 121.161(a) to create ETOPS route
authority within the regulations and to move away from ETOPS conducted
under the Administrator’s deviation authority.

Explanation.

As discussed earlier in this proposal, deviation from section 121.161(a)
has been the regulatory basis of ETOPS since its inception.  The FAA
issued AC 120-42 and AC 120-42A to provide guidance for carriers seeking
to conduct ETOPS.  However as ETOPS evolved from an exceptional kind of
operation to a prevalent kind of operation, the need for amending
paragraph 121.161(a) has become became apparent.  The proposed paragraph
121.161(a) would describe when and where the requirements of ETOPS would
apply and furthermore would contain a pointer to the new Appendix O.
Appendix O would contain the approval requirements for the different
ETOPS time thresholds and ETOPS areas of applicability.  ETOPS would no
longer be conducted under the Administrator’s deviation authority
under this proposal but would have a distinct regulatory basis.

The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph 121.161(d) that would limit
operations of reciprocating engine powered airplanes to routes no more
than 60 minutes away from an adequate airport at single-engine
inoperative speed in still air and standard conditions.  This new
section would have language allowing the Administrator to grant
deviations.  The FAA believes that, although not possible at present,
reciprocating engines may someday achieve the reliability necessary for
operations beyond 60 minutes.

Proposed New Section 121.374 ETOPS Maintenance Requirements

(1) Format changes

ARAC Proposal	NPRM Draft

121.368 ETOPS Maintenance	121.374 ETOPS Maintenance Elements

(a) CMP	(a) CMP

(b) Initial maintenance and training procedures	(b) CAMP

	(g) Maintenance training

(c)(1) CMP requirements	Deleted

(c)(2) Pre-departure service check	(b)(1) Pre-departure service check

(c) (3) Verification procedures	(b)(3) Verification program

(c) (4) Preclude dual maintenance	(b)(2)(i) Preclude dual maintenance

(c) (5) Procedures if dual maintenance. 	(b)(2)(ii) Procedures if dual
maintenance cannot be

cannot be avoided	avoided

(c) (6) APU in-flight start program	(f) APU in-flight start program

(d) Centralized maintenance control	(b)(5) Centralized maintenance
control

(e) Changes to maintenance and training procedures	(h) Procedural
changes

(f) ETOPS task identification	(b)(4) ETOPS task identification

(g) ETOPS document	(b)(6) ETOPS document

(h) ETOPS parts control	(b)(7) ETOPS parts control

(i) ETOPS reliability program	(b)(8) ETOPS reliability program

None	(b)(8)(i) Reporting requirements

(j) Investigate each IFSD	(b)(8)(ii) Investigation requirements

(j) Also contained IFSD rates	(c) Propulsion system monitoring

(k) Engine condition monitoring	(d) Engine condition monitoring

(l) Oil consumption program	(e) Oil consumption monitoring

(m) APU in-flight start program	(f) APU in-flight start program

Explanation.

A crucial element of ETOPS is a robust maintenance program that
complements the standard airplane-engine maintenance program.  ETOPS
maintenance practices are designed to preclude and protect diversions
through closely controlled procedures such as engine condition
monitoring, oil consumption monitoring, the aggressive resolution of
reliability issues, and procedures to reduce the risks of human error
during maintenance of airplane systems and engines.  For the past 18
years, AC 120-42 and AC 120-42A have provided guidance describing the
specialized maintenance requirements necessary for ETOPS.  The FAA
proposes to codify the guidance from the AC.  These requirements would
apply to all airplanes used in ETOPS regardless of the number of the
engines installed.

This proposal would require operators to develop an ETOPS maintenance
program that addresses or incorporates the following elements:

(a) Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) compliance.

Each certificate holder would have to establish a system to ensure
compliance with the CMP.  The importance of the CMP is discussed more
fully above in the General Discussion of the Proposal.

(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP)

A CAMP is a comprehensive oversight program to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of an airplane.  A CAMP includes but is not limited to
maintenance tasks, inspection tasks, auditing requirements, and data
analysis.  CAMP is required by part 121 Subpart L.  The proposed
regulation would expand the scope of the CAMP for ETOPS operators to
encompass issues unique to ETOPS.  The following are considered basic
additional elements of a CAMP for an ETOPS operator:

(1) ETOPS pre-departure service check

The pre-departure service check is designed to ensure that ETOPS
significant systems will perform their intended function throughout the
flight.  An ETOPS pre-departure service check would have to verify the
status of ETOPS significant systems. Some certificate holders conducting
ETOPS flights have elected to add other items to their check as a result
of operational experience and knowledge gained from their reliability
programs.  Regardless of any additional items an operator may add to a
check, the focal point of this check must be inspection, servicing, and
maintenance of ETOPS significant systems.

(2) Dual maintenance

Dual maintenance is a concept relating to repetition of maintenance
errors on redundant systems.  There have been instances of a single
mechanic repeating a maintenance error on multiple systems.  An example
of dual maintenance error is failing to install o-rings on engine oil or
fuel components on multiple engines.  Establishing procedures to avoid
dual maintenance can minimize the probability of such errors.  The use
of two or more mechanics reduces the risk of this type of error.
Routine tasks on multiple similar elements, such as oil and fuel filter
changes, should never be scheduled and assigned on the same maintenance
visit.

However, the FAA is aware that under some limited circumstances, dual
maintenance may be unavoidable.  For instance, a pilot’s report of a
discrepancy on an ETOPS significant system may require maintenance on
one engine at the same time as a scheduled maintenance event for the
other engine.  In such cases, the certificate holder must establish and
follow procedures to mitigate the risk of a common cause human error.

(3) Verification program

The verification program ensures the effectiveness of ETOPS maintenance
actions.  Verification programs are designed to identify any potential
problems and may consist of ground tests, flight tests, use of built in
test equipment (BITE), and other tests as appropriate.  Verification
action must be accomplished following corrective action to an ETOPS
significant system, primary system failure, IFSD or in response to
significant adverse trends. The certificate holder must establish
procedures to clearly indicate who is going to initiate the action and
what verification action is necessary.  A verification flight may be
performed in combination with an ETOPS revenue flight, provided the
verification phase is documented as satisfactorily completed upon
reaching the ETOPS entry point.

(4) Task identification

ETOPS maintenance programs include numerous tasks that are critical to
ETOPS.  Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to
identify specific tasks that must be accomplished by ETOPS qualified
personnel.  These ETOPS-specific tasks are performed during all phases
of maintenance.  On the other hand, some tasks in an ETOPS maintenance
program are identical to tasks on a non-ETOPS airplane.  The FAA
realizes that tasks, such as checking seat belts prior to a flight, do
not involve ETOPS significant systems and may be performed by non-ETOPS
qualified personnel.  ETOPS specific tasks would either be identified on
the certificate holder’s routine work forms and related instructions
or parceled together and identified as an “ETOPS package.”

(5) Centralized maintenance control procedures

The certificate holder would have to develop and clearly define in their
program ETOPS related procedures, duties, and responsibilities, such as
the involvement of centralized maintenance control.  The function of
centralized maintenance control is to be a focal point for operational
aspects of ETOPS maintenance and to ensure that ETOPS aircraft are
airworthy.  Procedures and centralized control processes would be
established which would preclude an airplane being dispatched for ETOPS
flights after a propulsion system shut-down, significant primary
airframe system failure, or significant adverse trends in system
performance without appropriate corrective action having been taken.
Confirmation of corrective maintenance would require appropriate
verification action prior to an ETOPS flight.  Depending on the size and
scope of the ETOPS operation, the maintenance control entity could be an
entire department or one ETOPS-qualified individual for a small
operation.  “Centralized maintenance control” is also referred to as
“technical services center”, “maintenance operations control
(MOC)”, and “maintenance coordination center” among other terms
within industry.

(6) ETOPS program document

The certificate holder would have to develop a document that identifies
all ETOPS requirements, including supportive programs, procedures,
duties, and responsibilities.  The ETOPS program document would be for
use by personnel involved in ETOPS and would be readily accessible to
those personnel.  This document need not be inclusive but should at
least reference the maintenance program and other requirements, and
clearly indicate where they are located in the certificate holder’s
document system.  The ETOPS program document would have to be submitted
to the CHDO for approval at least 60 days before beginning ETOPS flights
and be subject to revision control.

(7) ETOPS parts control

Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to develop a
parts control program that ensures the proper parts and configurations
are maintained for ETOPS airplanes.  The program would have to include
procedures to verify that the parts installed on ETOPS airplanes during
parts borrowing or pooling arrangements, as well as those parts used
after repair or overhaul, maintains the necessary ETOPS configuration.
In many cases, certificate holders utilize the Illustrated Parts Catalog
(IPC) as the ETOPS parts controlling document.  However, other methods
may be used provided that the configuration standard of the airplane and
engine is maintained.

(8) Reliability program

The certificate holder would have to develop an ETOPS Reliability
Program or the certificate holder’s existing Reliability Program would
have to be supplemented.  This program should be designed to identify
and prevent ETOPS related problems.  The program would be event-oriented
and incorporate reporting procedures for critical events detrimental to
ETOPS flights.  For those certificate holders that do not have a FAA
approved reliability program, their Continuing Analysis and Surveillance
(CAS) would have to be enhanced to achieve ETOPS reliability goals.
Reliability data would have to be readily available for use by the
certificate holder and the FAA to ensure that an acceptable level of
reliability is achieved and maintained.

The reporting requirements differ from the ARAC recommendation.  The
ARAC proposal indicated that the reporting requirements for ETOPS would
be satisfied through reporting required by sections 121.363, 121.703,
121.704 and 121.705.  Due to other FAA rulemaking activity to amend
sections 121.703 and 121.704, the reporting requirements of 121.703 and
121.704 would not apply in the manner as understood by the Working
Group.  In order to adjust for these changes, the FAA proposes to codify
the existing list of reportable events from Advisory Circular 120-42A.

(1) The following are in addition to the reporting requirements in
section 121.703 and would include:

(a) In-flight shutdowns.

(b) Diversions or turnback.

(c) Uncommanded power changes or surges.

(d) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.

(e) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.

(f) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.

(2) Certificate holders would also be required to furnish the following
information:

(a) Airplane identification (type and N-number).

(b) Engine identification (make and serial number).

(c) Total time, cycles and time since last shop visit.

(d) For systems, time since overhaul or last inspection of the
discrepant unit.

(e) Phase of flight.

(f) Corrective action.

This proposed regulation would require certificate holders to conduct an
investigation into the cause of the occurrence of any event listed above
in addition to any event described in section 121.703.  The certificate
holder would have to submit findings and description of corrective
action taken to the CHDO.  The FAA expects certificate holders to
investigate events above in conjunction with manufacturers.  The report
must be submitted in the manner prescribed by section 121.703(e).

(c) Propulsion System Monitoring

Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights.  A
propulsion system-monitoring program is intended to detect adverse
trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for
when corrective action may be necessary.  Propulsion system problems and
IFSD may be caused by type design deficiencies, ineffective maintenance,
or operational procedures.  It is very important to identify the root
cause of events so that corrective action may be determined.  The
diverse causes of propulsion system problems require different
solutions.  For example, type design problems may affect an entire fleet
of aircraft.  If an individual certificate holder experiences a problem
caused by a type design issue, it may not be appropriate for the FAA to
withdraw ETOPS authority.  Fundamental design problems that require an
effective hardware (or software) final fix will normally be corrected by
an FAA Airworthiness Directive.  Inspections may be satisfactory as an
interim solution but long-term design solutions are required for
terminating action.  However, maintenance or operational problems may be
wholly, or partially, the responsibility of the certificate holder.  In
these cases, the cause would be specific to that certificate holder and
may require changes to their operational, dispatch or maintenance
procedures.  Propulsion system monitoring should be used to ensure that
airplane and engine reliability stay within approximate IFSD rates as
described in the proposed regulation.

(d) Engine condition monitoring

The certificate holder would have to monitor the condition of engines on
ETOPS airplanes.  The monitoring program would describe the engine
performance parameters to be tracked, method of data collection,
analysis, and corrective action processes.  It would detect
deterioration in engine performance by tracking parameters such as rotor
speeds, exhaust gas temperatures, and fuel flow and to allow for
corrective action before safe operation is affected.  The program should
reflect the manufacturer’s instructions and industry practices.
Engine limit margins must be maintained so that prolonged engine
inoperative diversions may be conducted without exceeding approved
engine limits at all approved power levels and expected environmental
conditions.  Engine margins are maintained through this program to
account for the effects of additional engine loading demands such as
electrical and pneumatic systems that may be required during a
diversion.  If oil analysis such as Spectrographic Oil Analysis Program
(SOAP) would be relevant, it should be included.

(e) Oil consumption monitoring

The certificate holder would have to establish an engine oil consumption
monitoring program to ensure that there is enough oil to complete any
ETOPS flight.  The certificate holder’s consumption limit would not be
allowed to exceed the manufacturer’s recommendations, and would have
to be sensitive to oil consumption trends.  The program would have to
track the amount of oil added at the departing ETOPS station with
reference to the running average consumption.   The monitoring must be
continuous up to and including the oil added at the ETOPS departure
station.  For example, after servicing, the oil consumption may be
calculated by maintenance personnel as part of the pre-departure check
or may be automatically calculated by the certificate holder’s
computer software program.  The amount of oil added could also be
reported to centralized maintenance control for calculation prior to the
ETOPS flight. If an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) is required for ETOPS,
then its oil consumption for the

APU must be included in the program.

(f) APU in-flight start program

If APU in-flight start capability is required for ETOPS, the certificate
holder would be required to establish an in flight start and run
monitoring program.  The primary function of an APU is to provide backup
electrical power in the event of a main system failure such as engine
in-flight shut down or generator loss.  This program would have to
ensure that the APU in-flight start capability would continue at a level
of performance and reliability established by the manufacturer or the
FAA.  The program would have to be acceptable to the Administrator and
include periodic sampling of each ETOPS airplane’s APU in-flight
starting capabilities.  Certificate holders with existing approved
programs may continue under that authority under this proposal.
Sampling intervals may be adjusted according to system performance and
fleet maturity.  The Advisory Circular accompanying this proposal
contains guidance for APU reliability and performance assessment.

(g) Maintenance training

The certificate holder would have to develop additional ETOPS specific
training that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is required for
all personnel involved in ETOPS.  This training would be in addition to
the certificate holder’s accepted maintenance training program to
qualify individuals for specific airplane and engines.  This program may
be incorporated into the accepted maintenance training curricula.  The
certificate holder would have to review the entire maintenance-training
program with the CHDO to ensure that it adequately supports ETOPS
training requirements.  The goal of this program is to ensure that all
personnel involved in ETOPS are provided the necessary training so that
the ETOPS maintenance requirements are properly accomplished.

The program must establish a system to qualify ETOPS maintenance
personnel.  ETOPS qualified maintenance personnel are those who have
successfully completed the certificate holder’s ETOPS training program
and who have satisfactorily performed extended range tasks under the
direct supervision of an FAA certificated maintenance person who has had
previous experience with maintaining the particular make and model
aircraft being utilized under the certificate holder’s maintenance
program.  For new aircraft introduction, the previous experience for
training can be obtained from the manufacturers training program.

(h) Procedural changes

Following approval of the maintenance and training procedures
established to qualify for ETOPS; substantial changes to those
procedures must be submitted to the Certificate Holding District Office
(CHDO) and approved before they may be adopted.  The determination of
what constitutes substantial changes should be negotiated between the
certificate holder and the CHDO.  This is to allow some flexibility
depending on the certificate holder’s ETOPS experience and performance
history.  The CHDO may require submission of all changes for a new ETOPS
operator or for an operator experiencing difficulties. However, as
experience is gained the CHDO may reevaluate what changes it needs to
approve.

Continuing Surveillance

As with all other operations, the CHDO may also monitor all aspects of
the ETOPS operations it has authorized, to ensure that the levels of
reliability achieved in ETOPS operations remain at acceptable levels,
and that the operation continues to be conducted safely.  In the event
that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained, if
significant adverse trends exists, or if critical deficiencies are
detected in the type design or in the conduct of ETOPS operations, the
CHDO may initiate a special evaluation, impose operational restrictions,
and ensure the operator adopts corrective actions in order to resolve
the problems in a timely manner.  The CHDO should alert the appropriate
FAA Aircraft Certification Office and Aircraft Evaluation Group when
problems associated with airplane design or operations are identified.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.415(a)(4) Crewmember and dispatcher training
requirements.

The FAA proposes to add a new requirement to train crewmembers and
dispatchers in their roles and responsibilities in the certificate
holder’s passenger recovery plan to the certificate holder’s
approved training program.

Explanation.

Crewmember and dispatcher involvement in seeing to the welfare of
passengers following a diversion often is an important factor in the
success of post diversion passenger handling.  With ETOPS and the
possibility of diversion to a remote foreign airport with reduced
services and facilities available for passenger welfare, it is
increasingly important that the certificate holder have a passenger
recovery plan and that crew members and dispatchers understand their
role in that plan. Current regulations do not require training for
crewmembers or dispatchers in their role in a certificate holder’s
passenger recovery plan.  The role of the crewmembers and dispatchers
must be defined and the training program tailored around those defined
roles.

Proposed Change to Paragraph 121.565(a) Engine inoperative: Landing;
reporting   REF R121_565aEngineInoperativeLanding \p \h  \* MERGEFORMAT
below

Explanation.

The FAA proposes a minor revision to paragraph 121.565(a) to delete the
reference to stopping the rotation of an engine, which applies only to
propeller driven airplanes.  This is to be replaced with terminology
…“ whenever an engine is shut down…” that applies to all
reciprocating engines and turbine powered engines.

Proposed New Section 121.624 Dispatch Requirements for an ETOPS
Alternate Airport

The FAA proposes to add a regulation, which specifies the dispatch
requirements for an ETOPS alternate, and the requirements for a valid
ETOPS alternate after takeoff.

Explanation.

Most airplanes operate in an environment where there is usually a choice
of diversion airports available within a close proximity to the route of
flight.  The available airports usually have significant infrastructure
and facilities for routine handling of aircraft, crews, and passengers.
An airplane conducting ETOPS may have only one alternate within a range
dictated by the endurance of a particular airframe system (for example,
cargo fire suppressant) and therefore the approved maximum diversion
time for that route.  Additionally, the alternates maybe isolated and
less completely equipped to deal with passenger aircraft.  Therefore, it
is important that any airport designated as an ETOPS alternate has the
capabilities, services and facilities to safely support the airplane and
its passengers and crew during the diversion.  Section 121.624

A regulatory requirement for an ETOPS alternate meets a prudent planning
requirement for an en route diversion alternative for all long-range
aircraft in the event an engine failure, an airplane system failure or a
serious passenger problem.  A new regulation is required to specify the
dispatch and en route requirements for ETOPS alternates.  In addition,
past experience in ETOPS operations of twin-engine aircraft with en
route diversions for reasons other than engine failure justify the
imposition of a requirement to designate en route alternate for all
long-range operations with airplanes with two or more engines.  The
additional operational challenges of these routes are equally demanding
of all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, and include such
issues as extremes in terrain and meteorology, as well as limited
navigation and communications infrastructure.

At dispatch, an enroute alternate must meet the alternate weather
requirements specified in the certificate holder’s operations
specifications.  Due to the natural variability of weather conditions
with time, as well as the need to determine the suitability of a
particular enroute alternate prior to departure, such requirements are
higher than the weather minimums required to initiate an instrument
approach.  This is necessary to assure that the instrument approach can
be conducted safely if the flight must divert to an alternate airport.
The visual reference necessary to safely complete an approach and
landing is determined, among other things, by the accuracy with which
the airplane can be controlled along the approach path by reference to
instruments and the accuracy of the ground-based instrument aids, as
well as the tasks the pilot is required to accomplish to maneuver the
airplane so as to complete the landing.  For these reasons the weather
minima for non-precision approaches are generally higher than for
precision approaches.

The weather conditions at the time of arrival should provide a high
assurance that adequate visual references are available upon arrival at
decision height (DH) or minimum descent altitude (MDA), and the surface
wind conditions and corresponding runway surface conditions must be
within acceptable limits to permit the approach and landing to be safely
completed with an engine and/or systems inoperative.

The proposed section (d) would require operators to designate only those
airports as ETOPS alternates that adequately protect the passengers and
crew from the elements and see to their welfare.

Proposed Change to Section 121.625 Alternate airport weather minimums

Explanation.

The purpose of the proposed amendment to section 121.625 is to clarify
the intent of this regulation as being applicable to destination and
takeoff alternates only and not to ETOPS alternates requirements. ETOPS
alternate requirements are the subject of proposed new regulation,
section 121.624 ETOPS Alternates.

Proposed Change to Section 121.631 Original dispatch or flight release,
redispatch or amendment of dispatch or flight release

The FAA proposes to modify section 121.631 to specify weather
requirements for ETOPS alternates while a flight is en route and the
availability of the option to amend the dispatch or flight release to
add another ETOPS alternate if a required ETOPS alternate becomes
unavailable.

Explanation.

The FAA proposes to modify section 121.631 to address weather
conditions required at designated ETOPS alternates while a flight is en
route.  This regulation is consistent with the standards and practices
of AC 120-42A, the advisory circular that provided guidance for ETOPS
since 1985.

The proposed regulation also specifies the action required of the pilot
in command and, in the case of flag operations, the dispatcher, in the
event a required, designated alternate becomes unavailable and no other
qualifying airport is available.  In that event, the flight may not
continue as an ETOPS flight unless another track that qualifies is
available.  The FAA recognizes that this may sometimes cause disruptions
in scheduled operations and anticipates that carriers will adjust the
enroute alternate weather minimums upward on routes on which this
becomes more than a very infrequent problem.

Proposed New Section 121.633 Planned ETOPS diversion time limitations

The FAA proposes to add new regulation section 121.633 to require that
planned ETOPS diversion times not exceed the time limit specified in the
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) for the airplanes most time-limited system
minus 15 minutes.  For airplanes with more than two engines and type
certificated before the effective date of this regulation, the effective
date for compliance with paragraph 121.633(b) is proposed to be not
later than six years following the date on which this rule becomes
effective.

Explanation.

Section 121.633 has been developed to codify the two-engine airplane
operating practices with regard to diversion time and time critical
systems and to expand those regulations to include airplanes with more
than two engines in long-range operations.

The premise of ETOPS has been to preclude a diversion and, if it were to
occur, to have programs in place that protect the diversion.  Under this
concept, propulsion systems are designed and tested to assure an
acceptable level of in-flight shutdown; other airplane systems are
designed and tested to ensure their reliability.  However, despite the
best design/testing, and maintenance practices, situations have occurred
which required an airplane to divert.  In-service data has also shown
that all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, divert from
time to time for various causes.  Airplanes with more than two engines
currently are operated in areas where there are a limited number of
enroute airports, where the support infrastructure is marginal or with
challenging weather conditions.  All such operations should adopt the
same ‘preclude and protect’ concept.

Under the ‘preclude and protect’ concept, various failure scenarios
need to be considered.  For example, during the design of the airplane,
time limited systems such as cargo compartment fire
suppression/containment capability are considered.  The fuel planning
process accounts for the possibility of decompression and/or the failure
of an engine with considerations for icing.

If airplanes with more than two engines plan to operate in areas where
en route airports are farther than 180 minutes or in north polar areas
where weather conditions can be challenging at certain times of the
year, these operations should be required to meet the standards to
ensure that all efforts are made to preclude a diversion and, if a
diversion were to occur, procedures are in place to protect that
diversion.  This would include systems capability to protect the
aircraft and its occupants during the entire length of the diversion.
As such, for ETOPS operations less than 180 minutes the one engine
inoperative cruise speed maximum diversion time to any ETOPS alternate
may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
for the airplane’s most time-limited system, minus 15 minutes.  The 15
minutes allows time for approach and landing.  The cruise speed is
calculated as if in still air under standard temperature conditions.

In ETOPS operations wind becomes an increasingly significant factor with
increasing diversion times and should be considered in ETOPS operations
beyond 180 minutes to assure that AFM system time limits are not
exceeded.  For example, while diverting with an engine inoperative, it
is essential to ensure that there is sufficient amount of oil in the
tank for continuous operation of the remaining engines at Maximum
Continuous Thrust for the actual duration of divert.  As a result, for
ETOPS operations with approved diversion times greater than 180 minutes
the one engine inoperative cruise speed (approved) maximum diversion
time is calculated by taking into account forecast wind and temperature.
 The maximum diversion time may not exceed the time specified in the
airplane flight manual for the airplane’s most time-limited system,
minus 15 minutes for approach and landing.

However, there are some other time limited systems, like cargo fire
suppression, which may not have as much relevance to the one engine
inoperative diversion time.  The FAA believes that the likelihood of an
engine failure at the critical point followed by cargo fire to be
extremely remote.  Thus ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo fire suppression
requirement would be based on covering the diversion distance authorized
(maximum diversion time authorized at the approved one engine
inoperative speed) at the all engine operating speed.  It has already
been stated that for ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes wind becomes an
increasingly significant factor with increasing diversion times and
should be considered.  Therefore this proposed rule requires that for
ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo fire suppression time required be based
on the airplane operating at all engine operating speed with actual
wind.  For ETOPS at or below 180 min, there is precedent in AC 120-42,
for cargo fire suppression for the maximum diversion time based on one
engine inoperative speed.  This proposal would codify that practice.
The cargo fire suppression time in all cases shall also include 15
minutes allowance for holding, approach and landing.

During development of their recommendation the ARAC ETOPS Working Group
had much discussion regarding aircraft utilized in long haul operations.
 Some three and four-engine airplanes routinely operate on routes with
diversion times that exceed aircraft system capabilities such as cargo
fire suppression.  The FAA believes equivalent cargo fire suppression
capabilities should exist among the entire fleet of airplanes conducting
ETOPS.  The proposed regulation would require the modification of those
airplanes.  The FAA recognizes that a transition period to gain full
compliance with the proposed rule is necessary for the industry.  The
FAA finds that these modifications can be accomplished within the
scheduled maintenance D check cycle (6 years) based on ARAC
recommendations.  This proposal would grant the operator sufficient time
to adequately plan for and incorporate necessary modifications in the
6-year time frame proposed.

The FAA recognizes this proposal would allow three and four engine
airplanes to continue to operate on routes with diversion times up to
and including 180 minutes without having to update time-limited system
capabilities.  The FAA seeks comment on how it should address this
discrepancy in the future.

Proposed New  Section 121.646 Fuel supply required following
depressurization

We propose to add a new rule, section 121.646, to specify the fuel
supply required following depressurization.  Current regulations contain
no requirement for a fuel supply sufficient to reach an en route
diversion airport.

Explanation.

ICAO Annex 6, Part I, section <IP_ADDRESS>(d) requires consideration of
additional fuel in the event of loss of pressurization.  Fuel
consumption increases considerably at the lower altitudes flown
following a loss of pressurization.  Although section 121.329 requires
descent following cabin depressurization “to an altitude that will
allow successful termination of the flight,” there is no explicit
requirement in part 121 for a fuel supply in the event of cabin
depressurization to assure a safe landing.  It should be noted that an
interpretation can be made that fuel to provide for cabin pressurization
is required because of the requirement of section 121.329.

Both AC 120-42 and 120-42A considered the fuel supply required at the
most critical point in the ETOPS area of operation in the event of the
cabin depressurization, and also considered the possibility of a
simultaneous failure of an engine.  As the probability of
depressurization is comparable between two, three, and four-engine
airplanes , the proposed section 121.646 would retain the AC conditions
for fuel supply to an ETOPS alternate in the event of cabin
depressurization for all ETOPS operations.

For airplanes with more than two engines the section 121.329 implied
fuel supply requirement becomes a proposed regulatory requirement.
Paragraph 121.646(a) applies to operations more than 90 minutes (with
all engines operating at cruising power) and less than 180 minutes (at
the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed) from an adequate
airport, while the requirements in paragraph 121.646(b) apply for
operations greater than 180 minutes (at the approved one engine
inoperative cruise speed) from an adequate airport.

	Further, the AC required consideration of fuel for icing at the cabin
depressurization cruise altitude and consideration of errors in wind
forecasting.  Studies done by the Atmospheric Environment Service of
Canada with the assistance of airplane manufacturers under the second
Canadian Atlantic Storms Program (CASP II) confirm that the probability
of a continuous or repetitive significant icing encounter is very small
on a long flight segment.  The airspeeds associated with cruise at cabin
depressurization altitude are not conducive to ice build-up.  Moreover,
pilots can avoid icing with minor changes in altitude or by changing the
cruise speed, either of which can have a large effect on ice accretion.
Based on the CASP II study, considering the probability of encountering
depressurization at the critical point and icing on the same flight, an
argument was made that fuel for icing in addition to fuel for
depressurization is not deemed necessary.  However, as a conservative
measure, paragraph 121.646(b)(C)(iv) requires fuel to compensate for the
greater of the effect of airframe icing (including the fuel used by
engine and wing anti-ice during this period) during 10 percent of the
time for which icing is forecast, or a combination of fuel for engine
anti-ice, and for some models of airplanes based on their
characteristics and the manufacturer’s recommended procedures fuel for
wing anti-ice for the time during which icing is forecast.

Based on the weather forecasting techniques of the early 1980s, the AC
required a five percent fuel pad to account for wind forecast errors.
However, winds aloft forecasting has improved dramatically in the last
twenty years as a result of the following:

·	The sophistication of wind forecast models have experienced a quantum
improvement.  These models provide forecasts based on a wider range of
inputs and more accurate extrapolation throughout the altitude profile.

·	Wind forecasting responsibilities have been assigned to computers
with vastly increased capacity, capability, and speed.

·	The flow of input data has significantly increased; largely as a
result of systems that automatically downlink weather information at
much more frequent intervals.  Additionally, weather is measured on a
worldwide grid of collection points.  This grid has nearly four times
the collection points compared to the grid used previously.

·	Information gleaned from satellite downlinks and satellite depictions
of air mass movement are added to the data stream, not only to fine tune
forecasting at frequently flown altitudes, but also to provide more
accurate forecasts at lower altitudes (10,000 to 15,000 feet) where the
decompression profiles are flown.

This information is collected, analyzed, and distributed worldwide by
the World Area Forecast System (WAFS).  This centralized distribution of
weather information provides for a consistent level of accuracy that can
eliminate the assignment of arbitrary penalties, provided that
individual airlines subscribe to the service and make use of this level
of information.

Therefore, given the documented improvements in forecasting accuracy
when using WAFS, a more accurate means of determining the fuel used
during a decompression profile involves adding a pad to the actual
forecast winds in making the fuel calculation rather than adding an
arbitrary fuel penalty.  The addition of a five- percent wind error pad
provides an accurate case-by-case adjustment as compared with a five-
percent fuel penalty, while preserving the necessary level of safety.
However, if a certificate holder elects not to use such accurate winds
in the computation of decompression fuel, then the proposed rule will
require the operator to continue applying the five percent fuel pad to
account for wind forecast errors.

Section 121.646 requires accounting for any airplane performance
degradation on the fuel requirement.  In addition, if APU is a required
power source, then its fuel consumption also must be accounted for.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.687(a)(6) Dispatch release: Flag and
domestic operations

We propose to add new paragraph 121.687(a)(6), which would add the ETOPS
approval basis to the content of the dispatch release under which the
flight is being dispatched.

Explanation.

The proposal assures that the pilot in command of an ETOPS flight is
notified as to the time basis, (for example, 120 minute or 180 minute
ETOPS) including the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) limitations, under
which the flight is dispatched.

Proposed New Paragraph 121.689(a)(8) Flight release form: Supplemental
operations

The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph 121.689(a)(8) to add the ETOPS
time basis to the content of the flight release of each ETOPS flight.

Explanation.

The proposal assures that the pilot in command of an ETOPS flight is
aware of the limitations (for example, 120 minute or 180 minute ETOPS)
including the minimum Equipment List (MEL) limitations, under which the
flight is released.

Proposed New 14 CFR 121 Appendix O Requirements for ETOPS Approvals

Appendix O to Part 121 would establish the operational requirements and
limitations for the various ETOPS diversion time thresholds and areas of
ETOPS applicability.  In very general terms, Appendix O would codify
existing approvals and operational practices that have been developed
since 1985 and it would also establish requirements for ETOPS flights
that certificate holders may elect to operate in the future.  These
latter ETOPS flights would have diversion time bases exceeding 180
minutes and are not authorized at this time.  The FAA points out again
that 207-minute ETOPS flights are an extension of the 180-minute
authority and not an independent diversion time authority.

A. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes with 2 engines

(a) 75 Minutes ETOPS

The proposed 75-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification of
the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A.  This deviation authority
has traditionally been used for operations in the Caribbean, Western
Atlantic, and less frequently, in the North Atlantic areas of operation.

(b) 90-minute ETOPS (Micronesia).

This ARAC recommendation for a new diversion authorization is to
establish a 90-minute ETOPS authority for exclusive use on Micronesia
routes.  This geographical area has been served with ETOPS approved
airplanes with operational authority to dispatch at 120-minutes.  The
only difference between the proposed 90-minute level in comparison to
120-minute ETOPS is to require the ETOPS pre-departure check on the
outbound segment only.  The nature of flights to serve this area
involves destinations to islands at frequencies such that it becomes
unreasonable for the operator to have an ETOPS certified mechanic
stationed at the arrival location.  An alternative means is for the
operator to carry on board each flight a certified ETOPS mechanic that
would conduct the ETOPS pre-departure check prior to the return to the
return flight.  This option is an inefficient use of a certified
mechanic.  The Micronesia route structure is such that it lies beyond a
75-minute authority (which would allow for the operation to be conducted
without requiring the ETOPS pre-departure check for the return flight),
but short of requiring the full 120-minute diversion.  The Micronesia
area in terms of weather and airport availability is similar to the area
associated with ETOPS conducted in the Caribbean area.

The FAA proposes to allow for a 90-minute ETOPS diversion authority for
use in Micronesia routes provided that the airplane is type design
approved, and configured to the CMP standards for 120-minutes.  The
operations are to be conducted to 120-minute ETOPS standards and
requirements and MEL requirements, with the exception that the ETOPS
pre-departure check will not be required for the return leg of the round
trip flight.

(c) 120 minutes.

The FAA proposed 120-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification
of the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A.  The airplane and
engine combination would have to be ETOPS type design approved for a
minimum of 120-minutes and configured to the standards specified in the
CMP document.  All flight operations dispatched or released to
120-minute ETOPS standards would have to comply with MEL requirements
specified for the operation.

(d) 138 Minutes.

The FAA proposed 138-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification
of the criteria that is specified in the 138-minute ETOPS policy letter.
 No changes to the present existing requirements are proposed.
Operators may request 138-minute ETOPS operational approval on an
airplane engine combination that has an ETOPS type design approval of
120-minutes provided that the airplane engine combination has been
assessed by the FAA for the extended diversion length.  In such cases
the dispatch authority may only be exercised on a flight-by-flight
exception basis.  The operator will be required to amend and use a MEL
that has been amended to include those items that are specified for
operations beyond 120-minutes.  Operators approved to conduct 138-minute
ETOPS with an airplane and engine combination that has 180-minute ETOPS
type design approval may to so without any restriction to frequency of
use.  The operator must dispatch or release such flights in accordance
with the MEL provisions for ETOPS beyond 120 minutes.

(e) 180 Minutes.

The FAA proposed 180-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification
of the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A.  The airplane and
engine combination would have to be ETOPS type design approved for a
minimum of 180-minutes and configured to the standards specified in the
CMP document for 180-minutes.  All flight operations dispatched or
released to 180-minute ETOPS standards would have to comply with MEL
requirements specified for the operation.

(f) Greater than 180 minutes

The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendations to include the increased ETOPS
diversion authorizations beyond 180-minutes.  ETOPS beyond 180 minutes
has been in use on a limited, flight by flight exception basis, since
March 2000 with the issuance of the 207-minute ETOPS policy.  The
industry has demonstrated its capability to maintain the necessary
engine and systems reliability for such operations using the B-777
airplane.  Certain geographical areas of the world have few adequate
airports along flight routing, and are separated by a distance that is
farther than what could be flown within 180-minutes.  Other geographical
areas have severe weather patterns and weather systems that at times
would not allow for the designation and use of area airports as ETOPS
alternates.  In these cases the air carrier would benefit with better
dispatch reliability and added safety of the flight with the ability to
flight plan with diversion times that exceed 180-minutes to avoid
exposure to such conditions.

The authority for this increased diversion distance flight planning is
dependent on the demonstrated capability of the operator’s ETOPS
program, and the use of an airplane and engine combination that is
approved for such operations.  The FAA therefore proposes that
eligibility of an air carrier to conduct ETOPS beyond 180 minutes will
be dependant on the air carrier already having ETOPS approval to conduct
180-minute ETOPS with the requested airplane and engine combination.  It
will therefore not be possible for the air carrier to bypass the
180-minute ETOPS approval process before making application for ETOPS
approvals beyond 180-minutes.

Air carriers that are authorized to conduct ETOPS beyond 180-minutes
will be required to consider all available airports that are within
180-minutes of the routing being planned for use as ETOPS alternates.
This is to minimize the dispatch diversion time to 180-minutes when
possible, and thereby minimizes the risk of the extended exposure when
possible.  The proposed rule in Appendix O requires that:

“In conducting all such operations, operators shall make every attempt
to minimize diversion time along the preferred track and plan ETOPS at
maximum diversion distances of 180 minutes or less.  If conditions
prevent the use of adequate airports within 180 minutes as ETOPS
alternates, the route may be flown beyond 180 minutes subject to the
requirements provided for the specific area of operations.”

In March 2000 the FAA implemented the 207-minute ETOPS policy that
required certain airplane system capabilities and that specific
equipment be operable at time of dispatch or flight release for a
207-minute planned route.  This included enhanced communication
capability with the use of SATCOM, or with the use of SATCOM data link.
It also required that the flight crew before entering the extended range
entry point receive company communication to update the flight plan
information based on a review of the airplane status and systems
capability, as well as an update on all available alternates along the
flight route.  For airplane capabilities, single engine autoland is
required to be operative at dispatch for a 207-minute ETOPS flight.  The
policy letter also specified additional system and equipment operability
that cannot be deferred for such operations through the use of a minimum
equipment list (MEL).  This includes the fuel quantity indicating system
(FQIS), the auxiliary power unit (APU) to its full electrical and