\112\ An exception for Type 2 lap belts that have detachable
torso belts is not relevant here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In developing a performance standard for lap/shoulder belt
anchorages, the agency considered several alternatives, and assessed
the suitability of alternatives using seat belt anchorage test data
obtained in the motorcoach crash test and sled test program. NHTSA
tentatively determined that the test data best supported applying FMVSS
No. 210 to the passenger seat belt anchorages on the covered buses, but
we requested comments on alternatives to FMVSS No. 210, particularly
ECE R.14 and ECE R.80.
    ECE Regulation No. 14, ``Vehicles with Regard to Safety-Belt
Anchorages, ISOFIX Anchorages Systems and ISOFIX Top Tether
Anchorages,'' applies to M2 and M3 vehicles \113\ and specifies a
static test method to evaluate seat belt and seat anchorage strength.
The ECE R.14 load does not include the load that unbelted occupants aft
of the seat being evaluated (we call this the ``target seat'') may
impose on the target seat. For M3 vehicles, ECE R.14 applies a load of
4,500 N to the shoulder belt and 4,500 N to the lap belt (total of
9,000 N). In addition, for M3 vehicles it also specifies an additional
inertial seat load of 6.6g x the weight of the seat. For M2 seats, it
specifies an addition load of 10g x the weight of the seat.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ ECE Regulations define the M2 vehicle category as vehicles
having more than eight seating positions and mass not exceeding 5
metric tons (11,023 lb). The M3 vehicle category consists of
vehicles having more than eight seating positions and mass exceeding
5 metric tons (11,023 lb).
    \114\ Seats designed to meet ECE R.14 for M3 vehicles are
referred to in this final rule document as ``7 g'' seats and seats
designed for M2 vehicles are referred to as ``10 g'' seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ECE Regulation No. 80, ``Seats of Large Passenger Vehicles and of
These Vehicles with Regard to the Strength of the Seats and Their
Anchorages,'' applies to M2 and M3 vehicles. The ECE R.80 procedures
evaluate the seat back's strength, energy absorption capability and
impact protection for occupants in the rear seat aft of the target seat
and the target seat's anchorage strength. The seat back performance is
assessed with either a dynamic or a static test option. The ECE R.80
load does not include the seat belt loads from the restrained occupant
in the target seat and evaluates anchorage performance in terms of the
loading of the seat back from unrestrained occupants in the rearward
row.
    The dynamic test option of ECE R.80 loads the seat back with an
unrestrained \115\ 50th percentile male dummy in a 30-32 km/h (18.6-
19.9 mph) delta V, 6.5-8.5 average g pulse. Performance value limits on
the injury measures of the dummy are HIC = 500, chest acceleration = 30
g, femur force = 10,000 N (2,248 lb) and 8,000 N (1,798 lb) for not
more than 20 milliseconds.\116\ The static test option assesses seat
back performance through a static force-deflection test that applies
5,000 N (1,124 lb) to the seat over a 200 millisecond time period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ We note that ECE R.80 also requires testing with a
restrained dummy in the rear ``auxiliary'' seat. However, this
auxiliary seat need not be the same as the forward seat that is the
focus of the test. If the test with the belted dummy in the rear is
conducted with the manikin restrained by a lap/shoulder belt and the
injury criteria are not exceeded, the auxiliary seat is considered
to have met the requirements relating to the static test loads and
movement of the upper anchorage of ECE R.14.
    \116\ These injury criteria do not match those in FMVSS No. 208
for the 50th percentile male test dummy, except for the upper limit
on femur force. The chest acceleration limit in FMVSS No. 208 is 60
gs. FMVSS No. 208 specifies a HIC15 limit of 700. The HIC limit in
ECE R.80 does not appear to have a time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency proposed to adopt FMVSS No. 210 after analyzing the seat
belt anchorage test data obtained in the VRTC motorcoach crash test and
sled test program.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ NHTSA found that the over-the-road bus in the 48 km/h (30
mph) rigid barrier crash test experienced only a 13g peak
deceleration (crash pulse). Data from our frontal sled test program
enabled us to analyze the magnitude of the forces that are exerted
on the seat anchorages in a 13g crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We studied five sled tests from the sled test program to determine
the loads measured at the seat belt anchorages.\118\ These five were
selected because they represented demanding yet potentially common
scenarios for the loads we believe will be imparted to seat belt
anchorages during a motorcoach crash. We identified the loads recorded
in the sled tests at the seat anchorage points in the second row target
seat, the loads on the lap/shoulder belts in the target seat in which
test dummies were restrained, and the loads to the seat back of the
target seat from the unrestrained dummies in the third (aft) row. We
then compared those loads to the loads that seat belt and seat
anchorages are required to withstand under FMVSS No. 210, ECE R.14 and
ECE R.80. In that way, we could determine which performance test best
accounted for the loads imparted on the seat belt anchorages.
    Of the five sled tests, the highest total load experienced by the
seat anchorages in the forward direction was 46,570 N (10,469 lb). This
load resulted from a test of a 10 g seat with two 50th percentile male
test dummies restrained with lap/shoulder belts in the middle row and
with two unrestrained 50th percentile male dummies in the rear (aft)
row. Applying a static load of 48,569 N (10,918 lb) (or approximately
24,285 N (5,460 lb) per seating position) to the seat belt anchorages,
using the loading devices and technique specified in FMVSS No. 210,
reproduces the load measured at the seat anchorages in the sled
test.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ For a description of the five sled tests, see 75 FR 50973,
col. 2.
    \119\ This relationship was determined by testing a seat to
failure using the loading device specified in FMVSS No. 210 and
measuring the load applied through the seat belt anchorages and the
load experienced at the seat anchorages (in the x-direction). This
method was referred to as ``Method B'' in the NPRM and in research
report DOT HS 811 335, NHTSA's Motorcoach Safety Research Crash,
Sled, and Static Tests, dated May 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FMVSS No. 210 appeared to best account for the loads imparted on
the seat belt anchorages. The total load on the seat belt anchorages of
48,569 N (10,918 lb) (approximately 24,285 N (5,460 lb) per seating
position) required to generate the same peak total load experienced in
the sled test is only slightly lower than the total forces required by
FMVSS No. 210 of 53,380 N (12,000 lb) (or 26,690 N (6,000 lb) per
seating position). That is, the highest total peak dynamic loading
recorded by the seat anchorage of the tests (48,569 N) was about 91
percent of that applied in FMVSS No. 210 (26,690 N (6,000 lb) per seat,
or 53,380 N (12,000 lb) for a two-person bench seat). These data
indicated that the FMVSS No. 210 load would account for seat belt loads
generated by a restrained occupant, seat inertia loads, and loading
from unbelted occupants in the rear.
    ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 both determine seat belt and seat anchorage
strength by separately considering the loading from the belted occupant
in the seat and the loading due to unrestrained occupants in the rear
row. We believed that the loads specified in these regulations are not
sufficiently high to sustain the combined loads from the restrained
occupant in the seat and rear occupant loading. In the test of the 7 g
seat with restrained 50th percentile male dummies in the target seat
and unrestrained 50th percentile male dummies in the rear, we estimated
that the total peak load on the anchorages from the lap/shoulder belts
alone for one motorcoach seating position was

11,400 N (2,563 lb) and that from rear occupant loading was 8,150 N
(1,832 lb). The contribution of anchorage loads in this sled test from
the seat belt loading alone was greater than the 9,000 N (2,023 lb)
applied by ECE R.14 and the loading from rear occupant loading was
greater than the 5,000 N (1,124 lb) applied by ECE R.80. We believed
that a seat manufactured to meet FMVSS No. 210 would better be able to
withstand this tri-loading on the seat in a severe yet not uncommon bus
crash, than a seat that was not manufactured to account for the
rearward loading.
    In the NPRM, the agency explained that it has tentatively
determined that there were no adverse consequences associated with
applying FMVSS No. 210 to the seat belt anchorages of the affected
vehicles rather than ECE R.14 (75 FR at 50974). There did not appear to
be adverse consequences to meeting FMVSS No. 210 in terms of weight,
comfort, or cost, because data from our testing program indicated that
the Amaya 7 g seats we acquired to evaluate in our testing program
appeared to have been already made to meet the more stringent
requirements of FMVSS No. 210. In April 2009, VRTC tested existing
Amaya lap/shoulder belt seat designs to evaluate FMVSS No. 210
performance. The agency sought to understand the extent to which
changes will be needed to existing 7 g and 10 g seat and seat anchorage
designs in order to meet the performance requirements in FMVSS No. 210.
Two static tests were performed on the seats using a test fixture and
the FMVSS No. 210 test method.\120\ Both the 7 g and 10 g seats were
able to meet the FMVSS No. 210 performance requirements, which NHTSA
believed showed not only the practicability of the proposed FMVSS No.
210 requirements with current designs, but also that meeting FMVSS No.
210 was not likely to adversely affect the weight or comfort of current
``7 g'' seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ An additional test was conducted on a 10 g seat because an
initial FMVSS No. 210 test was conducted on a 10 g seat using the
same seat mounting rails used during the 7 g seat test. During this
10 g seat test, the seat failed to meet the FMVSS No. 210 loads.
However, we determined that this test should be deemed invalid
because the seat rails were reused. It was unknown to what extent
the rails were damaged during the previous test, thus affecting the
results of the subsequent test. The rails were replaced on the test
fixture and a second test using a 10 g rated seat was performed
successfully.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although we preferred FMVSS No. 210 to ECE R.14 and ECE R.80, the
NPRM asked for information that could help the agency make a fuller
incremental assessment of each alternative's costs and benefits.

Comments

    There were 16 comments on the proposal to apply FMVSS No. 210 to
all seating positions in the affected vehicles. Many commenters
supported applying FMVSS No. 210, while several others supported the
ECE regulations. Two commenters suggested alternative requirements.
Many commenters recommended that NHTSA adopt requirements regulating
seat back impact and/or energy absorption.
    Generally, the seat manufacturers commenting on this issue (C.E.
White, Freedman, IMMI, and American Seating) supported applying FMVSS
No. 210 as proposed. C.E. White stated that ``not only the forward
forces applied to the lap/shoulder belts, representative of the
restrain[ed] occupants in the test seat, [should] be taken into
consideration but also the forces applied by the knee/femur and head/
upper torso of the unrestrained occupants in the seat behind the test
seat [should] be taken into consideration.'' Freedman agreed with the
agency's conclusion that FMVSS No. 210 should be extended to all
seating positions in the affected vehicles and stated that the U.S. bus
industry is already familiar with FMVSS No. 210 requirements and will
therefore be able to move forward into the testing process very
quickly.
    IMMI expressed its support of the agency's proposal to extend the
FMVSS No. 210 requirements to all seating positions. It believed that
FMVSS No. 210 is a better choice than either ECE R.14 or ECE R.80 since
it is a more realistic representation of the types of crash forces that
may be experienced in real-world crashes, and reflects the total forces
that may be experienced by the seat anchorage from both restrained and
unrestrained occupants. IMMI said that compliance with FMVSS No. 210 is
already achievable and is currently available in motorcoach seating.
IMMI stated that, at the time of submission of its comments to the
NPRM, at least three manufacturers of covered buses offer IMMI's
Premier[supreg] FMVSS No. 210 compliant seats in their vehicles. IMMI
also stated that it helped these manufacturers develop the necessary
floor and wall structure to meet the performance standard.
    IMMI also stated that it performed sled tests of its own seats and
found that the data produced were consistent with the agency's
findings. In addition, IMMI said the results of analytical simulations
of severe case loading were also similar to the agency's data. (These
data are discussed below.) AORC agreed with the agency's proposal to
apply the FMVSS No. 210 anchorage load requirement.
    Five bus manufacturers (Setra, Prevost, IC Bus, MCI, and Van Hool)
and ABC Companies, a distributor of Van Hool's buses, commented on the
proposal to apply the FMVSS No. 210 anchorage load requirements to all
seating positions in covered buses. These commenters were divided in
their views.
    Setra, a European bus manufacturer, preferred the ECE regulations,
stating that the ECE regulations have been successfully used in Europe.
Setra stated that VRTC's testing might not represent realistic
situations, and that seats meeting FMVSS No. 210 may lead to higher
injuries than a seat meeting the ECE ``impact requirements.''
    Prevost requested that NHTSA consider the M2 requirements of ECE
R.14, which it stated is based on a ``closer and more realistic
deceleration pulse'' than the proposed FMVSS No. 210 requirements.
Prevost stated that the load from an unbelted occupant behind the seat
as well as the weight of the seat should be included in the forces
applied to the seat, but ``the deceleration pulse must be diligently
specified since it has a very significant multiplying effect.'' Prevost
also recommended that the requirements be reduced for seats where there
is no possibility of an unbelted passenger being seated behind it.
    IC Bus agreed with the agency's conclusion that FMVSS No. 210
should be extended to all seating positions in covered buses. IC Bus
noted that when it builds a commercial bus that specifies seat belts,
it is built to meet the applicable requirements of FMVSS No. 210.
    MCI disagreed with the proposal to apply FMVSS No. 210 to all
seating positions, believing that NHTSA has not tested a sufficiently
broad spectrum of seating configurations. The commenter suggested that
the agency duplicate the same or similar test conditions with emphasis
on protecting women and children. The commenter submitted confidential
test data from sled tests it conducted, and recommended a form of
static testing on a bus frame using a unique loading profile that
combined aspects of ECE R.14 (10 g; M2 vehicles) and FMVSS No. 210.
    Van Hool, a European bus manufacturer, supported adopting ECE R.14
and ECE R.80. Van Hool stated that a ``true European seat'' cannot
fulfill the FMVSS No. 210 requirements as proposed in the NPRM because
the loads are three times that required by ECE R.14 and the strength of
the seat is limited by the energy-absorbing

capabilities required by ECE R.80 for unbelted passengers striking the
seat from behind. In its submission, Van Hool questioned whether the
Amaya seats that were used in the NHTSA VRTC tests, which according to
Amaya met the ECE R.14 requirements for M3 and M2 vehicles, were also
approved to ECE R.80 since this was not mentioned in the NPRM. Van Hool
also asked why the NPRM did not consider a proposal for adding a 10 g
standard for large buses into FVMSS No. 207, ``Seating systems.'' \121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ By this we believe Van Hool meant applying half the forces
specified by FMVSS No. 210 to the seat belt anchorages and an
inertial load to the seat, assuming a 10 g deceleration instead of
the 20 g specified in FMVSS No. 207.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ABC Companies supported an approach that allows compliance with
either the U.S. standards or preexisting European standards, to
facilitate harmonization of standards.
    Transportation providers Greyhound, Coach USA, UMA and American Bus
Association (ABA) were divided in their support of the proposed
application of FMVSS No. 210 anchorage load requirements.
    Greyhound strongly supported the agency's proposal to apply the
FMVSS No. 210 requirements to the passenger seat anchorages. Greyhound
stated that the 10 percent strength margin that the FMVSS No. 210 loads
provided is prudent since ``higher speeds and larger passengers than
those [reflected in the VRTC tests] will sometimes be involved in real
world crashes.'' Greyhound stated that it sees no basis for allowing
the European standards as an alternative to FMVSS No. 210. It commented
that FMVSS No. 210 is ``clearly the more appropriate standard'' when
compared to ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 because FMVSS No. 210 accounts for
the load of both the belted passenger in the seat and an unrestrained
passenger in the seat behind, whereas the European standards do not.
Greyhound stated that it has been installing IMMI Safeguard Premier
seats, which meet FMVSS No. 210 and other FMVSSs, in all of its new
buses since 2008.
    UMA supported the FMVSS No. 210 requirements. UMA stated that it
reviewed the data provided by NHTSA in the NPRM and concluded that seat
belt assembly anchorages that meet FMVSS No. 210 will perform in a
manner that offers occupants the highest known protection in ``real-
life'' crash and rollover occurrences.
    ABA favored allowing motorcoach manufacturers to certify their
vehicles to either the FMVSS requirements proposed in the NPRM or, at
the manufacturer's option, to ECE R.14 and ECE R.80. ABA stated that
the agency's proposed performance requirements accurately represent the
agency's results of its motorcoach crash and sled testing and
subjecting passenger seating to FMVSS No. 210 reasonably matches the
forces and loads in NHTSA's test results. However, ABA also suggested
that in light of what the commenter believed would be the panoply of
new regulations that may be adopted, the considerable costs involved,
the relatively small volume of new covered buses sold each year and the
global nature of the industry, compliance options permitting
harmonization will enhance flexibility, reduce costs and promote the
overall turnover of the fleet towards newer vehicles.
    Coach USA also supported the approach of allowing manufacturers to
comply with either FMVSS No. 210 or ECE R.14 and ECE R.80. The
commenter stated that its parent company, Stagecoach Group,
headquartered in Scotland, operates approximately 780 motorcoaches in
Europe that are equipped with seat belts that meet the EU standards,
and the belts ``have not proven to pose a safety issue over a period of
several years.'' The commenter believed that ECE R.14 ``is sufficient
to accomplish NHTSA's primary goal in this rulemaking, namely, ejection
prevention in rollovers.'' Coach USA stated that NHTSA did not suggest
that seat belts designed to meet FMVSS No. 210 are necessary to achieve
this level of effectiveness in rollover crashes. The commenter believed
that frontal crashes resulting in forces on the seat back exceeding
those of ECE R.14 are ``rare.'' Coach USA believed that FMVSS No. 210
will provide little, if any, benefit in frontal crashes beyond the
benefits produced by ECE R.14.
    Coach USA commented that a combination of ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 is
likely to provide some safety benefits compared to FMVSS No. 210 by
protecting unbelted passengers. It stated that, to the extent that
FMVSS No. 210 provides some benefit relative to the European standard
in severe frontal crashes, this benefit is offset in other areas and,
as a result, the two ECE standards would appear to provide an
approximately comparable level of safety when all relevant factors are
taken into account.
    Coach USA submitted a separate report to the agency which detailed
a sled test study that it conducted on Van Hool motorcoach seats, which
they stated comply with ECE R.14 (for M3 vehicles) and ECE R.80. Coach
USA conducted sled testing and FMVSS No. 210 static testing on Van Hool
motorcoach seats installed on a test ``buck'' representing the interior
of a motorcoach. In the tests, three rows of seats were mounted on the
test buck. The first row (front row) was unoccupied, the second was
occupied with Hybrid III 50th percentile adult male test dummies that
were restrained with lap/shoulder belts, and the third row was occupied
with two unrestrained 50th percentile adult male Hybrid III test
dummies. Coach USA stated that the restrained dummies in the second row
remained restrained and the seat remained attached to the replicated
bus, and the commenter said, provided protection for the belted
occupants.
    Subsequently, Coach USA conducted an FMVSS No. 210 test on a new
Van Hool seat, and the seat failed to meet the standard's strength
requirements. Coach USA concluded that FMVSS No. 210 is ``not a
necessary requirement for safety. . . . [A] motor coach seat that is
able to comply with ECE R.80 dynamic test or its dynamic equivalent
such as FMVSS [No.] 208 would assure more protection than a seat that
is able to meet FMVSS [No.] 210 requirements.''

Agency Response

    In accordance with the Vehicle Safety Act and the Motorcoach
Enhanced Safety Act, after considering all relevant, available safety
information, we have determined that the FMVSS No. 210 requirements are
reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the seat belt anchorages
on buses affected by this final rule (buses with a GVWR greater than
11,793 kg (26,000 lb)). Our reasons for adopting the FMVSS No. 210
requirements, set forth in the NPRM (75 FR at 50973-50975), were
supported and bolstered by diverse commenters. The information provided
by all the commenters enhanced our knowledge of the subject matter. The
requirements we have adopted take into account the impact to seating
capacity of changes to size and weight of motorcoaches and the ability
to comply with State and Federal size and weight requirements, as
required by section 32703(e), ``Application of Regulations,'' of the
Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act, and are based on the best available
science, as mandated by section 32703(e) of the Act.

Safety Need

    There is a safety need to apply FMVSS No. 210 to the passenger seat
belt anchorages of the affected buses. NHTSA has decided not to accept
the European requirements because ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 do not consider
the totality of loads resulting from (a) belted occupants, (b) unbelted
occupants aft of

the belted occupant, and (c) the inertia load of the seat, i.e., the
``tri-loading'' from the three in a motorcoach crash. We believe FMVSS
No. 210 is needed to ensure the belt anchorages can protect the belted
occupant. The static load requirements specified in ECE R.14 (for M2
and M3 vehicles) and ECE R.80 are far below that needed to generate the
peak seat anchorage loads that NHTSA measured in its sled tests, which
means a seat that minimally meets the ECE required static loads for M3
vehicles may separate from its floor anchorages in a crash of the
severity represented by the 48 km/h (30 mph) frontal barrier impact
performed by NHTSA.
    In its comment supporting the application of FMVSS No. 210, IMMI
stated that it performed tests on its own seats after the NPRM and
found that the sled test data were consistent with the agency's data
provided in the NPRM. IMMI stated that its test data supported the
agency's view that FMVSS No. 210 is a more realistic representation of
the crash forces that may be experienced in real-world crashes than
those of ECE R.14 and ECE R.80. The commenter reported that in over 20
sled tests using 50th and 95th percentile test dummies, IMMI found an
average total x-direction (fore-aft) component force of 51,983 N
(11,686 lb) for its 2-occupant seat, which it stated was ``near the
FMVSS [No.] 210 specified requirement of 26,688 N per position or
53,376 N per 2-occupant seat.'' \122\ The close similarity between
IMMI's sled tests and NHTSA's sled tests reinforces the conclusion that
the FMVSS No. 210 requirements are reasonable and appropriate for the
seats on the affected buses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ NHTSA notes that the FMVSS No. 210 load is required to be
applied at an initial angle of 5 to 15 degrees above the horizontal
resulting in an x-direction component force that is lower than
53,380 N; therefore, it is more accurate to compare IMMI's forces to
the x-direction component of the applied FMVSS No. 210 load, which
is from 51,561 N to 53,177 N for a 2-occupant seat. This indicates
that the average total loads that IMMI recorded in its sled tests
were within the load range that may be experienced in an FMVSS No.
210 test; their maximum loads were only slightly above those of
FMVSS No. 210. [Footnote not in quoted text.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other safety information from IMMI also supports the validity of
the agency's data. In its comment, IMMI said that it performed two
analytical simulations, one with two unrestrained 50th percentile males
seated behind two restrained 50th percentile males and another with two
unrestrained 95th percentile males seated behind two restrained 50th
percentile males, which resulted in total x-direction component forces
of 56,196 N (12,633 lb) and 57,451 N (12,916 lb), respectively. The
peak total loads in both of IMMI's simulations are also slightly above
the loads which may be experienced in an FMVSS No. 210 test, the
largest being 8 percent [57,451 N/53,177 N] above the largest x-
direction component expected in an FMVSS No. 210 test. In addition, the
IMMI simulations indicated that sustained loads of 40,000 N (8,992 lb)
to 50,000 N (11,240) for approximately 100 milliseconds following the
peak loads are possible in real-world crashes, which are only slightly
below the loads applied in an FMVSS No. 210 test.

Reasonable and Appropriate

    As noted above, Coach USA supported the approach of allowing
manufacturers to comply with either FMVSS No. 210 or ECE R.14 and ECE
R.80. Coach USA states that FMVSS No. 210 will provide little, if any,
benefit in frontal crashes beyond the benefits produced by ECE R.14.
Coach USA said that only 0.16 fatalities from high speed frontal
crashes into rigid roadside objects would be prevented annually by the
rule, assuming a 15 percent seat belt use rate. It stated that, even if
seat belts are used in motorcoaches at the same rate they are used in
passenger vehicles (83 percent), the expected number of fatalities
prevented per year for this kind of crash is still less than one. It
also argued that these estimates do not take into account that some of
the crashes in which the most harmful event was listed as ``Roadside''
were not the type of crash simulated by NHTSA (involving direct frontal
impact into a rigid object at 48 km/h (30 mph)). Thus, Coach USA
suggested NHTSA overestimated the estimated number of fatalities the
rule will prevent annually.
    In response, accident data show that it is reasonable to base a
standard on data from a 48 km/h (30 mph) barrier test, i.e., that it is
reasonable to assume that the test is representative of a realistic,
severe crash condition. As discussed earlier in this preamble, FARS
data show that frontal impacts represent a substantial amount (41.6
percent [87/209]) of the fatalities in buses affected by this final
rule. Moreover, the covered buses can travel on high speed roads where
the risk of a high speed impact is foreseeable. The NTSB has
investigated a number of high speed frontal crashes that likely
underwent a velocity change (delta-V) comparable to or exceeding the
crash test performed by NHTSA, as illustrated in Table 6.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ We note that the investigation of these crashes provided
crash speed, which is not directly comparable to the barrier impact
speed in the 48 km/h (30 mph) NHTSA crash test. However, these
impact speeds ranged from double to 2\1/2\ times the barrier crash
speed. Depending on the object struck, this suggests a crash
severity (as represented by a velocity change (delta-V)) similar to
or greater than the barrier impact.

    Table 6--Examples of Frontal Motorcoach Crashes Investigated by the NTSB Involving Impact Velocities Well in Excess of the NHTSA 48 km/h (30 mph)
                                                                   Barrier Crash Test
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Injury severity [dagger]
              Incident                   Total    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------     Approximate impact
                                       occupants            Fatal                   Serious             Minor         None              velocity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Osseo 2005..........................           45  5 (inc. driver)........  5......................           30            5  102-126 km/h.
                                                                                (64-78 mph).
Tallulah 2003.......................           15  8......................  7 (inc. driver)                    0            0  97-105 km/h.
                                                                             [Dagger].                                         (60-65 mph).
Loraine 2002........................           38  3......................  6 (inc. driver)........           24            5  77-89 km/h.
                                                                                (48-55 mph).
New Orleans 1999....................           44  22.....................  16.....................            6            0  93 km/h. (58 mph).
Burnt Cabins 1998...................           23  7 (inc. driver)........  1......................           15            0  97-105 km/h.
                                                                                (60 to 65 mph).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[dagger] Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines fatal injury as ``any injury which results in death within 30 days of the accident''
  and serious injury as ``any injury which: (1) Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was
  received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, or tendon
  damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body
  surface.''

[Dagger] One of the seriously injured passengers died due to accident injuries 35 days after the accident. Only fatalities resulting within 30 days of
  the accident are included as fatal injuries in the NTSB reports.

    Frontal crashes of the subject buses can be just as devastating as
rollovers, as shown by the 1999 New Orleans crash that took the lives
of 22 people on the bus.\124\ Our updated field data show that frontal
impacts represent a substantial amount (41.6 percent [87/209]) of the
fatalities. Therefore, while our primary focus in this rulemaking was
on ejection mitigation in rollovers, our initiative, consistent with
NHTSA and the Department's focus on increasing overall safety in these
vehicles, was also focused on frontal \125\ and other planar crashes.
We believe it would be a short-sighted public policy to define the
requisite level of performance of the seat belt anchorages considering
only rollovers when the affected buses are involved in other severe
crashes as well. Requiring anchorage strength that addresses a safety
need for frontal crashes will not degrade the performance of these
restraints in rollovers. Requiring anchorage strength that addresses
only rollovers could degrade the performance of the belts in severe
frontal crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ In March 2012, a frontal crash of a tour bus on a highway
near Sierre, Switzerland, took the lives of 28 people, 22 of whom
were children. http://apnews.excite.com/article/20120314/D9TG77QO0.html.
    \125\ This was shown by our proposal to require lap/shoulder
belts for occupants and not just lap belts alone, based on the data
from the VRTC frontal crash testing of the motorcoach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's frontal passenger crash protection requirements are
developed to address foreseeable crashes of different severities, up to
and including severe crashes. FMVSS No. 208 specifies a 56 km/h (35
mph) rigid barrier belted test for passenger-carrying vehicles with
GVWRs of 3,856 kg (8,500 lb) or less. FMVSS No. 208 and FMVSS No. 210
ensure, to the degree practicable, that at least a minimum level of
crash protection will be provided to the occupants of passenger-
carrying vehicles in the event the vehicles crash at the higher speeds
at which they are driven. This final rule extends this principle to
buses with a GVWR greater than 11,793 kg (26,000 lb).
    The operation of the affected buses at high speeds can be observed
on roadways every day, and crash data files show the repeated
involvement of the affected buses in high speed crashes. The risk of
injury in a high speed crash is high. NHTSA has determined it is
important to ensure that the seat and lap/shoulder seat belt system on
the affected buses will withstand the crash energy that was measured in
the 48 km/h (30 mph) frontal barrier test. It is important that the
seat-to-floor attachments have the ability to withstand the forces
resulting from tri-loading of the bus seat (the total load on the
subject seat from restrained occupants in the seat, unrestrained
occupants rearward of the seat, and the inertia of the seat itself) and
that the lap/shoulder belt system will not fail to restrain the
occupant when subjected to the load from the restrained occupant and
the unrestrained occupant aft of the seat. The static load requirements
of ECE R.14 for M2 and M3 vehicles are both well below the level needed
to produce the anchorage loads measured in the agency's sled tests.
Even if the ECE R.14 static loads are applied simultaneously with the
ECE R.80 static loads, which is not required by the ECE regulations,
the total load still falls below that measured by the agency.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ Seat back impact and energy absorption are discussed later
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FMVSS No. 210 loads also have a margin of safety that ensure
the integrity of the seat and lap/shoulder belt anchorages at higher
speeds than that replicated by the VRTC test and with occupants of
larger mass than the test dummies used in the agency's tests. In its
comment in support of the proposal, transportation provider Greyhound
believed that the 10 percent strength margin that the FMVSS No. 210
loads provided is prudent since ``higher speeds and larger passengers
than those [reflected in the VRTC tests] will sometimes be involved in
real world crashes.'' The operator has first-hand knowledge of the
operating conditions and the wide range in the weights of passengers
using the affected vehicles.
    Coach USA estimated that requiring motorcoach passenger seats to
meet FMVSS No. 210 will only reduce fatalities in frontal crashes by
0.16 per year assuming seat belt usage of 15 percent and that it would
still be less than one fatality per year if seat belt usage is the same
as in passenger vehicles (83 percent). It stated that the success of
the ECE R.14/ECE R.80 over the past decade in Europe suggests that the
European standards are effective in the overwhelming majority of
crashes. For these reasons, Coach USA stated that FMVSS No. 210 will
provide little, if any, benefit in ``rare'' frontal crashes in terms of
reducing fatalities relative to ECE R.14.
    We have previously explained our reasons not to accept ECE R.14 and
ECE R.80 and our basis for concluding that FMVSS No. 210 is appropriate
for the vehicles covered by this final rule. We note here that it is
correct that fatalities in the affected vehicles are relatively
``rare'' in comparison to the injuries and deaths in light vehicle
crashes. Even with this rarity, we have assessed the benefits and costs
of this rule and have found the rule to be cost effective at an assumed
lap/shoulder belt use of 4 to 5 percent.
    Prevost requested that NHTSA consider the M2 requirements of ECE
R.14, which it believed is based on a ``closer and more realistic
deceleration pulse'' than the proposed FMVSS No. 210 requirements.
Prevost believed that the load from an unbelted occupant behind the
seat as well as the weight of the seat should be included in the forces
applied to the seat, but did not believe that there was a correlation
between the peak load obtained with a 13 g sled test and the loads
required in FMVSS No. 210.
    Prevost did not explain in its comment why it suggested there is
not a correlation between the peak loads obtained in the VRTC testing
and the loads required in FMVSS No. 210. In contrast, the best
available data show there is a correlation. The agency's sled tests,
which used a pulse modeled after the crash pulse from an actual crash
of an over-the-road bus, demonstrated that the total loads at the seat-
to-floor attachment for motorcoach seats with integrated lap/shoulder
belts reached levels that are very close to those generated by the
current FMVSS No. 210 requirements.
    Further, the best available data do not support a finding that the
ECE R.14 for M2 buses uses a ``closer and more realistic deceleration
pulse.'' The ECE R.80 pulse bears very little resemblance to an actual
crash pulse of the affected vehicles due to the lower energy, faster
ramp-up, shorter duration, and potentially higher peak of the ECE
pulse, compared to the 13 g pulse obtained from the actual crash of an
over-the-road bus. The unrepresentative ECE R.80 crash pulse may yield
dummy injury values that are not realistic. When the agency subjected
the same seat and dummy configurations to both the ECE R.80 pulse and
the pulse obtained by VRTC from an actual motorcoach crash, differences
in the injury values, especially with respect to the head, and to a
lesser extent the femurs, were observed. The injury values were
generally higher with the

ECE pulse, and lap/shoulder belted dummies exceeded the HIC IARV in
several tests.\127\ The higher injury values were likely a result of
the faster ramp-up of the ECE pulse, which created a higher closing
velocity between the dummy and the seat back ahead of it in spite of
the dummies carrying less total energy as compared to the VRTC pulse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ See tables A.2 and A.6, test types 1 though 5, 7G seats
subjected to the VRTC and EU pulses in research report DOT HS 811
335, NHTSA's Motorcoach Safety Research Crash, Sled, and Static
Tests, dated May 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are unable to agree to Prevost's suggestion that the strength
requirements be adjusted (reduced) for seats where there are no other
seats behind it (and therefore no unbelted passengers seated behind
it). We are aware that some operators of covered buses have changed the
passenger seating configuration from that set by the factory or have
removed and reinstalled seats. If ``weaker'' seats are moved after the
factory installation to a position that had a passenger seat behind it,
the weaker seat would not provide the performance required by FMVSS No.
210. Furthermore, this final rule provides some of the flexibility
Prevost seeks. Under this final rule, seats with no other seats behind
them are not required to have the lap/shoulder belt anchorages attached
to the seat structure. For these seats, the lap/shoulder belt
anchorages can be attached directly to the vehicle structure.
    European bus manufacturer Van Hool supported adopting ECE R.14 and
ECE R.80. Van Hool stated that a ``true European seat'' cannot fulfill
the FMVSS No. 210 requirements because the loads are three times that
required by ECE R.14, and because the strength of the seat is limited
by the energy-absorbing capabilities required by ECE R.80 for unbelted
passengers striking the seat from behind. Van Hool believed that the
Amaya seats tested by NHTSA in our research program were seats made in
Mexico for the American market and were not true European seats.
    In response, all information available to NHTSA indicate that
European seats can meet FMVSS No. 210 and ECE R.14 and ECE R.80. The
available information show that the Amaya seats tested at VRTC, which
passed FMVSS No. 210, were designed to meet both ECE R.14 and ECE R.80.
Our knowledge of the seats meeting ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 is based on
information provided by Amaya.
    Van Hool was not clear in what it meant by its claim that a ``true
European seat'' cannot meet FMVSS No. 210. It is true that the static
load requirements for ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 are far below that required
to generate the peak seat anchorage loads that NHTSA measured in its
sled tests. Thus, if Van Hool meant that a seat that minimally meets
the ECE required static loads for M3 vehicles would not meet FMVSS No.
210, that may be correct. However, such a seat may separate from its
floor anchorages in a crash, especially in a severe frontal crash at
seats where tri-loading occurs, which NHTSA deems unacceptable.
    If Van Hool meant that a seat that meets ECE R.14 and R.80 is
technically unable to meet FMVSS No. 210, we do not agree. The
technical information from our research program shows that meeting
FMVSS No. 210 and ECE R.14 and R.80 are not mutually exclusive. It is
technically possible for a manufacturer to design a seat that
withstands the loads required by FMVSS No. 210 and that deflects upon
forces applied from the rear. This is because FMVSS No. 210 requires
the seat belt anchorages to ``withstand'' the loads applied to them;
there is no limit on or specification for how the seat back may
displace except in the absolute, gross sense: The seat back (with
integrated shoulder belt anchorages) cannot fail to withstand the
applied forces, e.g., the seat cannot break apart, or the seat's
pedestal cannot pull from the floor of the bus. Meeting FMVSS No. 210
does not entail designing the seat back to be a ``stone wall,'' as Van
Hool worded it. The seat back has to be strong enough to withstand the
FMVSS No. 210 forces, but there is no impediment in the standard that
prevents a manufacturer from designing the seat back to withstand the
requisite loads of FMVSS No. 210 while deflecting in a controlled
manner to absorb forces applied from the rear.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Moreover, even if ECE R.80 cannot be met by a seat meeting
FMVSS No. 210, that issue is not determinative as to whether FMVSS
No. 210 should be adopted. NHTSA has not decided whether ECE R.80
best addresses seat deformation characteristics. Several seat
manufacturers have suggested that the seat deflection requirements
of FMVSS No. 222, ``School bus passenger seating and crash
protection,'' should be applied to seats on the buses covered by
this final rule, and have reported that their seats meet both FMVSS
No. 210 and FMVSS No. 222's seat deflection requirements. This is
discussed in a later section of today's preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ability of the seat back to absorb the loading from the rear
seat passenger is an aspect of performance not regulated by FMVSS No.
210. Manufacturers have the ability, the leeway, and, we maintain, the
responsibility to design energy-absorbing seat backs to account for the
loading from an occupant aft of the seat, if they believe energy
absorption is an appropriate aspect of performance to address. This
final rule provides the opportunity and flexibility to manufacturers to
develop innovative seat back designs.
    Van Hool asked why the NPRM did not consider a proposal for adding
a 10 g standard for large buses into FVMSS No. 207,\129\ as it claims
was done in ECE R.14. The commenter provided the table below (shown as
Table 7) of how such a standard could have been proposed and how it
would compare to FMVSS No. 210.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ By this we believe Van Hool meant applying half the forces
specified by FMVSS No. 210 to the seat belt anchorages and a
inertial load to the seat assuming a 10 g deceleration instead of
the 20 g specified in FMVSS No. 207.

     Table 7--Van Hool's Example of an Alternative ``10 g'' Standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Alternative standard
                               FMVSS No. 210 as by     at 10 g (for a
                                      NPRM           single seat of 22.5
                                                             kg)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upper anchorages............  13,345 N (3,000 lb).  6,818 N (1,533 lb).
Lower anchorages............  13,345 N (3,000 lb).  6,818 N (1,533 lb).
Seat Mass inertia...........  0...................  2,250 N (506 lb).
Unbelted passenger..........  0...................  6,800 N (1,529 lb).
Total forces................  26,690 N (6,000 lb).  22,686 N (5,101 lb).
Total moments...............  16,014 Nm (11,811 lb- 13,954 Nm (10,292
                               ft).                  lb).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response, we did not develop such a standard. This is because
NHTSA determined the appropriate loads by first measuring the seat
anchorage loads in a dynamic sled test using the VRTC pulse, and then
applying static loads to

another seat, using various methods, until the loads measure in the
sled test could be recreated.\130\ The example ``10 g'' loads Van Hool
presented still appear to be below the force levels necessary to
generate the same peak seat anchorage loads that were measured in the
VRTC sled test. On the other hand, the FMVSS No. 210 loading is only 15
percent [16,014 N/13,954 N] greater than the loading that Van Hool
suggested. As such, the FMVSS No. 210 loading provides a slight factor
of safety over the Van Hool approach. We note that the Van Hool
approach is a function of seat mass. If a greater seat mass were
assumed, the difference between the FMVSS No. 210 loading and the Van
Hool approach would decrease further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ This process was described in the NPRM (75 FR at 50958)
and explained in detail in research report DOT HS 811 335, ``NHTSA's
Motorcoach Safety Research Crash, Sled, and Static Tests,'' dated
May 2010. The method described as ``Method B'' in the research
report, which used the loading devices and technique specified in
FMVSS No. 210, reproduced the anchorage loads that were measured in
the VRTC sled tests when a total load equal to 91 percent of that
required by FMVSS No. 210 was applied through the loading device.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    MCI disagreed with the proposal to apply FMVSS No. 210 to all
seating positions, believing that NHTSA has not tested a sufficiently
broad spectrum of seat configurations. The commenter suggested that the
agency duplicate the same or similar test conditions with emphasis on
protecting women and children. The commenter submitted confidential
test data from sled tests it conducted using a representative
motorcoach frame (test buck) and a variety of dummy, seat, restraint,
seat spacing (pitch) and acceleration pulse combinations, and
recommended a form of static testing on a bus frame using a unique
loading profile that combined aspects of ECE R.14 (10 g; M2 vehicles),
ECE R.80, and FMVSS No. 210.
    We do not agree that MCI's suggested test is preferable to FMVSS
No. 210. The tests that MCI used to draw its conclusions appear to have
used the ECE R.80 or a similar pulse, which does not sufficiently
represent a real-world crash pulse of the affected vehicles (for the
reasons previously stated in this section in response to Prevost). In
addition, we believe that the injury values MCI recorded were generally
higher than the values recorded by the agency in the VRTC sled tests,
especially for the smaller unrestrained occupants, due to the greater
seat pitch (seat spacing) used in the MCI tests. This is explored
further in the section below, on seat back energy absorption.
    Coach USA submitted a separate report to the agency which detailed
a study that it conducted on Van Hool motorcoach seats, which they
stated comply with ECE R.14 (for M3 vehicles) and ECE R.80. It stated
that the objective of its study was ``to evaluate the protective
capability of the Van Hool motor coach seats in the severe crash
environment employed by NHTSA and to determine if the seat systems
(which were certified to the European standards) can meet the
requirements of FMVSS 210.''
    In its study, Coach USA conducted sled testing and FMVSS No. 210
static testing on Van Hool motorcoach seats that were installed on a
test ``buck'' that Coach USA said was fabricated to closely represent
the interior of a motorcoach. The test buck used the same aluminum seat
mounting tracks and hardware as those used in a motorcoach, with the
exception of the seat mounting track to floor fasteners, which were
high-strength steel screws and washers as opposed to the rivets used in
the actual motorcoach. The test configurations were essentially
identical to those used in NHTSA's motorcoach seat sled and static
tests described in the NPRM. The tests were performed at Transportation
Research Center (TRC) Inc., located in East Liberty, Ohio, which is the
same facility that performed NHTSA's testing.
    In its sled tests, Coach USA mounted three rows of seats on the
test buck at a seat pitch of 800 mm (31.5 inches). The first row (front
row) was unoccupied, the second was occupied with Hybrid III 50th
percentile adult male test dummies that were restrained with lap/
shoulder belts, and the third row was occupied with two unrestrained
50th percentile adult male Hybrid III test dummies. Coach USA used an
acceleration pulse that the commenter described as ``slightly more
severe'' than the pulse used in the NHTSA test, with a delta-V just
over 40 km/h (25 mph) and a peak deceleration of 9.7 g, as compared to
a delta-V of 40 km/h (25 mph) and a peak deceleration of 9.5 g in the
NHTSA tests.
    Coach USA described the results of its sled test as follows:

    The restrained dummies in the second row remained restrained,
but contacted the back of the first row of seats. The second row of
seats sustained some damage from the forces resulting from the
belted dummies pulling and the unbelted dummies impacting the seats
from the rear. The seat backs were severely distorted, and a small
section of the floor rail was pulled upward pulling free from two of
the mounting screws. But the seat remained attached to the ``bus''
providing protection for the belted occupants.

    Coach USA also noted that the second row slid forward about 5
inches (127 mm) in the side-wall mounting track, but it claimed this
did not create any apparent deviation from expected results, based on a
comparison of the left side restrained dummy injury traces with
corresponding traces from the NHTSA tests. It reported the injury
measures shown in Table 8 and explained that these values are well
below the thresholds for frontal passenger protection in FMVSS No. 208
for the 50th percentile adult male dummy.

       Table 8--Coach USA's Van Hool Seat Study Second Row Dummy Injury Measures, as Reported by Coach USA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Femur Load
                                                                                (average. of
          Seat position                HIC15          Chest g       Chest Defl.         Nij          right and
                                                                                left)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inj. Ref. Values................             700            60 g           63 mm             1.0        10,000 N
Left Seat.......................             331            22 g          7.4 mm            0.52         1,930 N
                                           (47%)           (37%)           (12%)           (52%)           (19%)
Right Seat......................             464            20 g          5.5 mm            0.50         3,647 N
                                           (66%)           (33%)            (4%)           (50%)           (36%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Coach USA noted that the injury values measured for the belted
dummies in its test of the Van Hool seats are very comparable to those
measured in the NHTSA sled tests for the Amaya 7 g seats. In addition,
it stated that the Van Hool seat structure had no evidence of being
compromised in any way as a result of the test. From these data, Coach

USA concluded that ``it can be expected that real world injuries in
motorcoaches equipped with Van Hool Seats when involved in similar
crash environments would be low.''
    Following the sled test, Coach USA conducted an FMVSS No. 210 test
on a new Van Hool seat using the same test buck and new mounting
tracks. It performed the test following the same protocol that was used
in NHTSA's FMVSS No. 210 tests of motorcoach seats reported in the
NPRM.\131\ Coach USA reported that the Van Hool seat and seat belt
anchorages withstood a total load of approximately 35,584 N (8,000 lb)
applied through the seat belts before ``severe structur[al] failure
began to occur.'' The test was terminated at a total applied load of
37,808 N (8,500 lb), which is short of the FMVSS No. 210 requirement of
53,380 N (12,000 lb) for a seat with two seating positions and lap/
shoulder belts. The report indicated that the seat pulled completely
free from the rear bracket mount to the side-wall track and the left
side tubing structure of the seat was fractured in several locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ See research report DOT HS 811 335, ``NHTSA's Motorcoach
Safety Research Crash, Sled, and Static Tests,'' May 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From these tests, Coach USA concluded overall that ``a seat that is
able to comply with the dynamic requirements in FMVSS [No.] 208 would
be able to offer adequate protection to the occupants in motor coaches
[sic] and FMVSS [No.] 210 compliance is not a necessary requirement for
safety. Therefore, a motorcoach seat that is able to comply with ECE
R.80 dynamic test or its dynamic equivalent such as FMVSS [No.] 208
would assure more protection than a seat that is able to meet FMVSS
[No.] 210 requirements.'' It stated that it is questionable whether any
benefits will be derived by requiring FMVSS No. 210 since its
comparison of the Amaya and Van Hool seat tests ``clearly show that the
occupant protection performance of both seats in the sled test are
equivalent,'' even though the Amaya 7 g seat meets the strength
requirements of FMVSS No. 210 tests while the Van Hool seat does not.
    In response, we have carefully reviewed Coach USA's submission, but
cannot agree with the commenter's interpretation of the test results.
    Although the injury values recorded in the sled test for the
restrained test dummies in the second row were within the IARVs for
FMVSS No. 208, we are concerned about the reported damage to the seat
anchorage tracks of the second row seat (this seat reportedly did not
meet FMVSS No. 210). Coach USA reports that, although the second row
seat remained attached to the ``bus,'' the row sustained ``damage from
the forces resulting from the belted dummies pulling and the unbelted
dummies impacting the seats from the rear. The seat backs [of the
second row seat] were severely distorted, and a small section of the
floor rail was pulled upward pulling free from two of the mounting
screws.'' NHTSA believes that this damage, particularly at the floor
rail, may be is an indication that the anchorage system was near
failure. If the seats were occupied by people heavier than 50th
percentile adult males, or the seat pitch (spacing) were different, or
if the pulse of the crash were different, the loads carried by any one
seat could be increased, with possible seat anchorage failure. We
believe that the seat would have withstood the sled test forces better
had it been designed to meet FMVSS No. 210. The results did not show a
lack of a safety need for FMVSS No. 210.
    Second, we cannot conclude that the Van Hool seats minimally met
the requirements of the ECE regulations. The Coach USA FMVSS No. 210
test of the Van Hool seat found that the seat and anchorages are much
stronger than the minimum necessary to meet the static load
requirements of ECE R.14 for M3 or M2 vehicles. The seat withstood a
load 100 percent greater than that for M3 vehicles and 33 percent
greater than that for M2 vehicles. Yet, the seat anchorage was
substantially damaged in the sled test, suggesting that anchorages of
seats that minimally met the static load requirements of ECE R.14 for
M2 or M3 vehicles may perform even more poorly in the sled test.
    Third, we note that the data in Appendix B of the Coach USA report
indicated that both unrestrained 50th percentile male dummies in the
third row had HIC15 values exceeding the IARV for FMVSS No.
208 of 700. One unrestrained dummy had a HIC15 of 731, while
the other had a HIC15 of 1,139. The second row seat that the
dummies impacted reportedly met ECE R.80. The results bring into
question whether ECE R.80 is able to provide head protection to
unbelted occupants in severe frontal crashes (protection for unbelted
occupants has been one of the key points voiced by several commenters
that support adopting the European regulations).
    Based on these observations, we do not agree that the data support
a finding that FMVSS No. 210 is unnecessary.
    Coach USA questioned in its report whether the NHTSA static test of
the Amaya 7 g seat, which was found to withstand the FMVSS No. 210
loads, was ``precisely'' a FMVSS No. 210 test (i.e., mounted the same
as in a bus).
    Our answer is that an FMVSS No. 210 compliance test is performed
in-vehicle, as required by FMVSS No. 210, whereas the test performed
for the research program was a simulated in-vehicle test. The test is
simulated for research purposes to obtain as much data as possible
while conserving research monies and resources. However, the agency's
research test was carefully designed to be indicative of the actual
seat and anchorage performance.
    Coach USA questioned whether the Amaya 7 g seat was mounted to the
test fixture without a pedestal, based on Figure 62 in the NHTSA
research report that was docketed with the NPRM.
    Our response is yes, the seat was mounted on its pedestal and was
also attached to a fixture simulating the side wall of the bus. The
photograph of the seat from which Coach USA made this observation was a
lateral view from the right which obscured the left side pedestal. The
setup for these tests, which used actual motorcoach seat mounting rails
and hardware at the seat attachment points instead of load cells, can
be viewed in Figure 59 of report DOT HS 811 335, NHTSA's Motorcoach
Safety Research Crash, Sled, and Static Tests, May 2010.
    Several commenters requested NHTSA to allow alternative compliance
with the ECE regulations. While NHTSA has the authority to consider
alternative compliance with other existing standards such as ECE
regulations, alternative compliance is appropriate under the Vehicle
Safety Act when such a framework meets the safety need addressed by the
rulemaking. Alternative compliance can be provided in such a case
because the safety objectives of the rulemaking will be achieved no
matter if a manufacturer selects one alternative or another. NHTSA does
not have information in this situation that supports a finding that
allowing the alternative of certification to both ECE regulations would
meet the safety needs of this rulemaking. NHTSA conducted a preliminary
comparison of the proposed FMVSS No. 210 standard with ECE R.14/ECE
R.80, included on page 106 of the accompanying FRIA, which shows that
the separately applied ECE regulations provide for lower seat anchorage
strength than FMVSS No. 210. Specifically, NHTSA's analysis and sled
and static testing indicate that ECE R.14/ECE R.80 do not provide the
level of seat belt anchorage strength needed to address the foreseeable
frontal crash scenario represented by a 48 km/h (30

mph) barrier impact, whereas the FMVSS No. 210 requirement does.
    NHTSA was unable to obtain any information (either publically
available, through public comments or directly from the European Union)
on how the ECE R.14 and R.80 regulations were established or the
rationales underlying them. Given the lack of underlying analytical and
scientific information available to NHTSA, the agency is unable to
conclude that the safety needs of this rulemaking would be met by
allowing alternative compliance with the ECE standards. NHTSA is not
able to allow alternative compliance with the ECE standards in this
rulemaking in particular given Congress's direction in the Motorcoach
Enhanced Safety Act to base the regulation ``on the best available
science'' (MAP-21, section 32703(e)(1)(C)).
    We note, however, that despite having found that FMVSS No. 210 is
more effective with respect to seat anchorage strength than
certification to both ECE R.14 and ECE R.80, NHTSA keeps an open mind
about new developments in motor vehicle safety. In the future, the
agency would be willing to consider data and other sound information,
beyond that which has already been considered by the agency, from
persons wishing to demonstrate that the ECE regulations are not less
protective than FMVSS No. 210. In addition, NHTSA is currently planning
to research motorcoach seat back performance, and depending on the
results and evidence, may consider adopting some form of seat back
energy absorptions in the future. At that time, we will take into
consideration ECE R.80 and any other relevant information.

Practicable

    The agency has concluded that meeting FMVSS No. 210 is practicable,
and meeting FMVSS No. 210 with a seat that has deformation capability
is also practicable. In its comment, seat manufacturer C.E. White
stated that it has proven that a light weight single frame seat
structure can be manufactured to meet the FMVSS No. 210,\132\ and the
commenter provided confidential test data for one of its seat models
which supported its claim. Seat manufacturer IMMI also stated that it
offers a seat with lap/shoulder seat belts that meets the requirements
of FMVSS No. 210.\133\ IMMI stated that at least three motorcoach
manufacturers offer IMMI's Premier[supreg] FMVSS No. 210 compliant
seats in their vehicles at the time of its submission of comments.
Greyhound stated that it has been purchasing IMMI Safeguard Premier
seats, which meet FMVSS No. 210 and other FMVSSs, in all of its new
motorcoaches since January 2008. IC Bus noted that when it builds a
commercial bus that specifies seat belts, it is built to meet the
applicable requirements of FMVSS No. 210. This information on the
development and introduction into the motorcoach fleet of seats with
anchorages that meet FMVSS No. 210 clearly demonstrates that the
requirement to extend the FMVSS No. 210 requirements to all seating
positions in motorcoaches is practicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ C.E. White also stated that the bus seat can meet the seat
back deflection and quasi-static requirements of FMVSS No. 222.
    \133\ IMMI stated that the seat also meets FMVSS No. 222.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Implications of FMVSS No. 210 on Seat Weight, Cost, and Comfort

    NHTSA has developed this final rule taking into account the impact
to seating capacity of changes to size and weight of subject buses and
the ability to comply with State and Federal size and weight
requirements, in satisfaction of section 32703(e) of the Motorcoach
Enhanced Safety Act. We requested comments on the benefits and costs of
adopting ECE R.14 over FMVSS No. 210 and whether motorcoach seats will
need to be made significantly heavier, stiffer, or less comfortable in
order to meet the strength requirements of FMVSS No. 210. We stated in
the NPRM that the agency did not believe there would be adverse
consequences associated with applying FMVSS No. 210 to seat belt
anchorages on the affected vehicles, based on data from our test
program.

Comments

    Eight comments specifically discussed the effects that the more
stringent strength requirements of FMVSS No. 210 (compared to ECE R.14)
will have on seat weight, comfort, and cost. Commenters were divided in
their views of the effect that meeting FMVSS No. 210 would have on bus
weight, comfort, and cost.
    Seat manufacturer C.E. White commented that it has manufactured a
lightweight single frame seat structure that meets the criteria of
FMVSS No. 210, with energy absorption capability, and provided
confidential data supporting its claim.
    In response to the agency's question on whether adopting FMVSS No.
210 over ECE R.14 will increase cost and weight, seat manufacturer IMMI
said that its own review determined that adopting ECE R.14 would result
in only minor material reductions, resulting in minimal savings per
seat assembly.
    Conversely, bus manufacturer Prevost stated that introduction of
lap/shoulder belts will increase the weight of an affected bus by at
least 454 kg (1,000 lb). It commented that the more stringent the
standard is, the heavier the vehicle is, and manufacturers cannot
afford adding weight if it is not justified. Prevost stated that cargo
capacity is affected by added weight, and each 79 kg (175 lb) added
could potentially reduce the passenger capacity by one.
    Bus manufacturer Van Hool stated that requiring buses to meet FMVSS
No. 210 specifications will result in increased vehicle and seat
weight, increased vehicle and seat price, increased seat size,
decreased passenger comfort, and reduced passenger service. Van Hool
believed that integration of the FMVSS No. 210 requirements into its
vehicle platforms will force Van Hool to initiate new and different
production infrastructure and methods, thus increasing manufacturing
cost, in addition to the added structural material that would need to
be used in the process. The commenter stated that these factors would
raise the price of vehicles, and the additional structural material
would result in additional deadweight of the coach as a whole, even
without seats.
    On the other hand, transportation provider Greyhound stated that
its real-life experience has demonstrated that there are no adverse
consequences to meeting FMVSS No. 210 related to weight, comfort, or
cost. Greyhound made the following statement concerning the Safeguard
Premier seat manufactured by IMMI, which Greyhound said it has been
ordering in its new motorcoaches since 2008:

    These seats and their seat belt assemblies and anchorages comply
with FMVSS standards 208, 209, 210, 213, 225, and 302. The SafeGuard
Premier also complies with the forward and rearward seat back energy
curves defined in FMVSS [No.] 222. The installation of these seats
has not caused Greyhound to reduce the number of passengers it can
accommodate. The seats are quite comfortable, do not weigh
appreciably more than seats equipped with belts meeting the European
standard, and are competitively priced.

    Transportation provider Coach USA commented that FMVSS No. 210 will
result in passenger seats that are larger/bulkier, more rigid/stiffer,
less comfortable, and more expensive than those that meet the European
standards and that FMVSS No. 210 will increase the overall weight of
the affected vehicles. It also stated the larger FMVSS No. 210
compliant seats will require carriers to remove four seats (one row)
from their buses, reducing seating

capacity and increasing the cost of operations. Coach USA claims
decreased seat comfort along with the increased seat cost and decreased
capacity, which will be passed on as cost to the customer, may increase
the number of individuals that choose ``the more dangerous option'' of
travel by passenger car over motorcoach travel.
    In a supplemental comment, Coach USA provided estimates of the cost
and weight penalties of compliance with FMVSS No. 210 as compared to
compliance with ECE R.14/ECE R.80. It compared seats offered by IMMI,
which Coach USA said were the only FMVSS No. 210 compliant seats on the
market at the time of its analysis, to Van Hool seats meeting the
European regulations.\134\ Coach USA determined that the total weight
of the IMMI seats required to outfit a single deck motorcoach is 1,615
kg (3,560 lb) at a total cost of $37,800, whereas the total weight of
the Van Hool seats required to outfit the same bus is 1,196 kg (2,637
lb) at a cost of $29,830. The commenter stated that, for a double-
decker bus, the IMMI seats have a total weight of 2,263 kg (4,988 lb)
at a cost of $53,716, whereas the Van Hool seats have a total weight of
1,676 kg (3,695 lb) at a cost of $42,390. Coach USA noted that these
estimates do not include costs associated with reinforcement of the bus
floor for FMVSS No. 210, which NHTSA estimated at $3,000 per bus in the
PRIA. It also added that the cost penalties did not include the reduced
fuel efficiency of transporting ``heavier'' FMVSS No. 210 compliant
seats, which it estimated as an increase in lifetime fuel cost of
$4,584 to $6,217 for a single deck motorcoach and $6,422 to $8,710 for
a double-decker motorcoach.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ Coach USA's submission estimated that a standard IMMI two
occupant seat weighs 54 kg (119 lb), an IMMI slider seat weighs 73
kg (161 lb), a Van Hool standard two occupant seat weighs 40 kg (88
lb), and a Van Hool slider seat weighs 54 kg (119 lb).
    \135\ Coach USA extrapolated these costs from data provided in
NHTSA, Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis, FMVSS No. 208
Motorcoach Seat Belts (August 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Coach USA was concerned about the cumulative impact of possible
regulations resulting from NHTSA's Motorcoach Safety Plan on the weight
of motorcoaches. It stated that Federal law imposes weight limits on
commercial vehicles on public highways, and while motorcoaches are
currently exempt from the general weight limitation, they are still
subject to a limit of 10,866 kg (24,000 lb) per axle. It stated that
many motorcoaches are already close to this upper limit. Coach USA
noted that the motorcoach weight exemption is up for legislative
renewal in the upcoming transportation reauthorization and if the
exemption is not continued, motorcoaches will be required to meet the
general weight limitation, which is currently a maximum of 9,072 kg
(20,000 lb) per axle. Coach USA stated that even if the exemption is
renewed, manufacturers are likely to struggle to comply with the new
NHTSA regulations that will add weight, such as roof crush and window
glazing standards, while remaining under the statutory weight limit.
Coach USA believed that the European seat belt standard will not
increase the weight of motorcoaches to the same degree as FMVSS No.
210.

Agency Response

    The information available to the agency on cost and weight varied
greatly. Commenters opposed to the adoption of FMVSS No. 210 (Prevost,
Van Hool, Coach USA, and Chicago Sightseeing) \136\ \137\ suggested
that motorcoach passenger seats with anchorages that meet FMVSS No. 210
will be heavier than their European counterparts, whereas commenters
Greyhound (a transportation provider already purchasing and operating
buses with lap/shoulder belts and FMVSS No. 210 compliant seats), IMMI
and C.E. White (seat suppliers already manufacturing and selling FMVSS
No. 210 compliant seats in the U.S. for the affected buses, with lap/
shoulder belts) stated that in their experience, the seats do not weigh
appreciably more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ Prevost, Van Hool, and Coach USA are or are affiliated
with European bus manufacturers or operators.
    \137\ Bus driver David Kollisch estimated that heavier load-
rated seat belts proposed in the NPRM will add 4,536 kg (10,000 lb)
to a motorcoach, but provided no basis for this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The relevant, best available information on this issue is
persuasive in support of a finding that seats meeting FMVSS Nos. 208
and 210 \138\ will not weigh appreciably more than seats meeting the
ECE regulations. We found the information provided by Greyhound, IMMI,
and C.E. White compelling due to its empirical basis and the
commenters' first-hand experience with the subject seats. In addition,
we also evaluated Australia's experience with lap/shoulder belt
requirement for motorcoaches, and learned that bus seats with integral
lap/shoulder belts have been developed to meet Australian Design Rule
68 (requiring lap/shoulder seat belts with a 20 g crash force
capability) that were ``more than twice as strong, weighed less and
were not significantly more expensive (excluding the cost of seat
belts) to produce than the original products.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ As well as meeting FMVSS No. 222's seat deflection
requirements.
    \139\ ``Three Point Seat Belts On Coaches--The First Decade In
Australia,'' Griffiths et al., Abstract ID 05-0017, 19th
International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of
Vehicles, June 2005, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv19/05-0017-O.pdf (cited also in footnote 39, August 18, 2010 NPRM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prevost, Van Hool, and Coach USA estimated that lap/shoulder belt-
equipped seats meeting FMVSS No. 210 weigh much more than seats meeting
ECE R.14 and ECE R.80. According to Prevost, the installation of lap/
shoulder belts increases the weight of the affected vehicles by at
least 454 kg (1,000 lb) and each 79 kg (175 lb) could reduce the
passenger capacity by one. Van Hool estimated that a two-occupant seat
with FMVSS No. 210 anchorages will weigh about 15 kg (33 lb) more than
its ECE R.14/ECE R.80 seats, which the commenter said is a 420 kg (926
lb) increase for a 56-passenger bus. In its estimate, Van Hool
approximated the weight of an EU-approved lap/shoulder belt equipped
seat at 36 kg (79 lb) and an FMVSS No. 210 compliant seat at 51 kg (112
lb). Coach USA estimated that a standard two-occupant Van Hool EU-
approved seat at 40 kg (88 lb), a Van Hool slider seat version at 54 kg
(119 lb), an IMMI seat with FMVSS No. 210 anchorages at 54 kg (119 lb),
and an IMMI slider seat version at 73 kg (161 lb). It stated that the
IMMI seats resulted in a 419 kg (923 lb) increase in weight over the
Van Hool seats for a single deck motorcoach and a 586 kg (1,293 lb)
increase for a double-deck motorcoach.
    Only Coach USA identified the manufacturer of the FMVSS No. 210
seat that it used in its weight estimate--IMMI--and, according to the
data it used in its vehicle weight estimate, the two-occupant IMMI seat
is 14 kg (31 lb) heavier that the ECE-approved Van Hool seat. Yet, IMMI
had stated in its comment that there would be only limited-to-minor
material reductions, resulting in minimal cost and weight savings per
seat assembly if the anchorage requirements were reduced to ECE R.14
loads. (IMMI did not quantify these savings.)
    To understand better Coach USA's comment, we looked closer at the
IMMI seat used by Coach USA in its estimate and realized that the
particular IMMI seat had design features that added weight to the seat,
such as IMMI's SafeGuard SmartFrame TM technology. Because
the features are not needed for the seat to meet FMVSS No. 210 and all
other applicable FMVSSs, we determined the seat was not

representative of a typical seat with FMVSS No. 210 compliant
anchorages. We concluded that a more typical seat advertised as having
anchorages that meet the FMVSS No. 210 requirements is the Amaya-Astron
Torino G and A-210 model coach seats, which are available through
Freedman. These seats weigh 39 kg (86 lb) and 40 kg (88 lb),
respectively,\140\ as opposed to the weight of the IMMI seat as
reported by Coach USA (weighing 54 kg (119 lb)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ Weight data was provided by Freedman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The information from the seat manufacturers was compelling, since
they are now selling the seats at issue. Seat manufacturer C.E. White
commented that it has been proven that a lightweight single frame seat
structure can be manufactured that meets the criteria of FMVSS No. 210,
with energy absorption capability, and provided confidential data
supporting its claim. IMMI stated that its own review determined that
the reduction of the anchorage requirements to those of ECE R.14 will
result in minor material reductions, resulting in minimal savings per
seat assembly.
    We found the information provided by Greyhound of striking
importance, since the commenter has first-hand experience operating
buses with FMVSS No. 210 compliant, lap/shoulder-equipped passenger
seats. Greyhound stated that it has installed IMMI seats that meet the
FMVSS No. 210 requirements in its newer buses, and found in its real-
life experience there has been no adverse consequences related to
weight, comfort, or cost.
    The Australian motorcoach industry had similar concerns regarding
increased seat weight with the introduction of Australian Design Rule
68 (ADR 68) in 1994.\141\ The ADR 68 dynamic test requirements use a 20
g acceleration pulse, which is 1.5 times greater than the pulse used in
the NHTSA sled tests, and the ADR 68 static test total loads are also
significantly greater than those required by FMVSS No. 210.\142\ In
spite of the more stringent requirements of ADR 68, Australian
motorcoach seat suppliers have reported that ADR 68 seats with
integrated lap/shoulder belts weigh approximately 25 kg (55 lb) to 30
kg (66 lb) for a two-occupant seat.\143\ Styleride (http://www.styleride.com.au) and McConnell Seats Australia (http://www.mcconnellseats.com.au) currently manufacture seats in this weight
range that meet ADR 68 requirements. These ADR 68 compliant seats are
lighter than the current lap/shoulder belt equipped IMMI and Van Hool
seats, yet meet anchorage strength requirements that exceed that
required by FMVSS No. 210.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ Griffiths et al., ``Three Point Seat Belts on Coaches--The
First Decade in Australia,'' supra.
    \142\ ADR 68 has both dynamic and static test options. For the
dynamic option, ADR 68 requires a crash pulse with a 49 km/h (30.4
mph) delta-V and a peak deceleration of 20 g for at least 20
milliseconds. In comparison, the NHTSA motorcoach crash test had the
same delta-V, and a 13 g deceleration. Based on the 1.5 greater
deceleration in the ADR 68 crash pulse, we estimate peak belt
anchorage loading would be 1.5 times greater than that measured in
the NHTSA test. Recall that the agency research determined that
FMVSS No. 210 static loading was about 1.1 times the peak loading
from sled testing performed with the motorcoach crash pulse. Thus,
the static load generated by the ADR 68 dynamic options is
approximately 1.4 (1.5/1.1) times that of FMVSS No. 210. The ADR 68
static loading is a combination of belt pull forces, push forces on
the seat back and inertial loading based on the seat mass. A
comparison can be made between the x-direction (fore-aft) loading
created by FMVSS No. 210 and ADR 68, assuming a specific seat mass
(30 kg (66 lb)) and belt pull angle (20 degrees above horizontal).
This analysis indicates the ADR 68 static load option generates
approximately 1.3 times the loading of FMVSS No. 210 in the x-
direction.
    \143\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In view of the above information, NHTSA concludes that the concerns
expressed about increased seat weight are without merit. Lap/shoulder
belt-equipped seats that meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 210 are
available in the U.S. that are equivalent in weight to the European
seats, and will continue to be available after this final rule.

Other Concerns

    Some commenters expressed concerns that the weight increases to the
bus seats resulting from meeting FMVSS No. 210 would potentially reduce
fuel economy, reduce passenger-carrying capacity, and affect axle
weight limits. After considering all available information, we have
determined these concerns to be unfounded. In view of the light weight
of ADR 68 seats, and the information from C.E. White, IMMI and
Freedman, we believe that the average weight increase of the affected
buses resulting from this rule will be in line with the estimates made
in the agency's cost tear-down study.\144\ The agency's cost tear-down
study attempts to estimate only the weight of the lap/shoulder belt
addition. It estimated that the weight of a domestic bus seat added was
2.7 kg (5.98 lb) per 2-person seat, resulting in a 54 passenger bus
weight increase of 73.0 kg (161 lb). Any further increase in vehicle
weight, or reduction in passenger capacity, will result from the
manufacturer's or purchaser's selection (or design) of seat models and
features.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ See NHTSA Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0066-004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Van Hool, Coach USA, and ABA submitted comments that discussed the
cost implications of requiring passenger seats on the affected buses to
meet FMVSS No. 210 as compared to ECE R.14/ECE R.80. Coach USA provided
an analysis comparing the total cost to outfit its single and double-
decker motorcoaches with IMMI seats that meet FMVSS No. 210, as
compared to Van Hool seats that meet ECE R.14/ECE R.80 requirements.
Coach USA estimated that the additional cost to fully outfit a vehicle
with IMMI seats, as opposed to Van Hool seats, to be $10,970 for a
single deck bus and $13,768 \145\ for a double-decker bus (including
the estimated cost of $3,000 for reinforcement of the bus floor). This
estimate for the single deck bus is slightly less than, but reasonably
in line with, the estimate of $12,900 in the PRIA. However, it is
significantly higher than our estimate in the FRIA of $2,110 to add
lap/shoulder belts for the passenger seats in a 54 passenger bus, which
is based on the cost tear-down study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ There may be an error in Coach USA's double-deck estimate
because it reported a total seat cost for the IMMI and Van Hool of
$53,716 and $42,390 respectively, which results in a difference of
$11,326.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, Coach USA also estimated the related increase in lifetime
fuel costs due to what the commenter believed would be the extra weight
of the IMMI seats to be $4,584 and $6,217, at 3 percent and 7 percent
discount rates, respectively.\146\ This is a significant increase over
that estimated in the PRIA and FRIA. We believe that the 54 kg (119 lb)
IMMI seats Coach USA used in its estimate may represent seats at the
higher end of the weight spectrum for FMVSS No. 210 seats. As explained
above, ADR 68 seats that can withstand anchorage loads in excess of
FMVSS No. 210 loads weigh as little as 25 kg (55 lb) to 30 kg (66 lb)
for a two-occupant seat. Seat suppliers C.E. White and IMMI affirm the
practicability of manufacturing lightweight seats meeting FMVSS No.
210.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ Coach USA's estimate was based on a weight increase of 419
kg (923 lb) and was extrapolated from the values of $1,812 and
$1,336 estimated in the PRIA for a weight increase of 122 kg (269
lb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We conclude that the data indicate that seats meeting FMVSS No. 210
will result in little, if any, increase in total vehicle weight,
depending on how efficiently the vehicle seat and/or attachment points
are strengthened. Considering the weight of 40 kg (88 lb) of current
Van Hool seats (according to Coach USA's submission), the data indicate
there may even be a total weight decrease if the weight can be

reduced to the 25 kg (55 lb) to 30 kg (66 lb) weight of ADR 68 seats.
    We do not believe that requiring passenger seats on the affected
buses to be equipped with anchorages that meet FMVSS No. 210 will
necessarily reduce seat comfort (because of increased stiffness) as
suggested by Van Hool and Coach USA. Seat comfort is more dependent on
seat cushion design elements such as cushion material, thickness,
shape, and cover, rather than on the underlying frame. If the ability
of a seat to meet FMVSS No. 210 requirements equated to reduced
comfort, then this problem would have arisen in newer passenger
vehicles that have seats with fully integrated seat belts, especially
with the front seats of most convertibles and some rear seats of
multipurpose passenger vehicles. Importantly, Greyhound, which has been
operating buses with IMMI lap/shoulder belt equipped passenger seats
that meet FMVSS No. 210 since 2008, stated ``The installation of these
seats has not caused Greyhound to reduce the number of passengers it
can accommodate. The seats are quite comfortable, do not weigh
appreciably more than seats equipped with belts meeting the European
standard, and are competitively priced.'' After considering the above
information we conclude that the data indicate that seats meeting FMVSS
No. 210 will not reduce seat comfort or unduly affect costs.

Harmonization

    Commenting in support of the ECE regulations, European manufacturer
Van Hool stated that implementation of FMVSS No 210 will require
vehicle manufacturers to rethink their structural concept and
production, which will increase manufacturing cost and the price of
motorcoaches, which will ultimately be passed on to customers, whereas,
Van Hool stated, harmonization with the European standards would avoid
such costs. Coach USA and American Bus Association (ABA) submitted
similar comments and added that harmonization would enhance flexibility
and promote turnover of the fleet to newer motorcoaches.
    NHTSA has compared ECE R.14 and ECR R.80 to FMVSS No. 210 to see if
the ECE regulations offer greater benefits than FMVSS No. 210. We have
not found ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 to be sufficient to protect against
foreseeable crash risks.\147\ Our sled and static testing indicated
that ECE R.14/ECE R.80 regulations do not provide the level of seat
belt anchorage strength required for the foreseeable frontal crash
scenario represented by a 48 km/h (30 mph) barrier impact. The static
load requirements for ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 are far below that required
to generate the peak seat anchorage loads that NHTSA measured in its
sled tests, which means a seat that minimally meets the ECE required
static loads for M3 vehicles may separate from its floor anchorages in
a crash, especially in a severe frontal crash at seats where tri-
loading occurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ Coach USA asserted that all of the frontal benefits we
estimated resulting from meeting FMVSS No. 210 would be
insignificant, a claim we have refuted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also compared ECE R.14 and ECR R.80 to FMVSS No. 210 to see
if the ECE regulations offer less costs than FMVSS No. 210. The
information from the seat manufacturers indicate that meeting ECE R.14
and R.80 would not necessarily result in cost or weight savings. Seat
supplier IMMI stated that its own review determined that meeting ECE
R.14 would result in minor material reductions, resulting in minimal
savings per seat assembly. U.S. seat suppliers C.E. White and IMMI and
possibly others already have established their structural concepts and
production to meet FMVSS No. 210.
    When Australia decided to mandate lap/shoulder belts for passenger
seats in motorcoaches, Australia determined that the then-existing ECE
regulation (ECE R.80) was not sufficient to ensure seats would not fail
in the type of catastrophic coach crashes the country sought to
address.\148\ Australia had been in the process of considering adopting
ECE R.80, but decided that a regulation based on ECR R.80 would not
have been effective in those crashes. Id. Australia developed and
adopted ADR 68 to address the safety need it identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ Griffiths et al., ``Three Point Seat Belts on Coaches--The
First Decade in Australia,'' supra. The authors state that in 1989,
a coach crash resulted in 19 fatalities and a second crash resulted
in 35 fatalities. Both crashes were head-on crashes (the first with
a heavy truck, the second with another coach) on a highway with a
speed limit of 100 km/h (62.1 mph). Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have thoroughly assessed the ECE regulations at issue to compare
the benefits achievable under ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 and FMVSS No. 210,
in accordance with guiding principles for harmonization. There is a
large disparity between the anchorage load requirements of ECE R.14 and
R.80 and FMVSS No. 210. While a seat meeting FMVSS No. 210 could be
readily designed to also meet ECE R.14 and ECE R.80, seats just meeting
the strength requirements for even M2 vehicles would not be capable of
complying with FMVSS No. 210. Thus, a compliance option is unacceptable
to NHTSA, since it would permit part or all of the covered bus fleet
being equipped with seat belt anchorages that cannot withstand the
forces generated in foreseeable frontal crashes.

Seat Back Impact and Energy Absorption

    In the NPRM, NHTSA requested comment on the energy-absorbing
capability of current seat backs to provide impact protection to
occupants. Unbelted occupants in the NHTSA sled tests, primarily 5th
percentile female dummies, had HIC and Nij values in excess of IARVs
when they struck the seat back in front of them. Additionally, in some
sled tests the belted dummies interacted with the forward seat back
when unbelted dummies in the rear seat struck their seat back,
resulting in elevated HIC and Nij values to the belted dummies. We
asked for information on whether there may be some potential for seat
backs to become stiffer to accommodate the additional loads from seat
belts. We requested information on specifications on force-deflection
characteristics and/or impact deceleration characteristics for seat
backs, such as the absorption test in ECE R.80 and the impactor test in
ADR 68.

Comments

    Eleven commenters addressed the issue of seat back stiffness, with
many suggesting that NHTSA consider adding impact and/or energy
absorption requirements such as those in ECE R.80, FMVSS No. 201,
``Occupant protection in interior impact,'' or FMVSS No. 222.
    Several commenters believed that ECE R.14 and ECE R.80 should be
adopted instead of FMVSS No. 210, based in large part on the fact that
ECE R.80 has seat back energy absorption requirements while FMVSS No.
210 does not. This issue was addressed earlier in this preamble and, to
avoid redundancy, we will not repeat here our reasons for adopting
FMVSS No. 210 rather than the ECE regulations. We reiterate, however,
that the ability of the seat back to absorb the loading and provide
protection for the rear seat passenger is an aspect of performance not
regulated by FMVSS No. 210. Manufacturers have the ability to meet
FMVSS No. 210 and to design energy-absorbing seat backs to account for
the loading from an occupant aft of the seat, if they believe energy
absorption is an appropriate aspect of performance to address.
    In this section of the preamble, we explore whether there is a need
for NHTSA to regulate in this area. In the comments, there was no
consensus that

ECE R.80's energy absorption requirements were the preferred approach.
Many comments were submitted on this issue. Several commenters
suggested that FMVSS No. 222's seat deflection requirements were
superior to those of ECE R.80. Some commenters expressed support for
FMVSS No. 201's requirements.
    Seat supplier C.E. White believed that NHTSA should regulate seat
back energy absorption characteristics, and recommended that NHTSA
adopt the school bus compartmentalization requirements of FMVSS No.
222. C.E. White commented that ``without a limitation on the deflection
of the upper torso anchorage point of the test seat you stand the
chance of jeopardizing the protection of compartmentalization for the
unrestrained occupants to the rear of the test seat due to override of
the seat back or diminish the torso restraint effectiveness for the
restrained occupants of the test seat.''
    Seat supplier Freedman stated that some energy absorption
capability should be built into seat backs for passenger protection and
recommended that FMVSS No. 201 be used as a reference for any energy
absorption standards for seats in motorcoaches.
    Seat supplier IMMI stated that consideration must be made for
injury reduction of unrestrained passengers and, to that end, a
requirement for motorcoach seats to provide energy-absorbing
capabilities as a passive form of occupant protection should be adopted
by NHTSA. IMMI expressed concern that as seat backs are developed to
meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 210, severe stiffening of the seat
backs will occur which it stated may increase the injury potential for
unrestrained occupants. IMMI stated that existing non-belted motorcoach
seat backs offer minimal injury mitigating energy-absorbing capability
and that the seat backs fold over and direct occupants up into the
overhead racks. IMMI also stated that it studied some European seats
meeting ECE R.14 and ECE R.80, both at the M2 (10 g) and M3 (7 g)
levels, and found them to have anchorages that withstood the loads
specified in FMVSS No. 210, but have seat backs with ``unacceptably low
seat back energy absorption when subjected to the [FMVSS No. 222] load
deflection test.'' IMMI stated that in sled tests it conducted, it
found that these ECE seats folded forward and directed the unrestrained
dummies out of the seat compartment, which resulted in HIC values over
600.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ Although not specifically reported by IMMI, we assume this
is a HIC15 value, with a limit of 700, since IMMI
referenced FMVSS No. 208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on its studies, IMMI recommended that NHTSA adopt seat back
energy absorption requirements for seats on the affected buses. It
suggested that a static test similar to the forward and rearward force/
deflection tests specified in FMVSS No. 222 could be used to assess
energy absorption of the seat back. In addition, IMMI suggested that
the following requirements be established for motorcoach passenger
seats:
     A minimum seat back height of 150 mm above the shoulder
belt anchor point to reduce the potential for ``rideover'' by taller
occupants.
     A minimum shoulder belt anchor point height of 520 mm
above the seating reference point, which is equal to that required for
school bus seats.
     Criteria to provide occupant impact protection with the
interior of buses, including the seat back surface and items such as
tray tables, video screens, coat hooks, and grab handles.
     Criteria for seat spacing, seat orientation, use of
tables, and all other arrangements that could factor into proper energy
absorption of a seat back for an unrestrained occupant.
    Bus manufacturers MCI, Setra, and Van Hool provided comments
regarding impact and energy absorption requirements for the passenger
seats. MCI was concerned about the energy-absorbing capability of seat
backs meeting FMVSS No. 210 and recommended a form of static testing on
a bus frame using a unique loading profile that combined aspects of ECE
R.14 (10 g; M2 vehicles) and FMVSS No. 210. Setra stated that the ECE
``impact requirements'' were needed to guard against ``personal
injury.'' \150\ Van Hool said that energy absorption requirements for
an unbelted passenger should be addressed and that the static test of
ECE R.80 is similar to the compartmentalization requirement in FMVSS
No. 222 for school buses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ ECE R.80 is conducted with the occupant both belted and
unbelted and it specifies a HlC of 500 for an occupant hitting the
seat in front.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Greyhound stated that NHTSA should specify seat back energy
absorption standards. Greyhound stated that it is installing the IMMI
seat on all of its new equipment in large part because of the seat's
unique energy-absorbing capability.

Agency Response

    In general, all of the commenters who responded on this issue were
concerned that requiring motorcoach passenger seats to meet the
requirements of FMVSS No. 210 will result in stiffer seat backs that
may be more injurious to occupants seated behind them, particularly
unbelted occupants. Commenters recommended that NHTSA adopt some form
of energy absorption requirement for the seat back. Five of the
commenters (CE White, Freedman, IMMI, American Seating, and Greyhound)
recommended that seat back energy absorption requirements from existing
FMVSSs be extended to motorcoach passenger seats. One commenter (MCI)
recommended an alternate static load test which it suggested would
prevent stiffening of the seat backs. Five of the commenters (Setra,
Van Hool, Coach USA, ABA and ABC) recommended adoption of the European
regulations, partly because ECE R.80 has seat back energy absorption
requirements.
    As explained earlier in this document, seat stiffening as it
relates to impacts from belted and unbelted occupants into the seat
back in front of them is not an inevitable consequence of meeting FMVSS
No. 210. FMVSS No. 210 does not impose displacement limits on the seat
belt anchorages; therefore, the anchorages (and seat back, in this
case) must simply be strong enough to withstand the required loads and
can deform in the process. IMMI indicated in its comment that it found
in some tests of European seats that the seats met FMVSS No. 210, but
had ``unacceptably low'' seat back energy absorption when subjected to
the FMVSS No. 222 forward load deflection static test. IMMI also noted
that in sled tests the seat backs of these seats folded forwarded and
directed test dummies out of the compartment. Both these behaviors are
indicative of seat backs that are not stiff enough, rather than too
stiff with respect to their ability to provide compartmentalization for
unbelted occupants.
    The commenters varied significantly in their views as to the
appropriateness of various approaches for the covered buses.
    Some commenters supported FMVSS No. 222's school bus requirements.
FMVSS No. 222 is a complex, multifaceted standard that requires very
strict seating requirements in order for compartmentalization to
function properly. Applying the concepts of the standard to the buses
covered under today's final rule could result in school bus style seats
and barriers, with very tight seat spacing, which may or may not be
appropriate for the covered buses. We are unable to adopt FMVSS No.
222-type compartmentalization

requirements for the passenger seats in the affected buses at this
time, without fully considering the safety need for the requirements,
in addition to related benefits, costs, practicality, and technical
challenges. In addition, such a requirement could not be adopted
without providing the public an opportunity to comment on this issue.
    We cannot agree at this time that the seat back energy absorption
requirements of ECE R.80 are most appropriate. The seats advertised as
ECE R.80 compliant that were tested by the agency in support of the
NPRM, particularly in the full vehicle barrier impact, did not
demonstrate ``energy absorption'' or ``compartmentalization''
characteristics. IMMI's tests of European seats also showed a lack of
compartmentalization and energy absorption. Coach USA's tests of Van
Hool ECE-approved seats resulted in HIC15 values for the
unrestrained occupants that were above the IARV set in FMVSS No. 208.
    NHTSA will undertake further testing of seat backs on affected
vehicles to further evaluate the energy absorbing capability of current
seats. Section 32705 of the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act directs the
Secretary to research and test enhanced occupant impact protection
technologies for motorcoach interiors to reduce serious injuries for
all passengers of motorcoaches and to research and test enhanced
compartmentalization safety countermeasures for motorcoaches, including
enhanced seating designs. The Act states that not later than two years
after the completion of such research and testing, the Secretary shall
issue final motor vehicle safety standards if the Secretary determines
that such standards meet the requirements and considerations of section
30111(a) and (b) of the Vehicle Safety Act.

XVII. Lead Time

    The NPRM proposed a 3-year lead time for new bus manufacturers to
meet the new lap/shoulder seat belt requirements. We believed that 3
years were necessary since some design, testing, and development will
be needed to certify compliance to the new requirements. We proposed to
permit optional early compliance with the requirements.

Comments

    Coach USA supported the proposed 3-year lead time. It concurred
that the lead time period would allow companies to do the planning and
testing involved and would ease the financial burden. UMA also
supported a 3-year lead time with early compliance permitted.
    Commenters supporting a shorter lead time included some seat
suppliers and a number of consumer groups. IMMI said it believes that
the lead time could be reduced to 2 years because the technology to
comply with the proposed requirements has been commercially available
for several years. American Seating supported reducing the lead time to
2 years, suggesting that 3 major motorcoach manufacturers can now
supply vehicles in the U.S. that meet the NPRM's proposed requirements.
    Many consumer groups supported a shorter lead time. The American
Association of Classified School Employees (AACSE) commented that most
motorcoaches today are already built with seat belt anchorages at all
seating positions. The National Association of Bus Crash Families/West
Brook Bus Crash Families suggested an 18-month lead time, stating that
manufacturers are already aware of the changes needed to comply with
the proposed lap/shoulder belt rule. Advocates also supported an 18-
month lead time, suggesting that only those manufacturers that have not
previously produced motorcoaches with seat belt anchorages or
integrated anchorages should need more than 18 months to implement the
requirements of the final rule. The National Association of Bus Crash
Families wanted NHTSA to implement a lead time of not longer than 1
year. Four private individuals supported a lead time shorter than 3
years.

Agency Response

    Section 32703(e) of the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act states that
any regulation prescribed in accordance with subsection (a) (which is
the provision regarding safety belts) shall, with regard to new
motorcoaches, ``apply to all motorcoaches manufactured more than 3
years after the date on which the regulation is published as a final
rule.''
    Consistent with the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act and the
effective date proposed in the NPRM, this final rule specifies a 3-year
lead time for manufacturers of new buses to meet the lap/shoulder belt
requirements. In our judgment, we believe that 3 years is appropriate
to provide sufficient time to bus manufacturers to design and test
their anchorage systems to the requirements of this final rule.
Although some manufacturers are already offering seat systems that
comply with FMVSS No. 210, other manufacturers have not incorporated
seats with lap/shoulder belts or have incorporated seats with lap/
shoulder belts that meet a lesser strength requirement. For the latter
manufacturers, some may require strengthening or redesign of motorcoach
floor and side wall seat anchorage systems to meet the adopted
requirements, in addition to purchasing or designing seats that can
withstand the required loads. The 3-year lead time will give these
manufacturers time to plan the implementation of the new standard more
efficiently and effectively than a shorter lead time. (Under 49 CFR
571.8(b), manufacturers of vehicles built in two or more stages (multi-
stage manufacturers) are provided an additional year of lead time for
manufacturer certification of compliance. This additional year provides
multi-stage manufacturers, many of which are small businesses, added
flexibility and time to make the necessary assessments to acquire a
basis for certifying their vehicles' compliance.)
    A 3-year lead time is important for reducing the chances of
manufacturers making mistakes that could lead to future non-
compliances. Corrective action for potential non-compliances is likely
to be much more costly than designing and manufacturing the buses
correctly to start.
    An important part of this efficient implementation is related to
vehicle weight. As was discussed earlier, commenters expressed concern
over possible weight increases if seats had to meet FMVSS No. 210. As
we explained earlier in response to those comments, we do not believe
that seats with anchorages that meet FMVSS No. 210 need to be much
heavier or bulkier than current seats. Indeed, seats now offered by
Australian seat suppliers that meet ADR 68 weigh less than the original
seats. Australian government officials have noted that early prototype
seats did get heavier in response to ADR 68, as manufacturers simply
beefed up (strengthened) existing seats with steel bracing. However,
when seat designers decided to redesign seats from scratch, the new
designs were ``more than twice as strong, weighed less and were not
significantly more expensive (excluding the cost of seat belts) to
produce than the original product.'' \151\ Allowing a 3-year lead time
will give sufficient time to seat and vehicle designers, who wish to do
so, to develop modern seat designs that meet FMVSS No. 210 and that
provide energy-absorption features, while minimizing any weight
increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Griffiths et al., ``Three Point Seat Belts On Coaches--The
First Decade In Australia,'' supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Seat suppliers American Seating and IMMI recommended that the lead
time

be shortened to 2 years. We note that these seat manufacturers are
affiliated with each other and offer the same Premier[supreg] branded
seat, which is advertised as capable of meeting FMVSS No. 210
requirements, in addition to other FMVSSs. Thus, their suggestion may
be more representative of time necessary for vehicle manufacturers to
modify the vehicle structure to accept a seat such as theirs. However,
as stated above, we believe the 3 years of lead time will offer both
seat and vehicle manufacturers the opportunity to implement the
standard more efficiently, particular in regard to weight.
    Various consumer advocates and commenters from the general public
requested an even shorter lead time than 2 years. Many of the comments
were based on the current availability of bus seats with seat belts.
Some argued that the 3-year lead time will result in unnecessary
fatalities. NHTSA is keenly aware of the potential loss of life
inherent in any single crash of the covered buses, which is why the
agency has made this and other rulemaking actions initiated pursuant to
the ``NHTSA's Approach to Motorcoach Safety'' plan a high priority.
Although we believe that many bus manufacturers will comply with this
final rule before the 3-year deadline, it is important to give other
manufacturers the time to do the job correctly. In addition, to the
extent that many operators of the affected buses now offer vehicles
with lap/shoulder seat belts, we believe that early compliance with the
final rule will result in an increasing availability of buses with lap/
shoulder seat belts before the 3-year date.
    Advocates suggested in its comments that the final rule could
provide a staggered compliance schedule, with the agency identifying
motorcoaches that are not currently compliant with the final rule and
allowing 3 years to certify compliance, while the other manufacturers
would only get 18 months to certify. We believe such an approach is not
viable. The agency's limited compliance testing budget should not be
used simply to identify vehicles that either get 18 months to certify
(if found to be compliant, which in and of itself would be difficult to
verify short of testing a vehicle) or 3 years to certify (if found to
not comply) to the new standard. This would be an inefficient use of
agency resources with little, if any, potential safety benefit.

XVIII. On Retrofitting Used Buses

    In the NPRM, we asked for comments on the issue of retrofitting
existing (used) buses with seat belts at passenger seating positions.
We did not include a retrofit proposal as part of the NPRM, but we
wanted to know more about the technical and economic feasibility of a
retrofit requirement. Our understanding at the time of the NPRM was
that significant strengthening of the motorcoach structure would be
needed to accommodate the additional loading from the seat belts,
particularly for the older buses. It was not apparent that establishing
requirements similar to or based on the proposed requirements would be
cost effective, or feasible from an engineering perspective.
    Commenters were sharply divided in their opinion of the merits of a
retrofit requirement. In general, motorcoach manufacturers and
operators strongly opposed a retrofit requirement as being economically
and technically untenable. Seat suppliers did not support a retrofit
requirement. Consumer advocates and individual members of the public
strongly supported a retrofit requirement.
    The following points were made by various commenters.

On the Merits of Retrofitting Buses

     UMA, which represents motorcoach owners/operators and
industry suppliers, stated that the motorcoach industry is ``capital
intensive, competitive and generally a marginally profitable business,
at best.'' UMA stated that any retrofit requirement or retrofit
standard would likely divert financial resources from other safety-
related efforts, such as training and maintenance. It stated that these
efforts are at the core of the current motorcoach industry safety
record, and any diversion of resources could have the undesirable
effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, motorcoach accidents and
the related injuries and fatalities.
     UMA commented that a retrofit requirement would either
drive companies out of business or drive up costs of what the commenter
called an already safe mode of transportation, adversely affecting
customers who require economical transportation, such as students and
the elderly.
     ABA, representing bus operators, suppliers, and
manufacturers, did not support a retrofit requirement for seat belts on
motorcoaches. ABA did not believe that a retrofit requirement is
economically or technically feasible for the reasons stated in the
NPRM. ABA believed that owners of existing vehicles should not be
forced into renewed construction to meet performance requirements that
differ from those to which they were originally built.
     ABA and Coach USA stated that NHTSA does not have the
statutory authority to impose retroactive, vehicle-based performance
standards. The commenters suggested that the agency's authority only
extended to requiring the retrofit of ``equipment'' items, such as
retro-reflective tape and rear impact (underride) guards, and does not
extend to standards requiring substantial vehicle restructuring and a
case-by-case determination with regard to the actions necessary to
reach compliance.
     Coach USA believed that a retrofit requirement could push
motorcoaches over the statutory weight limits for operation on
highways.
     Twenty-nine operators submitted identical letters
commenting that any retrofit requirement would either put their company
out of business or severely restrict their operations. Operators
commented that they do not have the technical capacity to test vehicles
to ensure that they would comply with any new performance requirements
and have no way to ensure or certify that their vehicles, once equipped
with seat belts, would meet the government standards.
     Peter Pan commented that retrofitting motorcoaches that
are less than 5 years old is expensive and unnecessary and there is no
way for the operator to certify that retrofitted vehicles would meet
the government standard. It stated that, if the agency decides to
require retrofits, the retrofit requirement should be implemented in a
similar manner as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where
operators were given 12 years (the average fleet turnover rate) to
equip their fleet with lifts.
     Greyhound also suggested the approach of DOT setting a
date by which all motorcoaches on the road must have lap/shoulder
belts, e.g., a date representing the average over-the-road bus fleet
turnover rate, which the commenter said was 12 years.
     Star Shuttle and Charter commented that a retrofit
requirement would put them out of business and reduce the value of
their existing fleet. It requested that the agency establish a multi-
year grant program, whereby operators could obtain funding for
retrofitting or acquisition of new seat belt-equipped coaches.
     Monterey-Salinas Transit commented that there could be
service reductions with retrofitting based on cost to retrofit and out-
of-service time needed to retrofit the motorcoach.
     Plymouth & Brockton expressed concern that in many cases
the cost to retrofit buses would exceed the resale value of the buses
involved. It urged NHTSA to require seat belts in new buses, but let
the natural process of

vehicle attrition allow companies to fully comply with the regulation
over time.
     Prestige Bus Charters commented that while it supported
requirements for new coaches to be equipped with seat belts, it would
be very difficult to absorb the cost to retrofit its buses.
     Seat belt supplier IMMI commented that NHTSA should not
require retrofit of lap/shoulder belts, but rather establish technical/
performance standards/requirements when a retrofit is determined to be
necessary or desirable to fulfill a market-driven need. It added that
retrofitted motorcoaches should be made capable of meeting the same
performance standards as newly manufactured motorcoaches. IMMI
concurred with the many practical issues identified by the agency in
the NPRM and that each individual bus would need to be evaluated before
a retrofit could be accomplished adequately.
     The National Association of Bus Crash Families/West Brook
Bus Crash Families supported a mandatory retrofitting requirement. It
commented that without one it could take up to 20 years or more before
all motorcoach models are equipped with lap/shoulder seat belts. While
acknowledging that for older motorcoaches, design and cost burdens may
necessitate the installation of lap belts rather than lap/shoulder
belts, the group said it would be ``unfair and unwise'' to have a dual
system of motorcoach transportation available to the public--one
offering the protection of seat belts and the other not doing so.

On the Merits of Retrofitting Lap Belts Instead of Lap/Shoulder Belts

     IMMI was opposed to an approach that would specify used
motorcoaches to be retrofitted with lap only seat belts, rather than
lap/shoulder belts, given the agency's research findings that
demonstrate that lap/shoulder belts provide the best protection.
     Greyhound did not support a lap belt only retrofit
specification, referring also to poor performance of lap belt only
systems in NHTSA testing.
     National Association of Bus Crash Families/West Brook Bus
Crash Families indicated that motorcoaches manufactured before 2000
that are not structurally robust enough for lap/shoulder retrofitting
could be outfitted with just lap belts.

On the Merits of Retrofitting Only a Portion of the Fleet

     Greyhound said that limiting retrofitting to buses
manufactured within 5 years of the effective date might avoid unduly
impacting smaller operators with older buses that may not be able to
sustain the loads of seats with lap/shoulder belts.
     ABA suggested the idea of a voluntary retrofit program for
vehicles that were originally built to be seat belt-ready to the
European standards (or to the FMVSS), but that were sold without seat
belts.
     IMMI said that later model buses could be retrofitted with
lap/shoulder belts within 3 years of the implementation date of the
final rule.
     Advocates supported a retrofit provision for motorcoaches
manufactured more than 5 years prior to the implementation date. It
said NHTSA should work with motorcoach carriers, and especially
manufacturers, to determine which existing vehicles require retrofit
before evaluating whether it is feasible to retrofit such vehicles with
lap/shoulder belts. It believed that some makes of motorcoaches could
be retrofitted with seat belts at a reasonable cost, or at least at the
lower end of the cost range cited in the NPRM.
     SafetyBeltSafe U.S.A and Safe Ride News Publications would
like a mandatory retrofit program for motorcoaches less than10 years
old.
     National Association of Bus Crash Families/West Brook Bus
Crash Families urged NHTSA to require the retrofitting of all existing
buses with lap/shoulder belts not more than 3 years after January 1,
2011. It said it would support an interim rule allowing buses
manufactured before 2000 that do not meet the structural requirements
for lap/shoulder belts to have lap belts only.

Regarding Structural Issues

     Coach USA commented that retrofitting may not be possible
in some older vehicles. The structure of older vehicles may not be able
to support the necessary modifications and, without standards to ensure
that the seats and the structure of the motorcoach can withstand the
forces imposed in a crash, could result in additional safety risks.
     UMA believed that the structural modifications needed for
each vehicle will depend on factors such as the original manufacturer
and age of the vehicle. Arrow Coach Lines stated that retrofitting used
motorcoaches with seat belts would be difficult since buses in the
fleet will have different levels of deterioration.
     Some bus manufacturers and operators supported a voluntary
retrofit program. Some suggested that NHTSA should establish
retrofitting guidelines or provide financial support for operators to
voluntarily retrofit their buses.
     ABA believed that retrofitting used motorcoaches with seat
belts and ensuring that, as installed, the structural integrity of the
vehicle will be sufficient to withstand specified forces or loads will
require detailed knowledge of the original vehicle design, as well as
analysis of the vehicle's in-use condition and technical expertise on
how to upgrade the vehicle structure. Regarding manufacturer-provided
retrofit kits, ABA stated that because the manufacturer does not know
the use, maintenance or wear history of the vehicle, the manufacturer
would not be able to assure that the bus will be capable of meeting a
particular performance requirement once a belt retrofit kit is applied.

Regarding the Cost of Retrofitting

     Setra estimated that the cost of a retrofit requirement
for its buses would be on the order of $85,000 per bus. It specified
that retrofitting an existing motorcoach would involve: removing
existing seats; removing the flooring; removing the engine in order to
gain access to the bus structure at the rear; welding in a new frame
structure to accommodate FMVSS No. 210 seat belt requirements;
reinstalling the engine, reinstalling removed parts, installing
(compliant) seats; and verifying compliance critical elements to meet
the FMVSSs.
     Coach USA described NHTSA's estimate of $40,000 per
vehicle as ``a significant underestimate.'' Coach USA estimated that
for a single deck motorcoach, the cost will be approximately $35,000
per motorcoach to modify the motorcoach structure to meet FMVSS No. 210
seat anchorage requirements, and another $20,000 per motorcoach to
replace the seats (approximately $18,000 to purchase the seats and
$2,000 to install them).
     Some commenters said that the estimated costs should also
include the cost to the company of taking the bus out of service while
the vehicle is undergoing retrofitting. Coach USA estimated that a
motorcoach will need to be taken out of service for 30 to 45 days to
perform the necessary modifications, a cost that Coach USA estimates to
be approximately $20,000 per motorcoach.
     UMA commented that the cost to retrofit a vehicle could
easily range between $30,000 and $60,000. It noted that about 90
percent of motorcoach companies are small businesses that typically can
maintain only small capital reserves to cover such exigencies as
highway breakdowns or business income gaps.

     UMA stated that consumer demand for late model equipment
on motorcoaches creates a significant decline in asset value after just
a few years use. A retrofit requirement ``could likely quell the demand
for new motorcoaches if the possibility exists for burdensome
recapitalization of existing equipment looms.''
     UMA stated that most motorcoaches in the U.S. are sold
direct, or by similar means, by the manufacturers of motorcoaches, and
that subsequently, existing motorcoaches are routinely acquired by the
manufacturers through trades. The commenter stated that it is likely
the manufacturers will evaluate traded motorcoaches, particularly later