---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Violation Risk Factor Rehearing Order, 120 FERC ] 61,145 at
P 11-16, citing North American Reliability Corp., 118 FERC ] 61,030,
at P 91, order on clarification and reh'g, 119 FERC ] 61,046 (2007).
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    144. That being said, NERC may choose the procedural vehicle to
change the violation risk factors consistent with the Commission's
directives. NERC may use the Reliability Standards development process,
so long as it meets Commission-imposed deadlines.\70\ In this instance,
the Commission sees no vital reason to direct the ERO to use section
1403 of its Rules of Procedure to revise the violation risk factors
discussed below, so long as the revised violation risk factors address
the Commission's concerns and are filed no less than 90 days before the
effective date of the relevant Reliability Standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 118 FERC ]
61,030, at P 91, order on compliance, 119 FERC ] 61,046, at P 33
(2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    145. Coordinating operations and planning between the nuclear power
plant and its transmission entities serves two purposes; safety of the
nuclear power plant and reliability of the Bulk-Power System. With
regard to safety, the Blackout Report highlighted the importance of
coordinated operations and planning between the Bulk-Power System and
nuclear power plants, stating ``[a]s the design and operation of the
electricity grid is taken into account when evaluating the safety
analysis of nuclear power plants, changes to the electricity grid must
be evaluated for the impact on plant safety.'' \71\ With regard to
reliability, since the NPIR supports many of the requirements necessary
for the nuclear power plant to operate connected to the bulk electric
system, not having an NPIR could result in the long-term outage of one
or all nuclear power plants at a particular site to which the NPIR is
applicable. This is relevant because the bulk electric system is not
required to be planned to have multiple nuclear power plants out of
service during peak load periods. As a result, the Commission disagrees
with commenters that object to its reliance on the impact of a nuclear
power plant separating from the grid to justify elevating violation
risk factors for requirements of the Reliability Standard. While the
Commission recognizes that the power produced from nuclear and non-
nuclear power plants is the same, the conditions under which nuclear
power plants can safely operate are inherently different than non-
nuclear power plants because a nuclear power plant must meet all
licensing requirements established by the NRC to remain connected to
the grid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final
Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and
Canada: Causes and Recommendations, at 129 (April 2004) (Blackout
Report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    146. The Commission is concerned that a lack of coordination of
operations and planning between a nuclear power plant and its
transmission entities with respect to the interface capabilities and
requirements has the potential to result in both the unanticipated
separation and the long term outage of one or all nuclear power plants
at a site from the Bulk-Power System. The former has the potential to
place the Bulk-Power System at risk for cascading outages while the
latter may result in inadequate system capabilities to meet the
projected firm load in either the planning or operating horizon. For
example, once disconnected, before a nuclear power plant can reconnect
to the Bulk-Power System, not only must Bulk-Power System conditions be
suitable, but the nuclear power plant must also complete certain
activities relevant to ensuring the safety of the plant to resume power
production. Since nuclear power plants are typically designed as base
load plants, the Commission is concerned that while the Bulk-Power
System may typically be able to withstand the disconnection of a
nuclear power plant for a reasonable period until such time Bulk-Power
System conditions allow for reconnection and the nuclear power plant is
permitted to reconnect, a prolonged disconnection of a nuclear power
plant because its NPIRs are not satisfied may not be sustainable
without affecting system capabilities, thus putting the Bulk-Power
System at risk for instability, separation, or cascading outages.
    147. The Commission also disagrees with arguments that elevated
violation risk factors for Requirements of the Reliability Standard are
not justified because the reliability concern of instability,
separation, or cascading outages are already addressed in other
Reliability Standards. The Commission agrees with commenters that, as
required by other Reliability Standards, the Bulk-Power System is
planned and operated such that there will not be any interruptions of
firm transmission service after one event, such as the loss of a
generator, nuclear fueled or otherwise.\72\ However, the Commission has
previously determined that it is not appropriate to mitigate perceived
content issues among Reliability Standards, as suggested by commenters
in this instance as the duplication of reliability objectives, through
the violation risk factor assignment.\73\ A violation risk factor
represents the potential reliability risk a violation of a requirement
presents to the Bulk-Power System. This assessed reliability risk is
independent of, and not contingent upon, compliance with other
Reliability Standard requirements. The Commission recognizes the
complementary nature of some Reliability Standard Requirements and the
fact that some requirements may share the same reliability objective.
In fact, the Commission expects the assignment of a violation risk
factor corresponding to requirements that address similar reliability
goals in different Reliability Standards to be treated comparably.\74\
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    \72\ See Order No. 693 at P 1794 (``[b]ased on the record before
us, we believe that the transmission planning Reliability Standard
should not allow an entity to plan for the loss of non-consequential
load in the event of a single contingency''). The Commission
recognized that load directly connected to a fault would be removed
from service. See also TPL-001-000, Table 1, ``Transmission Planning
Standards--Normal and Emergency Conditions.''
    \73\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 121 FERC ]
61,179, at P 16 (2007) (Order on Violation Risk Factor Compliance
Filing).
    \74\ Violation Risk Factor Order, 119 FERC ] 61,145 at P 25.
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    148. Commenters also argue that elevated violation risk factors are
not justified because the proposed Reliability Standard is
administrative in nature, not operational. The Commission disagrees.
While the Commission recognized in the NOPR that many of the
requirements of the Nuclear Reliability Standard are administrative in
nature, these same requirements provide for the development of
procedures to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the grid, and
responses to potential emergency conditions.\75\ As such, we disagree
with arguments that the proposed standard focuses on nuclear safety
through the administrative requirement of establishing agreements and
not grid reliability.
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    \75\ NOPR at P 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    149. Constellation's request for assurance that, when there are
overlapping requirements, registered entities will be subject to a
single penalty is a compliance issue and is thus best addressed on a
case-by-case basis in the context of a compliance

proceeding. We note that each instance of non-compliance with a
Requirement is a separate violation. This is consistent with the FPA
which establishes the statutory maximum penalty amount of $1 million on
a per day, per violation basis as reflected in the order certifying
NERC as the ERO.\76\ However, the Commission approved NERC's Sanction
Guidelines that allow NERC, in the context of a compliance proceeding,
to use its discretion in the determination of monetary penalties for a
violation of a Requirement of a Reliability Standard.\77\
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    \76\ 16 U.S.C. 825o-1(b) (2006). See also North American
Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 61,062, at P 412
(Certification Order), order on reh'g and compliance, 117 FERC ]
61,126 (2006).
    \77\ Section 3.10 of the NERC Sanction Guidelines states in
part, ``NERC or the regional entity can determine and levy a
separate penalty or sanction, or direct remedial action, upon a
violator for each individual violator for each individual violation.
However, in instances of multiple violations related to a single act
or common incidence of noncompliance, NERC or the regional entity
will generally determine and issue a single aggregate penalty,
sanction, or remedial action directive bearing reasonable
relationship to the aggregate of the related violations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    150. EEI's argument that Order No. 706 requires changes to the
violation risk factors to be considered through the Reliability
Standards development process is flawed. The passages in Order No. 706
cited by EEI concern modification of the Reliability Standard itself.
As the Commission has repeatedly held, the violation risk factors are
not a part of the Reliability Standards. In fact, in Order No. 706, we
stated that ``we will not allow NERC to reconsider the violation risk
factor designations in this instance but, rather, direct below that
NERC make specific modifications to its designations.'' \78\ However,
similar to our action in this order, Order No. 706 allowed NERC to
choose the procedural vehicle to change the violation risk factors, so
long as it meets Commission-imposed deadlines.\79\
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    \78\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Docket No. RM06-22-000; Order No. 706, 73 FR 7368 (Feb.
7, 2008), 122 FERC ] 61,040, at P 757, order on reh'g, Order No.
706-A, 123 FERC ] 61,174 (2008).
    \79\ Id.
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 2. Requirement-Specific Issues
a. Requirement R2
i. NOPR
    151. The NOPR proposed to direct the ERO to raise the violation
risk factor for Requirement R2 from lower to medium. The NOPR justified
this proposal because the Requirement co-mingles the administrative
element of having an executed agreement in place with the operational
element of determining how the parties to the interface agreement will
address nuclear plant licensing requirements and SOLs in order to
provide for safe nuclear plant operation and shutdown. Thus, the
operational requirements established will include requirements for off-
site power to enable safe operation and shutdown during an electric
system or plant event. Therefore, the NOPR noted that a violation of
Requirement R2 ``could, under emergency, abnormal, or restorative
conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly affect the
electrical state or capability of the Bulk-Power System'' and found
that a medium violation risk factor is appropriate.
ii. Comments
    152. Ontario IESO and Hydro One and SCE&G disagree with the
Commission that Requirement R2 has a direct impact on the electrical
state or capability of the Bulk-Power System. They argue that, in the
absence of an agreement, each party would continue to operate its own
system in accordance with all applicable Reliability Standards.\80\
Entergy and NEI argue that Requirement R2 is an administrative
requirement, and state that violations can be quickly detected and
corrected and will not directly affect the Bulk-Power System. Entergy
also points out that Requirement R2 takes place in the planning
timeframe and concludes that a lower violation risk factor is more
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Detroit Edison states that it agrees with Ontario IESO and
Hydro One on specific violation risk factor issues, and Ontario
Power and SCE&G also disagree with the Commission's proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Commission Determination
    153. The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal. As the Commission
identified in the NOPR, Requirement R2 co-mingles the administrative
element of having an executed agreement in place with the operational
element of determining how the parties to the interface will address
nuclear plant licensing requirements and SOLs. Consistent with
violation risk factor guideline five, the Commission expects the
assigned violation risk factor to reflect the highest reliability risk
objective of the requirement.\81\ A failure to establish operational
and implementation elements of the NPIRs, the higher reliability risk
objective of the requirement, has the potential under emergency,
abnormal, or restorative conditions to directly affect the electrical
state or capability of the Bulk-Power System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Violation Risk Factor Order, 119 FERC ] 61,145 at P 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    154. Arguments that elevating a violation risk factor is not
justified because Requirement R2 is an administrative requirement that
takes place in the planning time frame, thus violations are quickly
detected and corrected are fundamentally flawed.\82\ NERC contemplates
in its definitions of the violation risk factor levels, the reliability
risk a requirement violation presents in both the operating and
planning time frames. Consistent with NERC's definition, a violation
risk factor represents the potential reliability risk a violation of a
requirement presents to the Bulk-Power System, regardless of the time
frame.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ See NEI comments at 8, and Entergy comments at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    155. With regard to comments from Ontario IESO and Hydro One and
SCE&G, as explained previously in this Final Rule, it is not
appropriate to assign a requirement's violation risk factor based on
compliance with other Reliability Standards.
    156. Accordingly, the Commission directs the ERO to revise the
violation risk factor assignment for Requirement R2 from lower to
medium no later then 90 days before the effective date of the
Reliability Standard.
b. Requirements R4.2 and R4.3
i. NOPR
    157. The NOPR proposed to direct the ERO to raise the violation
risk factors for sub-Requirements R4.2 and R4.3 to high. Sub-
Requirements R4.2 and R4.3 require a transmission entity to incorporate
NPIRs into operating analyses, operate to meet the NPIRs and inform the
nuclear plant generator operator when the ability to assess performance
to meet the NPIRs is lost.
    158. The NOPR states that sub-Requirement R4.2 obligates a
transmission entity to operate its electric system to meet NPIRs
established in an interface agreement. Furthermore, NPIRs are described
as forming the basis for nuclear plant generator operators and
transmission entities to ``coordinate planning, assessment, analysis,
and operation of the bulk power system to ensure safe nuclear plant
operations and shutdowns.'' Therefore, the NOPR noted that, under
emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions, a violation of
Requirement R4.2 could directly cause or contribute to Bulk-Power
System instability, separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or
could place the Bulk-Power System at an unacceptable risk of
instability, separation, or

cascading failures,\83\ and proposed a high violation risk factor for
Requirement R4.2.
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    \83\ See also NERC November 19, 2007 Petition at 20 (``The
proposed reliability standard also acknowledges that the obligation
to public safety relative to nuclear plant operation establishes a
unique set of requirements that other generating facilities are not
subjected to. In order to protect the common good, the applicable
transmission entities must respect these unique requirements that
maintain and/or restore offsite power adequate to supply minimum
nuclear safety requirements.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    159. The NOPR noted that Requirement R4.3 obligates a transmission
entity to inform the nuclear plant generator operator when the ability
to monitor the system and verify NPIRs is lost. The NOPR noted that a
nuclear plant generator operator that is not aware that a transmission
entity can no longer guarantee that NPIRs are met to respond to, would
suffer an impaired ability to anticipate, emergencies and changing
system conditions. Because such an event could increase the likelihood
that the plant is separated from the transmission system and cause
significant degradation in Bulk-Power System reliability, characterized
by instability, uncontrolled islanding and cascading, the NOPR proposed
to direct the ERO to raise the violation risk factor for Requirement
R4.3 from medium to high, and requested comment.
ii. Comments
    160. Several commenters object to the proposal to raise the
violation risk factor of Requirement R4.2 and R4.3.\84\ NEI
characterizes Requirement R4.2 as requiring transmission entities to
operate their electrical systems to meet the NPIRs incorporated in the
interface agreements and describes Requirement R4.3 as requiring
transmission entities which lose the ability to monitor their systems
to maintain compliance with NPIRs to communicate this information to
the affected nuclear plant generator operators. NEI, ConEdison, and
Entergy state that the Commission's concerns regarding the loss of a
single generator are addressed in other NERC Reliability Standards that
minimize the risk of system instability, separation, or cascading loss
if a generator were to go offline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See ConEdison, Detroit Edison, Entergy, Ontario IESO and
Hydro One, Midwest ISO, NEI, Ontario Power, and SCE&G comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    161. NEI states that transmission planning and operations
Reliability Standards require the transmission system to be able to
withstand threats from the loss of a single generator. According to
NEI, entities having the responsibility to meet the Requirements of
these other Reliability Standards already incorporate the limitations
of nuclear generating plants into their studies and analyses and
address the loss of a given generator and limit the effect of the loss
on the grid. NEI states that NUC-001-1 deals only with the important
interaction and communication between the nuclear plant generator
operator and transmission entities to ensure that the NPIRs are met,
while the operation of the Bulk-Power System and requirements to
prevent instability, separation, or cascading failures are adequately
addressed by other Reliability Standards.
    162. Ontario IESO and Hydro One characterize the consequences of a
violation of Requirement R4.2 or R4.3 as affecting a nuclear plant
generator operator's license requirements and may result in a shut
down, but argue that such a result, while significant to the generator,
would not cause significant degradation in Bulk-Power System. Ontario
IESO and Hydro One state that the shut down of a power plant is a
controlled process, not a contingency, and conclude that reliability
impacts such as instability, uncontrolled islanding and cascading would
not result.
    163. Midwest ISO disagrees with the Commission's assessment that a
high violation risk factor is necessary for Requirement R4.2. In most
cases, if the reliability coordinator and transmission operator are in
a condition in which the bulk electric system cannot support the off-
site power requirements of a nuclear plant, the nuclear plant is not at
risk of tripping. Normally, in its licensing requirements, the plant is
required after a period of time (usually two to eight hours) to begin a
controlled shutdown of the reactor in this situation.
iii. Commission Determination
    164. The Commission confirms its findings proposed in the NOPR and
directs the ERO to revise the violation risk factor for Requirements
R4.2 and R4.3 from medium to high. We disagree with the
characterization that Requirements R4.2 and R4.3 deal only with the
``important interaction and communication between the nuclear plant
[generator] operator and transition entities to ensure that the NPIRs
are met.'' \85\ As discussed in the NOPR, these requirements are
directly relevant to ensuring the continued operation of a nuclear
power plant on the Bulk-Power System. A failure of the transmission
entity to operate as needed to provide the NPIR or inform the nuclear
plant generator operator when its ability to assess the operation of
the electric system is lost, puts the Bulk-Power System at risk of
cascading outages. We note that most nuclear plant sites operate more
than one nuclear power plant. If a transmission entity loses its
ability to assess the operation of the electric system affecting its
NPIRs, it will, in most cases, impact more than one nuclear power plant
where the result would be the shutdown, controlled or otherwise, of the
applicable nuclear plant site. As a result, there could be significant
loss of firm transmission service if not cascading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ NEI comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    165. The Commission is also not persuaded by the argument that
elevated violation risk factors are not justified because the shutdown
of a nuclear power plant is a controlled process and not a contingency.
NERC defines a contingency as, ``the unexpected failure or outage of a
system component, such as a generator, transmission line, circuit
breaker, switch or other electrical element.'' Although the shut down
of a nuclear power plant is described as a ``controlled'' process
because of the methodical and orderly operation of safety systems to
disconnect the plant from the Bulk-Power System, the shut down is
initiated because Bulk-Power System conditions are unsuitable for the
continued operation of the nuclear power plant on the Bulk-Power
System. If the shutdown, albeit controlled, of a nuclear power plant is
unexpected in the course of the operation of the Bulk-Power System, it
is, nonetheless, a contingency that must be accommodated in real time
operations without the loss of firm service.
    166. Further, not continuously providing specific NPIRs may result
in the additional loss of one or more nuclear power plants during
single or multiple contingencies. The Commission is concerned that an
initial system event near, but unrelated to, one or more nuclear power
plants that degrades system conditions beyond the nuclear power plant's
license requirements could result in the disconnection of one or more
nuclear power plants from the Bulk-Power System. In this case, the
outages of multiple nuclear power plants would be the result of one
contingency and would be considered by the Commission to be a single
event. However, the reliability impact to the bulk electric system due
to this single event may not be addressed in operations planning and
long term planning, thus putting the Bulk-Power System at risk of
cascading outages. Thus, not achieving the NPIRs could put the Bulk-
Power System in

danger of instability, separation or a cascading sequence of failures.
    167. For the reasons discussed previously in this Final Rule, the
Commission reiterates that it is not appropriate to assess a
requirement's violation risk factor assignment based on compliance with
other Reliability Standard requirements.
    168. Therefore, consistent with the definition of a high violation
risk factor, for the reasons discussed above, the Commission directs
the ERO to revise the violation risk factor assignment for Requirements
R4.2 and R4.3 from medium to high no later then 90 days before the
effective date of the Reliability Standard.
c. Requirement R5
i. NOPR
    169. The NOPR proposed to direct the ERO to raise the violation
risk factor for Requirement R5 from medium to high. The NOPR noted that
Requirement R5 obligates a nuclear plant generator operator to operate
its system consistent with the interface agreement developed under NUC-
001-1, and that the separation of a typically large nuclear power plant
from the grid may significantly affect grid operations. Because nuclear
power plant service interruptions could be initiated by incidents
occurring on the nuclear power plant system, including incidents
stemming from a failure to meet interface agreement terms, a violation
of Requirement R5 could directly affect the reliability of the system.
That possibility suggested that the violation risk factor for
Requirement R5 should be raised from medium to high.
ii. Comments
    170. Several commenters object to the proposal to raise the
Requirement R5 violation risk factor from medium to high.\86\ NEI
characterizes Requirement R5 as ensuring that the nuclear plant
generator operator understands and implements the interface agreements,
and coordinates with the applicable transmission entities to ensure
nuclear plant safe operation and shutdown. According to NEI, the
nuclear industry consensus is that operation of the Bulk-Power System
to prevent instability, separation, or cascading failures is adequately
addressed by other Reliability Standards. According to NEI, the NOPR
overstates the significance of the separation of a nuclear plant from
the Bulk-Power System, because all Bulk-Power Systems are designed and
operated to handle the loss of the largest generator on the grid as an
N-1 contingency, including a large nuclear power plant, which may not
be the largest generator on the grid. Hence, the separation of a
nuclear power plant should not be assumed to result in a loss of Bulk-
Power System stability. NEI states that transmission grids must be able
to withstand the loss of a single generating unit, including nuclear
power plants and other facilities.\87\ Thus, according to NEI the
tripping of a large nuclear unit should not directly cause Bulk-Power
System instability, separation or a cascading sequence of failures or
place the Bulk-Power System at an unacceptable risk of instability,
separation, or cascading failures. Should a nuclear generating unit
separate from the grid and the resultant ``post-trip'' voltage be
insufficient to meet the nuclear offsite power requirements for the
site, it would not result in the automatic separation of the remaining
nuclear units. Any subsequent shutdown of the nuclear units should not
introduce grid or nuclear system transients because the shutdown would
be an operator controlled, orderly process to ensure compliance with
the requirements of the license.
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    \86\ See Detroit Edison, Ontario IESO and Hydro One, Entergy,
Ontario Power, and SCE&G comments.
    \87\ NEI cites the NERC ``Category B'' stability criteria which
it describes as the most restrictive criteria. See TPL-001-000,
Table 1, ``Transmission Planning Standards.'' NEI also cites what it
characterizes as more stringent regional criteria that require that
the common mode simultaneous outage of two generator units (nuclear
or otherwise) connected to the same switchyard shall not result in
cascading, though not addressed by the initiating events in NERC
``Category C.''
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    171. Ontario IESO and Hydro One concede that failure to meet this
requirement may significantly affect grid control and operation, but
suggest that the reliability of the power grid will not be affected in
a way that will cause instability, uncontrolled islanding and cascading
because the separation of the plant would be coordinated and
implemented in a controlled manner. Entergy states that the purpose of
NUC-001-1 is to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants by
requiring plant operators and transmission entities to coordinate to
meet NPIRs and that other Reliability Standards provide for operation
of the Bulk-Power System to prevent instability, separation, or
cascading failures.
iii. Commission Determination
    172. The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal. Commenters argue that
elevating the violation risk factor assignment for Requirement R5 is
not justified because: (1) The Commission overstates the significance
of separation of a nuclear plant from the Bulk-Power System; (2) the
reliability concerns associated with instability, separation, or
cascading outages are already addressed in other Reliability Standards,
and (3) the shutdown of a nuclear power plant is a controlled process
and not a contingency.
    173. Each of these arguments has been previously addressed in this
Final Rule. Accordingly, the Commission directs the ERO to revise the
violation risk factor assignment for Requirement R5 from medium to high
no later then 90 days before the effective date of the Reliability
Standard.
d. Requirements R7 and R8
i. NOPR
    174. The NOPR proposed to direct the ERO to raise the violation
risk factors for Requirements R7 and R8 from medium to high, and sought
comment. Requirements R7 and R8 obligate a nuclear plant generator
operator and its transmission entities to inform each other of actual
or proposed changes to their facilities that affect their ability to
meet NPIRs. Because the information to be exchanged, such as ``limits''
and ``protection systems,'' affects the ability of a plant to remain
connected to the Bulk-Power System, the NOPR stated that a failure to
provide information could result in a nuclear plant disconnecting from
the Bulk-Power System, and place the Bulk-Power System at risk for
cascading outages. To account for such a risk, the NOPR proposed to
direct the ERO to raise the violation risk factors for Requirements R7
and R8 from medium to high.
ii. Comments
    175. NEI states the violation risk factors for Requirements R7 and
R8 should not be changed. NEI states Requirements R7 and R8 require
nuclear plant generator operators and their transmission entities to
communicate with each other regarding any changes to their facilities
that could affect their capacity to meet their NPIR obligations. Since
violations of these requirements are not likely to lead to Bulk-Power
System instability, separation, or cascading failures, the violation
risk factors for Requirements R7 and R8 should not be changed. Entergy
also argues that Requirements R7 and R8 should have a medium violation
risk factor, since a failure of communication to be avoided under the
Requirements is not likely to lead to significant events such as Bulk-
Power System instability, separation, or cascading failures, but only
over the parties ability to monitor and oversee the Bulk-Power System
or cause other unspecified problems.

    176. Ontario IESO and Hydro One also suggest that the violation
risk factors of Requirements R7 and R8 be assigned to medium, not
high.\88\ They agree that failure to meet these requirements may
significantly affect grid control and operation, but not the
reliability of the power grid characterized by instability,
uncontrolled islanding and cascading. Finally, ConEdison believes that
the violation risk factor for Requirement R8 should not be changed
because transmission planners and operators do not analyze generation
from nuclear power plants differently than other generators or the
requirements are largely administrative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See also Detroit Edison, Ontario Power, and SCE&G comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Commission Determination
    177. The Commission adopts the NOPR proposal. As discussed in the
NOPR and in additional detail above, if transmission entities and
nuclear plant generator operators do not provide or otherwise
communicate information concerning system changes to each other, their
planning and operating analyses may not include the true consequences
of a single contingency. As a result, unanticipated events that could
result in the disconnection of one or more nuclear power plants from
the Bulk-Power System, in addition to the consequences of the
initiating event, could place the Bulk-Power System at risk for
cascading outages.
    178. Arguments that elevating the violation risk factor assignment
for Requirements R7 and R8 is not justified because the shutdown of a
nuclear power plant is a controlled process and transmission planners
and operators do not analyze nuclear power plants differently than
other generation have been previously addressed in this Final Rule.
    179. Accordingly, consistent with the definition of a high
violation risk factor, and for the reasons discussed above, the
Commission directs the ERO to revise the violation risk factor
assignment for Requirements R7 and R8 from medium to high no later then
90 days before the effective date of the Reliability Standard.
e. Requirement R9
i. NOPR
    180. The NOPR proposed to direct the ERO to raise the violation
risk factor for Requirement R9 from lower to medium, and sought
comment. Requirement R9 describes specific administrative, technical,
operations, maintenance, coordination, communications, and training
elements that a nuclear plant generator operator and its transmission
entities must include in their interface agreement. The NOPR stated
that Requirement R9 is similar to Requirement R2, in that it co-mingles
an administrative element of incorporating the various elements into
the interface agreement with the operational element of determining how
the parties to the interface agreement will address the administrative,
technical, operations, maintenance, coordination, communications, and
training issues in order to provide for safe nuclear power plant
operation and shutdown. The NOPR stated that a violation of Requirement
R9 could result in an inability to resolve system conditions in an
emergency because the necessary operational or emergency planning
elements may not be in place. Therefore, the NOPR noted that a
violation of Requirement R9 ``could, under emergency, abnormal, or
restorative conditions anticipated by the preparations, directly affect
the electrical state or capability of the Bulk-Power System.'' In
response, the NOPR proposed to find that a medium violation risk factor
is appropriate for Requirement R9, but stated that if the ERO wishes to
assign a lower violation risk factor to the purely administrative sub-
Requirements of Requirement R9, it could propose appropriate
differentiation in its comments.
ii. Comments
    181. Commenters object to raising this violation risk factor
because Requirement R9 is a planning requirement that is administrative
in nature. Because generation from nuclear power plants is not analyzed
differently than other generation by transmission planners and
operators their operations do not justify higher risk factors.
    182. NEI states the violation risk factor for Requirement R9 should
not be changed. Requirement R9 sets forth the specific administrative,
technical, operations, maintenance, coordination, communications, and
training elements that a nuclear plant generator operator and its
transmission entities must incorporate in the interface agreement. It
argues that, while the implementation of these elements is substantive,
Requirement R9 is an administrative requirement to include the
specified provisions. Violations of this requirement can be readily
identified and corrected; therefore, violations should not directly
affect the Bulk-Power System.
    183. Entergy characterizes Requirement R9 as addressing the various
elements that parties must address in an interface agreement and
supporting the terms in Requirements R3 through 8. Entergy states that
Requirement R9 is administrative in nature, occurs in the planning time
frame and violations could be easily corrected without affecting the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
iii. Commission Determination
    184. Consistent with the NOPR, the Commission directs the ERO to
revise the violation risk factor assignment for Requirement R9 from
lower to medium. The Commission disagrees with commenters that a lower
violation risk factor is appropriate because Requirement R9 is an
administrative requirement to include the specified provisions. While
the Commission recognized in the NOPR that many of the requirements of
the proposed Reliability Standard are administrative in nature, these
same requirements provide for the development of procedures to ensure
the safe and reliable operation of the grid, and responses to potential
emergency conditions.
    185. Further, as identified in the NOPR, Requirement R9 co-mingles
the administrative element of incorporating the various elements into
the interface agreement with the operational elements of determining
how the parties to the interface agreement will address the
administrative, technical, operations, maintenance, coordination,
communications, and training issues for safe nuclear power plant
operation and shutdown. Consistent with violation risk factor Guideline
5, the Commission expects the assigned violation risk factor to reflect
the highest reliability risk objective of the requirement. A violation
of the highest reliability risk objectives of Requirement R9, under
emergency, abnormal, or restorative conditions has the potential to
affect the electrical state or capability of the Bulk-Power System.
    186. As discussed previously in this Final Rule, arguments that
elevating the violation risk factor assigned to Requirement R9 are not
justified because the subject requirement takes place in the planning
time frame, thus violations are quickly detected and corrected, are
fundamentally flawed.
    187. Therefore, consistent with the definition of a medium
violation risk factor, and for the reasons discussed above, the
Commission directs the ERO to revise the violation risk factor
assignment for Requirement R9 from lower to medium no later then 90
days before the effective date of the Reliability Standard.

H. Violation Severity Levels

    188. For each Requirement of a Reliability Standard, NERC states
that it will also define up to four violation severity levels--lower,
moderate, high and severe--as measurements of the degree to which the
Requirement was violated. For a specific violation of a particular
Requirement, NERC or the Regional Entity will establish the initial
value range for the base penalty amount by finding the intersection of
the applicable violation risk factor and violation severity level in
the Base Penalty Amount Table in Appendix A of the Sanction
Guidelines.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 FERC ]
61,248, at P 74 (2007) (directing NERC to develop up to four
violation severity levels (lower, moderate, high, and severe) as
measurements of the degree of a violation for each requirement and
sub-requirement of a Reliability Standard).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. NOPR
    189. The NOPR noted that NERC's November 19, 2007 Petition proposed
violation severity levels that apply generally to all violations of the
Requirements of NUC-001-1, rather than to specific Requirements and
sub-Requirements, but that NERC had submitted proposed new violation
severity levels for each Requirement and sub-Requirement of NUC-001-1
in Docket No. RR08-4-000.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ The updated NUC-001-1 violation severity levels are
provided in NERC's March 4, 2008 filing of revised Exhibit A,
containing the NERC violation severity level matrix, in Docket No.
RR08-4-000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    190. The NOPR stated the Commission's intention to address issues
relating to NUC-001-1 violation severity levels in the Docket No. RR08-
4-000 proceeding, but approve the proposed undifferentiated violation
severity levels on an interim basis, in case the revised violation
severity levels are not approved before the NUC-001-1 effective date.
Because the initial violation severity levels for NUC-001-1 resemble
previously proposed levels of non-compliance by grouping Requirements
in NUC-001-1 rather than distinguishing on a per-Requirement and sub-
Requirement basis, the NOPR proposed to treat the proposed,
undifferentiated violation severity levels for NUC-001-1 consistent
with the treatment adopted for levels of non-compliance, until the
Requirement and sub-Requirement-specific violation severity levels are
approved.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 FERC ]
61,248 at P 78-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    191. NERC concurs with the Commission's approach to violation
severity levels.
3. Commission Determination
    192. The Commission takes no action on the violation severity
levels in this Final Rule. The June 19, 2008 Order on violation
severity levels directed the ERO to assess the violation severity
levels for proposed NUC-001-1 in accordance with the Commission's
guidelines set forth in that order.\92\ As such, NERC has been directed
to re-submit violation severity levels for NUC-001-1, including
appropriate revisions based on the application of the Commission's
guidelines, as part of NERC's six-month compliance filing directed in
the Violation Severity Level Order.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 123 FERC ]
61,284, at P 14 (2008) (Violation Severity Level Order).
    \93\ The Commission notes that NERC has sought rehearing of the
Violation Severity Level Order concerning the scope and timing of
the compliance filing in Docket No. RR08-4-001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Information Collection Statement

    193. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require
approval of certain information collection requirements imposed by
agency rules.\94\ Upon approval of a collection(s) of information, OMB
will assign an OMB control number and an expiration date. Respondents
subject to the filing requirements of this Final Rule will not be
penalized for failing to respond to these collections of information
unless the collections of information display a valid OMB control
number. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) \95\ requires each federal
agency to seek and obtain OMB approval before undertaking a collection
of information directed to 10 or more persons, or continuing a
collection for which OMB approval and validity of the control number
are about to expire.\96\ The PRA defines the phrase ``collection of
information'' to be the ``obtaining, causing to be obtained,
soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public,
of facts or opinions by or for an agency, regardless of form or format,
calling for either--

    \94\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \95\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-20.
    \96\ 44 U.S.C. 3502(3)(A)(i), 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) answers to identical questions posed to, or identical
reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed on ten or more
persons, other than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the
United States; or (ii) answers to questions posed to agencies,
instrumentalities, or employees of the United States which are to be
used for general statistical purposes.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ 44 U.S.C. 3502(3)(A).

    194. This Final Rule approves the new Reliability Standard
developed by NERC as the ERO. In addition, the Final Rule directs the
ERO to develop a modification to one Requirement through its
Reliability Standards development process. Section 215 of the FPA
authorizes the ERO to develop and enforce Reliability Standards that
provide for an adequate level of reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
Pursuant to the statute, the ERO must submit each Reliability Standard
that it proposes to be made effective to the Commission for
approval.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See 16 U.S.C. 824o(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    195. Reliability Standard NUC-001-1 does not require responsible
entities to file information with the Commission. Nor, with the
exception of a three year self-certification of compliance, does the
Reliability Standard require responsible entities to file information
with the ERO or Regional Entities. However, the Reliability Standard
does require responsible entities to develop and maintain certain
information for a specified period of time, subject to inspection by
the ERO or Regional Entities.
    196. Reliability Standard NUC-001-1 requires nuclear plant
generator operators and entities that provide generation, transmission
and distribution services relating to off-site power (these entities
are defined as ``transmission entities'') to enter into interface
agreements with nuclear plant generator operators that will govern
certain communication, training, operational and planning elements for
use in addressing generation and transmission system limits and nuclear
licensing requirements. The Commission understands that most entities
subject to this Reliability Standard already have such agreements in
place. The responsible entities are also required to retain evidence
that they executed such an agreement and incorporated its terms into
systems planning and operations. Further, each nuclear plant generator
operator and transmission entity must self-certify its compliance to
the compliance monitor once every three years.
    197. The Commission is submitting these reporting and recordkeeping
requirements to OMB for its review and approval under section 3507(d)
of the PRA. In the NOPR, the Commission sought comments on the
Commission's need for this information, whether the information will
have practical utility, the accuracy of provided burden

estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected, and any suggested methods for minimizing
the respondent's burden, including the use of automated information
techniques.
    198. Our estimate below regarding the number of respondents is
based on the NERC compliance registry as of April 2007 and NERC's
November 19, 2007 Petition that is the subject of this proceeding. In
its Petition, NERC states that 104 nuclear power plants are subject to
the proposed Reliability Standard. These plants are run by
approximately 30 different utilities and are located on 65 different
sites. Each plant must contract with transmission entities to obtain
off-site power, and coordinate distribution and transmission services
for such power.
    199. The Nuclear Reliability Standard identifies 11 categories of
functional entities that could be a transmission entity when providing
covered services, including transmission operators, transmission
owners, transmission planners, transmission service providers,
balancing authorities, reliability coordinators, planning authorities,
distribution providers, load-serving entities, generator owners and
generator operators. NERC's compliance registry indicates that there is
a significant amount of overlap among the entities that perform these
functions. Therefore, in some instances, a single entity may be
registered under several of these functions. The November 19, 2007
Petition includes NERC drafting team comments which report, ``In many
cases, agreements are not two-party [agreements]--they are often multi-
party agreements involving RTO/ISO Protocols, transmission and
generation owners and others.'' \99\ Therefore, this analysis attempts
to account for the overlap of services to be provided by entities
responsible for the various roles identified in the Reliability
Standard, as well as the fact that certain plants may need to
coordinate with multiple entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ NERC Nuclear Reliability Standard drafting team,
``Consideration of Comments, Draft 2--SAR on Nuclear Plant Offsite
Power Reliability'' at 2 (May 23, 2005), filed in November 19, 2007
Petition, Exh. B, Record of Development of Proposed Reliability
Standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    200. Under NUC-001-1, the 104 nuclear power plants must coordinate
with off-site power suppliers and related transmission and/or
distribution service providers. NUC-001-1 drafting team reports in its
responses to SAR comments, ``Nuclear plant generators and most nuclear
offsite power supplies interconnect with the bulk electric system at
transmission system voltage levels. While backup station service for
some plants may be provided via distribution lines, these cases are the
exception, not the rule.'' \100\ Assuming conservatively, that not more
than half of the nuclear power plants call for multi-party coordination
and those that do involve all the types of parties listed by the
drafting team, the Commission estimates that 52 nuclear power plants
will execute bi-lateral interface agreements and 52 nuclear power
plants will execute multi-lateral interface agreements with
approximately four other parties. Thus, the Commission estimates that
the 104 nuclear power plants will enter into agreements with an
additional 260 parties to bilateral and multi-party agreements,
providing 364 as the total number of entities required to comply with
the information ``reporting'' or development requirements of the
Nuclear Reliability Standard.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ NERC Nuclear Reliability Standard drafting team,
``Consideration of Comments on 2nd Draft of Nuclear Off-site Power
Supply Standard'' at 54 (Feb. 7, 2007), filed in November 19, 2007
Petition, Exh. B, Record of Development of Proposed Reliability
Standard.
    \101\ Because it is assumed that each plant operator must ensure
that appropriate agreements are in place for each plant, this
analysis assesses the workload by measuring the work for 104 plants,
rather than for the 30 nuclear plant operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    201. Burden Estimate: The Public Reporting burden for the
requirements contained in the Final Rule is as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Number of    Number of
             Data collection              respondents   responses             Hours per  respondent                       Total annual  hours
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 FERC-725F:
Nuclear Plant Owners or Operators.......          104            1  Reporting: 80............................  Reporting: 8,320.
                                          ...........  ...........  Recordkeeping: 40........................  Recordkeeping: 4,160.
Investor-Owned Utilities................          130            1  Reporting: 80............................  Reporting: 10,400.
                                          ...........  ...........  Recordkeeping: 40........................  Recordkeeping: 5,200.
Large Municipals, Cooperatives and other          130            1  Reporting: 80............................  Reporting: 10,400.
 agencies.
                                          ...........  ...........  Recordkeeping: 40........................  Recordkeeping: 5,200.
                                         ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................          364  ...........  .........................................  43,680.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Total Hours: (Reporting 29,120 hours + Recordkeeping 14,560 hours)
= 43,680 hours. (FTE = Full Time Equivalent or 2,080 hours)
    Total Annual hours for Collection: Reporting + Recordkeeping =
43,680 hours.
    Information Collection Costs: The Commission finds the average
annualized cost to be the total annual hours (Reporting) 29,120 times
$120 = $3,494,400.
    Recordkeeping = @ $40/hour = $ 582,400, with labor calculated as
file/record clerk @ $17 an hour + supervisory @ $23 an hour.
    Total costs = $4,076,800.
    The Commission believes that this estimate may be conservative
because most if not all of the applicable entities currently have
agreements in place to provide for coordination between a nuclear plant
generator operator and its local transmission, distribution and off-
site power suppliers. Furthermore, multiple plants are located on
certain sites, and one entity may operate multiple plants, providing
for potential economies in updating, drafting and executing the
interface agreements.
    Title: FERC-725F, Mandatory Reliability Standard for Nuclear Plant
Interface Coordination.
    Action: Final Rule.
    OMB Control No.: [To be determined.]
    Respondents: Business or other for profit, and/or not for profit
institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: One time to initially comply with the rule,
and then on occasion as needed to revise or modify. In addition, annual
and three-year self-certification requirements will apply.
    Necessity of the Information: NUC-001-1, implements the
Congressional mandate of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to develop
mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards to better ensure the
reliability of the nation's Bulk-Power System. Specifically, the
Nuclear Reliability Standard will ensure that system operating limits
or SOLs used in the

reliability planning and operation of the Bulk-Power System are
coordinated with nuclear licensing requirements in order to ensure the
safe operation and shut down of nuclear power plants.
    Internal review: The Commission has reviewed the requirements
pertaining to the Nuclear Reliability Standard for the Bulk-Power
System and determined that the requirements adopted are necessary to
meet the statutory provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. These
requirements conform to the Commission's plan for efficient information
collection, communication and management within the energy industry.
The Commission has assured itself, by means of internal review, that
there is specific, objective support for the burden estimates
associated with the information requirements.
    202. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Michael Miller,
Office of the Executive Director, Phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, fax: (202)
273-0873, e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Comments on the
requirements of the Final Rule may also be sent to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission], e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
IV. Environmental Analysis

    203. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\102\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. The actions proposed here fall within the categorical
exclusion in the Commission's regulations for rules that are
clarifying, corrective or procedural, for information gathering,
analysis, and dissemination.\103\ Accordingly, neither an environmental
impact statement nor environmental assessment is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats.
and Regs. ] 30,783 (1987).
    \103\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    204. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \104\ generally
requires a description and analysis of Final Rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Most of the entities, i.e., planning authorities, reliability
coordinators, transmission planners and transmission operators, to
which the requirements of this rule would apply do not fall within the
definition of small entities.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12.
    \105\ The RFA definition of ``small entity'' refers to the
definition provided in the Small Business Act, which defines a
``small business concern'' as a business that is independently owned
and operated and that is not dominant in its field of operation. See
15 U.S.C. 632 (2006). According to the SBA, a small electric utility
is defined as one that has a total electric output of less than four
million MWh in the preceding year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    205. As indicated above, based on available information regarding
NERC's compliance registry, approximately 364 entities, including
owners and operators of 104 nuclear power plants, will be responsible
for compliance with the new Reliability Standard. It is estimated that
one-third of the responsible entities, about 130 entities, would be
municipal and cooperative organizations. In addition to generator
owners and operators and distribution service providers, the Nuclear
Reliability Standard applies to planning authorities, transmission
planners, transmission operators and reliability coordinators, which
tend to be larger entities. Thus, the Commission believes that only a
portion, approximately 30 to 40 of the municipal and cooperative
organizations to which the Reliability Standard applies, qualify as
small entities.\106\ The Commission does not consider this a
substantial number of all municipal and cooperative organizations.
Moreover, as discussed above, the Nuclear Reliability Standard will not
be a burden on the industry since most if not all of the applicable
entities currently coordinate operations and planning with nuclear
plant generator operators and the Nuclear Reliability Standard will
simply provide a common framework for agreements governing such
coordination and many of the entities already have agreements in place
to meet prior NRC requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ According to the DOE's Energy Information Administration
(EIA), there were 3,284 electric utility companies in the United
States in 2005, and 3,029 of these electric utilities qualify as
small entities under the SBA definition. Among these 3,284 electric
utility companies are: (1) 883 cooperatives of which 852 are small
entity cooperatives; (2) 1,862 municipal utilities, of which 1842
are small entity municipal utilities; (3) 127 political
subdivisions, of which 114 are small entity political subdivisions;
and (4) 219 privately owned utilities, of which 104 could be
considered small entity private utilities. See Energy Information
Administration Database, Form EIA-861, Dept. of Energy (2005),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/
eia861.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    206. Based on this understanding, the Commission certifies that
this Final Rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, no regulatory
flexibility analysis is required.

VI. Document Availability

    207. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in
the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
    208. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
    209. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web
site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at<PHONE_NUMBER>) or e-mail at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. E-mail the Public Reference Room at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
    By the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

    Note: This Appendix will not appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations.

                Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Abbreviation                            Entity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ameren.............................  Ameren Service Co.

ATC\+\.............................  American Transmission Company LLC.
CenterPoint Energy.................  CenterPoint Energy Houston
                                      Electric, LLC.
ConEdison..........................  Consolidated Edison of New York,
                                      Inc.
Constellation......................  Constellation Energy Group, Inc.
Detroit Edison.....................  Detroit Edison Company.
Dominion...........................  Dominion Resources, Inc.
Duke...............................  Duke Energy Corporation.
EEI................................  Edison Electric Institute.
Entergy............................  Entergy Services, Inc.
Exelon.............................  Exelon Corporation.
ISO/RTO Council....................  ISO/RTO Council.
International Transmission.........  International Transmission Co.,
                                      Michigan Electric Transmission
                                      Co., LLC and ITC Midwest.
Midwest ISO........................  Midwest Independent Transmission
                                      System Operator, Inc.
National Grid\+\...................  National Grid USA.
NERC...............................  North American Electric Reliability
                                      Corp.
NEI\+\.............................  Nuclear Energy Institute.
Ontario IESO and Hydro One.........  Independent Electricity System
                                      Operator of Ontario and Hydro One
                                      Networks Inc.
Ontario Power......................  Ontario Power Generation Inc.
SCE&G..............................  South Carolina Electric and Gas
                                      Company.
Southern...........................  Southern Company Services, Inc.
TVA................................  Tennessee Valley Authority.
Wisconsin Electric.................  Wisconsin Electric Power Company.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\+\ Comments filed out-of-time.

 [FR Doc. E8-25139 Filed 10-24-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P