[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 55 (Wednesday, March 24, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15663-15664]
[FR Doc No: 2021-06065]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[EPA-HQ-OPPT-2003-0004; FRL-10021-67]

Access to Confidential Business Information by Eastern Research
Group and Its Identified Subcontractors and PG Environmental

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: EPA has authorized its contractor and subcontractor, Eastern
Research Group (ERG), Lexington, MA; and PG Environmental, Golden, CO,
to access information which has been submitted to EPA under all
sections of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Some of the
information may be claimed or determined to be Confidential Business
Information (CBI).

DATES: Access to the confidential data will occur no sooner than March
31, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    For technical information contact: Scott Sherlock, Program
Management and Operations Division (7407M), Office of Pollution
Prevention and Toxics, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200
Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20460-0001; telephone number:
(202) 564-8257; fax number:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email address:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    For general information contact: The TSCA-Hotline, ABVI-Goodwill,
422 South Clinton Ave., Rochester, NY 14620; telephone number: (202)
554-1404; email address<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. General Information

A. Does this action apply to me?

    This action is directed to the public in general. This action may,
however, be of interest to all who manufacture, process, or distribute
industrial chemicals. Since other entities may also be interested, the
Agency has not attempted to describe all the specific entities that may
be affected by this action.

B. How can I get copies of this document and other related information?

    The docket for this action, identified by docket identification
(ID) number EPA-HQ-OPPT-2003-0004 is available at http://www.regulations.gov or at the Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics
Docket (OPPT Docket), Environmental Protection Agency Docket Center
(EPA/DC), West William

Jefferson Clinton Bldg., Rm. 3334, 1301 Constitution Ave. NW,
Washington, DC. The Public Reading Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30
p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. The telephone
number for the Public Reading Room is<PHONE_NUMBER>, and the telephone
number for the OPPT Docket is<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Due to the public health concerns related to COVID-19, the EPA
Docket Center (EPA/DC) and Reading Room is closed to visitors with
limited exceptions. The staff continues to provide remote customer
service via email, phone, and webform. For the latest status
information on EPA/DC services and docket access, visit https://www.epa.gov/dockets.

II. What action is the Agency taking?

    Under EPA contract number 68HERC21D0007, contractor and
subcontractors ERG, 110 Hartwell Ave, Suite 1, Lexington, MA and PG
Environmental, 1113 Washington Ave, Golden, CO, will assist the Office
of Pollution Prevention and Toxics (OPPT) in enforcement program
implementation; enforcement case support; conducting inspections;
provide laboratory support; and perform analysis.
    In accordance with 40 CFR 2.306(j), EPA has determined that under
EPA contract number 68HERC21D0007, ERG and PG Environmental will
require access to CBI submitted to EPA under all section(s) of TSCA to
perform successfully the duties specified under the contract. ERG and
PG Environmental personnel will be given access to information
submitted to EPA under all section(s) of TSCA. Some of the information
may be claimed or determined to be CBI.
    EPA is issuing this notice to inform all submitters of information
under all sections of TSCA that EPA may provide ERG and PG
Environmental access to these CBI materials on a need-to-know basis
only. All access to TSCA CBI under this contract will take place at EPA
Headquarters and ERG's site located at 14555 Avion Parkway, Suite 200,
Chantilly, VA, in accordance with EPA's TSCA CBI Protection Manual.
    Access to TSCA data, including CBI, will continue until March 09,
2026. If the contract is extended, this access will also continue for
the duration of the extended contract without further notice.
    ERG and PG Environmental personnel will be required to sign
nondisclosure agreements and will be briefed on appropriate security
procedures before they are permitted access to TSCA CBI.

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.

    Dated: March 19, 2021.
Pamela Myrick,
Director, Project Management and Operations Division, Office of
Pollution Prevention and Toxics.
[FR Doc. 2021-06065 Filed 3-23-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 31 (Wednesday, February 17, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 7973-7974]
[FR Doc No: 2016-03067]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 71

[Docket No. FAA-2015-3084; Airspace Docket No. 15-AGL-13]

Establishment of Class E Airspace; International Falls, MN

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action establishes Class E airspace in the International
Falls, MN, area to facilitate vectoring of Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) aircraft under control of Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ARTCC). This action enhances the safety and efficiency of
aircraft operations within the National Airspace System (NAS).

DATES: Effective 0901 UTC, May 26, 2016. The Director of the Federal
Register approves this incorporation by reference action under title 1,
Code of Federal Regulations, part 51, subject to the annual revision of
FAA Order 7400.9 and publication of conforming amendments.

ADDRESSES: FAA Order 7400.9Z, Airspace Designations and Reporting
Points, and subsequent amendments can be viewed on line at http://www.faa.gov/airtraffic/publications/. For further information, you can
contact the Airspace Policy Group, Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 29591; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
The Order is also available for inspection at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of
this material at NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal-regulations/ibr_locations.html.
    FAA Order 7400.9, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, is
published yearly and effective on September 15.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Raul Garza, Jr., Central Service
Center, Operations Support Group, Federal Aviation Administration,
Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177;
telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is
found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's
authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described
in Subtitle VII, Part, A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section,
the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient
use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority
as it establishes controlled airspace in the International Falls, MN,
area.

History

    On August 27, 2015, the FAA published in the Federal Register a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to establish Class E en Route
Domestic Airspace in the International Falls, MN area. (80 FR 51972)
FAA-2015-3084. On September 25, 2015, the FAA published in the Federal
Register a correction to the aforementioned NPRM to include
exclusionary reference to Canadian airspace (80 FR 57755) FAA-2015-
3084. Interested parties were invited to participate in this rulemaking
effort by submitting written comments on the proposal to the FAA. One
positive comment was received.
    Class E airspace designations are published in paragraph 6006 of
FAA Order 7400.9Z dated August 6, 2015, and effective September 15,
2015, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR part 71.1. The Class
E airspace designations listed in this document will be published
subsequently in the Order.

Availability and Summary of Documents for Incorporation by Reference

    This document amends FAA Order 7400.9Z, airspace Designations and
Reporting Points, dated August 6, 2015, and effective September 15,
2015. FAA Order 7400.9Z is publicly available as listed in the
ADDRESSES section of this document. FAA Order 7400.9Z lists Class A, B,
C, D, and E airspace areas, air traffic service routes, and reporting
points.

The Rule

    This amendment to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)
part 71 establishes Class E Domestic en Route airspace extending upward
from 1,200 feet above the surface in the International Falls, MN area,
to contain aircraft while in IFR conditions under control of
Minneapolis ARTCC by safely vectoring aircraft from en route airspace
to terminal areas. Controlled airspace is needed for the safety and
management of IFR operations within the confines of Minneapolis ARTCC
airspace.
    Class E airspace designations are published in Paragraph 6006 of
FAA Order 7400.9Z, dated August 6, 2015, and effective September 15,
2015, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1. The Class E
airspace designations listed in this document will be published
subsequently in the Order.

Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an
established body of technical regulations for which frequent and
routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current, is
non-controversial and unlikely to result in adverse or negative
comments. It, therefore: (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action''
under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26,
1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a Regulatory Evaluation
as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter
that only affects air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is
certified that this rule, when promulgated, does not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.

Environmental Review

    The FAA has determined that this action qualifies for categorical
exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act in accordance
with FAA Order 1050.1F, ``Environmental Impacts: Policies and
Procedures,'' paragraph 5-6.5. This airspace action is not expected to
cause any potentially significant environmental impacts, and no
extraordinary circumstances exists that warrant preparation of an
environmental assessment.

Lists of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 71

    Airspace, Incorporation by reference, Navigation (air).

Adoption of the Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

PART 71--DESIGNATION OF CLASS A, B, C, D, AND E AIRSPACE AREAS; AIR
TRAFFIC SERVICE ROUTES; AND REPORTING POINTS

0
1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g); 40103, 40113, 40120, E.O.
10854, 24 FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389.

Sec.  71.1  [Amended]

0
2. The incorporation by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 of FAA Order 7400.9Z,
Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, dated August 6, 2015,
effective September 15, 2015, is amended as follows:

Paragraph 6006 Enroute Domestic Airspace Areas.

* * * * *

AGL MN E6 International Falls, MN [New]

    That airspace extending upward from 1,200 feet above the surface
within an area bounded by lat. 49[deg]00'00'' N., long.
095[deg]00'00'' W.; to lat. 49[deg]00'00'' N., long. 093[deg]30'00''
W.; to lat. 48[deg]06'30'' N., long. 090[deg]06'00'' W.; to lat.
47[deg]53'00'' N., long. 090[deg]55'00'' W.; to lat. 48[deg]34'00''
N., long. 094[deg]00'00'' W.; to lat. 48[deg]40'00'' N., long.
095[deg]00'00'' W., thence to the point of beginning, excluding that
airspace within Federal airways and within Canadian airspace.

    Issued in Fort Worth, TX, on February 4, 2016.
Robert W. Beck,
Manager, Operations Support Group, ATO Central Service Center.
[FR Doc. 2016-03067 Filed 2-16-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 40 (Tuesday, March 1, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 11299]
[FR Doc No: 2011-4695]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of the
Government in the Sunshine Act, Public Law 94-409, that the Securities
and Exchange Commission will hold a Closed Meeting on Monday, February
28, 2011 at 10:30 a.m.
    Commissioners, Counsel to the Commissioners, the Secretary to the
Commission, and recording secretaries will attend the Closed Meeting.
Certain staff members who have an interest in the matters also may be
present.
    The General Counsel of the Commission, or his designee, has
certified that, in his opinion, one or more of the exemptions set forth
in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3), (5), (7), and (10) and 17 CFR 200.402(a)(3),
(5), (7), and (10), permit consideration of the scheduled matter at the
Closed Meeting.
    Commissioner Casey, as duty officer, voted to consider the item
listed for the Closed Meeting in closed session, and determined that no
earlier notice thereof was possible.
    The subject matter of the Closed Meeting scheduled for Monday,
February 28, 2011 will be:
    Institution of administrative proceedings.
    At times, changes in Commission priorities require alterations in
the scheduling of meeting items.
    For further information and to ascertain what, if any, matters have
been added, deleted or postponed, please contact:
    The Office of the Secretary at<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    February 25, 2011.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-4695 Filed 2-25-11; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 194 (Tuesday, October 6, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 62981-62990]
[FR Doc No: 2020-21996]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2016-6145; Product Identifier 2015-NM-056-AD; Amendment
39-21223; AD 2020-18-02]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series
airplanes. This AD was prompted by the FAA's analysis of the Model 747
fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. This AD requires

modifying the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) to prevent
development of an ignition source inside the center fuel tank due to
electrical fault conditions. This AD also provides alternative actions
for cargo airplanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective November 10, 2020.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of November 10,
2020.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA
90740-5600; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this service information at the
FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>. It is also available on
the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and
locating Docket No. FAA-2016-6145.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
6145; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains
this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Section, FAA, Seattle ACO Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing
Company Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series airplanes. The
NPRM published in the Federal Register on May 3, 2016 (81 FR 26490).
The NPRM was prompted by the FAA's analysis of the Model 747 fuel
system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. The NPRM proposed to
require modifying the FQIS to prevent development of an ignition source
inside the center fuel tank due to electrical fault conditions. The
proposed AD also proposed to provide alternative actions for cargo
airplanes.
    The FAA is issuing this AD to address ignition sources inside the
center fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors,
could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.

Comments

    The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in
developing this final rule. The following presents the comments
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Support for the NPRM

    The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) and National
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) supported the intent of the
NPRM. Additional comments from NATCA are addressed below.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: Unjustified by Risk

    Airlines for America and the Cargo Airline Association, in
consolidated comments (A4A/CAA), United Parcel Service (UPS) and KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) requested that the FAA withdraw the NPRM.
A4A/CAA and UPS cited comments submitted by Boeing to Docket No. FAA-
2012-0187 in which Boeing stated that the risk is ``less than extremely
improbable.'' A4A/CAA added that Boeing does not believe that an unsafe
condition exists. UPS stated the Boeing's comments demonstrate an
unsafe condition does not exist. A4A/CAA and UPS noted that they
consider the Boeing comments to be applicable to the airplane models in
the NPRM. KLM added that it understands that Boeing is not able to
explain or substantiate the rationale behind the NPRM.
    KLM and Martinair stated that the NPRM does not clarify the
necessity of additional actions beyond the currently mandated Special
Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 88 (in 14 CFR part 21), related
service bulletins, airworthiness limitations, and critical design
configuration control limitations. UPS stated that an agency is
required to consider all relevant factors and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action. UPS noted that the FAA is apparently basing
its decision to issue the AD on historical SFAR 88 design reviews that
have been superseded by the more recent Boeing analysis and favorable
operational experience in the years since the SFAR 88 reviews were
completed.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenters' request. The FAA notes that
Boeing's comments were addressed in the supplemental NPRM (SNPRM) for
Docket No. FAA-2012-0187 (80 FR 9400, February 23, 2015) in the comment
response for ``Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012):
Unjustified by Risk.'' As explained in that comment response, in
addition to examining average risk and total fleet risk, the FAA
examines the individual flight risk on the worst reasonably anticipated
flights. In general, the FAA issues ADs in cases where reasonably
anticipated flights with preexisting failures (either due to latent
failure conditions or allowable dispatch configurations) are vulnerable
to a catastrophic event due to an additional foreseeable single failure
condition. This is because the FAA considers operation of flights
vulnerable to a potentially catastrophic single failure condition to be
an excessive safety risk to the passengers on those flights. The FAA
has determined that the currently mandated SFAR 88 service bulletins,
airworthiness limitations, and critical design configuration control
limitations do not adequately address the unsafe condition identified
in this AD and therefore it is necessary to issue this final rule. The
FAA has not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: No Unsafe Condition

    Boeing requested that the FAA withdraw the NPRM. Boeing suggested
that, by requiring center fuel tank FQIS wire separation for passenger
airplanes that have not incorporated a nitrogen generating system
(NGS), the NPRM specifically addresses airplanes regulated by the
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and other civil aviation
authorities and the lack of a flammability reduction means (FRM) rule.
Boeing stated that because it considered the use of FRM (NGS) to
address unknown ignition sources as the final corrective action, Boeing
has not developed center tank FQIS wire separation service instructions
for passenger aircraft. Boeing stated that it believes no unsafe
condition exists and does not feel that the lack of FRM rule
harmonization should cause additional work and expense for airlines.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. The FAA determined
that an unsafe condition exists using the criteria in FAA Policy
Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15,

``SFAR 88--Mandatory Action Decision Criteria,'' dated February 25,
2003.\1\ That policy was used to evaluate the noncompliant design areas
identified in the manufacturer's fuel system reviews and to determine
which noncompliance issues were unsafe conditions that required
corrective action under 14 CFR part 39. The FAA's unsafe condition
determination was not based on an assessment of average risk or total
fleet risk, but rather was driven by the qualitative identification of
an unacceptable level of individual risk that exists on flights that
are anticipated to occur with a preexisting latent in-tank failure
condition and with a flammable center fuel tank. For these reasons, and
based on further detailed responses to similar comments in the SNPRM
for Docket No. FAA-2012-0187, and in the subsequently issued final
rule, AD 2016-07-07, Amendment 39-18452 (81 FR 19472, April 5, 2016)
(``AD 2016-07-07''), which addressed the same unsafe condition for
Boeing Model 757 airplanes, the FAA has determined that it is necessary
to issue this final rule.
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    \1\ https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgPolicy.nsf/0/dc94c3a46396950386256d5e006aed11/$FILE/Feb2503.pdf.
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Request To Withdraw NPRM: Probability Analysis Inconsistent With
Regulatory Requirements

    A4A/CAA and UPS requested that the FAA withdraw the NPRM. The
commenters stated that the assumption of a single failure regardless of
probability is inconsistent with 14 CFR part 25 regulatory
requirements. The commenters referred to the phrase ``regardless of
probability'' associated with single failures. A4A/CAA and UPS
acknowledged that the term is used with single failures in FAA Advisory
Circular (AC) 25.981-1C,\2\ ``Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention
Guidelines,'' but since that term does not appear in 14 CFR
25.981(a)(3), the commenters considered its use arbitrary, possibly
introducing additional requirements not included in that section. A4A/
CAA and UPS stated that the ``worst reasonably anticipated flight'' is
a flight with a latent FQIS failure and a high-flammability tank, and
this ``latent plus one'' failure--regardless of probability of a single
failure--is not consistent with 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_25.981-1C.pdf.
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    The FAA disagrees with the commenters' request. The FAA notes that
the commenters' assertion about the intent of 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3) is
incorrect based on both the language of the rule and on the published
rulemaking documents. The absence of a probabilistic qualifier in both
the ``from each single failure'' clause and in the ``from each single
failure in combination with each latent failure not shown to be
extremely remote'' clause in 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3) in fact means just
that--there is no probabilistic qualifier intended by the regulation.
The intent for single failures in these two scenarios to be considered
regardless of probability of the single failure was explicitly stated
in the NPRM for 14 CFR 25.981, as amended by amendment 25-102 (66 FR
23085, May 7, 2001) (``amendment 25-102''). That NPRM stated, in
pertinent part, that it would also add a new paragraph (a)(3) to
require that a safety analysis be performed to demonstrate that the
presence of an ignition source in the fuel tank system could not result
from ``any single failure, from any single failure in combination with
any latent failure condition not shown to be extremely remote, or from
any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable.''
These new requirements would define three scenarios that must be
addressed in order to show compliance with the proposed paragraph
(a)(3). ``The first scenario is that any single failure, regardless of
the probability of occurrence of the failure, must not cause an
ignition source. The second scenario is that any single failure,
regardless of the probability occurrence, in combination with any
latent failure condition not shown to be at least extremely remote
(i.e., not shown to be extremely remote or extremely improbable), must
not cause an ignition source. The third scenario is that any
combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable must not
cause an ignition source.''
    The preamble to the final rule for amendment 25-102 made a nearly
identical statement, including the same uses of the phrase ``regardless
of probability.'' The FAA has determined that it is necessary to
proceed with issuance of this final rule as proposed. Further details
and a description of the FAA's risk assessment can be found in
responses to similar comments in a related SNPRM that addressed the
same unsafe condition for Model 757 airplanes, in Docket No. FAA-2012-
0187, and in the subsequently issued final rule, AD 2016-07-07,
amendment 39-18452 (81 FR 19472, April 5, 2016) (``AD 2016-07-07''). No
change to this AD was made in response to these comments.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: No New Data Since Fuel Tank Flammability
Reduction (FTFR) Rulemaking

    A4A/CAA and UPS requested that the FAA withdraw the NPRM based on a
lack of new data since the issuance of the FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July
21, 2008). The commenters referred to the FTFR rule and decision to not
require FRM for all-cargo airplanes, and the FAA's intent to gather
additional data and consideration of further rulemaking if flammability
of these airplanes is excessive. UPS stated that since the FTFR rule,
no additional data has been publicly introduced that would support or
justify the applicability of this rulemaking to all-cargo aircraft. The
commenters also referred to the FAA's response to comments in the
preamble to the SNPRM for Docket No. FAA-2012-0187, which documented
the FAA's decision on applicability of FRM and cost estimates. The
commenters stated that the FAA response was misleading and not factual
since manufacturers did not begin detailed designs to address the
proposed unsafe condition until after the FTFR rule was published. The
commenters added that the FAA did not discuss other changes to the FQIS
system in the FTFR rule.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenters' request. The FAA notes that
the FTFR rule and FQIS ADs are two different issues with separate FAA
actions. The intent of the FTFR rule was to provide an order of
magnitude reduction in the rate of fuel tank explosions for the
airplanes affected by that rule through adding a new airworthiness
standard for the flammability of fuel tanks. The FAA notes that the
FTFR rule was never intended to be a replacement for the issuance of
ADs to address identified unsafe conditions. An unsafe condition due to
the identified FQIS latent-plus-single failure issue in high-
flammability fuel tanks was determined to exist during the SFAR 88 AD
Board held by the FAA in 2003 using the guidance in FAA Policy
Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15 for high-flammability fuel tanks,
including the center fuel tank on Model 747-400 airplanes. That same
issue was not considered to be an unsafe condition in low-flammability
wing fuel tanks based on that same policy memorandum. The FAA has not
changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: Arbitrary and Inconsistent Wire Separation
Standards

    A4A/CAA and UPS requested that the FAA withdraw the NPRM based on a
lack of consistent design standards for

FQIS wire separation. The commenters assumed that the approved standard
for the retrofit is a 2-inch wire separation minimum, which the
commenters considered arbitrary and inconsistently applied. The
commenters reported that the amount of wiring capable of meeting that
separation standard varies widely among airplane models. A4A/CAA and
UPS also acknowledged that other separation methods were used in areas
not meeting the 2-inch wire separation requirement.
    The FAA does not agree with the commenters' request. The degree of
physical isolation of FQIS wiring from other wiring, whether provided
by physical distance or barrier methods, that is necessary to eliminate
the potential for hot shorts due to wiring faults is dependent on the
materials used, the wire securing methods, and the possible types of
wiring faults. The FAA relied on the manufacturer to assess the details
of the design and to propose the appropriate isolation measures. While
2 inches of physical separation may appear to be an arbitrary number,
it was the distance proposed by the manufacturer as appropriate for
their design based on analysis of the design details. The FAA has not
changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: NPRM Arbitrary and Inconsistently Applied

    A4A/CAA and UPS requested that the FAA withdraw the NPRM. The
commenters noted that airplanes with FRM are not included in the
applicability, and the NPRM would therefore not fully address the
unsafe condition. The commenters added that the distinction between
high- and low-flammability exposure time fuel tanks as used in the NPRM
is arbitrary. The commenters stated that an arbitrary differentiation
of high- versus low-flammability as decisional criteria for the need
for corrective action does not take into account the actual probability
of the impact of the difference in flammability on the potential of
catastrophic failure. The commenters also stated that allowing the
proposed alternative actions for cargo airplanes does not fully address
the unsafe condition in the NPRM. The commenters referenced the FAA's
response to comments in AD 2016-07-07 regarding this issue. The
commenters summarized numerical analysis showing no significant
difference in risk between high- and low-flammability fuel tanks. The
commenters concluded that the FAA's risk analysis is arbitrary and an
unsafe condition does not exist.
    The FAA disagrees with the assertion that the NPRM is arbitrary and
inconsistent. The NPRM follows defined policy in FAA Policy Memorandum
ANM100-2003-112-15, and consistently applies the policy to several
airplane models with similar unsafe conditions, similar to AD 2016-07-
07. The FAA defined the difference between low- and high-flammability
exposure time fuel tanks based on recommendations from the Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee Fuel Tank Harmonization Working Group
(FTHWG). The preamble to the final rule for amendment 25-102, which
amended 14 CFR 25.981, defined this difference as based upon comparison
of ``the safety record of center wing fuel tanks that, in certain
airplanes, are heated by equipment located under the tank, and unheated
fuel tanks located in the wing.'' The FTHWG concluded that the safety
record of fuel tanks located in the wings was adequate and that if the
same level could be achieved in center wing fuel tanks, the overall
safety objective would be achieved.
    In the response to comments in the preamble to the final rule for
AD 2016-07-07 referenced by the commenters, the FAA described why FRM
or alternative actions for cargo airplanes provide an acceptable level
of safety, even if they do not completely eliminate the non-compliance
with 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3).
    The fuel tank explosion history for turbojet/turbofan powered
transport airplanes fueled with kerosene type fuels, outside of
maintenance activity, has consisted of explosions of tanks that (1) are
not conventional aluminum wing tanks and (2) spend a considerable
amount of their operating time empty. The service history of
conventional aluminum wing tanks has been acceptable. The intent of the
difference in decision criteria in FAA Policy Memorandum ANM100-2003-
112-15 was to give credit for this satisfactory service experience, and
to differentiate between tanks with a level of flammability similar to
that of a conventional wing tank and those with a significantly higher
level of flammability.
    The numerical analysis provided by the commenters is inconsistent
with the fuel tank explosion service history. There are at least three
identifiable physics-based reasons for that inconsistency. First, low-
flammability tanks on most types of airplanes are main tanks that are
the last tanks used. During a large portion of their operating time,
the systems and structural features that have the potential to be
ignition sources in the event of a failure condition are covered with
liquid fuel, and an ignition source, if it occurs, is likely to be
submerged. When a potential ignition source in a main tank is
uncovered, it is likely to be later in the flight when the tank is cool
and no longer flammable. The commenters' analysis does not account for
this significant effect. Second, the numerical analysis used by the
commenters assumes that any given ignition source has a random
occurrence in time at the estimated probability, and that, in order for
an explosion to occur, that random occurrence of an ignition source
needs to coincide with the tank being in a flammable state. In fact,
many of the identified ignition threats do not simply occur briefly and
then go away. Instead, a fault occurs that, until it is discovered and
corrected, repeatedly creates an ignition source, and repeatedly tests
whether flammable conditions exist.
    Third, the flammability of low-flammability fuel tanks is typically
dependent on weather, and a low-flammability fuel tank may operate for
months without ever becoming flammable. This is not true of most high-
flammability fuel tanks, which typically have significant on-airplane
heat sources driving their temperature. This factor can mean that, on
some airplanes, an in-tank latent failure can occur and, after some
period of time, be detected and corrected without the low-flammability
tank ever having flammable conditions. The numerical analysis provided
by the commenters does not account for these significant factors. The
difference in likelihood of a failure that results in repeated ignition
source events causing a tank explosion is not simply proportional to
difference in the fleet average flammability of the tank for the
reasons stated above. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this
issue.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: Inadequate Fleet Exposure and Cost Estimates

    Boeing requested that the FAA withdraw the NPRM. Boeing stated that
the fleet exposure for the affected fleet continues to decrease due to
aging airplanes and production stopping on Model 747-400 airplanes.
Boeing added that the estimated costs in the NPRM do not take into
account the costs of compliance for passenger airplanes without FRM
installed.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. The FAA did not
base its unsafe condition determination on fleet risk but instead on
individual risk. This is discussed in detail in the response to
comments in the SNPRM for Docket No. FAA-2012-0187, under the heading
``Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012):

Unjustified by Risk.'' Therefore, the age of the airplane and its
current production stoppage do not affect the determination that an
unsafe condition still exists on an individual airplane.
    The NPRM for this proposed rule did contain a cost estimate for
passenger airplanes that was based on the estimate provided by Boeing
for the Model 757 and Model 767 airplanes, which have an FQIS of
similar design. The FAA notes that Boeing asserted that the cost to
operators of modifying an airplane's FQIS to be fully compliant with
the airworthiness standards would be similar to the cost of installing
Boeing's NGS flammability reduction system. Based on that, Boeing
requested that the FAA agree to not require Boeing to develop service
information for a fully compliant FQIS modification. However, the FAA
used Boeing's estimate of the cost to modify the Model 757 and Model
767 FQIS to a fully part-25-compliant configuration to provide the
estimated costs in the NPRM, based on an assumption that the cost for
Model 747 airplanes would be similar. At the time, Boeing concurred
with this estimate. This is discussed in detail in the response to
comments in the SNPRM for Docket No. FAA-2012-0187. Therefore, the FAA
has not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Withdraw NPRM: Insufficient Justification for AD

    Based on an assertion that the FAA did not sufficiently explain how
the unsafe condition justifies AD rulemaking, UPS requested that the
FAA withdraw the NPRM. UPS stated that the FTFR rule did not suggest
that any future modifications of FQIS systems had been considered. UPS
contended that all-cargo operators were surprised and prejudiced by
costly proposed FQIS modifications that are unsupported by both an
updated risk assessment and full cost/benefit analysis that consider
the pertinent facts. UPS alleged that the FAA did not fully explain or
justify its decision making for the NPRM, and concluded that the NPRM
is arbitrary and does not reflect properly reasoned agency action.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. A review of the
rulemaking record shows that the commenter's first assertion is not
correct. The FAA notes that Section III.K.5. of the preamble of the
FTFR rule states that ``the findings from the analysis required by SFAR
88 showed that most transport category airplanes with high-flammability
fuel tanks needed transient suppression units (TSUs) to prevent
electrical energy from airplane wiring from entering the fuel tanks in
the event of a latent failure in combination with a single failure.''
In addition, the NPRM for the FTFR rule (70 FR 70922, November 23,
2005) states: ``As part of the safety reviews of SFAR 88, we have
identified other models that likewise would need a transient
suppression device.'' These statements indicate that the FAA expects to
take AD action on multiple airplane models to address FQIS issues
identified through the SFAR 88 analyses. The preamble of the FTFR rule
also states that the proposed FRM has the potential to reduce the
industry cost associated with those expected ADs because the
installation of an FRM likely would eliminate the need to further
address the FQIS issue through AD actions.
    The purpose of those statements was to note that there would be
some cost savings to industry resulting from the elimination of other
actions required to address an unsafe condition for the airplanes
affected by the proposed rules, and to point out that the FAA did not
take credit for those potential cost reductions in assessing the cost
of the FTFR rule because the costs were not well understood at the
time. That statement was not a commitment by the FAA to forego issuing
ADs if necessary to address an identified unsafe condition on the
airplanes but rather to not require the affected airplanes to
incorporate FRM. As noted previously, the NPRM for the FTFR rule and
the FTFR rule both made statements indicating that the FAA expects to
issue AD actions on multiple airplane models to address FQIS issues
identified through the SFAR 88 analyses. The FAA explained the unsafe
condition and the risk on anticipated flights with a pre-existing
latent failure condition in the NPRM to this final rule. The FAA also
provided an estimate of the costs associated with the proposed AD in
accordance with FAA rulemaking policy and the Administrative Procedures
Act. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Require Cargo Airplane Option for All Airplanes

    Boeing requested that the NPRM be revised to make the alternative
actions for cargo airplanes specified in paragraph (h) of the proposed
AD applicable to all airplanes, including passenger airplanes with FRM
not installed due to differences in foreign regulations. In addition,
Boeing requested that the actions specified in paragraph (h) of the
proposed AD become the primary means of compliance for all airplanes,
not an alternative method of compliance for some airplanes. In
addition, KLM proposed that the FAA review if the ``Alternative Actions
for Cargo Airplanes'' as described in paragraph (h) of the proposed AD
is a possible acceptable means of compliance for passenger airplanes.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenters' requests. As discussed in
the comment response in the SNPRM for Docket No. FAA-2012-0187, under
the heading ``Requests To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012)
Based on Applicability'' the FAA does not consider the alternative
action for cargo airplanes allowed by this AD to provide an adequate
level of safety for passenger airplanes. The FAA is willing to accept a
higher level of individual flight risk exposure for cargo flights that
are not fail-safe due to the absence of passengers and the resulting
significant reduction in occupant exposure on a cargo airplane versus a
passenger airplane, and due to relatively low estimated individual
flight risk that would exist on a cargo airplane after the corrective
actions are taken. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this
issue.

Request To Record Only Certain Codes

    Boeing requested that paragraph (h)(1) of the proposed AD be
revised to only require corrective actions if a nondispatchable fault
code pertaining to the center wing tank is recorded (as opposed to any
nondispatchable fault code being recorded). Boeing stated that all FQIS
wire separation changes in the proposed AD are limited to the center
wing tank, therefore only built-in test equipment (BITE) check messages
pertaining to the center wing tank are applicable to the proposed AD.
    The FAA agrees that the unsafe condition addressed by this AD is
limited to the center wing tank. However, the FAA does not agree that
the AD should be changed as proposed by Boeing. It is not clear to the
FAA whether there may be FQIS BITE fault codes that are not clearly
identified as related to the center wing tank but that may impact
center tank circuits. Therefore, the FAA has determined that all
nondispatchable fault codes recorded prior to the BITE check or as a
result of the BITE check required by paragraph (h)(1) of this AD must
be addressed. Operators or Boeing may request an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD if
they can provide sufficient data that a particular fault code does not
pertain to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD.
    Regarding the requirement to record and address fault codes read

immediately prior to running the BITE check procedure, the FAA notes
that the normal Boeing procedure for performing an FQIS BITE check is
to first erase all of the existing fault codes, then perform the BITE
check and troubleshoot any resulting new fault codes. For this AD, the
FAA did not want any already stored fault codes to be potentially
ignored due to erasure at the first step because some of the failures
of concern can be intermittent. This AD therefore requires operators to
record the existing codes before doing the BITE check, then do the BITE
check and record the new codes that result from that BITE check, and
then do the appropriate troubleshooting and corrective action for both
sets of codes per the manufacturer's guidance. The FAA has not changed
this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Exclude Certain Airplanes

    Delta Airlines (DAL) requested that the FAA revise the proposed AD
to exclude airplanes that are affected by 14 CFR 121.1117. DAL and
United Airlines (UAL) noted that the FRM required by 14 CFR 121.1117
will have been installed on all affected airplanes in passenger
configuration by December 26, 2018. DAL suggested modifying paragraph
(c) of the proposed AD to clarify that the proposed AD is only
applicable to aircraft that are not affected by 14 CFR 121.1117. UAL
also suggested that the FAA either delete paragraph (g) of the proposed
AD or make paragraph (g) of the proposed AD applicable only to
airplanes in a cargo configuration that do not have an FRM installed
and non-U.S.-registered airplanes that do not have to comply with FRM
requirements.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenters' requests. There are other
passenger-carrying airplanes operated under 14 CFR part 91 that are not
required to install FRM. (The requirement to install FRM on all
passenger-carrying airplanes operated by air carriers is in 14 CFR
121.1117.) The FAA notes that foreign air carriers may not have to
comply with that requirement or similar requirements of their own civil
aviation authority. EASA, for example, has chosen not to require FRM to
be retrofitted to in-service airplanes. This AD is intended to require
any Model 747-400 series passenger airplane that does not have FRM,
regardless of the rules under which it is operated, to address the FQIS
latent-plus-one unsafe condition with a corrective action that fully
complies with the FAA airworthiness standards. This requirement
fulfills the FAA's International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
obligation to address unsafe conditions on all of the aircraft
manufactured by the state of design, not just those aircraft whose
operation is under the jurisdiction of the state of design. The FAA has
not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Change Compliance Time

    A4A/CAA requested that the FAA extend the compliance time for the
modifications specified in paragraphs (g) and (h)(2) of the proposed AD
to 72 months. The commenter stated that the compliance time should
match that of AD 2016-07-07 because the unsafe condition and corrective
actions are similar. A4A/CAA stated that although service information
was not yet available, the compliance time should align with major
maintenance schedules, but should be not less than 72 months after
service information is available.
    Conversely, NATCA recommended that the FAA reject requests for a
compliance time longer than 5 years as proposed in the NPRM. Assuming
final rule issuance in 2016, NATCA estimated that a 5-year compliance
time would result in required compliance by 2021--25 years after the
TWA Flight 800 fuel tank explosion that led to the requirements in SFAR
88, and 20 years after issuance of SFAR 88.
    The FAA agrees with A4A/CAA's requests to extend the compliance
time, and disagrees with NATCA's request. The FAA received similar
requests to extend the compliance time from several commenters
regarding the NPRMs for the FQIS modification on other airplanes. The
FAA disagrees with establishing a compliance time based on issuance of
the service information that is not yet approved or available. The FAA
has determined that a 72-month compliance time is appropriate and will
provide operators adequate time to prepare for and perform the required
modifications without excessive disruption of operations. The FAA has
determined that the requested moderate increase in compliance time will
continue to provide an acceptable level of safety. The FAA has changed
paragraphs (g) and (h)(2) of this AD accordingly.

Request To Exclude Airplanes To Be Retired

    Virgin Atlantic Airways (VAA) and British Airways (BA) requested
that the proposed AD be revised to provide dispensation for aircraft to
be retired. VAA specifically asked for dispensation for aircraft to be
retired before 2022, noting that a costly retrofit is a real concern
and a penalty to continued operation of aircraft that are scheduled for
retirement in the coming years.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenters' request. As previously
mentioned, the FAA has revised this AD to provide 72 months from the
effective date of this AD for incorporation of the required
modification. This compliance time extends several years beyond the
2022 date requested by VAA, and appears to be beyond the 747-400 fleet
retirement time planned by BA based on media reports. Therefore, the
FAA has determined that special dispensation for aircraft to be retired
is not needed. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Request To Extend Repetitive BITE Check Interval

    Boeing, KLM, and Martinair requested that paragraph (h)(1) of the
proposed AD be revised to extend the repetitive check interval for the
BITE checks. Boeing requested that the repetitive interval be extended
to 750 flight hours to match the repetitive intervals specified in
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2340, dated June 6, 2014. KLM and
Martinair requested that the repetitive check interval be extended to
1,000 flight hours to match A-check intervals.
    The FAA agrees to extend the repetitive check interval to 750
flight hours to match the repetitive intervals specified in Boeing
Service Bulletin 747-28-2340, dated June 6, 2014. The FAA intended to
propose a 750 flight hour interval, but inadvertently specified 650
flight hour intervals in the proposed AD. The FAA disagrees with
extending the repetitive check interval to 1,000 flight hours because
the 750 flight hours was agreed to during discussion of the risk
assessment and service information for the cargo airplane option with
Boeing. The FAA has revised paragraph (h)(1) of this AD to specify
repetitive intervals of 750 flight hours.

Request To Add an Optional Method of Compliance

    Boeing requested that paragraph (h) or (i) of the proposed AD be
revised to add Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2344, dated October 12,
2018, as an optional method of compliance. Boeing noted that the
proposed AD does not specify any authority for how to perform the
required modification. Boeing noted that Boeing Service Bulletin 747-
28-2344, dated October 12, 2018, provides a certified design and
procedure for accomplishing the wire separation modification and will
ensure the modification is performed to specified requirements.

    The FAA agrees with the commenter's request. The FAA has revised
paragraph (h)(2) of this AD to specify that Boeing Service Bulletin
747-28-2344, dated October 12, 2018, is an acceptable method of
compliance. This revision includes adding paragraphs (h)(2)(i) and (ii)
of this AD. The FAA has also revised the Estimated Costs for
Alternative Actions table in this final rule to include the estimated
costs for the inspections and wire separation modification specified in
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2344, dated October 12, 2018, if
operators choose to comply using that method.
    The FAA notes that this cost estimate is based on data provided in
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2344, dated October 12, 2018, while the
cost estimate provided for a modification using methods approved in
accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (h)(2)(i) of this
AD (paragraph (h)(2) of the proposed AD) is based on data provided by
the manufacturer for Model 757 and 767 airplanes. The FAA had
previously determined, as specified in the NPRM, that the work involved
for the cargo airplane wire separation modification would take 230
work-hours. Boeing has since provided an updated estimate of 74 work-
hours for the alternative modification for cargo airplanes. The FAA has
revised the cost estimate for the modification accordingly in this
final rule.

Request To Address Unsafe Condition on All Fuel Tanks

    NATCA recommended that the FAA require design changes that
eliminate unsafe FQIS failure conditions on all fuel tanks on the
affected models, regardless of fuel tank location or the percentage of
time the fuel tank is flammable. NATCA referred to four fuel tank
explosions in low-flammability exposure time fuel tanks identified by
the FAA during FTFR rulemaking. NATCA stated that neither FRM nor
alternative actions for cargo airplanes (e.g., BITE checks (checks of
built-in test equipment) followed by applicable repairs before further
flight and modification of the center fuel tank FQIS wiring within 60
months) would bring the airplane into full regulatory compliance. NATCA
added that the combination of failures described in the NPRM meets the
criteria for ``known combinations'' of failures that require corrective
action in FAA Policy Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. The FAA has
determined that according to Policy Memorandum ANM100-2003-112-15, the
failure condition for the airplanes affected by this AD should not be
classified as a ``known combination.'' While the FQIS design
architecture is similar to that of the early Boeing Model 747
configuration that is suspected of contributing to the TWA Flight 800
fuel tank explosion, significant differences exist in the design of
FQIS components and wire installations between the affected The Boeing
Company models and the early Model 747 airplanes such that the intent
of the ``known combinations'' provision for low-flammability fuel tanks
in the policy memorandum is not applicable. Therefore, this AD affects
only the identified Boeing airplanes with high-flammability exposure
time fuel tanks, as specified in paragraph (c) of this AD. The FAA
provided a detailed response to similar comments in the preamble of the
final rule for AD 2016-07-07. The FAA has not changed this final rule
regarding this issue.

Request To Clarify Certification Basis for Modification Requirements

    NATCA recommended that the FAA revise paragraph (g) of the proposed
AD to clearly state that the required FQIS design changes must comply
with the fail-safe requirements of 14 CFR 25.901(c), as amended by
amendment 25-46 (43 FR 50597, October 30, 1978); and 14 CFR 25.981(a)
and (b), as amended by amendment 25-102; NATCA added that these
provisions are required by SFAR 88.
    The FAA does not agree to change paragraph (g) of this AD. While
the FAA agrees that modifications to comply with paragraph (g) of this
AD should be required to comply with the referenced regulations, that
requirement already exists in 14 CFR part 21. No change to this AD is
necessary.

Request To Require Modification on All Production Airplanes

    NATCA recommended that the FAA require designs that comply with 14
CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3) on all newly produced transport
airplanes. NATCA stated that continuing to grant exemptions to 14 CFR
25.901(c), as amended by amendment 25-40 (42 FR 15042, March 17, 1977);
and 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3), as amended by amendment 25-102; has allowed
continued production of thousands of airplanes with this known unsafe
condition.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. The recommendation
to require production airplanes to fully comply with 14 CFR 25.901(c)
and 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3) is outside the scope of this rulemaking. This
AD applies only to Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series
airplanes, which are no longer in production. In addition, the FAA has
implemented requirements for all large transport airplanes produced
after September 2010 to include flammability reduction methods for
tanks that would otherwise be high-flammability fuel tanks. Boeing
incorporated this change into the Model 747 series airplanes that are
still in production and the FAA has excluded those models from the
applicability of this AD. The FAA has not changed this final rule
regarding this issue.

Request To State That an Exemption Is Required

    Boeing requested that paragraph (h) of the proposed AD be revised
to state that an exemption is required to accomplish the specified
actions. Boeing stated that the FAA has identified that the BITE
procedure and wire separation design changes specified in the proposed
AD are not sufficient for compliance to 14 CFR 25.981(a) at the FQIS
level. Boeing stated that an exemption is therefore needed prior to
approval of the related design change.
    The FAA agrees to clarify. The BITE check is not a type design
change or alteration, so no exemption from the airworthiness standards
is required for that action. The design data approval of any partial
wire separation modification would require an exemption. That exemption
would be obtained by the party seeking approval of the alteration data,
and no further exemption would be required for the party using that
data to alter an aircraft. Obtaining such an exemption would be part of
the certification process for such a change, so the FAA does not find
it necessary to include such information in paragraph (h) of this AD.
In addition, some parties may choose to comply with the AD using a
design change that fully complies with the airworthiness standards. The
FAA also notes that the commenter appears to misunderstand why an
exemption is needed for the required modification. The exemption is
needed because, even with the modification, the FQIS does not comply
with 14 CFR 25.901(c) and 14 CFR 25.981(a). The exemption does not
authorize evaluation of a partial system for compliance with the system
level requirement. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this
issue.

Request To Provide Cost-Effective Method of Compliance

    Korean Air Lines (KAL), VAA, KLM, and BA requested that the FAA
encourage Boeing to provide a cost-effective method of compliance for
passenger airplanes. KAL noted that the

proposed AD does not provide a clear means of compliance for the
modification, such as a Boeing service bulletin. KAL and VAA noted that
the majority of non-FAA operators are not required to retrofit the NGS
system. The commenters requested that the FAA encourage Boeing to
develop an acceptable cost-effective method of compliance that does not
require installation of an NGS. KLM and Martinair also noted that EASA
only adopted the FAA operational requirement to equip an FRM on newly
delivered airplanes.
    The FAA agrees that the lack of service information for FQIS
modifications makes it difficult to assess the required work to modify
the FQIS, and acknowledges the high cost of NGS. However, the FAA
disagrees with the commenters' request. For passenger-carrying
airplanes, the cost per airplane of providing a modification of the
FQIS that fully complies with the airworthiness standards was estimated
by Boeing and their FQIS vendor (Goodrich) prior to the issuance of the
NPRM to be comparable to the cost of installing NGS. Based on that cost
estimate, Boeing proposed that they not be required to develop a fully
compliant FQIS modification for passenger airplanes because it would
not provide significant savings to operators and NGS would provide a
greater safety benefit. The FAA agreed.
    The FAA's understanding is that Boeing's current position is the
same, and that they do not plan to develop a fully compliant FQIS
modification for passenger airplanes to address paragraph (g) of this
AD. However, if service information is developed, approved, and
available in the future, operators may request approval under the
provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD to use approved service
instructions as an AMOC for the requirements of this AD, or the FAA may
approve the service information as a global AMOC for this AD. In
addition, as noted previously, Boeing has issued Service Bulletin 747-
28-2344, dated October 12, 2018, for all-cargo airplanes, and the FAA
has revised paragraph (h)(2)(ii) of this AD to specify that Boeing
Service Bulletin 747-28-2344, dated October 12, 2018, is an acceptable
method of compliance.

Request To Require Design Changes From Manufacturers

    NATCA recommended that the FAA follow the agency's compliance and
enforcement policy to require manufacturers to develop the necessary
design changes soon enough to support operators' ability to comply with
the proposed requirements. NATCA noted that SFAR 88 required
manufacturers to develop all design changes for unsafe conditions
identified by their SFAR 88 design reviews by December 2002, or within
an additional 18 months if the FAA granted an extension.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenter's concerns. However, any
enforcement action is outside the scope of this rulemaking. The FAA has
not changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Clarification of BITE Check Compliance Time

    The FAA has revised paragraph (h)(1) of this AD to clarify the
compliance time for the BITE check relative to the requirement to
record the fault codes. The FAA recognized that operators might
interpret the proposed requirements for alternative actions for cargo
airplanes as allowing additional flights prior to performing the BITE
check after first recording the fault codes. The FAA intended for
operators to perform the BITE check immediately after recording the
fault codes to address both the fault codes that exist prior to
performing the BITE check and any new codes that are identified during
the BITE check.

Clarification of Applicability

    The FAA has revised paragraph (c) of this AD to clarify that
airplanes equipped with an ignition mitigation means (IMM) approved by
the FAA as compliant with certain regulations are excluded from this
AD. This revision includes adding paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this AD.
The FAA intended for airplanes with compliant IMM to be excluded from
the actions required by this AD. The FAA has determined that the
installation of an approved IMM provides a level of risk reduction at
least as great as that provided by FRM and adequately addresses the
unsafe condition.

Conclusion

    The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments
received, and determined that air safety and the public interest
require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously
and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor
changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
    The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final
rule.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2340, dated June 6,
2014. This service information describes procedures for a BITE check
(check of built-in test equipment) of the FQIS.
    The FAA also reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2344, dated
October 12, 2018. This service information describes procedures for a
general visual inspection for any damage to the FQIS wire bundle,
repair of damaged FQIS wire bundles, and modification of the airplane
by separating FQIS wiring that runs between the FQIS processor and the
center tank wing spar penetrations from other airplane wiring.
    This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 71 airplanes of U.S.
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                      Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost per      Cost on U.S.
               Action                         Labor cost            Parts cost        product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modification.......................  1,200 work-hours x $85 per         $200,000        $302,000     $21,442,000
                                      hour = $102,000.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     Estimated Costs for Alternative Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Action                            Labor cost              Parts cost        Cost per product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BITE check............................  1 work-hours x $85 per hour =               $0  $340 per year (4 checks
                                         $85 per check.                                  per year).
Inspection and wire separation (using   Up to 41 work-hours x $85 per            4,220  Up to $8,065.
 service information).                   hour = Up to $3,845.
Wire separation.......................  74 work hours x $85 per hour =          10,000  $16,290.
                                         $6,290.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has received no definitive data that would enable us to
provide cost estimates for the on-condition actions specified in this
AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

2020-18-02 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-21223; Docket No. FAA-
2016-6145; Product Identifier 2015-NM-056-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective November 10, 2020.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 747-400, -400D, and
-400F series airplanes, certificated in any category, excluding the
airplanes identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this AD.
    (1) Airplanes equipped with a flammability reduction means (FRM)
approved by the FAA as compliant with the fuel tank flammability
reduction (FTFR) requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(b) or 26.33(c)(1).
    (2) Airplanes equipped with an ignition mitigation means (IMM)
approved by the FAA as compliant with the FTFR requirements of 14
CFR 25.981(c) or 26.33(c)(2).

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by the FAA's analysis of the Model 747 fuel
system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. The FAA is issuing
this AD to prevent ignition sources inside the center fuel tank,
which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a
fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Modification

    Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the
fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) to prevent development of an
ignition source inside the center fuel tank due to electrical fault
conditions, using a method approved in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i) of this AD.

(h) Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes

    For airplanes used exclusively for cargo operations: As an
alternative to the requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD, do the
actions specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and (2) of this AD. To
exercise this alternative, operators must perform the first
inspection required under paragraph (h)(1) of this AD within 6
months after the effective date of this AD. To exercise this
alternative for airplanes returned to service after conversion of
the airplane from a passenger configuration to an all-cargo
configuration more than 6 months after the effective date of this
AD, operators must perform the first inspection required under
paragraph (h)(1) of this AD prior to further flight after the
conversion.
    (1) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, record
the existing fault codes stored in the FQIS processor and before
further flight thereafter do a BITE check (check of built-in test
equipment) of the FQIS, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2340, dated June 6,
2014. If any nondispatchable fault code is recorded prior to the
BITE check or as a result of the BITE check, before further flight,
do all applicable repairs and repeat the BITE check until a
successful test is performed with no nondispatchable faults found,
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 747-28-2340, dated June 6, 2014. Repeat these actions
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 750 flight hours. Modification
as specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD does not terminate the
repetitive BITE check requirement of this paragraph.
    (2) Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, do the
actions specified in paragraph (h)(2)(i) or (ii) of this AD.
    (i) Modify the airplane by separating FQIS wiring that runs
between the FQIS processor and the center tank wing spar
penetrations, including any circuits that might pass through a main
fuel tank, from other airplane wiring that is not intrinsically safe
using methods approved in accordance with the procedures specified
in paragraph (i) of this AD.
    (ii) Do a general visual inspection for any damage to the FQIS
wire bundle and all

applicable repairs; and modify the airplane by separating FQIS
wiring that runs between the FQIS processor and the center tank wing
spar penetrations, including any circuits that might pass through a
main fuel tank, from other airplane wiring that is not intrinsically
safe; in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Service Bulletin 747-28-2344, dated October 12, 2018. Do all
applicable repairs before further flight.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request
to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District
Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the
manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of the
person identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
    (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD
if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle
ACO Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the repair
method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must meet
the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
    (4) For service information that contains steps that are labeled
as Required for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs
(i)(4)(i) and (ii) of this AD apply.
    (i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. If a step or substep is labeled ``RC Exempt,'' then the
RC requirement is removed from that step or substep. An AMOC is
required for any deviations to RC steps, including substeps and
identified figures.
    (ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.

(j) Related Information

    (1) For more information about this AD, contact Jon Regimbal,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Section, FAA, Seattle ACO Branch,
2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206-231-
3557; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) Service information identified in this AD that is not
incorporated by reference is available at the addresses specified in
paragraphs (k)(3) and (4) of this AD.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2340, dated June 6, 2014.
    (ii) Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2344, dated October 12,
2018.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110 SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-
5600; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability
of this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued on August 19, 2020.
Gaetano A. Sciortino,
Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-21996 Filed 10-5-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


active ingredients jointly under FFDCA section 408(p) and FIFRA section
3(c)(2)(B). The procedures discussed above for challenging an FFDCA
section 408(p) test order are wholly consistent with the procedures
applicable to FIFRA section 3(c)(2)(B), which similarly limits the
issues for resolution in any suspension hearing held for failure to
comply with the order. [See 7 U.S.C. 136a(c)(2)(B)(iv)]. Accordingly,
EPA believes that for pesticide registrants, pre-enforcement review of
the test order would be available directly in federal district courts
under any approach, and based on the plain meaning of the statute,
would be the only means to obtain judicial review of the validity of
the test order itself.
    By contrast, FFDCA section 408(p)(5)(D) provides that non-
registrants (manufacturers or importers of inert ingredients) are
subject to monetary penalties through an enforcement proceeding, using
the process established by TSCA section 16. Under TSCA section 16,
civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day may be assessed, after an
administrative hearing is held on the record in accordance with section
554 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). [15 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1)-
(2)(A)]. Before issuing a final penalty order, EPA must provide notice
of its intention to assess the penalty, including a draft of the final
penalty order, and provide the recipient with the opportunity to
request a hearing within 15 days of the date the notice has been
received. [15 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2)(A)]. [See also, 40 CFR 22.13-22.14].
TSCA section 16 also specifies that the following issues shall be taken
into account in determining the amount of a civil penalty: The nature,
circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation(s); the violator's
ability to pay; the effect on the violator's ability to continue to do
business; any history of prior violations; the degree of culpability;
and such other matters as justice may require. [5 U.S.C.
2615(a)(2)(B)].
    Although neither FFDCA section 408(p) nor TSCA section 16 expressly
imposes the same restriction on the issues that a non-registrant may
raise in the penalty hearing, EPA's preferred interpretation of the
statutes and existing regulations would be to impose a similar
restriction. In large measure this interpretation turns on the fact
that, at least for pesticide registrants, FFDCA section 408(p) test
orders constitute final agency action, and consequently, would be
subject to review in the appropriate district court. Logically, it
makes sense to interpret the test order to be final for all parties, as
the provisions of FFDCA section 408(p)(5)(A) that describe the test
order do not distinguish between registrants and other test order
recipients. Moreover, EPA believes that, in general, it would simplify
matters to have a single set of procedures for all test order
recipients. Accordingly, pre-enforcement judicial review of the test
order would be available, and would be the means by which any test
order recipient would challenge the validity of the test order. As a
consequence of that interpretation, EPA would interpret TSCA section 16
to restrict the issues that may be raised in any enforcement hearing to
whether the test order recipient had violated the test order, as well
as the appropriate amount of any penalty. This interpretation would be
consistent with the issues listed in TSCA section 16(a)(2)(B), which do
not expressly relate to the validity of the underlying requirement.
    Alternatively, EPA could interpret the legal status of the order to
differ between registrants and non-registrants, based on the procedural
distinctions created by FFDCA section 408(p)(5)(C) and (D). Under this
approach, FFDCA section 408(p) test orders would constitute final
agency action only for pesticide registrants, and only those test
orders would be subject to pre-enforcement review in federal district
courts. Accordingly, non-registrants would only be able to challenge
the provisions of the order in an enforcement proceeding, and would not
be entitled to pre-enforcement review in district court.

I. Informal Administrative Review Procedure

    EPA intends to include a provision in the FFDCA section 408(p) test
order that requires the order recipients to raise any questions or
challenges concerning the issuance of the test order to the Agency in
response to the order. EPA would review the issues presented and
provide a written response within a specified time frame. The Agency
understands that it would need to respond within sufficient time for
the order recipient to either comply with the order or determine
whether to pursue its concerns through judicial review. EPA requests
comment on whether such a provision would be appropriate, and on the
appropriate parameters for such a requirement, including the deadline
for order recipients to initially provide their concerns, and the time
frame for the Agency's response.

J. Adverse Effects Reporting Requirements

    Under FIFRA section 6(a)(2), pesticide product registrants are
required to submit adverse effects information about their products to
the EPA. Among other things, the implementing regulations in 40 CFR
part 159, subpart D provide registrants with detailed instructions on
whether, when, and how to report information in the possession of the
registrant or its agents.
    In addition, under TSCA section 8(c), companies can be required to
record, retain and in some cases report ``allegations of significant
adverse reactions'' to any substance/mixture that they produce, import,
process, or distribute. EPA's TSCA section 8(c) rule requires
producers, importers, and certain processors of chemical substances and
mixtures to keep records concerning significant adverse reaction
allegations and report those records to EPA upon notice in the Federal
Register or upon notice by letter. The TSCA section 8(c) rule also
provides a mechanism to identify previously unknown chemical hazards in
that it may reveal patterns of adverse effects which otherwise may not
be otherwise noticed or detected. Further information is available
under 40 CFR part 717.
    Under TSCA section 8(e), U.S. chemical manufacturers, importers,
processors and distributors are required to notify EPA within 30
calendar days of new, unpublished information on their chemicals that
may lead to a conclusion of substantial risk to human health or to the
environment. The term ``substantial risk'' information refers to that
information which offers reasonable support for a conclusion that the
subject chemical or mixture poses a substantial risk of injury to
health or the environment and need not, and typically does not,
establish conclusively that a substantial risk exists. For additional
information about TSCA section 8(e), please go to http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/pubs/sect8e.htm
.

    EPA does not require duplicate submission of EDSP results under
FIFRA section 6(a)(2) or TSCA section 8(c) or (e). Any information
submitted under FIFRA section 6(a)(2) or TSCA section 8(c) or 8(e)
procedures does not need to be submitted again to satisfy the FFDCA
section 408(p) test order. The test order recipient should instead
submit the necessary information to cite to the previously submitted
information as described earlier in this document.

V. Specific Topics for Commenters

    While interested person are invited to comment on any issue
discussed in this notice, the Agency would find it particularly helpful
if interested commenters address the general issues and specific
questions, set forth below. If, for example, commenters have ideas on
how the Agency could minimize duplicative testing that are not captured
in the questions below, the Agency welcomes comments on the general
issue itself.

A. Minimizing Duplicative Testing

    1. If there are multiple entities who manufacture or import a
substance for which EDSP data are needed, under what circumstances, if
any, should EPA send test orders only to a single entity?
    2. When issuing test orders for EDSP data on an active ingredient,
should EPA issue the test order under the authority of FFDCA section
408(p), under FIFRA section 3(c)(2)(B), or under both authorities?
    3. When issuing test orders for EDSP data on an inert ingredient,
should EPA issue the test order under the authority of FFDCA section
408(p), under FIFRA section 3(c)(2)(B), or under both authorities?

B. Cost Sharing

    What evidence of a willingness to share the cost of generating EDSP
data should EPA require?

C. Data Compensation

    1. What evidence of a willingness to pay compensation for
previously submitted EDSP data should EPA require?
    2. Should EPA issue ``catch-up'' FFDCA section 408(p) test orders
to people who begin to manufacture or import an inert ingredient after
required EDSP data have been submitted?
    3. If so, at what point (e.g., during registration review) and for
how long should EPA issue such ``catch-up'' test orders?
    4. What alternatives should EPA consider for the 15-year period
proposed, and why?

D. Who Should Receive Test Orders?

    1. If EPA relies on FIFRA section 3(c)(2)(B) as an authority to
require data for an active ingredient, should EPA send the DCI only to
technical registrants or to all registrants whose products contain the
active ingredient?
    2. Should EPA send FFDCA section 408(p) test orders to producers of
commodity chemicals that do not hold a pesticide registration for a
product containing the substance to be tested?
    3. How should EPA address the issuance of test orders for an inert
ingredient that is contained in a ``proprietary mixture''?
    4. After EPA has received compensable EDSP data on an inert
ingredient, which authority should EPA use to ensure that pesticide
registrants are buying their inert ingredient only from sources on the
``Inert Suppliers List'': FIFRA section 3(c)(1)(F) only, FIFRA section
3(c)(1)(F) and FIFRA section 3(g), or FIFRA section 3(c)(1)(F) and
FIFRA section 3(c)(2)(B)?

E. How to Identify Potential Recipients of Test Orders

    1. Please suggest an efficient approach to identify potential
recipients of FFDCA section 408(p) test orders for inert ingredients.
Please identify any databases that will provide the best information.
    2. Please comment on the preferred mechanism for making the list of
recipients of FFDCA section 408(p) test orders public.
    3. Please comment on a mechanism to identify entities that should
have received a test order, but that were not initially identified.
    4. How should EPA evaluate requests for exemptions under FFDCA
section 408(p)(4)?

F. How to Respond to Test Orders

    1. Is 90 days sufficient time for recipients of a test order to
respond with their intentions for complying with the order?
    2. Should EPA allow a person to ``fulfill'' the requirements of a
test order by promising not to manufacture or import an active
ingredient? An inert ingredient?
    3. Should EPA allow a person to ``fulfill'' the requirements of a
test order

on an inert ingredient by promising not to manufacture or import the
inert ingredient for use in a pesticide product? If so, how would EPA
enforce such an agreement?

G. Procedural Issues

    1. When should a recipient of a test order for EDSP data on an
inert ingredient be able to judicially challenge the issuance of the
order?
    2. Should EPA include an optional or mandatory informal
administrative review procedure by which a person who wishes to
judicially challenge the validity of a test order would raise the
objections first with the Agency?
    3. Should the 90-day response form be mandatory or optional?
    4. Should test protocols be attached to the order and/or posted on
a website?
    5. Should the Agency establish a website of FFDCA section 408(p)
test order recipients to facilitate the formation of consortia?

H. Due Process Options

    EPA requests comment on whether the informal administrative review
procedures (as outlined in this document) would be appropriate. Please
also comment on the appropriate parameters for such a requirement,
including the deadline for order recipients to initially provide their
concerns, and the time frame for the Agency's response.

I. CBI

    Provide comments on how best to address CBI concerns associated
with notifying HPV inert manufacturers, including the difficulty of
informing registrants, without disclosing the identity of the inert.

J. Estimated Test Costs and Paperwork Burden

    1. Please provide comments on the estimated test costs and burden
hours presented in the draft ICR. Explain the basis for your estimates
in sufficient detail to allow EPA to reproduce the estimates.
    2. Provide comments on the methodology used by EPA to estimate the
burden for data generation, which is based on the total estimated test
costs.
    3. Is it reasonable to continue to assume that as much as 35% of
the test costs represents the paperwork burden?

VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

A. Regulatory Planning and Review

    Under Executive Order 12866, entitled Regulatory Planning and
Review (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993, as amended by Executive Order
13422 on January 18, 2007 (72 FR 2763), this policy statement is
considered to be a ``significant guidance document'' under the terms of
the amended Executive Order because this policy might raise novel legal
or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's
priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive Order.
Accordingly, EPA notified the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
submitted a draft of this policy to OMB under Executive Order 12866.
Any changes made in response to OMB recommendations have been
documented in the docket for this action as required by section
6(a)(3)(E) of the Executive Order.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    The information collection requirements described in this document
have been submitted for review by the OMB under the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. Elsewhere in today's Federal Register is a
separate document that announces the availability of the draft
Information Collection Request (ICR) document that has been prepared by
EPA, identified by EPA ICR No. 2249.01). Pursuant to the PRA, the
Agency is seeking public review and comment on the ICR before it
submits the ICR to OMB for approval under the PRA. The following is a
brief summary of the ICR document, which describes the information
collection activities and EPA's estimated burden in more detail.
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a
currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control numbers for EPA's
regulations codified in Chapter 40 of the CFR, after appearing in the
preamble of the final rule, are listed in 40 CFR part 9, are displayed
either by publication in the Federal Register or by other appropriate
means, such as on the related collection instrument or form, if
applicable. The display of OMB control numbers in certain EPA
regulations is consolidated in 40 CFR part 9. As a new ICR, the Agency
does not yet have an OMB control number for this information collection
activity. Once assigned, EPA will announce the OMB control number for
this information collection in the Federal Register, and will add it to
any related collection instruments or forms used.
    Burden under the PRA means the total time, effort, or financial
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, disclose
or provide information to or for a Federal agency. This includes the
time needed to review instructions; develop, acquire, install, and
utilize technology and systems for the purposes of collecting,
validating, and verifying information, processing and maintaining
information, and disclosing and providing information; adjust the
existing ways to comply with any previously applicable instructions and
requirements; train personnel to be able to respond to a collection of
information; search data sources; complete and review the collection of
information; and transmit or otherwise disclose the information.
    Under the EDSP, the information collection activities include
reviewing the order and related instructions, providing the initial
response, participating in a consortia, generating the data, submitting
the data, requesting an extension, and maintaining records. As
described in more detail in the ICR, the total estimated per chemical/
per respondent paperwork burden is 2,649 hours, with an estimated cost
of $194,252. The total annualized estimated paperwork burden for this
ICR is 93,655 hours, with an estimated total annual cost of $6,887,418.
The Agency believes that this is an over estimate because this estimate
assumes that the respondent actively participates in all potential
activities, including developing a consortia, generating all of the
potential data, requesting an extension and submitting the data. The
Agency also assumed that all of the potential tests currently scheduled
for validation would be used for each chemical. It is highly unlikely
that any one respondent would need to participate at this level, or
that all of the tests would be performed for each respondent.
    Direct your comments on the Agency's need for this information, the
accuracy of the provided burden estimates, and any suggested methods
for minimizing respondent burden, including the use of automated
collection techniques, to EPA using the public docket that has been
established for the ICR (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OPPT-2007-1081). The
Agency will consider and address comments received on the ICR as it
develops the final policy and related final ICR.

VII. References

    1. EPA. Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory
Committee (EDSTAC) Final Report. August 1998. http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/oscpendo/pubs/edspoverview/finalrpt.htm
.

    2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Final Report of the OECD Workshop on Harmonization of Validation and
Acceptance Criteria for Alternative

Toxicological Test Methods. August 1996.

List of Subjects

    Environmental protection, Chemicals, Endocrine disruptors,
Pesticides and pests, Reporting and recordkeeping.

    Dated: December 7, 2007.
James B. Gulliford,
Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic
Substances.

[FR Doc. E7-24166 Filed 12-12 ndash;07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560-50-S