[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 79 (Wednesday, April 24, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 24107-24124]
[FR Doc No: 2013-09643]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM13-5-000]

Version 5 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability
Standards

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the
Commission proposes to approve the Version 5 Critical Infrastructure
Protection Reliability Standards, CIP-002-5 through CIP-011-1,
submitted by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the
Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization. The proposed
Reliability Standards, which pertain to the cyber security of the bulk
electric system, represent an improvement over the current Commission-
approved CIP Reliability Standards as they adopt new cyber security
controls and extend the scope of the systems that are protected by the
CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission is concerned, however, that
limited aspects of the proposed CIP version 5 Standards are potentially
ambiguous and, ultimately, raise questions regarding the enforceability
of the standards. Therefore, the

Commission proposes to direct that NERC develop certain modifications
to the CIP version 5 Standards to address the matters identified by the
Commission.

DATES: Comments are due June 24, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed in the
following ways:
     Electronic Filing through http://www.ferc.gov. Documents
created electronically using word processing software should be filed
in native applications or print-to-PDF format and not a scanned format.
     Mail/Hand Delivery: Those unable to file electronically
may mail or hand-deliver comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20426.
    Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Comment
Procedures Section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  Jason Christopher (Technical
Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Division of Reliability
Standards and Security, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First
Street NE., Washington, DC 20426 Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; Austin
Rappeport (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability,
Division of Reliability Standards and Security, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 1800 Dual Highway, Suite 201, Hagerstown, MD
21740, Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; Kevin Ryan (Legal Information),
Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>;
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(Issued April 18, 2013)

    1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the
Commission proposes to approve the Version 5 Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, CIP-002-5 through CIP-011-1,
submitted by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization
(ERO). The proposed CIP version 5 Standards, which pertain to the cyber
security of the bulk electric system, represent an improvement over the
current Commission-approved CIP Reliability Standards as they adopt new
cyber security controls and extend the scope of the systems that are
protected by the CIP Reliability Standards.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2006).
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    2. Specifically, the proposed CIP version 5 Standards include
twelve requirements with new cyber security controls. The new controls
address Electronic Security Perimeters (CIP-005-5), Systems Security
Management (CIP-007-5), Incident Reporting and Response Planning (CIP-
008-5), Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems (CIP-009-5), and
Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (CIP-010-
1). As discussed below, the proposed new controls will improve the
security posture of responsible entities and represent an improvement
in the CIP Reliability Standards.
    3. In addition, NERC has proposed to adopt a new approach to
identifying and classifying BES Cyber Systems that will require at
least a minimum classification of ``Low Impact'' for all BES Cyber
Systems. Specifically, NERC has proposed to categorize BES Cyber
Systems as having a Low, Medium, or High Impact on the reliable
operation of the bulk electric system. Once a BES Cyber System has been
categorized, the responsible entity must comply with the associated
requirements of the CIP version 5 Standards that pertain to that
category. As discussed further below, the proposed approach to
categorizing BES Cyber Systems is a step towards applying the CIP
protections more comprehensively to better assure the protection of the
bulk electric system.
    4. While we believe that the proposed CIP version 5 Standards
improve the currently-approved CIP Reliability Standards, certain
aspects of the proposal raise concerns regarding the potential
ambiguity and, ultimately, enforceability of the CIP version 5
Standards. Specifically, seventeen of the requirements of the suite of
CIP version 5 Standards include language that requires the responsible
entity to implement the requirement in a manner to ``identify, assess,
and correct'' deficiencies.\2\ As explained below, we are concerned
that this language is unclear with respect to the compliance
obligations it places on regulated entities and that it is too vague to
audit and enforce compliance. For example, it is unclear whether the
inclusion of the ``identify, assess and correct'' language in the
requirements imposes one obligation on the responsible entity (i.e., to
ensure the entity has a process in place to identify, assess and
correct a violation) or two obligations (i.e., to (1) ensure the entity
has a process in place to identify, assess and correct a violation and
(2) to ensure that the underlying substantive requirement is not
violated). Therefore, we seek comment on the meaning of this language
and on how it will be implemented and enforced. Depending on the
comments and explanations received, we may determine that it is
appropriate to direct NERC to develop modifications. For example, the
modification may seek to direct NERC to clarify both the compliance
obligations created by this language and the criteria by which auditors
will be able to determine compliance. Alternatively, we may direct NERC
to remove this language if it results in requirements that degrade the
protections afforded by the CIP version 5 Standards and are difficult
to implement and enforce. The nature of any next steps will depend on
additional information filed with the Commission.
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    \2\ See NERC Petition at 33.
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    5. In addition, we have concerns with one specific provision,
Requirement R2 of Reliability Standard CIP-003-5, which sets forth the
single compliance obligation for BES Cyber Systems categorized as Low
Impact. Requirement R2 requires responsible entities to ``implement * *
* documented cyber security policies that collectively address * * *''
cyber security awareness, physical security controls, electronic access
controls and incident response to a cyber security incident. We support
extending the scope of the systems that are protected by the CIP
Reliability Standards, and believe this is a positive step forward in
comprehensive protection of assets that could potentially cause cyber
security risks to the bulk electric system. However, we are concerned
that CIP-003-5, Requirement R2 simply requires responsible entities to
implement documented policies and does not provide those entities with
a clear roadmap of what they need to do in order to protect Low Impact
BES Cyber Systems.
    6. Beyond the identification of four broad topics, neither this
Reliability Standard nor the NERC petition indicate the required
content of such policies or the qualitative expectation for an adequate
policy. Thus, we are concerned that Requirement R2 is not clear and
unambiguous regarding what is required of the responsible entities or,
more important, does not provide adequate cyber security controls for
Low

Impact BES Cyber Assets. Accordingly, as discussed in detail below, we
propose to direct that NERC develop modifications to CIP-003-5,
Requirement R2, to require that responsible entities adopt specific,
technically-supported cyber security controls for Low Impact assets.
    7. We also propose to approve the nineteen new or revised
definitions associated with the proposed Reliability Standards for
inclusion in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards
(NERC Glossary). In addition, we seek comment on certain aspects of the
proposed definitions. Depending on the comments and explanations
received, we may determine that it is appropriate to direct that NERC
develop modifications to certain proposed definitions to eliminate
ambiguities and assure that BES Cyber Assets are adequately protected.
    8. We further propose to approve 30 of the 32 Violation Risk
Factors (VRF). However, we propose to direct NERC to modify the VRF
assignment for CIP-006-5, Requirement R3 from Lower to Medium, and to
modify the VRF assigned to CIP-004-5, Requirement R4 from Lower to
Medium. In addition, we propose to direct NERC to modify the Violation
Severity Levels (VSL) for the CIP version 5 Standards. We seek comment
on these proposals.
    9. We propose to approve NERC's proposal to allow responsible
entities to transition from compliance with the currently-effective CIP
version 3 Standards to compliance with the CIP version 5 Standards,
essentially retiring the CIP version 4 Standards prior to mandatory
compliance. Thus, upon approval of the CIP version 5 Standards in a
Final Rule in this docket, CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4 would not become
effective, and CIP-002-3 through CIP-009-3 would remain in effect and
would not be retired until the effective date of the CIP version 5
Standards. However, we also raise questions whether the 24-month and
36-month implementation periods proposed by NERC for the CIP version 5
Standards are necessary, and what activities are required to effect the
transition during the proposed implementation periods.
    10. The Commission recognizes the ongoing challenge of developing
and maintaining meaningful cyber security requirements that set a
baseline for protection of the nation's bulk electric system from cyber
vulnerabilities. Users, owners and operators of the bulk electric
system must adapt to changing threats and cyber technologies to assure
the ongoing security of the nation's critical infrastructure. We
believe that the modified CIP version 5 Standards proposed by NERC
represent an improvement over the previously approved standards and
should assist in a more robust cyber security posture for the industry.
Therefore, we propose to approve the CIP version 5 Standards. However,
Reliability Standards with unclear requirements or lacking minimum
controls can create uncertainty and erode an otherwise effective cyber
security posture. Thus, pursuant to section 215(d)(5), we also propose
to direct NERC to modify the proposal to remove ambiguous language and
assure that Low Impact assets have a clear compliance expectation that
includes specified cyber security controls, in lieu of the proposed
requirement for unspecified policies, as explained in detail below.

I. Background

A. Section 215 of the FPA

    11. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission-certified ERO to
develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO subject to
Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\3\ Pursuant
to the requirements of FPA section 215, the Commission established a
process to select and certify an ERO \4\ and, subsequently, certified
NERC as the ERO.\5\
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    \3\ See 16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(3).
    \4\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
    \5\ N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 61,062, order on
reh'g and compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Alcoa
Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009).
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B. Order Nos. 706 and 761

Order No. 706
    12. On January 18, 2008, the Commission issued Order No. 706, which
approved the CIP version 1 Standards to address cyber security of the
Bulk-Power System.\6\ In Order No. 706, the Commission approved eight
CIP Reliability Standards (CIP-002-1 through CIP-009-1). While
approving the CIP version 1 Standards, the Commission also directed
NERC to develop modifications to the CIP version 1 Standards, intended
to enhance the protection provided by the CIP Reliability Standards.
Subsequently, NERC filed the CIP version 2 and CIP version 3 Standards
in partial compliance with Order No. 706. The Commission approved these
standards in September 2009 \7\ and March 2010,\8\ respectively.
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    \6\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040, order on reh'g, Order
No. 706-A, 123 FERC ] 61,174 (2008), order on clarification, Order
No. 706-B, 126 FERC ] 61,229 (2009), order on clarification, Order
No. 706-C, 127 FERC ] 61,273 (2009).
    \7\ N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 128 FERC ] 61,291, order
denying reh'g and granting clarification, 129 FERC ] 61,236 (2009).
    \8\ N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 130 FERC ] 61,271 (2010).
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Order No. 761
    13. On April 19, 2012, the Commission issued Order No. 761, which
approved the CIP version 4 Standards (CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4).\9\
Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 (Critical Cyber Asset Identification)
sets forth 17 uniform ``bright line'' criteria for identifying Critical
Assets. The Commission also accepted NERC's proposed implementation
schedule for the CIP version 4 Standards, which are to be fully
implemented and enforceable beginning April 2014.\10\
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    \9\ Version 4 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability
Standards, Order No. 761, 77 FR 24594 (Apr. 25, 2012), 139 FERC ]
61,058 (2012) order denying reh'g, 140 FERC ] 61,109 (2012).
    \10\ We note that on February 12, 2013, President Barack Obama
issued an Executive Order requiring the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to ``lead the development of a
framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.'' NIST
is required to publish a preliminary version of the framework within
240 days of the Executive Order and a final version one-year after
the Executive Order.
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II. NERC Petition and Proposed CIP Version 5 Standards

A. NERC Petition

    14. In its January 31, 2013 petition, NERC seeks Commission
approval of the CIP version 5 Standards, nineteen new or revised
Glossary terms, Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels,
and an implementation plan.\11\ NERC maintains that the proposed CIP
version 5 Standards are just and reasonable, as the proposal meets or
exceeds each of the guidelines that the Commission identified in Order
No. 672 for evaluating a proposed Reliability Standard.\12\ NERC
asserts that the proposed CIP version 5 Standards ``serve the important
reliability goal of providing a cybersecurity framework for the
identification and protection of BES

Cyber Systems * * * to support the reliable operation of the Bulk Power
System.'' \13\ In addition, NERC states that the proposed CIP version 5
Standards are ``designed to be clear and unambiguous'' and the
Commission should approve the CIP standards as ``clearly enforceable.''
\14\
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    \11\ Reliability Standards CIP-002-5 through CIP-011-1 are not
attached to the notice of proposed rulemaking. The complete text of
CIP version 5 Standards is available on the Commission's eLibrary
document retrieval system in Docket No. RM13-5-000 and is posted on
the ERO's Web site, available at http://www.nerc.com.
    \12\ See Petition at 8 (citing Order No. 672 FERC Stats. Regs. ]
31,204 at PP 320-337. See also NERC Petition, Exh. G (Order No. 672
Criteria for Approving Proposed Reliability Standards)).
    \13\ Id. at 10.
    \14\ Id. at 27.
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    15. Further, NERC maintains that the proposed CIP version 5
Standards represent a significant improvement to the currently-
effective standards, as the CIP version 5 Standards require responsible
entities to use a new approach to categorize all cyber systems
impacting the bulk electric system as having a Low, Medium, or High
Impact.\15\ NERC states that the new approach to classifying cyber
systems ``moves away from the CIP version 4 ``bright-line'' approach of
only identifying Critical Assets (and applying CIP requirements only to
their associated Critical Cyber Assets), to requiring a minimum
classification of ``Low Impact'' for all BES Cyber Systems.'' \16\ NERC
states that the adoption of the Low-Medium-High Impact categorization
``resulted from a review of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework for categorizing and
applying security controls, a review that was directed by the
Commission in Order No. 706.'' \17\
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    \15\ See Id. at 15.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Id.
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    16. NERC also notes the adoption of new language within several of
the CIP version 5 Standards where the Standard Drafting Team
incorporated ``a requirement that Responsible Entities implement cyber
policies in a manner to ``identify, assess, and correct''
deficiencies.'' \18\ NERC states that the proposed ``identify, assess,
and correct'' language is ``[c]onsistent with the NIST Risk Management
Framework and the Commission's guidance in prior orders,'' asserting
that the ``implementation of certain CIP version 5 requirements in a
manner to ``identify, assess, and correct'' deficiencies emulates the
FERC Policy Statement on Penalty Guidelines.'' \19\ NERC further states
that the ``identify, assess, and correct'' language ``is included as a
performance expectation in the requirements, not as an enforcement
component.'' \20\
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    \18\ Id. at 33.
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ Id.
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    17. NERC asserts that the CIP version 5 Standards address ``all
applicable directives in Order No. 706'' while ``eliminating
unnecessary documentation requirements to allow entities to focus on
the reliability and security of the Bulk Power System.'' \21\
Accordingly, NERC requests that the Commission approve the proposed CIP
version 5 Standards, the proposed new and revised definitions, the
associated Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels, and
the proposed implementation plan. NERC requests as an effective date
for the Reliability Standard, ``the first day of the eighth calendar
quarter after a Final Rule is issued in this docket.'' \22\
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    \21\ Id. at 5.
    \22\ Id. at 2.
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    18. NERC requests prompt Commission action approving the CIP
version 5 Standards and associated implementation plan.\23\ With regard
to the implementation plan, NERC states that the proposed language
``would allow entities to transition from CIP Version 3 to CIP Version
5, thereby bypassing implementation of CIP Version 4 completely upon
Commission approval.'' \24\ NERC asserts that prompt approval of the
CIP version 5 Standards and implementation plan ``would reduce
uncertainty among Responsible Entities regarding implementation of the
CIP standards.'' \25\
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    \23\ Id. at 5.
    \24\ Id. at 4.
    \25\ Id. at 5.
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B. Proposed CIP Version 5 Standards and NERC Explanation of Provisions

    19. NERC's proposal includes ten new or modified Reliability
Standards.
    20. CIP-002-5-Cyber Security--BES Cyber System Categorization:
Proposed CIP-002-5 is the first step in identifying BES Cyber Systems,
which are assets which must be protected by the cyber security
standards. If a responsible entity does not identify any BES Cyber
Systems, it does not have compliance responsibility under the rest of
the proposed CIP Standards. However, a responsible entity that
identifies BES Cyber Systems must comply with proposed CIP-003-5 to
CIP-011-1, according to specific criteria that characterize the impact
of the identified BES Cyber Systems.
    21. In particular, proposed CIP-002-5 adds two new terms to the
NERC Glossary that define the assets subject to CIP protections. First,
NERC defines a BES Cyber Asset as ``[a] Cyber Asset that if rendered
unavailable, degraded, or misused would, within 15 minutes of its
required operation, misoperation, or non-operation, adversely impact
one or more Facilities, systems, or equipment, which, if destroyed,
degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable when needed, would affect
the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.'' \26\ Second, NERC
defines a BES Cyber System as ``[o]ne or more BES Cyber Assets
logically grouped by a responsible entity to perform one or more
reliability tasks for a functional entity.'' \27\
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    \26\ Id. at 14.
    \27\ Id.
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    22. NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-5 will
require the identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems
according to specific criteria that characterize their impact for the
application of cyber security requirements commensurate with the
adverse impact that loss, compromise, or misuse of those BES Cyber
Systems could have on the reliable operation of the bulk electric
system.\28\
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    \28\ Id. at 11.
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    23. NERC states that proposed CIP-002-5 ``Attachment 1--Impact
Rating Criteria'' identifies three categories of BES Cyber Systems. The
High Impact category covers large Control Centers, similar to those
control centers identified as Critical Assets in CIP-002-4. The Medium
Impact category covers generation and transmission facilities, similar
to those identified as Critical Assets in CIP-002-4, along with other
control centers not identified as Critical Assets in CIP-002-4. The Low
Impact category covers all other BES Cyber Systems. NERC states that
the Low Impact Category provides protections for systems not included
in the CIP version 4 Standards.\29\
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    \29\ Id.
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    24. Once a responsible entity identifies a BES Cyber System under
CIP-002-5, the entity must comply with the controls included in CIP-
003-5 to CIP-011-1 corresponding to its impact category.\30\
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    \30\ Id.
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    25. CIP-003-5--Cyber Security--Security Management Controls: NERC
states that proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-5 will require
approval by a CIP Senior Manager of the documented cyber security
policies related to CIP-004-5 through CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-
011-1. Proposed CIP-003-5, Requirement 2, will require implementation
of policies related to cyber security awareness, physical security
controls, electronic access controls, and incident response to a Cyber
Security Incident for those assets that have Low Impact BES Cyber
Systems under CIP-002-5's categorization process. According to NERC, a
requirement that a Cyber

Security Policy be ``readily available'' was deleted because of general
confusion around that term and because training requirements in CIP-
004-5 provide for knowledge of reliability policies. NERC states that
it moved several provisions of requirements related to information
protection in previous CIP versions to CIP-011-1 and, therefore,
deleted the requirements from CIP-003-5.\31\
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    \31\ Id. at 11-12.
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    26. CIP-004-5--Cyber Security--Personnel and Training: NERC states
that proposed Reliability Standard CIP-004-5 will require documented
processes or programs for security awareness, cyber security training,
personnel risk assessment, and access management. Requirement R2 of
CIP-004-5 adds specific training roles for visitor control programs,
electronic interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of
BES Cyber Systems, and storage media as part of the treatment of BES
Cyber System Information. NERC states that the drafting team modified
the requirements pertaining to personnel risk assessments and access
management in response to lessons learned from implementing previous
versions. Proposed CIP-004-5, Requirement R3, now specifies that the
seven year criminal history check covers all locations where the
individual has resided for six consecutive months or more without
specifying school, work, etc., and regardless of official residence.
Proposed CIP-004-5, Requirement R4 now combines the access management
requirements from CIP-003-4, CIP-004-4, CIP-006-4, and CIP-007-4 into a
single requirement. These requirements from the CIP version 4
Standards, as incorporated in Requirement R4, remain largely unchanged
except to clarify certain terminology. NERC states that combining these
requirements improves consistency in the authorization and review
process. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-004-5 modifies Requirement
R4 by removing the obligation to maintain a list of authorized
personnel. NERC explains that the removal is appropriate because the
list represents only one form of evidence to demonstrate compliance
that only authorized persons have access. Requirement R5 requires a
registered entity to revoke a terminated employee's access concurrent
with his or her termination, to be completed within 24 hours.\32\
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    \32\ Id. at 12.
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    27. CIP-005-5--Cyber Security--Electronic Security Perimeter(s):
NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard CIP-005-5, Requirement
R1 focuses on the discrete Electronic Access Points rather than the
logical ``perimeter,'' which is the focus of currently-effective CIP-
005-3. Requirement R1.2 of currently-effective CIP-005 Standard has
been deleted from the CIP version 5 Standards. NERC explains that
Requirement R1.2 is definitional and was used to bring dial-up modems
using non-routable protocols into the scope of previous versions of
CIP-005. According to NERC, the non-routable blanket exemption included
in CIP version 1 through version 4 was removed from CIP-002-5.
Moreover, NERC deleted Requirements R1.1 and R1.3. However, according
to NERC, the drafting team integrated the underlying concepts from
Requirements R1.1 and R1.3 into the definitions of Electronic Security
Perimeter (ESP) and Electronic Access Point (EAP).\33\
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    \33\ Id.
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    28. CIP-006-5--Cyber Security--Physical Security of BES Cyber
Systems: NERC states that proposed CIP-006-5 is intended to manage
physical access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a physical security
plan to protect BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to
misoperation or instability. Proposed CIP-006-5 reflects the retirement
of Requirements R8.2 and R8.3 of Commission-approved CIP-006-4,
concerning the retention of testing records. According to NERC, the
retention period is now specified in the compliance section of proposed
CIP-006-5.\34\
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    \34\ Id.
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    29. CIP-007-5--Cyber Security--Systems Security Management: NERC
states that proposed CIP-007-5 addresses system security by specifying
technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of
protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to
misoperation or instability of the bulk electric system. NERC states
that it modified CIP-007-5 to conform to the formatting approach of CIP
version 5, along with changes to address several Commission directives
and to make the requirements less dependent on specific technology so
that they will remain relevant for future, yet-unknown developing
technologies. For example, according to NERC, Requirement R3 is a
competency-based requirement, i.e., the responsible entity must
document how it addresses the malware risk for each BES Cyber System,
but the requirement does not prescribe a particular technical method in
order to account for potential technological advancement.\35\
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    \35\ Id. at 12-13.
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    30. CIP-008-5--Cyber Security--Incident Reporting and Response
Planning: NERC states that proposed CIP-008-5 mitigates the risk to the
reliable operation of the bulk electric system resulting from a Cyber
Security Incident by specifying incident response requirements.
Proposed Requirement R1 requires responsible entities to report Cyber
Security Incidents within 1 hour of recognition. Requirement R2
requires testing to verify response plan effectiveness and consistent
application in responding to a Cyber Security Incident. Requirement R3
provides for an after-action review for tests or actual incidents, and
requires an update to the Cyber Security Incident response plan based
on those lessons learned. Requirement R3 also establishes a single
timeline for a responsible entity to determine the lessons learned and
update recovery plans. Specifically, where previous CIP versions
specified ``30 calendar days'' for determining the lessons learned,
followed by additional time for updating recovery plans and
notification, proposed Requirement R3 combines those activities into a
single 90-day timeframe.\36\
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    \36\ Id. at 13.
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    31. CIP-009-5--Cyber Security--Recovery Plans for BES Cyber
Systems: NERC explains that proposed CIP-009-5 provides for the
recovery of the reliability functions performed by BES Cyber Systems by
specifying a recovery plan to support the continued stability,
operability, and reliability of the bulk electric system. Requirement
R1 includes controls to protect data that would be useful in the
investigation of an event that results in the execution of a Cyber
System recovery plan. NERC explains that Requirement R2 includes
operational testing to support the recovery of BES Cyber Systems.
Requirement R3 establishes a single timeline for a responsible entity
to determine the lessons learned and update recovery plans, similar to
CIP-008-5.\37\
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    \37\ Id.
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    32. CIP-010-1--Cyber Security--Configuration Change Management and
Vulnerability Assessments: NERC states that proposed CIP-010-1 is a new
standard consolidating the configuration change management and
vulnerability assessment-related requirements from previous versions of
CIP-003, CIP-005 and CIP-007. Requirement R1 specifies the
configuration change management requirements. Requirement R2
establishes the configuration monitoring requirements intended to
detect unauthorized modifications to BES Cyber Systems. NERC explains
that

Requirement R3 establishes the vulnerability assessment requirements
intended to ensure proper implementation of cyber security controls
while promoting continuous improvement of a responsible entity's cyber
security posture.\38\
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    \38\ Id.
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    33. CIP-011-1--Cyber Security--Information Protection: NERC states
that proposed CIP-011-1 is a new standard consolidating the information
protection requirements from previous versions of CIP-003 and CIP-007.
Requirement R1 specifies information protection controls to prevent
unauthorized access to BES Cyber System Information. Requirement R2
specifies reuse and disposal provisions to prevent unauthorized
dissemination of protected information.\39\
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    \39\ Id. at 13-14.
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III. Discussion

    34. Pursuant to section 215(d) of the FPA, we propose to approve
the CIP version 5 Standards, CIP-002-5 through CIP-011-1 as just,
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the
public interest. The proposed CIP version 5 Standards, which pertain to
the cyber security of the bulk electric system, represent an
improvement over the current Commission-approved CIP Reliability
Standards. For example, the CIP version 5 Standards adopt new cyber
security controls that are intended to safeguard physical and
electronic access to BES Cyber Systems. Further, NERC proposes a new
approach to identifying and classifying BES Cyber Systems that will
require at least a minimum classification of ``Low Impact'' for all BES
Cyber Systems.
    35. With regard to controls, the proposed CIP version 5 Standards
include twelve requirements with new cyber security controls. These new
cyber security controls should improve the defense-in-depth posture of
users, owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System. For example,
Requirement R1.3 of proposed Reliability Standard CIP-005-5 requires
responsible entities to implement inbound and outbound network access
permissions, and the reason for granting access. All other access is
denied by default. Implementing outbound access permissions can prevent
malware from reaching out to a command and control system, potentially
reducing the effectiveness of the malware. As another example, pursuant
to proposed CIP-005-5, Requirement R1.5, responsible entities must
monitor for suspicious inbound and outbound communications at all
access points to the Electronic Security Perimeter. Monitoring
communications can detect and help prevent malicious code from
transferring between networks. Other new controls pertain to increased
minimum protections for remote access (CIP-005-5, Requirement R2),
protection against the use of unnecessary physical input/output ports
(CIP-007-5, Requirement R1.2), testing recovery plans at least once
every 36 months through an operational exercise (CIP-009-5, Requirement
R2.3), and developing a baseline configuration of BES Cyber Systems and
monitoring for unauthorized changes to the baseline configuration (CIP-
010-1, Requirement R1.1 and R2.1). We believe that the proposed new
controls will improve the security posture of responsible entities and
represent an improvement in the CIP Reliability Standards.
    36. In addition, NERC has proposed to adopt a new approach to
identifying and classifying BES Cyber Systems that will require at
least a minimum classification of ``Low Impact'' for all BES Cyber
Systems.\40\ Specifically, NERC has proposed to adopt a process that
will categorize BES Cyber Systems as having a Low, Medium, or High
Impact on the reliable operation of the bulk electric system. Once a
responsible entity has categorized its BES Cyber System(s), the
responsible entity must then apply the associated requirements of the
remaining CIP Reliability Standards, i.e., CIP-003-5 through CIP-011-1.
The proposed new approach to categorizing BES Cyber Systems is a step
towards applying the CIP protections more comprehensively to better
assure the protection of the bulk electric system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Commission
proposes to approve the CIP version 5 Standards.
    38. We also propose to approve the nineteen new or revised
definitions associated with the proposed Reliability Standards for
inclusion in the NERC Glossary. In addition, we seek comment on certain
aspects of the proposed definitions. Depending on the comments and
explanations received, we may determine that it is appropriate to
direct that NERC develop modifications to certain proposed definitions
to eliminate ambiguities and assure that BES Cyber Assets are
adequately protected.
    39. We further propose to approve 30 of the 32 Violation Risk
Factors (VRF). However, we propose to direct NERC to modify the VRF
assignment for CIP-006-5, Requirement R3 from Lower to Medium, and to
modify the VRF assigned to CIP-004-5, Requirement R4 from Lower to
Medium. In addition, we propose to direct NERC to modify the Violation
Severity Levels (VSL) for the CIP version 5 Standards. We seek comment
on these proposals.
    40. We propose to approve NERC's proposal to allow responsible
entities to transition from compliance with the currently-effective CIP
version 3 Standards to compliance with the CIP version 5 Standards,
essentially retiring the CIP version 4 Standards prior to mandatory
compliance. Thus, upon approval of the CIP version 5 Standards in a
Final Rule in this docket, CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4 would not become
effective, and CIP-002-3 through CIP-009-3 would remain in effect and
would not be retired until the effective date of the CIP version 5
Standards. However, we also raise questions whether the 24-month and
36-month implementation periods proposed by NERC for the CIP version 5
Standards are necessary, and what activities are required to effect the
transition during the proposed implementation periods.
    41. While we propose to approve the CIP version 5 Standards, we
have also identified several concerns with certain provisions of the
CIP version 5 Standards. In particular, as discussed in detail below,
we are concerned that NERC's proposal to include language that requires
entities to ``identify, assess, and correct'' deficiencies is unclear
with respect to the implementation and compliance obligations it
imposes and that it is too vague to audit and enforce compliance.
Therefore, as explained below, we seek comment on this language.
    42. Further, the advancement in security resulting from NERC's
adoption of a tiered asset categorization, including requiring at least
a minimum classification of ``Low Impact'' for all BES Cyber Systems,
can be enhanced by: (1) Ensuring that the CIP Reliability Standards are
clear, unambiguous, and enforceable; (2) ensuring that the scope of
assets covered by the definition of ``BES Cyber System'' and associated
terms captures the right assets for protection; and (3) ensuring that
the minimum protections required for ``Low Impact'' assets are
reasonable. Thus, we propose to direct that NERC develop a modification
to CIP-003-5, Requirement R2, to require that responsible entities
adopt specific, technically-supported cyber security controls for Low
Impact assets. We discuss these proposed modifications below.
    43. Accordingly, we discuss the following matters below: (A) The

``identify, assess, and correct'' language; (B) BES Cyber Asset
categorization; (C) proposed definitions; (D) implementation plan; (E)
Violation Risk Factor and Violation Severity Level assignments; and (F)
other technical issues.

A. ``Identify, Assess, and Correct'' Language

NERC Petition
    44. As noted above, 17 requirements of the CIP version 5 Standards
incorporate ``a requirement that Responsible Entities implement cyber
policies in a manner to `identify, assess, and correct' deficiencies.''
\41\ NERC states that the proposed ``identify, assess, and correct''
language is ``[c]onsistent with the NIST Risk Management Framework and
the Commission's guidance in prior orders,'' asserting that the
``implementation of certain CIP version 5 requirements in a manner to
``identify, assess, and correct'' deficiencies emulates the FERC Policy
Statement on Penalty Guidelines.'' \42\ During the development of the
CIP version 5 Standards, some commenters were concerned that ``there is
no clear mechanism with how [the proposed ``identify, assess, and
correct'' language] will be audited or that there may be inconsistent
audits across Regions.'' \43\ In response, the drafting team stated
that the ``intent [of the language] is to change the basis of a
violation in these requirements so that they are not focused on whether
there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing and correcting
deficiencies.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Petition at 33.
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ Id. at App. F, Part 2, p. 3435.
    \44\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. In addition, the drafting team explained that the CIP version 5
Standards are written to require documented processes set forth in the
tables that accompany the requirements. According to the drafting team,
in moving toward a risk-based approach, ``[e]ntities are to have the
processes; the processes must meet the requirements in the tables [of
the CIP standards]; and the entities shall implement those processes in
a manner that identifies assesses, and corrects deficiencies.'' \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Id. at App. F, Part 2, p. 3436.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion
    46. NERC has not sufficiently explained the proposed ``identify,
assess, and correct'' language, which NERC has elsewhere referred to as
``self-correcting language.'' \46\ As we explain below, we are
concerned that this language is unclear with respect to the
implementation and compliance obligations it places on regulated
entities and that it is too vague to audit and enforce compliance.
Therefore, we seek comment on the meaning of this language and on how
it will be implemented and enforced. Depending on the comments and
explanations received, we may determine that it is appropriate to
direct NERC to develop modifications. For example, the modification may
seek to direct NERC to clarify both the implementation and compliance
obligations created by this language and the criteria by which auditors
will be able to determine compliance. Alternatively, we may direct NERC
to remove this language if it results in requirements that degrade the
protections afforded by the CIP version 5 Standards and are difficult
to implement and enforce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See North American Electric Reliability Corporation,
Informational Filing, Docket Nos. RM05-17-000, et al., at 1, n. 3
(filed December 31, 2012) (NERC refers to the ``identify, assess,
and correct'' term as ``self correcting language'' in the
Reliability Standards Development Plan for 2013-2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. Initially, we are concerned that the proposed ``identify,
assess, and correct'' language is unclear with respect to the
implementation and compliance obligations it places on regulated
entities. For example, it is unclear whether the inclusion of the
``identify, assess and correct'' language in the requirements imposes
one obligation on the responsible entity (i.e., to ensure the entity
has a process in place to identify, assess and correct a violation) or
two obligations (i.e., to (1) ensure the entity has a process in place
to identify, assess and correct a violation and (2) to ensure that the
underlying substantive requirement is not violated). In the former
case, the language could be interpreted or understood to mean that a
violation of a Requirement occurs only if the responsible entity did
not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. In the latter case,
entities would have to demonstrate that they identify, assess, and
correct the deficiencies and, in addition, not violate the underlying
requirement.
    48. The proposed ``identify, assess, and correct'' language is
ambiguous enough to support both interpretations. Moreover, the
comments of the drafting team can be read to support both
interpretations. On one hand, the drafting team stated that the
``intent [of the language] is to change the basis of a violation in
these requirements so that they are not focused on whether there is a
deficiency, but on identifying, assessing and correcting
deficiencies.'' \47\ This suggests that the language is part of a
single compliance obligation and does not impose an additional
obligation not to violate the underlying requirement. On the other
hand, the drafting team stated that ``[e]ntities are to have the
processes; the processes must meet the requirements in the tables [of
the CIP standards]; and the entities shall implement those processes in
a manner that identifies assesses, and corrects deficiencies.'' \48\
This suggests that the language creates a requirement to ``identify,
assess and correct'' in addition to the obligation to meet the
underlying substantive requirement imposed by the standard.
Additionally, it is not clear to what extent the drafting team's
statement that entities are required to implement processes ``in a
manner that identifies assesses, and corrects deficiencies'' permits
auditors and the Commission to evaluate the adequacy of an entity's
processes or against what criteria they would be evaluated. We seek
comment on the purpose of this language and the implications for
reliability of both interpretations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ NERC Petition at App. F, Part 2, p. 3435.
    \48\ Id. at App. F, Part 2, p. 3436 [emphasis added].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    49. Additionally, we are concerned that under either interpretation
the proposed the ``identify, assess, and correct'' language is too
vague to be audited. NERC does not explain what is expected of
responsible entities or the intended meaning of the individual terms
``identify,'' ``assess,'' ``correct,'' and ``deficiencies'' as they are
used in CIP version 5.
    50. As to the term ``identify,'' it is not clear whether a
responsible entity is expected to take steps to recognize past
deficiencies, ongoing deficiencies, or deficiencies that are likely to
or may occur in the future. NERC does not explain the scope of
activities that are implied in the term ``assess,'' which could range
from a cursory review of an isolated ``deficiency'' to a detailed root-
cause analysis. In addition, NERC has not explained what it means for a
responsible entity to ``correct'' a deficiency. This term may include
ending a deficiency, taking measures to address the effect of a
deficiency, or taking steps to prevent a deficiency from recurring.
NERC does not explain, nor does the text of the CIP version 5 Standards
define, the term ``deficiencies.'' It is not clear whether
``deficiencies'' means ``possible violations,'' as defined in NERC's
Compliance Monitoring and

Enforcement Program, or extend to a broader category of matters. In
short, if a goal of this language is to encourage strong internal
controls, the language itself provides no basis for distinguishing
strong controls from weak controls and instead leaves this issue to be
disputed in future enforcement proceedings. We seek comment on these
concerns and on any modification that may be necessary to address them.
    51. In addition, the petition does not identify a reasonable
timeframe for identifying, assessing and correcting deficiencies.
Without identifying a timeframe it is conceivable that, as long as the
responsible entity identifies, assesses and corrects a deficiency
before, or perhaps even when, NERC, the Regional Entities or the
Commission discover the deficiency, there is no possible violation of
the CIP Reliability Standards, regardless of the seriousness of the
deficiency, the duration of the deficiency, or the length of time
between the identification and correction of the deficiency. We seek
comment on these concerns and on any modification that may be necessary
to address them.
    52. The proposed ``identify, assess, and correct'' language allows
a responsible entity to avoid audit risk. Specifically, since there is
no required timeframe for identifying, assessing and correcting a
deficiency, a responsible entity could defer its required assessment of
its CIP compliance program until just prior to a scheduled audit or
self-certification. The petition does not explain whether the
responsible entity is required to disclose the identified deficiencies
in such cases. Nor is it clear whether the audit team can identify a
potential violation if the responsible entity identifies the deficiency
and is in the process of assessing and correcting it, even if the
deficiency is identified long after it came into existence. It is also
not clear how prior deficiencies that are identified, assessed and
corrected are treated in assessing a responsible entity's compliance
history. We seek comment on these concerns and on any modification that
may be necessary to address them.
    53. The petition does not explain how NERC will treat multiple
corrections of deficiencies concerning the same requirement, or the
quality of the mitigation. It is unclear whether previous corrections
will be reported or otherwise made known to NERC because they are not
considered potential violations of the standard. We seek comment on
these concerns and on any modification that may be necessary to address
them.
    54. We are also concerned about how performance of the ``identify,
assess and correct'' phrase can be expected to be uniform or consistent
among responsible entities absent additional clarification, explanation
or identification of techniques that Regional Entities and NERC would
use to determine performance that would comply with requirements that
include this phrase. NERC indicates that Audit Worksheets will address
the ``identify, assess and correct'' provisions. However, the Audit
Worksheets have not been developed or submitted for consideration in
the petition. We seek comment on these concerns and on any modification
that may be necessary to address them.
    55. In the petition, NERC states that the ``identify, assess, and
correct'' language is based upon the assess \49\ and monitor \50\ steps
of the NIST Risk Management Framework.\51\ NERC does not identify any
specific source in these steps of the NIST Risk Management Framework
for the ``identify, assess, and correct'' language. Moreover, both the
assess and monitor steps of the NIST Risk Management Framework are tied
to guidance publications that establish clear expectations for
assessments and continuous monitoring.\52\ As noted above, neither the
CIP version 5 Standards nor the petition explain what is expected of
responsible entities under the proposed ``identify, assess, and
correct'' language. We are not opposed to adopting a process to assess
and monitor a responsible entity's performance under the CIP
Reliability Standards and, in fact, support the idea of having such a
process along with clear, well-developed guidance materials. We are
concerned, however, that including the assess and monitor processes in
the language of a Requirement, as proposed by NERC, could render such
provisions unenforceable. We seek comment on these concerns and on any
modification that may be necessary to address them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ SP 800-37 describes the assess step as: ``Assess[ing] the
security controls using appropriate procedures to determine the
extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as
intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting
the security requirements for the system.''
    \50\ SP 800-37 describes the monitor step as: ``Monitor[ing] and
assess[ing] selected security controls in the information system on
an ongoing basis including assessing security control effectiveness,
documenting changes to the system or environment of operation,
conducting security impact analyses of the associated changes, and
reporting the security state of the system to appropriate
organizational officials.''
    \51\ See Petition at 32.
    \52\ See SP 800-53A Revision 1, Guide for Assessing the Security
Revision 1 Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations
and SP 800-137, Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM)
for Federal Information Systems and Organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    56. Depending on the comments and explanations received, we may
determine that it is appropriate to direct NERC to develop
modifications. For example, the modification may clarify the
implementation and compliance obligations created by this language, and
the standards by which auditors will be able to determine compliance.
Alternatively, we may direct NERC to remove this language if it results
in requirements that degrade the protections afforded by the CIP
version 5 Standards and are difficult to implement and enforce.
    57. We emphasize that our concerns about the proposed ``identify,
assess, and correct'' language should not be read to prejudge the
ongoing efforts at NERC to develop changes to the compliance and
enforcement program, and this NOPR should not be read as a ruling on
that effort. We support wholly NERC's effort to encourage responsible
entities to develop internal controls and, moreover, agree that
responsible entities should have strong internal controls and receive
recognition for such controls when penalties actually are found
warranted. Effective internal controls can reduce the need for external
enforcement processes, and the resources committed by all participants
to these processes. As the Commission stated in the Revised Policy
Statement on Penalty Guidelines, ``the Penalty Guidelines served only
to solidify the importance we place on compliance by providing
substantial and transparent mitigation credit for effective compliance
programs.'' \53\ We also acknowledge and agree that the resources
committed to compliance monitoring and enforcement should be reasonably
calibrated to the reliability risks presented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Revised Policy Statement on Penalty Guidelines, 132 FERC ]
61,216, at P 109 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. BES Cyber Asset Categorization and Protection

    58. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-5 requires responsible
entities to categorize BES Cyber Systems as having a Low, Medium, or
High Impact. NERC states that proposed CIP-002-5 requires ``the
identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems according to
specific criteria that characterize their impact for the application of
cyber security requirements commensurate with the adverse impact that
loss, compromise,

or misuse of those BES Cyber Systems could have on the reliable
operation of the [bulk electric system].'' \54\ NERC states that the
new approach to classifying cyber systems, which requires a minimum
classification of ``Low Impact'' for all BES Cyber Systems, ``resulted
from a review of the NIST Risk Management Framework for categorizing
and applying security controls, a review that was directed by the
Commission in Order No. 706.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Petition at 11.
    \55\ Id. at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    59. NERC's new approach to categorizing BES Cyber Systems is a step
closer to comprehensively protecting assets that could cause cyber
security risks to the bulk electric system. However, as discussed
below, the Commission believes that NERC should consider improving the
categorization process and should modify the minimum protections
required for ``Low Impact'' assets to identify specific controls.
1. Reliability Based Criteria
    60. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to ``monitor the
development and implementation of the NIST standards to determine if
they contain provisions that will protect the Bulk-Power System better
than the CIP Reliability Standards.'' \56\ The incorporation of new
NIST-like concepts into the CIP Reliability Standards, such as the Low-
Medium-High categorization, is encouraging. However, as discussed
below, significant differences exist between the NIST Risk Management
Framework and the proposed CIP version 5 Standards, particularly with
regard to system identification and categorization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 233.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    61. As noted above, proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-5
requires each responsible entity to categorize BES Cyber Systems as
having a Low, Medium, or High Impact based on the adverse impact that
loss, compromise, or misuse of its BES Cyber Systems could have on the
reliable operation of the bulk electric system. NERC states that this
categorization process is based upon the NIST Risk Management
Framework. The NIST Risk Management Framework, however, utilizes a
categorization process based on the loss of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of systems, as defined in the Federal Information and
Security Act of 2002.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ See Federal Information and Security Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C.
3542 (2002) (Confidentiality is defined as preserving authorized
restrictions on access and disclosure, including a means for
protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; integrity
as guarding against improper information modification or
destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and
authenticity; availability as ensuring timely and reliable access to
and use of information).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    62. The NIST Risk Management Framework requires a low, moderate, or
high level of protection for devices, systems, and associated data
based on the criticality of the protected information.\58\ The
categorization process establishes a foundation for security
standardization across different types of data, controls, and
equipment.\59\ While the CIP version 5 Standards share a similar
grouping of Low-Medium-High categories with the NIST Risk Management
Framework, the categorization processes proposed under the CIP version
5 Standards and the NIST Risk Management Framework are different.
Rather than categorize assets based on the loss of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of systems, CIP-002-5 categorizes assets
based on ``reliability impact.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See NIST Special Publication 800-60, at 9. According to
NIST, ``security categories are based on the potential impact on an
organization should certain events occur. The potential impacts
could jeopardize the information and information systems needed by
the organization to accomplish its assigned mission, protect its
assets, fulfill its legal responsibilities, maintain its day-to-day
functions, and protect individuals. Security categories are to be
used in conjunction with vulnerability and threat information in
assessing the risk to an organization.''
    \59\ See NIST Special Publication 800-60 at 4-5. NIST states
that the value of information security categorization is to enable
organizations ``to proactively implement appropriate information
security controls based on the assessed potential impact to
information confidentiality, integrity, and availability and in turn
to support their mission in a cost-effective manner.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    63. Specifically, the reliability impacts underlying the CIP-002-5
asset categorizations are based on facility ratings, such as generation
capacity and voltage levels. For example, the CIP-002-5--Attachment 1
Impact Rating Criteria establishes a threshold for ``Medium Impact''
generation at 1500 MW. This determination is based on the assumption
that generation facilities with smaller values would have a ``Low
Impact'' on grid reliability.\60\ However, the petition does not
contain or reference reliability studies that provide the supporting
engineering analysis for such thresholds. For example, the ``Medium
Impact'' thresholds for both generation and transmission do not seem to
consider the impacts of a coordinated attack on ``Low Impact'' systems,
such as the loss of several or all 100 kV facilities owned or operated
by a single entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See Reliability Standard CIP-002-5--BES Cyber System
Categorization, at Attachment 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    64. NERC's proposed categorization process is based on facility
ratings, such as generation capacity and voltage levels. As discussed
elsewhere, the NIST Risk Management Framework categorizes systems based
on cyber security principles regarding the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of systems.\61\ We accept NERC's proposal at this
time. However, we may revisit the categorization of assets under the
CIP Reliability Standards at a later date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ For example, the ISA99 suite of standards (also known as
ISA/IEC-62443: ``Security for Industrial Automation and Control
Systems'') utilizes an approach similar to what is outlined in the
NIST Framework and further clarifies system impact to mean ``impacts
that might result from security failures, taking into account the
consequences of a loss of confidentiality, system integrity, or
availability of the assets, loss of reliability and manipulation of
the [industrial control system].'' See ISA/IEC-62443-2-1, 2013
Draft. Requirement <IP_ADDRESS>. Establishing and Managing the Industrial
Automated Control System Security Management System. http://isa99.isa.org/Documents/Drafts/ISA-d62443-2-1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Protection of Low Impact BES Cyber Assets
    65. Reliability Standard CIP-003-5, Requirement R2, which pertains
to the obligations for BES Cyber Systems identified as Low Impact,
provides:

    R2. Each Responsible Entity for its assets identified in CIP-
002-5, Requirement R1, Part R1.3 [i.e., low impact systems], shall
implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects
deficiencies, one or more documented cyber security policies that
collectively address the following topics, and review and obtain CIP
Senior Manager approval for those policies at least once every 15
calendar months: * * *
    2.1 Cyber security awareness;
    2.2 Physical security controls;
    2.3 Electronic access controls for external routable protocol
connections and Dial-up Connectivity; and
    2.4 Incident response to a Cyber Security Incident.
    An inventory, list, or discrete identification of low impact BES
Cyber Systems or their BES Cyber Assets is not required.

    This is the only CIP version 5 Requirement applicable to Low Impact
systems.
    66. NERC states that the proposed CIP version 5 Standards require a
minimum classification of ``Low Impact'' for all BES Cyber Systems that
are not classified as either ``Medium'' or ``High'' Impact. The
proposed new approach to identify Low Impact BES Cyber Systems is a
positive step towards applying the CIP Reliability Standards in a more
comprehensive manner to better assure the protection of the bulk
electric system. However, we have concerns regarding Requirement R2 of
Reliability Standard CIP-003-5, which sets forth the single compliance
obligation for BES Cyber Systems categorized as Low

Impact. Requirement R2 requires responsible entities to ``implement * *
* documented cyber security policies that collectively address * * * ''
cyber security awareness, physical security controls, electronic access
controls and incident response to a cyber security incident. Further,
CIP-003-5, Requirement R2, simply requires responsible entities to
implement documented policies, which could allow insufficient
protection to Low Impact BES Cyber Assets.
    67. Under the proposed CIP version 5 Standards, a responsible
entity is required to document and implement both policies and
procedures to perform the specific requirements of CIP-003-5 through
CIP-011-1 for systems identified as High or Medium Impact pursuant to
the criteria in proposed CIP-002-5.\62\ By contrast, a responsible
entity is only required to have ``documented cyber security policies''
for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems; there is no requirement to implement
actual cyber security protections.\63\ While the Commission believes
that an individual Medium or High Impact asset will have higher
potential reliability impacts as compared to an individual Low Impact
asset, the Reliability Standards must also enumerate specific,
technically-supported cyber security controls for Low Impact assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See Reliability Standard CIP-003-5--Cyber Security--
Security Management Controls, at Requirement R1.
    \63\ See Reliability Standard CIP-003-5--Cyber Security--
Security Management Controls, at Requirement R2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    68. We support NERC's efforts to increase the scope of systems that
are protected by the CIP Reliability Standards, but the lack of
specificity regarding the content of the four policies covering Low
Impact BES Cyber Systems raises the prospect of an ambiguous
Reliability Standard that will be difficult for responsible entities to
implement.
    69. Our concern is highlighted by NERC's supporting materials for
proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-5. For example, while Requirement
R2.3 requires responsible entities to have policies on electronic
access controls, the Guidelines and Technical Basis for CIP-003-5
pertaining to Requirement R2.3 states that ``electronic access
control'' is not meant ``in the specific technical sense requiring
authentication, authorization, and auditing.'' \64\ However, it is
unclear how an entity can perform electronic access control without
some form of authentication or authorization. We also question whether
the proposal to require a policy document can be considered
implementing ``electronic perimeter protection,'' which NERC states is
required at every impact level to implement a ``mutual distrust''
posture across all BES Cyber Systems.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See Reliability Standard CIP-003-5--Cyber Security--
Security Management Controls, at Page 18.
    \65\ See Petition at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    70. We are concerned that NERC's proposal to limit the protections
for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems to documented policies, as opposed to
requiring specific cyber security protections, results in ambiguity
that may lead to inconsistent and inefficient implementation of the CIP
Reliability Standards with regard to Low Impact BES Cyber Systems, and
may not provide an adequate roadmap for responsible entities to follow
to ensure the reliable operation of the bulk electric system.
Therefore, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we propose to
direct NERC to develop a modification to CIP-003-5, Requirement R2, to
require responsible entities to adopt specific, technically-supported
cyber security controls for Low Impact assets, as opposed to the
proposed unspecified policies. We seek comment on this proposal. In
particular, we seek comment on the value of adopting specific controls
for Low Impact assets that reflect their cyber security risk level,
similar to the NIST Risk Management Framework.
    71. Also, we seek comment on the lack of a requirement to have an
inventory, list or discrete identification of Low Impact BES Cyber
Systems. The definition of BES Cyber Systems is a threshold for
determining applicability of the CIP Reliability Standards, so we
assume responsible entities will in fact start by identifying all
covered systems. If so, the rationale or benefit for not requiring an
inventory, list or identification is unclear.

C. Proposed Definitions

    72. The proposed CIP version 5 Standards include nineteen
definitions for inclusion in the NERC Glossary. This includes the
addition of fifteen new definitions and four revised definitions, as
well as the retirement of two definitions.\66\ We propose to approve
the proposed definitions for inclusion in the NERC Glossary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ Newly proposed definitions include BES Cyber Asset, BES
Cyber System, BES Cyber System Information, CIP Exceptional
Circumstances, CIP Senior Manager, Control Center, Dial-up
Connectivity, Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems
(EACMS), Electronic Access Point (EAP), External Routable
Connectivity, Interactive Remote Access, Intermediate System,
Physical Access Control Systems (PACS), Protected Cyber Assets
(PCA), and Reportable Cyber Security Incident. Revised definitions
include Cyber Assets, Cyber Security Incident, Electronic Security
Perimeter (ESP), and Physical Security Perimeter (PSP). Retired
definitions include Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    73. We also seek comment on certain aspects of the proposed
definitions. After receiving comments, depending on the adequacy of the
explanations provided in response to our questions, we may direct NERC
to develop modifications to certain proposed definitions to eliminate
ambiguities and assure that BES Cyber Assets are adequately protected.
Definition--BES Cyber Asset
    74. In its Petition, NERC proposes the following definition of a
BES Cyber Asset:

    A Cyber Asset that if rendered unavailable, degraded, or misused
would, within 15 minutes of its required operation, misoperation, or
non-operation, adversely impact one or more Facilities, systems, or
equipment, which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered
unavailable when needed, would affect the reliable operation of the
Bulk Electric System. Redundancy of affected Facilities, systems,
and equipment shall not be considered when determining adverse
impact. Each BES Cyber Asset is included in one or more BES Cyber
Systems. (A Cyber Asset is not a BES Cyber Asset if, for 30
consecutive calendar days or less, it is directly connected to a
network within an ESP, a Cyber Asset within an ESP, or to a BES
Cyber Asset, and it is used for data transfer, vulnerability
assessment, maintenance, or troubleshooting purposes.)

    75. The first step in determining whether the substantive
requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards apply is the
identification of BES Cyber Assets pursuant to CIP-002-5. If an entity
does not identify a BES Cyber Asset, the remaining CIP Reliability
Standards do not apply. Thus, a clear understanding of the definition
of BES Cyber Asset is important to assure accurate and consistent
application of the CIP version 5 Standards.
    76. The definition begins with ``[a] Cyber Asset that if rendered
unavailable, degraded, or misused would, within 15 minutes of its
required operation, misoperation, or non-operation, adversely impact
one or more Facilities, systems, or equipment * * *.'' The CIP version
4 Standards include a 15 minute parameter for the identification of
Critical Cyber Assets associated with generation units at a single
plant location with an aggregate highest rated net Real Power
capability of the preceding 12 months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in
a single

Interconnection.\67\ The drafting team adopted the 15 minute parameter
in CIP version 4 in recognition of a concern that ``there may be
Facilities which, while essential to the reliability and operability of
the generation facility, may not have real-time operational impact
within the specified real-time operations impact window of 15
minutes.'' \68\ An example considered during the development of CIP
version 4 was a coal-handling facility, the outage of which typically
does not disrupt operations until after at least a short period of
time. Thus, the 15 minute language found in the CIP version 4 Standards
is tailored to address a specific concern with one class of assets.
NERC now proposes to adopt similar 15 minute language in relation to
all Cyber Assets associated with all classes of assets without
explanation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See Reliability Standard CIP-002-4a (Critical Cyber Asset
Identification), at Requirement R2.
    \68\ NERC Petition, Docket No. RM11-11-000, at 16 (filed Feb.
10, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    77. We seek comment on the purpose and effect of the 15 minute
limitation. In particular, we seek comment on the types of Cyber Assets
that would meet the ``within 15 minutes'' caveat. Further, we seek
comment on the types of assets or devices that the 15 minute language
would exclude and, in particular, whether the caveat ``within 15
minutes'' exempts devices that have an impact on the reliable operation
of the bulk electric system. We also seek comment on whether the use of
a specified time period as a basis for identifying assets for
protection is consistent with the procedures adopted under other cyber
security standards, such as the NIST Risk Management Framework, that
apply to industrial control and Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, as well as traditional information
technology systems.
    78. The proposed definition of BES Cyber Asset also provides that
``[a] Cyber Asset is not a BES Cyber Asset if, for 30 consecutive
calendar days or less, it is directly connected to a network within an
[Electronic Security Perimeter], a Cyber Asset within an [Electronic
Security Perimeter], or to a BES Cyber Asset, and it is used for data
transfer, vulnerability assessment, maintenance, or troubleshooting
purposes.'' We seek comment on the purpose and anticipated effect of
this provision in identifying BES Cyber Assets. Specifically, we seek
comment on whether the clause could result in the introduction of
malicious code or new attack vectors to an otherwise trusted and
protected system, as demonstrated in recent real-world incidents.\69\
In addition, we seek comment on the types of Cyber Assets used for
``data transfer, vulnerability assessment, maintenance, or
troubleshooting purposes,'' as this language is used in the proposed
BES Cyber Asset definition. If the terms cited here leave unreasonable
gaps in the applicability of the CIP Reliability Standards, we will
direct appropriate modifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control
Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Monthly Monitor
(October-December 2012) at 1. Available at http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/pdf/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Oct-Dec2012.pdf. The
October-December 2012 ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor describes two recent
situations where malware was introduced into two electric generation
industrial control systems (ICS) through removable media (i.e., USB
drive) that was being used to back-up a control system environment
and update software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Definition--Control Center

    79. NERC proposes the following definition of a control center:

    One or more facilities hosting operating personnel that monitor
and control the Bulk Electric System (BES) in real-time to perform
the reliability tasks, including their associated data centers, of:
1) a Reliability Coordinator, 2) a Balancing Authority, 3) a
Transmission Operator for transmission Facilities at two or more
locations, or 4) a Generator Operator for generation Facilities at
two or more locations.

    80. We seek comment on the meaning of the phrase ``generation
Facilities at two or more locations'' and, specifically, whether the
phrase includes two or more units at one generation plant and/or two or
more geographically dispersed units.
Definition--Cyber Asset
    81. NERC's currently-effective Glossary definition of Cyber Asset
provides:

Programmable electronic devices and communication networks including
hardware, software, and data.

NERC proposes the following definition of a Cyber Asset:

Programmable electronic devices, including the hardware, software,
and data in those devices.

Thus, NERC's proposed definition of Cyber Asset removes the phrase
``communication networks.'' We note that the FPA defines
``cybersecurity incident'' as follows:

A malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an attempt
to disrupt, the operation of those programmable electronic devices
and communication networks, including hardware, software and data
that are essential to the reliable operation of the bulk power
system.[\70\]

    \70\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(8) (2006) (emphasis added).

Thus, it appears that NERC's revised definition of Cyber Asset removes
a type of asset the statute defines as essential to the reliable
operation of the Bulk-Power System.
    82. We seek from NERC and other commenters an explanation for the
purpose and intended effect of removing ``communication networks'' from
the definition of a Cyber Asset. Further, we seek comment whether the
removal of ``communication networks'' from the definition could create
a gap in cyber security and the CIP Reliability Standards. In addition,
we seek comment on the purpose and intended effect of the phrase ``data
in those devices'' and, in particular, whether the phrase excludes data
being transferred between devices.
Reliability Tasks
    83. The term ``reliability tasks'' is an undefined term used in
NERC's proposed definitions of BES Cyber System, Control Center, and
Reportable Cyber Security Incident. For example, the proposed
definition of BES Cyber System provides:

One or more BES Cyber Assets logically grouped by a responsible
entity to perform one or more reliability tasks for a functional
entity.

    84. We are concerned that the use of the undefined term
``reliability tasks'' will likely lead to confusion during
implementation and result in interpretation requests. We seek comment
on the meaning and scope of the phrase ``reliability tasks'' and
whether there is a common understanding of this phrase to assure
accurate and consistent implementation of the definitions and, hence,
the CIP version 5 Standards.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ We note that the term ``reliability tasks'' is used in the
NERC Functional Model to register entities based upon their
responsibilities for the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power
System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Intermediate Devices
    85. NERC proposes to define Electronic Access Control or Monitoring
Systems (EACMS) and Interactive Remote Access as follows:

EACMS--Cyber Assets that perform electronic access control or
electronic access monitoring of the Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
or BES Cyber Systems. This includes Intermediate Devices.

Interactive Remote Access--[* * *] Remote access originates from a
Cyber Asset that is not an Intermediate Device and not located
within any of the Responsible Entity's

Electronic Security Perimeter(s) or at a defined Electronic Access
Point (EAP). [* * *]

Both proposed definitions include the undefined term ``intermediate
devices.'' The proposed defined term ``Intermediate Systems'' was
originally referred to as ``Intermediate Device'' in previous draft
versions of the CIP version 5 Standards.\72\ This inconsistency may
lead to confusion in application of the CIP version 5 Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ The first balloted draft of the proposed CIP version 5
Standards included a definition for ``Intermediate Device.'' The
name of this term did not change to ``Intermediate System'' until
the fourth and final balloted draft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    86. Therefore, we seek comment on whether the proposed defined term
``Intermediate Systems'' is the appropriate reference in the proposed
definitions of Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)
and Interactive Remote Access, as opposed to the undefined term
``intermediate devices.''

D. Implementation Plan

    87. NERC's proposed implementation plan for the CIP version 5
Standards addresses two distinct issues. First, NERC proposes language
that would provide a transition from CIP version 3 to CIP version 5,
thereby bypassing implementation of CIP version 4. Specifically, the
proposed language provides:

    Notwithstanding any order to the contrary, CIP-002-4 through
CIP-009-4 do not become effective, and CIP-002-3 through CIP-009-3
remain in effect and are not retired until the effective date of the
Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards under this implementation
plan.

NERC states that the proposed language is intended to alleviate
uncertainty resulting from ``industry stakeholders not knowing whether
the Commission will act on CIP Version 5 prior to the CIP Version 4
effective date, April 1, 2014 * * *.'' \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Petition at 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    88. Second, NERC proposes a 24-month implementation period for
``High Impact'' and ``Medium Impact'' BES Cyber Systems, and a 36-month
implementation period for ``Low Impact'' BES Cyber Systems. The NERC
petition does not provide an explanation or justification for the
proposed implementation periods.
    89. We propose to approve the implementation plan for the CIP
version 5 Standards to allow responsible entities to transition from
compliance with the currently-effective CIP version 3 Standards to
compliance with the CIP version 5 Standards, essentially retiring the
CIP version 4 Standards prior to mandatory compliance. Thus, upon
approval of the CIP version 5 Standards in a Final Rule in this docket,
CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4 would not become effective, and CIP-002-3
through CIP-009-3 would remain in effect and would not be retired until
the effective date of the CIP version 5 Standards. However, we do not
see why the 24-month and 36-month implementation periods proposed by
NERC for the CIP version 5 Standards are necessary.
    90. We seek comment on the activities and any other considerations
that justify 24-month and 36-month implementation periods for the CIP
version 5 Standards. We seek an explanation of the activities that
responsible entities will have to undertake to achieve timely
compliance with the CIP version 5 Standards. We also seek comment on
whether responsible entities can achieve compliance with the CIP
version 5 Standards in a shorter period for those Cyber Assets that
responsible entities have identified to comply with the currently-
effective CIP Reliability Standards. Finally, we seek comment on the
feasibility of a shorter implementation period and the reasonable time
frame for a shorter implementation period. If the comments do not
provide reasonable justification for the proposed implementation
periods, we will direct appropriate modifications.

E. Violation Risk Factor/Violation Severity Level Assignments

    91. NERC requests approval of the Violation Risk Factors (VRF) and
Violation Severity Levels (VSL) assigned to the CIP version 5
Standards. In particular, NERC requests approval of 32 VRFs, one set
for each requirement in the proposed CIP version 5 Standards. As
explained below, we seek comment on our proposal to accept 30 VRFs and
to direct NERC to develop modifications to two VRFs. Specifically, we
seek comment on our proposal to direct NERC to modify the VRF
assignment for CIP-006-5, Requirement R3 from Lower to Medium, and to
modify the VRF assigned to CIP-004-5, Requirement R4 from Lower to
Medium. In addition, we propose to direct NERC to modify the VSLs for
the CIP version 5 Standards.
Lower VRF for Maintenance and Testing of Physical Access Control
Systems
    92. NERC assigns a Lower VRF to proposed CIP-006-5, Requirement R3,
which addresses the maintenance and testing of Physical Access Control
Systems (PACS). The NERC mapping document comparing the CIP version 4
and CIP version 5 Standards identifies CIP-006-4, Requirement R8, which
addresses the maintenance and testing of all physical security
mechanisms, as the comparable requirement in the CIP version 4
Standards.\74\ Reliability Standard CIP-006-4, Requirement R8 is
assigned a VRF of Medium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ Mapping Document Showing Translation of CIP-002-4 to CIP-
009-4 into CIP-002-5 to CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1. Page
20-21. Accessible from: http://www.nerc.com/docs/standards/sar/Mapping_Document_012913.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    93. Our Violation Risk Factor guidelines require, among other
things, consistency within a Reliability Standard (guideline 2) and
consistency between requirements that have similar reliability
objectives (guideline 3).\75\ The petition does not explain the change
from a Medium VRF to a Lower VRF for a comparable requirement. We
propose to modify the VRF assigned to CIP-006-5, Requirement R3 from
Lower to Medium. However, NERC and other commenters are free to provide
additional explanation than provided thus far to demonstrate CIP-006-5,
Requirement R3 is properly assigned a Lower VRF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See N. Amer. Elec. Reliability Corp., 119 FERC ] 61,145,
order on reh'g and compliance filing, 120 FERC ] 61,145, at PP 8-13
(2007) (VRF Order). The guidelines are: (1) Consistency with the
conclusions of the Blackout Report; (2) Consistency within a
Reliability Standard; (3) Consistency among Reliability Standards;
(4) Consistency with NERC's Definition of the Violation Risk Factor
Level; and (5) Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More Than
One Obligation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    94. On this basis, we seek comment on our proposal to direct NERC
to modify the VRF assignment for CIP-006-5, Requirement R3 from Lower
to Medium, consistent with the treatment of the comparable requirement
in the CIP version 4 Standards, within 90 days of the effective date of
a final rule in this proceeding.
Lower VRF for Access Authorizations
    95. NERC assigns a Lower VRF to proposed CIP-004-5, Requirement R4,
which relates to access management programs addressing electronic
access, unescorted physical access, and access to BES Cyber System
Information. Requirement R4 obligates a responsible entity to have a
process for authorizing access to BES Cyber System Information,
including periodic verification that users and accounts are authorized
and necessary.
    96. Recommendation 40 of the U.S.--Canada Power System Blackout
Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United
States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations (Blackout Report) states
that access to operationally sensitive computer

equipment should be ``strictly limited to employees or contractors who
utilize said equipment as part of their job responsibilities.'' \76\ In
addition, Recommendation 44 of the Blackout Report states that entities
should ``develop procedures to prevent or mitigate inappropriate
disclosure of information.'' \77\ These two Blackout Report
recommendations relate to the protection of critical bulk electric
system equipment and information, and we believe these recommendations
support assigning access management programs, such as those required
under CIP-004-5, Requirement R4, a Medium VRF. Our Violation Risk
Factor guidelines require, among other things, consistency with the
conclusions of the Blackout Report (guideline 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See U.S.--Canada Power System Blackout Task Force, Final
Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and
Canada: Causes and Recommendations (April 2004) (Blackout Report) at
167. The Blackout Report is available at https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf.
    \77\ See Id. p 169.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    97. In addition, NERC proposes to assign a Medium VRF to CIP-004-5,
Requirement R5, which addresses access revocation. This proposed
assignment results in a potential inconsistency between VRFs within
CIP-004-5. As noted above, Guideline 2 of our Violation Risk Factor
guidelines requires consistency within a Reliability Standard. Access
authorization, addressed in CIP-004-5, Requirement R4, is the companion
to access revocation, addressed in CIP-004-5, Requirement R5. This
relationship is demonstrated by the history of the CIP Reliability
Standards; in the CIP version 1 through 4 Standards, access
authorization and access revocation are two sub-requirements of a main
requirement addressing the maintenance of a list of persons with
authorized cyber or authorized unescorted physical access.\78\ The
petition does not explain the potential inconsistency between VRFs in
CIP-004-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ E.g., Reliability Standard CIP-004-4a, Requirement R4
states:
    R4. Access--The Responsible Entity shall maintain list(s) of
personnel with authorized cyber or authorized unescorted physical
access to Critical Cyber Assets, including their specific electronic
and physical access rights to Critical Cyber Assets.
    R4.1. The Responsible Entity shall review the list(s) of its
personnel who have such access to Critical Cyber Assets quarterly,
and update the list(s) within seven calendar days of any change of
personnel with such access to Critical Cyber Assets, or any change
in the access rights of such personnel. The Responsible Entity shall
ensure access list(s) for contractors and service vendors are
properly maintained.
    R4.2. The Responsible Entity shall revoke such access to
Critical Cyber Assets within 24 hours for personnel terminated for
cause and within seven calendar days for personnel who no longer
require such access to Critical Cyber Assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    98. We propose to modify the VRF assigned to CIP-004-5, Requirement
R4 from Lower to Medium. However, NERC and other commenters are free to
provide additional explanation than provided thus far to demonstrate
CIP-004-5, Requirement R4 is properly assigned a Lower VRF.
    99. We seek comment on our proposal to direct NERC to change the
VRF assignment for CIP-004-5, Requirement R4 from Lower to Medium,
consistent with the Blackout Report and to ensure consistency between
VRFs within CIP-004-5, within 90 days of the effective date of a final
rule in this proceeding.
Violation Severity Levels
    100. NERC requests approval for 32 sets of VSLs--one set for each
requirement in the CIP version 5 Standards.\79\ Due to inconsistencies
with previous Commission orders and various typographical errors in the
content of the VSLs, we propose to direct NERC to file a modified
version as discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Petition at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    101. Certain VSLs for the CIP version 5 Standards are inconsistent
with previous Commission guidance.\80\ For example, proposed CIP-007-5,
Requirement R4.4 requires entities to ``review a summation or sampling
of logged events * * * at no greater than 15 days.'' The High VSL
gradation for Requirement R4.4 states that an entity must miss ``two or
more intervals'' for the violation to reach High severity over the
specified time period. In addition, CIP-003-5, Requirement R4 provides
the framework for a CIP Senior Manager to delegate authorities. The
proposed VSL is based upon the number of incorrect delegations. The
Commission has previously stated that VSL assignments are to be based
on ``a single violation of a Reliability Standard, and not based on a
cumulative number of occasions of the same requirements over a period
of time.'' \81\ These are two examples of proposed VSL assignments that
are inconsistent with the Commission's VSL guidelines.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ N. Amer. Elec. Reliability Corp., 123 FERC ] 61,284
(Violation Severity Level Order), order on reh'g, 125 FERC ] 61,212
(2008).
    \81\ Violation Severity Level Order, 123 FERC ] 61,284 at PP 35-
36.
    \82\ Further examples of this concern include VSL assignments
for the following: CIP-003-5, Requirement R3, CIP-004-5, Requirement
R1, CIP-007-5, Requirement R4, CIP-009-5, Requirement R3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    102. Also, certain VSLs are unclear or contain typographical
errors. For instance, the proposed VSLs for CIP-004-5, Requirement
R4.2's Moderate and High gradations are identical.\83\ Such
typographical errors will create confusion and potentially hinder both
compliance with and enforcement of the CIP Reliability Standards.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See NERC Petition, Exh. E (Table of VRFs and VSLs Proposed
for Approval and Analysis of how VRFs and VSLs Were Determined Using
Commission Guidelines), at 21.
    \84\ The Requirements that raise this concern include: CIP-003-
5, Requirements R1, R2, R3; CIP-007-5, Requirement R5; CIP-008-5,
Requirements R2, R3; CIP-009-5, Requirements R2, R3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    103. NERC also proposes VSLs that include the terms ``identify,''
``assess,'' ``correct,'' and ``deficiencies'' for the 16 CIP version 5
``identify, assess and correct'' Requirements.\85\ As noted above, we
seek comment on these terms and may direct modifications based on the
comments received. If we do so, the VSLs may no longer be consistent
with VSL Guideline 3, that VSLs use the same terminology as the
associated requirement.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ Although NERC has proposed 17 requirements with the
``identify, assess, and correct'' language, the VSL assignment for
CIP-003-5, Requirement R4 does not refer to the ``identify, assess,
and correct'' language.
    \86\ See Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding and Load
Shedding Plans Reliability Standards, Order No. 763, 139 FERC ]
61,098, at PP 91, 95 (2012) (citing VSL Guideline 3, the Commission
directed NERC to change a VSL for Reliability Standard PRC-006-1,
Requirement R8 to remove the phrase ``more than 5 calendar days,
but'' because the requirement did not contain a five-day grace
period for providing data to planning coordinators that was included
in the VSL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    104. Therefore, for the reasons outlined above, we seek comment on
our proposal to direct NERC to file a modified version of the VSLs
within 90 days of the effective date of a final rule in this
proceeding.

F. Other Technical Issues

    105. While we propose to approve the CIP version 5 Standards based
upon the improvements to the currently-approved CIP Reliability
Standards discussed above, we believe that the cyber security
protections proposed in the CIP version 5 Standards could be enhanced
in certain areas. Therefore, we invite comment on the issues outlined
below. After receiving comments, depending on the adequacy of the
explanations provided in response to our questions, we may direct NERC
to develop modifications to certain aspects of the CIP Reliability
Standards to assure that BES Cyber Assets are adequately protected.
Alternatively, we may conclude that while no changes are necessary at
this time, NERC must consider these issues in preparing the next
version of CIP Standards.

1. Communications Security
    106. Protecting communications systems is a critical concept in
cyber security. Communications security involves securing the data
being transmitted across a network.\87\ Secure data transmission is a
basic layer to any defense-in-depth security strategy for typical
industrial control systems.\88\ When addressing cyber security for
electric power systems, communications security should protect and
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data and
functions used to support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power
System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See NIST Interagency Report 7298, Glossary of Key
Information Security Terms, which defines communication security
(COMSEC) as a ``component of Information Assurance that deals with
measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized persons information
derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of
such telecommunications. COMSEC includes crypto security,
transmission security, emissions security, and physical security of
COMSEC material.''
    \88\ See NIST Special Publication 800-82, Guide to Industrial
Control Systems Security, at page 3. According to NIST, ``in a
typical ICS * * * a defense-in-depth strategy * * * includes * * *
applying security techniques such as encryption and/or cryptographic
hashes to ICS data storage and communications where determined
appropriate.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    107. We believe that the adoption of cryptography would improve the
approach adopted in the CIP version 5 Standards.\89\ Cryptography is a
branch of mathematics that provides communications protection.\90\
Cryptography is a useful technique to protect data that is utilized for
both smart grid applications \91\ and in other industries,\92\
including the natural gas \93\ and nuclear power industries.\94\
Cryptography ensures the confidentiality of sensitive information,
ensures the integrity of data and commands, determines if data has been
modified, and authenticates the identity of the sender. A variety of
cryptographic tools, such as encryption, integrity checks, and multi-
factor authentication, can enhance a responsible entity's defense-in-
depth security strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ The CIP version 5 Standards address the use of cryptography
in only one instance, regarding interactive remote access. See
Reliability Standard CIP-005-5--Cyber Security--Electronic Security
Perimeters, Requirement R2.2, at Page 16.
    \90\ See NIST Special Publication 800-21. According to NIST,
cryptography can be used to provide confidentiality, data integrity,
authentication, authorization and non-repudiation. Cryptography
relies upon two basic components: an algorithm (or cryptographic
methodology) and a key. The algorithm is a mathematical function,
and the key is a parameter used in the transformation.
    \91\ See NISTIR 7628: Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security
and FIPS 140-2 for further guidance regarding smart grid systems and
cryptography.
    \92\ See ISA/IEC-62443-2-1: Security for Industrial Automation
and Control Systems--Industrial Automation and Control System
Security Management System.
    \93\ See AGA 12: Cryptographic Protections for SCADA
Communications.
    \94\ See NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71 for both data transmission
integrity and confidentiality, as well as cryptographic key
management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    108. We are also concerned with NERC's proposal to exempt
communication networks from protection based solely on specific types
of technology. While proposed CIP-002-5 removes the prior blanket
exemption for non-routable protocol, we seek comment regarding whether
or not the resulting standards adequately protect non-routable
communication systems.\95\ We maintain our prior position that limiting
the CIP protections to only routable systems adds additional risk to
the bulk electric system.\96\ Furthermore, by effectively locking the
CIP Reliability Standards into a specific technology, we are concerned
that any future technology which is non-routable in nature will not be
addressed by the CIP Reliability Standards. Regardless of technology,
the NIST Risk Management Framework addresses security for all
communication systems.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See NERC Petition at pages 11-12. In particular, CIP
Version 5 introduces qualifying language for many requirements
through the use of the ``External Routable Connectivity''
definition. Furthermore, other definitions exempt non-routable
systems.
    \96\ See Order No. 761, 139 FERC ] 61,058 at PP 85-86.
    \97\ See SP 800-53 Revision 3, security control family System
and Communications Protection, page F-106-123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    109. We invite comment on whether the adoption of communications
security protections, such as cryptography and protections for non-
routable protocol, would improve the CIP Reliability Standards.
2. Remote Access
    110. Remote access refers to the ability to access a non-public
computer network from external locations.\98\ Remote access provides
greater flexibility in accessing remote computer networks; however,
this flexibility creates new security risks by allowing a potentially
unsecured device access into an entity's network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See SP 800-46 Revision 1, Guide to Enterprise Telework and
Remote Access Security page 2-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    111. Improperly implementing remote access procedures can create
security vulnerabilities.\99\ An entity must be able to verify that a
party, whether it be an employee, vendor, or automated system,
initiating remote access to the entity's internal networks has the
appropriate access permissions. Since the communication network used
for remote access is a pathway that can be used to spread malware, the
secure implementation of remote access is another step in protecting
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data and
functions used to support the reliable operation of the bulk electric
system.
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    \99\ See Remote Access VPN--Security Concerns and Policy
Enforcement, SANS Reading Room, 2003, at page 3. Available at http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/vpns/remote-access-vpn-security-concerns-policy-enforcement_881.
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    112. Due to the increased risk associated with utilizing remote
access and the complexities involved with secure implementation, many
groups have created guidance documents to aid in the secure
implementation of remote access. NIST, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and NERC have developed guidance documents for securing remote
access connections.\100\ The CIP version 5 Standards reflect certain
aspects of these guidance documents. Specifically, proposed CIP-005-5,
Requirement R2 requires responsible entities to utilize an Intermediate
System, use encryption that terminates at an Intermediate System, and
implement multi-factor authentication for all Interactive Remote Access
sessions associated with high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems that
allow Interactive Remote Access.\101\
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    \100\ See SP 800-53 Revision 3, security control AC-17 page F-
14-15. See also SP 800-46 Revision 1, Guide to Enterprise Telework
and Remote Access Security. See also DHS Configuring and Managing
Remote Access for Industrial Control Systems. See also NERC's
Guidance for Secure Interactive Remote Access.
    \101\ See Petition at 12.
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    113. The controls in CIP-005-5, Requirement R2, however, are not as
stringent as the guidance in the NERC advisory or controls required
under the NIST Risk Management Framework.\102\ For example, both the
NIST Risk Management Framework and NERC's remote access guidance
document recommend authorization for each individual, person or system,
granted remote access.\103\ We invite comment on whether the adoption
of more stringent controls for remote access would improve the CIP
Reliability Standards.
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    \102\ See SP 800-53 Revision 3, security control AC-17, page F-
14-15.
    \103\ See SP 800-53 Revision 3, security control AC-17, page F-
14-15. See also Guidance for Interactive Remote Access, NERC, July
2011, page 12.
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3. Differences Between the CIP Version 5 Standards and NIST
    114. It appears that the CIP version 5 Standards do not address
certain aspects of cyber security in as comprehensive a manner as the
NIST Risk Management Framework addresses the same topics. For example,
certain security controls contained in NIST Special Publication

800-53's Security Control Catalog and associated guidance documents are
not reflected in the CIP version 5 Standards.
    115. The proposed CIP version 5 Standards do not address the proper
upkeep and the protection of maintenance devices in as comprehensive a
manner as the NIST Risk Management Framework.\104\ In addition,
proposed CIP-004-5 does not require a comprehensive analysis of all
individual's duties to determine where separation of duties can be
utilized to improve security.\105\ The proposed CIP version 5 Standards
also do not address the monitoring of information systems for new
threats and vulnerabilities, as well as changes to how the asset should
be categorized pursuant to CIP-002-5, in as comprehensive a manner as
the NIST Risk Management Framework.\106\
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    \104\ See SP 800-53 Revision 3, Maintenance and Media Protection
control families, pages F-66 through F-75.
    \105\ See SP 800-53 Revision 3, control AC-5, pages F-8 and F-9.
    \106\ See SP 800-137, Information Security Continuous Monitoring
(ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Page vi,
``Information security continuous monitoring (ISCM) is defined as
maintaining ongoing awareness of information security,
vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk
management decisions.''
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    116. In particular, the CIP version 5 Standards do not provide for
re-categorizing BES Cyber Systems based on a change in an individual
entity's risk determinations. The CIP version 5 Standards also do not
require minimum terms for contractual agreements associated with the
acquisition or integration of new systems.\107\ This is not an
exhaustive list of the differences between the proposed CIP version 5
Standards and the NIST Risk Management Framework, but is representative
of the differences in the security posture required under each.
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    \107\ See generally Department of Homeland Security: Cyber
Security Procurement Language for Control Systems. See also SP 800-
53 Revision 3, System and Services Acquisition control family, pages
F-96 through F-105.
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    117. While we are not proposing to direct NERC to address these
concepts in the CIP Reliability Standards at this time, we invite
comment on whether, and in what way, adoption of certain aspects of the
NIST Risk Management Framework could improve the security controls
proposed in the CIP version 5 Standards.

IV. Information Collection Statement

    118. The FERC-725B information collection requirements contained in
this Proposed Rule are subject to review by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995.\108\ OMB's regulations require approval of certain information
collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\109\ Upon approval of
a collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and
expiration date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this
rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to these collections
of information unless the collections of information display a valid
OMB control number. The Commission solicits comments on the
Commission's need for this information, whether the information will
have practical utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to
enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be
collected or retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing
respondents' burden, including the use of automated information
techniques.
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    \108\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2006).
    \109\ 5 CFR 1320.11 (2012).
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    119. The Commission based its paperwork burden estimates on the
difference between the latest Commission-approved version of the CIP
Reliability Standards (CIP version 4) and the estimated paperwork
burden resulting from CIP version 5. While the Commission is proposing
to allow the CIP version 3 Standards to remain in effect until the CIP
version 4 Standards become effective, the Commission has already
imposed the burden of implementing the CIP version 4 Standards. Thus,
from a regulatory perspective, any change in burden related to the
proposed approval of the CIP version 5 Standards would be relative to
the change from the burden related to that imposed by the
implementation of the CIP version 4 Standards.
    120. The information collection burden under CIP version 5 is
different than that imposed by CIP version 4. Under CIP version 4, all
applicable entities must first identify, by applying criteria specified
in CIP-002-4, which of the Cyber Assets they own are subject to the
mandatory protections specified in the remaining CIP standards. Those
identified Cyber Assets are termed Critical Cyber Assets (CCA) in CIP
version 4. If, upon completion of the required process in CIP-002-4,
the entity has identified at least one CCA, it must implement all
mandatory protections specified in the remaining CIP Reliability
Standards with respect to any identified CCA. If, on the other hand,
the entity determines that it does not own any CCAs, it is not required
to implement any of the protections specified in the remaining CIP
version 4 Standards. By contrast, CIP version 5 does not use the term
CCA. Under CIP version 5, a responsible entity identifies Cyber Assets
for protection by applying the CIP-002-5 definitions and classification
criteria. The responsible entity is required to comply with at least
some mandatory protections in the remaining standards for all Cyber
Assets identified as BES Cyber Systems (depending on their
classification of Low, Medium, or High and other specifics specified in
various individual requirements).
    121. Because the change in paperwork burden between CIP version 4
and CIP version 5 differs depending upon the extent to which that
entity had to comply with CIP version 4, we delineate the registered
entities into three groupings, as follows:
    Group A: Entities that are not subject to the CIP version 4
Standards, but are subject to the CIP version 5 Standards. The Group A
entities consist of those Distribution Providers that are not also
registered for another CIP function, such as the Load Serving Entity
function (which is subject to CIP version 4).
    Group B: Entities that are registered for functions subject to CIP
version 4, but that did not identify any CCAs under CIP-002-4.
Therefore, Group B entities do not own facilities that require the
implementation of mandatory protections specified by the remaining CIP
version 4 Standards.
    Group C: Entities that are registered for functions subject to CIP
version 4 and that identify, upon completion of the CIP-002-4 analysis,
at least one asset as a CCA. Therefore, Group C entities own facilities
that require the implementation of the mandatory protections specified
in the remaining CIP version 4 Standards.
    122. The NERC Compliance Registry as of February 28, 2013 indicated
that 1,927 entities were registered for NERC's compliance program. Of
these, 1,911 were identified as being U.S. entities. Staff concluded
that of the U.S. entities, approximately 1,475 were registered for at
least one CIP-applicable function, and therefore must comply with the
CIP Reliability Standards. Further, 1,414 are subject CIP version 4.
Consistent with the Commission's approach in Order No. 761,\110\ we
assume that 23 percent (325) of the 1,414 US entities subject to CIP
version 4 identified CCAs (Group C). It follows that the remaining 77
percent (1089) of the US entities did not identify any CCAs under CIP
version 4 (Group B). This ratio factors into several of the

calculations needed to estimate the differences in effort among
entities in Group B, as compared to Group C.
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    \110\ See Order No. 761, 139 FERC ] 61,058 at P 122, n.162.
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    123. To estimate the change in paperwork burden between CIP version
4 and CIP version 5, we recognize that the entities in all groups will
undertake the following paperwork tasks to at least some extent: (1)
Create or modify documentation of processes used to identify and
classify the cyber assets to be protected under the CIP Reliability
Standards; (2) create or modify policy, process and compliance
documentation; and (3) continuing documentation of compliance data
collection. We estimate the level of burden for each Group as follows:
     All of Group B & C entities, but no more than 10 percent
of the Group A entities, will own at least one subject asset classified
as Low under the CIP version 5 Standards. We estimate 24 hours \111\
per entity to develop its evaluation process documentation for
identifying the facilities subject to the standard, and 1,024 hours
\112\ to develop the required documentation for covered assets. We
divide the total burden hours between the second and third years of the
compliance period allowed for the assets classified as Low.
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    \111\ Based on assumption of 2 persons per entity, working 15
percent of time for 2 weeks.
    \112\ Based on assumption of 2 persons per entity, creating
required policy documentation per policy (4- low policies), working
40 percent of time for 8 weeks.
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     The burden hours for facilities classified as Medium and
High are split between the first and second year, since Groups B and C
are allowed a 24-month period to bring them into compliance. (The third
year figure shown for these rows represents an ongoing effort level).
Except for Group C Blackstart facilities, 32 hours \113\ per entity are
assumed for development of its evaluation process documentation.
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    \113\ Based on assumption of 2 persons per entity, working 20%
of time for 2 weeks.
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     We assume no more than 30 percent of Group B and Group C
entities will own one or more of the newly covered transmission
facilities classified as Medium. For those that do, we assume 3,200
hours \114\ to develop the required policy, compliance and
implementation documentation, and 832 hours \115\ per entity for
ongoing compliance burden.
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    \114\ Based on assumption of 1 person per entity, per standard
(10) creating policy documentation, working 75 percent of time for 8
weeks, and 1 person per entity, per standard (10) on creating
compliance documentation, 25 percent of time for 8 weeks.
    \115\ Based on assumption of 2 persons per entity, working 20
percent of time for 52 weeks.
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     With respect to the Blackstart facilities owned by Group C
entities, 160 hours\116\ per entity are assumed for each entity to
modify its policy and evaluation process documentation. We also assume
a reduction of 728 hours \117\ per entity for ongoing compliance
documentation that is required under CIP version 4 but is no longer
required under CIP version 5.
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    \116\ Based on assumption of 1 person per entity, per standard
(10) modifying policy documentation, working 10 percent of time for
2 weeks, and 1 person per entity, per standard (10) modifying
compliance documentation, 10 percent of time for 2 weeks.
    \117\ Based on assumption of a reduction of 2 persons per
entity, collecting compliance data, working 20 percent of time for
52 weeks, and an increase of 1 person per entity, collecting
compliance data, working 5 percent of time for 52 weeks.
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     For Group C's Medium and High facilities, we assume 1,600
hours \118\ per entity to modify the required policy, compliance and
implementation documentation, and 416 hours \119\ per entity for
ongoing compliance.
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    \118\ Based on assumption of 1 person per entity, per standard
(10) modifying compliance documentation, working 50 percent of time
for 8 weeks.
    \119\ Based on assumption of 2 persons collecting compliance
data, working 10 percent of time for 52 weeks.
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    124. The estimated paperwork burden changes for these entities, as
contained in the proposed rule in RM13-5-000, are illustrated in the
table below. The information collection burden also varies according to
the types of facilities the entities own, as classified by the criteria
in CIP-002-5, Attachment 1. To further refine our estimate, we indicate
the classes of facilities each group of entities owns in the second
column of the table below.
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    \120\ Distribution Providers are the only functional entity type
in Group A (see section 4, Applicability, of each CIP version 5
Standard), and their facilities are captured only by the Low
classification criteria listed in CIP-002-5. The number of entities
in this group represent the number of Distribution Providers that
are not registered for any additional CIP version 5 applicable
functions, including the Load Serving Entity function (and are
therefore subject to CIP versions 1-4).
    \121\ As with Groups A and C, Group B will own Low facilities
which were not identified for protections under prior CIP versions.
The number of Group B respondents is calculated as 77 percent of the
total entities previously subject to the CIP Reliability Standards.
(.77 * 1414 = 1,089).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Classes of
                                    entity's                       Total burden    Total burden    Total burden
 Groups of registered entities     facilities        Number of    hours in  Year  hours in  Year  hours in  Year
                                  requiring V5       entities            1               2               3
                                   protections
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Group A.......................  Low \120\.......              61               0           3,804           3,804
Group B.......................  Low \121\.......           1,089               0         570,636         570,636
Group B.......................  Medium \122\....             260         128,960         128,960          64,896
Group C.......................  Low \123\.......             325               0         170,300         170,300
Group C.......................  Medium \124\                  78           1,248           1,248          19,136
                                 (New).
Group C.......................  Low \125\                    283          22,640          22,640        -206,024
                                 (Blackstart).
Group C.......................  Medium or High               325         265,200         265,200         135,200
                                 \126\.
                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Totals....................  ................  ..............         418,048       1,163,556         758,716
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    125. The following shows the average annual cost burden for each
group,

based on the burden hours in the table above: \127\
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    \122\ In contrast to CIP version 4, Criterion 2.5 in CIP version
5 identifies new facilities for protection--transmission facilities
[gE] 200kV < 300kV--and classifies them as ``Medium.'' Some of these
newly-applicable transmission facilities are owned by entities that
had not previously identified any CCAs under previous versions,
while some of the Criterion 2.5 facilities are owned by entities
that previously identified CCAs. Assuming Group B entities
constitute 77 percent of the entities to which this criterion
potentially applies, 260 entities of the 338 total Transmission
Owners (TO) captured by Criterion 2.5 are assigned to Group B, while
the remaining 78 are allotted to Group C.
    \123\ As with Groups A and B, the entities that identified CCAs
under CIP version 4 (Group C) will also own facilities newly
addressed by CIP version 5 and classified as Low. The number of
Group B respondents is calculated as 23 percent of the total