[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 87 (Thursday, May 5, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26750-26751]
[FR Doc No: 2022-09654]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings

    Take notice that the Commission has received the following Natural
Gas Pipeline Rate and Refund Report filings:

Filings in Existing Proceedings

    Docket Numbers: RP20-1042-002.
    Applicants: Northern Natural Gas Company.
    Description: Compliance filing: 20220428 2021 Operational Purchase
and Sales Report to be effective N/A.
    Filed Date: 4/28/22.
    Accession Number: 20220428-5353.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/10/22.

    Any person desiring to protest in any of the above proceedings must
file in accordance with Rule 211 of the Commission's Regulations (18
CFR 385.211) on or before 5:00 p.m. Eastern time on the specified
comment date.

Filings Instituting Proceedings

    Docket Numbers: RP22-855-000.
    Applicants: El Paso Natural Gas Company, L.L.C.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Negotiated Rate Agreement
Update (Conoco May 22) to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/28/22.
    Accession Number: 20220428-5186.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/10/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-856-000.
    Applicants: East Cheyenne Gas Storage, LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: ECGS 2022-04-28 First Revised
Volume No. 1 Baseline to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/28/22.
    Accession Number: 20220428-5200.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/10/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-857-000.
    Applicants: NEXUS Gas Transmission, LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Negotiated Rates--Various
Releases eff 5-1-2022 to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/28/22.
    Accession Number: 20220428-5205.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/10/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-858-000.
    Applicants: ANR Pipeline Company.
    Description: Compliance filing: Operational Purchases and Sales
Report 2022 to be effective N/A.
    Filed Date: 4/28/22.
    Accession Number: 20220428-5240.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/10/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-859-000.
    Applicants: Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: 2022 TUP/SBA Annual Filing to
be effective 6/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/28/22.
    Accession Number: 20220428-5242.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/10/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-860-000.
    Applicants: Northern Border Pipeline Company.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Negotiated Rate Agreement--
Sequest TL371F/101324 to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/28/22.
    Accession Number: 20220428-5272.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/10/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-861-000.
    Applicants: Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Negotiated Rates--Cherokee
AGL--Replacement Shippers--May 2022 to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5000.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-862-000.
    Applicants: Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Volume No. 2--Stagecoach
Energy Solutions LLC SP39122 to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5028.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-863-000.
    Applicants: Venice Gathering System, L.L.C.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: VGS Section 11.3 Filing to be
effective 6/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5031.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-864-000.
    Applicants: ANR Pipeline Company.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Cashout Surcharge 2022 to be
effective 6/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5032.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-865-000.
    Applicants: Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: 4.29.22 Negotiated Rates--
Shell Energy North America (U.S.), L.P. R-2170-24 to be effective 5/1/
2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5034.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-866-000.
    Applicants: ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Fuel Filing on 4-29-22 to be
effective 6/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5040.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-867-000.
    Applicants: Fayetteville Express Pipeline LLC.
    Description: Compliance filing: Fuel Filing on 4-29-22 to be
effective N/A.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5042.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-868-000.
    Applicants: Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage, Inc.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: EGTS--April 29, 2022 MCS
Negotiated Rate Agreements to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5043.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-869-000.
    Applicants: Carolina Gas Transmission, LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: CGT--April 29, 2022
Administrative Change to be effective 6/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5044.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Docket Numbers: RP22-870-000.
    Applicants: Rockies Express Pipeline LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: REX 2022-04-29 Negotiated Rate
Agreement to be effective 5/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 4/29/22.
    Accession Number: 20220429-5045.

    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 5/11/22.

    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the
proceeding.
    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system
(https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp) by querying
the docket number.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call<PHONE_NUMBER>
(toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: April 29, 2022.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-09654 Filed 5-4-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 185 (Tuesday, September 24, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 58533]
[FR Doc No: 2013-23168]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings

    Take notice that the Commission has received the following Natural
Gas Pipeline Rate and Refund Report filings:

Filings Instituting Proceedings

    Docket Numbers: PR13-62-000
    Applicants: Columbia Gas of Maryland, Inc.
    Description: Tariff filing per 284.123/.224: Statement of Operating
    Conditions to be effective 8/30/2013
    Filed Date: 8/30/13
    Accession Number: 20130830-5107
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/20/13
    Docket Numbers: PR13-63-000
    Applicants: American Midstream (SIGCO Intrastate), LLC
    Description: Tariff filing per 284.123(b)(2)/.: SIGCO Rate Petition
to be effective 8/12/2013
    Filed Date: 9/11/13
    Accession Number: 20130911-5073
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 10/2/13
    Docket Numbers: CP13-548-000
    Applicants: Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.
    Description: Application for a Limited Jurisdiction Blanket
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
    Filed Date: 9/17/13
    Accession Number: 20130917-5080
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/30/13
    Docket Numbers: RP13-1329-000
    Applicants: Southeast Supply Header, LLC
    Description: Hourly Nomination/Scheduling Flexibility to be
effective 10/16/2013
    Filed Date: 9/16/13
    Accession Number: 20130916-5112
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 9/30/13
    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system by
clicking on the links or querying the docket number.
    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the
proceeding.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call<PHONE_NUMBER>
(toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: September 18, 2013.
 Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
 Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-23168 Filed 9-23-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register: September 12, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 176)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 52027]
[DOCID:fr12se07-19]

=======================================================================
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 52

[EPA-R04-OAR-2005-NC-0004-200704(b); FRL-8465-5]

Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; North
Carolina: Mecklenburg County Regulations

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: EPA is proposing to approve revisions to the North Carolina
State Implementation Plan (SIP). On February 16, 2005, the North
Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources submitted
revisions to the Mecklenburg County Air Pollution Control Ordinance
(MCAPCO), to be incorporated into the Mecklenburg County portion of the
North Carolina SIP. The revisions include changes to MCAPCO 2.0902,
``Applicability,'' and 2.0933, ``Petroleum Liquid Storage in External
Floating Roof Tanks.'' These changes were made to maintain consistency
with State and federal regulations, and are part of Mecklenburg
County's strategy to attain and maintain the 8-hour ozone National
Ambient Air Quality Standard, by reducing precursors to ozone. In the
Final Rules Section of this Federal Register, the EPA is approving
North Carolina's SIP revision as a direct final rule without prior
proposal because the Agency views this as a noncontroversial submittal
and anticipates no adverse comments. A detailed rationale for the
approval is set forth in the direct final rule. If adverse comments are
received in response to this rule, no further activity is contemplated.
If EPA receives adverse comments, the direct final rule will be
withdrawn and all public comments received will be addressed in a
subsequent final rule based on this proposed rule. EPA will not
institute a second comment period on this document. Any parties
interested in commenting on this document should do so at this time.

DATES: Written comments must be received on or before October 12, 2007.

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, identified by Docket ID No. EPA-R04-
OAR-2005-NC-0004, by one of the following methods:
    1. http://www.regulations.gov: Follow the on-line instructions for

submitting comments.
    2. E-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    3. Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    4. Mail: ``EPA-R04-OAR-2005-NC-0004,'' Regulatory Development
Section, Air Planning Branch, Air, Pesticides and Toxics Management
Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4, 61 Forsyth
Street, SW., Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8960.
    5. Hand Delivery or Courier: James Hou, Regulatory Development
Section, Air Planning Branch, Air, Pesticides and Toxics Management
Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4, 61 Forsyth
Street, SW., Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8960. Such deliveries are only
accepted during the Regional Office's normal hours of operation. The
Regional Office's official hours of business are Monday through Friday,
8:30 to 4:30, excluding federal holidays. Please see the direct final
rule which is located in the Rules section of this Federal Register for
detailed instructions on how to submit comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Hou, Regulatory Development
Section, Air Planning Branch, Air, Pesticides and Toxics Management
Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4, 61 Forsyth
Street, SW., Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8960. The telephone number is (404)
562-8965. Mr. Hou can also be reached via electronic mail at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: For additional information see the direct
final rule which is published in the Rules Section of this Federal
Register.

    Dated: August 27, 2007.
Russell L. Wright, Jr.,
Acting Regional Administrator, Region 4.
 [FR Doc. E7-17780 Filed 9-11-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 170 (Tuesday, September 5, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 60603-60605]
[FR Doc No: 2023-18858]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2023-1647; Project Identifier AD-2023-00487-E]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for certain General Electric Company (GE) Model GE90-90B, GE90-94B,
GE90-110B1, and GE90-115B engines. This proposed AD was prompted by a
manufacturer investigation that revealed certain high-pressure turbine
(HPT) stage 1 disks, HPT stage 2 disks, forward HPT rotor seals,
interstage HPT seals, and stages 7-9 compressor rotor spools were
manufactured from powder metal material suspected to contain iron
inclusion. This proposed AD would require replacement of affected HPT
stage 1 disks, HPT stage 2 disks, forward HPT rotor seals, interstage
HPT seals, and stages 7-9 compressor rotor spools. The FAA is proposing
this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 20,
2023.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow
the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2023-1647; or in person at
Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this NPRM, any comments
received, and other information. The street address for Docket
Operations is listed above.
    Material Incorporated by Reference:
     For service information incorporated by reference in this
NPRM, contact General Electric Company, 1 Neumann Way, Cincinnati, OH
45215; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
website: ge.com.
     You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 1200
District Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alexei Marqueen, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; phone:
(781) 238-7178; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed
under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2023-1647; Project Identifier
AD-2023-00487-E'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposal because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal
contact received about this NPRM.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to
Alexei Marqueen, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th
Street, Des Moines, WA 98198. Any commentary that the FAA receives
which is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the
public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

    The FAA was notified by the manufacturer of the detection of iron
inclusion in a turbine disk manufactured from the same powder metal
material used to manufacture certain HPT stage 1 disks, HPT stage 2
disks, forward HPT rotor seals, interstage HPT seals, and stages 7-9
compressor rotor spools for GE90-90B, GE90-94B, GE90-110B1, and GE90-
115B engines. Further investigation by the manufacturer determined that
the iron inclusion is attributed to deficiencies in the manufacturing
process and may cause reduced material properties and a lower fatigue
life capability, which may result in premature fracture and subsequent
uncontained failure. The FAA has been informed that GE has communicated
with affected operators with affected HPT stage 1 and stage 2 disks
regarding the proposed corrective action for this unsafe condition. As
a result, affected operators are already aware of the proposed
corrective action and have already performed the actions proposed in
this AD. Therefore, the FAA has determined that the compliance time to
replace the affected HPT stage 1 and stage 2 disks before further
flight is

appropriate. This condition, if not addressed, could result in
uncontained debris release, damage to the engine, and damage to the
airplane. The FAA is proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition
on these products.

FAA's Determination

    The FAA is issuing this NPRM after determining that the unsafe
condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other
products of the same type design.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed GE GE90-100 Service Bulletin (SB) 72-0914, dated
January 25, 2023 (GE GE90-100 SB 72-0914); which provides the affected
part and serial numbers of the HPT stage 2 disks, forward HPT rotor
seals, and stages 7-9 compressor rotor spools; and specifies
replacement instructions for the HPT stage 2 disks, forward HPT rotor
seals, and stages 7-9 compressor rotor spools. This service information
is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to
it through their normal course of business or by the means identified
in ADDRESSES.

Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM

    This proposed AD would require replacement of certain HPT stage 1
disks, HPT stage 2 disks, forward HPT rotor seals, interstage HPT
seals, and stages 7-9 compressor rotor spools with parts eligible for
installation.

Differences Between This Proposed AD and the Service Information

    GE GE90-100 SB 72-0914, uses the term ``HPT rotor stage 2 disk,''
while this proposed AD uses the term ``HPT stage 2 disk.''
    GE GE90-100 SB 72-0914, Effectivity, identifies GE Model GE-90-
110B1 and GE-90-115B engines. The GE Model GE90-90B and GE90-94B
engines are also affected by the unsafe condition, however, the FAA is
not incorporating service information that is specific to GE Model
GE90-90B and GE90-94B engines.

Interim Action

    The FAA considers that this proposed AD would be an interim action.
This unsafe condition is still under investigation by the manufacturer
and, depending on the results of that investigation, the FAA may
consider further rulemaking action.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would
affect 9 engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA
estimates that 0 engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry would
require replacement of the interstage HPT seal. The FAA estimates the
following costs to comply with this proposed AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost per      Cost on U.S.
                Action                         Labor cost           Parts cost        product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replace HPT stage 1 disk..............  8 work-hours x $85 per        $1,116,300      $1,116,980      $2,233,960
                                         hour = $680.
Replace HPT stage 2 disk..............  8 work-hours x $85 per           531,578         532,258         532,258
                                         hour = $680.
Replace stages 7-9 compressor rotor     8 work-hours x $85 per           493,588         494,268       1,977,072
 spool.                                  hour = $680.
Replace forward HPT rotor seal........  8 work-hours x $85 per            25,093          25,773          51,546
                                         hour = $680.
Replace interstage HPT seal...........  8 work-hours x $85 per           108,256         108,936               0
                                         hour = $680.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:

General Electric Company: Docket No. FAA-2023-1647; Project
Identifier AD-2023-00487-E.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive
(AD) by October 20, 2023.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) Model GE90-90B
and GE90-94B with interstage HPT seals listed in Table 1 to
Paragraph (c) and GE90-110B1 and GE90-115B engines with an installed
high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 1 disk, HPT stage 2 disk, forward
HPT rotor seal, or stages 7-9 compressor rotor spool part number (P/
N) and serial number (S/N) identified in

Table 1 to paragraph (c) of this AD or identified in Paragraph 4.
APPENDIX--A, Tables 1, 2, or 3, of GE GE90-100 Service Bulletin (SB)
72-0914, dated January 25, 2023 (GE90-100 SB 72-0914).

           Table 1 to Paragraph (c)--Affected HPT Stage 1 and Stage 2 Disks, and Interstage HPT Seals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Part name                                P/N                                 S/N
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HPT stage 1 disk........................  1865M13G08......................  GWN11657
                                                                            GWN117GN
                                                                            GWN10NNW
                                                                            GWN10PGW
                                                                            GWN10T0A
                                                                            GWN10T0C
                                                                            GWN10THW
                                                                            GWN10TJ0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HPT stage 2 disk........................  1865M14P04......................  TMT4RN06
                                                                            TMT4RN26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstage HPT seal.....................  2453M60P01......................  NCU61528
                                                                            NCU61686
                                                                            NCU56200
                                                                            NCU61527
                                                                            NCU61687
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 7230, Turbine Engine
Compressor Section; 7250, Turbine Section.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a manufacturer investigation that
revealed certain HPT stage 1 disks, HPT stage 2 disks, forward HPT
rotor seals, interstage HPT seals, and stages 7-9 compressor rotor
spools were manufactured from powder metal material suspected to
contain iron inclusion. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent
premature fracture and subsequent uncontained failure. The unsafe
condition, if not addressed, could result in uncontained debris
release, damage to the engine, and damage to the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    At the applicable times specified in paragraphs (g)(1) through
(6) of this AD, remove each affected HPT stage 1 disk, HPT stage 2
disk, forward HPT rotor seal, interstage HPT seal, and stages 7-9
compressor rotor spool from service and replace with a part eligible
for installation.
    (1) For HPT stage 1 disks, before further flight.
    (2) For HPT stage 2 disks with a P/N and S/N identified in
Paragraph 4. APPENDIX--A, Table 1 of GE90-100 SB 72-0914, at the
next piece part exposure or before exceeding 3,500 cycles since new
(CSN), whichever occurs first.
    (3) For HPT stage 2 disks with a P/N and S/N identified in Table
1 to paragraph (c) of this AD, before further flight.
    (4) For forward HPT rotor seals with a P/N and S/N identified in
Paragraph 4. APPENDIX--A, Table 3 of GE90-100 SB 72-0914, at the
next piece part exposure or before exceeding 14,200 CSN, whichever
occurs first.
    (5) For interstage HPT seals, at the next piece part exposure or
before exceeding 12,600 CSN, whichever occurs first.
    (6) For stages 7-9 compressor rotor spools, at the next piece
part exposure or before exceeding the cyclic removal thresholds
identified in Paragraph 4. APPENDIX--A, Table 2 of GE90-100 SB 72-
0914, whichever occurs first.

(h) Definition

    For the purpose of this AD, a ``part eligible for installation''
is any HPT stage 1 disk, HPT stage 2 disk, stages 7-9 compressor
rotor spool, forward HPT rotor seal, or interstage HPT seal with a
P/N and S/N that is not identified in paragraph (c) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, AIR-520 Continued Operational Safety Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of AIR-520 Continued Operational
Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD and email to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Alexei Marqueen,
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines,
WA 98198; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email: [email protected].

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) General Electric GE90-100 Service Bulletin 72-0914, dated
January 25, 2023.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) For service information incorporated by reference in this
AD, contact General Electric Company, 1 Neumann Way, Cincinnati, OH
45215; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
website: ge.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District Avenue,
Burlington, MA 01803. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, email: [email protected], or go to: www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued on August 11, 2023.
Ross Landes,
Deputy Director for Regulatory Operations, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2023-18858 Filed 9-1-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


MEMORANDUM

DATE:	December 1, 2014

TO:	Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket ID: OAR-2013-0602

FROM:	Rob Lawrence EPA/Region 6/PD

SUBJECT:	September 17, 2014 Call with New Mexico Bernalillo County / City of Albuquerque Regarding the Proposed Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants

SUMMARY

      A conference call was made by EPA to New Mexico Bernalillo County / City of Albuquerque on September 17, 2014, to discuss the proposed Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, which was proposed on June 2, 2014.

ATTENDEES

Participant:		Margaret Nieto, Bernalillo County

EPA Participants	Terry Johnson and John Walser


[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 161 (Tuesday, August 20, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Page 43121]
[FR Doc No: 2019-17882]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings

    Take notice that the Commission has received the following Natural
Gas Pipeline Rate and Refund Report filings:

Filings Instituting Proceedings

    Docket Numbers: RP19-1466-000.
    Applicants: Equitrans, L.P.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Gas Quality Updates to be
effective 9/12/2019.
    Filed Date: 8/12/19.
    Accession Number: 20190812-5110.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 8/26/19.

    Docket Numbers: RP19-1467-000.
    Applicants: ANR Pipeline Company.
    Description: Compliance filing 2019 Request for Waiver--Grand
Chenier Project.
    Filed Date: 8/12/19.
    Accession Number: 20190812-5168.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 8/19/19.

    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system by
clicking on the links or querying the docket number.
    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the
proceeding.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call<PHONE_NUMBER>
(toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: August 14, 2019.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-17882 Filed 8-19-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


Good Neighbor Environmental Board Meeting

October 17th, 2005

Tohono O’odham Nation land

Desert Diamond Casino

1100 Pima Mine Road, Sahuarita,, Arizona

AGENDA

Meeting Theme: Border Security and the Environment

8:00 a.m.	Registration

8:30 a.m.	Welcome Remarks

		Rafael DeLeon, Director, EPA Office of Cooperative Environmental Management

		Paul Ganster, Chair, Good Neighbor Environmental Board

		Ned Norris, Vice Chair, Tohono O’odham Nation

		Tribal Blessing

		Self Introductions

 9:00 a.m.	Speaker Presentations Begin

9:00 a.m. – Mike Connolly, Campo Band of Mission Indians

	9:45 a.m. – Colin Soto, Cocopah Indian Tribe

10:15 a.m.	Break

	10:30 a.m. – Jonathan Ammon and Rose Whitehair, State of Arizona Office of Homeland 			Security

	11:15 a.m. – Judith Gans, Udall Center for Policy Studies

12:00 noon	Public Comment Session

12:30 p.m.	Lunch (includes briefing from Paula Stigler, Pala Band of Indians)

  2:00 p.m.	Speaker Presentations Continue

	 2:00 p.m. – René Córdova and Flavio Olivieri, Mexican Consejo Consultivo Liaisons to 				the Good Neighbor Environmental Board

Good Neighbor Environmental Board Meeting

October 17th, 2005

Tohono O’odham Nation land

Desert Diamond Casino

1100 Pima Mind Road, Sahuarita,, Arizona

	2:45 p.m.  – Melody Sees, Los Coyotes Reservation

3:30 p.m.	Break

	3:45 p.m. – Ronald Colburn, Deputy Chief, US Customs and Border Protection, Tucson

	4:30 p.m. – Roger De Rosa, Refuge Manager, Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge

	5:15 p.m. – Additional Business

	5:30 p.m. – Day One of Meeting Ends

### 10/10/05

 PAGE

 PAGE   1


[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 72 (Monday, April 15, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 15122-15124]
[FR Doc No: 2019-07359]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

44 CFR Part 64

[Docket ID FEMA-2019-0003; Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-8575]

Suspension of Community Eligibility

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This rule identifies communities where the sale of flood
insurance has been authorized under the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) that are scheduled for suspension on the effective dates
listed within this rule because of noncompliance with the floodplain
management requirements of the program. If the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) receives documentation that the community has
adopted the required floodplain management measures prior to the
effective suspension date given in this rule, the suspension will not
occur and notification of this will be provided by publication in the
Federal Register on a subsequent date. Also, information identifying
the current participation status of a community can be obtained from
FEMA's Community Status Book (CSB). The CSB is available at https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-community-status-book.

DATES: The effective date of each community's scheduled suspension is
the third date (``Susp.'') listed in the third column of the following
tables.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you want to determine whether a
particular community was suspended on the suspension date or for
further information, contact Adrienne L. Sheldon, PE, CFM, Federal
Insurance and Mitigation Administration, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 400 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472,<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The NFIP enables property owners to purchase
Federal flood insurance that is not otherwise generally available from
private insurers. In return, communities agree to adopt and administer
local

floodplain management measures aimed at protecting lives and new
construction from future flooding. Section 1315 of the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 4022, prohibits the sale
of NFIP flood insurance unless an appropriate public body adopts
adequate floodplain management measures with effective enforcement
measures. The communities listed in this document no longer meet that
statutory requirement for compliance with program regulations, 44 CFR
part 59. Accordingly, the communities will be suspended on the
effective date in the third column. As of that date, flood insurance
will no longer be available in the community. We recognize that some of
these communities may adopt and submit the required documentation of
legally enforceable floodplain management measures after this rule is
published but prior to the actual suspension date. These communities
will not be suspended and will continue to be eligible for the sale of
NFIP flood insurance. A notice withdrawing the suspension of such
communities will be published in the Federal Register.
    In addition, FEMA publishes a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) that
identifies the Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in these communities.
The date of the FIRM, if one has been published, is indicated in the
fourth column of the table. No direct Federal financial assistance
(except assistance pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act not in connection with a flood) may be
provided for construction or acquisition of buildings in identified
SFHAs for communities not participating in the NFIP and identified for
more than a year on FEMA's initial FIRM for the community as having
flood-prone areas (section 202(a) of the Flood Disaster Protection Act
of 1973, 42 U.S.C. 4106(a), as amended). This prohibition against
certain types of Federal assistance becomes effective for the
communities listed on the date shown in the last column. The
Administrator finds that notice and public comment procedures under 5
U.S.C. 553(b), are impracticable and unnecessary because communities
listed in this final rule have been adequately notified.
    Each community receives 6-month, 90-day, and 30-day notification
letters addressed to the Chief Executive Officer stating that the
community will be suspended unless the required floodplain management
measures are met prior to the effective suspension date. Since these
notifications were made, this final rule may take effect within less
than 30 days.
    National Environmental Policy Act. FEMA has determined that the
community suspension(s) included in this rule is a non-discretionary
action and therefore the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) does not apply.
    Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Administrator has determined that
this rule is exempt from the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act because the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended,
Section 1315, 42 U.S.C. 4022, prohibits flood insurance coverage unless
an appropriate public body adopts adequate floodplain management
measures with effective enforcement measures. The communities listed no
longer comply with the statutory requirements, and after the effective
date, flood insurance will no longer be available in the communities
unless remedial action takes place.
    Regulatory Classification. This final rule is not a significant
regulatory action under the criteria of section 3(f) of Executive Order
12866 of September 30, 1993, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR
51735.
    Executive Order 13132, Federalism. This rule involves no policies
that have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.
    Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. This rule meets the
applicable standards of Executive Order 12988.
    Paperwork Reduction Act. This rule does not involve any collection
of information for purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.

List of Subjects in 44 CFR Part 64

    Flood insurance, Floodplains.

    Accordingly, 44 CFR part 64 is amended as follows:

PART 64--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  42 U.S.C. 4001 et seq.; Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1978, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp.; p. 329; E.O. 12127, 44 FR 19367, 3 CFR,
1979 Comp.; p. 376.

Sec.  64.6   [Amended]

0
2. The tables published under the authority of Sec.  64.6 are amended
as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Effective date
                                                authorization/
                                  Community    cancellation of     Current effective map   Date certain Federal
       State and location            No.        sale of flood              date            assistance no longer
                                                 insurance in                               available in SFHAs
                                                  community
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Region IV

Alabama:
    Baldwin County,                  015000  April 30, 1971,      April 19, 2019........  April 19, 2019.
     Unincorporated Areas.                    Emerg; January 12,
                                              1973, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
    Bay Minette, City of,            010004  April 23, 1975,      ......do *............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          Emerg; December 1,
                                              1981, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
    Elberta, Town of, Baldwin        010212  N/A, Emerg; March    ......do..............   Do.
     County.                                  8, 2011, Reg;
                                              April 19, 2019,
                                              Susp.
    Fairhope, City of, Baldwin       010006  September 22, 1972,  ......do..............   Do.
     County.                                  Emerg; January 5,
                                              1978, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
    Gulf Shores, City of,            015005  January 15, 1971,    ......do..............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          Emerg; July 9,
                                              1971, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
    Loxley, Town of, Baldwin         010009  April 24, 1975,      ......do..............   Do.
     County.                                  Emerg; December 1,
                                              1981, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
    Magnolia Springs, Town of,       010524  N/A, Emerg; August   ......do..............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          1, 2011, Reg;
                                              April 19, 2019,
                                              Susp.
    Orange Beach, City of,           015011  April 30, 1971,      ......do..............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          Emerg; January 12,
                                              1973, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
    Perdido Beach, Town of,          010523  N/A, Emerg; April    ......do..............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          22, 2010, Reg;
                                              April 19, 2019,
                                              Susp.
    Robertsdale, City of,            010222  August 28, 1978,     ......do..............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          Emerg; December 1,
                                              1981, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
    Silverhill, Town of,             010010  April 28, 1976,      ......do..............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          Emerg; December
                                              14, 1979, Reg;
                                              April 19, 2019,
                                              Susp.

    Spanish Fort, City of,           010429  May 3, 1999, Emerg;  ......do..............   Do.
     Baldwin County.                          June 17, 2002,
                                              Reg; April 19,
                                              2019, Susp.
Kentucky:
    Christian County,                210277  May 2, 1997, Emerg;  April 19, 2019........  April 19, 2019.
     Unincorporated Areas.                    November 1, 1997,
                                              Reg; April 19,
                                              2019, Susp.
    Princeton, City of,              210031  June 30, 1975,       ......do..............   Do.
     Caldwell County.                         Emerg; August 19,
                                              1986, Reg; April
                                              19, 2019, Susp.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* ......do = Ditto.
Code for reading third column: Emerg.--Emergency; Reg.--Regular; Susp.--Suspension.

    Dated: March 29, 2019.
Katherine B. Fox,
Assistant Administrator for Mitigation, Federal Insurance and
Mitigation Administration--FEMA Resilience, Department of Homeland
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2019-07359 Filed 4-12-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 9110-12-P


[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 131 (Friday, July 8, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40445-40447]
[FR Doc No: 2011-17184]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

[Docket No. FMCSA-2011-0141]

Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Vision

AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of applications for exemptions; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FMCSA announces receipt of applications from 9 individuals for
exemption from the vision requirement in the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations. If granted, the exemptions would enable these
individuals to qualify as drivers of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs)
in interstate commerce without meeting the Federal vision standard.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before August 8, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments bearing the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS) Docket No. FMCSA-2011-0141 using any of the
following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the on-line instructions for submitting
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
    Instructions: Each submission must include the Agency name and the
docket numbers for this notice. Note that all comments received will be
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading below
for further information.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or Room W12-140
on the ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The FDMS is available 24 hours each day, 365
days each year. If you want acknowledgment that we received your
comments, please include a self-addressed, stamped envelope or postcard
or print the acknowledgement page that appears after submitting
comments on-line.
    Privacy Act: Anyone may search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or of the person signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review DOT's Privacy Act Statement for the FDMS published in
the Federal Register on January 17, 2008 (73 FR 3316), or you may visit
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-785.pdf.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elaine M. Papp, Chief, Medical
Programs,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>FMCSA, Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room W64-224, Washington,
DC 20590-0001. Office hours are from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Under 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) and 31315, FMCSA may grant an exemption
from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for a 2-year period
if it finds ``such exemption would likely achieve a level of safety
that is equivalent to or greater than the level that would be achieved
absent such exemption.'' FMCSA can renew exemptions at the end of each
2-year period. The 9 individuals listed in this notice have each
requested such an exemption from the vision requirement in 49 CFR
391.41(b)(10), which applies to drivers of CMVs in interstate commerce.
Accordingly, the Agency will evaluate the qualifications of each
applicant to determine whether granting an exemption will achieve the
required level of safety mandated by statute.

Qualifications of Applicants

Joe M. Flores

    Mr. Flores, age 34, has had a macular hole in his left eye since
2006. The best corrected visual acuity in his right eye is 20/20 and in
his left eye, 20/200. Following an examination in 2011, his optometrist
noted, ``Joe has sufficient vision peripherally in both eyes and
centrally in his right eye to operate a commercial vehicle.'' Mr.
Flores reported that he has driven tractor-trailer combinations for 4
years, accumulating 180,000 miles. He holds a Commercial Driver's
License (CDL) Class A from New Mexico. His driving record for the last
3 years shows no crashes and no convictions for moving violations in a
Commercial Motor Vehicle (CMV).

Matthew K. Hagge

    Mr. Hagge, 31, has had optic atrophy in his right eye since 2007
due to multiple sclerosis. The visual acuity in his right eye is 20/250
and in his left eye, 20/20. Following an examination in 2011, his
ophthalmologist noted, ``Visual acuity fine for performing commercial
vehicle driving.'' Mr. Hagge reported that he has driven straight
trucks for 4 years, accumulating 20,000 miles and tractor-trailer
combinations for 7 years, accumulating 420,000 miles. He holds a CDL
Class A from North Dakota. His driving record for the last 3 years
shows no crashes and no convictions for moving violations in a CMV.

James O. Howard

    Mr. Howard, 48, has had amblyopia in his left eye since age 6. The
best corrected visual acuity in his right eye is 20/20 and in his left
eye, 20/100. Following an examination in 2011, his optometrist noted,
``Mr. James Howard has sufficient vision to perform the driving tasks
required to operate a commercial vehicle.'' Mr. Howard reported that he
has driven straight trucks for 14 years, accumulating 291,200 miles. He
holds a Class C operator's license from California. His driving record
for the last 3 years shows no crashes and no convictions for moving
violations in a CMV.

Ramon Melendez

    Mr. Melendez, 57, has had amblyopia in his left eye since
childhood. The best corrected visual acuity in his right eye is 20/20
and in his left eye, 20/200. Following an examination in 2011, his
ophthalmologist noted, ``certified by David Lichtenstain to have
sufficient vision to operate a commercial vehicle and do driving
tasks.'' Mr. Melendez reported that he has driven tractor-trailer
combinations for 14 years, accumulating 1.1 million miles. He holds a
Class A CDL from New Jersey. His driving record for the last 3 years
shows no crashes and no convictions for moving violations in a CMV.

Matthew D. Nelson

    Mr. Nelson, 27, has had refractive amblyopia in his left eye since
birth. The best visual acuity in his right eye is 20/20 and in his left
eye, 20/50. Following an examination in 2011, his optometrist noted,
``Matthew's vision is sufficient to perform the driving tasks required
to operate a commercial vehicle.'' Mr. Nelson reported that he has
driven straight trucks for 3\1/2\ years, accumulating 56,000 miles. He
holds a Class A CDL from Florida. His driving record for the last 3
years shows no crashes, but one conviction for a moving violation in a
CMV; failure to observe a stop sign.

Jesse A. Nosbush

    Mr. Nosbush, 31, has complete loss of vision in his left eye due to
a work related accident in 1998. The visual acuity in his right eye is
20/20. Following an examination in 2011, his optometrist noted, ``It is
in my opinion that Jesse, even knowing that he has one eye, should not
have any difficulty when it comes to operating a commercial motor
vehicle.'' Mr. Nosbush reported that he has driven tractor-trailer
combinations for 9 years, accumulating 495,000 miles. He holds a Class
A CDL from Minnesota. His driving record for the last 3 years shows one
crash, for which he was cited, and no convictions for moving violations
in a CMV.

Richard E. Purvenas, Jr.

    Mr. Purvenas, 51, has a prosthetic left eye. The visual acuity in
his right eye is 20/20. Following an examination in 2011, his
optometrist noted, ``It is my understanding that Mr. Purvenas has
maintained a safe driving record for many years and has always driven
without having any vision in the left eye. Since it has always been
non-existent, he has functioned well, and his peripheral visual acuity
is excellent there is no reason to believe that he cannot continue to
operate commercial vehicles.'' Mr. Purvenas reported that he has driven
buses for 5 years, accumulating 400,000 miles. He holds a Class D
operator's license from Delaware. His driving record for the last 3
years shows no crashes and no convictions for moving violations in a
CMV.

Wilfred E. Sweatt

    Mr. Sweatt, 50, has had amblyopia in his left eye since childhood.
The best corrected visual acuity in his right eye is 20/20 and in his
left eye, 20/50. Following an examination in 2011, his optometrist
noted, ``He has sufficient vision to perform the driving tasks required
to operate a commercial vehicle.'' Mr. Sweatt reported that he has
driven straight trucks for 8 years, accumulating 176,000 miles. He
holds an operator's license from New Hampshire. His driving record for
the last 3 years shows no crashes and no conviction for moving
violations in a CMV.

Thomas L. Swatley

    Mr. Swatley, 55, has had amblyopia in his left eye since childhood.
The best corrected visual acuity in his right eye is 20/20 and in his
left eye, 20/50. Following an examination in 2011, his optometrist
noted, ``Mr. Swatley appears to have stable visual function at the
present time that is not an impediment to his operating commercial
vehicles.'' Mr. Swatley reported that he has driven straight trucks for
35 years, accumulating 1.1 million miles and tractor-trailer
combinations for 3 years, accumulating 450,000 miles. He holds a Class
A CDL from Tennessee. His driving record for the last 3 years shows

no crashes and no conviction for moving violations in a CMV.

Request for Comments

    In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) and 31315, FMCSA requests
public comment from all interested persons on the exemption petitions
described in this notice. The Agency will consider all comments
received before the close of business August 8, 2011. Comments will be
available for examination in the docket at the location listed under
the ADDRESSES section of this notice. The Agency will file comments
received after the comment closing date in the public docket, and will
consider them to the extent practicable.
    In addition to late comments, FMCSA will also continue to file, in
the public docket, relevant information that becomes available after
the comment closing date. Interested persons should monitor the public
docket for new material.

    Issued on: June 29, 2011.
Larry W. Minor,
Associate Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2011-17184 Filed 7-7-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-EX-P


[Federal Register: July 14, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 135)]
[Notices]
[Page 40087-40088]
[DOCID:fr14jy06-57]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP06-426-000]

MIGC, Inc.; Notice of Tariff Filing

July 7, 2006.
    Take notice that on July 3, 2006, MIGC, Inc. (MIGC) tendered for
filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, First Revised Volume No.1,
Eleventh Revised Sheet No. 6, to become effective August 1, 2006.
    MIGC asserts that the instant tariff sheet is being submitted in
compliance with section 25 of MIGC's FERC Gas Tariff, First Revised
Volume No. 1, which provides for MIGC to file revised fuel retention
and loss percentage factors (FL&U factors) each year.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Protests will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed in accordance with the provisions of
section 154.210 of the Commission's regulations (18 CFR 154.210).
Anyone filing an intervention or protest must serve a copy of that
document on the Applicant. Anyone filing an intervention or protest on
or before the intervention or protest date need not serve motions to
intervene or protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov.
 Persons unable to file electronically should submit an

original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission,

888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the

``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription''
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive email
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For

TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

Magalie R. Salas,
Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E6-11187 Filed 7-13-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 189 (Tuesday, September 29, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61097-61101]
[FR Doc No: 2020-21508]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2020-0025]

Pipeline Safety: Overpressure Protection on Low-Pressure Natural
Gas Distribution Systems

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.

ACTION: Notice; Issuance of advisory bulletin.

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SUMMARY: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) is issuing this advisory bulletin to remind owners and
operators of natural gas distribution pipelines of the possibility of
failure due to an overpressurization on low-pressure distribution
systems. PHMSA is also reminding such owners and operators of existing
federal integrity management regulations for gas distribution systems.

ADDRESSES: PHMSA guidance, including the advisory bulletin, can be
found on PHMSA's website at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/guidance.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    Technical Questions: Michael Thompson, Transportation Specialist,
by phone at<PHONE_NUMBER> or by email at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    General Questions: Ashlin Bollacker, Technical Writer, by phone at
202-366-4203 or by email at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Natural Gas Distribution Systems

    Natural gas distribution systems deliver natural gas to customers
for heating, cooking, and other domestic and industrial uses. A basic
natural gas distribution system has four elements: (1) Mains that
transport gas underground; (2) service lines that deliver natural gas
from the main to the customer; (3) regulators that control the pressure
of gas to a designated value; and (4) meters that measure the quantity
of natural gas used by each customer. Customer piping takes natural gas
from the meter to the customer's heating equipment and other
appliances.
    There are two types of natural gas distribution systems used to
supply natural gas to the customer: High-pressure distribution systems
and low-pressure distribution systems. In a high-pressure distribution
system, the gas pressure in the main is higher than the pressure
provided to the customer. A pressure regulator installed at each meter
reduces the pressure from the main to a pressure that can be used by
the customer's equipment and appliances. These regulators incorporate
an overpressure protection device to prevent overpressurization of the
customer's piping and appliances should the regulator fail.
Additionally, as of April 14, 2017, all new or replaced service lines
connected to a high-pressure distribution system must have excess flow
valves. (Sec.  192.383).\1\ Excess flow valves can reduce the risk of
overpressurization in natural gas distribution pipelines by shutting
off unplanned, excessive gas flows. Because each customer's service
line in a high-pressure distribution system is protected by an excess
flow valve and a pressure regulator, it is highly unlikely that an
overpressurization condition in the main would impact customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ PHMSA published the final rule, ``Pipeline Safety: Expanding
the Use of Excess Flow Valves in Gas Distribution Systems to
Applications Other Than Single-Family Residences,'' on October 14,
2016, but delayed the effective date by six months to give operators
time to comply with the new provisions. (81 FR 70987). A copy of
this final rule is available in the docket PHMSA-2011-0009 at
https://www.regulations.gov.
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    In a low-pressure natural gas distribution system, however, the
natural gas in a distribution pipeline flows predominantly at the same
pressure as the pressure contained within the customer's service line
piping. Natural gas is typically supplied to distribution pipeline
mains from a high-pressure source that connects to, and flows through,
a regulator station. The regulator station functions to reduce the
pressure to a level that allows the gas to flow continuously at a low
pressure all the way to premises of the customers where the gas is
ultimately consumed. Since there are no regulators at the customer
meter set in a low-pressure system, an overpressure condition occurring
on the distribution system can affect all customers served by the
system in the event that the regulator(s) that controls the pressure
for the system fails. This scenario is what happened in the September
13, 2018, accident in Merrimack Valley that prompted the subsequent
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report and recommendations.

II. CMA's Accident in Merrimack Valley

A. Accident Synopsis

    On September 13, 2018, a series of structure fires and explosions
occurred after high-pressure natural gas entered a low-pressure natural
gas distribution system operated by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts
(CMA), a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc.\2\ CMA delivers natural gas to
about 325,000 customers in Massachusetts. According to an investigation
of the accident conducted by the National Transportation Safety
Board,\3\ the fires and explosions damaged 131 structures, including at
least 5 homes that were destroyed in the city of Lawrence and the towns
of Andover and North Andover. CMA shut down the low-pressure natural
gas distribution system serving 10,894 customers, including some
outside the affected area who had their service shut off as a
precaution. An 18-year-old male was killed when a home exploded, and
the house's chimney fell onto the vehicle where he was sitting. Another
person in the vehicle at the time of the explosion was seriously
injured, as was someone on the second floor of the house. In total, 22
people, including 3 firefighters, were transported to hospitals for
treatment of their injuries.
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    \2\ CMA is expected to be officially transferred by NiSource,
Inc., to Eversource Energy in November 2020.
    \3\ ``Pipeline Accident Report: Overpressurization of Natural
Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley,
Massachusetts; September 13, 2018.'' The National Transportation
Safety Board. Accident Report: NTSB/PAR-19/02. Adopted September 24,
2019.
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B. Background on CMA's Natural Gas Main Replacement Project

    The low-pressure natural gas distribution system in the Merrimack
Valley was installed in the early 1900s and was constructed with cast
iron mains. The system was designed with 14 regulator stations to
control the pressure of natural gas entering the downstream
distribution pipeline mains. Each regulator station contained two
regulators in series--a ``worker regulator'' and a ``monitor
regulator''--each with a sensing line connected to a downstream section
of main for the purpose of providing a pressure measurement back to the
regulator station so that the system could be maintained at a specified
pressure level of 0.5 pounds per square inch. The

``worker'' regulator is the primary regulator that maintains the
natural gas pressure, and the ``monitor'' regulator provides a
redundant backup to the ``worker'' regulator. Each of the regulator
stations reduced the natural gas pressure from about 75 pounds per
square inch gauge (psig) to 12 inches of water column (w.c.), or about
0.5 psig, for distribution through the mains and delivery to
customers.\4\
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    \4\ In the pipeline industry, it is customary to measure
anything less than 1 psig in inches of water column. A measurement
of 1 inch w.c. equals 0.0361 psig.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Beginning in 2016, CMA initiated an effort to replace 7,595 feet of
low-pressure cast iron and bare steel mains with 4,845 feet of low-
pressure and high-pressure polyethylene (plastic) mains. CMA contracted
with Feeney Brothers, a pipeline services firm, to complete the
replacement project. A work package, which included materials such as
isometric drawings and procedural details for disconnecting and
connecting pipes, was prepared for each of the planned construction
activities. However, no package was prepared for the relocation of the
Winthrop Avenue sensing lines serving the Winthrop Avenue regulator
station.
    The first stage of the project involved the installation of the
plastic main, which was completed in late 2016. The regulator sensing
lines at the Winthrop Avenue regulator station remained attached to the
cast iron main that would ultimately be decommissioned.
    CMA connected the plastic pipe to the distribution system, which
allowed it to be monitored for pressure changes. The second stage of
the project began in 2018 and involved the installation of tie-ins to
the new plastic main, after which the legacy cast iron mains would be
decommissioned and abandoned in their existing location. On the day of
the accident, the sensing lines were still connected to the abandoned
cast iron main.
    At the Winthrop Avenue regulator station, about 0.5 mile south of
the work area, the sensing lines connected to the abandoned cast iron
mains continued providing data input to the two pressure regulators
used to control the system pressure.\5\ Once the contractor crew
isolated the cast iron main, the natural gas pressure began to drop in
the cast iron main and the sensing lines continued to provide those
readings to the regulator station. As the pressure dropped, the
pressure regulators responded by opening further to inject more gas to
into the downstream system to the newly installed plastic system.
Because there were no sensing lines connecting the regulator station to
the newly installed plastic mains, the legacy sensing lines continued
to provide ``zero'' pressure readings to Winthrop Avenue regulators,
thereby causing them to fully open and provide a continuous flow of gas
into the new low-pressure plastic system, resulting in an extreme
overpressurization of the distribution system. This immediately
resulted in multiple fires, explosions, and injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Sensing lines are also called control lines or static lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Accident Investigation
and Recommendations

    Since the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
issued several safety recommendations. On November 14, 2018, NTSB
recommended that the operator, NiSource Inc.:
     Revise the engineering plan and constructability review
process across all of its subsidiaries to ensure that all applicable
departments review construction documents for accuracy, completeness,
and correctness, and that the documents or plans be sealed by a
professional engineer prior to commencing work (P-18-6);
     Review and ensure that all records and documentation of
its natural gas systems are traceable, reliable, and complete (P-18-7);
     Apply management of change process to all changes to
adequately identify system threats that could result in a common mode
failure (P-18-8); and
     Develop and implement control procedures during
modifications to gas mains to mitigate the risks identified during
management of change operations. Gas main pressures should be
continually monitored during these modifications and assets should be
placed at critical locations to immediately shut down the system if
abnormal operations are detected (P-18-9).
    In response, NiSource Inc. has taken actions that satisfied the
NTSB's recommendations, which are now classified as ``Closed.''
    On September 24, 2019, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) issued its accident report and identified the probable cause of,
and contributing factors to, CMA's accident in Merrimack Valley. NTSB
found that the probable cause of the accident was CMA's weak
engineering management that failed to adequately plan, review,
sequence, and oversee the construction project that abandoned the cast
iron main without first relocating the regulator sensing lines to the
new plastic main. NTSB also found that a contributing cause of the
accident was a low-pressure natural gas distribution system that was
designed and operated without adequate overpressure protection. As a
result of its investigation, NTSB made several recommendations to
NiSource, Inc., the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and several other
States, and PHMSA. NTSB made two recommendations to PHMSA. The first
(P-19-14) called for PHMSA to ``revise Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 192 to require overpressure protection for low-
pressure natural gas distribution systems that cannot be defeated by a
single operator error or equipment failure.'' Having investigated
multiple overpressurization accidents over the past 50 years, NTSB
concluded that low-pressure natural gas distribution systems that use
only sensing lines and regulators to detect and prevent
overpressurization are not optimal to prevent overpressurization
accidents.
    NTSB's second recommendation (P-19-15) called for PHMSA to ``issue
an alert to all low-pressure natural gas distribution system operators
of the possibility of a failure of overpressure protection, and the
alert should recommend that operators use a failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) or equivalent structured and systematic method to
identify potential failures and take action to mitigate those
identified failures.'' NTSB found that CMA's constructability review
\6\ process was not sufficiently robust to detect the omission of a
work order to relocate the sensing lines; and that CMA's engineering
risk management processes were deficient. NTSB explained that for
regulator sensing lines, CMA only considered excavation damage as a
risk to be mitigated. NTSB concluded that a comprehensive and formal
risk assessment, such as FMEA, would have identified the human error
that caused the redundant regulators to open and over pressurize the
low-pressure system.
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    \6\ ``Constructability reviews'' are a recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practice commonly used for the execution
of professional design services and are intended to provide an
independent and structured review of construction plans and
specifications to ensure there are no conflicts, errors, or
omissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to NTSB's recommendation P-19-15, PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to remind owners and operators of low-pressure
natural gas distribution systems of the possibility of a failure of
overpressure protection devices. Currently, there are Federal
regulations in place that specify several minimum safety standards
requiring operators to account for the possibility of overpressure
events in the

design and operation of their systems. Specifically, the Distribution
Integrity Management Program (DIMP) regulations at 49 CFR 192.1005
require operators of natural gas distribution systems to develop and
implement an integrity management program for pipelines they own,
operate, or maintain. Under DIMP, operators must identify existing and
potential threats to the integrity of their systems, and to rank the
risks so that known issues can be evaluated by the risks they pose.
PHMSA agrees with the NTSB that low-pressure distribution system
operators need to be reminded of their obligation to identify all
threats to their systems and take mitigative measures in accordance
with the risks to their systems. The diversity of designs and operating
conditions of those systems mean that the risks associated with
overpressure conditions may be best managed by a combination of design
elements and engineering practices tailored to the unique attributes
and conditions of their specific systems that pipeline operators are
best positioned to identify and implement. Therefore, PHMSA is
reminding operators of low-pressure distribution systems of their
existing obligations under the DIMP regulations to consider and
implement such tailored approaches to mitigate or eliminate the risk of
an overpressurization event.

D. Distribution Integrity Management Program Regulatory Provisions

    PHMSA first adopted integrity management regulations for hazardous
liquid pipelines in 2000, then for gas transmission pipelines in 2003.
Subsequently, the Pipeline Integrity, Protection, Enforcement, and
Safety Act of 2006 (PIPES Act of 2006; Pub. L. 109-468) mandated that
PHMSA prescribe minimum safety standards to extend integrity management
to gas distribution pipeline systems. The 2006 legislation directed
PHMSA to require operators of distribution pipelines to identify and
assess risks on their distribution lines, to remediate conditions that
present a potential threat to pipeline integrity, and to monitor
program effectiveness. In response to that mandate, PHMSA implemented
new requirements in 49 CFR part 192, subpart P, that rely on operator-
specific programs to improve the overall integrity of pipeline systems
and reduce risk (74 FR 63905; December 4, 2009). PHMSA concluded that
this performance-based approach was a more effective method for
improving pipeline system safety--given the diversity of distribution
systems and the particular threats to which different systems may each
be exposed--than imposing a ``one-size-fits-all'' prescriptive
requirement.
    The DIMP regulations require operators of natural gas distribution
systems to develop, write, and implement an integrity management
program for pipelines they own, operate, or maintain. An integrity
management plan is a written set of policies and procedures that each
operator must develop and implement to ensure compliance. Pursuant to
Sec.  192.1007,\7\ an integrity management plan must include procedures
for implementing the following elements:
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    \7\ ``Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Program for Gas
Distribution Pipelines.'' Final Rule. (74 FR 63905; Dec. 4, 2009).
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2009/12/04/E9-28467/pipeline-safety-integrity-management-program-for-gas-distribution-pipelines#h-22
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     Periodically assess and improve the integrity management
program; and
     Report performance results to PHMSA and, where applicable,
also to state public utility commissions.
    a. Knowledge (192.1007(a)). This section requires an operator to
develop an understanding of its distribution pipeline. An operator must
identify the characteristics of its pipeline's design and operations,
and of the environment in which it operates, which are necessary to
assess applicable threats and risks. This must include considering
information gained from past design, operations, and maintenance. This
section further requires that operators develop their understanding
from reasonably available information. Operators have considerable
knowledge of their pipeline to support routine operations and
maintenance, but this information may be distributed throughout the
company, in possession of groups responsible for individual functions.
Operators must assemble this information to the extent necessary to
support the development and implementation of their IM program.
    PHMSA recognizes that there may be gaps in the knowledge an
operator possesses when it develops its initial IM plan. Operators must
identify these gaps and the additional information needed to improve
their understanding. Operators are required to provide a plan for
gaining that information over time through the normal activities of
operating and maintaining pipeline systems (e.g., collecting
information about underlying components when portions of the pipeline
must be excavated for other reasons). Operators must also develop a
process by which the program will be periodically reviewed and refined,
as needed.
    b. Identify threats ((Sec.  192.1007(b)). Identification of the
threats that affect, or could potentially affect, a distribution
pipeline remains critical to ensuring integrity. Knowledge of
applicable threats allows operators to evaluate the safety risks they
pose and to rank those risks, allowing safety resources to be applied
where they will be most effective. This section requires that operators
consider the general categories of threats that must be reported on
annual reports. Operators are required to consider reasonably available
information to identify threats that affect their pipeline or that
could potentially affect it (e.g., landslides in a hilly area with
loose soils even if no landslide has been experienced). The section
specifies that operators should minimally consider data sources
resulting from normal operation and maintenance in evaluating threats.
    c. Evaluate and rank risk (192.1007(c)). This section requires that
an operator evaluate the identified threats to determine their relative
importance and rank the risks associated with its pipeline. Operators
must consider the likelihood of threats and the consequences of a
failure that might result from each threat. Consideration of
consequences is important to help ensure that risks are properly
ranked. A potential accident of relatively low probability but that
would produce significant consequences should be considered to be of
higher risk than an accident with somewhat greater likelihood, but one
that is not expected to produce major consequences.
    d. Identify and implement measures to address risks (Sec.
192.1007(d)). This section requires operators to determine and
implement measures designed to reduce the risk of failure of gas
distribution pipeline systems.
    e. Measure performance, monitor results, and evaluate effectiveness
(Sec.  192.1007(e)). This section requires operators to develop
performance measures, including some that are specified for use by all
operators. Measuring performance periodically enables operators to
determine whether actions being taken to address threats are effective,
or whether different or additional actions are needed. An operator must
also periodically re-evaluate the threats and risks to its gas
distribution pipeline.
    f. Periodic evaluation and improvement (Sec.  192.1007(f)). This
section requires operators to re-evaluate risks across the entire
pipeline system periodically and to consider the relevance of threats
in one specific location as compared to other locations.

Operators must consider the results of their performance monitoring in
these evaluations, which must be performed at least once every five
years. An operator must determine an appropriate period for conducting
a complete program evaluation based on the complexity of its system. An
operator should conduct a program evaluation any time there are changes
in factors that would increase the risk associated with a failure.
    While DIMP regulations have been in place since 2009, some
operators may not be sufficiently aware of their pipeline attributes,
nor adequately or consistently assessing threats as part of their DIMP
programs. Early in the investigation, NTSB determined that several of
NiSource's engineering processes were deficient. For example, the NTSB
found that CMA's inadequate planning, documentation, and recordkeeping
processes led to the omission of the relocation of sensing lines during
a construction project. Further, NTSB found that CMA's constructability
review process was not sufficiently robust to detect the omission of a
work order to relocate sensing lines. It was the abandonment of the
cast iron main without first relocating the sensing lines that led
directly to the accident. Thus, it is necessary to identify and
evaluate the physical and operational characteristics of each pipeline
system to evaluate risks adequately. It is also important that an
operator focus its DIMP on identifying the conditions that can cause
failures and address them before a failure occurs. Therefore, PHMSA is
reminding owners and operators of their continuing obligation to comply
with DIMP regulations and is alerting operators that PHMSA considers
the possibility of an overpressure protection failure to be a high-risk
threat. PHMSA reminds operators of low-pressure systems that they must
consider reasonably available information about possible threats to
their gas distribution system, including such sources as the NTSB
report, industry publications, and this advisory bulletin.
    As part of the DIMP plans, PHMSA recommends that operators enhance
their processes and procedures by including a failure modes and effects
analysis, or equivalent structured and systematic method of risk
analysis. Including a failure mode and effect analysis or equivalent
methodology can help identify and mitigate the possibility of an
overpressure failure event. PHMSA also urges operators to develop and
implement procedures for construction-related work that are specific to
low-pressure distribution systems, such as repairs, uprates in
pressure, or replacement of pipeline or pressure regulation facilities.

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2020-02)

    To: Owners and Operators of Natural Gas Distribution Systems
    Subject: Overpressure Protection on Low-pressure Natural Gas
Distribution Systems.
    Advisory: PHMSA is reminding all owners and operators of low-
pressure natural gas distribution systems of the risk of failure of
overpressure protection systems. This advisory bulletin is intended to
clarify for the public existing pipeline safety standards and highlight
the importance of evaluating and implementing overpressure protection
design elements and operational practices within their compliance
programs. The contents of this advisory bulletin do not have the force
and effect of law. They are not meant to bind the public in any way,
even as pipeline owners and operators must comply with the underlying
safety standards.
    PHMSA encourages operators to review the NTSB's Pipeline Accident
Report concerning Columbia Gas of Massachusetts' (CMA)
overpressurization event in the Merrimack Valley on September 13, 2018.
It may be instructive regarding a host of potential safety problems
that operators of low-pressure natural gas distribution systems may
need to address. A copy of NTSB's accident report is contained within
Docket No. PHMSA-2020-0025 for this advisory bulletin.
    PHMSA also reminds pipeline operators of their obligations to
comply with the gas DIMP regulations at 49 CFR part 192, subpart P.
Under DIMP, gas distribution operators must have knowledge of their
pipeline systems; identify threats to their systems; evaluate and rank
risks; and identify, evaluate, and implement measures to address those
risks. CMA's accident in Massachusetts highlights the need for
operators of low-pressure systems to review thoroughly their current
DIMP for the threat of overpressurization and to make any necessary
changes or modifications to become fully compliant with the Federal
Pipeline Safety Regulations (Sec.  192.1007(f)).

Written Procedures (Sec.  192.1005)

    Developing and implementing comprehensive written procedures with
sufficient specificity is one of the most effective ways to prevent
overpressurization of a low-pressure gas system. Therefore, PHMSA
reminds operators of low-pressure systems to review their written
integrity management plans to help ensure that they comply with Sec.
192.1005 and to ensure that they specifically address the risk of an
overpressurization event. PHMSA further recommends, in addition to
having procedures for operations, maintenance, and emergencies (Sec.
192.605), that operators develop written procedures for all activities
involving new construction or pipe replacement projects for low-
pressure distribution systems. PHMSA recommends that these procedures
account for the additional precautions needed to protect those systems
from an overpressurization event. These procedures should include:
     Clear roles and responsibilities across all departments
involved in the planning and execution of construction or pipe
replacement projects;
     Description and delineated scope of work to be conducted,
with a materials list, necessary schematics, and maps of the location
of the work;
     Requirements to review and ensure that all records and
documentation of the affected gas system(s) are traceable, reliable,
and complete;
     The sequential process of how the work is to be carried
out and who or what group is responsible for each step;
     Application of a ``management of change'' process to
identify all changes that could threaten system integrity, particularly
where there is a risk emanating from a common mode of failure,
including a list of individuals and groups necessary for review along
with their comment and approval before work commences; and
     Implement a review process sufficiently robust to detect
the omission of critical process and procedural steps that could
prevent possible overpressurization events.

Knowledge of Distribution System (Sec.  192.1007(a))

    PHMSA reminds operators that they are required to develop
procedures in their DIMP that demonstrate an understanding of their gas
distribution systems (Sec.  192.1007(a)). An operator must identify the
characteristics of its pipeline design and operations, and of the
environment in which it operates, in the process of assessing
applicable threats and risks. Section 192.1007(a) requires that
operators develop their understanding from reasonably available
information. This must include information gained from past design,
operations, and maintenance. If an operator acquires a pipeline and the
historical records were not obtained or are not reasonably available,
the records do not need to be re-created. However,

operators must assemble this information to the extent necessary to
support the development and implementation of their integrity
management programs. Underlying procedures must also identify
additional information necessary to improve their understanding and
provide a plan for gaining that information over time through the
normal activities of operating and maintaining pipeline systems (e.g.,
collecting information about buried components when portions of the
pipeline must be excavated for other reasons). Operators must also
develop a process by which the program will be periodically reviewed
and refined, as needed. The outcome of the process should be that all
affected departments of an operator's organization are aware of any
planned construction work, have had the opportunity to review and
provide comments on potential failure modes and to adopt a process for
providing final approval of construction procedures.

Identifying Threats and Ranking Risk (Sec.  192.1007(b)-(c))

    PHMSA reminds operators of their obligation under DIMP regulations
(part 192, subpart P) to consider available information when
identifying all potential and existing threats to the integrity of
their systems (Sec.  192.1007(b)). In accordance with Sec.
192.1007(b), operators are required to consider seven specific threats,
including equipment failure and incorrect operation. Further, PHMSA
reminds operators to evaluate the risks associated with their
distribution pipelines, determine the relative importance of each
threat, and rank the risks posed to their pipeline systems (Sec.
192.1007(c)). PHMSA reminds operators that consideration of
consequences is important to help ensure that risks are properly
ranked. A potential accident of relatively low likelihood but one that
would produce significant consequences may be a higher risk than an
accident with somewhat greater likelihood, but one that is not expected
to produce major consequences.
    Given the catastrophic consequences of the Merrimack Valley
accident, PHMSA considers the possibility of an overpressure protection
system failure to be a high-risk threat for low-pressure distribution
systems where there are not adequate provisions to protect such
systems. Therefore, PHMSA recommends that operators consider the single
point of failure that could lead to an overpressurization of a low-
pressure system as a high-risk threat and to review and adjust their
DIMP plans accordingly. NTSB's Pipeline Accident Report sufficiently
documents the occurrence of overpressurization of low-pressure
distribution systems such that the threat of overpressurization should
be considered a real and present threat. If the threat of
overpressurization of low-pressure distribution systems is not
considered an existing threat by an operator, justification for the
elimination of this threat from consideration should be documented.
    In performing a risk analysis required by DIMP (Sec.  192.1007),
PHMSA recommends operators use a failure modes and effectiveness
analysis (FMEA) model or an equivalent structured and systematic method
to identify and mitigate risks. Failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA) is a generally accepted and recognized engineering practice used
to identify and assess potential failures, including common mode
failures. As NTSB concluded, a comprehensive and formal risk
assessment, such as FMEA, would have identified the human error that
caused the redundant regulators to open and over-pressurize the low-
pressure system. Operators may already be leveraging FMEA or other
similarly robust methodologies to perform the risk analysis and should
continue to do so. PHMSA recommends that operators consider adopting
FMEA or another qualitative tool that may help to identify possible
failures or consequences of those failures that would not be identified
otherwise.

Identify and Implement Measures To Address Risk (Sec.  192.1007(d))

    PHMSA reminds operators that they must determine and implement
measures designed to reduce the risk of failure on their pipeline
systems (Sec.  192.1007(d)). If additional actions have not been taken
to reduce risks, justification should be documented (e.g., current
overpressure protection design was determined to be sufficient; risks
were deemed to be low).
    There are several ways that operators can protect low-pressure
distribution systems from overpressure events. Some notable examples
include:
     Installing a full-capacity relief valve downstream of the
low-pressure regulator station, including in applications where there
is only worker-monitor pressure control;
     Installing a ``slam shut'' device;
     Using telemetered pressure recordings at district
regulator stations to signal failures immediately to operators at
control centers; and
     Completely and accurately documenting the location for all
control (i.e., sensing) lines on the system.

Measure Performance, Monitor Results, and Evaluate Effectiveness (Sec.
192.1007(e))

    PHMSA reminds operators that they must monitor performance measures
from an established baseline to evaluate the effectiveness of DIMP
(Sec.  192.1007(e)). Section 192.1007(e)(vi) requires that these
performance measures include any additional measures determined
necessary to control identified threats. PHMSA reminds operators to
modify their DIMP as appropriate, considering the potential failure of
overpressure protection systems as a high-risk threat.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 24, 2020, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2020-21508 Filed 9-28-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P