[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 246 (Thursday, December 22, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 79675]
[FR Doc No: 2011-32740]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. PR09-32-003]

DCP Raptor Pipeline, LLC; Notice of Extension of Time

    On November 30, 2011, DCP Raptor Pipeline, LLC (Raptor) filed a
request to extend the date for filing its next rate case pursuant to
sections 284.224 and 284.123 (2011) of the Commission's regulations.\1\
In support of this request, Raptor states that in Order No. 735 the
Commission modified its policy concerning periodic reviews of rates
charges by section 311 and Hinshaw pipelines to extend the cycle for
such reviews from three to five years.\2\ Therefore, Raptor requests
that the date for its next rate filing be extended to September 1,
2014, which is five years from the date of Raptor's most recent rate
filing with this Commission.
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    \1\ 18 CFR 284.123 and 284.224 (2011).
    \2\ Contract Reporting Requirements of Intrastate Natural Gas
Companies, Order No. 735, 131 FERC ] 61,150 (May 20, 2010).
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    Upon consideration, notice is hereby given that an extension of
time for Raptor to file its section 284.123 rate petition is granted to
and including September 1, 2014.

    Dated: December 15, 2011.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-32740 Filed 12-21-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 242 (Tuesday, December 19, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60246-60252]
[FR Doc No: 2017-27235]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-82316; File No. SR-LCH SA-2017-012]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; LCH SA; Notice of Proposed Rule
Change, Security-Based Swap Submission, or Advance Notice Relating to
LCH SA's Recovery Plan

December 13, 2017.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder \2\ notice is hereby given that
on November 30, 2017, Banque Centrale de Compensation, which conducts
business under the name LCH SA (``LCH SA''), filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the proposed rule change
described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared
primarily by LCH SA. The Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.

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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the
Proposed Rule Change

    LCH SA is proposing to adopt an updated recovery plan (the ``RP'')
in accordance with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(ii). The text of the proposed
rule change has been annexed as Exhibit 5. LCH SA has requested
confidential treatment of the material submitted as Exhibit 5.

II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, LCH SA included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. LCH SA has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A,
B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of these statements.

A. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    On September 28, 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') adopted amendments to Rule 17Ad-22 \3\ pursuant to
Section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ``Act'') \4\
and the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010
(``Clearing Supervision Act'') \5\ to establish enhanced standards for
the operation and governance of those clearing agencies registered with
the Commission that meet the definition of a ``covered clearing
agency,'' as defined by Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5) \6\ (collectively, the new
and amended rules are herein referred to as ``CCA rules'').
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    \3\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22.
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78q.
    \5\ 12 U.S.C. 5461 et seq.
    \6\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(5).
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    LCH SA is a covered clearing agency under the CCA rules and
therefore is subject to the requirements of the CCA rules, including
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3). The CCA rules require that covered clearing
agencies, among other things, ``establish, implement, maintain and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to . . .
maintain a sound risk management framework for comprehensively managing
legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment,
custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by the covered
clearing agency, which . . . includes plans for the recovery and
orderly wind-down of the covered clearing agency necessitated by credit
losses, liquidity shortfalls, losses from general business risk, or any
other losses''.\7\ As a central counterparty recognized under the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (``EMIR'') \8\, LCH SA is
also subject to prudential requirements, as well as requirements
regarding its operations and oversight. As a credit institution based
in the European Union, LCH SA is also subject to Directive 2014/59/EU,
as supplemented, requiring institutions to draw up and maintain
recovery plans setting forth options for measures to be taken by the
institution to restore its financial position following a significant
deterioration of its financial position.
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    \7\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(3)(ii).
    \8\ Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 4 July 2012 on OTC
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories
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    Specific guidance has been given on Recovery for CCP by CPMI IOSCO.
Within the CPMI IOSCO principles for financial market infrastructures
(PFMI) it is outlined that all systemically important FMIs should have
a comprehensive and effective recovery plan. For this purpose it has
issued the report ``recovery of financial market infrastructures''
containing guidance on recovery plans, content of a recovery plan in
October 2014 and a guidance relating resilience and recovery in 2017.
    Furthermore, regulations are under preparation on a European level
outlining the Recovery and Resolution measures for CCPs.
    As described in more detail below, the purpose of the RP is to
maintain the continuity of critical services in times of extreme stress
and to facilitate the recovery of LCH SA agency. Among other things,
the RP seeks to: (i) Identify if and to what level LCH SA's service are
critical for the market and what internal or external services/systems
are critical for the continuity of LCH SA's activity; (ii) outline the
scenario under which recovery of the LCH SA might be necessary; (iii)
define the early warning indicators and triggers for initiating the
recovery measures under the RP, including the market conditions or
events that could trigger it; (iv) define the governance framework to
trigger these recovery measures; (v) identify the available recovery
tools to manage crisis situations and to restore business as usual; and
(vi) Perform a quantitative and qualitative assessment if the recover
tools meet the CPMI IOSCO criteria for recovery instruments.
    The RP also includes a detailed summary of the overall business and
regulatory framework that LCH SA operates in, including identification
of applicable regulations, company structure, detail regarding the LCH
SA business lines and geographical spread, and information regarding
the interaction between LCH SA and its parent entity (the ``Parent'').
    The RP also contains an FMI analysis which analyses LCH SA
relationship with other financial market infrastructure (e.g.
settlement platforms, trade repositories, etc) and institutions used by
LCH SA or its clearing members such a payment and settlement agents.
    The RP covers all scenarios which may potentially prevent LCH SA
from providing its critical services:

--The default of one or multiple Clearing Member(s) on one or several
of its markets, where LCH SA has to re-establish the matched book and
may have allocate any uncovered credit losses to its own capital or to
surviving clearing members.
--Potential and actual liquidity shortfalls as result of a clearing
member or allied clearing house default.
--The default of an investment counterparty of LCH SA or any other
investment losses resulting from changes in the market value on the
investments.
--A loss resulting from an operational risk event or any other event
which impacts the critical services provided by LCH SA (e.g., failure
in the provision of service by a third party).
--Poor business performance or loss of critical contracts with
Exchanges.
--Operational or financial failure of an FMI (e.g., allied clearing
house/(I)CSD/Trades Repository).
1. Identification of Critical Services and Operations
    With respect to the critical services that might impact the
continuity of LCH SA's operations, the proposed RP provides that an
assessment has been done in accordance with guidance by the Financial
Stability Board (``FSB'') on identification of critical functions and
shared services. LCH SA has assessed that the clearing services LCH SA
provides to participants with respect to the markets identified in the
RP are deemed critical for purposes of the RP. Overall the services
provided in respect of all markets are critical because: (1) The volume
of the activity on certain markets may be very significant, (2) most of
the business on the relevant market is cleared through LCH SA or (3)
the suspension of the clearing service could impact materially the
functioning of the market; the level of global market share with
respect to certain products is high; and LCH SA's service are used by
significant clearing firms. Moreover, a

transfer of the clearing activity to another CCP is technically and
organizationally complex to perform on short notice.
    The RP also identifies those shared operations which LCH SA depends
on to perform critical services to members, including those critical
departments and services and systems within its corporate group and
those provided by others. The RP identifies the main operating units
within LCH SA that play a critical role in providing services as well
as those enterprise systems that are critical for LCH SA's ongoing
operations. Such systems are categorized as (i) Tier 1 Enterprise
Critical (which is the most important category and where a failure may
have direct impact on the continued functioning of LCH SA); (ii) Tier 2
Business Critical (which is a category of systems where business may
not be able to proceed as usual in the event of a failure); and (iii)
Tier 3 Business Support (which are non-critical systems). In addition,
the RP identifies those services provided by its affiliates (including
its Parent) and third-party service providers that are essential to LCH
SA's operations as well as the agreements governing such relationships.
    The RP describes that LCH SA maintains comprehensive exit
management plans should its Parent initiate its own recovery and wind-
down plan, cease to operate, or notify LCH SA of its termination of
services. The RP also describes the business continuity procedures and
exit management plans that LCH SA would initiate upon the failure of a
critical third-party service provider.
2. Identification of Possible Stress and Recovery Scenarios
    The RP categorizes potential stress scenarios in two ways as a
result of either: (i) Clearing member defaults and (ii) non-clearing
member events. Clearing member defaults are identified as those losses
that threaten LCH SA's ability to operate as a going concern through
either uncovered credit losses or liquidity shortfalls created as a
result of a default by one or more members. Non-clearing member
defaults are defined as losses impacting capital adequacy arising from
risks, including, without limitation, general business risks,
operational events, custody and investment risks, or risks on the
interoperability link.
    The RP then identifies, prior to implementing any of the recovery
strategies described therein, the day-to-day risk measures in place to
assure provision of the critical services performed where these are
insufficient the recovery plan will be triggered.
    With respect to clearing member defaults, the LCH SA risk framework
provides mitigations for uncovered credit losses due to a member
default. LCH SA follows high standards to assess financial resources
against member portfolios, including initial margin model covering the
potential loss from any member default to a 99.7% confidence level over
the applicable holding period, margin add-ons to deal with specific
member portfolios risks such as concentration, liquidity risk and
sovereign risk, and default fund sizing to cover simultaneous default
of the 2 members having the largest stress testing losses beyond the
99.7% confidence level. Stress tests are applied by LCH SA in order to
assess whether financial resources are calibrated to handle systemic
risks. In addition, a reverse stress resting procedure is used to
ascertain adequacy of financial resources held against member
positions. The stress testing framework is reviewed on an annual basis.
    Further, reverse stress testing exercise is conducted at least
quarterly for each default fund and is subject to review by LCH
Executive Risk Committee. Risk monitoring mechanisms have been
established in order to anticipate and identify any credit or market
risks with respect to a clearing member, including daily monitoring of
credit watch lists by LCH SA's credit risk department.
    The RP covers the default of one or multiple Clearing Member(s) on
one or several of its markets, where LCH SA has to re-establish the
matched book and may have allocate any uncovered credit losses to its
own capital or to surviving clearing members.
    With respect to liquidity shortfalls as a result of the clearing
member default, the existing liquidity risk management framework seeks
to manage liquidity risk by requiring certain minimum liquidity
coverage ratio and using reserve stress testing to identify plausible
scenarios where the liquidity coverage ratio falls below 100%, as well
as considering the liquidity impact as a result of the default of its
liquidity line provider.
    LCH SA would leverage on the reserve stress testing scenarios and
the liquidity line provider's default to define the liquidity recovery
scenarios.
    In addition, the RP provides that LCH SA uses a set of early
warning indicators and management actions to mitigate liquidity risk
prior to implementing RP. To the extent a clearing member default has
occurred, LCH SA would perform increased risk monitoring, including
preparation of liquidity risk reports that would be produced several
times a day.
    The RP covers the potential and actual liquidity shortfalls as
result of a clearing member or allied clearing house default.
    For operational risks, the RP provides that on a quarterly basis,
control assessments, incident and audit recommendations are reviewed
and adjusted as appropriate. On a yearly basis, a risk and control
self-assessment is performed whereby all risks are reassessed. The
operational risk department performs second line challenge on all these
activities. In addition, all ``major'' or ``high'' incidents are
processed through a detailed incident review to identify actions to
further improve the control environment.
    LCH SA also performs a business impact analysis where it identifies
all critical systems and departments and has in place a global business
continuity strategy which outlines the strategy to maintain critical
services in case of a disaster. The RP further identifies events,
including cyber-attacks, failure of a critical service provider,
failure of data providers and exchanges, failure of LCH SA's Parent,
and reputational events as potential operational risks that could
threaten its continued functioning.
    The RP covers both a loss resulting from an operational risk event
or any other event which impacts the critical services provided by LCH
SA (e.g., failure in the provision of service by a third party).
    Business risk is managed by the relevant individual business lines
and requires frequent monitoring of results against budget and
financial plans, with a second line challenge performed by the risk and
finance departments to verify if sufficient capital buffers are
available for applicable business risks. In addition, LCH SA conducts a
yearly review of business risk scenarios to define potential loss
scenarios under foreseeable conditions and the LCH SA finance
department monitors key metrics, including revenues and quarterly
financial information. Investment risk and second line monitoring is
also conducted with respect to interest rate risk, aggregate credit
risk exposure, daily mark-to-market limits, and internal credit scores
for investment counterparties.
    The RP also considers that LCH SA is connected to a broad range of
financial market infrastructures, including central securities
depositories, settlement platforms and interoperating central
counterparties and identifies the types of operational or financial
failures that

could restrict LCH SA's ability to operate.
    Finally, the RP identifies a series of scenarios which, taken
together, could also impact the continued functioning of critical
services.
3. Triggers for RP
    The RP includes a detailed list of events which if they were to
occur would trigger the implementation of a specific action identified
in the RP.
    The RP provides that a clearing member default will be identified
through credit risk monitoring and review of external information
indicating a default. Each LCH SA business line then applies its own
default management process under which a default management group
identifies and manages the phases of the default management process and
the application of the default waterfall. The possible triggers for the
RP include: (i) A clearing member default, in which case the default
procedures will be initiated to reestablish the matched book; (ii)
several default events may lead to more than one replenishment of Skin
in the Game (iii) mutualized default fund contributions per specific
default have been consumed, in which case unfunded resources will be
used to keep LCH SA appropriately funded.
    Each LCH SA business lines maintain its own default management
process and waterfall, but, in general, the RP describes the tools used
in the event of a clearing member default. The default management
process is used to re-establish the matched book of LCH SA and return
back to business as usual and therefore considered as a recovery tool.
The relevant governance for the management of a default is followed as
described in the paragraph 5.
    When covering the relevant credit losses related to a default
event. First, LCH SA looks to the defaulting clearing member's margin.
These amounts are already held by LCH SA and are available to manage
the default of a clearing member and, as such, are not considered to be
a trigger of the RP. Second, LCH SA looks to the defaulting clearing
member's default fund contribution, which may be allocated to the
defaulting clearing member's shortfalls. Again, this action is within
the control of LCH SA and does not impact the capital adequacy of LCH
SA, so is also not considered a trigger for the RP. Third, in line with
requirements under EMIR, LCH SA is required to hold capital equivalent
to 25 percent of LCH SA's minimum net capital requirement against which
default losses can be applied against liquid available capital. In
addition, excess capital is held to replenish such amount within the
relevant EMIR deadline. Where multiple defaults occur over a longer
time period and lead to multiple replenishments of Skin in the Game,
this may lead to start up of the recovery plan and application of
capital conservation measures. Fourth, should losses arising from a
clearing member default be consumed by the defaulter's margin and
default fund contribution and subsequently LCH SA's contribution from
capital, LCH SA may look to non-defaulting member default fund
contributions. Those amounts are pre-funded by members and held and
controlled by LCH SA for the purposes of managing a default and, thus,
the utilization of those amounts is not considered an application of
the RP. However, LCH SA has the right to trigger an assessment of the
defaults as to reestablish the fund to its original size, and such an
assessment is considered to be a recovery measure under the RP.
Finally, when it is no longer possible for LCH SA to make assessments
and all pre-funded default fund contributions have been used, recovery
measures under the RP, as described below, will be implemented.
    With respect to liquidity shortfall triggers, LCH SA runs a daily
liquidity assessment and monitors key liquidity drivers. In the event
that these fall below a specific level, the RP will be triggered. In
addition, the occurrence of a clearing member default or the failure of
a third-party providing settlement and payment services to clearing
member may also result in increased monitoring, and in the event that
LCH SA does not have sufficient liquid resources to meet liquidity
needs, the RP would be triggered.
    With respect to non-clearing member default events, the RP
identifies those events with more particularity and identifies the
specific triggers for the RP with respect to such events. For
investment losses, which are defined as losses related to the default
of an investment counterparty or losses incurred as a result of extreme
market conditions, the RP is triggered if losses are greater than the
maximum regulatory capital allocated to this activity. For operational
risk events, the RP is triggered upon any operational losses that
consume the regulatory capital LCH SA holds against the relevant risks;
failure of a third party which impacts the provision of LCH SA's
services; and reputational events impacting LCH SA's reputation with
clearing members and partners. With respect to business risks, the RP
is triggered upon a loss that consumes the regulatory capital LCH SA
holds against the relevant risks. The RP may also be triggered upon the
failure of other financial market infrastructures.
4. Identification and Assessment of Recovery Tools
    The RP identifies the various recovery tools that may be applied by
LCH SA upon the triggering of the RP, using again the same distinction
between clearing member default events and non-clearing member events.
    For clearing member default scenarios, the existing stages of the
LCH SA default management process have been used as the framework for
identifying and confirming the appropriate tools to use in the event of
a clearing member default. The RP describes that the default management
process in detail and summarizes the actions to be taken at each phase,
including, as mentioned above, (i) reestablishing the matched book,
(ii) default fund assessments, (iii) service continuity charges, and
(iv) voluntary payments. To the extent that the default fund and
assessments cannot manage the losses accumulated from the clearing
member default and any service continuity or voluntary service
continuity contributions received are not sufficient to cover the
relevant losses, the service closure phase of the default management
process is triggered and all outstanding contracts will be closed out
as of the clearing day following such determination and all relevant
losses are allocated to the clearing members. If the RP is triggered as
a result of a liquidity shortfall, the RP provides that LCH SA may use
its central bank credit line to deposited securities received on behalf
of defaulting clearing member(s).
    Other potential tools to manage liquidity stress situation are
limits with respect to illiquid collateral or, if necessary apply
increased haircuts on certain types of collateral to incentivize the
use of more liquid collateral as well or apply specific liquidity
margins.
    The measures should assure that LCH SA has sufficient liquid
resources at all times. As a last resort, under its rulebook, LCH SA
could defer funding for the settlement platform for a limited period of
time.
    As to non-clearing member events, the tool that is used under the
RP will depend on the nature of the event, but for most investment,
business, and operational risks, LCH SA has its capital surplus that it
can allocate losses against. Further, LCH SA can put in place several
measures for capital conservation and LCH SA also maintains insurance
coverage for specific operational risk events. As a last resort, LCH SA
may also initiate a

capital raising strategy in order to obtain an injection of capital to
replenish any consumed capital.
    If an event resulted in a major disruption of its activities, LCH
SA would initiate its business continuity strategy, which establishes
an enterprise wide RP and response proportionate to the event which
aims to minimize the impact of a major disruption on LCH SA's critical
business and resources. For any disruption or loss of key third-party
service provider, LCH SA would be able to exercise several contractual
rights and maintains exit plans which are intended to safeguard the
continuity of services. LCH SA also maintains c back up procedures and
protocols that would be initiated if there is an impact on critical
services of FMIs, for example its ability to collect margin within T2
under an emergency platform. Finally, LCH SA maintains a crisis
communication plan which outlines the procedure for communicating with
clearing members and partners in the event of a disruption.
    With respect to each recovery tool identified, the RP also seeks to
assess that each tool possesses the following characteristics:
Comprehensive; effective, including as to reliability, timeliness;
transparent, provides appropriate incentives, and results in a minimum
negative impact. To confirm that each recovery tool does, in fact, have
these characteristics, the RP considers as to each: The barriers or
constraints within the tool itself; the steps and time to implement (if
not already available as a tool); the likely effectiveness of the tool;
any risk of execution; the potential impacts on participants and
markets generally; the sequencing of the use of the tools where
multiple tools may be required; and the legal basis of the tool. The RP
also includes a qualitative and quantitative assessment to provide an
indication of the likelihood and severity of a potential recovery
situation and whether the tools included in the RP are adequate.
5. Governance Requirements
    The creation of the RP and its approval is subject to a number of
layers of governance approval. At a high level, the LCH SA Management
Committee is responsible for the preparation of the RP and
implementation of the monitoring and the recovery tools set forth in
the RP. Before submission to the LCH SA Risk Committee, the RP is
reviewed and validated by the Executive Risk Committee of LCH Group.
The LCH SA Risk committee, which includes independent directors, then
reviews, challenges (if needed), and recommends the RP for approval by
the LCH SA board. Final approval of the RP rests with the LCH SA Board.
    At a more granular level, the RP identifies the groups and
individuals within LCH SA that are responsible for the various aspects
of the RP.
    A clearing member default will be managed in accordance with the
relevant procedures. The Default Management Group (``DMG'') is
responsible for the management of the default while all critical
decisions are escalated and submitted to the LCH SA Default Crisis
Management Team (``DCMT''). All decision which may lead to the
triggering of recovery measures are subject to discussion in the DCMT
and approval of the LCH SA CEO.
    With respect to non-clearing member events, the management of those
events will depend on the nature of the event. For example, investment
losses and liquidity shortfalls are managed from a first line of
defense, which attempts to control risks within the risk appetite
parameters set by the Board, and then are escalated as appropriate.
Operational risks are managed in accordance with the operational risk
policy approved by the Board and reporting and second line challenges
are performed by the operational risk department. Business risk is
managed by individual business lines and requires frequent monitoring
of results against budget and financial plans, with a second line
challenge performed by the risk and finance departments to verify if
sufficient capital buffers are available for the applicable business
risks.
    Upon the occurrence of a clearing member default, the recovery
measures that will apply are clearly set forth in LCH SA's rulebook and
LCH SA's CEO has the authority to trigger the different stages in the
waterfall process, but will consult with DCMT and regulators prior to
taking any action. In addition, the RP provides that the LCH SA will
also activate an emergency board meeting for approval (if reasonably
possible). Upon receipt of information relevant to a scenario causing
non-default losses, the LCH SA management committee will consider
whether a recommendation to formally invoke the RP should be made to
the LCH SA Board. Upon receipt of a recommendation for action, the LCH
SA Board will consider the information presented to determine if the RP
should be formally invoked.
6. Plan Testing and Maintenance
    The RP requires that LCH SA conduct testing and review of member
default rules and associated procedures through the running of periodic
``fire drills'' which simulate member default scenarios. According to
the RP, the fire drills are intended to simulate all aspects of a
member default, including the auctioning of the defaulting members
portfolio to non-defaulting members (where appropriate) and involves
the participation of members and relevant functions within the LCH SA
organization. Further, because one of the main scenarios contemplated
under the RP is a clearing member default, the testing of this element
(i.e. the tools to recover from uncovered credit losses or liquidity
shortfalls arising from a member default) will be incorporated into
each relevant fire drill cycle. As noted in the RP, LCH SA performs an
annual multi-service fire drill and service specific fire drills are
performed at least annually and testing for non-default events are
incorporated into the fire drill regime as well. Should either the
periodic testing or other change within LCH SA result in the need to
amend the RP, the RP will be revised in accordance with the governance
requirements identified above.
2. Statutory Basis
    LCH SA believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the requirements of Section 17A of the Act and the regulations
thereunder, including the standards under Rule 17Ad-22.\9\
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    \9\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22.
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    Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \10\ requires, among other things,
that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to promote the prompt
and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions to
assure safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the custody or
control of the clearing agency or for which it is responsible, and in
general to protect investors and the public interest. LCH SA believes
that the RP will permit it to initiate recovery upon the occurrence of
certain trigger events to maintain continuity of critical services or
orderly wind down in accordance with the applicable requirements of
Rule 17Ad-22 \11\ and LCH SA's rules. The RP is designed to formalize
and set out the risk framework and measures that LCH SA will use to
ensure its stability and recovery in the event of a crisis in order to
be able to maintain its critical business processes and operations.
Specifically, the RP would describe the LCH SA risk framework and
process applicable to identify, measure, monitor and manage the risks
faced by LCH SA in the provision of clearing, settlement and risk
management services when a crisis

event occurs. The RP would serve as a means of addressing, credit risk,
market risk, general business risk, operational risk, and other risks
that may otherwise threaten the viability of LCH SA. The RP would also
support the stability of LCH SA as a clearing house that is part of the
broader financial markets and seeks to promote the protection of market
participants from the risk of default by a clearing member of LCH SA or
an unforeseen operational or business event that impacts LCH SA's
continued functioning. In that regard, LCH SA believes that the RP
supports the public interest, in line with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) \12\ of
the Act.
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    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \11\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22.
    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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    The RP would also be consistent with the specific relevant
requirements of Rule 17Ad-22, including under 17Ad-22(e)(2) and
(3).\13\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) \14\ provides that a covered clearing
agency shall have governance arrangements that are clear and
transparent and clearly prioritize the safety and efficiency of the
covered clearing agency, to support the public interest requirements in
Section 17A of the Act applicable to clearing agencies, and the
objectives of owners and participants. LCH SA believes that the RP is
consistent with these requirements. The RP includes extensive
governance requirements that clearly identify the lines of
responsibility with respect to the RP. As described above, at a high
level, the LCH SA Management Committee is responsible for the
preparation of the RP and implementation of the monitoring and the
recovery tools set forth in the RP. The LCH SA Risk committee, which
includes clearing member representatives, then reviews, challenges (if
needed), and recommends the RP for approval by the LCH SA board. Final
approval of the RP rests with the LCH SA Board, which includes, among
other categories, non-executive Chair, independent directors and user
directors. At a more granular level, the RP identifies the groups and
individuals within LCH SA that are responsible for the various aspects
of the RP. Therefore, LCH SA believes that the RP contains governance
arrangements that are clear and transparent and clearly prioritize the
safety and efficiency of the covered clearing agency, to support the
public interest requirements and the objectives of owners and
participants, and is, therefore, consistent with the requirements of
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2) and (3).
    \14\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)\15\ requires that a covered clearing agency
maintain a sound risk management framework for comprehensively managing
legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment,
custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by the covered
clearing agency, which must include plans for the recovery and orderly
wind-down of the covered clearing agency necessitated by credit losses,
liquidity shortfalls, losses from general business risk, or any other
losses. The RP is designed to maintain the continuity of critical
services in times of extreme stress and to facilitate the recovery of
LCH SA in the event of extreme (loss) scenarios, as part of LCH SA's
comprehensive risk management framework. As described above, the RP
seeks to identify those services which could impact the continuity of
LCH SA's operations, implement early warning indicators to identify
potential recovery scenarios and define the triggers for initiating the
RP, and clearly identify the recovery tools available under the RP.
Accordingly, LCH SA believes the RP is consistent with Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(3).\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(3).
    \16\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(3).
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B. Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition

    Section 17A(b)(3)(I) of the Act requires that the rules of a
clearing agency not impose any burden on competition not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.\17\ LCH SA does
not believe the proposed rule change would impact or impose any burden
on competition. The proposed rule change would establish and maintain
LCH SA's RP in accordance with the CCA rules. The RP would not affect
clearing member's access to services offered by LCH SA or impose any
direct burden on clearing members. To the contrary, the RP seeks to
identify the key risks and to establish appropriate recovery measures
to ensure LCH SA's ability to operate in the event of an extreme loss.
Accordingly, the proposed rule change would not unfairly inhibit market
participants' access to LCH SA's services or disadvantage or favor any
particular user in relationship to another user. Therefore, LCH SA does
not believe that the proposed rule change imposes any burden on
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments relating to the proposed rule change have not been
solicited or received. LCH SA will notify the Commission of any written
comments received by LCH SA.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-LCH SA-2017-012 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-LCH SA-2017-012. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than

those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of LCH SA and on LCH
SA's website at http://www.lch.com/asset-classes/cdsclear.
    All comments received will be posted without change. Persons
submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-LCH SA-2017-012 and should
be submitted on or before January 9, 2018.
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    \18\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\18\
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-27235 Filed 12-18-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 100 (Friday, May 22, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31179-31180]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11120]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. CP20-436-000]

Texas Eastern Transmission, LP; Notice of Intent To Prepare an
Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Appalachia to Market Project
and Request for Comments on Environmental Issues

    The staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or
Commission) will prepare an environmental assessment (EA) that will
discuss the environmental impacts of the Appalachia to Market Project
involving construction and operation of facilities by Texas Eastern
Transmission, LP (Texas Eastern) in Westmoreland, Berks, and Fayette
Counties, Pennsylvania. The Commission will use this EA in its
decision-making process to determine whether the project is in the
public convenience and necessity.
    This notice announces the opening of the scoping process the
Commission will use to gather input from the public and interested
agencies about issues regarding the project. The National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) requires the Commission to take into account the
environmental impacts that could result from its action whenever it
considers the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity. NEPA also requires the Commission to discover concerns the
public may have about proposals. This process is referred to as
``scoping.'' The main goal of the scoping process is to focus the
analysis in the EA on the important environmental issues. By this
notice, the Commission requests public comments on the scope of issues
to address in the EA. To ensure that your comments are timely and
properly recorded, please submit your comments so that the Commission
receives them in Washington, DC on or before 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on
June 19, 2020.
    You can make a difference by submitting your specific comments or
concerns about the project. Your comments should focus on the potential
environmental effects, reasonable alternatives, and measures to avoid
or lessen environmental impacts. Your input will help the Commission
staff determine what issues they need to evaluate in the EA. Commission
staff will consider all filed comments during the preparation of the
EA.
    If you sent comments on this project to the Commission before the
opening of this docket on May 1, 2020, you will need to file those
comments in Docket No. CP20-436-000 to ensure they are considered as
part of this proceeding.
    This notice is being sent to the Commission's current environmental
mailing list for this project. State and local government
representatives should notify their constituents of this proposed
project and encourage them to comment on their areas of concern.
    If you are a landowner receiving this notice, a pipeline company
representative may contact you about the acquisition of an easement to
construct, operate, and maintain the proposed facilities. The company
would seek to negotiate a mutually acceptable easement agreement. You
are not required to enter into an agreement. However, if the Commission
approves the project, that approval conveys with it the right of
eminent domain. Therefore, if you and the company do not reach an
easement agreement, the pipeline company could initiate condemnation
proceedings in court. In such instances, compensation would be
determined by a judge in accordance with state law.
    Texas Eastern provided landowners with a fact sheet prepared by the
FERC entitled An Interstate Natural Gas Facility On My Land? What Do I
Need To Know? This fact sheet addresses a number of typically asked
questions, including the use of eminent domain and how to participate
in the Commission's proceedings. It is also available for viewing on
the FERC website (www.ferc.gov) at https://www.ferc.gov/resources/guides/gas/gas.pdf.

Public Participation

    The Commission offers a free service called eSubscription which
makes it easy to stay informed of all issuances and submittals
regarding the dockets/projects to which you subscribe. These instant
email notifications are the fastest way to receive notification and
provide a link to the document files which can reduce the amount of
time you spend researching proceedings. To sign up go to www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/esubscription.asp.
    For your convenience, there are three methods you can use to submit
your comments to the Commission. The Commission encourages electronic
filing of comments and has staff available to assist you at (866) 208-
3676 or<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please carefully follow these
instructions so that your comments are properly recorded.
    (1) You can file your comments electronically using the eComment
feature, which is located on the Commission's website (www.ferc.gov)
under the link to Documents and Filings. Using eComment is an easy
method for submitting brief, text-only comments on a project;
    (2) You can file your comments electronically by using the eFiling
feature, which is located on the Commission's website (www.ferc.gov)
under the link to Documents and Filings. With eFiling, you can provide
comments in a variety of formats by attaching them as a file with your
submission. New eFiling users must first create an account by clicking
on eRegister. You will be asked to select the type of filing you are
making; a comment on a particular project is considered a Comment on a
Filing; or
    (3) You can file a paper copy of your comments by mailing them to
the following address. Be sure to reference the project docket number
(CP20-436-000) with your submission: Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Room 1A,
Washington, DC 20426.

Summary of the Proposed Project

    The Appalachia to Market Project would consist of the following
facilities and actions, all in Pennsylvania. Specifically, Texas
Eastern would construct:
     Approximately 0.8 mile of 30-inch-diameter pipeline loop
\1\ in the same-trench as a segment of an abandoned 30-inch-diameter
pipe (that would be removed for this project) on the Texas Eastern
system in Westmoreland County;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ A pipeline loop is a segment of pipe constructed parallel to
an existing pipeline to increase capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     one crossover at the existing Bechtelsville pig \2\-
launcher site in Berks County;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ A pig is a tool that the pipeline company inserts into and
pushes through the pipeline for cleaning the pipeline, conducting
internal inspections, or other purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     one crossover at the existing Uniontown pig-receiver site
in Fayette County; and
     other related appurtenances.
    The Appalachia to Market Project would provide up to 18,000
dekatherms per day of firm natural gas transportation service to UGI
Utilities Inc. at an existing delivery point near Reading,
Pennsylvania. The general location of the project facilities is shown
in appendix 1.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The appendices referenced in this notice will not appear in
the Federal Register. Copies of appendices were sent to all those
receiving this notice in the mail and are available at www.ferc.gov
using the link called ``eLibrary'' or from the Commission's Public
Reference Room, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, or call
(202) 502-8371. For instructions on connecting to eLibrary, refer to
the last page of this notice.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Land Requirements for Construction

    The proposed project has been designed to minimize impacts by
replacing existing pipeline and installing crossovers at previously
existing aboveground facilities within and directly adjacent to Texas
Eastern's existing right-of-way. Construction of the proposed
facilities would disturb about 16.2 acres of land for the aboveground
facilities and the pipeline. Following construction, Texas Eastern
would maintain 12.9 acres for permanent operation of the project's
facilities. The entire proposed 0.8-mile Delmont Loop pipeline route
parallels existing pipeline, utility, or road rights-of-way with the
exception of the proposed launcher and receiver barrels, which will
convert 3.6 acres of land use from open land to industrial/commercial.

The EA Process

    The EA will discuss impacts that could occur as a result of the
construction and operation of the proposed project under these general
headings:

 geology and soils;
 water resources and wetlands;
 vegetation and wildlife;
 threatened and endangered species;
 cultural resources;
 land use;
 air quality and noise;
 public safety; and
 cumulative impacts.

    Commission staff will also evaluate reasonable alternatives to the
proposed project or portions of the project, and make recommendations
on how to lessen or avoid impacts on the various resource areas.
    The EA will present Commission staff's independent analysis of the
issues. The EA will be available in electronic format in the public
record through eLibrary \4\ and the Commission's website (https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/eis.asp). If eSubscribed, you will
receive instant email notification when the EA is issued. The EA may be
issued for an allotted public comment period. Commission staff will
consider all comments on the EA before making recommendations to the
Commission. To ensure Commission staff have the opportunity to address
your comments, please carefully follow the instructions in the Public
Participation section, beginning on page 2 of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ For instructions on connecting to eLibrary, refer to the
last page of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With this notice, the Commission is asking agencies with
jurisdiction by law and/or special expertise with respect to the
environmental issues of this project to formally cooperate in the
preparation of the EA.\5\ Agencies that would like to request
cooperating agency status should follow the instructions for filing
comments provided under the Public Participation section of this
notice.
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    \5\ The Council on Environmental Quality regulations addressing
cooperating agency responsibilities are at Title 40, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 1501.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consultation Under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act

    In accordance with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's
implementing regulations for section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act, the Commission is using this notice to initiate
consultation with the Pennsylvania State Historic Preservation Office,
and to solicit their views and those of other government agencies,
interested Indian tribes, and the public on the project's potential
effects on historic properties.\6\ The EA for this project will
document findings on the impacts on historic properties and summarize
the status of consultations under section 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's regulations
are at Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 800. Those
regulations define historic properties as any prehistoric or
historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in
or eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic
Places.
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Environmental Mailing List

    The environmental mailing list includes federal, state, and local
government representatives and agencies; elected officials;
environmental and public interest groups; Native American Tribes; other
interested parties; and local libraries and newspapers. This list also
includes all affected landowners (as defined in the Commission's
regulations) who are potential right-of-way grantors, whose property
may be used temporarily for project purposes, or who own homes within
certain distances of aboveground facilities, and anyone who submits
comments on the project. Commission staff will update the environmental
mailing list as the analysis proceeds to ensure that Commission notices
related to this environmental review are sent to all individuals,
organizations, and government entities interested in and/or potentially
affected by the proposed project.
    If the Commission issues the EA for an allotted public comment
period, a Notice of Availability of the EA will be sent to the
environmental mailing list and will provide instructions to access the
electronic document on the FERC's website (www.ferc.gov).
    If you need to make changes to your name/address, or if you would
like to remove your name from the mailing list, please return the
attached ``Mailing List Update Form'' (appendix 2).

Additional Information

    Additional information about the project is available from the
Commission's Office of External Affairs, at (866) 208-FERC, or on the
FERC website at www.ferc.gov using the eLibrary link. Click on the
eLibrary link, click on General Search and enter the docket number in
the Docket Number field, excluding the last three digits (i.e., CP20-
436). Be sure you have selected an appropriate date range. For
assistance, please contact FERC Online Support at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or<PHONE_NUMBER>, or for TTY, contact (202)
502-8659. The eLibrary link also provides access to the texts of all
formal documents issued by the Commission, such as orders, notices, and
rulemakings.
    Public sessions or site visits will be posted on the Commission's
calendar located at www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/EventsList.aspx along
with other related information.

    Dated: May 18, 2020.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-11120 Filed 5-21-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 143 (Thursday, July 27, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34956-34957]
[FR Doc No: 2017-15443]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

Office of the Commissioner; Statement of Organization, Functions,
and Delegations of Authority

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Office of the Medical
Products and Tobacco (OMPT), has modified its structure. This new
organizational structure was approved by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services on December 22, 2016, and became effective on that date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rachel Sherman, M.D., Deputy
Commissioner for Medical Products and Tobacco, Office of Medical
Products and Tobacco, Food and Drug Administration, White Oak Bldg. 1,
HFD-40, Room 2307, Silver Spring, Maryland, 20993. Phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    Part D, Chapter D-B, (Food and Drug Administration), the Statement
of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority for the
Department of Health and Human Services (35 FR 3685, February 25, 1970;
60 FR 56606, November 9, 1995; 64 FR 36361, July 6, 1999; 72 FR 50112,
August 30, 2007; 74 FR 41713, August 18, 2009; and 76 FR 45270, July
28, 2011) is amended to reflect the reorganization of the Office of
Medical Products and Tobacco.
    This reorganization establishes the Oncology Center of Excellence
(OCE) to optimize an integrated cross-center regulatory approach and
enhance the coordination of medical product development in oncology.
Located within OMPT, OCE will work closely with the directors of the
centers, the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the Center for Devices
and Radiological Health (CDRH), and all FDA staff involved in oncology
efforts. The OCE will be responsible, in accordance with an Inter-
Center Agreement between OCE, CBER, CDER, and CDRH, for the clinical
portion of medical oncology and malignant hematology applications
involving drugs, biologics, and devices. Other functions of the OCE
include: Harmonization of cancer-specific regulatory approaches;
coordination of oncology-specific regulatory science initiatives and
outreach; implementation of cross-center oncology-focused meetings;
stakeholder engagement to the external community of other government
agencies, industry, academia, professional societies, and patient
advocacy groups; and communication with international regulatory
agencies.
    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Office of Medical Products
and Tobacco (OMPT), has been restructured as follows:
    DKK. Organization. The Office of Medical Products and Tobacco is
headed by the Deputy Commissioner for Medical Products and Tobacco and
includes the following organizational units and FDA Centers that, under
the current structure, officially report to OMPT:

Office of Medical Products and Tobacco (DKK)
Office of Special Medical Products (DKKA)
Office of Pediatric Therapeutics (DKKAA)
Office of Orphan Products Development (DKKAB)
Office of Combination Products (DKKAD)
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (DKKB)
Center for Tobacco Products (DKKI)
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (DKKN)
Center for Devices and Radiological Health (DKKW)
Oncology Center of Excellence (DKKX)

II. Delegations of Authority

    Pending further delegation, directives, or orders by the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, all delegations and redelegations of
authority made to officials and employees of affected organizational
components will continue in them or their successors pending further
redelegations, provided they are consistent with this reorganization.

III. Electronic Access

    This reorganization is reflected in FDA's Staff Manual Guide (SMG).
Persons interested in seeing the complete Staff Manual Guide can find
it on FDA's Web site at: http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/default.htm.

    Authority:  44 U.S.C. 3101.

    Dated: July 17, 2017.
Thomas E. Price,
Secretary of Health and Human Services.
[FR Doc. 2017-15443 Filed 7-26-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P