[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 47 (Thursday, March 10, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13732-13733]
[FR Doc No: 2022-05085]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0312; FRL-7887-02-OAR]

Release of Volumes 1 and 2 of the Integrated Review Plan for the
Lead National Ambient Air Quality Standards

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice of availability.

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SUMMARY: On or about March 4, 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is making available to the public, Volumes 1 and 2 of the
Integrated Review Plan for the Lead National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (IRP). The national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
lead (Pb) are set to protect the public health and the public welfare
from Pb in ambient air. Volume 1 of the IRP contains contextual
background material and the anticipated schedule for the current review
of the air quality criteria and NAAQS for Pb. Volume 2 identifies
policy-relevant issues in the review and describes key considerations
in EPA's development of the Integrated Science Assessment (ISA). The
ISA provides the scientific basis for the EPA's decisions, in
conjunction with additional technical and policy assessments, for the
review of the NAAQS, as described in the Clean Air Act, section 108(a).

DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 4, 2022.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments on Volume 2 of the IRP, identified by
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0312, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov/
(our preferred method). Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
     Mail: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Docket
Center, Office of Air and Radiation Docket, Mail Code 28221T, 1200
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460.
     Hand Delivery or Courier (by scheduled appointment only):
EPA Start Printed Page 56264 Docket Center, WJC West Building, Room
3334, 1301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004. The Docket
Center's hours of operations are 8:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m., Monday-Friday
(except Federal Holidays).
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the Docket ID
No. for this notice. Comments received may be posted without change to
https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information
provided. For detailed instructions on sending comments, see the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. The two volumes
described here will be available on the EPA's website at https://www.epa.gov/naaqs/lead-pb-air-quality-standards. The documents will be
accessible under ``Planning Documents'' from the current review.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Deirdre L. Murphy, Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, (Mail Code C504-06), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, NC 27711; telephone number:
919-541-0729, fax number: 919-541-027; or email:
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. General Information

Written Comments

    Submit your comments, identified by Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-
0312, at https://www.regulations.gov (our preferred method), or the
other methods identified in the ADDRESSES section. Once submitted,
comments cannot be edited or removed from the docket. The EPA may
publish any comment received to its public docket. Do not submit to
EPA's docket at https://www.regulations.gov any information you
consider to be Confidential Business Information (CBI) or other
information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Multimedia
submissions (audio, video, etc.) must be accompanied by a written
comment. The written comment is considered the official comment and
should include discussion of all points you wish to make. The EPA will
generally not consider comments or comment contents located outside of
the primary submission (i.e., on the web, cloud, or other file sharing
system). For additional submission methods, the full EPA public comment
policy, information about CBI or multimedia submissions, and general
guidance on making effective comments, please visit https://www.epa.gov/dockets/commenting-epa-dockets.
    Due to public health concerns, the EPA Docket Center and Reading
Room are open to the public by appointment only. Our Docket Center
staff continues to provide remote customer service via email, phone,
and webform. Hand deliveries or couriers will be received by scheduled
appointment only. For further information and updates on EPA Docket
Center services, please visit us online at https://www.epa.gov/dockets.

II. Information About the Documents

    Two sections of the Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act) govern the

establishment and revision of the NAAQS. Section 108 directs the
Administrator to identify and list certain air pollutants and then
issue ``air quality criteria'' for those pollutants. The air quality
criteria are to ``accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge
useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on
public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of
such pollutant in the ambient air . . .'' (CAA section 108(a)(2)).
Under section 109 of the Act, the EPA is then to establish primary
(health-based) and secondary (welfare-based) NAAQS for each pollutant
for which the EPA has issued air quality criteria. Section 109(d)(1) of
the Act requires periodic review and, if appropriate, revision of
existing air quality criteria. Revised air quality criteria are to
reflect advances in scientific knowledge on the effects of the
pollutant on public health and welfare. Under the same provision, the
EPA is also to periodically review and, if appropriate, revise the
NAAQS, based on the revised air quality criteria.
    The Act additionally requires appointment of an independent
scientific review committee that is to periodically review the existing
air quality criteria and NAAQS and to recommend any new standards and
revisions of existing criteria and standards as may be appropriate (CAA
section 109(d)(2)(A)-(B)). Since the early 1980s, the requirement for
an independent scientific review committee has been fulfilled by the
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC).
    Presently the EPA is reviewing the air quality criteria and NAAQS
for Pb.\1\ The documents announced in this notice have been developed
as part of the integrated review plan (IRP) which is developed in the
planning phase for the review. The documents have been prepared jointly
by the EPA's Center for Public Health and Environmental Assessment,
within the Office of Research and Development, and the Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, within the Office of Air and Radiation.
These documents will be available on the EPA's website at https://www.epa.gov/naaqs/lead-pb-air-quality-standards, accessible under
``Planning Documents'' from the current review.
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    \1\ The EPA's call for information for this review was issued on
July 7, 2020 (85 FR 40641).
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    The IRP for the current review of the lead NAAQS will be comprised
of three volumes. Volumes 1 and 2 are the subject of this notice.
Volume 1 provides background information on the air quality criteria
and standards for Pb and may serve as a reference by the public and the
CASAC in their consideration of the subsequent two volumes. Volume 2
addresses the general approach for the review and planning for the
integrated science assessment (ISA). Comments are solicited from the
public on Volume 2, which will also be the subject of a consultation
with the CASAC, to be announced in a separate Federal Register notice.
This volume identifies policy-relevant issues in the review and
describes key considerations in EPA's development of the ISA. Volume 3,
which is not yet completed, is the planning document for quantitative
analyses to be considered in the policy assessment (PA), including
exposure and risk analyses. In order that consideration of the
availability of new evidence in the review can inform these plans, the
development and public availability of Volume 3 will generally coincide
with that of the draft ISA and it will be the subject of a consultation
with the CASAC at that time.
    Comments on Volume 2 of the IRP should be submitted to the docket,
as described above, by April 4, 2022. A separate Federal Register
notice will provide details about the CASAC consultation meeting and
the process for participation in the CASAC consultation on Volume 2.
The EPA will consider the consultation comments from the CASAC and
public comments on the IRP, Volume 2, in preparation of the Pb ISA.
Volume 1 of the IRP, also being made available, provides background or
contextual and historical material for this NAAQS review. These
documents do not represent and should not be construed to represent any
final EPA policy, viewpoint, or determination.

Panagiotis Tsirigotis,
Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards.
[FR Doc. 2022-05085 Filed 3-9-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 164 (Friday, August 25, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 58120-58123]
[FR Doc No: 2023-17775]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2023-1649; Project Identifier AD-2022-00905-T]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-8 and 747-8F series airplanes.
This proposed AD was prompted by a report that all six Integrated
Display Units (IDUs) became blank when new flight plan data was entered
in the Flight Management System (FMS), and by a determination that
indication of decaying airspeed in certain scenarios is required. This
proposed AD would require installing updated software. The FAA is
proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 10,
2023.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow
the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2023-1649; or in person at Docket Operations between 9
a.m. and

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this NPRM, any comments received, and other information. The
street address for Docket Operations is listed above.
    Material Incorporated by Reference:
     For service information identified in this NPRM, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-5600;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; website: myboeingfleet.com.
     You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South
216th Street, Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>. It is also available at
regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2023-1649.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Tsuji, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed
under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2023-1649; Project Identifier
AD-2022-00905-T'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposal because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal
contact received about this NPRM.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to
Douglas Tsuji, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street,
Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email:
[email protected]. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not
specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for
this rulemaking.

Background

    The FAA has received a report indicating all six IDUs became blank
when new flight plan data was entered in the FMS. It was determined
that the Jeppesen airport map database (AMDB) had an error in the data
structure tied to the Sydney airport (YSSY). The Electronic Flight
Instrumentation System (EFIS)/Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting
System (EICAS) Interface Units (EIUs) were unable to process the data
structure, resulting in the displays blanking. Jeppesen subsequently
fixed the AMDB to address the issue with YSSY and additional airport
codes with an incorrect data structure. The current EIU software is
unable to process incorrect data structures, which results in an EIU
fault that cannot be cleared by the automated reset function of an EIU.
After five resets the EIU defaults to shut down, resulting in all six
IDUs, which are controlled by the EIUs, becoming blank. The EIU shut
down can also result in an autothrottle disconnect and a degraded
autopilot mode. The problem can occur on the ground when an airport
code with an incorrect data structure in the AMDB is entered as an
origin or destination and the flight plan is then put into operation by
the FMS. In flight, the problem can occur when an airport code with an
incorrect data structure in the AMDB is entered as the selected
diversion airport.
    Additionally, the existing software does not provide an earlier
indication of decaying airspeed during the landing phase for flap
settings 25 and 30. The revised software specified in this proposed AD
provides an earlier threshold for triggering the low airspeed alerting
EICAS Caution message.
    This condition, if not addressed, could result in loss of all
flight deck displays (Primary Flight Display (PFD)/EICAS/Navigation
Display (ND), not including standby displays) combined with potential
impact to the autopilot and auto-throttle functionality and lack of
crew visibility of any subsequent system failures, which can prevent
continued safe flight and landing; it could also result in inadequate
alerting of decaying airspeed, unacceptably low airspeed, and loss of
control of the airplane.

FAA's Determination

    The FAA is issuing this NPRM after determining that the unsafe
condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other
products of the same type design.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 747-31A2544 RB,
dated March 31, 2020. This service information specifies procedures for
installing Integrated Display System (IDS) 804 software in each of the
six LCD IDUs and in each of the three EIUs, if not already installed;
followed by installing IDS 805 software, which includes EIU software
part number COL3F-0034-E805 and Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) software
part number 3177-COL-DL8-05.
    This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in ADDRESSES section.

Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM

    This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified
in the service information already described except for any differences
identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of this proposed AD.
For information on the procedures and compliance times, see this
service information at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2023-1649.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would
affect 19 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following
costs to comply with this proposed AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost on U.S.
             Action                   Labor cost          Parts cost       Cost per product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Software Installation...........  Up to 6 work-hours  Up to $650........  Up to $1,160......  Up to $22,040.
                                   x $85 per hour =
                                   Up to $510.
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Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:

The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA-2023-1649; Project Identifier AD-
2022-00905-T.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive
(AD) by October 10, 2023.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 747-8 and 747-8F
series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in
Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 747-31A2544 RB, dated March 31,
2020.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code: 31,
Instruments.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a report that all six Integrated Display
Units (IDUs) became blank when new flight plan data was entered in
the Flight Management System (FMS), and by a determination that
indication of decaying airspeed in certain scenarios is required.
The FAA is issuing this AD to address problems with the Electronic
Flight Instrumentation System (EFIS)/Engine Indicating and Crew
Alerting System (EICAS) Interface Units (EIUs), which control the
IDUs. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in loss
of all flight deck displays (Primary Flight Display (PFD)/EICAS/
Navigation Display (ND), not including standby displays) combined
with potential impact to the autopilot and auto-throttle
functionality and lack of crew visibility of any subsequent system
failures, which can prevent continued safe flight and landing; it
could also result in inadequate alerting of decaying airspeed,
unacceptably low airspeed, and loss of control of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    Except as specified by paragraph (h) of this AD: At the
applicable times specified in the ``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 747-31A2544 RB, dated March 31, 2020, do
all applicable actions identified in, and in accordance with, the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
747-31A2544 RB, dated March 31, 2020.
    Note 1 to paragraph (g): Guidance for accomplishing the actions
required by this AD can be found in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
747-31A2544, dated March 31, 2020, which is referred to in Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 747-31A2544 RB, dated March 31, 2020.

(h) Exceptions to Service Information Specifications

    (1) Where the Compliance Time column of the table in the
``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 747-
31A2544 RB, dated March 31, 2020, uses the phrase ``the original
issue date of Requirements Bulletin 747-31A2544 RB,'' this AD
requires using ``the effective date of this AD.''
    (2) For Group 2 airplanes identified in Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 747-31A2544 RB, dated March 31, 2020: The
concurrent requirements specified in Action 1 of Table 1 of the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
747-31A2544 RB, dated March 31, 2020, do not apply.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, AIR-520 Continued Operational Safety Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or
responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the certification office,
send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j)
of this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
    (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD
if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, AIR-520
Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To
be approved, the repair method, modification deviation, or
alteration deviation must meet the certification basis of the
airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Douglas Tsuji,
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines,
WA 98198; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email: [email protected].

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 747-31A2544 RB, dated
March 31, 2020.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Boulevard, MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA
90740-5600; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; website: myboeingfleet.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, [email protected], or go to: www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued on July 26, 2023.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2023-17775 Filed 8-24-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 188 (Thursday, September 27, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 48777-48779]
[FR Doc No: 2018-20967]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 62

[EPA-R05-OAR-2018-0588; FRL-9984-57--Region 5]

Air Plan Approval; Minnesota; Commercial and Industrial Solid
Waste Incineration Units and Other Solid Waste Incineration Units
Negative Declarations for Designated Facilities and Pollutants

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is notifying the
public that we have received negative declarations from Minnesota
pertaining to the presence of Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste
Incineration (CISWI) units and Other Solid Waste Incineration (OSWI)
units in Minnesota. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
submitted its CISWI negative declaration by letter dated February 3,
2017, and its OSWI negative declaration by letter dated June 21, 2017.
MPCA notified EPA in its negative declaration letters that there are no
CISWI or OSWI units subject to the requirements of the Clean Air Act
(Act) currently operating in Minnesota.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before October 29, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, identified by Docket ID No. EPA-R05-
OAR-2018-0588, at http://www.regulations.gov or via email to
[email protected]. For comments submitted at Regulations.gov, follow
the online instructions for submitting comments. Once submitted,
comments cannot be edited or removed from Regulations.gov. For either
manner of submission, EPA may publish any comment received to its
public docket. Do not submit electronically any information you
consider to be Confidential Business Information (CBI) or other
information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Multimedia
submissions (audio, video, etc.) must be accompanied by a written
comment. The written comment is considered the official comment and
should include discussion of all points you wish to make. EPA will
generally not consider comments or comment contents located outside of
the primary submission (i.e., on the web, cloud, or other file sharing
system). For additional submission methods, please contact the person
identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. For the full
EPA public comment policy, information about CBI or multimedia
submissions, and general guidance on making effective comments, please
visit http://www2.epa.gov/dockets/commenting-epa-dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Margaret Sieffert, Environmental
Engineer, Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5, 77 West Jackson
Boulevard (AT-18J), Chicago, Illinois 60604,<PHONE_NUMBER>,
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Throughout this document whenever ``we,''
``us,'' or ``our'' is used, we mean EPA. This supplementary information
section is arranged as follows:

I. Background
    A. Sections 111 and 129 of the Act
    B. Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units
    C. Other Solid Waste Incineration Units
II. Negative Declarations and EPA Analysis
    A. Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units
    B. Other Solid Waste Incineration Units
III. Proposed EPA Action
IV. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

I. Background

A. Sections 111 and 129 of the Act

    Sections 111 and 129 of the Act set forth EPA's statutory authority
for regulating new and existing solid waste incineration units. Section
111(b) directs EPA to publish and periodically revise a list of
categories of stationary sources which cause or significantly
contribute to air pollution, and to establish new source performance
standards (NSPS) within these categories. Section 111(d) grants EPA
statutory authority to require states to submit to the agency
implementation plans for establishing performance standards applicable
to existing sources belonging to those categories established in
section 111(b).
    Section 111(d) of the Act requires states to submit plans to
control certain pollutants (designated pollutants) at existing
facilities (designated facilities) whenever standards of performance
have been established under section 111(b) for new sources of a source
category and EPA has established emission guidelines (EGs) for
designated facilities. 40 CFR 60.21(a) and (b). Section 129 of the Act
is specific to solid waste combustion, and requires EPA to establish
performance standards pursuant to section 111 of the Act for each
category of solid waste incineration units, which includes the
categories addressed in today's action.
    The regulations at 40 CFR part 60, subpart B, contain general
provisions applicable to the adoption and submittal of state plans for
the control of

designated pollutants from designated facilities under section 111(d)
of the Act, including those pollutants and facilities designated
pursuant to section 129 of the Act. Further, 40 CFR part 62, subpart A,
provides the procedural framework by which EPA will approve or
disapprove such plans submitted by a state. If a state fails to submit
a satisfactory plan, the Act provides EPA with the authority to
prescribe a plan for regulating the designated pollutants at the
designated facilities. The EPA prescribed plan, also known as a Federal
plan, is used to regulate designated facilities when there is no EPA
approved state-specific plan. Further, if there are no designated
facilities within a state's jurisdiction, the state may submit to EPA a
letter of certification to that effect (referred to as a ``negative
declaration'') in lieu of a state plan to satisfy the state's
obligation. 40 CFR 60.23(b) and 62.06. The negative declaration exempts
the state from the requirement to submit a state plan for the
designated pollutants and facilities. Therefore, if a state submits a
negative declaration for a category of solid waste incineration units,
the state is not required to submit a state plan for that source
category.

B. Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units

    On December 1, 2000, EPA promulgated new source performance
standards for new CISWI units, 40 CFR part 60, subpart CCCC, and EGs
for existing CISWI units, 40 CFR part 60, subpart DDDD. 65 FR 75338. On
March 21, 2011, EPA, after voluntarily remanding the 2000 CISWI
standards and EGs, promulgated final CISWI standards and EGs. 76 FR
15704. Correspondingly, on the same date, EPA promulgated a final rule
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to identify
which non-hazardous secondary materials, when used as fuels or
ingredients in combustion units, are ``solid wastes.'' 76 FR 15456; see
40 CFR part 241, Solid Wastes Used as Fuels or Ingredients in
Combustion Units (also known as the ``Non-Hazardous Secondary Material
Rule''). The identification of solid waste in the Non-Hazardous
Secondary Material Rule is used to determine whether a combustion unit
is required to meet the emissions standards for solid waste
incineration units issued under sections 111 and 129 of the Act, or
meet the emissions standards for commercial, industrial, and
institutional boilers issued under section 112 of the Act. EPA
subsequently promulgated amendments to both rules on February 7, 2013:
Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units:
Reconsideration and Final Amendments; Non-Hazardous Secondary Materials
That Are Solid Waste; Final Rule. 78 FR 9112. Reconsideration of
certain aspects of the final CISWI rule resulted in minor amendments.
81 FR 40956 (June 23, 2016). Pursuant to sections 111(d) and 129 of the
Act and 40 CFR part 60, subpart B, states were required to revise their
state plans for existing CISWI units to comply with the amended
regulations.
    A CISWI unit is defined in 40 CFR 60.2875 as any distinct operating
unit of any commercial or industrial facility that combusts, or has
combusted in the preceding 6 months, any solid waste, as the term
``solid waste'' is defined in the Non-Hazardous Secondary Material
Rule. A state plan must address all existing CISWI units that commenced
construction on or before June 4, 2010, or for which modification or
reconstruction was commenced on or before August 7, 2013, with limited
exceptions as provided in 40 CFR 60.2555. 40 CFR 60.2550.
    However, as discussed above, if there are no existing designated
facilities in a state, the state may submit a negative declaration in
lieu of a state plan. EPA will provide public notice of receipt of a
state's negative declaration with respect to that solid waste
incineration unit category. 40 CFR 60.2530. If any unit of a solid
waste incineration category is subsequently identified in a state for
which a negative declaration had been submitted, the Federal plan
implementing the EGs for that source category would apply to that unit.
In the case of a CISWI unit, subpart DDDD would automatically apply to
that CISWI unit until a state plan is approved. 40 CFR 60.2530.

C. Other Solid Waste Incineration Units

    EPA promulgated new source performance standards and EGs for OSWIs
on December 16, 2005. 70 FR 74870. The standards and EGs are codified
at 40 CFR part 60, subparts EEEE and FFFF, respectively. Thus, states
were required to submit plans for existing OSWIs pursuant to sections
111(d) and 129 of the Act and 40 CFR part 60, subpart B.
    An OSWI unit is defined in 40 CFR 60.3078 as a very small municipal
waste combustor and institutional waste incinerator. The designated
facilities to which the original EGs applied to are existing OSWI units
that commenced construction on or before December 9, 2004.

II. Negative Declarations and EPA Analysis

A. Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units

    On February 3, 2017, MPCA submitted its CISWI negative declaration,
in which MPCA certified that there are no existing CISWI units
currently operating in Minnesota. Two non-waste determinations under
the Non-Hazardous Secondary Materials Rule were critical elements of
MPCA's February 3, 2017 negative declaration letter. Specifically, on
September 25, 2015, in response to a petition to Region 5, the Regional
Administrator made a non-waste determination under the Non-Hazardous
Secondary Materials Rule provision at 40 CFR 241.3(c), with regard to
the poultry litter burned as fuel in the boiler at the Benson Power,
LLC power plant in Benson, Minnesota. The Regional Administrator
determined that the poultry litter at issue was not a solid waste.
Further, by letter dated October 15, 2015, ReConserve of Minnesota
Inc., d/b/a Endres Processing, Rosemount, Minnesota, certified to
Region 5 that it had made a non-waste self-determination under the Non-
Hazardous Secondary Materials Rule provision at 40 CFR 241.3(b), with
regard to the refuse derived fuel that it processes, as defined at 40
CFR 241.2, and which meets the legitimacy criteria for fuels at 40 CFR
241.3(d)(1), that the refuse derived fuel is not a solid waste.
Correspondingly, by technical review document dated February 23, 2018,
Region 5's Land and Chemicals Division reviewed and confirmed the non-
waste self-determination. EPA's Office of Resource Conservation and
Recovery correspondingly concurred with the Region's review and
conclusion.

B. Other Solid Waste Incineration Units

    On June 21, 2017, MPCA submitted its OSWI negative declaration, in
which it certified that there are no existing OSWI units currently
operating in Minnesota.

III. Proposed EPA Action

    EPA is notifying the public of EPA's receipt of MPCA's negative
declarations for both CISWI and OSWI facilities and that EPA is
amending 40 CFR part 62 to reflect both negative declarations. For
CISWI, EPA received the negative declaration on February 3, 2017, and
for OSWI, EPA received the negative declaration on June 21, 2017.

IV. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

General Requirements

    This action is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under the
terms of Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993) and
therefore is not subject to review by the Office of Management and
Budget under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 (76 FR 3821, January 21,
2011). For this reason, this action is also not subject to Executive
Order 13211, ``Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use'' (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001). This
action is not an Executive Order 13771 (82 FR 9339, February 2, 2017)
regulatory action because this action is not significant under E.O.
12866. This action merely approves state law as meeting Federal
requirements and merely notifies the public of EPA's receipt of
negative declarations from an air pollution control agency without any
existing CISWI or OSWI units in its state. This action imposes no
requirements beyond those imposed by the state. Accordingly, the
Administrator certifies that this rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). Because this rule
pertains to pre-existing requirements under state law and does not
impose any additional enforceable duty beyond that required by state
law, it does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or
uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4). This rule is not approved
to apply on any Indian reservation land or in any other area where EPA
or an Indian tribe has demonstrated that a tribe has jurisdiction. In
those areas of Indian country, the rule does not have tribal
implications and will not impose substantial direct costs on tribal
governments or preempt tribal law as specified by Executive Order 13175
(65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000). This action also does not have
Federalism implications because it does not have substantial direct
effects on the states, on the relationship between the national
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government, as specified
in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999). This action
merely provides notice of receipt of negative declarations, and does
not alter the relationship or the distribution of power and
responsibilities established in the Act. This rule also is not subject
to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997), because it just
notifying the public regarding receipt of the negative declarations.
    In reviewing state plan submissions, EPA's role is to approve state
choices, provided that they meet the criteria of the Act. With regard
to negative declarations for designated facilities received by EPA from
states, EPA's role is to notify the public of the receipt of such
negative declarations and revise 40 CFR part 62 accordingly. In this
context, in the absence of a prior existing requirement for the state
to use voluntary consensus standards (VCS), EPA has no authority to
disapprove a state plan submission or negative declaration for failure
to use VCS. It would thus be inconsistent with applicable law for EPA,
when it reviews a state plan or negative declaration submission, to use
VCS in place of a state plan or negative declaration submission that
otherwise satisfies the provisions of the Act. Thus, the requirements
of section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272 note) do not apply. This rule does not
impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 62

    Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure,
Air pollution control, Commercial and industrial solid waste
incinerators, Intergovernmental relations, Other solid waste
incinerator units, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    Dated: September 13, 2018.
Cathy Stepp,
Regional Administrator, Region 5.
[FR Doc. 2018-20967 Filed 9-26-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 160 (Monday, August 19, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 42907-42908]
[FR Doc No: 2019-17730]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EL19-88-000]

New York Power Authority; Notice of Petition for Declaratory
Order

    Take notice that on August 12, 2019, pursuant to section 219 of the
Federal

Power Act,\1\ Rule 207 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(Commission) Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 385.207(a)(2)
(2018), Order No. 679,\2\ and the Commission's November 15, 2012 policy
statement on transmission incentives,\3\ the New York Power Authority
(NYPA or Petitioner), filed a petition for declaratory order seeking
incentive rate treatments for NYPA's investment in competitively
selected New York Independent System Operator, Inc. transmission
projects needed to relieve severe and chronic congestion between
upstate and downstate New York (AC Transmission Needs Projects or AC
Projects), as more fully explained in the petition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824s (2012).
    \2\ Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform,
Order No. 679, 71 FR 43,294 (July 31, 2006) FERC Stats. & Regs.
31,222 (2006) (Order No. 679), order on reh'g, Order No. 679-A, 72
FR 1152 (Jan. 10, 2007), FERC Stats & Regs. 31,236 (2006) (``Order
No. 679-A''), reh'g denied, 119 FERC ] 61,062 (2007).
    \3\ Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform,
141 FERC ] 61,129 (2012) (Incentives Policy Statement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date.
Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of
that document on the Petitioner.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the eFiling link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an
original and 5 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the
eLibrary link and is available for review in the Commission's Public
Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link on the
website that enables subscribers to receive email notification when a
document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For assistance with any
FERC Online service, please email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call
(866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: August 13, 2019.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-17730 Filed 8-16-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


40            5.64            5.09            3.78            25.7
                                              50            7.82            6.57            6.01             8.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The TTCI Summary Report suggested that the effectiveness rate
calculated in Table BR7 would change as a result of the transcription
error in Table BR4. However, this is incorrect because Table BR7
calculates the effectiveness of ECP brakes after the effectiveness of
the tank car upgrades is calculated. In other words, the ECP brake
effectiveness values reported in Table BR7 reflect the effectiveness of
ECP brakes in derailments involving DOT-117 and DOT-117R specification
tank cars. As a result, Table BR7 continues to read as follows:

        Table BR7--Effectiveness Rate of ECP Brakes Weighted by Volume of Product Spilled in a Derailment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                ECP
                                     Number of      Total spill   Share of total   effectiveness    Cumulative
                                     incidents        volume          volume        rate at 30,    effectiveness
                                                                                40, 50 mph       rate  (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below 34 mph....................              33         798,433            22.8           20.10             4.6
35-44 mph.......................               8       1,488,350            49.2           25.80            12.7
45 mph and above................               5         980,180              28            8.60             2.4
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................              46       3,499,656             100  ..............            19.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Modeling used in the final rule: The TTCI Summary Report contends
the modeling and analytical approach used in the final rule is
sufficiently different from the modeling and analytical approach used
in the NPRM, suggesting that reliance on the final Sharma report for
the final rule warranted additional notice and comment. Yet AAR
discussed this very work in detail in its comments to the NPRM review.
AAR's comments to the NPRM appended a 13-page critique of the LS-Dyna
methodology authored by Dr. Steven Kirkpatrick of Applied Research
Associates. In addition, the main body of AAR's comments to the NPRM
contained several references to both Dr. Kirkpatrick's critique as well
as Sharma's reliance on the LS-Dyna work. In developing the final rule,
we refined the modeling and analytical approach used in the NPRM to
account for and take into consideration many elements

of AAR's comments and Dr. Kirkpatrick's critique. For example, the
modeling conducted during preparation of the NPRM was limited to
modeling the results of a derailment of a 100-car train, assuming the
derailment occurred at the first car behind a train's locomotive. In
response to AAR's comments and Dr. Kirkpatrick's critique, in
developing the final rule, we conducted additional modeling again using
a 100-car train model, but this time to more accurately represent real
life derailment scenarios, we modeled and analyzed the effects of cars
derailing throughout the train consist (i.e., assuming the 20th, 50th,
and 80th cars in a consist derail), not just the first car. Similarly,
to address AAR and Dr. Kirkpatrick's concerns regarding the impactor
size used in the modeling, we conducted a sensitivity analysis using
both smaller and larger-sized impactors than used in the NPRM modeling.
This sensitivity analysis demonstrated that impactor size affected the
number of tank cars punctured and the velocity at which those cars
punctured only negligibly.
    One element of the analysis that was introduced for the final rule
was the mechanism for calculating overall effectiveness based on the
distribution of PODs along the train. This addition to the analysis was
in response to the critique of the technique by AAR/TTCI in comments to
the NPRM suggesting that this distribution be accounted for in the
analysis. This element was added to the analysis in the final rule
stage in response to AAR's comments critiquing the NPRM.
    The Sharma Report model was validated in both the number of cars
derailed and number of punctures in real life derailments such as
Aliceville. Indeed, the rear car distance traveled in one set of Dyna
simulations matched the Aliceville locomotive's event recorder data
with a difference of less than four percent. This indicates that, in
spite of all the potential variations, the derailment simulations
closely matched what actually occurred in the Aliceville accident as
evidenced by the event recorder download. See RIA, p. 214.
    On the issue of impactor size distribution, the TTCI Summary Report
notes that ``the distribution of impactor size was very similar.''
PHMSA and FRA disagree. The average impactor size variation between the
three distributions was 58 percent. We would not characterize that as
``similar.'' Past work on tank car puncture resistance--including
substantial work conducted by Dr. Kirkpatrick (and funded by the
industry/AAR)--shows that the effect of a 58 percent variation in
impactor size is quite significant.
    Furthermore, the review of Sharma's modeling in AAR's comment to
the NPRM suggested that the distribution presented above might be
skewed towards smaller impactors. However, as noted by Dr. Kirkpatrick
in his earlier work, when the combinations of complex impactor shapes
(such as couplers and broken rail) and off-axis impactor orientations
are considered, many objects will have the puncture potential of an
impactor with a characteristic size that is less than 6 inches. See
``Detailed Puncture Analysis of Tank Cars: Analyses of Different
Impactor Threats and Impact Conditions,'' Kirkpatrick, SW., DOT/FRA/
ORD-13/17, March 2013.\29\ The impactor distributions considered in
PHMSA and FRA's analysis in the final rule are consistent with this
notion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04420.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Need for additional study: The TTCI Summary Report contends that
the modeling and analysis utilize a number of assumptions and
simplifications, the effects of which need further study. AAR made a
similar comment in its comments on the NPRM, and the extended analysis
in the final rule addressed these issues by studying/reviewing several
additional elements of the methodology. PHMSA and FRA addressed several
prior criticisms submitted in connection with the NPRM, including:

 The effect of varying the POD along the length of the train
 The effect of alternate train lengths
 The effect of varying internal pressures
 The effect of varying impactor sizing, etc.

    In addition, the RIA for the final rule includes justification for
many of the assumptions made in the analysis, including the friction
coefficients used, the coupler model, and the lateral derailment load
values. See RIA, pp. 63-72, 207-212, 213-216, and 246-247. In other
words, this is similar to AAR's earlier critique on the topic and we
addressed most elements of that critique in the RIA.
    Derailment location: The TTCI Summary report states that ``the
probability distribution for derailment location within the train does
not appear to take train length into account,'' thus exaggerating the
benefit of operating in ECP brake mode. The Sharma Report estimated the
distribution of PODs using the best available data, which included all
reasonable derailments. Any ``exaggeration'' of benefits towards ECP
brakes due to the PODs being skewed towards the front of the train
would tend to exaggerate the benefit of DP trains even more. Thus, even
if the distribution was skewed towards the front, the Sharma Report
does not exaggerate the relative benefits of ECP brakes compared to DP
trains.
    Use of derailment data from all train types: The TTCI Summary
Report asserts that the analysis performed on the probability of
derailments occurring throughout the train seems to use data from all
train types to derive a distribution of derailment locations. This is
true. The locations of train derailments are more uniformly spread
under mixed traffic conditions compared to unit trains. This tends to
push the average location of POD further towards the rear of the train.
In fact, the POD, as a percent of the length of train for unit trains,
is about half that of freight trains (21% compared to 41%). As a
result, PHMSA and FRA expect that the use of derailment data of all
train types (as opposed to unit trains only), results in a prediction
of lower benefits for ECP braking. Using PODs from unit trains only
would have led to ECP brake benefits being higher. We considered this
during development of the final rule and determined our assumptions
were conservative.
    Analyzing the number of cars trailing POD: The TTCI Summary Report
notes that ``[t]he critical parameter is not the first car in the train
that was derailed, but rather the number of cars trailing the first car
derailed.'' PHMSA and FRA agree. This is exactly how all the LS-Dyna
modeling was done. We modeled 100 cars, 80 cars, 50 cars, and 20 cars
behind the POD, and interpolated the results for the other cases.
    Net braking ratios: The TTCI Summary report notes that PHMSA and
FRA make multiple references in the RIA to the use of higher net
braking ratios (NBR) with ECP brakes. While the RIA does make reference
to a higher NBR, the LS-Dyna simulations were all performed with the
same braking ratio. The results presented in the RIA are based on ECP
brakes with 12 percent NBR, the same used for the other brake systems
considered. See RIA, pp. 324. So, the benefits attributed to ECP brakes
regarding the reduced number of cars punctured do not include any
contribution from increased braking ratio.
    However, it is important to note that even though the NBR allowed
for the different brake systems are theoretically the same, the use of
ECP brakes does, as a practical matter, allow a train to better
approach the high end of the limit. This

is because features inherent to ECP brake design allow a more uniform
and consistent effective brake cylinder pressure to be maintained as
compared to conventional pneumatic brakes.\30\ Closed loop feedback
control of the cylinder pressure is an inherently more reliable method
of obtaining the commanded pressure than the open loop, volume
displacement method used in conventional brake systems. Furthermore,
trains equipped with ECP brakes can detect and report low brake
cylinder pressure malfunctions on individual cars, which can then be
addressed. In contrast, a malfunctioning pneumatic control valve
generating lower than commanded pressure may go unnoticed indefinitely.
Additionally, the overall braking ratio of a train equipped with ECP
brakes can be much closer to the allowable upper limit than a
conventionally-braked train because the cars in an ECP-equipped train
are all braking at the same effective brake ratio (to the extent that
the physical capacity of their individual construction allows). The
brake ratios of cars in a conventionally-braked train can vary over the
allowable range (8.5 percent to 14 percent loaded NBR), so the train
average brake ratio is limited by this variation already built into the
existing fleet. For these reasons, PHMSA and FRA expect that DOT-117/
DOT-117R cars (with ECP brakes) can be built (or converted from
existing cars) with an NBR close to 14 percent and operated (in ECP
trains) with a train average brake ratio also very close to 14 percent.
In contrast, the train average brake ratio of a train with conventional
air brakes is likely to be significantly lower, even if some of the
cars have close to a 14 percent NBR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ The NTSB's recent study notes that ECP brake systems can
provide the same target NBR for each car in the consist and apply a
consistent braking force to each car nearly simultaneously, which
allows all cars to decelerate at a similar rate. This minimizes run-
in forces, and therefore reduces the likelihood of a wheel
derailment and the sliding of braked wheels. All of these factors
potentially allow ECP brakes to operate nearer to AAR's upper limit
for NBR. See ``Train Braking Simulation Study,'' pp. 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Control of unit trains: The TTCI report takes issue with a
statement in the RIA to the final rule concerning unit train operations
being more difficult to control than other types of trains. The
excerpts, and TTCI's comments, are qualitative characterizations of
unit train operations. However, the excerpt from the RIA did not
influence the objective analysis we performed in support of this rule.
    Peak ECP brake benefits: TTCI takes issue with the modeling that
shows ECP brake effectiveness peaking at 40 mph. The TTCI Summary
reports states, '' [i]ntuitively, it would seem that the benefit of ECP
brakes would either increase or decrease as speed increases.''
Derailment performance is the result of several physical phenomena.
Consider a derailment that happens at a very slow speed. Given the
physical strength of the tanks and the energy levels involved, there
would be no punctures for either a conventionally braked train or an
ECP-equipped train. As a result, there would be no perceived derailment
benefit to ECP brakes at very low speeds when the benefit is measured
by puncture probability. As the speeds increase, and one starts seeing
multiple punctures as a result of the derailment, the benefits of ECP
braking become more apparent. However, at higher speeds, the percentage
of braking time spent in the ``propagation mode'' (where ECP brakes
offer the most benefit) is a smaller portion of the overall time spent
braking. Consequently, the relative benefits of ECP braking start to
diminish at speeds over 40 mph.
    Derailment rates: The derailment rate we used was based on the most
recent five complete years of data: 2009-2013. Using the most recent
years to construct this rate largely incorporates the factor of 10
decrease in the observed derailment rate cited by TTCI into our
estimate of future derailments. It is not realistic to expect tenfold
decreases in the derailment rate to continue indefinitely. In our
judgement, the rate decrease may have bottomed out, so we used a
constant rate based on the most recent data, which reduces the rate to
the fewest derailments per carload observed in the available data, to
forecast future derailments.
    Criticism of Train Operation and Energy Simulator (TOES) modeling:
The TTCI Summary Report attempts to respond to perceived criticism of
the TOES modeling TTCI used to evaluate emergency braking scenarios
involving ECP brakes. As an example, the TTCI Summary Report takes
issue with the statement in the RIA that TTCI's modeling ``only
captures a part of the benefit of ECP.'' See RIA, p. 70. TTCI contends
that

[t]his statement implies that the ECP braking system has an effect
on other aspects of the derailment dynamics that were included in
the DOT analysis, such as impactor size distributions and tank car
puncture resistance. In fact, the amount of energy is the only thing
that ECP brakes (or any brake system, for that matter) can directly
affect.

    The TTCI Summary Report's contention, however, ignores the reduced
coupler force benefits of ECP braking. The lower coupler forces
inherent to an ECP brake application reduce the chaos/energy input into
the simulation. The TTCI Summary Report did not consider or even
acknowledge the benefits associated with this aspect of ECP braking.
    The TTCI Summary Report also takes issue with statements in the RIA
discussing PHMSA and FRA's conclusion that AAR's predictions of two-way
EOT or DP performance are overestimated. See RIA, pp. 68 and 70. This
is because AAR's comments, which rely on a TTCI Summary Report, expect
that DP and two-way EOT devices offer a benefit if the derailment
occurs in the rear half of the train. This is incorrect. There is no
benefit to DP if the POD is in the second half of the train. Under
derailment conditions (where trains break in two), DP offers no benefit
over conventional brakes. By keeping the train together in their
simulations, AAR attributed benefits to DP and two-way EOT devices
where none exist. Indeed, this issue is addressed in NTSB's Train Brake
Simulation Study, published on July 20, 2015. See p. 12. While this
newly issued study was not used in the development of the final rule,
it is informative on ECP brake performance in emergency braking
compared to DP emergency braking. Indeed, the NTSB specifically looked
at derailments with air hose separation and train separation occurring
in the second half of the train and found ``there is no benefit to DP
if the emergency is initiated in the second half of the train.'' \31\
Thus, the NTSB study determined that trains operating in ECP brake mode
``[are] not substantially affected by the location of the emergency
initiation.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ NTSB also notes that this scenario is more consistent with
recent tank car derailments than a derailment where there is no
train separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, The TTCI Summary Report argues that ``there is no analysis
produced that shows that reducing the number of cars in the Aliceville
derailment from 26 to 24.5 (or even 24) cars would have resulted in a
significant--or any--benefit in terms of reduced severity of the
accident.'' We disagree. The reduction of the number of cars punctured
is fundamental to improving tank car safety. All the comments from AAR
and the industry, whether it is adding head shields, jackets, or
thickness, have aimed exactly for this result: reducing the number of
cars punctured. One way to reduce the number of cars punctured is to
stop them from entering the pile-up in the first place. By TTCI's own
analysis, which is skewed towards overestimating the benefits of DP,
ECP braking provides an eight percent reduction in the

number of cars entering the pile-up, and a further twelve percent
reduction in kinetic energy, a combined benefit of about 20 percent due
to ECP braking. If one then combines this benefit with the structural
benefit such as jackets and head shields, one starts seeing cumulative
significant reductions in damage severity, which is the intent of the
final rule.

8. Integration of ECP Brakes With Positive Train Control (PTC)

    Relying on the Oliver Wyman Report, AAR asserts that requiring ECP
brakes on HHFUTs will present integration challenges with PTC for two
reasons. First, implementation of the ECP brake requirement will
require new braking algorithms. Second, there will be difficulties
associated with installing two complex technologies on locomotives
simultaneously. PHMSA and FRA addressed both of these arguments in the
final rule and do not find either argument compelling.
    The Oliver Wyman Report states that braking algorithms will need to
be modified and that there will be great difficulty and expense
creating algorithms for PTC for ECP trains. PHMSA and FRA previously
addressed this argument in the preamble to the final rule. See 80 FR
26702-26703. We recognize that PTC coupled with ECP brakes may result
in significant business benefits--such as increased fluidity and higher
throughputs--but there is simply no regulatory requirement directing
that ECP brake systems be integrated with PTC. Further, the Oliver
Wyman Report assertion that integration is necessary for safety reasons
is not supported by data or analysis. PTC operates on a block system
with forced braking to ensure that a single block is not occupied by
two trains at once. In other words, if one train is occupying the
block, then a trailing train cannot enter the block. An algorithm based
on a conventionally braked train will provide a conservative cushion
for the stopping distance for a train operating in ECP brake mode, but
it does not change the fact that under PTC only one train will occupy
the block at a time. Operations during this time could be used to
safely collect the data needed to develop the algorithm to apply to
trains operating in ECP brake mode. Of course, once developed, the
benefits of shorter stopping distances can then be safely integrated
into the system, but such actions would be voluntary business decisions
by a railroad based on a belief that integration between ECP brakes and
PTC will provide efficiencies not otherwise available.
    The Oliver Wyman Report further contends that there will be costs
associated with placing locomotives in the shop to install ECP brake
systems in addition to PTC programming. PHMSA and FRA accounted for the
costs of installing ECP brakes on locomotives on page 219-220 of the
RIA, assigning a cost of $40,000 per locomotive.\32\ This is for new
locomotives, because PHMSA and FRA expect that the allotment of
locomotives needed to operate HHFUTs will come from new builds. As a
result, shop time likely will be reserved for regular inspections
(e.g., 92-day and 368-day inspections), at which time the railroads may
take the opportunity, to the extent necessary, to focus on PTC
installation issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ PHMSA notes that its $40,000 estimate is consistent with a
recent TTCI ECP Brakes presentation. In that presentation, TTCI
estimated the cost of equipping a locomotive with ECP brakes at
$40,000 based on a 2011 study. That is less than half the cost
estimated in the Oliver Wyman Report. PHMSA recognizes that costs
can change over time, but the presentation is instructive on the
issue of costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Oliver Wyman Report attempts to buttress its argument on costs
by stating that there will be hidden costs due to the complexity of
integrating PTC and ECP brakes on the same locomotive. Such comments
are purely anecdotal and not supported by any data or analysis. The
purported costs are unquantified in the Oliver Wyman Report and appear
to be based solely on the comments of an unnamed UP mechanical officer.
PHMSA notes that UP has minimal experience with ECP brakes, using the
technology for about eight months over six years ago.
    Finally, PHMSA and FRA note that the Oliver Wyman Report states ECP
braking is not a mature technology and, therefore, ``will increase
operational disruption and failures that compromise safety.'' PHMSA and
FRA addressed contentions about technological readiness in the RIA at
page 222-225. It is unclear why the Oliver Wyman Report insists on
characterizing ECP brake technology as ``immature.'' Such statements
are unsupported and, indeed, contradicted by various other sources. In
the RIA, we cited an independent report calling ECP a ``mature''
technology. To place the quote in context, PHMSA and FRA now cite to
the entire paragraph:

    Application of ECP-brakes in freight trains is a technology that
can reduce derailment frequency. The technology for ECP-brakes is
mature and such brakes are applied in passenger trains and in block
trains for freight in Spoornet, South Africa and by Burlington
Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and Norfolk Southern (NS) in the USA. ECP-
brakes in freight trains would reduce the longitudinal forces in the
train during braking and brake release, and in particular for low
speed braking it would significantly reduce the risk of
derailment.\33\

    \33\ See ``Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction
measures: A4--New Technologies and Approaches,'''', Report for
European Railway Agency, Report No. BA 000777/05, April 19, 2011, at
9, http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/DNV%20Study%20-%20Final%20A4%20Report%20-%2020110419%20-%20Public.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA and FRA recognize that ECP brakes are not in widespread use
in the U.S., but that is not a proxy for maturity of the technology.
AAR first began developing interchange standards for ECP brake systems
in 1993. As noted in the RIA, North American railroads have used ECP
brakes in some form since at least 1998. Australian railroads began
widespread use of ECP brakes in 2005. The technology has grown and
improved over that time as the industry has worked to resolve
``crosstalk'' and ``interoperability'' issues. Even TTCI, in its recent
ECP Brakes presentation, notes that AAR ``agrees that ECP is a mature
technology.'' Of course, this is not to suggest that no issues will
arise with ECP brakes as railroads implement the braking system on
HHFUTs. However, PHMSA and FRA account for such issues in the RIA,
recognizing there will need to be significant investment in training
and to ensure sufficient equipment is on hand to address normal
operational issues. Therefore the accumulation of business benefits was
assumed to be demonstrated one year after ECP trains are put into
service, recognizing that this change in operating culture will take
time. See RIA pg. 218.

9. Impact on Small Business

    AAR contends that the final rule fails to address or mitigate the
harmful impact on small business, including Class III railroads,
commuter railroads, smaller contractors, and hazardous materials
shippers. The basis for this contention is that federal law requires
PHMSA and FRA to assess the impact of the final rule on small business
and consider less burdensome alternatives. We did assess the impact of
the final rule on small business and considered less burdensome
alternatives to develop the final rule.
    PHMSA and FRA conducted a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (RFA),
which looked at the costs associated with small businesses for the
entire final rule. See 80 FR 26725-26735. The RFA included a focused
analysis of braking requirements. See 80 FR 26732-26733. As stated in
the RFA, about 22 percent of short lines (160 of 738 small railroads)
transport flammable liquids in

HHFTs and most small railroads the final rule affects do not operate at
speeds higher than the restricted speeds. Indeed, before we issued the
NPRM and the final rule, the American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association (ASLRRA) recommended to their members that they voluntarily
operate unit trains of crude oil at a top speed of no more than 25 mph
on all routes. ASLRRA issued this letter in response to the Secretary's
Call to Action on February 12, 2014, and it has been added to the
docket.
    PHMSA and FRA did acknowledge that some small railroads may be
affected by the ECP brake mandate because they accept unit trains of
crude oil (and other trains that trigger the mandate) from Class I
railroads. However, we accounted for this impact in two ways in the
final rule. First, as discussed on page 220 of the RIA, PHMSA and FRA
assumed an overlay ECP brake system. This will allow the tank cars to
work both with ECP brakes and conventional air brakes. While the
initial cost to the car owner is slightly higher than a stand-alone ECP
brake system, we expect that the added flexibility of an overlay system
makes it the most likely alternative to be chosen by car owners. Aa a
result, any small railroad that accepts a unit train of crude oil would
be able to use their own power (locomotives) because the trains would
travel at a maximum speed of 30 mph and would be able to use
conventional air brakes. Second, PHMSA and FRA also anticipate that
Class I and smaller railroads will make use of alternatives, such as
trackage rights or interchange agreements, which will allow smaller
railroads to avoid equipping their locomotives with ECP brakes. Under
this type of scenario, Class I railroad crews operating an HHFUT in ECP
brake mode could continue operating over the smaller railroad's line,
and the HHFUT would pass through the interchange with the train intact.
    AAR also raised the concern that short line railroads would be
assuming the responsibility for troubleshooting ECP brake-related
problems by accepting HHFUTs from Class I railroads. AAR states that
this type of troubleshooting requires expertise beyond that of most
small railroads because they do not have the resources to hire trained
electronic engineers with the necessary expertise to identify the
source of ECP system failures. PHMSA and FRA addressed the need for
training on small railroads in the RIA on page 220. Because the final
rule includes the less burdensome alternatives discussed above, PHMSA
and FRA believe that there are effective methods for avoiding the type
of training described.
    Finally, AAR states that where an interchange agreement requires
the small railroads to use existing power, there would be an enormous
expense for the small railroad because that railroad would need to
equip locomotives with ECP brakes for handling interchanged unit
trains. AAR asserts that this is a particularly large problem because
most small railroads have older locomotives that are not processor-
based and that lack the required space to install an ECP brake system.
It estimates it would cost approximately $250,000 to equip a non-
processor based locomotive with ECP brakes. For the reasons discussed
above, PHMSA and FRA do not anticipate that older locomotives would
need to be equipped.

10. Conflict With the Statute Requiring Two-Way EOT Devices

    AAR argues that the ECP brake requirement in the final rule is
prohibited by 49 U.S.C. 20141. This statute provides that ``[t]he
Secretary shall require two-way end-of-train devices (or devices able
to perform the same function) on road trains, except locals, road
switchers, or work trains, to enable the initiation of emergency
braking from the rear of a train.'' The statute further requires the
Secretary to establish performance based regulations to govern the use
of two-way EOT devices and allows the Secretary ``to allow for the use
of alternative technologies that meet the same basic performance
requirements.'' See 49 U.S.C. 20141(b)(2). AAR contends that PHMSA and
FRA's ECP braking requirement is defective because it directs freight
railroads to use ECP brake systems instead of two-way EOT devices. This
argument is without merit because any HHFUT operating in ECP brake mode
must comply with the ECP-EOT requirements in part 232, subpart G. See
Sec.  174.310(a)(3); 80 FR 26748.
    FRA initially issued regulations governing the use of conventional
two-way EOT devices in 1997. See 62 FR 278 (Jan. 2, 1997). These
regulations are in part 232, subpart E, and are targeted at trains with
conventional air brakes. Subpart E requires a conventionally braked
train to have a two-way EOT device or an alternative technology unless
it meets one of the explicit exceptions identified in Sec.  232.407(e).
For example, under Sec.  232.407(e), a conventionally braked train is
not required to operate with a two-way EOT device if a locomotive or
locomotive consist is located at the rear of the train that is capable
of making an emergency brake from the rear--as would occur with a lined
and operative DP locomotive located at the rear of the train--or when
the train does not operate over heavy grade and the speed of the train
is limited to 30 mph.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See 49 CFR 232.407(e), identifying additional exceptions to
the two-way EOT requirement for trains with conventional air brakes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AAR appears to be under the misconception that the final rule fails
to comply with 49 U.S.C. 20141 because it foregoes the requirements in
part 232, subpart E, for HHFUTs operating in excess of 30 mph. However,
the final rule pertaining to ECP brakes does comply with 49 U.S.C.
20141. It mandates compliance with part 232, subpart G, for any HHFUT
operating in ECP brake mode. Indeed, subpart G contains EOT device
requirements that are specific to trains operating in ECP brake mode.
See Sec.  232.613.
    The ECP-EOT device requirements in section 232.613 were promulgated
as part of FRA's ECP regulations in 2008. See 73 FR 60512 (Oct. 16,
2008). These regulations were issued, in part, under 49 U.S.C.
20141.\35\ See 73 FR at 61552. While ECP-EOT devices perform many of
the same functions as conventional two-way EOT devices, FRA recognized
that ECP-EOT devices also have different features than those required
for trains operated using conventional air brakes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ It is worth noting that FRA's ECP regulations were also
issued under 49 U.S.C. 20306. This provision allows the Secretary to
waive the statutory provisions in 49 U.S.C. ch. 203 ``when those
requirements preclude the development or implementation of more
efficient railroad transportation equipment or other transportation
innovations under existing law.'' FRA held public hearings on
October 4, 2007, and October 19, 2007, which included comments and
discussion about ECP-EOT devices. Based on the comments received
during these public hearings and a related public hearing on January
16, 2007, FRA determined it was appropriate to exercise the
Secretary's authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to promulgate its ECP
regulations.

    In addition to serving as the final node on the ECP brake
system's train line cable termination circuit and as the system's
`heart beat' monitoring and confirming train, brake pipe, power
supply line, and digital communications cable continuity, the ECP-
EOT device transmits to the [head end unit or] HEU a status message
that includes the brake pipe pressure, the train line cable's
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
voltage, and the ECP-EOT device's battery power level.

    See 73 FR 61545. Although FRA noted that the ECP-EOT device
operates differently than a conventional two-way EOT device, the ECP-
EOT device does ensure that an automatic emergency brake application
occurs in the event of a communication breakdown:

    Since the ECP-EOT device--unlike a conventional EOT device--will
communicate

with the HEU exclusively through the digital communications cable
and not via a radio signal, it does not need to perform the function
of venting the brake pipe to atmospheric pressure to engage an
emergency brake application. However, ECP-EOT devices do verify the
integrity of the train line cable and provide a means of monitoring
the brake pipe pressure and gradient, providing the basis for an
automatic--rather than engineer commanded--response if the system is
not adequately charged. In the case of ECP brakes, the brake pipe
becomes a redundant--rather than primary--path for sending emergency
brake application commands. Under certain communication break downs
between the ECP-EOT device, the HEU, and any number of CCDs, the
system will self-initiate an emergency brake application.

    Id. Section 232.613 requires the ECP-EOT device to send a beacon
every second from the rear unit of the train to the controlling
locomotive. The EOT beacon works as a kind of fail-safe. It functions
virtually identically to the radio signal of a conventional two-way EOT
device with one important exception: if the EOT Beacon is lost for six
seconds on a train operated in ECP brake mode, then the train goes into
penalty brake application, which will brake all cars in the train
simultaneously. In contrast, a two-way EOT device may lose
communication for up to 16 minutes, 30 seconds, at which point the
train speed must be reduced to 30 mph.
    Based on these factors, PHMSA and FRA conclude that the ECP brake
component of the final rule complies with the requirements of 49 U.S.C.
20141. AAR should be aware that HHFUTs operating in ECP brake mode must
have an ECP-EOT or an appropriate alternative, such as an ECP-equipped
locomotive, at the rear of the train. This requirement is consistent
with FRA's ECP brake regulations at part 232, subpart G.
    For the above reasons, AAR's appeal to eliminate the new ECP brake
standard of the final rule is denied.

III. Summary

    PHMSA denies the appellants' (DGAC, ACC, AAR, AFPM, and Treaty
Tribes) appeals on Scope of Rulemaking, Tribal Impacts and
Consultation, Retrofit Timeline and Tank Car Reporting Requirements,
Thermal Protection for Tank Cars, and Advanced Brake Signal Propagation
Systems. We conclude we reasonably determined how to apply new
regulations and provided the regulatory analysis to support those
decisions. While we understand that shippers, carriers, and tank car
manufacturers for Class 3 flammable liquids will face new challenges in
the wake of these regulations, we maintain that they are capable of
complying with the final rule.
    We also deny DGAC's appeal to eliminate or provide further guidance
for the Sampling and Testing program. The sampling and testing program
is reasonable, justified, necessary, and clear as written.
Additionally, we disagree that a delayed compliance date of March 31,
2016 should be provided for implementation of the requirements in Sec.
173.41 for shippers to implement changes for training and
documentation.
    With respect to Information Sharing/Notification, PHMSA announced
in a May 28, 2015, notice that it would extend the Emergency Order
applicable to the topic of Information Sharing/Notification
indefinitely, while it considered options for codifying the disclosure
requirement permanently. Furthermore, on July 22, 2015, FRA issued a
public letter instructing railroads transporting crude oil that they
must continue to notify SERCs of the expected movement of Bakken crude
oil trains through individual States. While the treaty tribes and other
stakeholders will have the opportunity to comment on these future
regulatory proposals in the course of that rulemaking proceeding, PHMSA
will continue to seek opportunities to reach out to the tribes and
consultation from tribal leaders.

    Issued in Washington, DC on November 5, 2015.
Marie Therese Dominguez,
Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 2015-28774 Filed 11-17-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-60-P


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 157 (Tuesday, August 14, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40384-40385]
[FR Doc No: 2018-17462]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

Agency Information Collection Activities: Requests for Comments;
Clearance of Renewed Approval of Information Collection: Dealer's
Aircraft Registration Certificate Application

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, FAA

invites public comments about our intention to request the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) approval to renew an information
collection. The collection involves submittal of pertinent information
by a business or an individual to support issuance by the FAA of a
Dealer's Aircraft Registration Certificate, which allows operation of
an aircraft on a temporary basis under the auspices of a dealer
business rather than having to obtain permanent registration. The
Federal Register Notice with a 60-day comment period soliciting
comments on the following collection of information was published on
June 7, 2018.

DATES: Written comments should be submitted by September 13, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on
the proposed information collection to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. Comments should be
addressed to the attention of the Desk Officer, Department of
Transportation/FAA, and sent via electronic mail to
[email protected], or faxed to<PHONE_NUMBER>, or mailed to
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management
and Budget, Docket Library, Room 10102, 725 17th Street NW, Washington,
DC 20503.
    Public Comments Invited: You are asked to comment on any aspect of
this information collection, including (a) Whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary for FAA's performance; (b) the
accuracy of the estimated burden; (c) ways for FAA to enhance the
quality, utility and clarity of the information collection; and (d)
ways that the burden could be minimized without reducing the quality of
the collected information. The agency will summarize and/or include
your comments in the request for OMB's clearance of this information
collection.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Barbara Hall by email at:
[email protected]; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    OMB Control Number: 2120-0024.
    Title: Dealer's Aircraft Registration Certificate Application.
    Form Numbers: AC Form 8050-5.
    Type of Review: Renewal of an information collection.
    Background: Public Law 103-272 states that all aircraft must be
registered before they may be flown. It sets forth registration
eligibility requirements and provides for application for registration
as well as suspension and/or revocation of registration.
    a. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 47 prescribes procedures
that implement Public Law 103-272 which provides for the issuance of
dealer's aircraft registration certificates and for their use in
connection with aircraft eligible for registration under this Act by
persons engaged in manufacturing, distributing or selling aircraft.
Dealer's certificates enable such persons to fly aircraft for sale
immediately without having to go through the paperwork and expense of
applying for and securing a permanent Certificate of Aircraft
Registration. It also provides a system of identification of aircraft
dealers.
    b. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 47 establishes
procedures for implementing Section 505 of the Act. Specifically,
Subpart C, Parts 47.61 through 47.71, describes procedures for
obtaining and using dealer's certificates in FAR Part 47.63, elicit the
information needed from the applicant in order to comply with Section
505 of the Act and FAR Part 47, Subpart C.
    Respondents: Application for dealer's certificate may be made by
any individual or company engaged in manufacturing, distributing, or
selling aircraft who wants to be able operate those aircraft with a
dealer's certificate instead of registering them permanently in the
name of the entity.
    Frequency: To maintain the certificate, the holder must renew/re-
submit annually as the certificate expires one year after issuance.
    Estimated Average Burden per Response: 45 minutes.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden: During FY-2017, the FAA received
3,579 applications for dealer certificate, which equals 2684.25 hours.

    Issued in Washington, DC on August 7, 2018.
Robin Darden,
Management Support Specialist, Performance, Policy, and Records
Management Branch, ASP-110.
[FR Doc. 2018-17462 Filed 8-13-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P