[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 122 (Tuesday, June 27, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 41477-41499]
[FR Doc No: 2023-13268]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 141

[Docket Nos. RM22-16-000, AD21-13-000; Order No. 897]

One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather Vulnerability
Assessments Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric System
Reliability

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is
adopting a reporting requirement to direct transmission providers to
file one-time informational reports describing their current or planned
policies and processes for conducting extreme weather vulnerability
assessments. The Commission defines an extreme weather vulnerability
assessment as any analysis that identifies where and under what
conditions jurisdictional transmission assets and operations are at
risk from the impacts of extreme weather events, how those risks will
manifest themselves, and what the consequences will be for system
operations. Specifically, the Commission requires transmission
providers to file a one-time informational report on whether, and if so
how, they establish a scope, develop inputs, identify vulnerabilities
and exposure to extreme weather hazards, and estimate the costs of
impacts in their extreme weather vulnerability assessments, as well as
how they use the results of those assessments to develop risk
mitigation measures.

DATES: This rule is effective September 25, 2023. Each transmission
provider must file the one-time informational report required by this
final rule by October 25, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Alyssa Meyer (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected]
Neal Anderson (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

                                                               Paragraph
                                                                 Nos.

I. Introduction.............................................           1
II. Background..............................................           5
III. Need for Reports.......................................          15
    A. NOPR Proposal........................................          15
    B. Comments.............................................          16
    C. Commission Determination.............................          20
IV. Discussion on Required Reports..........................          29
    A. Reporting Requirement................................          29
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          29
        2. Comments.........................................          34
        3. Commission Determination.........................          47
    B. Scope................................................          62
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          62
        2. Comments.........................................          63
        3. Commission Determination.........................          68
    C. Inputs...............................................          71
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          71
        2. Comments.........................................          72
        3. Commission Determination.........................          77

    D. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather                82
     Hazards................................................
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          82
        2. Comments.........................................          83
        3. Commission Determination.........................          84
    E. Costs of Impacts.....................................          86
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          86
        2. Comments.........................................          87
        3. Commission Determination.........................          89
    F. Risk Mitigation......................................          91
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          91
        2. Comments.........................................          92
        3. Commission Determination.........................          95
    G. Compliance Issues....................................          98
        1. Deadline for Filing the One-Time Informational             98
         Reports............................................
        2. Public Comment on the One-Time Informational              101
         Reports............................................
        3. Treatment of Confidential Information............         107
    H. Issues Outside the Scope of This Final Rule..........         110
        1. Comments.........................................         110
        2. Commission Determination.........................         113
V. Information Collection Statement.........................         114
VI. Environmental Analysis..................................         117
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act.............................         118
VIII. Document Availability.................................         121
IX. Effective Date and Congressional Notification...........         124
X. Appendix A: Report Questions
    A. Scope
    B. Inputs
    C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather
     Hazards
    D. Costs of Impacts
    E. Risk Mitigation
XI. Appendix B: Edits Demonstrating Modifications To Report
 Questions Proposed in the NOPR
    A. Scope
    B. Inputs
    C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather
     Hazards
    D. Cost of Impacts
    E. Risk Mitigation

I. Introduction

    1. In this final rule, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) directs transmission providers to file one-time
informational reports, pursuant to section 304 of the Federal Power Act
(FPA),\1\ describing their current or planned policies and processes
for conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments of their
Commission-jurisdictional transmission assets and operations. For the
purpose of these reports, we define an extreme weather vulnerability
assessment as an analysis that identifies where and under what
conditions jurisdictional transmission assets and operations are at
risk from the impacts of extreme weather events, how those risks will
manifest themselves, and what the consequences will be for system
operations.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
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    2. As explained in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR),\2\ we
find that while weather events have impacted the transmission grid
throughout its history, the frequency and severity of extreme weather
events is increasing.\3\ A robust and growing body of scientific
evidence attributes this trend to climate change and indicates that
this trend will persist.\4\ For the reasons discussed below, we find
that that the trend threatens livelihoods, electric system reliability,
and the Commission's ability to ensure just and reasonable
jurisdictional rates. Our actions in this final rule will result in a
fuller record as to whether and how transmission providers assess and
mitigate vulnerabilities to extreme weather and will enable
coordination among transmission providers as well as information
sharing on best practices.
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    \2\ One-Time Informational Reps. on Extreme Weather
Vulnerability Assessments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 87 FR 39
414 (July 1, 2022), 179 FERC ] 61,196 (2022) (NOPR).
    \3\ See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.,
National Centers for Environmental. Information, U.S. Billion-Dollar
Weather and Climate Disasters (2023), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/; Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change
Indicators: Weather and Climate (May 12, 2021) (EPA Climate Change
Indicators), https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-climate;
see also NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 2.
    \4\ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change
2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2022); National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Attribution of
Extreme Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change (2016);
Herring, S.C., N. Christidis, A. Hoell, M.P. Hoerling, and P.A.
Stott, Eds., Explaining Extreme Events of 2020 from a Climate
Perspective, 103 Bulletin of the American Meteoreorological Society
3 (2022).
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    3. As discussed further below, in this final rule, we direct each
transmission provider \5\ to file, in the above-captioned dockets, a
one-time informational report on its extreme weather vulnerability
assessment and risk mitigation efforts within 120 days of the
publication of this final rule in the Federal Register. This one-time
informational report should include whether, and if so how,
transmission providers: (1) establish a scope; (2) develop inputs; (3)
identify vulnerabilities and exposure to extreme weather hazards; (4)
estimate the costs

of impacts in their extreme weather vulnerability assessments; and (5)
use the results of those assessments to develop risk mitigation
measures. This final rule only seeks to gather information on current
and planned policies and processes from transmission providers, not to
establish new requirements.
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    \5\ See infra PP 47-50. In this final rule, unless otherwise
noted, we use the term ``transmission provider'' to mean any public
utility that owns, controls, or operates facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. See 16
U.S.C. 824(e); 18 CFR 35.28 (2022). To be clear, this term
encompasses public utility transmission owners that are members of
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Independent System
Operators (ISO). Accordingly, the reports we are proposing herein
would be filed by either the public utility members of RTOs/ISOs,
the RTOs/ISOs themselves, or both, as well as other public utility
transmission providers outside of RTO/ISO regions.
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    4. We largely adopt the Commission's proposal in the NOPR issued on
June 16, 2022, with certain modifications. Among other things, we have
revised aspects of the NOPR proposal to ask how each transmission
provider defines extreme weather in its vulnerability assessments and
how RTOs/ISOs account for differences between transmission owner
members' assessment assumptions and results. Additionally, we revise
questions 8 and 19, which were proposed in the NOPR, by replacing
references to disadvantaged and vulnerable communities, and affected
and frontline communities, respectively, with the term ``affected
communities.'' We use the term ``affected communities'' in this final
rule to include disadvantaged,\6\ vulnerable, and frontline
communities,\7\ and any other community or stakeholder group
respondents consider in their extreme weather vulnerability assessments
that may be affected, currently or in the future, by the impacts of
extreme weather on jurisdictional electric transmission assets and
operations.
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    \6\ Exact definitions and thresholds used to identify
disadvantaged communities vary. However, we note that the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) explains that ``[d]isadvantaged
communities refers to the areas throughout California which most
suffer from a combination of economic, health, and environmental
burdens. These burdens include poverty, high unemployment, air and
water pollution, presence of hazardous wastes as well as high
incidence of asthma and heart disease.'' CPUC, Disadvantaged
Communities (last visited May 17, 2023), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/infrastructure/
disadvantaged-communities#:~:text=Disadvantaged%20communities%20refer
s%20to%20the,of%20asthma%20and%20heart%20disease.
    \7\ Georgetown Climate Center explains that ``[f]rontline
communities include people who are both highly exposed to climate
risks (because of the places they live and the projected changes
expected to occur in those places) and have fewer resources,
capacity, safety nets, or political power to respond to those risks
(e.g., these people may lack insurance or savings, inflexible jobs,
low levels of influence over elected officials, etc.).'' Georgetown
Climate Center, Equitable Adaptation Legal & Policy Toolkit (last
visited May 18, 2023), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/toolkits/equitable-adaptation-toolkit/introduction.html.
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II. Background

    5. The NOPR, as supplemented by the record in this proceeding, as
well as recent events illustrate the increasing frequency and severity
of extreme weather events and their impact on reliability and rates.
    6. While the nature of extreme weather and the extent of
transmission impairments will vary across different regions of the
U.S., no region will be unaffected. Indeed, in its 2022 Long-Term
Reliability Assessment, the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) lists the need for the industry and policymakers to
include extreme weather scenarios in resource and system planning among
its top recommendations to address reliability risks.\8\ Similarly, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in May 2021
stating that climate change is expected to have far-reaching effects on
the electric grid that could cost billions of dollars and could affect
the ability of grid operators to transmit electricity.\9\ GAO
identified potential impacts of climate change-driven extreme weather
to the grid in every region of the U.S. and discussed the risk that,
absent measures to increase resilience, more frequent and severe
weather associated with climate change is likely to increase the cost
of outages, imposing billions of dollars in costs on utility
customers.\10\ GAO recommended that the Commission take steps to
identify and assess climate change risks to the grid in order to ensure
the Commission is well-positioned to determine the actions needed to
enhance resilience to those risks.\11\
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    \8\ NERC, 2022 Long-term Reliability Assessment 8 (Dec. 2022),
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf.
    \9\ GAO, Electricity Grid Resilience: Climate Change Is Expected
to Have Far-Reaching Effects and DOE and FERC Should Take Actions
(Mar. 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-423t.pdf.
    \10\ Id. at 4.
    \11\ Id. at 8.
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    7. In early 2023, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) National Centers for Environmental Information
released the final update to its 2022 figures on weather and climate
disasters. That update identifies each disaster that caused damages
exceeding one billion dollars,\12\ using insurance data to estimate
damage costs.\13\ The update shows that the U.S. experienced 18
separate billion-dollar weather and climate disasters in 2022, as well
as a macro-level trend of increasingly costly, numerous, and intense
disasters. NOAA reports that 2022 had the third highest number of
billion-dollar weather and climate disasters since it began tracking in
1980, tied with 2011 and 2017, and that, at $165 billion in damages,
2022 also ranked third highest in total damage costs, behind 2017 and
2005.\14\
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    \12\ NOAA, Adam Smith, 2022 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters in Historical Context (last visited June 1, 2023),
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/.
    \13\ See Adam B. Smith, Richard W. Katz, U.S. Billion-dollar
Weather and Climate Disasters: Data Sources, Trends, Accuracy, and
Biases, 67 Natural Hazards 387 (Feb. 3, 2013), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/monitoring-content/billions/docs/smith-and-katz-2013.pdf.
    \14\ NOAA, Adam Smith, 2022 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters in Historical Context (last visited June 1, 2023),
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/. NOAA notes that
increasing population and material wealth throughout the country,
especially in regions vulnerable to extreme weather events, is an
important factor in the rising costs described. NOAA also notes that
2022's figures may rise by several billion additional dollars when
the costs of Winter Storm Elliot in the Central and Eastern United
States are fully accounted for. Furthermore, this total only
captures the costs of those weather and climate disasters that
exceeded $1 billion in damages, based on insurance data.
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    8. Reliable electric service is vital to the nation's economy,
national security, public health, and safety. Yet, in the past three
years alone, region-wide heat waves, cold snaps, hurricanes, and
wildfires have resulted in outages or other significant reliability
impacts, often while contributing to substantial consumer costs.\15\
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    \15\ Indeed, NERC found that all of the days in 2021 with the
highest severity risk index, a quantitative measure of the relative
severity of risks to the bulk-power system, were attributed to some
type of weather occurrence. NERC, 2022 State of Reliability Report
20 (2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/PA/Performance%20Analysis%20DL/NERC_SOR_2022.pdf.
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    9. In December 2022, Winter Storm Elliot impacted a swath of the
U.S. with record cold temperatures and blizzard conditions in some
areas, causing 1.6 million customers to lose power.\16\ PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) and Midcontinent Independent System
Operator, Inc. (MISO) saw high load forecast errors during this period
due to the unprecedented nature and scale of that storm. As unusually
low temperatures drove electricity demand up, almost 65 GW of
generating capacity was forced offline between these two RTOs/ISOs.\17\
These outages highlight, first, the difficulty in preparing for extreme
weather patterns that increasingly diverge from historical trends, and
second, how extreme weather events can often drive the need for
potentially lifesaving energy when it

is most difficult for the bulk-power system to deliver it.
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    \16\ FERC, 2022 State of the Markets (Mar. 16, 2023), https://www.ferc.gov/media/report-2022-state-market.
    \17\ See MISO, Overview of Winter Storm Elliott December 23,
Maximum Generation Event 10 (Jan. 17, 2023), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20230117%20RSC%20Item%2005%20Winter%20Storm%20Elliott%20Preliminary%20Report627535.pdf; PJM, Winter Storm Elliott 11 (2023), https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2023/20230111/item---winter-storm-elliott-overview.ashx.
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    10. Hurricane Ian, a strong Category 4 storm in September 2022,
left 2.6 million customers without power and caused an estimated $113
billion of damage.\18\ Hurricane Ida resulted in outages for more than
one million customers across eight states in August 2021,\19\ with the
most severe impacts in Louisiana, which saw the collapse of a
transmission tower and an outage of more than 2,000 miles of
transmission lines outside of New Orleans.\20\ Some customers were
without electricity for nearly a month after Hurricane Ida's
landfall.\21\ In July 2021, wildfires in Oregon limited the ability to
import electricity into California as temperatures soared above 100
degrees Fahrenheit, ultimately triggering emergency demand response
measures to avoid reliability impacts.\22\ During Winter Storm Uri in
February 2021, more than four and half million people in Texas alone
lost power, and in some cases the outages contributed to loss of
life.\23\ Winter Storm Uri caused over 65 GW of unplanned generation
outages, the nation's largest controlled firm load shed, at 23,418 MW,
and drove energy prices to historic levels across Texas and the South-
Central U.S.\24\ In August 2020, California experienced rolling outages
during a West-wide extreme heat event that impacted nearly 500,000
customers.\25\
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    \18\ NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information,
September 2022 National Climate Report: Hurricane Ian Special
Summary (Oct. 2022), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/monitoring/monthly-report/national/202209/supplemental/page-5.
    \19\ U.S. Energy Information Administration., Hurricane Ida
Caused At Least 1.2 Million Customers to Lose Power (Sept. 15,
2021), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49556.
    \20\ See S. Van Voorhis, Transmission Tower Destroyed by Ida
Likely to Complicate Power Restoration in New Orleans, Experts Say,
Utility Dive (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/transmission-tower-destroyed-by-ida-likely-to-complicate-power-restoration/605826/.
    \21\ U.S. Department of Energy, Hurricanes Ida and Nicholas
Update # 20 (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-09/TLP-WHITE_DOE%20Situation%20Update_Hurricane%20Ida_20.pdf.
    \22\ See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., California ISO Issues
Flex Alert for Monday, July 12 Due to Wildfires, Heat (July 11,
2021), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/California-ISO-Issues-Flex-Alert-for-Monday-July-12-due-to-Wildfires-Heat.pdf.
    \23\ FERC, FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Staff Report: The February
2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United
States 9 (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-south-central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and.
    \24\ Id. at 8-9; see also Elec. Reliability Council of Texas,
Review of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event 22 (2021),
https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/03/03/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-25-2021.pdf (average system wide
pricing during event greater than $6000/MWh compared to $18-20/MWh
in more typical conditions); Sw. Power Pool, Inc, A Comprehensive
Review of SPP's Response to the February 2021 Winter Storm 72
(2021), https://spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp's%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%2020
21%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf (``SPP experienced
historically high market settlements for the impacted operating
days''); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, The February Artic
Event: Event Details, Lessons Learned, and Implications for MISO's
Reliability Imperative 45 (2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2021%20Arctic%20Event%20Report554429.pdf (Independent Market Monitor
reports average energy prices rose 226 percent in February because
of the Artic Event in February).
    \25\ See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Final Root Cause
Analysis: Mid-August 2020 Extreme Heat Wave 35 (Jan. 13, 2021),
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Final-Root-Cause-Analysis-Mid-August-2020-Extreme-Heat-Wave.pdf.
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    11. The record shows that extreme weather events can also increase
electricity prices because grid operators are forced to dispatch
higher-priced generators to account for transmission line outages.\26\
The level of increased electricity prices depends on a number of
variables, including the clearing price for electricity, the duration
of the outage, and the load.\27\ For example, Winter Storm Uri had a
significant impact on consumers as energy prices rose to historic
levels in the wholesale markets serving Texas and the South-Central
region during the event.\28\ Above-average temperatures exacerbate
reliability risks by contributing to prolonged periods of high
electricity demand, decreased transmission capacity, and higher forced
outage rates for generation and other elements of the bulk-power
system. The historic 2021 drought across much of the western U.S. also
reduced hydropower generation, a key component of the generation fleet
in that region, to 48% below the 10-year average in California and 14%
below the 10-year average in the Pacific Northwest.\29\ Heavy
precipitation during winter 2022-2023 has since reduced the area of the
western U.S. classified as ``in drought'' from 74% to 25% \30\ and
increased snowpack from 22% of the historic median to 232%.\31\
However, although the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
forecasts a 72% increase in California hydropower generation in 2023,
it forecasts total hydropower generation to remain roughly equal to
2022 levels due to continued below normal precipitation and a mixed
water supply forecast in the Pacific Northwest.\32\
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    \26\ See, e.g., Dale et al., Assessing the Impact of Wildfires
on the California Electricity Grid: A report for California's Fourth
Climate Assessment 16-18 (Aug. 2018), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/Forests_CCCA4-CEC-2018-002_ada.pdf
(estimating multi-million-dollar cost increases per event due to
disruption of transmission paths caused by wildfires).
    \27\ Id.
    \28\ See Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Review of February
2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event 22 (2021), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/03/03/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-25-2021.pdf
(average system wide pricing during event greater than $6000/MWh
compared to $18-20/MWh in more typical conditions); Sw. Power Pool,
Inc., A Comprehensive Review of SPP's Response to the February 2021
Winter Storm 72 (2021), https://spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp's%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%2020
21%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf (``SPP experienced
historically high market settlements for the impacted operating days
. . . .''); MISO, The February Artic Event: Event Details, Lessons
Learned, and Implications for MISO's Reliability Imperative 45
(2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2021%20Arctic%20Event%20Report554429.pdf (Independent Market Monitor
reports average energy prices rose 226% in February because of the
Artic Event in February).
    \29\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Drought Effects on
Hydroelectricity Generation in Western U.S. Differed by Region in
2021 (Mar. 30, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51839.
    \30\ Jennifer Yachnin, NOAA Reports Big Decrease in Western
Drought Conditions, E&E NewsPM (4:15PM May 9, 2023).
    \31\ FERC, Summer Energy Market and Electric Reliability
Assessment 3, 43-44 (May 2023), https://www.ferc.gov/media/report-2023-summer-energy-market-and-electric-reliability-assessment.
    \32\ EIA, Mixed Water Supply Condition Across Western States
Affects 2023 Hydropower Outlook (May 2023), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56440.
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    12. On June 1-2, 2021, in the aftermath of Winter Storm Uri's
impact on the South-Central U.S., Commission staff hosted a technical
conference on Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric System
Reliability. The technical conference and comments underscored the
importance of planning appropriately for extreme weather. But the
record did not provide the Commission with a clear understanding of
whether and to what extent transmission providers are currently
conducting, or planning to conduct, extreme weather vulnerability
assessments, the method(s) used to conduct those assessments, and what
is done with the information from those assessments.\33\
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    \33\ Based on the record developed during the technical
conference, these assessments did not appear to be widespread among
transmission providers at that time. In addition, of the six
jurisdictional RTOs/ISOs, only New York Independent System Operator,
Inc. appeared to have conducted such an assessment. Yet not every
RTO/ISO or transmission provider has indicated whether or not it
performs these assessments. Therefore, we believe that this one-time
informational reporting requirement will provide the necessary
information for the Commission to understand the extent to which
transmission providers are currently performing these assessments.
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    13. On June 16, 2022, the Commission issued the NOPR in this
proceeding and

proposed to require transmission providers to report on whether and how
they assess and mitigate the risks of extreme weather to jurisdictional
transmission assets and operations. In response to the NOPR, the
Commission received 18 comments from a diverse set of stakeholders.
    14. On July 12, 2022, the Commission issued an errata notice to
correct a series of NOPR question paragraphs with numbering errors.\34\
In this final rule, we refer to the questions as listed in Appendix A.
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    \34\ One-Time Informational Reps. on Extreme Weather
Vulnerability Assessments, Errata Notice, 180 FERC ] 61,020, at 1
(2022).
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III. Need for Reports

A. NOPR Proposal

    15. In the NOPR, the Commission stressed that the trend of the
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events threatens
livelihoods, electric system reliability, and the Commission's ability
to ensure just and reasonable jurisdictional rates. The Commission
found that it does not yet know enough about how transmission providers
assess and mitigate the threat of extreme weather to their transmission
assets and operations. Accordingly, the Commission proposed to require
one-time informational reports on extreme weather vulnerability
assessments and mitigation efforts pursuant to FPA section 304, which
allows the Commission to order reports as ``necessary or appropriate to
assist the Commission in the proper administration of [the FPA].'' \35\
The Commission preliminarily found that the proposed reports could also
facilitate coordination among transmission providers and promote
information sharing about extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
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    \35\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
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B. Comments

    16. Most commenters support the Commission's proposal to require
transmission providers to file one-time informational reports on
extreme weather vulnerability assessments, including: Ameren Services
Company (Ameren), Bureau of Reclamation, Edison Electric Institute
(EEI), Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), Electric Reliability
Organization Enterprise (ERO Enterprise),\36\ Environmental Defense
Fund and Columbia Law School's Sabin Center for Climate Change Law
(EDF/Sabin Center), Eversource Energy Service Company (Eversource),
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners (PJM TO),\37\ MISO Transmission
Owners (MISO TO),\38\ National Association of Mutual Insurance
Companies (NAMIC), National Mining Association, PJM, Public Interest
Organizations,\39\ San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), and WE ACT
for Environmental Justice (WE ACT).\40\ ERO Enterprise notes that
extreme weather events, particularly extreme heat and cold conditions,
have threatened reliability multiple times over the past decade, and
that the grid is increasingly vulnerable to the effects of extreme
weather.\41\ Public Interest Organizations state that in February 2022,
the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
reported that the effects of climate change are already pervasive and
acknowledged that more frequent and intense extreme weather events are
putting stress on the grid.\42\ Public Interest Organizations argue
that it is imperative that the Commission understand the impacts of
extreme weather on the transmission system and how transmission
providers are addressing them.\43\ EEI agrees that the informational
reports can help the Commission understand the extent to which
transmission providers are assessing extreme weather vulnerabilities
and help inform transmission providers when developing their own
extreme weather vulnerability assessment practices.\44\ EPSA notes that
data from recent seasonal assessments highlights that extreme weather
impacts not only all regions but all resource types in some manner.
EPSA argues that information on whether and how transmission providers
are assessing weather and other reliability risks over the near- and
longer-term will be critical in establishing a reality-based
understanding of how transmission providers are addressing these
issues, what may need to be reformed, and whether to reassess
reliability planning criteria, capacity accreditation approaches, and
new products or services to mitigate extreme weather reliability
risks.\45\ EDF/Sabin Center highlight a 2020 study that found that
failing to build resilience into infrastructure from the start could
lead to a 25% increase in transmission and distribution spending each
year by 2090.\46\ Conversely, the same study found that building such
infrastructure for projected climate conditions can halve the expected
annual costs of climate change experienced by 2090.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ ERO Enterprise includes NERC and the six Regional Entities.
    \37\ PJM TOs include: Exelon Corporation; the FirstEnergy
Transmission Companies, including American Transmission Systems,
Incorporated, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic
Interstate Transmission LLC, West Penn Power Company, The Potomac
Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company; PPL Electric Utilities
Corporation; Public Service Electric and Gas Company; and Virginia
Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia.
    \38\ MISO TOs consist of: Ameren Services Company, as agent for
Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri, Ameren Illinois
Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois and Ameren Transmission Company of
Illinois; American Transmission Company LLC; Big Rivers Electric
Corporation; Central Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; City Water,
Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Cleco Power LLC; Cooperative
Energy; Dairyland Power Cooperative; Duke Energy Business Services,
LLC for Duke Energy Indiana, LLC; East Texas Electric Cooperative;
Entergy Arkansas, LLC; Entergy Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Mississippi,
LLC; Entergy New Orleans, LLC; Entergy Texas, Inc.; Great River
Energy; GridLiance Heartland LLC; Hoosier Energy Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc.; Indiana Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis
Power & Light Company; International Transmission Company d/b/a ITC
Transmission; ITC Midwest LLC; Lafayette Utilities System; Michigan
Electric Transmission Company, LLC; MidAmerican Energy Company;
Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Missouri
River Energy Services; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern
Indiana Public Service Company LLC; Northern States Power Company, a
Minnesota corporation, and Northern States Power Company, a
Wisconsin corporation, subsidiaries of Xcel Energy Inc.;
Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company; Otter Tail Power Company;
Prairie Power, Inc.; Republic Transmission, LLC; Southern Illinois
Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (d/b/a
CenterPoint Energy Indiana South); Southern Minnesota Municipal
Power Agency; Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.; and Wolverine
Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.
    \39\ Public Interest Organizations consist of: Sustainable FERC
Project, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Southern
Environmental Law Center, and Western Resource Advocates.
    \40\ Ameren Comments at 1, 4; Bureau of Reclamation Comments at
1; EDF/Sabin Center Comments 3-4; EEI Comments at 3; EPSA Comments
at 3; ERO Enterprise Comments at 2, 4-5; Eversource Comments at 3;
MISO TOs Comments at 2, 4; NAMIC Comments at 2; National Mining
Association Comments at 2; PJM Comments at 3; PJM TOs Comments at 2;
Public Interest Organizations Comments at 1; SDG&E Comments at 1; WE
ACT Comments at 2.
    \41\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 4.
    \42\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 1-2 (citing IPCC,
Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability--Summary
for Policymakers 7 (Feb. 27, 2022), https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/IPCCAR6WGIISummaryForPolicymakers.pdf).
    \43\ Id. at 2.
    \44\ EEI Comments at 3.
    \45\ EPSA Comments at 7.
    \46\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 10 (citing Charles Fant et
al., Climate Change Impacts and Costs to U.S. Electricity
Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure, 195 Energy 116,899, at
1, 7 (Mar. 2020)).
    \47\ Id. (citing Charles Fant et al., Climate Change Impacts and
Costs to U.S. Electricity Transmission and Distribution
Infrastructure, 195 Energy 116,899, at 7 (Mar. 2020)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    17. Several commenters express concern over the impact extreme
weather will have on jurisdictional rates. Public Interest
Organizations aver that the extent to which transmission providers
assess their vulnerabilities to

extreme weather events is unclear, and without access to this
information, the Commission cannot assess whether and how those
practices are leading to unjust and unreasonable rates.\48\ NAMIC
states that extreme weather, coupled with inadequate resiliency, will
impact insurance markets and the public in addition to the power
sector. NAMIC asserts that federal and state energy regulators' failure
to ensure grid resiliency will negatively impact consumers and the
broader economy.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 4 (arguing that
if transmission providers do not assess their vulnerability to
extreme weather, or do so inadequately, consumers ultimately bear
the cost of increased outages and replacing damaged facilities).
    \49\ NAMIC Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    18. Commenters also agree that the Commission has authority to
direct reports on extreme weather vulnerability assessments.\50\ Public
Interest Organizations agree with the Commission that if transmission
providers do not assess their vulnerability to extreme weather, or do
so inadequately, consumers ultimately bear the cost of increased
outages and replacing damaged facilities.\51\ ERO Enterprise notes
that, while the Commission proposed these reports to aid in its
statutory obligations under FPA section 215, the reports will also aid
ERO Enterprise in carrying out its own statutory obligations with
respect to reliability.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 11-13; Public Interest
Organizations Comments at 3-4.
    \51\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 4 (citing NOPR,
179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 16).
    \52\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    19. Many commenters argue that the one-time reports will offer a
record to develop best practices.\53\ SDG&E contends that the proposed
one-time reports could be a useful means of sharing information and
best practices and aiding transmission provider efforts to manage
reliability risks.\54\ Similarly, ERO Enterprise agrees that the
proposed reports would improve transparency and information sharing
between transmission providers, which could ultimately benefit
reliability.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ E.g., Eversource Comments at 3; Xcel Comments at 5-6.
    \54\ SDG&E Comments at 3.
    \55\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Commission Determination

    20. FPA section 304 authorizes the Commission to require the filing
of special reports the Commission ``prescribe[s] as necessary or
appropriate to assist the Commission in the proper administration of
[the FPA].'' \56\ FPA section 215 provides the Commission with
jurisdiction for overseeing the development and enforcement of
reliability standards for the bulk-power system.\57\ Additionally, FPA
sections 205 and 206 require that the Commission ensure that the rates,
terms, and conditions of Commission-jurisdictional services are just
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
    \57\ Id. 824o; see NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 15.
    \58\ 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e; see NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    21. As discussed above, the frequency and severity of extreme
weather events have been increasing, are likely to continue to
increase, and, thereby, will likely continue to jeopardize system
reliability and affect jurisdictional electric rates.
    22. The record shows that extreme weather events can significantly
impact reliability of the bulk-power system. The events outlined above
exemplify the reliability impacts of Hurricane Ian in September 2022,
Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022, Winter Storm Uri in February
2021, and Hurricane Ida in August 2021, as well as the wildfires in
July 2021 and the extreme west-wide heat event in August 2020.
    23. Generally, as the Commission explained in the NOPR, the failure
to assess and mitigate the risks of extreme weather could increase the
frequency of loss of load events, burden consumers with more frequent
outages and costs, and lead to higher prices for wholesale
electricity.\59\ SDG&E notes that the frequency, intensity, and
duration of wildfires in southern California are increasing due to
climate change, which threatens public safety and also requires
mitigation efforts in the form of public safety power shutoff.\60\
Public Interest Organizations similarly argue that more frequent and
intense extreme weather events will put stress on the grid, leading to
the loss of power and increasing consumer prices. Public Interest
Organizations agree with the NOPR that the failure of transmission
providers to adequately assess their vulnerabilities to such extreme
weather events will result in increased outages and consumer costs.\61\
EDF/Sabin Center also agree that the increasing frequency, severity,
and duration of extreme weather poses a reliability threat to the bulk-
power system.\62\ NERC reports on short- and long-term reliability
issues highlight the impact of extreme weather on system reliability,
as well as the Commission's concern that such events are likely to
increase in frequency and severity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 16; see also GAO, Electricity
Grid Resilience: Climate Change Is Expected to Have Far-Reaching
Effects and DOE and FERC Should Take Actions 4, 5-6 (Mar. 2021),
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-423t; Public Interest
Organizations Comments at 4; EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 10.
    \60\ SDG&E Comments at 3.
    \61\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 1-2, 4.
    \62\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. The record shows that extreme weather events can also impact
jurisdictional rates. EDF/Sabin Center agree that considering and
planning for the impacts of extreme weather can help reduce the need
for costly future retrofits.\63\ Public Interest Organizations point
out that consumers will bear the costs of increased outages and
replacing facilities damaged during extreme weather events, which flow
through into transmission rates.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Id. at 10.
    \64\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    25. As discussed above, the record before the Commission
demonstrates a lack of consistency in whether and how transmission
providers plan for the impacts of extreme weather.\65\ Based on the
foregoing, we find that requiring transmission providers to file one-
time informational reports is justified because the reports will allow
the Commission to understand whether and how transmission providers
assess their vulnerabilities to extreme weather events and enhance the
Commission's ability to fulfill its obligations to ensure system
reliability and just and reasonable rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See supra P 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. In addition to our finding that the reports will assist the
Commission in administering the FPA, the record shows that the reports
will provide the opportunity to facilitate coordination among
transmission providers and promote information sharing about
vulnerability assessments, including best practices for vulnerability
assessments among transmission providers. Several commenters, including
SDG&E, Xcel, and Eversource explained that the reports could be used to
establish such best practices. For instance, as explained by ERO
Enterprise, the proposed reports will improve transparency and
information sharing between transmission providers, which could
ultimately benefit reliability.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. Several commenters acknowledged the value of extreme weather
vulnerability assessments, such as helping transmission providers
mitigate extreme weather risks to the bulk-power system.\67\ While we
expect that the reports will promote information sharing about how

transmission providers conduct extreme weather vulnerability
assessments, in this final rule we do not require transmission
providers to conduct extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 8-9; ERO Enterprise Comments
at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. Some commenters ask that the Commission indicate how it plans
to use the information provided in the reports and establish additional
procedures, such as disseminating best practices or setting extreme
weather vulnerability assessment requirements.\68\ We do not set forth
in this final rule what additional steps, if any, the Commission may
take in the future in response to the informational reports. After the
reports are filed and the public comments on them, the Commission will
consider any further action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See, e.g., EEI Comments at 7-8; Eversource Comments at 5;
MISO TOs Comments at 3-5; PJM TOs Comments at 2-3; Xcel Comments at
5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Discussion on Required Reports

A. Reporting Requirement

1. NOPR Proposal
    29. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require transmission
providers to file one-time informational reports describing their
current or planned policies and processes for conducting extreme
weather vulnerability assessments and mitigating identified extreme
weather risks within 90 days of the publication of any final rule in
this proceeding in the Federal Register.
    30. For the purposes of this rulemaking, the Commission proposed to
define an extreme weather vulnerability assessment as any analysis that
identifies where and under what conditions jurisdictional transmission
assets and operations are at risk from the impacts of extreme weather
events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and what the
consequences will be for transmission system operations. The Commission
further stated that the extreme weather threats analyzed by these
reports may include those extreme weather events exacerbated by climate
change (e.g., extended heat waves or storm surge due to sea level
rise).\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    31. The Commission explained that transmission providers may use
such extreme weather vulnerability assessments to develop mitigation
solutions in the form of extreme weather resilience plans, which
outline measures to reduce risks to vulnerable assets and operations.
The Commission further explained that extreme weather resilience
efforts can take many forms but generally involve both measures to
prevent or minimize damage to vulnerable assets (e.g., investments in
asset hardening or relocation) and to manage the consequences of such
damage when it occurs (e.g., investments in system recoverability).\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ R.M. Webb, M. Panfil, and S. Ladin, Climate Risk in the
Electric Sector: Legal Obligations to Advance Climate Resilience
Planning by Electric Utilities 10 (Dec. 2020), https://perma.cc/V25A-KBNP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. The Commission stated that it did not intend in the NOPR to
require transmission providers to conduct extreme weather vulnerability
assessments where they do not do so already, or to require transmission
providers to change how they conduct or plan to conduct such
assessments.\71\ Instead, the Commission expressly stated that the goal
of this proceeding is to gather information, not to establish new
requirements. In addition, the Commission did not propose for
transmission providers to file their actual vulnerability assessments,
the results of their extreme weather vulnerability assessments, or
lists of affected assets and operations, specific vulnerabilities, or
asset- or operation-specific mitigation strategies in the informational
reports. Rather, the Commission proposed that the one-time
informational reports focus on describing current or planned policies
and processes to assess and mitigate extreme weather risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Similarly, while the NOPR proposed that transmission
providers may describe what they ``plan'' to do with respect to
various issues, the Commission explained that the proposed reporting
requirement was meant only to capture plans that have already been
made, but not yet been implemented. The NOPR emphasized that
transmission providers would not be required to speculate on how
they would conduct extreme weather vulnerability analysis where they
have no firm plans to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Finally, the Commission stated that while individual extreme
weather vulnerability assessments may not follow the same processes or
include the same analyses, the topic areas included in the NOPR (and
adopted in this final rule)--Scope, Inputs, Vulnerabilities and
Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards, Costs of Impacts, Risk
Mitigation--reflect typical practices and considerations in the
development of extreme weather vulnerability assessments. If
respondents' policies and processes for developing their own extreme
weather vulnerability assessments differ from those the Commission
described, the Commission proposed to require that transmission
providers still describe in their one-time reports the policies and
processes that most closely align with the topics discussed.
2. Comments
    34. Commenters generally support the proposed reporting requirement
in the NOPR. EPSA argues that it is important to have transparency and
current data available to inform discussions on assessment, planning,
operational, and market approaches to ensuring grid reliability.\72\
EPSA and EEI specifically support the five areas of inquiry set out in
the NOPR.\73\ MISO, however, argues the reporting requirement is
redundant because it submitted pre- and post-conference comments in
Docket No. AD21-13-000 detailing its current and planned actions under
its Reliability Imperative, on which MISO continues to focus.\74\ MISO
further explains that it, with ERO Enterprise, participated in a
Commission technical conference on generator winter readiness.\75\ MISO
asserts that preparing the report would be complex and, because of
resource constraints related to its ongoing reliability work, it
requests a four-week extension if the Commission moves forward with
requiring these reports.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ EPSA Comments at 3.
    \73\ EEI Comments at 5; EPSA Comments at 7.
    \74\ MISO Comments at 1-2.
    \75\ Id. at 3.
    \76\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. With respect to who has to file the reports, Ameren agrees with
the NOPR that public utility transmission providers, including both
RTOs/ISOs and transmission owner members, are the appropriate entities
covered under the reporting obligation.\77\ Ameren explains that
requiring RTOs/ISOs to file, in addition to having the transmission-
owning members of the RTOs/ISOs file, makes sense because the RTOs/ISOs
have a wider view than individual transmission owner members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Ameren Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. However, other commenters suggest allowing transmission
providers to file their informational reports either individually or
jointly with their RTO/ISO.\78\ Public Interest Organizations suggest
that RTOs/ISOs could report on the effects of extreme weather on their
market in a single RTO/ISO filing.\79\ PJM adds that RTO/ISO
transmission owner members could supplement joint reports with
additional information on their own transmission facilities.\80\ PJM
TOs, Eversource, and EEI contend that joint reports have two benefits:
they would

incorporate regional extreme weather assessment practices absent from
individual reports and align the reporting process with the joint
nature of system planning and operation.\81\ PJM TOs similarly contend
that joint reports would provide the Commission with a more holistic
view of extreme weather assessment and preparation because they would
incorporate the perspectives of RTOs/ISOs and their transmission owner
members in a single report.\82\ MISO TOs state that much of the
information the Commission proposes to collect is aggregated at the
RTO/ISO level and that RTOs/ISOs are more capable of providing much of
the information than their transmission owner members.\83\ MISO TOs
explain that MISO itself does most weather forecasting and risk
mitigation for its region, evaluates issues like winter readiness and
resource availability, and coordinates with neighboring entities.\84\
MISO TOs add that RTOs/ISOs can provide information on vulnerability
assessments over wide areas and among planning regions.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ EEI Comments at 6-7; Eversource Comments at 6; PJM Comments
at 8; PJM TOs Comments at 6-7.
    \79\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 7.
    \80\ PJM Comments at 8.
    \81\ EEI Comments at 6; Eversource Comments at 6; PJM TOs
Comments at 6-7.
    \82\ PJM TOs Comments at 6-7.
    \83\ MISO TOs Comments at 6.
    \84\ Id. at 6-7.
    \85\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Commenters have different views on the proposed definitions of
an extreme weather vulnerability assessment and an extreme weather
event. EPSA, Ameren, EEI, and Eversource, support the NOPR's definition
of an extreme weather vulnerability assessment, and Ameren, EEI, and
Eversource state that the definition is sufficiently flexible to allow
transmission providers to describe their practices and processes, even
if they differ from the NOPR's conceptualization of extreme weather
vulnerability assessments.\86\ Other commenters, by contrast, suggest
that the definition of extreme weather vulnerability assessment may be
too narrow. Xcel states that the NOPR's definition may be too narrow
and exclude other types of studies that inform transmission providers'
responses to extreme weather risks.\87\ For example, Xcel states that
utilities are constantly collecting and evaluating operating and
performance data, and may perform studies on specific extreme weather
system impacts that could inform the utility's response.\88\ Given
this, Xcel requests the Commission be prescriptive about the types of
studies and evaluations it is seeking reports on.\89\ Xcel states that
doing so would prevent transmission providers from failing to report or
underreporting.\90\ Public Interest Organizations similarly request
that the Commission expand the definition of extreme weather
vulnerability assessment.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Ameren at 5; EEI Comments at 3-4; EPSA Comments at 7;
Eversource Comments at 3.
    \87\ Xcel Comments at 3-4.
    \88\ Id. at 4.
    \89\ Id. at 5.
    \90\ Id. at 5-6.
    \91\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. PJM TOs request that the Commission provide guidance on what
constitutes an extreme weather event.\92\ PJM TOs point out that the
NOPR neither defines the term ``extreme weather'' nor provide guidance
or criteria for what constitutes an ``extreme weather'' event.\93\ As a
result, PJM TOs contend that in response to a final rule, transmission
providers would have to determine, for example, whether winter storms
in the northeast or hurricanes in the southeast are ``extreme weather
events'' or ordinary weather events.\94\ PJM TOs suggest the Commission
could distinguish weather events between those that may be deemed
``predictable'' or ``expected'' based on historical trends and those
that are associated with climate change.\95\ Given that intermittent
generation will increase in the future, PJM TOs contend that cloud
cover or lack of wind, especially over extended periods of time, may
need to be included in the definition of extreme weather events and in
planning studies.\96\ PJM TOs argue that although transmission
providers already incorporate weather events into transmission planning
and vulnerability assessments, extreme and ordinary weather events will
vary greatly depending on geography.\97\ At the same time, PJM TOs
caution that the Commission should not starkly delineate extreme
weather impacts from other low-probability, high impact events that
transmission providers should also plan for to improve overall grid
resiliency.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ PJM TOs Comments at 3.
    \93\ Id.
    \94\ Id. at 4.
    \95\ Id.
    \96\ Id. at 4-5.
    \97\ Id. at 3-4.
    \98\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    39. Other commenters argue that extreme weather should be defined
broadly. PJM and Xcel assert that the definition for extreme weather
should allow for regional flexibility as to what types of extreme
weather events should be included in the one-time reports.\99\ PJM
suggests including windstorms, ice/snowstorms, and geo-magnetic
disturbance within the definition of ``extreme weather events.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ PJM Comments at 6; Xcel Comments at 6.
    \100\ PJM Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    40. Some commenters suggest expanding the reporting requirement.
EDF/Sabin Center suggest adding climate-related risks to the scope of
the reporting requirement because the reasons the Commission cites in
the NOPR for requiring reports on extreme weather vulnerability
assessments apply equally to climate-related impacts to the grid.\101\
EDF/Sabin Center argue that changing climate baselines will impact the
operation of transmission infrastructure, as well as generation and
distribution assets, in ways that could impair the reliability of the
electric system. EDF/Sabin Center explain that increasing air and water
temperatures can reduce the capacity of the bulk-power system to
generate and transmit electricity and decrease asset lifetimes.\102\
EDF/Sabin Center also explain that shifting precipitation patterns
could reduce hydroelectric operations by reducing snowmelt and
increasing drought.\103\ Finally, EDF/Sabin Center explain that, as sea
levels rise, more bulk-power systems will be at risk of nuisance
flooding, storm surge, and permanent inundation.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 3, 13-14.
    \102\ Id. at 4-6 (citing Jayant Sathaye et al., Estimating Risk
to California Energy Infrastructure from Projected Climate Change
25-27 (2011), https://doi.org/10.2172/1026811; Craig D. Zamuda et
al., Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand, in Impacts, Risks, and
Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment,
Volume II 174, 181 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018), https://perma.cc/ZP2G-JJRK; Dennis Wamsted and Seth Feaster, May Heat Wave
Exposes Myth of Fossil Fuel Reliability as Texas Coal- and Gas-fired
Generators Fail Early Season Performance Test, Inst. for Energy
Econs. and Fin. Analysis (June 27, 2022), https://ieefa.org/resources/may-heat-wave-exposes-myth-fossil-fuel-reliability-texascoal-and-gas-fired-generators; U.S. Department of Energy, U.S.
Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather
10-11 (2013), https://perma.cc/FMB6-RSRK).
    \103\ Id. at 6 (citing D.R. Easterling et al., Precipitation
Change in the United States, in Climate Science Special Report:
Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I 207, 207, 217 (D.J.
Wuebbels et al. eds., 2017), https://perma.cc/MV9S-NMAS; U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis,
Climate Change and the Electricity Sector: Guide for Climate
Resilience Planning 10-11 (Sept. 2016), https://toolkit.climate.gov/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Electricity%20Sector%20Guide%20for%20Climate%20Change%20Resilience%20Planning%20September%202016_0.pdf
(DOE Guide for Resilience Planning)).
    \104\ Id. at 7 (citing DOE Guide for Resilience Planning at 89-
90).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    41. EDF/Sabin Center also argue that the reporting requirement
should be expanded to include information on whether and how
transmission providers incorporate risks to interconnected generators,
electric

demand, and distribution system assets in their assessments.\105\ In
particular, EDF/Sabin Center contend that questions 6, 8, 14, and 15
should specifically request information on whether the transmission
provider includes generation assets and operations in its assessments
and whether the transmission provider considers interdependencies of
its assets with independently-owned generation assets.\106\ EDF/Sabin
Center note that relationships between transmission providers and
generation owners can take a number of different forms that could
affect whether and how the transmission provider assesses climate risks
to generating units.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Id. at 3, 16.
    \106\ Id. at 16.
    \107\ Id. at 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. Public Interest Organizations similarly request that the
Commission expand the reporting requirement to include generation
assets and demand side resources; specifically, they request that the
definition include any analysis concerning where and under what
conditions generation assets or demand-side resources within the
transmission provider's footprint are at risk from the impacts of
extreme weather events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and
what the consequences will be for the ability to serve load. Public
Interest Organizations argue that the reporting requirement should be
expanded because ``even if a transmission provider does not also own
generation or demand-side resources, it will need to understand the
effect of extreme weather on those resources because they are often
large contingencies within its footprint.'' \108\ In addition, Public
Interest Organizations aver that the NOPR only mentions disadvantaged
communities in the context of transmission providers' stakeholder
outreach; they argue that, instead, the Commission should require
transmission providers to file information on whether, and if so how,
they consider the effects on these communities in each section of the
NOPR.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 7.
    \109\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. Some commenters raise concerns that a one-time reporting
requirement may be insufficient. Ameren agrees that a one-time
reporting requirement is appropriate but expresses concern that report
collection alone may not make information and insights accessible
enough to the industry and suggests that the Commission also convene a
forum on extreme weather vulnerability assessments and barriers to
transmission providers improving assessments.\110\ Similarly, Bureau of
Reclamation asserts that one-time informational reports may be useful
to establish a baseline regarding extreme weather event information,
but it is unlikely that one-time submissions alone will satisfy the
Commission's desire for this information.\111\ EPSA urges that, in
order to move forward as expeditiously as possible, the Commission
convene a technical conference soon after the reports are filed in
order to (1) assess the information gathered, (2) highlight best
practices, and (3) publicly discuss information sharing avenues.\112\
WE ACT contends that the Commission should assess any gaps or
deficiencies revealed by the reports and require transmission providers
to develop appropriate mitigation strategies that promote resilience
and affordable rates.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ Ameren Comments at 4, 6.
    \111\ Bureau of Reclamation Comments at 1.
    \112\ EPSA Comments at 4.
    \113\ WE ACT Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. Commenters offer the following comments on the reporting
burden. EPSA states that the reporting requirement will minimally
burden transmission providers.\114\ It explains that this is because
the Commission is only seeking information on policies and processes
already in place or planned by each transmission provider and
concerning only one aspect of reliability risks, and does not seek the
results or conclusions reached by any individual transmission
provider.\115\ Ameren, EEI, and Eversource agree that transmission
providers should not have to hypothesize how they might conduct an
extreme weather vulnerability assessment if they have no plans of doing
so.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ EPSA Comments at 7.
    \115\ Id. at 7-8.
    \116\ Ameren Comments at 5; EEI Comments at 4; Eversource
Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. Bureau of Reclamation recommends that the Commission use an
online or electronic database or form with fillable fields to collect
the information to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected and to minimize the burden on responding
entities.\117\ Xcel also requests that the Commission specify in what
form or format transmission providers should file their reports to
minimize the burden of the data request.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ Bureau of Reclamation Comments at 2.
    \118\ Xcel Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. Lastly, EDF/Sabin Center offer several suggestions on best
practices for conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
EDF/Sabin Center explain that resilience planning should prevent
maladaptation by identifying measures consistent with reducing
greenhouse gas emissions that exacerbate climate risks.\119\ EDF/Sabin
Center explain that forward-looking climate resilience planning with a
long-range view that considers interactions between sectors can
identify climate-related risks that other planning processes that rely
on historic weather data may miss, and ensure that transmission
providers make informed investments based on future conditions within
the lifespan of their assets.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 10.
    \120\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    47. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require one-time informational
reports from all transmission providers, including RTOs/ISOs and their
transmission owner members, and adopt, with modification, the questions
proposed in the NOPR.\121\ We find that the reporting requirement is
necessary for the Commission's proper administration of the FPA by
providing the Commission with information related to its statutory
responsibilities regarding reliability and rates.\122\ We also find
that the reporting requirement will also promote information sharing
and best practices about extreme weather vulnerability assessments as
well as coordination among transmission providers. The questions for
transmission providers as modified by this final rule are listed in
Appendix A below.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 1.
    \122\ 16 U.S.C. 825c. FPA section 304(a) states ``Such reports
shall be made under oath unless the Commission otherwise
specifies.'' We specify that the one-time informational reports
filed under this final rule need not be made under oath. Id.
825c(a).
    \123\ See infra Appendix A--Report Questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. We modify the proposal to allow each transmission owner that is
a member of an RTO/ISO to either file its one-time informational report
individually or jointly with its RTO/ISO. That is, a transmission owner
member of an RTO/ISO and an RTO/ISO may satisfy its reporting
requirement by filing a joint one-time informational report without
needing to also file separate one-time informational reports. For
example, an RTO/ISO could work with all of its interested transmission
owner members to complete and submit a joint one-time report.
    49. We find that RTOs/ISOs and their transmission owner members
will have a unique view of their own practices with respect to
assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities. By allowing joint one-time
informational reports from RTOs/

ISOs and their transmission owner members, any joint reports will
provide the perspectives of multiple entities in a single filing, align
the reporting process with the joint and collaborative nature of system
planning and operation, and potentially streamline the reporting
process.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See EEI Comments at 6; Eversource Comments at 6; PJM TOs
Comments at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    50. In a joint informational report, the RTO/ISO itself must also
convey information about its own extreme weather vulnerability
assessment as well as information provided by its transmission owner
members about any extreme weather vulnerability assessments they
conduct. Joint informational reports must include each participating
transmission owner member's response to every question listed in this
final rule. Joint filers must list the RTO/ISO and transmission owner
members that participated in the development of the joint informational
report.
    51. To reiterate the expectation stated in the NOPR, we do not
intend to require transmission providers to conduct extreme weather
vulnerability assessments where they do not do so already, or to
require transmission providers to change how they conduct or plan to
conduct such assessments.\125\ The goal of this proceeding is to allow
the Commission to understand whether and how transmission providers
currently assess their vulnerabilities to extreme weather events, not
to establish new requirements.\126\ If a transmission provider does not
currently assess its vulnerabilities to extreme weather events, it
should report that in its responses. If transmission providers'
policies and processes for developing their own extreme weather
vulnerability assessments differ from those described in the questions
in Appendix A, transmission providers must still describe their
relevant policies and processes, or indicate their lack thereof, in
their responses. We note that the final rule does not require
transmission providers to file the results of their extreme weather
vulnerability assessments or include lists of affected assets and
operations, specific vulnerabilities, or asset- or operation-specific
mitigation.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ While we require transmission providers to describe what
they ``plan'' to do with respect to various issues, this is meant
only to capture plans that have been made but not yet implemented;
transmission providers are not required to speculate on how they
would conduct extreme weather vulnerability analysis where they have
no plans to do so.
    \126\ See NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 22.
    \127\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    52. For the purposes of the required reporting, we adopt the
definition of extreme weather vulnerability assessment proposed in the
NOPR: an extreme weather vulnerability assessment is any analysis that
identifies where and under what conditions jurisdictional transmission
assets and operations are at risk from the impacts of extreme weather
events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and what the
consequences will be for system operations. We find that this
definition provides sufficient guidance to transmission providers on
which analyses should be described in their reporting. Further, this
definition ensures that the Commission receives information regarding
the transmission assets and operations that are within its
jurisdiction; it also ensures that the Commission receives information
relevant to its statutory responsibilities regarding reliability and
rates.
    53. Further, as noted by Ameren, EEI, and Eversource, this
definition provides flexibility for transmission providers to describe
their practices and processes. In contrast, Xcel expresses concern that
the Commission's definition of an extreme weather vulnerability
assessment may be too narrow. We disagree with Xcel. As a threshold
matter, this definition of extreme weather vulnerability assessment was
crafted to guide transmission providers filing in compliance with the
one-time reports required by this final rule. These reports are meant
to aid the Commission's understanding of these issues with respect to
jurisdictional transmission assets and operations.\128\ In that
context, we find that the definition the Commission proposed for
extreme weather vulnerability assessments properly focuses the
reporting requirement on analyses that evaluate impacts of extreme
weather and provides flexibility for respondents to report on their
analyses that fall within this description.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Our use of this definition for these reports in no way
limits the ability of transmission providers or others to assess
vulnerabilities to other assets and operations, such as those for
generation and distribution systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    54. To preserve the flexibility of the definition of extreme
weather vulnerability assessments and to avoid making the reporting
requirement too narrow, we decline to define the term ``extreme
weather,'' as requested by some commenters. One of the purposes of the
required reports is to share information and best practices, including
on how transmission providers define extreme weather for purposes of
assessing vulnerabilities. A specific definition of ``extreme weather''
would hinder this purpose by unnecessarily narrowing the reporting.
    55. However, to further the purpose of the sharing of information
and best practices for extreme weather vulnerability assessments, we
will require each transmission provider to explain how it defines
extreme weather in its vulnerability assessments by responding to a new
question, question 3, in the list of questions in Appendix A. In
responding to question 3, a transmission provider will explain whether,
and if so how, it defines extreme weather events in relation to
ordinary or historical weather events or patterns for the purposes of
their extreme weather vulnerability assessments. For instance, a
transmission provider's definition of extreme weather may be consistent
with the explanation from NOAA that extreme weather can be considered
as a weather event in which the magnitude of one or more variables
(such as temperature, precipitation, drought, flooding, or duration)
falls outside a certain threshold relative to historical measurements,
or one whose estimated probability of occurrence falls below a certain
historical value.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ David Herring, What Is an `Extreme Event'? Is There
Evidence that Global Warming Has Caused or Contributed to Any
Particular Extreme Event?, NOAA (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-qa/what-extreme-event-there-evidence-global-warming-has-caused-or-contributed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    56. We find that this approach to the term ``extreme weather'' and
the new question will promote information sharing and best practices
and further the overall goal of the required reporting to assist the
Commission in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities regarding
reliability and rates. We note that some commenters identified best
practices in their comments \130\ and we believe that the one-time
informational reports will foster such information sharing. We find
that this modification to the NOPR proposal also accommodates the
flexibility requested by PJM to consider events such as windstorms,
ice/snowstorms, and geo-magnetic disturbance as extreme weather events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    57. We decline to adopt EDF/Sabin Center's recommendation to
require transmission providers to report on whether, and if so how,
they evaluate climate risks beyond those risks caused by extreme
weather. The focus of this rulemaking and the one-time informational
reports is on risks and mitigation of the effects of extreme weather
events such as those described above. Although we acknowledge that
climate change is expected to exacerbate

the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, we believe that
climate risks manifest in wider, more gradually onsetting risks that
are not the focus of this proceeding.\131\ In addition, question 9
requires respondents to describe the ``methods and processes the
transmission provider uses, or plans to use, to determine the
meteorological data needed for its assessment'' and question 10
requires respondents to describe how they determine whether to use
scenario analysis. We adopt these questions in this final rule and, as
discussed further in the Inputs section, expect respondents to discuss
in their reports the extent to which they incorporate or consider
climatic trends in determining the meteorological data needed and
identifying and/or developing extreme weather projections or scenarios
for their assessments, if applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ Respondents may of course voluntarily describe the extent
to which they analyze climate risks, if they so desire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    58. Public Interest Organizations and EDF/Sabin Center seek to
expand the scope of the reporting requirement beyond transmission
assets and operations to include analysis of generation, distribution,
and demand side resources. We decline to expand the reporting
requirement. As discussed above, the focus of this rulemaking is
extreme weather impacts to jurisdictional transmission assets and
operations. We have chosen to focus this rulemaking on jurisdictional
transmission providers because of the key role that the transmission
system can play in ensuring reliability and resilience. In addition,
expanding the scope of this final rule would result in adding a
significant number of additional respondents; increase the burden on
respondents that own transmission as well as generation and/or
distribution; and increase the burden on the Commission to review and
analyze the responses.
    59. We further disagree with MISO's assertion that the NOPR's
proposed reporting requirement would provide the Commission with little
new information on how transmission providers assess and mitigate the
impacts of extreme weather to their systems. We instead find that the
information provided through these reports will help the Commission
carry out its responsibilities under the FPA to oversee the development
and enforcement of reliability standards for the bulk-power system and
ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of Commission-
jurisdictional services are just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
    60. Regarding commenters' assertions that a one-time information
collection may not be sufficient, and that the NOPR's proposed
reporting requirement could likely lead to additional information
collections or technical conferences, we reiterate that we are neither
requiring a recurring reporting requirement nor are we establishing
further proceedings at this time. We are not persuaded by commenters
that request that the Commission also commit at this time to convene a
technical conference or forum to address these issues after the reports
are filed. The Commission will assess whether further actions are
appropriate after reviewing the reports. As discussed herein, and
consistent with the Commission's broad discretion in formulating its
procedures, we find that the approach in this final rule that requires
transmission providers to file the one-time informational reports to be
appropriate.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978) (agencies have broad
discretion over the formulation of their procedures); Stowers Oil &
Gas Co., 27 FERC ] 61,001 (1984) (stating that the Commission is
generally the master of its own calendar and procedures).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    61. Finally, we decline Bureau of Reclamation's request that the
Commission collect informational reports using an online form.
Respondents must file reports using the Commission's eFiling portal, as
they would with any other submission to the Commission. Likewise, in
response to Xcel's request for guidance on report formatting, we
confirm that transmission providers should provide narrative responses
to each individual question listed in Appendix A. They may file their
reports in these dockets using a file format allowable under the
eFiling portal.

B. Scope

1. NOPR Proposal
    62. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each
transmission provider to explain, as a threshold matter, whether it
conducts extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Further, the
Commission proposed to require each transmission provider to file
information on the policies and processes it employs, or plans to
employ, in determining the scope of its extreme weather vulnerability
assessments. Specifically, through the questions on scope, the
Commission proposed to seek a description of the types of extreme
weather events for which the transmission provider conducts, or plans
to conduct, vulnerability assessments, if any, as well as a description
of how the transmission provider determined which extreme weather
hazards and which transmission assets and operations to examine. The
Commission also proposed to seek a description of how the transmission
provider determines the assessment's geographic or regional scope, and
whether the transmission provider also considers, or plans to consider,
external interdependencies (such as other critical infrastructure
sectors and supply chain-related vulnerabilities). The Commission
further proposed to seek information on whether, and to what extent,
the transmission provider coordinates, or plans to coordinate, with
neighboring utilities or other relevant entities while completing their
assessment. Finally, the Commission proposed to seek information on
whether, and to what extent, the transmission provider engages, or
plans to engage, with stakeholders in the scoping phase of the
assessment, inclusive of processes used to identify and engage with
relevant groups, including disadvantaged and vulnerable communities,
and incorporate relevant feedback.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    63. Commenters generally support the questions in the NOPR on the
scope of the extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Ameren agrees
that the six scope-related questions--ranging from a description of the
types of extreme weather events for which the transmission provider
conducts, or would conduct, extreme weather vulnerability assessments,
to whether and to what extent the transmission provider considers, or
plans to consider, external interdependencies--are reasonable.\134\ WE
ACT supports transmission providers incorporating broad geographic or
regional scopes and assessing long-term extreme weather events such as
drought.\135\ WE ACT also praises the Commission for highlighting PG&E
as a case study for exemplifying the consideration of external
interdependencies including utilities and community- and customer-level
resilience.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ Ameren Comments at 7.
    \135\ WE ACT Comments at 5-6.
    \136\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    64. Some commenters contend that the scope of the extreme weather
vulnerability assessment should be modified in various ways. EDF/Sabin
Center argue that transmission providers

should be required to specifically report on the frequency with which
assessments are conducted or updated.\137\ WE ACT asserts that
transmission providers should also assess vulnerabilities to upstream
and downstream interdependencies, such as water, telecommunications,
and community and customer-level resilience.\138\ Public Interest
Organizations similarly argue the Commission should require
transmission providers to report on gas-electric coordination,
including ``natural gas production, storage, and transportation
systems'' as critical interdependencies with the bulk-power
system.\139\ PJM contends that transmission providers should be
required to describe any steps being taken to enhance gas-electric
coordination to better integrate the development of new natural gas
infrastructure with the development of new generation
infrastructure.\140\ EDF/Sabin Center similarly assert that some
questions, such as question 6, should be expanded to request specific
information on whether and how the transmission provider coordinates
with distribution system operators and considers interdependencies with
the distribution system.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 14-15.
    \138\ WE ACT Comments at 5-6.
    \139\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 8.
    \140\ PJM TOs Comments at 7-8.
    \141\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 17-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    65. EDF/Sabin Center and WE ACT assert that transmission providers
should engage in a process of vulnerability assessment and resilience
planning regularly, assessing climate-related vulnerabilities and any
updates to methodologies, while evaluating measures to reduce those
vulnerabilities.\142\ WE ACT supports periodic reports and states that
they may allow the Commission to stay up-to-date with climate science
and evolving extreme weather vulnerability assessment
methodologies.\143\ EDF/Sabin Center state that although these risks
will vary on a regional basis, there are certain general principles for
assessing and planning for the impacts of climate change that all
transmission providers should follow.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ Id. at 8-9; WE ACT Comments at 5.
    \143\ WE ACT Comments at 5.
    \144\ Id.; EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 9 (stating that climate
vulnerability assessments should (1) be based on scientifically
credible climate projections that anticipate future conditions; (2)
examine long time horizons and all possible climate change impacts
that could occur over assets' useful lives; and (3) recognize
interactions between the bulk-power system, distribution systems,
load impacts, and other sectors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    66. Commenters argue that the reports should also highlight impacts
on disadvantaged communities. Public Interest Organizations contend
that transmission providers should report on how they engage with
disadvantaged and vulnerable communities as stakeholders, arguing that
these communities have distinct perspectives on how extreme weather
impacts on the power system affect them, and that it is insufficient
for transmission providers only to seek information on these
communities from other stakeholders.\145\ Public Interest Organizations
further argue that the Commission should require transmission providers
to report on any ways in which they consider the effect of extreme
weather vulnerabilities on disadvantaged or vulnerable communities in
their extreme weather vulnerability assessments.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 11.
    \146\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    67. WE ACT agrees that transmission providers should report on
their efforts to identify and engage with disadvantaged communities, as
well as community and environmental justice groups, during the scoping
phase of their extreme weather vulnerability assessments and how they
incorporate feedback from such engagement into their assessment
process.\147\ WE ACT notes that communities of color and environmental
justice and frontline communities experience disproportionately higher
burdens from extreme weather due to higher energy burdens, lack of
backup supplies and backup generators, higher reliance on electrical
medical equipment, lower prioritization for power outage restoration,
historic underinvestment in infrastructure, and disinvestment from
redlining.\148\ WE ACT asserts that transmission providers should
report on the processes used to identify and engage them and to
incorporate their feedback into the extreme weather vulnerability
assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ WE ACT Comments at 6.
    \148\ Id. at 1-2 (citing Reuters, Creaky U.S. Power Grid
Threatens Progress on Renewables, EVs (May 12, 2022 10:00 a.m.),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-renewables-electric-grid/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    68. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers to
report on how they determine the scope of their extreme weather
vulnerability assessments. However, as explained below we modify the
threshold reporting question, question 1, so that the question
addresses frequency of assessments. We also add question 3 on the
definition of extreme weather as discussed below. Otherwise, the
Commission in this final rule is requiring transmission providers to
respond to the set of questions regarding scope as proposed in the
NOPR, set forth as question 2 and questions 4 through 8.
    69. We modify the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers
to report on the frequency with which they conduct extreme weather
vulnerability assessments.\149\ Such responses will help the Commission
understand the extent to which transmission providers are performing
extreme weather vulnerability assessments, a point noted by EDF/Sabin
Center.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ For clarity, we have modified the NOPR's proposed
threshold question into a standalone question, question 1, in the
reporting requirement. Although the question was previously set
forth in the body of the NOPR, this modification will help ensure
respondents fully comply with the reporting requirement.
    \150\ EDF/Sabin Center at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    70. With respect to commenters' assertions that the Commission
should require transmission providers to report specifically on gas-
electric coordination, we find that no modification of the NOPR
proposal is necessary. Question 6 requires transmission providers to
describe ``whether and to what extent the transmission provider
considers, or plans to consider, external interdependencies, such as
interconnected utilities, other critical infrastructure sectors (e.g.,
water, telecommunications) and supply chain-related vulnerabilities, in
the [extreme weather vulnerability] assessment.'' Natural gas delivery
systems qualify as a type of external interdependency and would fall
under this description. Therefore, to the extent that a transmission
provider considers gas-electric interdependencies in its extreme
weather vulnerability assessment, it should report on how it evaluates
such interdependencies in its report.

C. Inputs

1. NOPR Proposal
    71. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each
transmission provider to provide information about the inputs it uses,
or plans to use, for any extreme weather vulnerability assessment.
Specifically, through the questions on inputs, the Commission proposed
to seek a description of methods and processes the transmission
provider uses, or plans to use, to determine the meteorological data
needed for its assessment. The Commission requested that the
description include how the

transmission provider determines whether it can rely on existing
extreme weather projections, and if so, whether such projections are
adequately robust. The Commission also proposed to seek a description
of how the transmission provider determines whether to use scenario
analysis, and if so, whether the analysis includes multiple scenarios.
The Commission proposed that the transmission provider discuss the
extent to which it reviews neighboring transmission providers' extreme
weather vulnerability assessments, if available, to evaluate the
consistency of extreme weather projections between transmission
providers, as well as the timeframe(s) and discount rate(s) selected
for the extreme weather vulnerability assessment. Finally, the
Commission proposed to seek a description of the methods and processes
the transmission provider uses, or plans to use, to create an inventory
of potentially vulnerable assets and operations.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ See NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    72. Commenters generally support the questions on extreme weather
vulnerability assessment inputs proposed in the NOPR.\152\ Ameren avers
that the questions are generally appropriate and answerable in a
narrative format. Eversource supports the flexibility the Commission
proposed to grant to transmission providers to determine the timeframes
selected for the reports.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Ameren Comments at 9; Public Interest Organizations
Comments at 13.
    \153\ Eversource Comments at 3 (citing NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196
at P 32).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    73. Several commenters, however, provide suggestions on specific
questions. In response to question 11, regarding the extent to which a
transmission provider reviews neighboring transmission providers'
extreme weather vulnerability assessments, Public Interest
Organizations recommend that the Commission require transmission
providers to report on how they coordinate and share their assessment
information with neighboring transmission providers, rather than only
requiring transmission providers to report on how they review their
neighbors' assessments.\154\ Ameren also notes that question 11 assumes
a level of information sharing and/or alignment on extreme weather
events between neighboring transmission providers that may not
exist.\155\ Therefore, Ameren recommends the Commission also (1) ask
transmission providers whether, and to what extent, they share
information and align on events with neighboring transmission
providers, and (2) ask RTOs/ISOs how they account for differences in
transmission owner members' assumptions about extreme weather
events.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ Public Interest Organizations at 3, 13.
    \155\ Ameren Comments at 9-10.
    \156\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    74. Public Interest Organizations recommend that the Commission
``add more specificity to the inputs the transmission provider must
report on.'' \157\ Public Interest Organizations recommend that the
Commission require transmission providers to explain whether they use
historical or forward-looking weather data, whether and how they
account for how climate change increases the frequency and magnitude of
extreme weather events, and whether and how they account for the
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather in their
analyses.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 3.
    \158\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    75. EDF/Sabin Center assert that transmission providers should be
required to describe the sources or data underlying the climate
projections they use, how they determine whether existing projections
are adequate or whether new projections are required, and whether they
have a process for identifying or generating new projections or
updating previously-used ones to make them more robust.\159\ EDF/Sabin
Center also assert that a question should be added to the inputs
section requesting information on ``methods, processes, and data
sources the transmission provider uses to determine anticipated
electric demand.'' \160\ Additionally, EDF/Sabin Center argue that the
questions about scenario analysis will not enable the Commission to
determine whether transmission providers analyze worst-case
scenarios.\161\ EDF/Sabin Center recommend that the Commission request
information on whether and how transmission providers determine which
scenarios to use in their assessments.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 15.
    \160\ Id. at 17-18.
    \161\ Id. at 15.
    \162\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    76. PJM states that it currently uses forecasting data to perform
vulnerability analyses for the development of operating plans,
generation owner/operator and transmission owner outage coordination,
and interregional coordination. PJM argues that these assessments
should be used as the framework for any extreme weather vulnerability
assessment and be reviewed to incorporate appropriate levels of extreme
weather testing.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ PJM Comments at 5 (citing PJM Technical Conference
Comments, Docket AD21-13, at 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    77. We adopt, with one modification, the NOPR proposal to require
each transmission provider to report on the inputs it uses, or plans to
use, for its extreme weather vulnerability assessment. Thus, we require
transmission providers to respond to the set of questions regarding
inputs as proposed in the NOPR, set forth as questions 9 through 13,
with modification to question 11 requiring that each RTO/ISO provide a
description of how it accounts for differences between transmission
owner members' extreme weather vulnerability assessment assumptions and
results.
    78. We find that this revision, as proposed by Ameren, will allow
RTOs/ISOs to describe how they account for differences in transmission
owner members' assumptions about extreme weather events. Such
information will give the Commission and the public a better
understanding of how RTOs'/ISOs' own extreme weather vulnerability
assessments address the variations in assumptions among their members.
As Ameren expressed in its comments, this information will also avoid
assuming that transmission providers use any information from
neighboring transmission providers.
    79. In response to Public Interest Organizations' and Ameren's
concerns that the Commission should require transmission providers to
report on coordination with neighboring transmission providers, we note
that question 7 requires such reporting. It requires reporting on
coordination with neighboring transmission providers as well as with
neighboring utilities and other entities that could be relevant to the
extreme weather vulnerability assessment. Additionally, question 11
requires reporting on the extent to which transmission providers review
neighboring transmission providers' extreme weather vulnerability
assessments. In response to commenters' requests that the Commission
require reporting on whether, and to what extent, transmission
providers share information with neighboring transmission providers, in
question 19 transmission providers must explain how they inform, or
plan to inform, relevant stakeholders of identified extreme weather
risks, including neighboring transmission providers.

    80. We decline to require transmission providers to provide more
specific information regarding the inputs used in their assessments.
The questions regarding inputs address more broadly the policies and
processes each transmission provider uses to select inputs as part of
its extreme weather vulnerability assessment. For instance, question 9
requires a transmission provider to report on how it determines whether
it can rely on existing extreme weather projections and whether its
extreme weather projections are adequately robust. To the extent that a
transmission provider considers historical versus forward-looking data
as a factor in determining whether a projection is reliable and/or
adequately robust, it may describe such considerations in its report.
    81. Similarly, we decline to require reporting on whether and how
transmission providers account for the increasing frequency and
severity of extreme weather, as requested by Public Interest
Organizations. To the extent that a transmission provider considers
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events in
evaluating extreme weather projections or in their scenario analysis,
we find question 9 on extreme weather projection and question 10 on
scenario analysis will allow the Commission to understand whether
transmission providers account for these considerations.

D. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards

1. NOPR Proposal
    82. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to direct each
transmission provider to provide information about the methods or
processes it uses, or plans to use, to assess the vulnerability of its
transmission assets and operations to extreme weather events.
Specifically, through the questions on this topic, the Commission
proposed to require each transmission provider to describe how it: (1)
identifies the transmission assets or operations vulnerable to the
extreme weather events for which it conducts assessments; (2) uses, or
plans to use, screening analyses to test for potential vulnerabilities;
and (3) examines, or plans to examine, the sensitivities of the
transmission assets and operations being studied to types and
magnitudes of extreme weather events.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    83. While Ameren supports the type of information the NOPR proposes
to require, it also expresses concern that making information on how
transmission providers identify vulnerable assets publicly available
could expose vulnerabilities in transmission providers' processes that
could be taken advantage of.\165\ Therefore, Ameren suggests the
Commission reconsider these questions to prevent the potential for
information to be released that could be used by bad actors.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ Ameren Comments at 11.
    \166\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    84. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers to
report on the methods or processes they use, or plan to use, in their
extreme weather vulnerability assessments to identify vulnerabilities
and determine exposure to extreme weather hazards of their transmission
assets and operations. Thus, we require transmission providers to
respond to questions 14 and 15 regarding this topic.
    85. As discussed below, the one-time informational reports do not
require submission of the extreme weather vulnerability assessments
themselves and should avoid the need for respondents to file Critical
Energy/Electric Infrastructure Information.\167\ We find that Ameren
has not explained why disclosing information on how transmission
providers identify assets that are vulnerable to extreme weather could,
by itself, expose vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a bad
actor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ See infra P 109.
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E. Costs of Impacts

1. NOPR Proposal
    86. The Commission proposed to require each transmission provider
to provide information on whether, and if so how, it estimates, or
plans to estimate, the costs associated with extreme weather impacts in
its extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Specifically, through
the questions on costs of impacts, the Commission proposed to seek a
description of the methodology or process, if any, the transmission
provider uses, or plans to use, to estimate the potential costs of
extreme weather impacts on identified vulnerable transmission assets
and operations. If the transmission provider estimates such potential
costs, the Commission further proposed to seek a description of: (a)
direct costs, such as replacements or repair costs, restoration costs,
associated labor costs, or opportunity costs of lost sales; and (b)
indirect costs, such as costs associated with loss of service to
electric customers and other utilities that purchase power from the
transmission provider, including equipment damage, spoilage, and health
and safety effects, in calculating the costs of extreme weather
impacts.\168\
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    \168\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 43.
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2. Comments
    87. Commenters generally support the Commission's proposal.\169\
EEI states that additional flexibility may be necessary with respect to
how transmission providers can define direct costs and indirect costs
as they relate to extreme weather impacts.\170\ EEI elaborates that
there is currently no broad agreement across the industry on
methodologies for calculating the costs of extreme weather
impacts.\171\ Therefore, EEI requests that the Commission clarify that
it will not require reporting of such information where agreed-upon
methodologies are not yet developed.\172\ Ameren's comments similarly
underscore the need for flexibility, noting that some transmission
providers may use value of lost load to assess impacts without directly
quantifying economic losses.\173\ Therefore, Ameren suggests that the
Commission may want to consider seeking information on that approach
and thresholds used.\174\
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    \169\ See, e.g., Ameren Comments at 12.
    \170\ EEI Comments at 5-6.
    \171\ Id. at 6.
    \172\ Id.
    \173\ Ameren Comments at 12.
    \174\ Id.
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    88. WE ACT notes that low-income communities and communities of
color, who already experience higher energy burdens, will be
disproportionately impacted by rising energy costs due to rebuilding
the grid from and adapting it to extreme weather.\175\ Public Interest
Organizations assert that the Commission should revise the NOPR
proposal to require information about how transmission providers
consider extreme weather impacts on disadvantaged and vulnerable
communities in each section of the report and to report on how they
consider the costs of extreme weather vulnerabilities to these
communities, at each time interval of the outage, for example, 15
minutes out, hourly, or daily.\176\
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    \175\ WE ACT Comments at 3.
    \176\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 11.
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3. Commission Determination
    89. We adopt, with one modification, the NOPR proposal to require
transmission providers to report on how they estimate, or plan to
estimate, the costs associated with extreme weather impacts in their
extreme weather

vulnerability assessments. Thus, we require transmission providers to
respond to the questions regarding costs of impacts as proposed in the
NOPR, set forth as questions 16 and 17.
    90. In response to EEI's concerns around flexibility regarding the
reporting of costs, as stated in the NOPR,\177\ transmission providers
that neither currently estimate nor plan to estimate the costs
associated with extreme weather impacts in their extreme weather
vulnerability assessments--or that do not conduct extreme weather
vulnerability assessments at all--are not required to develop new
methods to comply with this reporting requirement and may simply state
that they do not perform such cost estimations. In response to Ameren's
similar concerns about flexibility, we clarify that transmission
providers should describe any methodologies or processes used to
estimate the potential costs of extreme weather impacts on identified
vulnerable transmission assets and operations, such as value of lost
load, including those that do not directly quantify economic losses.
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    \177\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 43.
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F. Risk Mitigation

1. NOPR Proposal
    91. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each
transmission provider to report on the policies and processes it uses,
or plans to use, to determine and implement appropriate measures for
mitigating extreme weather risks identified by its vulnerability
assessments. Specifically, through the questions on risk mitigation,
the Commission proposed to require transmission providers to provide
information regarding how they currently, or plan to: (1) use extreme
weather vulnerability assessment results to identify appropriate
mitigation actions, including methods for determining highest impact
and lowest cost mitigation measure portfolios; (2) inform relevant
stakeholders and government agencies of vulnerabilities and mitigation
plans; (3) incorporate extreme weather risk mitigation into local and
regional transmission planning processes; and (4) measure the success
of risk mitigation measures and incorporate findings into future
mitigation actions.\178\
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    \178\ Id. P 48.
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2. Comments
    92. Ameren supports the NOPR's proposed questions on risk
mitigation. Ameren states that Winter Storm Uri provides a recent
example of the widespread effects of an extreme weather event. Ameren
argues that it is incumbent on transmission providers to assess these
and other types of extreme weather events and plan to have robust
transmission systems and operational arrangements in place.\179\ Public
Interest Organizations generally support the proposed questions on risk
mitigation.\180\
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    \179\ Ameren Comments at 13.
    \180\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 14.
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    93. Public Interest Organizations and WE ACT support requiring
information on how transmission providers inform disadvantaged,
vulnerable, and frontline communities of extreme weather risks and
mitigation measures.\181\ Public Interest Organizations recommend that
the Commission expand the list of relevant stakeholders in question 19
to include disadvantaged and vulnerable communities and market
monitors.\182\ Public Interest Organizations further urge the
Commission to require transmission providers to discuss whether they
consider performance impacts in specific disadvantaged or vulnerable
communities when evaluating extreme weather risk mitigation
measures.\183\
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    \181\ Id. at 15; WE ACT Comments at 6.
    \182\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 15.
    \183\ Id. at 11.
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    94. PJM suggests that the questions should not necessarily be
limited to ``extreme weather risks and mitigation measures'' but should
also include additional questions such as how local and regional
planning address the potential need for storm hardening of certain
facilities and the steps being taken to reduce the criticality of CIP-
14 facilities \184\ through their planning processes.\185\
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    \184\ CIP-14 facilities are transmission stations and
substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if
rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack
could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or
cascading within an interconnection.
    \185\ PJM Comments at 7-8.
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3. Commission Determination
    95. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers to
report on the policies and processes they use, or plan to use, to
determine and implement appropriate measures to mitigate risks
identified by their extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Thus, we
require transmission providers to respond to the set of questions
regarding risk mitigation as proposed in the NOPR, set forth as
questions 18 through 21.
    96. With respect to the list of relevant stakeholders in question
19, that list was intended to provide examples of relevant
stakeholders, it was not intended to be exhaustive of all potential
stakeholders. To the extent that transmission providers inform, or plan
to inform, all affected communities, market monitors, or any other
relevant stakeholder groups not listed in question 19 of identified
extreme weather risks and selected mitigation measures, they should
report on how they currently, or plan to, do so.
    97. Regarding PJM's request to require reporting on how local and
regional transmission planning processes address the need for storm
hardening, we find no modification of the NOPR proposal is necessary.
Question 20 requires respondents to report ``[a] description of the
extent to which the transmission provider incorporates, or plans to
incorporate, identified extreme weather risks and mitigation measures
into local and regional transmission planning processes.'' Therefore,
to the extent transmission providers incorporate, or plan to
incorporate, identified risk mitigation measures into, and seek to
address that risk through, local or regional transmission planning
processes, they should report on that.

G. Compliance Issues

1. Deadline for Filing the One-Time Informational Reports
a. NOPR Proposal
    98. The Commission proposed to require transmission providers to
file the one-time informational reports within 90 days of the
publication of any final rule in this proceeding in the Federal
Register.
b. Comments
    99. Commenters have different views about the proposed 90-day
deadline for filing the one-time reports. Eversource, EEI, and MISO
request that the Commission extend the submission period to at least
120 days after the publication of a final rule. Eversource states that
a 120-day deadline would balance the urgency of the issues and the
sensitivity of the information.\186\ Eversource and EEI argue that a
transmission provider's policies and practices would have to be
internally vetted to avoid disclosing sensitive information.\187\ EEI
states that, in some cases, subject to the transmission provider's
development of such policies and practices, the reporting requirement
may require it to expend significant time and resources.\188\ MISO
asserts that preparing the report will be complex

and that its work on the Reliability Imperative causes resource
constraints, and therefore requests a four-week extension.\189\ PJM TOs
prefer a longer timeline of 180 days, which they argue is more
reasonable if transmission providers are required to develop and
implement new protocols and metrics or acquire new software and
technology to assess their extreme weather vulnerabilities.\190\ On the
other hand, EPSA argues that the information the Commission proposes to
collect could be gathered more quickly than proposed.\191\
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    \186\ Eversource Comments at 3-4.
    \187\ Id.; EEI Comments at 8.
    \188\ EEI Comments at 8.
    \189\ MISO Comments at 4.
    \190\ PJM TOs Comments at 5-6.
    \191\ EPSA Comments at 8.
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c. Commission Determination
    100. We extend the submission deadline proposed in the NOPR and,
accordingly, we alter the proposed compliance schedule. Specifically,
we require transmission providers to file in the above-captioned
dockets (that is, RM22-16-000 and AD21-13-000) the one-time reports
within 120 days after the publication of this final rule in the Federal
Register. We agree with commenters that extending the deadline could
improve the quality of responses and facilitate coordination. We do not
require transmission providers to develop new metrics, and therefore,
we find that an extension beyond 120 days is unnecessary.\192\
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    \192\ See NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 22.
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2. Public Comment on the One-Time Informational Reports
a. NOPR Proposal
    101. The Commission proposed to seek public comment on the reports
30 days after they are filed.
b. Comments
    102. EEI, Eversource, and Ameren do not support the Commission's
proposal to seek public comments on the reports, while EDF/Sabin Center
request that the comment period be extended to 60 days after the
reports are filed.\193\ EEI and Eversource claim that, generally, the
Commission does not allow public comment on informational reports
provided to the Commission and doing so would be a departure from
Commission precedent.\194\ EEI and Eversource state that informational
reporting, including the one-time report proposed in the NOPR, is
inappropriate for public comment because it threatens to turn good-
faith and impartial information sharing into a de facto adversarial
proceeding in which entities are compelled to defend themselves.\195\
Eversource adds that an adversarial proceeding may undermine the
Commission's use of the reports to assist its administration of the FPA
and industry efforts to improve extreme weather policies and
procedures.\196\ Ameren asserts that comments on the substance of a
particular transmission provider's report are likely of little value
because the proposed rule seeks descriptive information about the
transmission provider's policies and practices without a standard by
which to measure or judge them.\197\ Ameren contends that the
Commission did not contemplate an opportunity for transmission
providers to respond to comments on the transmission provider's
explanations or propose reforms. Eversource and Ameren add that if the
Commission decides to pursue future reforms, including updates to its
regulations, based on the information filed in the one-time reports,
that proceeding would be the appropriate place to seek comments.\198\
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    \193\ Ameren Comments at 14; EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 19;
EEI Comments at 8-9; Eversource Comments at 4-5.
    \194\ Eversource Comments at 4.
    \195\ EEI Comments at 8-9; Eversource Comments at 4-5.
    \196\ Eversource Comments at 4-5.
    \197\ Ameren Comments at 14.
    \198\ Id.; Eversource Comments at 5.
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    103. Conversely, EPSA states that while the public should be
afforded the opportunity to comment on Commission action, that part of
the timeline is extremely compressed for any entity that may be
impacted by multiple transmission providers.\199\ EDF/Sabin Center
assert that the Commission should allow at least 60 days for
stakeholders to review and submit comments on the one-time
reports.\200\ WE ACT asserts that the reports should be available for
public scrutiny, and notes that the Commission's Office of Public
Participation could play an important role in facilitating vigorous and
meaningful public engagement.\201\
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    \199\ EPSA Comments at 3-4.
    \200\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 18-19.
    \201\ WE ACT Comments at 5.
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