[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 143 (Monday, July 27, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44386-44398]
[FR Doc No: 2015-18319]

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2012-0035]

Traylor Bros., Inc., Application for Permanent Variance and
Interim Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for Comments

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA announces the application of Traylor
Bros., Inc., for a permanent variance and interim order from the
provisions of OSHA standards that regulate work in compressed-air
environments at 29 CFR 1926.803 and presents the Agency's preliminary
finding to grant the permanent variance. OSHA also announces its grant
of an interim order in this notice. OSHA invites the public to submit
comments on the variance application to assist the Agency in
determining whether to grant the applicant a permanent variance based
on the conditions specified in this application.

DATES: Submit comments, information, documents in response to this
notice, and request for a hearing on or before August 26, 2015. The
interim order specified by this notice becomes effective on July 27,
2015, and shall remain in effect until the interim order is modified or
revoked.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments by any of the following methods:
    1. Electronically: Submit comments and attachments electronically
at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal.
Follow the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
    2. Facsimile: If submissions, including attachments, are not longer
than 10 pages, commenters may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at
(202) 693-1648.
    3. Regular or express mail, hand delivery, or messenger (courier)
service: Submit comments, requests, and any attachments to the OSHA
Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-2012-0035, Technical Data Center, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-2625,
Washington, DC 20210; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER> (TDY number: (877) 889-
5627). Note that security procedures may result in significant delays
in receiving comments and other written materials by regular mail.
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for information about security
procedures concerning delivery of materials by express mail, hand
delivery, or messenger service. The hours of operation for the OSHA
Docket Office are 8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
    4. Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and
the OSHA docket number (OSHA-2012-0035). OSHA places comments and other
materials, including any personal information, in the public docket
without revision, and these materials will be available online at
http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, the Agency cautions commenters
about submitting statements they do not want made available to the
public, or submitting comments that contain personal information
(either about themselves or others) such as Social Security numbers,
birth dates, and medical data.
    5. Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at
the address above. All documents in the docket are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index; however, some information (e.g.,
copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download
through the Web site.\1\ All submissions, including copyrighted
material, are available for inspection at the OSHA Docket Office.
Contact the OSHA Docket Office for assistance in locating docket
submissions.
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    \1\ Traylor indicated that the decompression tables it intends
to use for decompression with trimix are proprietary. Therefore,
these tables are not available in the docket.
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    6. Extension of Comment Period: Submit requests for an extension of
the comment period on or before August 26, 2015 to the Office of
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, Variance Program,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210, or by fax
to<PHONE_NUMBER>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>;
email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; telephone:
(202) 693-2110; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>OSHA's Web page includes
information about the Variance Program (see http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/variances/index.html).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Copies of this Federal Register notice. Electronic copies of this
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov.
This Federal Register notice, as well as news releases and other
relevant information, also are available at OSHA's Web page at http://www.osha.gov.
    Hearing Requests. According to 29 CFR 1905.15, hearing requests
must include: (1) A short and plain statement detailing how the
proposed variance would affect the requesting party; (2) a
specification of any statement or representation in the variance
application that the commenter denies, and a concise summary of the
evidence adduced in support of each denial; and (3) any views or
arguments on any issue of fact or law presented in the variance
application.

I. Notice of Application

    On April 26, 2012, Traylor Bros., Inc., 835 N. Congress Ave.,
Evansville, IN 47715, and Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue
Plains Tunnel, 5000 Overlook SW., Washington, DC 20032, submitted under
Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (``OSH
Act''; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and other relief
under section 6(d)''), an application for a permanent variance from
several provisions of the OSHA standard that regulates work in
compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. OSHA is addressing this request as
two separate applications: (1) Traylor Bros., Inc. (``Traylor'' or
``the applicant'') request for a permanent variance for future
tunneling projects; and (2) Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture, Blue
Plains Tunnel (``Traylor JV''). This notice only addresses the Traylor
application for an interim order and permanent variance for future
tunneling projects. This notice does not address

the Traylor JV application for the Blue Plains Tunnel Project, which
OSHA granted on March 27, 2015 (80 FR 16440).
    Specifically, this notice addresses Traylor's application for a
permanent variance and interim order, applicable to future tunneling
projects, from the provisions of the standard that: (1) Prohibit
compressed-air worker (CAW) exposure to pressures exceeding 50 pounds
per square inch (p.s.i.) except in an emergency (29 CFR
1926.803(e)(5)); \2\ (2) require the use of the decompression values
specified in decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air
standard for construction (29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and (3) require the
use of automated operational controls and a special decompression
chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii),
respectively).
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    \2\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g.
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i.
value specified by Sec.  1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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    The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of
tunnels using advanced shielded mechanical excavation techniques in
conjunction with an earth pressure balanced tunnel boring machine
(EPBTBM).
    According to its application, Traylor is likely to be the sole
contractor, as well as the general contractor in association with
future Joint Venture partners for the construction of future tunnels at
various sites throughout the nation. Traylor asserts that generally, it
bores tunnels (i.e., Blue Plains, as well as future tunnels) below the
water table through soft soils consisting of clay, silt, and sand.
    Traylor employs specially trained personnel for the construction of
the tunnel, and states that this construction will use shielded
mechanical-excavation techniques. Traylor asserts that its workers
perform hyperbaric interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g.
in the excavation chamber of the EPBTBM; these interventions consist of
conducting inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-head
structure and cutting tools of the EPBTBM.
    Traylor asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation, specifically
with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to pressurize
the entire tunnel. This technology negates the requirement that all
members of a tunnel-excavation crew work in compressed air while
excavating the tunnel. These advances in technology modified
substantially the methods used by the construction industry to excavate
subaqueous tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the
current OSHA compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR
1926.803. Such advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the
total duration of exposure to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel
construction.
    Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized
tunnel face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in
the working chamber (the pressurized portion of the EPBTBM) take place
only after halting tunnel excavation and preparing the machine and crew
for an intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
Maintenance conducted in the working chamber includes changing
replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars, and, in rare cases,
repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
    In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, Traylor
asserts that innovations in hyperbaric medicine and technology improve
the safety of decompression from hyperbaric exposures. According to
Traylor, the use of decompression protocols incorporating oxygen is
more efficient, effective, and safer for tunnel workers than compliance
with the decompression tables specified by the existing OSHA standard
(29 CFR 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). These
hyperbaric exposures are made safe by advances in technology, a better
understanding of hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a project-
specific Hyperbaric Operations Manual (HOM) that requires specialized
medical support and hyperbaric supervision to provide assistance to a
team of specially trained man lock attendants and hyperbaric workers or
CAWs.
    OSHA initiated a technical review of the Traylor's variance
application and developed a set of follow-up questions that it sent to
Traylor on September 17, 2012 (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0003). On October 26,
2012, Traylor submitted its response and a request for an interim order
for the Blue Plains Tunnel Project, as well as future projects (Ex.
OSHA-2012-0035-0013). In its response to OSHA's follow-up questions,
Traylor indicated that the maximum pressure to which it is likely to
expose workers during future project interventions is 75 p.s.i.g and
may involve the use of trimix breathing gas (composed of a mixture of
oxygen, nitrogen, and helium in varying concentrations used for
breathing by divers and CAWs for compression and decompression when
working at pressures exceeding 73 p.s.i.g.). Therefore, to work
effectively on future projects, Traylor must perform hyperbaric
interventions in compressed air at pressures higher than the maximum
pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard, 29 CFR
1926.803(e)(5), which states: ``No employee shall be subjected to
pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. except in emergency'' (see footnote 2).
    On July 11, 2013, OSHA granted Traylor JV a project-specific
interim order for the completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel in order to
permit the applicant to begin work while OSHA continued to consider its
application for a permanent variance (for Traylor JV's completion of
the Blue Plains Tunnel, as well as Traylor's future tunneling
projects). On December 11, 2014, OSHA published a Federal Register
notice announcing Traylor JV's application for permanent variance and
interim order, grant of an interim order, and request for comments (79
FR 73631). The comment period expired on January 12, 2015. OSHA did not
receive any comments on the proposed variance. As noted above, on March
27, 2015, OSHA published the Federal Register notice announcing the
grant of a permanent variance to Traylor JV for completion of the Blue
Plains Tunnel (80 FR 16440).
    During its consideration of the Blue Plains variance, OSHA
continued its technical review of the Traylor's variance application
focusing on the proposed use of trimix breathing gas (proposed for use
in future tunneling projects at pressures exceeding 73 p.s.i.g.) and
developed a second set of follow-up questions that it sent to Traylor
on December 18, 2013 (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0002). On January 21, 2014,
Traylor submitted its response (Ex. OSHA-2012-0035-0009). In its
response to OSHA's follow-up questions, Traylor provided additional
technical and scientific information concerning successful trimix use
on tunneling projects throughout the United States, as well as in
Europe and Asia. Additionally, Traylor reaffirmed that the maximum
pressure to which it is likely to expose workers during interventions
for future tunneling

projects is 75 p.s.i.g. and may involve the use of trimix breathing
gas.
    In reviewing Traylor's application for future tunneling projects,
OSHA focused on the following important considerations:

     Variances are granted only to specific employers that
submitted a properly completed and executed variance application.
Traylor has met this requirement (for the single employer
application);
     This notice announces only Traylor's (single employer)
application for a variance dealing with future projects. It does not
address Traylor's future hyperbaric tunneling projects in
association with unnamed joint venture partners;
     Proposed variance conditions require Traylor to submit
for OSHA's review and approval a project-specific HOM at least one
year prior to the start of work on any future project;
     The proposed variance conditions require the HOM to
demonstrate that the EPBTBM to be used on the project is designed,
fabricated, inspected, tested, marked, and stamped in accordance
with the requirements of ASME PVHO-1.2012 (or most recent edition of
Safety Standards for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy) for the
TBM's hyperbaric chambers.
     This condition ensures that each proposed future
tunneling project can be comprehensively reviewed on a case-by-case
basis prior to OSHA granting its approval to Traylor to proceed with
its new project;
     Traylor may not begin hyperbaric interventions at
pressures exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. until OSHA completes its review of
the project-specific HOM and determines that the safety and health
instructions and measures it specifies would be appropriate, would
comply with the conditions of the variance, would adequately protect
the safety and health of CAWs, and so notifies the applicant; and
     Traylor will be required to submit new applications
requesting modification of its single employer variance and approval
of its project-specific HOM [with sufficient lead time (at least one
year prior to start of work on any future project), to allow OSHA to
complete the variance modification process], upon forming any future
joint ventures.

    Further, on December 6, 2012, OSHA published a Federal Register
notice (77 FR 72781) announcing a request for information (RFI) for its
continuing regulatory reviews named standards improvement projects
(SIPs). The Agency conducted similar regulatory reviews of its existing
standards previously and issued this latest RFI to initiate another of
these regulatory reviews, and naming this review the Standards
Improvement Project--Phase IV (SIP-IV). The purpose of SIP-IV is to
improve and streamline OSHA standards by removing or revising
requirements that are confusing or outdated, or that duplicate, or are
inconsistent with other standards. Additionally, the regulatory review
also is designed to reduce regulatory burden while maintaining or
enhancing employees' safety and health. SIP-IV will focus primarily on
OSHA's construction standards.
    As part of SIP-IV, OSHA is considering updating the decompression
tables in Appendix A (1926.803(f)(1)) (77 FR 72783). This proposed
action would permit employers to use decompression procedures and
updated decompression tables that take advantage of new hyperbaric
technologies used widely in extreme hyperbaric exposures. If the
planned SIP-IV revises Appendix A, Traylor (and similar tunneling
contractors previously granted a variance) will still require
hyperbaric tunneling variances to address portions of the standard not
covered by SIP-IV (i.e., 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5); .803(g)(1)(iii) and
.803(g)(1)(xvii)).
    If SIP-IV is completed (including the update of the decompression
tables in Appendix A (1926.803(f)(1)), OSHA will modify Traylor's
(single employer) and similar variances granted to other employers to
include the applicable SIP-IV provisions as appropriate.
    OSHA considered Traylor's application for a permanent variance and
interim order for future tunneling projects. OSHA determined that
Traylor proposed an alternative that will provide a workplace at least
as safe and healthful as that provided by the standard.

II. The Variance Application

A. Background

    Traylor asserts that the advances in tunnel excavation technology
described in Section I of this notice modified significantly the
equipment and methods used by contractors to construct subaqueous
tunnels, thereby making several provisions of OSHA's compressed-air
standard for construction at 29 CFR 1926.803 inappropriate for this
type of work. These advances reduce both the number of workers exposed,
and the total duration of exposure to the hyperbaric conditions
associated with tunnel construction.
    Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with pre-cast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs
provide methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a
stabilized tunnel face, through various geologies, while isolating that
pressure to the forward section (working or excavation chamber) of the
EPBTBM.
    Interventions involving the working chamber (the pressurized
chamber at the head of the EPBTBM) take place only after the applicant
halts tunnel excavation and prepares the machine and crew for an
intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the
mechanical-excavation components located in the forward portion of the
working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the forward portion of the
working chamber includes changing replaceable cutting tools, disposable
wear bars, and, in rare cases, repairs to the cutter head due to
structural damage.
    In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for
construction in 1971, resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression
protocols incorporating oxygen and trimix is more efficient, effective,
and safer for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA
standard (29 CFR 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables).
According to the applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose
employees performing interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to
hyperbaric pressures up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than
maximum pressure specified by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR
1926.803(e)(5)).
    The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures
included in its application provide its workers with a place of
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee
representatives of affected workers with a copy of the variance
application.\3\ The applicant also certifies that it notified its
workers of the variance application by posting at prominent locations
where it normally posts workplace notices, a summary of the application
and information specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the
application. In addition, the applicant informed its workers and their
representatives of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance
application.
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    \3\ See the definition of ``Affected employee or worker'' in
section III. D.
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B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (see Footnote 1)

    The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions
at

pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g.
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments.
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man
locks if required in an emergency.
    EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier,
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: the staging
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the
section of the working chamber between the man lock door and the entry
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
    The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure) to a maximum
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be around 14.7
p.s.i.g. However, the applicant maintains that they may have to perform
interventions at pressures up to 75 p.s.i.g.
    During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
    Further, the applicant asserts that it will develop a project-
specific HOM for each future tunnel project that describes in detail
the hyperbaric procedures and required medical examinations used during
the planned tunnel-construction project. The HOM will be project-
specific, and will discuss standard operating procedures and emergency
and contingency procedures. The procedures will include using
experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who have the training
and experience necessary to recognize and treat decompression illnesses
and injuries. The attendants will be under the direct supervision of
the hyperbaric supervisor and attending physician. In addition,
procedures will include medical screening and review of prospective
CAWs. The purpose of this screening procedure is to vet prospective
CAWs with medical conditions (e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular
circulation, and muscle cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting
in a cramped space (e.g., a man lock) for extended periods or by
exposure to elevated pressures and compressed gas mixtures. A
transportable recompression chamber (shuttle) will be available to
extract workers from the hyperbaric working chamber for emergency
evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle attaches to the topside
medical lock, which is a large recompression chamber. The applicant
believes that the procedures included in the variance application and
in its project-specific HOM will provide safe work conditions when
interventions are necessary, including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.
OSHA will comprehensively review the project-specific HOM for each of
Traylor's future projects prior to granting its approval for Traylor to
proceed with its new project. Therefore, Traylor may not begin
hyperbaric interventions at pressures exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. until OSHA
completes its review of the project-specific HOM and determines that
the safety and health instructions and measures it specifies would be
appropriate, would conform with the conditions in the variance, and
would adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs. OSHA will
notify the applicant that: (1) Its project-specific HOM was found to be
acceptable; and (2) the applicant may begin hyperbaric interventions at
pressures exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. by complying fully with the conditions
of the interim order or proposed variance (as an alternative to
complying with the requirements of the standard).

C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To
Use OSHA Decompression Tables

    OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A
of 29 CFR 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used
during decompression with air, nitrox, or trimix (as appropriate). The
applicant asserts decompression protocols using the 1992 French
Decompression Tables for air, nitrox, or trimix as specified by the HOM
are safer for tunnel workers than the decompression protocols specified
in Appendix A of 29 CFR 1926, subpart S.
    Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric
conditions in the working chamber. Also, Traylor proposes to decompress
with trimix gas, under certain conditions specific to and described in
detail in the project-specific HOM associated with each future
tunneling project. Depending on the maximum working pressure and
exposure times, the 1992 French Decompression Tables provide for air
decompression with or without oxygen or trimix. Traylor asserts that
using the 1992 French Decompression Tables for air, nitrox, or trimix
decompression has many benefits, including (1) keeping the partial
pressure of nitrogen in the lungs as low as possible; (2) keeping
external pressure as low as possible to reduce the formation of bubbles
in the blood; (3) removing nitrogen from the lungs and arterial blood
and increasing the rate of elimination of nitrogen; (4) improving the
quality of breathing during decompression stops so that workers are
less tired and to prevent bone necrosis; (5) reducing decompression
time by about 33 percent as compared to air decompression; and (6)
reducing inflammation. Traylor asserts that the 1992 French
Decompression Tables, Appendix B provide for air decompression with
trimix supplementation for staged decompression for pressures ranging
from 58 to 75 p.s.i.g. As described in Section IV of this notice,
OSHA's review of the use of air, nitrox, or trimix in several major
tunneling projects completed in the past indicates that it contributed
significantly to the reduction of decompression illness (DCI) and other
associated adverse effects observed and reported among CAWs.

    In addition, the project-specific HOM will require a physician
certified in hyperbaric medicine to manage the medical condition of
CAWs during hyperbaric exposures and decompression. A trained and
experienced man-lock attendant also will be present during hyperbaric
exposures and decompression. This man lock attendant will operate the
hyperbaric system to ensure compliance with the specified decompression
table. A hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in
hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, will directly oversee
all hyperbaric interventions, and ensures that staff follow the
procedures delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.
    The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures,
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The variance application and the
project-specific HOMs will establish protocols and procedures that
provide the basis for alternate means of protection for CAWs under
these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols and procedures,
the applicant requests to use the 1992 French Decompression Tables for
hyperbaric interventions up to 75 p.s.i.g. for future projects. The
applicant is committed to follow the decompression procedures described
in its application and the project-specific HOM during these
interventions.

D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803,
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression

    According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions,
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly
referred to as ``the bends.'' This description of the etiology of DCI
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue
(see footnote 12 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
    The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes
10 through 18 in this notice for references to these studies).\4\ In
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression
process because:
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    \4\ In the study cited in footnote 10, starting at page 338, Dr.
Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically regulated
continuous decompression in the Washington State safety standards
for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its decompression
tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the union, and
against the advice of the expert who calculated the decompression
table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr. Kindwall then
states, ``Continuous decompression is inefficient and wasteful. For
example, if the last stage from 4 psig . . . to the surface took 1
h, at least half the time is spent at pressures less than 2 psig . .
., which provides less and less meaningful bubble suppression . . .
.'' In addition, the report referenced in footnote 5 under the
section titled, ``Background on the Need for Interim Decompression
Tables'' addresses the continuous-decompression protocol in the OSHA
compressed-air standard for construction, noting that ``[a]side from
the tables for saturation diving to deep depths, no other widely
used or officially approved diving decompression tables use straight
line, continuous decompressions at varying rates. Stage
decompression is usually the rule, since it is simpler to control.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression
tables, including stops; and
    2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results
in lower occurrences of DCI.
    Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric
supervisor.

E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement
of Special Decompression Chamber

    The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires
employers to use a special decompression chamber of sufficient size to
accommodate all CAWs being decompressed at the end of the shift when
total decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Use of the special decompression chamber enables
CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent neuromuscular
problems during decompression.
    As an alternative to using a special decompression chamber, the
applicant notes that since only the working chamber of the EPBTBM is
under pressure, and only a few workers out of the entire crew are
exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks (which, as noted earlier,
connect directly to the working chamber) and the staging chamber are of
sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers during
decompression. In addition, space limitations in the EPBTBM do not
allow for the installation and use of an additional special
decompression lock or chamber. Again, the applicant uses the existing
man locks, each of which adequately accommodates a three-member crew
for this purpose when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When
decompression exceeds 75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting
the two compartments in each man lock (during decompression stops) or
exit the man lock and move into the staging chamber where additional
space is available. The applicant asserts that this alternative
arrangement is as effective as a special decompression chamber in that
it has sufficient space for all the CAWs at the end of a shift and
enables the CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent
neuromuscular problems.

F. Previous Tunnel Construction Variances

    OSHA notes that on May 23, 2014, it granted a sub-aqueous tunnel
construction permanent variance to Tully/OHL USA Joint Venture (79 FR
29809) from the same provisions of the standard that regulates work in
compressed air (at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and
(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application.
Additionally, as previously stated in this notice, on March, 27, 2015,
OSHA also granted a sub-aqueous tunnel construction permanent variance
to Traylor JV for the

completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel (80 FR 16440).
    Generally, the proposed alternate conditions in this notice are
based on and very similar to the alternate conditions of the previous
permanent variances.

G. Multi-State Variance

    Traylor stated that it performs construction of sub-aqueous tunnels
using EPBTBM in compressed-air environments in a number of states that
operate safety and health plans that have been approved by OSHA under
Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970 (29
U.S.C. 651 et seq.) and 29 CFR part 1952 (``Approved State Plans for
Enforcement of State Standards''). Because Traylor performs tunnel
construction work nationwide, OSHA will process Traylor's application
as one for a permanent, multi-state variance covering all states.
    Twenty-seven state safety and health plans have been approved by
OSHA under Section 18 of the OSH Act.\5\ As part of the permanent
variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs
will notify the State Plans of Traylor's variance application and grant
of the interim order, and the states will have the opportunity to
comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New
York, and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety and
health authority to state and local employers only. State Plans that
exercise their occupational safety and health authority over both
public- and private-sector employers are: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, in consideration of Traylor's application for a
permanent multi-state variance and interim order, OSHA noted that four
states have previously granted sub-aqueous tunnel construction
variances and imposed different or additional requirements and
conditions (California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). California
also promulgated a new standard \6\ for similar sub-aqueous tunnel
construction work. In these states that previously granted variances,
Traylor would have to continue to meet state-specific requirements,
should OSHA grant Traylor a permanent multi-state variance. Traylor
must be prepared to apply separately to these states for a variance for
tunnel construction work addressing the conditions specified by this
proposed variance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Five State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands) cover only public-sector workers and have no
authority over the private-sector workers addressed in this variance
application (i.e., that authority continues to reside with Federal
OSHA).

III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Application for a
Permanent Variance

    This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides
additional detail regarding the proposed conditions that form the basis
of Traylor's application for a permanent variance.

Proposed Condition A: Scope

    The scope of the permanent variance would limit coverage to the
work situations specified under this proposed condition. Clearly
defining the scope of the proposed permanent variance provides Traylor,
Traylor's employees, potential future applicants, other stakeholders,
the public, and OSHA with necessary information regarding the work
situations in which the proposed permanent variance would apply.
    As previously indicated in this notice, according to 29 CFR
1905.11, an employer (or class or group of employers \7\) may request a
permanent variance for a specific workplace or workplaces (multiple
sites). If granted, the variance would apply to the specific
employer(s) that submitted the application. In this instance, if OSHA
were to grant a permanent variance, it would apply to the applicant
only. As a result, it is important to understand that if OSHA were to
grant Traylor a permanent variance, the interim order and proposed
variance would not apply to any other employers such as other joint
ventures the applicant may undertake in the future. However, the
variance rules of practice do contain provisions for future
modification of permanent variances. Under the provisions of 29 CFR
1905.13, an applicant may submit an application to modify or amend a
permanent variance to add or include additional employers (i.e., when
future joint ventures are established).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed Condition B: Application

    The proposed condition specifies the circumstances under which the
proposed permanent variance would be in effect, notably only for
hyperbaric work performed during interventions. The proposed condition
places clear limits on the circumstances under which the applicant can
expose its employees to hyperbaric pressure.

Proposed Condition C: List of Abbreviations

    This proposed condition defines a number of abbreviations used in
the proposed permanent variance. OSHA believes that defining these
abbreviations serves to clarify and standardize their usage, thereby
enhancing the applicant's and its employees' understanding of the
conditions specified by the proposed permanent variance.

Proposed Condition D: Definitions

    The proposed condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical
terms, used in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their
meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and its
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the proposed
permanent variance.

Proposed Condition E: Safety and Health Practices

    The proposed condition requires the applicant to develop and submit
to OSHA a project-specific HOM at least one year before using the
EPBTBM for tunneling operations. The HOM will have to demonstrate that
the EPBTBM planned for use in tunneling operations is designed,
fabricated, inspected, tested, marked, and stamped in accordance with
the requirements of ASME PVHO-1.2012 (or most recent edition of Safety
Standards for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy) for the TBM's
hyperbaric chambers. These requirements ensure that the applicant
develops hyperbaric safety and health procedures suitable for each
specific project. The HOM enables OSHA to determine that the safety and
health instructions and measures it specifies would be appropriate to
the field conditions of the proposed tunnel (including expected
geological conditions), would conform to the conditions of the
variance, and will adequately protect the safety and health of the
CAWs. It also enables OSHA to enforce these instructions and measures.
Additionally, the proposed condition includes a series of related
hazard prevention and control requirements and methods (e.g.,
decompression tables, job hazard analysis (JHA), operations and
inspections checklists, investigation, recording and notification to
OSHA of recordable hyperbaric injuries and illnesses, etc.) designed to

ensure the continued effective functioning of the hyperbaric equipment
and operating system.
    Review of the project-specific HOM would enable OSHA to: (1)
Determine that the safety and health instructions and measures it
specifies would be appropriate, would conform to the conditions of the
variance, and would adequately protect the safety and health of CAWs;
and (2) request the applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds
that the hyperbaric safety and health procedures are not suitable for
the specific project and would not adequately protect the safety and
health of the CAWs. The applicant may not begin hyperbaric
interventions at pressures exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. until OSHA completes
its review of the project-specific HOM and determines that the safety
and health instructions and measures it specifies would be appropriate,
would conform to the conditions of the variance, and will adequately
protect the safety and health of the CAWs. OSHA will notify the
applicant that: (1) Its project-specific HOM was found to be
acceptable; and (2) the applicant may begin hyperbaric interventions at
pressures exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. by complying fully with the conditions
of the interim order or proposed permanent variance (if, or until the
permanent variance is granted as an alternative to complying with the
requirements of the standard).
    Once approved, the project-specific HOM would become part of the
variance, thus enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health
procedures and measures.

Proposed Condition F: Communication

    The proposed condition would require the applicant to develop and
implement an effective system of information sharing and communication.
Effective information sharing and communication ensures that affected
workers receive updated information regarding any safety-related
hazards and incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start
of each shift. The proposed condition also requires the applicant to
ensure that reliable means of emergency communications are available
and maintained for affected workers and support personnel during
hyperbaric operations. Availability of such reliable means of
communications would enable affected workers and support personnel to
respond quickly and effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies
that may develop during EPBTBM operations.

Proposed Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training

    The proposed condition would require the applicant to develop and
implement an effective qualification and training program for affected
workers. The proposed condition specifies the factors that an affected
worker must know to perform safely during hyperbaric operations,
including how to enter, work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions
under both normal and emergency conditions. Having well-trained and
qualified workers performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that
they recognize, and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and
health hazards. These qualification and training requirements enable
affected workers to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the
discomfort and physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby
preventing injury, illness, and fatalities.
    Paragraph (2)(e) of this proposed condition also would require the
applicant to provide affected workers with information they can use to
contact the appropriate healthcare professionals if it is suspected
that they are developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This
requirement provides for early intervention and treatment of DCI and
other health effects resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby
reducing the potential severity of these effects.

Proposed Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    The proposed condition would require the applicant to develop,
implement, and operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of
the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated
work areas. This proposed condition would help to ensure the safe
operation and physical integrity of the equipment and work areas
necessary to conduct hyperbaric operations. The proposed condition
would also enhance worker safety by reducing the risk of hyperbaric-
related emergencies.
    Paragraph (3) of this proposed condition would require the
applicant to document tests, inspections, corrective actions, and
repairs involving the EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job
site for the duration of the job. This requirement would provide the
applicant with information needed to schedule tests and inspections to
ensure the continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and
to determine that the actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric
equipment and systems were appropriate, prior to returning them to
service.

Proposed Condition I: Compression and Decompression

    The proposed condition would require the applicant to consult with
its designated medical advisor regarding special compression or
decompression procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW. This
proposed provision would ensure that the applicant consults with the
medical advisor, and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation,
development, and implementation of compression or decompression
protocols appropriate for any CAW requiring acclimation to the
hyperbaric conditions encountered during EPBTBM operations.
Accordingly, CAWs requiring acclimation would have an opportunity to
acclimate prior to exposure to these hyperbaric conditions. OSHA
believes this proposed condition would prevent or reduce adverse
reactions among CAWs to the effects of compression or decompression
associated with the intervention work they perform in the EPBTBM.

Proposed Condition J: Recordkeeping

    The proposed condition would require the applicant to maintain
records of specific factors associated with each hyperbaric
intervention. The information gathered and recorded under this
provision, in concert with the information provided under proposed
condition K (using OSHA 301 Incident Report form to investigate,
record, and provide notice to OSHA of hyperbaric recordable injuries as
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), would enable
the applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in preventing DCI and other hyperbaric-related effects.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping
forms and instructions (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); and updates to OSHA's
recordkeeping rule and Web page ((79 FR 56130); http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed Condition K: Notifications

    Under the proposed condition, the applicant would be required,
within specified periods, to notify OSHA of: (1) Any recordable injury,
illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an eye, or
fatality that occurs as a result of hyperbaric exposures during EPBTBM
operations; (2) provide OSHA with a copy of the hyperbaric exposures
incident investigation report (using

OSHA 301 form) of these events within 24 hours of the incident; (3)
include on the 301 form information on the hyperbaric conditions
associated with the recordable injury or illness, the root-cause
determination, and preventive and corrective actions identified and
implemented; (4) provide its certification that it informed affected
workers of the incident and the results of the incident investigation;
(5) notify the Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
(OTPCA) and the OSHA Area Office closest to the tunnel project site
within 15 working days should the applicant need to revise its HOM to
accommodate changes in its compressed-air operations that affect its
ability to comply with the conditions of the proposed permanent
variance; and (6) provide OTPCA and the OSHA Area Office closest to the
tunnel project site, at the end of the project, with a report
evaluating the effectiveness of the decompression tables.
    It should be noted that the requirement of completing and
submitting the hyperbaric exposure-related (recordable) incident
investigation report (OSHA 301 form) would be more restrictive than the
current recordkeeping requirement of completing the OSHA 301 form
within 7 calendar days of the incident (1904.29(b)(3)). This modified
and more stringent incident investigation and reporting requirement
would be restricted to intervention-related hyperbaric (recordable)
incidents only. Providing notification would be essential because time
is a critical element in OSHA's ability to determine the continued
effectiveness of the variance conditions in preventing hyperbaric
incidents, and the applicant's identification and implementation of
appropriate corrective and preventive actions.
    Further, these notification requirements also would enable the
applicant, its employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of
the permanent variance in providing the requisite level of safety to
the applicant's workers and, based on this determination, whether to
revise or revoke the conditions of the proposed permanent variance.
Timely notification would permit OSHA to take whatever action may be
necessary and appropriate to prevent further injuries and illnesses.
Providing notification to employees would inform them of the
precautions taken by the applicant to prevent similar incidents in the
future.
    Additionally, this proposed condition also would require the
applicant to notify OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address
or location for its main office, or transfers the operations covered by
the proposed permanent variance to a successor company. In addition,
the condition specifies that OSHA must approve the transfer of the
permanent variance to a successor company. These requirements would
allow OSHA to communicate effectively with the applicant regarding the
status of the proposed permanent variance, and expedite the Agency's
administration and enforcement of the permanent variance. Stipulating
that an applicant would be required to have OSHA's approval to transfer
a variance to a successor company would provide assurance that the
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the
conditions specified by proposed permanent variance, thereby ensuring
the safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by
the proposed permanent variance.

IV. Grant of Interim Order

    As noted earlier, the applicant requested an interim order. Based
on Traylor's assertions in its application, the interim order addresses
CAWs performing interventions in hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50
p.s.i.g. that involve proposed use of the 1992 French Decompression
Tables for air, nitrox, or trimix as specified by the HOM for staged
decompression with pressures ranging from 58 to 75 p.s.i.g. During the
period starting with the publication of this notice until the Agency
modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on its
application for a permanent variance, the applicant is required to
comply fully with the conditions of the interim order (as an
alternative to complying with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803
(hereafter, ``the standard'')) that:
    A. Prohibit employers using compressed air under hyperbaric
conditions from subjecting workers to pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g.,
except in an emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5));
    B. Require the use of decompression values specified by the
decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard (29
CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
    C. Require the use of automated operational controls and a special
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii),
respectively).
    After reviewing the proposed alternatives OSHA preliminarily
determined that:
    A. Traylor developed, and proposed to implement, effective
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The alternative measures
include use of engineering and administrative controls of the hazards
associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions exceeding
50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous tunnel
using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in conjunction
with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the EPBTBM's
pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel excavation and
prepares the machine and crew to conduct the interventions.
Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair of the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
    B. Traylor developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical
examinations for future tunneling projects' CAWs. The applicant will
compile these standard operating procedures into a project-specific
HOM. The HOM will discuss the procedures and personnel qualifications
for performing work safely during the compression and decompression
phases of interventions. The HOM will also specify the decompression
tables the applicant proposes to use. Depending on the maximum working
pressure and exposure times during the interventions, the tables
provide for decompression using the 1992 French Decompression Tables
for air, nitrox, or trimix as specified by the HOM. The decompression
tables also include delays or stops for various time intervals at
different pressure levels during the transition to atmospheric pressure
(i.e., staged decompression). In all cases, a physician certified in
hyperbaric medicine will manage the medical condition of CAWs during
decompression. In addition, a trained and experienced man-lock
attendant, experienced in recognizing decompression sickness or
illnesses and injuries will be present. Of key importance, a hyperbaric
supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric operations,
procedures, and safety, will directly supervise all hyperbaric
operations to ensure compliance with the procedures delineated in the
project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
    C. Traylor developed, and proposed to implement, a training program
to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with conducting
hyperbaric operations.
    D. Traylor developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously
decrease pressure to

achieve decompression in accordance with the tables specified by the
standard. The alternative includes using: (1) The 1992 French
Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to achieve lower
occurrences of DCI; (2) decompression protocols of air, nitrox, or
trimix again to achieve lower occurrences of DCI; (3) a trained and
competent attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and
exit procedures, and (4) a competent hyperbaric supervisor and
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all
hyperbaric operations.
    E. Traylor developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the
working chamber) at elevated pressure during interventions. The
applicant would limit interventions conducted in the working chamber to
performing required inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting
tools on the face of the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working
chamber provide sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to
stand up and move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up
to 360 minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the
EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber function as effectively as the
special decompression chamber required by the standard.
    OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) Traylor proposed would
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the
standard. Based on this review, OSHA determined that tunneling
operations performed with these tables \9\ resulted in a lower
occurrence of DCI than the decompression tables specified by the
standard.10 11 12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear)
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
    \10\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed-air tunneling and caisson
work decompression procedures: Development, problems, and solutions.
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA
standard.
    \11\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric
environment: Medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations.
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g.,
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
    \12\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled ``Criteria for Interim
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers;'' this report
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on
NIOSH's Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The review conducted by OSHA focused on the use of the 1992 French
Decompression Tables with air, nitrox, or trimix and found several
research studies supporting the determination that such use resulted in
a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified by the
standard. For example, H. L. Anderson studied the occurrence of DCI at
maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43 p.s.i.g.
during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-1996);
\13\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson
observed 6 decompression sickness (DCS) cases out of 7,220
decompression events, and reported that switching to the 1992 French
Decompression tables reduced the DCI incidence to 0.08%. The DCI
incidence in the study by H. L. Andersen is substantially less than the
DCI incidence reported for the decompression tables specified in
Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in which the DCI incidence reported
for the 1992 French Decompression Tables were higher than the DCI
incidence reported for the OSHA decompression tables, nor did OSHA find
any studies indicating that the 1992 French Decompression Tables were
more hazardous to employees than the OSHA decompression tables.\14\
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    \13\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during
construction of the Great Belt Tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
    \14\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F
(September 1996). Compressed-air work--French Tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp.
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2012-0036-0005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA also reviewed the use of trimix in tunneling operations. In
compressed-air atmospheres greater than 73 p.s.i.g., it becomes
increasingly more difficult to work due to increased breathing
resistance, increased risk of DCI, and the adverse effects of the
increased partial pressures of nitrogen and oxygen. Nitrogen narcosis
occurs when a diver or CAW breathes a gas mixture with a nitrogen
partial pressure greater than 2.54 ATA (i.e., 73 p.s.i.g.). Nitrogen
narcosis compromises judgment, performance, and reaction time of divers
and CAWs and can lead to loss of consciousness.\15\ There is concern
that nitrogen narcosis may impair CAWs leading to possible safety
issues.\16\ Exposure to oxygen at partial pressures greater than normal
daily living may be toxic to the lungs and central nervous system under
certain conditions. The higher the partial pressure of oxygen and the
longer the exposure, the more severe the toxic effects. One way to
reduce oxygen exposure is to alter the percentage of oxygen in the
breathing mixture (see footnote 15). Trimix is a mixture of the inert
gas helium, oxygen and nitrogen. Because helium is less dense than air,
use of helium in compressed atmospheres decreases breathing resistance
and allows for adjustment of the partial pressures of oxygen and
nitrogen to reduce the incidence of nitrogen narcosis and oxygen
toxicity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ United States Navy. (2011) U.S. Navy Diving Manual,
Revision 6. Department of the Navy.
    \16\ Van Rees, Vellinga T, Verhoevan A, Jan Dijk F, Sterk W
(November-December 2006) Health and efficiency in trimix versus air
breathing in CAWs. Undersea Hyperbaric Medicine 33 (6), pp 419-427.
This article reported that during construction of the Western
Scheldt Tunneling Project, there were 52 exposures to trimix at
81.2-84.1 p.s.i. with no reported cases of DCI. Three of 318
exposures to compressed air resulted in DCI in this study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Trimix has been successfully used in deep caisson work and
tunneling projects including the construction of the Meiko West
Bridge,\17\ the Western Scheldt Tunnel (see footnote 16), and in the
Seattle Brightwater Tunneling Project.\18\ During the construction of
the Western Scheldt Tunnel, there were fewer reported cases of DCIs in
CAWs using trimix than in other CAWs using just compressed air, despite
working at higher pressures (see footnotes 16 and 17). Additionally,
the use of compressed air during the construction of the Western
Scheldt Tunnel was also

associated with a slower working pace and operational errors that the
authors associated with the adverse effects of nitrogen at high
pressure ((i.e., nitrogen narcosis) (see footnote 16)). Trimix
decompression tables are proprietary so large studies of workers with
specific pressure exposure for specific trimix schedules are not
available. Additional concerns include the lack of a defined
recompression protocol in the case of DCI and some studies have found
evidence of cardiopulmonary strain in divers using trimix but at
pressures greater than those submitted for this variance (see footnote
15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Takishima R, Sterk W, Nashimoto T (1996) Trimix breathing
in deep caisson work for the construction of Pier (P2) for the Meiko
West Bridge. Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical Society Meeting
Abstract. During construction of the Meiko West Bridge, there were
11 cases of DCI in 2059 trimix exposures for a reported DCI rate of
1%.
    \18\ Hamilton R, Kay E (November 2008) Boring deep tunnels.
Proceedings, 3rd of U.S.-Japan Panel on Aerospace-Diving Physiology
and Technology, and Hyperbaric Medicine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Review of the literature and reports from presentations to
professional societies support that the incidence of DCI with this
technique is lower than the incidence of DCIs reported with the use of
OSHA tables. In addition, use of trimix reduces the risk of impairment
from nitrogen narcosis and allows for the adjustment of oxygen partial
pressure to reduce exposure to elevated oxygen partial pressures (see
footnotes 16 and 18). Therefore, OSHA preliminarily concludes that the
proposed use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables would protect
workers at least as effectively as the OSHA decompression tables.
    Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon, and Washington)
\19\ or promulgated a new standard (California) \20\ for hyperbaric
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work,
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application,
OSHA is granting an interim order for future tunneling projects and
announces the application for the permanent variance.
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    \19\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs.
OSHA-2012-0035-0006 (Nevada), OSHA-2012-0035-0007 (Oregon), and
OSHA-2012-0035-0008 (Washington).
    \20\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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    Under section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on the record discussed above, the
Agency preliminarily finds that when the employer complies with the
conditions of the proposed variance, the working conditions of the
employer's workers would be at least as safe and healthful as if the
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraphs
(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803.
Therefore, Traylor will: (1) Comply with the conditions listed in the
future tunnel projects interim order for the period starting with the
grant of the interim order until the Agency modifies or revokes the
interim order or makes a decision on its application for a permanent
variance); (2) comply fully with the specific conditions of the
variance, if granted; (3) comply fully with all other applicable
provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (4) provide a copy of this Federal
Register notice to all employees affected by the proposed conditions,
including the affected employees of other employers, using the same
means it used to inform these employees of its application for a
permanent variance.

V. Specific Conditions of the Interim Order and the Application for a
Permanent Variance

    The following conditions apply to the interim order OSHA is
granting to Traylor. These conditions specify the alternative means of
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii). In addition, these conditions
are the conditions that specify the alternative means of compliance
with the requirements of paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1),
(g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) that OSHA is proposing for Traylor's
permanent variance. The conditions/proposed conditions would apply to
all employees of Traylor exposed to hyperbaric conditions. These
conditions/proposed conditions would be: \21\
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    \21\ In these conditions, OSHA is using the future conditional
form of the verb (e.g., ``would''), which pertains to the
application for a permanent variance (designated as ``permanent
variance'') but the conditions also apply to the interim order.
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A. Scope

    The permanent variance would apply only to work:
    1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of future
subaqueous tunnels using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation
techniques and involving operation of an EPBTBM;
    2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to
75 p.s.i.g;
    3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress
employees entering and exiting the working chamber;
    4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), Traylor would be required to
comply fully with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926;
and
    5. The interim order granted to Traylor for future tunnel projects
will remain in effect until OSHA modifies or revokes this interim order
or grants Traylor's request for a permanent variance in accordance with
29 CFR 1905.13.

B. Application

    The permanent variance would apply only when Traylor stops the
tunnel-boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs
either enter the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e.,
inspect, maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or
exit the working chamber after performing interventions.

C. List of Abbreviations

    Abbreviations used throughout this proposed permanent variance
would include the following:

1. ATA--Atmosphere Absolute
2. CAW--Compressed-air worker
3. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
4. DCI--Decompression Illness
5. DCS--Decompression Sickness (or the bends)
6. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
7. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
8. JHA--Job hazard analysis
9. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
10. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities

D. Definitions

    The following definitions would apply to this proposed permanent
variance. These definitions would supplement the definitions in each
project-specific HOM.
    1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this proposed permanent variance, or any
one of his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has
the meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
    2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea-level,
generally, 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
    3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment
while breathing air at pressures up to 75 p.s.i.g.
    4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has

authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them.\22\
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    \22\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
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    5. Decompression illness--an illness (also called decompression
sickness (DCS) or the bends) caused by gas bubbles appearing in body
compartments due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of
symptoms of decompression illness include (but are not limited to):
Joint pain (also known as the `bends' for agonizing pain or the
`niggles' for slight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction);
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\23\
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    \23\ See Appendix 10 of ``A Guide to the Work in Compressed-Air
Regulations 1996,'' published by the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf.

    Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention but
not considered symptoms of DCI can include: Barotrauma (direct
damage to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses
and lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in
consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric environments and is
caused by the anesthetic effect of certain gases at high pressure);
and oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system condition resulting
from the harmful effects of breathing molecular oxygen
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(O2) at elevated partial pressures).

    6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery
used to excavate the tunnel.
    7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable
atmosphere.\24\
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    \24\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
    9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting,
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
    10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific
health and safety plan developed and implemented by Traylor for working
in compressed air during future hyperbaric tunnel projects.
    11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
    12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
    13. Nitrox--a mixture of oxygen and air and refers to mixtures
which are more than 21% oxygen.
    14. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
    15. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
    16. p.s.i.a--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute pressure,
is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At sea-
level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding 14.7 to
a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute
pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
    17. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
    18. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the
subject matter, the work, or the project.\25\
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    \25\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    19. Trimix--a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen and helium that is used
in hyperbaric environments instead of air to reduce nitrogen narcosis
and the hazards of oxygen toxicity.
    20. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.

E. Safety and Health Practices

    1. Traylor would have to develop and implement a project-specific
HOM, and submit the HOM to OSHA at least one year before using the
EPBTBM on the project for which the HOM applies. The HOM would provide
the governing requirements regarding expected safety and health hazards
(including anticipated geological conditions) and hyperbaric exposures
during the tunnel-construction project.
    2. The HOM would be required to demonstrate that the EPBTBM to be
used on the project is designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, marked,
and stamped in accordance with the requirements of ASME PVHO-1.2012 (or
most recent edition of Safety Standards for Pressure Vessels for Human
Occupancy) for the EPBTBM's hyperbaric chambers.
    3. When submitting the project-specific HOM to OSHA for approval,
Traylor must demonstrate that it informed its employees of the proposed
HOM and their right to petition the Assistant Secretary for a variance
by:
    a. giving a copy of the proposed project-specific HOM to the
authorized employee representatives;
    b. posting a statement giving a summary of the proposed project-
specific HOM and specifying where its employees may examine a copy of
the permanent variance application (at the place(s) where the applicant
normally posts notices to employees or, instead of a summary, posting
the application itself); or
    c. using other appropriate means.
    4. Traylor may not begin hyperbaric interventions at pressures
exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. until OSHA completes its review of the project-
specific HOM and determines that the safety and health instructions and
measures it specifies would be appropriate, would comply with the
conditions of the variance, and would adequately protect the safety and
health of CAWs. Traylor would have to receive a written acknowledgement
from OSHA stating that: (1) OSHA found its project-specific HOM
acceptable; and (2) OSHA determined that it may begin hyperbaric
interventions at pressures exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. by complying fully
with the conditions of the interim order or proposed permanent variance
(as an alternative to complying with the requirements of the standard).
Once approved by OSHA, the HOM would become part of this variance for
the purposes of the project for which it was developed.
    5. Traylor would have to implement the safety and health
instructions included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the
EPBTBM, and the safety and health instructions provided by the
manufacturer for the operation of decompression equipment.
    6. Traylor would have to use air or trimix as the only breathing
gas in the working chamber.
    7. Traylor would have to use the 1992 French Decompression Tables
for air, nitrox, and trimix decompression specified in the HOM,
specifically, the extracted portions of the 1992 French

Decompression tables titled, ``French Regulation Air Standard Tables.''
    8. Traylor would have to equip man locks used by its employees with
an air, nitrox, or trimix-delivery system as specified by the HOM
approved by OSHA for the project. Traylor would be required to not
store oxygen or other compressed gases used in conjunction with
hyperbaric work in the tunnel.
    9. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions would
have to use flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
    10. In hyperbaric work areas, Traylor would have to maintain an
adequate fire-suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
    11. Traylor would have to develop and implement one or more JHAs
for work in the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically and as
necessary (e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that
affects its operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected
employees. The JHAs would have to include all the job functions that
the risk assessment \26\ indicates are essential to prevent injury or
illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    12. Traylor would have to develop a set of checklists to guide
compressed-air work and ensure that employees follow the procedures
required by this proposed permanent variance (including all procedures
required by the HOM approved by OSHA for the project, which this
proposed variance would incorporate by reference). The checklists would
have to include all steps and equipment functions that the risk
assessment indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness during
compressed-air work.
    13. Traylor would have to ensure that the safety and health
provisions of each HOM adequately protect the workers of all
contractors and subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations for
the project to which the HOM applies.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Communication

    1. Prior to beginning a shift, Traylor would have to implement a
system that informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any
hazardous occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety,
including hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth
or rock slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
    2. Traylor would have to provide a power-assisted means of
communication among affected workers and support personnel in
hyperbaric conditions where unassisted voice communication is
inadequate.
    a. Traylor would have to use an independent power supply for
powered communication systems, and these systems would have to operate
such that use or disruption of any one phone or signal location will
not disrupt the operation of the system from any other location.
    b. Traylor would have to test communication systems at the start of
each shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.

G. Worker Qualifications and Training

    Traylor would have to:
    1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this
training.
    2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The
instruction would include:
    a. The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
    b. Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
    c. Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity).
    d. How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression;
    e. Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure; and
    f. Procedures and requirements applicable to the employee in the
project-specific HOM.
    3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (G)(2) of this
proposed condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making
changes to its hyperbaric operations).
    4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers, make this
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's
National Office and OSHA's nearest affected Area Office before the
training takes place.

H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    1. Traylor would have to initiate and maintain a program of
frequent and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment
and support systems (such as temperature control, illumination,
ventilation, and fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and
hyperbaric work areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
    a. Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work
areas; and
    b. Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
    2. If the competent person determines that the equipment
constitutes a safety hazard, Traylor would have to remove the equipment
from service until it corrects the hazardous condition and has the
correction approved by a qualified person.
    3. Traylor would have to maintain records of all tests and
inspections of the EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and
repairs, at the job site for the duration of the job.

I. Compression and Decompression

    Traylor would have to consult with its attending physician
concerning the need for special compression or decompression exposures
appropriate for CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.

J. Recordkeeping

    Traylor would have to maintain a record of any recordable injury,
illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an eye, or
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from exposure of an
employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA 301 Incident
Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses.

    Note:  Examples of important information to include on the OSHA
301 Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on
the form) would have to address the following: the task performed
(Question (Q) 14); an estimate of the CAW's workload (Q 14); the
composition of the gas mixture (e.g., air or trimix (Q 14)); the
pressure worked at (Q 14); temperature in the work and decompression
environments (Q 14); did something unusual occur during the task or
decompression (Q 14); time of symptom onset (Q 15); duration of time
between decompression and onset of symptoms (Q 15); nature and
duration of symptoms (Q 16); a medical summary of the illness or
injury (Q 16); duration of the hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); any
possible contributing factors (Q 17); the number of prior
interventions completed by injured or ill CAW (Q 17); the number of
prior interventions completed by injured or ill CAW at that pressure
(Q 17); the contact information for the treating

healthcare provider (Q 17); and the date and time of last hyperbaric
exposure for this CAW.

    In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, Traylor would have
to maintain records of:
    1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing),
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
    2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
    3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric
work time at each pressure.
    4. The post-intervention physical assessment of each individual CAW
for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated with work
in compressed air or mixed gasses for each hyperbaric intervention.

K. Notifications

    1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
Traylor would have to:
    a. Notify the OTPCA and the nearest affected Area Office of any
recordable injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation,
loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed OSHA 301
Incident Report form \28\) resulting from exposure of an employee to
hyperbaric conditions including those that do not require recompression
treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity, barotrauma), but
still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria (of 29 CFR 1904).
The notification would have to be made within 8 hours of the incident,
or after becoming aware of a recordable injury or illness, and a copy
of the incident investigation (OSHA 301) would have to be provided
within 24 hours of the incident, or after becoming aware of a
recordable injury or illness. In addition to the information required
by the OSHA 301, the incident-investigation report would have to
include a root-cause determination, and the preventive and corrective
actions identified and implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ See footnote 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    b. Provide certification within 15 days of the incident that it
informed affected workers of the incident and the results of the
incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
    c. Notify the OTPCA and the nearest affected Area Office within 15
working days and in writing, of any change in the compressed-air
operations that affects Traylor's ability to comply with the proposed
conditions specified herein.
    d. Upon completion of each hyperbaric tunnel project, evaluate the
effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the project,
and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA and the
neared affected Area Office.
    Note: The evaluation report would have to contain summaries of: (1)
the number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented
(including composition of gas mixtures (air, oxygen, nitrox, and
trimix), and the results achieved; (3) the total number of
interventions and the number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression
illnesses and/or health effects associated with hyperbaric
interventions as recorded on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant
medical diagnoses and treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root-
causes, and preventive and corrective actions identified and
implemented.
    e. To assist OSHA in administering the proposed conditions
specified herein, inform the OTPCA and the nearest affected Area Office
as soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
    i. Cease to do business;
    ii. Change the location and address of the main office for managing
the tunneling operations specified by the project-specific HOM; or
    iii. Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
    f. Notify all affected employees of this interim order/proposed
permanent variance by the same means required to inform them of its
application for a variance.
    2. OSHA would have to approve the transfer of the proposed
permanent variance to a successor company.

Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice.
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to Section 29
U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912,
Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.

    Signed at Washington, DC, on July 22, 2015.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-18319 Filed 7-24-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 197 (Friday, October 9, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Page 64181]
[FR Doc No: 2020-22552]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting; Cancellation

FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION OF PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT:  85 FR 62361,
October 2, 2020.

PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED TIME AND DATE OF THE MEETING:  Wednesday, October
7, 2020 at 2:00 p.m.

CHANGES IN THE MEETING: The Closed Meeting scheduled for Wednesday,
October 7, 2020 at 2:00 p.m., has been cancelled.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: For further information; please
contact Vanessa A. Countryman from the Office of the Secretary at (202)
551-5400.

    Dated: October 7, 2020.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-22552 Filed 10-7-20; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P