[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 182 (Thursday, September 19, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57470-57472]
[FR Doc No: 2013-22848]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 23

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0650; Notice No. 23-13-01-SC]

Special Conditions: Eclipse, EA500, Certification of Autothrottle
Functions

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Eclipse EA500
airplane. This airplane as modified by Innovative Solutions and Support
(IS&S) will have a novel or unusual design feature(s) associated with
the autothrottle system (ATS). The applicable airworthiness regulations
do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design
feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is September 11,
2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark S. Orr, FAA, Programs and
Procedures Branch, ACE-114, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, 901 Locust; Kansas City, Missouri 64106;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; facsimile<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On April 15, 2011, Innovative Solutions and Support (IS&S) applied
for a supplemental type certificate for an update to the aircraft
software to activate the previously installed autothrottle provisions
in the EA500. The EA500 is a pressurized monoplane with provisions for
up to six persons (standard seating five people) and may be operated as
a single or two pilot aircraft (reference Minimum Flight Crew
Limitation, AFM 06-122204 Rev 4 section 2-4). The airplane is operated
under 14 CFR part 91 with standard systems installed and under 14 CFR
part 135 with additional equipment installed. The Eclipse Model EA500
was certificated under part 23 by the FAA on September 30, 2006 (Type
Certificate A00002AC) with autothrottle provisions (i.e., motors and
controls) installed yet rendered inactive through ``collaring'' of the
ATS motor Electronic Circuit Breaker (ECB). Under the original Type
Certification program, no certification credit was received nor the
regulatory basis established for the autothrottle functions of the
Eclipse Model EA500 aircraft.
    Current part 23 airworthiness regulations do not contain
appropriate safety standards for autothrottle system (ATS)
installations, so special conditions are required to establish an
acceptable level of safety. Part 25 regulations contain appropriate
safety standards for these systems, so the intent for this project is
to apply the language in Sec.  25.1329 for the autothrottle,
substituting Sec.  23.1309 and Sec.  23.143 in place of the similar
part 25 regulations referenced in Sec.  25.1329.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Sec.  21.101, IS&S must show that the
EA500, as changed, continues to meet the applicable provisions of the
regulations incorporated by reference in A00002AC or the applicable
regulations in effect on the date of application for the change. The
regulations incorporated by reference in the type certificate are
commonly referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The
regulations incorporated by reference in A00002AC are as follows:

    14 CFR Part 23 through Amendment 55 (except 14 CFR 23.1303
Amendment 23-62), Part 34 through Amendment 34-3, and Part 36
through Amendment 36-26.
    Special Conditions:

23-128-SC for Engine Fire Extinguishing System
23-121-SC for Electronic Engine Control System
23-112A-SC for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection

    Equivalent Levels of Safety Findings:

ACE-02-19: 14 CFR 23.777(d) and 23.781 Fuel Cutoff Control
ACE-05-32: 14 CFR 23.1545(a) and 23.1581(d) for Indicated Airspeeds
ACE-05-34: 14 CFR 23.181(b), Dynamic Stability
ACE-05-35: 14 CFR 23.1353(h), Storage Battery Design and
Installation
ACE-05-36: 14 CFR 23.1323(c), Airspeed Indicating System
ACE-06-01: 14 CFR 23.1545(b)(4), Airspeed Indicator
ACE-06-05: 14 CFR part 23, Appendix H, Sec.  H23.5, Installation of
an Automatic Power Reserve System
ACE-07-04: 14 CFR 23.1545(b)(4), Airspeed Indicator
ACE-08-12, 14 CFR 23.201(b)(2) Wings Level Stall, and 23.203(a),
Turning Flight and Accelerated Turning Stalls for flight into known
icing (FIKI)

    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., part 23) do not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for the EA500 because of a novel or unusual design
feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of
Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model included on the same type
certificate to incorporate the same or similar novel or unusual design
feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model
under Sec.  21.101.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the EA500 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust
emission requirements of part 34 and the noise certification
requirements of part 36.

    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type-
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The EA500 will incorporate the following novel or unusual design
features: Innovative Solutions and Support (IS&S) has applied for a
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) to update the aircraft software for
implementation of an autothrottle function on the EA500 aircraft.
Included with the software upgrade is the activation of previously
installed autothrottle provisions. Since the current part 23
airworthiness regulations do not contain appropriate safety standards
for ATS installations, special conditions are required to establish an
acceptable level of safety. Part 25 regulations contain appropriate
safety standards for these systems, so the intent for this project is
to apply the language in Sec.  25.1329 for the autothrottle,
substituting Sec.  23.1309 and Sec.  23.143 in place of the similar
part 25 regulations referenced in Sec.  25.1329. In addition, proper
function of the ATS must be demonstrated according to Sec.  23.1301 in
a manner acceptable to the administrator, as prior evaluations of the
system components included in the existing type design did not include
demonstration of proper installed function on the ground or in the air.

Discussion

    Part 23 at this time does not sufficiently address autothrottle
technology and safety concerns. Therefore, special conditions must be
developed and applied to this project to ensure an acceptable level of
safety has been obtained. For approval to use the ATS during flight,
the Eclipse EA500 airplane must demonstrate compliance to the intent of
the requirements of Sec.  25.1329, applying the appropriate part 23
references to Sec.  23.1309 (to include performing FHA/SSA to determine
the appropriate/applicable Software and Airborne Electronic Hardware
assurance levels) and Sec.  23.143 and the following special
conditions:
    The following special conditions, derived from Sec.  25.1329, are
issued for the Eclipse EA500 airplane:

    (a) Quick disengagement controls for the autothrust functions
must be provided for each pilot. The autothrust quick disengagement
controls must be located on the thrust control levers. Quick
disengagement controls must be readily accessible to each pilot
while operating the thrust control levers.
    (b) The effects of a failure of the system to disengage the
autothrust functions when manually commanded by the pilot must be
assessed in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 23.1309.
    (c) Engagement or switching of the flight guidance system, a
mode, or a sensor may not cause the autothrust system to effect a
transient response that alters the airplane's flight path any
greater than a minor transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of
this section.
    (d) Under normal conditions, the disengagement of any automatic
control function of a flight guidance system may not cause a
transient response of the airplane's flight path any greater than a
minor transient.
    (e) Under rare normal and non-normal conditions, disengagement
of any automatic control function of a flight guidance system may
not result in a transient any greater than a significant transient,
as defined in paragraph (l)(2) of this section.
    (f) The function and direction of motion of each command
reference control, such as heading select or vertical speed, must be
plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each control if necessary to
prevent inappropriate use or confusion.
    (g) Under any condition of flight appropriate to its use, the
flight guidance system may not produce hazardous loads on the
airplane, nor create hazardous deviations in the flight path. This
applies to both fault-free operation and in the event of a
malfunction, and assumes that the pilot begins corrective action
within a reasonable period of time.
    (h) When the flight guidance system is in use, a means must be
provided to avoid excursions beyond an acceptable margin from the
speed range of the normal flight envelope. If the airplane
experiences an excursion outside this range, a means must be
provided to prevent the flight guidance system from providing
guidance or control to an unsafe speed.
    (i) The flight guidance system functions, controls, indications,
and alerts must be designed to minimize flightcrew errors and
confusion concerning the behavior and operation of the flight
guidance system. Means must be provided to indicate the current mode
of operation, including any armed modes, transitions, and
reversions. Selector switch position is not an acceptable means of
indication. The controls and indications must be grouped and
presented in a logical and consistent manner. The indications must
be visible to each pilot under all expected lighting conditions.
    (j) Following disengagement of the autothrust function, a
caution (visual and auditory) must be provided to each pilot.
    (k) During autothrust operation, it must be possible for the
flightcrew to move the thrust levers without requiring excessive
force. The autothrust may not create a potential hazard when the
flightcrew applies an override force to the thrust levers.
    (l) For purposes of this section, a transient is a disturbance
in the control or flight path of the airplane that is not consistent
with response to flightcrew inputs or environmental conditions.
    (1) A minor transient would not significantly reduce safety
margins and would involve flightcrew actions that are well within
their capabilities. A minor transient may involve a slight increase
in flightcrew workload or some physical discomfort to passengers or
cabin crew.
    (2) A significant transient may lead to a significant reduction
in safety margins, an increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort to
the flightcrew, or physical distress to the passengers or cabin
crew, possibly including non-fatal injuries. Significant transients
do not require, in order to remain within or recover to the normal
flight envelope, any of the following:
    (i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength.
    (ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are greater than those
specified in Sec. 23.143(c).
    (iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might
result in further hazard to secured or non-secured occupants.

    The applicant must also functionally demonstrate independence
between the left and right ATS installation to prove they cannot have a
single point failure that is not extremely improbable that
inadvertently leads to a loss of thrust, or to substantial uncommanded
thrust changes and transients, in both engines simultaneously.

Discussion of Comments

    Notice of proposed special conditions No. 23-13-01-SC for the
Eclipse EA500 airplane was published in the Federal Register on July
31, 2013, (78 FR 46295). No comments were received, and the special
conditions are adopted as proposed.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
EA500. Should IS&S apply at a later date for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model included on A00002AC to
incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special
conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model EA500 of airplanes. It is not a rule of general
applicability and it affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA
for approval of these features on the airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

Citation

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for Eclipse EA500 airplanes modified by
IS&S.
    1. Certification of Autothrottle Functions under Part 23.
    The following special conditions, derived from Sec.  25.1329, are
issued for the Eclipse EA500 airplane:

    (a) Quick disengagement controls for the autothrust functions
must be provided for each pilot. The autothrust quick disengagement
controls must be located on the thrust control levers. Quick
disengagement controls must be readily accessible to each pilot
while operating the thrust control levers.
    (b) The effects of a failure of the system to disengage the
autothrust functions when manually commanded by the pilot must be
assessed in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 23.1309.
    (c) Engagement or switching of the flight guidance system, a
mode, or a sensor may not cause the autothrust system to effect a
transient response that alters the airplane's flight path any
greater than a minor transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of
this section.
    (d) Under normal conditions, the disengagement of any automatic
control function of a flight guidance system may not cause a
transient response of the airplane's flight path any greater than a
minor transient.
    (e) Under rare normal and non-normal conditions, disengagement
of any automatic control function of a flight guidance system may
not result in a transient any greater than a significant transient,
as defined in paragraph (l)(2) of this section.
    (f) The function and direction of motion of each command
reference control, such as heading select or vertical speed, must be
plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each control if necessary to
prevent inappropriate use or confusion.
    (g) Under any condition of flight appropriate to its use, the
flight guidance system may not produce hazardous loads on the
airplane, nor create hazardous deviations in the flight path. This
applies to both fault-free operation and in the event of a
malfunction, and assumes that the pilot begins corrective action
within a reasonable period of time.
    (h) When the flight guidance system is in use, a means must be
provided to avoid excursions beyond an acceptable margin from the
speed range of the normal flight envelope. If the airplane
experiences an excursion outside this range, a means must be
provided to prevent the flight guidance system from providing
guidance or control to an unsafe speed.
    (i) The flight guidance system functions, controls, indications,
and alerts must be designed to minimize flightcrew errors and
confusion concerning the behavior and operation of the flight
guidance system. Means must be provided to indicate the current mode
of operation, including any armed modes, transitions, and
reversions. Selector switch position is not an acceptable means of
indication. The controls and indications must be grouped and
presented in a logical and consistent manner. The indications must
be visible to each pilot under all expected lighting conditions.
    (j) Following disengagement of the autothrust function, a
caution (visual and auditory) must be provided to each pilot.
    (k) During autothrust operation, it must be possible for the
flightcrew to move the thrust levers without requiring excessive
force. The autothrust may not create a potential hazard when the
flightcrew applies an override force to the thrust levers.
    (l) For purposes of this section, a transient is a disturbance
in the control or flight path of the airplane that is not consistent
with response to flightcrew inputs or environmental conditions.
    (1) A minor transient would not significantly reduce safety
margins and would involve flightcrew actions that are well within
their capabilities. A minor transient may involve a slight increase
in flightcrew workload or some physical discomfort to passengers or
cabin crew.
    (2) A significant transient may lead to a significant reduction
in safety margins, an increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort to
the flightcrew, or physical distress to the passengers or cabin
crew, possibly including non-fatal injuries. Significant transients
do not require, in order to remain within or recover to the normal
flight envelope, any of the following:
    (i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength.
    (ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are greater than those
specified in Sec. 23.143(c).
    (iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might
result in further hazard to secured or non-secured occupants.

    The applicant must also functionally demonstrate independence
between the left and right ATS installation to prove they cannot have a
single point failure that is not extremely improbable that
inadvertently leads to a loss of thrust, or to substantial uncommanded
thrust changes and transients, in both engines simultaneously.

    Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on September 11, 2013.
Earl Lawrence,
Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2013-22848 Filed 9-18-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P