[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 68 (Monday, April 9, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15201-15202]
[FR Doc No: 2018-07202]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

[Docket No. FMCSA-2013-0122; FMCSA-2015-0327; FMCSA-2012-0154]

Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Hearing

AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of renewal of exemptions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: FMCSA announces its decision to renew exemptions for four
individuals from the hearing requirement in the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) for interstate commercial motor vehicle
(CMV) drivers. The exemptions enable these hard of hearing and deaf
individuals to continue to operate CMVs in interstate commerce.

DATES: The exemptions were applicable on February 24, 2018. The
exemptions expire on February 24, 2020. Comments must be received on or
before May 9, 2018.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments bearing the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS) Docket No. FMCSA-2013-0122; FMCSA-2015-0327;
FMCSA-2012-0154 using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
e.t., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
    Instructions: Each submission must include the Agency name and the
docket number(s) for this notice. Note that all comments received will
be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading below
for further information.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or Room W12-140
on the ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., e.t., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The FDMS is available 24 hours each day, 365
days each year. If you want acknowledgment that we received your
comments, please include a self-addressed, stamped envelope or postcard
or print the acknowledgement page that appears after submitting
comments online.
    Privacy Act: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits
comments from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT
posts these comments, without edit, including any personal information
the commenter provides, to http://www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed
at http://www.dot.gov/privacy.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Christine A. Hydock, Chief,
Medical Programs Division,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected], FMCSA,
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W64-224,
Washington, DC 20590-0001. Office hours are from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.,
e.t., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. If you have
questions regarding viewing or submitting material to the docket,
contact Docket Services, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Under 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) and 31315, FMCSA may grant an exemption
for five years if it finds ``such exemption would likely achieve a
level of safety that is equivalent to or greater than the level that
would be achieved absent such exemption.'' The statute also allows the
Agency to renew exemptions at the end of the five-year period. FMCSA
grants exemptions from the FMCSRs for a two-year period to align with
the maximum duration of a driver's medical certification.
    The physical qualification standard for drivers regarding hearing
found in 49 CFR 391.41(b)(11) states that a person is physically
qualified to driver a CMV if that person first perceives a forced
whispered voice in the better ear at not less than 5 feet with or
without the use of a hearing aid or, if tested by use of an audiometric
device, does not have an average hearing loss in the better ear greater
than 40 decibels at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz with or without a
hearing aid when the audiometric device is calibrated to American
National Standard (formerly ASA Standard) Z24.5--1951.
    49 CFR 391.41(b)(11) was adopted in 1970, with a revision in 1971
to allow drivers to be qualified under this standard while wearing a
hearing aid, 35 FR 6458, 6463 (April 22, 1970) and 36 FR 12857 (July 3,
1971).
    The four individuals listed in this notice have requested renewal
of their exemptions from the hearing standard in 49 CFR 391.41(b)(11),
in accordance with FMCSA procedures. Accordingly, FMCSA has evaluated
these applications for renewal on their merits and decided to extend
each exemption for a renewable two-year period.

II. Request for Comments

    Interested parties or organizations possessing information that
would otherwise show that any, or all, of these drivers are not
currently achieving the statutory level of safety should immediately
notify FMCSA. The Agency will evaluate any adverse evidence submitted
and, if safety is being compromised or if continuation of the exemption
would not be consistent with the goals and objectives of 49 U.S.C.
31136(e) and 31315, FMCSA will take immediate steps to revoke the
exemption of a driver.

III. Basis for Renewing Exemptions

    In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) and 31315, each of the four
applicants has satisfied the renewal conditions for obtaining an
exemption from the hearing requirement. The 4 drivers in this notice
remain in good standing with the Agency. In addition, for Commercial
Driver's License (CDL) holders, the Commercial Driver's License
Information System (CDLIS) and the Motor Carrier Management Information
System (MCMIS) are searched for crash and violation data. For non-CDL
holders, the Agency reviews the driving records from the State Driver's
Licensing Agency (SDLA). These factors provide an adequate basis for
predicting each driver's ability to continue to safely operate a CMV in
interstate commerce. Therefore, FMCSA concludes that extending the
exemption for each of these drivers for a period of two years is likely
to achieve a level of safety equal to that existing without the
exemption.
    As of February 24, 2018, and in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 31136(e)
and 31315, the following four individuals have satisfied the renewal
conditions for obtaining an exemption from the hearing requirement in
the FMCSRs for interstate CMV drivers.

Michael Bunjer (MD)
Allen Estes (LA)
Edwin Oakes (NY)
Kenneth Prusinski (OH)

    The drivers were included in docket numbers FMCSA-2013-0122; FMCSA-

2015-0327; FMCSA;2012-0154. Their exemptions are applicable as of
February 24, 2018, and will expire on February 24, 2020.

IV. Conditions and Requirements

    The exemptions are extended subject to the following conditions:
(1) Each driver must report any crashes or accidents as defined in 49
CFR 390.5; and (2) report all citations and convictions for
disqualifying offenses under 49 CFR part 383 and 49 CFR 391 to FMCSA;
and (3) each driver prohibited from operating a motorcoach or bus with
passengers in interstate commerce. The driver must also have a copy of
the exemption when driving, for presentation to a duly authorized
Federal, State, or local enforcement official. In addition, the
exemption does not exempt the individual from meeting the applicable
CDL testing requirements. Each exemption will be valid for two years
unless rescinded earlier by FMCSA. The exemption will be rescinded if:
(1) The person fails to comply with the terms and conditions of the
exemption; (2) the exemption has resulted in a lower level of safety
than was maintained before it was granted; or (3) continuation of the
exemption would not be consistent with the goals and objectives of 49
U.S.C. 31136(e) and 31315.

V. Preemption

    During the period the exemption is in effect, no State shall
enforce any law or regulation that conflicts with this exemption with
respect to a person operating under the exemption.

VI. Conclusion

    Based upon its evaluation of the 4 exemption applications, FMCSA
renews the exemptions of the aforementioned drivers from the hearing
requirement in 49 CFR 391.41(b)(11). In accordance with 49 U.S.C.
31136(e) and 31315, each exemption will be valid for two years unless
revoked earlier by FMCSA.

    Issued on: April 2, 2018.
Larry W. Minor,
Associate Administrator for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2018-07202 Filed 4-6-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-EX-P


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 217 (Thursday, November 8, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55881-55882]
[FR Doc No: 2018-24451]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Notice of Commission Staff Attendance

    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) hereby gives
notice that members of the Commission's staff may attend the following
meetings related to the transmission planning activities of the New
York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO):

NYISO Electric System Planning Working Group, Installed Capacity
Market, Market Issues Working Group Meeting

November 6, 2018, 10:00 a.m.--4:00 p.m. (EST)

    The above-referenced meeting will be via web conference and
teleconference.
    The above-referenced meeting is open to stakeholders.
    Further information may be found at: http://www.nyiso.com/public/committees/documents.jsp?com=bic_espwg&directory=2018-11-06.

NYISO Business Issues Committee Meeting

November 14, 2018, 10:00 a.m.-4:00 p.m. (EST)

    The above-referenced meeting will be via web conference and
teleconference.
    The above-referenced meeting is open to stakeholders.
    Further information may be found at: http://www.nyiso.com/public/committees/documents.jsp?com=bic&directory=2018-11-14.

NYISO Operating Committee Meeting

November 15, 2018, 10:00 a.m.--4:00 p.m. (EST)

    The above-referenced meeting will be via web conference and
teleconference.
    The above-referenced meeting is open to stakeholders.
    Further information may be found at: http://www.nyiso.com/public/committees/documents.jsp?com=oc&directory=2018-11-15.

NYISO Electric System Planning Working Group Meeting

November 15, 2018, 2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m. (EST)

    The above-referenced meeting will be via web conference and
teleconference.
    The above-referenced meeting is open to stakeholders.
    Further information may be found at: http://www.nyiso.com/public/committees/documents.jsp?com=bic_espwg&directory=2018-11-15.

NYISO Electric System Planning Working Group, Installed Capacity
Market, Market Issues Working Group Meeting

November 16, 2018, 10:00 a.m.-4:00 p.m. (EST)

    The above-referenced meeting will be via web conference and
teleconference.

    The above-referenced meeting is open to stakeholders.
    Further information may be found at: http://www.nyiso.com/public/committees/documents.jsp?com=bic_espwg&directory=2018-11-16.

NYISO Management Committee Meeting

November 28, 2018, 10:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m. (EST)

    The above-referenced meeting will be via web conference and
teleconference.
    The above-referenced meeting is open to stakeholders.
    Further information may be found at: http://www.nyiso.com/public/committees/documents.jsp?com=mc&directory=2018-11-28.
    The discussions at the meetings described above may address matters
at issue in the following proceedings:
    New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER15-2059.
    New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER17-2327.
    For more information, contact James Eason, Office of Energy Market
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at<PHONE_NUMBER> or
[email protected].

    Dated: November 2, 2018.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-24451 Filed 11-7-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 21 (Thursday, February 2, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 9034-9035]
[FR Doc No: 2017-02065]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. AD17-9-000]

Petition for Rulemaking; Foundation for Resilient Societies

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of petition for rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has received a
petition from the Foundation for Resilient Societies requesting the
Commission initiate a rulemaking to require an enhanced reliability
standard to detect, report, mitigate, and remove malware from the Bulk
Power System, all as more fully explained in its petition.

DATES: Comments are due by 5 p.m. February 17, 2017.

ADDRESSES: The Commission encourages electronic submission of comments
in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov.
Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 5
copies of the comments to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kevin Ryan (Legal Information), Office
of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First
Street NE., Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January 13, 2017, the Foundation for
Resilient Societies, pursuant to Rule 207 of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (Commission) Rules of Practice and Procedure,
18 CFR 385.207, filed a petition requesting that the Commission
initiate a rulemaking to require an enhanced reliability standard to
detect, report, mitigate, and remove malware from the Bulk Power
System, all as more fully explained in its petition.
    Any person that wishes to comment in this proceeding must file
comments in accordance with Rule 211 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 385.211 (2016). Comments will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken. Comments must be filed on or before the comment date.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the

``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription''
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive email
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For
assistance with any FERC Online service, please email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For
TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: January 17, 2017.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-02065 Filed 2-1-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 5, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 19472-19482]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07150]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2012-0187; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-094-AD;
Amendment 39-18452; AD 2016-07-07]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by fuel
system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. This AD requires
modifying the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wiring to prevent
development of an ignition source inside the center fuel tank. We are
issuing this AD to prevent ignition sources inside the center fuel
tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in
a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

DATES: This AD is effective May 10, 2016.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of May 10,
2016.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P. O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone
206-544-5000, extension 1; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>. It is also available on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2012-
0187.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2012-
0187; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6506; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to
amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The
Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. The SNPRM published in the Federal
Register on February 23, 2015 (80 FR 9400) (``the SNPRM''). We preceded
the SNPRM with a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that published in
the Federal Register on March 1, 2012 (77 FR 12506). The NPRM proposed
to require modifying the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wiring
or fuel tank systems to prevent development of an ignition source
inside the center fuel tank. The NPRM was prompted by fuel system
reviews conducted by the manufacturer. The SNPRM proposed to revise the
applicability, including alternative actions for cargo airplanes, and
extend the compliance time. We are issuing this AD to prevent ignition
sources inside the center fuel tank, which, in combination with
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and
consequent loss of the airplane.

Record of Ex Parte Communication

    In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on the operational and economic impact from design
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain issues
related to this final rule in a meeting held December 1, 2015, with
Airlines for America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry.
This final rule addresses the issues discussed during that meeting that
are relevant to this final rule. A summary of this meeting can be found
in the rulemaking docket at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA-2012-0187.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the SNPRM and
the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: New Certification Requirements for
Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) Unwarranted

    A4A, representing U.S. cargo operators, stated that the FAA intends
to issue rulemaking requiring U.S. cargo operators to do additional
fuel safety modifications to meet the latest aircraft certification
requirements.
    We infer that A4A considers that requiring airplanes to meet the
latest certification requirements is not warranted and that the SNPRM
should therefore be withdrawn. We assume that by ``the latest aircraft
certification requirements,'' A4A is referring to the relatively new
requirements for FRM contained in 14 CFR part 125.
    We do not agree that the SNPRM should be withdrawn. This AD is not
specifically intended to require that the affected airplanes meet the
flammability requirements of 14 CFR part 125. It is instead intended to
address an unsafe condition as required by 14 CFR part 39 identified by
the FAA under the policy contained in the FAA's Special Federal
Aviation Regulation No. 88 (14 CFR part 21, SFAR 88) AD decision policy
(Policy Memorandum ANM-100-2003-112-15) (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/DC94C3A46396950386256D5E006AED11?OpenDocument&Highlight=anm-100-2003-112-15), dated February 25, 2003, and the FAA's Transport Airplane Risk
Assessment Methodology (TARAM) (Policy Statement PS-ANM-25-05) (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/4E5AE8707164674A862579510061F96B?OpenDocument&Highlight=ps-anm-25-05).
The FAA determined that installing FRM that meets 14 CFR part 125 would
be one acceptable way to address the identified unsafe condition, so
airplanes on which such a modification was incorporated were excluded
from the applicability of the SNPRM. Other modifications identified
later in this discussion are available as alternative actions to
installing FRM for certain operations. We have determined it is
necessary to proceed with issuance of this final rule.

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Intrusive, Expensive, Unnecessary

    A4A stated that Airbus and Boeing have indicated to them that the
service bulletins for the wire separation modification that is part of
the cargo airplane alternative actions will be intrusive and expensive
and will not significantly improve safety. A4A stated that the safety
analyses performed by the aircraft manufacturers do not classify the
proposed modifications as safety critical. A4A noted that those service
bulletins will not be issued as ``Alert'' service bulletins.
Additionally, A4A stated that foreign regulatory authorities, aircraft
manufacturers, and airlines do not support that a safety issue remains.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we withdraw the SNPRM because
the airplane manufacturers have determined that an unsafe condition
does not exist and the SNPRM will not significantly improve safety. We
do not agree that the SNPRM should be withdrawn. We acknowledge that
Boeing does not consider the condition associated with FQIS on these
airplanes to be unsafe. We disagree with Boeing's assertions, for the
reasons discussed extensively in our response to Boeing's similar
comment in the SNPRM, under ``Request to Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506,
March 1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk.'' We have determined that it is
necessary to proceed with issuance of this final rule.

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Global Economic Disadvantage to U.S.
Operators

    A4A does not expect that foreign regulators will require
modification of affected foreign-registered aircraft, and stated that
the competitive position of U.S. cargo operators will be harmed as a
result. A4A stated that foreign regulatory agencies did not mandate
retrofit of FRM for cargo airplanes, and therefore A4A did not expect
that those authorities will mandate FQIS changes for their operators.
A4A's comment made reference to documents published by the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Civil Aviation Authority of China
(CAAC), and the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) as evidence that
those agencies are not planning action to address any unsafe condition
associated with FQIS.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we withdraw the NPRM because
other foreign regulatory agencies have determined that an unsafe
condition does not exist with regard to FQIS as addressed by the
proposed AD.
    We were unable to examine the EASA document A4A attempted to
reference because the reference number was incomplete. We do not agree
that the CAAC and JCAB documents indicate a position on the unsafe
condition addressed by the SNPRM. Both of those documents simply state
a requirement for existing type certificate holders to review fuel tank
designs that is similar to the FAA's SFAR 88. Those documents do not
state positions on any unsafe conditions or AD proposals identified by
the FAA, the CAAC, or the JCAB.
    A4A stated that the U.S. air cargo industry is currently in an
extremely competitive global market. Additional lower deck capacity on
passenger aircraft, especially through Middle East hubs, has
significantly increased the need for cargo industry capacity. Several
cargo carriers have ceased operations, and many others have parked some
aircraft. U.S. carriers compete directly with foreign cargo operators.
A4A stated that any additional costs on U.S. cargo operators that are
not incurred by foreign operators will make U.S. operators less
competitive and will lead to the loss of jobs in the U.S.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we withdraw the proposal to
require corrective action on cargo airplanes because non-U.S. cargo
operators will not be required to make similar modifications, and the
FAA AD action would harm the competitive position of U.S. cargo
operators, resulting in the loss of U.S. jobs.
    We do not agree to withdraw the SNPRM for corrective action on
cargo airplanes. As part of the AD development process, the FAA works
with the affected manufacturer to develop a cost estimate for the
corrective actions in a proposed AD. The FAA considers all possible
corrective actions proposed by a manufacturer in an attempt to minimize
the cost burden on operators. In some cases the FAA even makes a
specific suggestion to a manufacturer for a less costly alternative. In
the end, the manufacturer is responsible for development of an
appropriate corrective action.
    While the FAA attempts to minimize the costs associated with a
required corrective action for a U.S. product, ultimately the FAA has
the responsibility as the civil aviation authority (CAA) of the state
of design to address unsafe conditions through AD action. Other CAAs
overseeing foreign operators will typically apply the FAA AD or develop
a similar AD for U.S. products operated under each CAA's jurisdiction.
Other CAAs rely heavily on the knowledge and judgment of the CAA of the
state of design to identify unsafe conditions and appropriate
corrective actions for products of that state. The FAA is not aware at
this time of any affected CAAs that do not plan to issue a
corresponding mandate to address the unsafe condition associated with
FQIS identified in the proposed AD. Even if such a situation occurs,
the FAA would not use a foreign CAA's position as a justification for
not addressing an unsafe condition identified by the FAA. While we
acknowledge such a situation could harm the competitive position of a
U.S. operator, we are still obligated by U.S. law and by international
treaties to address the identified unsafe condition. We have determined
that it is necessary to proceed with issuance of this final rule.

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Costs of Compliance

    A4A stated that the proposed modifications are very costly, and
noted that United Parcel Service (UPS) has estimated a total cost of
$16 million for its fleet of four aircraft types that are potentially
affected by the SNPRM and other similar planned ADs. A4A pointed out
that U.S. cargo operators have already spent tens of millions of
dollars on fuel tank safety improvements. UPS alone has spent $35.5
million to comply with 51 SFAR 88 ADs on the four fleet types
potentially affected. A4A noted that cargo operators already have
recurring expenses for Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane
Safety (EAPAS) maintenance program tasks that continue to help ensure
fuel tank safety. A4A added that cargo operators have already invested
in improved and more expensive fuel tank component repair and overhaul
processes.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we withdraw the SNPRM because
the costs of addressing previously identified fuel tank unsafe
conditions has been high, and that the additional cost to address the
FQIS latent-plus-one issue will also be high, with very little safety
benefit.
    We do not agree to withdraw the SNPRM. We acknowledge that the
total industry cost to address other fuel tank system unsafe conditions
has been high. The SFAR 88 studies for Boeing airplanes identified
several basic design deficiencies in lightning protection that could
cause an ignition source in a fuel tank in the event of a lightning
strike, and several issues with fuel pump systems and fuel valve
systems where a single failure could result in an ignition source in a
fuel tank. Fuel pump issues are suspected to have caused several fuel
tank ignition events, so these issues were considered to be the highest
priority for the development of corrective actions and related AD
actions. The FAA considers the cost of addressing those issues to be
clearly justified. Deficiencies in maintenance programs and
inappropriate component repair actions that could lead to inadvertent
significant increases in the risk of an ignition source in a fuel tank
were also identified, and the cost of airworthiness limitations to
address those issues is also considered to be justified.
    The SFAR 88 studies and the FAA's subsequent decision-making
process identified FQIS vulnerability of Model 707, 727, 737, 747, 757,
767, and 777 airplanes as an unsafe condition requiring corrective
action. While the more recently designed of these airplane models have
significant improvements in FQIS design details, they all have similar
FQIS design architecture with respect to the identified failure
scenario. That architecture is vulnerable to a combination of a latent
in-tank wiring failure and a subsequent wiring failure outside of the
tank that connects a high power source to the FQIS tank circuit
creating an ignition source in a fuel tank. This failure combination
was determined by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to
have been the most likely cause of the Model 747 fuel tank explosion
accident

off Long Island in 1996. NTSB Safety Recommendation A-98-038 (http://www.ntsb.gov/about/employment/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-98-038) recommended that the FAA require that
FQIS wiring on all airplane models that have similar wiring
installations be separated and shielded to the maximum extent possible.
    The FAA issued AD 98-20-40, Amendment 39-10808 (63 FR 52147,
September 30, 1998); and AD 99-03-04, Amendment 39-11018 (64 FR 4959,
February 2, 1999); to address this issue on early Model 747 and Model
737 airplanes, respectively, which used the same FQIS as the accident
airplane. The FAA subsequently (in 2003) determined that this same
architectural vulnerability was an unsafe condition for high
flammability fuel tanks on all Boeing jet transports existing at that
time. This determination was consistent with the published FAA policy
for SFAR 88 corrective actions and with the current FAA TARAM
guidelines for identification of unsafe conditions on transport
airplanes.
    The FAA deferred acting on this unsafe condition until after the
FRM rulemaking activity was complete because introduction of FRM had
the potential to change the classification of many of the affected fuel
tanks to low flammability. When the final decision for the FRM rule did
not include a requirement for FRM on all airplanes, the FAA resumed the
planned actions to address the identified FQIS unsafe condition on the
airplanes that were not required to have FRM.
    The FAA considers the safety benefit of the SNPRM to be significant
for both passenger and cargo airplanes. We estimate that the
installation of compliant FRM will provide approximately an order of
magnitude reduction in the risk of a fuel tank explosion on anticipated
flights with a latent failure of an FQIS circuit in the center fuel
tank. We estimate that the periodic BITE checks in the cargo airplane
alternative actions will result in a 75- to 90-percent reduction in the
number of flights that operate with a latent in-tank failure that makes
them vulnerable to a single additional wiring hot short failure
creating an ignition source in the center fuel tank. We estimate that
the proposed wire separation modification in the cargo airplane
alternative actions will reduce the risk of a hot short (and a
resultant ignition source) on flights that have a latent in-tank
failure by 50 to 75 percent. This estimated reduction in the risk on
anticipated flights with a latent in-tank failure is sufficient to
reduce the risk below the FAA's TARAM individual flight risk guideline
level for urgent action. As discussed below in our response to
``Request to Remove Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes,'' we
determined that further changes to further reduce the risk below the
TARAM individual flight risk corrective action guideline of 1 in 10
million per flight hour would significantly increase the costs of
compliance and are not necessary to adequately address the unsafe
condition. We have determined that it is necessary to proceed with
issuance of this final rule.

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Unsafe Condition Addressed by Previous
Requirements

    A4A stated that there have been no fuel tank ignition incidents
since the previously issued fuel tank safety ADs were implemented. A4A
stated that this provides direct evidence that FAA projections for
additional incidents were overstated and that SFAR 88 changes have
worked. They further stated that no unsafe condition exists, asserting
that service experience has shown that the fuel tank safety issues have
been sufficiently addressed with significant previous modifications,
recurring maintenance, controlled overhaul processes and repair
processes, and maintenance program tasks.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we withdraw the SNPRM because
previously required actions have adequately addressed the need for
improvements in fuel tank safety.
    We do not agree to withdraw the SNPRM. Until recently, fuel tank
ignition incidents on U.S.- and European-manufactured transport
airplanes have occurred roughly once every five to six years, with the
most recent event in May 2006 (a Model 727 airplane in India in 2006, a
Model 737 airplane in Thailand in 2001, a Model 747 airplane near New
York in 1996, and a Model 737 airplane in the Philippines in 1991). It
has now been ten years since the most recent event.
    We agree that a significant improvement in fuel tank safety has
occurred due to actions that have reduced the potential for ignition
sources associated with single failures of fuel pumps and fuel pump
power systems. That improvement alone would be expected to increase the
average interval between fuel tank ignition incidents to more than ten
years. However, the fact that no incidents have occurred since 2006 is
not statistically significant, and is not sufficient to predict that
additional events will not occur. In addition, even assuming the
average interval between events is significantly improved to the extent
that the overall fleet risk is considered acceptable, we would still
address unsafe conditions identified based on the published FAA policy
for SFAR 88 corrective actions and the current FAA guidelines for
identification of unsafe conditions on transport airplanes when the
individual flight safety risk exceeds our guidelines, as in this case.
We have determined that it is necessary to proceed with issuance of
this final rule.

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: All Related NTSB Safety Recommendations
Closed

    A4A stated that the NTSB previously issued the following safety
recommendations related to flammability, wiring, and wiring
maintenance:
     A-96-174--Preclude flammable fuel air mixtures in fuel
tanks. Closed--Acceptable Action: FRM Rulemaking. Safety Recommendation
A-96-174 can be found at http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-96-174.
     A-98-038--Separation of FQIS wires to the max extent
possible. Closed--Acceptable Action: SFAR 88 Rulemaking.
     A-98-039--Require surge protection systems for FQIS wires.
Closed--Acceptable Action: SFAR 88 Rulemaking. Safety Recommendation A-
98-039 can be found at http://www.ntsb.gov/about/employment/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-98-039.
     A-00-106--Assess wiring criticality and separation.
Closed--Acceptable Action: EAPAS/FTS Rulemaking. Safety Recommendation
A-00-106 can be found at (http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-00-106.
     A-00-108--Repair of potentially unsafe wiring conditions.
Closed--Acceptable Action: EAPAS/FTS Rulemaking. Safety Recommendation
A-00-108 can be found at http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-00-108.
    A4A noted that all applicable NTSB safety recommendations are
closed with acceptable actions taken by the FAA. A4A stated that none
of the NTSB safety recommendations called for the FAA to address wire
separation for the FQIS.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we withdraw the SNPRM because
the NTSB considers the overall fuel tank safety issue to be adequately
addressed by previous actions.
    We do not agree to withdraw the SNPRM. A4A appears to have

misunderstood NTSB Safety Recommendation A-98-038 and the NTSB's
acceptance of the FAA's response to that safety recommendation. NTSB
Safety Recommendation A-98-038 specifically called for the FAA to
require, in ``airplanes with fuel quantity indication system (FQIS)
wire installations that are co-routed with wires that may be powered,
the physical separation and electrical shielding of FQIS wires to the
maximum extent possible.'' The NTSB classified that recommendation as
``closed, acceptable action'' after the FAA stated that it would issue
ADs to mandate FQIS protection on the high flammability tanks of
aircraft on which the installation of FRM is not required by the Fuel
Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008).
The communications between the NTSB and the FAA on Safety
Recommendation A-98-038 can be viewed at http://www.ntsb.gov/about/employment/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-98-038. We
have determined that it is necessary to proceed with issuance of this
final rule.

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Unjustified by Risk Assessment

    A4A stated that the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and
other regulatory agencies are having difficulty calculating the true
safety value associated with the proposed FQIS AD. A4A stated that its
position is that all the unsafe conditions have been mitigated,
operationally and across industry, and all previous rules have been
effective. A4A added that, in light of the operators' financial and
technical investment to mitigate the unsafe conditions in all areas,
the SNPRM is difficult to understand technically relative to the amount
of mitigation that would be required, in light of a true risk
assessment. A4A stated that the FAA is alone in believing that a safety
issue still exists.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we withdraw the SNPRM because
it has not been justified by a risk assessment and because previously
required actions have adequately addressed the need for improvements in
fuel tank safety.
    We do not agree to withdraw the SNPRM. We provided a detailed
response to similar comments and described the FAA's risk assessment in
the SNPRM in the sections ``Request to Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506,
March 1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk,'' ``Request to Withdraw NPRM (77
FR 12506, March 1, 2012): Not Supported by Risk Analysis,'' and
``Request to Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012): No Unsafe
Condition,'' as well as in earlier paragraphs in this discussion. We
have determined that it is necessary to proceed with issuance of this
final rule.

Request To Remove Requirement for Corrective Actions for Cargo
Airplanes

    A4A stated that the alternative wire separation modifications
allowed for cargo airplanes would not meet the ``new design criteria.''
(We assume that A4A is referring to the wire separation requirements
for repairs and modifications that are included in the fuel tank system
airworthiness limitations required by recent ADs for the various Boeing
models.) A4A stated that in the Model 757 service bulletin under
development by Boeing, only about ``5 percent'' of FQIS wires can be
separated from other systems by a distance of 2 inches, and that the
majority of the wire bundle relocation will achieve only up to 0.5-inch
spacing. A4A stated that because the wire separation requirements are
not met, partial exemptions from the requirements of 14 CFR 25.981 are
required to allow approval of these wire separation service bulletins.
Based on the reduced separation distance and the need for exemptions,
A4A considered the proposed wire separation requirements included in
the cargo airplane alternative actions to be a symbolic gesture with no
significant safety benefit, while at the same time being expensive and
intrusive. A4A further stated that operators have reviewed the
associated draft service bulletins and are concerned about the lack of
a design target or adequate rationale for the actions proposed by the
FAA. Finally, A4A stated that Boeing had stated to them that Boeing
does not understand what design changes the FAA wants or why the FAA
considers there to be a safety issue.
    We infer that A4A is requesting that we remove the alternative
actions for a wire separation modification on cargo airplanes because
A4A believes the wire separation actions associated with the cargo
airplane alternative actions in the SNPRM would have no significant
safety benefit since inadequate physical wire separation is provided.
    We do not agree to withdraw the SNPRM. A4A appears to have
misunderstood the intent of the FQIS wire separation requirements added
to the airworthiness limitations as a critical design configuration
control limitation (CDCCL). The FQIS wire separation CDCCL provides a
set of wire separation requirements that are intended to be used as a
default when modifying or repairing an aircraft to ensure that the
intended level of separation of the FQIS wiring from other wiring is
maintained. The Model 757 CDCCL (28-AWL-05) contains a simple 2-inch
separation requirement as originally proposed by Boeing. While Boeing
has not proposed changes to the Model 757 FQIS wire separation CDCCL,
the corresponding CDCCL (28-AWL-05) for Model 737-700, -800, and -900
airplanes has numerous additional provisions approving other design
approaches (typically combinations of wire sleeving and smaller
separation distances) that Boeing or operators proposed and that the
FAA approved. Each time wire separation configuration options were
approved for Boeing, alternative CDCCL wording was approved as an AMOC
with the AD that required the addition of the CDCCLs to operators'
maintenance programs. A similar AMOC will be granted for the approved
modifications to the FQIS for Model 757 airplanes.
    A4A also appears to have misunderstood the reason that exemptions
would be required to allow approval of the cargo airplane wire
separation modification. Lack of a full 2 inches of wire separation in
all of the changed areas is not the reason an exemption is required.
Rather, an exemption is required because the overall FQIS will not
comply with 14 CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3) due to the existing
noncompliance of the unchanged areas of the system. Because those rules
require a system-level safety analysis, we cannot find the changes to
the system compliant if a noncompliance exists in the unchanged areas
of the system.
    The proposed Boeing design uses sleeving over the wire bundles and
extensive retention features to provide a level of wire protection
similar to the protection that would be provided by a greater
separation distance. The design measures are consistent with those
previously approved by the FAA in the Model 737-700/800/900 CDCCL
mentioned previously.
    We consider the safety benefit provided by the proposed cargo
airplane alternative actions to be significant. The unsafe condition
determination and the rationale and estimated safety benefit for the
cargo airplane alternative actions were discussed extensively with
Boeing in several meetings, and we consider that Boeing fully
understands the FAA's position on each of those aspects of the
proposal. The proposed requirement for a periodic check through the
built-in test equipment (BITE) of the FQIS processor is intended to
identify and result in corrective actions for the detectable fault
conditions in the FQIS in-tank wiring. We estimated that this

proposed requirement will result in a 75- to 90-percent reduction in
the number of flights that operate with a latent in-tank failure that
makes them vulnerable to a single additional wiring hot short failure
creating an ignition source in the center fuel tank. The proposed FQIS
wire separation modification is intended to reduce the risk of a hot
short of power onto center tank FQIS circuits by physically isolating
the portions of those circuits that are outside of the tank in the
areas where those circuits are most vulnerable to damage and most
easily separated. We did not propose to require modifications of the
wiring in the electrical racks or in the cockpit areas because of the
difficulty involved in accessing and achieving additional wire
separation in those areas, and in recognition that the FQIS processor
provides some beneficial circuit isolation to protect against hot
shorts in those areas. We estimated that the proposed wire separation
modification would reduce the risk of a hot short on flights that have
a latent in-tank failure by 50 to 75 percent. Those estimates were
reviewed with Boeing, and Boeing did not disagree with those estimates.
We have determined it is necessary to proceed with issuance of this
final rule.

Request To Remove Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes

    Colin Edwards and an anonymous commenter made no explicit request
to change the SNPRM, but objected to the proposed addition of
alternative actions for cargo airplanes that would allow a design
change that does not fully comply with the fuel tank system safety
requirements of 14 CFR part 25 (14 CFR 25.981(a)(3)) to be used to
address the unsafe condition. The commenters stated that it should not
be acceptable to allow greater risk to exist on cargo airplanes than
that allowed for passenger airplanes.
    We infer that the commenters propose the elimination of the
proposed alternative corrective action for cargo airplanes. We disagree
with this request. We determined that an acceptable level of safety
would be provided for the affected cargo airplanes, and explained our
position in depth in response to similar comments in the SNPRM.
However, we will attempt to address the commenters' concerns by
expanding on the explanation of our safety determination.
    When assessing potential unsafe conditions on transport airplanes
to determine if corrective action is necessary, the FAA assesses the
total risk to the affected fleet of airplanes exposed to the condition,
and assesses the level of risk on individual airplanes within the
fleet. The FAA's guidelines for assessing the total fleet risk related
to the unsafe condition are slightly different for cargo and passenger
airplanes due to operational usage differences. In this case, however,
the total risk to the affected fleet is lower than the unsafe condition
risk guidelines for both passenger and cargo airplanes. Total fleet
risk is therefore not the risk assessment element driving the proposed
actions.
    When assessing the level of risk on individual airplanes, the FAA
considers the risk on the worst reasonably anticipated flights to
ensure that the level of safety on each flight is acceptable. Our
individual flight risk unsafe condition threshold is 1 x 10E-7 events
(or a 1-in-10-million chance of a catastrophic event) per flight hour.
In addition, the worst reasonably anticipated flights should not be
vulnerable to a single failure that causes a fatal event, regardless of
probability. There is no difference in the individual flight risk
unsafe condition criteria for cargo airplanes and passenger airplanes
because the operational differences are not considered in this risk
calculation.
    In this case, we are concerned about a latent failure inside the
fuel tank that, in combination with an electrical short circuit in FQIS
wiring outside of the tank, could result in an electrical spark or arc
in the tank. An electrical arc or spark in the fuel tank combined with
flammable conditions in the fuel tank could result in a fuel tank
explosion. The worst reasonably anticipated flights in this case are
those that have both the latent failure and flammable conditions in the
tank. The manufacturer's analysis indicates that a significant number
of flights would be expected to occur with these conditions in the life
of the affected fleet if no corrective action is taken. For those
flights, one additional failure--a short circuit between FQIS wiring
and power wiring--could cause a fuel tank explosion. Also, the
probability of an explosion is between 1 in a million and 1 in 10
million, per flight hour, which slightly exceeds the numerical unsafe
condition guideline for individual flight risk discussed above.
    An issue that violates one or more of the individual flight risk
guidelines would normally require corrective action that reduces the
risk to a level that is below the unsafe condition guidelines. However,
in this case the FAA acknowledged that the cost of corrective action is
high, and that the available corrective action (fuel tank FRM systems)
would reduce, but not eliminate, the number of expected flights with
the condition we are concerned about (a latent failure plus flammable
conditions inside the tank). The alternative actions for cargo
airplanes would also reduce the number of expected flights with the
condition we are concerned about, but to a lesser degree. The FAA has
determined that allowing a moderate number of cargo flights per year
(on average) with this condition provides an acceptable level of
safety. As part of making this determination, we noted that the level
of risk on the worst reasonably anticipated flights is similar to the
level of risk for private and commercial pilots flying normal category
airplanes.
    We have not changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Require FQIS Modification in all Fuel Tanks

    National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) requested that
we require changes to the FQIS to address the potential ``latent-plus-
one-failure scenario'' in all fuel tanks, not just in the center fuel
tank.
    NATCA stated that the failure condition that is the subject of the
SNPRM should be classified as a ``known'' latent-plus-one-failure
condition when applying the FAA Transport Airplane Directorate Policy
Memorandum 2003-112-15, ``SFAR 88--Mandatory Action Decision
Criteria,'' dated February 25, 2015 (http://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/
dc94c3a46396950386256d5e006aed11/$FILE/Feb2503.pdf). NATCA stated that
this would have the effect of classifying the failure condition as an
unsafe condition requiring corrective action in all affected fuel tanks
regardless of flammability level.
    NATCA considered the combination of a latent in-tank failure with
electrical energy transmitted into the fuel tank via the FQIS wiring
due to an additional failure outside of the tank to be a ``known''
failure condition because that failure condition was considered to be
the most likely cause of the TWA Flight 800 Model 747 accident. (That
accident occurred on July 17, 1996, shortly after takeoff from John F.
Kennedy International Airport in Jamaica, New York.) NATCA concluded
that because the Model 757 FQIS is similar to that of the Model 747,
both models are vulnerable to the same failure scenario. NATCA cited
the unsafe condition statement for the SNPRM as evidence that the
scenario should be classified as ``known.'' NATCA pointed out that the
FAA issued AD 98-20-40, Amendment 39-10808 (63 FR 52147, September 30,
1998), to address this issue for Model

747 airplanes, and pointed out that the FAA TARAM Handbook specifically
states that Policy Memorandum 2003-112-15 should be followed in
determining whether corrective action should be required for fuel tank
safety concerns identified through SFAR 88.
    We disagree with the request to require modification of the FQIS in
all fuel tanks. We have determined that, under the policy contained in
the policy memorandum, this failure condition for the Model 757 FQIS
should not be classified as ``known.'' The memo defines ``known''
failure conditions as follows:

    [T]hose conditions which have occurred in-service and are likely
to occur on other products of the same or similar type design, and
conditions which have been subject to mandatory corrective actions,
following in-service findings, on products with a similar design of
fuel system.

    We agree that the Model 757 FQIS has the same high-level system
architecture and operating principles as those of the Model 747 FQIS,
resulting in vulnerability to the same theoretical latent-plus-one-
failure scenario. There are, however, significant differences in the
details of the Model 757 FQIS design that reduce the likelihood of the
individual contributing failures. Those differences include the
following:
     Improved FQIS probe terminal connector block design;
     The use of wiring that is not silver plated and therefore
does not create silver sulfide deposits on the terminal blocks;
     The use of improved wire types and wiring installation
practices outside of the fuel tanks; and
     The use of a system processor that provides significant
isolation of the tank probe circuits from the indication and power
circuits of the FQIS.
    We therefore did not consider that the FQIS designs for the Model
747 and Model 757 were so similar that the Model 757 FQIS design should
be considered to have a ``known'' latent-plus-one-failure condition
vulnerability as defined in the policy memorandum. The provisions in
the above definition for classifying a failure condition as ``known''
based on the existence of a similar design were intended to allow the
FAA to evaluate the degree of similarity in the design, and to make
discretionary judgments in determining that a failure condition that is
believed to have occurred (and/or was addressed by AD action) in one
specific design should be classified as ``known'' in a different
specific design. The application of that discretion would be expected
to involve evaluation of design detail differences and the effects of
those differences on failure modes and failure probability. Based on
our determination that sufficient design differences exist between the
Model 757 and Model 747 FQIS designs to not classify the Model 757 FQIS
latent-plus-one-failure condition as ``known,'' under the direction
contained in the policy memorandum, this AD addresses that failure
condition vulnerability only for the center fuel tank, which is the
only high-flammability fuel tank on the Model 757.
    NATCA expressed a concern that the FAA did not understand NATCA's
previous comment on this matter, and stated that the FAA had not
considered the requirements of ``Element 2.a)'' from Policy Memorandum
2003-112-15, dated February 25, 2015. In fact, we had addressed the
requirements of ``Element 2.a)'' in the response to the comments under
``Request to Revise Proposed AD Requirements to Apply to All Fuel
Tanks'' of the SNPRM. The FAA understood the earlier comment and
understands the more recent comment, but has reached a different
conclusion about the classification of the failure condition under the
guidance in the policy memorandum. We classified the Model 757 FQIS
latent-plus-one-failure scenario as a theoretical vulnerability rather
than a ``known'' combination of failures. Policy Memorandum 2003-112-
15, dated February 25, 2015, calls for corrective action for
theoretical latent-plus-one-failure conditions only in high-
flammability fuel tanks. Contrary to the assertion in the NATCA
comment, the acknowledgement of the scenario as theoretically possible
and the consequent AD proposal to address the scenario in the high
flammability center fuel tank do not automatically drive classification
of the failure as ``known'' under the policy memorandum. We have not
changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Address Unsafe Condition in All Fuel Tanks, With or Without
FRM

    NATCA requested that we require design changes to the FQIS to
address the potential latent-plus-one-failure scenario in all fuel
tanks of all Model 757 airplanes, regardless whether FRM is installed.
NATCA stated that the minimum performance standards for FRM contained
in 14 CFR part 25 allow flights to occur with flammable conditions in
tanks that are required to incorporate FRM due to system performance as
designed and due to system failures. In addition, time-limited dispatch
with an inoperative FRM has been allowed in the master minimum
equipment list (MMEL) for affected airplanes. Flights with flammable
conditions and a pre-existing latent in-tank FQIS failure are
reasonably anticipated to occur in the life of the affected fleet. For
those flights, a fuel tank explosion could occur due to a single
additional failure (hot short of power onto FQIS tank probe circuits).
NATCA notes that four fuel tank explosion events have occurred in fuel
tanks that are classified as low flammability.
    We disagree with the request. We have determined that the proposed
corrective actions (either installation of FRM or specific FQIS changes
limited to the center fuel tank) represent a reasonable, cost-effective
method to achieve a meaningful reduction in the risk of an accident due
to potential FQIS fuel tank ignition sources.
    The service history of conventional unheated aluminum wing tanks
that contain Jet A fuel indicates that there would be little safety
benefit by further limiting the flammability of these tanks. While
NATCA expressed concern because fuel vapor ignition events have
occurred in wing fuel tanks, NATCA did not differentiate service
experience based on fuel type used (JP-4 versus Jet A fuel).
    Our review of the nine wing tank ignition events we know to have
occurred on turbine-engine-powered transport airplanes shows that five
of the nine airplanes were using JP-4 fuel, and this type of fuel is no
longer used except on an emergency basis in the U.S. Use of JP-4 fuel
in other parts of the world is also relatively rare, and is normally
limited to areas with extremely cold airport conditions. Three of the
remaining four events were caused by external heating of the wing by
engine fires, and the remaining event occurred on the ground during
maintenance. To date, there have been no fuel tank explosions in
conventional unheated aluminum wing tanks fueled with Jet A fuel that
have resulted in any fatalities.
    The flammability characteristics of JP-4 fuel results in the fuel
tanks being flammable a significant portion of the time when an
airplane is in flight. This is not the case for wing tanks containing
Jet A fuel. Therefore, based on the low fleet average flammability of
the Model 757 wing fuel tanks and on the specific features of the Model
757 FQIS design, we have determined that the latent-plus-one
vulnerability that exists in the Model 757 wing tank FQIS is not an
unsafe condition requiring corrective action on in-service airplanes.
    We have not changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Require Design Changes for Full Compliance with
Airworthiness Regulations

    NATCA requested that we require design changes to the FQIS that
would bring that system into full compliance with the applicable
airworthiness regulations. NATCA stated that the failure condition that
is the subject of the SNPRM represents a noncompliance of the type
design with the requirements of 14 CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3), even
for low-flammability fuel tanks. NATCA stated that the proposed
corrective actions would not bring the airplane design into compliance
with those regulations ``as required by SFAR 88 and SFAR 88 Policy
published by the FAA as Mandatory Corrective Action criteria in FAA
Policy Statement No. 2003-112-15.'' NATCA added that the proposed
alternative corrective actions for cargo airplanes do not comply with
those regulations because the alternative actions do not fully
eliminate the potential for the failure condition that is addressed by
the SNPRM.
    We disagree with the request. SFAR 88, as modified by Amendment 21-
82, and Policy Memorandum 2003-112-15, dated February 25, 2003, do not
specifically require noncompliant designs discovered through SFAR 88 to
be brought into compliance. As originally issued, SFAR 88 required
design approval holders to develop the corrective actions necessary to
bring any noncompliant design fuel system features into compliance.
However, SFAR 88 did not dictate that the FAA require a given
corrective action. In fact, the FAA later published Amendment 21-82,
``Equivalent Safety Provisions for Fuel Tank System Fault Tolerance
Evaluations (SFAR 88),'' to clarify that the FAA would accept SFAR 88
reports that do not provide corrective actions that directly comply
with 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3) provided any aspects that do not comply are
compensated for by factors that provide an equivalent level of safety.
The FAA used the introduction of flammability reduction in place of
corrective action for a specific ignition source as an example of a
potentially acceptable compensating factor.
    Also, while the normal certification process requires proposed
design changes to be compliant with the applicable regulations,
applicants are permitted under 14 CFR part 11 to petition for an
exemption from any FAA regulatory requirement. Policy Memorandum 2003-
112-15, dated February 25, 2003, did not state that the FAA would not
consider a petition for exemption from an airworthiness requirement for
a proposed design intended as corrective action for an SFAR 88 issue.
We therefore consider that the applicant may petition for an exemption
and propose a noncompliant design change, and the FAA may approve and
issue an AD to require a noncompliant design change. Boeing's FRM
design change for the Model 757 was approved some time ago. We have
determined that for Model 757 airplanes, installation of FRM, instead
of FQIS design changes, represents a reasonable, cost-effective method
to achieve a meaningful overall reduction in the risk of an accident
due to fuel tank ignition events. We therefore excluded airplanes with
FRM installed from the applicability of this AD.

Request To Mandate Compliance with Airworthiness Regulations for Newly
Produced Airplanes

    NATCA requested that we require newly produced airplanes to be in
compliance with 14 CFR 25.901, 25.981(a), and 25.981(b). NATCA
expressed concern that nearly 20 years after the TWA Flight 800
accident, manufacturers have been allowed to continue production of
airplanes without making changes to eliminate the FQIS latent-plus-one-
failure scenario, and that the FAA has granted exemptions to approve
certain design changes without fully addressing the issue.
    We disagree with the request. This AD applies only to certain Model
757 series airplanes, and the Model 757 is out of production. The
comment is therefore outside of the scope of this AD. We have not
changed the final rule regarding this issue.

Request To Allow Alternative Procedure for BITE Check

    FedEx proposed that we revise paragraph (h)(1) of the SNPRM to
allow use of the FQIS BITE check procedure in its airplane maintenance
manual (AMM) as an alternative to the procedure in Boeing Service
Bulletin 757-28-0136, dated June 5, 2014, which does not apply to
FedEx's fleet. We assume this is because FedEx operates some airplanes
that were converted to a cargo configuration using a non-Boeing
supplemental type certificate.
    We disagree with the request. FedEx's comment did not provide
adequate information to show that its AMM procedure is equivalent to
the procedure described in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-28-0136, dated
June 5, 2014. FedEx's comment also did not identify the fault
conditions for which dispatch would be prohibited. We therefore do not
have sufficient information at this time to allow FedEx's proposed
alternative procedure. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i)
of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of alternative
procedures, if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the
change would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed
this final rule regarding this request.

Request To Reduce Compliance Time

    NATCA requested that we reduce the compliance time to 5 years or
less. NATCA noted that the proposed 72-month compliance time would
result in a corrective action deadline that is approximately 27 years
after the TWA Flight 800 accident. NATCA stated that such a long delay
in action is not in the public interest.
    We disagree with the request to reduce the compliance time, which
we have determined is necessary to give operators adequate time to
prepare for and perform the required modifications without excessive
disruption of operations. We had initially proposed 60 months, but
extended that to 72 months in response to operator comments, which
included extension requests of up to 108 months. NATCA made a similar
comment to the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012), requesting a
reduction in the compliance time to 36 months, and the FAA provided its
response in the SNPRM under ``Request to Reduce Compliance Time.'' We
have not changed this final rule regarding this issue.

Statement Regarding Compliance Time for Wire Separation

    FedEx stated that without service information for the wire
separation, it cannot effectively determine whether the proposed 72-
month compliance time is acceptable.
    We had previously determined, as specified in the SNPRM, that the
work involved for the cargo airplane wire separation modification would
take 230 work-hours, and a compliance time of 72 months would be
adequate for operators to perform the modification on their affected
fleets. Boeing has since provided an updated estimate of 74 work-hours
for the alternative modification for cargo airplanes. We have revised
the cost estimate accordingly in this final rule, but since this change
reduces the work-hour estimate, it is not necessary to adjust the
compliance time to accommodate the workload for this action for cargo
operators.

Request To Remove Reference to ``Fuel Tank Systems''

    Paragraph (g) of the SNPRM would have required modification of
``the FQIS wiring or fuel tank systems.'' Boeing asked that we remove
reference to ``fuel tank systems'' in this proposed requirement because
a fuel tank system modification could be done as an AMOC.
    We agree with the commenter's request and rationale. We have
removed the references to ``fuel tank systems'' throughout the preamble
and in paragraph (g) of this AD.

Request To Clarify Condition Requiring Repair

    Boeing requested that we revise paragraph (h)(1) of the SNPRM to
specify that repair is required for any ``nondispatchable'' fault code
recorded before or as a result of the BITE check. (The SNPRM would have
required repair for any fault code.) Boeing requested this change to
make the repair requirement consistent with the BITE check service
information referenced in the SNPRM (Boeing Service Bulletin 757-28-
0136, dated June 5, 2014).
    We agree with the request. The intent of the SNPRM was to require
correction only of faults identified as ``nondispatchable.'' The SNPRM
used the terminology ``as applicable'' to indicate this intent, but we
agree that further clarification is appropriate. We have revised
paragraph (h)(1) in this AD as requested by the commenter.

Request To Clarify End Point for FQIS Wire Separation

    Paragraph (h)(2) of the SNPRM specified that the FQIS wiring
separation was to be done on the wiring that runs between the FQIS
processor and the center fuel tank. Boeing requested that we change
``the center fuel tank'' to ``the center fuel tank wall penetrations.''
Boeing requested this change to clarify the end point for the FQIS wire
separation.
    We agree with the request. Boeing's suggestion is consistent with
the intent of this AD, and improves the clarity of the requirement. We
have revised paragraph (h)(2) in this AD to incorporate Boeing's
request.

Request To Delay Final Rule Pending New Service Information

    Boeing requested that we delay issuance of the final rule pending
issuance of new service information that would specifically define an
acceptable wiring configuration that complies with the proposed
requirements.
    We disagree with the request because the referenced service
information was not available at the time we were ready to publish the
final rule, and we cannot reliably predict the time that service
information will be issued by Boeing. We do not consider it in the
public interest to further delay this rulemaking. We have determined
that it is necessary to proceed with issuing the final rule as
proposed. Operators may, however, request approval under the provisions
of paragraph (i) of this AD to use a future approved service bulletin,
if developed, as an AMOC with the requirements of this AD, or we may
approve the service bulletin as a global AMOC.

Statement Regarding Unsafe Condition

    Boeing stated that it has accepted the FAA's requirement to provide
service information defining an acceptable wire separation
modification, but, based on previously provided analysis, maintained
that the risk level is less than extremely improbable. As asserted in
earlier comments, Boeing considers the design of the affected airplanes
safe and the proposed requirements therefore unnecessary.
    We disagree with Boeing's assertions for the reasons discussed
extensively in our response to Boeing's similar comment in the SNPRM.
The FAA's response to Boeing's assertion is covered in the response to
comments in the SNPRM under ``Request to Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506,
March 1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk.''

Additional Change Made to This AD

    We have revised the introductory text to paragraph (h) of this AD
to clarify that the alternative modification for cargo airplanes must
be accompanied by periodic BITE checks started within 6 months after
the effective date of this AD. And, for airplanes converted to an all-
cargo configuration more than 6 months after the effective date of this
AD, operators must perform the first BITE check before flight after the
conversion. In reviewing the proposed requirements after publication of
the SNPRM, we recognized that operators might interpret the
requirements as allowing a delay in the decision to exercise the cargo
airplane alternative until late in the compliance period. That is not
the literal meaning of the proposed language of the requirement, and
was not the FAA's intent. However, we determined that we should clarify
the language of paragraph (h) of this AD regarding the required timing
for the first BITE check if an operator chooses to exercise the cargo
airplane alternative.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
SNPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the SNPRM.
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin 757-28-0136, dated June 5,
2014, which describes procedures for a BITE check (check of built-in
test equipment). This service information is reasonably available
because the interested parties have access to it through their normal
course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 167 airplanes of U.S. registry.
This estimate includes 148 cargo airplanes and 19 non-air-carrier
passenger airplanes. We estimate the following costs to comply with
this AD:

                              Estimated Costs: Basic Requirement for All Airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Action                          Labor cost             Parts cost          Cost per product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fully correct FQIS vulnerability to     1,200 work-hours x $85              $200,000  $302,000
 latent-plus-one-failure conditions.     per hour = $102,000.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             Estimated Costs: Alternative Actions for All Airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install FRM...........................  720 work-hours x $85 per             323,000  $384,200.
                                         hour = $61,200.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Estimated Costs: Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wire separation.......................  74 work-hours x $85 per               10,000  $16,290.
                                         hour = $6,290.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FQIS BITE check (required with wire     1 work-hour x $85 per                      0  $85 per check (4 checks
 separation alternative actions).        hour = $85.                                   per year).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Existing regulations already require that air-carrier passenger
airplanes be equipped with FRM by December 26, 2017. We therefore
assume that the FRM installation specified in paragraph (g) of this AD
will be done on only the 19 affected non-air-carrier passenger
airplanes, for an estimated passenger fleet cost of $7,299,800. We also
assume that the operators of the 148 affected cargo airplanes would
choose the less costly actions specified in paragraph (h) of this AD,
at an estimated cost of $2,410,920 for the wire separation
modification, plus $50,320 annually for the BITE checks.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

2016-07-07 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18452; Docket No. FAA-
2012-0187; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-094-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective May 10, 2016.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, -
200CB, and -300 series airplanes; certificated in any category;
except airplanes equipped with a flammability reduction means (FRM)
approved by the FAA as compliant with the Fuel Tank Flammability
Reduction (FTFR) rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) requirements of
14 CFR 25.981(b) or 14 CFR 26.33(c)(1).

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 7397: Engine fuel
system wiring.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent ignition sources
inside the center fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable
fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent
loss of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Modification

    Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the
fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wiring to prevent development
of an ignition source inside the center fuel tank, using a method
approved in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph
(i) of this AD.

(h) Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes

    For airplanes used exclusively for cargo operations: As an
alternative to the requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD, do the
actions specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD, using
methods approved in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i) of this AD. To exercise this alternative, operators
must perform the first inspection required under paragraph (h)(1) of
this AD within 6 months after the effective date of this AD. To
exercise this alternative for airplanes returned to service after
conversion of the airplane from a passenger configuration to an all-
cargo configuration more than 6 months after the effective date of
this AD, operators must perform the first inspection required under
paragraph (h)(1) of this AD prior to further flight after the
conversion.
    (1) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, record
the existing fault codes stored in the FQIS processor and then do a
BITE check (check of built-in test equipment) of the FQIS, in
accordance with the

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 757-28-0136,
dated June 5, 2014. If any nondispatchable fault code is recorded
prior to the BITE check or as a result of the BITE check, before
further flight, do all applicable repairs, and repeat the BITE check
until a successful test is performed with no nondispatchable fault
found, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Service Bulletin 757-28-0136, dated June 5, 2014. Repeat these
actions thereafter at intervals not to exceed 750 flight hours.
    (2) Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, modify
the airplane by separating FQIS wiring that runs between the FQIS
processor and the center fuel tank wall penetrations, including any
circuits that pass through a main fuel tank, from other airplane
wiring that is not intrinsically safe.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
    (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD
if it is approved by the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the
Manager, Seattle ACO, to make those findings. To be approved, the
repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must
meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Jon Regimbal,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle ACO,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>;
fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Boeing Service Bulletin 757-28-0136, dated June 5, 2014.
    (ii) Reserved.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P. O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 21, 2016.
Michael Kaszycki,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-07150 Filed 4-4-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register: December 14, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 239)]
[Notices]
[Page 73997-73998]
[DOCID:fr14de05-52]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP06-134-000]

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation; Notice of Proposed
Changes in FERC Gas Tariff

December 8, 2005.
    Take notice that on December 2, 2005, Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corporation (Transco) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas
Tariff, Third Revised Volume No. 1, Thirty-Second Revised Sheet No. 28,
to become effective December 1, 2005.
    Transco states that copies of the filing are being mailed to
affected customers and interested state commissions.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Protests will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed in accordance with the provisions of
Section 154.210 of the Commission's regulations (18 CFR 154.210).
Anyone filing an intervention or protest must serve a copy of that
document on the Applicant. Anyone filing an intervention or protest on
or before the intervention or protest date need not serve motions to
intervene or protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov.
 Persons unable to file electronically should submit an

original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the

``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC.

There is an ``eSubscription'' link on the Web site that enables
subscribers to receive email notification when a document is added to a
subscribed docket(s). For assistance with any FERC Online service,
please email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll
free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

Magalie R. Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E5-7315 Filed 12-13-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 122 (Friday, June 26, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30662-30663]
[FR Doc No: E9-15027]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Docket No. FRA 2009-0001-N-14]

Agency Information Collection Activities; Comment Request

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and its
implementing regulations, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
hereby announces that it is seeking re-approval of the following
information collection activities that were previously approved by OMB
under Emergency Clearance Procedures. Before submitting these
information collection requirements for clearance by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), FRA is soliciting public comment on
specific aspects of the activities identified below.

DATES: Comments must be received no later than August 25, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments on any or all of the following
proposed activities by mail to either: Ms. Wynne Davis, Office of
Railroad Development, RDV-3, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Ave., SE., Mail Stop 17, Washington, DC 20590, or Ms. Nakia
Jackson, Office of Information Technology, RAD-20, Federal Railroad
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE., Mail Stop 35, Washington, DC
20590. Commenters requesting FRA to acknowledge receipt of their
respective comments must include a self-addressed stamped postcard
stating, ``Comments on OMB control number 2130-0580.'' Alternatively,
comments may be transmitted via facsimile to<PHONE_NUMBER> or (202)
493-6497, or via e-mail to Ms. Davis at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or to Ms.
Jackson at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please refer to the assigned OMB
control number and the title of the information collection in any
correspondence submitted. FRA will summarize comments received in
response to this notice in a subsequent notice and include them in its
information collection submission to OMB for approval.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Wynne Davis, Office of Railroad
Development, RDV-3, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Ave., SE., Mail Stop 17, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: (202) 493-
6441) or Ms. Nakia Jackson, Office of Information Technology, RAD-20,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE., Mail Stop
35, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>). (These telephone
numbers are not toll-free.)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13, Sec.
2, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as revised at 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520),
and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR Part 1320, require Federal
agencies to provide 60-days notice to the public for comment on
information collection activities before seeking approval of such
activities by OMB. 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A); 5 CFR 1320.8(d)(1),
1320.10(e)(1), 1320.12(a). Specifically, FRA invites interested
respondents to comment on the following summary of proposed information
collection activities regarding (i) whether the information collection
activities are necessary for FRA to properly execute its functions,
including whether the activities will have practical utility; (ii) the
accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of the information collection
activities, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions
used to determine the estimates; (iii) ways for FRA to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the information being collected; and
(iv) ways for FRA to minimize the burden of information collection
activities on the public by automated, electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or other forms of information
technology (e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses). See
44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)(I)-(iv); 5 CFR 1320.8(d)(1)(I)-(iv). FRA
believes that soliciting public comment will promote its efforts to
reduce the administrative and paperwork burdens associated with the
collection of information mandated by Federal regulations. In summary,
FRA reasons that comments received will advance three objectives: (i)
Reduce reporting burdens; (ii) ensure that it organizes information
collection requirements in a ``user friendly'' format to improve the
use of such information; and (iii) accurately assess the resources
expended to retrieve and produce information requested. See 44 U.S.C.
3501.
    Below is a brief summary of the information collection activities
that FRA will submit for renewed clearance by OMB as required under the
PRA:
    Title: Notice of Funding Availability and Solicitation of
Applications for Grants under the Railroad Rehabilitation and Repair
Grant Program.
    OMB Control Number: 2130-0580.
    Abstract: On September 30, 2008, President Bush signed Public Law
110-329, The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009. As part of this Act, Congress provided $20
million in disaster relief funds to FRA to award to States in one or
more grants for eligible projects related to repair and rehabilitation
of Class II and Class III railroad infrastructure damaged by
hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters in counties for which
the President declared a major disaster under title IV of the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974. These
funds are available for rehabilitation and repairs of railroad right-
of-way, bridges, signals, and other infrastructure which are part of
the general railroad system of transportation and primarily used by
railroads to move freight traffic. The Secretary may retain up to one-
half of one (1) percent of these funds for the oversight of the design
and implementation of projects funded by grants under this Program.
Funds provided under this grant program may constitute no more than 80
percent of the total cost of a selected project, with the remaining
cost funded from other sources. The funding provided under these grants
will be made available to grantees on a reimbursement basis. FRA
anticipates awarding grants to multiple eligible participants. FRA may
choose to award a grant or grants within the available funds in any
amount. Funding made available through grants provided under this
program, together with funding from other sources that is committed by
a grantee as part of a grant agreement, must be sufficient to complete
the funded project and achieve the anticipated rehabilitation and
repairs to Class II and Class IIII railroads. New applications will be
accepted after publication of a future

Federal Register Notice that will be published sometime this fall.
    Form Number(s): SF-424.
    Other Instruments: Information Published with the Notice of Funds
Availability (NOFA) to be published in Federal Register in Fall of
2009.
    Affected Public: 50 States/Local governments.
    Respondent Universe: 32 States/Local governments.
    Frequency of Submission: On occasion.

                                                Reporting Burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Total annual      Average time  per    Total annual
          Grant program            Respondent universe       responses             response        burden hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Application Process...........  32 States/Local      10 grant             315 hours..........           3,150
                                    govt.                applications.
--Meeting requests with FRA        32 States/Local      2 requests/letters.  30 minutes.........               1
 Associate Administrator.           govt.
--Face to Face Meetings with       32 States/Local      2 project meetings.  2 hours............               4
 Associate Admin.                   govt.
--Revisions to Grant Applications  32 States/Local      2 grant revisions..  40 hours...........              80
                                    govt.
--Environmental Assessments......  32 States/Local      10 environmental     80 hours...........             800
                                    govt.                documents.
--Close-Out Procedures...........  32 States/Local      10 sets of Close-    4 hours............              40
                                    govt.                out documents.
--Project Reports................  32 States/Local      10 reports.........  80 hours...........             800
                                    govt.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Total Responses: 46.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden: 4,875 hours.
    Status: Regular Review.
    Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3507(a) and 5 CFR 1320.5(b),
1320.8(b)(3)(vi), FRA informs all interested parties that it may not
conduct or sponsor, and a respondent is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number.

    Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520.

    Issued in Washington, DC on June 22, 2009.
Kimberly Orben,
Director, Office of Financial Management, Federal Railroad
Administration.
[FR Doc. E9-15027 Filed 6-25-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P