[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 103 (Thursday, May 28, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32068-32073]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11405]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-88930; File No. SR-NYSEArca-2020-45]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Amending the NYSE
Arca Equities Fees and Charges to Institute Ratio Threshold Fees

May 21, 2020.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on May 13, 2020, NYSE Arca, Inc. (``NYSE Arca'' or ``Exchange'') filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which
Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing
this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from
interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend the NYSE Arca Equities Fees and
Charges (``Fee Schedule'') to institute Ratio Threshold Fees. The
Exchange proposes to implement the fee change effective May 13, 2020.
The proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's website at
www.nyse.com, at the principal office of the Exchange, and at the
Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to amend the Fee Schedule to institute Ratio

Threshold Fees, which would be applied to orders ranked Priority 2--
Display Orders and to shares of Auction-Only Orders that have a
disproportionate ratio of orders that are not executed. The Exchange
proposes to implement the fee change effective May 13, 2020.\3\
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    \3\ The Exchange originally filed to amend the Fee Schedule on
May 1, 2020 (SR-NYSEArca-2020-40). SR-NYSEArca-2020-40 was
subsequently withdrawn and replaced by this filing.
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    The purpose of the proposed rule change is to encourage efficient
usage of Exchange systems by ETP Holders. The Exchange believes that it
is in the best interests of all ETP Holders and investors who access
the Exchange to encourage efficient systems usage. Unproductive share
entry and cancellation practices, such as when ETP Holders flood the
market with displayed orders that are frequently and/or rapidly
cancelled, do little to support meaningful price discovery, may create
investor confusion about the extent of trading interest in a security.
The Exchange further believes that inefficient order entry practices of
a small number of ETP Holders may place excessive burdens on Exchange
systems and to the systems of other ETP Holders that are ingesting
market data, while also negatively impacting the usefulness of market
data feeds that transmit each order and subsequent cancellation.\4\ ETP
Holders with an excessive ratio of cancelled to executed orders do
little to support meaningful price discovery.
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    \4\ See generally Recommendations Regarding Regulatory Reponses
to the Market Events of May 6, 2010, Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory
Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, at 11 (February 18, 2011)
(``The SEC and CFTC should also consider addressing the
disproportionate impact that [high frequency trading] has on
Exchange message traffic and market surveillance costs. . . . The
Committee recognizes that there are valid reasons for algorithmic
strategies to drive high cancellation rates, but we believe that
this is an area that deserves further study. At a minimum, we
believe that the participants of those strategies should properly
absorb the externalized costs of their activity.'').
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    The Exchange believes that market quality can be improved through
the imposition of a fee on market participants that have a
disproportionate ratio of orders that are not executed. The Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change would promote a more efficient
marketplace and enhance the trading experience of all ETP Holders by
encouraging them to more efficiently participate in the marketplace,
while at the same time allowing for the provision of liquidity in
volatile, high-volume markets and provide ETP Holders with order
management flexibility without being subject to this proposed fee.
Unnecessary ratios of executed orders due to cancellations can have a
detrimental effect on all market participants who are potentially
compelled to upgrade capacity as a result of the bandwidth usage of
other participants. All ETP Holders are free to manage their order and
message flow as is consistent with their business models, and the vast
majority of ETP Holders are able to do so without even approaching the
ratio thresholds proposed for the fee, as described below. The Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change would promote a more efficient
marketplace, encourage liquidity provision and enhance the trading
experience of all ETP Holders by imposing a financial incentive for the
small number of ETP Holders that are currently exceeding the proposed
ratio thresholds. The Exchange notes that its technology and
infrastructure is adequately able to handle high-volume and high-
volatility situations for ETP Holders that exceed the thresholds
established by the Exchange. As described below, the proposed fee would
take into consideration the number of shares that are executed or
trades that occur.
    Only a small number of ETP Holders are executing orders at a
disproportionately low ratio to the number of orders that have been
entered and, thus, the impact of the proposed fee would be narrow and
limited to those ETP Holders. These ETP Holders could avoid the
proposed fee by changing their behavior. The Exchange believes the
proposed fee would encourage ETP Holders that could be impacted by the
proposed fee to modify their practices in order to avoid the fee,
thereby improving the market for all participants. Accordingly, the
Exchange does not expect the proposed fee to result in meaningful, if
any, revenue. Prior to the submission of the proposed fee change, the
Exchange engaged in discussions with ETP Holders that could be impacted
by the proposed fee based on their prior trading behavior so that they
may enhance the efficiency of their order entry practices and avoid the
fee. The Exchange also provided notice to ETP Holders generally
regarding the proposed fee.\5\
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    \5\ See Trader Update at https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/notifications/trader-update/NYSE_Arca_Price_Change_2020_May.pdf.
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    As proposed, the Ratio Threshold Fee would apply to orders ranked
Priority 2--Display Orders and to shares of Auction-Only Orders during
the period when Auction Imbalance information is being disseminated.
Ratio Threshold for Priority 2--Display Orders (``RT--Display Fee'')
    For orders ranked Priority 2--Display Orders, ETP Holders that have
characteristics indicative of inefficient order entry practices would
be charged an RT--Display Fee on a monthly basis.\6\ For purposes of
determining the RT--Display Fee:
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    \6\ The proposed fee focuses on displayed orders because such
orders use more system resources than non-displayed orders.
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     The ``Weighted Order Total'' is the total number of orders
ranked Priority 2--Display Orders entered by that ETP Holder in a
month, as adjusted by a ``Weighting Factor.'' The Weighted Order Total
calculation excludes (i) all orders in securities in which an ETP
Holder is registered as a Market Maker \7\ or Lead Market Maker \8\ and
(ii) all orders for an ETP Holder that is registered as a Market Maker
or Lead Market Maker in 100 or more securities.
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    \7\ The term ``Market Maker'' is defined in Rule 1.1(z) to mean
an ETP Holder that acts as a Market Maker pursuant to Rule 7-E.
    \8\ The term ``Lead Market Maker'' is defined in Rule 1.1(w) to
mean a registered Market Maker that is the exclusive Designated
Market Maker in listings for which the Exchange is the primary
market.
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     The ``Weighting Factor'' applied to each order based on
its price in comparison to the national best bid or best offer
(``NBBO'') at the time of order entry is:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Order's price versus NBBO at entry            Weighting factor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 0.20% away.......................  0x
0.20% to 0.99% away........................  1x
1.00% to 1.99% away........................  2x
2.00% or more away.........................  3x
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, an order more than 2.0% away from the NBBO would be
equivalent to three orders that were 0.50% away. Due to the applicable
Weighting Factor of 0x, orders entered less than 0.20% away from the
NBBO would not be included in the Weighted Order Total but would be
included in the ``executed'' orders component of the Order Entry Ratio
if they execute in full or part.
     The ``Order Entry Ratio'' would be calculated by dividing
an ETP Holder's Weighted Order Total by the greater of (i) the number
of orders ranked Priority 2--Display Orders that execute in full or in
part or (ii) the number one (1).\9\
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    \9\ In the case where no orders entered by an ETP Holder
executed, this component of the ratio would be assumed to be 1, so
as to avoid the impossibility of dividing by zero.
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     ``Excess Weighted Orders'' would be calculated by
subtracting (i) the Weighted Order Total that would result in the ETP
Holder having an Order

Entry Ratio of 100 from (ii) the ETP Holder's actual Weighted Order
Total.
    An ETP Holder with a daily average Weighted Order Total of 100,000
or more \10\ during a month would be charged the RT--Display Fee, which
is calculated by multiplying the Applicable Rate in the chart below by
the number of Excess Weighted Orders.
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    \10\ The Exchange believes it is reasonable to exclude ETP
Holders with a daily average Weighted Order Total of less than
100,000 during the month because an ETP Holder with an extremely low
volume of entered orders has only a de minimis impact on Exchange
systems.
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    ETP Holders that exceed the Order Entry Ratio threshold of 1,000:1
would pay a fee of $0.01 on each order that caused the ETP Holder to
surpass the threshold. ETP Holders that exceed the Order Entry Ratio
threshold of 100:1 but less than 1,000:1 would pay a fee of $0.005 on
all orders that caused ETP Holder's ratio to exceed 100:1.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Applicable
                    Order entry ratio                          rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-100...................................................           $0.00
101-1,000...............................................           0.005
More than 1,000.........................................            0.01
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following example illustrates the calculation of the Order
Entry Ratio and resulting RT--Display Fee:
     In a month, ETP Holder A enters 35,000,000 displayed,
liquidity-providing orders:
    [cir] 20,000,000 of the orders are in securities in which ETP
Holder A is an LMM. These orders are excluded from the calculation.
    [cir] 10,000,000 orders are entered at the NBBO. The Weighting
Factor for these orders is 0x.
    [cir] 5,000,000 orders are entered at a price that is 1.50% away
from the NBBO. The Weighting Factor for these orders is 2x.
     The Weighted Order Total is (10,000,000 x 0) + (5,000,000
x 2) = 10,000,000.
     Of the 15,000,000 orders included in the calculation,
90,000 are executed in full or in part.
     The Order Entry Ratio is 10,000,000 (Weighted Order
Total)/90,000 (executed orders total) = 111
    In the example above, the Weighted Order Total that would result in
an Order Entry Ratio of 100 is 9,000,000, since 9,000,000/90,000 = 100.
Accordingly, the Excess Weighted Orders would be 10,000,000-9,000,000 =
1,000,000.
    The RT--Display Fee charged to an ETP Holder would then be
determined by multiplying the Applicable Rate by the number of Excess
Weighted Orders.
    In the example above, because ETP Holder A had an Order Entry Ratio
of 111, the Applicable Rate would be $0.0005. Accordingly, the monthly
RT--Display Fee would be 1,000,000 (Excess Weighted Orders) x $0.005
(Applicable Rate) = $5,000.
    Ratio Threshold for Auction-Only Orders During the Period When
Auction Imbalance Information is Being Disseminated for a Core Open
Auction or Closing Auction (``RT--Auction Fee'')
    For Auction-Only Orders,\11\ ETP Holders with an average daily
number of orders of 10,000 or more \12\ would be charged an RT--Auction
Fee on a monthly basis.\13\ For purposes of determining the RT--Auction
Fee:
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    \11\ An Auction-Only Order is a Limit or Market Order that is to
be traded only within an auction pursuant to Rule 7.35-E or routed
pursuant to Rule 7.34-E. See Rule 7.31-E(c). Auction-Only Orders are
orders submitted by an ETP Holder during the Early Open Auction,
Core Open Auction, Closing Auction and Trading Halt Auction. See
Rule 7.35-E.
    \12\ The Exchange believes it is reasonable to exclude ETP
Holders with average daily orders of less than 10,000 during the
month because an ETP Holder with an extremely low volume of entered
orders has only a de minimis impact on Exchange systems.
    \13\ Similar to orders ranked Priority 2--Display Orders, the
proposed fee focuses on Auction-Only Orders because a
disproportionate ratio of such orders that are not executed uses
more system resources, including updates to the Auction Imbalance
Information as such orders are entered and cancelled, than other
order entry and cancellation practices of ETP Holders. Accordingly,
for Auction-Only Orders, Ratio Shares include shares of Auction-Only
Orders executed in a disproportionate ratio to the quantity of
shares entered during the period when Auction Imbalance Information
is being disseminated for the Core Open Auction and Closing Auction.
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     The number of ``Ratio Shares'' is the average daily number
of shares of Auction-Only Orders that are cancelled by the ETP Holder
at a disproportionate ratio to the average daily number of shares
executed by that ETP Holder. Orders ranked Priority 2--Display Orders
designated for the Core Trading Session only that are entered during
the period when Auction Imbalance Information for the Core Open Auction
is being disseminated are included in the Ratio Shares calculation.\14\
All orders entered by an ETP Holder for securities in which it is
registered as a Lead Market Maker are not included the calculation of
Ratio Shares.
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    \14\ For purposes of the Ratio Threshold Fees, orders ranked
Priority 2--Display Orders designated for the Core Trading Session
only that are cancelled during the period when Auction Imbalance
Information for the Core Open Auction is being disseminated are
included in the calculation of the proposed RT--Auction Fee. The
Exchange proposes to include such orders as Auction-Only Orders for
purposes of such fee because prior to the Core Open Auction, such
orders would not be eligible to trade and therefore would not be
included in the RT--Display Fee calculation, yet such orders would
be included in the imbalance calculation for the Core Open Auction.
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     The ``Ratio Shares Threshold'' is an ETP Holder's Ratio
Shares divided by the average daily executed shares by the ETP Holder.
    The Exchange proposes to charge the RT--Auction Fee for Auction-
Only Orders during the period when Auction Imbalance Information is
being disseminated.\15\
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    \15\ See Rules 7.35-E(c)(1) (Core Open Auction Imbalance
Information begins at 8:00 a.m. ET) and 7.35-E(d)(1) (Closing
Auction Imbalance Information begins at 3:00 p.m. ET).
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    The Exchange proposes that it would not charge the RT--Auction Fee
if Auction-Only Orders have a Ratio Shares Threshold of less than 50.
If the Ratio Shares Threshold is greater than or equal to 50, the fee
would be as follows:
     No Charge for ETP Holders with an average of fewer than 20
million Ratio Shares per day.
     $1.00 per million Ratio Shares for ETP Holders with an
average of 20 million to 200 million Ratio Shares per day.
     $10.00 per million Ratio Shares for ETP Holders with an
average of more than 200 million Ratio Shares per day.
    ETP Holders would be charged for the entirety of their Ratio Shares
at a rate of $1.00 per million Ratio Shares if the ETP Holder has an
average of 20 million to 200 million Ratio Shares; and $10.00 per
million Ratio Shares if the ETP Holder has an average of more than 200
million Ratio Shares.
    The following example illustrates the calculation of the RT--
Auction Fee for Auction-Only Orders.
     In a month, ETP Holder B enters a daily average of 100,000
Auction-Only Orders for the Closing Auction, with an average size of
600 shares.
     Thus, ETP Holder B's daily average number of shares
submitted in Auction-Only Orders for the Closing Auction is 60,000,000
shares (100,000 orders x 600 shares).
     During the period when Closing Auction Imbalance
Information is being disseminated, ETP Holder B cancels a daily average
of 59,000,000 shares and executes a daily average of 1,000,000 shares
in the Closing Auction.
     ETP Holder B has an average daily Ratio Shares quantity of
58,000,000 (59,000,000-1,000,000), and a Ratio Shares Threshold of 58
(58,000,000/1,000,000).
     Since the Ratio Shares Threshold is greater than 50 and
the average daily Ratio Shares quantity is between 20 million and 200
million, ETP Holder B would be subject to the proposed fee of

$1.00 per million Ratio Share, resulting in a fee of $1,218 assuming a
21-day month (58,000,000/1,000,000 x $1.00 x 21).
    As noted above, the Exchange is not proposing to implement this fee
in order to create revenue, but rather to provide an incentive for a
small number of ETP Holders to change their order entry practices.
Therefore, the Exchange also proposes to limit the amount an ETP Holder
would pay by adopting a cap such that the combined RT--Display Fee and
RT--Auction Fee for an ETP Holder would not exceed $2,000,000 per
month. Based on an analysis of the impact to ETP Holders, the Exchange
does not believe that many ETP Holders would be impacted. For example,
the median Order Entry Ratio across all ETP Holders in April 2020 \16\
for orders ranked Priority 2--Display Orders is 0.32. The median Ratio
Shares Threshold across all ETP Holders in April 2020 \17\ for Auction-
Only Orders is approximately -0.68, which indicates that the median ETP
Holder has more executed shares than Ratio Shares.
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    \16\ Through April 20, 2020.
    \17\ Id.
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2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with Section 6(b) of the Act,\18\ in general, and furthers the
objectives of Sections 6(b)(4) and (5) of the Act,\19\ in particular,
because it provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues,
fees, and other charges among its members, issuers and other persons
using its facilities and does not unfairly discriminate between
customers, issuers, brokers or dealers.
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    \18\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \19\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
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    The Exchange believes that the proposed fee would help to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination
with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to
protect investors and the public interest, because it is designed to
reduce the numbers of orders and shares being entered and then
cancelled prior to an execution.
The Proposed Changes are Reasonable
    The Exchange operates in a highly competitive market. The
Commission has repeatedly expressed its preference for competition over
regulatory intervention in determining prices, products, and services
in the securities markets. Specifically, in Regulation NMS, the
Commission highlighted the importance of market forces in determining
prices and SRO revenues and, also, recognized that current regulation
of the market system ``has been remarkably successful in promoting
market competition in its broader forms that are most important to
investors and listed companies.'' \20\
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    \20\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9,
2005), 70 FR 37495, 37499 (June 29, 2005) (S7-10-04) (``Regulation
NMS'').
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    As the Commission itself recognized, the market for trading
services in NMS stocks has become ``more fragmented and competitive.''
\21\ Indeed, equity trading is currently dispersed across 13
exchanges,\22\ numerous alternative trading systems,\23\ and broker-
dealer internalizers and wholesalers, all competing for order flow.
Based on publicly-available information, no single exchange currently
has more than 20% market share (whether including or excluding auction
volume).\24\ The Exchange believes that the ever-shifting market share
among the exchanges from month to month demonstrates that market
participants can shift order flow, or discontinue or reduce use of
certain categories of products, in response to fee changes.
Accordingly, the Exchange's fees, including the proposed Ratio
Threshold Fee, are reasonably constrained by competitive alternatives
and market participants can readily trade on competing venues if they
deem pricing levels at those other venues to be more favorable.
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    \21\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808, 84 FR 5202,
5253 (February 20, 2019) (File No. S7-05-18) (Final Rule).
    \22\ See Cboe U.S Equities Market Volume Summary, available at
https://markets.cboe.com/us/equities/market_share. See generally
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html.
    \23\ See FINRA ATS Transparency Data, available at https://otctransparency.finra.org/otctransparency/AtsIssueData. A list of
alternative trading systems registered with the Commission is
available at https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/atslist.htm.
    \24\ See Cboe Global Markets U.S. Equities Market Volume
Summary, available at http://markets.cboe.com/us/equities/market_share/.
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    The Exchange believes that the proposed Ratio Threshold Fees are
reasonable because they are designed to achieve improvements in the
quality of displayed liquidity--both intraday and in advance of
auctions--on the Exchange for the benefit of all market participants.
In addition, the proposed fees are reasonable because market
participants may readily avoid the fee by adjusting their order entry
and/or cancellation practices, which would result in more orders or
shares being cancelled before execution.
    The Exchange believes it is also reasonable to charge a Ratio
Threshold Fee on the basis of the number of orders ranked Priority 2--
Display Orders and to charge a Ratio Threshold Fee that is based on the
number of shares of Auction-Only Orders because, as a general matter,
displayed orders entered on the Exchange have fewer shares associated
with each order whereas, the share quantity of an Auction-Only Order
typically is much larger. The Exchange believes that applying the Ratio
Threshold Fee to orders ranked Priority 2--Display Orders based on the
number of shares of each order would not promote efficient order entry
practice by ETP Holders in a meaningful way because, as noted above,
the average size of each displayed order is relatively small in terms
of shares. Therefore, to properly incentivize ETP Holders, the Exchange
believes assessing the proposed fee based on orders, rather than number
of shares, is more appropriate. The Exchange further believes that it
is reasonable to apply the proposed fee to Auction-Only Orders only
during the period when Auction Imbalance Information is being
disseminated, because such orders are not displayed prior to such
information being disseminated. By contrast, cancelling shares of
Auction-Only Orders during the period when Auction Imbalance
Information is being disseminated could result in excessive and
unnecessary changes to imbalance information.
    Although only a small number of ETP Holders could be subject to the
proposed fee, the Exchange believes that the proposed fee is necessary
because of the negative externalities that such behavior imposes on
others through order entry practices resulting in a disproportionate
ratio of executed orders or shares to those that are not executed.
Accordingly, the Exchange believes that it is fair to impose the fee on
these market participants in order to incentivize them to modify their
practices and thereby benefit the market. Importantly, whether an ETP
Holder would be subject to the proposed fee would be independent of any
determination of whether such ETP Holder is complying with Exchange and
federal rules, including those governing order entry and cancellation.
    The Exchange believes that the proposed combined fee cap of
$2,000,000 is reasonable as it would reduce the impact of the fee on
ETP Holders. As noted above, the purpose of

the proposed fee is not to generate revenue for the Exchange, but
rather to provide an incentive for a small number of ETP Holders to
change their order entry and/or cancellation behavior. As a general
principal, the Exchange believes that greater participation on the
Exchange by ETP Holders improves market quality for all market
participants. Thus, in adopting the proposed fee, and the cap, the
Exchange balanced the desire to improve market quality against the need
to discourage inefficient order entry and/or cancellation practices.
    The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is designed to
promote just and equitable principles of trade by adopting a fee that
is comparable to a fee charged by the NASDAQ Stock Market LLC
(``Nasdaq'') \25\ and by Exchange's options market, NYSE Arca Options,
to OTP Holders to disincentivize a disproportionate ratio of orders
that are not executed.\26\ With respect to the RT--Display Fee, the
proposed fee is identical to the Excess Order Fee currently in place on
Nasdaq and would subject ETP Holders to the fee if they exceed the
Order Entry Ratio thresholds established by the Exchange, which
thresholds are also identical to those on Nasdaq. Additionally, while
the RT--Auction Fee is novel in that no other exchange currently
assesses such a fee, the proposed fee, similar to the RT--Display fee,
is intended to disincentivize a disproportionate ratio of orders that
are not executed. Therefore, the RT--Auction Fee focuses on Auction-
Only Orders because a disproportionate ratio of such orders that are
not executed uses more system resources, including updates to the
Auction Imbalance Information as such orders are entered and cancelled,
than other order entry and cancellation practices of ETP Holders.
Finally, the RT--Auction Fee, unlike the RT--Display Fee which would be
assessed on a tiered basis, would be applied on the entirety of each
ETP Holder's Ratio Shares, which, as defined above, is calculated net
of shares that have been executed, and therefore, the fee would be
applied only to those shares that remain unexecuted. The Exchange
believes it would be appropriate to assess the fee in a non-tiered
manner because Auction-Only Orders generally have a larger number of
shares associated with each order than orders ranked Priority 2--
Display Orders and therefore, the number of shares that could be
impacted could increase significantly in a short period of time since
the auction imbalance period only lasts for one hour. Additionally, the
submission, and subsequent cancellation, of Auction-Only Orders during
the imbalance dissemination period could lead to disruption in trading
as each order, which could contain a large number of shares, would
require the Exchange to update and disseminate the new order
information on its market data feed. Accordingly, the Exchange believes
assessing the fee on a share basis is appropriate because it would more
effectively disincentivize ETP Holders from submitting a
disproportionate ratio of shares that are not executed.
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    \25\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 66951 (May 9,
2012), 77 FR 28647 (May 15, 2012) (SR-NASDAQ-2012-055) (Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Institute an Excess Order Fee).
    \26\ See Ratio Threshold Fee, at https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/arca-options/NYSE_Arca_Options_Fee_Schedule.pdf. The Ratio Threshold Fee is
charged to OTP Holders based on the number of orders entered
compared to the number of executions received in a calendar month.
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The Proposal Is an Equitable Allocation of Fees
    For the reasons noted above, the Exchange believes the proposed
fees are also equitably allocated among its market participants.
Although only a small number of ETP Holders may be subject to the
proposed fees based on their current trading practices, any ETP Holder
could determine to change their order entry practices at any time, and
the proposed fees would be applied to any ETP Holder that determined to
engage in such inefficient order entry practices. The proposed fee is
therefore designed to encourage better displayed order entry practices
by all ETP Holders for the benefit of all market participants.
Moreover, the purpose of the proposal is not to generate revenue for
the Exchange, but rather to provide an incentive for a small number of
ETP Holders to change their order entry and/or cancellation behavior.
    The Exchange believes that the proposal constitutes an equitable
allocation of fees because all similarly situated ETP Holders would be
subject to the proposed fees. As noted above, the Exchange believes
that because having a disproportionate ratio of unexecuted orders is a
problem associated with a relatively small number of ETP Holders, the
impact of the proposal would be limited to those ETP Holders, and only
if they do not alter their trading practices. The Exchange believes the
proposal would encourage ETP Holders that could be impacted to modify
their practices in order to avoid the fee, thereby improving the market
for all participants.
The Proposal Is Not Unfairly Discriminatory
    The Exchange believes that the proposal is not unfairly
discriminatory. In the prevailing competitive environment, ETP Holders
are free to disfavor the Exchange's pricing if they believe that
alternatives offer them better value, and are free to transact on
competitor markets to avoid being subject to the proposed fees. The
Exchange believes that the proposed fees neither target nor will they
have a disparate impact on any particular category of market
participant. The Exchange believes that the proposal change does not
permit unfair discrimination because it would be applied to all
similarly situated ETP Holders, who would all be subject to the
proposed fee on an equal basis.
    The Exchange further believes that it is not unfairly
discriminatory to exclude Market Makers and Lead Market Makers from the
proposed RT--Display Fee in securities in which they are registered, or
if they are registered in more than 100 securities. Market Makers and
Lead Market Makers have independent obligations to maintain a two-sided
quotation a specified percentage away from the NBBO. In order to meet
this obligation, such ETP Holders are more likely to need to cancel
their resting orders so that they can update their quotes. The Exchange
believes that such independent obligation to maintain a fair and
orderly market outweighs any impact such cancellations would have on
Exchange systems. The Exchange similarly believes that, unlike Lead
Market Makers, Market Makers do not have a similar obligation leading
into an auction, therefore it is not necessary to exclude Market Makers
from the proposed RT--Auction Fee.
    Finally, the submission of orders to the Exchange is optional for
ETP Holders in that they could choose whether to submit orders to the
Exchange and, if they do, the extent of its activity in this regard.
For the foregoing reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposal is
consistent with the Act.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    In accordance with Section 6(b)(8) of the Act,\27\ the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change would not impose any burden on
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. Instead, as discussed above, the Exchange believes
that the proposed fee would encourage

ETP Holders to modify their order entry and/or cancellation practices
so that fewer orders or shares are cancelled without resulting in an
execution, thereby promoting price discovery and transparency and
enhancing order execution opportunities on the Exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Intramarket Competition. The Exchange believes the proposed Ratio
Threshold Fees would not place any undue burden on intramarket
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act because the proposed fees are designed to encourage
ETP Holders to submit orders or shares into the market that are
actionable. Further, the proposal would apply to all ETP Holders on an
equal basis, and, as such, the proposed change would not impose a
disparate burden on competition among market participants on the
Exchange. To the extent that these purposes are achieved, the Exchange
believes that the proposal would serve as an incentive for ETP Holders
to modify their order entry practices, thus enhancing the quality of
the market and increase the volume of orders or shares directed to, and
executed on, the Exchange. In turn, all the Exchange's market
participants would benefit from the improved market liquidity.
    Intermarket Competition. The Exchange operates in a highly
competitive market in which market participants can readily favor other
exchange and off-exchange venues. In such an environment, the Exchange
must continually review, and consider adjusting its services along with
its fees and rebates, to remain competitive with other exchanges and
with off-exchange venues. Because competitors are free to modify their
own services, and their fees and credits in response, the Exchange does
not believe the proposed fee change can impose any burden on
intermarket competition.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A) \28\ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule
19b-4 \29\ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other
charge imposed by the Exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \29\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under
Section 19(b)(2)(B) \30\ of the Act to determine whether the proposed
rule change should be approved or disapproved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-NYSEArca-2020-45 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEArca-2020-45. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-NYSEArca-2020-45, and should be
submitted on or before June 18, 2020.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-11405 Filed 5-27-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 25 (Tuesday, February 7, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8018-8020]
[FR Doc No: 2023-02510]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-96787; File No. SR-ICEEU-2023-004]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; ICE Clear Europe Limited; Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the ICE
Clear Europe Counterparty Credit Risk Policy and Counterparty Credit
Risk Procedures

February 1, 2023.
    Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on January 20, 2023, ICE Clear Europe Limited (``ICE Clear Europe'' or
the ``Clearing House'') filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (``Commission'') the proposed rule changes described in
Items I, II and III below, which Items have been prepared primarily by
ICE Clear Europe. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the
Proposed Rule Change

    ICE Clear Europe Limited (``ICE Clear Europe'' or the ``Clearing
House'') proposes to modify its Counterparty Credit Risk Policy (the
``CC Risk Policy'') and Counterparty Credit Risk Procedures (the ``CC
Risk Procedures'') to provide that the Clearing House's framework for
monitoring counterparty credit risk covers links,\3\ as defined in the
Commission's standards for clearing agencies. The Clearing House also
proposes to make certain further updates and clarifications to the CC
Risk Procedures.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ ``Link'' means ``a set of contractual and operational
arrangements between two or more clearing agencies, financial market
utilities, or trading markets that connect them directly or
indirectly for the purposes of participating in settlement, cross
margining, expanding their services to additional instruments or
participants, or for any other purposes material to their
business.'' 17 CFR 240.17Ad-2(a)(8).
    \4\ Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the
meanings specified in the ICE Clear Europe Clearing Rules and the CC
Risk Policy and CC Risk Procedures, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, ICE Clear Europe included
statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule
change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule
change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places
specified in Item IV below. ICE Clear Europe has prepared summaries,
set forth in sections (A), (B), and (C) below, of the most significant
aspects of such statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

(a) Purpose
    ICE Clear Europe is proposing to revise the CC Risk Policy in order
to provide that the Clearing House's policies for monitoring
counterparty credit risk apply to links, as defined in the Commission's
regulations. ICE Clear Europe is also proposing to revise the CC Risk
Procedures to make conforming updates in respect of links and to make
certain other clarifications and enhancements.
I. Counterparty Credit Risk Policy
    The amendments to the CC Risk Policy would include as part of the
description of the Clearing House's counterparty credit risk the risk
that a ``link'' defaults, leaving the Clearing House to fund material
contractual or operational arrangements. A definition of ``link'',
based on the definition in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(8),\5\ would be added.
Conforming references to links would be added in relevant portions of
the CC Risk Policy: the amendments would add that an objective of the
CC Risk Policy is to minimize the risk of the Clearing House realizing
a material loss due to a link defaulting, and that a means by which the
Clearing House achieves this objective is to identify, monitor and
manage risks from links. The amendments would also clarify the credit
scoring with respect to links (which may use credit criteria other than
those used with respect to CMs) and provide that for link
counterparties whose credit scores are worse than a required threshold,
a mitigating action that the Clearing House may take is to change its
usage of links.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Non-substantive drafting and formatting updates would also be made.
II. CC Risk Procedures
    The CC Risk Procedures, which supplement the CC Risk Policy, would
be updated to make conforming changes to those discussed above with
respect to links, including as to including the risk of a link default
as a type of counterparty credit risk that Clearing House seeks to
manage. The amendments would provide that in order to minimize
counterparty credit risk, the Clearing House would identify, monitor
and manage material risks from links as well as ensure that all
counterparty risks are eliminated prior to off-boarding counterparties.
    The amendments would remove a specific statement that FSPs must be
legal entities in approved jurisdictions. Consistent with other ICE
Clear Europe policies and current practice, the Clearing House legal
department separately reviews and determines approved jurisdictions,
and accordingly a reference to this process in the CC Risk Procedures
is unnecessary. The amendments would also add a specific reference to
Anti-Money Laundering and Know-Your-Customer screenings. These
amendments would also state that agreements with FSPs are subject to
review by the legal team, including analysis of legal risk relating to
governing law and in that context jurisdiction. These changes are
intended to more clearly reflect current practice of the Clearing
House.
    Similar to the changes in the CC Policy, the amendments would
revise the discussion of credit scoring to reflect that the Clearing
House may use related

credit criteria (as opposed to credit scores) to evaluate credit
quality of counterparties. The amendments reflect the fact that
different criteria may be appropriate for evaluation of the credit
risks of FSPs and links, as compared to CMs. Conforming changes to
refer to such related criteria would be made where applicable in the CC
Risk Procedures. Such evaluations will continue to be made daily as set
out in the counterparty risk reviews section of the CC Risk Procedures
and the related Counterparty Credit Risk Parameters (``Parameters'')
(notwithstanding removal of certain duplicative language in the
discussion of credit scoring). A statement that the CRS may incorporate
exposure information reflecting the risk of the CM's portfolio held
with the Clearing House (specifically, loss given default) or analyze
exposure with reference to financial metrics would be removed, to be
consistent with changes to the relevant credit risk model used in
determining CRS scoring (which does not consider such exposures).
    The amendments would provide that late submissions of quarterly
financial statements by counterparties would be communicated and
escalated as set out in the Parameters. In the discussion of risk
classification, the amendments would provide that CMs who reach the
Watch List Criteria are added automatically to the Watch List, and that
the Watch List Criteria are set out in the Parameters. These updates
are to ensure alignment between the Clearing House's risk management
framework documentation, including the CC Risk Procedures and the
Parameters.
    In the section describing the Clearing House's counterparty credit
risk monitoring, the amendments would add that such monitoring and
review includes monitoring for cross-exposures of CMs' affiliates
(defined in the relevant Parameters as uncollateralized stress loss for
clearing members, unsecured exposure for FSPs and estimate loss for
purposes of links). Such continuous monitoring would, in addition to
other sources, be based on credit scores and public news. The
continuous monitoring will facilitate production of daily, rather than
weekly, risk reviews. Other reviews of monitoring activity would
continue to be carried out monthly and quarterly. The amendments would
also provide that review frequency and criteria in addition to findings
and recommendations from the counterparty risk reviews would be
approved based on the Parameters.
    The amendments would add to the discussion of the Clearing House's
practices for monitoring its exposures to CMs that the Clearing House
also monitors at least monthly credit cross-exposures among
counterparties and their affiliates in all their capacities. These
amendments are intended to reflect the expansive nature of the Clearing
House's current risk management practices.
    With respect to exposure limits and related capital calculations
for purposes of CMs that are part of a Systemically Important
Institution, the amendments will use the more specific definition of
Systemically Important Institutions in the Parameters as an institution
with assets greater than 200 billion Euros that is treated as a
Globally Systemically Important Institution by the European Banking
Authority. This would replace the previous, more subjective standard. A
reference to the institution being in a robust legal jurisdiction has
been removed as unnecessary in light of the revised definition and
approach to AML/KYC and governing law review discussed above.
    Non-substantive drafting and formatting updates would also be made.
(b) Statutory Basis
    ICE Clear Europe believes that the amendments to the CC Risk Policy
and the CC Risk Procedures are consistent with the requirements of
section 17A of the Act \6\ and the regulations thereunder applicable to
it. In particular, section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \7\ requires, among
other things, that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to
promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities
transactions and, to the extent applicable, derivative agreements,
contracts, and transactions, the safeguarding of securities and funds
in the custody or control of the clearing agency or for which it is
responsible, and the protection of investors and the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
    \7\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amendments to the CC Risk Procedures and CC Risk Policy are
designed to more clearly document certain of the Clearing House's
practices with respect to the management of counterparty credit risk
and would explicitly include references to losses from defaulting links
(in addition to the existing references to losses resulting from
defaulting CMs and losses resulting from the default of other FSPs).
The amendments would make certain other updates and clarifications with
respect to counterparty credit risk evaluation more generally. The
proposed amendments thus enhance the overall risk management of the
Clearing House and promote the stability of the Clearing House and the
prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of cleared contracts. The
proposed amendments to the CC Risk Policy and CC Risk Procedures are
thus also generally consistent with the protection of investors and the
public interest in the safe operation of the Clearing House. The
aspects of the updates to the CC Risk Policy and CC Risk Procedures
that relate to counterparty credit risk for FSPs or links will also
help manage the risk of assets held by the Clearing House from CMs and
their customers that may otherwise be affected by the default of an FSP
or link, and thus enhance the safeguarding of securities and funds in
ICE Clear Europe's custody or control or for which it is responsible.
Accordingly, the amendments satisfy the requirements of section
17A(b)(3)(F).\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amendments to the CC Risk Policy and the Risk Procedures are
also consistent with relevant provisions of Rule 17Ad-22. Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(3)(i) \9\ provides that the ``covered clearing agency shall
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonable designed to, as applicable [. . .] maintain a
sound risk management framework that'' among other matters identifies,
measures, monitors and manages the range of risks that it faces. The
amendments to the CC Risk Policy and the CC Risk Procedures are to
enhance the Clearing House's policies and practices for monitoring and
reviewing counterparty credit risk and related exposures, provide clear
descriptions of such policies and processes, as well as align with
other documents in ICE Clear Europe's overall risk management
framework. The amendments would thus strengthen the management of
potential counterparty risks, and risk management more generally. In
ICE Clear Europe's view, the amendments are therefore consistent with
the requirements of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(i).\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ 17 CFR 240.17 Ad-22(e)(3)(i).
    \10\ 17 CFR 240.17 Ad-22(e)(3)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 17A-22(e)(16) provides that the ``covered clearing agency
shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonable designed to, as applicable [. . .] safeguard
[its] own and its participants' assets, minimize the risk of loss and
delay in access to these assets, and invest such assets in instruments
with minimal credit, market and liquidity risks.'' \11\ As discussed
above, the amendments to the CC Risk Policy and CC Risk Procedures are
intended to document Clearing House practices with

respect to the management of credit risk with respect to FSPs and
links, including any through which assets of the Clearing House and CMs
may be invested or maintained. The policy and procedures address the
monitoring of an FSP or link's credit risk and the steps the Clearing
House may take to mitigate such risk where it exceeds exposure limits.
As such, the CC Risk Policy and CC Risk Procedures will continue to
enable the Clearing House to safeguard such assets and minimize the
risk of loss from FSP default, consistent with the requirements of Rule
17Ad-22(e)(16).\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(16).
    \12\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For similar reasons, the amendments to the CC Risk Policy and the
CC Risk Procedures are consistent with the requirements of Rule 17A-
22(e)(20),\13\ which provides that the ``covered clearing agency shall
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonable designed to, as applicable [. . .] identify,
monitor, and manage risks related to any link the covered clearing
agency establishes with one or more other clearing agencies, financial
market utilities, or trading markets''. The amendments document the
Clearing House practices and policies with respect to the management of
credit risk and related exposure with respect to link counterparties,
and in ICE Clear Europe's view are therefore consistent with the
requirements of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(20).\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(20).
    \14\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(20).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(B) Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition

    ICE Clear Europe does not believe the proposed documents would have
any impact, or impose any burden, on competition not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The amendments
to the CC Risk Policy and the CC Risk Procedures are intended to
enhance practices with respect to counterparty credit risk monitoring
and management, for CMs, FSPs and links, and are not intended to impose
new requirements on CMs. The proposed amendments clarify ICE Clear
Europe's risk management procedures and ensure that ICE Clear Europe
continues to appropriately monitors and limit risks relating to CMs,
FSPs and links' credit risk. The proposed amendments are not expected
to materially change margin requirements or costs for CMs and any such
change which may occur would be tailored to the counterparty credit
risk presented by a particular CM. ICE Clear Europe does not believe
that the proposed amendments will otherwise impact competition among
Clearing Members or other market participants or affect the ability of
market participants to access clearing generally. Therefore, ICE Clear
Europe does not believe the proposed rule change imposes any burden on
competition that is inappropriate or unnecessary in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.

(C) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments relating to the proposed amendments have not been
solicited or received by ICE Clear Europe. ICE Clear Europe will notify
the Commission of any written comments received with respect to the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) by order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml) or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-ICEEU-2023-004 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-ICEEU-2023-004. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change, that are filed
with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filings will also be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of ICE Clear Europe
and on ICE Clear Europe's website at https://www.theice.com/clear-europe/regulation.
    All comments received will be posted without change. Persons
submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-ICEEU-2023-004 and should be
submitted on or before February 28, 2023.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-02510 Filed 2-6-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P