Claim barred by laches.  Laches will bar the claim of petitioners if they delayed unreasonably in bringing their appeal to the administrative agency or board, to respondent s prejudice Goto v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 423 A. 2d 917 ( 1980). Reviewing court must determine: ( 1) Whether the agency has made a finding of fact on each material contested issue of fact; ( 2) whether substantial eyidence of record SUP ports each finding; and ( 3) whether the conclusions of law follow rationally from the findine George Washington Univ. v. District OfColUmbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, APP. D. C.? 4zs 4 3 J   ADMINISTRATI DU  RE § 1 1510VE PROCE ( 1984). Prejudice might occur to a petitioner who .~ li to . hl In n 1; rpnsp from an administrative board and is prevented from practicing his profession by the board  s failure to act promptly. Vann v. District of Columbia Bd. of  .: Funeral Dirs. & Embalmers, App. D. C., 441 A. 2d 246 11982), ad. App. D. C., 480 A. 2d 688 ( 1984). Review of action alleged to be constitutional violation.  A practitioner of 14 years, who subsequent to the passage of the District of Columbia Practice of Psychology Act ( 8  2 1704.1et seq., now repealed) applied for a license, and whose application was denied by the Board of Psychologist Examiners because of his lack of required academic degrees, can properly avail himself of the statutory review procedure outlined in this section in order to prosecute his constitutional challenge that the Board s refusal to test his professional competence by some standard other than his academic credentials constituted a violation of fundamental due process. Berger v. Board of Psychologist Exmrs., 521 F. 2d 1056 ( D. C. Cir. 1975). Agency s decision presumed to be correct  In determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support an agency decision, or whether it is in any way arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court starts from the premise that the agency s decision is presumed to be correct, so that the burden of demonstrating error is on the appellant or petitioner who challenges the decision. Cohen v. Rental How. Comm n, App. D. C., 496 A. 2d 603 ( 1985). Agency decision upheld unlessit is arbitrary capricious, etc.  A court will uphold the agency s interpretation of an act unless the interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Smith v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 548 A. 2d 95 ( 1988). Court must overturn arbitrary or capriciousdecision  In the exercise of its review function, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is obliged to overturn a decision of the District Unemployment Compensation Board when it is found to be arbitrary and capricious or not in accordance with law. Carpenter v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., App. D. C., 409 A. 2d 175 ( 1979). Agency findings must be supported by substantial evidence.  A finding that an employee has violated company policy, by itself is not enough to sustain a conclusion that the employee was fired for misconduct. Among other things, the agency must make findings, supported by substantial record evidence, as to whether the employee was aware of the policy, wheihe it was consistently enforced, id., and whether the employee s violation was deliberate and claims examiner s determination that petitioner was fired for misconduct was not supported by substanuai evidence. IvicLa6kiii v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs,, App. D. C., 572 A. 2d 443 ( 1990). Commission on Human Rights  findings in sex discrimination case based solely on documentary evidence were, necessarily, arbitrary and capricious where the docupentation provided in the case was without accompanying testimony at an evidentiary hearing, and thus the examiner had no reliable basis for assessing credibility. Garzon v. District of Columbia Comm n on Human Rights, App. D. C., 578 A. 2d 1134 ( 1990). Agency  s findings of fact are conclusive on Court ofAppeals, unless unsupprted by substantial evidence in the record. hulx v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 430 A. 2d 34 ( 1981). Court may not disturb action unless plainly wrong or without support.  On petition for review of order of Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, the Court of Appeals may not disturb any action of the Board in exercise of its statutory powers unless such action is plainly wrong or without support by substantial evidence in administrative record. Schiffmann v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 302 A. 2d 235 ( 1973). Review by the Court of Appeals of a decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment is limited to a determination of whether the decision reached follows as a matter of law fhm facts stated as its basis, and also whether facts so stated have any substantial support in the evidence If the Board s decision follows from its findings and those findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals must affirm even though it might have reached another result. Stewart v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 305 A. 2d 516 ( 1973). The Court s review of decision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board is limited to de233 I 5 1 1510   ADMINISTRATION termination of whether the Board decision is supported by Substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla, and is such rele vant evidence as reasonable minds might ac cept as adequate to support conclusion. Vestry I1   H of Grace Parish v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 366 A. 2d 1110 ( 1976). In reviewing a decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment the Court requires that there I be a rational connection between the facts ~

, a found by the Board and its decision. Dupont Circle Citizens Ass n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 390 A. 2d 1009 ( 1978). When the findings of basic facts are each supported by sufficient evidence and, when taken together, rationally lead to conclusions of law and an agency decision consistent with the governing statute, the Court of Appeals shall affirm that decision. Citizens Ass n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm n, App. D. C., 402 A. 2d 36 ( 1979); Draude v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 527 A. 2d 1242 ( 1987). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals may overturn an agency s decision only if the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, or if it is grounded on a faulty legal premise. Neer v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 415 A. 2d 523 ( 1980); Woody v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 441 A. 2d 987 ( 1982). Administrative determinations regarding an J. agency s internal procedures are entitled to due respect and should not be reversed unless Wearly wrong.  Goto v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C.. 423 A. 2d 917 ( 1980). In deciding questions of law, a reviewingL/  court must give due consideration of the administrative agency s interpretation of its substantive regulation, and should uphold that in111 RR    tervrotntinyr 1: nlosc. it ic nl? in! v ermnPniiS pr inconsistent with the regulation. George Washington Univ. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 429.. A. 2d 1342 ( 1981). Unless unreasonable, an appellate court should defer to the agency s construction of a 1 IF11 !, controlling statute or regulation. Kramer v. D. C. Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 447 A. 2d 28 ( 1982). Under this subchapter, agency findings of fact and conclusions of law must be affirmed if ~

. I I. ,: supported by and in accordance with reliable, Jil! l probative and substantive evidence in the./ I;#! record. Barry v. Wilson, App. D. C., 448 A. 2d ~

244 ( 1982). llI( l1 A reviewing court must give great weight toL/ any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute that has been adopted by the agency charged with its enforcement. Lee v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 509 A. 2d 100 ( 19%). Director of agency without authority to review de novo the evidence.  It was not within the authority ot  the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services to review de novo the evidence concerning factual issue; and Director s decision to ignore Substantial evidentiary support was reversible error. Santos v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 536 A. 2d 1085 ( 1988). Court may not substitute its judgment.  If there is Substantial evidence to support the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board s finding, then the mere existence of Substantial evidence contrary to that finding does not allow the Court of Appeals to substitute itsjudgment for that of the Board. Spevak v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 407 A. 2d 549 ( 1979). In applying the substantial evidence test, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Liberty v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 410 A. 2d 191 ( 1979), afYd, App. D. C., 452 A. 2d 1187 ( 1982). The reviewing court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency; rather, it must determine whether a rational basis existed for the decision. Spivey v. Barry, 501 F. Supp. 1093{ D. D. C. 1980i, rev d on other grounds, 665 F. 2d 1222 ( D. C. Cir. 1981). If there is Substantial evidence to support the agency s finding, the mere existence of substantial evidence to the contrary does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Scott v. Police & Firemens Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 447 A. 2d 447 ( 1982). On judicial review, it is not the province of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, provided the w niind= iinnyr which the aepnrv nrtd wprc clearly disclosed and adequately sustained. Kegley v. District of Columbia, App. D. C., 440 A. 2d 1013 ( 1982). The scope of review of the Court of Appeals as to contested cases, as provided by this ation prohibits the substitution of the court s judgment in areas of expertise reserved for the agency. Barry v. Wilson, App. D. C., 448 A. 2d 244 ( 1982). Court of Appeals will assume the validity of findings and conclusions which pedtioner does not challenge. First Baptia Church v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 432 A. 2d 695 ( 1981) Standards for contested cases apply , administrative decision appeals in SUPS ,! rior Court.  The scope of review ir. the SUpb rior Court of a decision made by the Metropdi I Q ADMINISTRATI ; p~ li@ Department Police Trial Board is 85 that of the Court of Appeals in a contested case under this section. District of Columbia, App. D. C., 440 ( 1982); Barry v. Wilson, App. D. C., 244 ( 1982). ency findings of fact and conclusions of br mmt be affrmed by the Superior Court if u~& dby and in accordance with reliable, ipDbativt! and substantive evidence in the md as a whole. Kegley v. Distri$ of Columbi App. D. C., 440 A. 2d 1013 ( 1982). Review of Superior Court s administrative appeal decision by Court of Appeals. When a decision of the Superior Court reviewing an action of the Metropolitan Pdice Department Police Trial Board is appealed, the Court of Appeals should use the precise scope of review employed in reviewing contested cases: A review of the administrative record to determine if there has been procedural error, if there is substantial evidence in the record to .,.). .. I ( 1 ..,. i;., n , f tho   P,.; nl RP,. J fir ; f th<.,.., ,  action is in some manner otherwise arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Kegley v. District of Columbia, App. D. C., 440 A. 2d 1013 ( 1982); Barry v. Holderbaum, App. D. C., 454 A. 2d 1328 ( 1982). Act of compiling and preserving a factual record enables the reviewing court to determine whether the decision maker  s choice was both reasonable and proper in the specific factual context. Johnson v. United States, App. D. C., 398 A. 2d 354 ( 1979). Review of designated portions of record todeterminefindings.  On appeal of a decision of an agency, the reviewing court must review the portions of the record designated by the parties to determine whether the agency could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did. Liberty v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 410 A. 2d 191 ( 1979), aff d, App. D. C., 452 A. 2d 1187 ( 1982). Requirements for upholding order on review  On review of an order of the Board of Zoning Adjustment, Court of Appeals must determine whether findings made are supported and in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole administrative record and whether conclusions of Board flow rationally from  these findings. Dietrich v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 320 A. 2d 282 ( 1974). The Court of Appeals must review the record as a whole to determine whether the agency could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did, and to assure that the agency s decision did not rely on unsupported findings. Proulx v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 430 A. 2d 34 ( 1981). Substantial evidence is   more than a mere scintilla  of evidence; it is   such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as VE PRoCEDURE 0 1 1510 adequate to support a conclusion.  Liberty V. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 410 A. 2d 191 11979); Proulx v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 430 A. 2d 34 ( 19811; Le Jimmy, Inc. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 433 A. 2d 1090 ( 1981); Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 476 A. 2d 671 ( 1984). The appellate court s role is only to examine contested issues and to determine whether the Zoning Commission s conclusions meet the test of substantial evidence. DuF ont Circle Citizens .4ss n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm n, App. D. C., 426 A. 2d 327 ( 1981). Substantial evidence test requires: ( 1) That the agency make findings of basic facts on all material contested issues; ( 2) that these findings, taken together, must rationally lead to bGZisions of law which are legally SUEcient to support the decision; and ( 3) that each basic finding is supported by substantial evi ncn n..~+ t pi+,, p: t:, nnc4??~,,, nirtrict of Columbia Zoning Comm n, App. D. C., 426 A. 2d 327 ( 1981). Findings held supported by substantial evidence.  See Citizens Ass n of Georgetown Inc. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 280 A. 2d 309 ( 1971t Johnson v. Board of Appeals & Review, App. D. C., 282 A. 2d 566 ( 1971). cert. denied, 405 US. 955,92 S. Ct. 1175,31L. Ed. 2d 232 ( 1972); Wheeler v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 395 A. 2d 85 ( 1978); Seabolt v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 413 A. 2d 908 ( 1980); Barry v. Wilson, App. D. C., 448A. 2d 244 ( 19FC2); Arthur v. District of Columbia Nurses Examining Bd., App. D. C., 459 A. 2d 141 ( 1983); Grant v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 490 A. 2d 1115( 1985); Draude v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 582 A. 2d 949 ( 1990); RafFerty v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm n, App. D. C., 583 A. 2d 169 ( 1990). Uncontroverted testimony that old hot and cold water risers were rotten and were replaced in a particular manner in order to minimize the cost and inconvenience to the tenants was sufficient evidence to sustain the examiner s conclusion that the expenditures would enhance and protect the health, safety, and security of the tenants, which is substantially in compliance with the requirement of a determination that the interests of the affected tenants are being protected under § 45 2520(~)( 2). Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Corn., App. D. C., 590 A. 2d 1043 ( 1991). Court need not reverse for unsupported subsidiary finding.  A reviewing court need not reverse when a board has made an unsupported finding if the finding is demon235 32 5 1 1510 ADMINISTRATION strably subsidiary and the agency does not purport to rely on the finding. Liberty v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 410 A. 2d 191 ( 1979), affd, App. D. C., 452 A. 2d 1187 ( 1982). But remand necessary where agency may have relied on erroneous findings.  Remand of an agency decision is necessary if the court is in substantial doubt whether the administrative agenry would have made the same ultimate finding with the erroneous findings or inferences removed from the picture. Liberty v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 410 A. 2d 191 ( 1979), afl d, App. D. C., 452 A. 2d 1187 ( 1982). Reversal and remand is required only if substantial doubt exists whether the agency would have made the same ultimate finding with the error removed. Arthur v. District of Columbia Nurses  Examining Bd., App. D. C., 459 A. 2d 141 ( 1983); King v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 1067 ( 1989). Reliance oninformation not in iecord.  Where the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board may have relied upon information from staff investigative reports not made a matter of record, the case would be remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Citizens Ass n of Georgetown, Inc. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 288 A. 2d 666 ( 1972), Bd, App. D. C., 305 A. 2d 861 ( 1973). Findings set aside as unsupported by substantial evidence.  See Sophia s, Inc. v. ABC Bd., App. D. C., 268 A. 2d 799 ( 1970); Miller v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, App. D. C., 294 A. 2d 365 ( 1972); Liberty v. Police & Firernen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 410 A. 2d 191 ( 1979), affd, App. D. C., 452 A. 2d 1187 ( 1982); American Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep t of Labor, App. D. C., 429 A. 2d 1374 ( 1981); Le Jimmy, Inc. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 433 A. 2d 1090 ( 1981); Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dep t of Ernp. Servs., App. D. C., 476 A. 2d 671 ( 1984); Selk v. District of Columbia Dep t of Ernp. Servs.. Apo. D. C 497 A Zd 1056 ( 1995)

Kemand required in absence of finding.  If the agency fails to make a finding on a material, contested issue of fact, the court cannot fill the gap by making ita own det@ fl! lEktion from the record, but must remand the case for findings on that issue. Colton v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 484 A. 2d 550 ( 1984). The finding that a claimant exercised reasonable diligencein seeking alternative employment following a discriminatory discharge is anissue of fact subject to determination upon review, by the Court of Appeals of whether it was supported by substantial evidence Wisconsin Ave. Nursing Home v. District of Columbia Comm n an Human Rights, App. D. C., 527 A. 2d 282 ( 1987). Failure to show prejudiced error.  Error in refusing timely request to examine for impeachment purposes certain material evidence was not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal where testimony based upon such evidence was corroborated by several other witnesses. K. G. S., Inc. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 531 A. 2d 1001 ( 1987). Failure to appear at hearing.  Claimants failure to appear at hearing may have waived his right to present testimony, but because the burden was still on the employer to prove misconduct, it did not waive his appeal, and agency s dismissal of claimant s timely appeal was not legitimized by the fact that the   Notice of Hearing  stated that failure to appear at the hearing   may result in denial of benefits of the appeal.  Claimant s failure to appear at a hearing where the employer had the burden of proof was no different from appearing and declining to testify. The employer still had to introduce evidence proving misconduct and the examiner had to make particular factual findings and legal conclusions based on that evidence. McCaskill v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 572 A. 2d 443 ( 1990). Prisoner s hearing before transfer from St. Elizabeths Hospital reviewed as agency action.  A judicially mandated hearing before transferring a prisoner from st. Elizabeths Hospital to the Department of Corrections is a review of the equivalent of agency action, and the appropriate inquiv is whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or without substantial evidence to support it. In re Hurt, App. D. C., 437 A. 2d 590 ( 1981). Prison discipline cases.  There is no constitutional right to a full trial type hearing in prison discipline cases. Prisoners are entitled to some due process protections, such as the right to receive notice of the charges against them and a written statement of reasons for , . 1:. . .. I: LuL di.:~ e< Loii.> Lii,..., !... r.,.. dz., ~> iv& i, tionai rights must generally be balanced against the correctional goals of the prison au. thorities. Singleton v. District of Columbia Dep t of Cors., App: D. C., 596 A. 2d 56 ( 19913. Workers  compensation case.  In a workers  compensation case, an order by the Director to remand a case to the Hearing Ex aminer for further findings was not a find Or der because the remand order only decided On* of two claims. Warner v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 567 A. 2d 1091 ( 1991). Superior Court may consider appfi u. ity of 8 5 513 to DHCD enforcement ad* but not whether property owner s Wb ; r. ADMINISTRATI ted thereby.  A real property k declaratory and injunctive re Superior Court as to the applica 5 513 to a Department of Housing unity Development ( DHCD) en action ( subject to review by the && of Appeals); however, since the   show cBu~   provision of § 5 513 requires a   con case   hearing under the Administrative Mure Act, the Superior Court may not mmider whether the owner  s rights were violated by DHCD s particular use of 5 5 513 as to him. Auger v. D. C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, ~ pp. D. C., 477 A. 2d 196 ( 1984). Decisions of Board of Elections and Ethics under § 1 131Ma) are reviewable by the Court of Appeals  under this section. Pendleton v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, App. D. C., 449 A. 2d 301 ( 1982). Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review decisions ui doinb Cumiiiitae UIL Landmarks of National Capitol inasmuch as the Joint Committee is not a District of Col. umbia agency. A & G Ltd. Partnership v. Joint Comm. on Landmarks of Nat l Capital, App. D. C., 449 A. 2d 291 ( 1982). Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over claim against Districtbased on the refusa! of District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development to accept and process applications for registration. Brenneman Assocs. v. District of Columbia, App. D. C., 466 A. 2d 459 ( 1983). Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review District of Columbia Hackers  License Appeal Board ruling affiing denial of license to a parolee becauseit arises from a   contested case  as defined under I 1 1502( 8). Allen v. District of Columbia Hackers  License Appeal Bd., App. D. C., 471 A. 2d 271 ( 1984). Court of Appeals may not review agency revocation of sign permit not appealed to Board of Appeals and Review.  Where petitioner did not appeal his sign permit revocation by District agency with the Board of Ap peals and Review, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the agency s revocation of the permit because petitioner failed to create a   contested case.  Auger v. D. C. Bd. of Appeals 6Review, App. D. C., 477 A. 2d 196 ( 1984). Property owner may seekreview of find DHCD action by Court of Appeals.  Because § 5 513 authorizes the Department of Housing and Community Development ( DHCDI, an administrative agency of the District to deprive the owner of his property, and because the Board of Appeals and Review does not have appellate jurisdiction over an enforcement order, due process entitles the owner to a   contested case  hearing at DHCD if he elects to show cause why he should not be required to correct such condition; whether DHCD grants . YE PROCEDURE § 1 1510 or refuses such a hearing, the owner can seek review of DHCDs final action directly by the Court of Appeals. Auger v. D. C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, App. D. C., 477 A. 2d 196 ( 1984). Human Rights Law does not expand the scope of appeal court s jurisdiction beyond that conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act. Lamont v. Rogers, App. D. C., 479 A. 2d 1274 ( 1984). Office of Human Rights findings.  An OEce of Human Rights  finding of no probable cause is subject to judicial reivew. Simpson v. District of Cohmbia OEce of Human Rights, App. D. C., 597 A. 2d 392 ( 1991). District courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over decisions of rental accom tion office.  Administrative Procedure Act does not grant District of Columbia courts exclusivejurisdiction to review decisions of the D. C. rental accommodation office. District Pri, pc,~ ies. LULL.,, 3istriLt , r? ;:: x? L:, 7 i? F. 2d 21 ( D. C. Cir. 1984). Showing held insufficient for review of denial of Department of Housing and Community Development housing loan award.  See Rones v. District of Columbia Dep t of Hous. & Community Dev., App. D. C., 500A. 2d 998 ( 1985). Cited in Murphy v. Heath, App. D. C., 256 A. 2d 421 ( 1969); Gunnel1 Constr. Co. v. Contract Appeals Bd., App. D. C., 282 A. 2d 556 ( 1971); Basiliko v. Government of D. C., App. D. C., 283 A. 2d 816 ( 1971); Citizens Ass n v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 287 A. 2d 87 ( 1972); Citizens Ass n of Georgetown, Inc. v. District of Columbia AFE Bd.. App. D. C., 305 A. 2d 861 ( 1973); Chevy Chase Citizens Ass n v. District of Columbia Council, App. D. C., 327 A. 2d 310 ( 1974); Dillard v. Yeldell, App. D. C., 334 A. 2d 578 ( 1975); C & P Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm n, App. D. C., 339 A. 2d 710 ( 1975); Latimer v. Joint Comm. on Landmarks, App. D. C., 345 A. 2d. 484 ( 1975); Hanke v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, App. D. C., 353 A. 2d 301 ( 1976); Thomas v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, App. D. C., 355 A. 2d 789 ( 1976); Richards v. District of Columbia Hackers  License Appeal Bd., App. D. C., 357 A. 2d 439 ( 1976); Barber v. District of Columbia Dep t of Human Resources, App. D. C., 361 A. 2d 194 ( 1976); Palisades Citizens Ass n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm n, App. D. C., 368 A. 2d 1143 ( 1977); Capitol Hill Restoration Wy v. Zoning Comm n, App. D. C., 380 A. 2d 174 ( 1977); Jacobs v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., App. D. C., 382 A. 2d 282 ( 1978); Cumming v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., App. D. C., 382 A. 2d 1010 ( 1978); Wieck v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 383 A. 2d 7 ( 1978); Arellano v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. G., 384 A. 2d 29 237 I § 1 1510 ADMINISTRATION ( 1978); Jameson s Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 384 A. 2d 412 ( 1978); Kober v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., App. D. C., 384 A. 2d 633 ( 1978); Association for Preservation of 1700 Block of N. St., N. W., & Vicinity v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 384 A. 2d 674 ( 1978); Haugness v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., App. D. C., 386 A. 2d 700 ( 1978); Wells v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., App. D. C., 386 A. 2d 703 ( 1978); Babazadeh v. District of Columbia Hackers  License Appeal Bd., App. D. C., 390 A. 2d 1004( 1978); Lechter Siege1 v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., App. D. C., 395 A. 2d 57 ( 1978); Carr v. Brown, App. D. C., 395 A. 2d 79 ( 1978); Silverstone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 396 A. 2d 992 ( 1979); In re Dwyer, App. D. C., 399 A. 2d 1 ( 1979); Fesjian v. Jefferson App. D. C., 399 A. 2d 861 ( 1979); American Univ. Park Citizens Ass n v. Burka, App. D. C., 400 A. 2d 737 ( 1979); Russell v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 402 A. 2d 1231 ( 1979); In re Smith, App. D. C., 403 A. 2d 296 ( 1979); Dupont Circle Citizens h n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment App. D. C., 403 A. 2d 314 ( 1979); Citizens Mn v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 403 A. 2d 737 ( 1979); Rorie v. District of Columbia Dep t of Human Resources, App. D. C., 403 A. 2d 1148 ( 1979); Taylor v. District of Columbia Rental AccommodationsComm n, App. D. C., 404 A. 2d 173 ( 1979); Sherman v. Commission on Licensure to Practice Healing Art, App. D. C., 407 A. 2d 595 ( 1979); D. T. Corp. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 407 A. 2d 707 ( 1979); Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep t of Labor, App. D. C., 409 A. 2d 164 ( 1979); Capitol Hill Restoration My, Inc. v. Moore, App. D. C., 410 A. 2d 184 ( 1979); Echard v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 422 A. 2d 1275 ( 1980); Spivey v. Barry, 665 F. 2d 1222 ( D. C. Cir. 1981); Kea v. Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., i.& A. Zd ii4 clkiij; Fkepecki Y. I& ce & Firemens Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 429 A. 2d 1388 ( 1981); 900 G St. Assocs. v. Department of How. & Community Dev., App. D. C.,. 430 A. 2d 1387 ( 1981); District of Columbia v. Sullivan, App. D. C., 436 A. 2d 364 ( 1981); Haight v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 439 A. 2d 487 ( 1981); Dankman v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, App. D. C., 443 A. 2d 507 ( 1981); Interstate Gen. Corp. v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm n, App. D. C., 441 A. 2d 252 ( 1982); American Combustion, Inc. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm n, App. D. C., 441 A. 2d 660 ( 1982); Hockaday v. D. C. Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 443 A. 2d 8 ( 1982); Barber v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 449 A. 2d 332 ( 1982); Muir v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 450 A. 2d 412 ( 1982); Donnelly v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 452 A. 2d 364 ( 1982); Hobson v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 452 A. 2d 1182 ( 1982); MB Assocs. v. D. C. Dep t of Licenses Investigation & Inspection, App. D. C., 456 A. 2d 344 ( 1982); Williams v. Barry, 708 F. 2d 789 ( D. C. Cir. 1983); NBC v. District of Columbia Comm n on Human Rights, App. D. C., 463 A. 2d 657 ( 1983); Dunn v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. S~ NS., App. D. C., 467 A. 2d 966 ( 1983); Kirkwood v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen s Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 468 A. 2d 965 ( 1983); Brice v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 472 A. 2d 406 ( 1984); Bealer v. District of Columbia Rental How. Comm n, App. D. C., 472 A.. 2d 901 ( 1984); Hager v. District of Columbia Dep t of Consumer RE Regulatory Affairs App. D. C., 475 A. 2d 367 ( 1984); Wire hp ties, Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental How. Comm n, App. D. C., 476 A. 2d 679 ( 1984); Harris v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Sews., App. D. C., 476 A. 2d 1111 ( 1984); Gopstein v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Se~ s., App. D. C., 479 A. 2d 1278 ( 1984); Vann v. District of Columbia Ekl. of Funeral Dirs. & Embalmers, App. D. C., 480 A. 2d 688 ( 1984); National Black Child Dev. Inst., Inc. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 483 A. 2d 687 ( 1984); Pmctor v. District of Columbia Rental How. Comm n, App. D. C., 484 A. 2d 542 ( 1984); Humbles v. District of Columbia Hackers  License Appeal Bd., App. D. C., 484A. 2d 586 ( 1984); Rap, Inc. v. District of Columbia Comm n on Human Rights, App. D. C., 485 A. 2d 173 ( 1984); Anthony v. District of Columbia Dep t of Ernp. Servs., App. D. C., 485 A. 2d 605 ( 1984); Barnett v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 491 A. 2d 1156 ( 1985); Weinberg v. Barry, 604 F. Supp. 390 ( D. D. C. 1985); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia Dep t of Ernp. Servs., App. D. C., 497 A. 2d 103 ( 1985); Phu1^ 2 \. 5; ati ici 0; C] V; LiilIi) ld i; cp, ~ dL Xi;+.

Servs., App. D. C., 497 A. 2d 464 ( 1985); Dell v. Department of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 499 && i102 ( 1985); Gerber v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 499 A. 2d 1193 ( 1985); Bailey v. District of Columbia Dep t of Erne. Se~ s., App. D. C., 499 A. 2d 1223 ( 1985); Shaw Project Area Comm., Inc. v. District of Columbia Comm n on Human Rights, App. D. C., 500 A. 2d 251 ( 1985); McEvily v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Serv., App. D. C., 500 A. 2d 1022 ( 1985); Strand v. Frenkel, App. D. C., 500 A. 2d 1368 ( 1985);. Feldman v. District of COlumbia Rental How. Comm n, App. D. C., 501 A. 2d 781 ( 1985); Inte& tate Gen. Cop. v. Dietrict of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm n, APP D. C., 501 A. 2d 1261 ( 1985); Stokes v. District of Columbia, App. D. C., 502 A. 2d 1006 ( 1985); .. y District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Sews., D. C., 503 A. 2d 684 ( 1986); Afshar v. Distria of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm n, App. D. C., 504 A. 2d 1105 ( 1986); Harris v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm n, App. D. C., 505 A. 2d 66 ( 1986); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. District of Columbia Dep t of J& lations Bd. v. Washington Teachers  Union Sews., App. D. C., 551 A. 2d 90 ( 1986); Lyonsgl District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 551 A. 2d 1345 ( 1988); Spiegler v. District of Columbia, 866 F. 2d 461 ( D. C. Cir. 1989); Park v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 555 A. 2d 1029 ( 1989); Public Employee App. D. C., 506 A. 2d 1127 ( 1986);  Local 6, App. D. C., 556 A. 2d 206 ( 1989); Emp. Sews., McLean v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Mannan v. District of Columbia Bd. of Medi sews., App. D. C., 506 A. 2d 1135 ( 1986); Madi cine, App. D. C., 558 A. 2d 329 ( 1989); Wright v. T.,<:>!? voir! . n; r : 4r~ 7ffc! LL:;> iL zcp :,!: c~,,~, ulaLriCL uLCuiuniola Liep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 509 ( 1989); Parodi v. District ofSrvs., App. D. C., 512 A. 2d 303 ( 1986); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia Comm n on Human Rights, App. D. C., 515 A. 2d 1095 ( 1986); Becker v. District of Columbia Dep t of Consumer & Regulatory Mairs, App. D. C., 518 A. 2d 93 ( 1986); Yirenkyi v. District of Columbia Hackers  License Appeal Bd., App. D. C., 520 A. 2d 328 ( 1987); Walsh v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 523 A. 2d 562 ( 1987); New Travel, Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, App. D. C., 530 A. 2d 217 ( 1987); United Planning Org. v. District of Columbia Comm n on Human Rights, App. D. C., 530 A. 2d 674 ( 1987); Martin v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters  Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 532 A. 2d 102 ( 1987); Tenley & Cleveland Park Emergency Comm. v. District of Columbia, 115 WLR 1973 ( Super. Ct.); Gilles v. Touchstone, 676 F. Supp. 341 ( D. D. C. 1987); Franks v. Office of Employee Appeals, App. D. C., 533 A. 2d 250 ( 1987); Embassy of People s Republic of Benin v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment App. D. C., 534 A. 2d 310 ( 1987); Revithes v. District of Columbia Rental How. Comm n, App. D. C., 536 A. 2d 1007 ( 1987); White v. District of Columbia Rd. of Elections & Ethics, App. D. C., 537 A. 2d 1133 ( 1988); Nwankwo v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm n, App. D. C., 542 A. 2d 827 ( 1988); Snipes v. District of Columbia Dep t of Employ. S~ NS., App. D. C., 542 A. 2d 832 ( 1988); Communication Workers, Local 2336 v. District of Columbia Taxicab Comm n, App. D. C., 542 A. 2d 1221 ( 1988); Price v. District of Columbia Police & Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 524 ( 1989); Donahue v. District of Columbia Bd. of Psychology, App. D. C., 562 A. 2d 116 ( 1989); Harrisv. District of Columbia Comm n on Human Rights, App. D. C., 562 A. 2d 625 ( 1989); Mason v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Sews., App. D. C., 562 A. 2d 644 ( 1989); Superior Beverages, Inc. v. District of Columbia ABC Bd., App. D. C., 567 A. 2d 1319 ( 1989); Levy v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment App. D. C., 570 A. 2d 739 ( 1990); Committee of 100 v. District of Columbia Dep t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, App. D. C., 571 A. 2d 195 ( 1990); Lyles v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. S~ NS., App. D. C., 572 A. 2d 81 ( 1990); Beins v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 572 A. 2d 122 ( 1990); Edward M. Crough, Inc. v. Department of Gen. S~ NS., App. D. C., 572 A. 2d 457 ( 1990); Murray v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 572 A. 2d 1055 ( 1990); Bublis v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. Servs., App. D. C., 575 A. 2d 301 ( 1990); Tenants of 738 Longfellow St., N. W. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm n, App. D. C., 575 A. 2d 1205 ( 1990); Robertsv. District of Columbia Bd. of Medicine, App. D. C., 577 A. 2d 319 ( 1990); Salama v. District of Columbia Bd. of Medicine, App. D. C., 578 A. 2d 693 ( 1990); Holderbaum v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters  Retirement & Relief Bd., App. D. C., 579 A. 2d 213 ( 1990); Teal v. District of Columbia Dep t of Emp. S~ NS., App. D. C., 580 A. 2d 647 ( 1990); Kennedy v. Dixon, 119 WLR 2637 ( Super. Ct. 1991).

239 § 1 1511 ADMINISTRATION 0 1 1511. Interpreters for the deaf.

Repealed. Jan. 28, 1988, D. C. Law 7 62, § 14( b), 34 DCR 7426.

Legislative history of Law 7 62.  See Application of Law 7 62.  See note to note to 8 1 1509. § 1 1509.

Subchapter II. Freedom of Information.

0 1 1521. Public policy.

Generally the public policy of the District of Columbia is that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees. To that end, provisions of this subchapter shall be construed with the view toward expansion of public access and the minimization of costs and time delays to persons requesting information. ( Oct. 21,1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title II, § 201; 1973 Ed., § 1 1521; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, § 2,23 DCR 9532b. l Section references.  This section is referred to in 8 28 4505. Legislative history of Law 1 96.  Law 1 96 was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 1 119, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Criminal Law. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on September 15, 1976 and October 12, 1976, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on November 19, 1976, it was assigned Act No. 1 178 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. Delegation of authority under D. C. Law 1 96, the   Freedom of Information Act of 1976.   See Mayor s Order 91 36, March 7, 1991. Freedom of information Act patterned ~

after federal Act.  F rovisions of the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act are patterned after, and many substantially parallel those contained in the federal Freedom of ; i& L ,& 31i .:.& 3 Z. Z.?. : i53!%.:. P.:? b,!!  1

Director, D. C. Dep t of Transp., App. D. C., 416 A. 2d 244 ( 1980). Files of Executive Oflice of Mayor gene: ally are not protected from disclosurexer any exemption of this chapter. Washington Post Co. v. Barry, 115 WLR 2249 ( Super. Ct.). Mayor  s ceremonial funds.  Documents related to the expenses of the Mayor from the discretionary and ceremonial funds are public records and are not exempt from production under D. C. Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA). Washington Post Co. v. Barry, 115 WLR 2249 ( Super. Ct.). Mayor  s security personnel.  Mayor has certain privacy interests regarding security personnel assigned to the Mayor and, in producing the records related to the expenses for the Mayor s security, appropriate steps shall be taken so as not to disclose the names, addresses telephone numbers or other identifying information regarding security personnel which may appear in the documents produced. Washington Post Co. v. Barry, 115 WLR 2249 ( Super. Ct.). Policy favors disclosure of information.  The general policy underlying the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act favors the disclosure of information about govemmental affairs and the acts of public officials, and includes a narrow reading of exemptions from disclosure. Dunhill v. Director, D. C. Dep t of Transp., App. D. C., 416 A. 2d 244 ( 1980). The Freedom of Information Act, like its federa1 counterpart, is designed to promote the disclosure of information, not to inhibit it; it was designed to pierce the veil of administrati wcrwj and tn npen apwy action to the light of public scrutiny. Washington Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm n, App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 517 ( 1989). Useasprivate discovery tool.  The basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act w88 to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, and the act was not intended to function as a private diacovery tool. Accordingly, salutary legislation enacted in the public interest is not to be converted into a vehicle for commercial espionage. Washington Post Co. v. Minority Bus. OPPOrtunity Comm n, App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 517 ( 1989). Cited in M. B. E., Inc. v. Minority Bus. * ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 9 1 1522 omm n, App. D. C., 485 A. 2d 152 Ct.); Newspapers, Inc. v. Metropolitan Police th v. Department of Consumer & Dep t, App. D. C., 546 A. 2d 990 ( 19881; Wolf V. Affairs, 115 WLR 2281 ( Super. Regardie, App. D. C., 553 A. 2d 1213 ( 1989).

8 1 1522. Right of access to public records; allowable costs; time limits.

( a) Any person has a right to inspect, and at his or her discretion, to copy any public record of the Mayor or an agency, except as otherwise expressly provided by § 1 1524, in accordance with reasonable rules that shall be issued by the Mayor or an agency after notice and comment, concerning the time and place of access. .

b) The Mayor or an agency may establish and collect fees not to exceed the actual cost of searching for or making copies of records, but in no instance >~ I~ IIL. IIc: t, uA IW Li bedidmg exLeed SAU iur edch request. or purposes oi this subsection,   request  means a single demand for any number of documents made at 1 time to an individual agency. Documents may be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge where the Mayor or agency determines that waiver or reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public. Notwithstanding the foregoing, fees shall not be charged for examination and review by the Mayor or an agency to determine if such documents are subject to disclosure. ( c) The Mayor or an agency, upon request reasonably describing any public record, shall within 10 days ( except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) of the receipt of any such request either make the requested public record accessible or notify the person making such request of its determination not to make the requested public record or any part thereof accessible and the reasons therefor. ( d) In unusual circumstances, the time limit prescribed in subsection ( c) uf this section may be extended by written notice to the person making such request setting forth the reasons for extension and expected date for determination Such extension shall not exceed 10 days ( except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays). For purposes of this subsection, and only to the extent necessary for processing of the particular request,   unusual circumstances are limited to: ( 1) The need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or ( 2) The need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or among 2 or more components of the agency having substantial subject matter interest therein. ( e) Any failure on the part of the Mayor or an agency to comply with a request under subsection ( a) of this section within the time provisions of subsections ( c) and ( d) of this section shall be deemed a denial of the request, and the person making such request shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request, unless such person 241 § 1 1523 ADMINISTRATION chooses to petition the Mayor pursuant to 5 1 1527 to review the deemed denial of the request. ( Oct.. 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title 11. 5 202; 1973 Ed., § 1 1522; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, § 2, 23 DCR 9532b.)

Section references.  This section is re records  within the meaning of this section and ferred to ih 85 1 1527 and 1 1528. are subject to the presumption of disclosure. Legislative history of Law 1 96.  See Belth v. Department of Consumer & Regulanote to 8 1 1521. tory Affairs, 115 WLR 2281 ( Super. Ct.). hsurance InfOrmation SYS Cited in Washington Post CO. V. Ram, 115 = PO&.  Possession and Ownership in WLR 2249 ( Super. Ct.); Newspapers, Inc. v. dicates that Insurance & dabW Information Metropolitan Police Dep t, App. D. C., 546 A. 2d%  stem repoh are withinthe the D. C. Department Of Consumer and controi 990 ( 1988); Hines v. District of Columbia Bd. of latory Affairs and are, therefore,   agency Parole, App. D. C.. 567 A. 2d 909 ( 1989).

0 1 1523. Letters of denial.

( a) Denial by the Mayor or an agency of a request for any public record shall contain at least the following: ( 1) The specific reasons for the denial, including citations to the particular exemption( s) under § 1 1524 relied on as authority for the denial; ( 2) The name( s) of the public officisl( s) or employee( s1responsible for the decision to deny the request; and ( 3) Notification to the requester of any administrative or judicial right. to appeal under § 1 1527. ( b) The Mayor and each agency of the District of Columbia shall maintain a file of all letters of denial of requests for public records. This file shall be made available to any person on request for purposes of inspection and/ or copying. ( Oct. 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title 11, § 203; 1973 Ed., § 1 1523; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, § 2, 23 DCR 9532b.)

Legislative history of Law 1 96.  See note to 5 1 1521.

0 1 1524. Exemptions from disclosure.

( a) The following matters may be exempt from disclosure under the provisions of this subchapter: ( 1) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from outside the government, to the extent that disclosure would result in substantial harm to the competitive position ot the person from whom the inlorrnaLid11 was obtained; ( 2) Information of a persezlsll nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; ( 3) Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would: ?'

ii.'< ( D) Disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a lLrd compiled by a law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelli gence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confiden

F tial source; F ( E) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures not generally i known outside the government;

I ( F) Endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel;

i! ( 4) Inter agency or intra agency memorandums or letters which would :. i not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; . c.

( 5) Test questions and answers to be used in future license, employment, K or academic examinations, but not previously administered examinations or allswers LU questiutis ~ iiereuii; ( 6) Information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ( other than this section), provided that such statute: ( A) Requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a . manner as to leave, no discretion on the issue; or L ( B) Establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particut lar types of matters to be withheld; ( 7) Information specifically authorized by federal law under criteria es tablished by a presidential executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy which is in fact properly classified pursuant to such executive order;

* ( 8) Information exempted fkom disclosure by § 28 4505; and ( 9) Information disclosed pursuant to § 4 317. ( b) Any reasonably segregable portion of a public record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of those portions which may be withheld from disclosure under subsection ( a) of this section. ( c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section This section is not authority to withhold information from the Council of the District of Columbia. This section shall not operate to permit nondisclosure of information of which disclosure is authorized or mandated by other law. ( d) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to the Vital Records Act of 1981. ( Oct. 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title 11, § 204; 1973 Ed., § 1 1524; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, § 2, 23 DCR 9532b; Mar. 5, 1981, D. C. Law 3 169, § 3( c), 27 DCR 5368 Oct. 8,1981, D. C. Law 4 34, § 29( i), 28DCR 3271; June 19, 1982, D. C. Law 4 119, 9 2( 0, 29 DCR 1952.)

Section references.  This section is re mittee on the Judiciary. The Bill was adopted ferred to in $$ 1 1522,1 1523,1 1527,1 1528, on first and second readings on October 28, 6 737, and 6 959. 1980 and November 12, 1980, respectively. Legislative history of Law 1 96. < See Signed by the Mayor on November 25, 1980, it note to § 1 1521. was assigned Act No. 3 300and transmitted to Legislative history of Law 3 169.  Law both Houses of Congress for its review. 3 169 was introduced in Council and assigned Legislative history of Law 4 34. Law Bill No. 3 107, which was referred to the Com 4 34was introduced in Council and assigned 243 Bill No. 4 161, which was referred to the Committee on Human Services. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on June 16, 1981, and June 30, 1981, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on July 20, 1981, it was assigned Act No. 4 58 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. Legislative history of Law 4 119.  Law 4 119 was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 4 135, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on March 23, 1982, and April 6, 1982, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on May 4, 1982, it was assigned Act No. 4 182 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. References in text.  The   Vital Records Act of 1981 , referred to in subsection ( d), is D. C. Law 4 34. Construction.  Just as the provisions of the act giving citizens the right of access are to be generously construed, so the nine statutory exemptions must be approached with a jaundiced eye. Indeed, these exemptions are to be narrowly construed, with ambiguities resolved in favor of disclosure. Washington Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Com n, App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 517 ( 1989). Policy favors disclosure of information.  The general policy underlying the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act favors disclosure of information about governmental affairs and the acts of public officials, including a narrow reading of exemptions from disclosure Dunhill v. Director, D. C. Dep t of Transp., App. D. C., 416 A. 2d 244 ( 1980); Newspapers, Inc. v. Metropolitan Police Dep t, App. D. C., 546 A. 2d 990 ( 1988). Subsection ( a)( l) differs from the corresponding Frovision in the federal Freedom of Information Act, which exempts   trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential Washington Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm n, App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 517 ( 1989). Subsection ( a)( Z) does not prevent disclo ure w1ier e sunsection ( c/ applies.  Although it is true that paragraph ( 2) of subsection ( a) of this section expressly exempts from dgulatory AfTairs, D. C. Dep t of Transp., App. D. C., 416 A. 2d 244 ( 1980). Ordinance not a statute under subs. ,  tion ( af( 6). The Duncan Ordinance. which.. provides that unexpurgated adult arrest records can only be obtained by law enforce. ment agents for legitimate law enforcement purposes, is not a statute within the meaning of subsection ( aI( 6) of this section; thus, although the Duncan Ordinance continues to have the full force and effect of law, it is not a statute authorizing the Metropolitan Police Department to withhold the disclosure of arrest records otherwise available under the FOJA. Newspapers, Inc. v. Metropolitan Police Dep t, App. D. C., 546 A. 2d 990 11988). Voluntary, nonprofit organization can suffer no competitive injury or economic harm and therefore may not claim protection from disclosure under subsection ( a)( l). Belth v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 115 WLR 2281 ( Super. Ct.). Application of subsection ( a)( 3). Subsection ( aJ( 3) is designed to protect a governmental interest and applies only to documents which have been compiled for investigation of specific, suspected violations of law, and not to documents generated in the routine administration surveillance or oversight of governmental programs. Belth v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 115 WLR 2281 ( Super. Ct.). Mayor s security expenses.  Documents relating to expenses for the Mayor s security were not exempt from disclosure as investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes Barry v. Washington Post Co., , App. D. C., 529 A. 2d 319 ( 1987). Inter agency or intra agency memorandums  Independently initiated, prepared and funded reports of a private organization which are not generated, initiated, solicited, contracted for, paid for, or supervised by a government agency or whose ultimate contents are not controlled by such agency, but which are used by such agency as the basis for important public policv decisions are nnt Yrlbragency or   intra agency  memorandums immunized from disclosure under subsection ( a)( 4). Belth v. Department of Consumer &

nature,  this exemption, as well as the others in subsection ( a), may not be invoked io prevent disclosure when subsection ( c) of this section applies. Dunhill v. Director, D. C. Dep t of Transp., App. D. C., 416 A. 2d 244 ( 1980). Where the information sought is available without limitation under a District of Columbia regulation, disclosure is   authorized or mandated by other law  under subsection ( c) of this section, and the Department of Transportation cannot deny disclosure based on paragraph ( 2) of subsection ( a). Dunhill v. Director, disclosure certain  [ ilnformation of a persona& 115 WLR 2281 ( Super. Ct.). Mayor s ceremonial funds.  Documents relating to the discretionary and ceremonial funds for the Mayor were not exempt under subsection ( a)( 6) of this section since the statutes authorizing the discretionary and ceremonial funds, I § 1 355 and 1 356, do not specifically exempt anything from disclosure. Barry v. Washington Post Co., App. D. C., 529 A. 2d 319 ( 1987). Burden of proof.  One who seeks to invoke one of these exemptions must prove that 244 ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURE § 1 1526 it applies; the burden is on the agency to susbin its action. Washington Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm n, App. D. C.. 560 A. 2d 517 ( 1989). Trade secrets, etc.  The party seeking to invoke the paragraph ( a)( l) exemption must show that: ( 1) the party from whom the information was obtained faces actual competition, and ( 2) disclosure will cause substantial competitive injury. Washington Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm n, App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 511 ( 1989). Inmate records.  Pre sentence reports, mental health assessments, academic records, and records concerning Inmates  institutional adjustment and progress are exempt from disclosure under this section. Hines v. District of Cnlrrmhia Rd nf Parnlo 9pp n c? 5F7 A  ? J 909 ( 1989). Public disclosure of psychologicalreports forwarded to the Board of Parole by the Department of Corrections is prohibited under the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, § 6 2001 et seq. Hines v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, App. D. C., 567 A. 2d 909 ( 1989). Production of non exempt materials.  In the sensitive area of national security information an agency must produce any reasonably segregable non exempt parts of classified documents. Washington Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm n, App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 517 ( 1989). Requirements on appellate review.  Appellate courts are ill equipped to conduct their own investigation into the validity of specific claims of exemption, and the trial judge 3% ijId therefore articulate the precise relationship between each such claim and the contents of specific documents held to be exempt. nr. I:., c...,. 2aIbtL.,. Pu~; Cu.,. XiwriLb Guh. dpputtunity Comm n, App. D. C., 560 A. 2d 517 ( 1989). Cited in Washington Post Co. v. Barry, 115 WLR 2249 ( Super. Ct.); Marrow v. United States, App. D. C., 592 A. 2d 1042 ( 1991).

§ 1 1525. Recording of final votes.

Each agency having more than 1member shall maintain and make available for public inspection a record of the final votes of each member in each proceeding of that agency. ( Oct. 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title II, § 205; 1973 Ed., § 1 1525; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, P 2, 23 DCR 9532b.)

Legislative history of Law 1 96.  See note to § 1 1521.

9 1 1526. Information required to be made public. Without limiting the meaning of other sections of this subchapter, the following categories of information are specifically made public information: ( 1) The names, salaries, title, and dates of employment of all employees and of iclers of the Mayor and an agency; ( 2) Administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public; ( 3) Final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases; ( 4) Those statements of policy and interpretations of policy, acts, and rules which have been adopted by the Mayor or an agency; ( 5) Correspondence and materials referred to therein, by and with the Mayor or an agency, relating to any regulatory, supervisory, or enforcement tesponsibiilities of the agency, whereby the agency determines, or states an opinion upon, or is asked to determine or state an opinion upon, the rights of the District, the public, or any private party; ( 6) Information in or taken from any account, voucher, or contract dealing with the receipt or expenditure of public or other funds by public bodies; and 245 5 1 1527 ADMINISTRATION ( 7) The minutes of all proceedings of all agencies. ( Oct. 21, 1968, pub. 90 614, title IT, 9 206; 1973 Ed., 9; 1 1526; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, p y 23 DCR 9532b. l Legislative history of Law 1 96.  See note to I 1 1521.

8 1 1527. Administrative appeals.

( a) Any person denied the right to inspect a public record of a public My may petition the Mayor to review the public record to determine whether it may be withheld from public inspection. Such determination shall be made ip writing with a statement of reasons therefor in writing within 10 days ( a. cluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) of the submission of the ptj. tion. ( 1) If the Mayor denies the petition or does not make a determination within the time limits provided in this subsection, or if a person is deem4 have exhausted his or her administrative remedies pursuant to subsection ( e) of § 1 1522, the person seeking disclosure may institute proceedings for in. junctive or declaratory relief in the Superior Court for the District of CoIum. bia. ( 2) If the Mayor decides that the public record may not be withheld, he shall order the public body to disclose the record immediately. If the public body continues to withhold the record, the person seeking disclosure may bring suit in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the public body from withholding the record and to compel the production of the requested record. ( b) In any suit filed under subsection ( a) of this section, the Superior Courl '. for the District of Columbia may enjoin the public body from withholding records and order the production of any records improperly withheld from the ' person seeking disclosure. The burden is on the Mayor or the agency to sustain its action. In such cases the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such records in camera to determine whether 11 such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in 0 1 1524. ( p\ Tf 1 narcnr snnl* iFg the ~ : mk' t;; ic,\' 6.... ptct to i'eceibt: it copy ul a pubiic record prevails in whole or in part in such suit, he or she may be awarded reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation. ( Oct. 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title 11, § 207; 1973. m1 1527; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, Ei 2, 23 DCR 9532b. l Legislative history of Law 1 96.  See note to I 1 1521. Redelegation of Authority Under D. C. Law 1 96, the Freedom of Information Act Section references.  This section is re g ,. ferred to in $ 5 1 1522, 1 1523, and 1 1528. ')

11 of 1976; Rescission of Mayor's Order 878.  See Mayor's Order 89 188, August 30, 1989. Cited in Dunhill v. Director, D. C. Dep't of Transp.. App. D. C., 416A. 2d 244 ( 1980); Hines v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, App. D. C., 567 A. 2d 909 ( 1989). I ; 8, Pub. L. 1 96, P ,2,

iblic body vhether it e made in days ( exf the petirmination ieemed to ; ection ( e) gs for in Df Columhheld he he public jure may   njoin the ion of the ior Court thholding from the : y to susnovo and whether e exempa public awarded ;, Pub. L. 1 96? § 2,

kder 874. ; t 30, 1989. C. Dep t of 980); Hines ( role, App. ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURE § 1 1529 0 1 1528. Oversight of disclosure activities.

On or before the 30th day of June of each calendar year, the Mayor shall compile and submit to the Council of the District of Columbia a report covering the public record disclosureactivities of each agency and of the executive branch as a whole during the preceding calendar year. The report shall include ( 1) The number of determinations made by each agency not to comply with requests for records made to such agency under this subchapter and the reasons for each such deternation; ( 2) The number of appeals made by persons under 0 1 1527( a), the result of such appeals, and the reason for the artion 1iy m web qp; 7paJ + bat  PPL~!~ Sin a denial of information; ( 3) The names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial of records requested under this subchapter, and the number of instances of participation for each such person; ( 4) A copy of the fee schedule and the total amount of fees collected by each agency for making records available under this subchapter; ( 5) Such other information as indicates efforts to administer fully this subchapter; and ( 6) For the prior calendar year, a listing of the total number of cases arising under this subchapter, the total number of cases in which a request was denied in whole or in part, the total number of times in which each exemption provided under 0 1 1524 was cited as a reason for denial of a request, and the total amount of fees collected under 0 1 1522@). Such report shall also include a description of the efforts undertaken by the Mayor to encourage agency compliance with this subchapter. ( Oct. 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title 11, § 208; 1973 Ed., § 1 1528; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, 8 2, 23 DCR 9532b. l Legislative history of Law 1 96.  See note to § 1 1521.

8 1 1529. Definitions. For purposes of this subchapter, the terms   Mayor,    Council,    District,    agency,    rule,    rulemaking,    person,    party,    order,    relief,    proceeding   public record,  and   adjudication  shall have the meaning as provided in 8 1 1502. ( Oct. 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90 614, title 11,0 209; 1973 Ed., § 1 1529; Mar. 29, 1977, D. C. Law 1 96, § 2, 23 DCR 9532b.)

Le% eIative history of Law 1 96.  See note to § 1 1521. 6 1 1531 ADMINISTRATION Subchapter III. Legal Publication.

15 1 1531. Definitions. For purposes of this subchapter: ( lr The terms   Mayor,    Council,    District,,   agency,    rule,    rulemak. ing,    person,    licensing,  and   regulation  ( except when used in the term   District of Columbia Municipal Regulation ) shall have the meaning provided in § 1 1502. ( 2) The terms   Commissioner,    District of Columbia Council,    Chairman   act,  and   District of Columbia COU~~ S  shall have the meaning provided in § 1 202. ( 3) The term   Administrator  means the person appointed by the Mayor to supervise and control the District of Columbia Office of Documents in accordance with § 1 1611. ( 4) The phrase   D. C. Code  means the Code of the District of Columbia laws as provided for in Chapter 3 of Act of July 30,1947 ( 61Stat. 636) and any continuations, supplements, or revisions thereof authorized by act, congressional resolution, or act. ( 5) The phrase   document having general applicability and legal effect  means any document issued under lawful authority prescribing a sanction or course of conduct, conferring a right, privilege, authority, or immunity or imposing an obligation, and applicable to the general public, members of a class or persons in a locality, as distinguished from named individuals or organizations. The phrase   document having general applicability and legal effect  does not include any act to be codified in the D. C. Code or a personnel manual or internal staff directive solely applicable to employees or agents of the District of Columbia. ( 1973 Ed., 0 1 1531; Mar. 6, 1979, D. C. Law 2 153, § 4( 301), 25 DCR 6960.)

Cross references.  As to public records Cited in In re O. M., 117 WLR 1253 ( Super. management, see Chapter 29 of this title. Ct.). Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to 8 1 1505.

0 1 1532. District of Columbia Municipal Regulations.

( a) The District of Columbia Office of Documents. estahlishd pu,. rsuant ti. 9 l ioll, shall supervise, manage, and direct the preparation, editing, publishing and supplementation of an official legal compilation entitled the District of Columbia Municipal,  && ations ( DCMR). The District of Columbia Municipal Regulations shall be published in a manner to promote efficient public access to all current District of Columbia rules and regulations. ( b) Except as otherwise provided by law, the following documents shall be accurately compiled in the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations: ( 1) Every rule, regulation, and document having general applicability and legal effect adopted by the Commissioner, the Mayor, the District of Columbia Council, and each agency;

248 trict of Columbia Municipal Regulations. ( b) The District of Columbia Register shall contain the entire text of the following: ( 1) Every rule, regulation, and document having general applicability and legal effect required to be but not yet published and integrated in the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations as provided in this subchapter; ( 2) Every notice of public hearing issued by an agency; ( 3) Every notice of proposed agency rulemaking or repeal and every other document required to be published under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act ( D. C. Code Q 1 1501 et seq.); and ( 4) Every act, resolution, and notice of the Council and any other document requested to be published by the Chairman of the Council or his or her designee. ( c) The Administrator is authorized to publish in the District of Columbia Register: ( 1) Any document requested to be published by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia; ( 2) Information on changes in the organization of the District of Columbia government; ( 3) Notices of public hearings not published under authority of subsection ( b) of this section; and ( 4) Such other matters as the Mavor mav from time to time determino to be of general public interest. ( d) The Administrator may exercise the discretion of omitting from the District of Columbia Register thqmblication of the entire text of a document iE ( 1) Such publication would be unduly cumbersome or expensive; and ( 2) If, in lieu of such publication, there is included in the District of Columbia Register a notice stating the general subject matter of any document so omitted and the specific manner in which a copy of such document may be obtained.

250 Y ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURE § 1 1534 ( e) If the text of an adopted act or rule is the same as the text of the previously published proposed act or rule, the Administrator may insert in the District of Columbia Register a notation to this effect, giving the publication date of and citation to the District of Columbia Register issue containing the proposed act or rule. ( 0 If, after a proposed rule has been published initially in the District of Columbia Register, an agency decides to alter the initial text so that the proposed rule is substantially different from the initial text, the agency shall submit the altered text as though for initial publication. The alterations shall be indicated by the use of symbols.& ermined by the Administrator. ( g) The District of Columbia Register shall be published on at least each Friday, or, if Friday is a legal holiday, on the next working day. Each year the Administrator shall y! hlish quarterly ; iLliiil& Libe index of a11matters published in the District of Columbia Register during the year. ( h) On each document published in the District of Columbia Register there shall appear the date upon which such document was filed with the Administrator pursuant to § 1 1534. On each issue of the District of Columbia Register there shall appear on its cover the actual date such issue was generally circulated to the public for review and comment: Provided, that should the District of Columbia Register be generally circulated after the cover date shown, a notice stating the correct date shall be attached thereto. All time computations based upon publication in the District of Columbia Register shalt commence from the cover date, or, if corrected, the date of notice thereof. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to any and all supplemental editions to the District of Columbia Register. ( 1973 Ed., 0 1 1533; Mar. 6, 1979, D. C. Law 2 153, § 4( 303), 25 DCR 6960.)

Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to 8 1 1505.

§ 1 1534. Documents to be filed inthe District of Columbia Office of Documents.

Any document required or authorized to be published in the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations or the District of Columbia Register shall be filed with the District of Columbia Office of Documents. If a document has been published pursuant to subchapter I of this chapter and forwarded to the Ofice of the Secretariat prior to March 6, 1979, such document need not be filed with the District of Columbia OEce of Documents, unless the Administrator otherwise notifies the person responsible for filing the document. ( 1973 Ed., § 1 1534; Mar. 6, 1979, D. C. Law 2 153, § 4( 304), 25 DCR 6960.)

Section references.  This section is re Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See ferred to in $ 6 1 1533and 1 1536. note to 3 1 1505.

251 4%  § 1 1535 ADMINISTRATION 6 1 1535. Permanent supplements to the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations. At least once each year, every document required to be compiled pursuant to § 1 1532 shall be permanently integrated into the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations by publication of loose leaf pages or other appropriate

permanent supplements of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations. The index, of the DCMR shall be similarly supplemented or reissued. ( 1973 Ed., § 1 1535; Mar. 6, 1979, D. C. Law 2 153, § 4( 305), 25 DCR 6960.)

Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to 8 1 1505.

6 1 1536. Documents to be filed with Administrator.

Except as provided in § 1 1534, 2 copies of any document to be published pursuant to this subchapter shall be filed with the Administrator. The Administrator shall immediately review filed documents to determine their conformity to the provisions of this subchapter and to editorial standards promulgated by the Administrator. Upon the Administrator s determination of a document s conformity with this section, 1 copy of each document shall be prepared for publication and 1 copy kept for permanent historic preservation. ( 1973 Ed., 0 1 1536; Mar. 6, 1979, D. C. Law 2 153, P 4( 306), 25 DCR 6960.)

Legislative history of Law 8153. See note to 8 1 1506.

6 1 1537. Publication, specifications, and distribution of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations ( a> The District of Columbia Municipal Regulations and its permanent supplements shall be published pursuant to typographical and contractual arrangements which ensure that the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations can be purchased at a reasonable cost in its entirety or in portions of related rules, regulations, or documents having general applicability and legal effect. ib) Copies of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations shall be avail k:~ LGpi&& LLL ed& Irgular branch ot the District of Columbia iibrarycy system and to each Advisory Neighborhood Commission established by the Council. ( 1973 Ed., 9 1 1537; Ma 1979, D. C. Law 2 l53, 0 4( 307), 25 DCR 6960.)

Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to 8 1 1505.

252 4v ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURE § 1 1538 9 1 1538. Legal effectiveness of documents.

( a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, any rule, regulation or document having general applicability and legal effect which has been adopted or enacted by the Commissioner, the Mayor, the District of Columbia Council, an agency, or other instrumentality of the District before March 6, 1979, and which is not published in the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations on or before June 30, 1984, shall not be in effect thereafter. ( b) Except in the case of emergency rules or acts, no rule or document of general applicability and legal effect ad d or enacted on or after March 6, 1979, shall become effective until after its publication in the District of Columbia Register, nor shall such rule or document of general applicability and IPeal effwt hrmrne PffPctiw if : t is rquired bj:,  VI uihar tlia subcnapter 1 of this chapter or this subchapter, to be otherwise published, until such rule or document of general applicability and legal effect is also published as required by such law. ( 1973 Ed., § 1 1538; Mar. 6, 1979, D. C. Law 2 153, § 4( 308), 25 DCR 6960; July 1,1980, D. C. Law 3 75, § 2,27 DCR 2277; Oct. 17,1981, D. C. Law 4 41, § 2,28 DCR 3423; May 20,1983, D. C. Law 5 10, § 2,30 DCR 1793; Aug. 2, 1983, D. C. Law 5 22, § 2, 30 DCR 3337.)

Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to 8 1 1505. Jegislative history of Law 3 75. Law 3 75 was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 3 253, which was referred to the Committee on Government Operations. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on April 22, 1980 and May 6, 1980, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on May 14, 1980, it was assigned Act No. 3 184and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. Legislative history of Law 441.  Law 4 41 was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 4 266, which was referred to the Committee on Government Operations and the Committee on the Judiciary. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on July 1, 1981 and July 14,1981, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on July 23, 1981, it was assigned Act No. 4 70 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. Legislative history of Law 5 10.  Law 5 10 was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 5 150, which wasretained by Council. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on March 15, 1983 and March 29, 1983, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on April 6, 1983, it was assigned Act No. 5 24 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review Legislative history of Law 5 22.  Law 5 22 was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 5 151, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on May 10, 1983 and May 24, 1983, respectively. Signedby the Mayor on June 9,1983, it was assigned Act NO. 5 39 and tranqmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. Regulation not rendered ineffective by failure to meet original deadbe as to defendants arrested prior to extension.  Where the July 1, 1981, deadline had been extended to December 31, 1982, before defendants were arrested under a District of Colum  bia police regulation, the police regulation was not rendered ineffective by failure to meet the original July 1deadline. Green v. District of Columbia, 710 F. 2d 876 ( D. C. Cir. 1983). Claim must first be decided by local courts of District of Columbia  Claim that failure of District of Columbia Department of Corrections ta comply with the public notice and comment requirements . of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D. C. Code 8 1 1501 et seq., and the publication requirement of subsection ( b) of thissection rendered prison visitation regulations invalid must be decided in the first instance by the local courts of the District of Columbia. Robinson v. Palmer, 841 F. 2d 1151 ( D. C. Cir. 1988). Cited in Hutchison Bros. Excavating Co. v. District of Columbia, App. D. C., 511 A. 2d 3 ( 1986); Draude v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, App. D. C., 527 A. 2d 1242 ( 1987); Committee of Blind Vendors v. District 253  § 1 1539 ADMINISTRATION of Columbia, 695 F. Supp. 1234 ( D. C. 1988); In re O. M., 117 WLR 1253 ( Super. Ct.).

0 1 1539. Correction of errors in documents. The Administrator of the District of Columbia Office of Documents shall correct grammatical or typographical errors in the printing of the text of a document in the District of Columbia Statutes at Large, the District of Columbia Register or the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations by the publication of an errata list or by publication of the entire document or the affected part of the document in its corrected form so as to indicate the actual corrections which were made. ( 1973Ed., § 1 1539; Mar. 6,1979, D. C. Law 2 153,8 4( 309), 25 DCR 6960.)

Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to § 1 1505.

0 1 1540. Certification. Each part of the District of Columbia Statutes& Large, the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, each permanent supplement of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, and the District of Columbia Register shall contain a certificate by the Administrator stating that such part contains all documents required to be published pursuant to this subchapter as of the date of such certificate. ( 1973Ed., § 1 1539.1; Mar. 6,1979, D. C. Law 2 153, 4( 310), 25 DCR 6960.)

Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to § 1 1505.

0 1 1541. Presumption created by publication. The publication of any document in the District of Columbia Statutes at Large, the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, or the District of Columbia Register creates a rebuttable presumption: ( 1) That it was duly issued, prescribed, adopted, or enacted; and ( 2) That all requirements of this subchapter have been complied with.   1973 Ed, ? 1 1539.2; 5kr. 5, 1979, E. C. ! a~ 2 153, :$. ?! 311), 25 DCR 5Yn 1 Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to § 1 1505.

0 1 1542. Penalties.

Any person who knowingly and willfully causes any document not to be published in the District of Columbia Statutes at Large, the District of Columbia Register, or the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations which is required to be so published pursuant to this subchapter shall be guilty of a 254 I ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURE § 1 1542 misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than $ 100, or imprisoned not more than 30 days, or both. ( 1973 Ed., 0 1 1539.3; Mar. 6, 1979, D. C. Law 2 153, 0 4( 312), 25 DCR 6960.)

ments shall Legislative history of Law 2 153.  See note to 8 1 1505.

he text of a strict of Co t Lions by the ment or the , e the actual 9, D. C. Law J District of ' the District bia Register ch part con chapter as of 9, D. C. Law Statutes ate District of ed; and mplied with. j DCR 6960.)

: nt not to be istrict of Coions which is ) e guilty of a 255 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS TITLE 16 CONSUMERS, COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, & CML INFRACTIONS D. C. OFFICEOF DOCUMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES SEPTEMBER 1997  Certified and published under the authority of the Office of Documents UcL. ! and Administrative Issuances = a g crt a Q N Bertrand S. Thomas Administrator Copyright * 1997 Office of Documents and Administrative Issuances Room 520  441 4th Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20001 Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations Secs. 3100 3101 3102 3103 3104 3105 3106 3107 3108 3109 3110 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115 3116 3117 3118 3119 3120 3121 3199 3100 3100.1 3101 3101.1 3101.2 3101.3 CHAPTER 31 CML INFRACTIONS: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES General Provisions Notice of Infraction Service of the Notice of Infraction Answering the Notice of lnfraction Abatement of Infractions Failure to Answer the Notice of Infraction Adjudication by Mail Pre Hearing Filings Motions Conduct of Hearings Amendments to the Notice of Infaction Record of Proceedings Failure to Appear at a Hearing Fiat Deckion Costs and Penahs Installment Agreements and Payment PaymCnt Cokctkn Proceedings Admmktrative Appeak Stay Pending Appeal Transcripts of Hearings Computation of Time Definitions GENERAL PROVISIONS .

Thischapter shall set forth the administrative procedures implementing the Act. The Schedule of Fines, which establishes the civil penalties for specific infractions subject to administrative adjudication under the Act, is in Chapter 32 of this title.

AUTHORITY: Unkss otherwise noted, the authority for this chapter k § lo5 of the Deparbnent of Consumer and Reguhtory Affairs Civil Infractions Act of 1985, D. C. law 6 42, D. C. Code 96701 etseq. ( 1986 Supp.), and Mayor', Order w, issued March 4,1986.33 DCR 1823 ( March 21.1986).

SOURCE: Fval Rukmaking publkhed at 34DCR 5718 ( September 4,1987).

NOTICE OF INFRACTION A Notice of Infkaction ( NOI) shall be in a form prescribed by the Director.

A properly completed NO1 signed by the issuing agent shallbe prima facie evidence of the validity of the issuance and the truth of the facts alleged in the NOI.

An NO1 shall include the following:

( a) The n'ame and address of the respondent;

31 1 2# Title 16 3101.4 3101.5 3101.6 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations ( b) A citation to the law or rule that the respondent allegedly violated;

( c) The nature, time, and place of the infraction:

( d) The amount of the fine applicable to the infraction;

( e) Notification of the following:

That the fine must be paid within fifteen ( 15) days of the date the NO1 is served on the respondent;

That, if the respondent fails to pay the he or request a hearing within fifteen ( 15) days of the date the NO1 is served on the respondent, a penalty equal to the amount of the fine may be imposed and the respondent s license or permit may be suspended until the fine and penalty have been paid;

That the respondent has the right to request a hearing on the infkaction charged in the NOI, and the procedure for requesting a hearing;

That the acceptable forms of payment are as follows:

( A) Cash, which is not acceptable by mail; or ( B) A personal check, company check, certified check, cashier s check, postal money order, or bank money order payable to the order of the District of Columbia Treasurer; and That, if the respondent admits the infraction or admits the infraction with explanation, the respondent is required to certlfy that each infraction on the NO1 has been abated; and ( 0 Any other information that the Director may require.

When the fine appearing on the NO1 is inconsistent with the applicable fine listed on the approved schedule of fines, the respondent shall be subject to liability only for the lesser fine.

The Director may issue and serve an amended NO1 for a repeat inhaction at any time prior to the decision of the administrative law judge ( ALJ) on the infraction, or the respondent s admission of the infraction and payment of the fine indicated on the NOI. The respondent shall answer an amended NO1 pursuant to $ 3103.

Unless otherwise prescribed by law, an NO1 shall be issued by the Director upon observance of an infraction. When applicable provisions of law require that a respondent be given a certain period of time to abate a violation, an NO1 shall not be issued until that period of time has elapsed.

SOURCE: Fmal Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718 ( September 4, 1987).

31 2   3 Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3102 SERVICE OF THE NOTICE OF INFRACTION 3102.1 The Director shall effect service of an NO1 on a respondent by one of the following methods:

( a) Personal service on the respondent or respondent s agent;

( b) Delivering the NO1 to the last known home or busir? ess address of the respondent or respondent s agent and leaving it with a person over the age of sixteen ( 16) years old residmg or employed therein; or ( e) Mailing the NO1 to the last known home or business address of the respondent or respondent s agent.

3102.2 Proof of service shall state the name and address of the person on whom service is made and the manner and date of service.

3102.3 Proof of service includes any of the following:

( a) The certificate of service signed by the issuing agent;

( b) A return receipt or certificate of mailing, if service is by mail; or ( c) A written acknowledgementby the respondent or respondent s agent.

3102.4 For purposes of this section,   respondent sagent  means a general agent, employee . or attorney of the respondent.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718,5720 ( September 4,1987).

3103 ANSWERING THE NOTICE OF INFRACTION 3 103.1 A respondent shall answer an NO1 in accordance with. this section within fifteen ( 15) days from the date ofservice of the NOI.

3103.2 In response to an NOI, a respondent shall do the following:

( a) Answer the NO1 in one of the following ways:

( 1) Admit the infraction;

( 2) Admit the infraction with explanation; or ( 3) Deny the commission of the infraction; and ( b) Otherwise complete, sign, and date the answer form on the back of the NOI.

3103.3 If a respondent admits an infraction, the respondent shall include payment of the fine with the respondent s answer.

, 31 3 Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3103.4 Payment of a fine shall not relieve the respondent of the obligation to abate an infraction cited in the NOI.

3 103.5 Ifa respondent admits an infraction with explanation,' therespondent shall indxate on the back of the NO1 whether respondent requests a hearing or adjudication by mail. If a respondent fails to indicate whether a hearing or adjudication by mail is requested, the Director shall schedule a hearing and send the respondent a notice of hearing.

3 103.6 If a respondent denies an infraction, the Director shall schedule a hearing and send the respondent a notice of hearing.

3 103.7 A notice of hearing sent pursuant to ths chapter shall inform the respondent of the following:

( a) The fact that a hearing has been scheduled;

( b) The time, date, and location of the hearing; and ( c) The respondent's rights at the hearing.

3103.8 A respondent may answer an NO1 in person or by mail.

3103.9 To answer an NO1 in person, a respondent shall appear at the following address between the hours of 8: 30 a. m.  4: OO p. m., Monday through Friday, except on legal holidays:

Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Office of Civil Infractions 613 G Street, N. W., 7th floor Washington, D. C. 20001 3103.10 To answer an NO1 by mail, a respondent shall md the completed NOI, postmarked within fifteen ( 15) days from the date of service, to the following address:

Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Office of Civil Infractions P. O. Box 37140 Washington, D. C. 20013 7200 3103.11 If a respondent responds to an NO1 and pays the stated he, but fails to indicate an answer, the respondent shall be deemed to have admitted the infraction.

3103.12 If a respondent responds to an NO1 but does not pay the stated fine, and fails to indicate an answer, the respondent shall be deemed to have denied the infraction, and the Director shall schedule a hearing.

3 103.13 If a respondent fads to answer an NO1 in a timely manner, the respondent shall not have a right to a hearing on the NO1 or adjudication of the NO1 by mail, unless the respondent shows good cause for the failure to answer the NO1 in a timely manner.

314 s Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3103.14 If a respondent challenges an NO1 as defective on its face, anALJ may review the NO1 prior to a hearing and, if the ALJ determines that the NO1 is defective on its face, dismiss the NOI. If the ALJ does not dismiss the NOI, the respondent shall be deemed to have denied the infraction and the Director shall schedule a hearing. The respondent s evidence presented in support of the deniaI may include evidence on whether the NO1 is defective.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718,5721 ( September 4, 1987).

3104 ABATEMENT OF INFRACTIONS 3104.1 The Director shall monitor and verify the abatement of all& actions.

3104.2 The requirements of this section shall apply to respondents who have admitted an infraction, admitted an infraction with explanation, or were found to have committed an infraction in a decision of an ALJ.

3104.3 . A respondent subject to this section shall be required to certify that each i& action listed on the NO1 has been abated, subject to penalties for false statements under $ 404of the D. C. Theft and White Collar Crimes Act of 1982, D. C. Code 922 2514 ( 1996Repf. Vol.).

3104.4 The Director may request a respondent subject to this section to complete and submit to the Director a Notice of Verification certifying that an infraction has been abated.

3104.5 A Notice of Verification certifying abatement of an infraction shall include the following:

( a) A list of all infractions cited;

( b) The name of the person in violatioc;

( c) The respondent s license or permit number;

( d) A complete description of the actions taken to abate the infraction;

( e) The respondent s signature; and ( 0 Any other information that the Director may require.

3104.6 The Director may, at any time, request that a respondent provide adhtional information pertaining to the verification of an abated Saction.

3104.7 The Director shall issue an additional NO1 after reinspection, if the Director determines that the cited infraction continues to exist.

3104.8 A respondent s failure to certify that. an infraction has been abated as required in the decision of the ALJ may be referred to the Officeof Compliance for appropriate action.

313 Title 16 3105 3 105.1 3105.2 District of Columbia Municipal Regula   dons SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5722 ( September 4, 1987).

FAILURETO ANSWER THE NOTICE OF INFRACTION If a respondent fails to answer an NO1 within fifteen ( 15) days of date of service, the Directos shall issue and serve upon respondent a second NOI, in a form prescribed by the Director,

A second NO1 shall include the following:

( a) The name and address of the respondent;

( b) An identification of the NO1 to which the respondent has failed to respond in a timely manner, and the amount of the fine and penalty for such failure to respond; ( c) Notification of the following:

( 1) That the respondent is subject to a penalty equal to the amount of the fine because of the respondent s fdure to respond to the initial NO1 in a timely manner, unless the respondent shows good cause for the failure to respond to the NO1 in a timely manner;

( 2) That the respondent has a right to a hearing to show good cause for the failure to respond to the NO1 in a timely manner and that, if the AkT determines that there is good cause, the respondent has a right to a . hearing on the infraction;

( 3) That, if the respondent fails to pay the fine and penalty or request a hearing within fifteen ( 15) days of the date of service of the second NO1 the following shall occur:

( A) The penalty for failure to answer in a timely manner shall increase to twice the amount of the initial fine and the respondent s license or permit may be suspended; and (  3) The respondent shall be required to appear at a hearing to show cause why the respondent s license or permit should not be suspended for such failure to make timely payment or request a hearing:

( 4) That the respondent has no right to adjudication of the infraction by mail; and ( 5) That the acceptable forms of payment are as follows:

( A) Cash, which is not acceptable by mail; or ( J3) A personal check, company check, certified check, cashier s check, postal money order, or bank money order payable to the order of the District of Columbia Treasurer; and 31 6 Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations ( d) Any other information that the Director may require.

3105.3 A second NO1 signed by the Director shall be prima facie evidence that the respondent has not answered the initial NO1 in a timely manner,

3105.4 A second NO1 shall be served and answered in the same manner as an initial NOI, with the following exceptions:

( a) If a respondent admits the infraction, the respondent is required to include payment of the penalty, in addition to the fine, with the answer;

( bj Respondent has no right to adjudication of the infraction by mail; and ( c) Respondent has no right to a hearing on the infraction unless the respondent shows good cause for the failure to timely answer the initial NOI. To show good cause, a respondent shall request a hearing in the manner provided by $ 3103 within fifteen ( 15) days of the date the second NO1 is served. Upon a showing of good cause, an ALJ may either proceed to consider the infraction or require the respondent to request another hearing on the infraction.

3105.5 A respondent who fails to answer a second NO1 within fifteen ( 15) days of service:

( a) Shall have no right to a hearing on the infraction unless the respondent establishes good cause for the failure to answer; and ( b)   Shall be required to appear at a hearing to show cause why the respondent s license or permit should not be suspended for such failure to answer.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5723 ( September 4. 1987).

3106 ADJUDICATION BY MAIL 3106.1 Adjudication by mail shall be available only to a respondent who answers an initial NO1 in a timely manner and admits the infraction with explanation. .

3106.2 A respondent who admits an infraction with explanation shall submit with the NO1 all evidence of mitigating circumstances or other evidence relevant to the respondent s explanation.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5725 ( September 4, 1987).

3107 PRE HEARING FILINGS 3107.1 The Director may require that the parties file, at least five ( 5) clays prior to the hearing and on a form approved by the Director, the following information:

( a) The name and address of each witness who may be called to testify during the hearing;

( b) The name and address of each expert witness who may be called to testify, together with a copy of any written report prepared by that expert witness;

31 7 Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3 107.2 3 107.3 3 107.4 3 108 3 108.1 3 108.2 3108.3 3 108.4 3108.5 3108.6 3109 3 109.1 3 109.2 ( c) The approximate length of time required by each party to present its case during the hearing;

( d) A certfication by the person filing that a true copy of the filed document has been served on allparties; and ( e) Any other information that the Director may determine to be necessary for the more efficient scheduling and operation of the hearing process.

The parties may enter stipulations into the record.

No pre hearing fihg shall be accepted within five ( 5) days prior to the scheduled hearing date without the authorization of the ALJ.

A request for continuance shall be submitted in writing.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718,5726 ( September 4, 1987).

MOTIONS Parties, witnesses, and other persons may file appropriate motions, including motions to intervene or to join another party to the action.

A party filing a motion shall serve it on all parties to the hearing.

A party opposing a motion shall respond to the motion filed by hand delivering the response to the address set forth at 53103.9 within five ( 5) days of the date the motion was served, or by mailing the response to the address set forth at $ 3103.10 postmarked within five ( 5) days of the date the motion was served.

Failure to respond to a motion within the time provided in $ 3 108.3 shall constitute sufficient grounds for the ALJ, in the Aw's hscretion, to grant the original motion as being unopposed.

Unless a party requests oral argument on a motion and the ALJ grants the request, the ALJ may dispose of the motion on written submissions.

The AkJ may schedule a separate hearing on a motion or may consider it at the time of the hearing on the NOI.

SOURCE: Fiflal Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5726 ( September 4, 1957).

CONDUCT OF HEARINGS A general partner may represent the partnership at a hearing.

A director or oficer of, or attorney for, a corporation may represent the corporation at a hearing.

37

89 Title 16 3 109.3 3109.4 3109.5 3109.6 09.7 09.8 3110 3110.1 31lO; Z 3110.3 3111 3111.1 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations A respondent shall have the following rights at a hearing:

( a) To appear and be heard in person or be represented by counsel:

( b) To examine the respondent s own witnesses and cross examine opposing witnesses; ( c) To present all relevant evidence; and ( d) To have subpoenas issued to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant documents upon submission of a written request to an ALJ at least five ( 5) days prior to the hearing.

If a respondent denies an infraction, the Director shall have the burden of proving the infraction by a preponderance of the evidence.

All testimony shall be given under oath or affirmation.

Parties at a hearing shall make objections in a timely manner and shall briefly state the grounds relied upon.

At the conclusion of a hearing, the ALJ may hold open the hearing record for an appropriate period of time to allow for the production of addtional documentary evidence or submission of briefs by the parties.

A party filing documentary evidence after the hearing but before the record has closed, shall serve a copy of the evidence on the opposing party.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5727 ( September 4, 1987).

AMENDMENTS TO THE NOTICE OF INFRACTION If, during a hearing, the Director has cause to believe that the respondent committed an additional infraction for which the respondent has not been charged, the Director may move to amend the NO1 during the hearing to add the new infraction.

If the Director moves to amend a NO1 pursuant to $ 3110.1, the ALJ shall grant a continuance when necessary for the respondent to defend , adequately against the amended NOI, unless the respondent waives the right to a continuance.

IE during a hearing, the Director proves that a respondent is a repeat violator of a rule, regulation, or law cited; the Director may move to amend the NO1 consistent with this section.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5728 ( September 4, 1987).

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS An official record of the hearing shall be maintained in each case, including. but not limited to, testimony and exhibits. A transcription of the hearing shall not be made unless requested pursuant to $ 3120. Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3111.2 The testimony and exhibits, together with a11 papers filed in the proceedmgs, and materialsor facts with respect to which official notice is taken, shall constitute the exclusive record of the hearing.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718,5728 ( September 4, 1987).

3112 FAILURETO APPEAR AT A HEARING 3112.1 If a respondent fads to appear for a scheduled hearing, and the hearing has not been continued, postponed, or rescheduled, the ALJ may receive evidence and hear testimony of witnesses who have appeared and render a final decision based on the evidence or may issue a default judgment against the respondent.

3112.2 A respondent who has failed to appear at a scheduled hearing may, before the ALJ issues a decision, make a request in writing to the ALJ that the hearing be reopened for good cause shown.

SOURCE: Final Rolemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5728 ( September 4, 1987).

3113 FINAL DECISION 3113.1 A decision of an ALJ sha!! be final upsii issuance.

3113.2 A decision of an ALJ shall be in writing and must be issued within ninety ( 90) days of the date the hearing is concluded or the request for an adjudxation by mail is . received.

3113.3 A decision of an Awshall contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, an order, and a statement which informs the respondent of the right to an appeal.

3113.4 The decision shall be served in accordance with 93 10' 2.

3113.5 A decision of an Aw finding that the respondent committed an infraction may notify the respondent that ! f the respondent fails to pay the fine, penalty, or costs within fifteen ( 15) days (+ A the date of service of the decision, the respondent's license or permit shall be suspended until the respondent pays the fine, penalty, or costs,

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718. 5729 ( September 4, 1987).

3114 COSTSAND PENALTIES 3114.1 A respondent may be subject to one or more of the following penalties and costs:

( a) A penalty equal to the amount of the fine, if a respondent fails to answer an NO1 within fifteen ( 15) days from the date of service;

( b) A penalty equal to twice the amount of the fine; if a respondent fails to answer a second NO1 within fifteen ( 15) days from the date of service;

31 10 // Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3115 3115.1 31 15.2 3115.3 3115.4 3115.5 31 15: 6 ( c) An inspection fee of fifty dollars ($ 50) for all reinspections and reinvestigations conducted by the Director in connection with an infraction;

( d) A hearing fee of forty dollars ($ 40), if the respondent is found fully liable for an infraction;

( e) A witness fee of thirty one dollars and fifty cents ($ 31.50) for each witness subpoenaed on behalf of the respondent: and ( 0 A fee of one percent ( 1%) per month of the outstanding amount sowed by a respondent for the installment senice.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718,5729 ( September 4,1987); as amended by Final Rulemaking published at 42 DCR 6224 ( November 10, 1995), effective December 8, 1995..

INSTALLMENT AGREEMENTS AND PAYMENT No person shall. be eligible to apply for an ' installment agreement except as provided in this section.

A respondent who has been served a decision in which monetary sanctions of fifty dollars ($ 50) or more have been imposed may, within fifteen ( 15) days after the date of service, request permission to make, paymerits pursuant to an installment agreement.

A respondent who has been served an NO1 or second NOI, and who admits to ' infractions and penalties of fifty dollars ($ 50) or more may, within fifteen ( 15) days after the date of service, request permission to make payments pursuant to an installment agreement. '

Installment applications shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Director.

Failure to submit a completed installment application along with all required documentation in a timely manner shall bar the respondent from receiving an installment agreement.

An installment agreement shall inform the respondent of the respondent's obIigations and shall contain the following information:

( a) The duration of the agreement, which shall be six ( 6) months or less;

( b) The due date for each installment payment:

( c) The terms and conditions of the agreement:

( d) That collection proceedmgs shall be initiated to collect the amount owed for respondent's failure to comply with the, terms and condltions of the instalIment agreement;

( e) That the acceptable forms of payment are as follows:

31 11 / z Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3116 3116.1 3116.2 3116.3 3117 3117.1 3117.2 ( 1) Cash, which is not acceptable by mail; or ( 2) A personal check, company check, certified check, cashier s check, postal money order, or bank money order payable to the order of the District of Columbia Treasurer: and ( 0 That the respondent s license or permit may be suspended for failure to make timely payments.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking publiihed at 34 WR 5718,5730 ( September 4, 1987).

PAYMENT The following shall be the only acceptable forms of payment of a fine, penalty, cost, or other charge imposed under this chapter or the Act:

( a) Cash; or ( b) A personal check, company check, certified check, cashier s check, postal money order, or bank money order payable to the order of the District of Columbia Treasurer.

A payment in the form of cash shall not be accepted by mail.

A respondent s submission of a personal check, company check, certified check, cashier s check, postal money order, or bank money order that is returned due to insufficient funds or for any other reason, shall constitute a failure to pay and a failure to respond properly to an NOI, second NOI, or decision.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718. 5731 ( September 4. 1987).

COLLECTION PROCEEDINGS The failbe of a respondent to pay monetary sanctions imposed by an ALJ or to comply with a decision of an ALJ within fifteen ( 15) days of the date of service of the decision shall subject the respondent to suspension of the respondent s license or permit.

The Director may refer to a collection agency or the Corporation Counsel cases which involve a respondent s failure to make timely payment for the initiation of civil proceedings to collect fines, penalties, and costs owed by the respondent. The civil proceedings may result in garnishment of wages, attachment of property, and liens and foreclosures against property.

SaURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5731 ( September 4, 1987). z . Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3118 ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS 3118.1 Thissection shall apply to all appeals from decisions of Us issued pursuant to the Act, except for appeals made to the District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review.

3118.2 A notice of appeal from a decision issued by an ALJ shall be submitted in person or postmarked within fifteen ( 15) days from the date of service of the final decision.

3118.3 A notice of appeal of a decision shall include the following information.

'( a) That an appeal is taken;

( b) A copy or identification of the final decision from which the appeal is taken;

( c) A concise statement indicating why the respondent believes the final decision is wrong; c ( d) The full name, street address, and telephone number of the respondent and the respondent's attorney or agent, if any; and ( e) The signature of the respondent, an officer of the respondent corporation, a partner of the respondent partnership, or respondent's attorney or agent.

3118.4 A notice of appeal may be submitted in person to the following address between the hours of 8: 30a. m. to 4: OO p. m., Monday through Friday, except legal holidays:

Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Office of Civil Infractions 613 G Street, N. W., 7th floor Washington, D. C. 20001 3 118.5 A notice of appeal may be mailed to the following address:

Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Office of Civil Infractions P. O. Box 37140 Washington, D. C. 20013 7200 3118.6 The Director shall transmit a notice of appeal, within one week of its receipt, to the appropriate board or commission along with a copy of the decision from which the appeal is taken.

3118.7 Appeals involving infractions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, D. C. Code 825 101 et seq., or des issued pursuant thereto shall be heard by the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.

' 3 118.8 Appeals involving infractions of laws or rules governing occupations or professions shall be heard by the appropriate occupational or professional board or commission.

31 13 N Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 3118.9 Appeals involving infractions of the Rental Housing Act of 1985, D. C. Code § § 45 2501et seq., or rules issued pursuant thereto shall be heard by the District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission.

3118.10 Appeals involving infractions of laws relating to zoning, D. C. Code $ 85 601et seq., and rules issued pursuant thereto, shall be heard by the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment.

3118.11 Appeals involving infractions of law and rules not within the scope of $ 93118.7to 3118.10shall be with the jurisdiction of the Board of Appeals and Review.

3118.12 A respondent shall pay a filing fee of ten dollars ($ 10) plus the cost of preparing a transcript at the time a notice of appeal is filed. .

3118.13 An administrative appeal filed by a respondent who has admitted an infraction with explanation shall be limited in scope to a determination of whether the monetary sanctions imposed were within the limitations prescribed by law.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718,5731 ( September 4. 1987).

3119 STAY PENDING APPELS   3119.1 The timely filing of a notice of appeal shall not operate to stay the final decision of an Aw.

3119.2 Upon motion of the respondent, an ALJ may stay the imposition of any sanction imposed pendmg appeal.

3119.3 A respondent who submits a motion pursuant to this section shail state the reasons supporting the motion and the facts relied upon. If the facts are subject to dispute, the motion must be supported by affidavits or other documents the veracity of which is sworn to by the respondent or other person submitting such facts.

3119.4 A respondent who submits a motion pursuant to this section shall attach a copy of the final decision sought to be stayed.

3119.5 A motion submitted pursuant to this section shall be delivered in person or postmarked within fifteen ( 15) days of the date of service of the final decision to the address set forth in $ 3118.4or 3118.5.

SOURCE: Fmal Rulemakingpublished at 34 DCR 5718, 5733JSeptember 4, 1987).

3120 TRANSCRIPTSOF HEZARINGS 3120.1 Transcripts of hearings may be ordered from the Director on a form prescribed by the Director.

31 14 /! Title 16 3 120.2 3 120.3 3 120.4 3120.5 3 120.6 3121 3121.1 3121.2 ' 3199 3 199.1 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations The fee for transcripts shall be three dollars and fifty cents ($ 3.50) per page.

A person ordering a transcript shall submit a deposit of fifty dollars ($ 50) with the order.

When the cost of a transcript has been determined to be less than the amount of the transcript deposit, the Director shall refund the amount by which the deposit exceeds the cost of the transcript.

When the cost of a transcript is determined to exceed the amount of the transcript deposit, the person ordering the transcript shall pay the balance prior to the issuance of the transcript.

The Director may waive all or part of the cost of a transcript in cases of financial hardship or other appropriate circumstances, as determined by the Director.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718,5733 ( September 4. 1987).

COMPUTATION OF TIME In computing any period of time specified in ths chapter, the day of the act, event, or default shall not be counted, and the last day of the period shall be counted unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which event the time period shall continue until the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

An AL, J may waive any of the prescribed time periods established in this chapter or the Act, if the respondent requests a waiver in writing within one year of the date of service of the infraction, and shows to the satisfaction of the ALJ why the time period should be waived.

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 DCR 5718, 5734 ( September 4, 1987).

DEFINITIONS When used in this chapter, the following terms and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed Act  the Department of Consumer andRegulatory Affairs Civil Infractions Act of 1985, D. C. Law 6 45. D. C. Code § § 6 2701et seq.

Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ)  a hearing examiner licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and authorized to hear cases pursuant to the Act.

Day  a calendar day.

Director  the Director of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, or a designee.

Legal holiday  one of the following days: District of Columbia Municipal Regulations New Year s Day;

Martin Luther King, Jr.  s Birthday;

Washington s Birthday;

Memorial Day;

Independence Day;

Labor Day;

Columbus Day;

Veterans Day;

Thanksgiving Day;

Christmas Day;.

Any other day designated as a legal holiday by the President, the Congress, the Mayor or the Council of the District of Columbia, on the actual day the legal holiday is celebrated by the government of the District of Columbia; and Any other day on which the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs is officially closed.

Date of service  date on which a notice or order is personally served or delivered pursuant to 53 102.1( a) or 3 102. l( b), or five ( 5) days after the date on which a notice or order is mailed pursuant to 83 102.1( c).

SOURCE: Final Rulemaking published at 34 OCR 5718, 5734 ( September 4, 1987).

31 16 / 7 z, 16 DCMR, Section 3226.1 ( X)

Civil Infraction Schedule for 14DCMR Section 707.3 M w z  c

Tie 16 3225.4 3226 3226.1 \ District of Columbia Municipal Regulations ( j) 20 DCMR $ 1111.7 ( fdure to have pesticide labels at job site);

( k) 20 DCMR 53200.6 ( failure to surrender a pesticide operator s credentials and license within ten ( 10) days of termination); or ( l) 20 DCMR 83202.4 ( fdure to note tire Director when supervision by a licensed certlfied applicator is not available).

Violation of any provision of the District of Columbia Pesticide Operations Act of 1977, 20 DCMR, Chapters 10 13, which provision is not cited elsewhere in this section, shall be a Class 5 infitaction.

SOURCE: Fnrl Rukrruking publiihed at 34 DCR 5736. 5766 ( September 4, 1987); as amended by Final Rulemaking publi. had 8t 38DCR 1,4 ( January 4.1991); and by Final Rulemaking published at 44DCR 1950, 1960 ( April 7.1997).

DCRA HOUSING INSPECTION DIVISION INFRACTIONS Violation of any of the following provisions shall be a Class 2 infraction:

D. C. Code $ 5 601( failure to secure or repair an unsafe structure);

D. C. Code 55 603 ( attempting to repair after expiration of allowed period, or interfering with authorized agents);

D. C. Code 55 604 ( allowing a nuisance to exist on any lot or parcel of land in the District of Columbia which affects the public health, comfort, safety and welfare of citizens);

14 DCMR 5103.2 ( removal of placard by an unauthorized person);

14 DCMR 5103.3 ( permitting the occupancy of an apartment or tenement thirty ( 30) days or more after the posting of a placard);

14 DCMR 5104.1 ( refusal to permit any designated agent of the District entry into the premises);

14 DCMR $ 104.4 ( refusal to permit inspection of premises);

14 DCMR 5400.1 ( permitting the occupancy of any habitation in violation of 14 DCMR, Chapter 4);

14 DCMR $ 400.7 ( renting a habitation in a buildmg in which noxious gases or offensive odors are generated by a commercial activity);

14 DCMR $ 402.4( permitting a sleeping facility to be located in a room with a furnace, open flame, space heater, domestic water heater, or gas meter);

14 DCMR 3403.1 ( unlawful use of uninhabitable rooms);  Title 16 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations 14 DCMR 6500.1 ( failure to provide adequate heating, ventilating, or lighting facility);

14 DCMR 5501.2 ( failure to provide and maintain a heating facility capable of maintaining a temperature of seventy degrees Fahrenheit ( 70" F.) in a budding or part of a budding used for habitation):

14 DCMR 5501.4 ( failure to supply sufficient heat);

14 DCMR 5501.6 or 501.7 ( failure to comply with the inspection, correction of defects and certification requirements);

14 DCMR 8510 ( fdure to comply with a requirement concerning air conditioning maintenance);

14 DCMR 5600.1 ( failure to provide required facilities, utilities and fixtures):

14 DCMR 5600.3 ( failure to provide utility service);

14 DCMR 5606.3 or 606.4 ( failure to comply with the inspection, correction of defects and certlfication requirements); ~

14 DCMR 8701.3 ( failure to use a repair material of suitable kind or quality, or to perform or repair in a workmanlike manner);

14 DCMR 5702.2 ( failure to maintain smoke pipe or chimney which is adequately supported and free from leakage or obstruction);

14 DCMR 5702.4 ( permitting to exist on premises a chimney on which the total area of all flue openings exceeds the net area of the flue);

14 DCMR 5704.1 ( permitting to exist on premises a foundation or structural member that fails to provide a safe, firm and substantial base and support for the structure at all points);

14 DCMR. 8707.3 ( permitting an unlawful quantity of bad to be present on an interior or exterior surface of a residential premise); 14 DCMR 5708.5 ( failure to install or maintain required porch balustrade or other guard);

14 DCMR 8901.1 ( failure to maintain fire extinguishing equipment in an operable condition);

14 DCMR 5901.2 ( failure to maintain fire proofing or fire protective construction id a good state of repair);

14 DCMR 8902.1 ( failure . tomaintain an egress facility in a good state of repair);

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