[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 199 (Wednesday, October 15, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61927-61936]
[FR Doc No: 2014-24482]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Vehicle-to-Vehicle Security Credential Management System; Request
for Information

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice--Request for Information (RFI).

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SUMMARY: On August 18, 2014, NHTSA announced an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) for V2V communications, and concurrently
released an extensive research report on the technology, as the formal
start to the regulatory process. This notice, a Request for Information
(RFI), seeks information related to the security system that will
support V2V operations but will not be established by NHTSA regulation.
This RFI will help the agency: (1) Become aware of private entities
that may have an interest in exploring the possibility of developing
and/or operating components of a V2V Security Credential Management
System (SCMS); (2) Receive responses to the questions posed about the
establishment of an SCMS provided in the last section of this RFI; and
(3) Obtain feedback, expressions of interest, and comments from all
interested public, private, and academic entities on any aspect of the
SCMS.
    The Background section of this RFI provides an overview of the
technical and organizational aspects of the current V2V security
design, of which the SCMS is an integral part. The SCMS encompasses all
technical,

organizational, and operational aspects of the V2V security system that
is needed to support trusted, safe/secure V2V communications and to
protect driver privacy appropriately. The primary managerial component
of the envisioned SCMS (called the SCMS Manager) would be responsible
for managing all other component entities (called Certificate
Management Entities or CMEs) which support the different V2V security
functions that, together, ensure the operational integrity of the total
system.

DATES: Responses to this RFI should be submitted by 11:59 p.m., E.T.,
on December 15, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Responses: You may submit responses, identified by Docket
No. NHTSA-2014-0023, by any of the following methods:
    Internet: To submit responses electronically, go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for submitting
comments. Alternatively, go to http://www.safercar.gov/v2v/index.html
and click the yellow button labeled ``Submit responses on the SCMS
Request for Information'' to go directly to the docket in
regulations.gov.
    Facsimile: Written responses may be faxed to 1-202-493-2251.
    Mail: Send responses to Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.
    Hand Delivery: If you plan to submit written responses by hand or
by courier, please do so at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. E.T., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. You may call the Docket Management Facility at
1-800-647-5527.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about the program
discussed herein, contact John Harding, NHTSA, Intelligent Technologies
Research Division,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>For legal
questions, interpretations and counsel, please contact Rebecca Yoon,
Office of the Chief Counsel,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Purpose of This Notice
II. RFI Guidelines
III. Background on V2V and the Agency's Actions Thus Far
IV. Security Overview and Operational Characteristics
    A. Technical Aspects
    B. V2V Security Design Concept: Functions, Components,
Communications
    C. Pseudonym Functions/Certificates
    D. ``Bootstrap''/Initialization Functions/Enrollment Certificate
    E. Privacy Considerations
    F. Device Non-Compliance and Potential Recalls
V. SCMS Organizational Options
VI. The Legal Relationship Between NHTSA and the SCMS
VII. Specific Questions for This Notice

I. Purpose of This Notice

    NHTSA seeks responses from parties potentially interested in
establishing and operating a V2V SCMS. Respondents can express
interest, provide comments concerning the establishment of an SCMS,
provide information concerning security approaches for a V2V
environment, and discuss the technical and organizational aspects of
the SCMS. While comments are welcome on any area of the RFI, NHTSA is
particularly interested in responses related to interest in
establishing an SCMS, including but not limited to some or all of the
legally distinct CMEs that make up the SCMS, along with responses to
the questions detailed in the Summary of Questions section of this RFI.

II. RFI Guidelines

    Responses to this notice are not offers and cannot be accepted by
the Government to form a binding contract or issue a grant. Information
obtained as a result of this RFI may be used by the Government for
program planning on a non-attribution basis. This RFI notice is NOT a
solicitation for proposals, applications, proposal abstracts, or
quotations. This RFI notice is not to be construed as a commitment on
the part of the Government to award a contract or grant, nor does the
Government intend to directly pay for any information or responses
submitted as a result of this RFI notice.
    The Government prefers that submissions NOT include any information
that might be considered proprietary or confidential. The Government
intends to publicly release a summary of responses to this RFI. Such a
summary may identify the number and types of respondents (e.g., public
agency, private entity, or academic institution). If you wish to submit
any information under a claim of confidentiality, you should submit
three copies of your complete submission, including the information you
claim to be confidential business information, to the Chief Counsel,
NHTSA, at the address given above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT. In addition, you should submit two copies, from which you have
deleted the claimed confidential business information, to Docket
Management at the address given above under ADDRESSES. When you send a
comment containing information claimed to be confidential business
information, you should include a cover letter, as specified in our
confidential business information regulation (49 CFR part 512.), that
delineates that information.
    Responses should clearly identify the name(s) of the responding
organization(s) or individual(s) and a designated point of contact, to
include address, email, and phone number.

III. Background on V2V and the Agency's Actions Thus Far

    The U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) announced on February 3, 2014,
that it will begin taking steps to enable vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communication technology for light vehicles. This technology would
improve safety by enabling nearby V2V devices to ``talk'' to each other
using dedicated short range communication (DSRC) to exchange, up to ten
times per second, basic safety data such as speed and position. This
data could then be used by vehicles to warn drivers of impending danger
from other vehicles, and ultimately could help avoid many crashes
altogether.
    On August 18, 2014, NHTSA announced an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) for V2V communications, and concurrently released an
extensive research report on the technology. The research report
contains a comprehensive discussion of the agency's current vision for
an SCMS in terms of governance, design, and potential costs. The ANPRM
contains a number of SCMS and security-related questions on which the
agency is seeking responses, which may also assist those responding to
this RFI. Although we provide a brief summary below, NHTSA believes
that respondents will be in the best position to respond
comprehensively to this RFI if they also review the research report and
the questions in the ANPRM. Responses to this RFI will be maximally
helpful to the agency if they are focused on the specific issue of
commenters' potential interest in operating an SCMS and how they might
approach doing so, as well as the other points raised specifically in
this RFI. Responses to the RFI will be collected in Docket No. NHTSA-
2014-0024. NHTSA requests

that respondents who wish to address V2V issues more broadly, including
those issues related to SCMS and security beyond what is discussed in
this RFI, please comment to the ANPRM and research report at Docket No.
NHTSA-2014-0022. The response period for the ANPRM closes on October
20, 2014.
    In order to function safely, a V2V system must have trusted
communication between V2V devices and message content that is protected
from outside interference. In order to create the required environment
of trust, a V2V system must include security infrastructure to secure
each message, as well as a communications network to convey security
and related information from vehicles to the entities providing system
security (and vice versa).
    During the Connected Vehicle Safety Pilot Model Deployment (i.e.,
Model Deployment), concluded in the Ann Arbor, MI area in 2013 and
2014, V2V devices installed in roughly 2,800 light vehicles were able
to transmit and receive messages from one another using security
credentials supplied by a prototype security management system. This
system was based on a design jointly developed by DOT and the Crash
Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) Vehicle Safety Communications 3
(VSC3) Consortium, a consortium of eight automobile manufacturers. The
security system successfully provided trusted and secure communications
among the equipped vehicles deployed for Model Deployment. This was
accomplished with relatively few problems given the magnitude of this
first-of-its-kind demonstration project.
    In the future, however, if the agency mandates V2V communications
devices for all new light vehicles, a much larger security
infrastructure and communications network would be necessary to provide
that required trust. At this point, DOT and NHTSA anticipate that
private entities will create, fund, and manage the security and
communications components of a V2V system. While NHTSA has identified
several potential types of entities that might be interested in
participating in a V2V security system, NHTSA has not identified any
private entities that have expressed a willingness to do so.

IV. Security Overview and Operational Characteristics

    In this section, the agency provides an overview of the discussion
of communications security issues associated with V2V, including the
nature of the SCMS, as well as a discussion of the agency's legal
relationship with a private SCMS system. For a complete discussion of
these issues, please see Part IX of the research report.

A. Technical Aspects

    In contrast to other types of safety technologies currently
widespread, or increasingly present, in the vehicle fleet, safety
applications based on V2V are cooperative--meaning that participating
vehicles must exchange (i.e. broadcast and receive) and analyze data in
real-time. This cooperative exchange of vehicle to vehicle messages,
which represents a new opportunity for vehicle safety, supplies the
information needed by a vehicle to prepare driver alerts and warnings
about potential hazardous situations. It also gives vehicles the
ability to use that information to generate information about mobility
and environmental conditions, and communicate with road-side
infrastructure. However, a cooperative system can only work when
participants in the system are able to trust the alerts and warnings
issued by their V2V devices that are based, at least in part, upon
information received from other V2V devices.
    For this reason, a primary requirement for a V2V system is
``trust''--a requirement that thousands of data messages will be
authenticated, in real-time, as being unaltered and coming from a
trusted source. It is also a critical element in achieving
``interoperability''--so that vehicles of different make/model/year
will be able to talk to each other and exchange trusted data without
pre-existing agreements or altering vehicle designs. In furtherance of
system-wide trust, a V2V system also needs to be secure against
internal and external threats or attacks.
    Thus, the three primary elements of the V2V system that require
security are the:
     V2V communications (the medium, the messages/data, the
certificates, and any other element that supports message exchange);
     V2V devices; and
     V2V security system itself (through organizational,
operational, and physical controls).
    In addition to these requirements, the V2V system needs to be: (1)
Ultimately scalable to meet the needs of over 350 million users across
the nation (such as light vehicles, heavy vehicles, motorcycles,
pedestrians, bicycles, etc.), (2) extendable to accommodate other types
of applications (such as V2I mobility, traffic management, and
environmental applications), and (3) financially sustainable to ensure
its continued operation over time.
    In considering which security technologies would most effectively
provide trusted message exchange and secure communications for safety-
critical applications, DOT and NHTSA, along with CAMP security experts,
compared three different security approaches --symmetric encryption,
group signature, and asymmetric public key infrastructure (PKI). When
assessing these alternatives, the V2V research team was looking for an
option that:
     Protects driver privacy appropriately by not requiring
participants to disclose their identities;
     Works quickly enough to fit within the bandwidth
constraints of DSRC and the expected processing constraints of the V2V
on-board equipment;
     Does not require over-the-air bytes for security that
exceed the constraints of DSRC bandwidth and size of the Basic Safety
Message (BSM) in the message payload; and
     Supports non-repudiation.\1\
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    \1\ Non-repudiation in public-key technology is traditionally
defined as the inability of a person (to whom a public key has been
bound by a recognized certification authority through issuance of a
public key certificate) to deny having made some digital signature.
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    After considering the characteristics of each security approach,
the research development team preliminarily determined that the PKI
option (asymmetric key) using the signature method offered the most
effective approach to achieving communications security and trusted
messaging for a very large set of users. For this reason, the research
team chose that approach to secure the BSM that is at the center of the
current V2V system design. Significantly, the effectiveness of this
approach is highly dependent upon technical design decisions relating
to how the approach is deployed in a given environment.

B. V2V Security Design Concept: Functions, Components, Communications

    Figure 1 presents the high level, basic components/functions of the
V2V security system. They are similar to the basic functions of any
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) security system.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN15OC14.000

    For reference, Table 1 contains a list of abbreviations used to
describe the system discussed in more detail below:

                   Table 1--Security Related Acronyms
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             Acronym                             Definition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BSM..............................  basic safety message.
CA...............................  certificate authority.
CME..............................  certificate management entity.
CP...............................  certificate policy.
CRL..............................  certificate revocation list.
DCA..............................  device configuration manager.
ECA..............................  enrollment certificate authority.
FIPS.............................  Federal Information Processing
                                    Standards.
LA...............................  linkage authority.
LOP..............................  location obscurer proxy.
MA...............................  misbehavior authority.
PCA..............................  pseudonym certificate authority.
PII..............................  personally identifiable information.
PKI..............................  public-key infrastructure.
RA...............................  registration authority.
SCMS.............................  security credential management
                                    system.
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    Figure 2 illustrates multiple security and privacy operations and
components that DOT envisions for a V2V system to accomplish the
distribution of certificates in a way that is trusted and that protects
consumers' privacy. The fundamental operations are indicated as (1)
Overall Management, (2) Registration and Enrollment, (3) Certificate
Management and (4) Misbehavior Management. The text following this
illustration contains definitions for each component.
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN15OC14.001

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
    The following discussion of SCMS functions focuses on
communications and activities within the SCMS. The technical design for
the SCMS includes several different operating functions that, together,
make up the overall SCMS structure. It is envisioned that single or
multiple operating functions

will be carried out by individual, legally distinct CMEs (including the
SCMS Manager) that, together, will make up the SCMS organization. The
agency is interested in respondents providing their views on potential
structure of the entire SCMS organization, including the distinction,
if one is needed, between separate components and responsibilities.
    That said, we note that the interaction between the components
shown in Figure 2 is all based on machine-to-machine performance. No
human judgment is involved in creation, granting, or revocation of the
digital certificates. The functions are performed automatically by
processors in the various V2V components, including the vehicle's on-
board equipment (OBE). The role of personnel within the SCMS is to
manage the overall system, protect and maintain the computer hardware
and facilities, update software and hardware, and address unanticipated
issues.\3\
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    \3\ The SCMS manager would establish policies and procedures
that influence the configuration of the system parameters.
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    Generally, these SCMS operating functions fall into two categories:
``pseudonym functions'' and ``bootstrap functions,'' discussed further
below. In order for the SCMS to support the security needs of the V2V
system, the various SCMS functions (housed in different CME
organizations) must work together to exchange information securely and
efficiently.

C. Pseudonym Functions/Certificates

    The security design employs short-term digital certificates used by
a vehicle's V2V device to authenticate and validate BSMs that are sent
and received. Since these BSMs provide the information needed for V2V-
based safety warning technologies to operate, it is important that they
are trustworthy. A valid certificate indicates the BSM was transmitted
from a trusted source. A BSM with a revoked (invalid) certificate is
ignored by other V2V devices. In order to protect privacy
appropriately, these short-term certificates do not contain any
information about the vehicles and their occupants (e.g., drivers/
occupants or vehicle make/model/VIN), but they serve as credentials
that permit vehicles to participate in the V2V system.
    Pseudonym functions create, manage, distribute, monitor, and revoke
short-term certificates for vehicles. They include the following
functions:
     Intermediate Certificate Authority (Intermediate CA),
which is an extension of the Root CA, shielding it from direct access
to the internet. It can authorize other CMEs (or possibly an Enrollment
Certificate Authority [ECA]) using authority from the Root CA, but does
not hold the same authority as the Root CA in that it cannot self-sign
a certificate. The Intermediate CA provides flexibility in the system
because it removes the need for the highly protected Root CA to
establish contact with every SCMS entity as they are added to the
system over time. Additionally, the use of Intermediate CAs lessens the
impact of an attack by maintaining protection of the Root CA.
     Linkage Authority (LA), which is the entity that generates
linkage values. The LA comes in pairs of two, which we refer to as LA1
and LA2, in order to further protect privacy. The LAs for most
operations communicate only with the RA and provide values, known as
linkage values, in response to a request by the RA (see below) and PCA
(see below). The linkage values provide the PCA with a means to
calculate a certificate ID and a mechanism to connect all short-term
certificates from a specific device for ease of revocation in the event
of misbehavior.
     Location Obscurer Proxy (LOP), which obscures the location
of OBE seeking to communicate with the SCMS functions, so that the
functions are not aware of the geographic location of a specific
vehicle. All communications from the OBE to the SCMS components must
pass through the LOP. Additionally, the LOP may shuffle misbehavior
reports that are sent by OBEs to the MA (see below) during full
deployment. This function increases participant privacy but does not
increase or reduce security.
     Misbehavior Authority (MA), which acts as the central
function to process misbehavior reports, as well as to produce and
publish the certificate revocation list (CRL). It works with the PCA,
RA, and LAs to acquire necessary information about a certificate to
create entries to the CRL through the CRL Generator. The MA eventually
may perform global misbehavior detection, involving investigations or
other processes to identify levels of misbehavior in the system. The MA
is not an external law enforcement function, but rather an internal
SCMS function intended to detect when messages are not plausible or
when there is potential malfunction or malfeasance within the system.
The extent to which the CMEs share externally information generated by
the MA about devices sending inaccurate or false messages--whether with
individuals whose credentials the system has revoked, regulatory
agencies or law enforcement--will depend on law, organizational policy,
and/or contractual obligations applicable to the CMEs and their
component functions.
     Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA), which issues the
short-term certificates used to ensure trust in the system. In earlier
designs their lifetime was fixed at five minutes. The validity period
of certificates is still on the order of ``minutes'' but is now a
variable length of time, making them less predictable and thus harder
to track. Certificates are the security credentials that authenticate
messages (BSM) from a device. In addition to certificate issuance, the
PCA collaborates with the MA, RA, and LAs to identify linkage values to
place on the CRL if misbehavior has been detected. Individual PCAs may
be limited to a particular manufacturer or a particular region.
     Registration Authority (RA), which performs the necessary
key expansions before the PCA performs the final ones. It receives
certificate requests from the OBE (by way of the LOP), requests and
receives linkage values from the LAs, and sends certificate requests to
the PCA. It shuffles requests from multiple OBEs to prevent the PCA
from correlating certificate IDs with users. It also acts as the final
conduit to batching short-term certificates for distribution to the
OBE. Lastly, it creates and maintains a blacklist of enrollment
certificates so it will know to reject certificate renewal requests
from revoked OBEs.
     Request Coordination, which is critical in preventing an
OBE from receiving multiple batches of certificates from different RAs.
The Request Coordination function coordinates activities with the RAs
to ensure that certificate requests during a given time period are
responded to appropriately and without duplication. Note that this
function is only necessary if there is more than one RA in the SCMS.
     Root Certificate Authority (Root CA), which is the master
root for all other CAs; it is the ``center of trust'' of the system. It
issues certificates to subordinate CAs in a hierarchical fashion (as
well as MA, LAs and RAs), providing their authentication within the
system so all other users and functions know they can be trusted. The
Root CA produces a self-signed certificate (verifying its own
trustworthiness) using out-of-band communications. This enables trust
that can be verified between ad hoc or disparate devices because they
share a common trust point. It is likely that the Root CA will operate
in a separate, offline environment because compromise of this function
is a

catastrophic event for the security system.
     SCMS Manager, which is the function that will provide the
policy and technical standards for the entire V2V system. Just as any
large-scale industry ensures consistency and standardization of
technical specifications, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and
other industry-wide practices such as auditing, the SCMS Manager would
establish SOPs, including in such areas as interoperability, security,
privacy and auditing, and manage the activities required for smooth and
expected operation of the SCMS. This could happen in a number of ways.
Often in commercial industries, volunteer industry consortia take on
this role. In other industries, or in public or quasi-public
industries, this role may be assumed by a regulatory or other legal or
policy body.
    Regardless of how the SCMS ``industry'' establishes and operates a
central administrative body, it is expected that one will be
established for the V2V SCMS. As no decisions about ownership or
operation have been made, we do not advocate for public or private
ownership of the CMEs that will make up the SCMS. Rather, in our
discussions and analyses, we identify the basic functions that we
expect the SCMS Manager will perform. The expectation is that the CMEs
that make up the SCMS, either voluntarily or contractually, will agree
to adhere to the SOPs, audit standards, and other practices established
by the SCMS Manager. In accordance with input from DOT, the SCMS
Manager will develop applicable guidance, practices, SOPs, auditing
standards, or additional industry-wide procedures in coordination with,
or so as to dovetail with Federal guidance or regulations applicable to
V2V communications. NHTSA also assumes that the CMEs will endow the
SCMS manager with authority to remove from the SCMS or revoke the
``credentials'' of CMEs that misbehave or do not comply with applicable
standards.

D. ``Bootstrap''/Initialization Functions/Enrollment Certificate

    The security design also includes functions that carry out the
bootstrapping process, which establishes the initial connection between
a V2V device and the SCMS. The chief functional component of this
process is the Enrollment Certificate Authority (ECA), which assigns a
long-term enrollment certificate to each V2V device.
    Initialization functions include:
     Certification Lab, which instructs the Enrollment CA on
polices and rules for issuing enrollment certificates, i.e. device
enrollment criteria. This is usually done when a new device is released
to the market or if the SCMS Manager releases new rules and guidelines.
The Enrollment CA uses information from the Certification lab to
confirm that devices of the given type are entitled to an enrollment
certificate. At this time, specific details regarding the Certification
and Enforcement are not defined.\4\
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    \4\ At this point, the extent and level of testing which the
Certification Lab will actually perform is still to be determined.
The role of the labs could range from simply managing a checklist of
requirements to performing extensive technical certification tests,
including: device performance, FCC compliance, cryptographic testing
(at the level of FIPS-140), and/or interoperability testing. The
intent is that the SCMS Manager, after it is created, will determine
the full roles and responsibilities of the Certification Lab.
Vehicle and device manufacturers may decide to rely in part on a
certification lab to support their own certification of compliance
with any relevant standards NHTSA may issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Device Configuration Manager (DCM), which is responsible
for giving devices access to new trust information, such as updates to
the certificates of one or more authorities, and relaying policy
decisions or technical guidelines issued by the SCMS Manager. It also
sends software updates to devices. The DCM coordinates initial trust
distribution with devices by passing on credentials for other SCMS
entities, and provides a device with information it needs to request
short term certificates from an RA. The DCM also plays a role in the
bootstrap process by ensuring that a device is cleared to receive its
enrollment certificate from the ECA. It also provides a secure channel
to the ECA. There are two types of connections used from devices to the
DCM: In-band and out-of-band communications. In-band communication
utilizes the LOP, while out-of-band communication is sent directly from
the device to the ECA, by way of the DCM.
     Enrollment Certificate Authority (ECA), which verifies the
validity of the device type with the Certification Lab. Once verified,
the ECA then produces the enrollment certificate and sends it to the
OBE. Once the OBE has a valid enrollment certificate, it is able to
request and receive certificates from the SCMS. Individual PCAs may be
limited to a particular manufacturer or a particular region.

E. Privacy Considerations

    Risks to consumer privacy, whether actual or perceived, are
intertwined with consumer and industry acceptance of V2V technologies.
For this reason, privacy considerations are critical to the analysis
underlying NHTSA's decision about how to proceed with regulation.
    At the outset, readers should understand some very important points
about the V2V system as contemplated by NHTSA. The system will not
collect or store any data on individuals or individual vehicles, nor
will it enable the government to do so. There is no data in the basic
safety messages broadcast by V2V devices or collected by the V2V
security system intended to be used by law enforcement or private
entities to personally identify a speeding or erratic driver.\5\ The
system--presumably operated by private entities--will not permit
tracking through space or time of vehicles linked to specific owners or
drivers or persons. Third parties attempting to use the system to track
a vehicle would find it extremely difficult to do so, particularly in
light of far simpler and cheaper means available for that purpose. The
system will not collect financial information, personal communications,
or other information linked to individuals. It will enroll V2V enabled
vehicles automatically, without collecting any information identifying
specific vehicles or owners.
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    \5\ Definition of the current basic safety message data elements
is found in Table V-1 and Table V-2 of the agency's V2V research
report, ``Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications: Readiness of V2V
Technology for Application V1.0 August, 2014''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The system will not provide a ``pipe'' into the vehicle for
extracting data. While the system needs to enable NHTSA and motor
vehicle manufacturers to find lots or production runs in the event of
defective and/or non-compliant V2V devices, it will do so without use
of VIN numbers or other information that could identify specific
drivers or vehicles.
    There are two primary categories of V2V system functions that
involve the transmission, collection, storage, and sharing of V2V data
by, and between, the V2V system components and other entities: system
safety and system security.
    The V2V system's safety functionality (i.e., the safety
applications that produce crash warnings) requires that V2V devices
broadcast and receive a basic safety message containing information
about vehicle position, heading, speed, and other information relating
to vehicle state and predicted path. The BSM, however, contains no
personally identifying information (PII) and is broadcast in a very
limited geographical range, typically less than 1 km. Nearby devices
installed in other vehicles will use that information to warn drivers
of crash-imminent

situations. Except as necessary to identify devices in the case of
malfunction, the system will not collect, and motor vehicles will not
store, the messages or data that are sent or received by V2V devices.

F. Device Non-Compliance and Potential Recalls

    Currently, as discussed in the report, NHTSA may need to conduct
further research into how to ensure that all V2V devices subject to a
recall can be identified, and that owners can be notified about the
issue and be provided instructions for how to remedy a potential
condition. Section VIII.B.3 of the agency's V2V research report
discusses the possibility that for vehicles manufactured with V2V
devices installed, the SCMS may be able to create a link at the time of
manufacture between specific installed V2V devices or production lots
of devices and enrollment certificates that later may help vehicle
manufacturers and NHTSA identify defective V2V equipment, potentially
linking device batches to enrollment certificates. However, it is not
yet clear how such a linkage would be created for V2V devices that are
not installed by the manufacturer. The agency welcomes discussion from
respondents on the potential approach discussed in the report along
with other potential approaches, based on a respondent's experience,
which NHTSA may employ to fulfill its defect and non-compliance
identification responsibilities.
    The security needs of the V2V system require the exchange of
certificates and other communications between: (1) V2V devices and (2)
the entity or entities providing security for the V2V system (i.e., the
Security Credential Management System). These two-way communications
are encrypted and subject to additional security measures. These
measures are designed to prevent SCMS insiders and others from
unauthorized access to information that might enable linkage of BSM
data or security credentials to specific motor vehicles.
    NHTSA also needs to ensure that the V2V system is protected from
defective and non-compliant devices. In order to do so, the V2V
security system will likely need to collect and share with
manufacturers, such that they can comply with Federal regulations, on a
very limited basis, some V2V data linking V2V device production lots to
security credentials. However, as currently envisioned, neither the V2V
system nor NHTSA will collect, store, or have access to information
that links production lots of defective V2V devices with specific VINs
or owners.
    NHTSA and the DOT take privacy very seriously. If NHTSA moves
forward with regulating V2V technologies, we are committed to doing so
in a manner that both protects individual privacy appropriately and
promotes this important safety technology.

V. SCMS Organizational Options

    The above discussion of SCMS functions focused on activities and
communications within the SCMS. The current section discusses the DOT
research performed by Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), with input from CAMP
and the Vehicle Infrastructure Integration Consortium (VIIC), on the
development of an SCMS organization. The purpose of BAH's research was
to generate organizational options for an SCMS capable of enabling
secure and efficient communications, protecting privacy appropriately,
and minimizing operational costs. BAH developed a number of different
organizational options by grouping the SCMS functions in CAMP's design
into legally/administratively distinct entities. BAH's analysis of the
organizational options for the SCMS, detailed below, focused primarily
on organizational connections and separations, as well as the closely-
related process of characterizing functions as ``central'' or ``non-
central'' (which is intimately tied to the issue of system ownership
and operation). It also examined the cost, security risk, and
operational/policy implications of the different SCMS models.
    BAH began by identifying multiple organizational models that,
together, captured all possible configurations of the SCMS functions
identified by CAMP. DOT initially selected a small number of these
organizational models for BAH to further consider. As CAMP's technical
design evolved, DOT instructed BAH to reconfigure the models to reflect
additional SCMS functions added to the SCMS design by CAMP, as well as
CAMP's new categorization of functions as either ``central'' or ``non-
central.'' Based on its independent PKI research, as well as new
insights into the security design communicated by CAMP, BAH then
simplified the initial organizational design proposed by CAMP to remove
certain organizational separations of functions that BAH determined
were not necessary for security or privacy reasons.
    Ultimately, the organization of the SCMS--the final grouping of
functions and estimates of any efficiencies--will be controlled by the
organization(s) that manage the SCMS and own and operate the component
CMEs. However, NHTSA and DOT anticipate being able to influence the
organization and operation of the SCMS (and thereby ensure adequate
separation to assure secure, privacy-appropriate V2V communications)
through an agreement or MOU with the SCMS Manager and/or through
participation on a SCMS ``governance board.''
    BAH's SCMS organizational model/analysis, Figure 2, is based on
CAMP's current SCMS technical design and represents BAH's perspective
of how functions within the SCMS may be grouped.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN15OC14.002

    Organizational separation of functions is an example of a policy
control often used to mitigate privacy risks in PKI systems--but such
separations come with increased costs and may negatively impact the
system's ability to identify and revoke the credentials of misbehaving
devices. Ultimately, more than one function may be co-located within
the same SCMS component organization. However, grouping of SCMS
functions and any resulting efficiencies/risk trade-offs will depend,
in large part, on: (1) The system's ownership, operational structure,
and governance in accordance with DOT, and (2) the preferences of the
entity or entities that own and operate the SCMS Manager and CME
component entities.
    The SCMS Manager is intended to serve as the entity that provides
system management, primarily by enforcing and auditing compliance with
uniform technical and policy standards and guidance for the SCMS
system-wide. The uniform standards/guidance will need to establish and
ensure consistency, effectiveness, interoperability, and appropriate
security and privacy protection across the CMEs, in order to facilitate
necessary communications, sharing of information, and operational
connections. The SCMS Manager will need to have mechanisms to ensure
that all CME entities have policies, practices, technologies, and
communications consistent with system-wide standards and guidance. The
SCMS Manager may (but need not) be the body that develops the
standards, guidance, or policies applicable system-wide; however, it
would be the entity charged with overseeing standards and policy
compliance by the CME entities that, together with the SCMS Manager,
make up the SCMS. The agency anticipates existing PKI technical
standards and industry best practices likely will form the basis for
many of the policies and procedures applicable across the SCMS.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ BAH SCMS Design and Analysis Report, at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. The Legal Relationship Between NHTSA and the SCMS

    As currently envisioned by NHTSA, deployment of V2V technologies
requires existence of an SCMS to provide necessary security functions.
In its February 3, 2014, announcement, NHTSA expressed its intent to
begin working on a regulatory proposal to require V2V devices in new
motor vehicles in a future year, and on August 18, 2014, NHTSA
announced an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to start the
regulatory process for V2V technology. A subsequent NHTSA V2V
regulatory proposal, a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),
potentially could extend to many aspects of the hardware, software, and
communications, making up significant parts of the V2V system. However,
NHTSA, at this time, anticipates that establishment of the SCMS itself,
which will provide security services necessary for secure reliable V2V
messaging within the V2V system, will not be encompassed in its
regulatory proposal. Instead, as discussed elsewhere in today's RFI,
NHTSA envisions that constitution and operation of the SCMS will be
undertaken by one or more private entities, working collaboratively
with NHTSA. NHTSA and DOT do not currently envision the Federal
government being the owner or operator of the SCMS.
    There is a wide range of collaborative relationships that NHTSA
potentially could enter into with the private entity or entities that
manage or make up the SCMS. The overarching goal of the relationship(s)
would be to ensure the existence and operation of an SCMS needed to
support the V2V system in a

way that appropriately protects consumer privacy and system security
and does not impose inordinate costs on OEMs, vehicle drivers, or
others. Ultimately, the nature and scope of the relationship(s) will
turn on the specific terms upon which the parties agree.
    Section IV of the research report contains discussion of the
agency's authority to enter into agreements documenting the
collaborative relationship between NHTSA and the private entity or
entities that constitute and operate the SCMS supporting V2V
communications. As discussed for the first time in this RFI, such an
agreement would likely address or provide minimum requirements in the
following areas:
     Service Period: How long the entity or entities would
commit to ensuring availability of security services required to
support the V2V system;
     Organization: Legal/administrative separation between, and
the legal relationship among, CMEs that make up the SCMS;
     Operation: Certificate, security, privacy, audit,
interoperability, and related operational policies;
     Governance: Initially, and on an ongoing basis,
transparent mechanisms for obtaining input on issues relevant to SCMS
constitution and operation from (1) the CMEs that make up the SCMS and
(2) other stakeholders;
     System Access: To ensure support for V2V, V2I, and V2X
applications and users (consumers and manufacturers) in the U.S.,
Canada and Mexico;
     Fees: Service and user classes for V2V, V2I, and V2X users
(consumers and manufacturers);
     Privacy: Controls, enforcement, reporting (internal and to
NHTSA), and data policies that provide clear notice to consumers of
(among other things) what data is being collected, how it is used, and,
for opt-in services, giving consumers control over access to their
data;
     Security: Controls, enforcement, and reporting (internal
and to NHTSA);
     Continuity of Operation: Procedural mechanisms to ensure
continued support for the V2V system;
     Liability/Insurance: Liability and business interruption
insurance;
     Cooperation: Procedures for working with Federal and State
law enforcement and consumer fraud authorities to address any issues
that threaten the system's safety or security.

VII. Specific Questions for This Notice

    Specific questions posed in this notice follow. Respondents are
reminded that feedback on any aspects of this notice is welcome from
all interested public, private, and academic entities. If your
responses relate to how NHTSA should implement a requirement for V2V,
and the agency's authority to require V2V, rather than to the SCMS
issues outlined in this notice, please submit such responses as
comments to the rulemaking docket for the ANPRM (NHTSA-2014-0022)
rather than this docket. While all feedback regarding the agency's
regulatory announcements and the ANPRM is welcome from all parties,
NHTSA is particularly interested, regarding this request for
information, in hearing from those entities interested in establishing
an SCMS. Respondents may respond, to some, all, or none of these
specific questions:
    1. SCMS ownership and operation are inextricably linked to SCMS
governance. DOT research to date has focused on the likelihood of
private ownership and operation of the SCMS ``industry,'' with
governance being largely ``self-governance'' by private industry
participants and stakeholders. Other basic organizational models that
could apply, besides this private model, are: public, and public-
private. What model is most appropriate and what are the risks, if any,
associated with a private ``self-governance'' approach and how would
you mitigate them?
    2. The SCMS has many functions that are needed to establish the
trusted environment required for V2V communications. The SCMS consists
of both central and non-central functions to be carried out by legally
distinct CMEs that can be owned and operated by various individual
entities. What is your interest in helping to establish an SCMS? Which
SCMS functions are you most interested in performing, either on your
own or as part of a larger consortium? What information or other
resources do you need to initiate planning, development, and
implementation of the identified SCMS functions? The agency would also
appreciate respondents providing potential lead times associated with
standing up an SCMS and making it fully operational to support a
national implementation of V2V technology, because lead time will help
the agency understand when V2V technology could potentially be rolled
out most successfully.
    3. In relation to the SCMS Manager function, will the establishment
of either a binding or non-binding ``governance board'' provide the
appropriate level of stakeholder guidance and direction to facilitate a
viable and self-sustaining business entity? If not, why not, and what
additional or other type of governance or oversight might be needed?
    4. In order for the SCMS to function, what standards and policies
applicable to individual CMEs will need to be developed and
implemented? Who do you envision will establish the various standards,
policies, procedures, auditing processes, and other related industry-
wide processes?
    5. NHTSA and DOT anticipate being able to influence the
organization and operation of the SCMS (and thereby ensure adequate
separation to assure secure, privacy appropriate V2V communications)
through some type of agreement with the SCMS Manager or through
participation on an SCMS ``governance board.'' In the ``Legal
Relationship between NHTSA and the SCMS'' section of this Request for
Information, we identify some likely components of an agreement between
NHTSA and the SCMS Manager or entities making up the SCMS. Are there
other components that such an agreement should cover? If so, please
identify them and explain their importance. If the SCMS established a
``governance board,'' how should the board be constituted? Should the
board's decisions be binding on the SCMS? Typically, NHTSA and other
Federal government entities participate as non-voting liaisons or ex
officio members of private boards (NHTSA, for example, regularly
assigns agency employees to be non-voting liaisons on Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) and Transportation Research Board (TRB)
Committees and Boards). Would it be viable for NHTSA to participate in
this manner?
    6. The agency asks respondents to provide their projections of
initial capital investment for SCMS functions overall and components
they may potentially be interested in ``standing up'' and supporting.
    7. Additionally, the agency welcomes feedback on how respondents
envision SCMS financial sustainability and its relation to any data
collection or fees, if any, that would be permitted under the agreement
with DOT.
    8. If you are interested in performing certain functions related to
the SCMS, explain how you would ensure that privacy concerns are
addressed in performance of those functions.

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 30101 et. seq.; 49 CFR 1.95.

    Issued in Washington.
Daniel C. Smith,
Senior Associate Administrator for Vehicle Safety.
[FR Doc. 2014-24482 Filed 10-14-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P


the Secretary determines that the withholding of this information is
contrary to the interest of the national defense. Information required
to be submitted to the Department of Transportation in connection with
the enforcement or administration of the Defense Production Act, this
part, or an official action, is deemed to be confidential under section
705(d) of the Defense Production Act and shall be handled in accordance
with applicable Federal law.

Sec.  33.92  Applicability of this part and official actions.

    (a) This part and all official actions, unless specifically stated
otherwise, apply to transactions in any State, territory, or possession
of the United States and the District of Columbia.
    (b) This part and all official actions apply not only to deliveries
to other persons but also include deliveries to affiliates and
subsidiaries of a person and deliveries from one branch, division, or
section of a single entity to another branch, division, or section
under common ownership or control.
    (c) This part and its schedules shall not be construed to affect
any administrative actions taken by the Department of Transportation,
or any outstanding contracts or orders placed pursuant to any of the
parts, orders, schedules or delegations of authority previously issued
by the Department of Transportation pursuant to authority granted by
the President to the Department under in the Defense Production Act.
Such actions, contracts, or orders shall continue in full force and
effect under this part unless modified or terminated by proper
authority.

Sec.  33.93  Communications.

    All communications concerning this part, including requests for
copies of the part and explanatory information, requests for guidance
or clarification, and requests for adjustment or exception shall be
addressed to the Defense Production Act Activities Coordinator, Office
of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P

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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP15FE11.036

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP15FE11.037

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP15FE11.038

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP15FE11.039

Appendix II to Part 33--Schedule 1 Approved Programs

    The programs listed in this schedule have been approved for
priorities and allocations support under this part by the
Administrator of FEMA. They have equal preferential status.

Approved Program

Program Identification Symbol

[FR Doc. 2011-3209 Filed 2-14-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-C


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34.9241676  114.5803070 34.9241676  114.5802994 34.9387131 8  114.5471878 34.9105682  114.5494080 34.9096184  114.5494385 34.9241562  114.5450592 34.9241524  114.5449524 34.9096413  114.5494080 34.9096184 9  114.5890579 34.9121323  114.5978317 34.9241486  114.5803070 34.9241676  114.5803070 34.9241676  114.5803070 34.9220200  114.5802841 34.9095612  114.5802841 34.9095612  114.5978165 34.9095840  114.5978165 34.9095840  114.5978317 34.9241486 10  114.5581970 34.9098778  114.5625381 34.9095802  114.5625305 34.9168930  114.5542297 34.9169044  114.5538788 34.9169121  114.5538635 34.9096146  114.5625381 34.9095802 11  114.5714111 34.9076805  114.5802841 34.9095612  114.5625381 34.9095802  114.5625381 34.9095802  114.5625763 34.8951225  114.5625763 34.8951225  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5802841 34.9095612 12  114.5536957 34.8949776  114.5625763 34.8951225  114.5448074 34.8950882  114.5448303 34.8806152  114.5448303 34.8806152  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5625763 34.8951225 13  114.5889816 34.8832588  114.5978165 34.8950882  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5801468 34.8805313  114.5801468 34.8805313  114.5977936 34.8805122  114.5977936 34.8805122  114.5978165 34.8950882 14  114.5360870 34.8679924  114.5449142 34.8661079  114.5448685 34.8750000  114.5448303 34.8806152  114.5448303 34.8806152  114.5273209 34.8805580  114.5273132 34.8750000  114.5272675 34.8660736  114.5272675 34.8660736  114.5449142 34.8661079 15  114.5713654 34.8764648  114.5801468 34.8805313  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5625458 34.8750000  114.5626068 34.8661041  114.5626068 34.8661041  114.5801315 34.8661385  114.5801315 34.8661385  114.5801849 34.8749924  114.5801468 34.8805313 16  114.5227890 34.8634758  114.5272675 34.8660736  114.5183334 34.8660736  114.5182953 34.8515854  114.5271683 34.8515816  114.5272675 34.8660736 17  114.5537338 34.8638153  114.5626068 34.8661041  114.5449142 34.8661079  114.5449142 34.8661079  114.5448074 34.8516388  114.5448074 34.8516388  114.5624008 34.8516159  114.5624008 34.8516159  114.5626068 34.8661041 18  114.5386200 34.8379745  114.5448074 34.8516388  114.5315628 34.8516006  114.5315170 34.8479576  114.5271149 34.8479462  114.5271225 34.8371201  114.5414810 34.8371162  114.5427628 34.8371124  114.5585938 34.8327103  114.5597076 34.8344498  114.5447083 34.8399658  114.5448074 34.8516388 19  114.5711441 34.8478661  114.5799484 34.8516083  114.5624008 34.8516159  114.5624008 34.8516159  114.5622635 34.8438187  114.5708542 34.8383942  114.5799561 34.8467484  114.5799484 34.8516083 20  114.5124283 34.8369713  114.5095444 34.8310509  114.5154343 34.8370552  114.5095139 34.8370743  114.5095444 34.8310509 21  114.5436249 34.8221283  114.5447540 34.8080177  114.5447311 34.8156853  114.5652466 34.8242722  114.5609283 34.8245239  114.5398712 34.8226089  114.5271301 34.8225403  114.5271072 34.8153000  114.5270767 34.8080597  114.5355148 34.8080673  114.5447540 34.8080177 22  114.5033569 34.8027916  114.5002823 34.7934036  114.5007935 34.7934303  114.5035858 34.7934952  114.5040207 34.7946930  114.5042419 34.7952538  114.5044479 34.7957191  114.5047607 34.7963829  114.5049286 34.7968102  114.5052338 34.7975769  114.5064011 34.7993126  114.5073166 34.8007164  114.5059967 34.8036385  114.5050812 34.8030701  114.5033722 34.8060493  114.5050201 34.8080368  114.5019455 34.8143997  114.5021057 34.8167686  114.5021973 34.8182564  114.5022354 34.8189125  114.5023727 34.8191299  114.5025864 34.8195229  114.5028763 34.8199997  114.5029907 34.8202896  114.5031509 34.8205681  114.5035858 34.8214378  114.5041809 34.8224945  114.5007935 34.8224792  114.5006866 34.8225327  114.5006943 34.8080177  114.5003662 34.8080254  114.5002823 34.7934036 23  114.5020599 34.7669029  114.5003204 34.7644081  114.5007935 34.7643776  114.5045242 34.7644196  114.5037613 34.7670708  114.5034256 34.7682266  114.5015030 34.7749176  114.5007935 34.7772446  114.5002594 34.7789497  114.5003204 34.7644081 24  114.4959030 34.7626114  114.5003204 34.7644081  114.4914932 34.7644005  114.4915085 34.7553215  114.4974365 34.7613182  114.5003128 34.7623749  114.5003204 34.7644081 50  114.5807419 34.9528999  114.5626144 34.9533615  114.5625916 34.9387283  114.5625916 34.9387283  114.5802994 34.9387131  114.5802994 34.9387131  114.5802765 34.9459610  114.5891113 34.9459915  114.5890884 34.9532890  114.5979156 34.9533081  114.5979080 34.9678764  114.5801544 34.9678764  114.5801544 34.9678764  114.5802307 34.9532623  114.5626144 34.9533615 51  114.5891037 34.9314499  114.5803070 34.9241676  114.5978317 34.9241486  114.5978317 34.9241486  114.5979614 34.9387283  114.5802994 34.9387131  114.5802994 34.9387131  114.5803070 34.9241676 52  114.6066208 34.9169044  114.5978317 34.9241486  114.5978165 34.9095840  114.5978165 34.9095840  114.6148682 34.9096413  114.6154251 34.9119034  114.6155167 34.9241524  114.6155167 34.9241524  114.5978317 34.9241486 53  114.5890350 34.9023132  114.5802841 34.9095612  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5978165 34.8950882  114.5978165 34.8950882  114.5978165 34.9095840  114.5978165 34.9095840  114.5802841 34.9095612 54  114.5713730 34.8878212  114.5625763 34.8951225  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5801468 34.8805313  114.5801468 34.8805313  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5802231 34.8950348  114.5625763 34.8951225 55  114.6065903 34.8878021  114.5978165 34.8950882  114.5977936 34.8805122  114.5977936 34.8805122  114.6153870 34.8805656  114.6153870 34.8805656  114.6153946 34.8950539  114.5978165 34.8950882 56  114.5537186 34.8733559  114.5448303 34.8806152  114.5448685 34.8750000  114.5449142 34.8661079  114.5449142 34.8661079  114.5626068 34.8661041  114.5626068 34.8661041  114.5625458 34.8750000  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5625610 34.8805809  114.5448303 34.8806152 57  114.5889740 34.8733177  114.5801468 34.8805313  114.5801849 34.8749924  114.5801315 34.8661385  114.5801315 34.8661385  114.5978088 34.8660965  114.5978088 34.8660965  114.5977554 34.8750000  114.5977936 34.8805122  114.5977936 34.8805122  114.5801468 34.8805313 58  114.5712738 34.8588638  114.5626068 34.8661041  114.5624008 34.8516159  114.5624008 34.8516159  114.5799484 34.8516083  114.5799484 34.8516083  114.5801315 34.8661385  114.5801315 34.8661385  114.5626068 34.8661041


The Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Applying Aluminum Parts --

Leachable Chromium Data

Facility Name	City	State	Sample Date	Sample ID	Duplicate Indicator Constituent Name	Leachable Actual or Calculated	Analytical Method Leachable Result	Units	Leachable Non-Detect Indicator	Leachable Detection Limit mg/L	Leachable Detection Limit Data Qualifier Description

Ford MI Truck/Wayne Integrated Stamping & Assembly	WAYNE	MI

Drum #5	N	chromium	actual

0.018	mg/L

0.14	J	The associated value is an estimated quantity.

Ford MI Truck/Wayne Integrated Stamping & Assembly	WAYNE	MI

Drum #6	N	chromium	actual

0.031	mg/L

0.2	J	The associated value is an estimated quantity.

GM Flint Truck	FLINT	MI

FT-1	N	chromium	actual

0.19	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Flint Truck	FLINT	MI

FT-2	N	chromium	actual

0.009	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Flint Truck	FLINT	MI

FT-3	N	chromium	actual

0.44	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Flint Truck	FLINT	MI

FT-4	N	chromium	actual

0.057	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Flint Truck	FLINT	MI

FT-5	N	chromium	actual

0.068	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Flint Truck	FLINT	MI

FT-6	N	chromium	actual

0.041	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Flint Truck	FLINT	MI

FT-7	N	chromium	actual

0.53	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Grand River Plant	LANSING	MI

LGR-3	N	chromium	actual

0.0027	mg/L

	GM Grand River Plant	LANSING	MI

LGR-4	N	chromium	actual

0.043	mg/L

	GM Grand River Plant	LANSING	MI

LGR-5	N	chromium	actual

0.017	mg/L

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H1-1	N	chromium	actual

0.027	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H1-2	N	chromium	actual

0.034	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H1-3	N	chromium	actual

0.054	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H1-4	N	chromium	actual

0.044	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H1-5	N	chromium	actual

0.028	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H1-6	N	chromium	actual

0.044	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H1-7	N	chromium	actual

0.037	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H2-1	N	chromium	actual

0.038	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H2-2	N	chromium	actual

0.056	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H2-3	N	chromium	actual

0.06	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H2-4	N	chromium	actual

0.05	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H2-5	N	chromium	actual

0.055	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H2-6	N	chromium	actual

0.053	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Hamtramck Plant	DETROIT	MI

H2-7	N	chromium	actual

0.049	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	12/19/1997	LAN-S01-01	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.089	mg/L

	X	One of the two OWEP metals results was non-detect (TCLP or soxhlet).  The detection level was used in the calculation to be conservative.

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	12/19/1997	LAN-S01-02	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.113	mg/L

	X	One of the two OWEP metals results was non-detect (TCLP or soxhlet).  The detection level was used in the calculation to be conservative.

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	12/19/1997	LAN-S01-03	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.164	mg/L

	X	One of the two OWEP metals results was non-detect (TCLP or soxhlet).  The detection level was used in the calculation to be conservative.

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	1/29/1998	LAN-S02-01	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.135	mg/L

	X	One of the two OWEP metals results was non-detect (TCLP or soxhlet).  The detection level was used in the calculation to be conservative.

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	1/29/1998	LAN-S02-02	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.152	mg/L

	JX	Estimate, one of the two OWEP metals results was non-detect (TCLP or soxhlet).  The detection level was used in the calculation to be conservative.

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	1/29/1998	LAN-S02-03	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.112	mg/L

	JX	Estimate, one of the two OWEP metals results was non-detect (TCLP or soxhlet).  The detection level was used in the calculation to be conservative.

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/16/2000	3880.01	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.0601	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/16/2000	3880.02	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.0449	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/16/2000	3880.03	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.0513	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/16/2000	3880.04	N	chromium actual	Method 6020	0.05	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/16/2000	3880.05 (Dup of 3880.01)	Y	chromium	actual	Method 6020	0.0406	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/1/2001	7454.01	N	chromium actual

0.03	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/1/2001	7454.02	N	chromium actual

0.03	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/1/2001	7454.03	N	chromium actual

0.03	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/1/2001	7454.04	N	chromium actual

0.03	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/1/2001	Dup of 7454.01	Y chromium	actual	Method 6020	0.03	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	10/15/2002	10738.01	N	chromium actual

0.11	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	10/31/2002	10904.01	N	chromium actual

0.17	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	11/25/2002	11180.01	N	chromium actual

0.04	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	12/6/2002	11327.01	N	chromium actual

0.15	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	12/6/2002	11327.02	N	chromium actual

0.11	mg/L

	GM Lansing Assembly Center	LANSING	MI	10/16/2003	S14816.01	N	chromium actual

0.18	mg/L

	GM Lordstown Assembly Plant	LORDSTOWN	OH	12/16/1997	LOR-S01-01	N chromium	actual

0.127	mg/L

	JX	Estimate, ne of the two OWEP metals results (TCLP or soxhlet) was non-detected. The OWEP concentration was calculated by assuming that the sample quantitation limit for the non-detected result was a worst-case contribution.

	GM Lordstown Assembly Plant	LORDSTOWN	OH	12/16/1997	LOR-S01-02	N chromium	actual

0.095	mg/L

	JX	Estimate, ne of the two OWEP metals results (TCLP or soxhlet) was non-detected. The OWEP concentration was calculated by assuming that the sample quantitation limit for the non-detected result was a worst-case contribution.

	GM Lordstown Assembly Plant	LORDSTOWN	OH	12/16/1997	LOR-S01-03	N chromium	actual

0.098	mg/L

	JX	Estimate, ne of the two OWEP metals results (TCLP or soxhlet) was non-detected. The OWEP concentration was calculated by assuming that the sample quantitation limit for the non-detected result was a worst-case contribution.

	GM Lordstown Assembly Plant	LORDSTOWN	OH	12/16/1997	LOR-S01-04	N chromium	actual

0.079	mg/L

	JX	Estimate, ne of the two OWEP metals results (TCLP or soxhlet) was non-detected. The OWEP concentration was calculated by assuming that the sample quantitation limit for the non-detected result was a worst-case contribution.

	GM Lordstown Assembly Plant	LORDSTOWN	OH	6/9/1998	LOR-S02-01	N	chromium actual

0.099	mg/L

	X	One of the two OWEP metals results (TCLP or soxhlet) was non-detected. The OWEP concentration was calculated by assuming that the sample quantitation limit for the non-detected result was a worst-case contribution.

	GM Lordstown Assembly Plant	LORDSTOWN	OH	6/9/1998	LOR-S02-02	N	chromium actual

0.076	mg/L

	X	One of the two OWEP metals results (TCLP or soxhlet) was non-detected. The OWEP concentration was calculated by assuming that the sample quantitation limit for the non-detected result was a worst-case contribution.

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	12/16/1997	OKL-S01-01	N	chromium actual

0.172	mg/L

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	12/16/1997	OKL-S01-02	N	chromium actual

0.159	mg/L

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	12/16/1997	OKL-S01-03	N	chromium actual

0.152	mg/L

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	12/16/1997	OKL-S01-04	N	chromium actual

0.139	mg/L

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	6/11/1998	OKL-S02-01	N	chromium actual

0.063	mg/L

	JX	Estimate, one of the OWEP extractions was ND, final result conservatively calculated using the sample quantitation limit in the final calculation of mobile metals concentration.

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	6/11/1998	OKL-S02-02	N	chromium actual

0.038	mg/L

	X	One of the OWEP extractions was ND, final result conservatively calculated using the sample quantitation limit in the final calculation of mobile metals concentration.

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	6/11/1998	OKL-S02-03	N	chromium actual

0.086	mg/L

	X	One of the OWEP extractions was ND, final result conservatively calculated using the sample quantitation limit in the final calculation of mobile metals concentration.

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	6/11/1998	OKL-S02-04	N	chromium actual

0.056	mg/L

	X	One of the OWEP extractions was ND, final result conservatively calculated using the sample quantitation limit in the final calculation of mobile metals concentration.

	GM Oklahoma City	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	6/11/1998	OKL-S02-05	N	chromium actual

0.039	mg/L

	X	One of the OWEP extractions was ND, final result conservatively calculated using the sample quantitation limit in the final calculation of mobile metals concentration.

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	2/20/1995	UPCU 4103788/255-008 - RB-4	N	chromium	actual

0.009	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	2/20/1995	UPCU 4108183/255-003 - RB-1	N	chromium	actual

0.005	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	2/20/1995	UPCU 4117098/255-004 - RB-2	N	chromium	actual

0.005	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	3/5/1998	FC-1	N	chromium	actual

0.31	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/3/1998	WWTPS I	N	chromium actual

0.01	mg/L

0.01

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/3/1998	WWTPS II	N	chromium actual

0.02	mg/L

0.01

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	9/20/1999	99-20 WWTP #3	N chromium	actual

0.04	mg/L

0.01

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	9/20/1999	99-21 WWTP #4	N chromium	actual

0.02	mg/L

0.01

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/13/2000	SAMPLE #1 COMPOSITE	N chromium	actual

0.17	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/13/2000	SAMPLE #2 COMPOSITE	N chromium	actual

0.17	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/13/2000	SAMPLE #3 COMPOSITE	N chromium	actual

0.16	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/13/2000	SAMPLE #4 COMPOSITE	N chromium	actual

0.098	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/21/2000	COMPOSITE	N	chromium actual

0.36	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	12/28/2000	COMPOSITE	N	chromium actual

0.021	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	1/30/2001	2001 Verification 1	N chromium	actual

0.15	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	1/30/2001	2001 Verification 2	N chromium	actual

0.11	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	3/29/2001	2001 Verification 5	N chromium	actual

0.036	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	4/23/2001	2001 Verification 7	N chromium	actual

0.058	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	8/15/2001	2001 Verification 11	N chromium	actual

0.029	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	10/15/2001	2001 Verification 12 N	chromium	actual

0.078	mg/L

	GM Orion Assembly Center	LAKE ORION	MI	2/12/2002	2002 Verification 1	N chromium	actual

0.29	mg/L

	GM Pontiac East Plant	PONTIAC	MI

PE-1	N	chromium	actual

0.073	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Pontiac East Plant	PONTIAC	MI

PE-2	N	chromium	actual

0.085	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Pontiac East Plant	PONTIAC	MI

PE-3	N	chromium	actual

0.055	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Pontiac East Plant	PONTIAC	MI

PE-4	N	chromium	actual

0.28	mg/L

	GM Pontiac East Plant	PONTIAC	MI

PE-5	N	chromium	actual

0.039	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Pontiac East Plant	PONTIAC	MI

PE-6	N	chromium	actual

0.083	mg/L

	J	Estimate

	GM Pontiac East Plant	PONTIAC	MI

PE-7	N	chromium	actual

0.068	mg/L

	J	Estimate

n

91

	MAXIMUM

0.53

	MEAN

0.0912923

	MEDIAN

0.057

	Std. Dev.

0.0914913

90th Percentile	0.17

	50th Percentile	0.057


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 81 (Thursday, April 27, 2023)]
[Unknown Section]
[Pages 25496-25498]
[FR Doc No: 2023-08905]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket Number USCG-2023-0314]
RIN 1625-AA00

Safety Zone; Cumberland River

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Temporary final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is proposing to establish a temporary safety
zone for certain waters of the Cumberland River. This action is
necessary to provide for the safety of life on the navigable waters of
the Cumberland River near Cadiz, KY. This rule would prohibit persons
and vessels from entering the safety zone unless authorized by the
Captain of the Port Sector Ohio Valley (COTP) or a designated
representative.

DATES: This rule is effective from May 4, 2023, through May 7, 2023.

ADDRESSES: To view documents mentioned in this preamble as being
available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov, type USCG-
2023-0314 in the search box and click ``Search.'' Next, in the Document
Type column, select ``Supporting & Related Material.''

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this rule,
call or email MST1 Evan Dawson, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit
Paducah; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER> x 2113, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Table of Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CUMB Cumberland River
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FR Federal Register
NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking
Sec.  Section
U.S.C. United States Code
CUMB Cumberland River
MM Mile Marker

II. Background Information and Regulatory History

    The Coast Guard is issuing this temporary rule without prior notice
and opportunity to comment pursuant to authority under section 4(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This
provision authorizes an agency to issue a rule without prior notice and
opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those
procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.'' Under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good
cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
with respect to this rule because it is impracticable. This safety zone
must be established by May 4, 2023 and there is a lack of sufficient
time to provide a reasonable comment period and then consider those
comments before issuing the rule.
    Under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), the Coast Guard finds that good cause
exists for making this rule effective less than 30 days after
publication in the Federal Register. Delaying the effective date of
this rule would be contrary to the public interest because immediate
action is needed to respond to the potential safety hazards associated
with a jet ski race.

III. Legal Authority and Need for Rule

    The Coast Guard is issuing this rule under authority in 46 U.S.C.
70034. The Captain of the Port (COTP) Sector Ohio Valley has determined
that potential hazards associated with the large gathering of small
craft vessels on to the Cumberland River (CUMB) MM 55 exists. This rule
is needed to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment in
the navigable waters within the safety zone while the event is
occurring.

IV. Discussion of the Rule

    The COTP is establishing a safety zone from 6 a.m. May 4, 2023, to
5 p.m. on May 7, 2023. The safety zone would cover all navigable waters
within two hundred fifty feet of the racecourse at any point of the
event. The duration of the zone is intended to ensure the safety of
vessels and persons during the event. No vessel or person would be
permitted to enter the safety zone without obtaining permission from
the COTP or a designated representative.

V. Regulatory Analyses

    We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and
Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses
based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders, and we
discuss First Amendment rights of protestors.

A. Regulatory Planning and Review

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits. This rule has not been designated a ``significant
regulatory action,'' under Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, this
rule has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB).
    This regulatory action determination is based on the size,
location, duration, and time-of-day of the safety zone. The Marine
Event will be within a protected cove not utilized for commercial
traffic, causing minimal disruption to vessel traffic. Moreover, the
Coast Guard would issue a Broadcast Notice to Mariners via VHF-FM
marine channel 22-A about the enforcement time of the zone, and the
rule would allow vessels to seek permission to enter the zone.

B. Impact on Small Entities

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, as
amended, requires Federal agencies to consider the potential impact of
regulations on small entities during rulemaking. The term ``small
entities'' comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations
that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than
50,000. The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
    While some owners or operators of vessels intending to transit the
safety zone may be small entities, for the reasons stated in section
V.A above, this rule will not have a significant economic impact on any
vessel owner or operator.
    Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), we want to assist small
entities in understanding this rule. If the rule would affect your
small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have
questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please
call or email the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section.
    Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal
employees who enforce, or otherwise determine compliance with, Federal
regulations to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory
Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory
Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and
rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to
comment on actions by employees of the Coast Guard, call 1-888-REG-FAIR
(1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small
entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or
action of the Coast Guard.

C. Collection of Information

    This rule will not call for a new collection of information under
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

D. Federalism and Indian Tribal Governments

    A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. We have analyzed this rule under that Order and have
determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism
principles and preemption requirements described in Executive Order
13132.
    Also, this rule does not have Tribal implications under Executive
Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on
one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538)
requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary
regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may
result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in
the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (adjusted for
inflation) or more in any one year. Though this rule will not result in
such an expenditure,

we do discuss the effects of this rule elsewhere in this preamble.

F. Environment

    We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security
Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and
Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast
Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f), and have determined that this action is one of
a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment. This rule involves a
safety zone lasting 96 hours that would prohibit entry within two
hundred fifty feet of the event which is inside of a protected cove.
Normally such actions are categorically excluded from further review
under paragraph L60(a) of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual
023-01-001-01, Rev. 1. A Record of Environmental Consideration
supporting this determination is available in the docket. For
instructions on locating the docket, see the ADDRESSES section of this
preamble.

G. Protest Activities

    The Coast Guard respects the First Amendment rights of protesters.
Protesters are asked to call or email the person listed in the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section to coordinate protest activities so
that your message can be received without jeopardizing the safety or
security of people, places or vessels.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165

    Harbors, Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Waterways.

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends
33 CFR part 165 as follows:

PART 165 REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS

0
1. The authority citation for part 165 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  46 U.S.C. 70034, 70051, 70124; 33 CFR 1.05-1, 6.04-
1, 6.04-6, and 160.5; Department of Homeland Security Delegation No.
00170.1, Revision No. 01.3.

0
2. Add Sec.  165.T08-0314 to read as follows:

Sec.  165.T08-0314  Safety Zone; Cumberland River; Cadiz, Kentucky.

    (a) Location. The safety zone will cover all waters on the
Cumberland River within two hundred fifty feet of the marine event,
near Cadiz, KY, during daylight race activities drawing a line from
36[deg]54'43.5'' N 87[deg]59'09.6'' W north west to 36[deg]54'44.9'' N
87[deg]59'12.0'' W, continuing north east to 36[deg]54'53.5'' N
87[deg]59'04.1'' W, and ending at 36[deg]54'47.1'' N 87[deg]58'53.0''
W.
    (b) Effective period. This rule will be effective from 6 a.m. on
May 4, 2023 to 5 p.m. on May 7, 2023.
    (c) Enforcement period. This section will be subject to enforcment
from 6 a.m. on May 4, 2023, and will continue through 5 p.m. on May 7,
2023, or until the hazards associated with the Midamerica Watercross
Championship Race, near Cadiz, KY, have been completed. If there is
inclement weather or other disruptions the U.S. Coast Guard will inform
mariners of the change in enforcement period via Broadcast Notice to
Mariners on VHF-FM channel 16 and on-scene notice.
    (d) Regulations. (1) In accordance with the general regulations in
Sec.  165.23, entry of vessels or persons into the zone during transit
operations is prohibited unless specifically authorized by the Captain
of the Port Sector Ohio Valley (COTP) or designated representative. A
designated representative is a commissioned, warrant, or petty officer
of the U.S. Coast Guard assigned to units under the operational control
of USCG Sector Ohio Valley or a designated Coast Guard Auxiliary unit.
    (2) If permission is granted, all persons and vessels must comply
with the instructions of the COTP or designated representative.

    Dated: April 21, 2023.
H.R. Mattern,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port Sector Ohio Valley.
[FR Doc. 2023-08905 Filed 4-26-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P