[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 126 (Friday, July 1, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 39414-39426]
[FR Doc No: 2022-13469]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 141

[Docket Nos. RM22-16-000 and AD21-13-000]

One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather Vulnerability
Assessments; Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric System
Reliability

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is initiating this
rulemaking to propose to direct transmission providers to submit one-
time informational reports describing their current or planned policies
and processes for conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
The Commission proposes to define extreme weather vulnerability
assessments as analyses that identify where and under what conditions
jurisdictional transmission assets and operations are at risk from the
impacts of extreme weather events, how those risks will manifest
themselves, and what the consequences will be for system operations.
Specifically, the Commission proposes to require transmission providers
to submit a one-time informational report on how they establish a scope
for their extreme weather vulnerability assessments,

develop inputs, identify vulnerabilities and determine exposure to
extreme weather hazards, estimate the costs of impacts, and develop
mitigation measures to address extreme weather risks.

DATES: Initial comments are due August 30, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed in the
following ways. Electronic filing through http://www.ferc.gov, is
preferred.
     Electronic Filing: Documents must be filed in acceptable
native applications and print-to-PDF, but not in scanned or picture
format.
     For those unable to file electronically, comments may be
filed by USPS mail or by hand (including courier) delivery.
    [cir] Mail via U.S. Postal Service Only: Addressed to: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First
Street NE, Washington, DC 20426.
    [cir] Hand (including courier) delivery: Deliver to: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 12225 Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, MD 20852.
    The Comment Procedures Section of this document contains more
detailed filing procedures.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Neal Anderson (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected]
Alyssa Meyer (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

                                                               Paragraph
                                                                 Nos.

I. Introduction.............................................           1
II. Background..............................................          11
    A. Procedural History...................................          11
    B. Need for Reports.....................................          13
III. Discussion.............................................          19
    A. Scope................................................          25
        1. Background.......................................          25
        2. Proposal.........................................          28
    B. Inputs...............................................          29
        1. Background.......................................          29
        2. Proposal.........................................          34
    C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather                35
     Hazards................................................
        1. Background.......................................          35
        2. Proposal.........................................          39
    D. Costs of Impacts.....................................          40
        1. Background.......................................          40
        2. Proposal.........................................          43
    E. Risk Mitigation......................................          44
        1. Background.......................................          44
        2. Proposal.........................................          48
IV. Information Collection Statement........................          49
V. Environmental Analysis...................................          56
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act..............................          57
VII. Comment Procedures.....................................          62
VIII. Document Availability.................................          65

I. Introduction

    1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to require each
transmission provider \1\ to file a one-time informational report
pursuant to Sec.  304 of the Federal Power Act (FPA).\2\ In the one-
time reports, transmission providers would describe their current or
planned policies and processes for conducting extreme weather
vulnerability assessments. The Commission believes that these reports
will assist in its administration of the FPA.
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    \1\ In this NOPR, unless otherwise noted, we use the term
``transmission provider'' to mean any public utility that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce. See 16 U.S.C. 824(e); 18 CFR
35.28. To be clear, this term encompasses public utility
transmission owners that are members of Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTO) and Independent System Operators (ISO).
Accordingly, the reports we are proposing herein would be filed by
the public utility members of RTOs/ISOs, as well as by the RTOs/ISOs
themselves and other public utility transmission providers.
    \2\ 16 U.S.C. 825c. Section 304 of the FPA provides that ``every
public utility shall file with the Commission such annual and other
periodic or special reports as the Commission may by rules and
regulations or order prescribe as necessary or appropriate to assist
the Commission in the proper administration of'' the FPA. Id.
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    2. The reliability of the electric grid is increasingly threatened
by extreme weather events and climate change. While extreme weather has
impacted the electric grid throughout its history, the severity and
frequency of extreme weather events is increasing.\3\ A robust and
growing body of scientific evidence attributes this trend to climate
change and indicates that the tendency toward more frequent and more
severe weather events will persist.\4\ In light of this trend, we
believe it is increasingly important to understand how the risks of
extreme weather to the electric grid are evaluated and mitigated.
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    \3\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National
Centers for Environmental Information ``U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather
and Climate Disasters'' (2022), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/.
    \4\ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change
2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2022); Nat'l Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Attribution of Extreme
Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change (2016); Herring,
S.C., N. Christidis, A. Hoell, M.P. Hoerling, and P.A. Stott, Eds.
Explaining Extreme Events of 2020 from a Climate Perspective. 103
Bulletin Am. Meteor. Soc'y 3 (2022).
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    3. Reliable electric service is vital to the nation's economy,
national security, and public health and safety, and prolonged power
outages can have significant humanitarian consequences, as the nation
witnessed in Texas and the South-Central United States in February 2021
during Winter Storm Uri. More

than four and half million people in Texas alone lost power during the
extreme weather event, and in some cases the outages contributed to a
tragic loss of life.\5\ Additionally, this extreme weather event had a
significant impact to consumers as energy prices rose to historic
levels in the wholesale markets serving Texas and the South-Central
region during the event.\6\
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    \5\ FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Staff Report: The February 2021
Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States 9
(Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-south-central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and.
    \6\ See Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Review of
February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event 22 (2021), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/03/03/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-25-2021.pdf (average system wide pricing during event greater than
$6000/MWh compared to $18-20/MWh in more typical conditions);
Southwest Power Pool, Inc, A Comprehensive Review of SPP's Response
to the February 2021 Winter Storm 72 (2021), https://spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp's%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%2020
21%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf (``SPP experienced
historically high market settlements for the impacted operating
days''); Midcontinent Independent System Operator, The February
Artic Event: Event Details, Lessons Learned, and Implications for
MISO's Reliability Imperative 45 (2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2021%20Arctic%20Event%20Report554429.pdf (Independent Market Monitor
reports average energy prices rose 226 percent in February because
of the Artic Event in February).
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    4. Winter Storm Uri is but one tragic example of the threat extreme
weather is posing across the entire country. In the last two years
alone,\7\ region-wide heat waves, hurricanes, and wildfires have
resulted in outages or other significant reliability impacts, often
while contributing to substantial consumer costs. In August 2020,
California experienced rolling blackouts during a West-wide extreme
heat event that impacted nearly a half million customers.\8\ Hurricane
Ida resulted in outages for more than a million customers across eight
states in August 2021,\9\ with the most severe impacts in Louisiana due
to the collapse of a transmission tower and outage of more than 2,000
miles of transmission lines outside of New Orleans. \10\ Some customers
continued to lack electricity nearly a month after Ida's landfall.\11\
In July 2021, wildfires in Oregon impacted crucial transmission
capacity, limiting the ability to import electricity into California as
temperatures soared above 100 degrees, ultimately triggering emergency
actions to avoid reliability impacts.\12\ At the same time, constrained
conditions on the electric grid that result from such extreme weather
events can increase electricity prices.\13\
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    \7\ Indeed, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) found that all but one of the days in 2020 with the highest
severity risk index, a quantitative measure of the relative severity
of risks to the bulk power system, was attributed to some type of
weather occurrence. NERC, 2021 State of Reliability Report 42
(2021).
    \8\ See California Independent System Operator Corporation,
Final Root Cause Analysis: Mid-August 2020 Extreme Heat Wave 35
(Jan. 13, 2021), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Final-Root-Cause-Analysis-Mid-August-2020-Extreme-Heat-Wave.pdf.
    \9\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Hurricane Ida Caused
At Least 1.2 Million Customers to Lose Power (accessed June 1,
2022), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49556.
    \10\ See S. Van Voorhis, Transmission Tower Destroyed by Ida
Likely to Complicate Power Restoration in New Orleans, Experts Say
(Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/transmission-tower-destroyed-by-ida-likely-to-complicate-power-restoration/605826/.
    \11\ U.S. Department of Energy, Hurricanes Ida and Nicholas
Update # 20 (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-09/TLP-WHITE_DOE%20Situation%20Update_Hurricane%20Ida_20.pdf.
    \12\ See California Independent System Operator Corporation,
California ISO Issues Flex Alert for Monday, July 12 Due to
Wildfires, Heat (July 11, 2021), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/California-ISO-Issues-Flex-Alert-for-Monday-July-12-due-to-Wildfires-Heat.pdf.
    \13\ See e.g., Dale et al., Assessing the Impact of Wildfires on
the California Electricity Grid: A report for California's Fourth
Climate Assessment 16-18 (Aug. 2018), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/Forests_CCCA4-CEC-2018-002_ada.pdf
(estimating multi-million dollar costs increases per event due to
disruption of transmission paths caused by wildfires).
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    5. Looking forward, the threats of extreme weather and climate
change are expected to continue to challenge the reliability of our
electric grid. This upcoming summer, NERC expects extreme drought
conditions and above-average temperatures across wide areas of North
America, resulting in heightened reliability risk.\14\ Drought
increases reliability risk because it can reduce availability of
generation during periods of high peak demand. Drought may impact
energy output from hydro generators as well as generators that depend
upon once-through cooling as low water levels trigger conservation
measures.\15\ Above-average temperatures exacerbate reliability risk by
contributing to prolonged periods of high electricity demand and to
higher forced outage rates for generation and other elements of the
bulk power system. NERC also projects above-normal fire risk across
U.S. South Central states, Northern California, Oregon, and Canada this
summer, which poses the risk of impacts to the transmission system,
potentially reducing output of solar PV generation due to smoke.\16\
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    \14\ NERC, 2022 Summer Reliability Assessment at 4, 7 (May
2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2022.pdf.
    \15\ Id. at 4.
    \16\ Id. at 6, 8.
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    6. NERC also evaluated these risks over the long-term in its
December 2021 Long Term Reliability Assessment and identified extreme
weather among the top risks that stakeholders and policymakers need to
focus on over the next ten years.\17\ NERC concluded in particular that
wide-area and long duration extreme weather events driven by climate
change threaten reliability over the long-term. NERC identified a
combination of factors that make such extreme weather events a threat
to reliability. Changes in climatology and the electrical system can
increase the volatility and uncertainty of electricity demand and thus
the risk that grid operators are unprepared for the peak demands that
accompany extreme weather. Further, when extreme temperatures extend
over a wide area for a long duration, resources can be strained across
multiple regions simultaneously, increasing the risk of shortfalls. At
the same time, transmission networks can become stressed by wide-area
events such as storms, wildfires, or heat waves, limiting imports of
electricity that could relieve shortfalls. Both weather-dependent
variable energy resources and thermal generation face risks of reduced
output or increased outages due to extreme weather events (e.g., frozen
equipment, poor hydrological conditions).\18\ While the nature of
extreme weather and the extent of transmission impairments will vary
across different regions of the United States, no region will be
unaffected.
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    \17\ NERC, 2021 Long-term Reliability Assessment at 5-6 (Dec.
2021), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2021.pdf.
    \18\ Id. at 23-26.
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    7. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in
May 2021 stating that climate change is expected to have far-reaching
effects on the electricity grid that could cost billions and could
affect the ability of grid operators to transmit electricity.\19\ GAO
identified potential impacts of climate change-driven extreme weather
to the grid in every region of the United States, and discussed the
risk that, absent measures to increase resilience, more frequent and
severe weather associated with climate change may increase outages,
imposing billions of dollars in additional costs to utility

customers. GAO recommended that the Commission take steps to identify
or assess climate change risks to the grid in order to ensure it is
well-positioned to determine the actions needed to enhance resilience
to those risks.\20\
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    \19\ GAO, Electricity Grid Resilience: Climate Change Is
Expected to Have Far-Reaching Effects and DOE and FERC Should Take
Actions (Mar. 2021), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-423t (GAO
Report).
    \20\ Id. at 18-19, 47.
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    8. In light of recent extreme weather events which demonstrate
their potential to substantially impact the reliability of the bulk
power system and jurisdictional rates, as well as the series of
assessments \21\ concluding that climate change and extreme weather are
expected to pose an ongoing and increasing threat to the electricity
grid, we believe that a greater understanding of actions to assess the
vulnerabilities of jurisdictional transmission assets and operations to
extreme weather events is necessary to carry out our responsibilities
under the FPA.\22\ Therefore, we propose to direct transmission
providers to submit one-time informational reports describing their
current or planned policies and processes for conducting extreme
weather vulnerability assessments and developing solutions for
mitigating identified extreme weather risks.
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    \21\ See supra notes 14, 17 & 19.
    \22\ 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824o.
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    9. Requiring transmission providers to submit a one-time
informational report on their current or planned efforts to assess the
vulnerabilities of their jurisdictional transmission assets and
operations to extreme weather events is necessary for ensuring just and
reasonable rates. Requiring one-time reports on this information will
also enhance transparency as well as provide opportunities for sharing
best practices among transmission providers. Therefore, we propose to
direct transmission providers to submit one-time informational reports
describing their current or planned policies and processes for
conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
    10. For the purposes of this rulemaking, we propose to define an
extreme weather vulnerability assessment as any analysis that
identifies where and under what conditions jurisdictional transmission
assets and operations are at risk from the impacts of extreme weather
events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and what the
consequences will be for transmission system operations.\23\ We propose
to require that these one-time informational reports be filed 90 days
after the publication of any final rule in this proceeding in the
Federal Register. We also propose to seek public comment on the reports
30 days after they are filed.
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    \23\ See infra P 20.
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II. Background

A. Procedural History

    11. On March 5, 2021, the Commission issued an initial Notice of
Technical Conference stating that Commission staff would convene a
technical conference to discuss issues surrounding the threat to
electric system reliability posed by climate change and extreme weather
events.\24\ On March 15, 2021, the Commission issued a Supplemental
Notice inviting pre-technical conference comments.\25\
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    \24\ March 5, 2021 Notice of Technical Conference, Docket No.
AD21-13-000.
    \25\ March 15, 2021 Supplemental Notice of Technical Conference
Inviting Comments, Docket No. AD21-13-000.
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    12. During the technical conference, held on June 1 and 2, 2021,
the Commission heard from utility executives, RTOs/ISOs and market
monitor executives, state regulators and energy officials, and energy
policy and reliability experts, as well as climatologists.
Subsequently, a Notice Inviting Post-Technical Conference Comments was
issued on August 11, 2021.\26\ Panelists and commenters agreed that
electric system planning processes need adjustment to adequately
address the threat posed by climate change and extreme weather.
Although individual utilities and states facing these threats can and
do adjust their planning, operations, and restoration practices in
response to climate change, there was widespread agreement that regular
and ongoing information sharing and coordination across jurisdictions
will be critical.\27\ Panelists also recommended that such sharing not
be limited to lessons learned, insofar as ongoing information sharing
could also benefit entities developing climate models (e.g., the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)) that may not
always know what information is relevant to electric system planners
and their stakeholders. Finally, there was agreement that the
Commission should play a role in facilitating information sharing among
industry stakeholders and government agencies.\28\
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    \26\ August 11, 2021 Notice Inviting Post-Technical Conference
Comments, Docket No. AD21-13-000.
    \27\ See, e.g., June 2, 2021 Tr. 127 (Wayland), 129-130
(Howard); Columbia/EDF Pre-Conference Comments at 2; PJM Pre-
Conference Comments at 6-9; East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc.
Pre-Conference Comments at 6-8; CPUC Pre-Conference Comments at 19;
Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich Pre-Conference Comments at 11-12, 20;
Exelon Pre-Conference Comments at 23-24.
    \28\ See, e.g., June 2, 2021 Tr. 127 (Wayland), 127-128
(Scripps), 129-130 (Howard), 132 (Terry); Exelon Pre-Conference
Comments at 34; NARUC Pre-Conference Comments at 5-6.
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B. Need for Reports

    13. Extreme weather events place the reliability of electric
service at risk. As discussed above, the United States has witnessed
several instances over just the past few years of how extreme weather
has severely impacted several regions of the nation. The consequences
to the electric system have included rolling blackouts, more extensive
service disruptions, limited transmission capacity, and damaged
electric infrastructure. These types of impacts not only harm system
reliability and strain the grid, but they also affect Commission-
jurisdictional rates. Moreover, the frequency and severity of extreme
weather has been increasing--and is likely to continue to increase--and
we are concerned that system reliability could be further jeopardized
and that jurisdictional rates could be further affected.\29\
Accordingly, we believe that, to assist in our administration of the
FPA, it is critically important for the Commission to understand how
transmission providers assess their vulnerabilities to extreme weather
events. As we explain below, requiring transmission providers to submit
a one-time report providing the information sought in this NOPR will
enhance the Commission's ability to fulfill its obligations under the
FPA.
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    \29\ NERC's reports on both short-term and long-term weather
issues discussed above highlight our concern regarding the impact of
extreme weather on system reliability, as well as our concern that
such events are likely to increase in severity of frequency.
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    14. Although the technical conference and technical conference
comments underscored the importance of planning appropriately for
extreme weather, the record to date does not provide the Commission
with a clear understanding of whether and to what extent transmission
providers are currently conducting, or planning to conduct, extreme
weather vulnerability assessments, the method(s) used to conduct those
assessments, and what is done with the information from those
assessments.\30\ Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which
transmission providers regularly assess their vulnerabilities to
extreme weather

events.\31\ But given the severe impacts resulting from extreme
weather, as discussed above, we believe the Commission needs a better
understanding of what transmission providers are doing--or not doing--
with respect to assessing and mitigating extreme weather risks.
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    \30\ Based on the record developed during the technical
conference, this practice does not appear to be widespread among
transmission providers. For example, of the six jurisdictional RTOs/
ISOs, only New York Independent System Operator, Inc. appears to
have conducted such an assessment. Therefore, we believe that the
proposed one-time informational reporting requirement will provide
the necessary information for the Commission to understand the
extent to which transmission providers are performing these
assessments.
    \31\ We recognize that transmission providers may be undertaking
such vulnerability assessments. See, e.g., Entergy Corporation
(Entergy) Post-Conference Reply Comments at 1. But we nonetheless do
not have much visibility into whether and how each transmission
provider undertakes such assessments, and we propose to remedy that
concern here.
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    15. We are issuing this NOPR under Sec.  304 of the FPA, which
allows the Commission to order reports as the Commission may prescribe
as ``necessary or appropriate to assist the Commission in the proper
administration of'' the FPA.\32\ We believe that our proposal here does
precisely that because it will help ensure that the Commission fulfills
its statutory obligations with respect to system reliability and just
and reasonable rates. Under the FPA, the Commission is responsible for
overseeing the development and enforcement of reliability standards for
the Bulk-power System.\33\ The Commission must also ensure that the
rates, terms, and conditions of Commission-jurisdictional services are
just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.\34\
The reports we propose to require will enhance the Commission's
understanding of whether, and if so, how transmission providers are
assessing risks to transmission assets and operations as a result of
extreme weather events. As noted above, we believe it is important for
the Commission to understand whether and to what extent such
assessments are being conducted to assist the Commission in the proper
administration of the FPA.
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    \32\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
    \33\ Id. 824o.
    \34\ Id. 824d, 824e.
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    16. For example, the failure to assess and mitigate the risks of
extreme weather could increase the frequency of loss of load events and
also impact consumers who could not only experience increased frequency
of power outages but would also ultimately bear the financial burden to
regularly rebuild damaged infrastructure or to pay for solutions that
may be more costly than solutions that could have been identified
through a more proactive, forward-looking process. Extreme weather
events can also lead to extreme prices for wholesale electricity.\35\
Notwithstanding these potentially severe impacts, the record in this
proceeding does not indicate that most transmission providers have
robust policies and processes for assessing and mitigating extreme
weather vulnerabilities.
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    \35\ During Winter Storm Uri, both the Midcontinent Independent
System Operator and the Southwest Power Pool experienced prices
exceeding the $2,000/MWh cap on incremental energy offers. FERC
Staff, 2021 State of the Markets Report, p. 30 (issued Apr. 21,
2022).
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    17. Additionally, transmission providers may face adverse impacts
to their credit ratings and increased insurance costs, which could
ultimately flow through into transmission rates. For example, credit
rating agencies like Standard & Poor's and Moody's have added
``resiliency'' as a component of their rating criteria, indicating the
relevance of extreme weather risk for creditworthiness.\36\ Similarly,
transmission providers could increasingly seek access to a higher level
of insurance to cope with potential damage from more frequent and
destructive weather-related events.\37\ Finally, we believe that the
one-time informational reports proposed in this NOPR will facilitate
the sharing of best practices among transmission providers and their
stakeholders for conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
At the technical conference, several commenters and panelists noted the
importance of coordination and information sharing between entities in
order to better assess and plan for extreme weather risks.\38\ The
information in these reports could serve as the basis for further
information sharing and coordination, which could lead to improved or
more robust assessments and thereby better avoid the adverse rate
impacts discussed above.
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    \36\ F. Shafroth, Climate Change and Credit Ratings (Dec. 10,
2015), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-climate-change-credit-ratings.html.
    \37\ See, e.g., Oregon Public Utility Commission Pre-Conference
Comments at 6-7, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Pre-Conference Comments at 1-3.
    \38\ See June 2, 2021 Tr. 102-103 (Moskowitz); Columbia/EDF Pre-
Conference Comments at 2; PJM Pre-Conference Comments at 6-9.
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    18. Extreme weather events are occurring more frequently than ever
before, and those events bring increased threats to system reliability
and impacts on jurisdictional rates. Consistent with the GAO's
recommendation noted above, the Commission needs to be well-positioned
to take appropriate action consistent with its FPA obligations, if
necessary. We believe that the reports we are proposing to require in
this NOPR will help provide us with information necessary to assist us
in administering the FPA.

III. Discussion

    19. We propose to require transmission providers to submit one-time
informational reports describing their current or planned policies and
processes for conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments and
mitigating identified extreme weather risks within 90 days of the
publication of any final rule in this proceeding in the Federal
Register. We propose to seek public comment on the reports 30 days
after they are filed.
    20. For the purposes of this proposed rulemaking, we propose to
define an extreme weather vulnerability assessment as any analysis that
identifies where and under what conditions jurisdictional transmission
assets and operations are at risk from the impacts of extreme weather
events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and what the
consequences will be for transmission system operations. Such
assessments can take different forms: they may be qualitative or
quantitative; they may be performed on a periodic or ad hoc basis; and
they may cover a narrower or broader range of extreme weather threats.
The extreme weather threats analyzed by these reports may include those
extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change (e.g., extended
heat waves or storm surge due to sea level rise).
    21. Transmission providers may then use such extreme weather
vulnerability assessments to develop mitigation in the form of extreme
weather resilience plans, which outline measures to reduce the risk to
vulnerable assets and operations. Extreme weather resilience efforts
can take many forms, but generally involve both measures to prevent or
minimize damage to vulnerable assets (e.g., investments in asset
hardening or relocation) and to manage the consequences of such damage
when it occurs (e.g., investments in system recoverability).\39\
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    \39\ R.M. Webb, M. Panfil, and S. Ladin, Climate Risk in the
Electric Sector: Legal Obligations to Advance Climate Resilience
Planning by Electric Utilities 10 (Dec. 2020), https://perma.cc/V25A-KBNP.
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    22. To be clear, we do not intend in this NOPR to require
transmission providers to conduct extreme weather vulnerability
assessments where they do not do so already, or to require transmission
providers to change how they conduct or plan to do such
assessments.\40\ Instead, the goal of this

proceeding is to gather information, not to establish new requirements.
In addition, we do not propose that transmission providers submit the
results of their extreme weather vulnerability assessments or include
lists of affected assets and operations, specific vulnerabilities, or
asset- or operation-specific mitigations in the informational reports
proposed by this NOPR. Rather, we propose that the one-time
informational reports focus on describing the current or planned
policies and processes that respondents have in place, or plan to
implement, to assess and mitigate extreme weather risks. We believe
that this focus of the proposed one-time informational reports should
avoid the need for respondents to file Critical Energy/Electric
Infrastructure Information. However, to the extent transmission
providers believe that information they will submit warrants
protections, they may make a request for such treatment pursuant to
Sec. Sec.  388.112 and 388.113 of the Commission's regulations.\41\
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    \40\ Similarly, while we propose that transmission providers may
describe what they ``plan'' to do with respect to various issues,
this is meant only to capture plans that have been made, but not yet
been implemented; transmission providers are not required to
speculate on how they would conduct extreme weather vulnerability
analysis where they have no plans to do so.
    \41\ 18 CFR 388.112-113. Section 388.112 of the Commission's
regulations specifies that any person submitting a document to the
Commission may request privileged treatment for some or all of the
information contained in a particular document that it claims is
exempt from the mandatory public disclosure requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act, and that should be withheld from public
disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. 552. Section 388.113 of the Commission's
regulations governs the procedures for submitting, designating,
handling, sharing, and disseminating Critical Energy/Electric
Infrastructure Information submitted to or generated by the
Commission.
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    23. Although commenters in Docket No. AD21-13-000 have referenced
previously published guidance on conducting vulnerability
assessments,\42\ insufficient data exists to establish best practices.
Therefore, we seek comments on our approach in directing such one-time
informational reports, the proposed topics and questions discussed
below, and the burden associated with submitting these reports. As
further described below, we propose the one-time reports to address:
(1) Scope; (2) Inputs; (3) Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme
Weather Hazards; (4) Costs of Impacts; and (5) Risk Mitigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Department of Energy, Office of Energy Policy and Systems
Analysis, Climate Change and the Electricity Sector: Guide for
Climate Resilience Planning (Sept. 2016), https://toolkit.climate.gov/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Electricity%20Sector%20Guide%20for%20Climate%20Change%20Resilience%20Planning%20September%202016_0.pdf
(DOE Guide); CPUC, Climate Adaptation in the Electric Sector:
Vulnerability Assessments & Resiliency Plans (Jan 2016), https://perma.cc/R6NW-F6GV (CPUC Guide); J. Gundlach and R. Webb, Climate
Change Impacts on the Bulk Power System: Assessing Vulnerabilities
and Planning for Resilience (Feb 2018), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2018/02/Gundlach-Webb-2018-02-CC-Bulk-Power-System.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. While not all extreme weather vulnerability assessments must
follow the same processes or include the same analyses, we understand
the aforementioned topics to reflect typical practices and
considerations in the development of extreme weather vulnerability
assessments. Therefore, should respondents' processes and policies for
developing their own extreme weather vulnerability assessments differ
from those we describe below, we propose to require that transmission
providers still describe in their one-time reports the processes and
policies which most closely align with the intent or aim of the topics
discussed below.

A. Scope

1. Background
    25. Determining the scope of an extreme weather vulnerability
assessment depends on the breadth of assets, operations, and extreme
weather hazards that a transmission provider faces in its specific
area. A narrower scope (i.e., examining a subset of assets and
operations, extreme weather hazards, or geographic regions in greater
depth) can produce important insights related to specific facilities,
systems, or regions, whereas a broader scope is more likely to identify
system- and company-wide risks. For example, although Hurricane Sandy
in 2012 initially motivated Consolidated Edison, Inc. (ConEd) to
conduct its 2019 climate change vulnerability assessment, ConEd sought
in its study to understand the broader impact of a changing climate on
its service area and identified additional climate vulnerabilities
including sea level rise, inland flooding due to increased
precipitation, and extreme heat events.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ ConEd, Climate Change Vulnerability Study 4 (Dec. 2019),
https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. As part of scoping the extreme weather vulnerability
assessment, transmission providers have the flexibility to choose the
assets and operations to examine for their assessment. For example,
some transmission providers focus their analyses on assets and
operations related to critical electric infrastructure and/or assets
and operations that meet or exceed some MW or other threshold.\44\
Furthermore, transmission providers may use discretion to determine
what extreme weather hazards and geographic scope to consider in their
vulnerability assessment. Transmission providers could also consider
external vulnerabilities in their assessment, such as those related to
consumers, interconnected utilities, and supply chains. For example,
with respect to external vulnerabilities, PG&E examined not only its
own assets, but upstream interdependencies, including regional bulk
electric and natural gas systems, water availability, telecommunication
utilities, and supply chains, as well as downstream interdependencies
like community- and customer-level resiliency.\45\ With respect to
geographic scope, although Entergy's service territory and assets
extend across multiple states, its assessment, conducted with partners,
focused exclusively on the 77 counties bordering the Gulf of Mexico.
This specific geographic scope allowed Entergy and its partners to
study the hazards unique to the Gulf region, driven by sea level rise,
land subsidence, and increasing hurricane intensity.\46\ A wider
geographic scope may consider wide-area and long duration extreme
weather events, such as the August 2020 West-wide extreme heat event
described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ National Grid and Dominion Energy Virginia, for example,
have focused specifically on substation flooding risk resulting from
sea level rise and severe storms because of the relatively higher
impact of substation loss compared to other assets like individual
distribution lines. DOE Office of Energy Policy and Systems
Analysis, A Review of Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment:
Current Practices and Lessons Learned from DOE's Partnership for
Energy Sector Climate Resilience 8 (May 2016), https://toolkit.climate.gov/sites/default/files/A%20Review%20of%20Climate%20Change%20Vulnerability%20Assessments%20Current%20Practices%20and%20Lessons%20Learned%20from%20DOEs%20Partnership%20for%20Energy%20Sector%20Climate%20Resilience.pdf (DOE
Vulnerability Assessment Review).
    \45\ PG&E, Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment and
Resilience Strategies 18 (Nov. 2016), https://www.pgecurrents.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/PGE_climate_resilience_report.pdf.
    \46\ Entergy, Building a Resilient Gulf Coast: Executive Report
(2010), https://www.entergy.com/userfiles/content/our_community/environment/GulfCoastAdaptation/Building_a_Resilient_Gulf_Coast.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. Finally, a transmission provider may engage a broad set of
stakeholders early in the scoping process to identify particularly
susceptible regions in their footprint and increase support for any
resilience actions that result from the extreme weather vulnerability
assessment.\47\ The Oregon Department of Energy, for example, engaged
stakeholders from vulnerable and underserved communities in its climate

vulnerability assessment in order to incorporate equity concerns and
examine the extent to which underserved and vulnerable groups are
disproportionately impacted by these risks.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ DOE Guide at 8-15.
    \48\ Oregon Department of Energy, 2020 Biennial Energy Report 28
(Nov. 2020), https://www.oregon.gov/energy/Data-and-Reports/Documents/2020-Biennial-Energy-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Proposal
    28. As a threshold matter, we propose that each transmission
provider state whether it conducts extreme weather vulnerability
analyses. Further, we propose to require each transmission provider to
provide the following information on the policies and processes they
employ, or plan to employ, for determining the scope of extreme weather
vulnerability assessments:
    (Q1) A description of the types of extreme weather events for which
the transmission provider conducts, or plans to conduct, extreme
weather vulnerability assessments, if any. For transmission providers
that conduct, or plan to conduct, such assessments, a description of
how the transmission provider determined which extreme weather hazards
to include in the assessment (e.g., extreme storms such as hurricanes
and the associated flooding and high winds, wildfires, extreme
prolonged heat or cold, or drought conditions);
    (Q2) A description of how the transmission provider selects, or
plans to select, the set of assets and operations that will be
examined;
    (Q3) A description of how the transmission provider determines, or
plans to determine, the geographic or regional scope of the analysis;
    (Q4) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission
provider considers, or plans to consider, external interdependencies,
such as interconnected utilities, other critical infrastructure sectors
(e.g., water, telecommunications) and supply chain-related
vulnerabilities, in the assessment;
    (Q5) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission
provider coordinates, or plans to coordinate, with neighboring
utilities and/or entities in other sectors that could potentially be
relevant to the assessment;
    (Q6) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission
provider engages, or plans to engage, with stakeholders in the scoping
phase of the assessment, including the processes used to identify and
engage relevant stakeholder groups and incorporate stakeholder feedback
into the extreme weather vulnerability assessment, especially with
regard to disadvantaged or vulnerable communities.

B. Inputs

1. Background
    29. As noted above, the processes for conducting extreme weather
vulnerability assessments may vary; however, there are several types of
key inputs that are likely to be part of such assessments. First, most
assessments require meteorological data that support and describe how
the extreme weather hazards selected for study during the scoping phase
may specifically manifest in the study region (e.g., local storm surge
projections for the next 50 years, historical drought data, projected
temperature data). In some cases, such data may be readily available,
or in cases where existing extreme weather projections are inadequate
to support a transmission provider's vulnerability assessment, new
projections may be generated by consulting a modeling group (typically
academic institutions or consulting firms).
    30. Second, transmission providers can elect to use scenario
analyses to explore how the set of potentially vulnerable assets and
operations may vary across a range of assumed extreme weather hazards
and other modeling inputs. Transmission providers may opt to study a
single scenario or multiple scenarios based on previous modeling
efforts; for example, in its internal climate vulnerability assessment,
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) compiled multiple projections
for temperature, rainfall patterns, drought, and sea level rise in its
service territory to explore potential impacts in 2050 and 2100.\49\
Alternatively, transmission providers may take a probabilistic approach
whereby probability distributions are developed and forecast for each
parameter (e.g., precipitation, windspeed). This approach is more
computationally advanced but can help produce granular, quantitative
risk assessments that capture a wider range of potential variation and
outcomes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ DOE Vulnerability Assessment Review at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    31. Third, the relevant attributes of the assets and operations
that will be studied are additional key inputs into an extreme weather
vulnerability assessment that may affect whether, and to what extent,
these assets and operations exhibit vulnerabilities under the
conditions being studied. For example, the potential vulnerability of a
transmission tower to extreme wind may vary based on its height, age,
and other known or foreseeable parameters. Example asset attributes
could include, among others, age, design lifetime, location, elevation,
and replacement costs, while example operations attributes could
include type and number of staff, locations of critical staff and
facilities, and maintenance schedules.
    32. Fourth, transmission providers have the flexibility to decide
the timeframe(s) to be considered by the vulnerability assessment
(e.g., the next 10 years, or a sampling of specific one-year
periods).\50\ The selected timeframe(s) may affect or be affected by
the transmission provider's choices with other study inputs (e.g.,
relevant datasets may not be available for a study of potential
vulnerabilities 100 years into the future).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ For example, in their internal climate vulnerability
assessments, Entergy studied the following 45 years while Seattle
City Light studied years 2030 and 2050. Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Lastly, if transmission providers analyze the potential
financial implications of extreme weather impacts, they could use a
discount rate that will convert the costs of potential impacts on
identified vulnerable assets and operations at different points in time
into equivalent values in a base year (i.e., present dollars).\51\
Discount rates could also inform transmission provider efforts to
compare the costs of extreme weather events to the benefits of
mitigation actions over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ William Pizer and Richard Newell, Discounting the Benefits
of Climate Change Mitigation: How Much Do Uncertain Rates Increase
Valuations? 2 (Dec. 2001), https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2001/12/econ_discounting.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Proposal
    34. We propose to direct each transmission provider to provide the
following information about the inputs it uses, or plans to use, for
any extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
    (Q9) A description of methods and processes the transmission
provider uses, or plans to use, to determine the meteorological data
needed for its assessment. In particular, how the transmission provider
determines whether it can rely on existing extreme weather projections,
and if so, whether such projections are adequately robust;
    (Q10) A description of how the transmission provider determines
whether to use scenario analysis, and if so, whether to do so with
multiple scenarios;
    (Q11) The extent to which it reviews neighboring transmission
providers' extreme weather vulnerability assessments, if available, to
evaluate the consistency of extreme weather

projections between transmission providers;
    (Q12) The timeframe(s) and discount rate(s) selected for the
extreme weather vulnerability assessment;
    (Q13) A description of the methods and processes the transmission
provider uses, or plans to use, to create an inventory of potentially
vulnerable assets and operations.

C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards

1. Background
    35. Extreme weather vulnerability assessments can include an
analysis of the assets or operations exposed to the types of extreme
weather hazards established in the assessment's scope (e.g., hurricanes
and associated flooding, and high winds, wildfires, extreme prolonged
heat or cold, drought conditions), the sensitivities of transmission
assets and operations to extreme weather events, and the magnitude of
any impacts to the transmission system caused by extreme weather
events. In assessing the exposure to extreme weather events,
transmission providers may estimate the likelihood and extent of damage
or disruption to their transmission assets and operations if various
extreme weather events occur.
    36. In extreme weather vulnerability assessments, transmission
providers generally use probability distributions or other quantitative
estimates to examine how a particular asset or operation would be
affected under a specific extreme weather event or combination of
events.\52\ The sensitivity of an asset or operation to a specific
extreme weather event depends on both the type and severity of the
event (e.g., the force of a wave during a hurricane or temperature
during a heat wave) and the type, configuration, or attributes of the
asset or operation itself (e.g., the physical resilience of a
transmission tower to increased wind speeds or wave force).\53\ In
cases where it is difficult to estimate the likelihood or severity of
damage or disruption given the occurrence of an extreme weather impact,
transmission providers may provide a best estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ CPUC Guide at 15.
    \53\ DOE Guide at 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Rather than attempting to analyze the likelihood of damage,
disruption or failure for all transmission assets and operations,
transmission providers may instead use a screening analysis to identify
critical thresholds at which extreme weather hazard(s) would likely
render an asset or operation vulnerable based on the relevant
attributes determined in the sensitivity analysis. If a screening
analysis identifies potential vulnerabilities among assets and
operations considered especially significant or critical, transmission
providers conducting vulnerability assessments could supplement their
analysis with a more detailed review of the specific assets and
operations.
    38. Once these vulnerabilities are identified, transmission
providers may estimate the magnitude of the impacts that would cause
damage or disruption to assets or operations triggered by various
extreme weather hazards. For example, NERC acknowledges that various
conditions could lead to loss of resources, including extreme cold
temperatures and wind that can cause wellhead, processing plant, or
compressor station freezing or ambient temperature conditions that are
outside the operating temperatures for the asset.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ NERC Post-Conference Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Proposal
    39. We propose to direct each transmission provider to provide the
following information about the methods or processes it uses, or plans
to use, in its extreme weather vulnerability assessment to assess the
vulnerability of its transmission assets and operations to extreme
weather events.
    (Q14) A description of how the transmission provider identifies the
transmission assets or operations vulnerable to the extreme weather
events for which it conducts assessments;
    (Q15) A description of how the transmission provider uses, or plans
to use, screening analyses to test for potential vulnerabilities, as
well as how the transmission provider examines, or plans to examine,
the sensitivities of the transmission assets and operations being
studied to types and magnitudes of extreme weather events.

D. Costs of Impacts

1. Background
    40. The aggregate economic effects of climate change and extreme
weather on energy infrastructure could be trillions of dollars over the
next few decades, including the costs of power outages to utility
customers and costs to rebuild from storm damage, among others.\55\
These costs are a function of the estimated exposure of the impacted
assets, their geographical locations, the severity of associated
extreme weather impacts, other potential location-specific factors, and
the study's timeframe and assumed discount rate (used for converting
costs to net present value). These costs may be further broken up into
direct and indirect costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ GAO Report at 19; Deloitte, The Turning Point: A New
Economic Climate in the United States 15 (Jan. 2022), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/about-deloitte/us-the-turning-point-a-new-economic-climate-in-the-united-states-january-2022.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    41. In this proceeding, we define direct costs as the economic
losses borne by the transmission provider. Direct costs may include
expenditures and administrative and labor costs associated with
responding to and resolving extreme weather impacts, such as the costs
of repairing, replacing, or relocating an asset. Direct costs may also
include the transmission provider's opportunity costs of lost sales
during an outage.\56\ Transmission providers may arrive at a rough
estimate of direct costs by assuming that impacted vulnerable assets
would be damaged beyond repair and calculating their associated
replacement costs. Alternatively, a more detailed analysis could
examine how costs vary as a function of impact severity for specific
assets and operations.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ DOE Guide at 43.
    \57\ Id. at 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. Depending on the scope of the extreme weather vulnerability
assessment, transmission providers may also consider indirect costs,
which we define in this proceeding as costs associated with loss of
service to utility customers.\58\ For example, relevant indirect costs
may include equipment damage, spoilage, and health and safety
effects.\59\ Value of lost load calculations, which estimate the value
that customers place on reliable electricity service, are a common
method for quantitatively estimating indirect costs.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Relatedly, transmission providers may also consider induced
costs that do not directly affect their ratepayers, such as
increased prices for consumer goods and effects on interdependent
sectors like water and transportation. However, we assume that
induced costs would likely be beyond the scope of most transmission
providers' extreme weather vulnerability assessments because they do
not directly affect ratepayers or the prudence of transmission
provider investments. Id. at 45.
    \59\ Id. at 45-46.
    \60\ See, e.g., Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized
Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 FR 64100 (Oct. 28, 2008), 125
FERC ] 61,071, at P 208 (2008) (describing the Commission's
contemplated reforms ``to ensure that the market price for energy
accurately reflects the value of such energy during an operating
reserve shortage'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Proposal
    43. We propose to direct each transmission provider to provide the
following information on how it estimates, or plans to estimate, the
costs associated with extreme weather

impacts in its extreme weather vulnerability assessments:
    (Q16) A description of the methodology or process, if any, the
transmission provider uses, or plans to use, to estimate the potential
costs of extreme weather impacts on identified vulnerable assets and
operations;
    (Q17) If the transmission provider estimates such potential costs,
a description of the types of: (a) direct costs, such as replacements
or repair costs, restoration costs, associated labor costs, or
opportunity costs of lost sales, and (b) indirect costs, such as costs
associated with loss of service to electric customers and other
utilities that purchase power from the transmission provider, including
equipment damage, spoilage, and health and safety effects,\61\ in
calculating the costs of extreme weather impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ DOE Guide at 43-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Risk Mitigation

1. Background
    44. In general, the overall vulnerability of the transmission
system is a function of the estimated exposure of vulnerable assets and
operations to extreme weather threats and the estimated impact of those
threats. For example, the failure of an asset that is highly exposed to
a particular extreme weather risk may not materially increase the
overall vulnerability of the system if there are other redundant assets
that perform similar system functions. Conversely, the failure of a
pivotal asset (i.e., not backed by redundant assets) with relatively
low exposure to a particular extreme weather risk may nonetheless pose
significant operational challenges if such failure were to occur.
    45. Some transmission providers consider the potential degradation
or failure of key assets and operations due to various extreme weather
threats by using likelihood-consequence matrices to categorize
vulnerable assets and operations based on: (1) the likelihood that the
asset or operation is impacted by an extreme weather event or change in
climatic parameter (e.g., severe storms and flooding, ambient heat
increase, sea-level rise); and (2) the estimated associated
consequences for overall system performance. This approach can reveal
the need to replace certain assets, deficiencies in current asset and
operational performance standards, or the potential for stranded
assets.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ CPUC Guide at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. Under this approach, transmission providers may further define
illustrative anchors for these categories to foster a consistent
interpretation under this approach. For example, Public Service
Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) chose to map vulnerabilities onto a
likelihood-consequence matrix composed of six likelihood categories--
with its highest likelihood category as those events expected to occur
more than once per year, and its lowest likelihood category as those
which are expected to never occur--and six consequence categories
(`inconsequential,' `minimal,' `minor,' `moderate,' `considerable,' and
`severe').\63\ PSE&G then assigned numeric ratings to each likelihood
and consequence category and scored each extreme weather vulnerability
by multiplying the two ratings together. This approach enabled PSE&G to
rank the severity of extreme weather and climate risks to its assets
and further prioritize actions to mitigate these risks.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ DOE Vulnerability Assessment Review at 16-17.
    \64\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. After assessing the relative risks to assets and operations,
the transmission provider can then determine appropriate mitigation.
Example solutions for mitigating risks to vulnerable assets may include
hardening or relocating, while example solutions for mitigating risks
to vulnerable operations may include improved load management practices
that reduce outages and expedite restoration.
2. Proposal
    48. We propose to direct each transmission provider to provide the
following information on the processes and policies it uses, or plans
to use, to determine and implement appropriate measures for mitigating
extreme weather risks identified in its extreme weather vulnerability
assessment:
    (Q18) A description of how the transmission provider uses, or plans
to use, the results of its assessment to develop measures to mitigate
extreme weather risks, including:
    i. How the transmission provider determines which risks should be
mitigated and the appropriate time horizon for mitigation;
    ii. How the transmission provider determines appropriate extreme
weather risk mitigation measures, including any analyses used to
determine the lowest-cost or most impactful portfolio of measures;
    (Q19) A description of how the transmission provider informs, or
plans to inform, relevant stakeholders--such as neighboring
transmission providers, RTOs/ISOs of which the transmission provider is
a member, electric customers, affected and frontline communities,
shareholders and investors, emergency management agencies, local and
state administrations, and state utility regulators--of identified
extreme weather risks and selected mitigation measures;
    (Q20) A description of the extent to which the transmission
provider incorporates, or plans to incorporate, identified extreme
weather risks and mitigation measures into local and regional
transmission planning processes;
    (Q21) A description of how the transmission provider measures, or
plans to measure, the progress and success of extreme weather risk
mitigation measures (e.g., through reduced outages) and how it
incorporates these observations into ongoing and future extreme risk
mitigation actions.

IV. Information Collection Statement

    49. The information collection requirements contained in this NOPR
are subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\65\ OMB's
regulations require approval of certain information collection
requirements imposed by agency rules.\66\ Upon approval of a collection
of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and an expiration
date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of a rule will not
be penalized for failing to respond to the collection of information
unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control
number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
    \66\ 5 CFR 1320.11 (2021).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    50. This NOPR would, pursuant to Sec.  304 of the FPA, require
transmission providers \67\ to file one-time reports on their extreme
weather vulnerability assessment practices. The Commission believes
requiring transmission providers to submit a one-time informational
report on their current or planned efforts to assess the
vulnerabilities of their jurisdictional transmission assets and
operations to extreme weather events will assist in the proper
administration of the FPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ As noted above, in this NOPR, unless otherwise noted, we
use the term ``transmission provider'' to mean any public utility
that owns, controls, or operates facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. See 16
U.S.C. 824(e); 18 CFR 35.28. To be clear, this term encompasses
public utility transmission owners that are members of RTOs/ISOs.
Accordingly, the reports we are proposing herein would be filed by
the public utility members of RTOs/ISOs, as well as by the RTOs/ISOs
themselves and other public utility transmission providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title: One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather
Vulnerability Assessments.
    Action: Proposed FERC-1004 collection of information in accordance
with Docket Nos. RM22-16-000 and AD21-13-000.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-TBD.
    Respondents: Transmission providers (including public utility
transmission owners that are members of RTOs/ISOs and the RTOs/ISOs
themselves).
    Frequency of Information Collection: One time.
    Necessity of Information: The Commission seeks to address the
increasing risks of extreme weather to bulk electric system reliability
and jurisdictional rates, and to better understand how transmission
providers assess and mitigate those risks. The Commission believes the
informational reports directed by this Proposed Rulemaking will allow
it to determine whether additional action on extreme weather
vulnerability assessments is needed and assist the Commission in the
proper administration of the FPA.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the reporting
requirement and has determined that such a requirement is necessary.
These requirements conform to the Commission's need for efficient
information collection, communication, and management within the energy
industry. The Commission has specific, objective support for the burden
estimates associated with the information collection requirements.
Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements
by contacting Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426
via email ([email protected]) or telephone ((202) 502-8663).
    51. The Commission solicits comments on its need for this
information; whether the information will have practical utility; the
accuracy of the burden estimates; ways to enhance the quality, utility,
and clarity of the information to be collected or retained; and any
suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including the use
of automated information techniques.
    52. Please send comments concerning the collection of information
and the associated burden estimate to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, through
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain, Attention: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Desk Officer. Please identify FERC-1004 and OMB Control
Number 1902-TBD in the subject line of your comments. Comments should
be sent within 60 days of publication of this notice in the Federal
Register.
    53. Please submit a copy of your comments on the information
collection to the Commission via the eFiling link on the Commission's
website at http://www.ferc.gov. Comments on the information collection
that are sent to FERC should refer to Docket Nos. RM22-16-000 and AD21-
13-000.
    54. Public Reporting Burden: Our estimates are based on the NERC
Compliance Registry as of May 6, 2022 and each RTO/ISO's list of
participating transmission owners per their websites, which indicates
that there are 49 transmission providers \68\ (including the six RTOs/
ISOs) and 83 transmission owners that are registered with NERC within
the United States and are subject to this proposed rulemaking.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ The transmission service provider (TSP) function is a NERC
registration function which is similar to the transmission provider
that is referenced in the pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff.
The TSP function is being used as a proxy to estimate the number of
transmission providers that are impacted by this proposed
rulemaking.
    \69\ The number of entities listed from the NERC Compliance
Registry reflects the omission of the Texas RE registered entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    55. The Commission estimates that the burden \70\ and cost of the
proposed FERC-1004 are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ ``Burden'' is the total time, effort, or financial
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or
disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency. For
further explanation of what is included in the information
collection burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3.
    \71\ Commission staff estimates that respondents' hourly wages
plus benefits are comparable to those of FERC employees. Therefore,
the hourly cost used in this analysis is $87.00 (or $180,703 per
year).
    \72\ The number of entities listed from the NERC Compliance
Registry reflects the omission of the Texas RE registered entities.

                      FERC-1004, as Proposed in NOPR in Docket Nos. RM22-16-000 and AD21-13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      C.  Annual
                                                      estimated                             E.  Total estimated
                                B.  Annual number     number of       D.  Average burden   burden hours &  total
   A.  Area of modification       of respondents     responses (1     hours & cost \71\        estimated cost
                                                         per             per response      (Column C x Column D)
                                                     respondent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report on Extreme Weather       132 (49 TPs \72\              132   Year 1: 99 hours;      Year 1: 13,068 hours;
 Vulnerability Assessment (one-  and 83 TOs).                        $8,613.00.             $1,136,916
 time).                                                             Subsequent Years: 0    Subsequent Years: 0
                                                                     hours per year; $0..   hours per year; $0.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Environmental Analysis

    56. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\73\ The
actions proposed to be taken here fall within categorical exclusions in
the Commission's regulations for rules regarding information gathering,
analysis, and dissemination, and for rules regarding sales, exchange,
and transportation of natural gas that require no construction of
facilities.\74\ Therefore, an environmental review is unnecessary and
has not been prepared in this rulemaking.
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    \73\ Reguls. Implementing the Nat'l Env'tal Pol'y Act, Order No.
486, 52 FR 47,897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783
(1987) (cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284).
    \74\ See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii), 380.4(a)(5), 380.4(a)(27).

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VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    57. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \75\ generally
requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that
accomplish the stated objectives of a proposed rule and minimize any
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.\76\ The Small Business Administration (SBA) sets the
threshold for what constitutes a small business. Under SBA's size
standards,\77\ transmission providers (including RTOs/ISOs) and
transmission owners fall under the category of Electric Bulk Power
Transmission and Control (NAICS code 221121),\78\ with a size threshold
of 500 employees (including the entity and its associates).\79\
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    \75\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
    \76\ Id. 603(c).
    \77\ 13 CFR 121.201.
    \78\ The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
is an industry classification system that Federal statistical
agencies use to categorize businesses for the purpose of collecting,
analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S.
economy. United States Census Bureau, North American Industry
Classification System, https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/.
    \79\ The threshold for the number of employees indicates the
maximum allowed for a concern and its affiliates to be considered
small. 13 CFR 121.201.
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    58. We estimate that there are 132 total transmission providers and
owners that (not including the six RTOs/ISOs) are affected by the NOPR.
    59. The six RTOs/ISOs (SPP, MISO, PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO, and CAISO)
each employ more than 500 employees and are not considered small
entities.
    60. Using the list of transmission service providers from the NERC
Registry (dated May 6, 2022), we estimate that approximately 30% of
those entities are small entities. We estimate an additional average
one-time cost of $8,613.00 for each of the 132 entities affected by the
NOPR.
    61. According to SBA guidance, the determination of significance of
impact ``should be seen as relative to the size of the business, the
size of the competitor's business, and the impact the regulation has on
larger competitors.'' \80\ We do not consider the estimated cost to be
a significant economic impact. As a result, pursuant to section 605(b)
of the RFA,\81\ the Commission certifies that the proposals in this
NOPR will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
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    \80\ U.S. Small Business Administration, A Guide for Government
Agencies How to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act 18
(August 2017), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/21110349/How-to-Comply-with-the-RFA.pdf.
    \81\ 16 U.S.C. 605(b).
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VII. Comment Procedures

    62. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish
to discuss. Comments are due August 30, 2022. Comments must refer to
Docket Nos. RM22-16-000 and AD21-13-000, and must include the
commenter's name, the organization they represent, if applicable, and
their address in their comments. All comments will be placed in the
Commission's public files and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded
remotely as described in the Document Availability section below.
Commenters on this proposal are not required to serve copies of their
comments on other commenters.
    63. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically
via the eFiling link on the Commission's website at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing
software must be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
    64. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically
may file an original of their comment by USPS mail or by courier-or
other delivery services. For submission sent via USPS only, filings
should be mailed to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of
the Secretary, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. Submission of
filings other than by USPS should be delivered to: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 12225 Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, MD 20852.

VIII. Document Availability

    65. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov). At
this time, the Commission has suspended access to the Commission's
Public Reference Room due to the President's March 13, 2020
proclamation declaring a National Emergency concerning the Novel
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19).
    66. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
    67. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's
website during normal business hours from the Commission's Online
Support at<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].

    By direction of the Commission. Commissioner Danly is concurring
with a separate statement attached.

    Issued: June 16, 2022.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.

United States of America

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

    One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather Vulnerability
Assessments; Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric System
Reliability
Docket Nos. RM22-16-000, AD21-13-000
(Issued June 16, 2022)
    DANLY, Commissioner, concurring:

    1. I concur in today's notice of proposed rulemaking directing
transmission providers to submit one-time informational reports
describing their current or planned policies and processes for
conducting weather assessments to identify where and under what
conditions jurisdictional transmission assets and operations are at
risk from weather-related events, how those risks manifest, and their
consequences for transmission system operations.\1\
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    \1\ One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather
Vulnerability Assessments, 179 FERC ] 61,196 (2022) (NOPR).
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    2. It will take over six months, at a minimum, from this NOPR to
the filing of the informational reports. These informational reports
will be filed long after this summer is over and will not, and indeed
cannot, timely address the projected risk of widespread blackouts this
summer.\2\ It is doubtful they will be

filed in time to take action, if gaps are identified, for the winter of
2022-2023 either. Nonetheless, I agree that there is some value in
understanding the extent to which, if any,\3\ transmission providers
currently assess and mitigate the risks posed by weather-related
events. I also agree that the informational reports may help us
identify opportunities to avoid adverse rate impacts stemming from
weather events, which is consistent with our obligations under the
Federal Power Act.\4\
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    \2\ Chairman Glick says that I am ``prone to hyperbole'' when I
warn that blackouts are the likely outcome of the majority's
misguided policies to prop up renewables at the expense of
competitive markets and existing fossil resources. Rich Heidorn Jr.,
Summer Forecasts Spark Warnings of `Reliability Crisis' at FERC, RTO
Insider (May 19, 2022), https://www.rtoinsider.com/articles/30170-summer-forecasts-spark-warnings-reliability-crisis-ferc. Chairman
Glick appears to be confusing ``hyperbole'' with ``reality.''
California and Texas have already experienced blackouts. Over two-
thirds of the nation faces ``elevated [reliability] risk'' this
summer. Ethan Howland, FERC commissioners respond to elevated power
outage risks across two-thirds of US, Utility Dive (May 20, 2022),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-nerc-power-outage-risks-summer-drought/624111/ (``At its monthly meeting Thursday, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission members dissected the North American
Electric Reliability Corp.'s warning that roughly two-thirds of the
United States faces [sic] heightened risks of power outages this
summer.'').
    \3\ The NOPR is clear that we do not intend in this NOPR to
require transmission providers to conduct extreme weather
vulnerability assessments where they do not do so already, or to
require transmission providers to change how they conduct or plan to
do such assessments. See NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 22; id. P 22
n.40 (``Similarly, while we propose that transmission providers may
describe what they `plan' to do with respect to various issues, this
is meant only to capture plans that have been made, but not yet been
implemented; transmission providers are not required to speculate on
how they would conduct extreme weather vulnerability analysis where
they have no plans to do so.'').
    \4\ See 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e.
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    3. The NOPR makes use of, indeed bases our action upon, an ever-
growing narrative: reliability challenges arise primarily from weather-
related events.\5\ But even if one were to grant that certain parts of
the United States were experiencing statistically unusual weather when
compared to historical baselines, that has absolutely nothing to do
with whether the markets and regulated utilities are procuring
sufficient generation of the correct type to ensure resource adequacy
and system reliability. We cannot blame our problems on the weather.
The problem is federal and state policies which, by mandate or subsidy,
spur the development of weather dependent generation resources at the
expense of the dispatchable resources needed for system stability and
resource adequacy. This is seen in particularly stark terms in our
markets in which subsidies, combined with failed market design, warp
price signals. This destroys the incentives required to ensure the
orderly entry, exit, and retention of the necessary quantities of the
necessary types of generation. The thinner and thinner margins that
result render the Bulk-Power System more and more susceptible to the
caprices of weather. We have been warned by credible sources on the
matter: NERC,\6\ the RTOs,\7\ and Commission staff.\8\
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    \5\ See Chairman Glick (@RichGlickFERC), Twitter (May 19, 2022,
11:13 a.m.), https://twitter.com/RichGlickFERC/status/1527306459263881223?s=20&t=3a4C-1cac3nmFkjZyvoUDA (``Extreme weather
may be the single most important factor impacting #grid #reliability
& the impacts of expected heat, drought, wildfires, hurricanes, &
other events--all pose a big threat. Keeping eye on West, ERCOT, &
parts of MISO this summer.''); Benjamin Mullin, Climate Change is
Straining California's Energy System, Officials Say, N.Y. Times (May
6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/06/business/energy-environment/california-electricity-shortage.html.
    \6\ See generally North American Electric Reliability Corp.,
2022 Summer Reliability Assessment (May 2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2022.pdf. In
addition, NERC has warned that system operators in areas of
significant amounts of solar photovoltaic (PV) resources should be
aware of the potential for resource loss events during grid
disturbances. Id. at 6. NERC has further warned that ``[i]ndustry
experience with unexpected tripping of [Bulk-Power System]-connected
solar PV generation units can be traced back to the 2016 Blue Cut
fire in California, and similar events have occurred as recently as
Summer 2021. A common thread with these events is the lack of
inverter-based resource (IBR) ride-through capability causing a
minor system disturbance to become a major disturbance. The latest
disturbance report reinforces that improvements to NERC Reliability
Standards are needed to address systemic issues with IBRs.'' Id.
NERC also explains that ``because the electrical output of variable
energy resources (e.g., wind, solar) depends on weather conditions,
on-peak capacity contributions are less than nameplate capacity.''
Id. at 45.
    \7\ See, e.g., California Independent System Operator Corp.,
2022 Summer Loads and Resources Assessment (May 18, 2022), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2022-Summer-Loads-and-Resources-Assessment.pdf; Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO),
Lack of Firm generation may necessitate increased reliance on
imports and use of emergency procedures to maintain reliability
(Apr. 28, 2022), https://www.misoenergy.org/about/media-center/miso-projects-risk-of-insufficient-firm-generation-resources-to-cover-peak-load-in-summer-months/; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM),
Energy Transition in PJM: Frameworks for Analysis (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mrc/2021/20211215/20211215-item-09-energy-transition-in-pjm-whitepaper.ashx
(addressing renewable integration).
    \8\ See FERC Staff Presentation on 2022 Summer Energy Market and
Reliability Assessment (AD06-3-000), FERC, at slide 9 (May 19,
2022), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/presentation-report-2022-summer-energy-market-and-reliability-assessment (identifying
the Western U.S., Texas, MISO and Southwest Power Pool as ``[p]arts
of North America are at elevated or high risk of energy shortfalls
during peak summer conditions'') (emphasis in original); id. at
slide 10 (In MISO, ``[g]eneration capacity declined 2.3% since 2021
resulting in [a] lower reserve margin'' and the ``[n]orth and
central areas [are] at risk of reserve shortfall in extreme
temperatures, high generation outages, or low wind'' with ``[s]ome
risk of insufficient operating reserves at normal peak demand.'').
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    4. As more nuclear \9\ and coal plants \10\--with their high
capacity factors and onsite fuel--announce early retirements, the
dispatchable resources that remain are predominantly natural gas
generators. Backstopping weather-dependent resources with gas
generators, largely dependent on just-in-time delivery of gas, raises
its own set of reliability concerns, particularly in areas--like New
England--with inadequate pipeline infrastructure. On top of this, the
Commission has delayed the processing of pipeline certificates and cast
a chill over the pipeline industry with its ``draft policy statements''
\11\ and orders throwing the finality of fully litigated certificates
into doubt.\12\ Under pressure to reduce emissions at all costs,
pipelines have moved to electrify compressor stations, furthering an
unhealthy co-dependency between the gas and electric systems. And the
efforts of politically motivated financial institutions to cut fossil
fuel producers' access to capital has added to the current supply
crunch.\13\ Yet, we are led to believe that extreme weather is supposed
to be the culprit for the nation's looming reliability woes. Not so.
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    \9\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. nuclear
electricity generation continues to decline as more reactors retire
(Apr. 8, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51978.
    \10\ Ethan Howland, Coal plant owners seek to shut 3.2 GW in PJM
in face of economic, regulatory and market pressures, Utility Dive
(Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/coal-plant-owners-seek-to-retire-power-in-pjm/620781/.
    \11\ See Certification of New Interstate Nat. Gas Facilities,
178 FERC ] 61,107 (2022) (Danly and Christie, Comm'rs, dissenting);
Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Nat. Gas Infrastructure
Project Revs., 178 FERC ] 61,108 (2022) (Danly and Christie,
Comm'rs, dissenting); see also Certification of New Interstate Nat.
Gas Facilities, 178 FERC ] 61,197, at P 2 (2022) (converting the two
policy statements to ``draft policy statements''). It is worth
noting that PJM and MISO filed comments on the draft policy
statements. PJM and MISO May 25, 2022 Limited Reply Comments, Docket
Nos. PL18-1-001 and PL21-3-001, at 4 (``[A]ny future Commission
pipeline policy should consider the importance of ensuring that
needed pipeline infrastructure can be timely sited, and ensure that
the need for infrastructure to meet electric system reliability is
affirmatively considered and not lost in the debate over the scope
of environmental reviews to be undertaken by the Commission.'').
    \12\ See, e.g., Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, 174 FERC ]
61,126 (2021) (Danly and Christie, Comm'rs, dissenting).
    \13\ Matt Egan, Energy crisis will set off social unrest,
private-equity billionaire warns, CNN Business (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/26/business/gas-prices-energy-crisis-schwarzman/index.html (``Part of the problem, [Blackstone CEO
Stephen Schwarzman] said, is that it's getting harder and harder for
fossil fuel companies to borrow money to fund their expensive
production activities, especially in the United States. And without
new production, supply won't keep up.'').

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    5. The question of whether the weather is getting worse is a red
herring. The much more relevant question is whether current system
operations and tariff and market design are adequate to maintain
reliability. The present high risk of reliability failures proves that
they are not. That the policies of the Commission and other government
bodies are undermining reliability is far more obvious than the
question of whether, and how, the weather is getting worse and what
specific effects that worsening weather might have on the stability of
the electric system. That question of the weather's effect on
reliability is a subject that doubtless merits study and planning, but
misguided government policies are the root cause of the alarming
reliability issues facing the nation, not the weather.
    For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

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James P. Danly,
Commissioner.

[FR Doc. 2022-13469 Filed 6-30-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 110 (Thursday, June 8, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37548-37549]
[FR Doc No: 2023-12288]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2023-N-2136]

Advisory Committee; Antimicrobial Drugs Advisory Committee;
Renewal

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice; renewal of Federal advisory committee.

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SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing the
renewal of the Antimicrobial Drugs Advisory Committee by the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs (the Commissioner). The Commissioner has
determined that it is in the public interest to renew the Antimicrobial
Drugs Advisory Committee for an additional 2 years beyond the charter
expiration date. The new charter will be in effect until the October 7,
2024, expiration date.

DATES: Authority for the Antimicrobial Drugs Advisory Committee will
expire on October 7, 2024, unless the Commissioner formally determines
that renewal is in the public interest.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: She-Chia Chen, Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, 10903 New
Hampshire Ave., Bldg. 31, Rm. 2417, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002, 240-
402-5343, [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to 41 CFR 102-3.65 and approval by
the Department of Health and Human Services and by the General Services
Administration, FDA is announcing the renewal of the Antimicrobial
Drugs Advisory Committee (the Committee). The Committee is a
discretionary Federal advisory committee established to provide advice
to the Commissioner. The Committee advises the Commissioner or designee
in discharging responsibilities as they relate to helping to ensure
safe and effective drugs for human use and, as required, any other
product for which FDA has regulatory responsibility.
    The Committee reviews and evaluates available data concerning the
safety and effectiveness of marketed and investigational human drug
products for use in the treatment of infectious diseases and disorders
and makes appropriate recommendations to the Commissioner.
    The Committee shall consist of a core of 13 voting members
including the Chair. Members and the Chair are selected by the
Commissioner or designee from among authorities knowledgeable in the
fields of infectious disease, internal medicine, microbiology,
pediatrics, epidemiology or statistics, and related specialties.
Members will be invited to serve for overlapping terms of up to 4
years. Non-Federal members of this committee will serve as Special
Government Employees, representatives or Ex-Officio members. Federal
members will serve as Regular Government Employees or Ex-Officios. The
core of voting members may include one technically qualified member,
selected by the Commissioner or designee, who is identified with
consumer interests and is recommended by either a consortium of
consumer-oriented organizations or other interested persons. In
addition to the voting members, the Committee may include one non-
voting representative member who is identified with industry interests.
There may also be an alternate industry representative.
    Further information regarding the most recent charter and other
information can be found at https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/antimicrobial-drugs-advisory-committee-formerly-known-anti-infective-drugs-advisory-committee/antimicrobial-drugs-advisory-committee-formerly-known-anti-infective-drugs-advisory-committee or by contacting
the Designated Federal Officer (see FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT).
In light of the fact that no change has been made to the committee name
or description of duties, no amendment will be made to 21 CFR 14.100.
    This notice is issued under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. app.). For general information related to FDA advisory
committees, please visit us at https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm.

    Dated: June 5, 2023.
Lauren K. Roth,
Associate Commissioner for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2023-12288 Filed 6-7-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4164-01-P