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Request Created Date/ Time: Monday, July 08, 2002 07: 40: 00 Central Client Identifier: KHOUANE DITTHAVONG DataBase: SCT Citation Text: 119 S. Ct. 1167 Print Command: Current document, Complete result Lines: 835 Lines Charged: 835 Documents: 1 Documents Charged: 0 Images: 1 Images Charged: 1 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 2 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works Supreme Court of the United States KUMHO TIRE COMPANY, LTD., et al., Petitioners, v. Patrick CARMICHAEL, etc., et al.

No. 97 1709.

Argued Dec. 7, 1998. Decided March 23, 1999.

Plaintiffs brought products liability action against tire manufacturer and tire distributor for injuries sustained when right rear tire on vehicle failed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, No. 93 0860 CB S, 923 F. Supp. 1514, Charles R. Butler, J., granted summary judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 131 F. 3d 1433, reversed and remanded. Defendants filed application for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court, Justice Breyer, held that: ( 1) Daubert's " gatekeeping" obligation, requiring an inquiry into both relevance and reliability, applies not only to " scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony; ( 2) when assessing reliability of engineering expert's testimony, trial court may consider the Daubert factors to the extent relevant; and ( 3) trial court did not abuse its discretion in its application of Daubert to exclude tire failure analyst's expert testimony that particular tire failed due to manufacturing or design defect.

Reversed.

Justice Scalia filed concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas joined.

Justice Stevens filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

West Headnotes [ 1] Evidence 508 157k508 Most Cited Cases [ 1] Evidence 555.2 157k555.2 Most Cited Cases Daubert's " gatekeeping" obligation, requiring an inquiry into both relevance and reliability, applies not only to " scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 702, 28 U. S. C. A.

[ 2] Evidence 555.2 157k555.2 Most Cited Cases 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 3 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works When assessing the reliability of an engineering expert's testimony, the trial court may consider the Daubert factors to the extent relevant, which will depend upon the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 702, 28 U. S. C. A.

[ 3] Evidence 508 157k508 Most Cited Cases [ 3] Evidence 555.2 157k555.2 Most Cited Cases Objective of Daubert's " gatekeeping" requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony; it is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 702, 28 U. S. C. A.

[ 4] Evidence 555.2 157k555.2 Most Cited Cases Trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 702, 28 U. S. C. A.

[ 5] Federal Courts 823 170Bk823 Most Cited Cases Court of Appeals is to apply an abuse of discretion standard when it reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony, and when it reviews the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 702, 28 U. S. C. A.

[ 6] Evidence 546 157k546 Most Cited Cases Whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of expert's reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine. Fed. Rules Evid. Rules 102, 702, 28 U. S. C. A.

[ 7] Evidence 555.5 157k555.5 Most Cited Cases Trial court did not abuse its discretion in its application of Daubert to exclude tire failure analyst's expert testimony that particular tire failed due to manufacturing or design defect, on grounds that methodology employed by analyst in analyzing the data obtained in his visual and tactile examination of tire in question was unreliable, even though court did not doubt analyst's qualification as expert, where there was no evidence that other experts in the industry used analyst's particular approach with regard visual and tactile examinations of tires, analyst's own testimony cast doubt upon reliability of both his theory and his 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 4 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works proposition about significance of visual inspection of tire in question, and tire bore some of marks that analyst said indicated abuse, rather than defect. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 702, 28 U. S. C. A. ** 1169 Syllabus [ FN*]

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337, 26 S. Ct. 282, 50 L. Ed. 499.

When a tire on the vehicle driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned, one passenger died and the others were injured. The survivors and the decedent's representative, respondents here, brought this diversity suit against the tire's maker and its distributor ( collectively Kumho Tire), claiming that the tire that failed was defective. They rested their case in significant part upon the depositions of a tire failure analyst, Dennis Carlson, Jr., who intended to testify that, in his expert opinion, a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blowout. That opinion was based upon a visual and tactile inspection of the tire and upon the theory that in the absence of at least two of four specific, physical symptoms indicating tire abuse, the tire failure of the sort that occurred here was caused by a defect. Kumho Tire moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which says: " If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact ..., a witness qualified as an expert ... may testify thereto in the form of an opinion." Granting the motion ( and entering summary judgment for the defendants), the District Court acknowledged that it should act as a reliability " gatekeeper" under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, in which this Court held that Rule 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that scientific testimony is not only relevant, but reliable. The court noted that Daubert discussed four factors testing, peer review, error rates, and " acceptability" in the relevant scientific community which might prove helpful in determining the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique, id., at 593 594, 113 S. Ct. 2786, and found that those factors argued against the reliability of Carlson's methodology. On the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court agreed that Daubert should be applied flexibly, that its four factors were simply illustrative, and that other factors could argue in favor of admissibility. However, the court affirmed its earlier order because it found insufficient indications of the reliability of Carlson's methodology. In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the District Court had erred as a matter of law in applying Daubert. Believing that Daubert was limited to the scientific context, * 138 the court held that the Daubert factors did not apply to Carlson's testimony, which it characterized as skill or experience based.

Held:

1. The Daubert factors may apply to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists. Pp. 1174 1176.

( a) The Daubert " gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to " scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Rule 702 does not distinguish between " scientific" knowledge and " technical" or " other specialized" knowledge, but makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony. It is the Rule's word " knowledge," not the words ( like " scientific") that modify that word, that establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 509 U. S., at 589 590, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Daubert referred only to " scientific" knowledge because that was the nature of the expertise there at issue. Id., at 590, n. 8, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Neither is the evidentiary rationale underlying Daubert's " gatekeeping" determination limited to " scientific" knowledge. Rules 702 and 703 grant all expert witnesses, not just " scientific" ones, testimonial latitude unavailable to other 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 5 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works witnesses on the assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline. Id., at 592, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a " gatekeeping" obligation depended upon a distinction between " scientific" knowledge and " technical" or " other specialized" knowledge, since there is no clear line dividing the one from the others and no convincing need to make such distinctions. Pp. 1174 1175.

** 1170 ( b) A trial judge determining the admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony may consider one or more of the specific Daubert factors. The emphasis on the word " may" reflects Daubert's description of the Rule 702 inquiry as " a flexible one." 509 U. S., at 594, 113 S. Ct. 2786. The Daubert factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test, id., at 593, 113 S. Ct. 2786, and the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the particular facts, id., at 591, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Those factors may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony. Some of those factors may be helpful in evaluating the reliability even of experience based expert testimony, and the Court of Appeals erred insofar as it ruled those factors out in such cases. In determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable, the trial court should consider the specific Daubert factors where they are reasonable measures of reliability. Pp. 1175 1176.

( c) A court of appeals must apply an abuse of discretion standard when it reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert * 139 testimony. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 138 139, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508. That standard applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine. See id., at 143, 118 S. Ct. 512. The Eleventh Circuit erred insofar as it held to the contrary. P. 1176.

2. Application of the foregoing standards demonstrates that the District Court's decision not to admit Carlson's expert testimony was lawful. The District Court did not question Carlson's qualifications, but excluded his testimony because it initially doubted his methodology and then found it unreliable after examining the transcript in some detail and considering respondents' defense of it. The doubts that triggered the court's initial inquiry were reasonable, as was the court's ultimate conclusion that Carlson could not reliably determine the cause of the failure of the tire in question. The question was not the reliability of Carlson's methodology in general, but rather whether he could reliably determine the cause of failure of the particular tire at issue. That tire, Carlson conceded, had traveled far enough so that some of the tread had been worn bald, it should have been taken out of service, it had been repaired ( inadequately) for punctures, and it bore some of the very marks that he said indicated, not a defect, but abuse. Moreover, Carlson's own testimony cast considerable doubt upon the reliability of both his theory about the need for at least two signs of abuse and his proposition about the significance of visual inspection in this case. Respondents stress that other tire failure experts, like Carlson, rely on visual and tactile examinations of tires. But there is no indication in the record that other experts in the industry use Carlson's particular approach or that tire experts normally make the very fine distinctions necessary to support his conclusions, nor are there references to articles or papers that validate his approach. Respondents' argument that the District Court too rigidly applied Daubert might have had some validity with respect to the court's initial opinion, but fails because the court, on reconsideration, recognized that the relevant reliability inquiry should be " flexible," and ultimately based its decision upon Carlson's failure to satisfy either Daubert's factors or any other set of reasonable reliability criteria. Pp. 1176 1179.

131 F. 3d 1433, reversed. 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 6 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and II of which were unanimous, and Part III of which was joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, ** 1171 and GINSBURG, * 140 JJ. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 1179. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 1179.

Joseph H. Babington, Mobile, AL, for petitioners.

Jeffrey P. Minear, Washington, DC, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court.

Sidney W. Jackson, for respondents.

For U. S. Supreme Court Briefs See:

1998 WL 541944 ( Pet. Brief)

1998 WL 734422 ( Resp. Brief)

1998 WL 802059 ( Reply. Brief)

1998 WL 541842 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541945 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541947 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541948 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541950 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541969 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541970 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541971 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 541973 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 545899 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 596787 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 713448 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 734430 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 734433 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 734434 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 739321 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 762012 ( Amicus. Brief)

1998 WL 762013 ( Amicus. Brief)

For Transcript of Oral Argument See: 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 7 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works 1998 WL 842179 ( U. S. Oral. Arg.)

* 141 Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 ( 1993), this Court focused upon the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. It pointed out that such testimony is admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable. And it held that the Federal Rules of Evidence " assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." Id., at 597, 113 S. Ct. 2786. The Court also discussed certain more specific factors, such as testing, peer review, error rates, and " acceptability" in the relevant scientific community, some or all of which might prove helpful in determining the reliability of a particular scientific " theory or technique." Id., at 593 594, 113 S. Ct. 2786.

This case requires us to decide how Daubert applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists. We conclude that Daubert's general holding setting forth the trial judge's general " gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to testimony based on " scientific" knowledge, but also to testimony based on " technical" and " other specialized" knowledge. See Fed. Rule Evid. 702. We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is " flexible," and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. * 142 Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 143, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 ( 1997) ( courts of appeals are to apply " abuse of discretion" standard when reviewing district court's reliability determination). Applying these standards, we determine that the District Court's decision in this case not to admit certain expert testimony was within its discretion and therefore lawful.

I On July 6, 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out. In the accident that followed, one of the passengers died, and others were severely injured. In October 1993, the Carmichaels brought this diversity suit against the tire's maker and its distributor, whom we refer to collectively as Kumho Tire, claiming that the tire was defective. The plaintiffs rested their case in significant part upon deposition testimony provided by an expert in tire failure analysis, Dennis Carlson, Jr., who intended to testify in support of their conclusion.

Carlson's depositions relied upon certain features of tire technology that are not in dispute. A steel belted radial tire like the Carmichaels' is made up of a " carcass" containing many layers of flexible cords, called " plies," along which ( between the cords and the outer tread) are laid steel strips called " belts." Steel wire loops, called " beads," hold the cords together at the plies' bottom edges. An outer layer, called the " tread," encases the carcass, and the entire tire is bound together in rubber, through the application of heat and various chemicals. See generally, e. g., J. Dixon, Tires, Suspension and Handling 68 72 ( 2d ed. 1996). The bead of the tire sits upon a " bead seat," which is part of the wheel assembly. That assembly contains a " rim flange," which extends over the bead and rests against the side of the * 143 tire. See M. Mavrigian, Performance Wheels & Tires 81, 83 ( 1998) ( illustrations). 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 8 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works ** 1172 Carlson's testimony also accepted certain background facts about the tire in question. He assumed that before the blowout the tire had traveled far. ( The tire was made in 1988 and had been installed some time before the Carmichaels bought the used minivan in March 1993; the Carmichaels had driven the van approximately 7,000 additional miles in the two months they had owned it.) Carlson noted that the tire's tread depth, which was 11/ 32 of an inch when new, App. 242, had been worn down to depths that ranged from 3/ 32 of an inch along some parts of the tire, to nothing at all along others. Id., at 287. He conceded that the tire tread had at least two punctures which had been inadequately repaired. Id., at 258 261, 322.

Despite the tire's age and history, Carlson concluded that a defect in its manufacture or design caused the blowout. He rested this conclusion in part upon three premises which, * 144 for present purposes, we must assume are not in dispute: First, a tire's carcass should stay bound to the inner side of the tread for a significant period of time after its tread depth has worn away. Id., at 208 209. Second, the tread of the tire at issue had separated from its inner steel belted carcass prior to the accident. Id., at 336. Third, this " separation" caused the blowout. Ibid.

Carlson's conclusion that a defect caused the separation, however, rested upon certain other propositions, several of which the defendants strongly dispute. First, Carlson said that if a separation is not caused by a certain kind of tire misuse called " overdeflection" ( which consists of underinflating the tire or causing it to carry too much weight, thereby generating heat that can undo the chemical tread/ carcass bond), then, ordinarily, its cause is a tire defect. Id., at 193 195, 277 278. Second, he said that if a tire has been subject to sufficient overdeflection to cause a separation, it should reveal certain physical symptoms. These symptoms include ( a) tread wear on the tire's shoulder that is greater than the tread wear along the tire's center, id., at 211; ( b) signs of a " bead groove," where the beads have been pushed too hard against the bead seat on the inside of the tire's rim, id., at 196 197; ( c) sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of deterioration, such as discoloration, id., at 212; and/ or ( d) marks on the tire's rim flange, id., at 219 220. Third, Carlson said that where he does not find at least two of the four physical signs just mentioned ( and presumably where there is no reason to suspect a less common cause of separation), he concludes that a manufacturing or design defect caused the separation. Id., at 223 224.

Carlson added that he had inspected the tire in question. He conceded that the 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 9 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works tire to a limited degree showed greater wear on ** 1173 the shoulder than in the center, some signs of " bead groove," some discoloration, a few marks on the rim flange, and inadequately filled puncture holes ( which can also cause heat that might lead to separation). Id., at 256 257, 258 * 145 261, 277, 303 304, 308. But, in each instance, he testified that the symptoms were not significant, and he explained why he believed that they did not reveal overdeflection. For example, the extra shoulder wear, he said, appeared primarily on one shoulder, whereas an overdeflected tire would reveal equally abnormal wear on both shoulders. Id., at 277. Carlson concluded that the tire did not bear at least two of the four overdeflection symptoms, nor was there any less obvious cause of separation; and since neither overdeflection nor the punctures caused the blowout, a defect must have done so.

Kumho Tire moved the District Court to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed Rule 702' s reliability requirement. The court agreed with Kumho that it should act as a Daubert type reliability " gatekeeper," even though one might consider Carlson's testimony as " technical," rather than " scientific." See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 1522 ( S. D. Ala. 1996). The court then examined Carlson's methodology in light of the reliability related factors that Daubert mentioned, such as a theory's testability, whether it " has been a subject of peer review or publication," the " known or potential rate of error," and the " degree of acceptance ... within the relevant scientific community." 923 F. Supp., at 1520 ( citing Daubert, 509 U. S., at 589 595, 113 S. Ct. 2786). The District Court found that all those factors argued against the reliability of Carlson's methods, and it granted the motion to exclude the testimony ( as well as the defendants' accompanying motion for summary judgment).

The plaintiffs, arguing that the court's application of the Daubert factors was too " inflexible," asked for reconsideration. And the court granted that motion. Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93 0860 CB S ( S. D. Ala., June 5, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1c. After reconsidering the matter, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that Daubert should be applied flexibly, that its four factors were * 146 simply illustrative, and that other factors could argue in favor of admissibility. It conceded that there may be widespread acceptance of a " visualinspection method" for some relevant purposes. But the court found insufficient indications of the reliability of " the component of Carlson's tire failure analysis which most concerned the Court, namely, the methodology employed by the expert in analyzing the data obtained in the visual inspection, and the scientific basis, if any, for such an analysis." Id., at 6c. It consequently affirmed its earlier order declaring Carlson's testimony inadmissible and granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F. 3d 1433 ( 1997). It " review[ ed] ... de novo " the " district court's legal decision to apply Daubert." Id., at 1435. It noted that " the Supreme Court in Daubert explicitly limited its holding to cover only the ' scientific context,' " adding that " a Daubert analysis" applies only where an expert relies " on the application of scientific principles," rather than " on skill or experience based observation." Id., at 1435 1436. It concluded that Carlson's testimony, which it viewed as relying on experience, " falls outside the scope of Daubert," that " the district court erred as a matter of law by applying Daubert in this case," and that the case must be remanded for further ( non Daubert type) consideration under Rule 702. 131 F. 3d, at 1436.

Kumho Tire petitioned for certiorari, asking us to determine whether a trial court " may" consider Daubert's specific " factors" when determining the " admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony." Pet. for Cert. i. We granted certiorari in light of uncertainty among the lower courts about whether, or how, Daubert applies to expert testimony that might be characterized as based not upon " scientific" knowledge, but rather upon " technical" or " other specialized" * 147 knowledge. Fed. Rule Evid. 702; compare, e. g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F. 3d 984, 990 991 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 10 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works ( C. A. 5 1997), with, e. g., ** 1174Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F. 3d 1513, 1518 1519 ( C. A. 10), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1042, 117 S. Ct. 611, 136 L. Ed. 2d 536 ( 1996).

II A [ 1] In Daubert, this Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to " ensure that any and all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable." 509 U. S., at 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786. The initial question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies only to " scientific" testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the parties, believe that it applies to all expert testimony. See Brief for Petitioners 19; Brief for Respondents 17.

For one thing, Rule 702 itself says: " If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." This language makes no relevant distinction between " scientific" knowledge and " technical" or " other specialized" knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony. In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the Rule's word " knowledge," not the words ( like " scientific") that modify that word, that " establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability." 509 U. S., at 589 590, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Hence, as a matter of language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to all " scientific," " technical," or " other specialized" matters within its scope. We concede that the Court in Daubert referred only to " scientific" knowledge. But as the Court there said, it referred to " scientific"* 148 testimony " because that [ wa] s the nature of the expertise" at issue. Id., at 590, n. 8, 113 S. Ct. 2786.

Neither is the evidentiary rationale that underlay the Court's basic Daubert " gatekeeping" determination limited to " scientific" knowledge. Daubert pointed out that Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the " assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." Id., at 592, 113 S. Ct. 2786 ( pointing out that experts may testify to opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation). The Rules grant that latitude to all experts, not just to " scientific" ones.

Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction between " scientific" knowledge and " technical" or " other specialized" knowledge. There is no clear line that divides the one from the others. Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its development upon observation and properly engineered machinery. And conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases. Cf. Brief for National Academy of Engineering as Amicus Curiae 9 ( scientist seeks to understand nature while the engineer seeks nature's modification); Brief for Rubber Manufacturers Association as Amicus Curiae 14 16 ( engineering, as an " ' applied science,' " relies on " scientific reasoning and methodology"); Brief for John Allen et al. as Amici Curiae 6 ( engineering relies upon " scientific knowledge and methods").

Neither is there a convincing need to make such distinctions. Experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of what Judge Learned Hand called " general truths derived from ... specialized experience." Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, * 149 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 54 ( 1901). And whether the specific expert testimony focuses upon specialized observations, the specialized translation of those observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a particular case, 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 11 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works the expert's testimony often will rest " upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [ the jury's] own." Ibid. The trial judge's effort to assure that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate ** 1175 that foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.

We conclude that Daubert's general principles apply to the expert matters described in Rule 702. The Rule, in respect to all such matters, " establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability." 509 U. S., at 590, 113 S. Ct. 2786. It " requires a valid ... connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id., at 592, 113 S. Ct. 2786. And where such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question, see Part III, infra, the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has " a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [ the relevant] discipline." 509 U. S., at 592, 113 S. Ct. 2786.

B Petitioners ask more specifically whether a trial judge determining the " admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony" may consider several more specific factors that Daubert said might " bear on" a judge's gatekeeping determination. Brief for Petitioners i. These factors include:  Whether a " theory or technique ... can be ( and has been) tested";  Whether it " has been subjected to peer review and publication";  Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high " known or potential rate of error" and whether there are " standards controlling the technique's operation"; and * 150  Whether the theory or technique enjoys " ' general acceptance' " within a " ' relevant scientific community.' " 509 U. S., at 592 594, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Emphasizing the word " may" in the question, we answer that question yes.

[ 2] Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations, the reliability of which will be at issue in some cases. See, e. g., Brief for Stephen N. Bobo et al. as Amici Curiae 23 ( stressing the scientific bases of engineering disciplines). In other cases, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience. As the Solicitor General points out, there are many different kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18 19, and n. 5 ( citing cases involving experts in drug terms, handwriting analysis, criminal modus operandi, land valuation, agricultural practices, railroad procedures, attorney's fee valuation, and others). Our emphasis on the word " may" thus reflects Daubert's description of the Rule 702 inquiry as " a flexible one." 509 U. S., at 594, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Daubert makes clear that the factors it mentions do not constitute a " definitive checklist or test." Id., at 593, 113 S. Ct. 2786. And Daubert adds that the gatekeeping inquiry must be " ' tied to the facts' " of a particular " case." Id., at 591, 113 S. Ct. 2786 ( quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F. 2d 1224, 1242 ( C. A. 3 1985)). We agree with the Solicitor General that "[ t] he factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. The conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.

* 151 Daubert itself is not to the contrary. It made clear that its list of factors was meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is challenged. It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the particular application at issue may never previously have 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 12 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works interested any scientist. Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of Daubert's general acceptance factor help show that an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any so called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy.

** 1176 At the same time, and contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, some of Daubert's questions can help to evaluate the reliability even of experience based testimony. In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for example, how often an engineering expert's experience based methodology has produced erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant engineering community. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask even of a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable.

We must therefore disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that a trial judge may ask questions of the sort Daubert mentioned only where an expert " relies on the application of scientific principles," but not where an expert relies " on skill or experience based observation." 131 F. 3d, at 1435. We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal cases that it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match.

[ 3][ 4] * 152 To say this is not to deny the importance of Daubert's gatekeeping requirement. The objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Nor do we deny that, as stated in Daubert, the particular questions that it mentioned will often be appropriate for use in determining the reliability of challenged expert testimony. Rather, we conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.

C [ 5][ 6] The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in Joiner makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse of discretion standard when it " review[ s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony." 522 U. S., at 138 139, 118 S. Ct. 512. That standard applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed both to avoid unnecessary " reliability" proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises. Indeed, the Rules seek to avoid " unjustifiable expense and delay" as part of their search for * 153 " truth" and the " jus[ t] determin[ ation]" of proceedings. Fed. Rule Evid. 102. Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine. See Joiner, supra, at 143, 118 S. Ct. 512. And the Eleventh Circuit erred insofar as it held to the contrary.

III [ 7] We further explain the way in which a trial judge " may" consider Daubert's 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 13 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works factors by applying these considerations to the case at hand, a matter that has been briefed exhaustively by the parties and their 19 amici. The District Court did not doubt Carlson's qualifications, which included a masters degree in mechanical engineering, 10 years' work at Michelin America, Inc., and testimony as a tire failure consultant in other tort cases. Rather, it excluded the testimony because, despite those qualifications, it initially ** 1177 doubted, and then found unreliable, " the methodology employed by the expert in analyzing the data obtained in the visual inspection, and the scientific basis, if any, for such an analysis." Civ. Action No. 93 0860 CB S ( S. D. Ala., June 5, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 6c. After examining the transcript in " some detail," 923 F. Supp., at 1518 1519, n. 4, and after considering respondents' defense of Carlson's methodology, the District Court determined that Carlson's testimony was not reliable. It fell outside the range where experts might reasonably differ, and where the jury must decide among the conflicting views of different experts, even though the evidence is " shaky." Daubert, 509 U. S., at 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786. In our view, the doubts that triggered the District Court's initial inquiry here were reasonable, as was the court's ultimate conclusion.

For one thing, and contrary to respondents' suggestion, the specific issue before the court was not the reasonableness in general of a tire expert's use of a visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overdeflection had caused * 154 the tire's tread to separate from its steel belted carcass. Rather, it was the reasonableness of using such an approach, along with Carlson's particular method of analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant. That matter concerned the likelihood that a defect in the tire at issue caused its tread to separate from its carcass. The tire in question, the expert conceded, had traveled far enough so that some of the tread had been worn bald; it should have been taken out of service; it had been repaired ( inadequately) for punctures; and it bore some of the very marks that the expert said indicated, not a defect, but abuse through overdeflection. See supra, at 1172; App. 293 294. The relevant issue was whether the expert could reliably determine the cause of this tire's separation.

Nor was the basis for Carlson's conclusion simply the general theory that, in the absence of evidence of abuse, a defect will normally have caused a tire's separation. Rather, the expert employed a more specific theory to establish the existence ( or absence) of such abuse. Carlson testified precisely that in the absence of at least two of four signs of abuse ( proportionately greater tread wear on the shoulder; signs of grooves caused by the beads; discolored sidewalls; marks on the rim flange), he concludes that a defect caused the separation. And his analysis depended upon acceptance of a further implicit proposition, namely, that his visual and tactile inspection could determine that the tire before him had not been abused despite some evidence of the presence of the very signs for which he looked ( and two punctures).

For another thing, the transcripts of Carlson's depositions support both the trial court's initial uncertainty and its final conclusion. Those transcripts cast considerable doubt upon the reliability of both the explicit theory ( about the need for two signs of abuse) and the implicit proposition ( about the significance of visual inspection in this case). Among other things, the expert could not say whether the tire had traveled * 155 more than 10, or 20, or 30, or 40, or 50 thousand miles, adding that 6,000 miles was " about how far" he could " say with any certainty." Id., at 265. The court could reasonably have wondered about the reliability of a method of visual and tactile inspection sufficiently precise to ascertain with some certainty the abuse related significance of minute shoulder/ center relative tread wear differences, but insufficiently precise to tell " with any certainty" from the tread wear whether a tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles. And these concerns might have been augmented by Carlson's repeated reliance on the " subjective[ ness]" of his mode of analysis in response to questions seeking specific information regarding how he could differentiate between a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a tire that 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 14 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works merely looked as though it had been. Id., at 222, 224 225, 285 286. They would have been further augmented by the fact that Carlson said he had inspected the tire itself for the first time the morning of his first deposition, and then only for a few hours. ( His initial conclusions were based on photographs.) Id., at 180.

** 1178 Moreover, prior to his first deposition, Carlson had issued a signed report in which he concluded that the tire had " not been ... overloaded or underinflated," not because of the absence of " two of four" signs of abuse, but simply because " the rim flange impressions ... were normal." Id., at 335 336. That report also said that the " tread depth remaining was 3/ 32 inch," id., at 336, though the opposing expert's ( apparently undisputed) measurements indicate that the tread depth taken at various positions around the tire actually ranged from .5/ 32 of an inch to 4/ 32 of an inch, with the tire apparently showing greater wear along both shoulders than along the center, id., at 432 433.

Further, in respect to one sign of abuse, bead grooving, the expert seemed to deny the sufficiency of his own simple visual inspection methodology. He testified that most tires have some bead groove pattern, that where there is reason * 156 to suspect an abnormal bead groove he would ideally " look at a lot of [ similar] tires" to know the grooving's significance, and that he had not looked at many tires similar to the one at issue. Id., at 212 213, 214, 217.

Finally, the court, after looking for a defense of Carlson's methodology as applied in these circumstances, found no convincing defense. Rather, it found ( 1) that " none" of the Daubert factors, including that of " general acceptance" in the relevant expert community, indicated that Carlson's testimony was reliable, 923 F. Supp., at 1521; ( 2) that its own analysis " revealed no countervailing factors operating in favor of admissibility which could outweigh those identified in Daubert," App. to Pet. for Cert. 4c; and ( 3) that the " parties identified no such factors in their briefs," ibid. For these three reasons taken together, it concluded that Carlson's testimony was unreliable.

Respondents now argue to us, as they did to the District Court, that a method of tire failure analysis that employs a visual/ tactile inspection is a reliable method, and they point both to its use by other experts and to Carlson's long experience working for Michelin as sufficient indication that that is so. But no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience. Nor does anyone deny that, as a general matter, tire abuse may often be identified by qualified experts through visual or tactile inspection of the tire. See Affidavit of H. R. Baumgardner 1 2, cited in Brief for National Academy of Forensic Engineers as Amicus Curiae 16 ( Tire engineers rely on visual examination and process of elimination to analyze experimental test tires). As we said before, supra, at 1977, the question before the trial court was specific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors " in deciding the particular issues in the case." 4 J. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Federal Evidence ¶ 702.05[ 1], p. 702 33 ( 2d ed. 1998); see also Advisory * 157 Committee's Note on Proposed Fed. Rule Evid. 702, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence: Request for Comment 126 ( 1998) ( stressing that district courts must " scrutinize" whether the " principles and methods" employed by an expert " have been properly applied to the facts of the case").

The particular issue in this case concerned the use of Carlson's two factor test and his related use of visual/ tactile inspection to draw conclusions on the basis of what seemed small observational differences. We have found no indication in the record that other experts in the industry use Carlson's two factor test or that tire experts such as Carlson normally make the very fine distinctions about, say, the symmetry of comparatively greater shoulder tread wear that were necessary, on Carlson's own theory, to support his conclusions. Nor, despite the prevalence of tire testing, does anyone refer to any articles or papers that validate Carlson's approach. Cf. Bobo, Tire Flaws and Separations, in Mechanics of Pneumatic Tires 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 15 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works 636 637 ( S. Clark ed. 1981); C. Schnuth, R. Fuller, G. Follen, G. Gold, & J. Smith, Compression Grooving and Rim Flange Abrasion as Indicators of Over Deflected Operating Conditions in Tires, presented to Rubber Division of the American Chemical Society, Oct. 21 24, 1997; J. Walter & R. Kiminecz, Bead ** 1179 Contact Pressure Measurements at the Tire Rim Interface, presented to the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., Feb. 24 28, 1975. Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for Michelin, would have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was similarly defective on grounds identical to those upon which he rested his conclusion here. Of course, Carlson himself claimed that his method was accurate, but, as we pointed out in Joiner, " nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." 522 U. S., at 146, 118 S. Ct. 512.

* 158 Respondents additionally argue that the District Court too rigidly applied Daubert's criteria. They read its opinion to hold that a failure to satisfy any one of those criteria automatically renders expert testimony inadmissible. The District Court's initial opinion might have been vulnerable to a form of this argument. There, the court, after rejecting respondents' claim that Carlson's testimony was " exempted from Daubert style scrutiny" because it was " technical analysis" rather than " scientific evidence," simply added that " none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by the Daubert court are satisfied." 923 F. Supp., at 1521. Subsequently, however, the court granted respondents' motion for reconsideration. It then explicitly recognized that the relevant reliability inquiry " should be ' flexible,' " that its " ' overarching subject [ should be] ... validity' and reliability," and that " Daubert was intended neither to be exhaustive nor to apply in every case." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4c ( quoting Daubert, 509 U. S., at 594 595, 113 S. Ct. 2786). And the court ultimately based its decision upon Carlson's failure to satisfy either Daubert's factors or any other set of reasonable reliability criteria. In light of the record as developed by the parties, that conclusion was within the District Court's lawful discretion.

In sum, Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case. The District Court did not abuse its discretionary authority in this case. Hence, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice O'CONNOR and Justice THOMAS join, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, which makes clear that the discretion it endorses  trial court discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability is not discretion to * 159 abandon the gatekeeping function. I think it worth adding that it is not discretion to perform the function inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is junky. Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.

Justice STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The only question that we granted certiorari to decide is whether a trial judge "[ m] ay ... consider the four factors set out by this Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 ( 1993), in a Rule 702 analysis of admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony." Pet. for 119 S. Ct. 1167 Page 16 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 ( Cite as: 526 U. S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167)

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works Cert. i. That question is fully and correctly answered in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, which I join.

Part III answers the quite different question whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he excluded the testimony of Dennis Carlson. Because a proper answer to that question requires a study of the record that can be performed more efficiently by the Court of Appeals than by the nine Members of this Court, I would remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit to perform that task. There are, of course, exceptions to most rules, but I firmly believe that it is neither fair to litigants nor good practice for this Court to reach out to decide questions not raised by the certiorari petition. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 150 151, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 ( 1997) ** 1180 ( STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Accordingly, while I do not feel qualified to disagree with the well reasoned factual analysis in Part III of the Court's opinion, I do not join that Part, and I respectfully dissent from the Court's disposition of the case.

119 S. Ct. 1167, 526 U. S. 137, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 67 USLW 4179, 50 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1177, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,638, 50 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1373, Prod. Liab. Rep. ( CCH) P 15,470, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2059, 1999 Daily Journal D. A. R. 2645, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 141 END OF DOCUMENT


[Federal Register: September 8, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 173)]
[Notices]
[Page 54620-54621]
[DOCID:fr08se10-69]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 13-023]

Green Island Power Authority; Notice of Availability of Draft
Environmental Assessment

August 31, 2010.
    In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's regulations, 18 CFR part
380 (Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897), the Office of Energy Projects has
reviewed the application for a new license for the 6.0-megawatt Green
Island Hydroelectric Project, located on the Hudson River, in Albany
County, New York, and has prepared a Draft Environmental Assessment
(DEA). In the DEA, Commission staff analyzes the potential
environmental effects of relicensing the project and conclude that
issuing a new license for the project, with appropriate environmental
measures, would not constitute a major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.
    A copy of the DEA is on file with the Commission and is available
for public inspection. The DEA may also be viewed on the Commission's
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docket number excluding the last three digits in the docket number
field to access documents. For assistance, contact FERC Online Support
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esubscription.asp to be notified via e-mail of new filings and
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contact FERC Online Support.
    The remaining hydro licensing procedural schedule is as follows:

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              Milestone                           Target date
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Comments of the DEA..................  September 30, 2010.
Modified terms and conditions........  November 29, 2010.

Notice of availability of the final    February 28, 2011.
 EA.
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    Any comments should be filed within 30 days from the date of this
notice. Comments may be filed electronically via the Internet. See 18
CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's Web
site http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp. Commenters can submit
brief comments up to 6,000 characters, without prior registration,
using the eComment system at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/
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Support. Although the Commission strongly encourages electronic filing,
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``Green Island Project No. 13-023'' to all comments. For further
information, contact Tom Dean at<PHONE_NUMBER>.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-22269 Filed 9-7-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 88 (Thursday, May 7, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26278-26280]
[FR Doc No: 2015-10995]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2012-N-0110]

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection;
Comment Request; Medical Device Reporting: Manufacturer, Importer, User
Facility, and Distributor Reporting

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing an
opportunity for public comment on the proposed collection of certain
information by the Agency. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
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Federal Register concerning each proposed collection of information,
including each proposed extension of an existing collection of
information, and to allow 60 days for public comment in response to the
notice. This notice solicits comments on medical device reporting
(MDR); manufacturer, importer, user facility, and distributor
reporting.

DATES: Submit either electronic or written comments on the collection
of information by July 6, 2015.

ADDRESSES: Submit electronic comments on the collection of information
to http://www.regulations.gov. Submit written comments on the
collection of information to the Division of Dockets Management (HFA-
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: FDA PRA Staff, Office of Operations,
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the PRA (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), Federal
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``Collection of information'' is defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(3) and 5 CFR
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the public submit reports, keep records, or provide information to a
third party. Section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A))
requires Federal Agencies to provide a 60-day notice in the Federal
Register concerning each proposed collection of information, including
each proposed extension of an existing collection of information,
before submitting the collection to OMB for approval. To comply with
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of information set forth in this document.
    With respect to the following collection of information, FDA
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proposed collection of information, including the validity of the
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including through the use

of automated collection techniques, when appropriate, and other forms
of information technology.

Medical Device Reporting: Manufacturer, Importer, User Facility, and
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Extension

    Section 519(a)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C
Act) (21 U.S.C. 360i(a)(1)) requires every manufacturer or importer to
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becomes aware of information that reasonably suggests that one of its
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facility shall, as soon as practicable but not later than 10 working
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the Secretary of HHS and, if the identity of the manufacturer is known,
to the manufacturer of the device.
    Section 519(b)(1)(B) of the FD&C Act requires whenever a device
user facility receives or otherwise becomes aware of information that
reasonably suggests that a device has or may have caused or contributed
to the serious illness of, or serious injury to, a patient of the
facility, shall, as soon as practicable but not later than 10 working
days after becoming aware of the information, report the information to
the manufacturer of the device or to the Secretary of HHS if the
identity of the manufacturer is not known.
    Complete, accurate, and timely adverse event information is
necessary for the identification of emerging device problems.
Information from these reports will be used to evaluate risks
associated with medical devices which will enable FDA to take
appropriate regulatory measures in protection of the public health
under section 519 of the FD&C Act. Thus FDA is requesting approval for
these information collection requirements which are being implemented
under part 803.
    Respondents to this collection of information are businesses or
other for-profit and nonprofit organizations including user facilities,
manufacturers, and importers of medical devices.
    Part 803 requires user facilities to report to the device
manufacturer and to FDA in case of a death, incidents where a medical
device caused or contributed to a death or serious injury.
Additionally, user facilities are required to annually submit the
number and summary of advents reported during the calendar year using
Form FDA 3419. Manufacturers of medical devices are required to report
to FDA when they become aware of information indicating that one of
their devices may have caused or contributed to death or serious injury
or has malfunctioned in such a way, that should the malfunction recur,
it would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury.
Device importers report deaths and serious injuries to the
manufacturers and FDA. Importers report malfunctions only to the
manufacturers, unless they are unknown, then the reports are sent to
FDA.
    The number of respondents for each CFR section in table 1 is based
upon the number of respondents entered into FDA's internal databases.
FDA estimates, based on its experience and interaction with the medical
device community, that all reporting CFR sections are expected to take
1 hour to complete, with the exception of Sec.  803.19. Section 803.19
is expected to take approximately 3 hours to complete, but is only
required for reporting the summarized data quarterly to FDA. By
summarizing events, the total time used to report for this section is
reduced because the respondents do not submit a full report for each
event they report in a quarterly summary report.
    The Agency believes that the majority of manufacturers, user
facilities, and importers have already established written procedures
to document complaints and information to meet the MDR requirements as
part of their internal quality control system. There are an estimated
30,000 medical device distributors. Although they do not submit MDR
reports, they must maintain records of complaints under Sec.
803.18(d).
    The Agency has estimated that on average 220 user facilities,
importers, and manufacturers would annually be required to establish
new procedures, or revise existing procedures, in order to comply with
this provision.
    Therefore, FDA estimates the one-time burden to respondents for
establishing or revising procedures under Sec.  803.17 to be 2,200
hours (220 respondents x 10 hours). For those entities, a one-time
burden of 10 hours is estimated for establishing written MDR
procedures. The remaining manufacturers, user facilities, and
importers, not required to revise their written procedures to comply
with this provision, are excluded from the burden because the
recordkeeping activities needed to comply with this provision are
considered ``usual and customary'' under 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2).
    Under Sec.  803.18, 30,000 respondents represent distributors,
importers, and other respondents to this information collection. FDA
estimates that it should take them approximately 1.5 hours to complete
the recordkeeping requirement for this section. Total hours for this
section equal 45,000 hours.

Reporting Requirements

    Part 803 requires user facilities to report incidents where a
medical device caused or contributed a death or serious injury to the
device manufacturer and to FDA in the case of a death. Manufacturers of
medical devices are required to report to FDA when they become aware of
information indicating that one of their devices may have caused or
contributed to death or serious injury or has malfunctioned in such a
way that, should the malfunction recur, it would be likely to cause or
contribute to a death or serious injury. Device importers report deaths
and serious injuries to the manufacturers and FDA. Importers report
malfunctions only to the manufacturers (see third-party disclosure
burden table), unless the manufacturers are unknown, then the reports
are sent to FDA.
    FDA estimates, based on its experience and interaction with the
medical device community, that all reporting CFR sections are expected
to take 1 hour to complete with the exception of Sec.  803.19. Section
803.19 is expected to take approximately 3 hours to complete, but is
only required to report the summarized data quarterly to FDA. By
summarizing events, the total time used to report for this section is
reduced because the respondents do not submit a full report for each
event they report in a quarterly summary report.

Recordkeeping Requirements

    The Agency believes that the majority of manufacturers, user
facilities, and importers have already established written procedures
to document complaints and information to meet the MDR requirements as
part of their internal quality control system. There are an estimated
30,000 medical device distributors. Although they do not submit MDR
reports, they must maintain records of complaints under Sec.
803.18(d). We estimate that it will take

each respondent 1.5 hours annually to maintain the records.
    The Agency has estimated that on average, 220 user facilities,
importers, and manufacturers would annually be required, under Sec.
803.17, to establish new procedures, or revise existing procedures, in
order to comply with this provision. We estimate that it will take each
respondent 10 hours annually to establish new procedures, or revise
existing procedures.

Third-Party Disclosure Burden

    Under Sec. Sec.  803.40 and 803.42, device importers report deaths
and serious injuries to the manufacturers and FDA. Importers report
malfunctions only to the manufacturers, unless they are unknown, then
the reports are sent to FDA. We estimate that it will take respondents
1 hour annually to report the information.
    FDA estimates the burden of this collection of information as
follows:

                                                     Table 1--Estimated Annual Reporting Burden \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of                        Average
                       CFR section                         FDA form No.      Number of     responses per   Total annual     burden per      Total hours
                                                                            respondents     respondent       responses       response
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exemptions--803.19......................................  ..............              57               4             228               3             684
User Facility Reporting--803.30 and 803.32..............  ..............             544               9           4,896               1           4,896
User Facility Annual Reporting--803.33..................            3419             195               1             195               1             195
Importer Reporting, Death and Serious Injury--803.40 and  ..............               1               1               1               1               1
 803.42.................................................
Manufacturer Reporting--803.50, through 803.53..........  ..............           1,239             243         301,077               1         301,077
Supplemental Reports--803.56............................  ..............             124             302          37,448               1          37,448
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............         344,301
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ There are no capital costs or operating and maintenance costs associated with this collection of information.

                               Table 2--Estimated Annual Recordkeeping Burden \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Number of
         21 CFR section             Number of      records per    Total annual   Average  burden    Total hours
                                  recordkeepers   recordkeeper       records       per  record
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MDR Procedures--803.17.........             220               1             220             10             2,200
MDR Files--803.18..............          30,000               1          30,000              1.5          45,000
                                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total......................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ...............          47,200
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ There are no capital costs or operating and maintenance costs associated with this collection of
  information.

                                               Table 3--Estimated Annual Third-Party Disclosure Burden \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                           21 CFR section                               Number of     disclosures per    Total annual   Average  burden    Total hours
                                                                       respondents       respondent      disclosures    per  disclosure
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importer Reporting, Malfunctions--803.40 and 803.42................               1               25               25                1               25
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ There are no capital costs or operating and maintenance costs associated with this collection of information.

    Dated: May 4, 2015.
Leslie Kux,
Associate Commissioner for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2015-10995 Filed 5-6-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4164-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 234 (Tuesday, December 6, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 88001-88002]
[FR Doc No: 2016-29237]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Docket No. FRA-2014-0011-N-02]

Proposed Agency Information Collection Activities; Comment
Request

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA is seeking public comments on its proposal to renew its
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) clearance to participate in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) program, ``Generic Clearance for the
Collection of Qualitative Feedback on Agency Service Delivery'' (OMB
program). FRA will submit the information collection requirements
described below to OMB for review, as required by the PRA. The OMB
program was created to facilitate Federal agencies' efforts to
streamline the process to seek public feedback on service delivery.
Current FRA clearance under the OMB program expires May 31, 2017.

DATES: Comments must be received no later than February 6, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments on any or all of the following
proposed activities by mail to Ms. Kimberly Toone, Office of
Information Technology, RAD-20, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200
New Jersey Ave. SE., Mail Stop 35, Washington, DC 20590. Commenters
requesting FRA to acknowledge receipt of their respective comments must
include a self-addressed stamped postcard stating, ``Comments on OMB
control number 2130-0593.'' Alternatively, comments may be transmitted
via facsimile to<PHONE_NUMBER>, or via email to Ms. Toone at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please refer to the assigned OMB control number in
any correspondence submitted. FRA will summarize comments received in
response to this notice in a subsequent notice and include them in its
information collection submission to OMB for approval.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Kimberly Toone, Office of
Information Technology, RAD-20, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200
New Jersey Ave. SE., Mail Stop 35, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone:
(202) 493-6132). (These telephone numbers are not toll-free.)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Executive Order 12862 (1993) (Setting
Customer Service Standards) directed all Federal executive departments
and agencies and requested independent Federal agencies to provide
service to ``customers'' that matches or exceeds the best service
available in the private sector. See also Executive Order 13571 (2011)
(Streamlining Service Delivery and Improving Customer Service). For
purposes of these orders, ``customer'' means an individual who or
entity that is directly served by a Federal department or agency. FRA
seeks renewed OMB approval of a generic clearance to collect
qualitative feedback on our service delivery (i.e., the products and
services that FRA creates to help consumers and businesses understand
their rights and responsibilities, including Web sites, blogs, videos,
print publications, and other content).
    Below is a brief summary of the information collection activity FRA
will submit to OMB for clearance as required under the PRA:
    Title: Generic Clearance for the Collection of Qualitative Feedback
on Agency Service Delivery OMB Control Number: 2130-0593.
    Status: Regular Review.

    Type of Request: Extension without change of a previously approved
collection.
    Abstract: This collection of information is necessary to enable the
FRA to garner customer and stakeholder feedback in an efficient, timely
manner, consistent with our commitment to improving service delivery.
The information collected from our customers and stakeholders will help
ensure users have an effective, efficient, and satisfying experience
with FRA's programs. This feedback will provide insights into customer
or stakeholder perceptions, experiences and expectations, provide an
early warning of issues with service, and focus attention on areas
where communication, training or changes in operations might improve
delivery of products or services. These collections will allow ongoing,
collaborative, and actionable communications between FRA and its
customers and stakeholders. It also allows feedback to contribute
directly to the improvement of program management.
    Improving FRA's programs requires ongoing assessment of service
delivery, meaning a systematic review of the operation of a program
compared to a set of explicit or implicit standards as a means of
contributing to the continuous improvement of the program. FRA will
collect, analyze, and interpret information gathered through this
generic clearance to identify strengths and weaknesses of current
services and make improvements in service delivery based on feedback.
The solicitation of feedback will target areas such as: Timeliness,
appropriateness, accuracy of information, courtesy, efficiency of
service delivery, and resolution of issues with service delivery. FRA
will assess responses to plan and inform efforts to improve or maintain
the quality of service offered to the public. If this information is
not collected, vital feedback from customers and stakeholders on the
FRA's services will be unavailable.
    FRA will only submit a collection for approval under this generic
clearance if it meets the following conditions:
     FRA will only use the information gathered internally for
general service improvement and program management purposes and does
not intend to release it outside FRA;
     FRA will not use information gathered to substantially
inform influential policy decisions;
     Information gathered will yield qualitative information;
FRA will not design the collections or expect them to yield
statistically reliable results or use them as though the results are
generalizable to the population of study;
     Participation in the collections is voluntary;
     The collections are low-burden for respondents (based on
considerations of total burden hours, total number of respondents, or
burden-hours per respondent) and are low-cost for both the respondents
and the Federal Government;
     The collections are non-controversial and do not raise
issues of concern to other Federal agencies;
     Any collection is targeted to the solicitation of opinions
from respondents who have experience with the OMB program or may have
experience with the OMB program in the near future; and
     With the exception of information needed to provide
renumeration for participants of focus groups and cognitive laboratory
studies, FRA will collect personally identifiable information (PII)
only to the extent necessary and will not retain it.
    Affected Public: Individuals and Households, Business and
Organizations, State, Local or Tribal Governments.
    Frequency of Submission: Once per request.
    Total Annual Number of Respondents: 2,100.
    Total Estimated Responses: 2,100.
    Average Minutes per Response: 10 minutes.
    Total Annual Burden Hours: 354 hours.

    Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on November 30, 2016.
Patrick Warren,
Acting Executive Director.
[FR Doc. 2016-29237 Filed 12-5-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 51 (Friday, March 15, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9513-9514]
[FR Doc No: 2019-04843]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings #1

    Take notice that the Commission received the following exempt
wholesale generator filings:

    Docket Numbers: EG19-65-000.
    Applicants: Sage Solar I LLC.
    Description: Self-Certification of EWG Status of Sage Solar I LLC.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5162.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    Docket Numbers: EG19-66-000.
    Applicants: Sage Solar II LLC.
    Description: Self-Certification of EWG Status of Sage Solar II LLC.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5170.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    Docket Numbers: EG19-67-000.
    Applicants: Sage Solar III LLC.
    Description: Self-Certification of EWG Status of Sage Solar III
LLC.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5178.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    Take notice that the Commission received the following electric
rate filings:

    Docket Numbers: ER13-738-006; ER11-3097-010; ER10-1186-009 ; ER10-
1329-009.
    Applicants: DTE Electric Company, DTE Energy Trading, Inc., DTE
Energy Supply, Inc., St. Paul Cogeneration, LLC.
    Description: Supplement to February 13, 2019 Notice of Non-Material
Change in Status of the DTE MBR Entities.
    Filed Date: 3/8/19.
    Accession Number: 20190308-5255.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/29/19.

    Docket Number: ER19-1229-000.
    Applicants: Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.,
GridLiance Heartland LLC.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: 2019-03-08_Revisions to add
GridLiance to Ameren-PPI JPZA & Schs 7,8,9 to be effective 9/1/2019.
    Filed Date: 3/8/19.
    Accession Number: 20190308-5204.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/29/19.

    Docket Numbers: ER19-1230-000.
    Applicants: TRS Fuel Cell, LLC.
    Description: Baseline eTariff Filing: Baseline New to be effective
5/8/2019.
    Filed Date: 3/8/19.
    Accession Number: 20190308-5216.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/29/19.

    Docket Numbers: ER19-1231-000.
    Applicants: Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.,
GridLiance Heartland LLC.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: 2019-03-08_Revisions to
Schedules 7, 8, and 9 to add GridLiance Heartland to be effective 9/1/
2019.
    Filed Date: 3/8/19.
    Accession Number: 20190308-5222.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/29/19.

    Docket Numbers: ER19-1232-000.
    Applicants: Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: Amendment to Borderline
Service Agreement to be effective 2/9/2019.
    Filed Date: 3/8/19.
    Accession Number: 20190308-5241.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/29/19.

    Docket Numbers: ER19-1233-000.
    Applicants: Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: 2019-03-11_SA 3261
MidAmerican--Bridges Wind Energy LLC GIA (J528) to be effective 2/25/
2019.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5040.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    Docket Numbers: ER19-1234-000.
    Applicants: Alabama Power Company.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: Wilsonville Solar LGIA
Filing to be effective 2/27/2019.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5043.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    Docket Numbers: ER19-1235-000.
    Applicants: Alabama Power Company.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: Iron City Solar LGIA Filing
to be effective 2/27/2019.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5051.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    Docket Numbers: ER19-1238-000.
    Applicants: Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: 2019-03-11_SA 3260
MidAmerican--Holliday Creek Solar GIA (J524) to be effective 2/25/2019.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5108.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    Docket Number: ER19-1239-000.
    Applicants: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
    Description: Sec.  205(d) Rate Filing: First Revised ISA, SA No.
5098; Queue No. AB1-173/AB1-173A/AB2-031 to be effective 2/8/2019.
    Filed Date: 3/11/19.
    Accession Number: 20190311-5179.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 4/1/19.

    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system by
clicking on the links or querying the docket number.
    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the
proceeding.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call<PHONE_NUMBER>
(toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Dated: March 11, 2019.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-04843 Filed 3-14-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P