[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 92 (Friday, May 11, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 21962-21963]
[FR Doc No: 2018-10014]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2018-0371; Product Identifier 2018-CE-005-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Pacific Aerospace Limited Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain Pacific Aerospace Limited Model 750XL airplanes. This proposed
AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and
address an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes
the unsafe condition as insufficient clearance between the pitot tubes
and the primary support at the flame arrester intersection. We are
issuing this proposed AD to require actions to address the unsafe
condition on these products.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 25, 2018.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Pacific Aerospace Limited, Airport Road, Hamilton, Private Bag 3027,
Hamilton 3240, New Zealand; phone: +64 7843 6144; fax: +64 843 6134;
email: [email protected]; internet: www.aerospace.co.nz. You may
review this referenced service information at the FAA, Policy and
Innovation Division, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (816)
329-4148.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-
0371; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains
this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for Docket Operations (telephone
(800) 647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available
in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Kiesov, Aerospace Engineer, FAA,
Small Airplane Standards Branch, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City,
Missouri 64106; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email:
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2018-0371;
Product Identifier 2018-CE-005-AD'' at the beginning of your comments.
We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider
all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed
AD because of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA), has issued DCA/
750XL/24A, dated March 22, 2018 (referred to after this as ``the
MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for Pacific Aerospace Limited
Model 750XL airplanes. The MCAI states:

    Pacific Aerospace SB PACSB/XL/094 issue 2, dated 20 March 2018
revised to include inspection information, and DCA/750XL/24A updated
to introduce the revised SB.
    The [CAA] AD is prompted by a production inspection of installed
pitot static plumbing which identified insufficient clearance
between the pitot tubes and the primary support at the flame
arrestor intersection.

    This proposed AD would require inspecting the pitot static tubes
for chafing damage, replacing tubing as necessary, installing
additional clamp for pitot static tube support, protecting plumbing
with spiralwrap, and ensuring proper clearance between the pitot tubes
and the primary support at the flame arrester intersection. You may
examine the MCAI on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0371.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    Pacific Aerospace Limited has issued Pacific Aerospace Service
Bulletin PACSB/XL/094, Issue 2, dated March 20, 2018. The service
information describes procedures for inspecting the pitot static tubing
for chafing, replacing tubing as necessary, installing an additional
clamp for pitot static tube support, protecting plumbing with
spiralwrap, and ensuring proper clearance between the pitot tubes and
the primary support at the flame arrester intersection. This service
information is reasonably available because the interested parties have
access to it through their normal course of business or by the means
identified in the ADDRESSES section.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, they
have notified us of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and
service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because
we evaluated all information and determined the unsafe condition exists
and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type
design.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this proposed AD will affect 22 products of U.S.
registry. We also estimate that it would take about 1 work-hour per
product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The
average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Required parts would cost
about $25 per product.
    Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on
U.S. operators to be $2,420, or $110 per product.
    In addition, we estimate that any necessary follow-on actions would
take

about 1 work-hour and require parts costing $25, for a cost of $110 per
product. We have no way of determining the number of products that may
need these actions.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
    This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by
FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is
normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but
during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the
authority to issue ADs applicable to small airplanes, gliders,
balloons, airships, domestic business jet transport airplanes, and
associated appliances to the Director of the Policy and Innovation
Division.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Pacific Aerospace Limited: Docket No. FAA-2018-0371; Product
Identifier 2018-CE-005-AD.

(a) Comments Due Date

    We must receive comments by June 25, 2018.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Pacific Aerospace Limited Model 750XL
airplanes, all serial numbers up to and including XL200,
certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 34: Navigation.

(e) Reason

    This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness
information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another
country to identify and address an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as insufficient
clearance between the pitot tubes and the primary support at the
flame arrester intersection. We are issuing this AD to prevent
chafing between the pitot-static plumbing and the flame arrestor,
which could lead to damage of the pitot-static lines.

(f) Actions and Compliance

    Unless already done, do the following actions in paragraphs
(f)(1) through (3) of this AD following the Accomplishment
Instructions in Pacific Aerospace Service Bulletin PACSB/XL/094,
Issue 2, dated March 20, 2018.
    (1) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the
effective date of this AD or within the next 60 days after the
effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, inspect the pitot
static tubing adjacent to the flame arrestor for chafing damage.
    (2) If any chafing damage is founding during the inspection
required in paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before further flight,
repair or replace any damaged tubing and conduct a pitot and static
leak check.
    (3) Within the next 100 hours TIS after the effective date of
this AD or within the next 60 days after the effective date of this
AD, whichever occurs first, install an additional support clamp,
protect plumbing with spiralwrap, and ensure proper clearance
between the pitot tubes and the primary support at the flame
arrester intersection.

(g) Other FAA AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
Small Airplane Standards Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve
AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR
39.19. Send information to ATTN: Mike Kiesov, Aerospace Engineer,
FAA, Small Airplane Standards Branch, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas
City, Missouri 64106; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax: (816) 329-
4090; email: [email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate
principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office
(FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
    (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD
to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the action must be
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, Small Airplane
Standards Branch, FAA; or Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand
(CAA).

(h) Related Information

    Refer to MCAI CAA AD DCA/750XL/24A, dated March 22, 2018, for
related information. You may examine the MCAI on the internet at
http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2018-0371. For service information related to this AD, contact
Pacific Aerospace Limited, Airport Road, Hamilton, Private Bag 3027,
Hamilton 3240, New Zealand; phone: +64 7843 6144; fax: +64 843 6134;
email: [email protected]; internet: www.aerospace.co.nz. You
may review this referenced service information at the FAA, Policy
and Innovation Division, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.
For information on the availability of this material at the FAA,
call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on May 4, 2018.
Melvin J. Johnson,
Deputy Director, Policy & Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2018-10014 Filed 5-10-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 233 (Monday, December 5, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 87649-87653]
[FR Doc No: 2016-29013]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Safety Advisory 2016-03]

Mitigation and Investigation of Passenger Rail Human Factor
Related Accidents and Operations in Terminals and Stations With Stub
End Tracks

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2016-03 to stress to passenger
and commuter railroads the importance of taking action to help mitigate
human factor accidents, assist in the investigation of such accidents,
and enhance the safety of operations in stations and terminals with
stub end tracks. This safety advisory contains various recommendations
to passenger and commuter railroads related to inward- and outward-
facing cameras, sleep apnea, and operating practices to potentially
mitigate the occurrence and assist in the investigation of human factor
related accidents and to enhance the safety of operations in terminals
and stations with stub end tracks.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christian Holt, Operating Practices
Specialist, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. New Jersey Transit Incident

    On September 29, 2016, at approximately 8:38 a.m., New Jersey
Transit (NJT) Train 1614 travelling at 21 miles per hour (mph) impacted
the bumping block at the end of the track No. 5 Depot, at Hoboken
Terminal, in Hoboken, New Jersey. The cab car overrode the bumping
block and struck the wall of the terminal building, near the ticket
office in the corner of the building. NJT Train 1614 was occupied by
three crew members and approximately 331 passengers. The accident
resulted in the three crewmembers and 108 passengers being transported
to four area hospitals. One individual who was standing on the
pedestrian walkway between the tracks and the station was fatally
injured from falling debris.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken the lead
role in conducting the investigation of this accident under its legal
authority. See 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b). As is
customary, FRA is participating in the NTSB's investigation and also
investigating the accident under its own authority. NTSB has not issued
its formal findings. Although the NTSB has not concluded its
investigation of this accident, FRA believes railroads should take more
robust action to address human factors that may cause accidents and to
enhance protection of railroad employees and the public.

II. Other Railroad Accidents

Amtrak Accident at Philadelphia, PA

    On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) passenger train 188 (Train 188) was traveling from Washington,
DC, to New York City. Aboard the train were five crew members and
approximately 238 passengers. Shortly after 9:20 p.m., the train
derailed while traveling through a curve in the track at Frankford
Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As a result of the accident,
eight persons were killed and a significant number of persons were
seriously injured.
    NTSB conducted an investigation of this accident under its legal
authority and issued its findings on May 17, 2016.\1\ As Train 188
approached the curve from the west, it traveled over a straightaway
with a maximum authorized passenger train speed of 80 mph. The maximum
authorized passenger train speed for the curve was 50 mph. NTSB
determined the train was traveling approximately 106 mph within the
curve's 50-mph speed restriction, exceeding the maximum authorized
speed on the straightaway by 26 mph, and 56 mph over railroad's maximum
authorized speed for the curve.\2\ NTSB concluded the locomotive
engineer operating the train made an emergency application of Train
188's air brake system, and the train slowed to approximately 102 mph
before derailing in the curve.\3\ NTSB concluded that the probable
cause of the engineer accelerating to this speed was due to his loss of
situational awareness likely because his attention was diverted to an
emergency situation with another train.\4\
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    \1\ 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b); and NTSB, Railroad
Accident Report, RAR-16/02, Derailment of Amtrak Passenger Train
188, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 12, 2015, http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1602.pdf.
    \2\ RAR-16/02 at 1. FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is
unlawful to ``[o]perate a train or locomotive at a speed which
exceeds the maximum authorized limit by at least 10 miles per
hour.'' 49 CFR 240.305(a)(2).
    \3\ RAR-16/02 at 4-5.
    \4\ Id. at 44.
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    On July 8, 2015, NTSB sent a letter to FRA reiterating NTSB
recommendations

R-10-01 & -02.\5\ The letter indicated NTSB believes inward-facing
locomotive recorders could have provided valuable information to help
determine the cause of the accident. After this accident occurred,
Amtrak announced it would install inward-facing cameras on all of its
ACS-64 locomotives on the Northeast Corridor.
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    \5\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation
History for Safety Recommendation R-10-001: available online at:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-10-001. NTSB's accident report also
reiterated these recommendations. See RAR-16/02 at 46-47. NTSB also
sent a letter regarding locomotive recorder recommendations to
Amtrak.
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Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) Chatsworth, CA

    On September 12, 2008, in Chatsworth, California, an accident
occurred involving a collision between a Southern California Regional
Rail Authority (Metrolink) passenger train and a Union Pacific Railroad
Company (UP) freight train.\6\ The accident occurred after the
locomotive engineer operating the Metrolink passenger train failed to
stop his train for a stop signal. As a result of the accident, 25
persons on the Metrolink train were killed and 102 injured passengers
were transported to the hospital. The accident damage was estimated to
be in excess of $12 million. The NTSB found the probable cause of that
accident was the Metrolink locomotive engineer's distraction due to the
use of a personal cell phone to send text messages resulting in a
failure to comply with the signal indication.\7\
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    \6\ See National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of
Metrolink Train 111 with Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 Chatsworth,
California September 12, 2008, Accident Report NTSB/RAR-10/01 (Jan.
21, 2010); available online at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1001.pdf.
    \7\ Id. at 66.
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    Shortly after the Metrolink accident, the Rail Safety Improvement
Act of 2008 \8\ (RSIA) was enacted. RSIA required, among other items,
that railroads install Positive Train Control (PTC) systems. Also after
the accident, FRA issued its Emergency Order No. 26 (EO 26). 73 FR
58702 (Oct. 7, 2008). EO 26 prohibited railroad operating employees
(typically train crew members such as locomotive engineers and
conductors) performing safety-related duties from using or turning on
electronic devices such as personal cell phones. The requirements in EO
26 were codified in amended form at 49 CFR part 220, subpart C, in an
FRA final rule published on September 27, 2010, which took effect on
March 28, 2011. 75 FR 59580. Among other requirements in the final
rule, railroad operating employees are required to receive training on
the regulation's requirements governing the use of electronic devices
while on-duty and are also required to be tested by railroad
supervisors to determine employees' compliance with such requirements.
49 CFR 220.313-315.
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    \8\ Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Public Law 110-432,
Division A, 122 Stat. 4848 (Oct. 16, 2008); available online at
https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/ L03588.
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    The NTSB's report on the Chatsworth accident resulted in two new
Safety Recommendations, R-10-01 and R-10-02.\9\ Safety Recommendation
R-10-01 superseded Safety Recommendation R-07-003, and recommended that
FRA:

    \9\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations
R-10-01 and R-10-02 (Feb. 23, 2010); available online at: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/R-10-001-002.pdf.

    Require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs and
cab car operating compartments, of crash- and fire-protected inward-
and outward-facing audio and image recorders capable of providing
recordings to verify that train crew actions are in accordance with
rules and procedures that are essential to safety as well as train
operating conditions. The devices should have a minimum 12-hour
continuous recording capability with recordings that are easily
accessible for review, with appropriate limitations on public
release, for the investigation of accidents or for use by management
in carrying out efficiency testing and system wide performance
monitoring programs.
    In addition, Safety Recommendation R-10-02 recommended that FRA:
    Require that railroads regularly review and use in-cab audio and
image recordings (with appropriate limitations on public release),
in conjunction with other performance data, to verify that train
crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are
essential to safety.

Metro-North Railroad Derailment, Bronx, NY

    On December 1, 2013, at approximately 7:20 a.m. EST, southbound
Metro-North Railroad (Metro-North) passenger train 8808 derailed as it
approached the Spuyten Duyvil Station in New York City. All passenger
cars and the locomotive derailed, and, as a result, four passengers
died and at least 61 passengers were injured. The train was traveling
at 82 mph when it derailed in a section of curved track where the
maximum authorized speed was 30 mph. Following the accident, the
engineer reported that: (1) He felt dazed just before the derailment;
\10\ and (2) his wife had complained about his snoring. The engineer
then underwent a sleep evaluation that identified excessive daytime
sleepiness and a sleep study that diagnosed severe obstructive sleep
apnea (OSA). Based on its investigation of the derailment, the NTSB
concluded that the engineer had multiple OSA risk factors, such as
obesity, male gender, snoring, complaints of fatigue, and excessive
daytime sleepiness. Even though the engineer had these OSA risk
factors, neither his personal health care provider nor his Metro-North
occupational health evaluations had screened the engineer for OSA.\11\
NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the
``engineer's noncompliance with the 30-mph speed restriction because he
had fallen asleep due to undiagnosed severe obstructive sleep apnea
exacerbated by a recent circadian rhythm shift required by his work
schedule.'' \12\
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    \10\ NTSB, Railroad Accident Brief RAB-14/12, Metro-North
Railroad Derailment, October 24, 2014, p. 2.
    \11\ Id. at 3.
    \12\ Id. at 5.
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    Railroad safety is of the utmost importance to FRA, and, based on
the above accidents, FRA recommends several measures discussed below,
to address human factor-caused accidents

III. Inward- and Outward-Facing Cameras

    On December 4, 2015, the President signed into law the Fixing
America's Surface Transportation Act, Public Law 114-94, 129 Stat. 1686
(Dec. 4, 2015) (FAST Act). Section 11411 of the FAST Act, codified in
the Federal railroad safety laws at 49 U.S.C. 20168 (the Statute),
requires FRA (as the Secretary of Transportation's delegate) to
promulgate regulations requiring each railroad carrier that provides
regularly scheduled intercity rail passenger or commuter rail passenger
transportation to install inward- and outward-facing image recording
devices in all controlling locomotives of passenger trains. 49 U.S.C.
20168(a). Although FRA is in the process of developing a regulatory
proposal addressing this statutory mandate, FRA encourages railroads to
accelerate the installation of the cameras. The Statute contains
various design and operational requirements related to these cameras
including:
     A minimum 12-hour continuous recording capability (49
U.S.C. 20168(b)(1));
     Crash and fire protections for any in-cab image recordings
that are stored only within a controlling locomotive cab or cab car
operating compartment (49 U.S.C. 20168(b)(2));
     Recordings must be accessible for review during an
accident or incident investigation (49 U.S.C. 20168(b)(3));

     Railroads may use the recordings to:
    [cir] Verify that train crew actions follow applicable safety laws
and the railroad carrier's operating rules and procedures (49 U.S.C.
20168(d)(1));
    [cir] Assist in an investigation into the causation of a reportable
accident or incident (49 U.S.C. 20168(d)(2)); and
    [cir] Document a criminal act or monitor unauthorized occupancy of
the controlling locomotive cab or car operating compartment (49 U.S.C.
20168(d)(3)).
    In addition to the design and operational requirements in the FAST
Act, the Statute also contains various other requirements regarding the
use and maintenance of inward- and outward-facing cameras as well as
limitations and protections on how data from the cameras can be used.
Importantly, the Statute prohibits railroads from using image
recordings to retaliate against their employees. 49 U.S.C. 20168(i). In
addition, to discourage tampering with the cameras, the Statute allows
railroads to take enforcement actions against employees that tamper
with or disable an inward- or outward-facing image recording device. 49
U.S.C. 20168(f). Furthermore, recording device data obtained from a
locomotive involved in a FRA reportable accident or incident must be
preserved by the railroad for one year after the accident or incident.
49 U.S.C. 20168(g).
    Once FRA has acquired this data from the railroad, FRA is
prohibited from publicly disclosing locomotive audio and image
recordings or transcripts of oral communications between train,
operating, and communication center employees related to the accident
or incident FRA is investigating. However, FRA may publicly release a
transcript of a written depiction of visual information that the agency
deems is relevant to the accident at the time other factual reports on
the accident are released to the public. 49 U.S.C. 20168(h). This
restriction is similar to the prohibition on public disclosure of
locomotive recordings that NTSB takes possession of during an
investigation. 49 U.S.C. 1114(d).
    FRA remains concerned with the ability to fully investigate
accidents that appear to be human factor-caused where there is
insufficient information from the controlling locomotive cab or cab
operating compartment to conclusively determine what caused or
contributed to an accident. Locomotive cab recording information could
benefit investigations and help identify necessary corrective actions
before similar train accidents occur. Inward- and outward-facing image
recording devices would be valuable in revealing crew actions and
interactions before, during, and after an accident. FRA also believes
that inward- and outward-facing cameras will give railroads the ability
to monitor crew behavior to ensure compliance with existing Federal
regulations and railroad operating rules and deter noncompliance.
Existing Federal regulations at 49 CFR part 217 require railroads to
conduct operational tests to determine the extent of employees'
compliance with railroad operating rules, and particularly those rules
which are most likely to cause the most accidents or incidents.

IV. Railroad Employee Fatigue

    Fatigue of railroad employees continues to be a concern of FRA,
particularly for employees with sleep disorders who operate passenger
trains. This Advisory contains suggested measures that railroads and
employees should utilize to prevent work-related errors and on-the-job
accidents as a result of sleep disorders.
    Sleep disorders represent a serious health problem and left
untreated can result in impaired work performance, including possible
loss of alertness and situational awareness, which could in turn
present an imminent threat to transportation safety.\13\ In general
terms, sleep disorders range from fairly common disorders, such as
insomnia (the inability to initiate or maintain sleep) to relatively
rare sleep disorders such as narcolepsy (inappropriate and
uncontrollable sleep episodes). Railroad employees who typically work
on-call are especially vulnerable to circadian rhythm disorders such as
shift work sleep disorder (SWSD).\14\ SWSD symptoms include excessive
sleepiness when a worker needs to be awake, insomnia when the worker
needs to obtain sleep, unrefreshing sleep, and difficulty
concentrating.\15\ One of the more common sleep disorders is
obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). And, the lawyer representing the
engineer of the NJT train stated the engineer had undiagnosed OSA.\16\
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    \13\ See 81 FR 12642, 12643-12644 (Mar. 10, 2016); Federal
Railroad Administration Notice of Safety Advisory 2004-04 (Oct. 1,
2004).
    \14\ Id.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ See http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/NJ-train-crash-undiagnosed-engineer-sleep-disorder-apnea-hoboken-401555955.html.
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    OSA is a respiratory disorder characterized by a reduction or
cessation of breathing during sleep. OSA is characterized by repeated
episodes of upper airway collapse in the region of the upper throat
(pharynx) that results in intermittent periods of partial airflow
obstruction (hypopneas), complete airflow obstruction (apneas), and
respiratory effort-related arousals from sleep (RERAs) in which
affected individuals awaken partially and may experience gasping and
choking as they struggle to breathe. Risk factors for developing OSA
include: Obesity, male gender, advancing age, family history of OSA,
large neck size, and an anatomically small oropharynx (throat).
Additionally, OSA is associated with increased risk for other adverse
health conditions such as: Hypertension (high blood pressure),
diabetes, cardiac dysrhythmias (irregular heartbeat), myocardial
infarction (heart attack), stroke, and sudden cardiac death.
Individuals who have undiagnosed OSA are often unaware they have
experienced periods of sleep interrupted by breathing difficulties
(apneas, hypopneas, or RERAs) when they awaken in the morning. As a
result, the condition is often unrecognized by affected individuals and
underdiagnosed by medical professionals.
    For individuals with OSA, eight hours of sleep can be less restful
or refreshing than four hours of ordinary, uninterrupted sleep.
Undiagnosed or inadequately treated moderate to severe OSA can cause
unintended sleep episodes and resulting deficits in attention,
concentration, situational awareness, and memory, thus reducing the
capacity to safely respond to hazards when performing safety sensitive
duties. Thus, OSA is a critical safety issue that can affect operations
in all modes of travel in the transportation industry.
    On March 10, 2016, FRA published an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) requesting data and information concerning the
prevalence of moderate-to-severe OSA of individuals occupying safety
sensitive positions in rail transportation and the potential
consequences for rail safety. See 81 FR 12642 (Mar. 10, 2016). The
ANPRM also requested information on the potential costs and benefits
from regulatory actions that would address the safety risks associated
with rail transportation workers in safety sensitive positions who have
OSA. The ANPRM was published jointly with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration and requested similar information regarding
highway transportation workers in safety sensitive positions and
highway safety. This Advisory and accompanying recommended actions is
not in response to the ANPRM; rather, it is an action concurrent with
the ANPRM. FRA is currently reviewing the data and

information submitted in response to the ANPRM.

V. Passenger Terminals and Stations With Stub End Tracks

    The Hoboken accident involved NJT Train 1614 that was traversing a
stub end track entering a passenger station at 21 mph-11 mph over the
10 mph posted speed limit. FRA recommends identifying locations that
have stub end tracks at passenger terminals and stations that are
equipped with technology that can warn and enforce passenger trains to
stop short of a stub end track and ensure they enforce applicable speed
limits. If such locations are not equipped with technology that can
warn and enforce passenger trains to stop short of a stub end track and
ensure they enforce applicable speed limits, then FRA encourages
railroads to take other operational actions to prevent trains from
overrunning stub end tracks equipped with or without bumping posts. One
such operational action would be to require communications between the
engineer and other qualified employees that can take appropriate
action, such as applying the emergency brakes, if necessary.

VI. Recommended Actions

    In light of the recent accident discussed above, and in an effort
to ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees, and
the general public, FRA recommends that intercity passenger and
commuter railroads do each of the following:
    1. Instruct their employees during training classes and safety
briefings on the importance of compliance with maximum authorized train
speed limits and other speed restrictions when entering passenger
stations and terminals;
    2. Not less than once every six months evaluate operational testing
data as required by 49 CFR 217.9. A railroad should consider increasing
the frequency of operational testing where its reviews show any non-
compliance with maximum authorized train speeds in passenger stations
or terminals. Railroads should conduct a significant number of
operational tests on trains required to operate into a station or
terminal with stub end tracks;
    3. Adopt procedures requiring communication between crew members
and the locomotive engineer before and during operation into a station
or terminal and/or implement technology to appropriately control and/or
stop the train short of the stub end track. These actions could
include:
    a. Making modifications to automatic train control (ATC), cab
signal, or other signal systems capable of providing warning and
enforcement to ensure trains comply with applicable speed limits and
stop short of stub end tracks;
    b. If a railroad does not utilize an ATC, cab signal, or other
signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement at
applicable passenger terminals and stations with stub end tracks
platforms (or if a signal system modification would interfere with the
implementation of PTC or is otherwise not viable), making all passenger
train movements at the identified locations while in communication with
a second qualified crew member. This will provide constant
communication with the locomotive engineer and allow the second
crewmember to take immediate appropriate action if the locomotive
engineer is not responding or is unable to stop short of stub end
tracks. This could also include making a safety stop at predetermined
location and if the locomotive engineer does not make an appropriate
safety stop the second qualified crew member can take appropriate
action to stop the train;
    4. Review Safety Advisory 2004-04 (69 FR 58995, Oct. 1, 2004);
Effect of Sleep Disorders on Safety of Railroad Operations, in its
entirety with all operating crews. Recommended actions from Safety
Advisory 2004-04 are listed below:
    a. Establish training and educational programs to inform employees
of the potential for performance impairment as a result of fatigue,
sleep loss, sleep deprivation, inadequate sleep quality, and working at
odd hours, and document when employees have received the training.
Incorporate elements that encourage self-assessment, peer-to-peer
communication, and co-worker identification accompanied by policies
consistent with these recommendations. The Railroaders' Guide to
Healthy Sleep Web site (http://www.railroadersleep.org) has several
educational resources to assist railroaders in improving their sleep
health including an anonymous tool for self-screening for sleep
disorders including OSA. This Web site is set up to disseminate
educational information to railroad employees and their families about
sleep disorders, the relevance of healthy sleep to railroad safety, and
provide information about improving the quality of the railroaders'
sleep. The Web site was developed in conjunction with the Division of
Sleep Medicine at Harvard Medical School, WGBH Educational Foundation,
and Volpe--The National Transportation Systems Center;
    b. Ensure that employees' medical examinations include assessment
and screening for possible sleep disorders and other associated medical
conditions (including use of appropriate checklists and records).
Develop standardized screening tools, or a good practices guide, for
the diagnosis, referral and treatment of sleep disorders (especially
OSA) and other related medical conditions to be used by company paid or
recommended physicians during routine medical examinations; and provide
an appropriate list of certified sleep disorder centers and related
specialists for referral when necessary;
    c. Develop and implement rules that request employees in safety-
sensitive positions to voluntarily report any sleep disorder that could
incapacitate, or seriously impair, their performance;
    d. Develop and implement policies such that, when a railroad
becomes aware that an employee in a safety-sensitive position has an
incapacitating or performance-impairing medical condition related to
sleep, the railroad prohibits that employee from performing any safety-
sensitive duties until that medical condition appropriately responds to
treatment; and
    e. Implement policies, procedures, and any necessary agreements
to--
    i. Promote self-reporting of sleep-related medical conditions by
protecting the medical confidentiality of that information and
protecting the employment relationship, provided that the employee
complies with the recommended course of treatment;
    ii. Encourage employees with diagnosed sleep disorders to
participate in recommended evaluation and treatment; and
    iii. Establish dispute resolution mechanisms that rapidly resolve
any issues regarding the current fitness of employees who have reported
sleep-related medical conditions and have cooperated in evaluation and
prescribed treatment.
    5. Accelerate the installation of inward- and outward-facing
cameras in passenger trains in the cab of the controlling locomotive or
cab car operating compartment per the FAST Act. FRA notes that the FAST
Act includes provisions on standards for the cameras, use of the
cameras, and preservation and protection of data from the cameras.
    FRA encourages all intercity passenger and commuter railroads to
take actions consistent with the preceding recommendations. FRA
acknowledges that action on some of the

above recommendations may have already taken place by segments of the
industry. If so, FRA recommends railroads review their current programs
for relevancy and review the policies and procedures with all their
operating employees.
    FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2016-03, issue additional
safety advisories, or take other appropriate action necessary to ensure
the highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads, including
pursing other corrective measures under its rail safety authority.

Robert Lauby,
Administrator for Railroad Safety Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2016-29013 Filed 12-2-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


1 Terrestrial Investigation Model x2.0 Dermal Exposure 2 Development Goals ° Tool reliant on existing fate data sets ° Consider adapting existing Agency approaches ° Relate exposure to available toxicity information 3 Dermal Conceptual Model Directly applied spray Dislodged residues from foliage Residues associated with soil particulate   X  proposed model addresses X not addressed 4 Interception of Directly Applied Spray IDD A SA BW rate ercept = int where: IDD = Intercepted Dermal Dose mg/ kg Arate = application rate from label converted to mg/ m2 SAintercept = exposed surface area of bird intercepting applied pesticide ( m2)

BW = bird body weight ( kg) 5 Incidental Dermal Contact with Dislodgeable Foliar Reside IDCD C F R SA TC BW plant dfr foliar contact foliar contact =

where: IDCD = Incidental Dermal Contact Dose mg/ kg C plant = concentration of the pesticide in crop foliage at time t ( mg/ kg)

F dfr = dislodgeable foliar residue adjustment factor ( kg/ m2)

R foliar contact = rate of foliar contact ( m2 foliage/ hr/ m2 body surface)

SA foliar contact = surface area of bird in contact with foliage ( m2)

TC = residue transfer coefficient BW = bird weight ( kg) 6 Surface Area ( )

SA BW total = 10 1000 1000 0 667 ( ) .

SA SA ercept total int .

= 0 5 where: BW = bird weight in kg Interception of spray assumes SA is for upper half of bird Incidental foliar contact assumes contact with lower leg and foot SA SA foliar contact total ( m ) .

2 0 07 = 7 Pesticide Concentration on Plant ° Uses the foliar concentrations from dietary exposure module of the model 8 Dislodgeable Foliar Residue Adjustment Factor F DPR TPR dfr =

where: DPR = Dislodgeable pesticide residues ( mg/ m2)

reported in submissions to the Agency TPR = Total pesticide residues ( mg/ kg)

reported in submissions to the Agency 9 Foliar Contact Rate ° Surface area bird contacts over a given exposure period ° Agency has no data specific to birds ° Field worker exposure contact rates are used as a surrogate ° Focus on measured contact rates for fruit/ vegetable picker hands as surrogate for bird feet ( 11.9 to 5050 cm2/ hr)

° Contact rates are normalized to hand surface area using 840 cm2 estimate of hand surface area ° Foliar contact rate used in the model is:

( 5050 cm2/ hr)/ 840 cm2 = 6.01 cm2/ hr/ cm2 10 Foliar Contact Rate ° Contact rates represent an " effective rate"

° Dosimetry studies measure residues on body ° Dislodgeable residues are measured on plants ° Contact rates are the ratio of dosimetry: dislodgeable residues ° Dosimeters may saturate before end of exposure period or transfer of residues may be less than complete ° Question of surrogacy, future research needed ° Importance of other areas of the bird surface for foliar contact 11 Transfer Coefficient ° Place holder in the model ° Anticipates eventual information on bird foliar contact rates ° Would allow for consideration of the efficiency of residue transfer from foliage to bird 12 Scenarios for Dermal Exposure ° Direct Spray Interception Exposure   First time step following application   In field residents ( air and ground spray applications)

  Edge residents ( air spray applications)

° Incidental Foliar Contact Exposure   Every time step bird is actively feeding on field 13 Relating Dermal Exposure to Available Toxicity Data ° No Agency requirement for acute dermal toxicity testing in birds ° TIM x2.0 relies on avian single oral dose toxicity ° Model goal is to evaluate cumulative exposure from multiple routes ° Need a method to relate external dermal dose to available toxicity endpoints 14 Developing a Route Relative Potency Factor where: Fred = the avian route equivalency factor for dermal exposure Need a dermal toxicity estimate.

F LD LD red avian oral for species x avian dermal for species x = 50 50 ( )

( ) 15 Dermal Toxicity Estimate ° Estimate relies on available comparative toxicity testing for both dermal and acute oral exposure in birds * error estimates in next presentation ° Incorporated into the Fred calculation ( )

log . . log *

( ) ( )

LD LD dermal oral 50 50 0 84 0 62 = +

( )

F LD red avian oral LD oral = + 50 0 84 0 62 10 50 ( )

. . ( log ( ) 16 Applying Fred to Dermal Exposure Estimates ° Uses existing toxicity data for birds ° Estimates of acute dermal toxicity are for external dose, simplifying exposure adjustments ° Limited by power of correlation between oral and dermal exposures ° Limited by chemicals represented in the toxicity database equivalent oral dose mg/ kg = ( model dermal dose mg/ kg)( Fred) 17 Mortality 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Exposure Scenario Mortality Rate (

n=

10,000) Food and Dew Food, Dew , Direct Dermal Spray Food, Dew , Dermal Contact Food, Dew , Dermal Spray,

Dermal Contact Impact of Dermal Exposure on Risk Assessment Chem X Scenario ° Field Resident Insectivore ° 0.5 lb ai/ acre, aerial application at 8am Average Total Dose at Death 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Exposure scenario m g/

kg oral dose equivalent Food and Dew Food Dew , Direct Dermal Spray Food, Dew , Dermal Contact Food, Dew , Dermal Spray,

Dermal Contact 18 Next Steps ° Sensitivity analysis ( parameter influences on exposure estimates and risk estimates)

° Improved methods for dermal contact and transfer of residues ° Longer term investigation of PBTK models 19 Relating external dermal dose to oral dose equivalents ° If dermal and oral data are available, a route equivalence factor ( Fred) is calculated as:

° Currently Agency does not have data requirement for avian acute dermal toxicity test. )

x species for dermal avian (

50 )

x species for oral avian (

50 LD LD red F = 20 If only oral data are available..

° Must estimate a dermal LD50 ° To accomplish this used:

  Definitive oral and dermal LD50' s are available for 42 individual avian studies   Explored data to evaluate relationship between oral and dermal LD50' s   Used linear regression to define relationship, similar to Mineau ( 2002) 21 Dermal LD50 vs. Oral LD50 r = 0.55 22 ° In addition to using oral LD50 to predict dermal LD50, several chemical properties were included in the regression to try to improve predictive ability   molecular weight, density, molar volume   none of the chemical properties significantly improved fit of the regression model 23 Final Regression Equation Therefore, Fred is estimated as: )

LD ( log 62 .

0 84 .

0 ( )

oral avian (

50 red )

oral avian (

50 10 LD F +

=

log ( Dermal LD50) = 0.84 + 0.62* log ( Oral LD50)

standard errors: ( 0.14) ( 0.15)

p value ( slope) = 0.0002 model Rsquare = 0.30