[ Footnote 1 1 ] Decisions in different contexts have emphasized that the nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of deferment ofjudicial review are important factors in determining whether a , statutory requirement of finality has been satisfied. The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely '' practical'' approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 I; S. 511, 546 ( 1949), when applying the finality requirements of 28 U. S. C. 1291, which grants jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review all " final decisions" of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. 1257, which empowers this Court to review only " finaljudgments" of state courts. See, e. g., Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 ( 1971); Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549  550 ( 1963); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555. 5.57  558 ( 1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., supra, at 545 546. TObe sure, certain of the policy considerations implicated in 1257 and 1291 cases are different from those that are relevant here. Compare Construction Laborers, supra, at 550; Mercantile Nat. Bank, supra, at 558, .

with McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193  195 ( 1969); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 424 426 ( 1 965). But the core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable Findl av.: Unitcd States C3se Law: Supreme Courp injuries to be suffered remains applicable.

[ Footnote 12 3 Given our conclusion that jurisdiction in the District Court was proper under 405 ( g), we find it unnecessary to consider Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding 405 ( h) there was jurisdiction over his claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. 1361, or the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 701 et seq.

[ Footnote 13 ] In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency charged with administering the state plan under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. 701 et seq. ( 1970 ed., Supp. III), acts as the " state agency" for purposes of the disability insurance program. Staff of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 148 ( 1974). This assignment of responsibility was intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers and to utilize the well established relationships of the local rehabilitation agencies with the medical profession. H. R. Rep. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 23 24 ( 1954).

[ F. O.~ rngte. l4] Work which " exists in the national economy" is in turn defined as '' work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 423 ( d) ( 2) ( A).

[ F. g. 01.0.0tn... l5] Because the continuing disability investigation concerning whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency involvement, the administrative procedures prior to the post termination [; t 2. t tj. s. 3 19,3371 evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in cases of possible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important respect that the process relies principally on written communications and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior to the cutoff of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in certain types of cases, such as those involving self employment and agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary conducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pretermination process. SSA Claims Manual ( CM) 6705.2 ( c).

[ Footnote 16 3 Information is also requested concerning the recipient's belief as to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past year, and any vocational services he is receiving.

[ F. u.~ rt. 0 ot. n.. l. 7..] All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly identified. DISM 353.4C.

[ Footnote 1S ] The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examine the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his choice, inciuding a lay friend or family member, examine all medical evidence. CM 7314. See also 20 CFR 40 1.3 ( a) ( 2) ( 1975). The Secretary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under review.

[ F~. o~. n. ot.~.. l. 9.] The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the agency for hrther consideration in light of the SSAs views. The agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment.

[ Eootnote 20 ] The reconsideration assessment is initially made by the state agency, but usually not by the same. persons who considered the case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass Justice 32 ( 197.3) Both the recipient and the agency may adduce new evidence. 1,' i: idLaw: United States Case Law: Supreme Court wy,~ wyg:!/ 6, http: i! caselaw. findlaw. corn/ scripts! getcase. pi" court us&~ Ol ~ J:.;& invol=!

[ F. ootn~ tg~. l JUnlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the district court is required to treat findings of facjt as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S. C. 405 ( 8).

[ Footnote 22 ] The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the beneficiary is " without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purposes of the Act or be " against equity and good conscience." 42 U. S. C. 404 ( b). See generally 20 CFR 404.501 404.515 ( 1975).

[ F. o9tngte. k. 3.] This, of course, assumes that an employee whose wages are garnished erroneously is subsequently able to recover his back wages.

[ Fg. ot. n. ot. g.. Z~] The level of benefits is determined by the worker's average monthly earnings during the period prior to disability, his age, and other factors not directly related to financial need, specified in 42 U. S. C. 415 ( 1970 ed., Supp. III). See 423 ( a) ( 2).

[ F. ootnote.. 25.. J Workmen's compensation benefits are deducted in part in accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. 424a ( 1970 ed., Supp. 111); 20 CFR 404.408 ( 1975); see Richardson v. Belcher, 30.1 I!.?,. 78 ( 1971).

[ F. g.~ Ioot. g.. Z~] Amici cite statistics complied by the Secretary which indicate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a disabled worker was $ 3,803, while the median income for the unit was $ 2,836. The mean liquid assets  i. e., cash, stocks, bonds  of these family units was $ 4,862; the median was $ 940. These statistics do not take into account the family unit's nonliquid assets  i. e., automobile, real estate, and the like. Brief for AFL CIO et al. as Amici Curiae App. 4a. See n. 29, infra.

[ Footnote 27 ] Amici emphasize that because an identical definition of disability is employed in both the Title I1 Social Security Program and in the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Security Income ( SSI), compare 42 U. S. C. 423 ( d) ( 1) with 1382c ( a) ( 3) ( 1970 ed., Supp. 111), the terminated disability benefits recipient will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income. In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps if it meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. 2013 ( c), 2014 ( b); 7 CFR 271 ( 1975). Finaiiy, in 1974 480,000 of the approximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial I. it2.1 Ij. S. 3 19, ?! 3j need is a criterion for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the SSI program, a pretermination evidentiary hearing is provided, if requested. 42 U. S. C. 1383 ( c) ( 1970 ed., Supp. 111); 20 CFR416.1336 ( c) ( 1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 1512 ( 1975); see StaffReport 346.

[ Footnote 78 ] The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medical diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's " age, education, and work experience'' he cannot " engage in any . , . substantial gainful work which exists in the nationai economy . . . ." 42 U. S. C. 423 ( d) ( 2) ( A), Yet information concerning each of these worker characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The value of an evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation, to an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to the types of employment opportunities that exist in the national economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of skills would not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. Cf. 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 7.06, p. 429 ( 1958). The statistical information relevant to this judgment is more amenable to written than to oral presentation.

[ F" o. t! lote 29 1 By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed reconsideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate. As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 41.9.. rL. S.:_; 7_ 9,..~ g.~.. n. 6 ( 1975), in order fidly. to assess the reliability and fairness of a system of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error for all denials of benefits. Here ' that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage of the administrative process. Since the median period between a request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months, Brief for AFL CIO et al. as Amici Curiae App. 4a, the deprivation is significantly less than that concomitant to the lengthier delay before an evidentiary hearing. Netting out these reconsideration reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%. See Supplemental and Reply Brief for Petitioner 14.

? VIR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom iw1. JUSTICE MARSKALL concurs, dissenting For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Richardson v. Wright, 40S.~. S~.~. O8,.. 21.2..( 1972), I agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that, prior to termination of benefits, Eldridge must be afforded 132.1{ i. s. 3 19:: jcj] an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. 601 et seq. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 ( 1970). I would add that the Court's consideration that a discontinuance of disability benefits may cause the recipient to suffer only a limited deprivation is no argument. It is speculative. Moreover, the very legislative determination to provide disability benefits, without any prerequisite determination of need in fact, presumes a need by the recipient which is not this Court's fknction to denigrate. Indeed, in the present case, it is indicated that because disability benefits were terminated there was a foreclosure upon the Eldridge home and the family's hrniture was repossessed, forcing Eldridge, his wife, and their children to sleep in one bed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, 47 48. Finally, it is also no argument that a worker, who has been placed in the untenable position of having been denied disability benefits, may still seek other forms of public assistance. [ J: L~ us. 3i9.3ji~

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http:/ naws. findlaw. com/ us/ 397/ 254. html Cases citing this case: Supreme Court Cases citing this case: Circuit Courts U. S. Supreme Court GOLDBERG v. KELLY, 397 U. S. 254 ( 1970)

397 US. 254 GOLDBERG, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK v. KELLY ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK No. 62. Argued October 13,1969 Decided March 23, 1970 Appellees are New York City residents receiving financial aid under the federally assisted Aid to Families with Dependent Children program or under New York State's general Home Relief program who allege that officials administering these programs terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing, thereby denying them due process of law. The District Court held that only a pre termination evidentiary hearing would satis3 the constitutional command, and rejected the argument of the welfare officials that the combination of the existing post termination " fair hearing" and informal pre termination review was sufficient. Held:

1. Welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them and procedural due process is applicable to their termination. Pp. 261 263.

2. The interest of the eligible recipient in the uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, which provides him with essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care, coupled with the State's interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing 53 concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens. Pp. 264 266.

3. A pre termination evidentiary hearing is necessary to provide the welfare recipient with procedural due process. Pp. 264, 266 271.

( a) Such hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi judicial trial, but the recipient must be provided with timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally before the decision maker. Pp. 266 270. [ 397 E.?. 254,2551 ( b) Counsel need not be hrnished at the pre termination hearing, but the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires. P. 270.

( c) The decisionmaker need not file a full opinion or make formal findings of fact or conclusions of law but should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on. P. 271.

( d) The decisionmaker must be impartial, and although prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessariiy bar a welfare official from acting as decision maker, he should not have participated in making the determination under review. P. 27 1.

294 F. Supp. 893, affirmed.

John J. Loflin, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were J. Lee Rankin and Stanley Buchsbaum.

Lee A. Albert argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Robert Borsody, Martin Garbus, and David Diamond.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, and Robert V. Zener for the United States, and by Victor G. Rosenblum and Daniel Wm. Fessler for the National Institute for Education in Law and Poverty.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question for decision is whether a State that terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient procedural due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth hendment.

This action was brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York by residents of New I; 27 I, S 2%. 2jtjl York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ( AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program. LTheir complaint alleged that the New York State and New York City officials administering these programs terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing, thereby denying them due process of law 2At the time ( 3w[ I s 35.1. ZYJ the suits were filed there was no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. However, the State and city adopted procedures for notice and hearing after the suits were brought, and the plaintiffs, appellees here, then challenged the constitutional adequacy ofthose procedures.

The State Commissioner of Social Services amended the State Department of Social Services' Official Regulations to require that local social services officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient's financial aid do so according to a procedure that conforms to either subdivision ( a) or subdivision ( b) of 35 1.26 of the rewlations as amended. ZThe City of New York f3? 7 u. s. 75 5. ES] elected to promulgate a local procedure according to subdivision ( b). That subdivision, so far as here pertinent, provides that the local procedure must include the giving of notice to the recipient of the reasons for a proposed discontinuance or suspension at least seven days prior to its effective date, with notice also that upon request the recipient may have the proposal reviewed by a local welfare official holding a position superior to that of the supervisor who approved the proposed discontinuance or suspension, and, hrther, that the recipient may submit, for purposes of the review, a written statement to demonstrate why his grant should not be discontinued or suspended. The decision by the reviewing official whether to discontinue or suspend aid must be made expeditiously, with written notice of the decision to the recipient. The section hrther expressly provides that "[ alssistance shall not be discontinued or suspended prior to the date such notice of decision is sent to the recipient and his representative, if any, or prior to the proposed effective date of discontinuance or suspension, whichever occurs later."

Pursuant to subdivision ( b), the New York City Department of Social Services promulgated Procedure No. 68 18. A caseworker who has doubts about the recipient's continued eligibility must first discuss them with the recipient. If the caseworker concludes that the recipient is no longer eligible, he recommends termination IZcjS U. S. 25.1. ijgj of aid to a unit supervisor. If the latter concurs, he sends the recipient a letter stating the reasons for proposing to terminate aid and notifling him that within seven days he may request that a higher official review the record, and may support the request with a written statement prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or other person. If the reviewing official affirms the determination of ineligibility, aid is stopped immediately and the recipient is informed by letter of the reasons for the action. Appellees' challenge to this procedure emphasizes the absence of any provisions for the personal appearance of the recipient before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and cross examination of adverse witnesses. $ However, the letter does inform the recipient that he may request a post termination " fair hearing." _ SThis is a proceeding before an independent I337 17.3. 25;, 36.3) state hearing officer at which the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross examine the witnesses against him, and have a record made of the hearing. If the recipient prevails at the " fair hearing" he is paid all hnds erroneously withheld. & HEW Handbook, pt. IV, 6200 6500; 18 NYCRR 84.2 84.23. A recipient whose aid is not restored by a " fair hearing" decision may have judicial review. N. Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules, Art. 78 ( 1 963). The recipient is so notified, 18 NYCRR84.16.

I The constitutional issue to be decided, therefore, is the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits. LThe District Court held [ 397 U. S. ijq,~; that only a pre termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy theJ constitutional command, and rejected the argument of the state and city officials that the combination of the post termination " fair hearing" with the informal pre termination review disposed of all due process claims. The court said: " While post termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without fbnds or assets. . . . Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of. . . ' brutal need' without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justifi it." Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899, 900 ( 1968). The court rejected the argument that the need to protect the public's tax revenues supplied the requisite " overwhelming consideration,' I " Against the justified desire to protect public hnds must be weighed the individuaI's over powering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfdly deprived of assistance . . . . While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. Under all the circumstances, we hold that due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and the fact that there is a later Findl aw.

constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result." Id., at 901. Although state officials were party defendants in the action, only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction, 394 IJ. S. 971 ( 1969), to decide important issues that have been the subject of disagreement in principle between the three judge court in the present case and that convened in Wheeler v. Montgomery, No. 14, post, p. 280, also decided today. We affirm.

Appellant does not contend that procedural due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare benefits. 1337 17, s. 2. i4,~:) Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. S.. Their termination involves state action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are " a ' privilege' and not a ' right."' Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618. 627 n. 6 ( 1969). Relevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 ( 1963); or to denial of a tax exemption, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 ( 1958); or to discharge fiom public employment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 IJ. S. ' 551 ( 1 956). % The extent to which procedural due process 1397 11 S. 2%. 2631 must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be " condemned to suffer grievous loss," Joint Anti Fascist Rehgee Committee v. McGrath, 341 LJ. S. 123, IPS ( 1951) ( FrankfUrter, J., concurring), and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. Accordingly, as we said in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 856, 89.$..( 196I), " consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government knction involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." See also Hannah v. Larche, 253 U. S. 420. 440, 442 ( 1960).

It is true,' of course, that some governmental benefits may be administratively terminated without affording the recipient a pre termination evidentiary hearing. 10 1397 u.~. LM, 26.11 But we agree with the District Court that when welfare is discontinued, only a pre termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process, Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 ( 1969). For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. LCf. Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U. S. 235. 239 ( 1967). Thus the crucial factor in this context  a factor not present in the case of the blacklisted govpmment contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended  is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy. 13 Moreover, important governmental interests are promoted by affording recipients a pre termination evidentiary hearing. From its founding the Nation's basic 13' 171; S. m, x5j commitment has been to foster the dignity and well being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. UThis perception, against the background of our traditions, has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified fmstration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to " promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receivc it, pre termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end. i% v. iIdaw: United States Case Law: Supreme Court wysiwyg:;/ 1 1ihttp: iicaselaw. find~ a~. comi... ts/~ etca~. pl? court~ s&~~~~~~~&~

Appellant does not challenge the force of these considerations but argues that they are outweighed by countervailing govermbental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative resources. These interests, the argument goes, justify the delay of any evidentiary hearing until after discontinuance of the grants. Summary adjudication protects the public fisc by stopping payments promptly upon discovery of reason to believe that a recipient is no longer eligible. Since most terminations are accepted without challenge, summary adjudication also conserves both the fisc and administrative time and energy by reducing the I number of evidentiary hearings actually held. [.? 1' 7 C. S. 25.1; ~ CG]

. We agree with the District Court, however, that these governmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context. The requirement of a prior hearing doubtless involves some greater expense, and the benefits paid to ineligible recipients pending decision at the hearing probably cannot be recouped, since these recipients are likely to be judgment proof. But the State is not without weapons to minimize these increased costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources can be reduced by developing procedures for prompt pre termination hearings and by skillfbl use of personnel and facilities. Indeed, the very provision for a post termination evidentiary hearing in New York's Home Relief program is itself cogent evidence that the State recognizes the primacy of the public interest in correct eligibility determinations and therefore in the provision of procedural safeguards. Thus, the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his payments . not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens. As the District Court correctly concluded, "[ tlhe stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be hlly informed of the case against him so that he may contest its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal." 294 F. Supp., at 904 905.

I1 We also agree with the District Court, however, that the pre termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi judicial trial. We bear in mind that the statutory " fair hearing" will provide the recipient 1337 Li. S. 254. m) with a full administrative review. HAccordingly, the pre termination hearing has one function only: to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 39. XJS.:.. 3.37,.. 34j.( 1969) ( HARLAN, J., concurring). Thus, a complete record and a comprehensive opinion, which would serve primarily to facilitate judicial review and to guide future decisions, need not be provided at the pre termination stage.. We recognize, too, that both . welfare authorities and recipients have an interest in relatively speedy resolution of questions of eligibility, that they are used to dealing with one another informally, and that some welfare departments have very burdensome caseloads. These considerations justi& the limitation of the pre termination hearing to minimum procedural safeguards, adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the limited nature of the controversies to be resolved. We wish to add that we, no less than the dissenters, recognize the importance of not imposing upon the States or the Federal Government in this developing field of law any procedural requirements beyond those demanded by rudimentary due process.

" The fimdamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, E. 1. U. S. 385. 394 ( 1914). The hearing must be " at a meaningfbl time and in a meaning&[ manner.'' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 553 ( 1965). In . the present context these principles require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a [ 337 U. S. 2%. 2631 proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally. These rights are important in cases such as those before us, where recipients have challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or 57 Findlaw: Urited States Case Law: Supreme Court wys1~ g: ii11/ http: l/ ca% law. fidlaw. com/... tu'getcase, pl? court~ s& v0~= 39?& ivoi= 2~

misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases  15 We are not prepared to say that the seven day notice currently provided by New York City is constitutionally insufficient per se, although there may be cases where fairness would require that a longer time be given. Nor do we see any constitutional deficiency in the content or form of the notice. New York employs both a letter and a personal conference with a caseworker to inform a recipient of the precise . questions raised about his continued eligibility. Evidently the recipient is told the legal and factual bases for the Department's doubts. This combination is probably the most effective method of communicating with recipients.

The city's procedures presently do not permit recipients to appear personally with or without counsel before the official who finally determines continued eligibility. Thus a recipient is not permitted to present evidence to that official orally, or to confront or cross examine adverse witnesses. These omissions are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures.

The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the [?! E U. S. 24.2691 capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. UIt is not enough that a welfare recipient may present his position to the decision maker in writing or secondhand through his caseworker. Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where credibility and veracity areat issue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. The secondhand presentation to the decisionmaker by the caseworker has its own deficiencies; since the caseworker usually gathers the facts upon which the charge of ineligibility rests, the presentation of the recipient's side of the controversy cannot safely be ! eft to him. Therefore a recipient must be allowed to state his position orally. informal procedures will suffice; in this context due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of offering evidence. Cf HEW Handbook, pt. IV, 6400 ( a).

In almost every setting where important decisions turn or! cjiiestions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses. E. g., ICC v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93  94 ( 19.13); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U. S. 96, 103  104 ( 1963). What we said in ( 397 [ J. S. 2%. 27i: j Greene v. McElroy, .~ 60. r;: lS1. 7i~~~.. 490 497( 1959), is particularly pertinent here:,

" Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment , . . , This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not onIy in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny."

Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross examine the witnesses relied on by the department. FlndLaw: United States Case Law: Supreme Court wysiwyg:!/ 1 t/? nttp:/: caseiaw. f! ndlaw. conv... tu'getcase. pl? court= us& vol= 3' 37&~~ 01=~

" The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Powell v. Alabama, 387 U. S. 45, 68  69 ( 1932). We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires. Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross examination, and generally safeguard the 1535 U S. 254,3: 11 interests of the recipient. We do not anticipate that this assistance will unduly prolong or otherwise encumber the hearing. Evidently HEW has reached the same conclusion. See45 CFR 205.10, 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 ( 1969); 45 CFR 220.25, 34 Fed. Reg. 13595 ( 1969).

Finally, the decisionmaker's conclusion as to a recipient's eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, ~~~. U.. S~..~.~~~( 1937); United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288  289 ( 1924). To demonstrate compliance with this elementary requirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, cf. Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U. S. 48. 57  59 ( 1922), though his statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential. Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 ( 1955); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33. 45  46 ( 1950). We agree with the District Court that prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as a decision maker. He should not, however, have participated in making the determination under review.

Affirmed.

[ For dissenting opinion of MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, see post, p. 282.1 [ For dissenting opinion of h4R. JUSTICE STEWART, see post, p. 285.1 Footnotes [ Footnote 1 ] AFDC was established by the Social Security Act of 1935,49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 601 610 ( 1964 ed. and Supp. IV). It is a categorical assistance program supported by federal grants in aid but administered by the States according to regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See N. Y. Social Welfare Law 343 362 ( 1966). We considered other aspects of AFDC in King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 ( 1968), and in Shapiro v. Thompson; 394 1i. S. 618 ( 1969). Home Relief is a general assistance program financed and administered solely by New York state and local governments. N. Y. Social Welfare Law 157 165 ( 1966), since July 1, 1967, Social Services Law 157 166. It assists any person unable to support himself or to secure support from other sources. Id., 158.

[ btnote 2 ] Two suits were brought and consolidated in the District Court. The named plaintiffs were 20 in number, including intervenors. Fourteen had been or were about to be cut off from AFDC, and six from Home Relief. During the course of this litigation most, though not all, of the plaintiffs either received a " fair hearing" ( see infra, at 259 260) or were restored to the rolls without a hearing. However, even in many of the cases where payments have been resumed, the underlying questions of eligibility that resulted in the bringing of this suit have not been resolved. For example, Mrs. Altagracia Guzman alleged that she was in danger of losing AFDC payments for failure to cooperate with the City Department of Social Services in suing her estranged husband. She contended that the departmental policy requiring such cooperation was inapplicable to the facts of her case. The record shows that payments to Mrs. Guzman . have not been terminated, but there is no indication that the basic dispute over her duty to cooperate has been resolved, or that the alleged danger of termination has been removed. Home Relief payments to Juan IkJesus were terminated because he refixed to accept counselling and rehabilitation for drug addiction. Findbw: United States Case Law: Supreme Court wysi\ yg:// 11ihttp: i'icaseIaw. find! aw. co~... tsigetcase. pi? court us& vo~~ 397&~ vol=~~,

Mr. DeJesus maintains that he [? Y: L! S. 254,2571 does not use drugs. His payments were restored the day after his complaint was filed. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that the underlying factual dispute in his case has been settled.

[ F~ etn. gt. c 3 1The adoption in February 1968 and the amendment in April of Regulation 35 1.26 coincided with or followed several revisions by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of its regulations implementing 42 U. S. C. 602 ( a) ( 4), which is the provision of the Social Security Act that requires a State to afford a " fair hearing" to any recipient of aid under a federally assisted program before termination of his aid becomes final. This requirement is satisfied by a post termination " fair hearing" under reylations presently in effect. See HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration ( hereafter HEW Handbook), pt. IV, 6200 6400. A new HEW regulation, 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 ( 1969), now scheduled to take effect in July 1970, 34 Fed. Reg. 13595 ( 1969), would require continuation of AFDC payments until the final decision after a " fair hearing" and would give recipients a right to appointed counsel at " fair hearings." 45 CFR 205.10,34 Fed. Reg. 1144 ( 1969); 45 CFR 220.25, 34 Fed. Reg. 1356 ( 1969). For the safeguards specified at such " fair hearings" see HEW Handbook, pt. IV, 6200 6400. Another recent regulation now in effect requires a local agency administering AFDC to give " advance notice of questions it has about an individual'seligibility so that a recipient has an opportunity to discuss his situation before receiving formal written notice of reduction in payment or termination of assistance." Id., pt. IV, 2300 ( d) ( 5). This case presents no issue of the validity or construction {.; 3? tr S. 2. j4,? 581 of the federal regulations. It is only subdivision ( b) of 35 1.26of the New York State regulations and implementing procedure 68 18 of New York City that pose the constitutional question before us. Cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618. 641 ( 1969). Even assuming that the constitutional question might be avoided in the context of AFDC by construction of the Social Security Act or of the present federal regulations thereunder, or by waiting for the new reguIations to become effective, the question must be faced and decided in the context of New York's Home Relief program, to which the procedures also apply.

[ F~. Ot~. ot. c..$] These omissions contrast with the provisions of subdivision ( a) of 35 1.26, the validity of which is not at issue in this Court. That subdivision also requires written notification to the recipient at least seven days prior to the proposed effective date of the reasons for the proposed discontinuance or suspension. However, the notification must krther advise the recipient that if he makes a request therefore he will be afforded an opportunity to appear at a time ad place indicated before the official identified in the notice, who will review his case with him and allow him to present such written and oral evidence as the recipient may have to demonstrate why aid should not be discontinued or suspended. The District Court assumed that subdivision ( a) would be construed to afford rights of confrontation and cross examination and a decision based solely on the record. 294 F. Supp. 893, 906 907 ( 1968).

[ Footriole S ] I?. Y. Social Welfare Law 353 ( 2) ( 1 966) provides for a post termination " fair hearing" pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 602 ( a) ( 4). See n. 3, supra. Although the District Court noted that HEW had raised some objections to the New York " fair hearing" procedures, 294 F. Supp., at 898 n. 9, these objections are not at issue in this Court. Shortly before this suit was filed, New York State adopted a similar provision for a " fair hearing" in terminations [; wt:, s 3~. 2ti(; 1 of Home Relief 18 NYCRR 84.2 84.23. In both AFDC and Home Relief the " fair hearing" must be held within 10 working days of the request, 84.6, with decision within 12 working days thereafter, 84.15. It was conceded in oral argument that these time limits are not in fact observed.

[ Footnote 6 ] Current HEW regulations require the States to make full retroactive payments ( with federal matching fbnds) whenever a " fair hearing" results in a reversal of a termination of assistance. I IEW Handbook, pt. IV, 6200 ( k), 6300 ( g), 6500 ( a); see 18 NYCRR 358.8. Under New York State regulations retroactive payments can also be made, with certain limitations, to correct an erroneous termination discovered before a " fair hearing" has been held. I8 NYCRR 35 1.27. HEW regulations also authorize, but t'indl. aw: United States Case Law: Supreme Court wysiwyg::/ 11/ h: tp:// caselaw . ilndl~~~.~ 0~'... tu~ etcuse. pilcourt us& vo~~

do not require, the States to continue AFDC payments without loss of federal matching hnds pending completion of as" fairhearing." HEW Handbook, pt. IV, 6500 ( b). The new HEW regulations presently scheduled to become effective July 1, 1970, will supersede all of these provisions. See n. 3, supra.

[ F 1oLii. ot.~. 7] Appellant does not question the recipient's due process right to evidentiary review after termination. For a general discussion of the provision of an evidentiary hearing prior to termination, see Comment, The Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1 12 ( 1 969).

[ Footnote 8 ] It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like " property" than a " gratuity." Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common law concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that "[ slociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to aid security and independence. Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and education; social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, hlly deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not been effectively enforced." Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245, 1255 ( 1965). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 ( 1964).

[ Footnote 9 ] See also Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 ( 1926) ( right of a certified public accountant to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F. 2d 605 / 397 2%; 2.531 ( C. A. 5th Cir. 1964) ( right to obtain a retail liquor store license); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 ( C. A. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, .~ 6S~ 1S.,. 9~~.( 1961)( right to attend a public college).

[ Footnote 10 ] One Court of Appeals has stated: " In a wide variety of situations, it has long been recognized that where harm to the public is threatened, and'the private interest infringed is reasonably deemed to be of less importance, an official body can take summary action pending a later hearing." R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 112 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 47, 299 F. 2d 127, 131, cert. denied, 370 1J. S. 91 1 ( 1962) ( suspension of exemption from stock registration requirement). See also, for example, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594 ( 1950) ( seizure of mislabeled vitamin product); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 21 1 U. S. 306 ( 1908) ( seizure of food not fit for human use); Yakus v. United States, 321 L. S. 414 ( 1944) ( adoption of wartime price regulations); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 180, 334 F. 2d 570 ( 1964) ( disqualification of a contractor to do business with the Government). In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, supra, at 896, summary dismissal of a public employee was upheld [ j! j7 1,: S. 35.1. zi;/ ij because "[; In [ its] proprietary military capacity, the Federal Government . . . has traditionally exercised unfettered control," and because the case involved the Government's " dispatch of its own internal affairs." Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., .~~.~. U~ S.~. l. l.~( 1940).

[ Footnote 1 I ] Administrative determination that a person is ineligible for welfare may also render him ineligible for participation in state financed medical programs. See N. Y. Social Welfare Law 366 ( 1966).

[ btnote I2 ] His impaired adversary position is particularly telling in light of the welfare bureaucracy's difficultiesi'n reaching correct decisions on eligibility. See Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior 1leal ing in Welfare Cases, 37 Ford. L. Rev. 604, 6 10 6 1 1 ( 1969). [ F. ootnote. l~] See, e. g., Reich, supra, n. 8, 74 Yale L. J., at 1255.

[ Footnote 14 1Due process does not, of course, require two hearings. If, for example, a State simply wishes to continue benefits until after a " fair" hearing there will be no need for a preliminary hearing.

[ Footnote 15 1 This case presents no question requiring our determination whether due process requires only an opportunity for written submission, or an opportunity both for written submission and oral argument, where there are no factual issues in dispute or where the application of the rule of law is not intertwined with factual issues. See FCC v. WJR, .7.~ 7.. r; r,. S_ 26S~..~~ j 277( 1 949).

[ Footnote 16 J "[ Tlhe prosecution of an appeal demands a degree of security, awareness, tenacity, and ability which few dependent people have." Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 326, 342 ( 1966).

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

In the last half century the United States, along with many, perhaps most, other nations of the world, has moved far toward becoming a welfare state, that is, a nation that for one reason or another taxes its most ~

[ WtT. S. 254,7 72] affluent people to, help support, feed, clothe, and shelter its less fortunate citizens. The result is that today more than nine million men, women, and children in the United States receive some kind of state or federally financed public assistance in the form of aliowances or gratuities, generally paid them periodically, usually by the week, month, or quarter. LSince these gratuities are paid on the basis of need, the list of recipients is not static, and some people go off the lists and others are added from time to time. These ever changing lists put a constant administrative burden on government and it certainly could not have reasonably anticipated that this burden would include the additional procedural expense imposed by the Court today,

The dilemma of the ever increasing poor in the midst of constantly growing affluence presses upon US and must inevitably be met within the framework of our democratic constitutional government, if our system is to survive as such. it was largely to escape just such pressing economic problems and attendant government repression that people from Europe, Asia, and other areas settled this country and formed our Nation. Many of those settlers had personally suffered from persecutions of various kinds and wanted to get away from governments that had unrestrained powers to make life miserable for their citizens. It was for this reason, or so i believe, that on reaching these new lands the early settlers undertook to curb their governments by confining their powers i397 US. 25;. 2731 within written boundaries, which eventually became written constitutions. LThey wrote their basic charters as nearly as men's collective wisdom could do SO as to proclaim to their people and their officials an emphatic command that: " Thus far and no farther shall you go; and where we neither delegate powers to you, nor prohibit your exercise of them, we the people are left free." 2 Representatives of the people of the Thirteen Original Colonies spent long, hot months in the summer of 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, creating a government of limited powers. They divided it into three departments  Legislative, Judicial, and Executive. The Judicial Department was to have no part whatever in making any laws. In fact proposals looking to vesting some power in the Judiciary to take part in the legislative process and veto laws were offered, considered, and rejected by the Constitutional Convention. 4 Inmy ( 397 E. S. 251,274] judgment there is not one word, phrase, or sentence from the beginning to the end of the Constitution from which it can be inferred that judges were granted any such legislative power. ' True, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 ( 18031, held, and properly, I think, that courts must be the final interpreters of the Constitution, and I recognize that the holding can provide an opportunity to slide imperceptibly into constitutional amendment and law making. But when federal judges use this judicial power for legislative purposes, I think they wander out of their field of vested powers and transgress into the area constitutionally assigned to the Congress and the people. That is precisely what I believe the Court is doing in this case. Hence my dissent.

The more than a million names on the relief rolls in New York, .5_ andthe more than nine million names on the rolls of all the 50 States were not put there at random. The names are there because state welfare officials believed that those people were eligible for assistance. Probably in the officials' haste to make out the lists many names were put there erroneously in order to alleviate immediate suffering, and undoubtedly some people are drawing relief who are not entitled under the law to do so. Doubtless some draw relief checks from time to time who know they are not eligible, either because they are not actually in need or for some other reason. Many of those who thus draw undeserved gratuities are without sufficient property to enable the government to collect back from them any money they wronghlly receive. But the Court today holds that it would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to stop paying those people weekly or monthly allowances unless the government first affords them a full " evidentiary hearing" even [ 347 1: s 2%. 2751 though welfare officials are persuaded that the recipients are not rightfully entitled to receive a penny under the law In other words, although some recipients might be on the lists for payment wholly because of deliberate fraud on their part, the Court holds that the government is helpless and must continue, untii after an evidentiary hearing, to pay money that it does not owe, never has owed, and never could owe. I do not believe there is any provision in our Constitution that should thus paralyze the government's efforts to protect itself against making payments to people who are not entitled to them.

Particularly do I not think that the Fourteenth Amendment should be given such an unnecessarily broad construction. That Amendment came into being primarily to protect Negroes from discrimination, and while some of its language can. and does protect others, all know that the chief purpose behind it was to protect ex slaves. Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 36, 71  72, and n. 5 ( 1947) ( dissenting opinion). The Court, however, relies upon the Fourteenth Amendment and in effect says that failure of the government to pay a promised charitable installment to an individual deprives that individual of his own property, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It somewhat strains credulity to say that the government's promise of charity to an individual is property belonging to that individual when the government denies that the individual is honestly entitled to receive such a payment.

I would have little, if any, objection to the majority's decision in this case if it were written as the report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, but as an opinion ostensibly resting on the language of the Constitution I find it woehlly deficient. Once the verbiage is pared away it is obvious that this Court today adopts the views of the District Court " that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of. . . ' brutal need' without a prior 1397 ~ J. s. 2j: i. 276; hearing of some sort is unconscionable," and therefore, says the Court, unconstitutional. The majority reaches this result by a process of weighing " the recipient's interest in avoiding" the termination of welfare benefits against " the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Ante, at 263. Today's balancing act requires a " pre termination evidentiary hearing," yet there is nothing that indicates what tomorrow's balance will be. Although the majority attempts to bolster its decision with limited quotations from prior cases, it is obvious that today's result does not depend on the language of the Constitution itself or the principles of other decisions, but solely on the collective judgment of the majority as to what would be a fair and humane procedure in this case.

This decision is thus only another variant of the view often expressed by some members of this Court that the Due Process Clause forbids any conduct that a majority of the Court believes " unfair," " indecent," or " shocking to their consciences." See, e. g., Rochin v. California, 332 U. S. 165. 172 ( 1 952). Neither these words nor any like them appear anywhere in the Due Process Clause. If they did, they would leave the niajority of Justices free to hold any conduct unconstitutional that they should concludeaon their own to be tinfair or shocking to them. & Had the drafters of the Due Process Clause meant to leave judges such I indLaw: United States Case Law: Supreme Court wysiwygd/ 1l/ ilap:// caselaw. find~ a~ v. com/... tigetcase. pl? court=~~ s~~ o~~~ Y7& tnvoi= 2:

ambulatory power to declare [ W US. 2~. 277] laws unconstitutional, the chief value of a written constitution, as, the Founders saw it, would have been lost. In fact, if that view of due process is correct, the Due Process Clause could easily swallow up all other parts of the Constitution. And truly the Constitution would always be " what the judges say it is'' at a given moment, not what the Founders wrote into the document. 2 A written constitution, designed to guarantee protection against governmental abuses, including those of judges, must have written standards that mean something definite and have an explicit content. I regret very much to be compelled to say that the Court today makes a drastic and dangerous departure fiom a Constitution written to control and limit the government and the judges and moves toward a constitution designed to be no more and no less than what the judges of a particular social and economic philosophy declare on the one hand to be fair or on the other hand to be shocking and unconscionable.

The procedure required today as a matter of constitutional law finds no precedent in our legal system. Reduced to its simplest terms, the problem in this case is similar to that frequently encountered when two parties have an ongoing legal relationship that requires one party to make periodic payments to the other. Often the situation arises where the party '' owing'' the money stops paying it and justifies his conduct by arguing that the recipient is not legally entitled to payment. The recipient can, of course, disagree and go to court to compel payment. But I know of no situation in our legal system in which the person alleged to owe money to [ 337 G. S. 254,2781 another is required by law to continue making payments to a judgment proof claimant without the benefit of any security or bond to insure that these payments can be recovered if he wins his legal argument. Yet. today's decision in no way obligates the welfare recipient to pay back any benefits wrongfblly received during the pre termination evidentiary hearings or post any bond, and in all " fairness" it could not do so. These recipients are by definition too poor to post a bond or to repay the benefits that, as the majority assumes, must be spent as received to insure survival.

The Court apparently feels that this decision will benefit the poor and needy. In my judgment the eventual result will be just the opposite. While today's decision requires only an administrative, evidentiary hearing, the inevitable logic of the approach taken will lead to constitutionally imposed, time consuming delays of a full adversary process of administrative and judicial review. In the next case the welfare recipients are bound to argue that cutting off benefits before judicial review of the agency's decision is also a denial of due process. Since, by hypothesis, termination of aid at that point may still " deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits,:' ante, at 264, I would be surprised if the weighing process did not compel the conclusion that termination without fill judicial review would be unconscionable. Mer all, at each step, as the majority seems to feel, the issue is only one of weighing the government's pocketbook against the actual survival of the recipient, and surely that balance must always tip in favor of the individual. Similarly today's decision requires only the opportunity to have the benefit of counsel at the administrative hearing, but it is difficult to believe that the same reasoning process would not require the appointment of counsel, for otherwise the right to counsel is a meaningless one since these C347 U. S. 3, 17Oj people are too poor to hire their own advocates. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 ( 1963). Thus the end result of today's decision may well be that the government, once it decides to give welfare benefits, cannot reverse that decision until the recipient has had the benefits of full administrative and judicial review, including, of course, the opportunity to present his case to this Court. Since this process will usually entail a delay of several years, the inevitable result of such a constitutionally imposed burden will be that the government will not put a claimant on the roIIs initially until it . has made an exhaustive investigation to determine his eligibility. While this Court will perhaps have insured that no' needy person will be taken off the rolls without a full " due process" proceeding, it will also have insured that many will never get OR the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligibility.

For the foregoing reasons I dissent from the Court's holding. The operation of a welfare state is a new .~ ndlaw. com/... i~~ ctcase. p~? court us&~ ol= 397& invoi Findbw: United States Case Law: Supreme Court wysiwyg:// I 1ihnp: iicase~ aw experiment for our Nation, For this reason, among others, I feel that new experiments in carrying out a welfare program should not be frozen into our constitutional structure. They should be left, as are other legislative determinations, to the Congress and the legislatures that the people elect to make our laws.

[ F0.~ tfiOt~ ll] This figure includes all recipients of Old age Assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Ckildren, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and general assistance. In this case appellants are AFDC and general assistance recipients. In New York State alone there are 95 1,000 AFDC recipients and 108,000 on general assistance. In the Nation as a whole the comparable figures are 6,080,000 and 391,000. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1969 ( 90th ed.), Table 435, p. 297.

[ F. g. Oj. n. ote. 2.] The goal of a written constitution with fixed limits on governmental. power had long been desired. Prior to our colonial constitutions, the closest man had come to realizing this goal was the political movement of the Levellers in England in the 1640' s. J. Frank, The Levellers ( 1955). In 1647 the Levellers proposed the adoption of An Agreement of the People which set forth written limitations on the English Government. This proposal contained many of the ideas which later were incorporated in the constitutions of this Nation. Id., at 135 147.

[ Footnote 3 J This command is expressed in the Tenth Amendment: " The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

[ Footnotg4] It was proposed that members of the judicial branch would sit on a Council of Revision which would consider legislation and have the power to veto it. This proposal was rejected. J. Elliot, 1 Elliot's Debates 160, 164, 214 ( Journal of the Federal Convention); 395, 398 ( Yates' Minutes); vol. 5, pp. 151, 164 166, 344 349 ( Madison's Notes) ( Lippincott ed. 1876). It was also suggested that The Chief Justice would serve as a member of the President's executive council, but this proposal was similarly rejected. Id., vol. 5, pp. 442, 445, 446, 462.

[ Footnote 5 3 See n. 1, supra.

[ Footnote 6 J I am aware that some feel that the process employed in reaching. today's decision is not dependent on the individual views of the Justices involved, but is a mere objective search for the " collective conscience of mankind," but in my view that description is only a euphemism for an individual'sjudgment. Judges are as human as anyone and as likely as others to see the world through their own eyes and find the " collective conscience" remarkably similar to their own. Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479. 5 18  519 ( 1965) ( BLACK, J., dissenting); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337. 350  351 ( 1969) ( BLACK, J., dissenting).

[ Footnote 7 ] To realize how uncertain a standard of " fundamental fairness" wouid be, one has only to reflect for a moment on the possible disagreement if the " fairness" of the procedure in this case were propounded to the head of the National Welfare Rights Organization, the president of the national Chamber of Commerce, and the chairman of the John Birch Society. 1397 f>. S. 254,2Ycj]

Copyrighl 01994 2000FindLaw Inc. P 3,

Office of Government Operations Legal Counsel Division MEMORANDUM TO:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT: Robert R. Rigsby Corporation Counsel Darryl G. Gorman Senior Deputy Corporation Counsel for Government Operations Legal Counsel Division October 31,2000 Statutory Functions of the Office of the Corporation Counsel ( AL 00 534)

Pursuant to your request, this is to provide you with a list of mandatory and discretionary statutory functions of the Ofice of the Corporation Counsel ( OCC).  In addition, I have attached a copy of the December 9,1598 memorandum fiom Judge John M. Ferren, then Corporation Counsel, which references OCC s obligations as set forth in Reorganization Order No. 50, as amended, effective June 26, 1953, and which fully discusses OCC s role as chief litigator for the District government. Judge Ferren s memorandum also contains an appendix containing a table that lists agencies and their statutory authority with respect to whether the agency does, or does not, have independent authority to represent itself.

Every effort has been made to list all references to the statutory duties of the OCC. However, it is possible that a particular statute, or statutes, has been inadvertently omitted? Accordingly, I will continue to update this list as omissions are discovered.

I These functions are distinguished fiom functions performed by the Office of the Corporation Counsel which, while they are not statutory, are necessary in order for the Office to successfully meet its statutory obligations. Further, the performance of the statutory duties referenced in this memorandum may require the OCC to perform ancillary functions, not referenced herein, in the furtheranceof its mandatory or permissive duties.

* This is especially true of those laws which have not yet been codified. STATUTORY FUNCTIONS A. Mandatory3 1. D. C. Code 6 1 263 ( d) ( 3) ( A)  The Mayor shall provide assistance to the Advisory Neighborhood Commissions in the following areas: ( A) Legal interpretations of statutes concerning or affecting the Commissions, or of issues or concerns affecting the Commissions. These interpretations are to be obtained from the Corporation Counsel and may be requested directly by the Commission.

2. D. C. Code 6 1 361  The Corporation Counsel shall ... have charge and conduct of all law business of the said District, and all suits instituted by and against the government thereof. He shall furnish opinions in writing to the Mayor, whenever requested to do so ... He shall perform such other duties as may be required of him by the Mayor.

3. D. C. Code 9 1 363  The Corporation Counsel and Assistant Corporation Counsels are hereby authorized to administer oaths and affirmations in the discharge of their official duties with the District of Columbia.

4. D. C. Code 3 1 609.55 ( a)  The Corporation Counsel shall exercise authority over other subordinateagency attorneys....( D. C. Code 5 1 609.55 ( b)  Corporation Counsel may delegate the direction, supervision and control of attorneys to a subordinate agency head as follows ....)

5. D. C. Code 3 1 609.57 ( a) and ( b) ( a) The Corporation Counsel shall establish an annual mandatory program of continuing legal education for attorneys in the Legal Service.... ( b) The Corporation Counsel shall develop and establish a performance management system that includes accountability standards and individual accountability plans for all attorneys ....

6. D. C. Code 9 1 1188.15 ( a)  The Corporation Counsel shall investigate, with such assistance from other District agencies as may be required, violations pursuant to 0 11188.144involving District funds. If the Corporation Counsel finds that a person has . The term   mandatory  as used herein generally means that the OCC is required to take the action. However, in some instances it means that if any action is taken, it must be taken by the OCC.

D. C. Code 9 1 1188.14 generally penalizes those who: ( 1) present, or cause to be presented, false claims to the District; ( 2) unlawfully possess or have custody of District property; ( 3) create a false record to procure District property; or, ( 4) are the unlawful beneficiary of District property or money.

2 violated or is violating the provisions of 3 1 1188.14, the Corporation Counsel may bring a civil action against that person in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

7. D. C. Code 0 1 1188.19 ( j) ( 1)  The Corporation Counsel shall designate a false claims investigator to serve as custodian of documentary material, answers to interrogatories, and transcripts of oral testimony received pursuant to this section, and shall designate such additional false claims law investigators as the Corporation Counsel determines from time to time to be necessary to serve as deputies to the custodian.

8. D. C. Code tj 1 1612 ( 3)  The Administrator of the District of Columbia Office of Documents shall... ( 3) With the assistance of the Office of the Corporation Counsel, the officer designated by the Chairman of the Council, or legal counsels to agencies and other governmental entities, certifLthe promulgation, adoption, or enactment of documents to be published in accordance with this subchapter. ( The subchapter concerns the publication of official District government documents such as laws and regulations.)

9. D. C. Code fj1 2547 ( re: human rights)  If, at any time after a complaint has been filed, the OEce [ of Human Rights] believes that appropriate civil action to preserve the status quo or to prevent irreparable harm appears advisable, the Office shall certify that matter to the Corporation Counsel, who shall bring, in the name of the District of Columbia, any action necessary to preserve such status quo or to prevent such harm ....

10. D. C. Code $ 1 2555 ( a) and ( b) ( re: human rights) ( a) ... the Commission [ of Human Rights] will certify the matter to the Corporation Counsel, and to such other agencies as may be appropriate for enforcement. ( b) The Corporation Counsel shall institute, in the name of the District, civil proceedings including the seeking of such restraining order and temporary or permanent injunctions, as are necessary to obtain ' complete compliance with the Commission's orders. In the event that successful civil proceedings do not result in securing such compliance, the Corporation Counsel shall institute criminal action.

11. D. C. Code $ 1 2573 ( 7)  Receive certified complaints from the Office of Human Rights for appropriate legal a~ tion.~

12. D. C. Code $ 2 505  Prosecutions for violations of this chapter [ Bonding of Home Improvement Business], or of the regulations made pursuant thereto, shall be conducted in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel or any of his assistants.

13. D. C. Code $ 2 712 ( b) and ( c) ( re: charitable solicitations) ( b) Prosecutions for violations of this chapter ... shall be conducted ... by the Corporation Counsel.... ( c) The This provision, which is not yet codified, is 0 204 ( 7) of the Office of Human Rights Establishment Act of 1999, effective October 20, 1999 ( D. C. Law 13 38; 46 D. C. Register 6378).

3 3 Corporation Counsel ... is hereby empowered to maintain an action ... to enjoin any person from soliciting in violation of this chapter ....

14. D. C. Code 5 2 1001 ( a)  The Council on Law Enforcement in the District of Columbia ... is hereby created. The Council shall be composed of the following members ... ( 5) The Corporation Counsel ....

15. D. C. Code 8 2 2315 ( a) and ( c) ( a) All violations of laws relating to the practice of engineering in the District of Columbia shall be prosecuted by ... the Corporation Counsel. The Corporation Counsel shall render such other legal services as may from time to time be required by the Board [ of Registration for Professional Engineers]. ( c) The Corporation Counsel is hereby authorized to apply for relief by injunction .... In such proceedings it shall not be necessary for the Corporation Counsel to allege or prove ....

16. D. C. Code 5 2 2506 ( a)  The [ Lottery Board] shall have power generally to do whatever is reasonably necessary for the carrying out of [ its duties] and is empowered to call upon other administrative departments and agencies of the City government, as well as the Police Department and the Office of the Corporation Counsel, for such information and assistance as it deems necessary to the performance of its duties.

17. D. C. Code 8 3 213.5 ( concerning public assistance)  Whenever a responsible relative fails to provide informationnecessary to determine his ability to support, or when it has been determined that he is financially able to but has not contributed to the person in need of assistance, the case shall be evaluated for appropriate action including referral to Corporation Counsel.

18. D. C. Code 5 3 424 ( c)  The [ Crime Victims Compensation Advisory] Commission shall be composed of: ( 1) The Chairperson of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Council of the District of Columbia ... ( 2) One representative from the Office of the Corporation Counsel ....

19. D. C. Code 5 4 143 ( a)  In accordance with regulations prescribed by the Council of the District of Columbia, the Corporation Counsel ... shall represent any officer or member of the Metropolitan Police Department, if he so requests, in any civil action for damages resulting from an alleged wrongful arrest by such officer or member.

20. D. C. Code 5 5 1305.1 ( b)  The Director [ of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs] may enforce the regulations issued pursuant to this act by means of covenants or agreements between the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs and an affected party. Where the Office of the Corporation Counsel determines that, under District law, a covenant or agreement may require the review and approval of other District agencies, it shall so notify such agencies and establish an inter agency process for review and, if required, under District law, approval. The Director shall coordinate with the Office of the Corporation Counsel the time required for the review and 4' 4 recommendations by the Office of the Corporation Counsel of any covenant or agreement proposed pursuant to this act.

21. D. C. Code 8 6 205.1  The Social Security account number shall be collected by the Register of Vital Records and made available only to the Department of Human Services Office of Paternity and Child Support Enforcement, and the Child Support Section of the Civil Division of the Office of the Corporation Counsel for the enforcement of child support orders ....

22. D. C. Code 5 6 711 ( a) ( 2) ( B) ( concerns hazardous waste management)  The Mayor may recover the costs of corrective action incurred by the District of Columbia government from any person responsible by requesting the Corporation Counsel to commence appropriate civil action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

23. D. C. Code 0 6 964 ( a) ( concerns health and safety/ environmental controls)  Any person who violates any provision of this subchapter or the rules ... shall be liable for a civil fine not exceeding $ 10,000 for each day during which each violation continues, and shall be required to perform any other action needed to correct any harm caused by any violation or to ensure that future violations do not occur. All prosecutions under this provision shall be in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in the name of the District of Columbia, and shall be instituted by the Corporation Counsel.

24. D. C. Code 0 6 2506 ( a) and ( b) ( concerning adult protective orders) ( a) If requested by the Department [ of Human Services]... the Corporation Counsel shall promptly conduct a factual inquiry, and if legally supportable, file a petition in court for a provisional protection order .... ( b) ... The Corporation Counsel shall ensure that, at least 10 days ... before the hearing, notice of the hearing date and a copy of the petition are served on the adult in need of protective services....

25. D. C. Code 8 6 2507 ( a) ( concerning exparte temporary protection orders)  The Corporation Counsel shall ensure that, within 48hours after the issuance of such an order, notice of the hearing date and copies of the petition, supporting affidavit( s), and order are served on the same parties and in the same manner as described in 9 6 2606 ( b).

26. D. C. Code 3 6 2602 ( b)  Prosecution for violations ofthis chapter [ concerning the buying and selling of human body parts] and regulations made pursuant to this chapter shall be brought in the name of the District of Columbia upon information by the Corporation Counsel.

27. D. C. Code 6 6 3304 ( c) ( 2)  Prosecutions for violations of this subsection [ concerninghazardous materials transportation] shall be brought by the Corporation Counsel.

28. D. C. Code 5 6 3460 ( b) ( concerning solid waste management)  If the Mayor finds that any person is constructing or operating a solid waste facility in a manner which endqngers human health, the public welfare, or the environment ... the Mayor may ( A)

5 5 request the Corporation Counsel to commence appropriate civil action ... to secure a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, or other appropriate relief, or ( B) issue a cease and desist order.

  29. D. C. Code $ 11 1731  The Executive Officer or the chiefjudge may request such reports as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the courts from ... ( 2) the .

Corporation Counsel.

30. D. C. Code 8 16 916.1 ( 0)( 2)  Every 3 years, in cases being enforced under Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, approved January 4,1975 ( 88 Stat. 2351; 42 U. S. C. 0 65 1 et seq.) (  IV D program ), the Department of Human Services Office of Paternity and Child Support Enforcement and the Child Support Section of the Civil Division of the Office of the Corporation Counsel shall notify both the noncustodial and custodial parent of the right to seek a modification of their child support order under the guidelines. The Department of Human Services Office of Paternity and Child Support Enforcement and the Child Support Section of the Civil Division of the Office of the Corporation Counsel shall establish a procedure for idorming the noncustodial and custodial parent if a modification is warranted under the guideline.

31. D. C. Code 5 16 1002 ( b) ( concerns proceedings regarding intrafamily offenses)  The United States attorney may also ( 1) file a criminal charge based upon the conduct and may consult with the Director of Social Services concerning appropriate recommendations for conditions of release taking into account the intrafamily nature of the offense; or ( 2) refer the matter to the Corporation Counsel for the filing of a petition for civil protection in the Family Division ....

32. D. C. Code 8 16 1025  Prosecutions under this subchapter [ parental kidnapping] shall be brought in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in [ the] name of the District by the Corporation Counsel.

33. D. C. Code $ 16 2305 ( a)  Complaints alleging delinquency, need of supervision, or neglect shall be referred to the Director of Social Serviceswho shall conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the best interests of the child or the public require that a petition be filed. If judicial action appears warranted, under intake criteria established by rule of the Superior Court, the Director shall recommend that a petition be filed. If the Director decides not to recommend the filing of a petition, the complainant in a delinquency or neglect case shall have a right to have that decision reviewed by the Corporation Counsel, and the Director shall notie the complainant of such right of review. Complaints alleging neglect submitted by the Child Protective Services Division of the Department of Human Services shall be referred directly to the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia.

34. D. C. Code $ 16 2305 ( c)  Each petition shall be prepared by the Corporation Counsel after an inquiry into the facts and a determination of the legal basis for the petition. If the Director of Social Services has refused to recommend the filing of a delinquency or neglect petition, the Corporation Counsel, on request of the complainant,

6 6 shall review the facts presented and shall prepare and file a petition if he believes such action is necessary to protect the community or the interests of the child. Any decision of the Corporation Counsel on whether to file a petition shall be final.

35. D. C. Code tj 16 2305 ( d)  A petition shall be filed by the Corporation Counsel within seven days ( excluding Sundays and legal holidays) after the complaint has been referred to the Directo; of Social Services, except as otherwise provided in section 162312 ....

36. D. C. Code 9 16 2305.2 ( b)  Where the Director of Social Services recommends, after a preliminary inquiry is conducted pursuant to D. C. Code tj 16 2305 ( a), that it is not in the best interests of the child or public to recommend the filing of a delinquency or persons in need of supervision petition, the Director of Social Services shall so recommend to the Office of the Corporation Counsel, and the Corporation Counsel shall make a determinationof the suitability of the case for adjustment, which may include diversion.

37. D. C. Code tj 16 2305.2 ( c)  In order to determine whether the case is suitable for adjustment, the Director of Social Services, in consultation with the Office of the Corporation Counsel, shall consider the following circumstances, among others ....

38. D. C. Code tj 16 2306 ( b)  Upon request of the Corporation Counsel, the Division may endorse upon the summons an order directing the parent, guardian, or other custodian of the child to appear personally at the hearing and directing the person having physical custody or control of the child to bring the child to the hearing.

39. D. C. Code 5 16 2307 ( a)  Within twenty one days ( excluding Sundays and legal holidays) of the filing of a delinquency petition, or later for good cause shown, and prior to a fact finding hearing on the petition, the Corporation Counsel may file a motion, supported by a statement of facts, requesting transfer of the child for criminal prosecution, if ....

40. D. C. Code !$ 16 2310 ( e) ( 2)  Upon motion of the Corporation Counsel, for good cause shown, or by or on behalf of the child consistent withthe Rules of the Superior Court, the fact finding hearing of a child securely detained may be continued, and the child continued in secure detention for additional periods not to exceed 30 days each.

41. D. C. Code tj 16 2312 ( c)  At the commencement of the [ detention] hearing the judge shall advise the parties of the right to counsel ... and shall appoint counsel if required. He shall also inform them of the contents of the petition and shall afford the child, or in a neglect case, the parent, guardian, or custodian, anopportunity to admit or deny the allegations in the petition. He shall then hear from the Corporation Counsel to determine whether the child should be placed or continued in detention or shelter care ....

42. D. C. Code 3 16 2312 ( e)  When a judge finds that a child s detention or shelter care is required ... he shall then hear evidence presented by the Corporation Counsel to 7 7 determine whether there is probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true ....

43. D. C. Code 0 16 2314 ( a)  At any time after the filing of a delinquency or need of supervision petition and prior to adjudication at a fact finding hearing, the Division, may, on motion of the Corporation Counsel or counsel for the child, suspend the proceedings and continue the child under supervision, without commitment, under terms and conditions established by rules of the Superior Court. Such a consent decree shall not be entered unless the child is represented by counsel and has been informed of the consequences of the decree; nor shall it be entered over the objection of the child or the Corporation Counsel.

44. D. C. Code 0 16 2314 ( c)  If prior to the expiration of the decree or discharge by . theDirector of Social Services, the child fails to fulfill the express conditions of the decree or a new delinquency or need of supervision petition is filed concerning the child, the original petition under which the decree was filed may, in the discretion of the Corporation Counsel following consultation with the Director of Social Services, be reinstated ....

45. D. C. Code 0 16 2316 ( a)  The Division shall, without a jury, hear and adjudicate cases involving delinquency, need of supervision, or. neglect. The Corporation Counsel shall present evidence in support of all petitions arising under this subchapter and otherwise represent the District of Columbia in all proceedings.

46. D. C. Code 3 16 2327( a)  A proceeding to revoke probation [ injuvenile cases] shall be commenced by the filing of a revocation petition by the Corporation Counsel ....

  47. D. C. Code 3 16 2336  Whoever willfully discloses, receives, makes use of, or knowingly permits the use of information concerning a child or other person in violation of sections 16 2331 through 16 2335, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, thereof, shall be fined not more than $ 250 or imprisoned not more than ninety days, or both. Violations of this section shall be prosecuted by the Corporation counsel in the name of the District of Columbia.

48. D. C. Code 3 16 2348 ( b)  No person shall disclose, receive, or use records in violation of this section. Whoever willfully discloses, receives, makes use of, or knowingly permits the use of information in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $ 250 or imprisoned not more than ninety days, or both. Violations of this section shall be prosecuted by the Corporation Counsel in the name of the District of Columbia.

49. D. C. Code 9 16 5007 ( a) and ( b) ( a) An individual who discloses confidential information in violation of 6 16 5005 [ concerning criminal record checks] is guilty of a criminal offense and, upon conviction, is subject to a fine not to exceed $ 1,000 or a term of incarceration of not more than 180 days, or both. ( b) Prosecutions for violation of this 8 chapter shall be brought in the name of the District of Columbia upon information by the Corporation Counsel.

50. D. C. Code 8 22 3315  Prosecutions for violations of this chapter [ concerning panhandling control] shall be conducted in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel.

51. D. C. Code 9 24 121 1 ( a) There is established as an independent agency of the District of Columbia a District of Columbia Truth in Sentencing Commission... which shall consist of .... ( b) A representative of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and a representative of the [ Olffice of the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia shall each serve as a nonvoting, ex officio member.

52. D. C. Code 0 24 1232 ( g)  Subject to subparagraph ( B) of this paragraph, the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia shall provide litigation services to the Trustee [ of the Pretrial Services, Parole, Adult Probation and Offender Supervision], except that the Trustee may instead elect, either generally or in relation to particular cases or classes of cases, to hire necessary staff and personnel or enter into contracts for the provision of litigation services at the Trustee s expense.

53. D. C. Code 5 24 1233 ( e) ( 4)  Subject to subparagraph ( B), the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia shall provide litigation services to the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency, except that the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency may instead elect, either generally or in relation to particular cases or classes or cases, to hire necessary staff and personnel or enter into contracts for the provision of litigation services at such agency s expense.

54. D. C. Code 3 25 104 ( b) ( 1)  The Mayor of the District of Columbia shall appoint an Assistant Corporation Counsel as a permanent full time staff counsel to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, established by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1983, who shall be an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia and who shall advise the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division regarding all legal matters.

55. D. C. Code 6 26 707 ( a)  Prosecutions for violations of this chapter [ concerning . money lenders; licenses] or any rules issued pursuant to this chapter shall be conducted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel or any of his or her assistants in the name of the District of Columbia.

56. D. C. Code 026 802.1 ( b 1)  The Superintendent shall, upon a finding of a violation of this subchapter [ regional interstate banking] or 3 26 103 [ banks and financial institutions to be organized pursuant to District or federal law], refer the matter to the Corporation Counsel or United States Attorney for civil or cfiminal enforcement, as the case may warrant.

9 9 57. D. C. Code $ 28 4505 ( k) ( see item # 41 in discretionary)  Any procedure, other than an action to enforce a demand pursuant to subsection ( h) of this section, or testimony taken or material produced under this section or voluntarily in the course of an investigation shall be ... kept confidential by the Corporation Counsel before bringing an action against a person under this chapter for the violation under investigation ... except that testimony taken or material or information produced under this section may be disclosed by the Corporation Counsel to any officer or employee or any federal or state law enforcement agency ,...

58. D. C. Code 5 28 4507 ( c) ( 1) ( see item # 41 in discretionary)  In any action brought under subsection ( b) of this section, the Corporation Counsel shall, at all times, in such manner, and with such content as the court may direct, cause notice to be given by publication ....

59. D. C. Code $ 29 399.49  All civil actions under this chapter [ business corporations] which the Mayor is authorized to commence, and all prosecutions for violations of the provisions of this chapter, shall be brought in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia ....

60. D. C. Code $ 3 1 603 ( c)  All prosecutions for violations of $ 5 31 602to 31 606 [ falsificationof information concerning requirement to pay nonresident tuition in public schools], shall be conducted inthe name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel or any of his assistants.

61. D. C. Code $ 32 551 ( 5)  The Corporation Counsel is entrusted by common law to bring actions on behalf of the public in the event of a breach of the charitable trust of healthcare entity and to represent the public in the sale or other transfer of the assets of a healthcare entity.

62. D. C. Code 5 32 551 ( 7)  The approval by the Corporation Counsel of any transfer of assets or operations is necessary to ensure the protection of these trusts [ for charitable healthcare entities].

63. D. C. Code $ 32 553 ( a)  Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law, a healthcare entity shall not execute a conversion to a for profit entity without the approval of the Corporation Counsel.

64. D. C. Code $ 32 553 ( b)  The Corporation Counsel shall review the conversion to determine whether charitable assets are adequately protected. A conversion shall not be approved unless necessary and appropriate steps have been taken by the healthcare entity, to safeguard the value of its charitable assets.

65. D. C. Code $ 32 553 ( c) ( 1)( 13)  In determining whether charitable assets have been adequately protected, the Corporation Counsel shall consider the following....

10 66. D. C. Code $ 32 553 ( d)  The Corporation Counsel shall assess the for profit entity the reasonable costs related to, and shall expend such amounts for, the review of the proposed conversion determined by the Corporation Counsel to be necessary or appropriate ....

67. D. C. Code $ 32 554 ( a) and ( b) ( a) If the Corporation Counsel determines... that the charitable assets of a healthcare entity have not been placed in a charitable trust controlled independently of the for profit entity... the Corporation Counsel shall ensure that a charitable trust is established. ( b) The governance of any charitable trust established to safeguard assets subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to review by the Corporation Counsel ....

68. D. C. Code $ 32 556 ( a), ( b) and ( c) ( a) The Corporation Counsel shall approve or disapprove a conversion within 60 days .... ( b) Prior to issuing a decision, the Corporation Counsel shall publish the request in at least two newspapers of general publication ... The Corporation Counsel shall hold a public hearing .... ( c) The Corporation Counsel shall employ the services of an independent expert to assess the value of the charitable assets ....

69. D. C. Code $ 32 559 ( a)  The Corporation Counsel may seek injunctive relief if the Corporation Counsel determines that a person is offering, developing, or operating a [ sic] entity in violation of the chapter [ healthcare entity conversion].

70. D. C. Code $ 32 1413 ( a) [ Tlhe Corporation Counsel may ... petition the court to appoint a receiver for any facility [ nursing home].

71. D. C. Code $ 35 603 ( a)  The Commissioner [ Department of Insurance and Securities Regulation] shall submit the proposed articles and other papers so filed with him [ for domestic life companies] to the Corporation Counsel of the District, who shall examine the same, and, if he finds the same in accordance with law, he shall so certifl and return the same to the Commissioner, who shall cause the articles ....

72. D. C. Code $ 35 1257 ( e)  No action brought under this section [ fraternal benefit societies] shall be recognized in any court of the District unless brought by the Corporation Counsel upon request of the Commissioner [ Department of Insurance and SecuritiesRegulation]....

73. D. C. Code $ 35 3723 ( a) ( concerning holding companies)  The articles of incorporation and any amendments ... shall be subject to approval of the Commissioner [ Department of Insurance and Securities Regulation] and Corporation Counsel ... in the same manner as those of an insurance company. The ... Corporation Counsel shall promptly examine the articles of incorporation ...

74. D. C. Code 9 35 4702 ( b) ( 1) and ( 2) ( concerning insurance) ( b) ( 1) A conversion or management or service contract with a for profit entity shall not be approved by the Corporation Counsel unless charitable assets, if any, have been 11 adequately protected. In determining whether charitable assets have been adequately protected, the Corporation Counsel shall apply the standard enumerated in 8 32 553 ( c). ( b) ( 2) The Commissioner of Insurance and Securities, in consultation with the Corporation Counsel, shall assess the for profit entity the necessary or appropriate costs related to, and shall expend such amounts for, the review of the conversion or management or service contract with a for profit entity ....

75. D. C. Code 8 36 323  In any court proceedings instituted under the provisions of this chapter, the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia shall appear as attorney or counsel on behalf of the Mayor whether the Mayor is a party to the case or interested, and shall represent the Mayor in any court in which such case may be carried on appeal.

76. D. C. Code 5 36 524  Prosecutions for violations of ... this chapter [ employment of minors] ... shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel ....

77. D. C. Code 8 40 613 ( a)  Such person shall be subject to criminal prosecution by the Corporation Counsel for such offense [ related to motor vehicles] ....

78. D. C. Code 8 40 613 ( b)  The Director [ DMV] shall promptly inform the Corporation Counsel of an infraction by any person who has accumulated 12 or more traffic points ....

79. D. C. Code 5 42 104 ( b)  Prosecutions for violations of this section [ false statements re: financing statements or other paper filed with Recorder of Deeds] shall be by the Corporation Counsel ....

80. D. C. Code 8 43 605 ( b)  And the said Commission [ Public Service Commission] is hereby given power to call on ... the Corporation Counsel ... to enforce the provisions of Chapters 1 10 of this title [ Public Utilities] in the proper courts of the United States ... and on such call it shall be the duty of the said ... Corporation Counsel ... to enforce the provisions of this section ....

81. D. C. Code 8 45 940  Whoever violates any provision of this subchapter [ Recordation Tax on Deeds] for which no specific penalty is provided... shall be subject to a fine ... or to imprisonment .... Prosecutions ... shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel ....

82. D. C. Code 0 45 1877 ( a)  Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter [ Condominiums].... shall be fined .... imprisoned .... Prosecution for violations ... shall be brought ... by the Corporation Counsel....

83. D. C. Code 5 47 340.3 ( a)  For each individual project for which there is a proposed bond series issuance, the Mayor shall submit to the Council a resolution of project approval accompanied by a summary description of the proposed project... the preliminary legal sufficiency determinations of the Office of the Corporation Counsel and bond counsel ....

12 84. D. C. Code 6 47 2030  All prosecutions under this chapter [ gross sales tax] shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel ....

85. D. C. Code 6 47 2312  All prosecutions for violations of the provisions of $ 9 472301 to 47 2315 [ motor fuel tax] ... upon information filed by the Corporation Counsel... and all suits for the collection of any taxor penalty ... shall be instituted by the Corporation Counsel ....

86. D. C. Code 6 47 2605  All prosecutions for violations of this chapter [ insurance companies] shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel ....

87. D. C. Code $ 47 2707  All prosecutions under this subchapter [ Public Auction Permits] shall be ... upon information by the Corporation Counsel....

88. D. C. Code $ 47 2845  Prosecutions for violations of any of the provisions of this chapter [ General License Law] ... shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel....

B. Discretionary6 1. D. C. Code 5 1 357 ( e)  The Corporation Counsel is authorized to institute actions at law in equi? for the recovery of all amounts owed to the District as set forth in subsection ( d) of this section, including the Corporation Counsel s own litigation expenses and attorneys fees. In the event the Corporation Counsel elects not to exercise his or her authority under this subsection, any person who, or entity that, renders the collection services provided for in subsection ( c)* of this section shall have the authority to institute actions at law or equity for the recovery of the amounts represented by any dishonored or unpaid check, in addition to any amounts charged by the collector for . collecting a dishonored or unpaid check and any litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the collector for such collection.

2. D. C. Code 5 1 624.24 ( b) and ( d) ( regarding disability compensation) ( b) ... At the hearing, the claimant and the Corporation Counsel are entitled to present evidence.... ( d) Within 30 days after the hearing, the Mayor or his or her designee shall notify the claimant, the Corporation Counsel, and the Benefits Administration Ofice of the The word   discretionary  as used herein means that the OCC is not required by statute to take the referenced action. However, the OCC may a matter of sound legal practice, professional ethics, or policy be required to take the referenced action.

  Subsection( d) permits the Mayor, in addition to any dishonored check fee, to collect any costs or expenses incurred to recover or collect the amount represented by the dishonored check including applicable litigation expenses and attorneys fees.

Subsection ( c) permits the Mayor to enter into contracts for the collection of the amounts represented by dishonored checks proffered in payment for sums due the District . government. Any such contract would be prepared by the OCC.

13 Department of Employment Services in writing of his or her decision and the'basis of the decision. The claimant and the Office of the Corporation Counsel shall have the right to seek review of the decision under 0 1 624.28 within 30 days of the issuance of the decision.

3. D. C. Code 0 1 1153.4 ( f) ( concerns small business enterprises)  In addition to the penalties provided in subsection ( e) of this section, the Corporation Counsel may bring a civil action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against a business enterprise and the directors, officers, or principals that is reasonably believed to have obtained certification by fraud or deceit or have furnished substantially inaccurate or incomplete ownership information to the [ District of Columbia Local Business Opportunity Commission].

4. D. C. Code 0 1 1188.15 ( a) ( see item # 6 in the mandatory section)  If the Corporation Counsel finds that a person has violated or is violating the provisions of 0 11188.14 the Corporation Counsel may bring a civil action against that person in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

5. D. C. Code 5 1 1183.16 ( a), ( b), and ( c) ( re: procurement) ( a) A business which enters into a contract with the District government after engaging in collusion with another business for the purpose of defrauding the District government is liable in a suit brought by the Corporation Counsel in the appropriate court for damages equal ...( b) If there is a reasonable basis for believing that collusion has occurred... the Director shall send a written notice of this belief to the Corporation Counsel .... ( c) All documents involved in any procurement in which collusion is suspected shall be retained until the Corporation Counsel gives notice that they may be destroyed. All documents shall be made available to the Corporation Counsel.

6. D. C. Code 01 1188.19( a) ( see item ## 7 in the mandatory section)  Whenever the Corporation Counsel has reason to believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material or information relevant to a false claims law investigation, the Corporation Counsel may, in order to determine whether to commence a civil proceeding ... issue in writing and cause to be served upon such person a civil investigative demand requiring that such person do the following: ( A) Produce documentary material relevant to the false claims law investigationfor inspection and copying; ( B) Answer in writing written interrogatories with respect to any documentary material or information relevant to the false claims law investigation; ( C) Provide oral testimony concerning any documentary material or information relevant to the false claims law investigation; or ( D) Furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.' J D. C. Code 5 1 1188.19 ( a) ( 2) states that the Corporation Counsel may not issue a civil investigative demand in order to conduct, or assist in the conducting of, a criminal I investigation.

14 7. D. C. Code fs 1 1188.19 ( k) ( 1) ( see items # 3 and 7 in the mandatory and discretionary sections, respectively)  Whenever any person fails to comply with any civil investigative demand, or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any material requested in such demand cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender such material, the Corporation Counsel may file in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for the enforcement of the civil investigative demand.

8. D. C. Code fs 1 1188.20 ( a) and ( b) ( re: procurement) ( a) There is hereby established an Antifraud Fund ... to be operated as a proprietary fund with assets not to exceed .... The fund shall consist of ... ( b) Amounts in the Fund shall be available for use by the Corporation Counsel to carry out the enforcement of this chapter...

9. D. C. Code fs 1 1189.1( c)  The Office of the Corporation Counsel may provide for the [ Contract Appeals] Board those supplies, materials, and administrative services the chairpersonrequests, on a basis ....

10. D. C. Code fs 2 33 10.10 ( a)  The Corporation Counsel may bring an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in the name of the District of Columbia to enjoin the unlawful practice of any health occupation or any other action which is grounds for the imposition of a criminal penalty or disciplinary action under this chapter.

11. D. C. Code fs 2 33 10.10 ( b)  The Corporation Counsel may bring an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in the name of the District of Columbia to enjoin the unlawful sale of drugs or the unlawful trade practice or unlawful operation of a pharmacy, nursing home, community residential facility, or any other establishment purporting to provide health services.

12. D. C. Code fs 3 218.4 ( a), ( d), and ( e) ( re: public assistance) ( a) In addition to any power to bring criminal or civil action or otherwise carry out the duties under this chapter, the Corporation Counsel shall have the authority to issue subpoenas for a witness to appear and testifl or to produce all books, records ....( d) If any witness, who has been personally summoned, neglects or refuses to obey the subpoena, the Corporation Counsel may report this fact to the Superior Court .... ( e) The Corporation Counsel may administer oaths to any witness summoned in any investigation under subsection ( a) of this section.

13. D. C. Code 8 3 704 ( a), ( b), ( e), ( f), and ( g) ( re: medicaid fraud) ( a) Criminal prosecution under 8 3 702 and civil actions brought under 9 3 703 ( e) shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel. ( b) ...[ Tlhe Corporation Counsel shall have the authority to investigate all alleged violations of this chapter, and in exercising this power, may issue subpoenas ....( e) ...[ Tlhe Corporation Counsel may report that fact [ summoned witness not appearing] to the Superior Court .... ( f) The Corporation Counsel may administer oaths to witnesses summoned in any investigation under subsection ( b) of this section. ( g) No person holding records required to be maintained by the Medicaid legislation or regulations ... may refbe to provide the Corporation Counsel with access to the records on the basis that release would violate any recipient s right of privacy .... 14. D. C. Code 9 6 405 ( f)  Prosecutions under the provisions of this subsection [ concerning drainage of lots] shall be ... by the Office of the Corporation Counsel.

15. D. C. Code 9 6 995.9 ( h)  Any action [ concerning environmental controls] under 4 this subsection shall ... be instituted by the Office of the Corporation Counsel.

16. D. C. Code 9 6 995.11 ( c)  No action may be commenced under this subsection ( a) [ Concerning underground storage tank management] ... until 30 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation to the Office of the Corporation Counsel ....

17. D. C. Code 9 6 1507  An emergency executive order issued by the Mayor may provide for a fine of not more than $ 1,000 for each violation. The Corporation Counsel... may bring an action ... against anyone who has violated the provisions of an emergency executive order ....

18. D. C. Code 9 6 2510 ( a) and ( b) ( concerning adult protective orders) ( a) ... The Corporation Counsel may, either as part of a proceeding for a protection order or in an independent court action, seek an order directing the adult in need of protective services or person( s) legally responsible for those servicesto pay or reimburse the District for so much of the cost of providing protective services ... as he or she is reasonably able to afford .... ( b) The Corporation Counsel may, either as part of a proceeding for a protection order or in an independent court action, seek an order directing the person( s) responsible for an adult s abuse, neglect, or exploitation to pay or reimburse the District for all or part of the costs associated with conducting the investigation, appointing counsel, and providing protective services in that particular case....

19. D. C. Code 3 6 3460 ( f) and ( g) ( f) An action to enjoin any public nuisance [ solid waste facility not in compliance] ... may be brought ... by the Corporation Counsel .... ( g) In the case of the violation of any temporary or permanent injunction rendered pursuant to the provisions of this section, proceedings for punishment for contempt may be commenced by the Corporation Counsel ....

20. D. C. Code 3 16 1003 ( a)  Upon referral by the United States attorney, or upon application of any person or agency for a civil protection order with respect to an intrafmily offense committed or threatened, the Corporation Counsel may file a petition for civil protection in the Family Division.

21. D. C. Code 9 16 1004( a) and ( b) ( concerning intrafamily offenses) ( a) Upon a filing of a petition for civil protection by the Corporation Counsel... the Family Division shall set the matter for hearing ....( b) With respect to a petition for civil protection filed by the Corporation Counsel, the Family Division shall cause notice of the hearing to be served on the respondent ... and the Corporation Counsel ....

22. D. C. Code 0 16 1005 ( a) ( concerningintrafamily offenses)  Members of the family receiving notice shall appear at the hearing. In addition to the parties, the 16 Corporation Counsel ... may present evidence at the hearing in cases where the petition was filed by the CorporationCounsel.

23. D. C. Code Q 16 2315 ( a) ( proceedingregarding delinquency, neglect, or need of supervision) At any time followingthe filing of a petition, on motion of the Corporation Counsel ... the Division may order a child to be examined to aid in determininghis physical or mental condition.

24. D. C. Code 5 16 2339 ( b)  The CorporationCounsel may request an order under subsection ( c) of this section when the testimony or other informationmay be necessary to the public interest, and the child called as a witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other informationon the basis of the privilege against self incrimination.

25. D. C. Code 9 16 2341  Where a public support burden has been incurred or is threatened, or where an individual seeks assistancepursuant to Part D in Title IV of the Social Security Act approved January 4, 1975 ( 88 Stat. 2351; 42 U. S. C. Q 651 et seq.), the Corporation Counsel or an assistant may bring a civil action in the Family Division to enforce support of any parent or child against an absent parent.

26. D. C. Code Q 16 3522  The United States attorney or the CorporationCounsel may institute [ anex rel.] proceeding pursuant to this subchapteron his own motion, or on the relation of a third person.

27. D. C. Code 0 22 1 119  It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to willfully or knowingly give a false alarm of fire .... Prosecutionsfor violation of the provisions of this section shall be on informationfiled ... by the CorporationCounsel ....

28. D. C. Code 9 22 1631 ( b)  Prosecutionsfor violations of this chapter [ game and fish laws] ... shall be conducted ... by the CorporationCounsel....

29. D. C. . Code 5 22 2714  Whenever a nuisance is kept, maintained or exists ... the Corporation Counsel ... may maintain an action in equity ... to perpetually enjoin said nuisance ....

30. D. C. Code Q 22 3305  All prosecutions [ for vagrancy] shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel ....

31. D. C. Code 0 22 3420  Prosecutionsfor violations of the provisions of [ the sale of unwholesome food] shall be ... by the CorporationCounsel ....

32. D. C. Code Q 22 3425  All prosecutions for violations of [ the use of   District of Columbia  or similar designation by private detective or collection agency] shall be ... by the Corporation Counsel ....

17 33. D. C. Code 9 23 101 ( a)  Prosecutions for violations of all police or municipal   ordinances or regulations and for violations of all penal statutes in the nature of police or municipal regulations, where the maximum punishment is a fine only, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, shall be conducted in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel ....

34. D. C. Code 5 23 101 ( b)  Prosecutions for violations ... relating to disorderly conduct, and for violations ... relating to lewd, indecent, or obscene acts, shall be conducted ... by the Corporation Counsel ....

35. D. C. Code 3 23 104 ( a)  The United States or the District of Columbia may appeal an order, entered before the trial of a person charged with a criminal offense, which directs the return of seized property, suppresses evidence, or otherwise denies the prosecutor the use of evidence at trial, if the United States attorney or the Corporation Counsel conducting the prosecution for such violation certifies to the judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the defendant.

36. D. C. Code 6 26 81 1 ( e) ( concerning regional interstate banking) ( e) If, in the opinion of the Superintendent [ of Banking] a violation or practice or threatened violation or practice ... is likely to cause insolvency, substantial prejudice to the interests of the depositors or customers of the bank or person, the Superintendent, through the Office of the Corporation Counsel may petition the Court to: ( 1) issue a restraining order ...; ( 2) appoint a receiver ...; ( 3) freeze or seize the assets of the bank or person ...; or ( 4) impose an order for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation ....

37. D. C. Code 0 26 915 ( a)  The Superintendent [ of Banking] shall report violations . of any provision of this chapter to the Corporation Counsel. The Corporation Counsel may institute a civil action on behalf of the District for equitable or any other appropriate relief, including the imposition of civil fines ... unless different procedures or means of obtaining relief are specified in this chapter....

38. D. C. Code 0 26 1018 ( c) ( concerning mortgage lenders and brokers)  The Superintendent [ of Banking] may request the Corporation Counsel ... to take appropriate action in the Superior Court ... for the enforcement of an order issued under this section. The Corporation Counsel may also seek ... damages and such other relief allowed by law, including restitution... In any action brought by the Corporation Counsel ... the Corporation Counsel shall be entitled to seek attorney s fees and costs.

39. D. C. Code 8 28 3909  Notwithstanding any provision of laws to the contrary, if the Corporation Counsel has reason to believe that any person is using or intends to use any method, act, or practice in violation of [ the consumer protection laws] and if it is in the public interest, the Corporation Counsel... may petition the Superior Cod ... to issue a temporary or permanent injunction against the use of the method, act.... The Corporation Counsel, on behalf of any identifiable person, may recover restitution for property lost or damages suffered as a consequence of the unlawfid act or practice.

18 40. D. C. Code 9 28 4505 ( a)  Whenever the Corporation Counsel has reason to believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, or may have any information, relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, the Corporation Counsel may, prior to the institution of a proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such documentary material for inspection and copying or reproduction, to answer written interrogatories, to give oral testimony concerning documentary material or information, or to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.

41. D. C. Code 8 28 4505 ( g) ( 7)  If such person refuses to answer any question, the Corporation Counsel may petition the Superior Court of the District of Columbia pursuant to this section for an order compelling such person to answer such question....

42. D. C. Code fj 28 4505 ( h) ( see items # 58 59 in mandatory)  Whenever any person fails to comply with any civil investigative demand duly served upon that person under this section or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any such material cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender such material, the Corporation Counsel may file, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for the enforcement of this chapter.

43. D. C. Code 9 28 4512 ( a)  In enforcing this chapter [ restraints of trade], the Corporation Counsel may accept an assurance of discontinuance of an act or practice considered in violation of this chapter from any person engaged in the act or practice.

44. D. C. Code 0 28 45 13  Except as provided in section 28 4505 ( k), the Corporation Counsel may cooperate with the federal government and the states in the enforcement of this chapter [ restraints of trade].

45. D. C. Code fj 29 599.7 ( concerning nonprofit corporations)  All civil actions under this chapter, which the Mayor is authorized to commence, and all prosecutions for violation of the provisions of this chapter ... shall be brought ... by the Corporation Counsel....

. 46. D. C. Code 5 29 1359  The Corporation Counsel may bring an action to restrain a foreign limited liability company from transacting business in the District in violation of this chapter.

47. D. C. Code ! j32 356 ( b) ( 8) ( concerning health services planning)  The Office of the Corporation Counsel may seek injunctive relief from a court of competentjurisdiction if it determines that a person is operating a [ health care facility] in violation of the certificationsmade under this subsection.

48. D. C. Code 9 32 366 ( b)  The Office of the Corporation Counsel may seek injunctive relief from a court of competent jurisdiction when it determinesthat a person is / P 19 offering, developing, or operating a [ health care facility] or service in violation of this chapter.

49. D. C. Code 5 32 560 ( see item # 61 in mandatory) ... In its discretion, the Corporation Counsel may issue emergency or proposed rules to implement the provisions of this act.

50. D. C. Code 5 32 1309 ( a)  Any ... officer, administrator,... who willfully and knowingly participates in the unlawful operation of [ a health care and community residence facility] shall be guilty .... Prosecution shall be... by information signed by the Corporation Counsel ....

51. D. C. Code 3 32 1309 ( b) ( see item # 69 in mandatory) [ Tlhe Corporation Counsel ... may maintain ... an action ... to enjoin any person, agency, corporation,... from operating a facility or agency in violation of the terms of its license, provisions of this subchapter, or any rule issued pursuant to this subchapter.

52. D. C. Code 5 32 1413 ( b) ( see item # 70 in mandatory) ... a resident, resident s representative... may ... submit a written request asking the Corporation Counsel to petition the court to appoint a receiver for any facility.

53. D. C. Code 6 32 1451 ... the Corporation Counsel may bring an action in court for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction to enjoin a facility [ nursing home] from violating any provision in subchapter I11 [ Discharge, Transfer, and Relocation of Residents] of this chapter, any rule issued by the Mayor pursuant to that subchapter, or any standard or resident s right ....

54. D. C. Code 3 40 622 ( b)  The Director [ of the Department of Transportation] shall promptly inform the Corporation Counsel of an infiaction by any person who has accumulated in excess of $ 750 in frnes .... If the Corporation Counsel assertsjurisdiction over such person, he may be prosecuted without respect to the provisions of this chapter; provided, that if the Corporation Counsel affirmatively declines to take jurisdiction over such offender within 15 calendar days of his receipt of notification by the Director of a violation by such person, such violation shall be adjudicated as a civil infraction pursuant to this subchapter.

55. D. C. Code 5 40 716 ( b) ( 5)  The Corporation Counsel ... shall prosecute violations of this subsection .... The Corporation Counsel if authorized to request that a person who is charged with a violation of any provision of paragraph ( 1) of this subsection agree, as a condition of acceptance into a diversion program in lieu of prosecution, to pay the District of Columbia... a reasonable fee for the costs to the District of the person s participation in the diversion program; provided that the Corporation Counsel shall set the fee by rule and at a level which the Corporation Counsel determines will not unreasonably discourage persons from entering the diversion program. The Corporation Counsel may reduce or waive the fee if it finds that the person is indigent....

20 20 56. D. C. Code $ 40 1 108  Prosecutions for violations of this chapter [ installment sales of motor vehicles] ... shall be conducted ... by the Corporation Counsel....

57. D. C. Code $ 41 161.5  The Corporation Counsel ... may maintain an action restrain a foreign limited liability partnership from transacting business in the District of Columbia in violation of this subchapter [ Uniform Partnership Act of 19961.

58. D. C. Code 8 41 499.24  The Corporation Counsel may bring an action on behalf of the District for violations of any provision of this chapter [ Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 19871.

59. D. C. Code 9 42 234 ( a)  At the request of a state, the Corporation Counsel may bring an action in the name of the administrator of the requesting states, in any court of appropriatejurisdiction to enforce the unclaimed property laws of the requesting state against a holder in the District of property subject to escheat or claim of abandonment by that state, if that state has agreed to pay expenses incurred by the Corporation Counsel in bringing the action.

60. D. C. Code § 45 1660  Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter [ rental housing conversion and sale] ... shall be fined... or... imprisoned .... Prosecution for violations ... shall be brought ... by the Office of the Corporation Counsel ....

While the foregoing list is substantially complete with respect to statutory references, and thus workload requirements, of the OCC, it must be recognized that some matters which add to the workload of the Office are not referenced in a statute. Certain matters which have a statutory basis are required to be performed by the OCC, although the OCC is not actually referenced in the statute. For example, D. C. Code $ 36 1216 ( b) states, in part,  ... the Mayor may apply to the Superior Court to enforce any abatement requirement prescribed ....  While the statute uses the word   Mayor  the actual function is performed by OCC on behalf of the Mayor.

Another example, of a law which does not specifically reference OCC even though its resources are required is the Adoption and Safe Families Amendment Act of 2000 ( Act), effective June 27,2000 ( D. C. Law 13 136; not yet codified). Section 201 ( d) ( a) ( 2) of the Act, which amends section 201 of the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, effective September23, 1977( D. C. Law 2 22; D. C. Code 6 6 2123) requires the Chief of the [ Child Protective Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of HumanServices] ( DHS):

[ wlithin 90 days of taking a child into custody pursuant to section 304 ( c) ( l), [ to] return the child to the home or to request the filing of a neglect petition in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.