consideration of their relative effects on dose projections. For a
two-tiered standard for the disposal system, the ability of the
performance assessment tool to distinguish between the two dose limits
is an important consideration in compliance decision making.  If
projected performance over the entire stability period is well below the
standards, there is little difficulty in making a compliance decision as
long as the performance model has been demonstrated to acceptably
simulate the processes controlling peak dose to the RMEI.  If the dose
projections overlap the standard to some degree, a compliance decision
is potentially problematical.  In formulating a standard, attention
should be directed to understanding the limits of the tool, so that dose
limits, judged to be protective, are not so close together that it is
unlikely the tool can meaningfully distinguish relatively short-term
performance (within 10,0000 years) from performance over the entire 1
million year geologic stability period.

There are still some important implications of uncertainty in the
performance assessments that have a bearing on standard setting.
Understanding these effects is also relevant to designing the structure
of a standard, so that uncertainties in dose projections do not
compromise the ability to make confident decisions about the safety of
the disposal system.  Performance assessment is the only tool available
to project performance of the disposal system over the regulatory time
frame in a standard.  As such, an understanding of the uncertainties on
a site-specific basis is necessary to avoid setting standards that
cannot be implemented with reasonable confidence that the disposal
system will perform adequately.  More specifically for example if tiered
standards are under consideration (e.g. different dose limits at varying
times), if the difference between these dose limits is well within the
uncertainty of the assessment tool to distinguish between them for the
various scenarios in the assessments, making a confident compliance
decision would be very difficult to impossible

  The site-specific aspects of aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties
present the applicant with the challenge of designing a disposal system
that can confidently be shown, through performance assessments of its
anticipated behavior, to meet the regulatory standards with a reasonable
degree of confidence.  From that perspective, the “sharpness” of the
performance assessment tool for regulatory decision making is a critical
issue.  If the projected performance of the disposal system, considering
the uncertainties, is below the regulatory limits the uncertainties
should not be an issue in the compliance decision.  If however the
envelope of uncertainties overlaps the regulatory markers, the nature of
the uncertainties will play a significant role in reaching a compliance
decision.  The analyses presented and discussed above illustrate the
quantitative effects of aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties on dose
projections for the complex Yucca Mountain disposal system. These
results present a reasonable picture of the capabilities of performance
assessments performed for exceedingly long time periods to confidently
distinguish between alternative conceptualizations of how the disposal
system may perform.

In terms of formulating a standard and making compliance decisions, the
sharpness of the PA tool and the role of conservative assumptions in the
performance modeling both come into play.  For setting a standard,
understanding how well the assessment tool can distinguish between
alternatives is important to determine how well a standard can be
implemented for decision making.  Understanding the uncertainties
involved in an assessment submitted to the regulatory decision maker is
an important component in sound decision making.  As the results and
discussions in this report illustrate, there is considerable uncertainty
in the confidence that can be placed in any given performance
assessment.  Many of these uncertainties cannot be significantly lowered
by additional testing because of the spatial and temporal complications
involved in extrapolating test data.  Implications concerning the
“sharpness” of the performance assessment tool on various aspects of
the standards are discussed below.

From the results of the examination of uncertainties, we have drawn some
conclusions about how they affect performance assessments, and their
interpretation in a regulatory process.  These conclusions are
summarized below.

A standard must be based on a societal decision on acceptable levels of
radionuclide release in the future.  The “protectiveness” of the
dose limits (i.e., the risks posed by radionuclide releases)  is not
determined by the ability of the disposal system to meet pre-set limits
nor the ability of the measurement tool to generate meaningful results.
For the peak dose limit, a dose limit of 100 mrem/yr to the RMEI was
chosen as a protective standard, for reasons articulated in the preamble
to the final standards and in the Response to Comments document
accompanying the final rule, not from a consideration of disposal system
performance assessments performed by the Agency or those published in
the open literature.

Performance assessment is the main tool for assessing potential
performance of the disposal system.  Uncertainties inherent in the
understanding and mathematical modeling of the system should be
understood as they impact both the standard setting and compliance
decision process.

Uncertainties in the functioning of the disposal system and in making
simulations of its performance over the geologic stability period do
increase over time, particularly time periods extending into the many
hundreds of thousands of years.  These uncertainties compromise the use
of performance assessments as highly confident predictors of disposal
system performance and dose histories over the geologic stability
period.

For a tiered standard (multiple dose levels) as a function of time,
implementability of the standard is in part dependent on the
“sharpness” of the performance assessment tool.  If the difference
between the tiered dose limits is too small for the tool to meaningfully
distinguish between reasonable alternative performance scenarios when
the uncertainties in the model are taken into account, (i.e., the
uncertainty band around the calculated mean dose over time overlaps the
standard’s dose limits), confidence in the compliance decision may be
minimal, depending on the level of the projected doses and the
uncertainty.  The same consideration applies to a given safety case
being evaluated against a tiered standard.  If the tool cannot
adequately distinguish performance relative to the separation in the
tiered standard, the implementability of the standard is highly suspect.
Other considerations beyond the numerical results of performance
assessments would become important, if not deciding, factors in a
compliance decision.

A degree of aleatoric uncertainty may persist even if the number of
realizations used in calculating mean doses is increased, simply for
practical considerations of time and resource allocation in doing TSPA
type assessments.  With some effort to minimize this source of
uncertainty, the aleatoric uncertainty should not make a compliance
decision difficult as long as the difference between the two standards
is more than 10-20 mrem/yr.  Epistemic uncertainties in contrast can
amount to many tens to hundreds of mrem/yr depending on the specific
causes and may prove difficult to lower for some sources.

Corrosion rates and drift collapse are the major driver parameters for
the peak dose estimates examined here.  A peak dose limit of 100 mrem/yr
provides sufficient separation between the 15 mrem/yr 10,000 year limit
and the dose limit for the remainder of the stability geologic period to
allow the performance assessment tool to distinguish between the 10,000
year safety case and that for a peak dose occurring at a later time.
The 100 mrem/yr peak dose limit also imposes a significant burden to
understand and reduce epistemic uncertainties as low as possible to
establish a level of confidence that the assessments are meaningful
representations of the disposal system in the very long term.

An important insight gained from the modeling work we have performed, is
that a peak dose limit in the low hundreds of mrem/yr constrains the
disposal system to keep waste package failures low and minimal for many
tens and even hundreds of thousand of years to meet the peak dose
standard.  The choice of a 100 mrem/yr peak dose limit places a heavy
constraint on the disposal system performance assessment in that
epistemic uncertainties, as illustrated by our modeling, can be larger
than the 85 mrem/yr difference between the 10,000 year and peak dose
limits.  Considerable effort must be expended to demonstrate in the
safety case that the epistemic uncertainties have been reduced to a
level that permits the performance assessment tool to make meaningful
assessments for comparison against the standards and distinguish between
alternative conceptualizations that may be proposed.

A relatively low peak dose limit should not be considered as a weakening
of the standard, but more correctly as recognition of the uncertainties
that develops and evolves over the course of the stability period, and
an understanding of the “sharpness” of the performance assessment
tool over these time frames.  This is essentially recognizing the limits
of the science relative to making these very long-term dose projections.
 Performance assessments of the site indicate that that a peak dose
limit not exceeding several hundred mrem/yr. would constrain the
disposal system to perform well enough to meet the 15 mrem/yr. 10,000
year standard by a large margin, and perform well enough to keep doses
to relatively low levels in the longer term.  The constraint would focus
primarily on the need for a highly corrosion resistant waste package and
drip shield design, and the ability to support the use of laboratory
corrosion data in a licensing process where it will get critical
examination.  The protectiveness of the 100 mrem/yr dose limit is
explained in the preamble to the final standards.

Conservative assumptions are commonly used in performance assessments
for areas where uncertainty cannot be reduced significantly or where
judgments are made that the additional efforts to reduce uncertainties
would not significantly change the projected dose histories.  However,
they should be evaluated with a degree of caution in that they may
influence regulatory decision making more than their inherent
uncertainties would warrant.

Many of the significant uncertainties in very log-term dose projections
are generic in nature although their magnitude can be determined by
site-specific conditions. Some uncertainties, such as drift wall
collapse rates and extent cannot be reduced dramatically, and can have a
significant effect on dose projections.

Definitively assessing the magnitude of aleatoric and epistemic
uncertainties for a specific site performance assessment model is
possible only after an extensive assessment using the site data base and
all reasonable alternate conceptual models for the operative processes
at the site over the assessment period.  Understanding the nature and
role of these uncertainties in the licensing safety case for the Yucca
Mountain disposal system will be a major part of the licensing process.
The insights gained from our examination of the site and the
uncertainties inherent in performance assessments, are important and
useful in developing a standard for the extremely long time period
covered by the Yucca Mountain standard.  Uncertainties in the
understanding the performance of the disposal system do change over the
million year stability period, as described in this paper.  Some
uncertainties decrease while others increase, and some uncertainties can
only be reduced, not eliminated, by site characterization and laboratory
testing efforts.

	As discussed in the introduction to this document, the analyses and
discussions presented here were done to provide insights into the import
of uncertainties in performance assessments of the Yucca Mountain
disposal system and their implications for our rulemaking.  We believe
these insights demonstrate that uncertainties become progressively
greater during the course of the geologic stability period, and more
important in making performance assessments and compliance decisions
over the geologic stability period.

References

BSC, 2001a.  FY01 Supplemental Science and Performance Analyses, Vol. 2,
 Performance Analyses. TDR-MGR-PA-000001 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada:
Bechtel SAIC Company.  Prepared for the Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management.

BSC, 2001b,  FY01 Supplemental Science and Performance Analyses, Vol.1,
Scientific Bases and Analyses, TDR-MGR-MD-000007 REV 00 ICN 01, Las
Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. Prepared for the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management.

CRWMS M&O, 2000.  Total System Performance Assessment for the Site
Recommendation.  TDR-WIS-PA-000001 REV 00 ICN 01. Las Vegas, Nevada:
CRWMS M&O.

EPA 2001, Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
for Yucca Mountain, Nevada – Final 40 CFR 197, Evaluation of Potential
Economic Impacts of 40 CFR Part 197,  EPA 402-R-01-004, June 2001.

EPA 2005.  Public Health and Environmental Protection Standards for
Yucca Mountain, Nevada: Proposed Rule, Code of Federal Regulations,
Monday, August 22,2005, 49014-49065.

DOE (U.S. Dept. of Energy), 1998.  Viability Assessment of a Repository
at Yucca Mountain - Total System Performance Assessment, vol. 3,
DOE/RW-0508, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,
Washington, D.C.

 DOE (U.S. Dept. of Energy), 2002.  Final Environmental Impact Statement
for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. DOE/EIS-0250.
Washington, D.C.: U.S Department of Energy, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management.

DOE (U.S. Dept. of Energy), 2005. Management and Technical Support -
Peak Dose Sensitivity Analysis, contained in EPA Docket No.
OAR-2005-0083-0352.  Department of Energy, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management.

DOE (U.S. Dept. of Energy) 2008, Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for the Disposal of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive
Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. DOE/EIS-0250F-S1.
Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.

Sanford Cohen & Associates, 2005.  Conservatisms, Assumptions, and
Uncertainties in Yucca Mountain Performance Assessments. EPA Docket No.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2005-0083-0085.

Sanford Cohen & Associates, 2006. Modeling Uncertainty on a Reference
Dose Level – Task 4, Final Report.  EPA OAR Docket No.
OAR-2005-0083-0386

Sanford Cohen & Associates, 2007.  Quality Assurance Audit Report , QARR
3-06, Support to the Revision of 40 CFR Part 197 (“Yucca Mountain”),
in EPA Docket No. OAR 2005-0083-0400.

National Academy of Sciences (NAS), National Research Council (NRC),
1995.  Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, Washington, D.C.,
National Academy Press, TIC: 217588.

TRW Environmental Safety Systems Inc, 2000.  Disruptive event Process
Model Report, TRD-NBS-MD-000002 REV00 ICN 1, Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management System Management & Operating Contractor.

Appendix  A

Aleatory Uncertainty in Performance Assessment Analyses of Disposal
System Performance

Two models of the Yucca Mountain disposal system and their results were
examined to estimate the aleatoric uncertainties.  This exercise is
intended to examine the “sharpness” of the PA tool to distinguish
between sets of realizations produced by these individual models
simulating site performance.  The two models examined here differ
significantly in complexity.  The DOE model used for the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) analyses is very complex, with the
number of variables extending into the many hundreds.  It contains
complex submodels addressing subsystem performance by components of the
engineered and natural barrier system, such as corrosion models, models
for water movement into and out of the emplacement drifts, etc.  The DOE
Peak Dose model is less complex.  It was developed to examine the
relative effects of the most important “driver” parameters on
calculations of the peak dose.  The number of variable parameters in the
DOE PDM is about a hundred.  These two models offer an opportunity to
examine and compare the aleatoric uncertainties for two models that can
be used for the same purpose, calculating the peak dose, but differ
significantly in complexity.  Both of these models address various
scenarios for system performance.  The data bases sampled by the models
contain parameter distributions derived from site and laboratory
investigations performed during the site characterization studies. Both
models should be considered site-specific performance models for the
disposal system therefore, differing only in the level of detail
imbedded within the models.

Parameter distributions in the models were derived considering the
alternative physical and chemical conditions anticipated to operate
under the scenarios.  In that sense, the data  bases in the model
address many individual scenarios for performance.  In developing the
data bases for specific parameters, the possible values of parameters
attributable to different scenarios (such as changed water flow rates
through the mountain reflecting differing precipitation/infiltration
rates from climate changes) are aggregated into parameter distributions.
 The probability of parameter values for various scenarios are
aggregated into a single probability density function  (pdf) which is
sampled by the model for each individual calculation (“realization”)
generating a dose history.

For each model, the analyses presented here attempt to determine with
what level of confidence can two sets of realizations (done with the
same model) be identified as statistically different from each other.
The mean of the dose distributions was used as the performance measure,
and a  two-sample Student t-test was used to determine the degree to
which the means for separate sets of realizations from each model could
be identified as statistically different, i.e, representing something
other than random variation produced by simply sampling the parameter
distributions.  This is one way to examine the “sharpness” of the PA
tool to make meaningful discrimination between alternative sets of
realizations.  The other aspect of examining the “sharpness” of the
PA tool is to examine how well the model can distinguish between
alternative conceptualizations of disposal system performance.  This
aspect is related to the aleatoric uncertainty examined here in that the
aleatoric uncertainty will be present to greater or less extent in any
PA model.  Should the dose variations from modeling one
conceptualization fall within the range of the aleatoric uncertainty,
the different conceptualizations can not be distinguished from each
other, and the performance of the disposal system would be considered
equivalent – regardless of which conceptualization is more likely in
reality.  The aleatoric uncertainty alone is a measure of the
“sharpness” of the PA model.  Results for the DOE Peak Dose Model
and the FEIS model are described below.

The DOE Peak Dose Model Calculations

The peak dose from the DOE Peak Dose Model (DOE PDM) was found to be
approximately 125 mrem/y at 730,000 years based on the arithmetic
average of 1,000 realizations.  The frequency distribution of 1,000
realizations at the time of the peak dose is shown in Figure A1.  There
are 467 realizations which forecast an annual dose equal to 0 mrem/y at
that time, while the remaining 533 realizations range up to a dose of
5,098 mrem/y.  As noted in the figure, the mean annual dose is 125
mrem/y and the standard deviation is 300 mrem/y.  It is of interest to
compare the mean of this distribution with the mean of other possible
distributions of peak dose forecasts with a similar uncertainty.  The
1,000 DOE PDM peak dose forecast realizations will be referred to as
Population 1.  The mean of Population 1 will be compared to the mean a
second hypothetical population of annual dose forecasts with the same
variance as the DOE PDM peak dose forecast but with a different mean,
which may be higher or lower than that of Population 1.

The distribution in Figure A1 is not normally distributed, but consists
of a substantial probability (0.467) at a dose of zero, while the
distribution of positive dose forecasts has a long tail to the right.
Despite the lack of normality, the large sample size permits a
possibility of comparing mean annual dose forecasts using a 2-sample
t-test.  Figure A2 shows the p-level of a 2-sided, 2-sample t-test as a
function of the mean of Population 2.  The p-level of the test measures
that probability that the two means differ by chance alone.

The t-test compares the means of the two populations using the standard
error of the mean as a measure of the ability to distinguish between the
two means.  For determination of a statistically significant difference
it is generally required that the p-level for the test be 0.05 or less,
i.e., a 5% or less chance that the observed difference would happen by
chance alone.  As shown in Figure 2, a p-level of 0.05 is achieved when
the mean of Population 2 is below 98.7 mrem/yr.  Symmetrically on the
upper end, the 0.05 p-level is achieved when the mean of population 2
exceeds 151.3 mrem/yr.  If the Population 2 mean is between 98.7 and
151.3 mrem/yr, the t-test will conclude there is no significant
difference in the means of the two populations since the p-level exceeds
0.05 in this interval.

Although the t-test is known to be fairly robust with respect to
deviations from normality, the results in Figure A2 must be considered
as only an approximation of the true power to distinguish between the
two population means.  The large number of realizations at a dose of  0
mrem/yr is the main concern in this respect.  The non-normality issue
may be addressed using nonparametric statistical tests for a difference
in means, or using a simulation model based on the empirical
distribution shown in Figure A1.  If Population 2 also contains a large
number of zeros, it may be even more difficult to distinguish between
the two populations using popular nonparametric methods like the
Mann-Whitney or the Wilcoxon Ranked Sum test because of the large number
of ties in rank at zero and a substantial degree of overlap between the
two distributions at higher dose levels

FEIS Peak Dose

The peak dose from the FEIS model  (the large model with many hundreds
of variable parameters) is approximately 152.5 mrem/yr at 476,000 years
based on the arithmetic average of 300 realizations (the typical number
of realizations calculated to obtain a “stable” mean, as described
previously).  The standard deviation is 290.6 mrem/yr.  In this section,
we compare the mean of this distribution with the mean of other possible
distributions of peak dose forecasts with a similar uncertainty.  The
300 FEIS peak dose forecast realizations will be referred to as
Population 1.  The mean of Population 1 is compared to the mean a second
hypothetical population of annual dose forecasts with the same variance
but with a different mean, which may be higher or lower than that of
Population 1.  Again, the large sample size permits a possibility of
comparing mean annual dose forecasts using a 2-sample t-test.  Figure A3
shows the p-level of a 2-sided, 2-sample t-test as a function of the
mean of Population 2.  The p-level of the test measures that probability
that the two means differ by chance alone.  For determination of a
statistically significant difference it is generally required that the
p-level for the test be 0.05 or less, i.e., a 5% or less chance that the
observed difference would happen by chance alone.  As shown in Figure
A3, a p-level of 0.05 is achieved when the mean of Population 2 is below
106 mrem/yr.  Symmetrically on the upper end, the 0.05 p-level is
achieved when the mean of population 2 exceeds 196 mrem/yr.  If the
Population 2 mean is between 106 and 196 mrem/yr, the t-test will
conclude there is no significant difference in the means of the two
populations, since the p-level exceeds 0.05 in this interval.

The FEIS mean comparison is based on a run with 300 realizations, while
the DOE PDM uses 1,000 realizations.  A better comparison of the
uncertainty in the two forecasts may be obtained when the DOE PDM model
also is run for only 300 realizations.  However, the DOE PDM results for
300 realizations are quite different than the results based on 1,000
realizations. Based on the arithmetic average of 300 realizations, the
peak dose from the DOE PDM is approximately 160 mrem/yr at 835,000
years.  The standard deviation is 438 mrem/yr at the time of the peak
dose.  With 1,000 realizations, the peak dose from the DOE PDM was
approximately 125 mrem/yr at 730,000 years, with a standard deviation of
300 mrem/yr.  The p-level plot for the DOE PDM run with 300 realizations
is shown in Figure A4.  With 300 realizations, the PDM has a higher peak
dose occurring 100,000 years later with a larger standard deviation at
that time.

The two DOE PDM runs are compared with the FEIS results in Table 1.  The
large standard deviation for the DOE PDM model when there are 300
realizations results in a much broader range of values for the mean of
Population 2 for which there is no significant difference.  Results of
the DOE  PDM for two different numbers of realizations (n =300 or 1000)
illustrate an important point.  By doing higher numbers of realizations,
the ability to distinguish between sets increases, i.e., the range where
no statistical differentiation can be made decreases (140 to 52 mrem/yr
as shown in Table I).  To increase the “sharpness” of the PA model
relative to the aleatoric uncertainties, larger numbers of realizations
must be done.  For a smaller model like the DOE PDM, calculating more
realizations is not difficult, but for very large models the extra
computer time demands can be excessive.  A judgment is often made
concerning the time demands and the added precision to be obtained.
Theoretically, if all the possible combinations of parameter values were
calculated there would be no uncertainty in the value of the mean for
the modeled system performance.

Figure A1.  DOE PDM Annual Dose Frequency Distribution at Time of Peak
Dose (n=1000 realizations)

Figure A2.

Figure A3

Figure A4.

Table A1.  Comparison of 2-Sample t-test Results for Three Models

Model Run	Peak Mean Dose

(mrem/yr)	Year of Peak Dose	Standard Deviation

(mrem/yr)	Lower Bound

(mrem/yr)	Upper Bound

(mrem/yr)	Range

(mrem/yr)

DOE PDM

(n=1000)	125	730,000	300	99	151	52

DOE PDM

(n=300)	160	835,000	438	90	230	140

FEIS

(n=300)	152.5	476,000	290.6	106	199	93

Appendix B

DOE-TSPA Analyses with Varying Corrosion Rate Assumptions

Confirmation of the importance of corrosion rate assumptions on dose
projections and some additional insight into the importance of corrosion
rate uncertainty can be obtained from examining the results of previous
TSPAs published by DOE.  These assessments were done with the larger,
more detailed, assessment models than the DOE PDM, which contain more
complex inter-relationships between the model components and represent
the “state-of-knowledge” in terms of available data bases when they
were performed.  The TSPA models evaluated stress-corrosion cracking
(SCC) as well as general corrosion and other failure mechanisms for the
metallic components of the EBS.

Table B1 describes briefly the waste package performance assumptions
used in DOE TSPA analyses, beginning with the Viability Assessments (VA)
published in 1998 (DOE, 1998) up to the recently published Supplemental
Environmental Impact  Statement (SEIS) analyses (DOE, 2007).  The
structure of these assessment models is basically the same, i.e., the
total system model is developed from abstractions of more complex
sub-system models and incorporates many assumptions to simplify the
integrated total system modeling.  Mean peak dose projections from the
various TSPAs range from a low of 2 mrem/yr in the most recent
assessment (DOE, 2007) to 120-150 mrem/yr in earlier analyses, with one
assessment going as high as 490 mrem/yr (DOE, 2000).  (This high number
came from an analysis that extended the calculations in a model,
designed only for processes active within the 10,000 year period, to the
one million year time frame.  It should not be considered as a realistic
simulation for the one million year stability period since many
assumptions were made for the 10,000 year analyses that are not valid
for much longer time periods, such as climatic fluctuations, cladding
failure rates, seismic activity and drift degradation rates.

 The most important aspect of the various TSPA models is the corrosion
rate assumptions used in each.  The full temperature dependence case
shown on Fig 7 (ID # 5 in Table 2 for the DOE PDM analyses) involves
using corrosion rate data that matches the thermal profile of the
repository over the performance period. The most recent performance
assessments published by DOE (DOE, 2008) also used this assumption.
Very low failure rates from general corrosion were calculated, with mean
doses at one million years below 10 mrem/yr.  During the early times
when repository temperatures are relatively higher, higher corrosion
rates are used, followed by progressively lower corrosion rates
corresponding to the decreasing repository temperature.  In the very
long-term, the low corrosion rates in this conceptualization result in
delaying waste packages failures significantly beyond the end of the
stability period, with an eventual peak in the dose projections (due to
the eventual degradation of a large portion of the waste packages)
occurring beyond one million years.  Ideally, this is a more realistic
approach since the corrosion rates should reflect the thermal history of
the repository.  However there is significant uncertainty in assuming
that the low-temperature corrosion rates can be reliably extrapolated to
these time frames, as discussed more below.  In contrast, if a more
skeptical view is taken on how reliably laboratory measurements can be
extrapolated to repository in-service conditions, assuming a five-fold
increase in corrosion rates might not be an unreasonable assumption (as
was illustrated by the DOE PDM analyses shown in Fig. 7).  This case is
illustrated by combined scenario #3 in Table 3 which combines the Full
Temperature Dependence (FTD) scenario from Table 2 with the assumption
that waste package corrosion rates are accelerated by a factor of 5.
The peak mean dose for this combined scenario is 209 mrem/yr, which is
significantly higher than the peak mean dose in the Base Case in Table
2.  The peak dose occurs much earlier, at 390,000 years versus 730,000
years in the base case.  If the corrosion rate also is accelerated for
the drip shields, then the peak mean dose is increased to 304 mrem/yr at
390,000 years in the combined scenario #4 in Table 3. The results from
the DOE PDM and the DOE SEIS analyses are in good agreement concerning
the implications of the full temperature-dependent assumption and its
effect on dose projections.

For the cases where the lowest corrosion rate was not assumed, higher
dose projections were calculated.  For the TSPA-SR and FEIS analyses
(Table B1), temperature independent corrosion rates were used and higher
peak dose projections resulted in time frames in the hundreds of
thousands of years.  For these analyses, corrosion rates were assumed to
be independent of temperature in the long-term, meaning that the
corrosion rate used after the repository had cooled significantly
corresponded to higher temperatures than the actual projected
temperatures in the very long-term.

Along with the TSPA-SR results, Table B1) also contains the TSPA results
from the follow-on Supplemental Science and Performance Analysis (SSPA)
model.  For the SSPA modeling, the DOE TSPA-SR model was modified in
various ways and “one-off” sensitivity studies of the modified model
were performed to assess the impact of changes to the SR model.  Results
of these sensitivity studies were reported in the DOE TSPA-SSPA (DOE,
2001) document.  In the SSPA analyses, a temperature dependent corrosion
assumption was analyzed and results showed that the time for peak dose
moved outward to the end of the stability period, reflecting the slower
degradation of the waste packages, in agreement with the DOE-PDM and the
SEIS models .

Unfortunately most of the sensitivity analyses in the SSPA report
compared the modified model results against the TSPA-SR results only to
the 100,000-year time line rather than to the later peak dose.  Since
most of the sensitivity studies only extended to 100,000 years, it is
not possible to quantitatively assess their individual contribution to
the spread of peak dose estimates.  However, the results offer some
insights into the effects.  Differences from the SR model results are
listed in Table B2 for the components of the TSPA-SR model that were
modified significantly.  A number of factors affect seepage rates into
the emplacement drifts.  Intuitively, it could be assumed that these
effects would amplify, to some extent, the effects of using the full
temperature-dependent corrosion rates, reducing dose estimates still
further.  Solubility control assumptions also contribute significantly
to mobilization of radionuclides from the waste package and transport
out of the EBS.

Results of these sensitivity studies on the TSPA-SR model show
variations in some parameters can cause changes in dose estimates of
many 10s of mrem/yr.  It is not possible to extrapolate these dose
changes from 100,000 years to the time of peak dose with high
confidence, but the trends in these results would probably continue as
the time frame extends outwards to the time of peak dose.  These results
generally confirm the observations made from the DOE-PDM modeling
exercise results discussed in the main body of this paper – that
epistemic uncertainties have the most significant effects on dose
projections and corrosion rate assumptions are the major driver in
determining the timing and magnitude of the peak dose.

Table B1 Waste Package Performance Assumptions and Dose Projection
Results in Various DOE Total System Performance Assessments (TSPA)

DOE TSPA	Peak Dose Time (years)	Mean Peak Dose (mrem/yr)
Corrosion/Radionuclide Release Assumptions for EBS Releases	Waste
Package Performance Results

TSPA-VA 1998

(DOE, 1998)	~ 300  K 	~ 140	Considered general, local, pitting; rates
span 25-100 oC; general corrosion by dripping proportional to seepage
with flow focusing from seeps onto failed metal, corrosion rates
correlated to dripping variations;  juvenile failures (1-10) included;
cladding credit taken; volumetric flux through failed package scaled
with increasing corroded areas on the package	Relatively rapid failure
of pkgs. because corrosion resistant metal is inside and more
susceptible to localized corrosion after stainless steel outer metal is
degraded

TSPA –SR

2000

Three separate models used

(DOE, 2000)	(1) 270 K

(2) 1,000 K

(3) ~ 700 K	 ~ 490

~ 30

 ~ 120 	General corrosion, local corrosion, SCC; Temperature independent
corrosion rate used; cladding credit taken; no credit for inner
stainless steel container, diffusion thru SCC (assumed continuous
pathway) and advective flow, volumetric flux through failed package
scaled with increasing corroded areas on the package	Three different
models used as follows: (1) 10 K model simply extrapolated to peak dose
beyond 10 K yrs., (2) secondary actinide phases control solubility in
the very long-term, (3) multiple glacial periods.

TSPA – SSPA

2001

(DOE, 2001)	~  120 K

1,000 K

 	~140 (TI)

~110 (FTD)	General corrosion, local corrosion, SCC; Full temperature
dependent (FTD) and temperature independent (TI) corrosion rates used;
cladding credit taken; volumetric flux through failed package scaled
with increasing corroded areas on the package	SR models modified for
newer data/assumptions, Peak shown for nominal case (no disruptive
events), SSPA analyzed a high-temp model (HTOM) and a lower-temp model
(LTOM) – both with dose history still rising at one million yrs.

TSPA-FEIS

2002

(DOE, 2002)	~475 K	~120-150	General corrosion. Local corrosion, SCC;
Temperature independent corrosion rate used (faster rates assumed);
cladding credit taken; volumetric flux through failed package scaled
with increasing corroded areas on the package	FEIS analyses assumed
larger repository than SR and SSPA analyses, also assumed different
BDCFs and 3,000 acre-ft rep vol. not used in previous PAs

TSPA-FSEIS 2008

(DOE, 2008)	>1 million yrs.	~  2	General corrosion – full temperature
dependence enhanced by microbial corrosion, local and stress corrosion
cracking; juvenile failures considered; no cladding credit;  volumetric
flux through failed package scaled to drip rate through failed shield
and increasing corroded areas on the package	10% of packages get general
corrosion breaches by one million yrs. Only 0.4% of package surface
removed;  SCC failures begin at 400  K yrs – no flow through SCC
failures; releases from gen. corr. Failures are well after one million
years, releases within one million years largely from disruptive
scenarios

Table B2 Modifications to the DOE TSPA-SR Model for Sensitivity
Analyses Presented in the DOE TSPA-SSPA

Post TSPA-SR Modifications to the TSPA-SR Sub-Models  	Nature of
Modification to TSPA-SR Model	Effect on Projected Performance (From DOE,
2001, Chapters 3. 2 & 4) against TSPA-SR base case model (~60 mrem/yr at
100 K yrs. reference mark)

Climate  	Includes post-10K climate fluctuations in the nominal case
Seepage increases with higher infiltration.  Only 20% increases in waste
packages experiencing seepage over the SR base case

Seepage  	More data for repository rock units	No significant increase in
dose over SR base case estimates

Seepage Flow Focusing	Used non-heterogeneous permeability field in
simulations to derive focusing factor	Increased seepage but only a small
difference from the SR base case – less than10 mrem/yr.

Episodic Seepage	New factors for episodic changes in seepage from
fractures	Raised 100 K yr. dose ~ 30 mrem/yr over the SR base case

Thermal Properties	Included newer data on rock units and invert
properties	Changes affect relative humidity in drifts – high temp.
case and SR base case very similar results, low-temp case significantly
different than the SR base case – longer time to failure

Thermal-Hydrologic Effects and Seepage	Calculations include newer data
on rock properties	Changes affect seepage rates – general lowering
relative to the SR base case

In-Drift Chemistry	Used  smaller range of thermodynamic data and host
rock mineralogy	No significant increase in dose over SR base case

Stress Corrosion Cracking	Newer data on crack shape and propagation,
uncertainty and threshold values	Longer time to SCC failures, resulting
in lower doses than SR base case at 100 K yrs. ~ 10 – 30 mrem/yr.
(greater difference at less than one million yrs.)

General Corrosion	Include temperature dependence of corrosion rate
Reduces doses by 60 mrem/yr. at 100 K yr.. over SR base case, peak dose
extends beyond one million yrs.

Evaporative Seepage Reduction	New model added	No significant change over
the SR base case

Flow through Waste Package	Flow through drip shield not always on
package breaches, bathtub effect	Lower dose than the SR base case at 100
K yrs.  ~20 mrem/yr

In-Package Chemistry	Considers waste form and iron degradation products
on chemistry	Raises dose as much as 50 mrem/yr. at  100 K yrs. –
elevated solubility for actinides

Cladding Degradation	Newer data on creep, SCC, local corrosion and
unzipping	Slightly lower doses up to 100 K yrs – no significant
difference from the SR base case at one million years.

In-Package Solubility Limits	Increased uncertainty on controlling phases
Lower dose at  100 K yrs. by ~ 60 mrem/yr. relative to SR base case

EBS Diffusive Transport	Diffusive transport included	No significant
difference from the SR base case

EBS Sorption	Includes sorption on waste package degradation products and
the invert	Reduces dose at 100 K yrs. By ~ 10 mrem/yr

UZ Transport in Drift Shadow	Modified flow mechanisms	Delays transport
by 10 K yrs. Relative to SR base case, lowers  100 K yr. dose by ~ 25
mrem/yr.

SZ Transport	Modified bulk density and I and Tc coefficients in the
alluvium, other assumptions	No significant differences through entire
dose history to 100 K yrs relative to the SR base case

Biosphere Dose Conversion Factors	Modified factors used	Small lowering (
less than 10 mrem/yr )

 relative to the SR base case

Total System Releases from TSPA-SSPA Model	Effects of all modifications
to the TSPA-SR model	Releases delayed in time relative to the SR base
case for the low-temp model and projected doses lower than the SR base
case by 10-80  mrem/yr. at one million years

  There is an earlier, lower peak of 153 mrem/yr at 635,000 years, not
used in this analysis.

 PAGE

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[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 128 (Tuesday, July 5, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43701-43705]
[FR Doc No: 2016-15797]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

[Docket No. FMCSA-2007-28043]

Hours of Service (HOS) of Drivers; American Pyrotechnics
Association (APA); Granting of Exemption From the 14-Hour Rule

AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of final disposition.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FMCSA announces the granting of an exemption for 51 member
companies of the American Pyrotechnics Association (APA) from the
hours-of-service (HOS) regulation prohibiting drivers of commercial
motor vehicles (CMVs) from driving after the 14th hour after coming on
duty. Fifty-one APA members currently hold such exemptions. APA
requests discontinuance of the exemption for 4 carriers, and new
exemptions for 4 carriers, with the total therefore remaining at 51.
The ``Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act'' (FAST Act) extended
the HOS exemptions in effect on the date of enactment of that Act to 5
years from the date of issuance. Because the FAST Act also authorized
new exemptions for a period of up to 5 years, the Agency grants 4-year
exemptions to 4 additional fireworks companies, ensuring that all 51
exemptions will terminate on July 8, 2020. FMCSA has determined that
the terms and conditions of the exemption ensure a level of safety
equivalent to, or greater than, the level of safety achieved without
the exemption.

DATES: These exemptions from 49 CFR 395.3(a)(2) are effective from June
28 through July 8, at 11:59 p.m. local time, each year through 2020.

ADDRESSES:
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments, go to www.regulations.gov at any time or visit Room W12-140
on the ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., ET, Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The on-line Federal Docket Management System
(FDMS) is available 24 hours each day, 365 days each year. If you want
acknowledgment that we received your comments, please include a self-
addressed, stamped envelope or postcard or print the acknowledgement
page that appears after submitting comments on-line.
    Privacy Act: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits
comments

from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information concerning this
notice, contact Ms. Pearlie Robinson, FMCSA Driver and Carrier
Operations Division; Office of Carrier, Driver and Vehicle Safety
Standards; Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>If you have
questions on viewing or submitting material to the docket, contact
Docket Services, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Public Participation

Viewing Comments and Documents

    To view comments, as well as documents mentioned in this preamble
as being available in the docket, go to www.regulations.gov and insert
the docket number, ``FMCSA-2007-28043'' in the ``Keyword'' box and
click ``Search.'' Next, click ``Open Docket Folder'' button and choose
the document listed to review. If you do not have access to the
Internet, you may view the docket online by visiting the Docket
Management Facility in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the DOT West
Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., e.t., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

II. Legal Basis

    FMCSA has authority under 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) and 31315 to grant
exemptions from certain parts of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations. FMCSA must publish a notice of each exemption request in
the Federal Register (49 CFR 381.315(a)). The Agency must provide the
public an opportunity to inspect the information relevant to the
application, including any safety analyses that have been conducted.
The Agency must also provide an opportunity for public comment on the
request.
    The Agency reviews the safety analyses and the public comments, and
determines whether granting the exemption would likely achieve a level
of safety equivalent to, or greater than, the level that would be
achieved by the current regulation (49 CFR 381.305). The decision of
the Agency must be published in the Federal Register (49 CFR
381.315(b)) with the reason for the grant or denial, and, if granted,
the specific person or class of persons receiving the exemption, and
the regulatory provision or provisions from which exemption is granted.
The notice must also specify the effective period of the exemption, and
explain its terms and conditions. The exemption may be renewed (49 CFR
381.300(b)).
    Section 5206(a)(3) of the FAST Act amended 49 U.S.C. 31315 to
permit FMCSA to grant exemptions for up to 5 years from the date of
issuance, instead of the previous two years [section 31315(b)(2)]. This
statutory provision will be codified in 49 CFR part 381 in a
forthcoming rulemaking. Section 5206(b)(2)(A) of the FAST Act also
extended all HOS exemptions in effect on the date of enactment to a
period of 5 years from the date of issuance. FMCSA announced the
extension of the HOS fireworks exemption in a Federal Register notice
published on May 9, 2016 [81 FR 28115].

III. APA Application for Exemption

    The HOS rule in 49 CFR 395.3(a)(2) prohibits the driver of a
property-carrying CMV from driving after the 14th hour after coming on
duty following 10 consecutive hours off duty. The APA, a trade
association representing the domestic fireworks industry, was granted
an exemption for 51 member companies for the 2015 and 2016 Independence
Day periods [80 FR 37040, June 29, 2015]. APA has requested new
exemptions for four carriers and discontinuance of the exemptions for
four carriers,\1\ maintaining the total at 51. As mentioned above, the
51 exemptions granted to APA members in 2015 (now reduced to 47
exemptions) were extended, pursuant to section 5206(b)(2)(A) of the
FAST Act, through the annual Independence Day periods ending on July 8,
2020. The exemptions for the 4 new APA carriers will also expire on
July 8, 2020. Although this is less than the 5-year exemption period
authorized by 49 U.S.C. 31315(b)(2), as amended by section 5206(a)(3)
of the FAST Act, FMCSA believes that the interests of the APA members
and the Agency would best be served by harmonizing, as far as possible,
the expiration dates of all such fireworks-related exemptions. It
should also be noted that section 5206(b)(2)(A) of the FAST Act extends
HOS exemptions in effect on the date of enactment ``for a period of 5
years from the date such exemption was granted'' (emphasis added).
FMCSA believes that the intent of the statute was to extend the
effective period of an exemption from 2 to 5 years, on the assumption
that exemptions begin upon issuance and remain in effect (in most
cases) for 2 consecutive years. Since the 2015 fireworks exemption
involved 2 separate periods, both ending after ``the date such
exemption was granted,'' the Agency believes the FAST Act amendment is
best interpreted as extending the end date of the fireworks exemption--
namely July 8 of each year--through 2020. Like the other 47 APA
companies that operated under the 2015 exemption, the 4 additional
companies would be subject to all of the terms and conditions of the
exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Colonial Fireworks, DOT 177274; Fireworks West
Internationale, DOT 245423; USA Halloween Planet Inc. dba USA
Fireworks, DOT 725457; Western Fireworks Inc., DOT 838585.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The original APA application for relief from the 14-hour rule was
submitted in 2004; a copy is in the docket. That application fully
describes the nature of the pyrotechnic operations of the CMV drivers
during a typical Independence Day period.
    As stated in the 2004 request, the CMV drivers employed by APA
members are trained pyro-technicians who hold commercial driver's
licenses (CDLs) with hazardous materials (HM) endorsements. They
transport fireworks and related equipment by CMVs on a very demanding
schedule during a brief Independence Day period, often to remote
locations. After they arrive, the drivers are responsible for set-up
and staging of the fireworks shows.
    The APA states that it is seeking an exemption for an additional
four member companies because compliance with the current 14-hour rule
in 49 CFR 395.3(a)(2) would impose a substantial economic hardship on
numerous cities, towns and municipalities, as well as its member
companies. To meet the demand for fireworks without the exemption, APA
states that its member companies would be required to hire a second
driver for most trips. The APA advises that the result would be a
substantial increase in the cost of the fireworks shows--beyond the
means of many of its members' customers--and that many Americans would
be denied this important component of the celebration of Independence
Day. The 47 APA member companies currently exempt, as well as the four
carriers seeking an exemption for the first time, are listed in an
appendix to this notice. The four new carriers are identified with an
asterisk. A copy of the request for the exemption is included in the
docket referenced at the beginning of this notice.

IV. Method To Ensure an Equivalent or Greater Level of Safety

    The APA believes that the new exemptions would not adversely affect
the safety of the fireworks transportation

provided by these motor carriers. According to APA, its member-
companies have operated under this exemption for 10 previous
Independence Day periods without a reported motor carrier safety
incident. Moreover, it asserts, without the extra time provided by the
exemption, safety would decline because APA drivers would be unable to
return to their home base after each show. They would be forced to park
the CMVs carrying unused fireworks (HM 1.1G, 1.3G and 1.4G products) in
areas less secure than the motor carrier's home base. As a condition of
holding the exemption, each motor carrier would be required to notify
FMCSA within five business days of any accident (as defined in 49 CFR
390.5) involving the operation of any of its CMVs while under this
exemption. To date, FMCSA has received no accident notifications, nor
is the Agency aware of any accidents reportable under terms of the
prior APA exemptions.
    In its exemption request, APA asserted that the operational demands
of this unique industry minimize the risks of CMV crashes. In the last
few days before July 4, these drivers transport fireworks over
relatively short routes from distribution points to the site of the
fireworks display, and normally do so in the early morning when traffic
is light. At the site, they spend considerable time installing, wiring,
and safety-checking the fireworks displays, followed by several hours
off duty in the late afternoon and early evening prior to the event.
During this time, the drivers are able to rest and nap, thereby
reducing or eliminating the fatigue accumulated during the day. Before
beginning another duty day, these drivers must take 10 consecutive
hours off duty, the same as other drivers of property-carrying CMVs.

V. Public Comments

    On May 9, 2016, FMCSA published notice of this application and
requested public comments (81 FR 28115). Two comments were submitted,
both opposing the exemption. The first was from an individual who
objected to the exemption in principle, stating ``I find it
hypocritical of the FMCSA to consider exemptions to the hours of
service regulations for any special interests.'' The second comment,
from the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates), listed
objections to 19 of the 51 carriers. Of these 19, two were among the
four carriers proposed to be added to this exemption. In most cases,
Advocates pointed out the carrier had out-of-service (OOS) rates well
above the national averages. Advocates also described violations that
were found during roadside inspections of the carriers. Further, they
asserted that FMCSA had not conducted thorough safety-record checks of
the carriers because the OOS rates and inspection violations were not
mentioned in the May 9, 2016, Federal Register notice (81 FR 28115).

FMCSA Response

    Section 5206(b)(2)(A) of the FAST Act extended HOS exemptions in
effect on the date of enactment ``for a period of 5 years from the date
such exemption was granted.'' Therefore, the exemptions of the 47
carriers that were included in the previous exemption period have been
statutorily extended until July 8, 2020 [81 FR 28115].
    Prior to the time exemption applications are announced in the
Federal Register, FMCSA checks basic elements of safety records for any
factors that would disqualify the carrier, such as being under an
Imminent Hazard Order. Other elements of the safety records are checked
during the comment period of the notice. The information provided by
Advocates for each carrier was also identified by FMCSA during the
comment period and has been considered in this final determination for
the four new applicant-carriers.
    With regard to safety statistics, none of the 51 carriers granted
exemptions in 2015 (which were extended by the FAST Act) or the 4
carriers proposed for exemption in 2016, was under an OOS or Imminent
Hazard Order, had any alerts in the Safety Management System (SMS), or
was under investigation by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration. All had ``satisfactory'' safety ratings based on
compliance reviews, and all had valid Hazardous Materials Safety
Permits. A few ``acute critical'' violations attributed to 3 of the
carriers occurred months after the Independence Day holiday, when the
carriers were not operating under the exemption. Because of the small
numbers of inspections on record for most of these carriers, the OOS
rates cited by Advocates do not constitute a statistically reliable
basis for a comparison with national averages. For example, a carrier
having only three inspections, one of which included a driver OOS
violation, would have a driver OOS rate of 33% compared to the national
average of approximately 5%. Under those circumstances, FMCSA would not
consider the apparent high OOS rate to be particularly significant.
    Carrier Pyrotecnico LLC, USDOT 548303, was identified as not having
a valid registration with FMCSA. However, investigation of the
carrier's MCS-150B registration documents indicated that the carrier's
officials had mistakenly used the same USDOT number when intending to
apply for new registration of a different carrier. The carrier is
reportedly undertaking a correction of the records. The Agency
considers Pyrotecnico LLC, USDOT 526749, to be registered and included
in the exemptions extended by the FAST Act.
    In light of the above, FMCSA believes that the fireworks carriers
previously granted HOS exemptions remain likely, as before, to achieve
a level of safety equivalent to or greater than the level that
compliance with the 14-hour rule would ensure. Similarly, the Agency
has concluded that the 4 APA members applying for the same HOS
exemption would likely meet the same standard and has decided to grant
them a 4-year exemption from the 14-hour rule.

VI. Terms and Conditions of the Exemption

Period of the Exemption

    The exemption from 49 CFR 395.3(a)(2) is effective from June 28
through July 8, at 11:59 p.m. local time, each year through 2020 for
the 51 carriers identified in this notice.

Terms and Conditions of the Exemption

    The exemptions from 49 CFR 395.3(a)(2) will be limited to drivers
employed by the 47 motor carriers already covered by the exemption, and
drivers employed by 4 motor carriers that were not included for the
2015 period. The four carriers are identified by an asterisk in the
appendix table of this notice. Section 395.3(a)(2) prohibits a driver
from driving a CMV after the 14th hour after coming on duty and does
not permit off-duty periods to extend the 14-hour limit. Drivers
covered by this exemption may exclude off-duty and sleeper-berth time
of any length from the calculation of the 14-hour limit. This exemption
is contingent on each driver driving no more than 11 hours in the 14-
hour period after coming on duty, as extended by any off-duty or
sleeper-berth time in accordance with this exception. The exemption
would be further contingent on each driver having a full 10 consecutive
hours off duty following 14 hours on duty prior to beginning a new
driving period. Drivers operating under the exemption must carry a copy
of this Federal Register notice or equivalent signed letter from FMCSA,
and provide it to enforcement officers upon request. The carriers and
drivers must comply with all other applicable requirements of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Regulations (49 CFR parts 350-399) and Hazardous Materials Regulations
(49 CFR parts 105-180).
Preemption
    In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 31315(d), as implemented by 49 CFR
381.600, during the period this exemption is in effect, no State shall
enforce any law or regulation applicable to interstate commerce that
conflicts with or is inconsistent with this exemption with respect to a
firm or person operating under the exemption. States may, but are not
required to, adopt the same exemption with respect to operations in
intrastate commerce.

FMCSA Notification

    Exempt motor carriers would be required to notify FMCSA within 5
business days of any accidents (as defined by 49 CFR 390.5) involving
the operation of any of their CMVs while under this exemption. The
notification must include the following information:
    a. Name of the exemption: ``APA,''
    b. Date of the accident,
    c. City or town, and State, in which the accident occurred, or
which is closest to the scene of the accident,
    d. Driver's name and driver's license number,
    e. Vehicle number and State license number,
    f. Number of individuals suffering physical injury,
    g. Number of fatalities,
    h. The police-reported cause of the accident,
    i. Whether the driver was cited for violation of any traffic laws,
or motor carrier safety regulations, and
    j. The total driving time and the total on-duty time of the CMV
driver at the time of the accident.

Termination

    The FMCSA does not believe the motor carriers and drivers covered
by this exemption will experience any deterioration of their safety
record. However, should this occur, FMCSA will take all steps necessary
to protect the public interest, including revocation of the exemption.
The FMCSA will immediately revoke the exemption for failure to comply
with its terms and conditions. Exempt motor carriers and drivers are
subject to FMCSA monitoring while operating under this exemption.

    Issued on: June 27, 2016.
T.F. Scott Darling, III,
Acting Administrator.

 Appendix to Notice of Application for Approval of Motor Carriers To Utilize American Pyrotechnics Association's
                 (APA) Exemption From the 14-Hour Rule During 2016 Independence Day Celebrations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Motor carrier                     Street address           City, state, zip code        DOT No.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. American Fireworks Company...........  7041 Darrow Road..........  Hudson, OH 44236..........          103972
2. American Fireworks Display, LLC......  P.O. Box 980..............  Oxford, NY 13830..........         2115608
3. AM Pyrotechnics, LLC.................  2429 East 535th Rd........  Buffalo, MO 65622.........         1034961
4. Arthur Rozzi Pyrotechnics............  6607 Red Hawk Ct..........  Maineville, OH 45039......         2008107
5. Atlas PyroVision Entertainment Group,  136 Old Sharon Rd.........  Jaffrey, NH 03452.........          789777
 Inc.
6. Central States Fireworks, Inc........  18034 Kincaid Street......  Athens, IL 62613..........         1022659
7. East Coast Pyrotechnics, Inc.........  4652 Catawba River Rd.....  Catawba, SC 29704.........          545033
8. Entertainment Fireworks, Inc.........  13313 Reeder Road SW......  Tenino, WA 98589..........          680942
9. Falcon Fireworks.....................  3411 Courthouse Road......  Guyton, GA 31312..........         1037954
10. Fireworks & Stage FX America........  12650 Hwy 67S. Suite B....  Lakeside, CA 92040........          908304
11. Fireworks by Grucci, Inc............  20 Pinehurst Drive........  Bellport, NY 11713........          324490
12. * Flashing Thunder Fireworks dba      700 E Van Buren Street....  Mitchell, IA 50461........          420413
 Legal Aluminum King Mtg.
13. J&J Computing dba Fireworks           174 Route 17 North........  Rochelle Park, NJ 07662...         2064141
 Extravaganza.
14. Gateway Fireworks Displays..........  P.O. Box 39327............  St Louis, MO 63139........         1325301
15. Great Lakes Fireworks...............  24805 Marine..............  Eastpointe, MI 48021......         1011216
16. Hamburg Fireworks Display, Inc......  2240 Horns Mill Road SE...  Lancaster, OH.............          395079
17. Hawaii Explosives & Pyrotechnics,     17-7850 N. Kulani Road....  Mountain View, HI 96771...         1375918
 Inc.
18. Hollywood Pyrotechnics, Inc.........  1567 Antler Point.........  Eagan, MN 55122...........         1061068
19. Homeland Fireworks, Inc.............  P.O. Box 7................  Jamieson, OR 97909........         1377525
20. Island Fireworks Co., Inc...........  N1597 County Rd VV........  Hager City, WI 54014......          414583
21. J&M Displays, Inc...................  18064 170th Ave...........  Yarmouth, IA 52660........          377461
22. Lantis Fireworks, Inc...............  130 Sodrac Dr., Box 229...  N. Sioux City, SD 57049...          534052
23. Legion Fireworks Co., Inc...........  10 Legion Lane............  Wappingers Falls, NY 12590          554391
24. Miand Inc. dba Planet Productions     P.O. Box 294, 3999 Hupp     Kingsbury, IN 46345.......          777176
 (Mad Bomber).                             Road.
25. Martin & Ware Inc. dba Pyro City      P.P. Box 322..............  Hallowell, ME 04347.......          734974
 Maine & Central Maine Pyrotechnics.
26. Melrose Pyrotechnics, Inc...........  1 Kinsgubury Industrial     Kingsbury, IN 46345.......          434586
                                           Park.
27. Precocious Pyrotechnics, Inc........  4420-278th Ave NW.........  Belgrade, MN 56312........          435931
28. * Pyro Shows, Inc...................  115 N 1st Street..........  LaFollette, TN 37766......          456818
29. Pyro Shows of Texas, Inc............  6601 9 Mile Azle Rd.......  Fort Worth, TX 76135......         2432196
30. * Pyro Engineering Inc., dba/Bay      400 Broadhollow Rd. Ste #3  Farmindale, NY 11735......          530262
 Fireworks.
31. Pyro Spectaculars, Inc..............  3196 N Locust Ave.........  Rialto, CA 92376..........          029329
32. Pyro Spectaculars North, Inc........  5301 Lang Avenue..........  McClellan, CA 95652.......         1671438
33. Pyrotechnic Display, Inc............  8450 W. St. Francis Rd....  Frankfort, IL 60423.......         1929883
34. Pyrotecnico (S. Vitale Pyrotechnic    302 Wilson Rd.............  New Castle, PA 16105......          526749
 Industries, Inc.).
35. Pyrotecnico, LLC....................  60 West Ct................  Mandeville, LA 70471......          548303
36. Pyrotecnico FX......................  6965 Speedway Blvd. Suite   Las Vegas, NV 89115.......         1610728
                                           115.
37. Rainbow Fireworks, Inc..............  76 Plum Ave...............  Inman, KS 67546...........         1139643
38. RES Specialty Pyrotechnics..........  21595 286th St............  Belle Plaine, MN 56011....          523981
39. Rozzi's Famous Fireworks, Inc.......  11605 North Lebanon Rd....  Loveland, OH 45140........         0483686
40. * Sky Wonder Pyrotechnics, LLC......  3626 CR 203...............  Liverpool, TX 77577.......         1324580
41. Skyworks, Ltd.......................  13513 W. Carrier Rd.......  Carrier, OK 73727.........         1421047

42. Sorgi American Fireworks Michigan,    935 Wales Ridge Rd........  Wales, MI 48027...........         2475727
 LLC.
43. Spielbauer Fireworks Co, Inc........  220 Roselawn Blvd.........  Green Bay, WI 54301.......          046479
44. Spirit of 76........................  6401 West Hwy 40..........  Columbia, MO 65202........         2138948
45. Starfire Corporation................  682 Cole Road.............  Carrolltown, PA 15722.....          554645
46. Vermont Fireworks Co., Inc./          2235 Vermont Route 14       East Montpelier, VT 05651.          310632
 Northstar Fireworks Co., Inc..            South.
47. Western Display Fireworks, Ltd......  10946 S. New Era Rd.......  Canby, OR 97013...........          498941
48. Western Enterprises, Inc............  P.O. Box 160..............  Carrier, OK 73727.........          203517
49. Wolverine Fireworks Display, Inc....  205 W Seidlers............  Kawkawlin, MI.............          376857
50. Young Explosives Corp...............  P.O. Box 18653............  Rochester, NY 14618.......          450304
51. Zambelli Fireworks MFG, Co., Inc....  P.O. Box 1463.............  New Castle, PA 16103......          033167
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Not included in 2015 list of approved carriers.

[FR Doc. 2016-15797 Filed 6-29-16; 4:15 pm]
 BILLING CODE 4910-EX-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 230 (Friday, November 29, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 71546-71549]
[FR Doc No: 2013-28589]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket Number USCG-2013-0471]
RIN 1625-AA00

Safety Zone; Belt Parkway Bridge Construction, Gerritsen Inlet,
Brooklyn, NY

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to establish a safety zone on the
navigable waters of Gerritsen Inlet surrounding the Belt Parkway
Bridge. This proposed rule would allow the Coast Guard to prohibit all
vessel traffic through the safety zone during bridge replacement
operations, both planned and unforeseen, that could pose an imminent
hazard to persons and vessels operating in the area. This rule is
necessary to provide for the safety of life in the regulated area
during the construction of the Bridge.

DATES: Comments and related material must be received by the Coast
Guard on or before December 30, 2013.
    Requests for public meetings must be received by the Coast Guard on
or before December 20, 2013.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by docket number using
any one of the following methods:
    (1) Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:[sol][sol]www.regulations.gov.
    (2) Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (3) Mail or Delivery: Docket Management Facility (M-30), U.S.
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001. Deliveries
accepted between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
federal holidays. The telephone number is<PHONE_NUMBER>.

See the ``Public Participation and Request for Comments'' portion of
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below for further instructions on
submitting comments. To avoid duplication, please use only one of these
three methods.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this rule,
call or email Mr. Jeff Yunker, Coast Guard Sector New York, Waterways
Management Division; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or Chief Craig Lapiejko, Coast Guard First
District Waterways Management Branch, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>If you have questions on viewing or
submitting material to the docket, call Barbara Hairston, Program
Manager, Docket Operations, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Acronyms

COTP Captain of the Port
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FR Federal Register
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

A. Public Participation and Request for Comments

    We encourage you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting
comments and related materials. All comments received will be posted
without change to http:[sol][sol]www.regulations.gov and will include
any personal information you have provided.

1. Submitting Comments

    If you submit a comment, please include the docket number for this
rulemaking, indicate the specific section of this document to which
each comment applies, and provide a reason for each suggestion or
recommendation. You may submit your comments and material online at
http:[sol][sol]www.regulations.gov, or by fax, mail, or hand delivery,
but please use only one of these means. If you submit a comment online,
it will be considered received by the Coast Guard when you successfully
transmit the comment. If you fax, hand deliver, or mail your comment,
it will be considered as having been received by the Coast Guard when
it is received at the Docket Management Facility. We recommend that you
include your name and a mailing address, an email address, or a
telephone number in the body of your document so that we can contact
you if we have questions regarding your submission.
    To submit your comment online, go to
http:[sol][sol]www.regulations.gov, type the docket number [USCG-2013-
0471] in the ``SEARCH'' box and click ``SEARCH.'' Click on ``Submit a
Comment'' on the line associated with this rulemaking.
    If you submit your comments by mail or hand delivery, submit them
in an unbound format, no larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches, suitable for
copying and electronic filing. If you submit comments by mail and would
like to know that they reached the Facility, please enclose a stamped,
self-addressed postcard or envelope. We will consider all comments and
material received during the comment period and may change the rule
based on your comments.

2. Viewing Comments and Documents

    To view comments, as well as documents mentioned in this preamble
as being available in the docket, go to
http:[sol][sol]www.regulations.gov, type the docket number (USCG-2013-
0471) in the ``SEARCH'' box and click ``SEARCH.'' Click on Open Docket
Folder on the line associated with this rulemaking. You may also visit
the Docket Management Facility in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of
the Department of Transportation West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.

3. Privacy Act

    Anyone can search the electronic form of comments received into any
of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may review a Privacy

Act notice regarding our public dockets in the January 17, 2008, issue
of the Federal Register (73 FR 3316).

4. Public Meeting

    We do not now plan to hold a public meeting. But you may submit a
request for one on or before December 20, 2013, using one of the
methods specified under ADDRESSES. Please explain why you believe a
public meeting would be beneficial. If we determine that one would aid
this rulemaking, we will hold one at a time and place announced by a
later notice in the Federal Register.

B. Regulatory History and Information

    In a letter received by the Coast Guard on May 16, 2013 the New
York City Department of Transportation (NYC DOT) and their contractors
outlined the first five phases of operations that require in-channel
work in the construction and demolition of Belt Parkway Bridge. There
is no previous regulatory action for this Bridge.

C. Basis and Purpose

    The legal basis for the proposed rule is 33 U.S.C. 1231, 1233; 46
U.S.C. Chapter 701, 3306, 3703; 50 U.S.C. 191, 195; 33 CFR 1.05-1, and
160.5; Public Law 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064; and Department of Homeland
Security Delegation No. 0170.1, which collectively authorize the Coast
Guard to define regulatory safety zones. This purpose of this proposed
rulemaking is to ensure the safety of vessels and workers from hazards
associated with the bridge construction operations in the regulated
area.
    A navigation safety situation created by construction of the new
Belt Parkway Bridge and removal of the current Belt Parkway Bridge
prompted the proposed rule. This bridge carries the Shore Parkway (also
referred to as the Belt Parkway) over Gerritsen Inlet. The current Belt
Parkway Bridge was built in 1940 and no longer meets current federal
and state safety standards. The New York City Department of
Transportation (NYC DOT) has contracted China Construction U.S. and J.
T. Cleary Inc. to construct a new fixed replacement bridge and remove
the current fixed bridge. Construction is scheduled to begin September
15, 2013. Scheduled completion of the new bridge and removal of the old
bridge is 2017.
    The Coast Guard has discussed this project with NYC DOT, China
Construction U.S., and J.T. Cleary Inc. to determine whether the
project can be completed without channel closures and, if possible,
what impact that would have on the project timeline. Through these
discussions, it became clear that while the majority of construction
activities during the span of this project would not require waterways
closures, there are certain tasks that can only be completed in the
channel and will require closing the waterway.
    Specifically, installed heavy steel support beams will be built on
land, and then floated by barge to the site. These steel beams will
then be lifted and installed in two new bridge piers that will support
the new bridge and roadway. The current bridge and support piers will
be dismantled into small sections and placed on a barge for removal
from the construction site. These two processes will be complex and
present many safety hazards including overhead crane operations,
overhead cutting operations, potential falling debris, and barges
positioned in the channel with a restricted ability to maneuver.
    The Coast Guard received a letter on May 16, 2013, in which the
contractors outlined the first five phases of operations that require
in-channel work, one of which will require two waterway closures. NYC
DOT will notify the Coast Guard as far in advance as possible if
additional closures are needed.

D. Discussion of Proposed Rule

    The Coast Guard's proposed rule would give the Captain of the Port
New York (COTP) the authority to prohibit vessel traffic on this
portion of Gerritsen Inlet when necessary for the safety of vessels and
workers during construction work in the channel. The Coast Guard would
close the designated area to all traffic during any circumstance,
planned or unforeseen, that pose an imminent threat to waterway users
or construction operations in the area. Complete waterway closures
would be minimized to that period absolutely necessary and made with as
much advanced notice as possible. During closures there would not be
enough space for mariners to transit through the safety zone between
the construction vessels and the current bridge piers. The COTP would
cause notice of enforcement to be made by appropriate means and ensure
the widest distribution among the affected segments of the public.
    Initial enforcement periods are currently anticipated to be from
December 1, 2013 to February 28, 2014 and from May 1, 2014 to June 30,
2014. The purpose of these closures is to float in steel beams for the
new bridge piers to be installed by a floating crane barge. The crane
barge and supply barge carrying the steel beams will take up the width
of the channel, causing a closure of the channel. Once the barges are
in place and the installation of the steel beams begins the barges
cannot move out of the channel. To minimize impacts to boaters upstream
of the bridge the contractor will only conduct these operations on
weekdays from Monday at 6 a.m. until Friday at 7 p.m.

E. Regulatory Analyses

    We developed this proposed rule after considering numerous statutes
and executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our
analyses based on a number of these statutes or executive orders.

1. Regulatory Planning and Review

    This proposed rule is not a significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review,
as supplemented by Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review, and does not require an assessment of potential
costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of Executive Order 12866 or
under section 1 of Executive Order 13563. The Office of Management and
Budget has not reviewed it under those Orders.
    The Coast Guard determined that this rulemaking would not be a
significant regulatory action for the following reasons: Vessel traffic
would only be restricted from the safety zone during weekdays,
recreational boaters would still be able to transit the safety zone on
weekends, the first closure would be during the winter months when
recreational boating is severely limited due to local weather
conditions, and the second closure would be early in the recreational
boating season that traditionally begins around the Memorial Day
weekend in late May.
    Advanced public notifications would also be made to local mariners
through appropriate means, which may include but are not limited to the
Local Notice to Mariners and at http://homeport.uscg.mil/newyork which
would allow the public an opportunity to plan for these closures.

2. Impact on Small Entities

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, as
amended, requires federal agencies to consider the potential impact of
regulations on small entities during rulemaking. The term ``small
entities'' comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations
that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than
50,000. The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this
proposed rule will not have a significant economic impact on

a substantial number of small entities. This rule will affect the
following entities, some of which may be small entities: the owners or
operators of vessels intending to enter, transit, anchor or moor
within, or upstream of the safety zone during a vessel restriction
period.
    The safety zone will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities for the following reasons: The
safety zone will be of limited size and most waterway closures will be
during times of reduced recreational boating traffic. The contractor
has hired outreach consultants to ensure local interests are regularly
notified of the project status and future impacts that can be expected.
Additionally, before the effective period of a waterway closure,
notifications will be made to local mariners through appropriate means.
    If you think that your business, organization, or governmental
jurisdiction qualifies as a small entity and that this rule would have
a significant economic impact on it, please submit a comment (see
ADDRESSES) explaining why you think it qualifies and how and to what
degree this rule would economically affect it.

3. Assistance for Small Entities

    Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), we want to assist small
entities in understanding this proposed rule. If the rule would affect
your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you
have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance,
please contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT, above. The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small
entities that question or complain about this proposed rule or any
policy or action of the Coast Guard.

4. Collection of Information

    This proposed rule will not call for a new collection of
information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-
3520).

5. Federalism

    A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. We have analyzed this proposed rule under that Order and
determined that this rule does not have implications for federalism.

6. Protest Activities

    The Coast Guard respects the First Amendment rights of protesters.
Protesters are asked to contact the person listed in the ``For Further
Information Contact'' section to coordinate protest activities so that
your message can be received without jeopardizing the safety or
security of people, places or vessels.

7. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538)
requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary
regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may
result in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in
the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (adjusted for
inflation) or more in any one year. Though this proposed rule would not
result in such an expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this rule
elsewhere in this preamble.

8. Taking of Private Property

    This proposed rule would not cause a taking of private property or
otherwise have taking implications under Executive Order 12630,
Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected
Property Rights.

9. Civil Justice Reform

    This proposed rule meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and
3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize
litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

10. Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13045,
Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety
Risks. This rule is not an economically significant rule and would not
create an environmental risk to health or risk to safety that might
disproportionately affect children.

11. Indian Tribal Governments

    This proposed rule does not have tribal implications under
Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments, because it would not have a substantial direct effect on
one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

12. Energy Effects

    This proposed rule is not a ``significant energy action'' under
Executive Order 13211, Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use.

13. Technical Standards

    This proposed rule does not use technical standards. Therefore, we
did not consider the use of voluntary consensus standards.

14. Environment

    We have analyzed this proposed rule under Department of Homeland
Security Management Directive 023-01 and Commandant Instruction
M16475.lD, which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)(42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f), and have
made a preliminary determination that this action is one of a category
of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment. This proposed rule involves
restricting vessel movement within a safety zone. This rule may be
categorically excluded from further review under paragraph 34(g) of
Figure 2-1 of the Commandant Instruction. A preliminary environmental
analysis checklist supporting this determination is available in the
docket where indicated under ADDRESSES. We seek any comments or
information that may lead to the discovery of a significant
environmental impact from this proposed rule.

List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165

    Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and record keeping
requirements, waterways.

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes
to amend 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

PART 165--REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREA

0
1. The authority citation for part 165 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  33 U.S.C. 1231; 46 U.S.C Chapter 701, 3306, 3703; 50
U.S.C. 191, 195; 33 CFR 1.05-1, 6.04-1, 6.04-6, 160.5; Pub. L. 107-
295, 116 Stat. 2064; Department of Homeland Security Delegation No.
0170.1.

0
2. Add Sec.  165.T01-0471 to read as follows:

Sec.  165.  T01-0471 Safety Zone; Belt Parkway Bridge Construction,
Gerritsen Inlet, Brooklyn, NY.

    (a) Location. The following area is a safety zone: All navigable
waters of Gerritsen Inlet: Southeast of a line from 40[deg]35'09.46''
N, 073[deg]54'53.92'' W to 40[deg]35'10.0'' N, 073[deg]54'44.5'' W and
Northwest of a line from 40[deg]35'04.88'' N, 073[deg]54'45.43'' W to
40[deg]35'10.34'' N, 073[deg]54'35.71'' W. (NAD 83)
    (b) Definitions. The following definitions apply to this section:
    (1) Designated Representative. A ``designated representative'' is
any Coast Guard commissioned, warrant or petty officer of the U.S.
Coast Guard who has been designated by the Captain of the Port New York
(COTP), to act on his or her behalf. The designated representative may
be on an official patrol vessel or may be on shore and will communicate
with vessels via VHF-FM radio or loudhailer. In addition, members of
the Coast Guard Auxiliary may be present to inform vessel operators of
this regulation.
    (2) Official Patrol Vessels. Official patrol vessels may consist of
any Coast Guard, Coast Guard Auxiliary, state, or local law enforcement
vessels assigned or approved by the COTP.
    (c) Enforcement Periods.
    (1) This rule is enforceable from December 1, 2013 through
September 30, 2017.
    (2) The COTP will give notice of enforcement by appropriate means
to inform the affected segments of the public, and such notification
will include dates and times. Means of notification may include, but
are not limited to, Broadcast Notice to Mariners and Local Notice to
Mariners.
    (d) Regulations.
    (1) The general regulations contained in 33 CFR 165.23, as well as
the following regulations, apply.
    (2) During periods of enforcement, all persons and vessels must
comply with all orders and directions from the COTP or the COTP's
designated representative.
    (3) During periods of enforcement, upon being hailed by a U.S.
Coast Guard vessel by siren, radio, flashing light, or other means, the
operator of the vessel must proceed as directed.

    Dated: October 23, 2013.
G. Loebl,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port New York.
[FR Doc. 2013-28589 Filed 11-27-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P