[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 100 (Wednesday, May 23, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23854-23864]
[FR Doc No: 2018-11001]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM18-8-000]

Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes
to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned
Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events). The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified
Electric Reliability Organization, submitted proposed Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 for Commission approval. Geomagnetic disturbance
events (GMDs) occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact
with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. Proposed
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently-effective Reliability
Standard TPL-007-1 by requiring applicable entities to: Conduct
supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments and thermal impact
assessments; obtain geomagnetically induced current and magnetometer
data; and meet certain deadlines for the development and completion of
tasks in corrective action plans. In addition, the Commission proposes
to direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability
Standard to require applicable entities to develop and implement
corrective action plans to mitigate supplemental GMD event
vulnerabilities.

DATES:  Comments are due July 23, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed
electronically at http://www.ferc.gov in acceptable native applications
and print-to-PDF, but not in scanned or picture format. For those
unable to file electronically, comments may be filed by mail or hand-
delivery to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. The Comment
Procedures Section of this document contains more detailed filing
procedures.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Justin Kelly (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426, Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected].
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426, Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the
Commission proposes to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2
(Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance
Events).\1\ The Commission also proposes to approve the associated
violation risk factors and violation severity levels, implementation
plan, and effective date for proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the
Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for approval in response to a
Commission directive in Order No. 830.\2\ Geomagnetic disturbance
events (GMDs) occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact
with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. This interaction
can cause geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) to flow in an
electric power system and, depending on various factors affecting the
intensity of the current, can result in a risk of voltage instability
or voltage collapse, as well as equipment loss or failure.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2012).
    \2\ Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned
Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, Order No. 830, 156
FERC ] 61,215 (2016), reh'g denied, 158 FERC ] 61,041 (2017).
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    2. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently-
effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (Transmission System Planned
Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events) by requiring applicable
entities to: (1) Conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments and
thermal impact assessments; (2) obtain GIC and magnetometer data; and
(3) meet certain deadlines for the development and completion of tasks
in corrective action plans.
    3. The Commission proposes to approve proposed Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2 as it largely addresses (with one exception discussed below)
the directives in Order No. 830 to modify currently-effective
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event
definition, as it pertains to the required GMD Vulnerability
Assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the
definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) to
require the collection of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer
data; and (3) to include a one-year deadline for the completion of
corrective action plans and two- and four-year deadlines to complete
mitigation actions involving non-hardware and hardware mitigation,
respectively.
    4. While proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 addresses the
first directive in Order No. 830 by requiring applicable entities to
conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and thermal impact assessments,
which do not rely solely upon on spatially-averaged data, the proposed
Reliability Standard does not require applicable entities to mitigate
vulnerabilities identified pursuant to such a supplemental
assessment.\3\ NERC's proposal to modify the benchmark, but then allow
entities the discretion to take corrective action based solely on the
results of the spatially-averaged data while taking under advisement
(``an evaluation of possible actions'') the results of the supplemental
assessment, does not satisfy the clear intent of the Commission's
directive. Moreover, Order No. 830 reiterated the directive in Order
No. 779 that NERC develop a second stage GMD Reliability Standard
requiring GMD vulnerability

assessments and that ``owners and operators [ ] develop and implement a
plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or
cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System.''\4\ Accordingly, as
discussed below, the Commission proposes to direct that NERC, pursuant
to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, develop and submit modifications to
the Reliability Standard to require applicable entities to develop and
implement corrective action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities revealed
by conducting supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments.\5\ The
Commission proposes to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability
Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective date of
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.
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    \3\ See Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 44 (directing NERC
to ``develop revisions to the benchmark GMD event definition so that
the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component is not
based solely on spatially-averaged data'').
    \4\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 7.
    \5\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
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    5. In addition, while proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2
imposes deadlines for the preparation and completion of tasks in
corrective action plans, Requirement R7.4 of the proposed Reliability
Standard also permits applicable entities to exceed deadlines for
completing corrective action plan tasks when ``situations beyond the
control of the responsible entity [arise].'' As discussed below, the
Commission seeks comment on two options that it is considering
regarding proposed Requirement R7.4. Under the first option, the
Commission would, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, direct NERC
to modify the Reliability Standard to bring the proposed standard into
alignment with the Commission's direction in Order No. 830, through a
process whereby NERC considers extensions on a case-by-case basis
informed by proposed Requirement R7.4.\6\ Under the second option, the
Commission would approve proposed Requirement R7.4. Under both options,
the Commission would direct NERC to prepare and submit a report
regarding how often and why applicable entities are exceeding
corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of the
proposed Reliability Standard. Under such a directive, NERC would
submit the report within 12 months from the date on which applicable
entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2.\7\
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    \6\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102.
    \7\ NERC's proposed implementation plan provides that, depending
on the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, applicable
entities will be required to comply with the requirements of the
proposed Reliability Standard on a staggered schedule. For example,
if proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 becomes effective before
January 1, 2021, the last requirement applicable entities will be
required to comply with is Requirement R7 54 months following the
effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. If proposed
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 becomes effective after January 1,
2021, the last requirement applicable entities will be required to
comply with is Requirement R8 72 months following the effective date
of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.
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I. Background

A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards

    6. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\8\
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    \8\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(e).
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B. GMD Primer

    7. GMD events occur when the sun ejects charged particles that
interact and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields.\9\ Once a
solar particle is ejected, it can take between 17 to 96 hours
(depending on its energy level) to reach earth.\10\ A geoelectric field
is the electric potential (measured in volts per kilometer (V/km)) on
the earth's surface and is directly related to the rate of change of
the magnetic fields.\11\ The geoelectric field has an amplitude and
direction and acts as a voltage source that can cause GICs to flow on
long conductors, such as transmission lines.\12\ The magnitude of the
geoelectric field amplitude is impacted by local factors such as
geomagnetic latitude and local earth conductivity.\13\ Geomagnetic
latitude is the proximity to earth's magnetic north and south poles, as
opposed to earth's geographic poles.\14\ Local earth conductivity is
the ability of the earth's crust to conduct electricity at a certain
location to depths of hundreds of kilometers down to the earth's
mantle. Local earth conductivity impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity)
of the geoelectric fields that are formed during a GMD event by, all
else being equal, a lower earth conductivity resulting in higher
geoelectric fields.\15\
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    \9\ See NERC, 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim
Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System
at i-ii (February 2012), http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf.
    \10\ Id. at ii.
    \11\ Id.
    \12\ Id.
    \13\ NERC, Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description,
Docket No. 15-11-000, at 4 (filed June 28, 2016) (2016 NERC White
Paper).
    \14\ Id.
    \15\ Id.
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    8. GICs can flow in an electric power system with varying intensity
depending on the various factors discussed above. As explained in the
Background section of the proposed Reliability Standard, ``[d]uring a
GMD event, geomagnetically[hyphen]induced currents (GIC) may cause
transformer hot[hyphen]spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power
sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the
combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.''

C. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and Order No. 830

1. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1
    9. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 consists of seven requirements
and applies to planning coordinators, transmission planners,
transmission owners and generation owners who own or whose planning
coordinator area or transmission planning area includes a power
transformer with a high side, wye-grounded winding connected at 200 kV
or higher.
    10. Requirement R1 requires planning coordinators and transmission
planners (i.e., ``responsible entities'') to determine the individual
and joint responsibilities in the planning coordinator's planning area
for maintaining models and performing studies needed to complete the
GMD vulnerability assessment required in Requirement R4. Requirement R2
requires responsible entities to maintain system models and GIC system
models needed to complete the GMD vulnerability assessment required in
Requirement R4. Requirement R3 requires each responsible entity to have
criteria for acceptable system steady state voltage performance for its
system during the GMD conditions described in Attachment 1 of
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Requirement R4 requires responsible
entities to conduct a GMD vulnerability assessment every 60 months
using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. Requirement R5
requires responsible entities to provide GIC flow information, based on
the benchmark GMD event definition, to be used in the transformer
thermal impact assessments required in Requirement R6, to each
transmission owner and generator owner that owns an applicable
transformer within the applicable planning area. Requirement R6
requires transmission owners and generator owners to conduct thermal
impact assessments on solely and jointly owned applicable transformers
where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5 is 75
amps per phase (A/phase) or greater. Requirement R7 requires
responsible entities to develop

corrective action plans if the GMD vulnerability assessment concludes
that the system does not meet the performance requirements in Table 1
of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.
    11. Calculation of the benchmark GMD event, against which
applicable entities must assess their facilities, is fundamental to
compliance with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Reliability Standard
TPL-007-1, Requirement R3 states that ``[e]ach responsible entity, as
determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System
steady state voltage performance for its System during the benchmark
GMD event described in Attachment 1.''
    Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Attachment 1 states that the
benchmark GMD event is composed of four elements: (1) A reference peak
geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis
of historical magnetometer data; (2) a scaling factor to account for
local geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor to account for local
earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series
or wave shape to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on
equipment. The product of the first three elements is referred to as
the regional peak geoelectric field amplitude. The benchmark GMD event
defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows for a
GMD vulnerability assessment, which is required in Reliability Standard
TPL-007-1.\16\
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    \16\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirements R4 and R5.
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 does not set a threshold amount of
GIC flow that would constitute a vulnerable transformer. However, if
a transformer is calculated to experience a maximum effective GIC
flow during a benchmark GMD event of a least 75 A/phase, a thermal
impact assessment of that transformer is required. See Reliability
Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R6.
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    12. For the purpose of determining a benchmark event that specifies
what severity GMD events a responsible entity must assess for potential
impacts on the Bulk-Power System, NERC determined that a 1-in-100 year
GMD event would cause an 8 V/km reference peak geoelectric field
amplitude at 60 degree north geomagnetic latitude using Qu[eacute]bec's
earth conductivity.\17\ Scaling factors (i.e., multiplying values) are
applied to this reference peak geoelectric field amplitude to adjust
the 8 V/km value for different geomagnetic latitudes (scaling factors
between 0.1 and 1.0) and earth conductivities (scaling factors between
0.21 and 1.17). NERC identified a reference geomagnetic field time
series from an Ottawa, Ontario magnetic observatory during a 1989 GMD
storm affecting Qu[eacute]bec. NERC used this to estimate a time series
(i.e., 10-second values over a period of days) of the geoelectric field
that is representative of what is expected to occur at 60 degree
geomagnetic latitude during a 1-in-100 year GMD event. Such a time
series is used in some methods of calculating the vulnerability of a
transformer to damage from heating caused by GIC.
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    \17\ NERC used Qu[eacute]bec as the location for the reference
peak 1-in-100 year GMD event because of its proximity to 60 degree
geomagnetic latitude and its well understood earth model. By
creating scaling factors, each entity can scale this reference peak
geoelectric field and geoelectric field time series values to match
its own expected field conditions.
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    13. NERC used field measurements taken from the International
Monitor for Auroral Geomagnetic Effects (IMAGE) magnetometer chain,
which consists of 39 magnetometer stations in Northern Europe, for the
period 1993-2013 to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field
amplitude. As described in the 2016 NERC White Paper, to arrive at a
reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km, NERC ``spatially
averaged'' four different station groups each spanning a square area of
approximately 500 km (roughly 310 miles) in width.\18\
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    \18\ ``Spatial Averaging'' refers to the averaging of
magnetometer readings over a geographic area. The standard drafting
team averaged several (but not all) geomagnetic field readings taken
by magnetometers located within square geographical areas of 500 km
per side.
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2. Order No. 830
    14. On January 21, 2015, NERC submitted for Commission approval
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 in response to a directive in Order No.
779, which directed NERC to develop one or more Reliability Standards
to address the effects of GMD events on the electric grid.\19\ In Order
No. 830, the Commission approved Reliability Standard TPL-007-1,
concluding that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 addressed the
Commission's directive by requiring applicable Bulk-Power System owners
and operators to conduct, on a recurring five-year cycle, initial and
ongoing vulnerability assessments regarding the potential impact of a
benchmark GMD event on the Bulk-Power System as a whole and on Bulk-
Power System components. In addition, the Commission determined that
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 requires applicable entities to develop
and implement corrective action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities
identified through those recurring vulnerability assessments and that
potential mitigation strategies identified in Reliability Standard TPL-
007-1 include, but are not limited to, the installation, modification
or removal of transmission and generation facilities and associated
equipment.
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    \19\ Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances, Order
No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147, reh'g denied, 144 FERC ] 61,113 (2013).
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    15. In Order No. 830, the Commission also determined that
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 should be modified. Specifically, Order
No. 830 directed NERC to develop and submit modifications to
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 concerning: (1) The calculation of the
reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark
GMD event definition; (2) the collection and public availability of
necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) deadlines for
completing corrective action plans and the mitigation measures called
for in corrective action plans. Order No. 830 directed NERC to develop
and submit these revisions for Commission approval within 18 months of
the effective date of Order No. 830.
    16. With respect to the calculation of the reference peak
geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event
definition, Order No. 830 expressed concern with relying solely on
spatial averaging in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 because ``the use
of spatial averaging in this context is new, and thus there is a dearth
of information or research regarding its application or appropriate
scale.'' \20\ While Order No. 830 directed that the peak geoelectric
field amplitude should not be based solely on spatially-averaged data,
the Commission indicated that this ``directive should not be construed
to prohibit the use of spatial averaging in some capacity, particularly
if more research results in a better understanding of how spatial
averaging can be used to reflect actual GMD events.'' \21\
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    \20\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 45.
    \21\ Id. P 46.
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D. NERC Petition and Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2

    17. NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2
enhances currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by
addressing reliability risks posed by GMDs more effectively and
implementing the directives in Order No. 830.\22\ NERC asserts that
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 reflects the latest

in GMD understanding and provides a technically sound and flexible
approach to addressing the concerns discussed in Order No. 830. NERC
contends that the proposed modifications enhance reliability by
expanding GMD vulnerability assessments to include severe, localized
impacts and by implementing deadlines and processes to maintain
accountability in the development, completion, and revision of
corrective action plans developed to address identified
vulnerabilities. Further, NERC states that the proposed modifications
improve the availability of GMD monitoring data that may be used to
inform GMD vulnerability assessments.
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    \22\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is not attached to
this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR). Proposed Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 is available on the Commission's eLibrary
document retrieval system in Docket No. RM18-8-000 and on the NERC
website, www.nerc.com.
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    18. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently-
effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by requiring applicable
entities to: (1) Conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer
thermal impact assessments in addition to the existing benchmark GMD
vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments required in
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1; (2) collect data from GIC monitors and
magnetometers as necessary to enable model validation and situational
awareness; and (3) develop necessary corrective action plans within one
year from the completion of the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment,
include a two-year deadline for the implementation of non-hardware
mitigation, and include a four-year deadline to complete hardware
mitigation.\23\
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    \23\ Unless otherwise indicated, the requirements of proposed
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 are substantively the same as the
requirements in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.
Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 contains conforming and
other non-substantive modifications that are not addressed in this
NOPR.
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    19. In particular, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies
Requirements R1 (identification of responsibilities) and R2 (system and
GIC system models) to extend the existing requirements pertaining to
benchmark GMD assessments to the proposed supplemental GMD assessments.
Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 adds the newly mandated
supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact
assessments in new Requirements R8 (supplemental GMD vulnerability
assessment), R9 (GIC flow information needed for supplemental GMD
thermal impact assessments) and R10 (supplemental GMD thermal impact
assessments). The supplemental GMD event definition contains a higher,
non-spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude
component than the benchmark GMD event definition (12 V/km versus 8 V/
km). These three new requirements largely mirror existing Requirements
R4, R5, and R6 that currently apply, and would continue to apply, only
to benchmark GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact
assessments.\24\
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    \24\ An exception is the qualifying threshold for transformers
required to undergo thermal impact assessments: For the supplemental
GMD assessment the qualifying threshold for transformers is a
maximum effective GIC value of 85 A/phase while the threshold for
benchmark GMD event assessments is 75 A/phase.
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    20. In addition, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes
two other new requirements, Requirements R11 and R12, that require
applicable entities to gather GIC monitored data (Requirement R11) and
magnetometer data (Requirement R12).
    21. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies existing
Requirement R7 (corrective action plans) to create a one-year deadline
for the development of corrective action plans and two and four-year
deadlines to complete actions involving non-hardware and hardware
mitigation, respectively, for vulnerabilities identified in the
benchmark GMD assessment. The proposed modifications to Requirement R7
include a provision allowing for extension of deadlines if ``situations
beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement
R1 prevent implementation of the [corrective action plan] within the
timetable for implementation.''

II. Discussion

    22. Pursuant to section 215(d) of the FPA, the Commission proposes
to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 as just, reasonable, not
unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.
Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 addresses the directives in
Order No. 830 to modify currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-
007-1: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event definition, as it pertains
to the required GMD Vulnerability Assessments and transformer thermal
impact assessments, so that the definition is not based solely on
spatially-averaged data; (2) to require the collection of necessary GIC
monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) to include a one-year
deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and two and
four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non-
hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively.\25\
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    \25\ NERC states that it will address the directive in Order No.
830 on public dissemination of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data
through a forthcoming NERC data request to applicable entities
pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure rather than
through a Reliability Standard requirement. On February 7, 2018,
NERC released a draft data request for a 45-day comment period.
After reviewing the comments, NERC indicates that it intends to seek
authorization from the NERC Board of Trustees to issue the data
request in August 2018. NERC Petition at 27.
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    23. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 complies with the
directives in Order No. 830 by requiring, in addition to the benchmark
GMD event vulnerability and thermal impact assessments, supplemental
GMD vulnerability and thermal impact assessments. The supplemental GMD
event definition in proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 contains a
non-spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude
component of 12 V/km, in contrast to the 8 V/km figure in the
spatially-averaged benchmark GMD event definition. As NERC explains in
its petition, the supplemental GMD event will be used to ``represent
conditions associated with localized enhancement of the geomagnetic
field during a severe GMD event for use in assessing GMD impacts.''
\26\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 therefore addresses the
Commission's directive to modify currently-effective Reliability
Standard TPL-007-1 so that the benchmark GMD event does not rely solely
on spatially-averaged data to calculate the reference peak geoelectric
field amplitude.
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    \26\ NERC Petition at 12.
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    24. While proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 addresses the
first directive in Order No. 830 by requiring applicable entities to
conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and thermal impact assessments,
the proposed Reliability Standard does not require applicable entities
to mitigate such vulnerabilities. Instead, proposed Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R8.3 only requires applicable entities
to make ``an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the
likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the
event(s)'' if a supplemental GMD event is assessed to result in
Cascading.\27\ As discussed below, NERC's proposal differs
significantly from Order No. 830 because the intent of the directive
was not only to identify vulnerabilities arising from localized

GMD events but also to mitigate such vulnerabilities. Moreover, Order
No. 830 reiterated the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC develop a
second stage GMD Reliability Standard requiring GMD vulnerability
assessments and that ``owners and operators [ ] develop and implement a
plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or
cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System.'' \28\ Accordingly, the
Commission proposes to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of
the FPA, to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability
Standard to require applicable entities to develop and implement
corrective action plans to mitigate supplemental GMD event
vulnerabilities. The Commission proposes to direct NERC to submit the
modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the
effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.
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    \27\ The NERC Glossary defines Cascading as ``uncontrolled
successive loss of System Elements triggered by an incident at any
location . . . [c]ascading results in widespread electric service
interruption that cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading
beyond an area predetermined by studies.'' Glossary of Terms Used in
NERC Reliability Standards (January 31, 2018).
    \28\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 7.
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    25. In addition, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comment
on the need for Requirement R7.4 of proposed Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2, which allows applicable entities to extend corrective action
plan implementation deadlines, as compared to a process whereby NERC
considers extensions on a case-by-case basis, as suggested in Order No.
830.\29\ After reviewing the comments, the Commission may approve the
requirement but direct NERC to prepare and submit a report concerning
the use of corrective action plan deadline extensions as allowed under
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4. Under such a
directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months from the date
on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Alternatively, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission may direct NERC to modify the
Reliability Standard to remove Requirement R7.4.
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    \29\ Id. P 102.
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A. Corrective Action Plan for Supplemental GMD Event Vulnerabilities

NERC Petition
    26. In requiring applicable entities to assess their
vulnerabilities to a supplemental GMD event, NERC states that
geomagnetic fields during severe GMD events can be spatially
non[hyphen]uniform with higher and lower strengths across a geographic
region. NERC explains that the supplemental GMD event was derived using
individual station measurements rather than spatially-averaged
measurements, and thus includes localized enhancement of field strength
above the average value found in the benchmark GMD event. NERC contends
that the supplemental GMD event thus addresses the directive in Order
No. 830 to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to account for the
effects of localized peaks that could potentially affect reliable
operations.
    27. NERC maintains that the benchmark GMD event and supplemental
GMD event are similar in structure but the supplemental GMD event
contains differences to account for localized impacts. NERC explains
that, like the benchmark GMD event, the supplemental GMD event defines
the geomagnetic and geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows
for use in a GMD vulnerability assessment and is composed of four
elements: (1) Reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 12 V/km
derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2)
scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling
factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a locally-
enhanced reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to
facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.
    28. NERC states that the higher reference peak geoelectric field
amplitude (12 V/km compared to 8 V/km used in the benchmark GMD event)
and local enhancements to the geomagnetic field time series or waveform
are distinguishing characteristics of the supplemental GMD event and
are intended to represent conditions associated with localized
enhancement of the geomagnetic field during a severe GMD event for use
in assessing GMD impacts.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ NERC states that the supplemental GMD event waveform is
more severe than the benchmark GMD event waveform because it
includes a five-minute duration enhanced peak up to 12 V/km for the
reference earth model and 60 degree geomagnetic latitude. NERC
Petition at 13. NERC explains that this synthetic enhancement
represents the observed localized, rapid magnetic field variation
periods associated with ionospheric sources during some severe GMD
events. Id. NERC observes that such GMD conditions could result in
increased transformer heating for short durations during a severe
GMD event due to increased GIC flows. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. In developing the supplemental GMD event, NERC indicates that
the standard drafting team ensured that the peak geoelectric field does
not rely on spatial averaging of geomagnetic field data. NERC states
that, like the value in the existing benchmark GMD event, the
supplemental GMD event peak geoelectric field is a 1-in-100 year
extreme value determined using statistical analysis of historical
geomagnetic field data. NERC explains that the fundamental difference
in the supplemental GMD event amplitude is that it is based on
geomagnetic field observations taken at individual observation stations
(i.e., localized measurements), instead of the spatially-averaged
geoelectric fields used in the benchmark GMD event. NERC states that
the result of the extreme value analysis shows that the supplemental
GMD event peak of 12 V/km is above the upper limit of the 95 percent
confidence interval for a 100[hyphen]year interval, while the same
confidence interval with spatially-averaged data (i.e., the benchmark
GMD event) is 8 V/km.
    30. NERC indicates that the corrective action plans mandated in
Requirement R7 continue to apply only if an entity has identified
system performance issues through the benchmark GMD vulnerability
assessments. NERC explains that mitigation for assessed supplemental
GMD vulnerabilities are addressed in proposed Requirement R8.3, which
states that if a responsible entity concludes that there would be
``Cascading'' caused by the supplemental GMD event, the entity shall
conduct an analysis of possible actions to reduce the likelihood or
mitigate the impacts of the event.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ NERC Petition at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    31. NERC states that the standard drafting team determined that
requiring corrective action plans in response to assessed supplemental
GMD event vulnerabilities would not be appropriate at this time because
the supplemental GMD event definition uses a small number of observed
localized enhanced geoelectric field events that provide only general
insight into the geographic size of localized events during severe
solar storms.\32\ NERC also contends that currently available modeling
tools do not provide entities with capabilities to model localized
enhancements within a severe GMD event realistically.\33\ As a result,
NERC claims that applicable entities may need to employ conservative
approaches when performing the supplemental GMD vulnerability
assessment, such as applying the localized peak geoelectric field over
an entire planning area.\34\ NERC states that, for these reasons,
``requiring mandatory mitigation may not provide effective reliability
benefit

or use resources optimally.'' \35\ NERC contends that the approach used
in proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for the supplemental GMD
event provides entities with flexibility to consider and select
mitigation actions based on their circumstances and is similar to the
approach used in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Requirement R3.5 for
extreme events.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Id.
    \33\ Id.
    \34\ Id. at 24.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Proposal
    32. NERC's proposal not to require corrective action plans for
supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities differs significantly from Order
No. 830 because the intent and clear meaning of the directive was not
only to identify vulnerabilities arising from localized GMD events but
also to mitigate such vulnerabilities. Order No. 830 reiterated the
directive in Order No. 779 that NERC develop a second stage GMD
Reliability Standard requiring GMD vulnerability assessments and that
``owners and operators [ ] develop and implement a plan to protect
against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of
the Bulk-Power System.'' \37\ By contrast, proposed Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 allows supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities to
potentially go unmitigated even, for example, if an applicable entity
assesses that the supplemental GMD event causes Cascading.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 7.
    \38\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R8.3
(``If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the
supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of
possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the
consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be
conducted.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Moreover, in Order No. 830, the Commission directed NERC to
``develop revisions to the benchmark GMD event definition so that the
reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component is not based
solely on spatially-averaged data.'' \39\ NERC's proposal to modify the
benchmark, but then allow applicable entities the discretion to take
corrective action based solely on the results of the spatially-averaged
benchmark analysis while taking under advisement (``an evaluation of
possible actions'') the results of the supplemental assessment, does
not satisfy the clear intent of the Commission's directive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Id. at 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    34. Further, we are not persuaded by NERC's reasoning that: (1)
Existing technical limitations, specifically the limited number of
observations used to define the supplemental GMD event and the
availability of modeling tools to assist entities in assessing
vulnerabilities, make requiring mitigation premature at this time; and
(2) requiring only an evaluation of possible actions for supplemental
GMD events that result in Cascading is similar to the treatment of
extreme events in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 (Transmission System
Planning Performance Requirements).
    35. We believe, based on the information before us, that it is
reasonable to require applicable entities to mitigate supplemental GMD
event vulnerabilities because, as NERC contends, the supplemental GMD
event ``provides a technically justified method of assessing
vulnerabilities to the localized peak effects of severe GMD events.''
\40\ While the supplemental GMD event possesses characteristics that
differentiate it from the benchmark GMD event (i.e., geographic area,
peak amplitude, duration, and geoelectric field waveform), both events
were developed by the standard drafting team using a common framework.
The standard drafting team determined the peak amplitude of the
supplemental GMD event using generalized extreme value statistical
analysis methods, as it did for the benchmark GMD event, and found a
consistent result of 12 V/km with a 95 percent confidence interval.
Generalized extreme value analysis is well-supported in the technical
literature and, in approving the benchmark GMD event, was previously
accepted in Order No. 830. The basic waveform used for the supplemental
GMD event is the same waveform used in the benchmark GMD event.\41\
Similar to the methodology for determining peak amplitude, the
benchmark GMD event waveform was previously considered appropriate in
Order No. 830. While the supplemental GMD event waveform includes a
``five-minute duration enhanced peak up to 12 V/km,'' NERC does not
suggest that the duration of the enhanced peak is unrepresentative of
the behavior of localized enhancements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ NERC Petition at 13.
    \41\ Id. (``Both the benchmark and supplemental GMD event
waveforms are based on 10-second sampling interval magnetic field
data from the Ottawa observatory recorded during the March 13-14,
1989 GMD event.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. NERC contends that the low number of real-world observations on
which the supplemental GMD event is based calls into question the
accuracy of its geographic size.\42\ However, any uncertainty regarding
the size of the geographic footprint of the supplemental GMD event
could be addressed by applicable entities through sensitivity analysis
and other methods within the planning studies. The proposed Reliability
Standard does not prescribe how applicable entities must perform such
studies; so applicable entities may incorporate this uncertainty into
their studies. Indeed, Attachment 1 (Calculating Geoelectric Fields for
the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events) of proposed Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 states that ``Planners have flexibility to determine
how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning
area in performing GIC calculations.'' \43\ Attachment 1 provides that
an applicable entity may apply the supplemental GMD event definition
over the entire planning area; apply some combination of the benchmark
GMD event and supplemental GMD event over portions of a planning area;
or use ``[o]ther methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to
account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the
supplemental GMD event.'' \44\ The flexibility afforded to applicable
entities by proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to determine the
geographic size of the supplemental GMD event, in our view, addresses
NERC's concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Id. at 23 (``[the] small number of observed localized
enhanced geoelectric field events . . . provide only general insight
into the geographic size of localized events during severe solar
storms'').
    \43\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Attachment 1,
Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental
GMD Event.
    \44\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. The Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description
appended to NERC's petition further supports the supplemental GMD event
definition by stating that ``[b]ased on the above analysis and the
previous work associated with the benchmark GMD event, it is reasonable
to incorporate a second (or supplemental) assessment into
TPL[hyphen]007[hyphen]2 to account for the potential impact of a local
enhancement in both the network analysis and the transformer thermal
assessment(s).'' \45\ The Supplemental GMD Event White Paper also
states that ``[g]iven the current state of knowledge regarding the
spatial extent of a local geomagnetic field enhancements, upper
geographic boundaries, such as the values used in the approaches above,
are reasonable but are not definitive.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ NERC Petition, Exhibit I (Supplemental Geomagnetic
Disturbance Event Description) at 12 (Supplemental GMD Event White
Paper).
    \46\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. With respect to NERC's contention regarding the unavailability
of modeling tools, we are not persuaded. We understand that there are
commercially available tools that could allow for

modeling of supplemental GMD events.\47\ In addition to these modeling
tools, other methods could be used within the framework of the
Reliability Standard to study planning areas (e.g., superposition or
sensitivity studies) in conjunction with other power system modeling
tools. However, we will consider any comments that substantiate NERC's
position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See, e.g., Siemens Power Technologies International, GIC
Module to Analyze Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Grid, Features
Summary, http://w3.usa.siemens.com/smartgrid/us/en/transmission-grid/products/grid-analysis-tools/transmission-system-planning/Documents/PTI_FF_EN_SWPE_GIC_1412.pdf; PowerWorld, Simulator,
Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC), https://www.powerworld.com/products/simulator/add-ons-2/simulator-gic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    39. In addition, the Commission recognized in Order No. 830 that an
improved understanding of GMDs is necessary and directed NERC to
conduct certain GMD-related research. The GMD research directed in
Order No. 830 is meant to address technical limitations regarding GMD
mitigation, among other areas. In the preliminary GMD research work
plan submitted by NERC on May 30, 2017, NERC stated that the Commission
in Order No. 830 ``noted its concern that a spatially-averaged
benchmark may not adequately account for localized peak geoelectric
fields that could potentially affect reliable operations.'' \48\ In
response, NERC indicated that it will conduct ``(i) research [Task 1 of
the GMD research work plan] to improve understanding of the
characteristics and spatial scales of localized geoelectric field
enhancements caused by severe GMD events; and (ii) research to
determine the impacts of spatial averaging assumptions on [Bulk-Power
System] reliability.'' \49\ NERC estimated that Task 1, which includes
the development of better models, will require approximately 24-36
months to complete from start of work. Such GMD research on localized
events should inform the standard development process and aid
applicable entities when implementing a modified Reliability
Standard.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ NERC, Geomagnetic Disturbance Research Work Plan of the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Docket No. RM15-11-
002, at 8 (filed May 30, 2017).
    \49\ Id.
    \50\ On April 19, 2018, NERC submitted a revised GMD Work Plan
that is currently pending before the Commission. NERC, Revised
Geomagnetic Disturbance Research Work Plan of the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation, Docket No. 15-11-003 (filed April
19, 2018). The revised GMD Work Plan provides additional detail to
the previous version. NERC now estimates that Task 1 deliverables
will be completed in 2019. Id., Attachment 1 (Order No. 830 GMD
Research Work Plan (April 2018)) at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    40. We are also not persuaded by NERC's reliance on Reliability
Standard TPL-001-4 to justify only requiring an evaluation of possible
actions for supplemental GMD events that result in Cascading in light
of the directive in Order No. 830. In Order No. 830, the Commission
directed NERC to modify the proposed Reliability Standard to assess and
address the risks posed by enhanced localized GMD events to the Bulk-
Power System. In contrast, in approving Reliability Standard TPL-001-4,
the Commission did not direct NERC to further modify the Reliability
Standard to address the risks posed by extreme events. Accordingly, the
treatment of extreme events under Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 does
not support the notion here that applicable entities should, as NERC
suggests, have the ``the flexibility to . . . consider mitigation.''
\51\ However, as with the mitigation of benchmark GMD event
vulnerabilities, we agree with NERC that any required mitigation of
supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities should be flexible in terms of
how applicable entities choose to mitigate such vulnerabilities. NERC's
petition already stresses that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2
affords flexibility as to how applicable entities apply the
supplemental GMD event to their planning areas.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ NERC Petition at 24 (emphasis added).
    \52\ NERC Petition, Exhibit I at 13 (``Proposed
TPL[hyphen]007[hyphen]2 provides flexibility for planners to
determine how to apply the supplemental GMD event to the planning
area.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    41. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to direct NERC, pursuant
to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop and submit modifications to
the Reliability Standard to require applicable entities to develop and
implement corrective action plans to mitigate supplemental GMD event
vulnerabilities. The Commission proposes to direct NERC to submit the
modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the
effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. The Commission seeks
comments from NERC and other interested entities on this proposal.

B. Corrective Action Plan Deadline Extensions NERC Petition

    42. NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2,
Requirement R7.2 requires responsible entities to develop a corrective
action plan within one year of the benchmark GMD vulnerability
assessment, if the entity concludes that its System does not meet the
performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD
event. NERC indicates that under Requirement R7.3, the corrective
action plan shall include a timeline that specifies the completion of
non-hardware and hardware mitigation within two and four years of
development of the corrective action plan, respectively.
    43. NERC maintains that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2
also recognizes that there may be circumstances outside of a
responsible entity's control that could prevent the completion of a
mitigation activity within the specified timetable. NERC cites as
examples delays due to regulatory or legal processes, such as
permitting; delays from stakeholder processes required by tariffs;
delays resulting from equipment lead times; or delays resulting from
the inability to acquire necessary right-of-way. NERC explains that in
such circumstances, a responsible entity may maintain compliance by
revising its corrective action plan in accordance with Requirement
R7.4. NERC states that under Requirement R7.4, the responsible entity
shall revise its corrective action plan if events beyond its control
prevent implementation within the original timetable. NERC explains
that in the revised corrective action plan, the responsible entity must
provide justification for its revised timetable by documenting: (1) The
circumstances causing the delay; (2) description of the original
corrective action plan and any changes; and (3) revisions to selected
actions, including the use of any operating procedures if applicable,
along with an updated timetable for completion. NERC states that the
revised corrective action plan shall be updated at least annually and
the responsible entity must then provide its revised corrective action
plan to recipients of the original corrective action plan (i.e.,
reliability coordinator, adjacent planning coordinator(s), adjacent
transmission planner(s), functional entities referenced in the
corrective action plan, and any functional entity that submits a
written request and has a reliability related need for the
information).
    44. NERC contends that this proposal is consistent with other
Commission-approved Reliability Standards. NERC cites Reliability
Standard FAC-003-4, Requirement R7 and asserts that it provides that an
entity may modify its annual vegetation work plan in light of
circumstances beyond the entity's control, such as a natural disaster
or other circumstance. NERC also cites Reliability Standard PRC-004-
5(i), Requirement R5 and contends that under that Reliability Standard
a responsible entity that owns a protection system component that
caused a misoperation shall either

develop a corrective action plan or explain in a declaration why
corrective actions are beyond the entity's control or would not improve
reliability.
Commission Proposal
    45. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 satisfies Order No. 830
by incorporating the deadlines set out by the Commission for the
development and implementation of corrective action plans. However,
Requirement R7.4 of the proposed Reliability Standard differs from
Order No. 830 by allowing applicable entities to ``revise'' or
``update'' corrective action plans to extend deadlines. This provision
contrasts with the Commission's guidance in Order No. 830 that ``NERC
should consider extensions of time on a case-by-case basis.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. NERC contends that the proposed Reliability Standard ``would
implement the Commission directed deadlines for Corrective Action Plans
and mitigation, along with a process to maintain accountability and
communication with affected entities when circumstances beyond a
responsible entity's control affect the entity's ability to complete
implementation within the original deadlines.'' \54\ Given the
complexities and potential novelty of steps applicable entities may
take to mitigate the risks of GMDs, we agree with NERC that there
should be a mechanism for allowing extensions of corrective action plan
implementation deadlines. However, we would like to avoid unnecessary
delay in implementing protection against GMD threats. Moreover, we are
not persuaded that the proposal is supported by the precedent cited by
NERC because the Reliability Standards NERC cites are distinguishable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ NERC Petition at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. NERC maintains that provisions similar to Requirement R7.4 are
found in two Reliability Standards. NERC states that Reliability
Standard FAC-003-4, Requirement R7, allows a registered entity to
modify its annual vegetation work plan in light of circumstances beyond
the entity's control. While Reliability Standard FAC-003-4, Requirement
R7 permits modifications to annual vegetation work plans, the
modifications cannot result in a registered entity's failure to avoid
the damage contemplated by Requirement R7--vegetation encroachment:
``Modifications to the work plan in response to changing conditions or
to findings from vegetation inspections may be made (provided they do
not allow encroachment of vegetation into the [minimum vegetation
clearance distance]) and must be documented.'' In contrast, proposed
Requirement R7.4 could enable applicable entities to delay mitigation
that would avoid the damage of known GMD vulnerabilities. Accordingly,
the extensions of time permitted by Reliability Standard FAC-003-4,
because they may not result in the damage contemplated by the
Reliability Standard, are not comparable, as NERC asserts, to failure
to mitigate an existing GMD vulnerability in a timely manner.
    48. NERC also compares the corrective action plan provision in
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 with Reliability Standard PRC-
004-5(i), Requirement R5, which allows ``a responsible entity that owns
a Protection System component that caused a Misoperation . . . [to]
either develop a Corrective Action Plan or explain in a declaration why
corrective actions are beyond the entity's control or would not improve
reliability.'' We are not persuaded that NERC's proposal to allow self-
declared extensions of time in Requirement R7.4 is supported by the
quoted language in Reliability Standard PRC-004-5(i), Requirement R5
because Requirement R5 does not allow for extensions of time. Rather,
Requirement R5 permits the registered entity to declare that it cannot
carry out corrective actions (e.g., because the misoperation occurred
on facilities it does not own or control) or because the corrective
action would not improve Bulk-Power System reliability. Moreover, the
Guidelines and Technical Basis document accompanying Reliability
Standard PRC-004-5(i) concludes by stating that a ``declaration that no
further corrective actions will be taken is expected to be used
sparingly.''
    49. Given these concerns, the Commission is considering two options
in response to Requirement R7.4 of the proposed Reliability Standard.
The Commission seeks comment from NERC and other interested entities on
each of these proposals.
    50. Under the first option, the Commission would, pursuant to
section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, direct NERC to modify the proposed
Reliability Standard to comport with Order No. 830, by requiring that
NERC and the Regional Entities, as appropriate, consider requests for
extension of time on a case-by-case basis.\55\ Under this option,
responsible entities seeking an extension would submit the information
required by proposed Requirement R7.4 to NERC and the Regional Entities
for their consideration of the request. The Commission would also
direct NERC to prepare and submit a report addressing the disposition
of any such requests, as well as information regarding how often and
why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines
following implementation of the proposed Reliability Standard.\56\
Under such a directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months
from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last
requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the
report, the Commission would determine whether further action is
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102.
    \56\ Under proposed Requirement R7.4, when an applicable entity
extends a corrective action plan deadline, it must revise the
corrective action plan to explain the ``[c]ircumstances causing the
delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions.''
NERC could use this information to populate the proposed report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    51. Under the second option, the Commission would approve proposed
Requirement R7.4 but also direct NERC to prepare and submit a report
regarding how often and why applicable entities are exceeding
corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of the
proposed Reliability Standard. Under such a directive, NERC would
submit the report within 12 months from the date on which applicable
entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the Commission would
determine whether further action is necessary.

III. Information Collection Statement

    52. The collection of information contained in this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking is subject to review by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995.\57\ OMB's regulations require review and approval of certain
information collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\58\ Upon
approval of a collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control
number and an expiration date. Respondents subject to the information
collection requirements of a rule will not be penalized for failing to
respond to the collection of information unless the collection of
information displays a valid OMB control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2012).
    \58\ 5 CFR part 1320 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    53. We solicit comments on the Commission's need for this
information, whether the information will have practical utility, the
accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility,
and clarity of the

information to be collected or retained, and any suggested methods for
minimizing respondents' burden, including the use of automated
information techniques. Specifically, the Commission asks that any
revised burden or cost estimates submitted by commenters be supported
by sufficient detail to understand how the estimates are generated.
    54. The Commission proposes to approve proposed Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2, which would replace currently-effective Reliability
Standard TPL-007-1. When compared to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1,
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 maintains the current
information collection requirements, modifies existing Requirement R7
and adds new requirements in Requirements R8 through R12.
    55. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes new corrective
action plan development and implementation deadlines in Requirement R7,
new supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact
assessments in Requirements R8 through R10, and requirements for
applicable entities to gather magnetometer and GIC monitored data in
Requirements R11 and R12. Deadlines in Requirement R7 for the
development and implementation of corrective action plans would only
change the timeline of such documentation and are not expected to
revise the burden to applicable entities. The burden estimates for new
Requirements R8 through R10 are expected to be similar to the burden
estimates for Requirements R4 through R6 in currently-effective
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 due to the closely-mirrored
requirements.\59\ The Commission expects that only 25 percent or fewer
of transmission owners and generator owners would have to complete a
supplemental transformer thermal impact assessment per Requirement R10.
Requirements R11 and R12 require applicable entities to have a process
to collect GIC and magnetometer data from meters in planning
coordinator planning areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ NERC Petition at 15-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Public Reporting Burden: The burden and cost estimates below are
based on the changes to the reporting and recordkeeping burden imposed
by proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Our estimates for the
number of respondents are based on the NERC Compliance Registry as of
3/9/2018, which indicates there are 183 entities registered as
transmission planner (TP), 65 planning coordinators (PC), 330
transmission owners (TO), 944 generator owners (GO) within the United
States. However, due to significant overlap, the total number of unique
affected entities (i.e., entities registered as a transmission planner,
planning coordinator, transmission owner or generator owner, or some
combination of these functional entities) is 1,130 entities. This
includes 188 entities that are registered as a transmission planner or
planning coordinator (applicability for Requirements R7 to R9 and R11
to R12), and 1,119 entities registered as a transmission or generation
owner (applicability for Requirement R10). Given the assumption above,
there is an expectation that at most only 25 percent of the 1,119
entities (or 280 entities) will have to complete compliance activities
for Requirement R10. The estimated burden and cost are as follow.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) figures for May 2017 (Sector 22, Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits for December
2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate
that an Electrical Engineer (NAICS code 17-2071) would perform the
functions associated with reporting requirements, at an average
hourly cost (for wages and benefits) of $66.90. The functions
associated with recordkeeping requirements, we estimate, would be
performed by a File Clerk (NAICS code 43-4071) at an average hourly
cost of $32.04 for wages and benefits.
    The estimated burden and cost are in addition to the burden and
cost that are associated with the existing requirements in
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (and in the current OMB-approved
inventory), which would continue under proposed Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2.

                                             FERC-725N, Changes Proposed in NOPR in Docket No. RM18-8 61 62
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Total annual
                                  Number and type of   Annual number of     Total number of     Average burden     burden hours and        Cost per
         Requirement (R)              respondents        responses per         responses      hours and cost per   total annual cost    respondent ($)
                                                          respondent                               response            (rounded)
                                  (1)...............  (2)...............  (1) x (2) = (3)...  (4)...............  (3) x (4) = (5)...  (5) / (1)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R1 through R6...................  No change.........  No change.........  No change.........  No change.........  No change.........  No change.
R7..............................  188...............  1/5 (once for       37.6..............  Rep. 5 hrs.,        Rep. 188            Rep. 1 hr., $66.9;
                                  (PC and TP).......   every five year                         $334.5; RK 5        hrs.,$12,577; RK    RK 1 hr., $32.04.
                                                       study).                                 hrs., $160.2.       188 hrs., $6,023.
R8..............................  188...............  1/5 (once for       37.6..............  Rep., 27 hrs.,      Rep. 1,015 hrs.,    Rep., 5.4 hrs.,
                                  (PC and TP).......   every five year                         $1,806.30;RK, 21    $67,917; RK 790     $361.26; RK 4.2
                                                       study).                                 hrs., $672.84.      hrs., $25,299.      hrs., $134.57.
R9..............................  188...............  1/5 (once for       37.6..............  Rep. 9 hrs.,        Rep. 338 hrs.;      Rep. 1.8 hrs.,
                                  (PC and TP).......   every five year                         $602.10.            $22,639 RK 263      $120.42; RK 1.4
                                                       study).                                RK 7 hrs., $224.28   hrs., $8,432.       hrs., $44.85.
R10.............................  280...............  1/5 (once for       56................  Rep. 22 hrs.,       Rep. 1,232 hrs.,    Rep. ;4.4 hrs.,
                                  (25% of 1,119)....   every five year                         $1,471.8;.          $82,421; RK 1,008   $294.36; RK 3.6
                                  (GO and TO).......   study).                                RK 18 hrs. $576.72   hrs., $32,296.      hrs., $115.34.
R11.............................  188...............  1 (on-going         188...............  Rep. 10 hrs.,       Rep. 1,880 hrs.,    Rep. 10 hrs.,
                                  (PC and TP).......   reporting).                             $669;.              $125,772; RK        $669; RK 10 hrs.,
                                                                                RK. 10 hrs.,         1,880 hrs.,         $320.40.
                                                                                $320.40.            $60,235.
R12.............................  188...............  1 (on-going         188...............  Rep. 10 hrs., $669  Rep. 1,880 hrs.     Rep. 10 hrs.,
                                  (PC and TP).......   reporting).                            RK. hrs 320.4.....   $125,772; RK        $669; RK 10 hrs.,
                                                                                1,880 hrs.,         $320.40.
                                                                                $60,235.
                                                                                -----------------------------------------------------------

    Total Additional Hrs. and     ..................  ..................  ..................  ..................  Rep., 6,533.......  ..................
     Cost (rounded), due to NOPR                                                                                hrs., $437,057; RK
     in RM18-8.                                                                                6,009.
                                                                                hrs., $192,528....
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: TPL Reliability
Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Rep. = reporting requirements; RK = recordkeeping
requirements.
    \62\ For each Reliability Standard, the Measure shows the
acceptable evidence (Reporting Requirement) for the associated
Requirement (R numbers), and the Compliance section details the
related Recordkeeping Requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Action: Proposed revisions to an existing collection of
information.
    OMB Control No: 1902-0264.
    Respondents: Business or other for profit, and not for profit
institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: \63\ Every five years (for Requirement R7-
R10), annually (for Requirement R11 and R12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ The frequency of Requirements R1 through R6 in proposed
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is unchanged from the existing
requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Necessity of the Information: Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2, if adopted, would implement the Congressional mandate of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to develop mandatory and enforceable
Reliability Standards to better ensure the reliability of the nation's
Bulk-Power System. Specifically, these requirements address the threat
posed by GMD events to the Bulk-Power System and conform to the
Commission's directives to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as
directed in Order No. 830.
    Internal review: The Commission has reviewed proposed Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2, and made a determination that its action is
necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA. The Commission has
assured itself, by means of its internal review, that there is
specific, objective support for the burden estimates associated with
the information requirements.
    56. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Office of the Executive Director, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC
20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, email: [email protected], phone:
(202) 502-8663, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>].
    Comments concerning the proposed collection of information and the
associated burden estimate should be sent to the Commission in this
docket and may also be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission]. Due to security concerns, comments should be
sent electronically to the following email address:
[email protected]. Comments submitted to OMB should refer to
FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264.

IV. Environmental Analysis

    57. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\64\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\65\ The actions proposed here
fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987).
    \65\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    58. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \66\ generally
requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The definition of small business is provided by the Small Business
Administration (SBA) at 13 CFR 121.201. The threshold for a small
utility (using SBA's sub-sector 221) is based on the number of
employees for a concern and its affiliates. As discussed above,
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 would apply to a total of 1,130
unique planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission
owners, and generation owners.\67\ A small utility (and its affiliates)
is defined as having no more than the following number of employees:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12 (2012).
    \67\ In the NERC Registry, there are approximately 65 PCs, 188
TPs, 944 GOs, and 330 TOs (in the United States), which will be
affected by this NOPR. Because some entities serve in more than one
role, these figures involve some double counting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 For planning coordinators, transmission planners, and
transmission owners (NAICS code 221121, Electric Bulk Power
Transmission and Control), a maximum of 500 employees
 for generator owners, a maximum of 750 employees.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ The maximum number of employees for a generator owner (and
its affiliates) to be ``small'' varies from 250 to 750 employees,
depending on the type of generation (e.g., hydroelectric, nuclear,
fossil fuel, wind). For this analysis, we use the most conservative
threshold of 750 employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    59. The total cost to all entities (large and small) is $629,585
annually (or an average of $1,345.27 for each of the estimated 468
entities affected annually). For the estimated 280 generator owners and
transmission owners affected annually, the average cost would be
$409.70 per year. For the estimated 188 planning coordinators and
transmission planners, the estimated average annual cost would be
$2,738.84. The estimated annual cost to each affected entity varies
from $409.70 to $2,738.84 and is not considered significant.
    60. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that the proposals
contained in this NOPR will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. The Commission seeks comment on
this certification.

VI. Comment Procedures

    61. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish
to discuss. Comments are due July 23, 2018. Comments must refer to
Docket No. RM18-8-000, and must include the commenter's name, the
organization they represent, if applicable, and their address in their
comments.
    62. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically
via the eFiling link on the Commission's website at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing
software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
    63. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically
must send an original of their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426.
    64. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.

VII. Document Availability

    65. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours
(8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A,
Washington DC 20426.
    66. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number, excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
    67. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's
website during normal business hours from the Commission's Online
Support at<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at 202-502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].

    By direction of the Commission.

    Issued: May 17, 2018.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-11001 Filed 5-22-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P