[Federal Register: March 5, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 44)]
[CORRECTIONS]
[Page 11995-11996]
[DOCID:fr05mr08-129]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 60

[Docket No. FAA-2002-12461; Notice No. 07-14]
RIN 2120-AJ12

Flight Simulation Training Device Initial and Continuing
Qualification and Use

Correction

    In proposed rule document 07-4884 beginning on page 59600 in the
issue of Monday, October 22, 2007, make the following correction:
    1. On page 59670, in Table A3A, entry 2.b. is corrected as follows:

                                   Table A3A.--Functions and Subjective Tests
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             <<>>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Simulator level
                   Number                                     Operation tasks                -------------------
                                                                                A    B    C    D
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Tasks in this table are subject to evaluation if appropriate for
                                               the airplane simulated as indicated in the SOQ Configuration List
                                               or the level of simulator qualification involved. Items not
                                               installed or not functional on the simulator and, therefore, not
                                               appearing on the SOQ Configuration List, are not required to be
                                               listed as exceptions on the SOQ.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  * * * * * * *
    2.b.....................................  Pushback/Powerback............................  ...   X    X    X
                                                  * * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. On page 59684, the heading to Table A3F is corrected as follows:

               Table A3F.--Functions and Subjective Tests
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         <<>>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Simulator level
     Number                Special effects           -------------------
                                                       A    B    C    D
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              * * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Beginning on page 59718, in Table B2A, entries 2.a.3.a. and
2.c.9.a. are corrected as follows:

                            Table B2A.--Flight Training Device (FTD) Objective Tests
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             <<>>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Test                                                                        FTD     <>
-------------------------------                        Flight                           level  -----------------
                                   Tolerances        conditions       Test details   ----------
   Number           Title                                                              5    6         Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  * * * * * * *
2.a.3.a.....  Rudder Pedal      5 lb  Ground..........  Record results          X
               Position vs.      (2.2 daN)                           for an
               Force and         breakout, 10% or                        control sweep
               Position          5                       to the stops.
               Calibration.      lb (2.2 daN)
                                 force, 2[deg]
                                 rudder angle.
                                                  * * * * * * *
2.c.9.a.....  Phugoid Dynamics  10%   Cruise..........  The test must           X
                                 period, 10% of                        whichever is
                                 time to \1/2\                       less of the
                                 or double                           following:
                                 amplitude or                        Three full
                                 .02                     cycles (six
                                 of damping                          overshoots
                                 ratio.                              after the input
                                                                     is completed),
                                                                     or the number
                                                                     of cycles
                                                                     sufficient to
                                                                     determine time
                                                                     to \1/2\ or
                                                                     double
                                                                     amplitude.
                                                  * * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Beginning on page 59842, in Table D1A, entry 2.c. is corrected
as follows:

                  Table D1A.--Minimum FTD Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                <<>>
------------------------------------------------------
                                        FTD level       <>
    Number         General FTD    --------------------       notes
                  requirements      4    5    6    7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              * * * * * * *
2.c..........  Relative responses        X    X    X   The intent is to
                of the flight                           verify that the
                deck instruments                        FTD provides
                must be measured                        instrument cues
                by latency tests                        that are, within
                or transport                            the stated time
                delay tests, and                        delays, like the
                may not exceed                          helicopter
                150 milliseconds.                       responses. For
                The instruments                         helicopter
                must respond to                         response,
                abrupt input at                         acceleration in
                the pilot's                             the appropriate,
                position within                         corresponding
                the allotted                            rotational axis
                time, but not                           is preferred.
                before the time
                that the
                helicopter or set
                of helicopters
                would respond
                under the same
                conditions..
                Latency:   ...  ...  ...  ...
                The FTD
                instrument and,
                if applicable,
                the motion system
                and the visual
                system response
                must not be prior
                to that time when
                the helicopter
                responds and may
                respond up to 150
                milliseconds
                after that time
                under the same
                conditions.
                Transport
                Delay: As an
                alternative to
                the Latency
                requirement, a
                transport delay
                objective test
                may be used to
                demonstrate that
                the FTD system
                does not exceed
                the specified
                limit. The
                sponsor must
                measure all the
                delay encountered
                by a step signal
                migrating from
                the pilot's
                control through
                all the
                simulation
                software modules
                in the correct
                order, using a
                handshaking
                protocol, finally
                through the
                normal output
                interfaces to the
                instrument
                display and, if
                applicable, the
                motion system,
                and the visual
                system.
               An objective test
                is required.
                              * * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. C7-4884 Filed 3-4-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 1505-01-D


[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 230 (Friday, November 29, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Page 65886]
[FR Doc No: 2019-25899]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Docket No. FAA-2019-0961; Notice of Availability Docket No. 19-AEA-20]

FAA Notice of Preparation of an Environmental Assessment for the
Proposed Teterboro (TEB) Area Navigation (RNAV) Global Positioning
System (GPS) Runway (RWY) 19 Offset Procedure at Teterboro Airport, NJ

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA) and
associated public workshop.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA, Eastern Service Area, is issuing this notice to
advise the public that the FAA has initiated preparation of an
environmental assessment (EA) that will analyze and discuss the
potential environmental impacts resulting from publishing and
implementing a new approach procedure to TEB, the TEB RNAV (GPS) RWY 19
Offset (Proposed Project).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Ryan W. Almasy, Federal Aviation
Administration, Operations Support Group, Eastern Service Center, 1701
Columbia Avenue, College Park, Georgia 30337,<PHONE_NUMBER> or https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/community_involvement/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The EA will include the requisite analyses
to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of the Proposed Project
within the defined study area. During development of a draft and final
EA, FAA will be coordinating with federal, state and local agencies, as
well as the public, to obtain comments and input regarding the EA for
the Proposed Project. The EA will assess potential impacts of the
proposed alternative and a no action alternative pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); FAA Order 1050.1F, Policies
and Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts; and, the
President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations,
implementing the provisions of NEPA, applicable special purpose and all
other applicable laws, regulations, and requirements.
    The FAA intends to conduct a public workshop subsequent to the
publication of the Draft EA. The FAA will provide the public with a
Notice of Availability of the Draft EA, the locations where the Draft
EA will be available, as well as the date, time and location of the
public workshop. The Notice of Availability will also provide the dates
comprising the 30-day public comment period on the Draft EA and the FAA
point of contact to whom comments should be submitted. For more
information regarding the public workshop meeting see the project
website at: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/community_involvement/.

    Issued in College Park, Georgia, on November 21, 2019.
Ryan Almasy,
Manager, Operations Support Group, Eastern Service Center, Air Traffic
Organization.
[FR Doc. 2019-25899 Filed 11-27-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 9, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 1765-1772]
[FR Doc No: 2013-00238]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2012-0812; Notice No. 13-01]
RIN 2120-AK14

Requirements for Chemical Oxygen Generators Installed on
Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This rulemaking would amend the type certification
requirements for chemical oxygen generators installed on transport
category airplanes so the generators are secure and not subject to
misuse. The intended effect of this action would be to increase the
level of security for future transport category airplane designs. This
proposal does not directly affect the existing fleet.

DATES: Send comments on or before March 11, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2012-0812
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without
change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA dockets, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11,
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gardlin, Airframe and Cabin
Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest
Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356;
telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    For legal questions concerning this action, contact Douglas
Anderson, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional
Counsel, ANM-7, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: See the ``Additional Information'' section
for information on how to comment on this proposal and how the FAA will
handle comments received. The ``Additional Information'' section also
contains related information about the docket, privacy, the handling of
proprietary or confidential business information. In addition, there is
information on obtaining copies of related rulemaking documents.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing
regulations required in the interest of safety for the design and
performance of aircraft; regulations and minimum standards in the
interest of safety for inspecting, servicing, and overhauling aircraft;
and regulations for other practices, methods, and procedures the
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This
regulation is within the scope of that authority because it would
prescribe new safety standards for the design of transport category
airplanes.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

AC--Advisory Circular
AD--Airworthiness Directive
ARAC--Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
ARC--Aviation Rulemaking Committee
COG--Chemical Oxygen Generator
LOARC--Lavatory Oxygen Aviation Rulemaking Committee
SaO2--Blood Oxygen Saturation Level
SFAR--Special Federal Aviation Regulation

I. Overview of the Proposed Rule

    This proposed rule would adopt new standards for COGs installed in
transport category airplanes. These proposed new standards, based on
the LOARC's recommendations, would apply to future applications for
type certificates, address potential security vulnerabilities with
those devices, and provide performance-based options for acceptable COG
installations.

II. Background

    The incorporation of security measures into an airplane design is a
significant development in aviation safety that was initiated over 20
years ago. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted
standards to address several key elements of airplane design to reduce
its vulnerability to terrorist acts following the bombing of a Pan
American 747 airplane near Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. These standards
were adopted as Amendment 97 to Annex 8 of the 1944 Convention on Civil
Aviation.
    In January 2002, the FAA adopted the first regulations that address
security vulnerabilities in airplanes. The FAA later incorporated all
of the ICAO standards into regulations by Amendment 25-127 to Title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25. That amendment
complemented other rulemaking initiatives that address security
measures for flightdeck doors and added a new Sec.  25.795, Security
considerations. ICAO does not have recommended practices related to
COGs. Nevertheless, the FAA has determined that COGs present an
unacceptable vulnerability and has exercised its authority to take
remedial action to correct this vulnerability in airplane design.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ For example, the FAA has issued ADs to address issues with
reinforced flightdeck doors that would not otherwise affect safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA became aware of a security vulnerability with certain types
of oxygen systems installed inside the lavatories of most transport
category airplanes operating under 14 CFR part 121, as well as certain
airplanes operating under part 129. As a result, in April 2011, the FAA
issued AD 2011-04-09, mandating that these oxygen systems be rendered
inoperative until the vulnerability could be eliminated.\2\ However, by
rendering the oxygen systems inoperative to comply with the AD, the
airplanes do not comply with the requirements of Sec. Sec.  25.1447,
121.329, and 121.333. The AD contained a provisional allowance to
permit noncompliance in the lavatories from those specific
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ FAA originally notified carriers in February 2011 and
required immediate compliance. The AD was issued in March 2, 2011
with a compliance date of March 14, 2011. See AD 2011-04-09,
Airworthiness Directives: Various Transport Category Airplanes
Equipped with Chemical Oxygen Generators Installed in a Lavatory,
Docket No. FAA-2011-0157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To further address that situation, the FAA also issued SFAR 111 \3\
to allow continued operation, delivery, and modification of affected
airplanes, despite their non-compliance with the above-noted
regulations. The AD and the SFAR (while still in effect) are interim
measures to minimize the disruption to air commerce while the
development of permanent solutions, including this proposed rule, are
underway.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ SFAR 111, Security Considerations for Lavatory Oxygen
Systems (76 FR 12550, March 8, 2011), Docket No. FAA-2011-0186.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the FAA chartered the LOARC shortly after issuing SFAR
111. The LOARC was tasked to make recommendations for new standards
that would ensure the installation of a safe and secure COG system,
including the best approach to implement those standards. The LOARC's
recommendations also included the key issues involved in making a COG
secure, and a summary of how those issues may affect implementation of
new standards. The LOARC's recommendations are discussed in the
``Lavatory Oxygen Aviation Rulemaking Committee'' section of this NPRM.
Those LOARC recommendations also form the basis for this proposal.

A. Lavatory Oxygen Systems

    The minimum performance requirements for oxygen supply and oxygen
mask presentation are contained in Sec. Sec.  25.1443 and 25.1447. The
supplemental oxygen systems are necessary safety equipment in the event
of loss of cabin pressure. Each occupant is required to have a
supplemental oxygen supply immediately available if cabin pressure
drops to a certain level. The regulations specifically require
lavatories to be equipped with two oxygen masks connected to oxygen
supply terminals and, for airplanes flying above 30,000 feet, automatic
presentation of the masks to the occupants. Two masks are required
inside a lavatory to address the situation where one person may be
assisting another, such as an adult assisting a small child. The
quantity of oxygen available to each occupant is based on the route
flown and how quickly the airplane can descend to an altitude that does
not require supplemental oxygen.
    Lavatory oxygen systems are generally similar to the systems
provided for passenger and flight attendant use in the cabin. The
intent of the supplemental oxygen requirements in 14 CFR part 25 is
reinforced in the operational requirements of Sec. Sec.  121.329 and
121.333, although neither section specifically references lavatories.
    The regulations do not specify the use of COGs as an oxygen supply.
However, COGs are common because they tend to provide a sufficient
oxygen supply while retaining the optimum size, weight, and
maintainability for most operations. Because COGs produce oxygen
through a chemical reaction that generates heat, there are requirements
in Sec.  25.1450 to ensure that adjacent materials and systems are
protected from damage and persons are protected from injury. Surface
temperatures can reach temperatures up to 500 degrees Fahrenheit, so
the COG often has a protective shroud installed.

B. Safety Ramifications

    In issuing AD 2011-04-09 and SFAR 111, the FAA carefully considered
the safety ramifications of removing supplemental oxygen from the
lavatories of a significant portion of the

commercial fleet. The FAA conducted a risk analysis to assess the
safety implications of temporarily \4\ not having supplemental oxygen
available inside lavatories. To support the risk assessment, earlier
studies involving passengers' use of supplemental oxygen were reviewed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See AD 2012-11-09, Various Transport Category Airplanes (77
FR 38000, June 26, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several years ago in an unrelated initiative, the FAA tasked the
ARAC to make recommendations for safety standards when airplanes
operate in high altitudes. As part of its efforts, the ARAC did a
comprehensive assessment of the frequency and nature of the need for
supplemental oxygen systems in service.\5\ The ARAC identified 2,800
instances over a 40-year period and categorized them by cause,
severity, and consequence. The majority of these instances were caused
by malfunctions of the cabin pressurization system. However, in none of
those 2,800 instances was there a loss of life due to lack of oxygen.
The ARAC used these data to make recommendations to the FAA for future
rulemaking not related to this action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ FAA-Regulations and Policies, Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee: Transport Airplane and Engine Issue Area Mechanical
System Harmonization Working Group, Task 3--Airplane Ventilation
Systems (66 FR 39074, July 26, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA reviewed the service history since those ARAC
recommendations were made and found that the types and frequencies of
incidents, as well as their causes, are consistent with the historical
record. The relative risks and service history have not changed in any
significant way since the ARAC recommendations were issued. With
respect to SFAR 111, the assessment was limited to the lavatories, as
opposed to the earlier ARAC task that applied to the entire airplane.
The lavatories are sporadically occupied during flight and by a small
number of passengers at any given time. This limits the potential
impact on safety.
    The ARAC found the frequency of the types of severe occurrences
necessitating the use of supplemental oxygen was around
10-8/flight-hour for causes other than a malfunction of the
pressurization system. These malfunctions tend to be slower losses of
pressure, or are identified at lower altitudes, and therefore, they are
not as critical for this situation. For the purposes of the assessment
leading to SFAR 111, the FAA assumed the probability of an occupied
lavatory is 50%. The probability of an event when supplemental oxygen
is physiologically required is around 5x10-9/flight-hour.
Since SFAR 111 was issued, there has been one decompression event due
to a mechanical failure involving oxygen mask deployment and emergency
descent. In that instance, no occupants were in a lavatory and no
persons suffered any injury.

C. Lavatory Oxygen Aviation Rulemaking Committee

    As discussed above, the FAA chartered the LOARC to obtain
recommendations from the affected public on what the new certification
standards for COGs should be, as well as the best way to implement
them. Specifically, the LOARC was tasked to:
    (1) Establish criteria for in-service, new production and new type
design airplanes, preferably in the form of performance standards, for
safe and secure installation of lavatory oxygen systems;
    (2) Determine whether the same criteria should apply to the
existing fleet and to new production and type designs;
    (3) Establish what type of safety assessment approach should be
used (e.g., in accordance with SAE International Document ARP5577 \6\
or Sec.  25.1309), and define the content and procedures of the safety
assessment;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 5577, Aircraft
Lightning Direct Effects Certification, dated September 30, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (4) Determine whether tamper resistance, active tamper evidence, or
different system design characteristics are equivalent options;
    (5) Develop guidance as necessary to satisfy the recommended
criteria for each system design characteristic as appropriate; and
    (6) Consider the pros and cons of different implementation options
and recommend a schedule(s) for implementation with the advantages and
disadvantages identified.
    The LOARC identified five key subjects to focus on to develop its
recommendations and fulfill its charter. Those subjects were:
     Design Considerations--identifying and characterizing the
design constraints and key factors affecting an installation.
     Security Standards--identifying the necessary components
of a secure installation, in terms of both new designs and for
retrofit.
     System Performance--identifying the factors that affect
system performance in general and how modifications to enhance security
might affect system performance.
     Implementation Considerations--identifying the major
factors in being able to implement the new requirements into the fleet
as expeditiously as practicable, as well as making assessments of how
long certain actions will take.
     Other Affected Areas--characterizing the parameters that
resulted in the determination of a security vulnerability for lavatory
COG installations and establishing criteria for evaluating other
installations against those characteristics.
    A sub-group was formed for each of the focus areas. Each subject
was explored in detail with respect to how it would affect the content
of new standards and the ability to implement those new standards into
the existing fleet. Using the inputs from the sub-groups, the LOARC
made recommendations in a final report, which is available in the
docket for this rulemaking.
    Some of the significant findings of the LOARC are summarized below.
The LOARC concluded that security could be achieved through tamper-
resistance alone, through a combination of tamper-resistance and active
tamper-evidence (e.g., an alarm), or by switching to a different means
of supplying oxygen in lieu of a COG. For new type designs, any of
these approaches would be feasible, and some could be adopted with
minimal impact on cost or weight.
    As discussed below, the FAA is addressing the existing U.S. fleet
via an AD. Although this proposal would not affect the existing U.S.
fleet, the proposed standards would likely be used by international
aviation authorities in approving installations for the retrofit of
those fleets covered by their regulations. The discussion of the
LOARC's conclusions regarding the implications for retrofit is included
here, because it may aid the international community in reintroducing
supplemental oxygen systems into affected airplane lavatories. From the
standpoint of the existing U.S. fleet, the LOARC concluded that if a
COG were to continue to be used, the majority of installations would
likely require using a combination of the tamper-resistance and tamper-
evidence approaches.
    Incorporation of an active system to provide tamper-evidence would
significantly increase complexity, cost, and time in implementing new
designs into the existing U.S. fleet compared to other approaches for
addressing the security concerns with COGs. This is because such a
system must demonstrate a suitable level of reliability and not be
susceptible to tampering. It would also require intervention on the
part of the crew, which would result in new crew

procedures and training. In addition, most of the modification work
must be done on the airplane, which can lead to unscheduled time out of
service. All of these factors contribute to the complexity of the
design, the time it takes to install and certificate the design, and
the costs associated with incorporating the design.
    The LOARC concluded that switching to a different means of
supplying oxygen might be the most efficient solution in a significant
number of cases. However, because the COG is an optimized design for
this application, there are currently no other types of systems
available for the existing fleet. Nonetheless, some design approval
holders may take this approach to avoid the issues associated with the
active tamper-evidence approach.
    The LOARC further concluded that there is limited space available
to modify existing designs or to add features. There is some
correlation between the size of the airplane and the space available,
but in almost all cases, there are very small tolerances on the size
and shape of an oxygen source (COG or other) that will fit. Similarly,
although moving the supplemental oxygen supply to a different location
may be feasible for new designs, relocating the supplemental oxygen
supply in existing fleets is limited by the space available in existing
designs. Relocating the supplemental oxygen supply can also complicate
activating the oxygen flow, since that is generally accomplished by
pulling on the oxygen mask. Nevertheless, the LOARC concluded that
there are practical design solutions, and, as discussed below under
``Related Actions,'' the FAA has accepted the LOARC's recommendations.

D. New Technology

    Irrespective of the method chosen to provide supplemental oxygen,
there may be means to indirectly mitigate the space constraints by
changing the way in which the supplemental oxygen dosage is measured.
Historically, oxygen systems have provided a constant tracheal partial
pressure of oxygen in accordance with Sec.  25.1443. In order to
maintain the requisite partial pressure, the system supplies oxygen at
a given rate for a time period as determined by the routes being flown.
    Recent developments in system technology have made a more direct
approach feasible for meeting the physiological oxygen requirement.
This approach measures the oxygen saturation level in the blood, known
as SaO2, instead of tracheal partial pressure. Because
SaO2 is more directly indicative of whether adequate oxygen
is being supplied, this approach has merit. Further, for a system that
can maintain adequate SaO2, the total quantity of oxygen may
be reduced, making the storage vessel smaller than one based on
tracheal partial pressure. Using a smaller storage vessel makes such
installations more practical by utilizing the existing locations. While
there is no regulatory change proposed to incorporate SaO2,
the FAA will consider this approach as a basis for a finding of an
equivalent level of safety to the oxygen quantity requirements of Sec.
25.1443, Minimum mass flow of supplemental oxygen.

E. Related Actions

    As previously discussed, the FAA began incorporating security
measures into the airplane design in 2002. This proposal is keeping
with that effort and reflects additional knowledge the FAA has acquired
since then. The FAA recently superseded AD 2011-04-09 with AD 2012-11-
09, Various Transport Category Airplanes (77 FR 38000, June 26, 2012)
to include terminating action for installations meeting requirements of
this proposal. To enable affected operators and modifiers to obtain
approval of COG installations in advance of finalizing this proposed
rulemaking, the FAA has also issued Policy Statement PS-ANM-25-04
regarding COGs using these proposed standards (based on the LOARC
recommendations) as guidance for methods of compliance.\7\ The policy
statement enables operators to satisfy the requirements in AD 2012-11-
09 while at the same time restoring a supplemental oxygen supply to
lavatories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ PS-ANM-25-04, Chemical Oxygen Generator Installations, dated
December 21, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Discussion of the Proposal

A. New Requirements for Chemical Oxygen Generator Installations (Sec.
25.795)

    The current requirements for COGs relate primarily to protecting
the airplane and passengers from the heat produced by the generators.
These standards are in Sec.  25.1450 and will continue to apply. The
requirements of Sec.  25.1450 address safety requirements for COGs when
correctly installed and operating, as well as predictable failures.
These existing requirements do not consider the deliberate misuse of a
COG, or the potential effects of that misuse.
    As previously discussed, Sec.  25.795 addresses the incorporation
of security measures into an airplane design, following similar
standards adopted by ICAO. Currently, Sec.  25.795 does not address
COGs, as they were not considered at the time that regulation was
adopted. Nevertheless, since the issues of concern stem from security
considerations, the FAA has determined that the most logical location
for these new COG standards is in Sec.  25.795, Security
considerations.
    Again, the FAA is proposing standards based on recommendations from
the LOARC. This proposal would amend Sec.  25.795 by requiring that
each COG or its installation must be designed to be secure by meeting
at least one of the following four conditions: (1) Provide effective
resistance to tampering; (2) provide an effective combination of
resistance to tampering and active tamper-evident features; (3)
installing in a location or manner where any attempt to access the COG
would be immediately obvious; and (4) by a combination of these
approaches, provided the Administrator finds it to be a secure
installation. These conditions are discussed in further detail below.
    There are two basic approaches to providing a secure lavatory COG
installation: make a fully tamper-resistant installation, or
incorporate a combined tamper-resistance and active tamper-evidence
approach. Either of these approaches would be acceptable, but they
involve different considerations.
    A COG that is inaccessible would be considered a tamper-resistant
COG for the purposes of Sec.  25.795(d). This could be accomplished by
locating the COG in an inaccessible area, or installing it in a more
conventional location in such a way that access to it is not possible.
The ARC considered whether to characterize such an installation as
``tamper proof'' rather than ``tamper resistant.'' However, a literal
interpretation of ``tamper proof'' was considered to be too stringent,
since there would always be some conceivable, albeit unreasonable,
method to overcome tamper-proof features. Nonetheless, where tamper
resistance is the sole method of providing security, it is intended
that the features be very robust.
    If the installation cannot rely solely on a tamper-resistance
approach, it is acceptable to incorporate a combined tamper-resistance
and active tamper-evidence approach, as previously stated. Using this
combined approach would also necessitate changes to crew procedures and
concurrent training to provide the same level of security. In this
case, it is intervention that ultimately prevents misuse of the
generator, so crew involvement is

essential. The use of a tamper-evidence approach alone is unacceptable,
since this relies entirely on intervention and does not improve the
security of the COG itself. Neither the LOARC nor the FAA considers a
tamper-evidence approach alone to adequately provide the needed
security.
    Another method of providing a secure installation is by locating
the COG where any attempt to access it would be immediately obvious. In
other words, the COG might be in a location where it is accessible, but
anyone attempting to gain access to it would be immediately noticed
before actually gaining access. This method would not be feasible
inside lavatories since they are inherently isolated from view. This
method is not the same as a sole tamper-evidence approach, which is
only effective after access has begun and relies entirely on subsequent
intervention.
    There may be any number of combinations used of tamper-resistance
and tamper-evidence approaches that would be effective. Applicants
would need to make specific proposals and obtain FAA approval for a
given approach. In addition, there may be methods of providing a secure
installation that involve other elements that would also be acceptable
but are not yet defined. The intent of these proposed requirements
would allow for those possibilities, while at the same time set a clear
performance goal.
    In addition, acceptable methods of employing tamper-resistance and
tamper-evidence approaches are discussed in proposed AC 25.795,
Chemical Oxygen Generator Security Requirements. A copy of AC 25.795
will be placed in the docket for this action.

B. Alternative Approaches

    The FAA and the LOARC recognize that the unique nature of COGs
drives the identified security vulnerability. Although not proposed in
this action, there are other means of delivering supplemental oxygen,
such as a stored gas system (either centrally or locally installed),
that could eliminate the security vulnerability. These systems are
currently used in certain airplane types and could be easily
incorporated for new airplane type designs.

C. General Provisions

    Although the installation of COGs in lavatories prompted the
various rulemaking activities discussed in this proposal, the LOARC
recommended applying the new standards to COG installations anywhere on
the airplane, and the FAA agrees with this recommendation. The LOARC
concluded that if the characteristic that makes the COG a risk exists
in locations other than in lavatories, then those locations should also
be subject to the same approval criteria. The LOARC did not attempt to
identify any specific locations, but it developed assessment criteria
to identify such locations. However, since lavatories are currently
without supplemental oxygen, those are the locations with the greatest
interest. The LOARC also concluded that the solution for other areas
might be different than for lavatories. This information is also
included in the above-noted proposed AC 25.795.

D. Operational Requirements

    The FAA has superseded AD 2011-04-09, with AD 2012-11-09 which
includes requirements to retrofit the fleet of airplanes affected by AD
2011-04-09. Superseding AD 2012-11-09 also applies to airplanes in
production for which compliance relief was provided by SFAR 111. The
expiration of SFAR 111 will correspond to the compliance date of AD
2012-11-09, since the relief provided by the SFAR will no longer be
necessary once operators have complied with that AD. As noted earlier,
the FAA has issued Policy Statement PS-ANM-25-04 to facilitate the
incorporation of designs meeting these proposed requirements. AD 2012-
11-09 references that policy as a potential means of compliance.
    The FAA does not intend any further mandate to retrofit oxygen
generator systems because only lavatory COG installations that meet the
criteria in Policy Statement PS-ANM-25-04 or in this NPRM would be
approved. This means that even if there are some changes between this
NPRM and the final rule, designs approved prior to the effective date
of the final rule, in accordance with the policy, would not be
affected. This applies to the design approval, not just to the
airplanes on which the design is installed prior to the effective date
of the final rule. Therefore, a design approved as an alternative means
of compliance to AD 2011-04-09, or as a means of compliance to AD 2012-
11-09, will still be approved for installation on airplanes after the
effective date of this rule.
    All affected airplanes need to be modified either in accordance
with the standards in this proposed rule, or via a prior approval as
discussed in Policy Statement PS-ANM-25-04 before the expiration date
of SFAR 111. For new design approvals on airplanes subject to AD 2012-
11-09, or applications for type design changes after the effective date
of the final rule, the FAA will use the requirements of the newly
adopted Sec.  25.795(d) as the approval basis. For example, if a design
is approved per Policy Statement PS-ANM-25-04, and an applicant applies
to amend the design after the effective date of the final rule, the
amended design must comply with the requirements of Sec.  25.795(d).
For transport airplanes that are not subject to proposed AD 2012-NM-
004-AD (e.g., all-cargo airplanes), Sec. Sec.  21.17 and 21.101, as
applicable, will be used to determine whether the requirements of Sec.
25.795(d) must be met.

E. Miscellaneous Amendments (Sec.  25.1450)

    Section 25.1450, which contains the general standards for COGs,
would be revised to refer to the new Sec.  25.795(d), in addition to
the existing standards for COGs.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct that each
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354)
requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes
on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39)
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States (U.S.). In
developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by state,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's
analysis of the economic impacts of this proposed rule.
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this proposed
rule: (1) Would have benefits that justify its costs; (2) would not be
an economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) would not be ``significant'' as
defined in DOT's

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) would
not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the U.S.;
and (6) would not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal
governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold
identified above.
    Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies
and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations.
If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order allows that a statement
to that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a
full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for this proposed rule. The
reasoning for this determination follows:
    This proposed rule would apply only to future type-certificated,
large transport airplane models. It would not affect any current
airplanes or future airplanes built under an existing type certificate.
The proposed requirements are technologically feasible, as evidenced by
two new type certificate programs (the Boeing 787 and the Airbus 350)
that include designs that would be in compliance with this proposed
rule. The FAA does not believe that compliance with the proposed rule
for future type certificates would require extensive airplane redesign.
    The FAA also believes that there would be little, if any,
production airplane cost increases from complying with these proposed
requirements. The FAA has learned that the emergency oxygen systems
technology used in the Boeing 787 and the Airbus 350 could be
transferrable to future type-certificate designs. Further, these
technologies provide greater airline operational flexibility because
they would allow the airplane to carry variable amounts of oxygen,
which is not currently the case with COGs. Finally, future type-
certificate designs could still use the COG for emergency oxygen in
other parts of the airplane with an alternative oxygen source within
the lavatories. The FAA requests comments on its conclusions and these
issues.
Total Estimated Benefits and Costs of This Proposed Rule
    The primary benefit from this proposed rule is that it would allow
the airplane to continue to provide supplemental oxygen to individuals
in lavatories during emergencies while ensuring that individuals in
lavatories could not tamper with the supplemental oxygen system.
    The FAA believes that the proposed rule would impose minimal costs
because it would only apply to new type-certificated airplane models so
that the manufacturer would be able to design the most cost-effective
emergency oxygen system for the model before construction would start
on the first airplane. Again, the Boeing 787 and the Airbus 350 are two
new type-certificate projects which include designs for supplemental
oxygen systems that would be in compliance with this proposed rule. The
FAA believes that similar emergency oxygen systems could be designed
for future type-certificated airplanes at a minimal cost.
    The FAA requests comments on this initial conclusion of minimal
expected costs for future type-certificated airplane models.
Who is affected by this rule?
    This rule affects all manufacturers of large transport category,
certificated airplanes under part 25.
Source(s) of Information
    The primary source of information is the LOARC, which included part
25 airplane manufacturers, other aviation safety regulatory agencies,
manufacturers of oxygen generating systems, airlines, a pilot union,
and a flight attendant union.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed rule
would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. If the agency determines that it would, the agency must
prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the
RFA. However, if an agency determines that a proposed rule would not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the
agency may so certify, and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
    The Small Business Administration defines a small airplane
manufacturer as one that employs fewer than 1,500 people. As all the
affected airplane manufacturers employ more than 1,500 people, this
proposed rule would not affect small entities. Therefore, the FAA
certifies that this proposed rule, if promulgated, would not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Specifically, the FAA requests comments on whether the proposed rule
would create any specific compliance costs unique to small entities.
Please provide detailed economic analysis to support any cost claims.
The FAA also invites comments regarding other small-entity concerns
with respect to this proposed rule.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States (U.S.). Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards
is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of
the U.S., so long as the standards have a legitimate domestic
objective, such as protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and determined that
it would improve safety and, therefore, is not an unnecessary obstacle
to international trade.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one
year by state, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by
the private sector; such

a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA
currently uses an inflation-adjusted value of $143.1 million in lieu of
$100 million. This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate;
therefore, the requirements of Title II do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated
with this proposed rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and
has identified no differences with these proposed regulations.
    Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.

G. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.

V. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 12866

    See the ``Regulatory Evaluation'' discussion in the ``Regulatory
Notices and Analyses'' section elsewhere in this preamble.

B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have
Federalism implications.

C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
would not be a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order
and would not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

VI. Additional Information

A. Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency
also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy,
or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written
comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should
submit only one time.
    The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before
the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed
after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without
incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal in
light of the comments it receives.
    Proprietary or Confidential Business Information: Commenters should
not file proprietary or confidential business information in the
docket. Such information must be sent or delivered directly to the
person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document, and marked as proprietary or confidential. If submitting
information on a disk or CD ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD
ROM, and identify electronically within the disk or CD ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or confidential.
    Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when the FAA is aware of proprietary
information filed with a comment, the agency does not place it in the
docket. It is held in a separate file to which the public does not have
access, and the FAA places a note in the docket that it has received
it. If the FAA receives a request to examine or copy this information,
it treats it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act
(5 U.S.C. 552). The FAA processes such a request under Department of
Transportation procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.

B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the
Internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
    All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from
the Internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

The Proposed Amendments

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.

0
2. Amend Sec.  25.795 by redesignating paragraphs (d) and (e) as (e)
and (f) respectively, and by adding a new paragraph (d) to read as
follows:

Sec.  25.795  Security considerations.

* * * * *
    (d) Each chemical oxygen generator or its installation must be
designed to be secure from deliberate manipulation by one of the
following:
    (1) By providing effective resistance to tampering,
    (2) By providing an effective combination of resistance to
tampering and active tamper-evident features,
    (3) By installation in a location or manner whereby any attempt to
access the generator would be immediately obvious, or
    (4) By a combination of approaches specified in paragraphs (d)(1),
(d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section that the Administrator finds provides
a secure installation.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec.  25.1450 by adding a new paragraph (b)(3) to read as
follows:

Sec.  25.1450  Chemical oxygen generators.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Except as provided in SFAR 109, each chemical oxygen generator
installation must meet the requirements of Sec.  25.795(d).
* * * * *

    Issued in Washington, DC, on January 3, 2013.
Dorenda D. Baker,
Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2013-00238 Filed 1-8-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P