[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 227 (Monday, November 26, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60347-60360]
[FR Doc No: 2018-25678]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket Nos. RM18-8-000 and RM15-11-003; Order No. 851]

Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard; Reliability
Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic
Disturbance Events

AGENCY:  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION:  Final rule.

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SUMMARY:  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission)
approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned
Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events). The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified
Electric Reliability Organization, submitted Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2 for Commission approval. The Commission also directs NERC to
develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2: To
require the development and implementation of corrective action plans
to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities; and to
authorize extensions of time to implement corrective action plans on a

case-by-case basis. In addition, the Commission accepts the revised GMD
research work plan submitted by NERC.

DATES:  This rule will become effective January 25, 2019.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:.
Michael Gandolfo (Technical Information), Office of Electric
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected].
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the
Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System
Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events).\1\ The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-
certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for Commission approval in response to
directives in Order No. 830.\2\ As discussed in this final rule, we
determine that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 better addresses the
risks posed by geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) to the Bulk-Power
System, particularly with respect to the potential impacts of locally-
enhanced GMD events, than currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-
007-1 and complies with the Commission's directives in Order No. 830.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o.
    \2\ Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned
Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, Order No. 830, 156
FERC ] 61,215, (2016) reh'g denied, Order No. 830-A, 158 FERC ]
61,041 (2017).
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    2. GMD events occur when the sun ejects charged particles that
interact with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. GMD
events have the potential to cause severe, wide-spread impacts on the
Bulk-Power System.\3\ Currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-
1 requires applicable entities to assess the vulnerability of their
transmission systems to a ``benchmark GMD event.'' An applicable entity
that does not meet certain performance requirements, based on the
results of the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment, must develop and
implement a corrective action plan to achieve the performance
requirements.
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    \3\ Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances, Order
No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147, at P 3, reh'g denied, 144 FERC ] 61,113
(2013); see also Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Background.
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    3. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 are
responsive to the directives in Order No. 830: (1) To revise the
benchmark GMD event definition, as it pertains to the required GMD
vulnerability assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments,
so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data;
(2) to require the collection of necessary geomagnetically induced
current (GIC) monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) to include a
one-year deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and
two- and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving
non-hardware and hardware mitigation.\4\ As discussed below,
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 complies with these directives and
improves upon the currently-effective version of the Reliability
Standard by requiring applicable entities to: (1) In addition to the
benchmark GMD event requirements, conduct supplemental GMD
vulnerability assessments and thermal impact assessments, which apply a
new supplemental GMD event definition that does not rely solely on
spatially-averaged data; (2) obtain GIC and magnetometer data; and (3)
meet the Commission-directed deadlines for the development and
completion of tasks in corrective action plans. Accordingly, pursuant
to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, we approve Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2.\5\
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    \4\ ``Spatial averaging'' refers to the averaging of
magnetometer readings over a geographic area. In developing the
benchmark GMD event definition, the standard drafting team averaged
several (but not all) geomagnetic field readings taken by
magnetometers located within square geographical areas of 500 km per
side.
    \5\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
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    4. In addition, as discussed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
we determine that it is appropriate, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of
the FPA,\6\ to direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require the development and
completion of corrective action plans to mitigate assessed supplemental
GMD event vulnerabilities.\7\ As discussed below, requiring corrective
action plans for supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities is appropriate
to ensure the reliability of the Bulk-Power System when confronted with
locally-enhanced GMD events, just as corrective action plans are
necessary to mitigate the effects of benchmark GMD events. Based on the
record in this proceeding, we discern no technical barriers to either
developing or complying with such a requirement. Moreover, the record
supports issuance of a directive at this time notwithstanding comments
in response to the NOPR advocating postponement of any directive until
after the completion of additional GMD research. As discussed below,
the relevant GMD research tasks are scheduled to be completed before
the modified Reliability Standard must be submitted. The Commission
directs NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for approval
within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2.
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    \6\ Id. 824o(d)(5).
    \7\ Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 83 FR 23854 (May 23, 2018), 163 FERC ] 61,126
(2018) (NOPR).
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    5. We also determine that it is appropriate, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, to direct that NERC modify the provision in
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4 that allows applicable
entities to exceed deadlines for completing corrective action plan
tasks when ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity
[arise].'' The NOPR raised concerns regarding the appropriateness of a
self-executing deadline extension and observed that it was inconsistent
with guidance in Order No. 830 that extension requests be considered on
a case-by-case basis.\8\ We recognize the point made in NERC's comments
in response to the NOPR that, under NERC's proposal, ``NERC and
Regional Entity staff would exercise their authority to review the
reasonableness of any Corrective Action Plan delay, including reviewing
the `situations beyond the control of the responsible entity' that are
cited as causing the delay'' and that Requirement R7.4 is ``not so
flexible . . . as to allow entities to extend Corrective Action Plan
deadlines indefinitely or for any reason whatsoever.'' \9\ While we
generally agree with the standard of review that NERC states it will
use to assess the merits of extension requests, we conclude that such
assessments should be made before any time extensions are permitted. By
requiring prior approval of extension requests, the modified
Reliability Standard will limit the potential for unwarranted delays in
implementing corrective action plans while also providing NERC with an
advance and more holistic understanding of where, to whom, and for how
long, extensions are granted. We expect that the extension process
developed by NERC in response to our directive will be timely and
efficient such that applicable

entities will receive prompt responses after submitting to NERC or a
Regional Entity, as appropriate, the extension request and associated
information described in Requirement R7.4.\10\ We also direct NERC, as
proposed in the NOPR, to prepare and submit a report addressing how
often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan
deadlines as well as the disposition of extension requests, which is
due within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must
comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.
Following receipt of the report, the Commission will determine whether
further action is necessary.
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    \8\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102.
    \9\ NERC Comments at 20-21.
    \10\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 50.
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    6. The Commission, as discussed below, also accepts the revised GMD
research work plan submitted by NERC on April 19, 2018.\11\
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    \11\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Filing,
Docket No. RM15-11-003 (filed Apr. 19, 2018) (Revised GMD Research
Work Plan).
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I. Background

A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards

    7. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\12\
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    \12\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(e).
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B. GMD Primer

    8. GMD events occur when the sun ejects charged particles that
interact and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields.\13\ Once a
solar particle is ejected, it can take between 17 to 96 hours
(depending on its energy level) to reach earth.\14\ A geoelectric field
is the electric potential (measured in volts per kilometer (V/km)) on
the earth's surface and is directly related to the rate of change of
the magnetic fields.\15\ The geoelectric field has an amplitude and
direction and acts as a voltage source that can cause GICs to flow on
long conductors, such as transmission lines.\16\ The magnitude of the
geoelectric field amplitude is impacted by local factors such as
geomagnetic latitude and local earth conductivity.\17\ Geomagnetic
latitude is the proximity to earth's magnetic north and south poles, as
opposed to earth's geographic poles.\18\ Local earth conductivity is
the ability of the earth's crust to conduct electricity at a certain
location to depths of hundreds of kilometers down to the earth's
mantle. Local earth conductivity impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity)
of the geoelectric fields that are formed during a GMD event by, all
else being equal, a lower earth conductivity resulting in higher
geoelectric fields.\19\
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    \13\ See NERC, 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim
Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System
at i-ii (February 2012).
    \14\ Id. at ii.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ NERC, Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description,
Docket No. 15-11-000, at 4 (filed June 28, 2016) (2016 NERC White
Paper).
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Id.
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    9. GICs can flow in an electric power system with varying intensity
depending on the various factors discussed above. As explained in the
Background section of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, ``[d]uring a GMD
event, geomagnetically[hyphen]induced currents (GIC) may cause
transformer hot[hyphen]spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power
sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the
combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.''

C. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and Order No. 830

1. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1
    10. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 consists of seven requirements
and applies to planning coordinators, transmission planners,
transmission owners and generation owners who own or whose planning
coordinator area or transmission planning area includes a power
transformer with a high side, wye-grounded winding connected at 200 kV
or higher.
    11. Requirement R1 requires planning coordinators and transmission
planners (i.e., ``responsible entities'') to determine the individual
and joint responsibilities in the planning coordinator's planning area
for maintaining models and performing studies needed to complete the
GMD vulnerability assessment required in Requirement R4. Requirement R2
requires responsible entities to maintain system models and GIC system
models needed to complete the GMD vulnerability assessment required in
Requirement R4. Requirement R3 requires each responsible entity to have
criteria for acceptable system steady state voltage performance for its
system during the GMD conditions described in Attachment 1 of
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Requirement R4 requires responsible
entities to conduct a GMD vulnerability assessment every 60 months
using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. Requirement R5
requires responsible entities to provide GIC flow information, based on
the benchmark GMD event definition, to be used in the transformer
thermal impact assessments required in Requirement R6, to each
transmission owner and generator owner that owns an applicable
transformer within the applicable planning area. Requirement R6
requires transmission owners and generator owners to conduct thermal
impact assessments on solely and jointly owned applicable transformers
where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5 is 75
Amperes per phase (A/phase) or greater. Requirement R7 requires
responsible entities to develop corrective action plans if the GMD
vulnerability assessment concludes that the system does not meet the
performance requirements in Table 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.
    12. Calculation of the benchmark GMD event, against which
applicable entities must assess their facilities, is fundamental to
compliance with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Reliability Standard
TPL-007-1, Requirement R3 states that ``[e]ach responsible entity, as
determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System
steady state voltage performance for its System during the benchmark
GMD event described in Attachment 1.''
    13. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Attachment 1 states that the
benchmark GMD event is composed of four elements: (1) A reference peak
geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis
of historical magnetometer data; (2) a scaling factor to account for
local geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor to account for local
earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series
or wave shape to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on
equipment. The product of the first three elements is referred to as
the regional peak geoelectric field amplitude. The benchmark GMD event
defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows for a
GMD vulnerability assessment, which is required in Reliability Standard
TPL-007-1.\20\
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    \20\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirements R4 and R5.
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 does not set a threshold amount of
GIC flow that would constitute a vulnerable transformer. However, if
a transformer is calculated to experience a maximum effective GIC
flow during a benchmark GMD event of a least 75 A/phase, a thermal
impact assessment of that transformer is required. See Reliability
Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R6.

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    14. For the purpose of determining a benchmark event that specifies
what severity GMD events a responsible entity must assess for potential
impacts on the Bulk-Power System, NERC determined that a 1-in-100 year
GMD event would cause an 8 V/km reference peak geoelectric field
amplitude at 60 degree north geomagnetic latitude using Qu[eacute]bec's
earth conductivity.\21\ Scaling factors (i.e., multiplying values) are
applied to this reference peak geoelectric field amplitude to adjust
the 8 V/km value for different geomagnetic latitudes (scaling factors
between 0.1 and 1.0) and earth conductivities (scaling factors between
0.21 and 1.17). NERC identified a reference geomagnetic field time
series from an Ottawa, Ontario magnetic observatory during a 1989 GMD
storm affecting Qu[eacute]bec. NERC used this to estimate a time series
(i.e., 10-second values over a period of days) of the geoelectric field
that is representative of what is expected to occur at 60 degree
geomagnetic latitude during a 1-in-100 year GMD event. Such a time
series is used in some methods of calculating the vulnerability of a
transformer to damage from heating caused by GIC.
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    \21\ NERC used Qu[eacute]bec as the location for the reference
peak 1-in-100 year GMD event because of its proximity to 60 degree
geomagnetic latitude and its well understood earth model. By
creating scaling factors, each entity can scale this reference peak
geoelectric field and geoelectric field time series values to match
its own expected field conditions.
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    15. NERC used field measurements taken from the International
Monitor for Auroral Geomagnetic Effects (IMAGE) magnetometer chain,
which consists of 39 magnetometer stations in Northern Europe, for the
period 1993-2013 to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field
amplitude. As described in the 2016 NERC White Paper, to arrive at a
reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km, NERC ``spatially
averaged'' four different station groups each spanning a square area of
approximately 500 km (roughly 310 miles) in width.
2. Order No. 830
    16. On January 21, 2015, NERC submitted for Commission approval
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 in response to the directive in Order
No. 779 that NERC develop one or more Reliability Standards to address
the effects of GMD events on the electric grid.\22\ In Order No. 830,
the Commission approved Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, concluding that
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 addressed the Commission's directive by
requiring applicable Bulk-Power System owners and operators to conduct,
on a recurring five-year cycle, initial and ongoing vulnerability
assessments regarding the potential impact of a benchmark GMD event on
the Bulk-Power System as a whole and on Bulk-Power System components.
In addition, the Commission determined that Reliability Standard TPL-
007-1 requires applicable entities to develop and implement corrective
action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities identified through those
recurring vulnerability assessments and that potential mitigation
strategies identified in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 include, but
are not limited to, the installation, modification or removal of
transmission and generation facilities and associated equipment.
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    \22\ Order No. 779, 144 FERC ] 61,113 at P 54.
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    17. In Order No. 830, the Commission also determined that
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 should be modified. Specifically, Order
No. 830 directed NERC to develop and submit modifications to
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 concerning: (1) The calculation of the
reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark
GMD event definition; (2) the collection and public availability of
necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) deadlines for
completing corrective action plans and the mitigation measures called
for in corrective action plans. Order No. 830 directed NERC to develop
and submit these revisions for Commission approval within 18 months of
the effective date of Order No. 830.
    18. With respect to the calculation of the reference peak
geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event
definition, Order No. 830 expressed concern with relying solely on
spatial averaging in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 because ``the use
of spatial averaging in this context is new, and thus there is a dearth
of information or research regarding its application or appropriate
scale.'' \23\ While Order No. 830 directed that the peak geoelectric
field amplitude should not be based solely on spatially-averaged data,
the Commission indicated that this ``directive should not be construed
to prohibit the use of spatial averaging in some capacity, particularly
if more research results in a better understanding of how spatial
averaging can be used to reflect actual GMD events.'' \24\
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    \23\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 45.
    \24\ Id. P 46.
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D. NERC Petition and Reliability Standard TPL-007-2

    19. NERC states that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 enhances
currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by addressing
reliability risks posed by GMDs more effectively and implementing the
directives in Order No. 830.\25\ NERC asserts that Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2 reflects the latest in GMD understanding and provides a
technically sound and flexible approach to addressing the concerns
discussed in Order No. 830. NERC contends that the proposed
modifications enhance reliability by expanding GMD vulnerability
assessments to include severe, localized impacts and by implementing
deadlines and processes to maintain accountability in the development,
completion, and revision of corrective action plans developed to
address identified vulnerabilities. Further, NERC states that the
proposed modifications improve the availability of GMD monitoring data
that may be used to inform GMD vulnerability assessments.
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    \25\ Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is not attached to this
final rule. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is available on the
Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM18-
8-000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com.
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    20. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently-effective
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by requiring applicable entities to: (1)
Conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact
assessments in addition to the existing benchmark GMD vulnerability and
transformer thermal impact assessments required in Reliability Standard
TPL-007-1; (2) collect data from GIC monitors and magnetometers as
necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness; and (3)
develop necessary corrective action plans within one year from the
completion of the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment, include a
two-year deadline for the implementation of non-hardware mitigation,
and include a four-year deadline to complete hardware mitigation.\26\
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    \26\ Unless otherwise indicated, the requirements of Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 are substantively the same as the requirements in
currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.
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    21. In particular, Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies
Requirements R1 (identification of responsibilities), R2 (system and
GIC system models) and R3 (criteria for acceptable System steady state)
to extend the existing requirements pertaining to benchmark GMD
assessments to the new supplemental GMD assessments.

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 adds the newly mandated supplemental GMD
vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments in new
Requirements R8 (supplemental GMD vulnerability assessment), R9 (GIC
flow information needed for supplemental GMD thermal impact
assessments) and R10 (supplemental GMD thermal impact assessments). The
supplemental GMD event definition contains a higher, non-spatially-
averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component than the
benchmark GMD event definition (12 V/km versus 8 V/km). These three new
requirements largely mirror existing Requirements R4, R5, and R6 that
currently apply, and continue to apply, only to benchmark GMD
vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments.\27\
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    \27\ An exception is the qualifying threshold for transformers
required to undergo thermal impact assessments: For the supplemental
GMD assessment the qualifying threshold for transformers is a
maximum effective GIC value of 85 A/phase while the threshold for
benchmark GMD event assessments is 75 A/phase.
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    22. In addition, Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes two other
new requirements, Requirements R11 and R12, that require applicable
entities to gather GIC monitoring data (Requirement R11) and
magnetometer data (Requirement R12).
    23. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies existing Requirement R7
(corrective action plans) to create a one-year deadline for the
development of corrective action plans and two and four-year deadlines
to complete actions involving non-hardware and hardware mitigation,
respectively, for vulnerabilities identified in the benchmark GMD
assessment. The modifications to Requirement R7 include a provision
allowing for extension of deadlines if ``situations beyond the control
of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent
implementation of the [corrective action plan] within the timetable for
implementation.''

E. NOPR

    24. On May 17, 2018, the Commission issued a NOPR that proposed to
approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 as the Reliability Standard
largely addresses the directives in Order No. 830. However, the NOPR
identified two aspects of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 that are
inconsistent with Order No. 830: (1) The lack of any requirement to
develop and implement corrective action plans in response to assessed
supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities; and (2) a general allowance,
per proposed Requirement R7.4, of extensions of time to complete
corrective action plans as opposed to permitting extensions of time on
a case-by-case basis.
    25. Having identified these issues, the NOPR proposed to direct
NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop and submit
modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require applicable
entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate
vulnerabilities discovered through supplemental GMD vulnerability
assessments. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to submit the modified
Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective
date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. The NOPR also sought comment on
two options for addressing the Commission's concerns regarding the
potential for undue delay of mitigation because of the proposed time-
extension process in Requirement R7.4: (1) Direct NERC to bring
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 into alignment with Order No. 830
through a process whereby NERC or Regional Entities consider extensions
on a case-by-case basis using the information that must be submitted
under Requirement R7.4; or (2) approve the proposed provision without
directing modifications. Under either option, NERC would prepare and
submit a report regarding how often and why applicable entities are
exceeding corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.\28\
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    \28\ The NOPR proposed that the report, under the first option,
would also include statistics describing how often extension
requests were granted.
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    26. The Commission received NOPR comments from nine entities. We
address below the issues raised in the NOPR and comments as well as
NERC's revised GMD research work plan and the comments submitted in
response. The Appendix to this final rule lists the entities that filed
comments in both matters.

II. Discussion

    27. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission
approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 as just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. We conclude
that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is an improvement over currently-
effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and responds to the directives
in Order No. 830: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event definition, as
it pertains to the required GMD Vulnerability Assessments and
transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the definition is not
based solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) to require the collection
of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) to include a
one-year deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and two
and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non-
hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively.\29\
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    \29\ In its petition, NERC stated that it would address the
directive in Order No. 830 on the collection of GIC monitoring and
magnetometer data through a forthcoming NERC data request to
applicable entities pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of
Procedure rather than through a Reliability Standard requirement.
NERC Petition at 27. On February 7, 2018, NERC released a draft data
request for a 45-day comment period. The NERC Board of Trustees
(BOT) subsequently approved the GMD data request at the August 2018
BOT meeting.
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    28. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 complies with the directives in
Order No. 830 by requiring, in addition to the benchmark GMD event
vulnerability and thermal impact assessments, supplemental GMD
vulnerability and thermal impact assessments. The supplemental GMD
event definition in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 contains a non-
spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component
of 12 V/km, in contrast to the 8 V/km figure in the spatially-averaged
benchmark GMD event definition. As NERC explains in its petition, the
supplemental GMD event will be used to ``represent conditions
associated with localized enhancement of the geomagnetic field during a
severe GMD event for use in assessing GMD impacts.'' \30\ Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 therefore addresses the Commission's directive to
modify currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 so that the
benchmark GMD event does not rely solely on spatially-averaged data to
calculate the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude.
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    \30\ NERC Petition at 12.
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    29. As proposed in the NOPR, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA, we also determine that it is appropriate to direct NERC to develop
and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require
the development and completion of corrective action plans to mitigate
assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. Given that NERC has
acknowledged the potential for ``severe, localized impacts'' associated
with supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities, we see no basis for
requiring corrective action plans for benchmark GMD events but not for

supplemental GMD events.\31\ Based on the record in this proceeding,
there appear to be no technical barriers to developing or complying
with such a requirement. Moreover, as discussed below, the record
supports issuance of a directive at this time, notwithstanding NOPR
comments advocating postponement of any directive until after the
completion of additional GMD research, because relevant GMD research is
scheduled to be completed before the due date for submitting a modified
Reliability Standard. The Commission therefore adopts the NOPR proposal
and directs NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for
approval within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2.
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    \31\ NERC Petition at 4 (``these revisions would enhance
reliability by expanding GMD Vulnerability Assessments to include
severe, localized impacts and by implementing new deadlines and
processes to maintain accountability in the development, completion,
and revision of entity Corrective Action Plans developed to address
identified vulnerabilities'').
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    30. We also determine, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA,
that it is appropriate to direct that NERC develop further
modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4.
Under NERC's proposal, applicable entities are allowed, without prior
approval, to exceed deadlines for completing corrective action plan
tasks when ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity
[arise].'' \32\ Instead, as discussed below, we direct NERC to develop
a timely and efficient process, consistent with the Commission's
guidance in Order No. 830, to consider time extension requests on a
case-by-case basis. Our directive balances the availability of time
extensions when applicable entities are presented with the types of
uncontrollable delays identified in NERC's petition and NOPR comments
with the need to ensure that the mitigation of known GMD
vulnerabilities is not being improperly delayed through such requests.
Further, as proposed in the NOPR, we direct NERC to prepare and submit
a report addressing how often and why applicable entities are exceeding
corrective action plan deadlines as well as the disposition of time
extension requests. The report is due within 12 months from the date on
which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the
Commission will determine whether further action is necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ In the Supplemental Material section of Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2, examples of situations beyond the control of the
of the responsible entity include, but are not limited to, delays
resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
delays resulting from equipment lead times; or delays resulting from
the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    31. The Commission, as discussed below, also accepts the revised
GMD research work plan submitted by NERC on April 19, 2018.

A. Corrective Action Plan for Supplemental GMD Event Vulnerabilities
NOPR

    32. The NOPR proposed to determine that the absence of a
requirement to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities
is inconsistent with Order No. 830, and Order No. 779, because the
proposal does not require ``owners and operators [to] develop and
implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled
separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. The NOPR explained that the Commission was not persuaded by
NERC's justification that technical limitations--specifically the small
number of observations used to define the supplemental GMD event and
the availability of modeling tools to assist entities in assessing
vulnerabilities--make requiring mitigation premature at this time.\34\
The NOPR, instead, accepted NERC's statement that the supplemental GMD
event definition ``provides a technically justified method of assessing
vulnerabilities to the localized peak effects of severe GMD events.''
\35\ The NOPR also observed that mitigation of supplemental GMD event
vulnerabilities is appropriate because Reliability Standard TPL-007-2:
(1) Does not prescribe how applicable entities must perform such
studies, and thus may incorporate any uncertainties regarding the
geographic size of such events into their studies; (2) there are
commercially-available tools that could allow for modeling of
supplemental GMD events; and (3) other methods could be used within the
framework of the Reliability Standard to study planning areas (e.g.,
superposition or sensitivity studies) in conjunction with other power
system modeling tools. The NOPR further recognized that research tasks
under way pursuant to the GMD research work plan that are relevant to
the supplemental GMD event definition are scheduled to be completed in
2019 and the results of such research should inform the work of the
standard drafting team.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ The Commission also rejected the assertion in NERC's
petition that an evaluation of possible actions for supplemental GMD
events that result in Cascading is similar to the treatment of
extreme events in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 (Transmission
System Planning Performance Requirements).
    \35\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 35 (quoting NERC Petition at
13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments
    34. NERC does not support the proposed directive. NERC maintains
that the provision in Requirement R8.3 that requires applicable
entities to evaluate possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood
or mitigate the adverse impacts of a supplemental GMD event ``is not
merely advisory, but rather supports a range of potential mitigating
actions, such as additional hardware mitigation, operating procedures,
or other resilience actions to enhance recovery and restoration.'' \36\
NERC expounds on this by noting that the requirement to consider
mitigation in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 ``would directly support
mitigation that is required by [Reliability Standard EOP-010-1].'' \37\
NERC also contends that it ``anticipates that the Corrective Action
Plans, when needed to address performance requirements for the
benchmark GMD event, will also provide a large degree of protection to
the Bulk-Power System for events with locally-enhanced geomagnetic
fields.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ NERC Comments at 9.
    \37\ Id. at 10.
    \38\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. NERC's comments reiterate the rationale in its petition that
requiring mitigation ``would result in the de facto replacement of the
benchmark GMD event with the proposed supplemental GMD event.'' \39\
NERC maintains that ``while the supplemental GMD event is strongly
supported by data and analysis in ways that mirror the benchmark GMD
event, there are aspects of it that are less definitive than the
benchmark GMD event and less appropriate as the basis of requiring
Corrective Action Plans.'' \40\ NERC also claims that the uncertainty
of geographic size of the supplemental GMD event could not be addressed
adequately by sensitivity analysis or through other methods because
there are ``inherent sources of modeling uncertainty (e.g., earth
conductivity model, substation grounding grid resistance values,
transformer thermal and magnetic response models) . . . [and]
introducing additional variables

for sensitivity analysis, such as the size of the localized
enhancement, may not improve the accuracy of GMD Vulnerability
Assessments.'' \41\ NERC further states that ``commercially-available
modeling tools now advertise capabilities that could be used to model
localized GMD enhancements, [but] to NERC's knowledge these
capabilities have not been used extensively by planners, nor have the
different software tools been benchmarked for consistency in results.''
\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Id. at 11-12; see also id. at 14 (``many entities would
likely employ the most conservative approach for conducting
supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, which would be to apply
extreme peak values uniformly over an entire planning area'').
    \40\ Id. at 13.
    \41\ Id. at 15.
    \42\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. NERC contends that completing the GMD work plan is a better
alternative to the NOPR directive. Moreover, NERC states that it
``commits to initiate a review of TPL-007-2 following the completion of
the GMD Research Work Plan to evaluate whether the standard continues
to be supported by the available knowledge or whether additional
refinements are necessary . . . [which] could result in modifications
to, or additional support for, the proposed supplemental GMD event, and
thereby inform what the TPL-007 standard should require in terms of
mitigation based on supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.'' \43\
In response to the NOPR's statement that the results of the GMD
research work plan may inform the work of the standard drafting team
tasked with carrying out the Commission's proposed directive, NERC
comments state that ``it expects that the last of the project's
deliverables will be ready by early 2020 . . . [but] [a]ny scientific
research project schedule, however, must account for the possibility
that additional time may be needed to explore potential findings or
amend project approaches to provide more useful results.'' \44\ NERC
states that while the technical report for Task 1 is scheduled to be
completed by the fourth quarter of 2019 according to the revised GMD
research work plan, NERC estimates that it will file a report with the
Commission, after allowing a period of public comment, six months later
(i.e., mid-2020).\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Id. at 18.
    \44\ Id. at 17.
    \45\ Revised GMD Research Work Plan at 5 (``NERC expects to
submit [informational filings with the Commission] approximately six
months following EPRI's completion of the associated technical
report(s)''); id., Attachment 1 (Order No. 830 GMD Research Work
Plan (April 2018)) at 7 (identifying ``Q4 2019'' as the estimated
completion date of ``Final technical report to provide additional
technical support for the existing supplementary (localized)
benchmark; or, propose update to the benchmark, as appropriate'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Trade Associations, Idaho Power, NE ISO, TVA and BPA do not
support the proposed directive. They contend that requiring corrective
action plans for supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities: (1) May be
premature given the limited data regarding localized GMD events; (2)
would address low-probability events that are unlikely to affect a wide
area; and (3) could impose costs on applicable entities that outweigh
the potential benefits of such a directive. Like NERC, these commenters
support completing the GMD research work plan before considering
mandating corrective action plans for supplemental GMD event
vulnerabilities. Idaho Power, moreover, contends that it would be
better for registered entities to gain experience with corrective
action plans for benchmark GMD events before mandating corrective
action plans for supplemental GMD events. Trade Associations state that
instead of the NOPR directive, any Commission directive should be
limited to requiring NERC to develop ``a study of the mitigation
measures deployed and the effectiveness of these measures to mitigate
benchmark GMD events before mandating mitigation measures on more
localized events.'' \46\ Similarly, BPA maintains that instead of the
NOPR directive, in order to assess the costs and benefits of requiring
corrective action plans for supplemental GMD events, the Commission
should require NERC to file periodic reports on supplemental GMD events
and the possible actions to mitigate them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Trade Associations Comments at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. Resilient Societies and Reclamation support the NOPR directive.
Reclamation states, and Resilient Societies concurs, that ``[a]n
exercise to only identify vulnerabilities arising from localized GMD
events is not a cost-effective use of resources unless accompanied by
activities to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Reclamation Comments at 1; Resilient Societies Comments at
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    39. Pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission adopts
the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to develop and submit modifications
to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require corrective action plans
for assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. While Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 requires applicable entities to assess supplemental
GMD event vulnerabilities, it does not require corrective action plans
to address assessed vulnerabilities. Instead, Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2, Requirement R8.3 only requires applicable entities to make ``an
evaluation of possible actions to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the
consequences and adverse impacts of the events if a supplemental GMD
event is assessed to result in Cascading.'' As the Commission observed
in the NOPR, NERC's proposal differs significantly from Order No. 830
because the intent of the directive was not only to identify
vulnerabilities arising from localized GMD events but also to mitigate
such vulnerabilities.
    40. The comments opposing the NOPR directive offer two rationales
for approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 without directing
modifications at this time: (1) Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 provides
sufficient protection against supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities;
and (2) requiring mitigation of supplemental GMD events is premature at
this time.
    41. With respect to the first rationale, NERC observes that the
provision requiring applicable entities to consider supplemental GMD
event mitigation is not ``merely advisory.'' However, there is no
dispute that an applicable entity must ``consider'' mitigation under
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. What is significant is that after
having done so, an applicable entity has no obligation under
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to implement mitigation even if the
applicable entity ``considered'' mitigation necessary to address an
assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerability.
    42. NERC also maintains that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
requires transmission operators to ``develop, maintain, and implement a
GMD Operating Procedure or Operating Process to mitigate the effects of
GMD events on the reliable operation of its respective system.'' And in
Order No. 779, the Commission determined that ``while the development
of the required mitigation plan [for benchmark GMD event
vulnerabilities] cannot be limited to considering operational
procedures or enhanced training alone, operational procedures and
enhanced training may be sufficient if that is verified by the
vulnerability assessments.'' \48\ Again, NERC's point does not resolve
the Commission's concern because Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 does
not ensure mitigation of all supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities
assessed under Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. That is because: (1)
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 applies, in relevant part, only to

transmission operators (viz., it does not apply to other applicable
entity types, such as planning coordinators, transmission planners and
generator owners, subject to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2); and (2)
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 does not require mitigation if the
supplemental GMD event vulnerability cannot be addressed through
operational procedures or enhanced training alone. Thus, Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1 does not ensure satisfactory mitigation or provide
an adequate substitute for mitigation as contemplated in Order No. 830.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. In addition, NERC asserts that the required mitigation of
benchmark GMD event vulnerabilities could also address supplemental GMD
event vulnerabilities. Of course that may occur in some circumstances,
but that is not a substitute for requiring mitigation to the extent
that benchmark GMD event mitigation does not completely address a
supplemental GMD event vulnerability. Under Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2 there is currently no requirement to mitigate the remaining
vulnerability to the Bulk-Power System.
    44. Regarding the second rationale in the NOPR comments, NERC and
other commenters reiterate the assertion in NERC's petition that it
would be premature, from a technical standpoint, to require corrective
action plans to address supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. As
reflected in the comment summary, these commenters instead request that
NERC complete the GMD research work plan and then produce a report that
assesses the possible need for modifications to Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2.
    45. The NOPR discussed how a standard drafting team could use new
information gathered through the GMD research work plan to develop a
modified Reliability Standard. The Commission noted that Task 1 of the
GMD research work plan (Further Analyze Spatial Averaging Used in the
Benchmark GMD Event), which encompasses localized GMD event research,
would be delivered in 2019 according to the most recent version of the
GMD research work plan (i.e., the revised GMD research work plan). The
NOPR stated that ``[s]uch GMD research on localized events should
inform the standard development process and aid applicable entities
when implementing a modified Reliability Standard.'' \49\ While we
appreciate that the informational filing for Task 1 may not be
submitted to the Commission prior to the deadline for submitting a
modified Reliability Standard, the underlying research in Task 1 is
scheduled to be completed before then. As such, the standard drafting
team and personnel working on the GMD research work plan could operate
in parallel and share information to ensure that research relevant to
the Commission's directive is incorporated into the modified
Reliability Standard. Thus we are not persuaded by the comments seeking
a delay of our directive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. We are not persuaded by the other points raised by commenters
to support their assertion that requiring corrective action plans is
premature. First, NERC assumes that under such a requirement ``many''
applicable entities will adopt a ``conservative approach'' and use the
supplemental GMD event definition in all GMD vulnerability assessments,
thus effectively supplanting the benchmark GMD event definition. NERC
bases this assumption on the standard drafting team's ``extensive
experience in system planning and the relative immaturity of tools and
methods for modeling localized enhancements.'' \50\ NERC acknowledges
the discussion in the NOPR on how uncertainties regarding the
supplemental GMD event definition--in particular the geographic size of
localized events--are ameliorated by the flexibility afforded by
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Specifically, Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2 permits applicable entities to apply the supplemental GMD event
definition to an entire planning area or any subset of a planning area.
However, NERC asserts that even with this flexibility, at least some
applicable entities would default to using the supplemental GMD event
definition in an overly-broad manner. Notwithstanding NERC's assertion,
nothing in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 requires applicable entities
to apply the supplemental GMD event definition to an entire planning
area or otherwise supplant the benchmark GMD event definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ NERC Comments at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. With respect to the statement in the NOPR that modeling tools
are currently available to support corrective action plans, NERC admits
that ``some commercially-available modeling tools now advertise
capabilities that could be used to model localized GMD enhancements.''
\51\ However, NERC contends that to its ``knowledge these capabilities
have not been used extensively by planners, nor have the different
software tools been benchmarked for consistency in result.'' \52\ Given
that GMDs have only recently been addressed in the Reliability
Standards and there is currently no requirement to model and assess,
let alone mitigate, localized GMD events, it is not unexpected that
these modeling tools have not been used extensively for that purpose.
Moreover, NERC does not assert that existing tools are incapable of
performing the desired modeling function.\53\ Thus, NERC's objections
on this point are not persuasive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Id. at 15.
    \52\ Id. at 15-16.
    \53\ See also Trade Associations Comments at 8 (``Although
current tools are available to model localized events, we understand
that such modeling will require significant time as the processes
involved are still largely manual, making it difficult to develop
accurate, system-wide models that appropriately consider the
localized impacts of the supplemental GMD event.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. NERC does not offer support for its comment in response to the
NOPR's observation that sensitivity analysis can serve, among other
methods, as a method to refine the geographic scope of localized GMD
impacts on planning areas. NERC responds that it ``does not believe
that concerns regarding the uncertainty of the geographic size of the
supplemental GMD event could be addressed adequately by sensitivity
analysis or though other methods in planning studies.'' \54\ NERC
claims there are already inherent sources of modeling uncertainty and
that introducing another variable, such as the size of the localized
enhancement, ``may not improve the accuracy of the GMD Vulnerability
Analysis.'' \55\ And yet NERC's concern implies that the benchmark GMD
event contains a geographic domain that does not itself inject
uncertainties. However, as the Commission stated in Order No. 830, the
geographic area for spatial averaging in the benchmark GMD event
definition is itself a ``subjective'' figure.\56\ Indeed, in Order No.
830, as part of the GMD research work plan directive, to address the
uncertainties surrounding the geographic scale of spatial averaging,
the Commission directed that NERC should ``further analyze the area
over which spatial averaging should be calculated for stability
studies, including performing sensitivity analyses on squares less than
500 km per side (e.g., 100 km, 200 km),'' which NERC is addressing in
Task 1.\57\ As

such, we see no basis, technical or otherwise, for not requiring
corrective action plans for assessed supplemental GMD event
vulnerabilities while requiring corrective action plans for assessed
benchmark GMD event vulnerabilities consistent with the Commission's
directions in Order Nos. 779 and 830. Accordingly, the Commission is
not persuaded by the arguments of NERC and other commenters for the
reasons discussed above, and directs that NERC develop modifications to
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require corrective action plans for
assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ NERC Comments at 15.
    \55\ Id.
    \56\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 45 (quoting
Pulkkinen, A., Bernabeu, E., Eichner, J., Viljanen, A., Ngwira, C.,
``Regional-Scale High-Latitude Extreme Geoelectric Fields Pertaining
to Geomagnetically Induced Currents,'' Earth, Planets and Space at 2
(June 19, 2015)).
    \57\ Id. P 26; see also revised GMD Research Work Plan (Task 1)
at 6 (``further analyze the area over which spatial averaging should
be used in stability studies and transformer thermal assessments by
performing GIC analysis on squares less than 500 km per side (e.g.,
100 km, 200 km) and using the results to perform power flow and
transformer thermal assessments'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Corrective Action Plan Deadline Extensions

NOPR
    49. The NOPR stated that Requirement R7.4 of Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2 differs from Order No. 830 by allowing applicable entities to
``revise'' or ``update'' corrective action plans to extend deadlines.
This provision contrasts with the guidance in Order No. 830 that ``NERC
should consider extensions of time on a case-by-case basis.'' While
agreeing that there should be a mechanism for allowing extensions of
corrective action plan implementation deadlines, the NOPR expressed
concern with unnecessary delays in implementing protection against GMD
threats.
    50. The NOPR identified two options for addressing Requirement
R7.4. Under the first option, the Commission would, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, direct NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2 to comport with Order No. 830, by requiring that NERC and the
Regional Entities, as appropriate, consider requests for extension of
time on a case-by-case basis. Under this option, responsible entities
seeking an extension would submit the information required by
Requirement R7.4 to NERC and the Regional Entities for their
consideration of the request. The Commission would also direct NERC to
prepare and submit a report addressing the disposition of any such
requests, as well as information regarding how often and why applicable
entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines following
implementation of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Under such a
directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months from the date
on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the
Commission would determine whether further action is necessary. Under
the second option, the Commission would approve proposed Requirement
R7.4 but also direct NERC to prepare and submit the report described in
the first option (without the statistics on disposition). Following
receipt of the report, the Commission would determine whether further
action is necessary.
Comments
    51. NERC supports the second option in the NOPR. NERC contends that
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 ``provides clarity and certainty
regarding when an entity may extend a Corrective Action Plan mitigation
deadline and what steps must be followed to maintain accountability and
thus compliance with the standard.'' \58\ NERC also maintains that the
proposal ``avoids the administrative burden, uncertainty, and further
delay that could be associated with implementing a new ERO adjudication
process, such as one that would be dedicated to evaluating GMD
Corrective Action Plan deadline extensions on a case-by-case basis. ''
\59\ To address concerns regarding the possible abuse of deadline
extensions, NERC states that as ``part of the compliance monitoring and
enforcement activities for the proposed standard, NERC and Regional
Entity staff would exercise their authority to review the
reasonableness of any Corrective Action Plan delay, including reviewing
the `situations beyond the control of the responsible entity' that are
cited as causing the delay.'' \60\ As noted in the Supplemental
Material section of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, NERC explains that
examples of such situations include ``lengthy legal or regulatory
processes, stakeholder processes required by tariff, or long equipment
lead times.'' \61\ NERC, moreover, ``agrees that a report describing
the results of NERC's monitoring of this provision could provide useful
information . . . [and] therefore commits to prepare and submit to the
Commission a report that describes how often and the reasons why
entities in the United States are exceeding Corrective Action Plan
deadlines.'' \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ NERC Comments at 20.
    \59\ Id.
    \60\ Id. at 20-21.
    \61\ Id. at 20.
    \62\ Id. at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    52. Trade Associations, BPA, ISO NE, Idaho Power, and TVA support
the second option and echo the rationale for adopting the second option
in NERC's comments. Trade Associations explain that while they
previously supported a case-by-case exception process, they now believe
NERC's proposal to be more efficient and effective. Trade Associations
contend that a case-by-case approach would ``only increase
administrative tasks for NERC and applicable entities . . . [and] would
further delay any actions to mitigate rather than expedite the approval
process.'' \63\ Trade Associations also maintain that Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 ``will not delay mitigation because this requirement
is only applicable if circumstances are beyond the entity's control.''
\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Trade Associations Comments at 13.
    \64\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    53. Reclamation does not appear to support modifying Requirement R7
to institute a case-by-case time extension process. However,
Reclamation comments that the sub-requirement in Requirement R7.4.1
requiring documentation of reasons for delaying corrective action plans
should be eliminated because it ``is merely a compliance exercise and
does not improve Bulk Electric System reliability.'' Reclamation makes
the same contention regarding the sub-requirement in Requirement R7.4.2
that a revised corrective action plan describe the original corrective
action plan.
Commission Determination
    54. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4 differs from
Order No. 830 by allowing applicable entities, under certain
conditions, to extend corrective action plan implementation deadlines
without prior approval. This conflicts with the Commission's guidance
in Order No. 830 that, using its compliance discretion, ``NERC should
consider extensions of time on a case-by-case basis.'' \65\ Based on
our consideration of the record, we believe that the case-by-case
review process contemplated by Order No. 830 is the appropriate means
for considering extension requests. Accordingly, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, we direct that NERC develop modifications to
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to replace the time-extension provision
in Requirement R7.4 with a process through which extensions of time are
considered on a case-by-case basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    55. At the outset, we note that the extension process in
Requirement R7.4

applies only to the implementation of corrective action plans and not
to the development of corrective action plans.\66\ NERC and other
commenters supportive of the second option in the NOPR urge approval of
Requirement R7.4 without modification largely because of the perceived
uncertainty and burden associated with treating extension requests on a
case-by-case basis. While it is true that granting extensions on a
case-by-case basis involves more uncertainty and potential burdens
versus the automatic extension of time afforded by Requirement R7.4, we
must weigh this against the potential for abuse of Requirement R7.4 to
unduly delay mitigation, as well as the delayed visibility that NERC
would have into the deployment of needed GMD protections. Presented
with these competing concerns, we conclude that the imperative to
address known GMD vulnerabilities in a timely manner, and without
unwarranted delays, is more compelling. We recognize that applicable
entities that have a legitimate need for extensions require timely
responses from NERC and Regional Entities, as appropriate. Accordingly,
we expect that the extension process developed by NERC in response to
our directive will be timely and efficient such that applicable
entities will receive prompt responses after submitting to NERC or a
Regional Entity, as appropriate, the extension request and associated
information described in Requirement R7.4.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4 (``[t]he
[corrective action plan] shall . . . [b]e revised if situations
beyond the control of the responsible entity . . . prevent
implementation of the [corrective action plan] within the timetable
for implementation'').
    \67\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    56. In reaching our determination on this issue, we considered
NERC's NOPR comments, which attempted to address the concerns with
Requirement R7.4 expressed in the NOPR, stating that NERC and Regional
Entity compliance and enforcement staff will review the reasonableness
of any delay in implementing corrective action plans, including
reviewing the asserted ``situations beyond the control of the
responsible entity'' cited by the applicable entity, and by citing
specific examples of the types of delays that might justify the
invocation of Requirement R7.4. NERC's comments also characterized
Requirement R7.4 as being ``not so flexible . . . as to allow entities
to extend Corrective Action Plan deadlines indefinitely or for any
reason whatsoever.'' \68\ We generally agree with the standard of
review that NERC indicates it will use to determine whether an
extension of time to implement a corrective action plan is appropriate.
However, the assessment of whether an extension of time is warranted is
more appropriately made before an applicable entity is permitted to
delay mitigation of a known GMD vulnerability. While NERC indicates
that under proposed Requirement R7.4 there are compliance consequences
for improperly delaying mitigation, mitigation of a known GMD
vulnerability will nonetheless have been delayed, and we conclude it is
important that any proposed delay be reviewed ahead of time. Therefore,
we direct NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement
R7.4 to develop a timely and efficient process, consistent with the
Commission's guidance in Order No. 830, to consider time extension
requests on a case-by-case basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ NERC Comments at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    57. We disagree with Reclamation's comment regarding Requirement
R7.4.1, which requires a description of the circumstances necessitating
mitigation delays, because it is at odds with NERC's NOPR comments,
discussed above, in which NERC states that NERC and Regional Entities
will review the reasons for delaying mitigation. Contrary to
Reclamation's assertion that this requirement is ``merely a
documentation exercise and does not improve [bulk electric system]
reliability,'' unreasonable delays of mitigation could harm bulk
electric system reliability by leaving it vulnerable to GMDs. Moreover,
Requirement R7.4.2, also opposed by Reclamation, requiring that revised
corrective action plans describe the original and previous revisions,
provides compliance enforcement authorities with a revision history of
the corrective action plan in a single document, thus facilitating
compliance review.

C. Other Issues Raised in NOPR Comments

    58. Resilient Societies' comments raise three issues not addressed
in the NOPR. First, Resilient Societies maintains that transformers
that experience an estimated GIC above 15 A/phase should be subject to
mandatory corrective action plans and the Commission should ``encourage
owner-operators and their research partners to develop `Corrective
Action Plans' for both [extra high voltage] transformers and for
associated generation stations, even if these long replacement-time
systems experience overstress at levels significantly below 75 amps per
phase.'' Second, Resilient Societies states that the Commission should
encourage best practices by industry beyond the mandatory requirements
of the Reliability Standards, including allowing cost recovery for such
practices. Third, Resilient Societies states that the Commission should
address combined GMD and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection.
    59. In Order No. 830, the Commission approved the 75 A/phase
threshold in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 based on the record and
despite objections from certain commenters. The Commission, however,
directed further study of this issue as part of the GMD research work
plan. Resilient Societies' comments provide no new basis for revisiting
this issue at this time. Moreover, as reflected in the NOPR proposal,
NERC has adequately supported the 85 A/phase threshold proposed in
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for the supplemental GMD event analysis.
However, new information resulting from the GMD research work plan will
also be relevant to this higher threshold. We will consider such
research at the appropriate time.
    60. In Order No. 830, the Commission stated that ``cost recovery
for prudent costs associated with or incurred to comply with
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and future revisions to the Reliability
Standard will be available to registered entities.'' \69\ It is
therefore beyond the scope of this proceeding to determine, as a
general matter, whether voluntary measures beyond those required to
comply with the governing Reliability Standards are eligible for cost
recovery. That said, jurisdictional entities may of course pursue such
voluntary measures, and the Commission would consider appropriate cost
recovery for those investments through a formula rate or other rate
proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    61. The Commission in previous orders has indicated that the
Commission's GMD proceedings are not directed to EMPs and thus
Resilient Societies' comments on EMP are out-of-scope.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See, e.g., Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Revised GMD Research Work Plan

    62. On April 19, 2018, NERC submitted a revised GMD research work
plan in response to a Commission order issued on October 19, 2017.\71\
In the October 19 Order, the Commission accepted the initial GMD
research work

plan filed by NERC on May 30, 2017. The Commission also directed NERC
to file a final GMD research work plan within six months and ensure
that the final GMD research work plan included a reevaluation of
reliance on single station readings when adjusting for latitude as part
of the benchmark GMD event definition. At NERC's request, the October
19 Order also provided guidance on how NERC should prioritize the tasks
in the GMD research work plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned
Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, 161 FERC ] 61,048
(2017) (October 19 Order).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    63. Bardin and Resilient Societies submitted comments in response
to the revised GMD research work plan, which largely focused on a
request for combined research on GMDs and EMPs. As discussed above,
however, EMPs are outside the scope of the Commission's directive
regarding GMD research. Resilient Societies also submitted comments
criticizing aspects of five tasks in the revised GMD research work
plan. With respect to Tasks 1, 2, 8 and 9, Resilient Societies'
criticism is based on the contention that the ``real-world data'' will
not be used to verify models. For example, Resilient Societies contends
that NERC will not use ``real-world'' GIC data to validate spatial
averaging (Task 1) or latitude scaling (Task 2). These assertions,
however, are refuted by the revised GMD research work plan. The revised
GMD research work plan indicates that the research on spatial averaging
includes an analysis of ``a large number (10-20) of localized extreme
events and collection of both ground-based and space-based data around
the times of these events.'' \72\ For latitude scaling, the revised GMD
research work plan states that NERC will evaluate the scaling factor
``using existing models and developing new models to extrapolate, from
historical data, the potential scaling of a 1-in-100 year GMD event on
lower geomagnetic latitudes.'' \73\ In addition, NERC indicates that
the data gathered through the Section 1600 data request ``will help
validate various models used in calculating GIC's and assessing their
impacts in data systems.'' \74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ Revised GMD Research Work Plan, Attachment 1 (Order No. 830
GMD Research Work Plan (April 2018)) at 2.
    \73\ Id. at 8.
    \74\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    64. Resilient Societies other comments are directed to an alleged
lack of specificity, granularity or ``scientific assurance'' in the
testing described in Tasks 5, 8 and 9 of the revised GMD research work
plan. These criticisms are misplaced as they demand an unreasonable
degree of detail in the revised GMD research work plan. For example,
regarding Task 5, NERC states that it will ``validate[e] existing
transformer tools with all data that is presently available and with
upcoming field/laboratory test results.'' \75\ Resilient Societies,
however, contends unpersuasively that ``NERC neglects to specify `all
data that is presently available' . . . and the number of transformers
to be employed in `upcoming field laboratory test results' and also
neglects to disclose details of the test protocols to be used.'' \76\
Regarding harmonics (Tasks 8 and 9), Task 9 specifically includes
``tank vibration measurements,'' not just simulations.\77\ Moreover,
Task 8 (Improving Harmonic Analysis Capabilities) is intended to
develop more basic information than some of the other tasks in the
revised GMD research work plan where industry has more knowledge. As
with all of the revised GMD research work plan tasks (with the
exception of Task 6, which deals with the Section 1600 data request),
NERC will submit a report to the Commission on its findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Id. at 17.
    \76\ Resilient Societies Comments on Revised GMD Research Work
Plan at 11.
    \77\ Id. at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    65. As the revised GMD research work plan complies with Order No.
830 and the Commission's October 19 Order, we accept the revised GMD
research work plan.

III. Information Collection Statement

    66. The collection of information contained in this final rule is
subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under
section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\78\ OMB's
regulations require review and approval of certain information
collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\79\ Upon approval of a
collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and an
expiration date. Respondents subject to the information collection
requirements of a rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to
the collection of information unless the collection of information
displays a valid OMB control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
    \79\ 5 CFR part 1320 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    67. In the NOPR, the Commission solicited comments on the need for
this information, whether the information will have practical utility,
the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected or retained,
and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including
the use of automated information techniques. Specifically, the
Commission asked that any revised burden or cost estimates submitted by
commenters be supported by sufficient detail to understand how the
estimates were generated. The Commission did not receive any comments
regarding the Commission's burden estimates.
    68. The Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, which
replaces currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. When
compared to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2 maintains the current information collection requirements,
modifies existing Requirements R1 through R7 and adds new requirements
in Requirements R8 through R12.
    69. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes new corrective action
plan development and implementation deadlines in Requirement R7, new
supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact
assessments in Requirements R8 through R10, and requirements for
applicable entities to gather magnetometer and GIC monitored data in
Requirements R11 and R12. Deadlines in Requirement R7 for the
development and implementation of corrective action plans would only
change the timeline of such documentation and are not expected to
revise the burden to applicable entities. The burden estimates for new
Requirements R8 through R10 are expected to be similar to the burden
estimates for Requirements R4 through R6 in currently-effective
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 due to the closely-mirrored
requirements.\80\ The Commission expects that only 25 percent or fewer
of transmission owners and generator owners would have to complete a
supplemental transformer thermal impact assessment per Requirement R10.
Requirements R11 and R12 require applicable entities to have a process
to collect GIC and magnetometer data from meters in planning
coordinator planning areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ NERC Petition at 14-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Public Reporting Burden: The burden and cost estimates below are
based on the changes to the reporting and recordkeeping burden imposed
by Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Our estimates for the number of
respondents are based on the NERC Compliance Registry as of March 3,
2018, which indicates there are 183 entities registered as transmission
planner (TP), 65 planning coordinators (PC), 330 transmission owners
(TO), 944 generator owners (GO) within the United States. However, due
to significant overlap, the

total number of unique affected entities (i.e., entities registered as
a transmission planner, planning coordinator, transmission owner or
generator owner, or some combination of these functional entities) is
1,130 entities. This includes 188 entities that are registered as a
transmission planner or planning coordinator (applicability for
Requirements R7 to R9 and R11 to R12), and 1,119 entities registered as
a transmission or generation owner (applicability for Requirement R10).
Given the assumption above, there is an expectation that at most only
25 percent of the 1,119 entities (or 280 entities) will have to
complete compliance activities for Requirement R10. The estimated
burden and cost are as follow.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) figures for May 2017 (Sector 22, Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits for December
2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate
that an Electrical Engineer (NAICS code 17-2071) would perform the
functions associated with reporting requirements, at an average
hourly cost (for wages and benefits) of $66.90 The functions
associated with recordkeeping requirements, we estimate, would be
performed by a File Clerk (NAICS code 43-4071) at an average hourly
cost of $32.04 for wages and benefits.
    The estimated burden and cost are in addition to the burden and
cost that are associated with the existing requirements in
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (and in the current OMB-approved
inventory), which would continue under Reliability Standard TPL-007-
2.
    The requirements for NERC to provide reports to the Commission
and to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-
007-2 are already covered under FERC-725 (OMB Control No. 1902-
0225).

                                             FERC-725N, Changes Due to Final Rule in Docket No. RM18-8 82 83
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Total annual
                                                      Annual number of     Total number of      Average burden       burden hrs. &         Cost per
        Requirement (R)          Number and type of     responses per      responses  (1) x     hrs. & cost per   total  annual cost    respondent ($)
                                  respondents  (1)     respondent  (2)        (2) = (3)          response  (4)      (rounded)  (3) x       (5) / (1)
                                                                                (4) = (5)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R1 through R6 \84\.............  No change.........  No change.........  No change..........  No change.........  No change.........  No change
R7.............................  188 (PC and TP)...  1/5 (once for       37.6...............  Rep. 5 hrs.,        Rep. 188 hrs.,      Rep. 1 hr.,
                                                      every five year                          $334.50; RK 5       $12,577; RK 188     $66.90; RK 1 hr.,
                                                      study).                                  hrs., $160.20.      hrs., $6,023.       $32.04
R8.............................  188 (PC and TP)...  1/5 (once for       37.6...............  Rep., 27 hrs.,      Rep. 1,015 hrs.,    Rep., 5.4 hrs.,
                                                      every five year                          $1,806.30; RK, 21   $67,917; RK 790     $361.26; RK 4.2
                                                      study).                                  hrs., $672.84.      hrs., $25,299.      hrs., $134.57
R9.............................  188 (PC and TP)...  1/5 (once for       37.6...............  Rep. 9 hrs.,        Rep. 338 hrs.,      Rep. 1.8 hrs.,
                                                      every five year                          $602.10; RK 7       $22,639; RK 263     $120.42; RK 1.4
                                                      study).                                  hrs., $224.28.      hrs., $8,432.       hrs., $44.85
R10............................  280 (25% of 1,119)  1/5 (once for       56.................  Rep. 22 hrs.,       Rep. 1,232 hrs.,    Rep. 4.4 hrs.,
                                  (GO and TO).        every five year                          $1,471.80; RK 18    $82,421; RK 1,008   $294.36; RK 3.6
                                                      study).                                  hrs., $576.72.      hrs., $32,296.      hrs., $115.34
R11............................  188 (PC and TP)...  1 (on-going         188................  Rep. 10 hrs.,       Rep. 1,880 hrs.,    Rep. 10 hrs.,
                                                      reporting).                              $669; RK. 10        $125,772; RK        $669; RK 10 hrs.,
                                                                                hrs., $320.40.      1,880 hrs.,         $320.40
                                                                                $60,235.
R12............................  188 (PC and TP)...  1 (on-going         188................  Rep. 10 hrs.,       Rep. 1,880 hrs.     Rep. 10 hrs.,
                                                      reporting).                              $669; RK. 10        $125,772; RK        $669; RK 10 hrs.,
                                                                                hrs., 320.40.       1,880 hrs.,         $320.40
                                                                                $60,235.
Total Additional Hrs. and Cost   ..................  ..................  ...................  ..................  Rep., 6,533 hrs.,   ..................
 (rounded), due to Final Rule                                                                                $437,057; RK
 in RM18-8.                                                                                6,009 hrs.,
                                                                                $192,528.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: TPL Reliability
Standards
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Rep.=reporting requirements; RK-recordkeeping requirements
(Evidence Retention).
    \83\ For each Reliability Standard, the Measure shows the
acceptable evidence (Reporting Requirement) for the associated
Requirement (R numbers), and the Compliance section details the
related Recordkeeping Requirement.
    \84\ While Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 extends the
requirements in existing Reliability Standard TPL-007-1,
Requirements R1 through R3 to the newly required supplemental GMD
event analyses, the obligation to conduct the supplemental GMD event
analyses is found in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirements R8
through R10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Action: Revisions to an existing collection of information
    OMB Control No: 1902-0264
    Respondents: Business or other for profit, and not for profit
institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: \85\ Every five years (for Requirement R7-
R10), annually (for Requirement R11 and R12), and ongoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ The frequency of Requirements R1 through R6 in Reliability
Standard TPL-007-2 is unchanged from the existing requirements in
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Necessity of the Information: Reliability Standard TPL-007-2
implements the Congressional mandate of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards to better
ensure the reliability of the nation's Bulk-Power System. Specifically,
these requirements address the threat posed by GMD events to the Bulk-
Power System and conform to the Commission's directives to modify
Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as directed in Order No. 830.
    Internal review: The Commission has reviewed Reliability Standard
TPL-007-2, and made a determination that its action is necessary to
implement section 215 of the FPA. The Commission has assured itself, by
means of its internal review, that there is specific, objective support
for the burden estimates associated with the information requirements.
    70. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Office of the Executive Director, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC
20426

[Attention: Ellen Brown, email: [email protected], phone: (202)
502-8663, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>].
    71. Comments concerning the collection of information and the
associated burden estimate should be sent to the Commission in this
docket and may also be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission]. Due to security concerns, comments should be
sent electronically to the following email address:
[email protected]. Comments submitted to OMB should refer to
FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264.

IV. Environmental Analysis

    72. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\86\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\87\ The actions here fall
within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987)
(cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284).
    \87\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    73. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \88\ generally
requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The definition of small business is provided by the Small Business
Administration (SBA) at 13 CFR 121.201. The threshold for a small
utility (using SBA's sub-sector 221) is based on the number of
employees for a concern and its affiliates. As discussed above,
Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 applies to a total of 1,130 unique
planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners, and
generation owners.\89\ A small utility (and its affiliates) is defined
as having no more than the following number of employees:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12.
    \89\ In the NERC Registry, there are approximately 65 PCs, 188
TPs, 944 GOs, and 330 TOs (in the United States), which will be
affected by this final rule. Because some entities serve in more
than one role, these figures involve some double counting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     For planning coordinators, transmission planners, and
transmission owners (NAICS code 221121, Electric Bulk Power
Transmission and Control), a maximum of 500 employees
     for generator owners, a maximum of 750 employees.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ The maximum number of employees for a generator owner (and
its affiliates) to be ``small'' varies from 250 to 750 employees,
depending on the type of generation (e.g., hydroelectric, nuclear,
fossil fuel, wind). For this analysis, we use the most conservative
threshold of 750 employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    74. As estimated in the NOPR, the total cost to all entities (large
and small) is $629,585 annually (or an average of $1,345.27 for each of
the estimated 468 entities affected annually). For the estimated 280
generator owners and transmission owners affected annually, the average
cost would be $409.70 per year. For the estimated 188 planning
coordinators and transmission planners, the estimated average annual
cost would be $2,738.84. The estimated annual cost to each affected
entity varies from $409.70 to $2,738.84 and is not considered
significant. The Commission did not receive any comments regarding
these burden and cost estimates.
    75. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that this final rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.

VI. Document Availability

    76. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, Washington DC
20426.
    77. From FERC's Home Page on the internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
    78. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's
website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].

VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    These regulations are effective January 25, 2019. The Commission
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. The rule will be provided
to the Senate, House, Government Accountability Office, and the SBA.

    By the Commission. Commissioner McIntyre is not voting on this
order.
    Issued: November 15, 2018.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

    Note:  The following appendix will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.

                      APPENDIX--List of Commenters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Abbreviation                           Commenter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bardin............................  David Bardin.
BPA...............................  Bonneville Power Administration.
Idaho Power.......................  Idaho Power Company.
ISO NE............................  ISO New England Inc.
NERC..............................  North American Electric Reliability
                                     Corporation.
Reclamation.......................  Bureau of Reclamation.
Resilient Societies...............  Foundation for Resilient Societies.
Trade Associations................  American Public Power Association,
                                     Edison Electric Institute,
                                     Electricity Consumers Resource
                                     Council, Large Public Power
                                     Council, National Rural Electric
                                     Cooperative Association.
TVA...............................  Tennessee Valley Authority.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2018-25678 Filed 11-23-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P