[Federal Register: January 11, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 6)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 1302-1324]
[DOCID:fr11ja10-18]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 172, 173, 175

[Docket No. PHMSA-2009-0095 (HM-224F)]
RIN 2137-AE44

Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), is proposing to amend requirements in the
Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) on the transportation of lithium
cells and batteries, including lithium cells and batteries packed with
or contained in equipment. The proposed changes are intended to enhance
safety by ensuring that all lithium batteries are designed to withstand
normal transportation conditions. This would include provisions to
ensure all lithium batteries are packaged to reduce the possibility of
damage that could lead to a catastrophic incident, and minimize the
consequences of an incident. In addition, lithium batteries would be
accompanied by hazard communication that ensures appropriate and
careful handling by air carrier personnel, including the flight crew,
and informs both transport workers and emergency response personnel of
actions to be taken in an emergency. These proposals are largely
consistent with changes made to the United Nations Recommendations on
the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations) and the
International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions on the
Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO Technical Instructions)
and respond to recommendations issued by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB).

DATES: Comments must be received by March 12, 2010.
    We are proposing a mandatory compliance date of 75 days after the
date of publication of a final rule in the Federal Register. In this
NPRM, we solicit comments from interested persons regarding the
feasibility of the proposed compliance date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:

     Federal Rulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the on-line instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management System; U.S. Department of
Transportation, Dockets Operations, M-30, Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: To U.S. Department of Transportation,
Dockets Operations, M-30, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: Include the agency name and docket number PHMSA-2009-
0095 (HM-224F) or RIN 2137-AE44 for this rulemaking at the beginning of
your comment. Note that all comments received will be posted without
change to http://www.regulations.gov including any personal information
provided. If sent by mail, comments must be submitted in duplicate.
Persons wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their comments
must include a self-addressed stamped postcard.
    Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any
written communications and comments received into any of our dockets by
the name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477), or you
may visit http://www.regulations.gov.
    Docket: You may view the public docket through the Internet at
http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the Docket Operations office
at the above address (See ADDRESSES).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles E. Betts or Kevin A. Leary,
Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, or Janet
McLaughlin, International & Outreach Division, Federal Aviation
Administration, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Contents

I. Background
    A. The Safety Problem
    B. Overview of Current Regulations
    C. Ongoing Efforts To Evaluate Lithium Battery Risk
II. Discussion of Proposed Regulatory Changes
    A. Summary of Proposals in This NPRM
    B. Evidence Preservation
    C. New Shipping Names
    D. Watt Hours Versus Equivalent Lithium Content
    E. Design Type Testing
    F. Elimination of Exceptions for Small Lithium Batteries
    G. Packaging and Stowage
    H. Consolidation of Lithium Battery Regulations
    I. Ongoing Safety Initiatives
    J. Compliance Date
III. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
    A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
    B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
    C. Executive Order 13132
    D. Executive Order 13175
    E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Procedures and Policies
    F. Paperwork Reduction Act
    G. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
    H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    I. Environmental Assessment
    J. Privacy Act
    K. International Trade Analysis

I. Background

A. The Safety Problem

    Lithium batteries are hazardous in transportation because they
present both chemical (e.g., flammable electrolytes) and electrical
hazards. If not safely packaged and handled, lithium batteries can
present a significant risk in transportation. Batteries which are
misused, mishandled, improperly packaged, improperly stored,
overcharged, or defective can overheat and ignite and, once ignited,
fires can be especially difficult to extinguish. Overheating has the
potential to create a thermal runaway, a chain reaction leading to
self-heating and release of the battery's stored energy. In general,
the risks posed by all batteries are a function of battery size and
chemistry. The high energy density (i.e., high energy to weight ratio)
of lithium batteries increases the consequences of a short circuit or
fire posing a greater risk in transportation.
    Lithium batteries fall into one of two basic categories, lithium
metal, including lithium alloy (also known as primary lithium
batteries), and lithium ion, including lithium ion polymer (also known
as secondary lithium batteries). As the name indicates, lithium metal
batteries contain a small amount of metallic lithium or a lithium
alloy. Batteries of this type are mostly non-rechargeable and these
cells and batteries are often used in medical devices, computer memory
and as replaceable batteries (AA and AAA size) suitable for electronic
devices. The lithium content in these cells and batteries ranges from a
fraction of a gram to a few grams and typical geometries include coin
cells, cylindrical, and rectangular. Conversely, lithium ion cells and
batteries contain a lithium compound (e.g., lithium cobalt dioxide,
lithium iron phosphate) and they are generally rechargeable. Lithium
ion batteries are mostly found in portable computers, mobile phones and
power tools. Common configurations are cylindrical and rectangular. The
size of a lithium ion battery is currently measured by equivalent
lithium content. Equivalent lithium content is described in greater
detail in Part II, Section C ``Watt Hours versus Equivalent Lithium
Content.''
    Once used primarily in industrial and military applications,
lithium batteries have become commonplace in consumer electronic
devices because they have a much higher energy density compared to
their predecessors (e.g., alkaline, nickel cadmium, and nickel metal
hydride batteries). They are now found in a variety of popular consumer
items, including cameras, notebook computers, and mobile telephones.
The numbers, types, and sizes of lithium batteries moving in
transportation have grown steadily in recent years with the increasing
popularity of these and other portable devices and a corresponding
proliferation of battery designs, manufacturers, and applications. An
estimated 3.3 billion lithium cells and batteries were transported
worldwide in 2008 by all modes of transportation. On aircraft, lithium
batteries are transported in shipments of batteries by themselves and
they are also packed with or contained in battery powered equipment.
Lithium batteries are also carried on board aircraft by passengers in
portable electronic equipment and as spares; however these are not
addressed in this rulemaking.
    As the demand for lithium batteries increases, so do the risks
associated with their transportation, especially on board aircraft. The
risk of transporting lithium batteries on-board aircraft increases with
the increase in the number of batteries transported by air, given the
assumption that the proportion of the number of correctly packaged
shipments to the total number of shipments remains constant. In other
words, an increase in the number of shipments will result in an
increase in the number of incidents even if the incident rate remains
the same since the number of incidents is a product of the incident
rate and the total number of batteries transported. Moreover,
increasing the proportion of flights that transport only one lithium
battery shipment introduces a risk where previously there was none. The
risk of

multiple shipments on one aircraft increases the probability of an
event within individual shipments, and also introduces the possibility
of one defective shipment influencing other, properly packaged
shipments on the same aircraft.
    The increasing manifestation of these risks, inside and outside of
transportation, drives the need for stricter safety standards. Since
1991, PHMSA and the FAA have identified over 40 air transport-related
incidents and numerous additional non-transport incidents involving
lithium batteries and devices powered by lithium batteries. These
incidents occurred, variously, aboard passenger aircraft and cargo
aircraft, prior to loading batteries aboard an aircraft, and after
batteries were transported by air. Twenty-one of these 44 incidents
involved a passenger aircraft. These incidents occurred in the cabin of
the airplane, in a passenger's checked baggage, in the cargo area of
the airplane or in the airport prior to boarding an aircraft. The
incident data suggest overheating or damage to the device occurred
immediately prior to the first indications of an incident. The
remaining incidents involved lithium batteries transported aboard cargo
aircraft. Many of these incidents were attributed to external short
circuiting and several packages involved in the incidents were not
subject to regulatory requirements for display of hazard communication
markings or labels. It is important to note that while each single
incident may appear relatively benign and while the overall incident
numbers may appear small when compared to the total number of lithium
batteries transported by aircraft each year, the incidents illustrate
the short circuit and fire risks posed by lithium batteries and the
potential for a serious incident that could result if the risks as not
addressed through transportation safety controls. The following table
shows a breakdown of these incidents:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Passenger aircraft
                                                --------------------------   Cargo on      Cargo
                                                                Checked     passenger     aircraft   Grand total
                                                   Carry-on     baggage      aircraft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lithium Batteries..............................           16            1            4           23           44
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A list of aviation incidents involving batteries reported to the
FAA since 1991 is available through the following URL: http://
www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ash/ash_programs/
hazmat/aircarrier_info/.
    Besides these incidents involving air transportation of lithium
batteries, there have been several recalls of lithium batteries used in
notebook computers and other consumer commodities. The Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) found that these batteries could spontaneously
overheat and cause a fire, because of a manufacturing defect or when
the battery is struck forcefully on the corner (e.g., a direct fall to
the ground).
    In addition to incidents definitely attributed to lithium
batteries, the NTSB investigated a February 7, 2006 incident at the
Philadelphia International Airport in which a fire--suspected to have
been caused by lithium batteries--destroyed a United Parcel Service
cargo aircraft and most of its cargo. While the captain, first officer,
and a flight engineer evacuated the airplane after landing, sustaining
only minor injuries, the NTSB concluded that flight crews on cargo-only
aircraft remain at risk from in-flight fires involving both primary
(non-rechargeable) and secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries.
Following the incident investigation, NTSB issued the following
recommendations to PHMSA:

    Safety Recommendation A-07-104: Require aircraft operators to
implement measures to reduce the risk of primary lithium batteries
becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft, such as
transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in
restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft.
    Safety Recommendation A-07-105: Until fire suppression systems
are required on cargo-only aircraft, as asked for in Safety
Recommendation A-07-99, require that cargo shipments of secondary
lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with
equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where
portable fire suppression systems can be used.
    Safety Recommendation A-07-106: Require aircraft operators that
transport hazardous materials to immediately provide consolidated
and specific information about hazardous materials on board an
aircraft, including proper shipping name, hazard class, quantity,
number of packages, and location, to on-scene emergency responders
upon notification of an accident or incident.
    Safety Recommendation A-07-107: Require commercial cargo and
passenger operators to report to the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving primary and
secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed
with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or
unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation
purposes.
    Safety Recommendation A-07-108: Analyze the causes of all
thermal failures and fires involving secondary and primary lithium
batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate action to
mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting secondary
and primary lithium batteries, including those contained in or
packed with equipment, on board cargo and passenger aircraft as
cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items.
    Safety Recommendation A-07-109: Eliminate regulatory exemptions
for the packaging, marking, and labeling of cargo shipments of small
secondary lithium batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent lithium
content) until the analysis of the failures and the implementation
of risk-based requirements asked for in Safety Recommendation A-07-
108 are completed.
    Safety Recommendation A-08-01: In collaboration with air
carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices,
air travel associations, and other appropriate government and
private organizations, establish a process to ensure wider, highly
visible, and continuous dissemination of guidance and information to
the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe
carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic
devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft.
    Safety Recommendation A-08-02: In collaboration with air
carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices,
air travel associations, and other appropriate government and
private organizations, establish a process to periodically measure
the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling
public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary
(rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing
these batteries on board passenger aircraft.

    Most of the recent lithium battery incidents have been determined
to originate from packages in non-compliant shipments of lithium
batteries. As a result, many feel that additional regulations will not
help lower the number of incidents. PHMSA and FAA believe non-
compliance most often arises from confusion concerning the regulatory
requirements. This confusion typically results from a lack of proper
training. Currently, shippers of small-size lithium batteries are
excepted from the training requirements in Subpart H of Part 172 of the
HMR. The proposals in this NPRM would require these shippers to train
employees who prepare lithium battery shipments for transportation to
ensure

the employees are knowledgeable about all the applicable regulatory
requirements and that shipments conform to those requirements. The
training requirements would also apply to air carrier employees; thus,
training in the requirements applicable to the transportation of small
lithium batteries would be included in the currently required air
carrier training for acceptance, handling, and loading and unloading
lithium battery packages.
    The proposals in this NPRM would also subject packages of small-
size lithium batteries to well-recognized hazardous materials marking
and labeling requirements. These hazard communication provisions will
ensure that packages of lithium batteries are placed into a well-
established and high-functioning cargo transportation system that
provides for more careful handling, more precise record keeping, and
more detailed tracking and reporting than is typically provided for
non-hazardous cargo.
    In addition to markings and labels, the proposals in this NPRM
would also require transport documentation to accompany a shipment of
small-size lithium batteries. This includes notation of the presence
and location of lithium batteries aboard the aircraft on the notice to
the pilot in command (NOPIC). This will allow pilots and crew to make
appropriate decisions in the event of an emergency. For example, if the
flight crew identifies fire or smoke in a location where a lithium
battery shipment is stowed, the crew can make an informed decision
about the possible severity of the fire, whether the presence of
lithium batteries could worsen the fire, and the time available to land
the aircraft or take other emergency actions. The NOPIC also allows
ground crew, firefighters and first responders to know how they should
respond in case of an emergency because they will know not only that
there are packages of lithium batteries aboard the aircraft, but also
where on the aircraft these packages are located.
    The hazardous materials regulatory system has for decades proven
its effectiveness in mitigating hazardous materials transportation
risk. Shippers and operators understand this system and have included
steps in their processes to ensure compliance. However, lithium
batteries have largely operated outside of this structure through the
use of exceptions. This current exception-based system has created a
set of regulations that is not easily understood or enforced. This,
coupled with the lack of required training, adds to the difficulty of
ensuring compliance. PHMSA and FAA believe the system created
specifically for the transportation of hazardous materials is sound and
can be used to effectively mitigate the risk posed by lithium batteries
in air transportation.

 B. Overview of Current Regulations

    Currently, the HMR address lithium battery transportation safety
through design type testing, short circuit protection, limits on
battery size, and limits on net and gross weight. The HMR provide
exceptions for small cells and batteries often found in consumer
electronic devices.
    Lithium batteries are regulated as a Class 9 material. Class 9
materials present a hazard during transportation but do not meet the
definition of any other hazard class. The HMR prohibit the transport of
primary lithium batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft unless packed
with or contained in equipment. Packaging and design type testing
requirements and exceptions for lithium batteries are found in Sec.
173.185. For transportation by all modes, lithium batteries of all
types and sizes must pass applicable tests in the UN Manual of Tests
and Criteria. These tests are designed to ensure that the battery can
withstand conditions normally encountered in transportation. In
addition, the battery must be designed in a manner that precludes a
violent rupture and must be equipped with an effective means of
preventing external short circuits and a means to prevent reverse
current flow if it contains cells that are connected in parallel.
    Batteries transported as a Class 9 material must be packaged in
combination packagings that conform to the performance standards
specified in Part 178 of the HMR at the Packing Group II performance
level. In addition, the batteries must be packaged so as to prevent
short circuits, including movement that could lead to short circuits. A
package containing lithium batteries must be labeled with a Class 9
label and must be accompanied by a shipping paper that describes the
lithium batteries being transported and emergency response information.
The location and quantity of shipments must also be provided to the
pilot in command.
    The HMR provide exceptions for lithium batteries based on the
battery size and packing method. Generally, shipments of small lithium
batteries are excepted from the specification packaging and hazard
communication requirements outlined above provided each package
containing more than 24 lithium cells or 12 lithium batteries is: (1)
Marked to indicate that it contains lithium batteries and that special
procedures must be followed if the package is known to be damaged; (2)
accompanied by a document indicating that the package contains lithium
batteries and that special procedures must be followed if the package
is known to be damaged; (3) no more than 30 kilograms gross weight; and
(4) capable of withstanding a 1.2 meter drop test in any orientation
without shifting of the contents that would allow short-circuiting and
without release of package contents. Further, each such package that
contains a primary lithium battery or cell forbidden for transport
aboard passenger carrying aircraft must be marked ``PRIMARY LITHIUM
BATTERIES--FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT'' or
``LITHIUM METAL BATTERIES--FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT ABOARD PASSENGER
AIRCRAFT.'' The marking, documentation and 1.2 meter drop test
requirements described above do not apply when these small cells or
batteries are contained in a piece of equipment.
    For medium-size lithium batteries and cells transported by motor
carrier or rail, the HMR provide exceptions similar to those for small
lithium batteries. Under these exceptions, a package containing medium
size lithium batteries and cells of all types must: (1) Be marked to
indicate it contains lithium batteries and special procedures must be
followed if the package is known to be damaged; (2) be accompanied by a
document indicating the package contains lithium batteries and special
procedures must be followed if the package is known to be damaged; (3)
weigh no more than 30 kilograms; and (4) be capable of withstanding a
1.2 meter drop test. For those packages that are not prepared for air
shipment, (i.e., not offered and transported as a Class 9 material) the
HMR require the package to be marked to indicate that they may not be
transported by aircraft or vessel. The marking, documentation and 1.2
meter drop test requirements described above do not apply when these
medium cells or batteries are contained in a piece of equipment.
    The exceptions for small and medium size lithium batteries
described above are found in Sec.  172.102 Special Provisions 188 and
189 respectively. Additional exceptions for special cases such as small
production runs of batteries and specific aircraft quantity limitations
are found in Sec.  172.102, Special Provisions 29, A54, A55, A100,
A101, A103, and A104.
    The current requirements in the HMR pertaining to the transport of
lithium batteries reflect a number of actions taken by PHMSA and FAA in
response

to the past incidents and NTSB recommendations, aimed at reducing the
risks posed by batteries and battery powered devices in transportation.
These include--
     Safety advisories issued by PHMSA to the public (64 FR
36743 [July 7, 1999]; 72 FR 14167 [Mar. 26, 2007]) and by the FAA to
the airline industry on July 2, 1999, May 23, 2002 and August 3, 2007
to remind persons that batteries and electrical devices that contain
batteries are prohibited for transport unless properly packaged to
prevent the likelihood of creating sparks or generating dangerous heat.
     Changes to UN Recommendations in 2000 and the 2003-04 ICAO
Technical Instructions based on proposals by the United States which
(1) revised battery testing requirements and required testing of small
lithium batteries, (2) adopted hazard communication and packaging
requirements for small batteries, (3) eliminated an exception for
medium-sized batteries, and (4) adopted limited exceptions for
passengers and crew to carry lithium batteries and battery-powered
equipment aboard an aircraft.
     A series of tests performed by FAA in 2004 concluded that
the presence of a shipment of primary lithium batteries can
significantly increase the severity of an in-flight cargo compartment
fire and the fire suppression systems currently in use aboard passenger
aircraft are ineffective.
     PHMSA's December 15, 2004 interim final rule (69 FR 75208,
correction, 71 FR 56894 [Sept. 28, 2006]), based on the results of the
FAA tests, adopted a limited prohibition on the transportation on
passenger-carrying aircraft of primary lithium batteries.
     Further testing by FAA in 2006 concluded that flames
produced by secondary lithium batteries and cells are hot enough to
cause adjacent cells to vent and ignite, but currently approved fire
suppression systems are effective on the electrolyte fire and prevent
any additional fire from subsequent cell venting.
     PHMSA's August 9, 2007 final rule (72 FR 44930) finalized
the December 15, 2004 interim final rule and (1) adopted design type
testing of all lithium batteries in accordance with international
standards, and (2) revised the exception for consumer electronic
devices and spare lithium batteries carried by passengers and crew. The
preamble to this final rule also discussed in more detail some of the
prior incidents during transportation of lithium batteries, the FAA
testing programs, the recalls of notebook computer batteries, and the
rulemaking changes up to that time.
     PHMSA's January 14, 2009 final rule (74 FR 2199) addressed
NTSB safety recommendations A-07-106 and A-07-107 by requiring an air
carrier, in the event of a serious incident, to make immediately
available to an authorized official of a federal, state, or local
government agency (including an emergency responder), the shipping
papers and notice to pilot in command or the information contained in
those documents. This requirement represents a proactive approach to
information dissemination similar to that in the ICAO Technical
Instructions. This final rule also added a requirement to report all
incidents that result in a fire, violent rupture, explosion or
dangerous evolution of heat (i.e., an amount of heat sufficient to be
dangerous to packaging or personal safety to include charring of
packaging, melting of packaging, scorching of packaging, or other
evidence) that occurs as a direct result of a battery or battery-
powered device. Additionally, the final rule amended regulatory
requirements to clarify acceptable methods for packaging batteries to
protect against short circuits and overheating and required the
reporting of certain incidents involving batteries or battery powered
devices. PHMSA set forth examples of methods to prevent short circuit
and damage (such as individually packaging each battery, securely
covering terminals with non-conductive caps or tape, or designing
batteries with terminals that are recessed or otherwise protected)
appropriate for all batteries.
     PHMSA and FAA have also conducted a campaign to educate
the public about ways to reduce lithium battery transportation risks.
On February 22, 2007; April 26, 2007; May 24-25 2007; and April 11,
2008, PHMSA hosted meetings with public and private sector stakeholders
who share our concern for the safe transportation of batteries and
battery powered devices. The meetings provided an opportunity for
representatives of the NTSB, CPSC, manufacturers of batteries and
battery powered devices, airlines, airline employee organizations
(e.g., pilots and flight attendants), testing laboratories, and the
emergency response and law enforcement communities to share and
disseminate information concerning battery related risks and
developments.
    The amendments to the HMR adopted since 2004 have produced positive
results, but they addressed only very specific issues and specific
transport contexts. The proposals outlined in this NPRM are intended to
comprehensively address the hazards posed by lithium batteries in all
modes of transportation and further reduce the likelihood and the
consequences of a battery related fire in transportation. In this NPRM,
PHMSA plans to address safety recommendations A-07-104, A-07-105, A-07-
108 and A-07-109.
    In addition to the safety measures identified in this NPRM, PHMSA
and FAA are considering additional safety standards. Many of these
additional measures affect multiple transport modes, including
aviation. As we develop these concepts we will continue to work with
the appropriate international transportation standards-setting bodies,
such as the United Nations Subcommittee of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods (UNSCOE TDG) and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel, to encourage their world-
wide acceptance. These additional measures may include:
     Establishing a new system for the classification of
articles, such as lithium batteries that have the potential to produce
heat and fire.
     Determining the feasibility of developing performance
standards for fire resistant containers that can be used for the
transport of lithium cells and batteries of all types and all other
flammable materials on board aircraft.
     Examining the role of packaging in preventing damage and
short circuits to lithium cells and batteries.

 C. Ongoing Efforts To Evaluate Lithium Battery Risk

    As previously mentioned, PHMSA and FAA have identified 44 air
transport related incidents and numerous additional non-transport
incidents involving lithium batteries and lithium battery powered
devices. The January 14, 2009 final rule required air carriers to
report all incidents that result in a fire, violent rupture, explosion
or dangerous evolution of heat that occur as a result of a battery or a
battery powered device. In addition to requiring an incident report
NTSB, A-07-107 recommends PHMSA require air carriers retain the failed
items for evaluation purposes. We have concerns with requiring a person
involved in an incident reported under Sec. Sec.  171.15 or 171.16 to
maintain in a secure manner items or packages especially if the item is
an airline passenger's property. Such a requirement would impose
additional responsibility on the air carrier to maintain possession of
the item or package in a secure manner. Currently, when an incident
occurs, DOT works with the person in physical possession of the item
such as a battery or device

to ensure the incident is thoroughly documented and when the air
carrier has accepted the property (68 FR 9735) it is maintained and in
some instances transported for evaluation. Depending on the nature and
severity of the incident we work with carriers on a case-by-case basis
to collect and analyze evidence as appropriate and we continue to seek
ways to improve the quality and consistency of data we receive. As part
of this NPRM, PHMSA seeks comments on how this data collection could be
improved.
    The proposals in this NPRM are intended to address the root causes
of lithium battery incidents. The available incident data suggest the
most likely causes of lithium battery incidents are:

    1. External short circuiting--occurs when an exposed battery
terminal contacts a metal object. When this happens, the battery can
heat up and may cause ignition of the battery and/or the surrounding
combustible materials.
    2. In-use situation--generally relating to improper ``charging''
and/or ``discharging'' conditions associated with the use of
equipment (e.g., computer or cell phone). This also includes
inadvertent activation and subsequent overheating (such was the case
when a power drill activated and burned in a passenger's checked
baggage).
    3. Non-compliance--includes faulty design of the battery (cells
or battery packs), false certification of compliance with regulatory
testing/classification requirements, and improper packing and
handling including some counterfeit batteries.
    4. Internal short circuit--can be caused by foreign matter
introduced into a cell or battery during the manufacturing process.
An internal short circuit can also occur when a battery is
physically damaged (e.g. dropped or punctured).

    As noted in the previous section, FAA's Technical Center initiated
a series of tests to evaluate the risk posed by lithium batteries
involved in an unrelated fire. FAA completed a study in 2004 to assess
the flammability characteristics of bulk packed primary lithium
batteries and a second study in 2006 examining the flammability
characteristics of bulk packed secondary lithium batteries. In both
studies the tests were designed to simulate the behavior of the
batteries in an environment that is similar to actual conditions
possible in an aircraft cargo compartment fire. Both the 2004 and 2006
test reports are available at the following url: http://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/reports/reports.asp.
    In the case of primary lithium batteries, the FAA tests showed that
the packaging materials delayed the ignition of the batteries, but
eventually added to the fire and contributed to battery ignition, even
after the original (alcohol) fire had been exhausted. In addition, the
packaging material held the batteries together, allowing the plastic
outer coating to fuse the batteries together. This enhanced the
probability of a burning battery igniting adjacent batteries,
increasing the propagation rate. The technical report concluded that
the presence of a shipment of primary lithium batteries can
significantly increase the severity of an in-flight cargo compartment
fire. In addition, the report concluded that primary lithium batteries
pose a unique threat in the cargo compartment of an aircraft because
primary lithium battery fires cannot be suppressed by means of Halon,
the only FAA-certified fire suppression system permitted for use in
cargo compartments of a passenger-carrying aircraft operating in the
United States.
    The second study completed in 2006 used a similar methodology to
determine the flammability of secondary lithium batteries and cells.
The testing demonstrated that flames produced by the batteries are hot
enough to cause adjacent cells to vent and ignite. The testing also
demonstrated that Halon is effective in suppressing the electrolyte
fire and preventing any additional fire from subsequent cell venting.
The lithium ion cells will continue to vent due to high temperatures
but will not ignite in the presence of Halon.
    We are aware of additional testing conducted in 2004 and 2005
independent of the FAA or PHMSA to assess the effect of a battery's
state of charge on its overall risk. The 2004 preliminary report titled
``Effect of Cell State of Charge on Outcome of Internal Cell Faults''
concluded the severity of the result of an internal short circuit is
strongly affected by the state of charge. The Draft 2005 report titled
``US FAA Style Flammability Assessment of Lithium Ion Cells and Battery
Packs in Aircraft Cargo Holds'' concluded: (1) Direct flame impingement
on small unpackaged quantities of lithium ion cells and battery packs
can lead to thermal runaway; (2) Halon 1301 is effective at controlling
burning lithium ion cells; (3) the fires had a minimal effect on bulk
packaged lithium ion cells with less than 50% state of charge; and (4)
the aircraft liner typically used on commercial aircraft is capable of
withstanding burning gases discharged from venting lithium ion cells
and batteries. A copy of this analysis is available for review in the
docket of this rulemaking.
    The FAA results with lithium ion batteries at 100% state of charge
exposed to a fire showed similar, but more forceful results (i.e. more
sparks, and more forceful cell venting). FAA and other test data on
lithium ion cells and batteries suggest that state of charge affects
their behavior under abuse conditions. PHMSA recognizes this fact and
commonly requires transport at a reduced state of charge as a condition
of competent authority approvals issued for the transport of extremely
large lithium ion batteries found in vehicles and military and
aerospace equipment. To date, we are not aware of any data that can be
used to suggest a reduced state of charge affects the behavior of
primary lithium batteries under abuse conditions.
    The United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority completed a report in
2003 titled: ``Dealing with In-Flight Lithium Battery Fires in Portable
Electronic Devices.'' The test results verified the effectiveness of
existing fire extinguishing agents in responding to an in-flight fire
involving a lithium battery powered portable electronic device. The
report also concluded that the safety systems inherent to lithium
batteries and battery powered devices decrease the likelihood of a
fire, but since there is a potential for a fire, these devices must be
considered a potential risk in flight and during ground based
operations. If a fire does occur in the aircraft cabin, the force of
the explosion is not sufficient to cause structural damage to the
aircraft, but there is a risk the fire could spread to adjacent
flammable material such as clothing and seats and flames and fumes from
burning batteries pose a hazard to passengers in the immediate
vicinity.
    The UK CAA testing, combined with additional research from the FAA
has formed the basis for improved response procedures and cabin crew
fire fighting training. Since 2007, the International Federation of
Airline Pilots Associations has issued several safety bulletins with
updated recommendations for flight crew actions. In March of 2009, the
FAA released a training video recreating in-flight scenarios which
includes actual lithium battery fires and appropriate response
measures. All of these test reports are available for review in the
public docket for this rulemaking.

II. Discussion of Proposed Regulatory Changes

A. Summary of Proposals in This NPRM

    In this NPRM, we propose a number of provisions to enhance the safe
transportation of lithium batteries. The proposals are intended to
reform the current regulatory framework specific to lithium batteries
and strengthen the regulations by eliminating certain exceptions. These
revisions will

enhance safety by ensuring that all lithium batteries are designed to
withstand normal transportation conditions, packaged to reduce the
possibility of damage that could lead to an incident, and accompanied
by hazard communication information that ensures appropriate and
careful handling by air carrier personnel and informs transport workers
and emergency response personnel of actions to be taken in an
emergency. The additional hazard communication information will also
provide the pilot in command with additional information about the
location and quantity of lithium batteries should an unrelated fire
require emergency measures. Several of the proposals are based on
recommendations issued by the NTSB. Specifically, in this NPRM, we
propose to:
     Revise current shipping descriptions for lithium batteries
(UN3090), lithium batteries packed with equipment (UN3091), and lithium
batteries contained in equipment (UN3091) to specify lithium metal
batteries including lithium alloy batteries as appropriate.\a\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \a\ In 2006, separate shipping descriptions for lithium metal
batteries and lithium ion batteries were adopted into the UN
Recommendations. The International Civil Aviation Organization and
the International Maritime Organization subsequently adopted these
shipping descriptions. All references to primary or secondary
lithium batteries in international regulations were revised to
reflect this change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Adopt shipping descriptions for lithium ion batteries
including lithium ion polymer batteries (UN3480), lithium ion batteries
packed with equipment including lithium ion polymer batteries (UN3481),
lithium ion batteries contained in equipment including lithium ion
polymer batteries (UN3481).\a\
     Adopt watt-hours in place of equivalent lithium content to
measure the relative hazard of lithium ion cells and batteries.
     Incorporate by reference the latest revisions to the
United Nations Manual of Tests and Criteria applicable to the design
type testing of lithium cells and batteries.
     Adopt and revise various definitions including ``Aggregate
lithium content'' ``Lithium content'', ``Lithium ion cell or battery'',
``Lithium metal cell or battery'', ``Short circuit'', and ``Watt-hour''
based on definitions found in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria.
     Require manufacturers to retain results of satisfactory
completion of UN design type tests for each lithium cell and battery
type and place a mark on the battery and/or cell to indicate testing
has been completed successfully. PHMSA and the FAA will coordinate with
the appropriate international organizations to ensure consistency.
     For air transportation, eliminate regulatory exceptions
for lithium cells and batteries, other than certain exceptions for
extremely small lithium cells and batteries that are shipped in very
limited quantities such as button cells and other small batteries that
are packed with or contained in equipment and those required for
operational use in accordance with applicable airworthiness
requirements and operating regulations.
     For all transport modes, require lithium cells and
batteries to be packed to protect the cell or battery from short
circuits.
     Unless transported in a container approved by the FAA
Administrator, when transported aboard aircraft, limit stowage of
lithium cells and batteries to crew accessible cargo locations or
locations equipped with an FAA approved fire suppression system.
     Consolidate and simplify current and revised lithium
battery requirements into one section of the HMR.
     Apply appropriate safety measures for the transport of
lithium cells or batteries identified as being defective for safety
reasons, or those that have been damaged or are otherwise being
returned to the manufacturer.

To expedite compliance with the amendments in this notice, we are
proposing a mandatory compliance date of 75 days after the date of
publication of the final. The following sections discuss these changes
in detail:

B. Evidence Preservation

    In this NPRM, in Sec.  171.21, we propose to require a shipper,
carrier, package owner or person reporting an incident under the
provisions of Sec. Sec.  171.15 or 171.16 to provide upon request, by
an authorized representative of the Federal, State or local government
agency reasonable assistance in investigating the damaged package or
article, if available.

C. New Shipping Names

    Currently, under the HMR, lithium metal batteries and lithium ion
batteries share the same UN number. However, differences in chemistry,
functionality, and behavior when exposed to a fire are well documented.
Based in part on the previously mentioned FAA fire tests, PHMSA imposed
additional requirements on lithium metal (primary) batteries including
prohibiting them from transportation aboard passenger aircraft, unless
packed with or contained in equipment. The fact that both lithium metal
and lithium ion batteries share the same UN number yet are regulated
differently has the potential to cause problems in acceptance
procedures for carriers and may unnecessarily hinder or delay the
transportation of these products.
    In 2006, the UN Recommendations adopted separate shipping names and
ID numbers for lithium metal and lithium ion batteries. The ICAO and
the International Maritime Organization subsequently adopted these
entries into their respective dangerous goods lists effective January
1, 2009. While the HMR permit the use of the ICAO Technical
Instructions and the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code
for international and for domestic transportation when a portion of the
transportation is by aircraft or vessel, subsequent domestic reshipping
of packages containing lithium batteries remains difficult.
    In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to provide two separate entries in the
hazardous materials table for primary lithium batteries, now referred
to as ``lithium metal batteries'' and secondary lithium batteries, now
referred to as ``lithium ion batteries''. Separate entries for lithium
metal and lithium ion batteries will facilitate the transportation of
these materials through various modes, both domestically and
internationally, and enable the application of different emergency
response actions. We will replace all references to ``primary lithium
batteries'' with ``lithium metal batteries'' and all references to
``secondary lithium batteries'' with ``lithium ion batteries''.

D. Watt Hours Versus Equivalent Lithium Content

    When requirements for lithium ion batteries were first adopted into
the HMR, it was necessary to provide an indication of the lithium
content in each cell and battery. Since lithium ion batteries do not
contain metallic lithium, an expression of lithium content analogous to
lithium metal batteries was devised. This term became known as
equivalent lithium content (ELC), also known as lithium equivalent
content. The ELC of a lithium ion cell measured in grams is calculated
to be 0.3 times the rated capacity in ampere hours. The ELC of a
lithium ion battery equals the sum of the grams of ELC contained in the
component cells of the battery. Although the term equivalent lithium
content is used in the HMR, this term is not widely used or understood
and can lead to confusion when calculating the ELC of a battery. For

example, the aggregate ELC for a lithium ion battery consisting of
multiple cells within a battery can be difficult to calculate based
solely on the ampere-hour capacity of the battery. Information on the
ampere-hour capacity of the component cells within a battery is not
normally provided and the ampere-hour capacity of a battery can change
depending on the configuration of component cells within a battery.
    PHMSA proposes to adopt a methodology for determining the relative
strengths of lithium ion batteries using measurements of watt-hours
rather than ELC. The term watt-hour, expressed as (Wh) is commonly used
in electrical applications. The watt-hour value of a lithium ion cell
or battery is determined by multiplying a cell or battery's rated
capacity in ampere-hours, by its nominal voltage. Therefore, watt-hour
(Wh) = ampere-hour (Ah) x Volts (V). This product is easy to calculate
for both cells and batteries and the watt-hour measurement is
independent of how the component cells within a lithium ion battery are
connected.
    PHMSA further proposes to replace the term equivalent lithium
content, or lithium equivalent content and aggregate equivalent content
each place it appears with watt-hour and replace the equivalent lithium
content values with their equivalent watt-hour values. These proposals
are consistent with proposals already adopted in the UN
Recommendations, ICAO Technical Instructions, and IMDG Code.

E. Design Type Testing

    Each lithium cell or battery is required to be of a type proven to
meet the requirements of each test in the UN Manual of Tests and
Criteria.\b\ These tests are designed to ensure that the cells and
batteries will withstand exposure to severe environmental conditions
encountered during transport without resulting in a short circuit or a
rupture. A comparison of the battery appearance before and after these
tests is intended to detect battery damage such as leakage or abnormal
venting, disintegration, cracking, swelling or distortion of the
battery pack, or any other observation that could indicate the
occurrence of an internal short circuit or constitute a transportation
safety hazard. Certain tests, including altitude simulation, thermal,
vibration and shock tests are designed to simulate extremes that may be
encountered during transport. External short circuit, impact,
overcharge and forced discharge tests are included, as these conditions
contribute to short circuits and other potentially hazardous
conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \b\ As previously discussed, shipments of small lithium cells
and batteries have been prohibited on passenger-carrying aircraft
since December 15, 2004, but, before October 1, 2009, small lithium
cells and batteries that met certain limited packaging and hazard
communication conditions could be shipped by surface transportation
(and small secondary lithium cells and batteries could be shipped on
cargo-only aircraft), without being subject to the testing
requirements in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria. Small lithium
cells and batteries were defined as follows: Cells with up to 1 g
lithium (primary) or 1.5 equivalent lithium content (ELC)
(secondary); batteries with up to 2 g lithium (primary) or 8 g ELC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An informal lithium battery working group of the United Nations
Subcommittee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UNSCOE
TDG) met in November 2008 and again in April 2009 to discuss the test
methods relevant to lithium cells and batteries as contained in the UN
Manual of Tests and Criteria. The group concluded that while the design
type tests outlined in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria adequately
address safety concerns involving lithium cells and batteries, they can
be improved based on an evolving understanding and use of lithium
battery technology.
    Recently, interest in adding an internal short circuit test into
the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria has grown. Several different tests
have been developed; however, each method has strengths and weaknesses
including repeatability and the ability to control the mechanism of the
internal short circuit. While no consensus has been reached on this
subject, research and discussion continues. Once a reliable internal
short circuit test method is developed and incorporated into the UN
Manual of Tests and Criteria, we will consider adopting this additional
test into the HMR. We invite commenters to address issues related to
the development of an internal short circuit test, including
recommendations on an appropriate and effective test methodology, real-
world experience in applying such a test, and the costs that would be
associated with an additional test requirement.
    In December 2008, the UN Committee of Experts adopted several
amendments to section 38.3 of the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria
(fourth revised edition), which we propose to incorporate by reference
in Sec.  171.7. These changes include:
     Modifications to the terms ``module'' and ``battery
assembly'', new definitions for the terms ``large battery'' and ``small
battery'' and modifications to the testing protocol for large batteries
and battery assemblies.
     Revised criteria for a different design type by adding
additional criteria for rechargeable lithium cells and batteries that
would trigger a new round of design-type testing.
    Currently, the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria specifies that a
change from a tested design type of 0.1 grams or 20% by mass to the
anode, the cathode, or electrolyte material constitutes a change in the
design of the battery requiring design-type testing. A change that
would materially affect the test results is also considered a new
design type requiring retesting. While we continue to believe in the
importance of harmonization with international standards, we believe a
change of 20% by mass to the anode, cathode, or electrolyte material by
mass is too high. Additionally, the language referencing a ``change
that would materially affect the test results'' remains too broad and
leaves a great deal to interpretation from the individual cell or
battery manufacturer or assembler. In this NPRM we propose to require a
change of 0.1 grams or 5% by mass to the anode cathode or electrolyte
material from a tested design type to constitute a new design and
require retesting. Depending on the lithium content, such a change
would affect the test results. In addition, we propose to include the
examples of changes that could materially affect the test results
developed by the informal UN working group. These examples include:
     A change in the material of the anode, the cathode, the
separator, or the electrolyte;
     A change of protective devices, including hardware and
software;
     A change of safety design in cells or batteries, such as a
venting valve;
     A change in the number of component cells;
     A change in connecting mode of component cells.
    In recent years, lithium battery technology has been developed for
use in electric vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles. The batteries now being utilized in hybrid electric
vehicles are assemblies that include systems of electronic controllers,
sensors, air flow ducts, cabling, cell mounting fixtures, cells, trays,
covers, and attachment brackets and are much larger than lithium
batteries found in consumer electronic devices (vehicle battery sizes
generally have a gross mass between 14 kg and 80 kg). While the current
UN Test standards and the HMR are broad enough in scope to accommodate
extremely large batteries and assemblies, some believe the forces
required by some of the UN tests are excessive and certain HMR
requirements hamper the commercial development of this technology.

Because these new lithium battery applications may require
modifications to the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria and revisions to
the HMR, we issue competent authority approvals on a case-by-case basis
and continue to actively participate in the advancement of modified
testing schemes and practical methods that support the development of
this technology without compromising safety. Based on transportation
experience gained through competent authority approvals, we may
consider revising the HMR to more adequately address these scenarios,
provided we can do so without creating adverse safety consequences.
    The cell and battery design type tests outlined in the UN Manual of
Tests and Criteria are generally completed prior to the initial
shipment of a battery from the manufacturer. While we believe most cell
and battery manufacturers ensure the appropriate tests are conducted
and the batteries and devices are safe for use, we remain uncertain
that all manufacturers or battery assemblers take such steps or are
even aware of the need to test each battery design type. We also remind
battery manufacturers and assemblers that each lithium battery design-
type is subject to the tests in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria,
even if the cells that make up the battery have been tested.
    In this NPRM, we propose to require cell and battery manufacturers
to retain evidence of satisfactory completion of each of the lithium
cell and battery design type tests outlined in the UN Manual of Tests
and Criteria. This evidence must be maintained in a readily accessible
location at the principal place of business for as long as the lithium
batteries are offered for transportation in commerce and for one year
thereafter. Each person required to maintain this evidence must make
this information available for inspection by a representative of a
federal, state or local government agency. Since cell and battery
design type tests already must be completed prior to transport we do
not believe this should be a particularly burdensome requirement.
    Additionally, we are considering a requirement for a visible
quality mark to appear on the outside case of each cell or battery.
This mark would signify successful completion of the required lithium
battery design type tests in a readily recognizable manner. Visible
quality marks on electronic devices are very common. Familiar examples
include the UL symbol meaning a particular product has been evaluated
and representative samples have been tested by Underwriters
Laboratories and those products meet particular requirements for safety
and quality. The CE marking certifies compliance with certain European
Union Directives. For the purposes of lithium design type testing, we
are considering requiring a UN symbol, identical to the symbol
currently required on UN packagings and UN cylinders to appear on all
cells and batteries that have met each of the design type tests
prescribed in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria. Below is an example
of the mark we are considering:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11JA10.008

    This mark is readily recognized throughout the world and is
generally associated with hazardous materials transportation. The
intended effect of these new provisions is to promote knowledge of the
UN Tests throughout the world and enhance compliance with these
important safety standards. We intend to develop proposals for a
quality mark and associated documentation for inclusion in the UN Model
Regulations and the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria. We invite
commenters to address these concepts. Based on comments from the public
in response to this notice and discussion with the UN SCOE TDG, we may
adopt the UN Marking or a similar mark in the final rule.

F. Elimination of Exceptions for Small Lithium Batteries

    As noted above, since October 1, 2009, the HMR except small lithium
cells and batteries from most HMR requirements provided the cells or
batteries meet the test requirements in the UN Manual of Tests and
Criteria and the shipment conforms to minimal packaging and hazard
communication requirements (see Special Provision 188 in Sec.
172.102(c)). Consistent with NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-109, in
this NPRM we propose to eliminate the regulatory exceptions for lithium
cells and batteries when transported aboard aircraft. Thus, small
lithium batteries and cells would be required to be offered for
transportation as Class 9 materials and would be subject to the
requirements for lithium cells and batteries in Sec.  173.185,
including the packaging requirements discussed in the next section and
the hazard communication requirements (shipping papers, package marking
and labeling) that apply to shipments of Class 9 materials.
    In cargo transportation, generally packages are treated as either
regulated hazardous materials or non-regulated general cargo. Packages
that display a hazardous materials label are typically handled in a
separate cargo stream to ensure more direct oversight than non-
regulated cargo. Those materials that are regulated as hazardous
materials are recognized by handlers, who ensure that proper
precautions are taken and the package is handled in accordance with all
applicable regulatory requirements.
    The proposals outlined in this NPRM have the net effect of moving a
discrete number of shipments of lithium cells and batteries that are
currently handled as general cargo into the hazardous material
transport system. When lithium batteries are offered for transportation
as a Class 9 material, the package itself provides a clear indication
of the presence of hazardous material that is readily recognized by
transport workers and ensures these packages are handled in a manner
appropriate to their hazard. This also ensures that individuals
responsible for ensuring the safety of these packages are appropriately
trained in accordance with the HMR. We believe most air carriers who
accept lithium batteries for transportation also accept other hazardous
materials for transportation and already have the necessary personnel
and procedures in place to handle these packages safely. Thus, the
requirement to identify and package lithium batteries as Class 9
materials provides significant safety benefits without imposing large
additional costs on air carriers.
    Air carriers are required during the certification process to
declare in their Operating Specifications if a business decision has
been made to ``carry hazardous materials'' or a business decision has
been made ``to prohibit the carriage of hazardous material''. Each air
carrier who elects to carry hazardous material must include handling
procedures, incident reporting procedures, and other information in its
operations manual for the appropriate personnel to follow, as well as a
hazardous material training program that is approved by FAA and
provided every 24 months to all appropriate persons. This training
would include recognition of all hazard communication information that
would be associated with lithium battery shipments as they are trained
to recognize all hazard class labels, marking and documentation.
    Under the HMR, materials that pose a specific and serious air
transportation

risk are regulated more stringently than materials that pose less of a
risk when transported by air. Lithium batteries are a current exception
to this standard. The need to fully regulate these items and to
aggressively enforce all applicable regulatory requirements is critical
to air safety. Once lithium batteries are fully regulated, enforcement
agencies will be able to take appropriate action against non-compliant
shipments, reducing the number of non-compliant packages and therefore,
reducing the number of lithium battery incidents.
    We note the ICAO Technical Instructions include provisions for
certain lithium cells and batteries, provided outer packages are marked
with a lithium battery handling label. This handling label shown below
notes the presence of lithium batteries and communicates a fire hazard
if damaged. While this handling label is not specifically authorized by
the HMR, we believe that it complements the basic intent of identifying
the materials adequately for emergency response and we would permit
packages containing lithium batteries to display the lithium battery
handling label in addition to the markings and labels required by the
HMR. The ICAO lithium battery handling label is displayed below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11JA10.009

    The Class 9 label would alert transport workers to the presence of
a hazardous material and should result in more careful handling and
stowage. Shipping papers would provide written notice to the pilot in
command of the presence of lithium batteries and the type, location and
number of packages of lithium batteries on board the aircraft. The
NOPIC serves as a valuable tool to relay information about the
hazardous materials on board an aircraft to first response personnel
and provide critical safety information when making decisions in
emergency situations. The additional information will also assist
carriers in the acceptance and handling of shipments. The hazardous
material regulatory system has been effective in mitigating risk for
decades. Shippers and carriers understand this system and have included
steps in their processes to ensure compliance and safety. Operating
outside of the regulatory structure has created a safety environment
that is haphazard, at best, and a set of requirements that is not
easily understood. The lack of required training only adds to the
difficulty. PHMSA and FAA believe the current system for the
transportation of hazardous materials is sound and can be used to
effectively mitigate the risk posed by the batteries in air
transportation.
    A requirement for small lithium batteries and cells to be
transported as Class 9 materials will have significant safety benefits
that will more than offset any additional transportation costs that may
result. PHMSA invites comments on the impacts associated with
elimination of existing regulatory exceptions and the risk reduction
benefits associated with eliminating the exceptions.
    To reduce compliance costs and facilitate multimodal transportation
without sacrificing safety, in Sec.  173.185(d) we propose to specify
provisions for the transportation of lithium cells and batteries by
highway, rail and vessel consistent with the IMDG Code. In addition, we
propose specific requirements for extremely small batteries with very
low energy (e.g., less than 0.3 grams or 3.7 Wh) when packed with or
contained in equipment. When contained in equipment, these types of
batteries are often embedded into circuit boards and are well protected
from damage and pose a negligible risk. We are seeking comments on
whether certain exceptions are appropriate from a risk and cost
perspective. Such exceptions would include lithium ion batteries
shipped at a reduced state of charge (e.g. less than 50% state of
charge) or ``very low energy'' batteries (3.7Wh) packed or contained in
equipment.
    On December 15, 2008, we received a petition (P-1533) from the Air
Transport Association of America and the Regional Airline Association
requesting we amend the HMR to permit airlines to carry a limited
number of small lithium batteries in the aircraft cabin in a constant
state of readiness with adequate backup power for the duration of the
flight. The petition states such necessary equipment includes
electronic flight bags, onboard medical monitoring devices, portable
oxygen concentrators, personal entertainment devices and credit card
readers. We agree a need exists for airlines to use and maintain
certain types of equipment that are increasingly powered by lithium
batteries. Under Federal Aviation Regulations, these devices must be
approved by the FAA to ensure they will not cause interference with the
navigation or communication system of the aircraft on which it is to be
used and crew members can safely handle these devices and batteries. In
this NPRM we propose to modify Sec.  175.8 to allow other items
approved by the FAA Administrator to be used on board an aircraft. FAA
will provide additional information published in an upcoming INFO to
supplement this requirement.

G. Packaging and Stowage

    The risks associated with the transport of lithium cells and
batteries are largely a function of the amount of stored energy in a
single cell or battery and the number of batteries in a shipment or a
package. In addition, factors such as battery chemistry, state of
charge, transport mode, type and method of packaging, quality of
manufacturing, age, and handling all contribute varying amounts to the
overall risks in transportation. Understanding and addressing these
risks pose unique challenges to U.S. and international regulatory
bodies.
    The available incident data suggest external short circuiting is a
leading cause of lithium battery incidents. Effective insulation of
exposed terminals, designing batteries with recessed terminals and
other such measures would help to prevent incidents resulting from
external short circuits. To reduce the potential of short-circuiting,
in this NPRM we are proposing to require lithium cells and batteries to
be transported in inner packagings of combination packagings that
completely enclose the cell or battery. The intent of the requirement
for inner packaging is to ensure that the conductive terminals of
batteries remain isolated from each other. This can be achieved in many
ways including individually packing each cell or battery or packing
batteries in blister packs commonly found in retail outlets where the
batteries would be contained between paperboard card and transparent
clear plastic. We continue to stress the intent of the packaging is to
protect the batteries from short circuits and damage. The above
examples are provided only to enhance understanding of the packaging
requirement and not to limit the acceptable packaging methods used for
compliance.
    For air transportation, the HMR impose per-package weight
limitations for lithium cells and batteries. However, there are no
limits on the number of packages that may be transported in an
overpack, unit load device, or cargo compartment. PHMSA and FAA are
concerned about the aggregate risks inherent in transportation
situations in which a large number of packages each containing small-
sized batteries, are transported in close proximity to one another.
Indeed, the risks inherent in the transportation of multiple packages
of small-sized batteries may be more serious than the risks associated
with a small number of packages containing large-sized batteries.
Currently, packages containing up to 24 cells or 12 batteries may be
transported without marks or labels indicating the presence of lithium
batteries. Further, a single battery shipment may consist of many
packages, each of which is excepted from the packaging and hazard
communication requirements. An individual battery will pose a fire risk
that can be exacerbated by poor packaging and careless handling and,
the number of batteries in a shipment can substantially affect the
severity of an incident. For example, several thousand small lithium
batteries consolidated together may present more significant potential
risks than a shipment of a single large lithium battery, because one
burning lithium battery can produce enough heat and energy to propagate
to other lithium batteries in the same overpack, freight container, or
cargo hold.
    PHMSA and FAA are aware of one incident that involved a shipment of
120,000 lithium metal batteries contained in small packages, each
excepted from the HMR. The pallets containing the packages were
mishandled by ground crew personnel, which led to their eventual
ignition. Initial attempts to extinguish the fire with water and
chemical fire extinguishers were ineffective. More recently, PHMSA and
FAA observed an incident involving lithium metal batteries contained in
personal disposable vaporizers. The shipment consisted of 40 cartons
with each package containing 50 devices. Upon landing at their
destination, the flight crew was alerted to a fire in the forward
compartment. Fire department personnel successfully extinguished the
fire with no injury or damage to the aircraft. These two examples
illustrate the potential for a serious incident that could result if
the risks are not addressed through transportation safety controls.
Both the 2004 and 2006 FAA technical reports show that an increase in
the number of batteries involved increases the duration of a fire.
Currently, fire suppression systems are not required in all cargo
compartments of cargo only aircraft. Therefore, even though Halon fire
suppression systems are effective at suppressing a fire involving
lithium ion batteries, flight crews on cargo only aircraft remain at
risk. In this NPRM we are proposing several actions intended to
mitigate this risk. Specifically we propose to prohibit the stowage of
lithium batteries in an inaccessible manner unless the inaccessible
cargo compartment or freight container is equipped with an FAA approved
fire suppression system or the lithium batteries are packaged in an FAA
approved fire resistant container. We believe the enhanced packaging
and hazard communication combined with loading and stowage limitations
will reduce the likelihood of a fire and will mitigate the consequences
of such a fire should one occur. We are also considering whether
imposing a limit on the number of lithium battery packages transported
in a single aircraft, single compartment, unit load device, pallet, or
similar overpack would further enhance safety. We invite commenters to
address such a limitation, including potential safety benefits,
possible cost impacts and operational implications or alternative
suggestions for reducing risk. We invite commenters to address methods
available to quantify lithium battery risks, and potential risk
mitigation techniques and alternatives--either in lieu of, or in
addition to, the provisions proposed in this NPRM. Based on the merits
of these comments we may consider adoption of additional stowage
requirements in the final rule.

H. Consolidation of Lithium Battery Regulations

    At present, requirements on transporting lithium cells and
batteries are located in several different special provisions in Sec.
172.102 and in Sec.  173.185. We believe that consolidating in a single
section the requirements that apply to these articles, in a manner
similar to most other hazardous materials, will promote greater
understanding and compliance with the regulations and reduce the
potential for undeclared or frustrated shipments.
    In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to consolidate the regulations
pertaining to the packaging of lithium batteries primarily by
relocating relevant provisions currently contained in special
provisions to Sec.  173.185. Additionally, aircraft quantity
limitations currently located in Sec.  172.102, Special provisions
A100, A101 and A103 will be incorporated into the Sec.  172.101
hazardous materials table (HMT). Consequently, Column 9A of the HMT
(passenger aircraft/passenger rail quantity limits) for the entry
``Lithium metal batteries, UN3090'' will be revised to read
``Forbidden'' and packages containing lithium metal batteries would be
required to display the cargo aircraft only label. We would remove the
current requirement found in Special provision 188 to mark packages as
forbidden aboard passenger aircraft. However, general requirements
applicable to all hazardous materials, such as hazard communication,
training, and emergency response information would not be repeated in

Sec.  173.185 (except to the extent that any exceptions from these
requirements apply).
    The United Parcel Service (UPS) filed a petition for rulemaking on
May 11, 2009 (P-1541), requesting an amendment to the HMR specific to
the marking of packages containing lithium batteries shipped under the
exceptions found in Sec.  172.102(c) Special Provision 189. In its
petition, UPS states the markings required by Special provisions 188
and 189 are too similar and can be easily confused. The UPS petition
asked PHMSA to develop a pictorial marking that would unambiguously
communicate the prohibition of loading packages meeting the exceptions
of Special provision 189 aboard aircraft and vessel.
    We agree the markings required by Special provisions 188 and 189
are similar and can be confused. As previously described, all packages
of small lithium metal batteries (UN3090) would be required to display
a Class 9 label and the cargo aircraft only label. We believe the
addition of the new proper shipping names specific to lithium ion cells
and batteries and the elimination of the exception currently found in
Sec.  172.102(c), Special provision 188 effectively eliminates the
confusion expressed by the petitioner.
    We are aware of situations in which damaged or recalled batteries
are required to be returned to the manufacturer. Product recalls or
returns may occur for a variety of reasons including a consumer product
recall in cooperation with the CPSC, a defective product that failed
during field tests or a battery or device involved in an incident. In
this NPRM we are proposing requirements for transporting such articles
based on requirements developed for competent authority approvals and
previously developed guidance. We propose to limit transport of damaged
or defective batteries to highway and rail transport only. Where rail
or highway transport is impracticable, we will work with FAA to develop
air shipping protocols under Competent Authority Approvals on a case-
by-case basis.

I. Ongoing Safety Initiatives

    This NPRM represents another step in our continuing efforts to
increase the safety controls applicable to the transportation of
lithium batteries. This NPRM is part of a larger effort to
comprehensively address the risks posed by the transportation of
lithium batteries primarily those lithium batteries shipped as cargo.
This NPRM does not impact lithium batteries carried by a passenger or
crewmember in checked or carry-on baggage. PHMSA has taken steps to
address this safety issue through several initiatives, including a
battery safety public awareness campaign targeting airline passengers
and infrequent battery shippers, focused enforcement with the goal of
maximum compliance, and research into appropriate fire detection and
suppression and containment methods.
    Since 2007, PHMSA has been working with air carriers, battery
manufacturers, air travel associations, airline pilot and flight crew
associations and other government agencies, including the
Transportation Security Administration, to educate the public about
potential safety problems and measures that will reduce or eliminate
those problems. PHMSA agrees that these efforts must be highly visible
and continuous to be effective. One of the most visible programs to
promote battery safety is the SafeTravel Web site, which includes
guidance and information on how to travel safely with batteries and
battery-powered devices. We have also been working with the major
airlines, travel and battery industries to provide SafeTravel
information for ticketed passengers and frequent flyers, and place
printed battery safety materials in seat pockets on passenger planes.
We have recorded several million hits on our SafeTravel Web site. PHMSA
continues to maintain and update the SafeTravel Web site as new
information becomes available and is currently in the process of a
major revision to the site. TSA includes SafeTravel information and
links on its popular public Web site and FAA has issued Travel Tips and
FAQs on Batteries Carried by Airline Passengers with a link to the
SafeTravel Web site. This material illustrates appropriate means for
airline passengers to safely handle and protect their portable
electronic devices and spare batteries. The goal is to educate the
flying public to play a part in ensuring air transportation safety.
Application of the measures set forth in this guidance would likely
have prevented at least some of the incidents involving lithium
batteries in a passenger's checked or carry-on baggage.
    PHMSA continues to pursue other initiatives targeting infrequent
shippers of lithium batteries. In March, 2009, PHMSA published a
guidance booklet called ``Shipping Batteries by Air: What You Need to
Know.'' This booklet describes the requirements applicable to the air
shipment of all battery types including lithium batteries in easy to
understand terms and is intended to assist infrequent shippers. PHMSA
and FAA continue to collect battery incident data to enhance our
understanding of the causes of lithium battery failures and have
conducted several effective investigations of battery shippers. PHMSA
seeks comments on the impact of the proposals in this NPRM on
infrequent shippers, and seeks data on the number of shipments, types
of shipments, costs incurred by these shippers. PHMSA also seeks
comments on how communication of the requirements for travelers and
infrequent shippers could be improved.

J. Compliance Date

    PHMSA and FAA believe that, if adopted, the provisions of this NPRM
will significantly enhance the safe transportation of lithium batteries
by aircraft. Therefore, we are considering requiring compliance with
the provisions of the final rule no later than 75 days after its
publication in the Federal Register. We are seeking comments as to the
feasibility and practicability of such a compliance schedule. We invite
commenters to provide data and information concerning the additional
costs that would result from such a compliance schedule, practical
difficulties associated with quickly coming into compliance with the
provisions of a final rule, and any other issues that we should
consider in making a decision on the compliance schedule. We also
invite commenters to address the feasibility and practicability of a
phased compliance schedule under which certain provisions of the final
rule would become effective on a faster schedule than other provisions
for which immediate compliance would be more difficult.

III. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking

    This proposed rule is published under the following statutory
authorities:
    1. 49 U.S.C. 5103(b) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to
prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including security,
of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.
    2. 49 U.S.C. 44701 authorizes the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air
commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum standards for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce and national security. Under 49 U.S.C.
40113, the Secretary of Transportation has the same authority to
regulate the

transportation of hazardous materials by air, in carrying out Sec.
44701, that he has under 49 U.S.C. 5103.

B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This proposed rule is a significant regulatory action under section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, was formally reviewed by
the Office of Management and Budget. This proposed rule also is a
significant rule under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the
Department of Transportation (44 FR 11034). The following sections
address the costs and benefits of the measures adopted in this proposed
rule.
    In developing this NPRM, PHMSA considered several regulatory
alternatives including (1) a do nothing approach, (2) imposing Class 9
requirements on all lithium battery shipments, (3) adopting the latest
requirements of the ICAO Technical Instructions for all lithium battery
shipments and (4) adopting certain provisions of options (2) and (3).
In this NPRM we adopted alternative (4). This alternative combines many
of the safety elements described in Alternative 2 while harmonizing
with international regulatory standards to create a more complete
regulatory solution. Under the proposed regulations, we will minimize
the regulatory exceptions for lithium batteries transported by
aircraft. Specifically, certain extremely small lithium batteries
packed with or contained in equipment that do not pose an unreasonable
risk in transport would not be subject to the HMR, and we would
maintain an exception for specifically packaged lithium batteries
transported by highway and rail only. All other lithium cells and
batteries must be transported as fully regulated Class 9 material, and
will be required to be packaged in combination packages. Each inner
packaging must be packed into an outer package meeting the Packing
Group II performance standard. This is expected to result in new costs
associated with packaging, hazard communication, cargo stowage and
training requirements. We expect two primary industry groups will be
most directly affected by the proposals in this NPRM: (1) Manufacturers
and distributors of all types of lithium batteries (including
electronic device manufacturers); and (2) passenger and cargo air
carriers. The costs of implementing the new rules come to approximately
$9.3 million for the first year; using a constant 7% discount, the 10-
year projected costs for the proposed rule come to $70.2 million. PHMSA
invites commenters to address the assumptions in the regulatory
evaluation, and to provide supporting data related to battery shipments
which would be covered by this proposal. Specifically, data on the size
distribution, value distribution, end usage, and number of batteries by
type of shipment and mode of transportation--as well as any other data
that would assist in validating impact estimates for this proposal,
including quantification of costs and how these costs would be
distributed across the lithium battery supply chain. PHMSA also invites
comments on the diversion of shipments from air to other modes of
transportation (due to the proposed elimination of regulatory
exceptions), including the impacts this diversion will have on cost and
length of shipments, and the nature of these shipments that would be
impacted. In addition to data related to quantification of costs, PHMSA
invites comments and data related to the quantification of risk, and
risk-reduction benefits.
    The regulatory evaluation does not include costs associated with
handling charges that are sometimes imposed by air carriers on
hazardous materials shipments. PHMSA believes the net cost of the
handling fee is zero; cash is transferred from one affected industry
group--shippers--to another industry group--carriers. The shipper
incurs the surcharge to compensate the carrier for the enhanced service
involved with transporting a hazardous materials package. Moreover, the
dynamics of this market make it difficult to conclude that shipping
costs will rise, fall, or remain relatively steady. Some high volume
shippers may negotiate a reduced surcharge with air carriers. Some
shippers may decide to switch to another mode. Rail and highway
transport is less expensive than air transport, although both require
more time in transit. If a shipper chose a different transport mode,
the net effect would be that the shipper or consignee would be required
to maintain an increase in inventory (and related costs) to replace the
product in transit, offsetting to some extent the savings realized by
using the less expensive mode. In this NPRM PHMSA specifically invites
commenters to address the economic impact of surcharges and other fees
associated with the handling of hazardous materials including how the
fees are determined.
    The principal anticipated benefits associated with this proposed
rule are a reduction in the risk of an aircraft cargo compartment fire
that involves lithium batteries becoming a catastrophic fire that can
threaten the entire aircraft. While the risk of this type of incident
is small, PHMSA has determined that, if adopted, the proposals in this
NRPM will generate benefits for system users by reducing that risk. Our
data shows an average of about three lithium battery incidents aboard
aircraft per year. The total costs of an incident can vary greatly,
from under $500 for a minor incident to hundreds of millions of dollars
should an incident result in the loss of an aircraft and cargo. To
calculate benefits we assumed that under the current regulations and
battery-market growth trends, we will observe approximately three
incidents per year and assume the average loss of $4.4 million per
incident. We anticipate benefits to be approximately $13.2 million per
year. Starting with 2008, the annual cost of $9.3 million and benefit
of $13.2 million have been discounted at a 7% annual rate to project a
total cost of $70.2 million and total benefit of $99.2 million, for an
overall benefit-cost ratio of 1.41, clearly demonstrating the utility
of the proposed regulation. A regulatory evaluation is available for
review in the public docket for this rulemaking.

 C. Executive Order 13132

    This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132
(``Federalism''). This proposed rule preempts State, local and Indian
tribe requirements but does not impose any regulation that has
substantial direct effects on the States, the relationship between the
national government and the States, or the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, the
consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not
apply.
    The Federal hazardous material transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 5101-
5128, contains an express preemption provision (49 U.S.C. 5125(b)) that
preempts State, local and Indian tribe requirements on the following
subjects:
    (1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous
material;
    (2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and
placarding of hazardous material;
    (3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents
related to hazardous material and requirements related to the number,
contents, and placement of those documents;
    (4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the
unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; and
    (5) The design, manufacture, fabrication, inspection, marking,
maintenance, recondition, repair, or

testing of a packaging or container represented, marked, certified, or
sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material in
commerce.
    This proposed rule addresses subject items (1), (2), (3), and (5)
above and preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements not
meeting the ``substantively the same'' standard.

 D. Executive Order 13175

    This proposed rule was analyzed in accordance with the principles
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13175 (``Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). Because this proposed
rule does not have tribal implications and does not impose substantial
direct compliance costs, the funding and consultation requirements of
Executive Order 13175 do not apply.

 E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Procedures and Policies

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an
agency to review regulations to assess their impact on small entities,
unless the agency determines that a rule is not expected to have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. This NPRM
proposes measures to enhance the safety in transportation of lithium
batteries by ensuring that all lithium batteries are designed to
withstand normal transportation conditions, packaged to reduce the
possibility of damage that could lead to an incident, minimize the
consequences of an incident and ensure packages of lithium batteries
are accompanied by hazard information that ensures appropriate and
careful handling by air carrier personnel and informs transport workers
and emergency response personnel of actions to be taken in the event of
an emergency.
    Two types of businesses are likely to incur costs associated with
compliance with the provisions of this NPRM--manufacturers and
distributors of lithium batteries and manufacturers of equipment using
lithium batteries. Unless alternative definitions have been established
by the agency in consultation with the Small Business Administration
(SBA), the definition of ``small business'' has the same meaning as
under the Small Business Act. Since no such special definition has been
established, we employ the thresholds published by SBA for industries
subject to the HMR. For this analysis, we identified 60 small
businesses that manufacture and/or distribute lithium metal or lithium-
ion batteries or cells and are potentially affected by the NPRM.
Additionally, we identified 2,179 businesses that manufacture or
distribute electronics shipped with lithium metal or lithium-ion
batteries.
    The compliance costs to small businesses subject to the provisions
in the NPRM are costs primarily related to packaging for lithium
battery shipments. As detailed in the regulatory evaluation,
incremental costs are expected to range from $0.02 to $0.09 per cell
for those shipments that are currently excepted from specification
packaging requirements. We estimate that small businesses will make
69,876 shipments per year for which more robust packaging will be
required; each shipment will average about 200 cells. Using the mid-
range incremental packaging cost estimate of $0.04 per cell, a small
business will incur an incremental cost of about $8 per shipment. The
total incremental packaging cost is $559,008 per year or about $250 per
small entity per year.
    Small entities will also incur increased costs related to training.
These costs are estimated to total $98 per small entity per year.
    We have prepared and placed in the docket a regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) addressing the economic impact of this rule. The RIA
includes qualitative discussions and quantitative measurements of costs
related to implementation of this rule.
    Based on this analysis, I certify that the provisions of this NPRM,
if adopted, would not have a significant impact on a substantial number
of small entities.

 F. Paperwork Reduction Act

    PHMSA currently has an approved information collection under Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number 2137-0034, ``Hazardous
Materials Shipping Papers and Emergency Response Information'' with an
expiration date of May 31, 2011. PHMSA believes this proposed rule will
result in an increase in the annual burden of this information
collection.
    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no person is required to
respond to a collection of information unless it is approved by OMB and
displays a valid OMB control number. Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code
of Federal Regulations requires that PHMSA provide interested members
of the public and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on
information collection and recordkeeping requests.
    This notice identifies a revised information collection request
that PHMSA will submit to OMB for approval based on the requirements in
this proposed rule. PHMSA has developed burden estimates to reflect
changes in this proposed rule, and estimates the additional information
collection and recordkeeping burden as proposed in this rule to be as
follows:

OMB Control No. 2137-0034:
  Additional Annual Number of Respondents.....................     5,131
  Additional Annual Number of Responses.......................   167,800
  Additional Annual Burden Hours..............................     1,939
  Additional Annual Burden Costs..............................   $48,480

    PHMSA specifically requests comments on the information collection
and recordkeeping burdens associated with developing, implementing, and
maintaining these requirements for approval under this proposed rule.
    Requests for a copy of this information collection should be
directed to: Deborah Boothe or T. Glenn Foster, Office of Hazardous
Materials Standards (PHH-10), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, Room E24-426, 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE., Washington, DC
20590-0001, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

 G. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of
this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.

 H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    This proposed rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of
$141,300,000 or more, adjusted for inflation, to either State, local or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or to the private sector in any
one year, and is the least burdensome alternative that achieves the
objective of the rule.

 I. Environmental Assessment

    The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Sec. Sec.  4321-4375,
requires Federal agencies to analyze proposed actions to determine
whether the action will have a significant impact on the human
environment. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations
order Federal agencies to conduct an environmental review considering
(1) the need for the proposed action, (2) alternatives to the proposed
action, (3) probable environmental impacts of the proposed action and
alternatives, and (4) the agencies and persons consulted during

the consideration process. 40 CFR Sec.  1508.9(b).

    Purpose and Need. As discussed elsewhere in this preamble, lithium
batteries are potentially hazardous in transportation because they
present both chemical (e.g., flammable electrolytes) and electrical
hazards. If not safely packaged and handled when transported, lithium
batteries can become dangerous. Defective batteries or batteries which
are misused, mishandled, or improperly packaged, improperly stored, or
overcharged can overheat and ignite and, once ignited, fires can be
especially difficult to extinguish. This NPRM proposes measures to
enhance the safety in transportation of lithium batteries by ensuring
that all lithium batteries are designed to withstand normal
transportation conditions, packaged to reduce the possibility of damage
that could lead to an incident, minimize the consequences of an
incident and ensure packages of lithium batteries are accompanied by
hazard information that ensures appropriate and careful handling by air
carrier personnel and informs transport workers and emergency response
personnel of actions to be taken in an emergency.

    Alternatives. PHMSA considered the following alternatives:
Alternative 1: Do Nothing
    Under this alternative, the current regulatory scheme applicable to
lithium batteries would continue in place. We rejected this alternative
because newly identified safety risks would not be addressed.
Alternative 2: Impose Class 9 Requirements on All Lithium Battery
Shipments
    Under this alternative, we would eliminate the current regulatory
exceptions for small lithium batteries and require their shipment as
fully regulated Class 9 materials. The current packaging requirement
for these excepted batteries (a package meeting the general packaging
requirements of Subpart B of Part 173 and capable of withstanding 1.2
meter drop test in any orientation) would be replaced by a requirement
to package the batteries in UN specification packaging conforming to
the Packing Group II performance level. The current marking applicable
to packages containing these excepted batteries would be replaced with
a CLASS 9 label and proper shipping name, UN ID number mark, and the
CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY label, as appropriate.
    In addition, each shipment would be accompanied by shipping papers
and emergency response information, documentation that is currently not
required for excepted battery shipments. In addition, eliminating the
regulatory exceptions would require notification to the pilot in
command of the presence of lithium batteries, the number of packages,
and their stowage location. Under this alternative, the ban on the
transport of lithium metal batteries aboard passenger aircraft would
continue. The maximum quantities that may be offered for transportation
in one package aboard passenger and cargo only aircraft would remain
unchanged at 5 kg and 35 kg respectively.
    We rejected Alternative 2. While it would address many of the
safety issues associated with the transportation of lithium batteries,
Alternative 2 does not represent a comprehensive regulatory solution.
Moreover, Alternative 2 does not address critical international
harmonization issues.
Alternative 3: Impose ICAO Requirements on All Lithium Battery
Shipments
    Under this alternative, PHMSA would amend the HMR to harmonize
transportation requirements for lithium batteries with requirements in
the ICAO Technical Instructions, as follows: (1) The current exception
for small lithium batteries would be retained; (2) for excepted
shipments, the watt-hour rating for the batteries would be marked on
the outside case and the package would be required to have a new
lithium battery handling label in place of the current mark; (3)
package weight limitations applicable to different lithium battery
types would be revised; and (4) for lithium metal batteries, each
package would be allowed to contain up to 2.5 kg of net lithium content
per package when surrounded by cushioning material and packaged in
rigid metal outer packaging.
    We rejected Alternative 3. Although it harmonizes the HMR with
international requirements applicable to lithium batteries, it does not
address safety issues associated with small batteries nor does it limit
the weight of batteries that may be carried in inaccessible
compartments on cargo aircraft. Our data and research suggest that the
severity of a fire involving lithium batteries is proportional to the
number of batteries involved in the fire.
Alternative 4: Adopt the Provisions in Both Alternatives 2 and 3
    Under this alternative, PHMSA would adopt the new and revised
regulatory provisions summarized in the discussion of Alternatives 2
and 3 above. In addition, we would adopt requirements for the transport
of recalled or defective batteries.
    Alternative 4 is the selected alternative. This alternative
combines many of the safety elements described in Alternative 2 while
harmonizing with international regulatory standards to create a more
complete regulatory solution. This alternative will minimize the
regulatory exceptions for lithium batteries transported by aircraft.
Specifically, with the exception of incident reporting requirements,
certain extremely small lithium batteries packed with or contained in
equipment that do not pose an unreasonable risk in transport would not
be subject to the HMR, and we would maintain an exception for
specifically packaged lithium batteries transported by highway and rail
only. All other lithium batteries would be fully regulated Class 9
materials. These lithium batteries would be packed in UN specification
packaging conforming to the Packing Group II performance level and
appropriately marked and labeled consistent with Part 172. Each
shipment of lithium batteries would be accompanied by shipping papers,
emergency response information, and a notice to the pilot in command.
Further, we would limit the manner in which lithium batteries may be
stowed on cargo aircraft. Finally, under this alternative, the
requirements applicable to lithium batteries would be harmonized with
international standards to the extent possible consistent with our
overall safety goals, thereby enhancing safety and facilitating
transportation of these critical energy devices.
    Analysis of Environmental Impacts. Hazardous materials are
substances that may pose a threat to public safety or the environment
during transportation because of their physical, chemical, or nuclear
properties. The hazardous material regulatory system is a risk
management system that is prevention-oriented and focused on
identifying a safety hazard and reducing the probability and quantity
of a hazardous material release. Hazardous materials are categorized by
hazard analysis and experience into hazard classes and packing groups.
The regulations require each shipper to classify a material in
accordance with these hazard classes and packing groups; the process of
classifying a hazardous material is itself a form of hazard analysis.
Further, the regulations require the shipper to communicate the
material's hazards through use of the hazard class, packing group, and
proper shipping name on the shipping paper and the use of labels on
packages and placards on transport

vehicles. Thus the shipping paper, labels, and placards communicate the
most significant findings of the shipper's hazard analysis. A hazardous
material is assigned to one of three packing groups based upon its
degree of hazard--from a high hazard Packing Group I to a low hazard
Packing Group III material. The quality, damage resistance, and
performance standards of the packaging in each packing group are
appropriate for the hazards of the material transported.
    Releases of hazardous materials, whether caused by accident or
deliberate sabotage, can result in explosions or fires. Radioactive,
toxic, infectious, or corrosive hazardous materials can have short- or
long-term exposure effects on humans or the environment. Generally,
however, the hazard class definitions are focused on the potential
safety hazards associated with a given material or type of material
rather than the environmental hazards of such materials.
    Lithium is the lightest solid metal. It can be absorbed into the
body by inhalation of its aerosol and by ingestion and is corrosive to
the eyes, the skin and the respiratory tract. Lithium reacts violently
with strong oxidants, acids and many compounds (hydrocarbons, halogens,
halons, concrete, sand and asbestos) causing fire and explosion hazard.
In addition, it reacts with water, forming highly flammable hydrogen
gas and corrosive fumes of lithium hydroxide. Lithium hydroxide
represents a potentially significant environmental hazard, particularly
to water organisms. Lithium metal batteries contain no toxic metals.
    Lithium ion batteries contain an ionic form of lithium but no
lithium metal. Lithium ion batteries do not pose an environmental
hazard and are safe for disposal in the normal municipal waste stream.
While other types of batteries include toxic metals such as cadmium,
the metals in lithium ion batteries--cobalt, copper, nickel and iron--
are considered safe for landfills or incinerators.
    The measures proposed in this NPRM will reduce the risks to people
and the environment posed during transportation of lithium metal and
lithium ion batteries by ensuring that the batteries will withstand
conditions normally encountered in transportation; packaged to reduce
the possibility of damage that could lead to an incident and minimize
the consequences of an incident; and ensure packages of lithium
batteries are accompanied by hazard information that ensures
appropriate and careful handling by air carrier personnel and informs
transport workers and emergency response personnel of actions to be
taken in an emergency.
    Lithium batteries are a key part of strategies to develop greener
technologies to power many different applications from automobiles to
cell phones and computers. The measures proposed in this NPRM will
facilitate the safe transportation of lithium metal and lithium ion
batteries across national boundaries, thereby supporting more
widespread use of these batteries as alternatives to other types of
energy sources that have adverse environmental impacts. We have
preliminarily concluded that there are no significant environmental
impacts associated with proposed amendments in this final rule.
    Consultation and Public Comment. We invite commenters to address
the potential environmental impacts of the proposals in this NRPM.

J. Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any written
communications and comments received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70;
Pages 19477-78) or you may visit http://www.regulations.gov/search/
footer/privacyanduse.jsp.

K. International Trade Analysis

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States. For purposes of these requirements, Federal agencies
may participate in the establishment of international standards, so
long as the standards have a legitimate domestic objective, such as
providing for safety, and do not operate to exclude imports that meet
this objective. The statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
for U.S. standards. PHMSA participates in the establishment of
international standards to protect the safety of the American public,
and we have assessed the effects of the proposed rule to ensure that it
does not exclude imports that meet this objective. Accordingly, this
rulemaking is consistent with PHMSA's obligations under the Trade
Agreement Act, as amended.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 171

    Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Imports, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

49 CFR Part 172

    Education, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Incorporation by reference, Labeling, Markings, Packaging and
containers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 173

    Hazardous materials transportation, Packaging and containers,
Radioactive materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Uranium.

49 CFR Part 175

    Air carriers, Hazardous materials transportation, Radioactive
materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    In consideration of the foregoing, we propose to amend 49 CFR
Chapter I as follows:

PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 171 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.45 and 1.53;
Pub. L. 101-410 section 4 (28 U.S.C. 2641 note); Pub. L. 104-134,
section 31001.

    2. In Sec.  171.7, in the paragraph (a)(3) table, the entry ``UN
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Manual of Tests
and Criteria, Fourth revised edition, (2003), and Addendum 2, (2004)''
is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  171.7  Reference material.

    (a) * * *
    (3) Table of material incorporated by reference. * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Source and name of material                49 CFR reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              * * * * * * *
UN Recommendations on the Transport of   172.102; 173.21; 173.56;
 Dangerous Goods Manual of Tests and      173.57; 173.58; 173.115;
 Criteria, Fifth revised edition (2009).  173.124; 173.125; 173.127;
                                          173.128; 173.137; 173.185;
                                          Part 173, appendix H; 178.274.

                              * * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. In Sec.  171.8:
    1. The definition for ``Equivalent lithium content'' is removed.
    2. The definitions for ``Lithium cell or battery'', ``Lithium ion
cell or battery'', ``Lithium metal cell or battery'', ``Short circuit''
and ``Watt-hour'' are added in appropriate alphabetical order.
    3. The definitions for ``Aggregate lithium content'' and ``Lithium
content'' are revised.
    The additions and revisions, in appropriate alphabetic order, read
as follows:

Sec.  171.8  Definitions and abbreviations.

* * * * *
    Aggregate lithium content means the sum of the grams of lithium
content contained by the cells comprising a battery.
* * * * *
    Lithium cell or battery refers to a family of cells and batteries
with different chemistries comprising many types of cathodes and
electrolytes. A lithium cell is a single encased exhibits a voltage
differential across its two terminals. A lithium battery consists of
multiple lithium cells electrically connected together fitted with
devices necessary for use, for example, case, terminals, markings and
protective devices. For the purposes of this subchapter, units that are
commonly referred to as ``battery packs'' or ``battery modules'' or
``battery assemblies'' having the primary function of providing a
source of power to another piece of equipment are treated as batteries.
    Lithium content means
    (1) For a lithium metal or lithium alloy cell the mass in grams of
lithium or lithium alloy in the anode, and
    (2) For a lithium metal or lithium alloy battery, the sum of the
grams of lithium content contained in the component cells of the
battery.
    (3) For a lithium ion cell or battery, see the definition for
``Watt-hour''.
    Lithium-ion cell or battery means a rechargeable electrochemical
cell or battery in which the positive and negative electrodes are both
lithium compounds constructed with no metallic lithium in either
electrode. A lithium ion polymer cell or battery that uses lithium-ion
chemistries, as described herein, is regulated as a lithium-ion cell or
battery.
    Lithium metal cell or battery means an electrochemical cell or
battery utilizing lithium metal or lithium alloys as the anode.
* * * * *
    Short circuit means a direct connection between positive and
negative terminals of a cell or battery that provides a virtual zero
resistance path for current flow.
* * * * *
    Watt-hour means a unit of energy equivalent to one watt (1 W) of
work acting for one hour (1 h) of time and is expressed as (Wh). The
Watt-hour rating of a lithium ion cell or battery is determined by
multiplying a cell or battery's rated capacity in ampere-hours, by its
nominal voltage. Therefore, Watt-hour (Wh) = ampere-hour (Ah) x volts
(V).
* * * * *
    4. In Sec.  171.12, paragraphs (a)(6) is revised to read as
follows:

Sec.  171.12  North American shipments.

    (a) * * *
    (6) Lithium cells and batteries. Lithium cells and batteries must
be offered for transport and transported in accordance with the
provisions of this subchapter. Lithium metal cells and batteries
(UN3090) are forbidden for transport aboard passenger-carrying
aircraft.
    (i) The provisions of this paragraph (a)(6) do not apply to
packages that contain 5 kg (11 pounds) net weight or less lithium metal
cells or batteries that are contained in or packed with equipment
(UN3091).
    (ii) Lithium cells and batteries with a lithium content of not more
than 0.3 grams or a watt-hour rating of not more than 3.7 Wh packed
with or contained in equipment are not subject to any other
requirements of this subchapter except for the requirements in
Sec. Sec.  171.15 and 171.16 applicable to the reporting of incidents.
* * * * *
    5. Section 171.21(a) is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  171.21  Assistance in investigations and special studies.

    (a) A person reporting an incident under the provisions of Sec.
171.15 or Sec.  171.16 must:
    (1) Give an authorized representative of the Federal, State or
local government agency reasonable assistance in the investigation of
the incident; (i.e. making all records and information pertaining to
the incident available or assisting in the transportation of the
evidence upon request).
    (2) Give an authorized representative or special agent of the
Department of Transportation reasonable assistance in the investigation
of the incident; and
    (3) Upon request, provide an authorized representative or special
agent of the Department of Transportation reasonable access to the
damaged package or article, if available.
* * * * *
    6. In Sec.  171.24, paragraphs (d)(1)(ii) and (d)(1)(iii) are
revised to read as follows:

Sec.  171.24  Additional requirements for the use of the ICAO Technical
Instructions.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (ii) Lithium cells and batteries. The following conditions and
limitations apply to lithium batteries and cells:
    (A) Lithium cells and batteries meeting the provisions found in
Section II of Packing Instructions 965 through 970 must be offered for
transportation and transported in accordance with the provisions of
this subchapter;
    (B) Lithium metal cells and batteries (UN3090) are forbidden for
transport aboard passenger-carrying aircraft.
    (1) The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to packages that
contain 5 kg (11 pounds) net weight or less lithium metal cells or
batteries that are contained in or packed with equipment (UN3091); and
    (2) Lithium cells and batteries of a design type proven to meet the
criteria of Class 9 in Subsection 38.3 of the UN Manual of Tests and
Criteria with a lithium content of not more than 0.3 grams or a watt-
hour rating of not more than 3.7 Wh packed with or contained in
equipment are not subject to any other requirements of this subchapter

except for the requirements in Sec. Sec.  171.15 and 171.16 applicable
to the reporting of incidents.
    (iii) Pre-production prototype lithium cells and batteries. Pre-
production cells and batteries must be approved by the Associate
Administrator prior to transportation aboard cargo aircraft.
* * * * *
    7. In Sec.  171.25, paragraph (b)(3) is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  171.25  Additional requirements for the use of the IMDG Code.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Lithium cells and batteries--
    (i) Transported in accordance with Special Provision 188 of the
IMDG Code may be offered for transportation and transported by highway,
rail or vessel only. Additionally, each package must be marked
``LITHIUM BATTERIES--FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT ABOARD AIRCRAFT'' on a
background of contrasting color. The marking must be durable, legible
and of such a size relative to the package as to be readily visible.
    (ii) Lithium cells and batteries of a design type proven to meet
the criteria of Class 9 in Subsection 38.3 of the UN Manual of Tests
and Criteria with a lithium content of not more than 0.3 grams or a
watt-hour rating of not more than 3.7 Wh packed with or contained in
equipment are not subject to any other requirements of the subchapter
except for the requirements in Sec. Sec.  171.15 and 171.16 applicable
to the reporting of incidents.
* * * * *

PART 172--HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, AND
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

    8. The authority citation for part 172 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.45 and 1.53.

    9. In Sec.  172.101, the Hazardous Materials Table is amended by
removing and adding entries in the appropriate alphabetical sequence,
to read as follows:
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11JA10.010

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11JA10.011

BILLING CODE 4910-60-C

Sec.  172.102  Special Provisions

    10. In Sec.  172.102, in paragraph (c)(1), Special Provisions 134
and 157 are revised; Special Provisions 29, 188, 189, and 190 are
removed; and in paragraph (c)(2), Special Provisions A54, A55, A100,
A101, A103, and A104 are removed.
    The revisions read as follows:

Sec.  172.102  Special provisions.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *

Code/Special Provisions

* * * * *
    134 This entry only applies to vehicles, machinery and equipment

powered by wet batteries, sodium batteries, or lithium batteries that
are transported with these batteries installed. Examples of such items
are electrically-powered cars, lawn mowers, wheelchairs, and other
mobility aids. Self-propelled vehicles that also contain an internal
combustion engine must be consigned under the entry ``Vehicle,
flammable gas powered'' or ``Vehicle, flammable liquid powered'', as
appropriate.
* * * * *
    157 This entry includes hybrid electric vehicles powered by both an
internal combustion engine and wet, sodium or lithium batteries
installed. Vehicles containing an internal combustion engine must be
consigned under the entry ``Vehicle, flammable gas powered'' or
``Vehicle, flammable liquid powered'', as appropriate.
* * * * *

PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND
PACKAGINGS

    11. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.45 and 1.53.

    12. Section 173.185 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  173.185  Lithium cells and batteries.

    Lithium cell and battery. A lithium cell or battery must be
transported only under the following conditions:
    (a) General Requirements. (1) Each lithium cell or battery must:
    (i) Be of a design type proven to meet the criteria of Class 9 in
Sub-section 38.3 of the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria (IBR; see Sec.
171.7 of this subchapter).
    (A) A lithium cell or battery that differs from a tested design
type would be considered a new design type and would be required to be
retested:
    (1) A change of 0.1 grams or 5% by mass to the cathode, to the
anode, or to the electrolyte; or for rechargeable batteries a change in
the nominal energy in watt-hours or an increase in the nominal voltage
of more than 5%; or
    (2) A change that would materially affect the test results would be
considered a new design type;
    Note to paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A): The type of change that might be
considered to differ from a tested type, such that it might lead to
failure of any of the tests, may include but is not limited to:

--A change in the material of the anode, the cathode, the separator, or
the electrolyte;
--A change of protective devices, including hardware and software;
--A change of safety design in cells or batteries, such as a venting
valve;
--A change in the number of component cells;
--A change in connecting mode of component cells.

    (B) Each person who manufactures lithium cells or batteries must
maintain a record of satisfactory completion of these tests prior to
offering the cell or battery for transport and must make this record
available, upon request, to an authorized official of a Federal, State,
or local government agency at reasonable times and locations. Each
person who manufactures lithium cells or batteries must retain this
record for as long as that lithium battery design type is offered for
transportation and for one year thereafter.
    (ii) Incorporate a safety venting device or otherwise be designed
in a manner that will preclude a violent rupture under conditions
normally incident to transportation.
    (iii) Be equipped with an effective means to prevent dangerous
reverse current flow (e.g., diodes, fuses, etc.) if a battery contains
cells or a series of cells that are connected in parallel; and
    (iv) Be equipped with an effective means of preventing external
short circuits and the evolution of a dangerous amount of heat (i.e. an
amount of heat sufficient to be dangerous to packaging or personal
safety to include charring, melting or scorching of packaging, or other
evidence).
    (2) Packaging. Lithium cells and batteries must be packaged as
follows:
    (i) Lithium cells or batteries, including lithium cells or
batteries packed with or contained in equipment, must be packaged in a
manner to prevent short-circuiting, generation of sparks, or a
dangerous quantity of heat. Examples of acceptable packaging methods
include but are not limited to the following: Packaging each battery or
each battery powered device in fully enclosed inner packagings made of
non-conductive material; separating batteries and battery powered
devices in a manner to prevent contact with other batteries, devices,
or conductive materials (e.g., metal) in the packagings; ensuring
exposed terminals are protected with non-conductive caps, non-
conductive tape; or other appropriate means; and
    (ii) Lithium cells or batteries must be packaged in combination
packagings conforming to the requirements of part 178, subparts L and
M, of this subchapter at the Packing Group II performance level. The
lithium cell or battery must be packed in inner packagings that
completely enclose the cell or battery. The inner packagings must be
packed within one of the following outer packagings: Metal boxes (4A or
4B); wooden boxes (4C1, 4C2, 4D, or 4F); fiberboard boxes (4G); solid
plastic boxes (4H2); fiber drums (1G); metal drums (1A2 or 1B2);
plywood drums (1D); plastic jerricans (3H2); or metal jerricans (3A2 or
3B2).
    (3) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, cells and
batteries with a liquid cathode containing sulfur dioxide, sulfuryl
chloride or thionyl chloride may not be offered for transportation or
transported if any cell has been discharged to the extent that the open
circuit voltage is less than two volts or is less than \2/3\ of the
voltage of the fully charged cell, whichever is less.
    (4) Cells and batteries with lithium content of not more than 0.3
grams or a watt-hour rating of not more than 3.7 Wh that meet the
requirements of paragraph (a) that are packed with or contained in
equipment in accordance with paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section are
not subject to any other requirements of the subchapter except for the
incident reporting requirements in Sec. Sec.  171.15 and 171.16.
    (b) Lithium cells or batteries packed with equipment. Lithium cells
or batteries packed with equipment must meet all the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section except the specification packaging
requirements of paragraph (a)(2)(ii).