[Federal Register: October 28, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 209)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 63867-63880]
[DOCID:fr28oc08-3]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 25 and 121

[Docket No. FAA-2006-26722; Amendment Nos. 25-127, 121-341]
RIN 2120-AI66

Security Related Considerations in the Design and Operation of
Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The rule adopts several standards of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and requires manufacturers to incorporate
certain security features in the design of new transport category
airplanes. Specifically, manufacturers of affected

airplanes must design flightdecks that are protected from penetration
by projectiles and intrusion by unauthorized persons. The flightdeck,
passenger cabin, and cargo compartments of these aircraft must be
protected from the effects of detonation of an explosive or incendiary
device. The rule also requires that manufacturers of new transport
category airplanes design a ``least risk bomb location'' and that
operators of certain existing airplanes designate such a location.

DATES: These amendments become effective November 28, 2008. The
Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this rule as of the
November 28, 2008 effective date of this rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this final rule, contact: Jeff Gardlin, FAA Airframe and Cabin Safety
Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055; telephone
(425) 227-2136; facsimile<PHONE_NUMBER>; e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
For legal questions concerning this final rule, contact: Gary Michel,
Regulations Division, AGC-200, FAA Office of the Chief Counsel, 800
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington DC, 20591; telephone (202) 267-
3148; e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing minimum
standards required in the interest of safety for the design and
performance of aircraft. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it prescribes new safety standards for the design of
transport category airplanes.

I. Background

A. Summary of the NPRM

    On January 5, 2007, the FAA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) entitled ``Security Related Considerations in the
Design and Operation of Transport Category Airplanes.'' \1\ The FAA
proposed to amend part 25 to specify design standards for new transport
category airplanes in order to increase security for passengers and
flightcrew.
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    \1\ 72 FR 630.
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    For airplanes required by operating rules to have a flightdeck
door, the FAA proposed standards to protect the flightdeck from
forcible intrusion by unauthorized persons or penetration by small arms
fire or fragmentation devices. The NPRM also proposed that airplanes
with a certificated passenger seating capacity of more than 60 persons
or a maximum certificated gross takeoff weight of over 100,000 pounds
must be designed to limit the effects of an explosive or incendiary
device by:
    1. Providing means to protect the flightdeck and the passenger
compartment from smoke, fumes, and noxious gases.
    2. Requiring fire suppression systems for cargo compartments be
designed to withstand certain impacts or loads--unless they are either
redundant and separated from one another by a specified distance or
installed remotely from the cargo compartment.
    3. Designating a ``least risk bomb location'' (LRBL) where a bomb
or other explosive device discovered in-flight could be placed, so if
it were to detonate, flight-critical structures and systems would be
protected from damage as much as possible.
    4. Ensuring redundant airplane systems necessary for continued safe
flight and landing are either physically separated by a certain
distance or otherwise designed to permit continued safe flight and
landing in the aftermath of some event.
    5. Creating interior features of the cabin that make it more
difficult to conceal weapons, explosives, or other such objects and
easier to find such items by a simple search.
    The FAA also proposed to amend part 121 to require operators of
existing airplanes with a passenger seating capacity of more than 60
persons designate a least risk bomb location. The public comment period
on the NPRM closed on April 5, 2007.
    The NPRM noted the requirements of this rule are not intended to be
applied to airplanes operated for private use. Though the FAA
specifically sought input, we received no comments on this subject.
Since publication of the NPRM, we have also published NPRM 07-13 \2\,
proposing certain alternative requirements for private use airplanes.
We further intend to exclude Sec.  25.795 from the final rule that
results from the ``private use'' NPRM. This action is consistent with
our previously stated intentions.
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    \2\ 72 FR 38732, (July 13, 2007).
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B. Summary of the Final Rule

    This rule amends part 25 to require manufacturers design certain
new transport category airplanes to increase security for passengers
and the flightcrew. The rule specifies design standards to protect the
flightdeck from forcible intrusion by persons or from penetration by
small arms fire or fragmentation devices. It also requires the design
provide means to limit the effects of detonation of an explosive or
incendiary device by (1) limiting entry of smoke, fumes, and noxious
gases into the flightdeck or the passenger cabin; (2) meeting specified
standards for all components of fire suppression systems in cargo
compartments; (3) establishing an LRBL; (4) physically separating
certain redundant airplane systems or otherwise designing them to
continue to function in the event of a detonation; and (5) providing
interior features that make it harder to conceal weapons, explosives,
or other objects and easier to detect such objects by a simple search
of the airplane cabin.
    This rule also amends part 121 to require operators of certain
existing airplanes designate a least risk bomb location.

C. Summary of Comments

    The FAA received 31 comments on the proposed rule. Commenters
included airplane manufacturers, airlines, aviation associations, and
individuals, including students and commercial pilots. Most of the
comments supported the proposed rule; several commenters also had
suggestions for change.
    As provided in the original tasking statement to the Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), certain comments we received were
referred to the Design for Security Harmonization Working Group. Those
comments pertained to the following proposed sections in the NPRM:
    1. In Sec.  25.795(b)(3)(iii), delete the requirement to withstand
``a 6-inch displacement from a single point source applied anywhere
along the distribution system because of support structure
displacements or adjacent materials displacing against the distribution
system.''
    2. In Sec.  25.795(b)(2), clarify those flight and dispatch regimes
under which smoke protection is not required.
    3. In Sec.  25.795(c)(2), further explain the relation of system
separation to several existing regulations.

    4. In Sec.  25.795(c)(2), explain how measurement of the separation
distance is accomplished.
    5. In Sec.  25.795(c)(3), define an object size to facilitate
interior searches.
    Comments received on these and other sections of the NPRM are
considered in detail in the following discussion of this final rule.

II. Discussion of Final Rule

A. Overview

    For more than 50 years, terrorist acts--including hijackings and
detonation of explosive devices--have targeted airplanes.
1. ICAO Design Standards To Increase Security
    In response to a number of airplane bombings and hijackings that
occurred in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, the International
Federation of Airline Pilots Association developed proposals regarding
design standards for increased security in airplanes. The association
submitted the proposals to the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations charged
with development of international standards for safety and security of
civil aviation. ICAO airworthiness standards affecting airplane design
are contained in Annex 8 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation. ICAO in turn, solicited comments on the proposals from its
member countries and aviation organizations.
    On December 21, 1988, a terrorist's bomb exploded in mid-air on Pan
American World Airways Flight 103 from London to New York City. The
explosion in the forward cargo hold of the Boeing Model 747 airplane
occurred over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people onboard and
11 people on the ground.
    As a result of this catastrophic event, the effort to establish
design standards for increased security gained impetus. Within several
months of the explosion on Flight 103, ICAO formed a study group called
Incorporation of Security into Aircraft Design (ISAD). The study group
included representatives of the airworthiness authorities of the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Brazil, and Russia. Also
included were representatives of the International Federation of
Airline Pilots Association, the International Coordinating Council of
Aerospace Industries Associations, and the International Air Transport
Association.
    The task of ISAD was to consider the existing proposals and
recommend design standards that were to be incorporated into Annex 8.
Ultimately, ISAD recommended design standards pertaining to the
following:
    1. Survivability of systems.
    2. Suppression of fire in cargo compartments.
    3. Protection from smoke and fumes in the flightdeck and the
passenger cabin.
    4. Design of an LRBL.
    5. Protection of the flightdeck from penetration by small arms fire
or shrapnel.
    6. Design of interior features to deter concealment of weapons,
explosives, or other objects and facilitate searching for them.
    On March 12, 1997, ICAO adopted the recommended standards as
Amendment 97 to Annex 8, and the member countries subsequently approved
those standards. All but one of the standards became effective 3 years
after their adoption. The exception was the standard requiring
identification of an LRBL, which became effective immediately. The
identification of an LRBL was already common practice in the aviation
industry and had been applied as an operational standard rather than a
design standard.
    Generally, Annex 8 standards do not apply directly to the design of
an airplane, but are implemented by adoption into the airworthiness
regulations of ICAO's member countries. As a signatory to the
Convention which established ICAO, the United States is required to
implement the Annex 8 rules into our national airworthiness regulations
to the extent practicable.\3\
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    \3\ Because we have not yet incorporated these ICAO standards
into our regulations, the United States (like all other states of
manufacture) has filed ``differences'' with ICAO regarding the
design for security provisions of Annex 8. Adoption of this final
rule removes these differences with the ICAO standards.
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2. ARAC's Recommendations Pertaining to Design for Security \4\
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    \4\ The FAA formally established the Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee on January 22, 1991, to provide advice and
recommendations about FAA's safety-related rulemaking (56 FR 2190).
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    In addition to participating in the development of international
standards through ICAO, a high priority for the FAA is maintaining
harmonized standards between the United States and Europe. This
harmonization is achieved through the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC) composed of 66 member organizations providing
extensive knowledge and expertise on a wide range of aviation matters.
    In 1999, the FAA tasked ARAC to propose regulations incorporating
security measures into airplane design.\5\ The proposed regulations
were to be based on Amendment 97 to Annex 8. The task was assigned to
the Design for Security Harmonization Working Group, incorporating
members from the aviation industry and the governments of Europe, the
United States, Brazil, and Canada.
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    \5\ 64 FR 57921, (October 27, 1999).
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    In April 2001, after several airlines reported incidents of
flightdeck intrusion by aggressive passengers, the FAA tasked ARAC to
propose harmonized regulations to improve the intrusion resistance of
the flightdeck.\6\ This task was also assigned to the Design for
Security Harmonization Working Group.
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    \6\ 66 FR 31273, (June 11, 2001).
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    The working group proposed harmonized regulations for implementing
security safeguards into the design of new transport category
airplanes. The working group submitted its recommendations to ARAC
which voted in favor of submitting the recommendations to the FAA.
3. Legislation and Rulemaking After the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11
    Several months after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Among
other provisions, the Act directed that--for airplanes required to have
a door between the flightdeck and the passenger compartment--the FAA
issue an order requiring strengthening of the door so that it could not
be forced open from the passenger side.
    On January 15, 2002, the FAA published Amendment No. 25-106.\7\ The
rule amended 14 CFR 25 to add new Sec.  25.795, Security
considerations. Paragraph (a) Protection of flightdeck specified that,
if a flightdeck door were required by operating rules, the door
installation must resist forcible intrusion by unauthorized persons and
penetration by small arms and fragmentation devices. The rule also
amended 14 CFR 121 to specify a date the required flightdeck door was
to be installed. Thus, the amendment addressed only the ICAO standard
regarding protection of the flightdeck.
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    \7\ 67 FR 2118.
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B. Withdraw or Defer Rule

    Two commenters, Boeing and the Air Transport Association of America
(ATA), argued that this rulemaking was premature and recommended it be
withdrawn or deferred for the reasons stated below. Because of the
nature of the comments, the FAA consulted with

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The following
discussion represents consensus of the FAA and TSA regarding
recommendation to withdraw or defer the proposed rule.
1. Coordination With Other Agencies
    Boeing and ATA contend the proposed rule was not properly
coordinated with agencies that regulate aviation security issues. As
was noted in the preamble to the NPRM, in October 1999 the FAA formed a
Design for Security Harmonization Working Group under the auspices of
ARAC. The task of the new working group was to propose harmonized
regulations incorporating security measures into airplane design. The
proposed regulations were to be based on ICAO's Amendment 97 to Annex
8. At that time, the TSA had not yet been formed. However, its
predecessor organization within the FAA was a part of ARAC.
Subsequently, when TSA was established as a separate agency, it
continued to participate in ARAC.
    After the FAA accepted ARAC's recommendations regarding harmonized
regulations, we coordinated with TSA throughout the process of drafting
the NPRM. This close coordination continued during the extensive
governmental review prior to publication of the NPRM. In fact, Homeland
Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), the Aviation Transportation
System Security Plan (ATSS), and the National Strategy for Aviation
Security all stress that aviation security measures should be fully
coordinated among the relevant governmental agencies, and coordination
of this rule was consistent with that approach.
2. Compliance With Certain HSPDs or With the National Strategy for
Aviation Security
    Boeing and ATA stated that another reason to withdraw or defer the
rule is it does not comply with Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 16 (Directive 16) or with the National Strategy for Aviation
Security.
    This is a more complex issue. Directive 16, issued in June 2006,
mandates creation of a National Strategy for Aviation Security (the
Strategy), which in turn is implemented through several security plans.
The Strategy was issued on March 26, 2007, more than two months after
publication of the FAA's proposed rule. Subsequently, the FAA and TSA
reviewed the Strategy and its corresponding plans and concluded that
this rule does not conflict with those documents. The ATSS notes:
    The FAA also has specific responsibilities and authorities relating
to safety and security of critical National Airspace System
infrastructure, as well as responsibility for providing technical
advice and regulatory certification for aircraft-based attack
countermeasures.
    The Strategy identifies terrorism and attacks directed at aircraft
and their occupants as the number one threat to aviation security. This
rule is consistent with the role of the FAA, as contemplated by the
ATSS, because it regulates the design and manufacture of certain
airplane countermeasures to protect the airplane and its occupants.
3. Risk Analysis of the Proposed Approach and Alternatives
    In their comments, ATA and Boeing also recommended the NPRM be
subject to a formal risk analysis to assess its merits compared to
alternative aviation security measures. In particular, they urged that
TSA's Risk Management Analysis Tool (RMAT), which is part of the Risk
Management Analysis Process (RMAP), be used to assess the proposal. The
commenters suggested that because the NPRM was not based on a risk
assessment it may duplicate or needlessly overlap other security
measures.
    A formal risk analysis tool, such as RMAT, was not available when
the NPRM was developed. The ARAC supported the measures proposed in the
NPRM, based on a real threat to aviation, and concluded the proposed
measures would reduce the risk associated with future attacks. The
principles that underlie the proposed security measures have their
origins in work done by the international aviation community dating
back to the 1980s and are based on the concept of layered security.
This is an integrated approach which relies on multiple layers of
security measures, including pre-travel measures, checkpoint measures,
and aircraft design measures to provide increased protection from
terrorists and weapons.
    Further, RMAT is a tool which is still under development and
requires further testing. Given the continuing threat of attacks by
terrorists, the FAA cannot justify delays in issuing this rule to
analyze it with a tool that has not yet been validated. New tools for
risk analysis are developed constantly, and if we wait for the next
best tool, no regulatory improvements would occur. Based on discussion
with TSA, we considered whether to use something other than the RMAT to
address the comments from Boeing and ATA. FAA and TSA concluded that
this wasn't feasible or necessary. First, there is really no other
suitable risk model available to address this type of rule. Second,
risk methodologies utilized by TSA and other agencies whose purview is
security provided the outside intelligence on which FAA relied
(beginning with ICAO standards) to determine that the threat of
terrorist acts was significant and mitigation through airplane design
was prudent and appropriate. All of the data available, including some
that is classified, clearly show this rule would provide benefit.
Regulatory decisions are based on the best information available at the
time. Therefore, the FAA is amending parts 25 and 121, as proposed,
with the modifications discussed below.
C. Applicability
    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(a) would apply to new transport category
airplanes which are required by operating rules to have a flightdeck
door. Sections 25.795 (b) and (c) would apply to new transport category
airplanes with a maximum certificated passenger seating capacity of
more than 60 persons or a maximum certificated takeoff gross weight of
over 100,000 pounds. Section 121.295 would apply to existing transport
category airplanes with a passenger seating capacity of more than 60
persons.
1. Rule Should Apply to All Transport Category Airplanes
    Four commenters, including the Air Line Pilots Association,
Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations, Passenger-Cargo Security
Group, and an individual suggested the proposed rule apply to all
transport category airplanes and not be limited, based on passenger
capacity or maximum takeoff gross weight. The commenters cited the
large number of airplanes in the fleet that are below the proposed
thresholds, sizable passenger and cargo loads carried, threat the
airplanes would present if commandeered and used as weapons, and the
desire to apply aviation security measures uniformly.
    As we discussed in the preamble to the NPRM, the intent of the
proposed rule was to adopt security provisions in design that will be
effective and at the same time practicable. Limiting the rule to the
appropriate aircraft was a key task of the Design for Security
Harmonization Working Group. In fact, as a result of the ARAC
recommendation and the position of its member states, ICAO amended the
applicability section of its standards to specify a similar
applicability. We discussed this matter with the TSA and concluded that
applying the proposed

rule to all transport category airplanes would add considerable
complexity to the design and certification of smaller airplanes without
measurably improving security.
    In addition, if operating rules require an airplane to have a
flightdeck door, then--regardless of that airplane's size--the
requirements for the flightdeck bulkhead will apply. This aspect of the
proposal most directly addresses use of the airplane as a weapon, which
was presented as the major concern of the commenters.
    The applicability of the majority of the provisions of Sec.  25.795
is governed by passenger capacity and gross weight. In the NPRM, we
stated both criteria are necessary to address airplanes of significant
size that could carry both passengers and cargo, but be below the
passenger threshold alone. Clearly, the intent was to capture airplane
types of a certain size, whether or not they were carrying large
numbers of passengers.
    In reviewing the language in the rule, we noted the terminology
used to define passenger capacity limits (``certificated passenger
seating capacity'') might not be sufficiently clear. The word
``capacity'' suggests the limit of the airplane's capability. However,
there could be some confusion whether this applies to each individual
airplane or to the airplane type. As discussed above, we clearly
intended to affect the airplane type. Therefore, to clarify the intent,
the word ``maximum'' has been added to paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec.
25.795 as well as Sec.  121.295. This is also consistent with the
language used to characterize the gross weight limits.
2. Rule Should Also Apply to Airplanes Which Carry Only Cargo
    Several commenters, including the Airline Professionals Association
(APA), Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and Coalition of Airline
Pilots Associations (CAPA) recommended the proposed requirements should
also apply to all-cargo airplanes. The commenters specifically cited
the physical protection of the flightdeck as something that should be
required on all-cargo airplanes as well as on passenger airplanes.
Their concern is cargo airplanes frequently operate from airports that
do not have passenger screening facilities and can be used as weapons
as effectively as airplanes which carry passengers.
    Existing requirements for reinforced flightdeck doors address all
transport category airplanes required by operating rules to have a
flightdeck door. This rule extends those same requirements to the rest
of the flightdeck bulkhead and other barriers, but does not change the
applicability of those requirements from a security standpoint. The
need to reinforce the flightdeck door or, in fact, the need to have a
flightdeck door depends on restrictions on access to the airplane. We
have discussed this issue with TSA and concluded that a suitable
screening program to restrict access to the airplane is as effective as
physical protection of the flightdeck without a rigorous screening
program. This subject was discussed in detail in Amendments 121-287 and
129-37, Flightdeck Security on Large Cargo Airplanes,\8\ and the
rationale in those rules continues to be applicable.
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    \8\ 68 FR 42874.
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3. Rule Should Apply to Existing As Well As New Airplanes
    Several individual commenters recommended the proposed requirements
be applied to existing airplane models, rather than only new type
designs.
    As discussed in the NPRM, existing airplanes are already equipped
with reinforced flightdeck doors and LRBLs that were established
voluntarily. The remainder of the proposed changes involve design
changes that are significant for an existing airplane type. The costs
of making these design changes would be very significant, and the
benefits would not balance the cost. When developing the proposal, we
considered various methods of implementation and concluded that
introduction of these requirements on new type designs would be the
only approach where benefits outweigh the costs. We have no plan to
extend any of these requirements to the existing fleet or existing type
designs. An airplane's certification basis is established in accordance
with 14 CFR 21, and that will continue to apply in this case. With the
exception of the change to Sec.  121.295, only airplanes with this
amendment in their certification basis will be covered by this final
rule.

D. Secondary Barriers To Protect Flightdeck

    Several commenters, including the CAPA, ALPA, Passenger-Cargo
Security Group, and several individuals recommended the FAA require
secondary barriers to provide enhanced security of the flightdeck. ALPA
cited operational advantages of a secondary barrier when the flightdeck
door must be opened during flight. The Passenger-Cargo Security Group
argued that while the reinforced flightdeck door is an effective
deterrent when it is closed and locked, its effectiveness is
compromised with the number of times it is opened during flight.
Therefore, the Group recommended that aircraft have a complementary
security system and corresponding procedures.
    Adding a requirement for secondary flightdeck barriers to this rule
would be beyond the scope of the notice, since we did not propose or
even discuss this issue in the NPRM. Therefore, if we were to conclude
that secondary barriers should be required, we would have to issue
another proposal and provide for public comment before adopting such a
requirement. In any case, we would need the input of TSA and other
agencies to determine whether security concerns warrant such a
requirement. Presently, we do not anticipate any rulemaking that will
require installation of secondary flightdeck barriers.
    Finally, installation of secondary flightdeck barriers is currently
permitted provided all airworthiness requirements are met and
associated operational procedures are approved. As mentioned in the
comment from ALPA, at least one major domestic carrier has developed,
acquired approval for, and installed secondary barriers on a portion of
its fleet. In addition, operators have established procedures to permit
opening of the flightdeck door, and these are working well.

E. Protection of Flightcrew Compartment

    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(a) would specify standards for the design
of the bulkhead, flightdeck door, and ``any other accessible barrier
separating the flightcrew compartment from occupied areas.''
1. Use of terms ``Barrier'' and ``Boundary''
    The International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries
Associations (ICCAIA) pointed out that the proposed rule refers to
``the bulkhead, door, and any other accessible barrier separating the
flightdeck compartment from occupied areas,'' whereas the proposed
Advisory Circular uses the term ``boundary.'' In the context of the
NPRM, we used the term ``barrier'' to indicate the function required.
In the context of the Advisory Circular, we used the term ``boundary''
to help define those items that must serve as barriers. However, we
agree the distinction is subtle and the term ``boundary'' is more
general. Therefore, this final rule uses the term ``boundary'' rather
than ``barrier'' to refer to structures which separate the flightdeck
from the passenger compartment.

2. Meaning of Term ``Accessible'' Barrier or Boundary
    Boeing, Bombardier, and the ICCAIA requested clarification of the
term ``accessible'' barrier (now accessible boundary).
    In the context of resistance to intrusion into the flightdeck, a
boundary is accessible if it could be exposed to loads from attempts at
forcible intrusion. If the flightdeck bulkhead is either composed or
installed forward of other interior structures, such as a galley or
closet, the contribution of those interior structures to intrusion
resistance may be included when assessing the acceptability of the
boundary.
    Boundaries on a multi-deck airplane could include the floor or
ceiling, although the ceiling might not be accessible if it is high off
the floor. Generally, physical intrusion through the cabin ceiling
(from below the flightdeck) would not be feasible because of the
flightdeck floor structural requirements that must already be met. When
the cabin is above the flightdeck, the cabin floor is clearly
accessible. However, it is also likely the existing structural
requirements for the floor will not permit intrusion through the
flightdeck ceiling.
    In terms of the ballistic protection provided by a barrier,
accessibility has a slightly different definition. Barriers are
accessible, if they are on a hazardous trajectory (as defined in
proposed AC 25.795-2) from a location accessible to a passenger.
Interior structures installed aft of a bulkhead would probably not
provide much ballistic protection. Floors and ceilings on multi-deck
airplanes will very likely require protection.
    When establishing a hazardous trajectory, an applicant for a new
type certificate should consider trajectories originating in areas
beyond the main cabin seating zones if a passenger has access to them.
Such areas would include any compartment that is not locked. Crew rest
compartments accessible from the cabin should be evaluated if they are
not locked or do not have some other means of physically preventing
unwanted access. This applies even though they are intended only for
crew use.
3. Placards To Restrict Entry
    An individual commented that placards on the compartment stating
``crew use only'' would be sufficient. We do not agree. While a placard
might discourage inadvertent entry by a person, it would not prevent
entry by a person deliberately trying to gain access. Therefore, an
area of the cabin, including a compartment not on the main deck, is
``accessible'' unless there is a physical impediment, such as a lock,
to entry.

F. Flightdeck Smoke Protection

    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(b)(1) would require that means be
provided to limit entry of smoke, fumes, and noxious gases from any
other area of the airplane into the flightdeck.
1. Applicability of Sec. Sec.  25.831 and 25.855
    Boeing commented that the preamble to the NPRM says that Sec.
25.831 addresses removal of smoke from the flightdeck but does not
directly address penetration of smoke into the flightdeck, other than
smoke originating in a cargo compartment. According to the commenter,
this statement incorrectly implies that Sec.  25.831 contains a
requirement pertaining to smoke penetration, and it does not.
    We agree that the preamble was misleading on this point. Section
25.831 addresses removal of smoke from the flightdeck but does not
address penetration of smoke from cargo compartments. It is Sec.
25.857 that addresses excluding hazardous quantities of smoke from a
fire in a cargo compartment from the flightdeck or passenger
compartment. This matter is clearly addressed in the background section
of proposed AC 25.795-3, therefore no change is needed to this final
rule or the Advisory Circular.
2. Clarification of References to Advisory Circular 25-9A
    Boeing and Transport Canada cited several places in the preamble of
the NPRM where reference to AC 25-9A \9\ could be misinterpreted and
might not be sufficiently precise.
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    \9\ Advisory Circular 25-9A, Smoke Detection, Penetration, and
Evacuation Tests and Related Flight Manual Emergency Procedures;
January 6, 1994.
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    We agree that the preamble did not completely characterize the
criteria provided in AC 25-9A and the relationship of that AC to these
requirements. Advisory Circular 25-9A covers guidance for testing of
smoke penetration and removal as well as recommended methods of
compliance with Sec. Sec.  25.854, 25.855, 25.857, 25.858, and 25.869.
Clearly, AC 25-9A does not explicitly address the requirements of Sec.
25.795, since they did not exist at the time the Advisory Circular was
issued. Therefore, any use of the guidance in AC 25-9A in the context
of Sec.  25.795 will require adaptation appropriate for the specific
requirements of this final rule. Nonetheless, some of the recommended
procedures described in AC 25-9A are directly applicable to procedures
that could be used to show compliance with Sec.  25.795.
3. Airflow Settings and Dispatch Conditions
    As discussed earlier, the FAA requested in the original tasking
statement for ARAC that certain comments be addressed by the Design for
Security Harmonization Working Group. Among them were comments
regarding protection of the flightdeck from smoke penetration. In
particular, Boeing and Transport Canada proposed opposite approaches to
addressing the portions of a flight and the dispatch conditions when
the capability to resist smoke penetration into the flightdeck should
be required. Since both organizations were part of the working group,
we referred the matter to the working group for a recommendation.
    The intent of the requirement is that the airplane be capable of
limiting smoke penetration into the flightdeck when an explosive or
incendiary device has been discharged elsewhere on the airplane. We
recognize that, at any given moment, the airplane may not be making use
of that capability. However, once the crew becomes aware of the need to
prevent smoke penetration, they should be able to take action in a
fairly short time. This is discussed further in proposed AC 25.795-3.
With regard to dispatch conditions, the conclusion of ARAC is that
manufacturers should consider the systems that will be permitted to be
inoperative for dispatch when showing compliance with this requirement.
This also is noted in the Advisory Circular.
    Transport Canada commented that the method of compliance discussed
in the preamble and the Advisory Circular-providing small differential
pressure between the flightdeck and other areas-might not be reliable
without tests. The commenter concluded that analysis alone would not be
acceptable to show compliance.
    The FAA agrees that testing is necessary as part of the
certification process, assuming that the differential pressures are
very small. As noted in proposed AC 25.795-3, small differential
pressures are difficult to predict analytically and often cannot be
measured directly. Once an applicant for a new type certificate
conducts tests, the FAA may agree that subsequent changes to the design
could be substantiated by analysis alone if the prior test data remain
valid. But we agree that in order to establish whether a small
differential pressure actually exists, a simple test will most likely
be

needed. Proposed Advisory Circular 25.795-3 provides one method of
compliance using testing.
4. Allowable Flightdeck Smoke
    Boeing also proposed language that would state explicitly that the
rule does not prohibit penetration of any smoke into the flightdeck in
the immediate aftermath of an event.
    The FAA does not believe that any further clarification is required
outside this discussion. Both the NPRM and this final rule use the term
``limit'' rather than ``prevent'' when discussing penetration of smoke
into the flightdeck. Additionally, proposed AC 25.795-3 clearly states
that smoke resulting from detonation of an explosive or incendiary
device ``may initially enter the flightdeck, until the flightcrew
initiates action to prevent further entry of smoke.''

G. Passenger Cabin Smoke Protection

    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(b)(2) would require that means be
provided to prevent incapacitation of persons in the passenger cabin
resulting from smoke, fumes, and noxious gases.
1. Airflow Settings and Dispatch Conditions
    Boeing and Transport Canada addressed the proposed requirements
pertaining to protection of the passenger cabin from smoke. As with
protection of the flightdeck from smoke, the comments addressed airflow
settings and dispatch conditions related to passenger cabin smoke
protection. These comments were also referred to ARAC for a
recommendation.
    The purpose of this requirement is that the airplane have the
capability of coping with a quantity of smoke and other toxic gases in
the passenger cabin, such that the passengers are not incapacitated. A
straightforward method of compliance is to change cabin air rapidly
with outside air. This rapid air change may not be possible in all
configurations of the environmental control system or all flight
regimes. In fact, the need to rapidly evacuate smoke from the passenger
cabin is an emergency procedure for which a change in the ventilation
rate may be required. Thus, the crew may need to initiate some
procedures to enable the airplane to meet the required air change rate.
This is discussed in more depth in proposed AC 25.795-4. No change is
made to this final rule since the rule simply requires ``means'' to
protect the passengers.
2. Use of Term ``Fresh Air''
    The NPRM discusses rapid air change using fresh air as one way to
comply with this requirement under Sec.  25.795(b)(2). Boeing and
Transport Canada questioned whether using the term ``fresh air'' was
strictly accurate. Boeing suggested using the term ``outside air''
which is more descriptive of our intent.
    The FAA agrees that the word ``fresh'' can have implications about
air quality and that the quality of outside air is beyond the control
of the applicant for a new type certificate. Using the term ``outside
air,'' does not have the same implications about air quality. When
showing compliance with this requirement by using rapid air changes,
the key factor is that the air is not re-circulated and originates from
the outside. Therefore, in the preamble of this final rule, the
discussion of rapid air change refers to ``outside air.''
    We also noted that the proposed rule language could be interpreted
as requiring consideration of constant gas concentrations, rather than
initial gas concentrations. While the preamble discussion of acceptable
methods of compliance, as well as the characterization of the hazard,
are clear that the initial concentrations of specific gases must be
addressed, there is a potential for confusion. To make sure there is no
misunderstanding, the word ``initial'' is added in paragraph b(2), as
follows: ``Means must be provided to prevent passenger incapacitation
in the cabin resulting from smoke, fumes, and noxious gases as
represented by the initial combined volumetric concentrations of 0.59%
carbon monoxide and 1.23% carbon dioxide.''

H. Cargo Compartment Fire Suppression

    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(b)(3) would require all components of
fire suppression systems for cargo compartments be designed to
withstand certain conditions, unless the systems are either redundant
and separated in accordance with proposed Sec.  25.795(c)(2) or
installed remotely from the cargo compartment.
1. Protection From Chemical and Biological Hazards
    The CAPA recommended that the requirements address chemical and
biological hazards in addition to the effects of an explosive or
incendiary device.
    While there are no doubt valid security concerns associated with
these potential hazards, they go beyond the scope and intent of this
final rule. The rule, as proposed, addressed mitigating effects of
explosive and incendiary devices from an engineering standpoint.
Chemical or biological threats introduce entirely different issues and
potential consequences. Should such threats warrant consideration in
the airplane design, further rulemaking would be necessary.
Accordingly, the FAA has made no change to this final rule.
2. Six-Inch Displacement of Components
    Boeing and Bombardier questioned the requirement that all
components of the cargo compartment's fire suppression system be able
to withstand ``A 6-inch displacement in any direction from a single
point force applied anywhere along the distribution system because of
support structure displacements or adjacent materials displacing
against the distribution system.'' Bombardier noted that this would
seem to require a sphere with a diameter of 12-inches of space around
each point along the distribution system. Boeing stated that certain
parts of the airplane structure cannot displace 6 inches without
failure or the distribution system would move with the structure, so
that there would be no relative displacement.
    These comments were referred to ARAC for consideration, and the
committee's recommendations form the basis of this discussion. The 6-
inch displacement criterion is not intended to require free space
surrounding the distribution system. The intent of Sec.
25.795(b)(3)(iii) is to provide sufficient flexibility that 6-inch
displacements can be tolerated without failure.
    The space available for displacement will obviously change in the
event of an explosion. Similarly, the fact that certain structures
cannot deform 6 inches without failure does not eliminate the potential
for a relative displacement between the system and its supporting
structure. Relative displacement can occur due to direct loading or
secondary contact with adjacent materials or a combination of the two.
This can occur irrespective of any structural failure and is a
transient condition that is not readily analyzed. The intent of the
criterion was to provide a straightforward standard that did not
require extensive analysis or knowledge of a particular device.
    Nonetheless, the FAA agrees that the proposed criterion could
require consideration of unrealistic situations and would not
contribute to safety. Therefore, this final rule addresses those
situations as follows:
    1. We considered the installation of systems near the fuselage
contour, for example, in the crown of the airplane

for a main deck cargo compartment. In this area, a system could not be
displaced beyond the contour of the fuselage, since the fuselage skin
itself will not significantly deflect without failure. In those cases,
the maximum displacement in the direction of the fuselage skin can be
limited to that which would result in displacement outside the fuselage
contour.
    2. Similarly, the direction of potential displacement may be
constrained somewhat since the explosive or incendiary device is
assumed to be within the cargo compartment. The proposed criterion
would have resulted in consideration of a displacement in any
direction. However, considering the direction of loading that would
result from an explosion within the compartment, there are some
directions of displacement that are very unlikely.
    Therefore, we have deleted the words ``any direction'' from this
final rule, giving the applicant for a new type certificate the ability
to propose how the system could be displaced. We expect the envelope of
displacement to be no less than a hemispherical shape of a 6-inch
radius in the direction away from the cargo compartment (except where
limited by the fuselage contour, as noted above.)
    3. Finally, there may be installations where the potential for
relative displacement between the distribution system and the structure
to which it is attached is eliminated. This would not apply to
attachments involving standoffs or hanging brackets but could apply to
more substantial structure. An example of such structure is a
continuous attachment to a floor beam, such that the floor beam would
have to fail in order to create a relative displacement with the
distribution system. In that case, the locations where a relative
displacement could occur would be more limited, and the necessary
flexibility could be focused into those areas.
    This approach does not address all possible scenarios but is in
keeping with the intent of the requirement to enhance survivability of
the system through reasonable and practicable measures. Advisory
Circular 25.795-5 has also been updated to reflect the change in rule
language and the discussion above.
3. All-Cargo Airplanes
    The APA, ATA, and CAPA all questioned how the proposed requirement
would apply to all-cargo airplanes that do not have an active fire
suppression system installed. They expressed concern that the rule
might eliminate the current approach to fire protection for all-cargo
airplanes and require the installation of a fire suppression system.
Such a system would have to be quite large and contain a large amount
of extinguishing agent. ATA noted that the cost of certification,
installation, and maintenance of a fire suppression system on all-cargo
airplanes is not accounted for in the initial regulatory evaluation.
    This final rule refers to ``an extinguishing agent'' but does not
require installation of an active fire suppression system for all-cargo
airplanes, assuming the existing method of fire suppression is
available. In most cases, fire suppression on all-cargo airplanes
involves oxygen starvation, rather than application of an extinguishing
agent. Depressurization at altitude will reduce the available oxygen
and cause the fire to be suppressed. Since this method should continue
to be available if an explosive or incendiary device were to detonate,
an additional fire suppression system would not be necessary.
    This approach is in contrast to that used in Class B cargo
compartments sometimes used on combination passenger-and-cargo
airplanes that require a person to enter the compartment to combat the
fire. After an explosion in the cargo compartment, having a person
enter the compartment would be neither an acceptable nor a reliable
method of fire suppression. The fire detection system in the cargo
compartment of an all-cargo airplane is effectively the same as the
fire detection system in the cargo compartment of a passenger airplane.
Therefore, this rule should have little effect on most all-cargo
airplanes.
4. Eliminate Class B Cargo Compartment on Affected Airplanes
    With respect to Class B cargo compartments, Embraer suggested that
it would be more clear and direct to simply eliminate them from
airplanes covered by this proposal. This suggestion has merit; however,
there is other rulemaking activity that specifically addresses
standards for Class B cargo compartments. The FAA believes that the
effects of this final rule and the results of that rulemaking need to
be considered together. A future Class B cargo compartment might not
require entry into the compartment to fight a fire. In that case, the
regulations would have to be amended to permit the use of Class B
compartments. Therefore, we have not changed the requirements or
modified the cargo compartment classifications in this final rule.
5. Remove First Sentence of Sec.  25.795(b)(3)
    Embraer also commented that the first sentence of Sec.
25.795(b)(3) (``An extinguishing agent must be capable of suppressing a
fire.'') should be removed because it is redundant to requirements
specified in Sec.  25.857(c)(2). In addition, in proposed AC 25.795-5,
there is a stated ``assumption'' that ``the system will extinguish the
fire.''
    We agree; however, the requirements of Sec.  25.795(b) pertain
specifically to the effects of explosive and incendiary devices which
are not covered in Sec.  25.857 and, in fact, are addressed only in
Sec.  25.795(b)(3). Since the assumption in proposed AC 25.795-5 is
based on the regulatory requirement (Sec.  25.795(b)(3)), lacking the
benefit of a supporting requirement in the rule, the assumption in the
Advisory Circular may not be valid. Therefore, we have made no change
to this final rule.
6. Protecting Pressure Vessels and Certain Other Equipment
    The APA and CAPA questioned the impact criteria for protection of
pressure vessels and other equipment vulnerable to fragment damage.
They believe that the fragment velocities are much too low and should
be on the order of the measured blast wave velocity of an explosive
itself.
    There may be some confusion as to what the requirements represent
in terms of the threat. The purpose of the proposed requirement to
protect against a half inch aluminum sphere traveling at 430 feet per
second is to account for objects that fragment and are dispersed as a
result of an explosive or incendiary device. While the fragment
velocities of the explosive or incendiary device itself may reach very
high levels, these are not a hazard to the airplane systems. Much of
the work done to establish these criteria involves sensitive
information and may not be released to the public. The impact criteria
were discussed and agreed upon within ARAC, but security considerations
preclude further detailed discussion in this rule. The FAA has
considered the issues presented by the commenters and concluded that
the criteria remain valid.

I. Least Risk Bomb Location

    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(c)(1) would require that an airplane be
designed with a designated location where a bomb or other explosive
device could be moved to protect flight-critical structures and systems
as much as possible from damage in the case of detonation.

1. Language of Sec.  25.795(c)(1)
    Boeing suggested Sec.  25.795(c)(1) be re-worded to read, ``An
airplane should be designed with a designated location or other
mitigation for a bomb * * *.'' Boeing argued that the wording in the
NPRM goes beyond the intent of the ARAC recommendation and that its own
suggested wording provides more flexibility.
    Section 25.795(c)(1) is consistent with the ARAC's recommendation.
Additionally, the FAA believes that use of the word ``should'' is
inappropriate in this context, as it conveys a recommendation rather
than a requirement. Finally, the rule is flexible to the extent that a
``location'' is very general and permits a number of different
approaches within the airplane. Approaches that do not fall under the
definition of a ``location'' may be approvable, using the equivalent
level of safety provisions of Sec.  21.21(b)(1).
2. The Fuel System Is a Critical System
    Transport Canada noted that one of the critical systems that should
be kept away from the LRBL is the fuel system.
    The FAA agrees that fuel systems are critical systems, as intended
by this final rule. We will add fuel systems to the discussion in
proposed AC 25.795-6.

J. Survivability of Systems

    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(c)(2) would require that redundant
airplane systems necessary for continued safe flight and landing either
be designed to maximize their ability to survive an event or be
physically separated by a certain distance, except where that is
impracticable. The NPRM proposed that redundant systems be separated by
the diameter of a sphere and specified a formula for calculating that
diameter.
1. Clarification of System Separation Requirement
    Boeing and Airbus requested clarification on the portions of the
airplane to which the system separation requirement applies: when must
an applicant consider the entire spherical volume defined in the
regulation and when is some lesser volume acceptable. In particular,
Airbus proposed that the floor and ceiling of the passenger cabin be
treated like the cargo compartment liner with only half the sphere
applied to those areas.
    The requirement applies to the entire fuselage, except where
impracticable and where limited by the boundary of the bulkheads in the
passenger and cargo compartments. As recommended by ARAC, the
separation requirement is to be applied in full above the passenger
ceiling, which is an area often used to route critical systems.
Significant discussion of the rationale for this requirement in the
final rule is contained in both the preamble to the NPRM and in
proposed AC 25.795-7.
2. Purpose of System Separation
    Boeing and Embraer addressed the purpose of system separation.
Boeing suggested that the final rule explicitly state that the purpose
of the requirement is to address an explosive or incendiary device.
Conversely, Embraer suggested that the rule clarify that an explosive
or incendiary device is only an example of something that system
separation will help to mitigate.
    While the impetus for the system separation requirement is related
to security, the requirement will have benefits that extend beyond
security. We do not believe a revision to regulatory language is
needed; there is no implication that the requirement is contingent on a
specific threat. The extent to which the requirement caters to security
issues is addressed by the ``impracticable'' provisions and the limits
on application of the sphere beyond the bulkheads in the passenger and
cargo compartments.
3. Possible Conflict With Other Applicable Regulations
    Boeing and Airbus commented that there are other regulations, such
as Sec. Sec.  25.729(f) and 25.903(d), that also require system
separation, and promulgation of Sec.  25.795(c)(2) could create
conflict.
    This is another subject addressed by the ARAC. The current
requirements for system protection against high energy rotor failure or
tire bursts are often met by system separation or shielding. In some
cases, the traditional approach of system isolation to address a tire
burst, for example, could result in both parts of a redundant system
running within the required sphere size for compliance with Sec.
25.795(c)(2).
    However, after consultation with ARAC, we cannot envision a
scenario in which compliance with either Sec. Sec.  25.729(f) or
25.903(d) would preclude compliance with Sec.  25.795(c)(2).
Nonetheless, if such a situation were to arise, the provision in the
regulation regarding impracticability would apply, and the applicant
for a type certificate would show compliance with the regulation
producing the conflict.
4. Combination of Systems Assumed To Be Inoperative
    Boeing objected to the discussion of the combination of systems
assumed to be inoperative within the sphere. The NPRM advised a
manufacturer to consider the effect on continued safe flight and
landing and whether primary and backup controls for particular systems
should be separated relative to another system's primary and backup
controls, essentially so that not only backup controls were available.
    The intent of this discussion was to include an assessment of the
effects of the system separation approach in addition to the literal
geometric compliance of the system locations. That is, each system
taken individually is sufficiently redundant to permit continued safe
flight and landing, if there is a failure.
    However, assuming a failure renders a combination of systems
inoperative, with the proper separation, there should be sufficient
control to permit continued safe flight and landing. Assuming entirely
redundant systems, the separation alone will address the concern. Even
if the systems are not 100% redundant, the capabilities of the backup
system may be such that there is no concern with continued safe flight
and landing. Nonetheless, the manufacturer should consider the
ramifications of the inoperative systems and the capability of the
systems that remain when complying with this requirement.
5. Other Mitigation Measures
    Airbus commented that the rule should make it clear that other
mitigation measures are required if system separation is impracticable.
They note that the phrase ``or otherwise designed to maximize their
survivability'' is intended to address this but believe that the
wording could be more explicit. They suggested dividing paragraph
(c)(2) into two paragraphs, to read as follows:
    ``i. Except where impracticable, redundant airplane systems
necessary for continued safe flight and landing must be physically
separated, at a minimum, by an amount equal to a sphere * * *. The
sphere is applied everywhere within the fuselage limited by the forward
bulkhead, the aft bulkhead, and the liner of the passenger cabin and
cargo compartment, beyond which only one-half the sphere is applied.
    ``ii. Where compliance with paragraph (i) above is impracticable,
other design precautions must be taken to maximize the survivability of
those systems.''

    We agree with the comment, inasmuch as it makes the requirement
clearer. Accordingly, the language has been changed in this final rule.
6. Clarification Regarding Reliability and Redundancy
    Airbus also commented that it would like the preamble to state more
definitively that this requirement does not change the reliability
requirements of any system or require systems that are not currently
redundant to become redundant.
    Both of these statements are correct, although there is no change
needed to the rule language. This final rule adds a requirement to the
system architecture (i.e., separation) but does not change the
functional requirements of the systems affected. Proposed AC 25.795-7
will reflect this intent.
7. Clarification of How To Measure Separation of Systems
    Boeing also asked for a more specific definition of how the
separation distance was to be measured. Since the affected systems
themselves have physical dimensions, the separation between them may
not be a simple distance between points.
    Due to the variety of possibilities and the number of different
system types, we asked ARAC to address this comment as well. The ARAC
concluded and we agree that the distance should be determined so that
the sphere derived from the equation in Sec.  25.795(c)(2) can pass
between any part of the systems. Proposed AC 25.795-7 has been revised
to reflect this same approach.

K. Clarification of Sec.  25.795(c)(3)

    As proposed, Sec.  25.795(c)(3) would require that certain parts of
the cabin be designed to make it more difficult to hide weapons,
explosives, or other objects and easier to search for them. The
specific parts of the cabin are the areas above the overhead bins, the
toilets, and the life preservers or the areas where they are stored.
    The ICCAIA, Bombardier, and Airbus all requested clarification on
the degree to which the area above stowage compartments must prevent
concealment of an object. In particular, they asked about the size of
the object to be considered and how the acceptability of the design
would be assessed. This is a subject that had initially been discussed
in ARAC's Design for Security Harmonization Working Group but was not
resolved. However, because of the evident need for a standard, we
referred this comment to the working group for its recommendation.
    The working group reached consensus on an approach for the interior
design that should simplify the compliance findings. Although Boeing
provided a dissenting opinion, the Transport Airplane and Engine Issues
Group concurred with the working group and forwarded the recommendation
to the FAA. In summary, the working group recommended an approach using
objects of varying shapes that have a volume of 20 cubic inches or
larger. A designer that elects to use this approach would have a
straightforward way of showing compliance. This method is described
more fully in AC 25.795-8. Nevertheless, since the commenters requested
additional clarification, we have decided to add a provision defining a
method of compliance that will always be found compliant, for designs
that prevent concealment of 20 cubic inch objects. The rule also
permits other methods acceptable to the Administrator. This would
include other approaches using standard objects, as well as design
features to eliminate the space above the overhead bins. Designs that
prevent concealment of objects smaller than 20 cubic inches would, of
course, also be acceptable.
    The requirements of Sec.  25.795(c)(3) are intended to facilitate
searching and are a way to improve the design to that end. The actual
search process and the types of things for which a search is conducted
are not changed by this requirement. By improving the design and making
it easier to search, the search is more effective and more efficient.
This requirement should not affect operators when an airplane is
searched, other than making the search more effective and efficient as
noted above. It is simply a way to gauge the effectiveness of the
design in improving the searchability of the airplane.
    Qantas Airways and the ATA commented that improved interior design
to facilitate searches was highly desirable and that any efforts in
this area need to be coordinated with the Transportation Security
Administration. Qantas commented that the regulatory requirements (that
involve the design) imposed on the operator by TSA should be
requirements on the airframe manufacturer as well.
    We agree that good coordination with TSA is needed and have
coordinated this rulemaking extensively with TSA. In terms of
regulatory compliance, regulations are specific in their applicability.
To the extent that these requirements apply only to persons subject to
the rule, good cooperation between the regulators, manufacturers, and
operators is the key to improving security.

L. Operational Requirement To Designate an LRBL

    As proposed, Sec.  121.295 would require that existing airplanes
which seat more than 60 passengers have a location where a suspected
explosive or incendiary device discovered in flight can be placed to
minimize the risk to the airplane.
    The ATA and AirTran Airways (AirTran) commented on the operational
requirement to designate an LRBL and, in particular, how important it
was for the airframe manufacturer to provide assistance to operators in
identifying the LRBL. They noted that an operator does not have all the
design information necessary to make this determination and would need
the airframe manufacturer's help in complying with proposed Sec.
121.295. AirTran also noted that the proposal does not address the
procedures required to make proper use of the LRBL.
    As discussed in the NPRM, operators have voluntarily designated an
LRBL for many years. The FAA and later TSA have worked with airframe
manufacturers and operators to implement identification and use of the
LRBL without a regulatory requirement in place. This final rule
requires the designation of an LRBL but does not require design changes
for existing airplanes. Proposed Advisory Circular 25.795-6 addresses
procedural issues and provides instruction for operators to obtain the
information that the ATA and AirTran are seeking. We agree that close
coordination between the operator and manufacturer is vital; however,
at present the information needed to identify and carry out the
necessary procedures for the LRBL is held by the TSA and is available
to operators.

M. Other Measures To Increase Airplane Security

    Section 107 (b) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
states:
    b. Implementation of other methods--As soon as possible after such
date of enactment, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration may develop and implement methods to--
    1. Use video monitors or other devices to alert pilots in the
flight deck to activity in the cabin, except that the use of such
monitors or devices shall be subject to nondisclosure requirements
applicable to cockpit video recordings under section 111.4(c);
    2. Ensure continuous operation of an aircraft transponder in the
event of an emergency; and
    3. Revise the procedures by which cabin crews of aircraft can
notify flight deck crews of security breaches and

other emergencies, including providing for the installation of switches
or other devices or methods in an aircraft cabin to enable flight crews
to discreetly notify the pilots in the case of a security breach
occurring in the cabin.
    Aerospace Services International proposed that closed circuit
television be added to airplanes and submitted detailed suggestions for
how these systems should operate.
    The concept of video monitoring has been discussed at aviation
safety and security forums for some years. However, there are numerous
concerns (especially as to violation of privacy) associated with use of
such systems, and at this point the potential benefits of requiring
video monitoring do not outweigh the concerns. This subject was also
discussed at some length in the rulemaking on Flightdeck Door
Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems.\10\ Any requirements for
use of closed circuit television are beyond the scope of the NPRM and
thus would require separate rulemaking. Currently, we do not anticipate
rulemaking in that area.
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    \10\ Amendment 121-334, 72 FR 45629.
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N. Existing Regulations Address Incendiary Devices

    Boeing inferred that the FAA equates explosive devices and
incendiary devices because of implications that they produce the same
effects. Boeing does not agree that these two types of devices produce
the same effect. Further, Boeing maintains that existing regulations
and airplane design practice already address the effects of an
incendiary device.
    We agree that different devices may produce different effects and
did not intend to equate them in the proposal. Most aircraft fires
originating from, for example, mechanical or electrical faults are
fairly slow-developing and localized, whereas an incendiary device can
produce a fire that is widespread and formed very quickly. For the most
part, Halon 1211 can be used to suppress the extensive fire that an
incendiary device can cause. However, as discussed in the NPRM, Halon
will not be available indefinitely.
    In addition, no explicit requirement in the current regulations
addresses fire caused by an incendiary device. Therefore, this final
rule specifically requires that new airplanes be designed to protect
against detonation of such devices. Proposed AC 25.795-5 discusses the
subject more fully.

O. Destructive Capability of Explosive or Incendiary Devices

    Boeing and Bombardier commented that the NPRM does not specify the
destructive capability of the devices that the proposed regulations are
intended to mitigate.
    The commenters are correct. In fact, with this rule we intend to
improve an airplane's survivability from security threats, including
explosive and incendiary devices, regardless of the energy of the
device. The degree of improvement will vary, depending on the airplane
design and the specific device. However, when coupled with other
security measures, the effect will be a significant improvement in
safety for the public.
    Since this final rule and the associated advisory circulars taken
together provide clear performance measures, design objectives, and
guidance, there is no need to discuss specific device capabilities. In
addition, this is sensitive security information and cannot be publicly
disclosed. We can be more specific with an applicant for a new type
certificate should a particular proposed method of compliance require
it. Accordingly, we have made no change to the rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. We have determined that there
is no current or new requirement for information collection associated
with this amendment.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable.
The FAA has reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices and has identified no differences with these regulations.

III. Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Determination,
International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S.
standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider international
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S.
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995).
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this rule has
benefits that justify its costs, and is a ``significant regulatory
action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 because it
raises novel policy issues contemplated under that executive order. The
rule is also ``significant'' as defined in DOT's Regulatory Policies
and Procedures. Accordingly, OMB has reviewed this final rule.
    The rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities, will not create unnecessary
obstacles to international trade, and will not impose an unfunded
mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private
sector. These analyses, are discussed below.

Summary of Costs and Benefits

    The cost of a fatal aircraft accident involving terrorist bombing
and hijacking can exceed one billion dollars. In addition to the direct
costs of such an accident are associated costs of Congressional
hearings, bankruptcy proceedings, and other litigation following such
an accident. Finally, the psychological costs of such an accident are
incalculable.
    The total estimated costs of this rule are $1.4 billion ($360.0
million present value). This total includes the costs of certification
and manufacturing as well as the incremental fuel burn. We estimate
larger transport category aircraft costs at $1.3 billion ($326.7
million present value). Smaller transport category airplane costs are
$88.8 million ($33.2 million present value).
    We estimate the total benefits of this rule at $2.7 billion ($587.7
million present value). The operational benefits alone justify the
costs of the rule.

Who Is Potentially Affected by This Rulemaking

    Manufacturers and operators of new part 25 transport category
airplanes.

Assumptions and Sources of Information

 Period of analysis: 2008 through 2061--While the period of
analysis is driven by the estimated number of certifications and
corresponding production period, this final rule would still be cost
beneficial if analyzed over a 20-year period.
 Discount rate: 7%
 Terrorist Acts: Transportation Security Administration
 Civil Aviation Crimes: 2000 Crime Acts Report, Federal
Aviation Administration
 Terrorist Acts: 9-11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004
 Costs of Terrorist Acts: ``September 11, 2001: Then and Now,''
John R. Jameson
 Costs of Terrorist Acts: ``The Economic Cost of Terrorism,''
Brian S. Wesbury, September 2002
 BACK Aviation Solutions: Fleet PC TM
 Wong, Jinn-Tsai and Yeh, Wen-Chien ``Impact of Flight Accident
on Passenger Traffic Volume of the Airlines in Taiwan,'' Journal of the
Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies, vol. 5, October, 2003
 NASA 2004 Cost Estimating Handbook

Alternatives We Considered

    The FAA considered reducing the size of transport category
airplanes that would be subject to the requirements contained in this
proposal because we believe that smaller airplanes--whether carrying
passengers or cargo--are less likely to be the target of terrorists.
However, given the importance of maintaining cabin security, this final
rule will require protection of the flightcrew compartment for all
transport category airplanes required by operating rules to have a
flightdeck door.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the
agency may so certify, and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
    In the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination, we found that
there would not be a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Entities potentially affected by this final
rule include manufacturers and operators of part 25 transport category
airplanes. We estimate direct cost and not secondary impacts or
indirect cost, as measuring indirect costs is speculative and subject
to double counting.
    We received no comments regarding our initial determination, and
our final regulatory flexibility determination is that this final rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
    In our classification, we use the size standards from the Small
Business Administration. According to those standards, companies with
fewer than 1,500 employees (in aircraft manufacturing) are small
entities. All U.S. manufacturers of transport category airplanes have
more than 1,500 employees; thus none are considered small entities.
    A substantial number of operators which purchase larger affected
aircraft might be classified as small entities and thus incur cost due
to increased fuel consumption. Although a substantial number of small
entities will be affected, operational cost savings alone are greater
than the additional cost of fuel consumption. In addition, a
substantial number of operators which purchase smaller affected
aircraft will incur fuel cost due to the incremental weight increase.
We estimate that the requirements contained in this final rule will add
$2,600 in cost per smaller aircraft annually. This cost equates to
roughly $200 per month per aircraft. We do not believe that this cost
will be significant in the purchase and operation of a new airplane.
    Therefore as the acting FAA Administrator, I certify that this rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-30) prohibits Federal
agencies from engaging in any standards or engaging related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this rule and
determined that it would promote international trade by standardizing
security-related design features of part 25 airplanes and thereby
comply with ICAO's international design standards.
    In accordance with the Trade Agreements Act, the FAA used
international aircraft safety standards as the basis for this rule and,
therefore, is in compliance with the Act.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by
the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant
regulatory action.'' The value equivalent of $100 million in CY 1995,
adjusted for inflation to CY 2007 levels by Consumer Price Index for
all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) as published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, is $136.1 million.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and, therefore would not have federalism implications.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation,
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, we
requested comments on whether the proposed rule should apply
differently to intrastate operations in Alaska. We did not receive any
comments, and we have determined, based on the administrative record of
this rulemaking, that there is no need to make any regulatory
distinctions applicable to intrastate aviation in Alaska.

Environmental Analysis

    Order 1050.1E defines FAA actions that are categorically excluded
from preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this rulemaking
action qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph
3f and involves no extraordinary circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this rulemaking under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is a
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in both Executive Order
12866, and DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures, the final rule is
not a ``Significant Energy Action'' because it is not likely to have a
significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You may obtain an electronic copy of rulemaking documents using the
Internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://
www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    You may also obtain a copy by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling<PHONE_NUMBER>. Make
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this
rulemaking.
    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit
or you may visit http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question
regarding this document, you may contact your local FAA official, or
the person listed under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at
the beginning of the preamble. You can find out more about SBREFA on
the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/
sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference

14 CFR Part 121

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) amends parts 25 and 121 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations,
as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 4794.

0
2. Revise Sec.  25.795 to read as follows:

Sec.  25.795  Security considerations.

    (a) Protection of flightcrew compartment. If a flightdeck door is
required by operating rules:
    (1) The bulkhead, door, and any other accessible boundary
separating the flightcrew compartment from occupied areas must be
designed to resist forcible intrusion by unauthorized persons and be
capable of withstanding impacts of 300 joules (221.3 foot pounds).
    (2) The bulkhead, door, and any other accessible boundary
separating the flightcrew compartment from occupied areas must be
designed to resist a constant 250 pound (1,113 Newtons) tensile load on
accessible handholds, including the doorknob or handle.
    (3) The bulkhead, door, and any other boundary separating the
flightcrew compartment from any occupied areas must be designed to
resist penetration by small arms fire and fragmentation devices to a
level equivalent to level IIIa of the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ) Standard 0101.04.
    (b) Airplanes with a maximum certificated passenger seating
capacity of more than 60 persons or a maximum certificated takeoff
gross weight of over 100,000 pounds (45,359 Kilograms) must be designed
to limit the effects of an explosive or incendiary device as follows:
    (1) Flightdeck smoke protection. Means must be provided to limit
entry of smoke, fumes, and noxious gases into the flightdeck.
    (2) Passenger cabin smoke protection. Means must be provided to
prevent passenger incapacitation in the cabin resulting from smoke,
fumes, and noxious gases as represented by the initial combined
volumetric concentrations of 0.59% carbon monoxide and 1.23% carbon
dioxide.
    (3) Cargo compartment fire suppression. An extinguishing agent must
be capable of suppressing a fire. All cargo-compartment fire
suppression systems must be designed to withstand the following
effects, including support structure displacements or adjacent
materials displacing against the distribution system:
    (i) Impact or damage from a 0.5-inch diameter aluminum sphere
traveling at 430 feet per second (131.1 meters per second);
    (ii) A 15-pound per square-inch (103.4 kPa) pressure load if the
projected surface area of the component is greater than 4 square feet.
Any single dimension greater than 4 feet (1.22 meters) may be assumed
to be 4 feet (1.22 meters) in length; and
    (iii) A 6-inch (0.152 meters) displacement, except where limited by
the fuselage contour, from a single point force applied anywhere along
the distribution system where relative movement between the system and
its attachment can occur.
    (iv) Paragraphs (b)(3)(i) through (iii) of this section do not
apply to components that are redundant and separated in

accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section or are installed
remotely from the cargo compartment.
    (c) An airplane with a maximum certificated passenger seating
capacity of more than 60 persons or a maximum certificated takeoff
gross weight of over 100,000 pounds (45,359 Kilograms) must comply with
the following:
    (1) Least risk bomb location. An airplane must be designed with a
designated location where a bomb or other explosive device could be
placed to best protect flight-critical structures and systems from
damage in the case of detonation.
    (2) Survivability of systems.
    (i) Except where impracticable, redundant airplane systems
necessary for continued safe flight and landing must be physically
separated, at a minimum, by an amount equal to a sphere of diameter
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28OC08.003

(where H0 is defined under Sec.  25.365(e)(2) of this part
and D need not exceed 5.05 feet (1.54 meters)). The sphere is applied
everywhere within the fuselage--limited by the forward bulkhead and the
aft bulkhead of the passenger cabin and cargo compartment beyond which
only one-half the sphere is applied.
    (ii) Where compliance with paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section is
impracticable, other design precautions must be taken to maximize the
survivability of those systems.
    (3) Interior design to facilitate searches. Design features must be
incorporated that will deter concealment or promote discovery of
weapons, explosives, or other objects from a simple inspection in the
following areas of the airplane cabin:
    (i) Areas above the overhead bins must be designed to prevent
objects from being hidden from view in a simple search from the aisle.
Designs that prevent concealment of objects with volumes 20 cubic
inches and greater satisfy this requirement.
    (ii) Toilets must be designed to prevent the passage of solid
objects greater than 2.0 inches in diameter.
    (iii) Life preservers or their storage locations must be designed
so that tampering is evident.
    (d) Exceptions. Airplanes used solely to transport cargo only need
to meet the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(3), and (c)(2) of
this section.
    (e) Material Incorporated by Reference. You must use National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) Standard 0101.04, Ballistic Resistance of
Personal Body Armor, June 2001, Revision A, to establish ballistic
resistance as required by paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation
by reference of this document under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You may review copies of NIJ Standard 0101.04 at the:
    (i) FAA Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington 98055;
    (ii) National Institute of Justice (NIJ), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
nij, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; or
    (iii) National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA go to http://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_
locations.html or call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (3) You may obtain copies of NIJ Standard 0101.04 from the National
Criminal Justice Reference Service, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849-
6000, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS

0
3. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-44904,
44912, 46105.
0
4. Add Sec.  121.295 to read as follows:

Sec.  121.295  Location for a suspect device.

    After November 28, 2009, all airplanes with a maximum certificated
passenger seating capacity of more than 60 persons must have a location
where a suspected explosive or incendiary device found in flight can be
placed to minimize the risk to the airplane.

    Issued in Washington, DC on October 17, 2008.
Robert A. Sturgell,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8-25476 Filed 10-27-08; 8:45 am]

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[Federal Register: April 8, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 66)]
[Notices]
[Page 15988]
[DOCID:fr08ap09-71]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2008-N-0490]

Agency Information Collection Activities; Announcement of Office
of Management and Budget Approval; Voluntary Cosmetic Registration
Program

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing that a
collection of information entitled ``Voluntary Cosmetic Registration
Program'' has been approved by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jonna Capezzuto, Office of Information
Management (HFA-710), Food and Drug Administration, 5600 Fishers Lane,
Rockville, MD 20857,<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the Federal Register of December 16, 2008
(73 FR 76360), the agency announced that the proposed information
collection had been submitted to OMB for review and clearance under 44
U.S.C. 3507. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays
a currently valid OMB control number. OMB has now approved the
information collection and has assigned OMB control number 0910-0030.
The approval expires on February 29, 2012. A copy of the supporting
statement for this information collection is available on the Internet
at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.

    Dated: April 1, 2009.
Jeffrey Shuren,
Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning.
[FR Doc. E9-7878 Filed 4-7-09; 8:45 am]

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