[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 49 (Wednesday, March 13, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 16051-16126]
[FR Doc No: 2013-04679]

Vol. 78

Wednesday,

No. 49

March 13, 2013

Part II

Department of Transportation

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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Parts 213 and 238

Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards; High-Speed and High Cant
Deficiency Operations; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 49 / Wednesday, March 13, 2013 /
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 213 and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2009-0036, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AC09

Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards; High-Speed and High
Cant Deficiency Operations

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: FRA is amending the Track Safety Standards and Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of rail
vehicles with the track over which they operate under a variety of
conditions at speeds up to 220 m.p.h. The final rule revises standards
for track geometry and safety limits for vehicle response to track
conditions, enhances vehicle/track qualification procedures, and adds
flexibility for permitting high cant deficiency train operations
through curves at conventional speeds. The rule accounts for a range of
vehicle types that are currently in operation, as well as vehicle types
that may likely be used in future high-speed or high cant deficiency
rail operations, or both. The rule is based on the results of
simulation studies designed to identify track geometry irregularities
associated with unsafe wheel/rail forces and accelerations, thorough
reviews of vehicle qualification and revenue service test data, and
consideration of international practices.

DATES: This final rule is effective July 11, 2013. The incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in the rule is approved by
the Director of the Federal Register as of July 11, 2013. Petitions for
reconsideration must be received on or before May 13, 2013. Comments in
response to petitions for reconsideration must be received on or before
June 26, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration and comments on petitions for
reconsideration: Any petitions for reconsideration or comments on
petitions for reconsideration related to Docket No. FRA-2009-0036,
Notice No. 2, may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal,
www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for
submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, Washington,
DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the
Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all petitions and comments received will be
posted without change to www.regulations.gov, including any personal
information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act information
related to any submitted petitions, comments, or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents,
petitions for reconsideration, or comments received, go to
www.regulations.gov anytime or visit the Docket Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room
W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John J. Mardente, Engineer, Office of
Railroad Safety, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>);
Ken Rusk, Staff Director, Track Division, Office of Railroad Safety,
Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>); Ali Tajaddini,
Program Manager for Vehicle/Track Interaction, Office of Railroad
Policy and Development, Mail Stop 20, Federal Railroad Administration,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-
6438); or Daniel L. Alpert, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Office of Chief
Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory Background
    A. Track Safety Standards
    B. Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
III. Proceedings to Date
    A. Proceedings to Carry Out the 1992/1994 Track Safety Standards
Rulemaking Mandates
    B. Proceedings To Carry Out the 1994 Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Rulemaking Mandate
    C. Identification of Key Issues for Future Rulemaking
    D. RSAC Overview
    E. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group
    F. Establishment of the Task Force
    G. Development of the NPRM
    H. Development of the Final Rule
IV. Technical Background
    A. Lessons Learned and Operational Experience
    B. Research and Computer Modeling
V. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions
    A. EU and SNCF Comments on Track Geometry Standards
    B. Wheel Unloading Ffrom Wind on Superelevated Curves
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Trade Impact
    I. Privacy Act

I. Executive Summary

    Having considered the public comments in response to FRA's May 10,
2010, proposed rule on vehicle/track interaction safety, see 75 FR
25928, FRA issues this final rule amending the Track Safety Standards,
49 CFR part 213, and the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 49 CFR
part 238, applicable to high-speed and high cant deficiency train
operations. (As explained more fully in the preamble, below, train
operations at cant deficiency involve traveling through curves faster
than the balance speed; the higher the train speed is above the balance
speed, the higher the cant deficiency.) Since FRA's high-speed track
safety standards and passenger equipment safety standards were issued
in the late 1990s, FRA and interested industry members have identified
various issues for possible future rulemaking. Some of these issues
resulted from the gathering of operational experience in applying the
safety standards to Amtrak's high-speed, Acela Express (Acela)
trainsets, as well as to higher-speed commuter railroad operations.
Other issues arose from research conducted, allowing FRA to gather new
information with which to evaluate the safety of high-speed and high
cant deficiency rail operations.

FRA has addressed these issues with the assistance of the Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which unanimously recommended the
requirements contained in this final rule.
    Among the final rule's main accomplishments, the rule:
     Revises performance standards and specifications for track
geometry for the higher-speed track classes, track Classes 6 through 9
(speeds greater than 80 miles per hour (m.p.h.) for freight and 90
m.p.h. for passenger operations). FRA has reviewed the performance
standards in light of advanced simulations that were developed to
support the rulemaking effort, as discussed in Section IV, below, and
is refining those standards to focus on identified safety concerns and
remove any unnecessary costs.
     Adds flexibility through procedures for safely permitting
high cant deficiency operations on the lower-speed track classes, track
Classes 1 through 5, without the need for obtaining a waiver. In order
to take advantage of high cant deficiency operations and the resultant
savings in travel time, the equipment must be qualified and the track
must be maintained to more stringent standards to permit the higher
speeds through curves.
     Institutes more cost-effective equipment qualification and
in-service monitoring requirements. Railroads can discontinue annual
use of instrumented wheelsets for in-service validation as a general
requirement and avoid some tests that have not provided useful data.
Further, the final rule makes it easier to qualify vehicles on
additional segments of track once they are qualified on any track,
extending territories in which qualified equipment may operate.
     Clarifies that individuals qualified to inspect track need
only understand the portions of the regulation relevant to the
inspections they conduct and the work they perform, given, in
particular, the provisions added for high cant deficiency operations in
lower-speed track classes.
    In analyzing the economic impacts of the final rule, FRA does not
find that any existing operation will be adversely affected by these
changes, nor does FRA find that the changes will induce any net costs.
    FRA expects three types of benefits: Benefits related to equipment
procurement for passenger trains at speeds exceeding 90 m.p.h.,
benefits from operations at high cant deficiency for passenger trains
at speeds up to 90 m.p.h, and benefits from streamlined testing
requirements. Under the rules existing before this final rule, a
railroad could insist that a carbuilder provide trainsets that could
meet acceleration requirements on track at the maximum allowable
deviations. FRA is unaware of any such trainsets that are available
that would have complied with the former rule under all permitted
conditions and also meet other requirements for service in the United
States. This final rule makes it more likely that railroads will
specify equipment that is currently produced, and thus could reduce the
costs of procurements, although Amtrak disagrees in its comments (and
FRA believes that, even without procurement benefits, the costs of the
rule are still justified by the benefits). Operations at high cant
deficiency allow trains to operate more rapidly around curves. This can
dramatically reduce the time required for any given trip. Streamlined
testing requirements make it much easier to qualify a trainset on
additional track once it has been qualified on any track, and provide
more flexibility for monitoring trainset performance in service.
    Nothing in the rule will increase the overall costs of procuring
equipment or of testing that equipment to validate compliance with the
rule. In fact, the rule will reduce those costs.
    Although the provisions for high cant deficiency operations on all
track classes are permissive in nature and create no additional net
costs, railroads that avail themselves of these provisions will incur
some costs. The first will be the one-time cost of programming the
software of automated track inspection vehicles to include the new
standards required by the rule, and the second will be the cost of
maintaining the track in curves to tighter geometric standards. FRA
conservatively estimates that it will cost $292,000 as a one-time
expense to update track inspection software to reflect the changes in
this rule. However, FRA is not certain whether overall maintenance
costs will be higher or lower with high cant deficiency operations, as
trains otherwise would have more frequently slowed down from the line
speed before entering curves and then accelerated back to the line
speed after exiting the curves, adding wear and tear to both equipment
and track. In any case, the difference in maintenance costs is not
included as a factor in the analysis.
    The rule creates net benefits and will facilitate the expansion of
passenger rail service.

II. Statutory Background

A. Track Safety Standards

    The first Federal Track Safety Standards were published on October
20, 1971, following the enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of
1970, Public Law 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (October 16, 1970), in which
Congress granted to FRA comprehensive authority over ``all areas of
railroad safety.'' See 36 FR 20336. FRA envisioned the new Standards to
be an evolving set of safety requirements subject to continuous
revision allowing the regulations to keep pace with industry
innovations and agency research and development. The most comprehensive
revision of the Standards resulted from the Rail Safety Enforcement and
Review Act of 1992, Public Law 102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (Sept. 3, 1992),
later amended by the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994,
Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4615 (November 2, 1994). The amended
statute is codified at 49 U.S.C. 20142 and required the Secretary of
Transportation (Secretary) to review and then revise the Track Safety
Standards, which are contained in 49 CFR part 213. The Secretary has
delegated such statutory responsibilities to the Administrator of FRA
(see 49 CFR 1.89), which as discussed below, carried out the review and
the rulemaking proceedings.

B. Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

    In September 1994, the Secretary convened a meeting of
representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with the goal of
enhancing rail safety. As one of the initiatives arising from this Rail
Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would develop safety
standards for rail passenger equipment over a 5-year period. In
November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for
implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations and included
it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994. Congress
also authorized the Secretary to consult with various organizations
involved in passenger train operations for purposes of prescribing and
amending these regulations, as well as issuing orders pursuant to them.
Section 215 of this Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133.

III. Proceedings to Date

A. Proceedings To Carry Out the 1992/1994 Track Safety Standards
Rulemaking Mandates

    To help fulfill the statutory mandates described in Section II.A,
FRA decided that the proceeding to revise part 213 should advance under
RSAC, which was established on March 11, 1996. (A fuller discussion of
RSAC is provided below.) In turn, RSAC formed the Track Working Group,
comprised of approximately 30 representatives from railroads, rail
labor organizations, trade associations, State government, track
equipment manufacturers, and FRA, to develop and draft a proposed rule
for revising part 213. The Track Working Group identified issues for
discussion from several sources, in addition to the statutory mandates
issued by Congress in 1992 and in 1994. Ultimately, the Track Working
Group recommended a proposed rule to the full RSAC body, which in turn
formally recommended to the Administrator of FRA that FRA issue the
proposed rule as it was drafted.
    On July 3, 1997, FRA published an NPRM that included substantially
the same rule text and preamble as that developed by the Track Working
Group. The NPRM generated comment, and following consideration of the
comments received, FRA published a final rule in the Federal Register
on June 22, 1998, see 63 FR 33992, which, effective September 21, 1998,
revised the Track Safety Standards in their entirety.
    To address the modern railroad operating environment, the final
rule included standards specifically applicable to high-speed train
operations in a new subpart G. Prior to the 1998 final rule, the Track
Safety Standards had addressed six classes of track, Classes 1 through
6, that permitted passenger and freight trains to travel at speeds up
to 110 m.p.h.; passenger trains had been allowed to operate at speeds
over 110 m.p.h. under conditional waiver granted by FRA. FRA revised
the requirements for Class 6 track, included them in new subpart G, and
also added in it three new classes of track, track Classes 7 through 9,
designating standards for track over which trains may travel at speeds
up to 200 m.p.h. The new subpart G was intended to function as a set of
``stand alone'' regulations governing any track identified as belonging
to one of these high-speed track classes.

B. Proceedings To Carry Out the 1994 Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Rulemaking Mandate

    FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group
to provide FRA with advice in developing the regulations mandated by
Congress. On June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety
standards for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM
provided background information on the need for such standards, offered
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented
questions on various passenger safety topics. Following consideration
of comments received on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on
September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive safety standards for
railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to
requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment
at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the
comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule, which was
published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540.
    After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the
following subject areas: Structural design; fire safety; training;
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective
equipment. On July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response to the petitions for
reconsideration relating to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of
passenger equipment, the movement of defective passenger equipment, and
other miscellaneous provisions related to mechanical issues contained
in the final rule. See 65 FR 41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to
all remaining issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration, with
the exception of those relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970.
Finally, on June 25, 2002, FRA completed its response to the petitions
for reconsideration by publishing a response to those petitions
concerning the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For
more detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and
FRA's response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.)
The product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part
238 and secondarily at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.

C. Identification of Key Issues for Future Rulemaking

    While FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA and interested
industry members began identifying various issues for possible future
rulemaking. Some of these issues resulted from the gathering of
operational experience in applying the new safety standards to Amtrak's
Acela trainsets, as well as to higher-speed commuter railroad
operations. These included concerns raised by railroads and rail
equipment manufacturers as to the application of the new safety
standards and the consistency between the requirements contained in
part 213 and those in part 238. Other issues arose from research
conducted, allowing FRA to gather new information with which to
evaluate the safety of high-speed and high cant deficiency rail
operations. FRA decided to address these issues with the assistance of
RSAC.
    FRA notes that train operation at cant deficiency involves
traveling through a curve faster than the balance speed. Balance speed
for any given curve is the speed at which the lateral component of
centrifugal force will be exactly compensated (or balanced) by the
corresponding component of the gravitational force. When operating
above the balance speed, there is a net lateral force to the outside of
the curve. Cant deficiency is measured in inches and is the amount of
superelevation that would need to be added to the existing track to
balance this centrifugal force with this gravitational force to realize
no net lateral force measured in the plane of the rails. For every
curve, there is a balance speed at which the cant deficiency is zero
based on the actual superelevation built into the track. The higher the
train speed is above the balance speed, the higher the cant deficiency.

D. RSAC Overview

    As mentioned above, in March 1996, FRA established RSAC as a forum
for developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes
representation from all of the agency's major stakeholders, including
railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other
interested parties. A list of member groups follows:
     American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners
(AAPRCO);
     American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO);

     American Chemistry Council;
     American Petroleum Institute;
     American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
     American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association
(ASLRRA);
     American Train Dispatchers Association;
     Association of American Railroads (AAR);
     Association of Railway Museums;
     Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
     Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
     Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division
(BMWED);
     Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
     Chlorine Institute;
     Federal Transit Administration (FTA); *
     Fertilizer Institute;
     High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
     Institute of Makers of Explosives;
     International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers;
     International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers;
     Labor Council for Latin American Advancement; *
     League of Railway Industry Women; *
     National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
     National Association of Railway Business Women; *
     National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
     National Railroad Construction and Maintenance
Association;
     National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
     National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); *
     Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
     Safe Travel America (STA);
     Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte; *
     Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
     Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
     Transport Canada; *
     Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
     Transportation Communications International Union/BRC
(TCIU/BRC);
     Transportation Security Administration (TSA); * and
     United Transportation Union (UTU).

    * Indicates associate, non-voting membership.

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a
given task. The individual task force then provides that information to
the working group for consideration. When a working group comes to
unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is
presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a
simple majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA.
FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because
FRA staff members play an active role at the working group level in
discussing the issues and options and in drafting the language of the
consensus proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the
recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final
rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the
rulemaking document issued by FRA. However, to the maximum extent
practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations
with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is
withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.

E. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established
the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task
and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF),
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
     AAPRCO;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., Herzog
Transit Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology, Inc. (Interfleet,
formerly LDK Engineering, Inc.), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), Maryland
Transit Administration (MTA), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company,
Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, Southern
California Regional Rail Authority, and Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
     ASLRRA;
     BLET;
     BRS;
     FTA;
     NARP;
     RSI;
     SMWIA;
     STA;
     TCIU/BRC;
     TSA;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to
the technical discussions. Staff from the NTSB also participated in the
Working Group's meetings. The Working Group has held 14 meetings on the
following dates and in the following locations:
     September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
     November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
     May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     October 26-27, 2004, in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
     March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 7, 2005, in Chicago, IL;
     March 21-22, 2006, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 12-13, 2006, in Orlando, FL;
     April 17-18, 2007, in Orlando, FL;
     December 11, 2007, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     June 18, 2008, in Baltimore, MD;
     November 13, 2008, in Washington, DC;
     June 8, 2009, in Washington, DC; and
     September 16, 2010, in Chicago, IL.

F. Establishment of the Task Force

    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting
the Working Group established four task forces--smaller groups to
develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's
particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces include
various representatives from the

respective organizations that are part of the larger Working Group. One
of these task forces was assigned to identify and develop issues and
recommendations specifically related to the inspection, testing, and
operation of passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the
attachment of safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on
these topics was published on December 8, 2005 (see 70 FR 73069), and a
final rule was published on October 19, 2006 (see 71 FR 61835). Another
of these task forces was assigned to develop recommendations related to
window glazing integrity, structural crashworthiness, and the
protection of occupants during accidents and incidents. The work of
this task force led to the publication of an NPRM focused on enhancing
the front end strength of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives
on August 1, 2007 (see 72 FR 42016), and the publication of a final
rule on January 8, 2010 (see 75 FR 1180). Another task force, the
Emergency Preparedness Task Force, was established to identify issues
and develop recommendations related to emergency systems, procedures,
and equipment. An NPRM on these topics was published on August 24, 2006
(see 71 FR 50276), and a final rule was published on February 1, 2008
(see 73 FR 6370).
    The fourth task force, the Track/Vehicle Interaction Task Force
(also identified as the Vehicle/Track Interaction Task Force, or Task
Force), was established to identify issues and develop recommendations
related to the safety of vehicle/track interactions. Initially, the
Task Force was charged with considering a number of issues, including
vehicle-centered issues involving wheel flange angle, tread conicity,
and truck equalization; the necessity for instrumented wheelset tests
for operations at speeds from 90 to 125 m.p.h.; consolidation of
vehicle trackworthiness criteria in parts 213 and 238; and revisions of
the track geometry standards. The Task Force was given the
responsibility of addressing other vehicle/track interaction safety
issues and to recommend any research necessary to facilitate their
resolution. Members of the Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the
following:
     AAR;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Interfleet, LIRR,
LTK Engineering Services, Port Authority Trans-Hudson, and STV Inc.;
     BMWED; and
     BRS.
    Staff from the Volpe Center attended all of the meetings and
contributed to the technical discussions through their comments and
presentations. In addition, staff from ENSCO, Inc., attended all of the
meetings and contributed to the technical discussions, as a contractor
to FRA. Both the Volpe Center and ENSCO, Inc., have supported FRA
throughout this rulemaking.
    The Task Force has held 32 meetings on the following dates and in
the following locations:
     April 20-21, 2004, in Washington, DC;
     May 24, 2004, in Springfield, VA (technical subgroup
only);
     June 24-25, 2004, in Washington, DC;
     July 6, 2004, in Washington, DC (technical subgroup only);
     July 22, 2004, in Washington, DC (technical subgroup
only);
     August 24-25, 2004, in Washington, DC;
     October 12-14, 2004, in Washington, DC;
     December 9, 2004, in Washington, DC;
     February 10, 2005, in Washington, DC;
     April 7, 2005, in Washington, DC;
     August 24, 2005, in Washington, DC;
     November 3-4, 2005, in Washington, DC;
     January 12-13, 2006, in Washington, DC;
     March 7-8, 2006, in Washington, DC;
     April 25, 2006, in Washington, DC;
     May 23, 2006, in Washington, DC;
     July 25-26, 2006, in Cambridge, MA;
     September 7-8, 2006, in Washington, DC;
     November 14-15, 2006, in Washington, DC;
     January 24-25, 2007, in Washington, DC;
     March 29-30, 2007, in Cambridge, MA;
     April 26, 2007, in Springfield, VA;
     May 17-18, 2007, in Cambridge, MA;
     June 25-26, 2007, in Arlington, VA;
     August 8-9, 2007, in Cambridge, MA;
     October 9-11, 2007 in Washington, DC;
     November 19-20, 2007, in Washington, DC;
     February 27-28, 2008, in Cambridge, MA;
     August 5-6, 2010, in Rockville, MD;
     August 23, 2010, in Washington, DC (via teleconference);
     September 7, 2010, in Washington, DC (via teleconference);
and
     June 29, 2011, in Washington, DC (via teleconference).

This list includes meetings of a technical subgroup comprised of
representatives of the larger Task Force. These subgroup meetings were
often convened the day before the larger Task Force meetings to focus
on more advanced, technical issues. The results of these meetings were
then presented at the larger Task Force meetings and, in turn, included
in the minutes of those Task Force meetings. Minutes of each of these
meetings have been made part of the public docket in this proceeding
and are available for inspection.

G. Development of the NPRM

    The NPRM was developed to address a number of the concerns raised
and issues discussed during Task Force and Working Group meetings. The
Task Force recognized that the high-speed track safety standards are
based on the principle that, to ensure safety, the interaction of the
vehicles and the tracks over which they operate must be considered
within a systems approach that provides for specific limits for vehicle
response to track perturbation(s). From the outset, the Task Force
strove to develop revisions that would: Serve as practical standards
with sound physical and mathematical bases; account for a range of
vehicle types that are currently used and may likely be used on future
high-speed or high cant deficiency rail operations, or both; and not
present an undue burden on railroads. The Task Force first identified
key issues requiring attention based on experience applying the Track
Safety Standards and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, and defined
the following work efforts:

 Revise--
    [cir] Qualification requirements for high-speed and high cant
deficiency operations;
    [cir] Acceleration and wheel/rail force safety limits;
    [cir] Inspection, monitoring, and maintenance requirements; and
    [cir] Track geometry limits for high-speed operations.
 Establish--
    [cir] Necessary safety limits for wheel profile and truck
equalization;
    [cir] Consistent requirements for high cant deficiency operations
covering all track classes; and
    [cir] Additional track geometry requirements for cant deficiencies
greater than 5 inches.
     Resolve and reconcile inconsistencies between the Track
Safety Standards and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, and

between the lower- and higher-speed Track Safety Standards.

Through the close examination of these issues, the Task Force developed
proposals intended to result in improved public safety while reducing
the burden on the railroad industry where possible. The proposals were
arrived at through the results of computer simulations of vehicle/track
dynamics, consideration of international practices, and thorough
reviews of qualification and revenue service test data.
    Nonetheless, in the NPRM published in the Federal Register on May
10, 2010, see 75 FR 25928, FRA made clear that the Task Force did not
seek to revise comprehensively the high-speed Track Safety Standards in
subpart G of part 213, and the NPRM did not propose to do so. For
example, there was no consensus within the Task Force to consider
revisions to the requirements for crossties, as members of the Task
Force believed it was outside of their assigned tasks. Nor was there
any real discussion about revisions to the requirements for ballast or
other sections in subpart G that currently do not distinguish
requirements by class of track. (See Sec.  213.307 in the Section-by-
Section Analysis, below, for further discussion on this point.) FRA
therefore made clear that by not proposing revisions to these sections
in the NPRM, FRA did not mean to imply that these other sections may
not be subject to revision in the future, such as through a separate
RSAC effort. Further, FRA invited comment on the need and rationale for
changes to other sections of subpart G not specifically proposed to be
revised through the NPRM, noting that based upon the comments received
and their significance to the changes specifically proposed, FRA may
consider whether revisions to additional requirements in subpart G are
necessary in this final rule.

H. Development of the Final Rule

    FRA notified the public of its options to submit written comments
on the NPRM and to request a public, oral hearing on the NPRM as well.
No request for a public hearing was received. However, a number of
interested parties did submit written comments to the docket in this
proceeding, and FRA considered all of these comments in preparing the
final rule. Specifically, written comments were received from AAR,
Amtrak, Bombardier, the European Union (EU), Florida Department of
Transportation (FDOT), New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit),
North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT), SEPTA,
Soci[eacute]t[eacute] Nationale des Chemins de fer Fran[ccedil]ais
(French National Railway Company, shortened as SNCF), and a private
citizen. As discussed below, FRA sought clarification from SNCF on
SNCF's initial written comments to the docket, and SNCF supplemented
its comments in response to FRA's request. FRA's request and SNCF's
response have been made part of the public docket in this proceeding.
    FRA convened the Task Force to discuss the comments received on the
NPRM and to help achieve consensus on recommendations concerning their
incorporation into this final rule. After four meetings and subsequent
electronic communications, the Task Force reached consensus on
recommendations for the text of the final rule. The recommendations
were accepted by the Working Group and unanimously approved by the full
RSAC as the Committee's recommendations to the FRA Administrator.
Finding that the recommendations help fulfill the agency's regulatory
goals, are soundly supported, and in accordance with policy and legal
requirements, FRA has adopted these recommendations in this final rule.
    FRA notes that throughout the preamble discussion of this final
rule, FRA refers to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations
made by members of the Task Force, Working Group, or full RSAC, as they
are identified or contained in meeting minutes or other materials in
the public docket. FRA does so to show the origin of certain issues and
the nature of discussions concerning those issues at the Task Force,
Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA believes this serves to
illuminate factors it has weighed in making its regulatory decisions,
as well as the rationale for those decisions.

IV. Technical Background

A. Lessons Learned and Operational Experience

    Since the issuance of both the high-speed Track Safety Standards in
1998 and the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards in 1999, experience
has been gained in qualifying a number of vehicles for high-speed and
high cant deficiency operations and in monitoring subsequent
performance in revenue service operation. These vehicles include
Amtrak's Acela trainset; MTA's MARC-III multi-level passenger car; and
NJ Transit's ALP-46 locomotive, Comet V car, PL-42AC locomotive, and
multi-level passenger car. Considerable data was gathered by testing
these vehicles at speed over their intended service routes using
instrumented wheelsets to measure forces directly between the wheel and
rail and using accelerometers to record vehicle motions. During the
course of these qualification tests, some uncertainties,
inconsistencies, and potentially restrictive values were identified in
the interpretation and application of the vehicle/track interaction
(VTI) safety limits then specified in Sec.  213.333 and Sec.  213.345
for excessive vehicle motions based on measured accelerations and in
the requirements of Sec.  213.57 and Sec.  213.329 for high cant
deficiency operation. The information and experience in applying these
requirements helped lay the foundation for a number of the changes made
in this rulemaking, examples of which are provided below.
Differentiate Between Sustained Oscillatory and Transient Carbody
Acceleration Events
    During route testing of the MARC-III multi-level car at speeds up
to 125 m.p.h. and at curving speeds producing up to 5 inches of cant
deficiency, several short-duration, peak-to-peak carbody lateral
accelerations were recorded that exceeded regulatory thresholds but did
not represent unsafe guidance forces simultaneously measured at the
wheel-to-rail interface. However, repeated (sustained) carbody lateral
oscillatory accelerations and significant motions were measured on
occasion at higher speeds in curves even though peak-to-peak amplitudes
did not exceed the thresholds. A truck component issue was identified
as a cause of the excessive accelerations and thereafter corrected.
    To recognize and account for wider variations in vehicle design,
this final rule divides the VTI acceleration limits into separate
limits for passenger cars from those for other vehicles, such as
conventional locomotives. In addition, new limits for sustained,
carbody oscillatory accelerations have been added to differentiate
between single (transient) events and repeated (sustained)
oscillations. As a result, the carbody transient acceleration limits
for single events, previously set conservatively to control for both
single and repeated oscillations, are now more specific and, as
appropriate, relaxed. FRA believes that this added specificity in the
rule will reduce or eliminate altogether the need for railroads to
provide clarification or perform additional analysis, or both, to
distinguish between transient and sustained oscillations following a
qualification test run. Based on the small energy content associated
with high-frequency acceleration events of

the carbody, transient acceleration peaks lasting less than 50
milliseconds are excluded from the carbody acceleration limits. Other
clarifying changes include the addition of minimum requirements for
sampling and filtering of the acceleration data. These changes followed
considerable research into the performance of existing vehicles during
qualification testing and revenue operation. Overall, it was found that
the carbody oscillatory acceleration limits need not be as stringent to
protect against events leading to vehicle or passenger safety issues.
Establish Consistent Requirements for High Cant Deficiency Operations
for All Track Classes
    Several issues related to operation at higher cant deficiencies
(higher speeds in curves) have also been addressed, based particularly
on route testing of the Acela trainsets on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor.
In sharper curves, for which cant deficiency was high but vehicle
speeds were reflective of a lower track class, it was found that
stricter track geometry limits were necessary, for the same track
class, in order to provide an equivalent margin of safety for
operations at higher cant deficiency. These stricter limits have been
adopted in this final rule. Second, although the Track Safety Standards
have prescribed limits on geometry variations existing in isolation, it
was recognized that a combination of track alinement (also spelled
``alignment'' and literally meant to indicate ``a line'') and surface
variations, none of which individually amounts to a deviation from the
Standards, may nonetheless result in undesirable response as defined by
the VTI limits. This finding was significant because trains operating
at high cant deficiency increase the lateral force exerted on track
during curving and, in many cases, may correspondingly reduce the
margin of safety associated with vehicle response to combined track
variations. Sections 213.65 and 213.332 have been added to the rule, as
a result. Qualification of Amtrak's conventional passenger equipment to
operate at cant deficiencies up to 5 inches also highlighted the need
to ensure compatibility between the requirements for low- (Sec.
213.57) and high-speed (Sec.  213.329) cant deficiency operations;
these requirements have been modified, accordingly.
Streamline Testing Requirements for Similar Vehicles
    This final rule provides that vehicles with minor variations in
their physical properties (such as suspension, mass, interior
arrangements, or dimensions) that do not result in significant changes
to their dynamic performance (i.e., are dynamically similar) be
considered of the same vehicle type for vehicle qualification purposes.
Provided that this similarity can be established to FRA's satisfaction,
these vehicles are not required to repeat full qualification testing of
the vehicle type to which they belong, thereby saving the costs
associated with full testing. In other cases, however, the variations
between car parameters may warrant partial or full dynamic testing. For
example, the approval process for NJ Transit's Comet V car to operate
at speeds up to 100 m.p.h. exemplified the need for clarification of
whether vehicles similar (but not identical) to vehicles that have
undergone full qualification testing should be subjected to full
qualification testing themselves. NJ Transit had sought relief from the
instrumented wheelset testing required in Sec.  213.345 by stating that
the Comet V car was similar to the Comet IV car. The Comet V car was
represented to FRA to have truck and suspension components nearly
identical to the Comet IV car already in service and operating at 100-
m.p.h. speeds for many years. However, examination by FRA revealed
enough differences between the vehicles to at least warrant dynamic
testing using accelerometers on representative routes. Results of the
testing showed distinct behaviors between the cars and provided
additional data that was necessary for qualifying the Comet V.
Refine Criteria for Detecting Truck Hunting
    During route testing of Acela trainsets, high-frequency lateral
acceleration oscillations of the coach truck frame were detected by the
test instrumentation in a mild curve at high speed. However, the
onboard sensors, installed per specification on every truck, did not
respond to these events. Based on these experiences, the truck lateral
acceleration safety limit, used for the detection of truck hunting, has
been tightened from 0.4g to 0.3g and provides that the 0.3g value must
be exceeded for more than 2 seconds for there to be an exceedance.
Analyses conducted by FRA have shown that this change will better help
to identify the occurrences of excessive truck hunting, while excluding
high-frequency, low-amplitude oscillations that do not require
immediate attention. In addition, to improve the process for analyzing
data while vehicles are negotiating spiral track segments, the limit
now requires that the RMSt (root mean squared with linear trend
removed) value be used rather than the RMSm (root mean squared with
mean removed) value.
    Finally, placement of the truck frame lateral accelerometer to
detect truck hunting has been more rigorously specified to be as near
an axle as is practicable. Analyses conducted by FRA have shown that
when hunting motion (which is typically a combination of truck lateral
motion and yaw) has a large truck yaw component, hunting is best
detected by placing an accelerometer on the truck frame located above
an axle. FRA has found that an accelerometer placed in the middle of
the truck frame will not always provide early detection of truck
hunting when yaw motion of the truck is large.
Revise Periodic Monitoring Requirements for Class 8 and 9 Track
    Based on collected data, and so that the required inspection
frequency better reflects experienced degradation rates, the periodic
vehicle/track interaction monitoring frequency contained in Sec.
213.333 for operations at track Class 8 and 9 speeds has been reduced
from once per day to four times per week for carbody accelerations, and
twice within 60 days for truck accelerations. In addition, a clause has
been added to allow the track owner or railroad operating the vehicle
type subject to the monitoring to petition FRA, after a specified
amount of time or mileage, to eliminate the truck accelerometer
monitoring requirement. Data gathered has shown that these monitoring
requirements could be adjusted without materially diminishing
operational safety. In this regard, FRA notes that safety is also
provided pursuant to Sec.  238.427 in that truck acceleration continues
to be constantly monitored on each Tier II vehicle under the Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards in order to determine if hunting
oscillations of the vehicle are occurring during revenue operation.

B. Research and Computer Modeling

    As a result of advancements made over the last few decades,
computer models of rail vehicles interacting with track have become
practical and reliable tools for predicting the behavior and safety of
these vehicles under a variety of conditions. These models can serve as
reliable substitutes for performing actual, on-track testing, which
otherwise may be more difficult--and likely more costly--to perform
than to model.
    Models for such behavior typically represent the vehicle body,
wheelsets, truck frames, and other major vehicle components as rigid
bodies connected

with elastic and damping elements and include detailed representation
of the non-linear wheel/rail contact mechanics (i.e., non-linear
frictional contact forces between the wheels and rails modeled as
functions of the relative velocities between the wheel and rail
contacts, i.e., creepages). The primary dynamic input to these models
is track irregularities, which can be created analytically (such as
versines, cusps, etc.) or based on actual measurements.
    There are a number of industry codes available with generally
accepted approaches for solving the equations of motion describing the
dynamic behavior of rail vehicles. These models require accurate
knowledge of vehicle parameters, including the inertia properties of
each of the bodies as well as the characteristics of the main
suspension components and connections. To obtain reliable predictions,
the models must also consider the effects of suspension non-linearities
within the vehicles and in the wheel/rail contact mechanics, as well as
incorporate detailed characterization of the track as input, including
the range of parameters and non-linearities encountered in service.
    In order to develop revisions to the track geometry limits in the
Track Safety Standards, several computer models of rail vehicles have
been used to assess the response of vehicle designs to a wide range of
track conditions corresponding to limiting conditions allowed for each
class of track. Simulation studies have been performed using computer
models of Amtrak's AEM-7 locomotive, Acela power car, Acela coach car,
and Amfleet coach equipment. In the time since the 1998 revisions to
the track geometry limits, which were largely based on models of
hypothetical, high-speed vehicles, models of the subsequently-
introduced Acela power car and coach car have been developed. In the
case of the Acela power car, the model has proven capable of
reproducing a wide range of vehicle responses observed during
acceptance testing, including examples of potential safety concerns.
    For purposes of this rulemaking, an extensive matrix of simulation
studies involving all four vehicle types was used to determine the
amplitude of track geometry alinement anomalies, surface anomalies, and
combined surface and alinement anomalies that result in undesirable
response. These simulations were performed using two coefficients of
friction (0.1 and 0.5), two analytical anomaly shapes (bump and ramp),
and combinations of speed, curvature, and superelevation to cover a
range of cant deficiency. The results provided the basis for
establishing the revisions to the geometry limits adopted in this final
rule. For illustration purposes, two examples are provided of results
from simulation studies that were performed for determining safe
amplitudes of track geometry: One illustrates the effect of combined
track alinement and profile defects; the other illustrates isolated
track alinement defects.
    Figure 1 depicts an example summarizing the modeling results of the
Acela power car at 130 m.p.h. and 9 inches of cant deficiency over
combined, 62-foot-wavelength defects. The darker-shaded squares
represent a combination of track alinement and surface perturbations
where at least one of the VTI safety criteria adopted in this final
rule is exceeded, and the solid, black-lined polygon represents the
track geometry limits that have been adopted in the final rule. Similar
results for other vehicles, speeds and cant deficiencies, and defect
wavelengths were created and reviewed. The track geometry limits for
the combined perturbations (solid line) were developed following
consideration of all of these results. Figure 1 displays how one
example case compares with these track geometry limits. As shown, the
combined perturbation limits address the most severe combination
conditions, though for computational simplicity and implementation
purposes, they do not attempt to control all possible combinations. The
figure shows that without the addition of the combined defect limits in
the upper right and lower left quadrants, which effectively limit track
geometry in the up-and-in and down-and-out cases, the single-defect
limits would otherwise permit conditions that could cause the VTI
safety criteria to be exceeded. For many of these high-speed and high
cant deficiency conditions, the net axle lateral force safety criterion
was found to be the limiting safety condition.
    Figure 2 depicts an example summarizing the modeling results of the
Acela power car on Class 7 track at 130 m.p.h. and 9 inches of cant
deficiency over isolated track alinement defects having 124-foot
wavelengths. Each vertical bar represents the amplitude of the largest
alinement perturbation that will not cause an exceedance of one of the
VTI safety criteria. Similar results for other vehicles, speeds and
cant deficiencies, and defect wavelengths were created and reviewed. In
addition, similar results for this range of analysis parameters
(vehicles, speeds and cant deficiencies, and defect wavelengths) were
created and reviewed using isolated, surface geometry defects. These
example results show that, with two exceptions, the geometry limits in
the 1998 Track Safety Standards have sufficiently protected against
such exceedances under the modeled conditions. Specifically, the VTI
limits for net axle lateral force and peak-to-peak carbody lateral
acceleration were exceeded on track at the 124-foot, mid-chord offset
(MCO) limit for alinement. The modeling showed this limit to be set too
permissively for high cant deficiency operations. Consequently, FRA
proposed to tighten this alinement limit from 1.25 inches to 1.0 inch
for Class 7 track operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency to
prevent unsafe vehicle dynamic response. FRA has adopted this proposal
in this final rule.
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR13MR13.004

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR13MR13.005

    As specified in this final rule, simulations using computer models
are now required during the vehicle qualification process as an
important tool for the assessment of vehicle performance. These
simulations are intended not only to augment on-track, instrumented
performance assessments but also to provide a means for identifying
vehicle dynamic performance issues prior to service to validate the
suitability of a vehicle design for operation over its intended route.
In order to evaluate safety performance as part of the vehicle
qualification process, simulations are required using both a measured
track geometry segment representative of the full route, and an
analytically defined track segment containing geometry perturbations
representative of minimally compliant track conditions for the
respective track class--Minimally Compliant Analytical Track (or MCAT).
MCAT is intended to be used to qualify both new vehicles for operation
and vehicles previously qualified (on other routes) for operation over
new routes. MCAT consists of nine sections; each section is designed to
test a vehicle's performance in response to a specific type of
perturbation (hunting perturbation, gage narrowing, gage widening,
repeated and single surface perturbations, repeated and single
alinement perturbations, short warp, and combined down-and-out
perturbations). Typical simulation parameters (that vary) include:
Speed, cant deficiency, gage, and wheel profile. Figure 3 depicts time
traces of the percent of wheel unloading for the Acela coach in a
simulated run over MCAT segments for analyzing high cant deficiency
curving performance at 160 m.p.h. In this example the most severe
response occurs over the warp segment of track. At 9 inches of cant
deficiency and a speed of 160 m.p.h., vehicle response exceeds the
permitted limit for a wheel to unload to less than 15 percent of its
static vertical wheel load for 5 or more continuous feet, as provided
in table of VTI safety limits in Sec.  213.333. Please see the Section-
by-Section Analysis for a further discussion of MCAT.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR13MR13.006

V. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions

    As noted above, FRA received written comments in response to the
NPRM from a number of interested parties. Most of the comments are
discussed in the Section-by-Section Analysis or in the Regulatory
Impact and Notices portion of this final rule directly with the
provisions and statements to which they specifically relate. Other
comments apply more generally to the final rule as a whole, and FRA is
discussing them here. Please note that the order in which the comments
are discussed in this document, whether by issue or by commenter, is
not intended to reflect the significance of the comment raised or the
standing of the commenter.

A. EU and SNCF Comments on Track Geometry Standards

    FRA received comments from both the EU and SNCF expressing concerns
that, in general, the proposed revisions to the Track Safety Standards
would permit significantly larger track geometry variations than
equivalent European limits. According to these commenters, such larger
track geometry variations could compromise the safety of high-speed
operations or have an impact on the achievable comfort values in high-
speed service, or both.
    FRA's track geometry standards are safety standards and specify
minimum safety requirements (i.e., maximum allowable track geometry
variations that do not compromise safety). The standards do not address
ride comfort, except to the extent that they inherently provide a level
of ride comfort as well. However, FRA encourages and expects railroads
to adopt their own internal, stricter track maintenance policies to
address other concerns such as ride comfort. Thus, FRA expects that a
high-speed rail system should normally operate well within the maximum
allowable track geometry safety limits.
    As discussed above, to establish the safety limits proposed in the
NPRM, FRA conducted a set of engineering and vehicle/track dynamic
interaction simulation studies, using a range of representative
vehicles (i.e., not developed for a particular vehicle type) to
identify specific track geometry limits that would provide for safety
in the envisioned speed ranges. These studies modeled the effects of
specific track geometry variations (consisting of a full range of
wavelengths likely to affect vehicle dynamics) on the safe response of
the candidate vehicles. In addition, comparisons were made between the
proposed limits derived from these modeling results and the track
geometry limits used by SNCF, to assess their validity. These
comparisons were made for track Classes 6 through 9.
    FRA sought clarification from SNCF on its comments on the NPRM, as
noted above. FRA prepared a brief presentation outlining the general
approach it followed in proposing the NPRM's safety limits, using the
Class 9 limits as a specific example. This presentation was sent to
SNCF along with three questions related to track geometry and safety
criteria currently in use in the French high-speed rail network. These
questions were intended to clarify FRA's understanding of SNCF's
practices (recognizing that both the track geometry standards used by
SNCF, as well as the measurements and calculations used to evaluate
compliance with its standards, are implemented in a manner different
from FRA's standards) and gather any specific information SNCF has to
indicate the need for track geometry limits stricter than those
proposed in the NPRM.
    Having considered the comments and supplemental response, FRA
continues to believe that the approach taken in this rulemaking sets
appropriate track geometry limits and safely accounts for vehicle
behavior in response to track geometry conditions. Based on the
information available to FRA, FRA does not find that more stringent
track geometry limits are necessary for the purposes of safety. In this
regard, SNCF's supplemental response noted inconsistencies with FRA's
initial understanding of SNCF limits which, when taken into account,
indicate that FRA's geometry limits actually provide tighter controls
on alignment variations. Moreover, SNCF stated that it was about to
start research to integrate vehicle dynamics more fully into its own
track geometry limits, and expressed interest in SNCF and FRA combining
their experience to share information and examine issues together. FRA
welcomes the opportunity for such cooperation and a dialogue with SCNF
is ongoing.

B. Wheel Unloading From Wind on Superelevated Curves

    Several comments were raised on FRA's proposal in Sec. Sec.
213.57(b) and 213.329(b) of the NPRM that all vehicles requiring
qualification of the vehicle/track system under Sec.  213.345
demonstrate that when stopped on a curve having a maximum uniform
elevation of 7 inches, no wheel unloads to a value less than 50 percent
of its static weight on level track. This proposed modification to the
1998 Track Safety Standards was intended to address potential vehicle
rollover and passenger safety issues from side-wind loading should a
vehicle be stopped or traveling at very low speeds on highly
superelevated curves, helping to prevent complete unloading of the
wheels on the high (elevated) rail and incipient rollover.
    In commenting on this proposal, Bombardier raised concern that only
vehicles seeking qualification under Sec.  213.345 would be subject to
the proposed requirement, even though the underlying safety issue
relates to all vehicle types operating at any speed and any cant
deficiency--not just vehicles seeking qualification under Sec.
213.345. Bombardier stated that a similar provision then contained in
Sec. Sec.  213.57 and 213.329 had been proposed to be removed for this
reason. Bombardier also raised concern as to the effect the proposal
would have on existing, qualified multi-level passenger equipment.
Amtrak commented that only high-speed equipment would in effect be
subject to the proposal, and yet the proposal had not been justified
for any equipment, be it high-speed, conventional, or freight. NCDOT
also commented that if rollover from side-wind loading when stopped on
a superelevated curve is a safety issue, then the proposal should apply
to either all vehicles, regardless of operating speed or cant
deficiency, or none. Like Bombardier, NCDOT noted concern that the
proposal could affect the procurement and qualification of bi-level
passenger equipment.
    After extensive discussion within the Task Force in response to
these comments, FRA has decided not to adopt the proposal. The proposal
would have effectively superseded the requirements in Sec. Sec.  213.57
and 213.329 for vehicles seeking qualification under Sec.  213.345, in
that, for a vehicle stopped or traveling at very low speeds on a highly
superelevated curve, it would have lowered the 60-percent unloading
limit to 50 percent, since dynamic effects on wheel unloading would not
be a factor, and would have eliminated the 8.6-degree roll requirement
for this stationary condition. However, FRA is not aware of passenger
rail equipment currently in service in the United States that would not
have met the proposal, and the proposal was therefore principally
intended to ensure that new passenger rail equipment designs for high-
speed or high cant deficiency operation would continue to address this
wheel unloading concern. In this regard, FRA had suggested in the Task
Force to limit the proposal only to new passenger cars--focusing the
provisions on new passenger cars (or new passenger car types),
particularly those with higher centers of gravity, to ensure that they
do not excessively unload from wind when stationary on highly
superelevated curves. Nevertheless, the Task Force could not reach
agreement on criteria by which to evaluate such excessive unloading.
FRA understood from the Task Force that the same criteria may not be
appropriate for all railroads and would depend on specific operating
characteristics and the operating environment (e.g, the criteria should
account for the fact that the risk is higher in high-wind regions).
Ultimately, the Task Force did not believe it necessary to specify a
general FRA standard by which to determine whether the equipment poses
a rollover-risk due to wind loading when stationary on a superelevated
curve.
    FRA does make clear in this final rule that for all equipment
operating at cant deficiencies above 3 inches, Sec. Sec.  213.57(d) and
213.329(d) continue to require that when positioned on track with a
uniform superelevation equal to the proposed cant deficiency, no wheel
of the vehicle may unload to a value less than 60 percent of its static
value on perfectly level track. This 60-percent limit retains an
allowance for the effects of wind loading on the risk of equipment
rollover at the proposed cant deficiency. Please see the discussion of
Sec. Sec.  213.57(d) and 213.329(d) in the Section-by-Section Analysis,
below. Nonetheless, FRA notes that the underlying safety issue of
equipment rollover from wind loading when stationary on a superelevated
curve is not otherwise addressed in the regulations. Consequently, in
the absence of a specific Federal standard, FRA expects that each
railroad will identify appropriate safety criteria by which to evaluate
the risk of equipment rollover from wind loading when stationary on a
superelevated curve, and then make the determination that the risk has
been safely addressed using those criteria.

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 213, Track Safety Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 213.1 Scope of Part
    This section was amended in the 1998 Track Safety Standards final
rule to distinguish the applicability of subpart G from that of
subparts A through F, as a result of subpart G's addition to this part
by that final rule. Subpart G applies to track over which trains
operate at speeds exceeding those permitted for Class 5 track, which
supports maximum speeds of 80 m.p.h. for freight trains and 90 m.p.h.
for passenger trains. Subpart G was intended to be comprehensive, so
that a railroad operating at speeds above Class 5 maximum speeds may
refer to subpart G for all of the substantive track safety requirements
for high-speed rail and need refer to the sections of the Track Safety
Standards applicable to lower-speed operations only for general
provisions, i.e., Sec.  213.1 (Scope), Sec.  213.3 (Application), and
Sec.  213.15 (Penalties). At the same time, railroads that do not
operate at speeds in excess of the maximum Class 5 speeds need not
directly refer to subpart G at all.
    FRA is maintaining this general structure of part 213 for ease of
use, and the requirements of subpart G continue not to apply directly
to operations at Class 1 through 5 track speeds. However, in adding new
requirements governing high cant deficiency operations for track
Classes 1 through 5, certain sections of subparts C and D refer
railroads operating at those high cant deficiencies to specific
sections of subpart G. In such circumstances, only the specifically-
referenced section(s) of subpart G apply, and only as provided. As
discussed in this Section-by-Section Analysis, below, the addition of
requirements for high cant deficiency operations over lower-speed track
classes in this final rule permits railroads to operate at higher cant
deficiencies over these track classes without requiring a waiver. Prior
to this change in the regulation, railroads had to petition FRA for
approval by waiver to operate at the higher cant deficiencies over the
lower-speed track classes.
    FRA believes that the approach in this rulemaking minimizes the
addition of detailed requirements for high cant deficiency operations
in subparts C and D. Moreover, with one exception noted below, FRA has
not found it necessary to amend this section on the scope of this part,
because only certain requirements of subpart G apply to lower-speed
track classes and only indirectly for high cant deficiency

operations by cross-referencing the requirements. FRA believes that
this approach is consistent with the organization of this part; for
example, the 1998 Track Safety Standards final rule revised Sec.
213.57 to reference subpart G for when a track owner or railroad
operating above Class 5 track speeds requests approval to operate at
greater than 4 inches of cant deficiency on curves in Class 1 through 5
track contiguous to the high-speed track. See 63 FR 33992, 34033.
    In the NPRM, FRA invited both comment on the proposal and
suggestions for any alternative approach for maintaining the ease of
use of this part, including whether the subpart headings should be
modified to make their application clearer to the rail operations they
address, and, if so, in what way(s). FRA did receive a comment from the
AAR suggesting that the phrase ``Except as provided in section
213.65,'' be added at the beginning of the second sentence in paragraph
(a) of this section. The AAR noted that the second sentence in
paragraph (a) provided that the requirements in part 213 apply to
specific track conditions ``in isolation,'' while this rulemaking is
adding new Sec.  213.65 to address ``combined'' track alinement and
surface deviations. Therefore, the AAR recommended adding the
introductory text to make Sec.  213.1 consistent with new Sec.  213.65.
    This final rule adopts the AAR's recommendation to make this
section consistent with the changes to this part. Yet, in this regard,
more than Sec.  213.65 is being added that addresses conditions
existing in combination. For example, Sec.  213.332 is also being added
in subpart G to address combined track alinement and surface deviations
for the higher-speed track classes, and the MCAT qualification
requirements in new Appendix D address ``combined perturbation.'' As a
result, the final rule modifies paragraph (a) by adding the
introductory words ``In general'' at the beginning of the second
sentence. While the requirements in this part do apply, in general, to
track conditions existing in isolation, the provisions discussed above
are not focused exclusively on track conditions in isolation, and this
modification preserves flexibility for encompassing these and other
similar provisions without specifically enumerating them. The Task
Force, including the AAR, concurred with this modification to the final
rule.
    As a separate matter, FRA noted that it was not proposing to revise
and re-issue the Track Safety Standards in full, as was done in the
1998 final rule. Instead, FRA is amending only certain portions of the
Track Safety Standards. Therefore, FRA explained in the NPRM that this
final rule needs to ensure that both the new and revised sections
appropriately integrate with those sections of this part that are not
amended, and that appropriate time is provided to phase-in the new and
amended sections. FRA noted that, in general, the Task Force
recommended that both new and revised sections become applicable one
year after the date the final rule is published, to allow the track
owner or operating railroad, or both, sufficient time to prepare for
and adjust to meeting the new requirements. Examples of such
adjustments may include changes to operating, inspection, or
maintenance practices, such as for compliance with Sec. Sec.  213.57,
213.329, 213.332, 213.333 and 213.345, as amended.
    FRA also explained that it was considering providing the track
owner or operating railroad the option of electing to comply sooner
with the new and amended requirements, upon written notification to
FRA. FRA noted that such a request for earlier application of the new
and amended requirements would indicate the track owner's or railroad's
readiness and ability to comply with all of the new and amended
requirements--not just certain of those requirements. Because of the
interrelationship of the amendments, FRA believes that virtually all of
them need to apply simultaneously to maintain their integrity. FRA
invited comment on formalizing this approach for this final rule;
however, no specific comment was received.
    In preparing the final rule, FRA decided that the more appropriate
way to implement the rule's requirements is to make the rule effective
120 days after its publication, rather than generally make the
revisions applicable one year after publication. While FRA did note in
the NPRM that it intended the final rule to become effective 60 days
after its publication, FRA also explained that since there cannot be
two different sections of the same CFR unit in effect under the same
section heading, a temporary appendix was being considered to separate
revised sections from their former provisions to allow for continued
compliance with those former sections for a track owner or railroad not
electing to comply sooner with all of the revised sections of part 213.
By lengthening the effective date of the final rule so that all of the
changes go into effect simultaneously but at a later time, the rule is
clearer and provides additional time in which to make preparations for
complying with the new requirements. FRA has further considered the
preparations that may be necessary, including changes to operating,
inspection, and maintenance practices, and believes that they can be
completed (and implemented) within this period. In particular, FRA
believes that it should take no more than a month of labor hours to
prepare all of a railroad's automated, vehicle-based inspection systems
and software to measure and process the necessary parameters to
determine compliance with this rule, based on the relatively limited
changes to the existing safety limits and the number of new parameters
that must be calculated. FRA also notes that the 1998 Track Safety
Standards final rule took effect 90 days after its publication, see 63
FR 33991-33992, although certain provisions were made applicable at a
later date.
Section 213.7 Designation of Qualified Persons to Supervise Certain
Renewals and Inspect Track
    This section recognizes that work on or about a track structure
supporting heavy freight trains or passenger operations, or both,
demands the highest awareness of employees of the need to perform their
work properly. At the same time, the wording of this section has
literally required that each individual designated to perform such work
know and understand the requirements of this part, detect deviations
from those requirements, and prescribe appropriate remedial action to
correct or safely compensate for those deviations, regardless whether
that knowledge, understanding, and ability with respect to all of this
part were necessary for that individual to perform his or her duties.
While qualified persons designated under this section have not been
directly required to know, understand, or apply requirements applicable
only to higher-speed track classes in subpart G (pursuant to Sec.
213.1(b)), the addition of vehicle qualification and testing
requirements for high cant deficiency operations in lower-speed track
classes, in particular, adds a level of complexity that may be outside
the purview of track foremen and inspectors in fulfilling their duties.
    As a result, the Task Force recommended and FRA agrees that this
rule add text clarifying that the requirements for a person to be
qualified under this section concern those portions of this part
necessary for the performance of that person's duties. This section
continues to require that a person designated under it possess the
knowledge, understanding, and ability necessary to supervise the
restoration and renewal of track, or to perform

inspections of track, or both, for which he or she is responsible. Yet,
adding the text makes clear that the person is not required to know or
understand specific requirements of this part not necessary to the
fulfillment of that person's duties. In this regard, the AAR commented
that these changes are particularly needed in light of the adoption of
high cant deficiency requirements in this final rule. FRA does not
believe that safety will be in any way diminished by these changes, and
they were supported by the Task Force.
Section 213.14 Application of Requirements to Curved Track
    This is a new section that is being added to help define the
application of requirements for curved track, following publication of
and comment on the NPRM. Rather than define what is meant by curved
track in each section where requirements for curved track appear, FRA
believes it more appropriate to provide the definition here for all of
part 213. This new section states that, unless otherwise provided in
this part, requirements specified for curved track apply only to track
having a curvature greater than 0.25 degree. This definition is
intended to apply in all sections where limits for curved track are
specified, unless otherwise provided.
    As further explanation, in its comments on the NPRM Bombardier
observed that the track geometry alinement limits proposed in Sec.
213.55(b) were those recommended by the Task Force, except for what was
proposed as footnote 5--i.e., that curved track limits be applied only
when track curvature is greater than 0.25 degree. See 75 FR 25957.
Bombardier stated that this proposed footnote was not included in the
rule text recommended by the Task Force and that FRA did not provide a
technical justification for its inclusion in the proposed rule.
Bombardier believed that this proposed footnote would only be
applicable at very high speeds and would therefore be irrelevant.
Consequently, Bombardier recommended the proposed footnote's deletion
in Sec.  213.55(b), as well as in the following sections regarding
application of curved track limits: Sec. Sec.  213.63(b), 213.327(b)
and (c), and 213.331(a) and (b).
    In discussing the proposed footnote with the Task Force, the Task
Force recognized that the primary intent was to provide a definitive
demarcation of curved track from tangent track so that track inspectors
and automated track geometry measurement systems can properly apply the
more stringent track geometry limits required for high cant deficiency
operation in track Classes 1 through 5. Continuing with the example of
Sec.  213.55, should track curvature be no greater than 0.25 degree,
the limits in Sec.  213.55(a) for tangent track apply. For practical
consideration in the way curvature is determined, and based on dynamic
simulations of VTI performance by and experience with Acela trainsets
on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor, a 0.25-degree (15-minute) curvature was
chosen as this demarcation. This same reasoning applies to the
inclusion of this provision for the proper application of track
geometry limits not only in Sec.  213.55, but also in Sec. Sec.
213.63, 213.327 and 213.331, as specifically cited by Bombardier.
Therefore, the Task Force recommended applying this provision to each
of these sections.
    Additionally, in preparing the final rule FRA noted that since
curved track limits apply elsewhere in this part, whether or not high
cant deficiency operations are conducted over the track, this provision
for determining when to apply curved track limits could apply to those
sections as well. FRA examined all of part 213 and found it appropriate
to apply this provision generally throughout the entirety of the part,
unless otherwise specified. The Task Force concurred with this
addition, but nevertheless recommended that FRA restate this section in
subpart G to make clear that it applies together with the other
provisions governing the high-speed track classes. FRA has therefore
added an identical provision in subpart G; please see the discussion of
Sec.  213.313. FRA believes that these new sections will help to ensure
that curved track limits are applied in a uniform and proper manner.
Subpart C--Track Geometry
Section 213.55--Track Alinement
    This section specifies the maximum alinement deviations allowed for
tangent and curved track in Classes 1 through 5. Alinement is the
localized variation in curvature of each rail. On tangent track, the
intended curvature is zero, and thus the alinement is measured as the
variation or deviation from zero. In a curve, the alinement is measured
as the variation or deviation from the ``uniform'' alinement over a
specified distance. As proposed, the section heading has been modified
so that it reads ``Track alinement,'' instead of ``Alinement,'' for
clarity.
    The former track alinement limits in this section have been
redesignated as paragraph (a) and remain unchanged. Paragraph (b) has
been added as a new provision containing tighter, single-deviation
geometry limits for operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency on
curved track, and includes both 31-foot and 62-foot MCO limits. These
limits are based on the results of simulation studies to determine the
safe amplitudes of track geometry alinement variations. See Technical
Background, Section IV.B, above. FRA believes that adding the track
geometry limits in paragraph (b) is necessary to provide an equivalent
margin of safety for operations at higher cant deficiency. FRA also
notes that, as proposed, the requirements for track Classes 1 and 2 in
paragraph (b) reference footnote 2 of paragraph (b), which provides
that restraining rails or other systems may be required for derailment
prevention.
    As provided in Sec.  213.14, limits for curved track in paragraph
(b) apply only to track having a curvature greater than 0.25 degree.
Consequently, it is unnecessary to add proposed footnote 5, which would
have contained the same instruction. Please see Sec.  213.14 for a full
discussion of the application of curved track limits.
Section 213.57 Curves; Elevation and Speed Limitations
    This final rule makes substantial changes to this section, which
specifies the requirements for safe curving speeds in track Classes 1
through 5. Notably, changes have been made to the qualification
requirements and approval procedures for vehicles intended to operate
at more than 3 inches of cant deficiency. For consistency with the
higher speed standards in subpart G, cant deficiency is no longer
limited to a maximum of 4 inches in track Classes 1 through 5. Prior to
this change, this section specified qualification requirements for
vehicles intended to operate only up to 4 inches of cant deficiency on
track Classes 1 through 5 unless the track was contiguous to a higher-
speed track. Consequently, vehicles intended to operate at more than 4
inches of cant deficiency on routes not contiguous to a higher-speed
track were only permitted to operate under a waiver in accordance with
part 211 of this chapter. This section now includes procedures for such
vehicles to operate safely at higher cant deficiencies without the
necessity of obtaining a waiver.
    Both portions of paragraph (a) are revised; the first portion is
revised as proposed without any comment. The maximum elevation of the
outside rail of a curve may not be more than 8 inches on track Classes
1 and 2, and 7 inches on track Classes 3 through 5. Formerly, the
provision had been stated in terms of the maximum crosslevel of

the outside rail, with the same limits. As crosslevel is a function of
elevation differences between two rails, and is specifically addressed
by other provisions of this rule, specifically Sec.  213.63, this
clarification is intended to focus the provision on the maximum
allowable elevation of a single rail.
    Numerous comments were received on FRA's proposal concerning the
second portion of paragraph (a), however, to restrict configuring track
so that the outside rail of a curve is designed to be lower than the
inside rail while allowing for a deviation up to the limits provided in
Sec.  213.63. In issuing the NPRM, FRA noted that the Task Force had
recommended removing this portion of paragraph (a), which formerly
stated that ``[e]xcept as provided in Sec.  213.63, the outside rail of
a curve may not be lower than the inside rail.'' Concern had been
raised in the Task Force that this statement potentially conflicted
with the limits in Sec.  213.63 for ``the deviation from * * * reverse
crosslevel elevation on curves.'' Nonetheless, FRA had believed that
these provisions complemented each other--rather than conflict--
addressing both the designed layout of a curve and deviations from that
layout through actual use. In the NPRM, FRA stated that the requirement
in paragraph (a) was intended to be a design restriction against
configuring track so that the outside rail of a curve is lower than the
inside rail, while the limits at issue in Sec.  213.63 were to govern
local deviations from uniform elevation--i.e., from the designed
elevation--that occur as a result of changes in conditions. However, as
discussed below, FRA recognizes that its proposal should have been more
complete, and FRA is modifying the final rule based on the comments
received.
    In commenting on the NPRM, SEPTA noted that there are at least two
situations when it is desirable to incorporate minimal reverse
elevation by design: (1) In grade crossings in which the roadway
profile is opposed to the desired track elevation; and (2) in special
trackwork where a turnout may be located in a slight curve which is
opposite the turnout curve. SEPTA stated that in these situations
incorporating reverse elevation may be desired to minimize the
potential highway hazard in a grade crossing and properly accommodate
connections to sidings and other facilities. Accordingly, SEPTA
believed that criteria should be developed to permit a minimal amount
of reverse superelevation by design.
    NJ Transit also commented that the proposal would impact a
significant number of switches in its system where reverse elevation
has been designed into curves. Specifically, NJ Transit cited switches
in interlockings at several junctions such as its Roseville Avenue
Interlocking, potentially impacting 65 daily trains destined to and
from the Montclair Line; Amtrak's Hunter Interlocking, potentially
impacting 53 daily NJ Transit trains destined to and from the Raritan
Valley Line; its Far Hills Interlocking, potentially impacting 49 daily
NJ Transit Gladstone Line trains; and other possible locations at
junctions on the Northeast Corridor that would be potentially impacted.
NJ Transit believed that future interlocking reconfigurations could
also be affected if the physical characteristics preclude even the
temporary location of a turnout in a curve that might involve reverse
elevation, and therefore requested that the proposal not be adopted.
    Likewise, Amtrak objected to the proposal, believing that it would
represent a fundamental restructuring of basic track design and
geometry tenets and that implementation of the proposed language would
have enormous consequences for rail service (both passenger and
freight) on the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak noted that there are more
than 77 locations on the Northeast Corridor between Washington, Boston,
and Harrisburg where reverse elevation exists in track by design.
According to Amtrak, in the majority of these locations, the design has
been in service for more than 100 years without causing any safety
issues. Amtrak raised concern that compliance with the rule as proposed
would engender myriad problems, such as forcing it to take large
sections of the Northeast Corridor out of service that contain curves
with reverse elevation by design. Amtrak cited the example of the River
Interlocking north of Baltimore that would need to be taken out of
service, inhibiting the Norfolk Southern Railway Company's access to
the Port of Baltimore. Amtrak stated that reconstructing some or all of
the existing reverse-elevated curves would be a massive, time-consuming
and prohibitively expensive undertaking that would take years to
implement and cost in excess of $200 million.
    The AAR also objected to the proposal, believing that it resulted
from a misunderstanding as to when it is appropriate for the outside
rail to be lower than the inside rail (for track Classes 5 and below).
The AAR noted that there are times when, by design, the outside rail
must be lower than the inside rail. For example, the AAR cited that at
thousands of mainline locations the outside rail is lower than the
inside rail where turnouts come off the outsides of superelevated
curves. According to the AAR, there is no realistic alternative to such
designs, and they have been used for over a century. The AAR also cited
the use of reverse superelevation on industrial or other tracks where
there is a hard pull around sharp curves and reverse elevation is used
to prevent ``stringlining'' derailments. The AAR maintained that FRA
incorrectly asserted in the NPRM that Sec.  213.63 is intended to
address only those changes that occur ``through actual use,'' stating
that Sec.  213.63 clearly is intended to address situations, as
discussed above, that occur at the design stage as well. Nor did the
AAR believe there to be a conflict between Sec. Sec.  213.57(a) and
213.63. The AAR stated that Sec.  213.57(a) addresses the general rule
that the outside of the rail may not be lower than the inside of the
rail, while Sec.  213.63 addresses situations where the general rule
does not apply. Noting that the proposed change was not part of the
Task Force's consensus on the proposed rule, the AAR recommended that
FRA either delete the second sentence in paragraph (a) or retain the
original wording in the regulation.
    After considering the comments on the proposal and discussing them
with the Task Force, FRA is modifying the rule to state that the
outside rail of a curve may not be lower than the inside rail by
design, except when engineered to address specific track or operating
conditions, and that the limits in Sec.  213.63 apply in all cases. FRA
continues to believe that the former rule text could give the mistaken
impression that it is appropriate to design reverse elevation into
curves as the nominal condition for all curves. Nonetheless, FRA
appreciates the comments raised, noting that reverse elevation is
designed into certain curves both out of necessity and for safety
reasons. FRA did not intend its proposal to nullify such engineering
design. As modified, the rule text addresses both the concerns raised
by FRA and those raised by the commenters, and the Task Force concurred
with the revision.
    As explained in the discussion of specific comments and conclusions
section of the preamble, above, what was proposed as paragraph (b) is
not included in this final rule. Please see Wheel Unloading from Wind
on Superelevated Curves, Section V.B., for an explanation of FRA's
treatment of that proposal, as well as of paragraph (d), below.
Instead, what was proposed as paragraph (c) is designated as paragraph
(b) in this final rule.
    As proposed, the Vmax formula in paragraph (b)
determines the maximum

allowable posted timetable operating speed for curved track based on
the qualified cant deficiency (inches of unbalance), Eu, for
the vehicle type. This final rule also amends paragraph (b) to
reference a new footnote 2 to permit the vehicle type to operate at the
cant deficiency for which it is approved, Eu, plus 1 inch,
if the actual elevation of the outside rail, Ea, and the
degree of track curvature, D, change as a result of track degradation.
As modified, this paragraph is intended to provide a tolerance to
account for the effects of local crosslevel or curvature conditions on
Vmax that may result in the actual cant deficiency exceeding
the cant deficiency approved for the equipment, i.e., the actual
operating speed may exceed the maximum allowable posted timetable
operating speed. Without this tolerance, these track conditions could
generate a limiting speed exception, and some railroads have adopted
the approach of reducing the cant deficiency of the vehicle in order to
avoid these exceptions. FRA believes that this 1-inch tolerance is
supported by operational experience and complemented by related
standards acting to mitigate safety concerns. For instance, the
Vmax formula is not intended to replace FRA's track geometry
limits, which more clearly focus on individual track irregularities
with shorter wavelengths. These track geometry limits apply
independently and act independently to limit the maximum allowable
speed for a track segment based on the condition of the track.
    FRA noted in the NPRM that it was the consensus of the Task Force
to clarify footnote 1 to state, in part, that actual elevation,
Ea, for each 155-foot track segment in the body of a curve
is determined by averaging the elevation for 11 points through the
segment at 15.5-foot spacing--instead of for 10 points, as was stated
in the original footnote. FRA explained that the Track Safety Standards
Compliance Manual (Compliance Manual) provides that the ``actual
elevation and curvature to be used in the [Vmax] formula are
determined by averaging the elevation and curvature for 10 points,
including the point of concern for a total of 11, through the segment
at 15.5-[foot] station spacing.'' See the guidance on Sec.  213.57
provided in Chapter 5 of the Manual, which is available on FRA's Web
site (www.fra.dot.gov). FRA therefore believes that this clarification
to footnote 1 makes the footnote more consistent with the manner in
which the rule is intended to be applied.
    In its comments on the NPRM, the AAR believed that FRA departed
from the RSAC consensus in proposing to change the way elevation is
calculated. Further, the AAR did not find persuasive FRA's reliance on
the Compliance Manual as a justification for changing the requirement,
stating that the Compliance Manual is inconsistent with the rule text.
In discussing these comments with the Task Force, the Task Force agreed
that the proposed footnote be adopted in the final rule. While FRA
stated in the NPRM that it was the consensus of the Task Force to
clarify footnote 1, FRA recognizes that there was no such explicit
consensus, as the AAR noted. Nevertheless, FRA believes that this
clarification to footnote 1 does make the footnote more consistent with
the manner in which the rule is intended to be applied, and it is not
intended to add any requirement. In calculating elevation, 10
measurements are taken from the point of concern--5 on each side--so
that 11 points are actually averaged, given that the point of concern
is included in the calculated average. The AAR did not oppose adoption
of this clarification after the Task Force discussion.
    Former footnote 2 has been redesignated as footnote 3 without
substantive change.
    Paragraph (c), proposed as paragraph (d) in the NPRM, provides that
all vehicle types are considered qualified for up to 3 inches of cant
deficiency, as allowed by the former rule.
    Paragraph (d), proposed as paragraph (e) in the NPRM, is being
modified to specify the requirements for vehicle qualification over
track with more than 3 inches of cant deficiency. Prior to this
modification, ``static lean'' qualification requirements were specified
for vehicles intended to operate up to an allowable 4 inches of cant
deficiency on track Classes 1 through 5. These requirements limited the
carbody roll to 5.7 degrees with respect to the horizontal when the
vehicle was standing on track with 4 inches of superelevation, and
limited the vertical wheel load remaining on the raised wheels to no
less than 60 percent of their static level values and carbody roll to
no more than 8.6 degrees with respect to the horizontal when the
vehicle was standing (stationary) on track with 6 inches of
superelevation. In the final rule, cant deficiency is no longer limited
to a maximum of 4 inches in track Classes 1 through 5. The revised
requirements, consistent with the higher-speed standards in Sec.
213.329, limit the vertical wheel load remaining on the raised wheels
to no less than 60 percent of their static level values and limit
carbody roll for passenger cars to no more than 8.6 degrees with
respect to the horizontal when the vehicle is standing (stationary) on
track with a uniform superelevation equal to the proposed cant
deficiency. Consequently, the rule no longer imposes a 6-inch
superelevation static lean requirement generally; rather, the amount of
superelevation is dependent on the proposed cant deficiency. For
example, if the proposed cant deficiency is 5 inches, the
superelevation used for demonstrating compliance with this paragraph is
also 5 inches.
    The requirements in paragraph (d) may be met by either static or
dynamic testing. In either case, the vehicle type must be tested in a
ready-for-service condition. In consultation with the Task Force, FRA
is clarifying that the vehicle type be tested in a ready-for-service
condition, i.e., in the same vehicle/track performance condition in
which it would be in passenger service. At the same time, FRA is
clarifying paragraph (e), below, so that the load condition under which
testing is performed is included in the description of the test
procedure. For example, the vehicle type may or may not be loaded to
simulate passengers on board, and this information would be necessary
for a complete evaluation of the vehicle's performance.
    As noted, the static lean test limits the vertical wheel load
remaining on the raised wheels to no less than 60 percent of their
static level values and limits the roll of a passenger carbody to 8.6
degrees with respect to the horizontal, when the vehicle is standing on
track with superelevation equal to the proposed cant deficiency. The
dynamic test limits the steady-state vertical wheel load remaining on
the low rail wheels to no less than 60 percent of their static level
values and limits the lateral acceleration in a passenger car to 0.15g
steady-state, when the vehicle operates through a curve at the proposed
cant deficiency. (Please note that steady-state, carbody lateral
acceleration, i.e., the tangential force pulling passengers to one side
of the carbody when traveling through a curve at higher than the
balance speed, should not be confused with sustained, carbody lateral
oscillatory accelerations, i.e., continuous side-to-side oscillations
of the carbody in response to track conditions, whether on curved or
tangent track.) This 0.15g steady-state lateral acceleration limit in
the dynamic test is intended to provide consistency with the 8.6-degree
roll limit in the static lean test, in that it corresponds to the
lateral acceleration a passenger would experience in a standing vehicle
whose carbody is at a roll angle of 8.6 degrees with respect to the
horizontal. The former 5.7-degree roll limit, which

limited steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration to 0.1g, has been
removed.
    Measurements and supplemental research have indicated that a
steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit of 0.15g is considered
to be the maximum, steady-state lateral acceleration above which jolts
from vehicle dynamic response to track deviations can present a hazard
to passenger safety. While other FRA vehicle/track interaction safety
criteria principally address external safety hazards that may cause a
derailment, such as damage to track structure and other conditions at
the wheel/rail interface, the steady-state, carbody lateral
acceleration limit specifically addresses the safety of the interior
occupant environment. For comparison purposes, it is notable that the
International Union of Railways (UIC) Code 518, Testing and Approval of
Railway Vehicles from the Point of View of Their Dynamic Behaviour--
Safety--Track Fatigue--Ride Quality, Ed. 4 (2009), has adopted a
steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit of 0.15g. FRA does
recognize that making a comparison with such a specific limit in
another body of standards needs to take into account what related
limits are provided in the compared standards and what the nature of
the operating environment is to which the compared standards apply. FRA
therefore invited comment whether such a comparison is appropriate
here--whether, for example, there are enhanced or additional vehicle/
track safety limits that apply to European operations, either through
industry practice or governing standards, or both.
    In their comments on the NPRM, SNCF responded that, concerning
curves and cant deficiency design, the limit of 0.15g for steady-state,
carbody lateral acceleration is justified. SNCF stated that this value
is usually considered a comfort limit for curve design and is the limit
value accepted for passenger cars. SNCF further noted that for freight
cars the accepted limit is 0.13g, and that, in European rules, the
0.15g value corresponds to an exceptional value of cant deficiency,
while the recommended value is about 0.14g.
    FRA notes that increasing the steady-state, carbody lateral
acceleration limit from 0.1g to 0.15g allows for operations at higher
cant deficiency on the basis of acceleration before tilt compensation
is necessary. This increase in cant deficiency without requiring tilt
compensation is larger for a vehicle design whose carbody is less
disposed to roll on its suspension when subjected to an unbalance
force, since carbody roll on curved track has a direct effect on
steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration. For example, a vehicle
having a completely rigid suspension system (S = 0) would have no
carbody roll and could operate without a tilt system at a cant
deficiency as high as 9 inches, at which point the steady-state,
carbody lateral acceleration would be 0.15g, which would correlate to
an 8.6-degree roll angle between the floor and the horizontal when the
vehicle is standing on track with 9 inches of superelevation. The
suspension coefficient ``S'' is the ratio of the roll angle of the
carbody on its suspension (measured relative to the inclination of the
track) to the cant angle of the track (measured relative to the
horizontal) for a stationary vehicle standing on a track with
superelevation. A suspension coefficient of 0 is theoretical but
neither practical nor desirable, because of the need for flexibility in
the suspension system to handle track conditions and provide for
occupant comfort and safety. Assuming that a car has some flexibility
in its suspension system, say S = 0.3, the car could operate without a
tilt system at a cant deficiency as high as approximately 7 inches, at
which point the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration would be
0.15g, which would correlate to an 8.6-degree roll angle between the
floor and the horizontal when the vehicle is standing on track with 7
inches of superelevation. To operate at higher cant deficiencies and
not exceed the limits, the vehicle would need to be equipped with a
tilt system so that the floor actively tilts to compensate for the
forces that would otherwise cause the limits to be exceeded.
    Under the former FRA requirements, using the above examples, a
vehicle having a completely rigid suspension system (S = 0) could
operate without a tilt system at a cant deficiency no higher than 6
inches, at which point the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration
would be 0.1g, which would correlate to a 5.7-degree roll angle between
the floor and the horizontal when the vehicle is standing on track with
6 inches of superelevation. Assuming that a vehicle has some
flexibility in its suspension system, again say S = 0.3, the vehicle
could operate without a tilt system at a cant deficiency no higher than
approximately 4.7 inches, at which point the steady-state, carbody
lateral acceleration would be 0.1g, which would correlate to a 5.7-
degree roll angle between the floor and the horizontal when the vehicle
is standing on track with 4.7 inches of superelevation.
    FRA notes that the less stringent steady-state, carbody lateral
acceleration limit and carbody roll angle limit adopted in this final
rule will minimize both the need to equip vehicles with tilt systems at
higher cant deficiencies and the costs associated with such features,
as well. Moreover, by facilitating higher cant deficiency operations,
savings may also result from shortened trip times. These savings may be
particularly beneficial to passenger operations in emerging high-speed
rail corridors, enabling faster operations through curves.
    Of course, any such savings should not come at the expense of
safety, and FRA has adopted additional track geometry requirements for
operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency, whether or not the
vehicles are equipped with tilt systems. These additional track
geometry requirements were developed to control for undesirable vehicle
response to track conditions that could pose derailment concerns.
Nonetheless, the VTI limits on transient accelerations may need to be
stricter when combined with higher steady-state lateral acceleration,
to address passenger ride safety concerns. Additional research
regarding passenger response to vibration is needed to establish this
relationship and model this effect. While the tighter geometry limits
at high cant deficiency that have been added in this final rule were
not specifically developed to address such concerns, they may help to
control transient, carbody acceleration events that could pose ride
safety concerns for passengers subjected to higher steady-state lateral
accelerations. These additional track geometry requirements apply only
to operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency, where steady-state,
carbody lateral acceleration may approach 0.15g for typical vehicle
designs. In this regard, during Task Force discussions, Amtrak stated
that Amfleet equipment has been operating at up to 5 inches of cant
deficiency (with approximately 0.13g steady-state, carbody lateral
acceleration levels) without resulting in passenger ride safety issues.
FRA is also not aware of any general safety issue involving passengers
losing their balance and falling due specifically to excessive steady-
state, carbody lateral acceleration levels in current operations.
    Nonetheless, a transient carbody acceleration event that poses no
derailment safety concern could very well cause a standing passenger to
lose his or her balance and fall. Although FRA is not aware of much
published data on the effect that transient, carbody acceleration
events have on passenger

ride safety, it is recognized that the presence of steady-state,
carbody lateral acceleration will generally reduce the margin of safety
for standing passengers to withstand transient, lateral acceleration
events and not lose their balance. If such passenger ride safety issues
were more clearly identified, additional track geometry or other limits
could potentially be proposed to address them. However, based on the
information available to the Task Force, the Task Force did not
recommend additional limits to address potential passenger ride safety
concerns that may result from transient, carbody acceleration events
either alone or when combined with steady-state, carbody lateral
acceleration. The Task Force also took into account that, as one of
several modes of transportation offered to the general public, rail
travel need provide a level of passenger comfort to both attract and
retain riders. As a result, the riding characteristics of passenger
rail vehicles should by railroad practice be subject to acceptable
criteria for passenger ride comfort, and such criteria for passenger
ride comfort should be more stringent than those for passenger ride
safety. Nonetheless, to fully inform FRA's decisions in preparing the
final rule, FRA specifically invited public comment on this discussion
in the NPRM and the proposal to set the steady-state, carbody lateral
acceleration limit at 0.15g. FRA requested specific comment on whether
the proposed rule appropriately provided for passenger ride safety, and
if not, requested that the commenters state what additional
requirement(s) should be imposed, if any.
    As noted above, in commenting on the NPRM, SNCF agreed that the
limit of 0.15g for steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration is
justified in that this value is usually considered a comfort limit for
curve design and is the limit value accepted for passenger cars. SNCF
specifically commented that, in European rules, the 0.15g value
corresponds to an exceptional value of cant deficiency, while the
recommended value is about 0.14g. FRA sees no conflict with these
comments; measurements and supplemental research have indicated that a
steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit of 0.15g is considered
to be the maximum, steady-state lateral acceleration above which jolts
from vehicle dynamic response to track deviations can present a hazard
to passenger safety. For the foregoing reasons, FRA has therefore
adopted the proposal in the final rule.
    The changes to this section also separate and clarify the submittal
requirements to FRA to obtain approval for the qualifying cant
deficiency of a vehicle type (paragraph (e)) and to notify FRA prior to
the implementation of the approved higher curving speeds (paragraph
(f)). As discussed above, FRA is clarifying paragraph (e) so that the
load condition under which the testing is performed is included in the
description of the test procedure. Additional clarification in
paragraph (e) has been included for submitting suspension system
maintenance information. The requirement for submitting suspension
system maintenance information applies to vehicle types not subject to
parts 238 or 229 of this chapter, such as a freight car operated in a
freight train, and then only to safety-critical components. Paragraph
(f) also clarifies that in approving the request made pursuant to
paragraph (e), FRA may impose conditions necessary for safely operating
at the higher curving speeds.
    Former footnote 3 is being redesignated as footnote 4 and modified
in conformance with the changes in this final rule. Former footnote 3
reflected that this section previously allowed a maximum of 4 inches of
cant deficiency; hence, the static lean test requirement to raise and
lower the car on one side by 4 inches. Former footnote 3 also specified
a cant excess requirement to raise and lower the car on one side by 6
inches. As proposed, FRA is removing the 4-inch limit on cant
deficiency, and the cant-excess requirement has been addressed, as
explained above. Thus, this footnote, now footnote 4, refers to ``the
proposed cant deficiency'' instead of 4 inches of cant deficiency. FRA
also notes that, as proposed, it has removed the statement in the
former footnote that the ``test procedure may be conducted in a test
facility.'' Testing may of course be conducted in a test facility, but
the statement could cause confusion that testing may be conducted only
in a test facility. No such limitation is intended. Separately, FRA has
slightly modified the footnote from that proposed in the NPRM based on
a concern raised during the Task Force's consideration of the draft
final rule. The test procedure's testing sequence could be wrongly
construed to indicate that the roll angle is measured after the wheels
are lowered; FRA agrees and has corrected this ambiguity.
    Former paragraph (e) is being moved to new paragraph (g), which was
proposed as paragraph (h) in the NPRM. As revised, this paragraph (g)
is identical to two other provisions in this final rule: Sec.
213.329(g)--the subpart G counterpart to this section--and Sec.
213.345(i). Please see the discussion of Sec.  213.345(i), below. The
Task Force agreed that the purpose of these provisions is the same and
therefore recommended that the same text be included. FRA agrees and
has modified the rule accordingly.
    Paragraph (h) was proposed as paragraph (j) in the NPRM to clarify
that vehicle types that have been permitted by FRA to operate at cant
deficiencies, Eu, greater than 3 inches prior to the date of
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register would be
considered qualified under this section to operate at those permitted
cant deficiencies over the previously operated track segments(s).
Consequently, before the vehicle type could operate over another track
segment at such cant deficiencies, FRA proposed that the vehicle be
qualified as provided in this section. FRA made a similar proposal in
Sec.  213.329(i) (now Sec.  213.329(h)).
    In commenting on the NPRM, Amtrak stated the tests proposed in this
section and in Sec.  213.329 for the higher-speed track classes would
be wasteful to repeat because, unlike the tests proposed for Sec.
213.345, the tests proposed here would not have been conducted under
``local'' conditions but rather in a static testing facility having no
connection to the location of the proposed service. Amtrak therefore
wondered what types of conditions FRA believed would be uncovered
during this testing process before permitting the vehicle types to
operate at the same cant deficiencies on other track segments. Amtrak
believed that it would be simply repeating the exact same test on the
exact same car at the exact same test facility, and therefore found it
difficult to find any justification for the proposed limitation.
    FRA discussed the proposal and the comments received with the Task
Force. The Task Force recommended that vehicle types that have been
permitted by FRA to operate at cant deficiencies, Eu,
greater than 3 inches but not exceeding 5 inches be considered
qualified under this section to operate at those permitted cant
deficiencies over all track segments--not only over previously operated
segments. FRA agrees that extending the nature of the qualification in
this way is appropriate given that the requirements of this section are
static or steady-state and do not directly reflect the ``local''
interaction of the vehicle and the track. Paragraph (h)(1) adopts this
recommendation, and FRA makes clear that it applies not only to
previous permission by FRA to operate at these cant deficiencies, but
also prospectively to vehicle types when they are approved

by FRA to operate at these cant deficiencies. Nonetheless, a
requirement has been included in paragraph (h)(1) that written notice
be provided to FRA no less than 30 calendar days prior to the proposed
implementation of such curving speeds on another track segment in
accordance with paragraph (f) of this section. This notice is intended
to identify the new track segment(s) so that FRA is aware of the
proposed operation, can ensure that appropriate permission has been
provided for it, and otherwise administer the requirements of this
rule.
    FRA notes that pursuant to paragraph (i) of this section and Sec.
213.345, Vehicle/track system qualification, dynamic testing is
required when moving a vehicle type to a new track segment for
operation at cant deficiencies exceeding 5 inches. Accordingly,
paragraph (h)(2) makes clear that vehicle types that have been
permitted by FRA to operate at cant deficiencies, Eu,
greater than 5 inches shall be considered qualified under this section
to operate at those permitted cant deficiencies only for the previously
operated or identified track segments(s). Please also see the
discussion regarding Sec.  213.329(h).
    As proposed, paragraph (i) is being added to reference pertinent
sections of subpart G--namely, Sec. Sec.  213.333 and 213.345--that
contain requirements related to operations above 5 inches of cant
deficiency. These sections include requirements for periodic track
geometry measurements, monitoring of carbody acceleration, and vehicle/
track system qualification. Specifically, in Sec.  213.333(c)(1), FRA
has added periodic inspection requirements using a Track Geometry
Measurement System (TGMS) to determine compliance with Sec.  213.53,
Track gage; Sec.  213.55(b), Track alinement; Sec.  213.57, Curves;
elevation and speed limitations; Sec.  213.63, Track surface; and Sec.
213.65, Combined track alinement and surface deviations. In sharper
curves, for which cant deficiency was high but vehicle speeds were
reflective of a lower track class, it was found that stricter track
geometry limits were necessary, for the same track class, in order to
provide an equivalent margin of safety for operations at higher cant
deficiency. As proposed in the NPRM, FRA has also added periodic
monitoring requirements for cardbody accelerations, to determine
compliance with the VTI safety limits in Sec.  213.333. Moreover, the
vehicle/track system qualification requirements in Sec.  213.345 apply
to vehicle types intended to operate at any curving speed producing
more than 5 inches of cant deficiency, and include, as appropriate, a
combination of computer simulations, carbody acceleration testing,
truck acceleration testing, and wheel/rail force measurements. FRA
believes that these requirements are necessary to apply to operations
at high cant deficiency on lower-speed track classes. Section
213.369(f) is also referenced, to make clear that inspection records be
kept in accordance with the requirements of Sec.  213.333, as
appropriate.
    Paragraph (j), which was proposed as paragraph (k) in the NPRM, is
being added as a new paragraph to define ``vehicle'' and ``vehicle
type,'' as used in this section. As the term ``vehicle'' is used
elsewhere in this part and has a different meaning than the term
``vehicle type,'' both terms are defined here for the purposes of this
section so that this section's requirements may be properly understood
and applied.
Section 213.59 Elevation of Curved Track; Runoff
    This final rule makes a conforming change to this section's
reference to Sec.  213.57(b), to reflect the changes adopted in that
section. The need for this conforming change had been overlooked in the
proposed rule. However, the AAR notified FRA and other Task Force
members of the omission and suggested change during RSAC consideration
of the final rule, and no objection was raised. FRA agrees that the
language should conform so as to avoid confusion, and has modified
paragraph (a) of this section accordingly. No other change is intended.
Section 213.63 Track Surface
    Track surface is the evenness or uniformity of track in short
distances measured along the running surface of the rails. Under load,
the track structure gradually deteriorates due to dynamic and
mechanical wear effects of passing trains. Improper drainage, unstable
roadbed, inadequate tamping, and deferred maintenance can create
surface irregularities, which can lead to serious consequences if
ignored.
    As proposed in the NPRM, this section is divided into two
paragraphs. What was formerly the entirety of this section (the
introductory text, table, and footnotes) is re-designated as paragraph
(a). Paragraph (a) generally mirrors the former section but substitutes
the date ``June 22, 1998'' for the words ``prior to the promulgation of
this rule'' in the asterisked portion of the table concerning the
variation in crosslevel on spirals due to physical restrictions on
spiral length and operating practices and experience as determined by
prior engineering decisions. The asterisk was included in the 1998
final rule and refers to that final rule, which was promulgated on June
22, 1998, to address the practice on some railroads to design a greater
runoff of elevation in spirals due to physical restrictions on the
length of spirals. Spiral runoff in construction after the promulgation
of that final rule must be designed and maintained within the
generally-applicable limits identified in the table for the difference
in crosslevel. Consequently, FRA has clarified this section so that the
asterisked text effectively continues to refer to the 1998 final rule--
not this very final rule.
    The primary substantive change to this section is the addition of
new paragraph (b), which contains tighter, single-deviation geometry
limits for operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency on curved
track. These limits include both 31-foot and 62-foot MCO limits and a
new limit for the difference in crosslevel between any two points less
than 10 feet apart. FRA believes that adding these track geometry
limits is necessary to provide an equivalent margin of safety for
operations at higher cant deficiency. These limits are based on the
results of simulation studies to determine the safe amplitudes of track
geometry surface variations. See Technical Background, Section IV.B,
above.
    FRA did not receive any comment on this section, other than the
comment raised by Bombardier and discussed in Sec.  213.14 as to the
inclusion of proposed footnote 4 specifying that curved track surface
limits apply only when track curvature is greater than 0.25 degree. As
noted in the discussion of Sec.  213.14, the text of the proposed
footnote has been adopted as Sec.  213.14 primarily to distinguish
curved track from tangent track so that track inspectors and automated
track geometry measurement systems can properly apply the more
stringent track geometry limits required for high cant deficiency
operation in track Classes 1 through 5. Should track curvature be less
than 0.25 degree, the limits in paragraph (a) apply. Consequently, all
of the proposals in this section have effectively been adopted in this
final rule without substantive change.
Section 213.65 Combined Track Alinement and Surface Deviations
    As proposed in the NPRM, FRA is adding this new section containing
limits addressing combined track alinement and surface deviations for
operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency on curved track. (In
preparing the final rule, FRA added

``track'' to the section heading for consistency with the section
headings for Sec.  213.55, Track alinement, and Sec.  213.63, Track
surface.) An equation-based safety limit is provided for track
alinement and surface deviations occurring in combination within a
single chord length of each other. The limits in this section are
intended to be used only with a TGMS, and applied on the outside rail
in curves.
    Although the Track Safety Standards have prescribed limits on
geometry variations existing in isolation, FRA has recognized that a
combination of track alinement and surface variations, none of which
individually amounts to a deviation from the requirements in this part,
may nevertheless result in undesirable vehicle response. Moreover,
trains operating at high cant deficiencies increase the lateral wheel
force exerted on track during curving, thereby decreasing the margin of
safety associated with the VTI safety limits in Sec.  213.333. To
address these concerns, simulation studies were performed to determine
the safe amplitudes of combined track geometry variations. See
Technical Background, Section IV.B, above. Results of this research
showed that the addition of this equation-based safety limit is
necessary to provide a margin of safety for vehicle operations at
higher cant deficiencies.
    One comment was raised on this section following publication of the
NPRM. Bombardier commented that the references in the proposed equation
identifying variables AL and SL should be
clarified if the intent is to use the alinement and surface limits in
Sec. Sec.  213.55(a) and 213.63(a), respectively, when operating at
cant deficiencies greater than 5 inches in curves not exceeding 0.25
degree. Bombardier noted that, alternatively, if its recommendation to
remove the footnote concerning the application of curved track limits
in Sec. Sec.  213.55(b) and 213.63(b) were accepted, this concern would
be resolved.
    In response to this comment and as a result of Task Force
discussions following publication of the NPRM, FRA has added Sec.
213.14 to make clear that limits specified for curved track apply only
to track having a curvature greater than 0.25 degree. As discussed in
Sec.  213.14, by defining curved track as track having a curvature
greater than 0.25 degree, the rule makes clear when the requirements
for curved track apply. This section is therefore adopted as proposed
without substantive change.
Section 213.110 Gage Restraint Measurement Systems
    This section specifies procedures for using a Gage Restraint
Measurement System (GRMS) to assess the ability of track to maintain
proper gage. As proposed, FRA has amended this section to make it
consistent with the changes to the GRMS requirements in Sec.  213.333,
the counterpart to this section in subpart G. Specifically, FRA has
replaced the former Gage Widening Ratio (GWR) with the Gage Widening
Projection (GWP), which is intended to compensate for the weight of the
testing vehicle. FRA believes that use of the GWP provides at least the
same level of safety, and its inclusion is supported by research
results documented in the report titled ``Development of Gage Widening
Projection Parameter for the Deployable Gage Restraint Measurement
System'' (DOT/FRA/ORD-06/13, October 2006), which is available on FRA's
Web site. Moreover, by making the criteria consistent with the changes
to the GRMS requirements in Sec.  213.333, a track owner or railroad
does not need to modify a GRMS survey to calculate the GWR for track