[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 3, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 154-180]
[FR Doc No: 2011-33103]

Vol. 77

Tuesday,

No. 1

January 3, 2012

Part II

Department of Transportation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Federal Railroad Administration

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

49 CFR Parts 238 and 239

Passenger Train Emergency Systems II; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 77 , No. 1 / Tuesday, January 3, 2012 /
Proposed Rules

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 238 and 239

[Docket No. FRA-2009-0119, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC22

Passenger Train Emergency Systems II

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) is intended to
further the safety of passenger train occupants through both
enhancements and additions to FRA's existing requirements for emergency
systems on passenger trains. In this NPRM, FRA is proposing to add
requirements for interior vestibule doors and enhance emergency egress
and rescue access signage requirements. FRA is also proposing to
establish requirements for low-location emergency exit path markings to
assist occupants in reaching and operating primary emergency exits,
particularly under conditions of darkness or smoke. Further, FRA is
proposing to add minimum emergency lighting standards for all existing
passenger cars so that emergency lighting systems are provided in all
passenger cars, and FRA is proposing to enhance requirements for the
survivability of emergency lighting systems in new passenger cars.
Finally, FRA is clarifying existing requirements for participation in
debriefing and critique sessions following emergency situations and
full-scale simulations.

DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by March 5, 2012. Comments
received after that date will be considered to the extent possible
without incurring additional expense or delay.
    (2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a
public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a
public, oral hearing prior to February 2, 2012, one will be scheduled
and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to
inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such
hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2006-25273 may
be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Instructions: Note that all comments received will be posted
without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal
information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading below.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at anytime, or to
the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. Follow the online instructions for accessing
the dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda J. Moscoso, Office of Railroad
Safety, Director, Safety Analysis, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590
(telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>); or Michael Masci, Trial Attorney, Office of
Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>).

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
IV. History
V. Proceedings to Date
VI. Technical Background and Overview of Issues Addressed in this
Proposal
    A. Doors
    B. Identification of Emergency Systems
    C. Emergency Lighting
    D. Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Marking and Instructions
    E. Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking
    F. Photoluminescent Material
    G. Emergency Communication System Marking
    H. Debriefing and Critique Session Following Emergency
Situations and Full-Scale Simulations
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
    A. Proposed Amendments to Part 238, Subparts B, C, and E
    B. Proposed Amendments to Part 239, Subpart B
VIII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Privacy Act

I. Executive Summary

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee (RSAC) accepted, the task of reviewing existing passenger
equipment safety needs and programs and recommending consideration of
specific actions that could be useful in advancing the safety of rail
passenger service. The RSAC established the Passenger Safety Working
Group (Working Group) to handle this task and develop recommendations
for the full RSAC to consider. The Working Group met 14 times between
September 9, 2003 and September 16, 2010. The Working Group
successfully reached consensus on the following issues related to
passenger train emergency systems: doors, emergency lighting, markings
and instructions for selected emergency systems, photoluminescent
materials, and participation of personnel at debriefing and critique
sessions after emergencies. It also recommended consolidation of all
requirements related to doors that are currently contained in parts 238
and 239. The full RSAC voted to recommend the consensus issues to FRA
on September 20, 2008. This NPRM is based on the RSAC recommendations.
    This NPRM proposes requirements related to the following subject
areas: doors, emergency lighting, emergency markings and instruction
for emergency egress and rescue access, emergency communication, low-
location emergency exit path markings, and debriefing and critique of
emergency situations and simulations. The following is a brief overview
of the proposal organized by the subject area:

Doors

     The proposal related to vestibule doors (and certain other
interior doors), would require such doors in new passenger cars to be
fitted with a removable panel or window for use in accessing and
exiting the passenger compartment from the vestibule in the event that
the vestibule door is inoperable. Additionally, FRA is proposing
distinct requirements for bi-

parting doors, including provisions for a manual override and retention
mechanisms. For security reasons, an exception is included to allow
railroads discretion when deciding whether or not to include an
emergency panel in doors leading to a cab compartment. The proposal
also sets forth requirements for the inspection, testing, reporting,
and repairing of vestibule door safety mechanisms.

Emergency Lighting

     The proposed rule would require: minimum illumination
levels within passenger cars; standards for the number and placement of
power sources that power the emergency lighting system; and, establish
requirements for testing lighting fixtures and power sources that are
related to the emergency lighting system.
     Currently, emergency lighting power sources include
batteries located under the passenger car, which are not reliable
following a collision or derailment due to their location. The proposal
is intended to ensure that these essential backup power sources are
able to function as intended by requiring that they be located in the
passenger compartment where they are better protected.

Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Markings & Instructions

     Emergency communication systems: this proposal contains
more specific requirements for the luminescent material used to mark
intercoms. Currently, the location of each intercom is required to be
clearly marked with luminescent material, and legible and
understandable operating instructions for operating the intercom must
be posted at or near each such intercom to facilitate passenger use.
Public address and intercom systems would be required to have back-up
power to remain operational for at least 90 minutes when the primary
power source fails.
     Emergency Roof Access: this proposal contains more
specific requirements for providing markings of, and instructions for,
emergency roof access locations. Currently, each emergency roof access
location is required to be conspicuously marked with retroreflective
material of contrasting color, and legible and understandable
instructions must be provided near the emergency roof access.
     Emergency Signage: this proposal would enhance current
signage requirements by specifying requirements for signage
recognition, design requirements, location, size, color and contrast,
and materials. This additional detail would help ensure that emergency
egress points can be easily identified and operated by passengers and
train crew members needing to evacuate a passenger car during an
emergency.

Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking (LLEEPM)

     This proposal would establish minimum requirements for
photoluminescent and electrically-powered LLEEPM to provide visual
guidance for passengers and train crewmembers when the emergency
lighting system has failed or when smoke conditions obscure overhead
emergency lighting. The rule would also require railroads to conduct
periodic inspections and tests to verify that all LLEPM system
components, including power sources, function as intended.

Photoluminescent Materials

     The proposal related to signage standards, including the
use of high-performance photoluminescent (HPPL) material and policies
and procedures for ensuring proper placement and testing of
photoluminescent materials to ensure maximum illumination in an
emergency situation will ensure train occupants can identify emergency
exits and the path to the nearest exit in the dark. Existing signage
inside some passenger compartment areas within a passenger car has been
ineffective due to their inability to absorb sufficient levels of
ambient or electrical light. The requirements in this proposal would
improve illumination of signage and marking in the passenger
compartment, and thus increase the discernability of the exit signs and
markings in the dark.

Debriefing and Critique

    FRA is proposing a modification to the existing debrief and
critique requirement to clarify that passenger train personnel who have
first-hand knowledge of an emergency are intended to participate in
debriefing and critique sessions after the emergency occurs.
    FRA has assessed the cost to railroads that are expected to result
from the implementation of this rule as proposed. For the 20-year
period analyzed, the estimated quantified cost that would be imposed on
industry totals $21.8 million with a present value (PV, 7 percent) of
$13.4 million. The proposed rulemaking is expected to improve railroad
safety by promoting the safe evacuation of passengers and crewmembers
in the event of an emergency.

                     20-Year Cost for Proposed Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Door/Removable Panels or Windows, and Bi-Parting              $4,399,223
 Doors...............................................
Emergency Lighting...................................          2,450,213
Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Marking and                 4,730,631
 Instructions........................................
Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Markings............          1,377,615
Debriefing and Critique..............................                N/A
Inspection, Testing, and Recordkeeping...............            405,296
                                                      ------------------
    Total............................................         13,362,979
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dollars are discounted at a present value rate of 7 percent.

    The primary benefits include a heightened safety environment in
egress from a passenger train after an accident. The requirements will
enable passenger car occupants to more readily identify, reach, and
operate emergency exits and emergency responders to more readily
identify and operate rescue access points. This corresponds to a
reduction of casualties and fatalities in the aftermath of collisions,
derailments, and other emergency situations. FRA believes the value of
the anticipated safety benefits would justify the cost of implementing
the rule as proposed.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary)
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the
initiatives arising from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary
announced that

DOT would begin developing safety standards for rail passenger
equipment over a five-year period. In November of 1994, Congress
adopted the Secretary's schedule for implementing rail passenger
equipment safety regulations and included it in the Federal Railroad
Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Pub. L. 103-440, 108 Stat.
4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). Congress also authorized the
Secretary to consult with various organizations involved in passenger
train operations for purposes of prescribing and amending these
regulations, as well as issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 215 of
the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133).

III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety
program issues. The Committee includes representation from all of the
agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations,
suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties. A list of
member groups follows:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO);
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO);
American Chemistry Council;
American Petroleum Institute;
American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA);
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
Association of American Railroads (AAR);
Association of Railway Museums (ARM);
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
Chlorine Institute;
Federal Transit Administration (FTA); *
Fertilizer Institute;
High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA);
Institute of Makers of Explosives;
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA); *
League of Railway Industry Women; *
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
National Association of Railway Business Women; *
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association;
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); *
Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
Safe Travel America (STA);
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte; *
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
Tourist Railway Association Inc.;
Transport Canada; *
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC);
Transportation Security Administration; * and
United Transportation Union (UTU).
* Indicates associate membership.

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and after
consideration and debate, the RSAC may accept or reject the task. If
accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a
given task. The task force then provides that information to the
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to
the RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority
of the RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff
has played an active role at the working group level in discussing the
issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the
recommendation and the agency exercises its independent judgment on
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final
rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the
rulemaking document issued by FRA. However, to the maximum extent
practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations
with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is
withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.

IV. History

    On May 4, 1998, pursuant to Sec.  215 of the Act, FRA issued a
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness (PTEP) final rule. See 63 FR
24629. The rule contains minimum Federal safety standards for the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains,
including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail
service. Elements of the required emergency preparedness plan include:
communication; employee training and qualification; joint operations;
tunnel safety; liaison with emergency responders; on-board emergency
equipment; and passenger safety information. This rule also established
specific requirements for passenger train emergency systems. The
requirements include: conspicuous marking of all emergency window exits
with luminescent material on the interior and all windows intended for
rescue access by emergency responders be marked on the exterior with
retroreflective material and that instructions be provided for their
use; all door exits intended for egress be lighted or marked; and all
door exits intended for rescue access by emergency responders be marked
and that instructions be provided for their use. In addition, the rule
contains specific requirements for debriefing and critique sessions
following emergency situations and full-scale simulations.
    On May 12, 1999, FRA issued the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards (PESS) final rule. See 64 FR 25540. This rule established
comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. The
standards included requirements for the size, and operation of exterior
side doors used for emergency egress or access for all passenger cars
and for emergency lighting for new passenger cars. After publication of
the PESS final rule, interested parties filed petitions seeking FRA's
reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the rule. These
petitions generally related to the following subject areas: structural
design; location of emergency exit

windows; fire safety; training; inspection, testing, and maintenance;
and movement of defective equipment. To address the petitions, FRA
grouped issues together and published three sets of amendments to the
final rule in 2000 and 2002 in the Federal Register. See 65 FR 41284;
67 FR 19970; and 67 FR 42892.
    On February 1, 2008, FRA published a final rule on Passenger Train
Emergency Systems (PTES) addressing: emergency communication, emergency
egress, and rescue access. This rule expanded the applicability of
requirements for public address systems to all passenger cars, for
intercom systems, and for emergency responder roof access to all new
passenger cars. It also enhanced existing requirements for emergency
window exits and established requirements for rescue access windows
used by emergency responders. See 73 FR 6370.
    During the development of the PESS rule and the PTES rule, FRA
identified the following issues for possible future rulemaking: doors;
emergency lighting; emergency signage and markings for egress, access,
and emergency communication; and low-location emergency exit path
markings. FRA determined that these issues would benefit from
additional research, the gathering of additional operating experience,
or the development of industry standards, or all three. FRA believes
that these issues have sufficiently developed and is addressing these
issues in this proposal.
    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and the RSAC accepted, the task of
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established
the Working Group to handle this task and develop recommendations for
the full RSAC to consider. Members of the Working Group, in addition to
FRA, include the following:

AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company, CSX Transportation,
Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
AAPRCO;
AASHTO;
Amtrak;
APTA, including members from: Bombardier, Inc., Herzog Transit
Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology Inc., Long Island Rail Road
(LIRR), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
BLET;
BRS;
FTA;
HSGTA;
IBEW;
NARP;
NTSB;
RSI;
SMWIA;
STA;
TCIU/BRC;
TWU; and
UTU.

    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to
the technical discussions. The Working Group has held meetings on the
following dates and locations:

September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
October 26-27, 2004 in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
September 7, 2005 in Chicago, IL;
March 21-22, 2006 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
September 12-13, 2006 in Orlando, FL;
April 17-18, 2007 in Orlando, FL;
December 11, 2007 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
June 18, 2008 in Baltimore, MD;
November 13, 2008 in Washington, DC;
June 8, 2009 in Washington, DC; and
September 16, 2010 in Chicago, IL.

    At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with
representatives of Metra and the South Florida Regional Transportation
Authority (Tri-Rail), respectively, and toured their passenger
equipment. The visits, which included demonstrations of emergency
system features, were open to all members of the Working Group, and FRA
believes they have added to the collective understanding of the Group
in identifying and addressing passenger train emergency system issues.
    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003
meeting, the Working Group established four task forces: Emergency
Preparedness, Vehicle/Track Interaction, Crashworthiness/Glazing, and
Mechanical. Each task force is a smaller group that develops
recommendations on specific issues within each group's particular area
of expertise. Members of the task forces include various
representatives from the respective organizations that were part of the
larger Working Group. Members of the Emergency Preparedness Task Force
(Task Force), in addition to FRA, include (or have included) the
following:

Amtrak;
APTA, including members from Bombardier, Ellcon National, Go Transit,
Interfleet Technology, Inc, Jacobs Civil Engineering, Jessup
Manufacturing Company, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LIRR, LTK, Luminator,
Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern Indiana Commuter
Transit District (NICTD), SEPTA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad
(Coaster), Permalight, Po's Ability USA, Inc., Prolink, Transit Design
Group (TDG),Transit Safety Management (TSM), Translite, STV Inc., and
Visual Marking Systems, Inc.;
BLET;
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
FTA;
NARP;
RSI, including Globe Transportation Graphics;
TWU; and
UTU.

    While they are not voting members of the Task Force,
representatives from TSA, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), attended certain of the meetings and contributed to the
discussions of the Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center
attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical
discussions through their comments and presentations and by setting up
various lighting, marking, and signage demonstrations.
    The task force held 17 meetings on the following dates and
locations:

February 25-26, 2004, in Los Angeles, CA;
April 14-15, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
July 7-8, 2004, in Washington, DC;
September 13-14, 2004, in New York, NY;
December 1-2, 2004, in San Diego, CA;
February 16-17, 2005, in Philadelphia, PA;
April 19-20, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
August 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
December 13-14, 2005, in Baltimore, MD;
August 10, 2006, in Grapevine, TX;
October 25-26, 2006, in Philadelphia, PA;
December 6-7, 2006, in Washington, DC;

March 28-29, 2007, in Los Angeles, CA;
June 13-14, 2007, in San Francisco, CA;
October 17-18, 2007, in Arlington, VA;
May 13-14, 2008, in Arlington, VA; and
March 31, 2009, in Washington, DC.

    At meetings in Los Angeles, Cambridge, Washington, New York, San
Diego, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, FRA met with representatives of
Metrolink, MBTA, Amtrak, LIRR, Coaster, SEPTA, and Caltrans,
respectively, and toured their passenger equipment. The visits were
open to all members of the various task forces and included
demonstration of emergency system features. As in the case of the
Working Group visits, FRA believes they have added to the collective
understanding of RSAC members in identifying and addressing passenger
train safety issues for not only this rulemaking, but for other RSAC
initiatives as well. After reaching consensus on a variety of issues,
and receiving formal recommendations from the RSAC, FRA issued the PTES
rule. As noted above, the final rule was published on February 1, 2008,
and it addressed requirements for emergency window exits, rescue access
windows, emergency communication, and roof access locations.

V. Proceedings to Date

    Like the first PTES rule, the NPRM in This rulemaking proceeding,
Passenger Train Emergency Systems II (PTES II), was developed to
address a number of the concerns raised, and issues discussed, during
the various Task Force and Working Group meetings. The issues include:
doors, emergency lighting, emergency marking and instruction for egress
and access, emergency communication, low-location emergency exit path
markings, and debriefing and critique of emergency situations and
simulations. The Working Group reached full consensus on all the
regulatory provisions contained in the NPRM at its meeting in December
2007. The Working Group presented its consensus recommendations to the
full RSAC for concurrence at its meeting on February 20, 2008. All of
the members of the full RSAC in attendance at its February 2008 meeting
accepted the regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group.
Thus, the Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC's
recommendations to FRA. FRA subsequently met with the Task Force twice
after that to make some non-substantive technical clarifications and
review technical research findings related to potential enhancements of
emergency systems. A Tier II Sub-Task Force also met to discuss the
proposed requirements affecting Tier II equipment, i.e., passenger
equipment operating at speeds in excess of 125 mph but not exceeding
150 mph. It did not recommend any changes to the proposed rule text.
After reviewing the full RSAC's recommendations, FRA agrees that the
recommendations provide a sound basis for a proposed rule and hereby
adopts the recommendations with generally minor changes for purposes of
clarity and Federal Register formatting.

VI. Technical Background and Overview of Issues Addressed in this
Proposal

    Experience with passenger train accidents and simulations, and
technological advances in emergency systems provide the main impetus
for these proposed enhancements and additions to FRA's existing
requirements related to passenger train emergency systems, as
highlighted below.

A. Doors

    In February 1996, as a result of a near head-on collision between a
Maryland Mass Transit Administration MARC Train Service (MARC) train
and an Amtrak train in Silver Spring, Maryland, and subsequent fire,
eight passengers and three crewmembers died in one car. This incident
raised concerns that at least some of the passengers in the MARC train
tried unsuccessfully to exit via the exterior side doors in the rear
vestibule of the lead, passenger-occupied cab car. Following its post-
collision investigation, the NTSB expressed concern regarding
passengers' ability to exit through interior and exterior passageway
doors. During the accident, the front end of the cab car that led the
MARC train suffered extensive structural damage and fire destroyed the
controls for the left- and right-side rear exterior doors. The left-
side exterior door's interior emergency release handle was also damaged
by the fire and could not be pulled down to operate the door. The
right-side door's interior emergency release handle was in a secured
cabinet in the lavatory and it failed to open the door when later
tested by the NTSB. The NTSB did note in its investigation report of
the Silver Spring train collision that ``[e]xcept for those passengers
who died of blunt trauma injuries, others may have survived the
accident, albeit with thermal injuries, had proper and immediate egress
from the car been available.'' NTSB/RAR-97/02 at page 63. The NTSB
explained in its explicit findings on the collision that ``the
emergency egress of passengers was impeded because the passenger cars
lacked readily accessible and identifiable quick-release mechanisms for
the exterior doors, removable windows or kick panels in the side doors,
and adequate emergency instruction signage.'' Id. at 73.
    Specifically, the NTSB recommended that FRA ``[r]equire all
passenger cars to have either removable windows, kick panels, or other
suitable means for emergency exiting through the interior and exterior
passageway doors where the door could impede passengers exiting in an
emergency and take appropriate emergency measures to ensure corrective
action until these measures are incorporated into minimum passenger car
safety standards.'' R-97-15. In addition, the Task Force identified
concerns related to door egress from a car that is not upright.
Emergency egress simulations organized by the Volpe Center confirmed
this. Such simulations at the FRA-funded ``roll-over rig,'' located at
the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's training facility,
demonstrated that egress from a passenger rail car that is not upright
can be very challenging. The simulations have demonstrated that
emergency egress from a car that is on its side could present a
significant challenge related to the operation of the pocket doors. If
the pocket for a door is situated on the side of the car that is above
the door when the car comes to rest on its side, gravity would work
against opening the door and maintaining it in place for occupants to
egress. Although passenger rail cars with single-panel vestibule doors
are usually designed such that on the two ends of a car the pockets are
on opposite sides of the panel, emergency situations may affect either
end of the car rendering one or more of the vestibule and end-frame
doors unavailable for emergency egress. In addition, doors could be
rendered inoperable due to structural deformation of the doors or their
frames and surrounding structures following a collision or derailment,
blocking the egress pathways.
    As with other items identified for future consideration during the
PESS rulemaking proceedings, the Task Force gave thoughtful
consideration to the issue of vestibule and end-frame door egress. With
assistance from the Task Force, FRA explored the feasibility of
designing removable panels or windows in interior and exterior
passenger car doors that could be used for emergency egress, and funded
research to develop and evaluate various designs. Interior door egress
was examined first. In some passenger cars, exterior side or end-

frame doors, or both, are located in vestibule areas that are separated
from the seating area(s) by an interior vestibule door. Structural
deformation or malfunctioning of vestibule doors would inhibit or
unduly delay access to the vestibules from the passenger compartments.
End-frame door egress was examined next. Ultimately, no design was
identified that would address three overriding concerns related to end-
frame doors: (1) Unintentional removal of the door, which would result
in a safety hazard for occupants attempting emergency egress from the
train; (2) crashworthiness of the door containing the panel or window;
and, (3) prevention of fluids, such as fuel, from entering the car
during an accident. Therefore, the Task Force developed a
recommendation that was limited to interior vestibule doors. The Task
Force generally recommended requiring a removable panel or window in
each vestibule door, and a retention mechanism for new passenger cars.
In such cases, occupants could use a removable panel or window in the
door to gain access from the seating area to the exterior doors in the
vestibule. Alternatively, this panel or window could also facilitate
passage in the opposite direction from the vestibule area to the
seating area. Given the unique circumstances surrounding passenger
train accidents, the Task Force considered it prudent to recommend that
access be available from both areas.
    The Task Force specifically evaluated kick-panels and ultimately
decided that such panels could be partially or fully removed
unintentionally creating a safety hazard, particularly for small
children who could get caught in the opening and become injured by the
door sliding into its pocket. For security reasons, the Task Force also
recommended an exception to the removable panel or window requirement
for a vestibule door that leads directly into a cab compartment. The
Task Force believed that each railroad is best situated to determine
whether equipping such a vestibule door with a removable panel or
window would be appropriate for its specific equipment and operation.
    FRA believes that its proposal in this rulemaking to require
vestibule doors to be equipped with a removable panel or window would,
in the event that vestibule doors are not operable, provide a means for
occupants in the passenger seating area to reach the vestibules where
exterior door are located. Once located near an exterior door,
emergency responders will be able to reach the occupants. FRA further
believes that its proposal would satisfy the safety concerns expressed
in the NTSB's recommendation without raising other safety concerns both
during normal operations and in accident situations.
    The Task Force considered requiring that existing equipment be
retrofitted to comply with the proposed vestibule door requirement.
Because of limitations posed by the design of existing doors, the Task
Force decided not to recommend that the equipment be retrofitted.
Vestibule doors are designed with a horizontal structural member,
located approximately at the vertical center of the door, which
provides rigidity. The design would significantly limit both the size
and location of a properly functioning removable panel or window.
Although there are existing windows in the upper half of certain
vestibule doors, the windows are not sufficiently large for adults to
pass through and would be difficult to access in many situations. In
addition, the existing door pockets would require modification.
Removable windows would likely be designed similarly to emergency
windows that are equipped with a handle to facilitate the removal of
the gasket that holds the emergency window in place. The doors would
need to be modified to accommodate the protrusions in the door that
would be created by adding the handle. As noted above, the Task Force
also examined the emergency egress issue as it relates to exterior end-
frame doors. After much deliberation, the Task Force recommended not to
proceed with a removable window or panel requirement for end-frame
doors at this time, due to remaining concerns related to the
crashworthiness of the exterior end-frame doors. The Task Force did,
however, extend the proposed removable window or panel requirement to
``any other interior door used for passage through a passenger car'' to
further expand options for emergency egress.

B. Identification of Emergency Systems

    Passenger train evacuation can be complicated by various
circumstances, such as: an overturned rail car(s); rail car(s) being
located in a narrow bridge or tunnel; and the presence of smoke or
darkness. Such circumstances necessitate enhanced systems for use in
emergency evacuations. The PESS rule highlighted a systems approach to
effective passenger train evacuation that takes into consideration the
interrelationship between features such as the number of door and
window exits in a passenger car, lighted signs that indicate and
facilitate the use of the door and window exits, and floor exit path
marking (such as that required by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) for passenger aircraft), in addition to the general emergency
lighting level in a car. 64 FR 25598. In particular, the PESS final
rule stated that FRA was investigating emergency lighting requirements,
as part of a systems approach to effective passenger train evacuation.
FRA also stated that it would examine the APTA standard on emergency
lighting to determine whether the standard satisfactorily addresses
matters related to emergency signage, exit path marking, and egress
capacity. See 64 FR 25598.
    As FRA was issuing comprehensive Federal requirements for passenger
train safety in the late 1990s, APTA was also developing and
authorizing complementary passenger rail equipment safety standards
applicable to equipment operated by its commuter and intercity
passenger railroad members. APTA developed a three-standard, systems-
based approach to facilitate the safe evacuation of a passenger car in
an emergency under various circumstances. These three standards, (the
most recent revised versions were approved by APTA in 2007) which
address emergency lighting, signage, and low-location exit path
markings, were designed to work together to provide a means for
passengers and crew to identify, reach, and operate passenger car
emergency exits.
    The most recent revised versions of the APTA standards approved by
APTA and all authorized on October 7, 2007, are listed below and copies
are included in the docket.
     APTA SS-E-013-99, Rev. 1 Standard for Emergency Lighting
System Design for Passenger Cars.
     APTA SS-PS-002-98, Rev. 3 Standard for Emergency Signage
for Egress/Access of Passenger Rail Equipment.
     APTA SS-PS-004-99, Rev. 2 Standard for Low Location Exit
Path Marking.

The APTA approach recognizes that, in the majority of emergencies, the
safest place for passengers and crew is on the train. Should evacuation
from a particular rail car be required, the safest course of action for
passengers and crew is normally to move into an adjacent car. This
evacuation strategy avoids or minimizes the hazards inherent with
evacuating passengers onto the railroad right-of-way. It is only in
unavoidable or extreme life-threatening situations that it would be
necessary for passengers

and crew leaves the train to reach a place of safety.
    The Task Force was charged with reviewing the three APTA standards
and recommending revisions that would enhance the existing emergency
lighting requirements contained in Sec.  238.115 and the egress and
rescue access marking requirements contained in Sec. Sec.  238.113 and
238.114. In addition, the Task Force was charged with adding a new
requirement for low location exit path marking. After careful review,
the Task Force recommended that the three APTA standards be revised to
address relevant evolving technology, and that the standards be
incorporated by reference in their entirety into the Federal
regulations. With assistance from the Task Force, APTA revised the
three APTA standards to enable FRA to incorporate them by reference and
take advantage of certain technological advances which allowed for
certain other desired enhancements. In addition, the Task Force
recommended applying the requirements of the emergency lighting,
emergency signage, and low-location exit path marking APTA standards
(as revised in 2007), which apply to both new and existing equipment.
Incorporation by reference of these APTA standards into part 238 would
extend their applicability to all commuter and intercity passenger
railroads and make them enforceable by FRA.

C. Emergency Lighting

    Section 238.115 contains emergency lighting requirements applicable
for new passenger cars. As noted in the PESS final rule, experience
gained from emergency response to several passenger train accidents
indicated that emergency lighting systems either did not work or failed
after a short time, greatly hindering rescue operations. See 64 FR
25596. Emergency lighting system failures, or low levels of
illumination during these accidents, or both, have been cited as a
cause for confusion and contributing to the injuries and casualties.
For example, according to the NTSB accident report, two passengers in a
coach car of the MARC train involved in the 1996 Silver Spring,
Maryland, accident stated that emergency lighting was not available
following the accident, and that, along with one passenger's injuries
and another's loss of eyeglasses, made it more difficult to move in the
darkness. See R-97-17. The coach car's tilted position also contributed
to their disorientation and hindered mobility. Post accident
investigation by the NTSB revealed that the main car battery powering
the emergency lighting had been damaged as a result of the derailment.
    The NTSB expressed concern regarding emergency lighting
survivability because the location of the battery supplying power to
the emergency lighting system below the car made it susceptible to
damage from the rail, the car's trucks, and the ground surface in the
event of a derailment. The NTSB concluded that ``[a] need exists for
Federal standards requiring passenger cars be equipped with reliable
emergency lighting fixtures with a self-contained independent power
source when the main power supply has been disrupted to ensure
passengers can safely egress.'' The NTSB issued recommendation R-97-17
to FRA, as follows:

    Require all passenger cars to contain reliable emergency
lighting fixtures that are each fitted with a self-contained
independent power source and incorporate the requirements into
minimum passenger car safety standards.

    In addition, on May 16, 1994, in Selma, NC, an Amtrak train
derailed after colliding with an intermodal trailer from a freight
train on an adjacent track. This accident resulted in 1 fatality and
121 injuries. According to the NTSB accident report, three of the
injured passengers reported difficulty exiting the passenger cars
because they could not identify the emergency exit windows in the
darkness. NTSB/RAR-95/02. When they were finally able to escape through
the doors leading outside, they said that they were not sure how far
they were above a surface, which may not have been solid ground,
because they could not see below the steps of the car. The NTSB found
that fixed emergency lighting systems were not operating inside several
passenger cars because the batteries and the wiring connecting the
batteries to the lights were damaged as a result of the derailment.
    In the 1999 PESS final rule, FRA established performance criteria
for emergency lighting, including minimum illumination levels for
certain locations in new passenger car door locations, aisles, and
passageways, because it would enable the occupants of the passenger
cars to discern their immediate surroundings (situational awareness)
and thereby minimize or avoid panic in an emergency. Establishing an
illumination requirement at floor level adjacent to doors, was intended
to permit passenger car occupants to see and negotiate thresholds and
steps that are typically located near doors. The illumination
requirement 25 inches above the floor for aisles and passageways was
intended to permit passenger car occupants to see and make their way
past obstacles as they exit a train in an emergency. FRA also pointed
out that the existing requirement contained in Sec.  238.115 provides
greater flexibility to railroads related to the placement of lighting
fixtures for new equipment. FRA also required that the emergency
lighting system remain operational on each car for 90 minutes,
consistent with FAA requirements for passenger aircraft emergency
lighting.
    With respect to existing equipment, FRA noted that it desired
achievable emergency lighting enhancements and that it would evaluate
an APTA emergency lighting standard when completed. The Task Force
developed a revised APTA emergency lighting standard that would enhance
the existing FRA emergency lighting requirements in Sec.  238.115 by:
(1) applying the requirements to existing equipment; and, (2) improving
the back-up power supply survivability requirement (with application to
both new and existing cars). The APTA emergency lighting standard
specifies the same minimum illumination levels and duration that are
required by Sec.  238.115 for doors, aisleways, and passageways in new
equipment. In addition, the APTA standard requires that additional
locations be provided with emergency lighting, such as stairways and
toilet rooms.
    The Task Force recommended revisions to the APTA emergency lighting
standard to address older equipment not currently covered by the
emergency lighting requirements contained in Sec.  238.115. The revised
APTA standard now specifies minimum emergency lighting performance
criteria for all passenger cars (new and existing). The levels of
illumination and duration required for equipment ordered before
September 8, 2000, and placed in service before September 9, 2002, are
half the levels that are required for newer equipment. This takes into
consideration the more limited capabilities of older electrical
lighting systems. The APTA emergency lighting standard provides that
these illumination and duration requirements be implemented by January
1, 2015, or when the equipment is transferred, leased, or conveyed to
another railroad for more than 6 months of operation, whichever occurs
first. Some railroads indicated their intention to retire certain
equipment by 2015. The Task Force agreed it would not be cost-justified
to retrofit such equipment.
    In addition, the APTA emergency lighting standard requires that

emergency lighting systems installed on each passenger car ordered on
or after April 7, 2008, or placed in service for the first time on or
after January 1, 2012, meet minimum illumination levels by means of an
independent power source(s) that is located in or within one half of a
car length of each light fixture it powers, and that operates when
normal power is unavailable. As previously noted, these illumination
levels are the same as the ones already specified in Sec.  238.115 for
doors, aisleways, and passageways. The independent power source
requirement is not currently contained in Sec.  238.115, and is being
proposed in this rulemaking proceeding. The Task Force evaluated the
feasibility of equipping each emergency lighting fixture with self-
contained power sources, as a back-up power source, independent of the
main car battery. After deliberation, the Task Force concluded that
maintenance would be very costly due to the high number of power
sources. The Task Force examined other methods for addressing the issue
of emergency lighting system reliability and assisted APTA in revising
the APTA emergency lighting standard to better address those situations
in which an emergency lighting system may be most beneficial. For
example, in the event of a derailment resulting in a car rollover, the
importance of situational awareness is heightened. Occupants are likely
not in the same location as they were before the incident and, in
conditions of darkness, are likely unaware as to where in the car they
are located in relation to the nearest exit. APTA added four
requirements that address NTSB's recommendation to FRA regarding
emergency lighting survivability for new passenger cars, as described
below.
    First, the APTA emergency lighting standard was revised to require
an independent power source within the car body located no more than a
half-car length away from the fixture it powers. For most passenger car
designs, this translates into a minimum of two batteries, one in each
end of the car. In the Silver Spring accident, passenger cars incurred
collision and derailment damage to underfloor battery boxes, causing
the wet cell batteries contained in those boxes to leak electrolyte.
Because of the damage and leakage, the batteries failed to provide
power to the emergency lighting on board the passenger cars. Placing
the batteries within the car body will reduce the risk of damage to the
battery during a collision, and increase the likelihood that the
batteries will be capable of providing power to the emergency lighting.
    Second, each of these independent power sources is required to have
an automatic self-diagnostic module to perform a discharge test to
ensure timely detection and notification of a malfunction. Third,
emergency lighting systems in new cars are required to be capable of
operating in all equipment orientations to address accident situations
resulting in the rollover of a car. During an accident, passenger cars
may tilt, causing wet cell batteries contained in those cars to leak
electrolyte and, as a consequence, fail to provide power to the
emergency lighting on board the passenger cars. Wet cell batteries will
likely leak when tilted in a rollover, because wet cell batteries are
designed with a vent on top that allows liquid to escape when tipped
over. Alternatively, a sealed battery is capable of functioning as
intended regardless of the battery's orientation. When a sealed battery
is tilted during an accident, it will not fail to provide power to
emergency lighting merely as a result of the batteries being tilted.
Finally, the APTA standards provides that emergency lighting systems
must be designed so that at least 50 percent of the light fixtures
operate notwithstanding the failure of any single fixture or power
source.
    In support of revising the APTA emergency lighting standard, the
Volpe Center researched various alternative, cost-effective
technologies for addressing the reliability of emergency lighting
systems. The Volpe Center found that the development of emergency-
lighting systems that can function reliably for a decade or more with
minimal maintenance and that can withstand passenger train collision/
derailment forces has been greatly facilitated by two recent
technologies:
     Solid-State Lighting (SSL)--most commonly known as light
emitting diodes (LEDs)
     Supercapacitors--devices that store about 100 times as
much electrical charge per unit volume as previous types of capacitors.
    Solid-state lighting includes conventional LEDs and other emerging
technologies to produce illumination without the use of incandescent
filaments or excited gases in glass containers. Compared with older
lighting technologies, the solid-state lighting devices are much
smaller, are able to withstand hundreds or thousands of times as much
shock forces, and have service lives ten to one hundred times greater.
Their light output per unit of electric power consumed is currently
equivalent to fluorescent lighting, and continues to improve.
Prototypes of new LED and other SSL devices use only half as much
energy to produce a given amount of light as the best fluorescent
lamps. The light output of current white LEDs ranges from 20 to 60
lumens per Watt, which means that a large area can be illuminated to a
required minimum value (one lumen per square foot) with only one Watt
of power. Furthermore, use of LEDs avoids the disposal costs of
mercury-containing lamps. For these reasons, railroads have already
started specifying the use of LED devices for new passenger car
lighting, and to some extent have already used LEDs for retrofitting
existing car lighting.
    Capacitors are devices that store energy in an electrical field (as
opposed to a battery, in which the energy is stored chemically).
Chemicals that store and release energy in amounts that are useful in
batteries are inherently corrosive, which limits battery life to about
a thousand charge-discharge cycles, or about seven years in
applications where the battery is rarely discharged. By avoiding use of
corrosive chemicals, capacitors are far more durable; but until
recently, they could not store enough energy to be useful in emergency
lighting. New supercapacitors are rated for 500,000 charge-discharge
cycles, and their service lives are expected to extend to at least ten
years. Currently, commercial supercapacitors are available that store
as much as 5 Watt-hours of energy. Combined with very efficient LEDs or
other SSL devices, they allow the manufacture of emergency lighting
systems using self-contained power with the ability to withstand
collision forces of much greater magnitude than emergency lighting
systems currently in use. As discussed in sections D, E, and F below,
the brightness of newer photoluminescent materials which can be used
for emergency egress signs and exit path marking can be a cost-
effective means of addressing concerns regarding the survivability of
emergency lighting systems, particularly for older equipment in
operation, until it is retired from service.

D. Marking and Instructions for Emergency Egress and Rescue Access

    To initially address emergency egress and rescue access, as well as
other issues related to the 1996 Silver Spring accident cited earlier,
FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (EO 20). 61 FR 6876. In addition to
other requirements, EO 20 required commuter and intercity passenger
railroads to mark the location, and provide instructions for the use,
of emergency window exits by no later

than April 20, 1996. In an effort to respond to this requirement as
effectively as possible in the short timeframe provided, affected
railroads began to install photo-luminescent emergency exit markings to
mark doors intended for emergency egress and emergency window exits
with photoluminescent materials that were available at the time for
this purpose.
    On May 4, 1998, FRA issued the PTEP final rule that requires door
exits that are intended for emergency egress to be lighted or
conspicuously marked with luminescent material, and that instructions
for their use be provided. The rule also requires that emergency window
exits be conspicuously marked with luminescent material, and that
instructions for their use be provided. See 63 FR 24630. Doors and
windows intended for emergency access by emergency responders for
extrication of passengers must also be marked with retroreflective
material, and instructions for their use must be posted. Notably, the
rule did not specify specific criteria for minimum luminance levels or
letter size or sign color but stated that the marking of the door and
window exits must be conspicuous enough so that a reasonable person,
even while enduring the stress and panic of an emergency evacuation can
determine where the closest and most accessible route out of the car is
located. See 63 FR 24669. Many railroads installed signs made of zinc-
sulfide, which were capable of providing luminance only for a period of
less than 10 minutes in many cases. Subsequently, photoluminescent sign
technology evolved, and other materials began to be used, such as
strontium-aluminate, which is capable of providing high levels of
luminance for much longer periods.
    The original APTA emergency signage standard was revised in 1999 to
require the installation of emergency exit signs with specific minimum
``higher performance'' photoluminescent material, in terms of
brightness and duration, as well as larger minimum letter sizes, color
contrast, etc., for emergency exit signs. The second revision,
authorized in 2002, included a reorganization of certain sections,
citation of ASTM International (ASTM) retroreflectivity standards, as
well as the revision of annex guidance to evaluate the performance
characteristics of the emergency exit signs. FRA considered
incorporating elements of the APTA standard into the PTES final rule in
2008 so that emergency exit signs and intercom markings in passenger
cars would be required to be made of photoluminescent material with
higher levels of brightness for longer duration. However, the Task
Force recommended that certain requirements in the APTA emergency
signage standard be revised to address technical issues with the
performance characteristics of certain types of photoluminescent
materials already installed in existing passenger rail cars, as well as
other necessary clarifications addressing sign size, color, and
contrast, etc., before the standard is incorporated by reference by
FRA. See 63 FR 6886.
    APTA revised its emergency signage standard to incorporate the Task
Force recommendations. The recommendations were based on Volpe Center
research findings and technological advances in photoluminescence (as
discussed in Section F below). Substantively, the revised APTA standard
requires that each passenger rail car have interior emergency signage
to assist passengers and train crewmembers in more readily locating,
reaching, and operating emergency exits in order to safely evacuate
from the rail car or train; and exterior signage to assist emergency
responders in more readily locating, reaching operating emergency
access points, during an emergency situation that warrants immediate
passenger rail car or train evacuation. To ensure visibility to
passengers, signs that are required to mark the location of vestibule
door markings must meet the brightness and duration performance
criteria requirements for photoluminescent material, as specified in
the APTA standard.
    Although the APTA emergency signage standard does not address
emergency communication system signage, the Task Force also recommended
applying certain criteria for photoluminescent marking specified in
that standard to intercom systems, as further described in Section G
below. The APTA standard also includes specifications for
retroreflective marking and material, which are consistent with FRA
requirements for rescue access point marking for doors, windows, and
roof access locations. The APTA standard is more detailed than the
relevant existing FRA requirements contained in part. For example, the
APTA standard requires specific minimum letter sizes for doors and
emergency window exits and includes specific criteria for color, color
contrast, etc.
    The revised APTA emergency signage standard requires periodic
testing of certain system components and contains procedures to ensure
compliance. APTA designed its emergency signage standard to offer
flexibility in application, as well as to achieve the desired goal of
facilitating passenger and crew egress from potentially life-
threatening situations in passenger rail cars. Individual railroads
have the responsibility to design, install, and maintain an emergency
signage system that is compatible with their internal safety policies
for emergency evacuation, while complying with the performance criteria
specified in this standard.
    The Task Force recommended that FRA adopt the specific
retroreflective material criteria contained in the 2007 APTA emergency
signage standard related to rescue access windows and doors intended
for access by emergency responders, into the new section 238.114 in the
2008 rule which added a requirement for installation of a minimum
number and the location of rescue access windows on all passenger cars.
Thus, in the 2008 rule, FRA added a definition of ``retroreflective
material'' that incorporates by reference criteria form ASTM's Standard
D 4956-07 for Type 1 Sheeting, which is consistent with the APTA
emergency signage standard. Accordingly, FRA requests comment regarding
the need to keep the definition in the rule given the incorporation of
the APTA emergency signage standard. FRA also made other revisions
related to rescue access marking, consistent with the other rescue
access marking requirements specified in the APTA. See 73 FR 6389.

E. Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking

    A review of past passenger rail accidents involving passenger and
train crew emergency evacuation has indicated that, in certain cases,
both passengers and emergency responders lacked sufficient information
necessary for expedient emergency egress and responder access due to
the absence of identifiable markings. A lack of adequate markings
indicating the location of emergency exits, in conjunction with
lighting system failures, or low levels of illumination, or both,
during conditions of darkness when these accidents occurred caused
confusion and contributed to injuries and casualties. In addition, the
presence of fire or smoke may substantially increase the difficulty of
evacuating passenger train occupants.
    To avoid the many hazards associated with evacuation onto the
right-of-way, the preferred means of egress from a passenger car that
is not located at a station is via the end door(s) to the next car.
Under conditions of darkness, or when illumination from emergency
lighting fixtures located at or near the ceiling are obscured by smoke,
such

markings (including exit signs) remain discernible. Particularly in the
smoke situation, the most viable escape path is the more visible path,
which is likely to be at or near the floor where occupants are forced
to lower themselves towards (where the pathway markings are located) to
avoid inhaling the smoke.
    The 1999 APTA standard for low-location emergency exit path marking
(LLEPM) required high performance photoluminesent (HPPL) material to be
installed on all new passenger rail cars. Such markings are intended to
maintain a visible pathway for passengers to use to locate and reach
emergency exits under conditions of darkness even if the emergency
lighting system fails, and include aisleways, stairways, and
passageways, which identify the path to the primary exit for a duration
of 90 minutes for both existing and new cars, using either HPPL or an
independent power source for a duration of 90 minutes. Certain
revisions were made to the original LLEPM standard which primarily
consisted of additional definitions, reorganization of certain sections
and revision, and the addition of annexes used to evaluate the
performance of HPPL material used for LLEPM.
    In December of 2006, with participation of the Emergency
Preparedness Task Force, the Volpe Center conducted a series of
emergency egress simulations at the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transportation Authority training facility, which demonstrated that
egress from a rail passenger car can be very challenging. Initially, a
single-level passenger with some photoluminescent emergency exit sign
materials commonly found in passenger rail cars and some HPPL sign and
LLEPM materials were placed in a car that was darkened to demonstrate
the difference in performance between the two types. ``High
performance'' is defined as material that exhibits significantly
enhanced surface brightness for a much longer time period compared with
zinc sulfide photoluminescent material. Section F below provides
further information relating to photoluminescent material performance
characteristics. Next, the car was filled with theatrical smoke, which
quickly rose and filled most of the car, making all photoluminescent
signs indiscernible (including HPPL markings), except for door exit
location and LLEPM markings located near the floor. Members of the Task
Force participating in the simulation attempted to exit the car via an
end door by moving along the aisle in a crouching position and using an
HPPL LLEPM system as guidance. The LLEPM system was covered in one end
(half) of the car to demonstrate the noticeable effectiveness of the
LLEPM system that remained visible in the other end (half) of the car,
in terms of brightness and duration. Next, the darkened car was tilted
to a 15 degree angle. This car orientation was used to demonstrate
firsthand the potential difficulties associated with trying to maintain
one's balance and walk through the car to a door exit.
    The low-location exit path marking (LLEPM) system complements the
emergency signage system by identifying all primary door exits with
HPPL and the emergency lighting system by providing a visible path to
emergency exits that is not dependent on a power sources outside of the
passenger compartment, ensuring that all primary emergency exits in a
passenger car can be identified from every seat in the car. The Task
Force reviewed the 2002 APTA LLEPM standard and recommended that
certain revisions be made to address the same type of issues related to
photoluminescent material, as for the emergency signage standard, as
well as other technical revisions, for consistency with the emergency
signage standard, and to enable the FRA to incorporate the standard by
reference.

F. Photoluminescent Marking Materials

    As mentioned above, as result of the NTSB's investigation of the
February 1996 Silver Spring accident, the NTSB expressed concern that
at least some of the passengers in the MARC train were unable to
locate, reach, or operate doors and emergency window exits due to the
failure of emergency lighting. Shortly after, FRA issued EO 20
requiring commuter and intercity passenger railroads to mark emergency
window exits with luminescent material. See 61 FR 6876. The most
conspicuous and visible markings related to emergency egress are either
internally illuminated (illuminated by a self-contained source), or
made of HPPL materials.
    Since the issuance of EO 20, Volpe Center research has provided
extensive information to FRA and the Task Force for different types of
photoluminescent materials and their performance characteristics, when
installed in passenger rail cars. The luminescence (brightness) levels
for many of the emergency exit signs and LLEPM marking, using zinc
sulfide material, originally installed in response to EO 20, are very
low and the duration is very short originally and thus do not perform
as well as the newer HPPL materials, using strontium aluminate, which
are capable of a much higher initial brightness and longer duration
time. In addition, Volpe Center research shows that placement of the
photoluminescent sign and marking materials relative to sources of
illumination is key to proper performance in terms of brightness and
duration. Other factors that affect the ability of occupants to see
signs and marking and read signs include: the size of the letters,
distance from the sign or marking, and the visual acuity of the person
seeing the sign and marking.
    Separately, and in conjunction with industry representatives, the
Volpe Center conducted illumination and luminance tests in various in-
service passenger cars of different design and age and demonstrated
that some of the photoluminescent markings were not as luminescent
(i.e., bright) as they were intended to be. Signs and LLEPM markings
certified to be capable of achieving certain luminance levels were
found not to meet those criteria due to inadequate charging light
levels. The presence of shadows cast by nearby structures and fixtures,
the location of light fixtures relative to emergency exit sign and
LLEPM markings, the condition of light diffusers, and the type of lamps
used to provide the illumination were all causes for why either the
zinc sulfide or the HPPL products were unable to charge sufficiently
and thus achieve expected luminance levels.
    The Task Force considered the use of HPPL material to be an
important improvement over the previous, less strenuous, requirements
for duration and luminance of photoluminescence materials and also a
cost-effective means of addressing concerns regarding the survivability
of emergency lighting systems, particularly for older equipment in
service. Adoption of the APTA LLEPM standard by FRA by incorporation by
reference into part 238 also addresses the NTSB Silver Spring
recommendation to require that the path to the emergency exits be
marked in all passenger cars.
    To develop a more effective photoluminescent standard that would
address the Volpe Center findings, the Task Force developed HPPL
material specifications with Volpe Center technical assistance that
APTA included in its 2007 revision of both the emergency signage
standard and the LLEPM standard. FRA notes that the Task Force proposed
revisions to the emergency signage and LLEPM standards to: (1) Allow
flexibility for use of different types of charging light sources, (2)
require that new HPPL signs meet the same luminance requirements with
lower charging light levels, (3) allow alternative testing criteria
using

meters that do not measure off-axis illuminance accurately, (4)
grandfather signs that are likely to perform as intended for 60
minutes, and (5) in small areas, to allow lower levels of luminance or
use of larger signs to compensate for even lower light levels. APTA
revised the two APTA standards which now establish more stringent
minimum requirements for the HPPL material performance criteria to
provide visual guidance for passengers and train crewmembers to locate,
reach, and operate door exits and emergency window exits, especially
during conditions of darkness when the emergency lighting system has
failed, (or when smoke conditions obscure overhead emergency lighting).

G. Emergency Communication System Marking

    The NTSB accident investigation report for the February 9, 1996
collision near Secaucus, New Jersey, that involved two New Jersey
Transit Rail Operations (NJTR) trains and resulted in three fatalities
and numerous injuries, illustrates the importance of emergency
communication systems to prevent panic and further injuries. According
to the NTSB report (NTSB/RAR-97/01, at p. 27):

    [a]lthough the train crews said that they went from car to car
instructing passengers to remain seated, passengers said that they
were not told about the severity of the situation and were concerned
about a possible fire or being struck by an oncoming train. They
therefore left the train and wandered around the tracks waiting for
guidance, potentially posing a greater hazard because of the leaking
fuel from train 1107.
    No crewmember used the public address system to communicate with
passengers. By using the public address system, all passengers would
have received the same message in less time than it would have taken
the NJT employees to walk from car to car.

    The NTSB report also stated:

    Information about the possibility of a fire or a collision with
an oncoming train could have been provided to passengers over the
public address system to address their concerns and prevent them
from leaving the train. The Safety Board concludes that the lack of
public announcements addressing the passengers' concerns caused them
to act independently, evacuate the train, and wander along the
tracks, thus potentially contributing to the dangerous conditions at
the collision site.

    To address the NTSB report, FRA issued the PESS final rule in 1999,
which established requirements for two-way emergency communication
systems and markings for Tier II passenger equipment. See 64 FR 25540,
25641 (May 12, 1999). Public address (PA) systems allow the train crew
to keep their passengers informed in an emergency situation and provide
instructions to them in a timely manner. The train crew can provide
instructions to passengers to not take an action that could place them
or other passengers in any greater danger, such as instructing them, as
appropriate, to remain on the train and not endanger themselves by
unnecessarily evacuating the train on their own. Conversely, passengers
could use the intercom feature of a two-way communication system to
report security issues as well as other life-threatening situations.
When head-end power is lost, having markings that remain conspicuous
allow passengers to locate and use the intercom to communicate with the
train crew. During the development of the 2008 PTES final rule, some
railroad representatives on the Task Force noted that although
instructions were posted at the intercom locations on their passenger
cars, luminescent markings to mark the intercom location were not used.
The Task Force therefore recommended that luminescent markings be
required for that purpose. It should be noted that FRA proposed to
adopt such a requirement in the PTES final rule, and invited comment on
whether the luminescent material should be HPPL material, as discussed
below. See 71 FR 50293. As noted above, in the discussion concerning
emergency window exit signage, the APTA emergency signage standard
contains specific criteria for luminescent markings. The Task Force
focused on revisions to this APTA standard in order to recommend
whether to incorporate some or all of its contents into part 238 by
reference and thereby require that luminescent markings for intercoms
comply with the standard as it relates to luminescent markings. APTA
PRESS had also indicated that they intended to revise APTA SS-PS-001-
98, ``Standard for Passenger Railroad Emergency Communications,'' to
include more specific requirements for marking emergency communication
systems. However, no comments were received, and the PTES final rule
required luminescent marking of each intercom location to ensure that
the intercom can be easily identified for use in the event that both
normal and emergency lighting are not functioning. The posted operating
instructions, however, are not required to be luminescent. Some Task
Force members indicated that the instructions may be easier to read
when not luminescent.
    As noted previously, the Task Force discussed at length issues
associated with the development of HPPL material component
requirements. Due to the APTA revision of the performance criteria for
HPPL material, the Task Force recommended that the intercom system
comply with the brightness and duration of HPPL material performance
criteria in the emergency lighting standard. Accordingly, FRA believes
that applying the luminescent marking requirements in the revised APTA
emergency signage standard to intercom systems would further address
the NTSB report emergency communication concerns.

H. Debriefing and Critique Session Following Emergency Situations and
Full-Scale Simulations

    As an illustration of the importance of train crew participation in
a debrief and critique session, FRA notes that on May 25, 2006, a power
outage disrupted all rail traffic on the Northeast Corridor between
Washington and New York during the morning rush hour, stranding
approximately 112 trains with tens of thousands of passengers on board.
Currently, part 239 requires that train crew members participate in the
required debriefing and critique session of such incidents. However,
the managers of the train crew of at least one train participated in
the debriefing and critique session, rather than the train crew. The
Task Force recognized the importance of the participation of train crew
and other employees who actually have first-hand knowledge of the
emergency in the debriefing and critique sessions. Accordingly, the
Task Force reviewed the existing debriefing and critique requirements
in section 239.105 and recommended that clarifications be made to
ensure that to the extent practicable, all onboard crewmembers, control
center personnel, and any other employees actually involved in
emergency situations and full-scale simulations, be included in the
debriefing and critique sessions. In addition, flexibility was provided
to railroads by permitting participation in the required debriefing and
critique sessions of the employees, either in person or by the use of
alternative methods. As such, FRA proposes to clarify Sec.  239.105 to
reflect this necessary participation.

VII. Section-by-Section Analysis

    This section-by-section analysis explains the provisions proposed.
Several of the issues and provisions involving this proposed rule have
been discussed and addressed in detail in the preamble, above.
Accordingly, these

preamble discussions should be considered in conjunction with those
below and will be referenced as appropriate.

A. Proposed Amendments to Part 238, Subparts B, C, and E

Section 238.5 Definitions
    In this section, FRA is proposing a set of new definitions to be
introduced into the regulation, as well as the revision of certain
existing definitions. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the
meaning of important terms as they are used in the text of the rule, in
an attempt to minimize the potential for misinterpretation of the rule.
    ``APTA'' would mean The American Public Transportation Association.
    FRA proposes the definition in this section to reflect the present
name of APTA, ``American Public Transportation Association.'' This
section's reference to APTA as the ``American Public Transit
Association,'' has become outdated.
    ``End-frame door'' would mean an end-facing door normally located
between or adjacent to the collision posts or similar end-frame
structural elements. This term refers to exterior doors only. This term
would be added for use in the definition of a vestibule door to make
clear that an end-frame door is not a vestibule door.
    FRA proposes to revise the definition of ``vestibule'' to clarify
that a ``vestibule'' is located adjacent to a side door exit. The
definition would make clear that certain interior doors would be
considered vestibule doors, and thus, would be subject to the proposed
requirements for removable panels or windows. In conjunction with
another defined term in this proposal, ``vestibule door,'' this
definition is intended to make clear that certain areas in a passenger
car that are used for passing from a seating area to a side door exit
are vestibules. Interior areas of a passenger car that normally do not
contain seating and are used for passing from, but are not adjacent to,
a side door are not vestibules. Therefore, doors located in such areas
would not be subject to requirements for vestibule doors unless
otherwise specified (see Sec.  238.112(f)). Passageways located away
from side door exits would not be considered vestibules.
    ``Vestibule door'' would mean a door separating a seating area from
a vestibule. End-frame doors and doors separating sleeping compartments
or similar private compartments from a passageway would not be
vestibule doors. This term is referenced in Sec.  238.112(f) as one
type of door that would be required to have removable panels or windows
for emergency egress use in new passenger cars. Note that Sec.  238.112
also applies to other interior doors intended for passage through a
passenger car, namely, the interior doors that, while not located
adjacent to a side door, are located near one or both ends of a car
(sometimes just the ``blind end'' of the car) and provide passage to
the next car, such as the door(s) at the end(s) of the Metra Gallery
Cars and Amtrak Amfleet I and II Cars, as well as the door located on
the upper level of the Amtrak Superliner Cars.
Section 238.112 Doors
    This proposed section would consolidate certain existing door
requirements that apply to both Tier I and Tier II passenger cars, add
new requirements related to removable panels or windows in vestibule
doors, and clarify that an exterior side door is required ``in each
side'' of a passenger car ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or
placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002.
Existing door requirements are currently located in Sec. Sec.  238.235
for Tier I equipment and 238.439 for Tier II equipment. Section 239.107
also contains interior and exterior marking and instruction
requirements, respectively, for all doors intended for emergency egress
and all doors intended for emergency access by emergency responders.
All door requirements that apply both to Tier I and Tier II passenger
cars would be moved to this new Sec.  238.112. The new vestibule door
requirements would enhance passenger safety by requiring an additional
means of access to the vestibule area from the passenger seating area,
and vice versa.
    Proposed paragraphs (a) through (c) would contain the requirements
currently located in paragraphs Sec.  238.235(a) through (c). A minor
modification is proposed to paragraph (b) to make clear that of the
minimum two exterior side doors required in each passenger car ordered
on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time
on or after September 9, 2002, one must be located in each side of the
car. Moreover, paragraph (b) makes clear that a set of dual-leafed
doors is considered a single door for purposes of this paragraph.
    Proposed paragraphs (d) and (e) contain the requirements for
interior and exterior door exit markings and instructions,
respectively, which are currently contained in Sec. Sec.  238.235(d)
and 239.107(a). Both paragraphs would reference the requirements in new
Sec.  238.125.
    Proposed paragraph (f) requires a removable panel or removable
window in each vestibule door, as well as in any other interior door
intended for passage through a passenger car. A vestibule door, or its
pocket, may become deformed or otherwise inoperable during an
emergency. The additional means of egress would be used in the event
that a vestibule door cannot be opened, or it becomes difficult to
retain the door in an open position, to allow for passage from the
seating area to the exterior doors in the vestibule. The latter
circumstance is of particular concern when a passenger car is on its
side where the pocket for the door would now be located above the door,
making it difficult to keep the door in the open position. In the case
of other interior doors intended for passage through a passenger car
(see discussion above related to the definition of vestibule door in
the section-by-section analysis of Sec.  238.5), the removable panel or
window would facilitate passage to the next car. Distinct requirements
would apply to bi-parting doors. Such doors, because each leaf is too
narrow, cannot reasonably contain removable panels or windows that
would allow occupants to pass through. To allow sufficient time for
railroads and manufacturers of passenger cars to implement these
requirements without costly modifications to existing car orders, the
requirements in this paragraph would apply to equipment ordered on or
after the effective date of the final rule or placed in service for the
first time on or after a date 4 years later. Railroad representatives
indicated that a 4-year time period was consistent with the time
between the placement of an order and delivery of the ordered
equipment.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(1) makes clear that doors providing access
to a control compartment would be exempt from this requirement. The
doors to such compartments are usually locked, particularly in newer
cars that have door lock override mechanisms, to prevent unauthorized
access to the control compartment. Railroads may, at their discretion,
include removable panels or other additional means of egress in these
doors, but they would not be required to do so. This paragraph also
requires a manual override device for the vestibule door if the door is
powered, to ensure occupants can open the door in the even power is
lost.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(2)(i) requires that each removable panel or
window be designed to permit rapid and easy removal from both the
vestibule and passenger seating area without the use of a tool or other
implement. Access

from both areas is consistent with the preferred means of car
evacuation, which is to the next car and not onto the right-of-way. The
designs for removable windows or panels would likely be very similar to
the removable gasket design and other designs generally used for dual-
function windows, which serve both as emergency window exits and rescue
access windows and therefore can be opened and removed from inside or
outside of the car. This requirement is intended to be consistent with
the ease of operability requirement currently applicable to emergency
window exits in Sec.  238.113, which dual-function windows must meet.
For example, the design presented by Kawasaki for a removable panel in
a vestibule door, described in the February 1, 2008 final rule, would
satisfy the requirements for ease of operability being proposed. See 73
FR 6370. Proposed paragraph (f)(2)(ii) requires that removal of the
panel or window create an unobstructed opening with minimum dimensions
of 21 inches horizontally by 28 inches vertically. The Task Force
consulted with passenger car and door manufacturers to ensure that the
dimensions being proposed could be met without sacrificing the basic
structural design and integrity properties of vestibule doors,
including firmness, balance, and stability. Manufacturers agreed that
the maximum width that could be reasonably achieved is 21 inches. The
proposed 28-inch vertical dimension allows for the door to have a
vertically-centered horizontal structural member as well as retain a
window in the upper half, which is common to many existing door designs
and a feature that railroads are interested in retaining.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(2)(iii) would require that the removable
panel or window be located so that the lowest point of the opening is
no higher than 18 inches from the floor. This requirement is intended
to provide ease of use for pass through after removal of the panel or
window. The opening should be located close to the floor so that car
occupants could crawl through without undue difficulty or undue delay.
    Proposed paragraphs (f)(3) would contain distinct requirements for
bi-parting doors. Each powered, bi-parting vestibule door would have to
be equipped with a manual override device and a mechanism to retain
each door leaf in the open position. Examples of a retention mechanism
include a ratchet and pawl system that allows movement in one direction
but locks it in the other, and a sprag. The retention mechanism would
be used to hold the door panels, which can be relatively heavy, in
place once they are opened. The override mechanism would provide a
means to operate the doors in the event that power is lost. It would
have to be located adjacent to the door leaf it controls and be
designed and maintained so that a person could readily access and
operate it from both the vestibule and the seating area, without the
use of any tool or other implement. Access from both areas is
consistent with the preferred means of car evacuation, which is to the
next car, and not onto the right-of-way.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(4) specifically contains requirements
related to the capabilities of manual override devices. A manual
override device is intended to allow a passenger to unlock a car door
during an emergency that has been locked by the railroad for
operational purposes. Without the manual override device, a key or
other tool or implement is typically needed to unlock the door. By
making the door easier to unlock, the manual override device will
expedite passenger egress during an emergency.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(5) contains requirements for marking and
operating instructions for removal panels and windows as well as bi-
parting door override devices and retention mechanisms. To ensure that
each removable panel or removable window can be identified in the dark,
these would have to be conspicuously and legibly marked with high-
performance photoluminescent material on both the vestibule and the
passenger seating area sides of the door. Use of such material is
consistent with requirements for emergency window exit and door exit
signage. Legible and understandable operating instructions for each
removable panel or window would also have to be provided on both the
vestibule and seating area side of the door. The same marking and
instruction requirements would apply to bi-parting door manual override
devices and retention mechanisms.
    FRA believes that it is important to inspect, maintain, and repair
manual door override devices and door retention mechanisms to ensure
that they function properly in the event of an emergency. FRA believes
that testing of a representative sample of manual override devices and
door retention mechanisms no less frequently than once every 184 days
to verify that they are operating properly would be reasonable and
appropriate for safety. This frequency is consistent with existing
requirements contained in Sec.  238.113 for the testing of emergency
window exits. However, because emergency window exits are subject to
different service conditions than removable panels and windows located
on vestibule doors, separate tests would be needed. Following each
test, FRA also believes that inoperative manual override devices should
be repaired before the cars they are in reenter service. FRA requests
comments regarding the proper timing of the testing and repair of
manual override door devices and retention devices as proposed in
paragraph (f)(6).
Section 238.113 Emergency Window Exits
    This section would be amended to require markings and instructions
for emergency window exits to comply with the APTA marking standards
that FRA is proposing to incorporate by reference in this rulemaking in
Sec.  238.125. The inspection requirement related to marking of
emergency window exits currently contained in Sec.  239.107(b) would
also be added to this section. FRA believes these changes will enhance
the reliability of markings for locating and instructions for operating
emergency window exits.
    Existing requirements in parts 223 and 239 for the marking of
emergency exits, as well as existing requirements in part 238 for the
marking of emergency communications transmission points, specify the
use of luminescent materials. (Door exits intended for emergency egress
may also be lighted, in accordance with Sec.  239.107(a)(1).) Part 238
defines ``luminescent material'' as material that absorbs light energy
when ambient levels of light are high and emits this stored energy when
ambient levels of light are low, making the material appear to glow in
the dark. See 49 CFR Sec.  238.5. Paragraph (d) would continue to
require that luminescent material be used to mark emergency window
exits. However, as further discussed below, FRA is proposing to
incorporate, by reference, in Sec.  238.125 APTA Standard SS-PS-002-98,
Rev. 3, ``Standard for Emergency Signage for Egress/Access of Passenger
Rail Equipment.'' The APTA standard would establish specific criteria
for luminescent material, including how bright the material must be and
how long it must stay luminescent. The APTA standard also contains
specific design requirements to facilitate recognition and reliability,
including letter size and color contrast requirements as well as
requirements for door locator signs to facilitate identification of
door locations that may not be easily seen by seated passengers.
    FRA is proposing to move the existing emergency window exit testing
requirements contained in Sec.  239.107(b)

to a new paragraph (e) in this section. Generally, emergency window
exits are intended to supplement door exits, which are normally the
preferred means of egress in an emergency situation. Emergency windows
provide an alternative means of emergency egress should doors be
rendered inoperable or inaccessible. They also provide an additional
means of egress in life-threatening situations requiring very rapid
exit, such as a fire on board or submergence of the car in a body of
water. The requirement to periodically test a representative sample of
emergency window exits arose from EO No. 20 and is being carried
forward from Sec.  239.107 into this new proposed paragraph.
Section 238.114 Rescue Access Windows
    This section would be amended to add the APTA marking standards
that are being proposed for incorporation by reference in this
rulemaking in Sec.  238.125 to the existing rescue access windows
requirements. Proposed paragraph (d) continues to require that
retroreflective material be used to mark rescue access windows.
However, as further discussed below, FRA is proposing to incorporate by
reference an APTA standard into Sec.  238.125 that would establish
specific criteria to maintain optimum retroreflective properties of the
base material.
    As noted above in the discussion of emergency window exits, Sec.
238.125 proposes to incorporate by reference APTA Standard SS-PS-002-
98, Rev. 3, ``Standard for Emergency Signage for Egress/Access of
Passenger Rail Equipment.'' The APTA standard contains detailed
criteria for marking rescue access windows, including the use of
retroreflective material. FRA invited comment on whether the criteria
in the APTA standard or in other existing standards for marking rescue
access windows were appropriate for use in the PTES final rule. See 71
FR 50292. While no written comments were received on this issue, both
the Task Force and the Working Group for the first PTES rulemaking
recommended that FRA add the criteria to the final rule. In order to
maintain the optimum retroreflective properties of the base material,
any retroreflective markings that have ink or pigment applied should
utilize a translucent or semi-translucent ink, as per the
manufacturer's instructions. A clear coat that protects against ultra-
violet light may be added to prevent fading. Retroreflectivity
requirements shall be met if protective coatings or other materials for
the enhancement of sign durability are used.
    FRA believes that adopting the APTA standard will increase the
quality and reliability of the retroreflective materials used in rescue
access windows and doors. This section was originally prompted in part
by the April 23, 2002 collision involving a Metrolink passenger train
near Placentia, CA, and the ensuing NTSB Safety Recommendation (R-03-
21) to FRA, which illustrated the potential importance of having rescue
access windows on each level of a passenger car. The general intent of
the provision is to provide a means for emergency responders to quickly
identify and effectively operate rescue access windows in order to gain
access directly into every passenger compartment on every level of a
passenger car, in the event that a stairway or interior door is
compromised and exterior doors are blocked. The enhanced quality and
reliability of the retroreflective material are intended to ensure the
markings and instructions remain conspicuous and legible taking into
consideration the environment in which passenger trains operate.
Section 238.115 Emergency Lighting
    To enhance the performance of emergency lighting in passenger cars,
FRA proposes to expand the application of this section to all passenger
cars, and modify the emergency lighting requirements by incorporating
by reference APTA Standard SS-E-013-99, Rev. 1 (October 7, 2007)
Standard for Emergency Lighting Design for Passenger Cars, or an
alternative standard providing at least an equivalent level of safety
if approved by FRA pursuant to Sec.  238.21. This section currently
contains requirements for emergency lighting in passenger cars ordered
on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the first time
on or after September 9, 2002. Incorporating this APTA standard for all
passenger cars would enhance the existing standards for new passenger
cars and establish standards for passenger cars both ordered before
September 8, 2000, and placed in service before September 9, 2002. Part
238 requires minimum illumination levels at doors, aisles, and
passageways. In addition to those locations, the APTA emergency
lighting standard requires minimum levels of emergency illumination for
stairways, crew areas of multiple-unit (MU) locomotives and cab cars,
toilets, and other areas.
    The existing requirements in part 238 related to emergency lighting
require a ``back-up power system'' capable of operating in all
equipment orientations within 45 degrees of vertical, as well as after
the initial shock of certain collision or derailment scenarios. The
car's main car battery is considered an acceptable ``back-up power
system.'' A main car battery is limited in its ability to provide power
in equipment orientations greater than 45 degrees of vertical.
Additionally, because it is common for such batteries to be at least
partially located below the car body, it would not be unusual for the
main car battery to be damaged in the event of a derailment and render
the emergency lighting system inoperable as occurred in the MARC train
cab car that was involved in the 1996 accident in Silver Spring. For
equipment ordered on or after April 7, 2008 or first placed in service
on or after January 1, 2012, the 2007 APTA lighting standard requires
an independent power source to be located within the car body and
placed no more than a half-car length away from the fixture it powers
in the event the main car battery is not able to power the system. This
system must also be capable of operating in all equipment orientations.
The APTA emergency lighting standard contains additional design and
performance criteria for batteries that are used as independent power
sources. It also contains rigorous requirements for periodic testing of
batteries used as independent power sources.
    Existing Sec.  238.307 requires railroads to perform periodic
mechanical inspections of passenger equipment, including passenger
cars. The periodic mechanical inspection requires the inspection of
interior and exterior mechanical components not less frequently than
every 184 days. As part of this inspection the railroad is required to
verify that all emergency lighting systems are in place and operational
as specified in Sec.  238.115. The APTA emergency lighting standard
contains more detailed periodic inspection and maintenance related to
emergency lighting. The APTA standard requires that periodic tests to
confirm the minimum illumination levels and duration be conducted no
less frequently than every eight years. A representative sample of cars
or areas must be tested. However, if the first two cars or areas exceed
the minimum illumination levels by a factor of 4 or greater, no further
testing is required. Importantly, the APTA standard also requires
railroads to replace each sealed battery that is used as an independent
power source for an emergency light circuit at two-year intervals,
unless equipped with controllers that

automatically prevent unnecessary battery discharge or other measures
are taken to prevent routine discharge (e.g., maintaining equipment on
wayside power or HEP). If so equipped, the APTA standard requires that
the battery-replacement interval shall be according to manufacturer's
specifications, or if not specified, at least every five years. For
emergency lighting systems that use capacitors as independent power
sources, a functional test of the devices shall be conducted as part of
the periodic inspection. Due to their long life, the two-year
replacement requirement does not apply to capacitor-based energy
storage devices. However, a functional test of the devices shall be
conducted as part of the periodic inspection. The APTA standard also
requires initial verification tests on at least one representative car
or area of a car for each emergency lighting system layout to ensure
compliance with the minimum duration and illumination levels. The Task
Force, APTA, and its member railroads, have invested considerable time
and effort in developing industry standards that address emergency
lighting in passenger cars. FRA has reviewed the industry standards it
proposes to incorporate by reference in this rule and has determined
that the standards contain the proper specifications for emergency
lighting in passenger cars. FRA believes that compliance with the APTA
standard requirements identified in this section will help ensure
effective operation of emergency lighting in new passenger cars.
Establishment of requirements for older existing equipment will help
ensure emergency lighting systems are capable of providing sufficient
illumination for passengers to retain situational awareness in the
event normal lighting is not available, particularly in the event of an
emergency situation. FRA expects that almost all affected railroads are
already in compliance with the APTA standard requirements. Some
railroads, including railroads that are not members of APTA, are not
currently in compliance with the APTA standard requirements. To allow
railroads that are not currently in compliance with the APTA standard
requirements enough time to comply with the requirements, FRA will
delay implementation of the requirements for one year from the
effective date of the final rule in this proceeding.
Section 238.121 Emergency Communications
    To clarify existing paragraph (a)(2), FRA proposes to insert the
word ``after'' directly before the date ``April 1, 2010.'' The previous
omission of the word ``after'' in the existing paragraph was a
typographical error. The existing language is intended to identify cars
ordered on or after April 1, 2010, and not only cars ordered on April
1, 2010. As such, the clarification would not result in substantive
change to the existing requirements contained in this section.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2) applies the requirements for luminescent
materials proposed to be incorporated in Sec.  238.125 for emergency
signage markings, to the existing requirements for luminescent material
at intercom locations in existing paragraph (b)(2). Existing paragraph
(b)(2) requires that the location of each intercom intended for
passenger use be clearly marked with luminescent material and that
legible and understandable operating instructions be posted at or near
each such intercom to facilitate passenger use. The Task Force
recommended an effective date of April 1, 2010, for this requirement.
However, to allow for sufficient implementation time, FRA is not using
this date. This proposed paragraph would become effective on the date
the rule becomes effective. This proposed paragraph also makes clear
that photoluminescent markings that were installed in accordance with
the February 1, 2008 PTES rule are, and would remain, in compliance for
the first 2 years following the effective date of the rule, as
recommended by the Task Force.
    Proposed paragraph (c) continues to require that PA and intercom
systems on all new Tier I passenger cars and all Tier II passenger
trains have back-up power for a minimum period of 90 minutes. An
example of a back-up power source is the main battery in a passenger
car. The only change FRA is proposing is to clarify the applicability
of this paragraph, which was originally added by the February 1, 2008
PTES final rule without any express applicability dates. FRA intended
that the back-up power requirements have the same applicability dates
as those for intercom systems in the February 1, 2008 final rule. That
is, paragraph (c) applies to each Tier I passenger car ordered on or
after April 1, 2008, or placed in service for the first time on or
after April 1, 2010, and to all Tier II passenger cars. While FRA
believes that the application of paragraph (c) is understood from a
reading of this section as a whole, adding these dates will remove any
confusion that may arise.
Section 238.123 Emergency Roof Access
    This proposal would amend paragraph (e) to include the APTA
standard for marking emergency roof access and providing
retroreflective material and instructions that is being proposed for
inclusion in this rulemaking in Sec.  238.125. Existing paragraph (e)
contains requirements for marking, and providing instructions for,
emergency roof access locations. Currently, each emergency roof access
location is required to be conspicuously marked with retroreflective
material of contrasting color, and legible and understandable
instructions must be provided near the emergency roof access location.
The retroreflective material is intended to enable emergency responders
to quickly identify the access locations by shining a light on the
roof, and the instructions are intended to facilitate the proper use of
the emergency roof access by emergency responders. To maximize the
potential use of the required retroreflective material and instruction
for emergency roof access, this rulemaking would apply the proposed
requirements of Sec.  238.125, which incorporates APTA's standard for
retroreflective material by reference. APTA and its member railroads
have invested considerable time and effort in developing industry
standards that address retroreflective material in passenger cars. FRA
has reviewed the industry standards it proposes to incorporate in this
rule and has determined that the standards contain the proper
specifications for retroreflective material in passenger cars. FRA
believes that compliance with the APTA standard identified in this
section will ensure that the retroreflective material markings for
emergency roof access are conspicuous and instructions are legible and
thus facilitate emergency responder access to passenger cars.
Section 238.125 Marking and Instructions for Emergency Egress and
Rescue Access
    To enhance the performance of emergency signage and markings for
egress and access in passenger cars, FRA proposes to modify the
emergency signage and markings for egress and access requirements by
incorporating by reference APTA Standard SS-PS-002-98, Rev. 3
(authorized on October 7, 2007), Standard for Emergency Signage for
Egress/Access of Passenger Rail Equipment. This proposal would also
permit use of an alternative standard providing at least an equivalent
level of

safety if approved by FRA pursuant to Sec.  238.21.
    Generally, the APTA signage standard requires that each passenger
rail car have interior emergency signage to assist passengers and train
crewmembers in locating and operating emergency exits in order to
safely evacuate from the rail car or train, and exterior signage to
assist emergency responders in locating and operating emergency access
points, during an emergency situation that warrants passenger rail car
or train evacuation. Passenger railroads recognize that, in the
majority of emergency situations, the safest place for passengers and
crew is on the train. Should evacuation from a particular car be
required, the safest course of action for passengers and crew is
normally to move into an adjacent car. This avoids or minimizes the
hazards inherent with evacuating passengers onto the railroad right-of-
way. The standard was designed to offer flexibility in application, as
well as to achieve the desired goal of facilitating passenger and crew
egress from potentially life threatening situations in passenger rail
cars. Individual railroads have the responsibility to design, install
and maintain an emergency signage system that is compatible with their
internal safety policies for emergency evacuation, while complying with
the performance criteria specified in this APTA standard. The APTA
signage standard requirements would improve upon the existing standards
by increasing the overall efficacy of the signage providing evacuation
guidance for passengers and train crew members and rescue access
guidance for emergency responders. The existing Federal requirements
related to signage require that the signage be legible and conspicuous.
The APTA standard specifies requirements related to signage including:
recognition, design requirements, location, size, color and contrast,
materials, and others. Incorporation of more detailed APTA signage
standard requirements would help ensure that emergency egress points
are easily identified and operated by passengers and train crew members
to evacuate a passenger car during an emergency.
    Existing Sec.  238.307 requires railroads to perform periodic
mechanical inspections of passenger equipment, including passenger
cars. The periodic mechanical inspection requires the inspection of
interior and exterior mechanical components not less frequently than
every 184 days. As part of this inspection the railroad is required to
verify that all safety-related signage is in place and legible. See
Sec. Sec.  238.305(c)(7) and 238.307(c)(12) . The APTA standard
specifies more detailed periodic inspection and maintenance related to
signage. Notably, as with the LLEPM standard, the signage standard
requires railroads to verify that all emergency signage system
components function as intended. Section <IP_ADDRESS> of the APTA Signage
Standard addresses photoluminescent (including HPPL) systems, and
requires railroads to:
     Conduct tests and inspections in conformance with the
requirements of APTA SS--I & M--005-98, Rev. 2, Standard for Passenger
Compartment Periodic Inspection and Maintenance;
     Conduct periodic tests and inspections to verify that all
emergency signage system components, including power sources, function
as intended;
     Test a representative sample of passenger rail cars/areas,
in accordance with Sections <IP_ADDRESS> and <IP_ADDRESS> (of the APTA Signage
Standard) using procedures in Annex F of the Standard or another
statistically valid documented sampling method; and
     Conduct periodic illuminance tests to confirm that
photoluminescent components receive adequate charging light no less
frequently than once every 8 years, with the first test conducted no
later than 8 years after the car was placed in service for the first
time:
     HPPL signs/markings placed in areas designed or maintained
with normal light levels of less than 5 fc.; and
     Grandfathered PL materials, where the sign/marking in
placed in an area designed or maintained with normal light levels of
less than 10 fc. If all of the illuminance levels in the first two
randomly selected representative sample cars/areas exceed the minimum
required to charge the photoluminescent components required by this
Standard by at least a factor of 2, no further testing is required for
the cars/areas represented by the sample car/area tested for the
periodic inspection cycle.
    The Task Force, APTA, and its member railroads have invested
considerable time and effort in developing industry standards that
address emergency signage and markings for egress and access in
passenger cars. FRA has reviewed the industry standard it proposes to
incorporate by reference and has determined that the standard contains
the proper specifications for emergency signage and markings for egress
and access that will allow passenger car occupants to identify and
operate emergency exits and emergency responders to identify and
operate rescue access points. FRA believes that compliance with the
APTA standard identified in this section will ensure effective use of
emergency signage and markings for egress and access in passenger cars.
FRA expects that almost all affected railroads are already in
compliance with the APTA standard requirements. Some railroads,
including railroads that are not members of APTA, are not currently in
compliance with the APTA standard requirements. To allow railroads that
are not currently in compliance with the APTA standard requirements
enough time to comply with the requirements, FRA will delay
implementation of the requirements for one year from the effective date
of the final rule in this proceeding.
Section 238.127 Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking
    To facilitate passenger car evacuation, particularly under
conditions of darkness and smoke, FRA proposes to incorporate by
reference APTA's low-location emergency exit path marking standard:
APTA SS-PS-004-99, Rev. 2 (authorized on October 7, 2007), Standard for
Low-Location Exit Path Marking. This proposal would also permit use of
an alternative standard providing at least an equivalent level of
safety if approved by FRA pursuant to Sec.  238.21.
    Generally, the APTA standard was developed to establish minimum
requirements for low-location exit path marking (LLEPM) in both
existing and new passenger cars to provide visual guidance for
passengers and train crewmembers to identify, reach, and operate
primary exits during conditions of darkness when the emergency lighting
system has failed or when smoke conditions obscure overhead emergency
lighting. This standard requires that each passenger rail car have an
LLEPM system, visible in the area from the floor to a horizontal plane
4 feet (1.22 m) above the aisle of the rail car to direct passengers to
exit the affected car to the adjacent car (or, at the option of the
railroad, off the train). This LLEPM system, located in or near the
rail car floor, is intended to assist passengers and train crewmembers
in identifying the path to exit the rail car in an emergency under
conditions of darkness and especially smoke.
    The APTA LLEPM standard would complement the existing emergency
signage requirements by increasing the overall efficacy of such systems
to enable passengers and train crew members to locate, reach, and
operate emergency exits under a greater range of emergency situations,
particularly life-threatening circumstances involving smoke. Existing
Federal requirements require that the signage be legible and

conspicuous. Much like the APTA signage standard, the APTA LLEPM
standard specifies requirements related to the selection of the
physical characteristics, informational content, and placement of LLEPM
systems for installation within passenger railcars to provide
consistent identification of both primary and secondary exits, under
certain conditions, and the path(s) to follow to reach such exits.
    Existing Sec.  238.307 requires railroads to perform periodic
mechanical inspections of passenger equipment, including passenger
cars. The periodic mechanical inspection requires the inspection of
interior and exterior mechanical components not less frequently than
every 184 days. As part of this inspection the railroad is required to
verify that all vestibule steps are illuminated. See Sec.
238.305(c)(9). The APTA LLEPM standard specifies additional periodic
inspection and maintenance related to LLEPM signage and markings.
Notably, the periodic inspection requirement in the APTA LLEPM standard
requires railroads to conduct periodic inspections and tests to verify
that all LLEPM system components, including power sources, function as
intended. Like the APTA signage standard, it requires railroads to test
a representative sample of passenger rail cars or areas using a
statistically-valid, documented sampling method.
    The Task Force, APTA, and its member railroads have invested
considerable time and effort in developing industry standards that
address low-location emergency exit path markings in passenger cars.
FRA has reviewed the industry standard it proposes to incorporate in
this rule and has determined that the standard contains the proper
specifications for low-location emergency exit path markings. FRA
believes that compliance with the APTA standard identified in this
section will help ensure that passenger car occupants are able to
identify, reach, and operate primary egress points during an emergency.
FRA expects that almost all affected railroads are already in
compliance with the APTA standard requirements. Some railroads,
including railroads that are not members of APTA, are not currently in
compliance with the APTA standard requirements. To allow railroads that
are not currently in compliance with the APTA standard requirements
enough time to comply with the requirements, FRA will delay
implementation of the requirements for one year from the effective date
of the final rule in this proceeding.
Section 238.235 Doors
    FRA proposes to remove Sec.  238.235. The existing door
requirements in this section would be moved to Sec.  238.112. The
substantive requirements would remain the same, and would be moved only
for user convenience. Proposed Sec.  238.112 would consolidate into one
section, all existing door requirements from Sec. Sec.  238.235,
238.439, and 239.107 that apply, as specified, to all passenger cars.
Because all of the requirements in Sec.  238.235 would be moved to
Sec.  238.112, no requirements would remain in Sec.  238.235.
Section 238.305 Interior Calendar Day Mechanical Inspection of
Passenger Cars
    FRA proposes clarifying existing paragraph (a), and adding new
paragraphs (c)(11) and (13) to address the inspection of removable
panels and windows in vestibule doors and certain other interior doors,
as well as the inspection of low-location emergency exit path markings.
Paragraph (c)(11) would contain requirements for ensuring that low-
location emergency exit path markings required by Sec.  238.127 are in
place and conspicuous.
    Proposed paragraph (a) would correct an erroneous cross-reference.
The existing paragraph contains an erroneous cross-reference to
paragraph (d) of this section, which was caused by a previous
redesignation of the original paragraph (d). See 65 FR 41284, 41308;
July 3, 2000. Paragraph (a) currently identifies equipment that
requires an interior calendar day inspection and references paragraph
(d) as the providing exceptions to the requirement. However, current
paragraph (d) does not address when the inspection is required, whereas
current paragraph (e) does. FRA is proposing to correct the cross
reference by changing the cross-reference within paragraph (a), from
(d) to (e).
    Paragraph (c)(13) proposes requirements for ensuring that removable
panels and windows in vestibule doors and other interior doors used for
passage through a passenger car are properly in place and secured,
based on a visual inspection performed during the interior calendar day
mechanical inspection. This paragraph also affords flexibility for
handling noncompliant equipment, provided that the railroad has
developed and follows written procedures for mitigating the hazard(s)
caused by the noncomplying condition and the train crew is given
written notification of the defect and a record of the time and date
the defect was discovered is maintained. Thus, a passenger car with an
inoperative or nonfunctioning removable panel or window is permitted to
remain in passenger service until no later than the car's fourth
interior calendar day mechanical inspection or next periodic mechanical
inspection required under Sec.  238.307, whichever occurs first, or for
a passenger car used in long-distance intercity train service until the
eighth interior calendar day mechanical inspection or next periodic
mechanical inspection required under Sec.  238.307, whichever occurs
first, after the noncompliant condition is discovered. At that time,
the removable panel or window would have to be repaired, or the car
would have to be removed from service.
    This existing section currently contains the requirements related
to the performance of interior calendar day mechanical inspections of
passenger cars (e.g., passenger coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars)
each calendar day that the equipment is used in service. Paragraph (c)
identifies the various components that require visual inspection as
part of the interior calendar day mechanical inspection. Inspection,
testing, and maintenance of emergency systems will help ensure that
these systems are either available for use in the event of an
emergency, or that the train crew is aware that they are not available.
This will allow for more effective and safe resolution of emergency
situations. The proposed modification would also allow flexibility for
operating equipment in passenger service with certain noncompliant
conditions. The operational flexibility will give railroads sufficient
time to repair the equipment without undue disruption to normal
operations.
Section 238.307 Periodic Mechanical Inspection of Passenger Cars and
Unpowered Vehicles Used in Passenger Trains
    FRA proposes the modification of this section to add requirements
for inspecting and repairing removable panels, removable windows,
manual override devices, and door retention mechanisms, in accordance
with Sec.  238.112, as well as low-location emergency exit path
markings required by Sec.  238.127. FRA is also proposing to relocate
the existing requirement for inspecting and repairing emergency window
exits in Sec.  239.107 to this section. In this regard, FRA would
continue to require that records of emergency window exit inspection,
testing, and maintenance be retained for two calendar years after the
end of the calendar year to which they relate, as currently required by
Sec.  239.107(c). FRA

is concerned in particular that sufficient records be kept of periodic
emergency window exit testing, which FRA is proposing to move from
Sec.  239.107(b) to Sec.  238.113(e). Inspection, testing, and
maintenance of emergency systems will help ensure that these systems
are available for use in the event of an emergency. This will allow for
more effective and safe resolution of emergency situations.
Section 238.311 Single Car Test
    FRA proposes amending this section to reflect the present name of
APTA, ``American Public Transportation Association''; and its present
address at 1666 K Street NW., Washington, DC 20006. This section's
reference to APTA as the ``American Public Transit Association,''
located at 1201 New York Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20005, has become
outdated. No substantive change to the requirement of this section is
intended. The APTA standard referenced in this section remains the
same.
Section 238.439 Doors
    This section currently contains the requirements for doors on Tier
II passenger cars. As noted, FRA is generally proposing to consolidate
the requirements of this section, along with those in its Tier I
counterpart (Sec.  238.235), into a single section applicable to both
Tier I and Tier II equipment: Sec.  238.112, Specifically, FRA is
proposing to remove current paragraphs (a), (b), (e), and (g), which
would then be addressed by the requirements of new Sec.  238.112. The
remaining paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) would then be redesignated as
paragraphs (a) through (c), and current paragraph (f) would also be
revised. Current paragraphs (c) and (d) have no counterpart in the Tier
I equipment requirements and would remain in this section. Paragraph
(c) currently requires the status of powered, exterior side doors to be
displayed to the crew in the operating cab and, if door interlocks are
used, the sensors to detect train motion must nominally be set to
operate at not more than 3 mph. Paragraph (d) currently requires that
powered, exterior side doors be connected to an emergency back-up power
system. Both would remain as redesignated paragraphs (a) and (b).
    Paragraph (f) currently requires passenger compartment end doors to
be equipped with a kick-out panel, pop-out window, or other means of
egress in the event the doors will not open, or be so designed as to
pose a negligible probability of becoming inoperable in the event of
car body distortion following a collision or derailment. This paragraph
does not apply to such doors providing access to the exterior of a
trainset, however, as in the case of an end door in the last car of a
train. Paragraph (f) would be redesignated as paragraph (c) and revised
to limit its applicability to Tier II passenger cars both ordered prior
to the effective date of the final rule in this rulemaking proceeding
and placed in service within four years after the effective date of the
same final rule. Accordingly, this proposal would effectively limit the
current requirement to existing Tier II passenger cars; all new Tier II
passenger cars would be subject to the more stringent requirement in
Sec.  238.112 related to equipping cars with a kick-out panel, pop-out