[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 136 (Monday, July 16, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 32807-32815]
[FR Doc No: 2018-15154]

========================================================================
Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================

Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 136 / Monday, July 16, 2018 /
Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No.: FAA-2018-0653-; Notice No. 18-04]
RIN 2120-AK89

Yaw Maneuver Conditions--Rudder Reversals

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to add a new load condition to the design
standards for transport category airplanes. The new load condition
would require the airplane be designed to withstand the loads caused by
rapid reversals of the rudder pedals and would apply to transport
category airplanes that have a powered rudder control surface or
surfaces. This rule is necessary because accident and incident data
show that pilots sometimes make rudder reversals during flight, even
though such reversals are unnecessary and discouraged by flightcrew
training programs. The current design standards do not require the
airplane structure to withstand the loads that may result from such
reversals. If the airplane loads exceed those for which it is designed,
the airplane structure may fail, resulting in catastrophic loss of
control of the airplane. This proposal aims to prevent structural
failure of the rudder and vertical stabilizer that may result from
these rudder reversals.

DATES: Send comments on or before October 15, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number [Insert docket
number from heading] using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Robert C. Jones, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems
Section, AIR-672, Transport Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation
Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
telephone and fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
Requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of
aircraft that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air
commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority. It
prescribes new safety standards for the design of transport category
airplanes.

I. Overview of Proposed Rule

    The FAA proposes to add a new load condition to the design
standards in title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25.
The new load condition, to be located in new proposed Sec.  25.353,
would require that the airplane be designed to withstand the loads
caused by rapid reversals of the rudder pedals. Specifically,
applicants would have to show that their proposed airplane design can
withstand an initial full rudder pedal input, followed by three rudder
reversals at the maximum sideslip angle, followed by return of the
rudder to neutral. Due to the rarity of such multiple reversals, the
proposed rule would specify the new load condition is an ultimate load
condition rather than a limit load condition. Consequently, the
applicant would not have to apply an additional factor of safety to the
calculated load levels.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The terms ``limit,'' ``ultimate,'' and ``factor of safety''
are specified in Sec.  25.301, ``Loads,'' Sec.  25.303, ``Factor of
safety,'' and Sec.  25.305, ``Strength and deformation.'' To
summarize, design loads are typically expressed in terms of limit
loads, which are then multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5,
to determine ultimate loads. In this proposal, the design loads
would be expressed as ultimate loads, and no additional safety
factor would be applied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would affect manufacturers of transport category
airplanes applying for a new type certificate after the effective date
of the final rule. The proposed rule may also affect applicants
applying for an amended or supplemental type certificate as determined
under 14 CFR 21.101 after the effective date of the final rule.
Proposed Sec.  25.353 would apply to transport category airplanes that
have a powered rudder control surface or surfaces, as explained in the
``Discussion of the Proposal.''

II. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

    Accident and incident data from the events described in section
II.B.1 show pilots sometimes make multiple and unnecessary rudder
reversals during flight. In addition, FAA-sponsored

research \2\ indicates that pilots use the rudder more often than
previously thought and often in ways not recommended by manufacturers.
Section 25.1583(a)(3)(ii) requires manufacturers to provide
documentation that warns pilots against making large and rapid control
reversals as they may result in structural failures at any speed,
including below the design maneuvering speed (VA). Despite
the requirement, and though such rudder reversals are unnecessary and
discouraged by flightcrew training programs, these events continue to
occur (see section II.B.1, ``History--Accidents and Incidents'' below).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-10/14, ``An International Survey of
Transport Airplane Pilots' Experiences and Perspectives of Lateral/
Directional Control Events and Rudder Issues in Transport Airplanes
(Rudder Survey),'' dated October 2010, is available in the Docket
and on the internet at http://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/201014.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 25.351, the standard for protecting the airplane's vertical
stabilizer from pilot-commanded maneuver loads, only addresses single,
full rudder inputs at airspeeds up to the design diving speed
(VD).\3\ This design standard does not protect the airplane
from the loads imposed by repeated inputs in opposing directions, or
rudder reversals.\4\ If the loads on the vertical stabilizer exceed
those for which it is designed, the vertical stabilizer may fail,
resulting in the catastrophic loss of airplane control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ VD is the design diving speed: The maximum speed
at which the airplane is certified to fly. See 14 CFR 1.2. Advisory
Circular 25-7C provides additional information related to
VD.
    \4\ A rudder reversal is a continuous, pilot-commanded pedal
movement starting from pedal displacement in one direction followed
by pedal displacement in the opposite direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Incidents and accidents related to rudder reversals have occurred
in the past, and the FAA believes that another such event could occur,
resulting in injuries to occupants or a structural failure that
jeopardizes continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

B. History

1. Accidents and Incidents
    Rudder reversals have caused a number of accidents and incidents.
On November 12, 2001, American Airlines Flight 587 (AA587), an Airbus
Model A300-600 series airplane, crashed at Belle Harbor, New York,
resulting in 265 deaths and the loss of the airplane. The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the probable cause of
this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer
as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by
the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. The
NTSB also noted that contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were
characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and
elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering
Program.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, ``In-flight
Separation of Vertical Stabilizer, American Airlines Flight 587,
Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York, November
12, 2001,'' dated October 26, 2004, is available in the Docket and
on the internet at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In two additional events--commonly known as the Interflug incident
\6\ and Miami Flight 903 accident (AA903) \7\--the vertical stabilizer
of each airplane experienced loads above the ultimate load level due to
pedal reversals commanded by the pilot after the airplane stalled.\8\
While none of the passengers and crew were injured in the Interflug
incident, a passenger was seriously injured and a crewmember sustained
minor injuries in the AA903 accident. The AA903 airplane also sustained
sheared fasteners, deformed nacelles, and engine component damage, but
landed safely. A catastrophe similar to AA587 was averted in each of
these events because the vertical stabilizer was stronger than required
by the design standards.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ On February 11, 1991, an Airbus Model A310 series airplane
experienced in-flight loss of control over Moscow, Russia.
    \7\ On May 12, 1997, an Airbus Model A300-600 series airplane
experienced in-flight loss of control near West Palm Beach, Florida,
after the flightcrew failed to recognize that the airplane had
entered a stall.
    \8\ The Interflug and Miami Flight 903 events are discussed in
NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 103-110. See
footnote 5 on p. 6.
    \9\ FCHWG Recommendation Report, ``Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/
Rudder Reversal,'' dated November 7, 2013, is available in the
Docket and on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See p. 5 of the report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other rudder reversal events have occurred more recently. On
January 10, 2008, an Airbus Model 319-114 series airplane, operated as
Air Canada Flight 190 (AC190), encountered a wake vortex while at
cruise altitude over Washington State.\10\ The pilot responded with
inputs that included six rudder reversals. The flightcrew eventually
stabilized the airplane and diverted to an airport capable of handling
the injured passengers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ TSB Aviation Investigation Report A08W0007, ``Encounter
with Wake Turbulence,'' is available in the Docket and on the
internet at http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/a08w0007/a08w0007.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this
event, along with NTSB accredited representatives, and classified it as
an accident. Analysis by the TSB showed that the pilot's actions
resulted in a load on the vertical stabilizer that exceeded its limit
load by approximately 29 percent. The TSB found that the flightcrew was
startled by wake turbulence at that altitude, erroneously believed that
the airplane had malfunctioned, and therefore responded with erroneous
actions. The pilot had received training to avoid rudder reversals.
    On May 27, 2005, a Bombardier DHC-8-100 series airplane, operated
by Provincial Airlines Limited for passenger service, experienced a
stall and uncontrolled descent over Canada.\11\ During climb-out, the
indicated airspeed gradually decreased, due to the flightcrew's
inadvertent selection of an incorrect autopilot mode. The airplane
stalled at an unexpectedly high airspeed, likely due to the formation
of ice. The flightcrew's failure to recognize the stall resulted in
incorrect control inputs and the loss of 4,200 feet of altitude in
approximately 40 seconds before recovery. There were no injuries and
the airplane was not damaged. During this event, the pilot commanded a
rudder reversal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059. See footnote 10
on p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. New Transport Airplane Programs
    Since the AA587 accident, the FAA has responded to the risk posed
by rudder reversals, in part, by requesting that applicants for new
type certificates show that their designs are capable of continued safe
flight and landing after experiencing repeated rudder reversals.
Applicants have been able to show this capability through rudder
control laws in flight control systems. Applicants have incorporated
these control laws through software and, therefore, added no weight or
maintenance cost to the airplanes.
    In 2016, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) began applying
special conditions to new airplane certification programs. EASA
mandated these special conditions to address the exact risk of rudder
reversals explained in this NPRM. The requirements in the EASA special
conditions are identical to the requirements proposed in this NPRM.
3. FAA Survey of Pilots' Rudder Use
    In 2006, the FAA sponsored a survey \12\ to better comprehend
transport category pilots' understanding and use of the rudder. This
survey included

transport pilots from all over the world. The FAA's analysis of the
survey data found that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-10/14 (see footnote 2 on p. 5), OMB
Control No. 2120-0712.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Pilots use the rudder more than previously thought and
often in ways not recommended by manufacturers.
     Pilots make erroneous rudder pedal inputs, and some
erroneous rudder pedal inputs include rudder reversals.
     Even after specific training, many pilots are not aware
that they should not make rudder reversals, even below VA.
Over the last several years, training and changes to the airplane
flight manual (AFM) have directed the pilot to avoid making cyclic
control inputs. The rudder reversals that caused the AC190 incident in
2008, and the Provincial Airlines Limited incident in 2005, occurred
despite this effort.
     The survey indicated that pilots in airplane upset
situations (e.g., wake vortex encounters) may revert to prior training
and make sequential rudder reversals.

C. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Activity

    In 2011, the FAA tasked ARAC to consider the need to add a new
flight maneuver load condition to part 25, subpart C, that would ensure
airplane structural capability in the presence of rudder reversals and
increasing sideslip angles (yaw angles) at airspeeds up to
VD. The FAA also tasked ARAC to consider if other
airworthiness standards would more appropriately address this concern,
such as pedal characteristics that would discourage pilots from making
rudder reversals.\13\ ARAC delegated this task to the Transport
Airplane and Engine subcommittee, which assigned it to the Flight
Controls Harmonization Working Group (FCHWG).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ This notice of ARAC tasking was published in the Federal
Register on March 28, 2011 (76 FR 17183).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FCHWG was tasked to examine several options to protect the
airplane from pilot-commanded rudder reversals. These options included
developing new standards for--
     Loads,
     Maneuverability,
     System design,
     Control sensitivity,
     Alerting, and
     Pilot training.
    The FCHWG completed its report in November 2013.\14\ ARAC and the
FAA accepted the report. The report's findings and recommendations
guided the formation of this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ FCHWG Recommendation Report, ``Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/
Rudder Reversal,'' dated November 7, 2013, is available in the
Docket and on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See footnote 9 on p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While multiple rudder reversals are a very low probability event,
they have occurred in service and cannot be ruled out in the future.
The FCHWG found that a load condition was the optimal way to protect
the airplane from the excessive loads that can result from multiple
rudder reversals. The FCHWG recommended a load condition over the other
options because it would be a performance-based requirement. The FCHWG
noted that this would provide applicants for design approval with the
flexibility to determine the best way to meet a load condition.

D. NTSB Safety Recommendation

    Following the AA587 accident described in section II.B.1 of this
NPRM, the NTSB provided safety recommendations to the FAA. The NTSB
stated, ``For airplanes with variable stop rudder travel limiter
systems, protection from dangerous structural loads resulting from
sustained alternating large rudder pedal inputs can be achieved by
reducing the sensitivity of the rudder control system (for example, by
increasing the pedal forces), which would make it harder for pilots to
quickly perform alternating full rudder inputs.'' In Safety
Recommendation A-04-056,\15\ the NTSB recommended that the FAA modify
part 25 to include a certification standard that will ensure safe
handling qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope,
including limits for rudder pedal sensitivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-056 is available in the
Docket and on the internet at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would address this recommendation and, if
incorporated on new airplane designs, would reduce the risk of an event
similar to AA587. The proposed rule would also respond to the NTSB's
concern about rudder pedal sensitivity.

E. Other Regulatory Actions

1. 2010 Revisions to Sec.  25.1583
    During its investigation of the AA587 accident, the NTSB found that
many pilots of transport category airplanes mistakenly believed that,
as long as the airplane's speed is below VA, they can make
any control input they desire without risking structural damage to the
airplane. AA587 exposed the fact that this assumption is incorrect. As
a result, the NTSB recommended that the FAA amend its regulations to
clarify that operating at or below VA does not provide
structural protection against multiple, full control inputs in one
axis, or full control inputs in more than one axis at the same
time.\16\ After making its own assessment, the FAA agreed, and revised
Sec.  25.1583(a)(3) at Amendment 25-130, effective October 15, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-60 is available in the
Docket and on the internet at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-
recs/recletters/A04_56_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 25.1583(a)(3) was revised to change the information that
applicants must furnish in the AFM explaining the use of VA
to pilots. The amendment clarified that, depending on the particular
airplane design, flying at or below VA does not allow a
pilot to make multiple large control inputs in one airplane axis or
full control inputs in more than one airplane axis at a time without
endangering the airplane's structure. However, the AC190 accident shows
that even a properly trained pilot might make rudder reversals when
startled or responding to a perceived failure.
2. Airworthiness Directives
    In 2012, the FAA adopted an airworthiness directive (AD) applicable
to all Airbus Model A300-600 and Model A310 series airplanes.\17\ The
AD was prompted by the excessive rudder pedal inputs and consequent
high loads on the vertical stabilizer in the events described
previously, including AA587. The AD required operators to either
incorporate a design change to the rudder control system or other
systems, or install a modification that alerts the pilot to stop making
rudder inputs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ AD 2012-21-15 was published in the Federal Register on
November 9, 2012 (77 FR 67526). For more information, see Docket No.
FAA-2011-0518 on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2015, the FAA adopted an AD applicable to all Airbus Model A318,
A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes.\18\ That AD was prompted by a
determination that, in specific flight conditions, the allowable load
limits on the vertical stabilizer could be reached and possibly
exceeded. Exceeding allowable load could result in detachment of the
vertical stabilizer. The AD also required a modification that alerts
the pilot to stop making rudder inputs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ AD 2015-23-13 was published in the Federal Register on
December 29, 2015 (77 FR 67526). For more information, see Docket
No. FAA-2011-0518 on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Advisory Material

    The FAA has developed proposed Advisory Circular (AC) 25.353-X,
``Design Load Conditions for Rudder Control Reversal,'' to be published
concurrently with this NPRM. This proposed AC would provide guidance

material on acceptable means, but not the only means, of showing
compliance with proposed Sec.  25.353. The FAA will post the proposed
AC on the ``Aviation Safety Draft Documents Open for Comment'' web page
at http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/.\19\ The FAA requests that
you submit comments on the proposed AC through that web page.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ The proposed AC is also available in the Docket. To ensure
the FAA receives your comments on the proposed AC, please submit
them via the instructions found on the ``Aviation Safety Draft
Documents Open for Comment'' web page.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Discussion of the Proposal

    The FAA proposes to revise 14 CFR by adding new Sec.  25.353 to add
a design load condition. It would apply to transport category airplanes
that have a powered rudder control surface or surfaces, as explained
later in this section. The load condition would require that the
airplane be able to withstand three full reversals of the rudder pedals
at the most critical points in the flight envelope. From a neutral
position, the pedal input would be sudden and to one side and held;
then, as the maximum sideslip angle is reached, the pedals would be
suddenly displaced in the opposite direction and held until the
opposite angle is reached; then again to the first side; then again to
the second side; then suddenly moved back to the neutral position.
    The reason for this proposal is that pilots make inadvertent and
erroneous rudder pedal inputs, and the accident and incident data show
that the loads caused by rudder reversals can surpass the airplane's
structural limit load and sometimes its ultimate load. Compliance with
the proposed rule would require a showing that the airplane's vertical
stabilizer and other airplane structure are strong enough to withstand
the rudder reversals.
    Ten of the eleven members of the FCHWG recommended proposing some
form of a new load condition to protect the airplane against rudder
reversals. During discussions, five members of the FCHWG \20\
recommended requiring a load condition that would protect the airplane
from three, sequential, full rudder reversals. This notice puts forth
those proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA),
EASA, National Civil Aviation Agency--Brazil (ANAC), and Transport
Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), and FAA representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Five members of the FCHWG \21\ recommended a similar load
condition, which would only protect against a single reversal of the
rudder pedals. The FAA is not proposing this alternative because a new
rule that only includes a single rudder reversal, with a safety factor
of 1.0, would not materially increase the design load level from
current design loads criteria and would not be effective in preventing
accidents such as the AA587 accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Airbus, Bombardier, Cessna, Dassault Aviation, and Embraer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One member, The Boeing Company (Boeing), took the position that no
new rulemaking or design standards are required, and that the risk from
rudder reversals should be addressed by flightcrew training. Boeing
stated that rudder reversals are always inappropriate and that pilots
should never make such commands. Boeing argued it is inappropriate to
issue an airworthiness standard to mitigate a situation caused by
actions that pilots should avoid. The FAA rejects this alternative
because, while multiple rudder reversals are a very low probability
event, they have been seen in service, despite training, and cannot be
ruled out in the future.
    As indicated previously, yaw maneuver loads are currently specified
in Sec.  25.351, ``Yaw maneuver conditions.'' The FAA used this
requirement as a template to develop the proposed new rudder reversal
design load condition. Therefore, the proposed load condition would be
similar to the load condition required by Sec.  25.351, except as
follows:
     Section 25.351 specifies a single, full-pedal command
followed by a sudden pedal release after the airplane has reached the
steady-state sideslip angle. Proposed Sec.  25.353 would specify a
single, full-pedal command followed by three rudder reversals, and
return to neutral.
     In the proposed rule, the rudder reversals must be
performed at the maximum sideslip angle, which is referred to as the
``overswing sideslip angle.'' This term is also used in Sec.  25.351
and would have the same meaning. The overswing sideslip angle is the
maximum sideslip angle that occurs following full rudder pedal input
and includes the additional sideslip that may occur beyond the steady-
state sideslip angle.
     The Sec.  25.353 load requirement would be an ultimate
design load condition, instead of a limit load condition as in Sec.
25.351. This means that applicants would apply a safety factor of 1.0,
rather than 1.5. The proposed rudder reversal maneuver would cover the
worst-case rudder maneuver expected to occur in service. Because
service history has shown that three full rudder reversals are unusual,
the FAA proposes that a safety factor of 1.0 is appropriate.
     The proposed Sec.  25.353 condition would require only
that the applicant account for the rudder reversals at speeds up to the
design cruising speed (VC). In contrast, Sec.  25.351
requires applicants to account for speeds up to VD. The
reason for this difference is that VC represents the
majority of the flight envelope, and compliance to VD is not
necessary due to the infrequency of exposure to such speeds and the low
probability that a rudder reversal will occur at speeds above
VC.
     Section 25.351 requires a pilot force of up to 300 pounds,
depending on the airplane's speed. In contrast, the pilot force
specified in Sec.  25.353 would be limited to 200 pounds because it
would be difficult, and therefore very unlikely, for a pilot to
maintain 300 pounds of force while performing rapid alternating inputs.
     The proposed Sec.  25.353 condition would be evaluated
only with the landing gear retracted and speed brakes (and spoilers
when used as speed brakes) retracted. This is because flight loads
would be more severe with the gear and speed brakes retracted.

A. Expected Methods of Compliance

    The proposed rule is performance-based. For example, an applicant
could choose to comply with the proposed standard by using control
system architecture and control laws to limit the airplane response to
rudder reversals, and thereby reduce structural loads on the airplane.
An applicant could also choose to comply by increasing the capability
of the airplane to withstand the maximum expected structural loads that
could result from the proposed load condition.

B. Proposed Applicability

    After examining all the data and considering stakeholder opinions,
the FAA has determined that the proposed rule should apply to new type
certification programs of transport category airplane designs and to
amended or supplemental type certificate programs as determined under
Sec.  21.101. The proposed rule would affect manufacturers of transport
category airplanes. In the future, applicants who want to certify new
airplanes under part 25 would have to comply with proposed Sec.
25.353.
    As noted previously, this proposed rule would apply only to
airplanes that use powered rudder control surfaces. In this proposed
rule, a powered rudder control surface is one in which the force
required to deflect the surface against the airstream is generated or
augmented by hydraulic or electric systems. An unpowered rudder control
surface is

one for which the force required to deflect the surface against the
airstream is transmitted from the pilot's rudder pedal directly through
mechanical means, without any augmentation from hydraulic or electrical
systems. Powered rudder control systems include fly-by-wire (FBW) and
hydro-mechanical systems. Unpowered rudder control systems are also
referred to as mechanical systems. Incorporation of a powered yaw
damper into an otherwise unpowered rudder control system does not
constitute a powered rudder control surface, for the purpose of this
proposed rule. The reasons that the FAA proposes to exclude airplanes
with unpowered (mechanical) rudder control surfaces are as follows, and
the FAA seeks comment on these reasons:
    1. The only U.S. transport category airplane models, currently in
production, that use unpowered rudder control surfaces are small
business jets. Small airplanes typically have a minimal delay between
pilot yaw control inputs and airplane response. The pilots of these
airplanes receive more immediate feedback of airplane response to their
yaw control inputs and, therefore, are less likely to execute
inappropriate pedal movements resulting in rudder reversals.
    2. The only U.S. transport category airplane models, currently in
production, that use an unpowered rudder control surface are also
equipped with a yaw damper. The FAA has assessed the design of this yaw
damper and determined its normal operation would be adequate to reduce
yaw overshoot loads resulting from rudder reversals to acceptable
levels. However, the yaw damper system on these airplanes is not
required to be operational on any given flight. The yaw damper is
included in these airplanes primarily to improve ride quality for
passenger comfort (as opposed to providing adequate stability about the
yaw axis to ensure airplane safety). Since the yaw damper may not be
available on a given flight, the manufacturer of these airplanes has
stated it might need to add structure or an improved yaw damper to any
new type certificated airplanes to comply with the proposed rule.\22\
This would significantly increase design, production, and operation
costs. The FAA considers that, for these airplanes, the cost to comply
with the proposed, new load condition through structural modification
is not justified by the relatively low risk these airplanes face from
rudder reversals. Further, the FAA considers it unlikely that many of
these airplanes would fly for extended periods without an operable yaw
damper that provides acceptable ride quality. Therefore, most of these
airplanes have protection against yaw overshoot loads, even if they are
not required to demonstrate this protection during certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ A record of this conversation between the FAA and airplane
manufacturer is available in the Docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. The use of unpowered rudder control surfaces is diminishing in
the transport category airplane fleet. The FAA expects that most, if
not all, new type certificate applications to which this proposed rule
would apply will employ powered rudder control surfaces.
    4. The FAA has reviewed the accident and incident records and has
found no events in which pilots commanded inappropriate rudder
reversals on airplanes with unpowered rudder control surfaces. This
alone does not mean such systems cannot be affected by pilot-commanded
inappropriate rudder reversals. However, the absence of any previous
incidents indicates that excluding these designs would not appreciably
increase the future risk of such events above acceptable levels.

C. Summary

    The proposed design criteria would provide a practical, relatively
low-cost solution that would be achievable on future designs without
the requirement to significantly strengthen the vertical stabilizer, or
make significant changes to system design. In fact, some current
airplanes would be able to meet the proposed criteria with no changes
whatsoever. This proposal should require a minimal increment of
applicant resources to show compliance. While an applicant might choose
to comply with this performance-based standard by strengthening the
airplane structure, the FAA believes that most applicants would use
control laws to comply with this proposed rule. These control laws are
a part of the flight control computer, and they adjust control surface
deflections based on pilot input and other factors like airspeed. Since
control laws are typically implemented through systems and software,
there would be little to no incremental cost in the form of weight,
equipment, maintenance, or training.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct that each
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354),
as codified in 5 U.S.C. 603 et seq., requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), 19 U.S.C. Chapter 13,
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter 25, requires agencies
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of
the economic impacts of this proposed rule.
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this proposed
rule has benefits that justify its costs and is not a ``significant
regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order
12866. The rule is also not ``significant'' as defined in DOT's
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The proposed rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States, and will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local,
or tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the
threshold identified previously.

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    Department of Transportation Order 2100.5 prescribes policies and
procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. If
the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits a statement to
that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a
full regulatory evaluation of the costs and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for this proposed rule. The
reasoning for this determination follows.
1. Background
    The genesis of this proposed rule is the crash of American Airlines
Flight 587 (AA587), near Queens, New York,

on November 12, 2001, resulting in the death of all 260 passengers and
crew aboard, and the death of five persons on the ground. The airplane
was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the
probable cause of the accident was ``the in-flight separation of the
vertical stabilizer [airplane fin] as a result of loads above ultimate
design created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder
pedal inputs.'' \23\ Ultimate loads on the airplane structure are the
limit loads (1.0) multiplied by a safety factor, usually 1.5 (as for
the vertical stabilizer). An airplane is expected to experience a limit
load once in its lifetime and is never expected to experience an
ultimate load.\24\ For the AA587 accident, loads exceeding ultimate
loads ranged from 1.83 to 2.14 times the limit load on the vertical
stabilizer,\25\ as a result of four, full, alternating rudder inputs
known as ``rudder reversals.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 160. See
footnote 5 on p. 6.
    \24\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 31, n. 53.
    \25\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Significant rudder reversals events are unusual in the history of
commercial airplane flight, having occurred during just five notable
accidents and incidents, with AA587 being the only catastrophic
accident resulting from rudder reversals.\26\ Ultimate loads were
exceeded in two of the other notable rudder reversal accidents, the
Interflug incident (Moscow, February 11, 1991) and American Airlines
Flight 903 (AA903) (near West Palm Beach, Florida, May 12, 1997).\27\
For the Interflug incident, with multiple rudder reversals, loads of
1.55 and 1.35 times the limit load were recorded; and for AA903 (eight
rudder reversals), a load of 1.53 times the limit load was
recorded.\28\ A catastrophe similar to AA587 was averted in these two
events only because the vertical stabilizer was stronger than required
by design standards.\29\ In a fourth event--Air Canada Flight 190
(AC190) (over the state of Washington, January 10, 2008)--with four
rudder reversals, the limit load was exceed by 29 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. Flight Controls
Harmonization Working Group. Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder
Reversal Recommendation Report, Nov. 7, 2013. (ARAC Rudder Reversal
Report). This Report identifies four notable rudder events to which
we add the Interflug incident discussed in the NTSB AA587 Report.
    \27\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 106-109.
    \28\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 104.
    \29\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 38-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In transport category airplanes, rudder inputs are generally
limited to aligning the airplane with the runway during crosswind
landings and controlling engine-out situations, which occur
predominately at low speeds. At high speeds, the pilot normally
directly rolls the airplane using the ailerons.\30\ If the pilot does
use the rudder to control the airplane at high speeds, there will be a
significant phase lag between the rudder input and the roll response
because the roll response is a secondary effect of the yawing moment
generated by the rudder.\31\ The roll does not result from the rudder
input directly. Even if the rudder is subsequently deflected in the
opposite direction (rudder reversal), the airplane can continue to roll
and yaw in one direction before reversing because of the phase lag. The
relationship between rudder inputs and the roll and yaw response of the
airplane can become confusing to pilots, particularly with the large
yaw and roll rates that would result from large rudder inputs, causing
the pilots to input multiple rudder reversals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ An aileron is a hinged control service on the trailing edge
of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft, one aileron per wing.
    \31\ The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to the wings
and to the normal line of flight. A yaw movement is a change in the
direction of the aircraft to the left or right around the yaw axis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Following the AA587 accident, in November 2004 the NTSB released
Safety Recommendation A-04-56 recommending that the FAA modify part 25
``to include a certification standard that will ensure safe handling
qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope. . . .'' \32\
In 2011, the FAA tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC) to consider the need for rulemaking to address the rudder
reversal issue. ARAC delegated this task to the Transport Airplane and
Engine subcommittee, which assigned it to the Flight Controls
Harmonization Working Group (FCHWG). One of the recommendations of the
ARAC Rudder Reversal Report, issued on November 7, 2013, was to require
transport category airplanes to be able to safely withstand the loads
imposed by three rudder reversals. This proposed rule adopts that
recommendation. The ARAC report indicates that requiring transport
category airplanes to safely operate with the vertical stabilizer loads
imposed by three full-stroke rudder reversals accounts for most of the
attainable safety benefits. With more than three rudder reversals, the
FCHWG found little increase in vertical stabilizer loads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-56, Nov. 10, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Costs and Benefits of This Proposed Rule
    Since the catastrophic AA587 accident, the FAA has responded to the
risk posed by rudder reversals by requesting, through the issue paper
process, that applicants for new type certificates show that their
designs are capable of continued safe flight and landing after
experiencing repeated rudder reversals. For airplanes with FBW systems,
manufacturers have been able to show capability by means of control
laws, incorporated through software changes and, therefore, adding no
weight and imposing no additional maintenance cost to the airplanes.
Many if not all of these designs have demonstrated tolerance to three
or more rudder reversals. Aside from converting to an FBW system,
alternatives available to manufacturers specializing in airplane
designs with mechanical or hydro-mechanical rudders include increasing
the reliability of the yaw damper and strengthening the airplane
vertical stabilizer.
    To estimate the cost of the proposed rule, the FAA solicited unit
cost estimates from U.S. industry and incorporated these estimates into
an airplane life cycle model. The FAA received one estimate for large
part 25 airplanes and two estimates for small part 25 airplanes
(business jets).
    One of the business jet estimates was provided by a manufacturer
specializing in mechanical rather than FBW rudder systems; therefore,
that estimate reflects significantly higher compliance costs. This
manufacturer's most cost-efficient approach to addressing the proposed
requirement--although high in comparison to manufacturers who use FBW
systems exclusively--is to comply with a strengthened vertical
stabilizer. The cost of complying with a more reliable yaw damper was
higher than strengthening the vertical stabilizer, and higher yet if
complying by converting to a FBW rudder system for new models.
    As a result of these high costs and other reasons set forth in the
preamble, the FAA has decided that the proposed rule would not apply to
airplanes with ``unpowered'' (mechanical) rudder control surfaces. An
``unpowered'' rudder control surface is one whose movement is affected
through mechanical means, without any augmentation from hydraulic or
electrical systems. Accordingly, the proposed rule would not apply to
models with mechanical rudder control systems, but would apply only to
models with FBW or hydro-mechanical

rudder systems. The FAA solicits comments on the exclusion of airplanes
with unpowered rudder control surfaces from the proposed rule and the
corresponding inclusion of FBW and hydro-mechanical models.
    The FAA estimates the costs of the proposed rule using unit cost
per model estimates from industry for FBW models and our estimates of
the number of new large airplane and business jet certifications with
FBW rudder systems in the ten years after the effective date of the
proposed rule. These estimates are shown in table 1. The FAA solicits
comments, with detailed cost estimates, on our estimates.

                                    Table 1--Cost Estimated for Proposed Rule
                                                    [$ 2016]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of new
                                                                  Cost per model  FBW models (10       Costs
                                                                                yrs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Airplanes.................................................        $300,000               2        $600,000
Business Jets...................................................         235,000               2         470,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total Costs.................................................  ..............  ..............       1,070,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With these cost estimates, the FAA finds the proposed rule to be
minimal cost, with expected net safety benefits from the reduced risk
of rudder reversal accidents.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the agency may so
certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. The
certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for
this determination, and the reasoning should be clear. As noted above,
because manufacturers with FBW rudder systems have been able to show
compliance by means of low-cost changes to control laws incorporated
through software changes, the FAA estimates the costs of this proposed
rule to be minimal. Therefore, as provided in section 605(b), the head
of the FAA certifies that this proposed rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the effect of this proposed rule and
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil
aviation. Therefore, the proposed rule is in compliance with the Trade
Agreements Act.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $155.0 million in lieu of $100
million.
    This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated
with this proposed rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    (1) In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed regulations.
    (2) Executive Order 13609, ``Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation,'' promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.

G. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded

from preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this rulemaking
action qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph
312f of Order 1050.1E and involves no extraordinary circumstances.

V. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism.'' The agency has
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have
Federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
``Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use'' (May 18, 2001). The agency has
determined that it would not be a ``significant energy action'' under
the executive order and would not be likely to have a significant
adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

C. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs

    This proposed rule is not expected to be an E.O. 13771 regulatory
action because this proposed rule is not significant under E.O. 12866.

VI. Additional Information

A. Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency
also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy,
or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written
comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should
submit only one time.
    The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before
the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed
after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without
incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal in
light of the comments it receives.
    Proprietary or Confidential Business Information: Commenters should
not file proprietary or confidential business information in the
docket. Such information must be sent or delivered directly to the
person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document, and marked as proprietary or confidential. If submitting
information on a disk or CD-ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD-
ROM, and identify electronically within the disk or CD-ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or confidential.
    Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is aware of proprietary
information filed with a comment, the agency does not place it in the
docket. It is held in a separate file to which the public does not have
access, and the FAA places a note in the docket that it has received
it. If the FAA receives a request to examine or copy this information,
it treats it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act
(5 U.S.C. 552). The FAA processes such a request under Department of
Transportation procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.

B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the
internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
    All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and
44704.

0
2. Add Sec.  25.353 to read as follows:

Sec.  25.353   Rudder control reversal conditions.

    For airplanes with a powered rudder control surface or surfaces,
the airplane must be designed to withstand the ultimate loads that
result from the yaw maneuver conditions specified in paragraphs (a)
through (e) of this section at speeds from VMC or the
highest airspeed for which it is possible to achieve maximum rudder
deflection at zero sideslip, whichever is greater, up to VC/
MC. The applicant must evaluate these conditions with the
landing gear retracted and speed brakes (and spoilers when used as
speed brakes) retracted. In computing the loads on the airplane, the
applicant may assume yawing velocity to be zero. The applicant must
assume a pilot force of 200 pounds when evaluating each of these
conditions:
    (a) With the airplane in unaccelerated flight at zero yaw, the
flight deck rudder control is displaced as specified in Sec.  25.351(a)
and (b).
    (b) With the airplane yawed to the overswing sideslip angle, the
flight deck rudder control is suddenly displaced in the opposite
direction.
    (c) With the airplane yawed to the opposite overswing sideslip
angle, the flight deck rudder control is suddenly displaced in the
opposite direction.
    (d) With the airplane yawed to the subsequent overswing sideslip
angle, the flight deck rudder control is suddenly displaced in the
opposite direction.
    (e) With the airplane yawed to the opposite overswing sideslip
angle, the flight deck rudder control is suddenly returned to neutral.

    Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f) and 44701(a)
in Washington, DC, on July 2, 2018.
Dorenda D. Baker,
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2018-15154 Filed 7-13-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 3, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60419-60420]
[FR Doc No: 2012-24372]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EL12-107-000]

ITC Holdings Corp., Entergy Corporation, Midwest Independent
Transmission System Operator, Inc.; Notice of Petition for Declaratory
Order

    Take notice that on September 24, 2012, ITC Holdings Corp., Entergy
Corporation, and Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator,
Inc., pursuant to section 207 of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (Commission) Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR
385.207 and section 305 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C.
825d(a), filed a petition for declaratory order requesting that the
Commission declare that the Separation Plan, as more fully described in
the petition, will not violate section 305(a) of the FPA.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date. On or
before the comment date, it is not necessary to serve motions to
intervene or protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription''
link on the web site that enables subscribers to receive email
notification when a

document is added to a subscribed docket(s).
    For assistance with any FERC Online service, please email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For
TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on November 8, 2012.

    Dated: September 26, 2012.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-24372 Filed 10-2-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 229 (Wednesday, November 27, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71028-71030]
[FR Doc No: 2013-28455]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2013-0080; Notice 2]

Combi USA, Inc., Denial of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Petition Denial.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Combi USA, Inc., (Combi),\1\ has determined that certain model
child restraint systems manufactured between 2007 and 2012 do not fully
comply with paragraph <IP_ADDRESS>(a) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, Child Restraint Systems. (49 CFR 571.213).
Combi has filed an appropriate report dated June 9, 2013, pursuant to
49 CFR Part 573, Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Combi is a U.S. company that manufactures child restraint
systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and the rule
implementing those provisions at 49 CFR part 556, Combi has petitioned
for an exemption from the notification and remedy requirements of 49
U.S.C. Chapter 301 on the basis that this noncompliance is
inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) published a notice of receipt of the
petition, with a 30-day public comment period, on August 9, 2013, in
the Federal Register (78 FR 48767). No comments were received in
response to Combi's petition.
    To view the petition and all supporting documents log onto the
Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) Web site at: http://www.regulations.gov/. Then follow the online search instructions to
locate docket number ``NHTSA-2013-0080.''

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on this
decision

contact Mr. Tony Lazzaro, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), telephone (202)
366-5304, facsimile<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Relevant Requirements of FMVSS No. 213: FMVSS No. 213 paragraph
S<IP_ADDRESS>(a) requires, in pertinent part, that ``the webbing of belts
provided with a child restraint system and used to attach the system to
the vehicle or to restrain the child within the system shall-- (a) Have
a minimum breaking strength for new webbing of . . . not less than
11,000 N in the case of the webbing used to secure a child to a child
restraint system when tested in accordance with S5.1 of FMVSS No.
209.''
    The term ``new webbing'', is ``webbing that has not been exposed to
abrasion, light, or micro-organisms.'' (49 CFR Sec.  571.213,
S<IP_ADDRESS>(a)).
    Child Restraints Involved: Affected are 23,357 Combi Coccoro 2009-
2012 model child restraint systems (model 8820), 5,391 Combi
Zeus 360 2009-2012 model child restraint systems (model 8836),
and 4,391 Combi Zeus Turn 2007-2009 model child restraint systems
(model 8815).
    Noncompliance: Combi acknowledges that the affected child restraint
systems do not meet the minimum breaking strength requirements of FMVSS
No. 213 paragraph <IP_ADDRESS>(a). Combi submitted a preliminary
Noncompliance Information Report on June 9, 2013. Combi submitted a
supplemental Noncompliance Information Report on July 1, 2013.

Summary of Combi's Analysis and Arguments

    Combi described the noncompliance as follows:

    Combi USA, Inc. has identified a noncompliance with certain
Model 8220 Coccoro Convertible child restraints when the
webbing assembly within the restraint is subjected to the minimum
breaking strength requirements as specified in FMVSS No. 213 section
<IP_ADDRESS> (a).

    Combi filed the same statement describing the noncompliance for the
Zeus Turn and Zeus 360 models of child restraint systems. In support of
its petition, Combi states that as part of NHTSA's 2012 safety
compliance testing of the subject Coccoro child restraint system
harness webbing, the breaking strength yielded results of 8,990 N,
9,170 N, and 9,300 N. As noted earlier, paragraph <IP_ADDRESS>(a) of FMVSS
No. 213 requires a minimum breaking strength of 11,000 N for webbing
used to restrain a child within a child restraint system. Combi also
noted that all of the subject Coccoro child restraint systems were
produced with the identical harness system as tested by NHTSA in 2012.
    Combi further noted that all of the subject Zeus 360 and Zeus Turn
child restraint systems were produced with the same embedded stop
button within the harness system as the Coccoro child restraints which
were tested by NHTSA in 2012.
    Combi stated in its petition that the production of the Zeus Turn
child restraint system ended on March 25, 2009, and that the production
of the Zeus 360 child restraint system ended on May 24, 2012. Combi
also explained that it has implemented an engineering modification
which removes the embedded stop button to all of the Coccoro child
restraints produced since January 29, 2013.
    In support of its petition, Combi stated that it has not received
notice of any partial or complete breakage or tearing of the harness
system in the Coccoro and Zeus child restraints. In further support of
its petition, Combi provided data based on its own dynamic testing of
the Coccoro and Zeus 360 child restraint systems. According to Combi,
its testing attempted to determine the crash force loading on the
harness system of the Coccoro and Zeus 360 child restraints when
subjected to the FMVSS No. 213 dynamic crash pulse (30 mph crash pulse)
and the NCAP pulse (35 mph crash pulse). Combi's own test results
showed load cell values ranging from approximately 1,150 N to 1,900 N.
Combi stated that these testing results confirm that the harness
assemblies of the subject Coccoro, Zeus 360, and Zeus Turn child
restraints will not fail in a real world crash under any circumstances,
as the forces acting on the harness system in dynamic testing are less
than 22 percent of the breaking strength test results determined by
NHTSA. Combi therefore asserts that the harness assemblies of the
subject Coccoro and Zeus child restraints present no safety risk.
    Finally, Combi asserts that given the relatively small number of
subject Coccoro, Zeus 360, and Zeus Turn child restraints, the
effectiveness of any notification campaign regarding this technical
noncompliance will be limited. Combi further states that any
noncompliance notice campaign may result in customers deciding to
discontinue using their Coccoro and Zeus child restraints for a period
of time, adding a risk of injury where none exists as a result of the
noncompliance of the harness webbing of the subject Coccoro and Zeus
child restraints with the minimum breaking strength requirements of
FMVSS No. 213 S<IP_ADDRESS>(a).
    In summary, Combi contends that the noncompliance is
inconsequential to motor vehicle safety, and that its petition to
exempt it from providing notification of noncompliance as required by
49 U.S.C. 30118 and remedying the noncompliance as required by 49
U.S.C. 30120, should be granted.
    Comments: NHTSA published a notice of the petition in the Federal
Register to allow an opportunity for members of the public to present
information, views, and arguments on the subject petition. As noted
earlier, no comments were received. The Agency notes that an absence of
opposing argument and data does not require the Agency to grant the
petition.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ See Dorel Juvenile Group; Denial of Appeal of Decision on
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 75 FR 507, 510 (Jan. 5, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NHTSA'S Consideration of Combi's Inconsequentiality Petition

    General Principles: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards are
adopted only after the Agency has determined, following notice and
comment, that the standards are objective and practicable and ``meet
the need for motor vehicle safety.'' See 49 U.S.C. 30111(a). Thus,
there is a general presumption that the failure of a motor vehicle or
item of motor vehicle equipment to comply with a FMVSS increases the
risk to motor vehicle safety beyond the level deemed appropriate by
NHTSA through the rulemaking process. To protect the public from such
risks, manufacturers whose products fail to comply with a FMVSS are
normally required to conduct a safety recall under which they must
notify owners, purchasers, and dealers of the noncompliance and provide
a remedy without charge. 49 U.S.C. 30118-30120.
    However, Congress has recognized that, under some limited
circumstances, a noncompliance could be ``inconsequential'' to motor
vehicle safety. ``Inconsequential'' is not defined either in the
statute or in NHTSA's regulations. Rather, the Agency determines
whether a particular noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle
safety based on the specific facts before it. The relevant issue in
determining inconsequentiality is whether the noncompliance in question
is likely to significantly increase the safety risk to individuals
involved in accidents or to individual occupants who experience the
type of injurious event against which the standard was designed to
protect. See

General Motors Corp.; Ruling on Petition for Determination of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 69 FR 19897 (Apr. 14, 2004).
    In order to demonstrate inconsequentiality, the petitioner must
demonstrate that the noncompliance ``does not create a significant
safety risk.'' See Dorel Juvenile Group; 75 FR at 510, quoting Cosco,
Inc., denial of Application for Decision of Inconsequential
Noncompliance, 64 FR 29408, 29409 (June 1, 1999). There have been
instances in the past where NHTSA has determined that a manufacturer
has met its burden of demonstrating that a noncompliance is
inconsequential to safety. These include a noncompliance concerning
labeling where the discrepancy with the safety standard was determined
not to lead to any misunderstanding, especially where sources of the
correct information were available (e.g. in the vehicle owner's
manual). See General Motors Corp., 69 FR at 19899.
    The burden of establishing the inconsequentiality of a failure to
comply with a performance requirement in a safety standard is more
substantial and difficult to meet, and the Agency has not found many
noncompliances related to a safety standard to be inconsequential. See
Id.
    Combi's Argument and NHTSA's Response: In support of its petition,
Combi makes several different arguments. First, Combi argues that the
company has not received notice of any partial or complete breakage or
tearing of the harness system in any Coccoro and Zeus child restraints.
The Agency, however, does not consider the absence of complaints to
show that the noncompliances are inconsequential to safety. The absence
of a complaint does not mean there have not been any problems or
failures, and it does not mean that there will not be failures in the
future. See Dorel Juvenile Group, Denial of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 53189, 53190 (August 28, 2013).
    Second, Combi argues that, based on measured forces acting on the
harness system when subjected to FMVSS No. 213 and NCAP crash pulse
dynamic testing, the subject child restraints present no motor vehicle
safety risk since the measured forces acting on the harness system are
less than 22 percent of the breaking strength results determined by
NHTSA. The Agency is not persuaded by this argument. NHTSA does not
simply have one performance test, a dynamic test. NHTSA has multiple
performance tests because a single test does not address the range of
safety concerns with child restraints. The webbing breaking strength
test and the child restraint system dynamic test do not test for the
same conditions and serve distinct purposes. The webbing breaking
strength test conditions are necessarily more severe than those for
dynamic testing to help ensure that the webbing will afford effective
protection for severe crashes, even after the webbing degrades due to
abrasion in use and exposure to sunlight. In addressing past similar
arguments raised by child restraint system manufacturers who submitted
webbing load force data generated in dynamic testing to demonstrate
apparent safety margins in comparison to webbing breaking strength test
results, the Agency stated that ``[a] 30 mile per hour test is not
indicative of the upper limit of safety. The test conditions in FMVSS
No. 213 reflect the concern that child restraints will withstand even
the most severe crashes. These are well above 30 mph.'' Dorel Juvenile
Group [Cosco] (DJG); Denial of Applications for Determination of
Inconsequential Noncompliance, 73 FR 41397, 41399 (July 19, 2008).
While Combi also conducted dynamic testing using the higher NCAP crash
pulse, this provides an increase of only 5 mph over the FMVSS No. 213
dynamic crash pulse. In adopting the webbing strength standard, NHTSA
has never said and NHTSA does not believe that it is enough that
webbing withstands a 35 mph crash. There are real-world severe crashes
which take place above this level. In those crashes, the force on the
webbing is higher than in a 30 or 35 mph based crash. And, it must be
recognized that webbing in child restraints that have been used may be
degraded. In such crashes, a child occupant restrained in a child seat
with webbing, when new, that merely met a strength test related to a 35
mph crash would be at an increased risk of injury compared with a child
restrained in a child seat with webbing that meets the webbing strength
test in FMVSS No. 213 S<IP_ADDRESS>(a).
    Next, Combi asserts that given the relative small number of subject
child restraint systems affected, the effectiveness of any notification
campaign will be limited. This type of argument is immaterial to the
inconsequentiality analysis because ``the number or percentage of
vehicles or equipment affected by the noncompliance is not relevant to
the issue of consequentiality''. See General Motors Corp., 69 FR 19899;
Cosco, Inc., Denial of Application for Decision of Inconsequential
Noncompliance, 64 FR 29408, 029409 (June 1, 1999). In addition, the
Agency would not necessarily consider an affected population of over
33,000 to be considered a small number when evaluating safety risk.
    Finally, Combi argues that any noncompliance notice campaign may
result in customers deciding to discontinue using their subject
restraint(s) for a period of time thereby adding risk of injury. This
argument was not supported with any evidence and the Agency is not
persuaded by this argument. The Agency's Recall Management Office will
review Combi's noncompliance notification campaign to assure that it is
effective and the notification makes it clear to the affected
customer(s) that it is better to continue to use the subject child
restraint(s) while awaiting the remedy provided by the manufacturer,
and that it is unsafe, and in almost all cases unlawful, to transport a
child passenger in a motor vehicle without the use of a proper
restraint.
    Decision: After carefully considering the arguments presented in
this matter, NHTSA has decided that the petitioner has not met its
burden of persuasion that the noncompliance described is
inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Combi's petition
is hereby denied, and the petitioner must notify owners, purchasers and
dealers pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118 and provide a remedy in accordance
with 49 U.S.C. 30120.

    Authority: (49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120: delegations of authority at
49 CFR 1.95 and 501.8)

    Dated: November 21, 2013.
Nancy Lummen Lewis,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2013-28455 Filed 11-26-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P