resulting in the signal system displaying a restricted speed signal
indication, an approaching train may be required to stop before
entering the block governed by the signal and proceed at restricted
speed, or to otherwise reduce its speed to restricted speed as it
enters the block governed by the signal, and be operated at restricted
speed until the train reaches the next signal displaying an indication
more permissive than proceed at restricted speed, including while
passing over any switch within the block. The governing signal,
however, may be anywhere from a few feet to more than a mile from the
hand-operated switch. For instance, if a signal governs a 3 mile long
block, and there is a switch at 1.8 miles after passing the governing
signal (stated in advance of the signal), and that switch is
misaligned, the train would have to travel that 1.8 miles at restricted
speed. Even if the train crew members were able to normal the
misaligned switch, they would need to remain at restricted

speed at least until the next signal (absent an upgrade of a cab signal
indication).
    In signaled territory, to require a PTC system to enforce a
positive stop of an approaching train at each individual switch that is
misaligned would be an unnecessary burden on the industry, particularly
since movement beyond the governing signal would be enforced by the PTC
system to a speed no more than the upper limit of restricted speed.
Accordingly, in signaled territory, FRA proposes in paragraph (e)(1) to
require a PTC system to enforce the upper limit of restricted speed
through the block. By definition, at restricted speed, the locomotive
engineer must be prepared to stop within one-half the range of vision
short of any misaligned switch or broken rail, etc., not to exceed 15
or 20 miles per hour depending on the operating rule of the railroad.
Accordingly, if a PTC system is integrated with the signal system, and
a train is enforced by the PTC system to move at restricted speed past
a signal displaying a restricted speed indication, FRA feels
comfortable that the PTC system will meet the statutory mandate of
preventing the movement of the train through the switch left in the
wrong position by continuously displaying the speed to be maintained
(i.e., restricted speed) and by enforcing the upper limit of the
railroads' restricted speed rule (but not to exceed 20 mph). While this
solution would not completely eliminate human factors associated with
movement through a misaligned switch, it would significantly mitigate
the risk of a train moving through such a switch and would be much more
cost effective.
    Moreover, it would be cost prohibitive to require the industry to
individually equip each of the many thousands of hand-operated switches
with a wayside interface unit (WIU) necessary to interconnect with a
PTC system in order to provide a positive stop short of any such switch
that may be misaligned. Currently each switch in signaled territory has
its position monitored by a switch circuit controller (SCC). When a
switch is not in its normal position, the SCC opens a signal control
circuit to cause the signal governing movement over the switch location
to display its most restrictive aspect (usually red). A train
encountering a red signal at the entrance to a block will be required
to operate at restricted speed through the entire block, which can be
several miles in length depending on signal spacing. The signal system
is not capable of informing the train crew which switch, if any, in the
block may be in an improper position since none of switches are
equipped with an independent WIU. There could be many switches within
the same block in a city or other congested area. Thus, there is a
possibility that one or more switches may be not in its proper position
and the signal system is unable to transmit which switch or switches
are not in normal position. The governing signal could also be
displaying a red aspect on account of a broken rail, broken bond wire,
broken or wrapped line wire, bad insulated joint, bad insulated switch
or gage rods, or other defective condition.
    FRA believes that requiring a PTC system to enforce the upper limit
of restricted speed in the aforementioned situations is statutorily
acceptable. The statute requires each PTC system to prevent ``the
movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.''
Under this statutory language, the railroad's intended route must
factor into the question of whether a switch is in the ``wrong''
position. In other words, in order to determine whether a switch is in
the ``wrong position,'' we must know the switch's ``right position.''
The ``right position'' is determined by the intended route of the
railroad. Thus, when determining whether a switch is in the wrong
position, it is necessary to know the railroad's intended route and
whether the switch is properly positioned to provide for the train to
move through the switch to continue on that route. The intended route
is normally determined by the dispatcher.
    Under the proposed rules, when a switch is in the wrong position,
the PTC system must have knowledge of that information, must
communicate that information to the railroad (e.g., the locomotive
engineer or dispatcher), and must control the train accordingly. Once
the PTC system or railroad has knowledge of the switch's position, FRA
expects the position to be corrected in accordance with part 218 before
the train operates through the switch. See, e.g., Sec. Sec.  218.93,
218.103, 218.105, 218.107.
    If the PTC system forces the train to move at no more than the
upper limit of restricted speed, the railroad has knowledge that a
misaligned switch may be within the subject block, and the railroad by
rule or dispatcher permission then makes the decision to move through
the switch (i.e., the railroad's intent has changed as indicated by
rule or dispatcher instructions), the switch is no longer in the
``wrong position.'' The RSAC PTC Working Group was unanimous in
concluding that these arrangements satisfy the safety objectives of
RSIA08. Utilization of the signal system to detect misaligned switches
and facilitate safe movements also provides an incentive to retain
existing signal systems, with substantial additional benefits in the
form of broken rail detection and detection of equipment fouling the
main line.
    Paragraph (e)(2) addresses movements over switches in dark
territory and under conditions of excessive risk, even if in block
signal territory. In dark territory, by definition, there are no
signals available to provide any signal indication or to interconnect
with the switches or PTC system. Without the benefit of a wayside or
cab signal system, or other similar system of equivalent safety, the
PTC system will have no signals to obey. In such a case, the PTC system
may be designed to allow for virtual signals, which are waypoints in
the track database that would correspond to the physical location of
the signals had they existed without a switch point monitoring system.
Accordingly, paragraph (e)(2)(i) proposes to require that in dark
territory where PTC systems are implemented and governed by this
subpart, the PTC system must enforce a positive stop for each
misaligned switch whereas the lead locomotive must be stopped short of
the switch to preclude any fouling of the switch. Once the train stops,
the railroad will have an opportunity to correct the switch's
positioning and then continue its route as intended.
    Unlike in signaled territory, FRA expects that on lines requiring
PTC in dark territory, each switch will be equipped with a WIU to
monitor the switch's position. A WIU is a device that aggregates
control and status information from one or more trackside devices for
transmission to a central office and/or an approaching train's onboard
PTC equipment, as well as disaggregating received requests for
information, and promulgates that request to the appropriate wayside
device. Most of the switches in dark territory are hand-operated with a
much smaller amount of them being spring and hydra switches. In dark
territory, usually none of the switches have their position monitored
by a SCC and railroads have relied on the proper handling of these
switches by railroad personnel. When it is necessary to throw a main
line switch from normal to reverse, an obligation arises under the
railroad's rules to restore the switch upon completion of the
authorized activity. Switch targets or banners are intended to provide
minimal visual indication of the switch's position, but in the typical
case trains are not required to operate at a speed permitting them to
stop short of open switches. As evidenced by the issuance of Emergency

Order No. 24 and the subsequent Railroad Operating Rules Final Rule (73
FR 8442 (Feb. 13, 2008)), proper handling of main line switches cannot
be guaranteed in every case. However, now with the implementation and
operation of PTC technology, if a switch is not in the normal position,
that information will be transmitted to the locomotive. The PTC system
will then know which switch is not in the normal position and require a
positive stop at that switch location only.
    In the event that movement through a misaligned switch would result
in an unacceptable risk, whether in dark or signaled territory,
paragraph (e)(2)(ii) proposes to require the PTC system to enforce a
positive stop on each train before it crosses the switch in the same
manner as described above for trains operating in dark, PTC territory.
FRA acknowledges that regardless of a switch's position, and regardless
of whether the switch is in dark or signaled territory, movement
through certain misaligned switches--even at low speeds--may still
create an unacceptable risk of collision with another train.
    FRA understands the term ``unacceptable risk'' to mean risk that
cannot be tolerated by the managing activity. It is a type of
identified risk that must be eliminated or controlled. For instance,
such an unacceptable risk may exist with a hand-operated crossover
between two main tracks, between a main track and a siding or auxiliary
track, or with a hand-operated switch providing access to another
subdivision or branch line. The switches mentioned in (e)(2)(ii) are in
locations where, if the switch is left lined in the wrong position, a
train would be allowed to traverse through the crossover or turnout and
potentially into the path of another train operating on an adjoining
main track, siding, or other route. Even if such switches were located
within a signaled territory, the signal governing movements over the
switch locations, for both tracks as may be applicable, would be
displaying their most restrictive aspect (usually red). This
restrictive signal indication would in turn allow both trains to
approach the location at restricted speed where one or both of the
crossover switches are lined in the reverse position. Since the PTC
system is not capable of actually enforcing restricted speed other than
its upper limits, the PTC system would enforce a 15 or 20 mile per hour
speed limit dependent upon the operating rules of the railroad.
However, there is normally up to as much as a 5 mile per hour tolerance
allowed for each speed limit before the PTC system will actually
enforce the applicable required speed. Thus, in reality, the PTC system
would not enforce the restricted speed condition until each train
obtained a speed of up to 25 miles per hour. In this scenario, it is
conceivable that two trains both operating at a speed of up to 25 miles
per hour could collide with each other at a combined impact speed
(closing speed) of up to 50 miles per hour. While these examples are
provided in the rule text, they are merely illustrative and do not
limit the universe of what FRA may consider an unacceptable risk for
the purpose of paragraph (e). FRA emphasizes that FRA maintains the
final determination as to what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable
risk in accordance with paragraph (e)(2)(ii).
    The PTC system must also enforce a positive stop short of any
misaligned switch on a PTC controlled siding in dark territory where
the allowable track speed is in excess of 20 miles per hour. Sidings
are used for meeting and passing trains and where those siding
movements are governed by the PTC system, safety necessitates the
position of the switches located on them to be monitored in order to
protect train movements operating on the siding. Conversely, on
signaled sidings, train movements are governed and protected by the
associated signal indications, track circuits, and monitored switches,
none of which are present in dark territory.
    Paragraph (e)(3) provides that the PTCSP may include a safety
analysis for PTC system enforcement associated with switch position and
an identification and justification of any alternate means of
protection other than that provided in this section shall be identified
and justified. FRA recognizes that in certain circumstances this
flexibility may allow the reasonable use of a track circuit in lieu of
individually monitored switches.
    Paragraph (e)(4) provides amplifying information regarding existing
standards of subparts A through G related to switches, movable-point
frogs, and derails in the route governed that are equally applicable to
PTC systems unless otherwise provided in a PTCSP approved under this
subpart. This paragraph explains that the FRA required and accepted
railroad industry standard types of components used to monitor switch
point position and how those devices are required to function. This
paragraph allows for some alternative method to be used to accomplish
the same level of protection if it is identified and justified in a
PTCSP approved under this subpart.
    Paragraph (f) provides amplifying information for determining
whether a PTC system is considered to be configured to prevent train-
to-train collisions, as required under paragraph (a). FRA will consider
the PTC system as providing the required protection if the PTC system
enforces the upper limits of restricted speed. These criteria will
allow following trains to pass intermediate signals displaying a
restricting aspect and will allow for the issuance of joint mandatory
directives.
    Where a wayside signal displays a ``Stop,'' ``Stop and Proceed,''
or ``Restricted Proceed'' indication, paragraph (f)(1)(i) requires the
PTC system to enforce the signal indication accordingly. In the case of
a ``Stop'' or ``Stop and Proceed'' indication, the train will be
brought to a stop prior to passing the signal displaying the
indication. The train may then proceed at 15 or 20 miles per hour, as
applicable according to the host railroad's operating rule(s) for
restricted speed. In the case of a ``Restricted Proceed'' indication,
the train would be allowed to pass the signal at 15 or 20 miles per
hour. In either event, the speed restriction would be enforced until
the train passes a more favorable signal indication. In dark territory
where trains operate by mandatory directive, the PTC system would be
expected to enforce the upper limit of restricted speed on a train when
the train was allowed into a block already occupied by another
preceding train traveling in the same direction. FRA would expect each
PTC system to function in this way and that each railroad will test
each system to ensure such proper functioning.
    Paragraphs (g) through (k) all concern situations where temporary
rerouting may be necessary and would affect application of the
operational rules under subpart I. While the proposed rule attempts to
reduce the opportunity for PTC and non-PTC trains to co-exist on the
same track, FRA recognizes that this may not always be possible,
especially when a track segment is out of service and a train must be
rerouted in order to continue to destination. Accordingly, paragraph
(g) allows for temporary rerouting of traffic between PTC equipped
lines and lines not equipped with PTC systems. FRA anticipates two
situations--emergencies and planned maintenance--that would justify
such rerouting.
    Paragraph (g) provides the preconditions and procedural rules to
allow or otherwise effectuate a temporary rerouting in the event of an
emergency or planned maintenance that would prevent usage of the
regularly used track. Historically, FRA has dealt

with temporary rerouting on an ad hoc basis. For instance, on November
12, 1996, FRA granted UP, under its application RS&I-AP-No. 1099,
conditional approval for relief from the requirements of Sec.  236.566,
which required equipping controlling locomotives with an operative
apparatus responsive to all automatic train stop, train control, or cab
signal territory equipment. The conditional approval provided for
``detour train movements necessitated by catastrophic occurrence such
as derailment, flood, fire, or hurricane'' on certain listed UP
territories configured with automatic cab signals (ACS) or automatic
train stop (ATS). Ultimately, the relief would allow trains not
equipped with the apparatus required under Sec.  236.566 to enter those
ACS and ATS territories. However, the relief was conditional upon
establishing an absolute block in advance of each train movement--as
prescribed by General Code of Operating Rules (GCOR) 11.1 and 11.2--and
notifying the applicable FRA Regional Headquarters. The detour would
only be permissible for up to seven days and FRA could modify or
rescind the relief for railroad non-compliance.
    On February 7, 2006, that relief was temporarily extended to
include defined territory where approximately two months of extensive
track improvements were necessary. Additional conditions for this
relief included a maximum train speed of 65 miles per hour and
notification to the FRA Region 8 Headquarters within 24 hours of the
beginning of the non-equipped detour train movements and immediately
upon any accident or incident. On February 27, 2007, FRA provided
similar temporary relief for another three months on the same
territory.
    While the aforementioned conditional relief was provided on an ad
hoc basis, FRA feels that codifying rules regulating temporary
rerouting involving PTC system track or locomotive equipment is
necessary due to the potential dangers of allowing mixed PTC and non-
PTC traffic on the same track and the inevitable increased presence of
PTC and PTC-like technologies. Moreover, FRA believes that the subject
railroads and FRA would benefit from more regulatory flexibility to
work more quickly and efficiently to provide for temporary rerouting to
mitigate the problems associated with emergency situations and
infrastructure maintenance.
    Under the proposed rule, FRA is providing for temporary rerouting
of non-PTC trains onto PTC track and PTC trains onto non-PTC track. A
train will not be considered rerouted for purposes of the conditions
set forth in this section if it operates on a PTC line that is other
than its ``normal route,'' which is equipped and functionally
responsive to the PTC system over which it is subsequently operated, or
if it is a non-PTC train (not a passenger train or a freight train
having any PIH materials) operating on a non-PTC line that is other
than its ``normal route.''
    Paragraph (g) effectively provides temporary civil penalty immunity
from various applicable requirements of this subpart, including
provisions under subpart I relating to lead locomotives, similar to how
waivers from FRA have provided certain railroads immunity from Sec.
236.566. FRA seeks comments on what other requirements under part 236
should also be included.
    FRA expects that emergency rerouting will require some flexibility
in order to respond to circumstances outside of the railroad's
control--most notably changes in the weather, vandalism, and other
unexpected occurrences--that would result in potential loss of life or
property or prevent the train from continuing on its normal route.
While paragraph (g) lists a number of possible emergency circumstances,
they are primarily included for illustrative purposes and are not a
limiting factor in determining whether an event rises to an emergency.
For instance, FRA would also consider allowing rerouting in the event
use of the track is prevented by vandalism or terrorism. While these
events are not the primary reasons FRA proposes paragraph (g) to allow
rerouting, FRA recognizes that they may fall outside of the railroad's
control.
    In the event of an emergency that would prevent usage of the track,
temporary rerouting may occur instantly by the railroad without
immediate FRA notice or approval. By contrast, the vast majority of
maintenance activities can be predicted by railroad operators. While
the proposed rule provides for temporary rerouting for such activities,
the lack of exigent circumstances does not require the allowance of
instantaneous rerouting without an appropriate request and, in cases
where the request is for rerouting to exceed 30 days, FRA approval.
Accordingly, under paragraph (g), procedurally speaking, temporary
rerouting for emergency circumstances will be treated differently than
temporary rerouting for planned maintenance. While FRA continues to
have an interest in monitoring all temporary rerouting to ensure that
it is occurring as contemplated by FRA and within the confines of the
rule, the timing of FRA notification, and the approval procedures,
reflect the aforementioned differences.
    When an emergency circumstance occurs that would prevent usage of
the regularly used track, and would require temporary rerouting, the
subject railroad must notify FRA within one business day after the
rerouting commences. To provide for communicative flexibility in
emergency situations, the proposed rule provides for such notification
to be made in writing or by telephone. FRA proposes that written
notification may be accomplished via overnight mail, e-mail, or
facsimile. In any event, the railroad should take the steps necessary
for the method of notification selected to include confirmation that an
appropriate person actually on duty with FRA receives the notification
and FRA is duly aware of the situation. FRA is considering whether to
employ the National Response Center (NRC) for such communications,
whereas notification may be made to the NRC clearly describing the
actions taken and providing the railroad's point of contact so that FRA
may follow up for additional information if necessary. While the NRC
provides full time telephonic services, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
365 days a year, the light volume of calls FRA expects for rerouting
purposes under this section may make the option cost prohibitive. FRA
is currently reviewing this option and seeks comments on this issue.
    While telephone notification may provide for easy communications by
the railroad, a mere phone call would not provide for documentation of
information required under paragraph (g). Moreover, if for some reason
the phone call is made at a time when the designated telephone operator
is not on duty or if the caller is only able to leave a message with
the FRA voice mail system, the possibility exists that the applicable
FRA personnel would not be timely notified of the communication and its
contents. Thus, while not in the proposed rules, FRA is considering
requiring any telephonic notification performed in accordance with
paragraph (g) to be followed up with written notification within 48
hours. FRA seeks comments on this issue.
    FRA is also considering using particular contact mail and e-mail
addresses and telephone and facsimile numbers to be used exclusively
for the notifications required by paragraph (g) as they relate to
emergency rerouting. Otherwise, if a railroad would notify a particular
member of the FRA staff in writing, and that staff member is
unavailable (e.g., on annual or sick leave, working in the field, or
otherwise indisposed), FRA would not be timely notified of the
emergency situation and the rerouting actions that are occurring.

If there is a singular contact address for each form of written
notification, FRA could attempt to provide continuous personnel
assignment to monitor incoming notifications. FRA seeks comments on
this issue. FRA also seeks comments on the possible need to include
requirements relating to confirmation of receipt of notifications
required under paragraph (g).
    Emergency rerouting can only occur without FRA approval for
fourteen (14) consecutive calendar days. If the railroad requires more
time, it must make a request to the Associate Administrator. The
request must be made directly to the Associate Administrator and
separately from the initial notification sometime before the 14-day
emergency rerouting period expires. Unless the Associate Administrator
notifies the railroad of his or her approval before the end of the
allowable emergency rerouting timeframe, the relief provided by
paragraph (g) will expire at the end of that timeframe.
    While a mere notification is necessary to commence emergency
rerouting, a request must be made, with subsequent FRA approval, to
perform planned maintenance rerouting. The relative predictability of
planned maintenance activities allows railroads to provide FRA with
much more advance request of any necessary rerouting and allows FRA to
review that request. FRA proposes that the request must be made at
least 10 calendar days before the planned maintenance rerouting
commences.
    To ensure a retrievable record, the request must be made in
writing. It may be submitted to FRA by fax, e-mail, or courier. Because
of security protocols placed in effect after 9/11, regular mail
undergoes irradiation to ensure that any pathogens have been destroyed
prior to delivery. The irradiation process adds significant delay to
FRA's receipt of the document, and the submitted document may be
damaged due to the irradiation process. The lack of emergency
circumstances makes telephonic communication less necessary and less
preferable. Like notifications for emergency rerouting, the request for
planned rerouting must include the number of days that the rerouting
should occur. If the planned maintenance will require rerouting up to
30 days, then the request must be made with the Regional Administrator.
If it will require rerouting for more than 30 days, then the request
must be made with the Associate Administrator. These longer time
periods reflects FRA's opportunity to review and approve the request.
In other words, since FRA expects that the review and approval process
will provide more confidence that a higher level of safety will be
maintained, the rerouting period for planned maintenance activities may
be more than the 14 days allotted for emergency rerouting.
    Regardless of whether the temporary rerouting is the result of an
emergency situation or planned maintenance, the communication to FRA
required under paragraph (g) must include the information listed under
paragraph (i). This information is necessary to provide FRA with
context and details of the rerouting. To attempt to provide railroads
with the flexibility intended under paragraph (g), and to attempt to
prevent enforcement of the rules from which the railroad should be
receiving relief, FRA must be able to coordinate with its inspectors
and other personnel. This information may also eventually be important
to FRA in developing statistical analyses and models, reevaluating its
rules, and determining the actual level of danger inherent in mixing
PTC and non-PTC traffic on the same tracks.
    For emergency rerouting purposes, the information is also necessary
for FRA to determine whether it should order the railroad or railroads
to cease rerouting or provide additional conditions that differ from
the standard conditions specified in paragraph (i). FRA recognizes the
importance of allowing temporary rerouting to occur automatically in
emergency circumstances. However, FRA must also maintain its
responsibility of ensuring that such rerouting occurs lawfully and as
intended by the rules. Accordingly, the proposed rules provide for the
opportunity for FRA to review the information required by paragraph (g)
to be submitted in accordance with paragraph (i) and order the railroad
or railroads to cease rerouting if FRA finds that such rerouting is not
appropriate or permissible in accordance with the requirements of
paragraphs (g) through (i), and as may be so directed in accordance
with paragraph (k), as discussed further below.
    For rerouting due to planned maintenance, the information required
under paragraph (i) is equally applicable and will be used to determine
whether the railroad should not reroute at all. If the request for
planned maintenance is for a period of up to 30 days, then the request
and information must be sent in writing to the Regional Administrator
of the region in which the temporary rerouting will occur. While such a
request is self-executing--meaning that it will automatically be
considered permissible if not otherwise responded to--the Regional
Administrator may prevent the temporary rerouting from starting by
simply notifying the railroad or railroads that its request is not
approved. The Regional Administrator may otherwise provide conditional
approval, request that further information be supplied to the Regional
Administrator or Associate Administrator, or disapprove the request
altogether. If the railroad still seeks to reroute due to planned
maintenance activities, it must provide the Regional Administrator or
Associate Administrator, as applicable, the requested information. If
the Regional Administrator requests further information, no planned
maintenance rerouting may occur until the information is received and
reviewed and the Regional Administrator provides his or her approval.
Likewise, no planned maintenance rerouting may occur if the Regional
Administrator disapproves of the request. If the Regional Administrator
does not provide notice preventing the temporary rerouting, then the
planned maintenance rerouting may begin and occur as requested.
However, once the planned maintenance rerouting begins, the Regional
Administrator may at any time order the railroad or railroads to cease
the rerouting in accordance with paragraph (k).
    Requests for planned maintenance rerouting exceeding 30 days,
however, must be made to the Associate Administrator and are not self-
executing. No such rerouting may occur without Associate Administrator
approval, even if the date passes on which the planned maintenance was
scheduled to commence. Under paragraph (h)(3), like the Regional
Administrator, the Associate Administrator may provide conditional
approval, request further information, or disapprove of the request to
reroute. Once approved rerouting commences, the Associate Administrator
may also order the rerouting to cease in accordance with paragraph (k).
    Paragraph (j) requires that, once temporary rerouting commences,
regardless of whether it is for emergency or planned maintenance
purposes, the track segments upon which the train will be rerouted must
have an absolute block established in advance of each rerouted train
movement and that each rerouted train movement shall not exceed 59
miles per hour for passenger and 49 miles per hour for freight. FRA
requests comment on whether these speed restrictions should be limited
to trains actually transporting PIH materials or intercity or commuter
passengers and whether a higher limit

should be provided on cab signal territory where the detoured train is
led by a locomotive equipped with operative cab signals. FRA also
requests comment on whether the more stringent requirements of Sec.
236.1029 (trains failed en route on PTC lines) should apply. Finally,
FRA requests comment on the extent to which the host railroad's PTCSP
might provide for alternative safety measures.
    Moreover, as referenced in paragraph (g) as it applies to both
emergency and planned maintenance circumstances, the track upon which
FRA expects the rerouting to occur would require certain mitigating
protections listed under paragraph (j) in light of the mixed PTC and
non-PTC traffic. While FRA purposefully intends paragraph (j) to apply
similarly to Sec.  236.567, FRA recognizes that Sec.  236.567 does not
account for the statutory mandates of interoperability and the core PTC
safety functions. Accordingly, paragraph (j) must be more restrictive.
    Section 236.567, which applies to territories where ``an automatic
train stop, train control, or cab signal device fails and/or is cut out
en route,'' requires trains to proceed at either restricted speed or,
if an automatic block signal system is in operation according to signal
indication, at no more than 40 miles per hour to the next available
point of communication where report must be made to a designated
officer. Where no automatic block signal system is in use, the train
shall be permitted to proceed at restricted speed or where an automatic
block signal system is in operation according to signal indication but
not to exceed medium speed to a point where absolute block can be
established. Where an absolute block is established in advance of the
train on which the device is inoperative, the train may proceed at not
to exceed 79 miles per hour. Paragraph (j) utilizes that absolute block
condition, which more actively engages the train dispatcher in managing
movement of the train over the territory (in both signaled and non-
signaled territory). Recognizing that re-routes under this section will
occur in non-signaled territory, the maximum authorized speeds
associated with such territory are used as limitations on the speed of
re-routed trains. FRA agrees with the comments of labor representatives
in the PTC Working Group who contend that the statutory mandate alters
to some extent what would otherwise be considered reasonable for these
circumstances. FRA welcomes comments on whether restrictions associated
with re-routing should vary depending on whether the actual train in
question is a passenger train or includes cars containing PIH
materials.
    It should be noted that this paragraph (j) was added by FRA after
further consideration of this issue and was not part of the PTC Working
Group consensus. FRA believes that special precautions may be
appropriate given the heightened safety expectations suggested by the
statutory mandate. Comment is requested on the appropriateness of these
restrictions, including any impact on other rail traffic.
    Paragraph (k), as previously noted, provides the Regional
Administrator with the ability to order the railroad or railroads to
cease rerouting operations that were requested for up to 30 days. The
Associate Administrator may order a railroad or railroads to cease
rerouting operations regardless of the length of planned maintenance
rerouting requested. FRA believes this is an important measure
necessary to prevent rerouting performed not in accordance with the
rules and FRA's expectations based on the railroad's communications and
to ensure the protection of train crews and the public. However, FRA is
confident that in the vast majority of cases railroads will utilize the
afforded latitude reasonably and only under necessary circumstances.
    FRA expects each host railroad to develop a plan to govern
operations in the event temporary rerouting is performed in accordance
with this section. Thus, as noted further below in Sec.  236.1015, FRA
proposes each PTCSP to include a plan accounting for such rerouted
operations.

Section 236.1006 Equipping Locomotives Operating in PTC Territory

    The PTC Working Group discussed at great length the issues related
to operation of PTC-equipped locomotives, and locomotives not equipped
with PTC onboard apparatus, over lines equipped with PTC. The PTC
Working Group recognized that the typical rule with respect to train
control territory is that all controlling locomotives must be equipped
and operative (see Sec.  236.566). It was also noted in the discussion
that the Interstate Commerce Commission (FRA's predecessor agency in
the regulation of this subject matter) and FRA have provided some
relief from this requirement in discrete circumstances where safety
exposure was considered relatively low and the hardship associated with
equipping additional locomotives was considered substantial.
    The ASLRRA noted that its member railroads conduct limited
operations over Class I railroad lines that will be required to be
equipped with PTC systems in a substantial number of locations. These
operations are principally related to the receipt and delivery of
carload traffic in interchange. The small railroad service extends onto
the Class I railroad track in order to hold down costs and permit both
the small railroad and the Class I railroad to retain traffic that
might be priced off the railroad if the Class I had to dispatch a crew
to pick up or place the cars. This, in turn, supports competitive
transportation options for small businesses, including marginal small
businesses in rural areas.
    The ASLRRA advocated an exception that would permit the trains of
its members and other small railroads to continue use of existing
trackage rights and agreements without the necessity for equipping
their locomotives with PTC. They suggested that any incremental risk be
mitigated by requiring that such trains proceed subject to the
requirement for an absolute block in advance (similar to operating
rules consistent with Sec.  236.567 applicable to trains with failed
onboard train control systems). This position was consistently opposed
both by the rail labor organizations and the Class I railroads. These
organizations took the position that all trains should be equipped with
PTC in order to gain the benefits sought by the congressional mandate
and to provide the host railroad the full benefit of its investment in
safety. Informal discussions suggested that Class I railroads might
offer technical or financial assistance to certain small railroads in
equipping their locomotives, but that this would, of course, be done
based on the corporate interest of the Class I railroad.
    In the PTC Working Group and in informal discussions around its
activities, Class I railroads indicated that they intended to take a
strong position against non-equipped trains operating on their PTC
lines, and that in order to enforce this restriction fairly they
understood that they would need to equip their own locomotives,
including older road switchers that might venture onto PTC-equipped
lines only occasionally. However, during these discussions, FRA was not
able to develop a clear understanding regarding, outside the scope of
FRA regulations, the extent to which the Class I railroads under
previously executed private agreements enjoy the effective ability to
enforce a requirement that all trains be equipped. FRA presumes for
purposes of this proposal that there will be circumstances rooted

in previously executed private agreements under which the Class I
railroad would be entitled to require the small railroad to use a
controlling locomotive equipped with PTC as a condition of operating
onto the property. FRA wishes to emphasize that, in making this
regulatory proposal, FRA does not intend to influence the exercise of
private rights or to suggest that public policy would disfavor an
otherwise legitimate restriction on the use of unequipped locomotives
on PTC lines. Rather, this proposal is intended to explore limited
exceptions that might be acceptable from the point of view of safety,
and helpful from the point of view of the public interest in rail
service, where it might be compatible with prior rights of the
railroads involved. FRA also notes that, in the absence of clear
guidance on this issue, a substantial number of waiver requests could
be expected that would have to be resolved without the benefit of
decisional criteria previously examined and refined through the
rulemaking process.
    Paragraph (a) proposes that, as general rule, all trains operating
over PTC territory must be PTC-equipped. In other words, paragraph (a)
would require that each lead locomotive to be operated with a PTC
onboard apparatus if it is controlling a train operating on a track
equipped with a PTC system in accordance subpart I. The PTC onboard
apparatus should operate and function in accordance with the PTCSP
governing the particular territory. Accordingly, it must successfully
and sufficiently interoperate with the host railroad's PTC system.
    Generally, the four parts of each PTC system are office, wayside,
communications, and onboard components. FRA recognizes that a PTC
onboard apparatus for a lead locomotive owned and operated by one
railroad may not be part of the PTC system upon which the locomotive
operates. For example, a Class II railroad lead locomotive equipped
with a PTC onboard apparatus may operate on a Class I railroad's PTC
line. Throughout this rule, the use of the term ``PTC system,''
depending upon its context, usually refers to the host railroad's PTC
system, and not the tenant railroad's lead locomotive. When using the
term, PTC onboard apparatus, however, FRA intends to cover all such
mobile equipment, regardless of whether it on a locomotive owned or
controlled by a host or tenant railroad.
    Under proposed Sec.  236.1006, FRA may enforce paragraph (a).
Proposed paragraphs (b) and (c), however, contains a series of proposed
qualifications and exceptions to paragraph (a).
    First, it is understood that during the time PTC technology is
being deployed to meet the statutory deadline of December 31, 2015,
there will be movements over PTC lines by trains with lead locomotives
not equipped with a PTC onboard apparatus. In general, Class I railroad
locomotives are used throughout the owning railroad's system and, under
shared power agreements, on other railroads nationally. FRA anticipates
that the gradual equipping of locomotives--which will occur at a
relatively small number of specialized facilities and which will
require a day or two out of service as well as time in transit--will
extend well into the implementation period that ends on December 31,
2015. It will not be feasible to tie locomotives down to PTC lines, and
the RSAC stakeholders fully understood that point. Labor organizations
did urge that railroads make every effort to use equipped locomotives
as controlling units, and FRA believes that in general, railroads will
do so in order to obtain the benefits of their investment.
    Second, FRA has included a transitional provision, related to PTC
apparatus that fails upon attempted initialization, specifically
intended to encourage placement of PTC-equipped locomotives on the
point during the period when reliability may be an issue. This
provision would allow a stated, declining percentage of locomotives
equipped with PTC to be dispatched even if the onboard apparatus fails.
Although FRA agrees with the objective of rail labor's suggestion for
``consist management'' that puts equipped locomotives on the point, FRA
also recognizes that a number of factors related to the age and
condition of locomotives may influence this decision. Further, in the
early stages of implementation, requiring that power be switched if
initialization fails could result in significant train delays and
contribute to congestion in yards and terminals. Some ``slack'' in the
system will be required to implement PTC intelligently and
successfully. Of course, if FRA determines during implementation that
good faith efforts are not being made to take advantage of PTC-equipped
locomotives, FRA could step in with more prescriptive requirements
after providing notice and an opportunity for comment.
    Recognizing that matching PTC lines with PTC-equipped controlling
locomotives will be a key factor in obtaining the benefits of this
technology in the period up to December 31, 2015, FRA requests comments
on whether PTC Implementation Plans should be required to include power
management elements describing how this will be accomplished to the
degree feasible.
    Third, the section provides a cross-reference to Sec.  236.1029
pertaining to PTC onboard apparatus failing en route.
    Fourth, this provision proposes exceptions for trains operated by
Class II and III railroads, including tourist or excursion railroads.
The exceptions are limited to lines not carrying intercity or commuter
passenger service, except where the Class I freight railroad and the
passenger railroad have requested an exception in the PTC
Implementation Plan's main line track exception addendum (MTEA) in
accordance with Sec.  236.1019, as further discussed below, and FRA has
approved that element of the plan.
    FRA has considered whether to provide an exception to requiring
each Class II and III railroad locomotive to be equipped with a PTC
onboard apparatus when operating over passenger routes to be equipped
with a PTC system, but FRA has not been able to define conditions that
would apparently be suitable in every case. FRA is open to
consideration of exceptions within the context of a PTC Implementation
Plan. To the extent that the host Class I or passenger railroad would
need to be supportive of the exception, FRA recognizes that options may
be foreclosed prior to FRA consideration. However, railroads have
historically exercised substantial control of operations over track
that they own or dispatch, and in this case those interests
significantly parallel the apparent intent of the Congress to achieve a
high level of safety in mixed freight and passenger operations. If FRA
were to handle exceptions through PTC Implementation Plans, FRA seeks
comments on how that should be accomplished. FRA also seeks comments on
whether there should be an assumption that the lead locomotives not
equipped with PTC onboard apparatus' on four unequipped Class II or III
railroad trains will be permitted daily on a segment of PTC-equipped
track and that variances from that are permitted in a PTC
Implementation Plan. If so, FRA questions whether that should be
subject to the agreement of both railroads. If agreement by the Class
II or III railroad is not required, FRA seeks comments on what
assurance there would be that the Class I railroad would not
effectively shut out the Class II or III railroad's operation.
    FRA recognizes that most of the justifications stated for these
proposed exceptions pertain to short movements for interchange that
would constitute a small portion of the movements over the

PTC-equipped line. The accident/incident data show that the risk
attendant upon these movements is small. A review of the last seven
years of accident data covering 3,312 accidents that were potentially
preventable by PTC showed that there were only two of those accidents
which involved a Class I railroad's train and a Class II or III
railroad's train. FRA believes that the low level of risk revealed by
these statistics justifies an exception for Class II and III railroad
trains traversing a PTC-equipped line for a relatively short distance.
FRA notes that the cost of equipping those trains would be high when
viewed in the context of the financial strength of the Class II or III
railroad and the marginal safety benefits would be relatively low in
those cases where a small volume of traffic is moved over the PTC-
equipped line.
    FRA also believes that it is clearly desirable to eventually have
each train using a PTC-equipped line to have a lead locomotive equipped
with a PTC onboard apparatus. However, FRA seeks comments on the length
of time the exception should last and a justification of that length of
time. Other considerations aside, FRA seeks comments on whether FRA
should not require a Class II or III railroad locomotive used on a PTC-
equipped line to be equipped with PTC when it is rebuilt or replaced
(i.e., when the cost of equipping a locomotive is lowest). In other
cases, the Class II or III railroad has dedicated locomotives serving
the line to be equipped with PTC. From the facts presently available to
FRA, it appears to be appropriate for those locomotives to be equipped
with PTC. Moreover, FRA is aware of other cases where Class II and III
railroads have rather more extensive operations over Class I railroad
lines; and, in these cases, the risks incurred could be more
substantial. Further, in some of these cases the smaller railroads are
aligned with the Class I railroads over which they operate or may even
be under common ownership and control. For purposes of prompting a more
complete public dialogue on this issue, FRA is proposing to limit
unequipped movements by any single Class II or III railroad to not more
than 4 trains per day over any given track segment on a PTC-equipped
line. A train moving from the small railroad to the point of
interchange and back within the same calendar day would count as two
trains.
    To the extent the movements in question do not exceed 20 miles,
this exception would be available at least until FRA next considered
the issue of PTC deployment. Information available to FRA indicates
that this would accommodate a substantial majority of the affected
operations. FRA questions and seeks comments as to whether this
latitude should be available if one or more locomotives subsequently
acquired by the small railroad were equipped for PTC.
    To the extent the movements in question exceed 20 miles, the
exception would be available only until December 31, 2020. In some
cases, small railroads operate over Class I railroad tracks for over
one hundred miles, and these operations may be integral to their
service plans (e.g., permitting the small railroad to reach lines
branching off from the Class I railroad's route structure for which the
smaller railroad provides local service). FRA recognizes that in these
circumstances the smaller railroads would face overwhelming competition
for supplier attention and significant challenges related to pricing
that will attend the initial period of implementation. Accordingly, FRA
proposes to provide for these railroads to equip the necessary
locomotives with additional time beyond the statutory deadline that
applies to Class I railroads. In conjunction with this latitude, FRA
would ask for progress reports to focus the attention of the railroads'
management teams and to ensure that the agency could not be presented
with unreasonable demands for further extensions at the end of the
extended implementation period.
    FRA recognizes that small railroads carry a wide variety of
commodities, including PIH traffic. FRA invites comments on whether the
small railroad exceptions for freight operations that FRA is proposing
should be altered if the small railroad is transporting PIH traffic on
PTC equipped track through a densely populated area. Commenters are
requested to detail any alternative standards they believe should be
adopted to address such a situation.

Section 236.1007 Additional Requirements for High Speed Service

    Since the early 1990s, there has been an interest centered around
designated high speed corridors for the introduction of high speed
rail, and a number of States have made progress in preparing rail
corridors through safety improvements at highway-rail grade crossings,
investments in track structure, and other areas. FRA has administered
limited programs of assistance using appropriated funds. With the
passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public
Law 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), which provides $8 billion in capital
assistance for high speed rail corridors and intercity passenger rail
service, and the President's announcement in April 2009 of a Vision for
High Speed Rail in America, FRA expects those efforts to increase
considerably. FRA believes that railroads conducting high speed
operations in the United States can provide a world class service as
safe as, or better than, any high speed operations conducted elsewhere.
In anticipation of such service, and to ensure public safety, FRA
proposes three tiers of requirements for PTC systems operating in high
speed service. The proposed performance thresholds are intended to
increase safety performance targets as the maximum speed limits
increase to compensate for increased risks, including the potential
frequency and adverse consequences of a collision or derailment.
    Section 236.1007 proposes setting the intervals for the high speed
safety performance targets for operations with: maximum speeds at or
greater than 60 and 50 miles per hour for passenger service and freight
operations, respectively, under paragraph (a); maximum speeds greater
than 90 miles per hour under paragraph (b); maximum speeds greater than
125 miles per hour under paragraph (c); and maximum speeds greater than
150 mph under paragraph (d). The reader should note that the
requirements increase as speed rises. Thus, for instance, operations
with trains moving above 125 miles per hour must, in addition to the
requirements under paragraph (c), adhere to the requirements under
paragraphs (a) and (b).
    Paragraph (a) addresses the PTC system requirements for territories
where speeds are greater than 59 miles per hour for passenger service
and 49 miles per hour for freight service. Under existing regulations
(49 CFR 236.0), block signal systems are required at these speeds
(unless a manual block system is in place, an option that this proposal
would phase out). The proposed rule expects covered operations moving
at these speeds to have implemented a PTC system that provides, either
directly or with another technology, all of the statutory PTC system
functions along with the safety-critical functions of a block signal
system as defined in the existing standards of subparts A-F of part
236. The safety-critical functions of a block signal system include
track circuits, which assist in broken rail detection and unintended
track occupancies (equipment rolling out), and fouling circuits, which
can identify equipment that is intruding on the clearance envelope and
may prevent raking collisions.

    FRA recognizes that advances in technology may render current block
signal, fouling, and broken rail detection systems obsolete and FRA
does not want to preclude the introduction of suitable and appropriate
advanced technologies. Accordingly, FRA believes that alternative
mechanisms providing the same functionality are entirely acceptable and
FRA encourages their development and use to the extent they do not have
an adverse impact on the level of safety.
    Paragraph (b) addresses system requirements for territories where
operating speeds are greater than 90 miles per hour, which is currently
the maximum allowable operating speed for passenger trains on Class 5
track. At these higher speeds, the implemented PTC system must not only
comply with paragraph (a), but also be shown to be fail-safe (as
defined in Appendix C) and at all times prevent unauthorized intrusion
of rail traffic onto the higher speed line operating with a PTC system.
FRA intends this concept of fail-safe application to be understood in
its commonplace meaning, i.e., that insofar as feasible the system is
designed to fail to a safe state, which normally means that trains will
be brought to a stop. Further, FRA understands that there are aspects
of current system design and operation that may create a remote
opportunity for a ``wrong-side'' or unsafe failure and that these
issues would be described in the PTCSP and mitigations would be
provided. FRA recognizes that, as applied in the general freight
system, this proposal could create a significant challenge related to
interoperability of freight equipment operating over the same
territory. Accordingly, FRA requests comment on whether, where
operations do not exceed 125 miles per hour or some other value, the
requirement for compliance with Appendix C safety assurance principles
might be limited to the passenger trains involved, with ``non-vital''
onboard processing permitted for the intermingled freight trains.
    As speed increases, it also becomes more important that inadvertent
incursions on the PTC-equipped track be prevented at switch locations.
FRA proposes that this be done by effective means that might include
use of split-point derails properly placed, equipping of tracks
providing entry with PTC, or arrangement of tracks and switches in such
a way as to divert an approaching movement which is not authorized to
enter onto the PTC line. The protection mechanism on the slower speed
line must be integrated with the PTC system on the higher speed line in
a manner to provide appropriate control of trains operating on the
higher speed line if a violation is not prevented for whatever reason.
    Paragraph (c) addresses high speed rail operations exceeding 125
miles per hour, which is the maximum speed for Class 7 track under
Sec.  213.307. At these higher speeds, the consequences of a derailment
or collision are significantly greater than at lower speeds due to the
involved vehicle's increased kinetic energy. In such circumstances, in
addition to meeting the requirements under paragraphs (a) and (b),
including having a fail-safe PTC system, the entity operating above 125
miles per hour must provide an additional safety analysis (the HSR-125)
providing suitable evidence to the Associate Administrator that the PTC
system can support a level of safety equivalent to, or better than, the
best level of safety of comparable rail service in either the United
States or a foreign country over the 5-year period preceding the
submission of the PTCSP. Additionally, PTC systems on these high speed
lines must provide the capability, as appropriate, to detect incursion
from outside the right of way and provide warnings to trains. Each
subject railroad is free to suggest in its HSR-125 any method to the
Associate Administrator that ensures that the subject high speed lines
are corridors effectively sealed and protected from such incursions
(see Sec.  213.347 of this title), including such hazards as large
motor vehicles falling on the track structure from highway bridges.
    Paragraph (d) addresses the highest speeds existing or currently
contemplated for rail operations exceeding 150 miles per hour. FRA
expects these operations to be governed by a Rule of Particular
Applicability and the HSR-125 required by paragraph (c) shall be
developed as part of an overall system safety plan approved by the
Associate Administrator. The quantitative risk showing required for
operations above 125 miles per hour is not required to include
consideration of acts of deliberate violence. The reason for this
exclusion is simply to remove speculative or extraordinary
considerations from the analysis. FRA and the Department of Homeland
Security will of course expect that security considerations are taken
into account in system planning.

Section 236.1009 Procedural Requirements

    RSIA08 and the proposed rule requires that by April 16, 2010, each
Class I railroad carrier and each entity providing regularly scheduled
intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation develop and submit
to FRA a plan for implementing a PTC system by December 31, 2015, and
that FRA shall not permit the installation of any PTC system or
component in revenue service unless the Administrator has certified
them through the approval process contained in this part. FRA
understands implementation to include design, testing, potential
Verification and Validation, installation, and operation over the PTC
system's life cycle.
    Current subpart H of part 236 provides a technically sound
procedure for obtaining FRA approval of various processor-based signal
and train control systems. However, as based on experience gained
during BNSF's ETMS 1 project, FRA believes that its process does not
support rapid FRA review and decision making and requires redundant
submission of information common to multiple railroads. FRA also
believes that although the risk analysis required by subpart H fully
reflects operational parameters associated with the different type of
operations, it is excessively cumbersome and overly time consuming for
the purposes of deploying PTC system technologies at the rate required
under RSIA08. Moreover, subpart H does not require an implementation
plan and does not provide for ``certification.'' Arguably FRA could
simply amend subpart H to include requirements relating to
implementation plans and to modify the language to equate ``approval''
under subpart H with ``certification'' under the statute. However, FRA
believes that such a resultant amended subpart H would remain
unsuitable for a PTC system certification process in light of the
congressional mandates. Those potential amendments alone would not
remedy subpart H's inability to provide quick and efficient FRA review.
    Accordingly, for PTC system implementation, certification, and
build-out completion to occur within the very aggressive dates set by
Congress, FRA is proposing a new subpart I, with some minor
modifications to subpart H. Under subpart I, Sec.  236.1007 proposes
and explains the process by which each railroad may ultimately receive
PTC System Certification for its PTC system. Under Sec.  236.1007, FRA
intends to avoid procedural redundancy, provide sufficient procedural
flexibility to accompany the varying needs of those seeking
certification, mitigate the financial risk associated with
technological investment necessary to comply with the regulatory
requirements, and otherwise develop a

streamlined process to provide for quick review and resolution of the
issues leading to certification.
    Generally speaking, there are three major elements of the proposed
PTC System Certification process: PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP)
submission and approval, receipt or use of a Type Approval number--
which may be provided with approval of a PTC Development Plan (PTCDP)--
and PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP) submission to receive PTC System
Certification. While Sec.  236.1009 provides for the procedural
requirements for this process, the contents for the applicable filings
are provided for under Sec. Sec.  236.1011, 236.1013, and 236.1015. The
PTCIP is the written plan that defines the specific details of how and
when the railroad will implement the PTC system. The PTCDP provides a
detailed discussion of specific elements of the proposed technology and
product that will be used to implement PTC as required by RSIA08.
Approval of the PTCDP comes in the form of a Type Approval number that
applies to the subject PTC system. The PTCSP provides the railroad-
specific elements demonstrating that the system, as installed, meets
the required safety performance objectives. Approval of the PTCSP comes
in the form of a PTC System Certification.
    Under paragraph (a), the PTCIP submission deadline of April 16,
2010, applies to all host railroads--as defined in Sec.  236.1003--that
exist at that time and are required to install a PTC system on one or
more main lines in accordance with Sec.  236.1005(b). Intercity and
commuter railroads that are tenants on Class I, II, or III freight
lines must also join with their host railroad in filing these plans.
FRA believes that the railroad that maintains operational control over
a particular track segment is generally in the best position to develop
and submit the PTCIP, since that railroad is more knowledgeable of the
conditions of and operations over its track. FRA recognizes that in
cases where a tenant passenger railroad operates over a Class II or III
railroad, the passenger railroad may be required to take a more active
role in planning the PTC system deployment by working with the host
railroad.
    Paragraph (a), proposes to require that a PTCIP will be filed by
railroads that are host railroads upon which passenger trains traverse
and thus require PTC installation and operation. FRA recognizes that
the statute requires timely submission of a PTCIP by each Class I
railroad and each entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or
commuter rail passenger transportation. Class II and III railroads that
host intercity or commuter rail service will need to file
implementation plans, whether or not they directly procure or manage
installation of the PTC system.
    The tenant passenger railroad will need to file jointly with the
Class I, II or III railroad. This is consistent with RSIA08, which
requires each subject passenger railroad to file an implementation
plan. In the case of an intercity or commuter railroad providing
service over a Class I railroad, it may be sufficient for the passenger
railroad to file a letter associating itself with the Class I's plan to
the extent it impacts the passenger service. FRA does not propose any
requirement for joint filing in the more common case where another
railroad has freight trackage rights over a Class I railroad's PTC
line. However, the Class I railroad will, of course, address these
joint operations and discuss the issue of interoperability in its plan
as required by law.
    If a host freight railroad and tenant passenger railroad cannot
come to an agreement on a PTCIP to jointly file by April 16, 2010, they
must instead each file a PTCIP separately with a notification separate
from the PTCIP to the Associate Administrator indicating that a joint
filing was not possible and an explanation of why the subject railroads
could not agree upon a final PTCIP draft for joint filing. Under such a
circumstance, each freight or passenger railroad may still be subject
to a civil penalty assessed for each day past the deadline that a PTCIP
is not jointly filed. FRA believes that these measures are necessary to
ensure timely PTC system implementation and operation under the statute
and are in the interest of public safety. FRA believes that when
subject railroads have an obligation to submit a joint filing, they
also carry the obligation to seek dispute resolution by private means
if needed.
    If a PTCIP or request for amendment (RFA), as provided in Sec.
236.1021, must be submitted in accordance with the rule after April 16,
2010, paragraph (a) does not propose to provide the subject railroads
with an opportunity to file separately. If a railroad intends to use
track that would require the installation of a PTC system in accordance
with paragraph (a)(3), and the parties have difficulty reaching
agreement, then such usage would merely be delayed until the parties
come to a mutually acceptable PTCIP for joint filing.
    FRA notes that new passenger railroads are likely to begin
operations during the period between issuance of the final rule in this
proceeding and the end of the implementation period for PTC (December
15, 2015). Railroads beginning operations after April 16, 2010, but
before December 31, 2015, that must install PTC would be expected to
file a PTCIP that meets the requirements of paragraph (a) as soon as
possible after the decision to proceed. It is FRA's position for
purposes of this proposal that any railroad commencing operations after
December 31, 2015, that require PTC will not be authorized to commence
revenue operations until the PTC installation is complete. FRA requests
comment on whether there are any legitimate exceptions to this
approach, which appears to be the only approach consistent with the
RSIA08.
    Paragraph (b) contains the proposed process for receiving a Type
Approval number for a particular PTC system. Under the proposed rule,
each PTC system must receive a Type Approval number. The Type Approval
is a number assigned to a particular off-the-shelf PTC system product--
described in a PTCDP in accordance with Sec.  236.1013--indicating
FRA's belief that the product could fulfill the requirements of subpart
I. FRA's issuance of a Type Approval does not mean that the product
will meet the requirements of subpart I. The Type Approval applies to
the technology designed and developed, but not yet implemented, and
does not bestow any ownership or other similar interests or rights to
any railroad. Each Type Approval number remains under the control of
the FRA, and can be issued or revoked in accordance with this subpart.
    FRA expects the proposed Type Approval process to provide a variety
of benefits to FRA and the industry. If a railroad submits a PTCDP
describing a PTC system, and the PTC system receives a Type Approval,
then other railroads intending to use the same PTC system without
variances may, in accordance with proposed paragraph (b)(1), simply
rely on the Type Approval number without having to file a separate
PTCDP. While the railroad filing the PTCDP must expend resources to
develop and submit the PTCDP, all other railroads using the same PTC
system would not. This would not only provide significant cost and time
savings for a number of railroads, but will remove a significant level
of redundancy from the approval process that is currently inherent in
subpart H.
    If, however, a railroad intends to use a modified version of a PTC
system that has already received a Type Approval number, and the
variances between the two systems are of a safety-critical nature, the
railroad must submit a new PTCDP. The new PTCDP can either fully

comply with the content requirements under Sec.  236.1013 or supply a
Type Approval number for the other PTC system upon which the modified
PTC system will rely and a document fulfilling the content requirements
under Sec.  236.1013 as it applies to the safety-critical variances.
    In any event, to receive a new Type Approval number, the railroad
must submit to FRA a PTCDP, drafted in accordance with Sec.  236.1013,
no later than when it submits its PTCIP. While the PTCDP may be drafted
by the PTC system vendor, FRA believes it is the railroads' regulatory
responsibility and duty to submit its PTCIP to FRA. FRA believes that
requiring the submission of the PTCDP with the PTCIP will facilitate a
reduction in regulatory activities, thus maximizing the time available
for the railroads to carry out the necessary activities to complete PTC
implementation within the 65 months available between April 2010, and
December 2015. During that time, the each railroad is expected to carry
out all of the required actions necessary to complete design,
manufacture, test, and installation of the PTC office, onboard, and
wayside subsystems. FRA believes that the process proposed in paragraph
(b) provides the railroads considerable flexibility. By requiring that
a railroad's PTCDP be submitted no later than its PTCIP, FRA intends to
ensure that FRA has the opportunity early in the regulatory approval
process to review and determine whether the proposed technical solution
in the PTCDP has the potential to satisfy the statutory requirements.
If a PTCDP is submitted at a later time, the length of time available
to the railroad to perform a complete PTC implementation will be
decreased even further.
    Many issues relating to FRA's review of the railroad's PTCDP may
also cause further delays, thus reducing the time between the receipt
of a Type Approval and the statutory deadline of December 15, 2015,
upon which the PTC system must be installed and operating. For
instance, FRA may find that the PTCDP does not adequately conform to
this subpart or otherwise has insufficient information to justify
approval. FRA may also determine that there are issues raised by the
PTCDP that would adversely affect the ability of FRA to eventually
certify the system. If such a situation were to arise, the railroad and
its vendor would need to address the issues, and resubmit the PTCDP for
FRA approval.
    Given the magnitude of the tasks faced by the railroads, any
additional delays beyond April 16, 2010, will increase the risk of the
railroad failing to meet the December 31, 2015, completion date
required by RSIA08. Such delays will increase the length of time that
the risk to the public and railroad employees remains unmitigated by
PTC technologies. More specifically, FRA recognizes that any loss of
time would make it more difficult for a railroad to perform the
installation, testing, and analyses necessary to submit its PTCSP for
PTC System Certification. Such installation, testing, and analyses
cannot occur until the railroad knows the PTC system that it may use,
as identified by a Type Approval number. Accordingly, paragraph (b)
proposes that each PTCDP be filed no later than when its associated
PTCIP is submitted in order to preserve as much time as possible to
ensure that each railroad meets the statutory deadline and that
Congress' intent is not otherwise frustrated.
    FRA believes that the existence of certain overlapping issues in
each PTCDP and PTCIP also requires their contemporaneous submission and
review. FRA strongly believes that a meaningful implementation plan
cannot be created if the railroad has not identified and understands
the technology they propose to implement. Without an understanding of
the technology, and the issues associated with its design, test, and
implementation, any schedules developed by the railroad may be
meaningless. Unless there is an understanding of the PTC system it
hopes to use, and how it expects to implement that system, evaluation
of a deployment schedule can not be undertaken.
    Moreover, the PTCIP requires that the railroad address the issue of
interoperability with other PTC systems. Any meaningful discussion
regarding interoperability requires that the railroad have a clear
understanding of the technical capabilities of the system that it
proposes to implement before it can make an informed judgment of how
the system will interoperate with other systems. The information
required in the PTCDP provides the implementing railroad, other
railroads with which the implementing railroad interfaces, and FRA with
an understanding of the technical requirements necessary for
interoperability. FRA believes that early identification of technical
capabilities of the proposed PTC systems will allow the concerned
parties to make more timely design adjustments to facilitate
interoperability, reducing any delays that may increase the level of
risk of the railroad meeting its statutory deadline.
    FRA also believes that the process proposed by paragraph (b) will
also reduce each railroad's financial risk related to implementing a
technological system requiring governmental approval. Members of the
PTC Working Group expressed concern about having to expend significant
resources to implement and test a PTC system prior to submitting a
PTCSP reflecting its findings in order to receive PTC System
Certification. FRA believes that proposed paragraphs (b) and (e)
address this concern. By requiring submission of a PTCDP earlier in the
process, FRA intends to be involved in the design and implementation
process from the beginning. After contemporaneously reviewing a
railroad's PTCIP and PTCDP, FRA may be able to predetermine, and share
with the railroad, an appropriate course of action to adequately
address the various issues specific to the railroad and related to
drafting a successful PTCSP. Moreover, in accordance with paragraph
(e)--as discussed further below--each subject railroad may have the
benefit of FRA monitoring its progress in implementing its PTC system.
With FRA's involvement in the process, each subject railroad's
financial risk associated with implementing a PTC system prior to PTCSP
approval will be mitigated.
    While FRA expects each subject railroad to submit its PTCDP with
its PTCIP, the proposed rule does not preclude a railroad from
submitting its PTCDP before its PTCIP for FRA review and approval. FRA
encourages an earlier submission of the PTCDP to further reduce the
required regulatory effort necessary to review the PTCIP and PTCDP if
submitted together. More importantly, it would present an opportunity
for FRA to issue a Type Approval for the proposed PTC system before
April 16, 2010, thus providing other railroads intending to use the
same or similar PTC system the opportunity to leverage off of the work
already accomplished by simply submitting the Type Approval--and a much
less burdensome PTCDP in the event of variances. FRA also believes that
the proposed regulatory procedure may incentivize railroads using the
same or similar PTC system to jointly develop and submit a PTCDP, thus
further reducing the paperwork burden on FRA and the industry as a
whole and increasing confidence in the interoperability between
systems.
    Paragraph (c) proposes to require that each subject railroad must
either file a Request for Expedited Certification (REC) or submit an
approved PTCIP, a Type Approval, and a PTCSP developed in accordance
with Sec.  236.1015 in order to receive PTC System Certification. A REC
applies only to PTC systems that

have already been in revenue service and meet the criteria of Sec.
236.1031(a), as further discussed below. If a PTC system is not
eligible for expedited certification, the railroad must submit a PTCSP.
As required under proposed Sec.  236.1015, the PTCSP must include
information relating to the operation and safety of the PTC system as
defined in the PTCDP and as applied to the railroad's actual territory.
To determine the sufficiency of the PTC system's applicability on the
railroad's territory, the railroad may be required, as referenced in
paragraph (e), to perform laboratory or field testing or have an
independent assessment performed. Ultimately, PTC System
Certification--issued by FRA based on a review and approval of the
PTCSP--is FRA's formal recognition that the PTC system, as described
and implemented, meets the statutory requirements and the provisions of
subpart I. It does not imply FRA endorsement or approval of the PTC
system itself.
    To be clear, paragraph (d) requires that each PTCIP, PTCDP, and
PTCSP must comply with the content requirements proposed in Sec. Sec.
236.1011, 236.1013, and 236.1015, respectively. If the submissions do
not comply with their respective regulatory requirements, then they may
not be approved. Without approval, a PTC system may not receive a Type
Approval or PTC System Certification.
    Paragraph (d) also proposes that the contents of the submitted
plans be understood by FRA personnel. In the interest of an open
market, FRA does not want to preclude the ability of PTC system
suppliers outside of the United States from manufacturing PTC systems
or selling them to the subject railroads. However, in order to ensure
the safety and reliability of those systems, FRA needs to adequately
review the submitted plans. Accordingly, FRA proposes to require that
all materials submitted in accordance with this subpart be in the
English language, or be translated into the English language and
attested as true and correct. FRA seeks comments on this proposal and
whether any additional requirements are necessary to ensure FRA's
adequate understanding of the submissions.
    Under subpart H of part 236, a railroad may seek confidential
treatment for certain information required to be submitted under that
subpart. According to Sec.  236.901(c), a railroad may label that
information as confidential--if it deems it to be trade secrets, or
commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential
under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(4)--and submit the information in accordance with Sec.  209.11.
FRA believes that the same concept should be applied to materials
submitted in accordance with proposed subpart I. FRA continues to
believe that the referenced information should receive the protections
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552) and the
Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. 1905). FRA also continues to believe that
it cannot make any flat pronouncements about the confidentiality of
information it has not yet received. Should a FOIA request be made for
information submitted under this rule that the submitting party has
claimed should be withheld, the submitting company will be notified of
the request in accordance with the submitter consultation provisions of
the Department's FOIA regulations (Sec.  7.17) and will be afforded the
opportunity to submit detailed written objections to the release of
information protected by exemption 4 as provided for in Sec.  7.17(a).
Since FRA proposes to place the redacted versions of the submitted
plans in a docket for public comment, FRA strongly encourages
submitting parties to request protection from withholding only for
those portions of documents that truly justify such treatment (i.e.,
trade secrets and security sensitive information).
    While FRA continues to believe that there is no need at this time
to substantially revise Sec.  209.11, FRA proposes in subpart I to
require an additional document to assist FRA in efficiently and
correctly reviewing confidential information. Under Sec.  209.11, a
redacted and an unredacted copy of the same document must be submitted.
When FRA review is required to determine whether confidentiality should
be afforded, FRA personnel must painstakingly compare side-by-side the
two versions to determine what information has been redacted. To reduce
this burden, FRA proposes that any material submitted for confidential
treatment under subpart I and Sec.  209.11 must include a third version
that would indicate, without fully obscuring, the redacted portions.
For instance, to indicate, without obscuring, the plan's redacted
portions, the railroad may use the color or light gray highlighting,
underlining, or strikethrough functions of its word processing program.
This document will also be treated as confidential under Sec.  209.11.
While FRA could instead amend Sec.  209.11 to include this requirement,
FRA does not believe it to be necessary at this time. If more
regulatory procedures in other subparts or parts provide for
confidential treatment under Sec.  209.11, FRA will then consider
whether amendment of Sec.  209.11 would be appropriate at that time.
    As discussed more specifically below, FRA is considering requiring
the submission of an adequate GIS shapefile to fulfill some of the
PTCIP content requirements under Sec.  236.1011. Redacting word
processing documents includes the simple task of blocking the text
wished to be deemed confidential. However, in a GIS shapefile, which
includes primarily map data, visually blocking out the information
would defeat the purpose. For instance, a black dot over a particular
map location, or a black line over a particular route, would actually
reveal the location. FRA expects that a railroad seeking
confidentiality for portions of a GIS shapefile will submit three
versions of the shapefile to comply with paragraph (d). FRA expects
that the version for public consumption would merely not include the
confidential information. FRA seeks comments on this proposal. FRA also
seeks comments on how a third version of the GIS shapefile would
indicate, without fully obscuring, the confidential portions.
    As previously noted, FRA expects that FRA-monitored laboratory or
field testing or an independent third party assessment may be necessary
to support conclusions made and included in a railroad's submitted
PTCDP or PTCSP. This issue is initially addressed in paragraph (e). The
procedural requirements to effectuate either of those requirements can
be found in Sec. Sec.  236.1035 and Sec.  236.1017, respectively.
    Proposed paragraph (f) makes clear that FRA approval of a plan
submitted under subpart I may be contingent upon any number of factors
and that once the plan is approved, FRA maintains the authority to
modify or revoke the resulting Type Approval or PTC System
Certification. Under paragraph (f)(1), FRAs would reserve the right to
attach additional requirements as a condition for approval of a PTCIP,
PTCDP, or PTCSP. A risk-informed and performance-based approach is one
in which the risk insights, and engineering analysis and performance
history, are used to: (1) Focus attention on the most important
activities; (2) establish objective criteria based upon risk insights
for evaluating performance; (3) develop measurable or calculable
parameters for monitoring systems performance; and (4) focus on the
results as the primary basis of regulatory decision-making. To
accomplish these tasks, it is necessary to identify, analyze,

assess, and control hazards and risks within all components of a
system--including people, cultures and attitudes, procedures,
materials, tools, equipment, facilities and software. In the
preparation of any of these plans, railroads may have inadvertently
failed to fully address hazards and risks associated with all of these
components.
    FRA believes that proposed paragraph (f)(1) will make the
regulatory process more efficient and stable. Rather than reject a
railroad's plan completely, and consequently delay the railroad's
implementation of its PTC system, FRA would prefer to add additional
conditions during the approval process to address these oversights.
When determining whether to attach conditions to plan approval, FRA
will consider whether: (1) The plan includes a well-defined and
discrete technical or security issue that affects system safety; (2)
the risk or safety significance of an issue can be adequately
determined; (3) the issue affects public health and safety; (4) the
issue is not already being processed under an existing program or
process; and (5) the issue cannot be readily addressed through other
regulatory programs and processes, existing regulations, policies,
guidance, or voluntary industry initiatives.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(2) provides FRA the right to withdraw a Type
Approval or a PTC System Certification as a consequence of the
discovery of new information regarding system safety that was not
previously identified. FRA issuance of each Type Approval or PTC System
Certification under performance-based regulations assumes that the
model of the train control system and its associated probabilistic data
adequately accounts for the behavior of all design features of the
system that could contribute to system risk. Different system design
approaches may result in different levels of detail introducing
different approximations/errors associated with the safety performance.
There are some characteristics for which modeling methods may not fully
capture the behavior of the system, or there may be elements of the
system for which historical performance data may not be currently
available. These potential inconsistencies in the failure analysis
could introduce significant variations in the predicted performance
from the actual performance. Because of the design complexity
associated with train control systems, FRA recognizes that these
inconsistencies are not the results of deliberate acts by any
individuals or organizations, but simply reflects the level of detail
of the analysis, the availability of comprehensive information as well
as the qualification and experience of the team of analysts, and the
resource limitations of both the railroad and FRA.
    In proposed paragraph (f)(3), FRA indicates that the railroad may
be allowed to continue operations using the system, although such
continued operations may have special conditions attached to mitigate
any adverse consequences. It is FRA's intent, to the maximum extent
possible and when consistent with safety, to assist railroads in
keeping the systems in operation. FRA expects that if it places a
condition on PTC system operations, each railroad will have a
predefined process and procedure in place that would allow continued
railroad operations, albeit under reduced capability, until appropriate
mitigations are in place, and the system can be restored to full
operation. In certain dire situations, FRA may actually order the
suspension or discontinuation of operations until the root cause of the
situation is understood and adequate mitigations are in place. FRA
believes that suspending a Type Approval or a PTC System Certification
pending a more detailed analysis of the situation may be appropriate,
and that any such suspension must be done without prejudice. FRA
expects to take such an action only in the most extreme circumstances
and after consultation with the affected parties.
    After reconsidering its issuance of a Type Approval or PTC System
Certification, under paragraph (f)(4), FRA may either dismiss its
reconsideration, continue to recognize the existing FRA approved Type
Approval or PTC System Certification, allow continued operations with
certain conditions attached, or order the railroad to cease applicable
operations by revoking its Type Approval or PTC System Certification.
If FRA dismisses its reconsideration or continues to recognize the Type
Approval, any conditions required during the reconsideration period
would no longer be applicable. If FRA will allow continued operations,
FRA may order that the same or other conditions apply. FRA expects that
revocation of a Type Approval or PTC System Certification may occur in
very narrow circumstances, where the risks to safety appear
insurmountable. Regrettably, there may be a few situations in which the
inconsistencies are the result of deliberate fraudulent
representations. In such situations, FRA may also seek criminal or
civil penalties against the entities involved.
    Proposed paragraph (g) enables FRA to engage in the proper
inspection to ensure that a railroad is in compliance with subpart I.
FRA inspections may be required to determine whether a particular
railroad has not implemented a PTC system where necessary. For
instance, FRA may need to confirm whether a track segment has
traversing over it 5 million gross tons or more of annual railroad
traffic, PIH materials, or passenger traffic. FRA may also need to
inspect locomotives to determine whether they are equipped with a PTC
onboard apparatus or to review locomotive logs to determine whether it
has entered PTC territory. Paragraph (g) makes clear FRA's statutorily
provided power to inspect the railroads and gather information
necessary to enforce subpart I.
    As noted above, in order to maintain an open marketplace, the
proposed rule has been drafted to allow domestic railroads to purchase
PTC systems from outside of the United States. FRA recognizes that PTC
systems have been used in revenue service across the globe and that
acceptable products may be available in other countries. FRA also
recognizes that such use may come under a regulatory entity much like
FRA. Accordingly, under paragraph (h), in the event information
relating to a particular PTC system has been certified under the
auspices of a regulatory entity in a foreign government, FRA is willing
to consider that information as independently Verified and Validated in
accordance with the proposed rule to support the railroad's PTCSP
development. The phrase ``under the auspices'' intends to reflect the
possibility of certification contractually performed by a private
entity on behalf of a foreign government agency. However, the foreign
regulatory entity must be one recognized by the Associate
Administrator. A railroad seeking to enjoy the benefits of paragraph
(h) must communicate that interest in its PTCSP.

Section 236.1011 PTC Implementation Plan Content Requirements

    This proposed section describes the minimum required contents of a
PTC Implementation Plan. A PTCIP is a railroad's plan for complying
with the installation of mandatory PTC systems required by RSIA08. The
PTCIP consists of implementation schedules, narratives, rules,
technical documentation, and relevant excerpts of agreements that an
individual railroad will use to complete mandatory PTC implementation.
FRA will measure the railroad's progress in meeting the required
implementation date based on the schedule and other information in the
PTCIP. While the proposed rule does not specify or mandate any format

for the PTCIP, it must at least clearly indicate which portions intend
to address compliance with the various plan requirements under Sec.
236.1011. The PTCIP must also clearly identify each referenced document
and either include a copy of each document (or its applicable excerpt)
or indicate where FRA and the public may view that document. Should FRA
not be able to readily determine adequate response to the required
information, FRA will assume that the information has not been
submitted, and will handle the document accordingly. The lack of the
required information may result in FRA's disapproval of a PTCIP. To
facilitate timely and successful submittals, FRA, through assistance
from a PTCIP Task Force drawn from the PTC Working Group, is developing
a template that could be used to format the documents that must be
submitted. FRA, however, wishes to emphasize that the use of such a
template is strictly voluntary, and encourages railroads to prepare and
submit the documents in whatever structure is most economical for the
railroad. FRA does believe it is necessary to require that the
railroads expend their limited resources in reformatting of documents
when such an activity adds no real value. However, while the template
may be a useful tool, and in light of the various forms a PTCIP may be
required to take due to the system the railroad intends to implement,
complete adherence to the template will not guarantee FRA approval of
the submitted PTCIP.
    FRA expects each PTCIP to include various highly specific and
descriptive elements relating to each railroad's infrastructure and
operations. FRA recognizes that to manually assemble each piece of data
into a PTCIP may be exceptionally onerous and time consuming and may
make the PTCIP prone to errors. In light of the foregoing and due to
the statutory requirement that Congress be apprised of the progress of
the railroad carriers in implementing their PTC systems, FRA believes
that electronic submission of much of this information may be warranted
and preferred. To facilitate collection of this data, FRA proposes to
require submission of this data in electronic format. Such electronic
submission would fulfill the requirements under Sec.  236.1011 to which
they apply.
    FRA believes that the preferred, least costly, and least error-
prone method to comply with Sec.  236.1011 is for railroads to submit
an electronic geographic digital system map containing the
aforementioned segment attribute information in shapefile format, which
is a data format structure compatible with most Geographic Information
System (GIS) software packages. Using a GIS provides an efficient means
for organizing basic transportation-related geographic data to
facilitate the input, analysis, and display of transport networks.
Railways around the world rely on GIS to manage key information for
rail operations, maintenance, asset management, and decision support
systems. FRA believes that the railroads may have already identified
track segments, and their physical and operational characteristics, in
shapefile format. For instance, FRA believes that it may be preferable
that for each track segment, a shapefile should provide the following
identifiable information: Owning railroad(s); distance; signal system;
track class; subdivision; number and location of sidings; maximum
allowable speed; number and location of mainline tracks; annual volume
of gross tonnage; annual number of cars carrying hazmat; annual number
of cars carrying PIH; passenger traffic volume; average daily through
trains; WIUs; switches; and at-grade rail-to-rail crossings. The
requirements under paragraph (a) may be changed to accommodate any of
these informational elements. FRA seeks comments on this proposal.
    Paragraph (a)(1) proposes that the railroad describe the technology
that will be employed in its PTC system. Here, FRA intends to use the
term ``technology'' broadly to include all applicable tools, machines,
methods, and techniques.
    In proposed paragraph (a)(2), FRA addresses the statutory
requirements that the PTCIP shall describe how the PTC system will
provide interoperability with movements of trains of other railroad
carriers over its lines. Practically speaking, this means that each
locomotive operating within PTC territory must be able to communicate
with and respond to the PTC systems installed on each PTC territory's
track and signal system, except in limited situations established
elsewhere in this proposed rule. For similar reasons, paragraph (a)(3)
proposes that the PTCIP should describe how the PTC system will provide
for interoperability of the system between the host and all tenant
railroads on the lines required to be equipped with PTC systems under
this subpart.
    Interoperability means the ability of diverse systems and
organizations to work together (inter-operate), taking into account the
technical, operational, and organizational factors that may impact
system-to-system performance. FRA expects each PTC system required by
subpart I to exhibit syntactic interoperability--so that it may
successfully communicate and exchange data with other PTC systems--and
semantic interoperability--so that it may automatically, accurately,
and meaningfully interpret the exchanged information to prove useful to
the end user of each communicating PTC system. To achieve semantic
interoperability, both sides must defer to a common information
exchange reference model. In other words, the content of the
information sent must be the same as what is received and understood.
Taking syntactic and semantic interoperability together, FRA expects
each PTC system to provide services to, and accept services from, other
PTC systems and to use those services exchanged to enable the PTC
systems to operate effectively together and to provide the intended
results. The degree of interoperability should be defined in the PTCIP
when referring to specific cases.
    Interoperability is achieved through four interrelated means:
Product testing, industry and community partnership, common technology
and intellectual property, and standard implementation.
    Product testing includes conformance testing and product
comparison. Conformance testing ensures that the product complies with
an appropriate standard. FRA recognizes that certain standards attempt
to create a framework that would result in the development of the same
end product. However, many standards apply only to core elements and
allow developers to enhance or otherwise modify products as long as
they adhere to those core elements. Thus, if an end product is
developed in different ways to conform to the same standard, there may
still be discrepancies between each instantiation of the end product
due to the existence of those variables. Accordingly, FRA believes that
comparison testing must also occur to ensure that each instantiation of
the same product, regardless of the means upon which it is created to
meet the same standard, is ultimately identical. In regards to PTC
systems, such comparison testing must occur on all portions that relate
to each system's interoperability with other systems. Thus, it is also
important that the PTC system be formally tested in a production
scenario--as they will be finally implemented--to ensure that it will
actually intercommunicate and interoperate with other PTC systems as
advertised and intended.
    To reach interoperability between the various applicable PTC
systems, each PTCDP must also show that the systems share common
product engineering.

Product engineering refers to the common standard, or a sub-profile
thereof, as defined by the industry and community partnerships,
specifically intended to achieve interoperability. Without common
product engineering, the systems will be unable to intercommunicate or
otherwise interact as necessary to comply with the proposed rule.
    FRA expects that each interoperability standard for PTC systems
will be developed by a partnership between various industry
participants. Industry and community partnerships, either domestic or
international, usually sponsor standard workgroups to define a common
standard to provide system intercommunications for a specific purpose.
At times, an industry or community will sub-profile an existing
standard produced by another organization to reduce options and thus
making interoperability more achievable. Thus, in each PTCDP, the
railroad must discuss how it developed or adopted a standard commonly
accepted by that partnership.
    Means of achieving interoperability include having the various
entities involved using the same PTC system product or obtaining its
components from the same developer. While FRA does not necessarily
require this approach--since the agency seeks to maintain an open and
competitive marketplace--FRA believes that this is a suitable means to
achieve interoperability. This technique may provide similar technical
results when using PTC system products from different vendors relying
on the same intellectual property. FRA recognizes that certain
developers with an intellectual property interest in a particular
technology may provide a non-exclusive license of its intellectual
property to another entity so that the licensee may introduce into the
marketplace a substantially similar product reliant on that
intellectual property. In such a case, FRA foresees that the use of a
common PTC system technology--even if it is proprietary to a single or
multiple entities and licensed to railroads--could reduce the
variability between components, thus providing for a more efficient
means to achieve interoperability.
    In order for interoperability to actually occur between multiple
entities' PTC systems, there must be some standard to which they all
adhere. Thus, FRA also expects that each PTCDP will provide assurances
of a common interoperability standard agreed to between all entities
using PTC systems that must interoperate.
    Since each of these interrelated means has an important role in
reducing variability in intercommunication, each railroad's PTCIP must
clearly describe the elements required under paragraph (a)(1)-(3).
    Much of the remaining information required in a PTCIP under the
proposed rule relies on the location, length, and characteristics of
each track segment. Therefore, a common understanding of a track
segment is necessary. A track is the main designation for describing a
physical linear portion of the network. Each line of railroad has a
station location referencing system, which serves to locate inventory
features and defects along the length of the track. Because some tracks
can be very long, track segments are established to divide the track
into smaller ``management units.'' Typically, segment's boundaries are
established at point of switch (POS) locations, but may also be located
at mile markers, grade crossings, or other readily identifiable
locations. Inspection, condition assessment, and maintenance planning
is performed individually on each segment. After the track network
hierarchy is established, the attribute information associated with
each track is defined. This attribute information describes the track
layout (e.g., curves and grades), the track structure (e.g., rail
weights and tie specifications), track clearance issues, and other
track related items such as turnouts, rail-to-rail at-grade crossings,
highway-rail grade crossings, drainage culverts, and bridges. Inventory
information about these track attributes can be quite detailed. The
benefits of a complete and accurate track inventory provides a record
of the track network's properties and information about the existing
track materials at the specific locations when maintenance or repair is
necessary.
    Proposed paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5) require the railroad to put
its entire implementation plan into an understandable context,
primarily as it relates to the sequence and schedule of line segment
implementation events. Under RSIA08, Sec.  20157(a)(2), Congress
requires each subject railroad, in its PTCIP, to describe how it shall,
to the extent practical, implement the PTC system in a manner that
addresses areas of greater risk before areas of lesser risk.
Accordingly, under paragraph (a)(4), the PTCIP must discuss the
railroad's areas of risk and the criteria by which these risks were
evaluated and prioritized for PTC system implementation. To this end,
the railroad must clearly identify all track segments that must be
equipped, the basis for that decision for each segment (which might be
done by categories of segments), and, as provided in paragraph (a)(5),
the dates that implementation of each segment will be completed, taking
into account the time necessary to fulfill the procedural requirements
related to PTCSP submission, review, and approval. At a minimum, the
deployment decisions must be based on segment traffic characteristics
such as passenger and freight traffic volumes, the quantity of PIH and
other hazardous materials, current methods of operations, existence of
block signals and other traditional train control technologies, the
number and class of tracks, authorized and allowable speeds for each
segment, and other unusual characteristics that may adversely impact
safety, such as unusual ruling grades and other track geometries. In
cases where deployment of the PTC system cannot be accomplished in
order of areas with the greatest risk to areas with the least risk,
paragraph (a)(9) proposes that the railroad must explain why such a
deployment was not practical and the steps that will be taken to
minimize adverse consequences to the public until the line segment can
be equipped.
    Proposed paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7) require the PTCIP to include
information regarding the rolling stock and wayside devices that will
be equipped with the appropriate PTC technology. For a PTC system to
work as intended, PTC system components must be installed and operated
in all applicable offices and on all applicable onboard and wayside
subsystems. Accordingly, the PTCIP must identify which technologies
will be installed on each subsystem and when they are scheduled to be
installed.
    Under paragraph (a)(6), each host railroad filing the PTCIP must
include a comprehensive list of all rolling stock upon which a PTC
onboard apparatus must be operative. FRA understands that in most
situations, the rolling stock referenced in paragraph (a)(6) may only
apply to lead locomotives. However, in the interest of not hindering
creative technological innovations, FRA presumes the possibility that
PTC system technology may also be attached to additional rolling stock
to provide other functions, including determining train capacity and
length or providing certain acceptable and novel train controls. To be
kept apprised of these possibilities, FRA is proposing in paragraph
(a)(6) that each PTCIP include a list of all rolling stock equipped
with PTC technology. FRA believes that the PTCIP should also identify
any risks associated with trains operated by tenant railroads and not
equipped with

PTC system technology and the efforts that the host railroad has made
to establish the extent of that risk. Although FRA believes that this
is inherent to reviewing the risk in the system, FRA asks for comment
as to whether a requirement should be specifically called out in the
rule text.
    FRA understands that a host railroad may not receive cooperation
from a tenant railroad in collecting the necessary rolling stock
information. Nevertheless, FRA expects each host railroad to make a
good faith effort. Identification of those tenant railroads that the
host railroad attempted to obtain the requisite and applicable
information from and that failed to address a host railroad's written
request may establish a good faith effort by the host railroad.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(7) requires the PTCIP to provide a detailed
schedule of and the railroad to subsequently report WIU installation.
The selection and identification of a technology selected as part of
the PTCIP will also, to a great extent, determine the distribution of
the functional behaviors of each of the PTC subsystems (e.g., office,
wayside, communications, and back office). The WIU is a type of remote
terminal unit (RTU) that is part of a larger PTC system, which is a
type of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA). As a
whole, the safe and efficient operation of a SCADA--a centralized
system that covers large areas, monitors and control systems, and
passes status information from, and operational commands to, RTUs--is
largely dependent on the ability of each of its RTUs to accurately
receive and distribute the required information. As such, a PTC system
cannot properly operate without properly functioning WIUs to provide
and receive status information and react appropriately to control
information.
    It is commonly understood that a WIU device is capable of
communicating directly to the office, train, or other wayside unit. FRA
recognizes that there may not be the same amount of WIUs and devices
that they monitor. Depending on the architecture and technology used, a
single WIU may communicate the necessarily information as it relates to
multiple devices. FRA is comfortable with this type of consolidation
provided that, in the event of a failure of any one of the devices
being monitored, the most restrictive condition will be transmitted to
the train or office, except where the system may uniquely identify the
failed device in a manner that will provide safe movement of the train
when it reaches the subject location.
    Because of the critical role that WIU's play in the proper and safe
operation of PTC systems, paragraph (a)(7) proposes that the railroad
identify the number of WIU's required to be installed on any given
track segment and the schedule for installing the WIU's associated with
that segment. This information is necessary to fully and meaningfully
fulfill the RSIA08 requirement that by December 31, 2012, Congress
shall receive a report on the progress of the railroad carriers in
implementing PTC systems. See 49 U.S.C. 20157(d). To comply with this
statutory requirement, each railroad must determine the number of WIUs
it will need to procure and the location--as defined by the applicable
subdivision--that each WIU will be installed. FRA believes that if a
railroad does not perform these traditional engineering tasks, it will
risk exceeding the statutory implementation deadline of December 31,
2015. FRA considers this information an integral part of the PTCIP that
must be submitted to FRA for approval.
    FRA recognizes the potential for technological improvements that
may modify the number and types of WIU's required. FRA also recognizes
that during testing and installation, it may be discovered that
additional WIU installation may be necessary. In either case, the
railroad will be required to submit an RFA in accordance with Sec.
236.1021 indicating how the railroad intends to appropriately revise
its schedule to reflect the resulting necessary changes. Nevertheless,
regardless of whether FRA approves or disapproves of the RFA, if a
railroad is required to submit its PTCIP by April 16, 2010,
implementation must still be completed by the statutory deadline
December 31, 2015.
    Under proposed paragraph (a)(8), each railroad must also identify
in its PTCIP which of its track segments are either main line or not
main line. This list must be made based solely on the statutory and
regulatory definitions regardless of whether FRA may later deem a track
segment as other than main line. If a railroad has a main line that it
believes should be considered not main line, it may file with the PTCIP
a main line track exception addendum (MTEA) in accordance with Sec.
236.1019, as further discussed below. Each track segment included in
the MTEA should be indicated as much on the list required under
paragraph (a)(8) so that the PTCIP accounts for each track segment with
an appropriate cross-reference to the subject MTEA.
    Paragraph (a)(9) requires that the plan call out the basis for this
determination to the extent the railroad determines that risk-based
prioritization required by paragraph (a)(4) of this section is not
practical. FRA recognizes that there may be situations where risk is
somewhat evenly distributed and where other factors related to
practical considerations--such as the need to establish reliable
operation of the system in less complex environments before installing
it in more complex environments--may be the prudent course. However,
the burden of establishing the reasonableness of this approach would be
on the railroad, starting with a showing that risk does not vary
substantially among the line segments in question.
    As previously mentioned, Sec.  236.1005(a) requires each applicable
PTC system to be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions. Under
that section, FRA has proposed various requirements that would apply to
at-grade rail-to-rail crossings, also known as diamond crossings. While
the proposed rule text includes certain specific technical
requirements, it also provides the opportunity for each subject
railroad to submit an alternative arrangement providing an equivalent
level of safety as specified in an FRA approved PTCSP. Accordingly,
under proposed paragraph (a)(10), if the railroad intends to utilize
alternative arrangements providing an equivalent level of safety to
that of the table provided under Sec.  236.1005(a)(1)(i), each PTCSP
must identify those alternative arrangements and methods, with any
associated risk reduction measures, in its PTCSP.
    Paragraph (b) contains proposed provisions related to further
deployment of PTC. As noted elsewhere in this preamble, the specific
characteristics of the PTC route structure, with the focus on PIH
traffic as an indicator of risk, was a late addition to the bill that
would become RSIA08, not having appeared in either the House or Senate
bills until the final package was assembled using consultations between
the committee staffs in lieu of a formal committee of conference.
Although the statutory construct (Class I rail line with 5 million
gross tons and some PIH materials) adequately defines most of the core
of the national freight rail system, it is a construct that will
introduce distortions at both ends of the spectrum of risk.
    On one hand, a line with a maximum speed limit of 25 miles per hour
ending at a grain elevator that receives a few cars of anhydrous
ammonia per year is a ``main line'' if it has at least 5 million gross
tons of traffic (a very low threshold for a Class I railroad). This is
not a line without risk, particularly if it lacks wayside signals, but
FRA analysis

shows that the potential for a catastrophic release from a pressure
tank car is very low at an operating speed of 25 miles per hour, and
the low tonnage is likely associated with relatively infrequent train
movements--limiting the chance of a collision. As FRA understands the
congressional mandate, the law gives FRA little choice but to require
PTC under these circumstances.
    On the other end of the spectrum, lines with greater risk may go
unaddressed. For instance, a line carrying perhaps a much higher level
of train traffic and significant volumes of other hazardous materials
at higher speeds, without any PIH or passenger traffic, would not be
equipped. This example is not likely to be present to any significant
extent under current conditions. However, should the Class I railroads
raise freight rates sufficiently to eliminate PIH traffic by making
rail transportation prohibitively expensive, the issue would be
presented as a substantial one. Most of the transportation risk--
including hazards to train crews and roadway workers and exposure to
other hazardous materials if released--would remain, but not the few
carloads of PIH. FRA believes that the intent of Congress with respect
to deployment of PTC might be defeated, even though the literal
language of the legislation would be satisfied. Other lines carrying
very heavy volumes of bulk commodities such as coal and intermodal
traffic may or may not include PIH traffic. Putting aside the risk
associated with PIH materials, significant risk exists to train crews
and persons in the immediate vicinity of the right-of-way if a
collision or other PTC-preventable accident occurs. Any place on the
national rail system is a potential roadway work zone, but special
challenges are presented in providing for on-track safety where train
movements are very frequent.
    Risk on the larger Class II and III railroads' lines is also a
matter of concern, and the presence of significant numbers of Class I
railroad trains on some of those properties presents the opportunity
for further risk reduction, since over the coming years virtually all
Class I railroad locomotives will be equipped with PTC onboard
apparatus'. Examples include trackage and haulage rights retained over
Class II and III railroads following asset sales in which the Class I
railroads divested the subject lines. Other prominent examples involve
switching and terminal railroads, the largest of which are owned and
controlled by two or more Class I railroads and function, in effect, as
extensions of their systems. Conrail Shared Assets, a large regional
switching railroad that is owned by NS and CSXT and is comprised of
major segments of the former Conrail, then a Class I railroad, is
perhaps the classic example.
    FRA notes that there has also been a trend, only recently and
temporarily abated by the downturn in the economy, toward higher train
counts on some non-signaled lines of the Class I railroads. On a train-
mile basis, these operations present about twice the risk as similar
operations on signalized lines. These safety gaps need to be filled;
and, while most will be filled due to the presence of PIH traffic, FRA
cannot verify that this is the case in every instance.
    FRA concludes that the mandated deployment of PTC will leave some
substantial gaps in the Class I route structure, including gaps in some
major urban areas. FRA believes that these gaps will, over time, be
``filled in'' by voluntary actions of the Class I railroads as they
establish the reliability of their PTC systems, verify effective
interoperability, and begin to enjoy the safety and other business
benefits from use of these systems. FRA fully understands both the
desire of the labor stakeholders in the PTC Working Group to see a
broader build-out of PTC systems than that ``minimally'' required by
RSIA08 and the concerns of the Class I railroads' representatives who
noted the extreme challenge associated with equipping tens of thousands
of wayside units, some 20,000 locomotives, and their dispatching
centers' back offices within the statutory implementation period.
    The Congress recognized that all of these issues are legitimate
concerns and so mandated the establishment of Risk Reduction Programs
under the same legislation. Section 103 of RSIA08 codifies language
that includes, within the Risk Reduction Program, a Technology
Implementation Plan that is specifically required to address technology
alternatives, including PTC. Accordingly, the PTC and Risk Reduction
provisions in RSIA08 are clearly aligned in purpose; and there are also
references in the technology plan elements of the Risk Reduction
language that address installation of PTC by other railroads. Further,
FRA has been charged with a separate rulemaking under section 406 of
RSIA08 regarding risk in non-signaled (dark) territory that
significantly overlaps the issue set in this rulemaking and the Risk
Reduction section. Use of technologies that are integral to PTC systems
constitute the best response to hazards associated with non-signaled
lines. Switch position monitoring systems, track integrity circuits,
digital data links and other technology used to address dark territory
issues should be and, as presently conceived, are forward-compatible
with PTC. FRA proposes in paragraph (b) to dovetail these requirements
by requiring that each Class I railroad include in its PTCIP deployment
strategies indicating how it will approach the further build-out of
full PTC, or partial implementation of PTC (e.g., using PTC technology
to prevent train-to-train collisions but perhaps not monitoring all
switches in the territory; or using PTC to protect movements of the
Class I over a switching or terminal railroad without initially
requiring all controlling locomotives of the switching or terminal
railroad to be equipped). These railroads would then be required to
include in the technology elements of their initial Risk Reduction
plans a specification of which lines will be equipped and with what PTC
system elements. Proposed paragraph (b) makes clear that there would be
no expectation regarding additional lines being equipped until those
mandated by subpart I have been addressed. FRA shares the view of the
Class I railroads and the passenger railroads that the December 31,
2015, deadline already presents a substantial challenge for railroads,
suppliers and the employees affected.
    Paragraph (c) proposes to codify in regulation the statutory
mandate that FRA review the PTCIP and determine, within 90 days upon
receipt of the plan, whether to provide its approval or disapproval.
FRA believes it is also important to provide procedural rules to
communicate approval or disapproval. Thus, under paragraph (c), FRA
proposes that any approval or disapproval of a PTCIP requires FRA to
provide written notice. In the event that FRA disapproves of the PTCIP,
the notice will also include a narrative explaining the reasons for
disapproval. Once the railroad receives notification that its PTCIP has
been disapproved by FRA, it will have 30 days to resubmit its PTCIP for
review and approval. While FRA may provide assistance to remedy a
faulty PTCIP, it is ultimately the railroad's responsibility and burden
to develop and submit a PTCIP worthy of FRA approval. A railroad may be
subject to civil penalties if it fails to timely file its PTCIP under
this section. As noted previously, subpart I applies to each railroad
that Congress and FRA has mandated to install a PTC system. A railroad
that is not required to install a PTC system may still do so under its
own volition. In such a case, it may

either seek approval of its system under either subpart H or I.
Paragraph (d) intends to make this choice clear.
    Paragraph (e) responds to comments by labor organizations in the
PTC Working Group. These employee representatives sought the
opportunity to comment on major PTC filings. The paragraph provides
that, upon receipt of a PTCIP, PTCDP, or PTCSP, FRA posts on its public
Web site notice of receipt and reference to the public docket in which
a copy of the filing has been placed. FRA may consider any public
comment on each document to the extent practicable within the time
allowed by law and without delaying implementation of PTC systems. The
version of any filing initially placed in the public docket would be
the redacted copy as filed by the railroad. If FRA later determined
that additional material was not deserving of protection as
confidential, that material would be added to the docket.

Section 236.1013 PTCDP Content Requirements and Type Approval

    As noted in the discussion above regarding Sec.  236.1009, each
PTCSP must be submitted with a Type Approval number identifying a PTC
system that FRA believes could fulfill the requirements of subpart I.
Under Sec.  236.1009, a railroad may submit an existing Type Approval
number in lieu of a PTC Development Plan (PTCDP) if the PTC system it
intends to implement and operate is identical to the one described in
that Type Approval's associated PTCDP. In the event, however, that a
railroad intends to install a system for which a Type Approval number
has not yet been assigned, or to use a system with an assigned Type
Approval number that may have certain variances to its safety-critical
functions, then the railroad must submit a PTCDP to obtain a new Type
Approval number.
    The PTCDP is the core document that provides the Associate
Administrator sufficient information to determine whether the PTC
system proposed for installation by the railroad could meet the
statutory requirements for PTC systems specified by RSIA08 and the
regulatory requirements under subpart I. Issuance of a product Type
Approval number is contingent upon the approval of the PTCDP by the
Associate Administrator. While filing of a PTCDP is optional in the
sense that the railroad may proceed directly to submission of the PTCSP
by the April 16, 2010 deadline (see Sec.  236.1009), FRA encourages
railroads engaged in joint operations to do so. Approval of the PTCDP,
and issuance of a Type Approval, presents the opportunity for other
railroads to reduce the effort required to obtain a PTC System
Certification. If a Type Approval for a PTC system exists, another
railroad may also use that Type Approval provided there are no
variances in the system as described in the Type Approval's PTCDP. In
such cases, the other railroad may avoid submitting its own PTCDP by
simply incorporating by reference the supporting information in the
Type Approval's PTCDP and certifying that no variances in the PTC
system have been made.
    This proposed section describes the contents of the PTCDP required
to obtain FRA approval in the form of issuance of a Type Approval
number. The proposed provisions of this section require each PTCDP to
include all the elements and practices listed in this section to
provide reasonable assurance that the subject PTC system will meet the
statutory requirements and are developed consistent with generally-
accepted principles and risk-oriented proof of safety methods
surrounding this technology. FRA believes it is necessary to include