[Federal Register: September 4, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 170)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 50819-50853]
[DOCID:fr04se07-11]

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Part V

Department of Transportation

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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Parts 229, 232, and 238

Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake System; Proposed Rule

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 232, and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2006-26175, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AB84

Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Systems

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA proposes revisions to the regulations governing freight
power brakes and equipment by adding a new subpart addressing
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake systems. The proposed
regulations are designed to provide for and encourage the safe
implementation and use of ECP brake system technologies. The proposal
contains specific requirements relating to design, interoperability,
training, inspection, testing, handling defective equipment, and
periodic maintenance related to ECP brake systems. The document also
identifies provisions of the existing regulations and statutes where
FRA is proposing to provide flexibility to facilitate the introduction
of this advanced brake system technology.

DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by November 5, 2007.
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent
possible without incurring additional expenses or delays.
    (2) FRA will hold an oral public hearing on a date to be announced
in a forthcoming notice.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2006-26175, may
be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web site: Until September 28, 2007, comments should be
filed at http://dms.dot.gov After September 28, 2007, comments should be filed at the Federal eRulemaking Portal, http://www.regulations.gov.

At each site, follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without
change to http://dms.dot.gov including any personal information. Please

see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted
comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://dms.dot.gov until September 28, 2007, to http://www.regulations.gov after September 28, 2007, or to Room W12-

140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Wilson, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Motive Power and Equipment Division, RRS-14,
Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue,
NW., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>); or Jason
Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20590 (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Background
II. Conventional Brake Operations
III. ECP Brake Operations
IV. Interoperability
V. Advantages of ECP Brakes Over Conventional Pneumatic Brakes
    A. Simultaneous Brake Application
    B. Continuous Brake Pipe Charging
    C. Graduated Brake Application and Release
    D. Train Management
    E. Improved Performance
VI. Standards, Approval, and Testing
    A. AAR Standards and Approval Process
    B. FMECA
VII. Market Maturity and Implementation
VIII. Related Proceeding
IX. Legal Impediments and Proposed Relief
X. Additional Issues
    A. Part 229
    B. Dynamic Brake Requirements
    C. Single Car Air Brake Test Approval Procedures and Single Car
Air Brake Tests
    D. Train Handling Information
    E. Piston Travel Limits
    F. Extended Haul Trains
    G. Part 238
XI. Section-by-Section Analysis
XII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Privacy Act

I. Background

    Since the inception of automatic air brakes by George Westinghouse
in the 1870s, brake signal propagation has been limited by the nature
of air and the speed of sound. Other adjustments have sought to
alleviate this deficiency, but have left the basic system unaltered. As
early as 1990, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) has
investigated more advanced braking concepts for freight railroads,
including ECP brake systems, which promise to radically improve brake
propagation by using electrical transmissions of the braking signal
through the train while still using air pressure in the cylinder to
apply the force of the brake shoe. During the past 15 years, ECP brake
technology has progressed rapidly and has been field tested and used on
various railroads' revenue trains.
    FRA has been an active and consistent advocate of ECP brake system
implementation. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR initiative to
develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded, through
Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of ECP brake systems based on the AAR
standards. FRA also took part in programs to develop and enhance
advanced components for ECP brake systems.
    To assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail
freight industry, FRA contracted Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) in 2005 to
conduct a study. BAH engaged an expert panel consisting of principle
stakeholders in ECP brake technology conversion to participate in the
study. The expert panel made various conclusions relating to
technological standards, safety, and efficiency. In addition, the final
BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and comparison of ECP and
conventional air brake systems. On August 17, 2006, FRA announced in a
press release its intention to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to
revise the federal brake safety standards to encourage railroads to
invest in and deploy ECP brake technology. In the press release, FRA
encouraged railroads to submit ECP brake plans before the proposed rule
changes are completed.

    In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006,
two railroads--the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and the Norfolk Southern
Corporation (NS)--jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in
parts 229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP
brake pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. FRA held a fact-
finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring testimony
from representatives of the petitioners, air brake manufacturers, and
labor unions and issued a conditional waiver on March 21, 2007. See id.
In drafting this proceeding's proposed rules, FRA has considered
information filed and decisions made in the related, but separate,
proceeding concerning the petition for waiver filed by BNSF and NS.

II. Conventional Brake Operations

    While the basic operational concept of the automatic air brake
system, originally conceived by George Westinghouse in the 1870s,
remains the same, it has seen continuous improvement in practice. An
air compressor in the locomotive charges a main reservoir to about 140
pounds per square inch (psi). With controls located in the locomotive,
the locomotive engineer uses the main reservoir to charge the brake
pipe--a 1\1/4\ inch diameter pipe--that runs the length of the train
and is connected between cars with hoses. The brake pipe's compressed
air--used as the communication medium to signal brake operations and
the power source for braking action--then charges each car's two-
compartment reservoir to a pressure of 90 psi. Braking occurs through a
reduction of air pressure in the brake pipe, which signals the valves
on each car to direct compressed air from the reservoir on each car to
its respective brake cylinder for an application of brakes. When air
pressure is supplied to the brake cylinder--which is connected to a
series of rods and levers that apply and release the brakes--the
resulting force presses the brake shoes against the wheel, slowing the
car's speed.
    While brake applications were initially directed by George
Westinghouse's triple valve, modern applications direct a control
valve, which directs air from the brake pipe into the air reservoir
when air pressure is rising in the brake pipe in order to charge the
auxiliary and emergency reservoir and be ready for a brake application.
To perform a brake application, the locomotive automatic brake valve
reduces pressure in the brake pipe by exhausting air, causing the car's
control valve to direct air from the auxiliary reservoir into the brake
cylinder. The increase in pressure to the brake cylinder is
approximately proportional to the drop in brake pipe pressure. A 26 psi
reduction in brake pipe pressure is equal to a full service brake
application on a fully charged brake pipe, and should result in a brake
cylinder pressure adequate to achieve a full service braking effort
(brake force). While the control valve is directing air into the brake
cylinder, or holding air in the brake cylinder, it is unable to
recharge the auxiliary reservoir on each car. The engineer can apply
the brakes in increments, at few psi at a time, go directly to a full
service application of 26 psi reduction, or initiate an emergency
application of the brakes, as explained below.
    Unlike a brake application, the incremental release of brakes on a
freight train cannot be accomplished. Brakes can only be fully
released, called a direct release, and the auxiliary reservoirs then
begin to charge. Brake applications are possible, but are more
complicated, from undercharged brake pipe and reservoirs. Recharging
takes more time for a longer train, because the air has to be sent down
the length of the train's brake pipe--which can be up to a mile and a
half. In addition, on extremely long trains, the brake pipe pressure on
the last car may not reach 90 psi due to small leaks throughout the
brake pipe, and there may be problems getting enough brake pipe
pressure to fully release the brakes during cold weather.
    Brake pipe pressure is measured by an end-of-train (EOT) device,
which is electrically and pneumatically connected to the rear of a
train equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes and sends signals
(EOT Beacon) via radio indicating the brake pipe pressure to the lead
locomotive. Current Federal regulations specify the design and
performance standards for both one-way and two-way EOT devices. See
Part 232, subpart E. Both EOT device designs comprise of a rear unit
pneumatically connected to the rear of the train's last car that an EOT
Beacon to a Head End Unit (HEU)--a brake system control device mounted
within the locomotive and used to control the ECP brake system by the
locomotive engineer and containing the fail-safe software for certain
undesirable conditions. One-way EOT devices can transmit information
from the rear unit to the HEU. At a minimum, the one-way device must
transmit the brake pipe pressure to the HEU and display the reading to
the locomotive engineer. Two-way EOT devices transmit and receive
information from both the rear end unit and the HEU.
    An emergency brake application can be initiated in several ways.
The locomotive engineer can initiate the application by moving the
brake handle to the emergency position, which exhausts air from the
locomotive end at a faster rate than the service application. Emergency
brake applications can also be initiated by opening the conductor's
valve, located in the cab of the locomotive, or by a break-in-two,
where the train separates between cars and the brake pipe hoses
separate, exhausting brake pipe pressure. While performing an emergency
brake application from the locomotive, a locomotive engineer can also
use a two-way EOT to initiate an emergency brake application at the
rear of the train. This permits the emergency application to be
simultaneously initiated from both the front and rear of the trains and
ensures that the brakes on the cars at the rear of the train apply in
the event a brake pipe blockage occurs.

III. ECP Brake Operations

    As early as 1990, AAR began investigating a more advanced braking
concept for freight railroads, the ECP brake system. The ECP brake
system radically improves the operation of the automatic air brake by
using electrical transmissions to signal the application and release of
brakes on each car in a train while still using compressed air to apply
the force of the brake shoe against the wheel. ECP brakes also greatly
simplify the brake system by eliminating multiple pneumatic valves used
by conventional brakes and replacing them with a printed circuit board
with microprocessor, one electrically activated application valve, and
one electrically activated release valve, with feedback on brake
cylinder pressure for control.
    ECP brake technology requires equipping locomotives and cars with
special valves and equipment that are unique to the operation of ECP
brakes. While this system still requires a brake pipe to supply
compressed air from the locomotive to each car's reservoir in a train,
there are currently two known methods to send the electronic signal for
ECP brake operations from the locomotive to each car in the train.
These methods include using a hard wire electrical cable running the
length of the train or a radio-based technology requiring a transmitter
and a receiver installed on the cars and locomotives. At this time, it
appears that the railroad industry has chosen to use a cable-based
system for ECP brake operation. Therefore, the proposed rules will be

limited to operations involving cable-based ECP brake systems.
    ECP brake systems still employ the automatic air brake system's
basic concept where the locomotive supplies compressed air to each
car's reservoir via the conventional brake pipe. Each car's brake valve
reacts to a signal to apply the brakes by directing compressed air from
the reservoir to the brake cylinder or to release the brakes by
releasing air from the brake cylinder. The similarities between the
conventional pneumatic and ECP brake systems end here. Instead of
utilizing reductions and increases of the brake pipe pressure to convey
application and release signals to each car in the train, ECP brake
technology uses electronic signals, resulting in an almost
instantaneous application and release of brakes on each car in the
entire train. Since the brake pipe pressure no longer serves as the
communication medium in ECP braked trains, the brake pipe is constantly
supplied or charged with compressed air from the locomotive regardless
of whether the brakes are applied or released. In addition, ECP brake
equipped trains offer graduated release, where a partial brake release
command provides a partial, proportional brake release.
    The basic ECP brake system is controlled from the HEU and each car
is equipped with a Car Control Device (CCD), an electronic control
device that replaces the function of the conventional pneumatic service
and emergency portions during electronic braking. The CCD acknowledges
and interprets the electronic signals from the HEU and controls the
car's service and emergency braking functions and brake releases. The
CCD also controls reservoir charging and sends a warning signal to the
locomotive in the event any component fails to appropriately respond to
a braking command. Each CCD has a unique electronic address located in
the Car ID Module, which is keyed to a car's reporting mark and number.
    Each car connects to the locomotive via special connectors and
junction boxes. More specifically, an ECP brake equipped train's train
line cable--a two-conductor electric cable (8 A-WG and a
shield)--connects the locomotive and cars and carries train line power
to operate all CCDs and ECP brake system's end-of-train (ECP-EOT)
device and communicates network signals via the power voltage. A Power
Supply Controller (PSC)--mounted within the locomotive and providing
230 VDC of electricity--interfaces with the train line cable's
communication network, provides power to all connected CCDs and ECP-EOT
devices, and controls the train line power supply as commanded by the
HEU. Under the AAR standards, a single power supply shall be capable of
supplying power to an ECP brake equipped train consisting of at least
160 CCDs and an ECP-EOT device.
    Under the existing regulations, the conventional pneumatic brake
system's EOT device can lose communication for 16 minutes and 30
seconds before the locomotive engineer is alerted. See 49 CFR
232.407(g). After the message is displayed, the engineer must restrict
the speed of the train to 30 mph or stop the train if a defined heavy
grade is involved. Per the regulations, railroads must calibrate each
conventional two-way EOT devices every 365 days and would likely incur
additional maintenance and cost expenses while replacing its batteries.
Further, a conventional EOT device is heavy and presents a potential
for personal injury when applied to the rear of the train.
    By contrast, an ECP-EOT device uniquely monitors both brake pipe
pressure and operating voltages and sends an EOT Beacon every second
from its rear unit to its HEU on the controlling locomotive. The HEU
will initiate a full service brake application should brake pipe
pressure fall below 50 psi or an emergency brake application should a
communication loss occur for five consecutive seconds or the electrical
connection break. An ECP-EOT device may not require calibration and its
battery, only a back-up for the computer, is charged by the train line
cable and is much lighter in weight than the conventional EOT device
battery. Physically the last network node in the train, the ECP-EOT
device also contains an electronic train line cable circuit--a 50 ohm
resistor in series with 0.47 micro-farad capacitor--and must be
connected to the network and transmit status messages to the HEU before
the train line cable can be powered continuously.
    ECP brake systems have a great advantage of real-time monitoring
the brake system's health. In normal operation, the HEU transmits a
message/status down the train line cable to each car. If an individual
car's brakes do not respond properly to the HEU's brake command, or if
air pressures are not within the specified limits for operation, a
message indicating the problem and the applicable car number is sent
back to the HEU, which in turn notifies the locomotive engineer. The
ECP brake system can identify various faults, including, but not
limited to: low brake pipe pressure; low reservoir pressure; low train
line cable voltage; low battery charge; incorrect brake cylinder
pressure; and offline or cut out CCDs.
    Emergency or full service brake applications--enabled by compressed
air propagating pneumatic pressure signals through the brake pipe--
automatically occur when the ECP brake system software detects certain
faults. For instance, if the HEU detects that the percentage of
operative brakes falls below 85 percent, a full service brake
application will automatically occur. In addition, the brakes will
automatically apply when the following occurs: (1) Two CCDs or the ECP-
EOT report a ``Critical Loss'' within 5 seconds; (2) the train line
cable indicates low voltage with less than 90 percent operative brakes;
(3) the ECP-EOT reports a low battery charge; (4) the train moves
during set-up; (5) the train line cable becomes disconnected; or (6)
the train exceeds 20 mph in Switch Mode. Under the AAR standards, the
ECP brake system shall also have a pneumatic back-up system on each car
for an emergency brake application in the event of a vented brake pipe
or a train separation. These features preserve the fail safe feature of
conventional pneumatic brake systems.

IV. Interoperability

    Due to control methodology differences, ECP brake systems are not
functionally compatible with conventional pneumatic air brake systems.
For instance, while conventional pneumatic air brake systems command a
brake application by reducing the air pressure in the brake pipe, ECP
brake systems command a brake application through a digital
communications link transmitted on the electrical train line cable.
Further, conventional freight cars are not equipped with an electrical
train line cable and must depend on the pneumatic brake pipe for the
brake command.
    Manufacturers have developed application strategies to address
issues relating to car and locomotive fleet interchangeability. In
particular, they have proposed three major schemes of ECP brake design:
stand-alone systems using only ECP brakes; overlay (dual mode) systems
capable of operating in either conventional or ECP brake mode; and
emulation systems, also capable of operating in either conventional or
ECP brake mode.
    Since cars with stand-alone ECP brake systems do not include a
fully pneumatic brake control valve, they are incompatible with
conventionally braked cars and must be operated in complete ECP brake
equipped train sets. Stand-alone ECP brake systems cannot

intermix in the same train with conventional pneumatic braked cars
unless those cars are transported as cars with inoperative brakes.
While the stand-alone ECP brake system is the least expensive
alternative of the three design types, its incompatibility with
conventional pneumatic brake systems requires train segregation,
potentially posing significant operational problems until the entire
car fleet is converted to ECP brakes.
    Overlay configurations--cars equipped with both ECP CCDs and
conventional pneumatic control valve portions--allow cars to operate
with either ECP or conventional pneumatic air brakes. To operate in ECP
brake mode, compatible ECP equipment must be installed on the
locomotive as well as on the freight car. While an overlay system's
dual mode capability provides significant flexibility, railroad
operators must purchase, install, and maintain equipment to support
both types of brake systems for as long as dual mode capability is
required.
    Emulation configurations use a CCD capable of operating in either
ECP or conventional mode without requiring conventional pneumatic
controls. One manufacturer has provided an emulation ECP brake valve
that monitors both the digital communications cable and the brake pipe
for a brake command. If an electrical signal is present, the ECP brake
valve operates in ECP brake mode. If the electrical brake command
signal is not present, then the valve will monitor the changes in the
brake pipe pressure like a conventional pneumatic control valve and the
CCD will use a software program to emulate the function and response of
a conventional pneumatic valve. This mode is called limited emulation
and is meant to be used for small cuts of cars hauled short distances
at slow speeds with a non-ECP brake equipped locomotive. An emulation
ECP brake system can be operated in any train with any mix of emulation
ECP and conventional brake systems. In a mixed train, the emulation ECP
brake system will monitor the brake pipe for pressure changes and set
up brake cylinder pressure like a conventional pneumatic valve.
Currently, FRA does not propose any rules uniquely regulating trains or
cars equipped with emulation ECP brake systems. However, FRA seeks
comments on whether or how it should regulate such systems differently
than what is proposed herein.
    Manufacturers have also addressed ECP brake compatibility with
conventional pneumatic brake equipped locomotives, which must be
equipped with a HEU unit to operate the brakes on ECP brake equipped
cars. For instance, one manufacturer has developed a portable unit that
will allow a non-ECP brake equipped locomotive to operate an ECP brake
equipped train by converting the air pressure changes in the brake pipe
to digital command signals that are transmitted to the freight cars
through the electrical train line cable. The locomotive engineer
operates the brakes with the conventional automatic brake valve in the
control cab. The brakes, however, will respond instantaneously and
provide all of the benefits of an ECP brake system.

V. Advantages of ECP Brakes Over Conventional Pneumatic Brakes

    ECP brake technology overcomes many of the physical limitations
inherent in conventional pneumatic brake technology. Field testing of
AAR compliant ECP brake systems over the past decade has not revealed
any indication of a catastrophic event that could be caused by an ECP
brake system malfunctioning. With a high level of confidence, the ECP
brake stake holders support the implementation of ECP brake systems on
the Nation's railroads. FRA concludes that the advantages of ECP brake
technology will significantly improve the safety and the performance of
train operations. Examples of such benefits include better train
handling through simultaneous brake applications, continuous brake pipe
charging, and graduated brake operation. ECP brake benefits also
include electronic train management and improved performance.

A. Simultaneous Brake Application

    The conventional pneumatic brake system uses compressed air as the
source for braking power and as the medium for communicating brake
application and release commands and communicates brake commands by
changing brake pipe pressure through the use of the locomotive
automatic brake control valve. These commands begin at the front of the
train and propagate to the rear of the train at the speed of the air
pressure moving from car to car. This slow propagation of the brake
command contributes to uneven braking, excessive in-train and run-in
forces, train handling challenges, longer stopping distances, safety
risks of prematurely depleting air brake reservoirs, and a
corresponding low brake rate until all cars in the train receive and
fully respond to the brake command. FRA recognizes that the slow
application and release of brakes in a train causes excessive in-train
forces, which have the potential to cause derailments when they occur
in curves, cross-overs, or when heavier cars are placed at the rear of
the train. When the brakes on the rear of the train release much more
slowly than the brakes on the front of the train, the potential for a
``string-line'' derailment--where the train stretches out until one or
more wheels are lifted off the inside of a curve--increases.
    The ECP brake system reduces these problems by enabling cars to
brake simultaneously at the command of an electronic signal. The
electronic signal's speed ensures an instantaneous, simultaneous, and
even activation of each car's brake valves, significantly reducing
braking distances--40 to 60 percent for the longest trains--and
minimizing the consequences of collisions or derailments by reducing
the collision speed and slowing the non-derailed portion of the train.

B. Continuous Brake Pipe Charging

    Propagating a brake command signal through the induction or
reduction of air pressure in the brake pipe represents a significant
limitation of conventional pneumatic brakes. The same brake pipe air
used to propagate brake commands also charges reservoirs on each
freight car. As a result, the brake pipe must be fully charged to
restore full braking capacity to depleted reservoirs. Partially
depleted air from the brake pipe, which occurs during the initial stage
of braking, prohibits repeat applications of brakes until the brake
pipe can be recharged. A brake pipe can only be recharged once the
brakes have been fully released. This characteristic of conventional
pneumatic brakes contributes to the risk of run-away trains caused by
prematurely depleted brake pipe pressure, particularly on steep grades.
    The ECP brake system reduces this risk by continuously charging the
brake pipe. Since ECP brakes do not use the brake pipe as a brake
command medium, the brake pipe is constantly being charged, allowing
the locomotive engineer to operate the brake system more aggressively.
With ECP brake systems, it is unnecessary to apply hand brakes on steep
grades to recharge the brake pipe after the train stops on the grade.

C. Graduated Brake Application and Release

    The conventional pneumatic brake system's inability to operate
freight trains in graduated release has long hampered train operations
and has increased fuel consumption. The conventional pneumatic brake
system

can only operate in direct release, preventing locomotive engineers
from reducing the braking effort without completely releasing and
resetting the brakes. In other words, after a direct release brake
application with a conventional pneumatic brake system, braking effort
can be increased but not decreased without fully releasing the brakes.
In many cases, direct release leads to unnecessary train stops and
insufficient initial brake applications. ECP brake systems overcome
this deficiency by operating in graduated release, which enables the
operator to reduce braking effort to a lower level after making an
initial brake application without fully releasing the brakes. As a
result, the operator can accurately adjust the braking level as each
situation requires, eliminating the stops required to recharge and
reset the brakes after excessive brake applications and prior to
negotiating hills and valleys.

D. Train Management

    The use of a train line cable allows real-time self-diagnostic
functions to be incorporated in the brake system. The initial check of
brake system conditions on each car and continuous monitoring of each
car's braking functions provides immediate communication to the
locomotive engineer of certain brake failures. The continuous
monitoring of each car's braking functions and real-time diagnostics of
the train's brake system is a significant advantage to the locomotive
engineer for the operation of the train and provides justification to
eliminate the need for some of the required physical inspections of the
train and supports regulatory change to operate cars with non-
functioning brakes out of the initial terminal. When the ECP brake
system diagnostics detect a serious problem, including when the brake
pipe pressure falls below 50 psi, the ECP brake system will
automatically command a penalty brake application. ECP brake systems
also eliminate the conventional pneumatic brake system's inability to
apply all brakes in the train when there is a blockage in a brake pipe,
which is handled through the use of a two-way EOT telemetry device not
required by all trains. This failure will not affect brake applications
in ECP brake systems, because each car is provided a braking command
through a train line cable, not solely through the reduction of brake
pipe pressure, which would not be propagated through the consist if the
brake pipe is blocked. Therefore, ECP brake systems incorporate
features that make them inherently safer than conventional pneumatic
brakes. Using sensor-based technology to maintain a continuous feedback
loop on train conditions for the crew and any centralized monitoring,
the electrical communication cable network can also serve as a platform
for the gradual addition of other train performance monitoring and
management controls, including distributed power locomotive control,
automatic activation of hand brakes, hot bearing detection, and truck
oscillation and vibration. These and other train management features
will increase the reliability and overall safety of train operations.

E. Improved Performance

    Ultimately, ECP brake technology also provides improved
performance, which will contribute to safer train operations and
significant cost savings over time. Since ECP brake operated trains can
operate in graduated release, instead of direct release, of the brakes,
fuel will not be wasted while dragging trains against a brake
application. Further, because all of the cars' ECP brakes release
instantaneously, fuel will not be wasted on initial start-ups and
power-ups after a brake application.
    Operations utilizing ECP brake systems also promise increased
average train speeds and decreased trip times. ECP brake systems allow
the locomotive engineer to modulate the brake applications in
territories with descending grades, thus increasing overall trip
average speeds and reaching destinations sooner. While the slow release
of the rear cars' brakes on conventional pneumatic braked trains cause
drag, the brakes on ECP brake equipped trains release simultaneously,
improving start-up and acceleration times. Further, due to its shorter
stopping distances, trains equipped solely with ECP brake systems may
potentially permit higher train speeds within existing signal spacing,
which will increase average system velocity, or permit use of shorter
``blocks'' between signals, facilitating greater system capacity.
    The instantaneous application and release of ECP brakes will result
in more uniform braking, thus improving wheel wear and lengthening
brake shoe life. In a conventional pneumatically braked train, the
brake pipe gradient and slower response time causes the first third of
the train's cars to provide the majority of the braking action, thus
applying additional pressure and heat on those cars' wheels. Since ECP
brake systems provide instantaneous braking on all cars, such pressure
will be more uniformly distributed along the train, thus eliminating
the uneven braking force on the wheels of those leading cars. The ECP
brake system also self-monitors each car's brake cylinder pressure and
maintains the prescribed pressure, thus reducing the potential for
creating shelling and flat spots on wheels.
    Due to minimized wheel defects, and their accompanying vibrations,
freight cars and brake components will enjoy increased life. Further,
instantaneous braking will also prevent draft gear assemblies from
receiving the constant pressure caused by trains equipped with
conventional pneumatic brake systems and will reduce lading damage by
eliminating slack action and in-train forces caused by uneven braking.
ECP brake systems will also reduce the number of brake parts and rubber
diaphragms required by conventional pneumatic brake systems.

VI. Standards, Approval, and Testing

    During the past 17 years, FRA has monitored the progression of ECP
brake technology and has observed field testing on various revenue
trains, both freight and passenger. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR
initiative to develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded,
through the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., an FMECA of the ECP
brake system based on AAR's Standards and Recommended Practices, S-4200
Series. FRA also participated in programs to develop and enhance
advanced components for ECP brake systems. After all of these efforts,
FRA has decided that the AAR S-4200 Series of standards is appropriate
substantively and legally for adoption by reference in this rule and
that the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee is an appropriate vehicle to
rely upon in the implementation of ECP brake technology and this rule.
    FRA acknowledges that ECP brakes are an attractive, viable, and
enabling technology with the potential to substantially improve the
operational efficiency of trains and that by complying with AAR
Standard S-4200, ECP-braked trains offer significant safety and
efficiency benefits in freight train handling, car maintenance, fuel
savings, network capacity, self-monitoring, and fail-safe operation.
FRA proposes that all suppliers obtain AAR approval for ECP brake-
equipped-trains intended for use on U.S. railroads.
    AAR administers the existing industry ECP brake standards through
its Air Brake Systems Committee--consisting of representatives from the
major railroads, brake manufacturers, and FRA--which requires
demonstrated proof of compatibility, safety, and reliability of air
brake systems to receive AAR approval. FRA is satisfied that the

existing AAR S-4200 specifications, AAR approval procedures, and
continuing oversight by the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee will best
ensure the safety and reliability of ECP brake systems. An ECP brake
monitoring system complying with AAR Standard S-4200 Series increases
safety by communicating information on the location and quantity of
defective equipment and by providing for the safe movement of equipment
over longer distances and periods of time.

A. AAR Standards and Approval Process

    In order to assure the safety and the interoperability of ECP brake
system designs, AAR developed the S-4200 Series of standards. The first
five standards (S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S-4230, and S-4250)--issued in
1999 and updated in 2002 and 2004--specify the functional, operational,
and interface requirements for cable-based ECP brake systems. AAR
issued two additional standards in January 2007, specifying ECP brake
equipment approval procedures (S-4240) and interoperability testing
requirements (S-4260). AAR has not completed specifications for radio-
based ECP brakes, which it considers technically immature and
unsuitable. The purposes of the standards are to ensure that AAR-
approved electronic brake systems are interoperable between different
manufacturers and meet high standards of safety and reliability. The
analysis of the S-4200 Series of standards indicates that the
performance specifications for the cable-based ECP brake concept are
complete.
    The AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices (MSRP)
contains the following standards for cable-based ECP brake systems:
     S-4200, ECP Cable-Based Brake Systems--Performance
Requirements;
     S-4210, ECP Cable-Based Brake System Cable, Connectors,
and Junctions Boxes--Performance Specifications;
     S-4220, ECP Cable-Based Brake DC Power Supply--Performance
Specification;
     S-4230, Intratrain Communication Specification for Cable-
Based Freight Train Control System;
     S-4240, ECP Brake Equipment--Approval Procedure;
     S-4250, Performance Requirements for ITC Controlled Cable-
Based Distributed Power Systems; and
     S-4260, ECP Brake and Wire Distributed Power
Interoperability Test Procedures.
    The main standard, S-4200, ensures that the functionality and
performance of freight ECP brake systems are uniform and consistent
among equipment from different manufacturers, that cars equipped with
AAR-approved ECP brake systems from different manufacturers are
interoperable, and that AAR-approved electronic brake systems meet a
high standard of safety and reliability. This standard defines ECP
brake system elements, specifies their functionality in different
implementation schemes--such as stand-alone, overlays, and emulators--
and sets the requirements for all system functions. It covers all
primary functions of ECP brakes, including graduated brake application
and releases, continuous reservoir charging, adjustment of braking
level to car load, continuous fault detection, equipment status
monitoring, and pneumatic backup. It also specifies requirements for
all modes of train operation and provides an extensive description of
fault response and recovery functions for all possible faults of the
system components. The standard also establishes environmental
requirements for the designed systems, in-service testing, and rigorous
approval procedures for certification process of new ECP brake
equipment.
    Other standards in the AAR S-4200 Series (S-4210, S-4220, S-4230,
S-4250, and S-4260) contain requirements for critical ECP brake system
components and communication protocols. Standard S-4210 contains the
performance specifications and qualification test procedures for ECP
brake system cables, connectors, and end-of-car junction boxes. The
required testing verifies that the designed components have high
reliability, will withstand harsh environmental conditions, and will
have at least an 8-year operating life.
    Standard S-4220 contains performance specifications for the DC
power supply system through the hard-wired train line cable for ECP
brake controllers and other electronic freight car components. Since a
DC power supply conductor will also send communication control commands
between a locomotive and its attached cars, the standard requires
reliable separation and absence of interference between the DC power
supply and the communication circuits.
    Standard S-4230 contains the requirements related to intra-train
communication systems on freight equipment used in revenue interchange
service. The standard facilitates interoperability between freight cars
and locomotives without limiting the proprietary design approaches used
by individual suppliers. The communication protocol was developed for
control of ECP brakes and multiple remote units, including distributed
power locomotives, and for safety reporting of various car and
locomotive components.
    Standard S-4250 contains the methodology and communication flow
requirements for controlling the operation of multiple locomotives in a
freight consist through the intra-train communication network that is
shared with the ECP brake system. The locomotive control through the
intra-train communication line is an alternative method of locomotive
control, which was not available before the introduction of ECP brake
system technology. The controlled locomotives can either trail a lead
locomotive or be remotely located (i.e., separated by cars) in a train.
The standard establishes protocols for different types of locomotive
controls through the intra-train line cable, depending on the location
of the consist's multiple locomotives.
    Standard S-4260 contains the test procedures that must be completed
by ECP brake suppliers to establish interoperability baselines among
ECP brake and wire distributed power (WDP) systems in compliance with
the S-4200 standards series. The test procedures validate the
functional interoperability of ECP brake and WDP systems developed by
different manufacturers.
    The AAR approval process and the work of the Air Brake Systems
Committee has been the primary method of ensuring the safety and
reliability of railroad brake systems and components for decades. FRA
proposes that meeting all the requirements of the AAR ECP brake
standards and obtaining AAR approval will be a prerequisite for any new
ECP brake system to be employed on U.S. railroads. Through its
participation on the Air Brake Systems Committee, FRA can monitor any
safety or reliability issues that may develop with ECP brake systems.
In the event of a serious safety issue with a supplier's ECP brake
system, FRA can appropriately respond by invoking its authority to
intervene with additional rulemaking or an emergency order. FRA does
not expect to use this authority, because the AAR Air Brake Systems
Committee already has the authority to rescind AAR approval for brake
systems that do not perform safely or reliably.
    Standard S-4240 contains the acceptance procedure for seeking AAR
approval of ECP brake equipment. The standard requires a manufacturer
to apply for approval by submitting certain information under
Administrative Standard S-060. Following review and

approval of the initial application data and test plan by the AAR Air
Brake Systems Committee, a manufacturer maintains the burden of
establishing compliance with Standards S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S-4230,
S-4250, and S-4260 to obtain conditional approval.
    For laboratory testing, an AAR representative will select 150 CCDs
from a lot of 200 and will select HEUs, train power supplying units
(TPSs), and ECP-EOTs from lots of four each. The testing will be
performed on a 150-car test rack configured in accordance with AAR
specifications. The manufacturer will provide for AAR evaluation of the
test results, which shall include a requirements traceability and
compliance matrix for each AAR standard and all necessary test reports,
and then conduct interoperability laboratory testing between new ECP
brake equipment and AAR-approved ECP brake equipment in accordance with
standard S-4260.
    Upon satisfactory completion of the aforementioned laboratory
tests, AAR will consider conditional approval for field testing of ECP
brake equipment. If conditional approval is granted, 150 ECP brake CCDs
shall be selected from a production lot of 200 test-approved CCDs, and
100 of those selected, plus at least two ECP brake equipped locomotives
and one ECP-EOT device, must be placed in railroad service for 24
months. Under conditional approval, at least 1,000 cars must be
allotted for use.
    Within those 24 months, all in-service tests must be conducted.
After those 24 months, the Air Brake Systems Committee continues to
monitor the product for reliability and safety concerns. If a problem
with any brake component is discovered, the Committee will discuss the
issue and may either demand further tests or withdraw AAR approval.
    Full AAR approval shall be provided after 4 years if during that
time a manufacturer furnishes AAR at specified intervals various
service reports, which must include accurate ECP brake equipment
malfunction records. FRA agrees with AAR's assessment that 4 years are
needed to collect a history of reliable data with minimum failures. In
addition, the manufacturer must provide to AAR a semiannual report
containing any repair material for the test ECP brake equipment. Under
the draft standard, AAR reserves the right to withdraw conditional test
approval if it determines that safety is impaired, reliability
degrades, or incompatibility of ECP brake operation develops, and may
require any additional testing or performance evaluations it deems
necessary. Standard S-4240 also contains specific procedures that must
be followed when a manufacturer intends to change certain ECP brake
equipment physical characteristics, software, or electronics.
    FRA supports this effort as a timely measure for AAR to strengthen
the regulatory package for ECP brake systems. Overall, FRA considers
AAR approval a valuable step to ensure the reliability and safety of
ECP brake systems and a minimum requirement for initial application of
ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads. However, FRA fully intends
to monitor the application and safety of ECP and may, at its
discretion, require additional safety analysis to be performed to
confirm the safety of ECP brake systems installed and operating in
revenue service. FRA reserves the right to witness the AAR approval
testing of the product.

B. FMECA

    AAR Standard S-4200 Series was developed to support the design of a
safer, more reliable ECP braking system when compared with conventional
air brakes. Once the standard was created, the railroad industry
identified the need to perform a safety and reliability assessment of
an ECP brake system built in accordance with this standard. Since
actual S-4200 ECP brake systems did not yet exist, the industry decided
to conduct a FMECA for a hypothetical ECP brake system that satisfied
all the requirements of the standard. At FRA's insistence, the FMECA on
AAR Standard S-4200 was performed in 1999 by DEL Engineering with
participation of AAR, FRA and a number of experts with significant
experience in the development and application of ECP brake systems.
    The FMECA team began the analysis by identifying all major ECP
brake system components and their intended functions. The analysis
examined each component and function and identified associated failure
modes and effects. The failure modes were analyzed to determine
severity, frequency of occurrence, and effectiveness of detection. The
FMECA team created a numeric ranking criterion and determined and
prioritized the level of risk posed by each failure mode. High risk
failure modes were identified and appropriate mitigation strategies
were developed to decrease the risk.
    The FMECA team analyzed the failure modes of all ECP brake
components, including: CCDs with the battery; HEUs on the head
locomotive; ECP-EOT devices; train line cables, communication and power
supplies; power supply controllers; head end line terminators; car ID
modules; locomotive ID modules; and operative brakes. The analysis
included different types of ECP brake systems, including stand alone,
overlay (dual mode), and emulator and all system functional
requirements and operating modes, including Initialization, Switch,
Run, and Cut-out. The FMECA failure log contained about 1,500 failure
modes. For each high-risk failure mode, the FMECA team identified
action items and offered recommendations on how to mitigate the
consequences of component failures or system functional failures. The
team primarily examined single-point failures but also identified and
evaluated some cases of combined failures that had significant safety
consequences.
    The FMECA results confirmed that the ECP brake concept offers the
potential for improved performance, reliability, and safety over that
of conventional pneumatic brake systems. The FMECA concluded that no
failure mode of an AAR-compliant ECP brake system exists that can cause
a catastrophic accident due to single-point failure of the system
itself. The AAR standards, as written, eliminate or mitigate critical
outcomes of single-point failure of ECP brake systems.
    The FMECA team encouraged manufacturers to pursue ECP brake
technology, because the potential safety and efficiency benefits will
far outweigh any disadvantages. If designed and maintained properly,
ECP brakes will be substantially safer and more reliable than the
conventional pneumatic brake system they are intended to replace.
    AAR and the brake manufacturers indicated that they were completely
satisfied that ECP brake systems are significantly safer than
conventional pneumatic systems. They accepted the results of the FMECA
and concluded that no modifications were necessary to the AAR standards
related to ECP brake systems.

VII. Market Maturity and Implementation

    The U.S. market for ECP brake systems is mature enough to begin
implementation of ECP brake technology. The equipment manufacturers
have made a significant investment in the technology and have completed
the preliminary design work and field testing of ECP brakes. For
instance, they have provided technical solutions for different ECP
brake implementation strategies, enabling non-ECP and ECP brake
equipped cars to run in combined trains and, in some cases, allowing
ECP-equipped freight cars to run in ECP brake mode using locomotives
with conventional

pneumatic brake systems. In addition, they are ready to supply fully
operational stand-alone ECP brake systems, overlays, and emulators for
the U.S. market, easing the industry's migration process. A commitment
by the railroad industry to change over to ECP brakes is necessary to
inspire additional technological initiatives by the manufacturers.
    ECP brake systems from three U.S. manufacturers--all in different
stages of AAR approval and testing in revenue service--have been built
with the intention of complying with the AAR S-4200 Series of
standards, proven safe through field testing, designed using fail-safe
principles, and accommodated the industry's need for a different
implementation scheme. The AAR S-4200 Series standards are intended to
assure the necessary level of safety, reliability, interoperability,
and, ultimately, the applicability of this equipment in the U.S.
market. The equipment of all three suppliers relies on the conventional
pneumatic emergency brake system as a backup in case of failure of the
ECP brake control. In most cases, ECP brake systems will support
enhanced safety even if the electronics fail, because continuous
recharging of the brake pipe will ensure availability of an emergency
application. Therefore, the ECP brake system reduces the risk caused by
depleted air in the case of an emergency. There is no instance of a
malfunctioning ECP brake system that resulted in a catastrophic or
critical event.
    To assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail
freight industry, FRA contracted BAH in 2005 to conduct a study. An ECP
brake expert panel of principal stakeholders in the conversion of the
U.S. freight car fleet to ECP brake technology, including suppliers,
railroads, private car owners, AAR, and FRA was assembled to
participate in the study. The expert panel supports the conclusion that
the AAR standards are sufficient for the ECP brake system designer to
achieve a system safety level adequate for a safety-critical system. In
particular, an AAR-compliant system, while providing a significant
increase in safety and efficiency, does not introduce extra risks
associated with single-point failure of the ECP system itself.
    The final BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and
comparison of ECP and conventional air brake systems. BAH acknowledged
that while trains with ECP brake systems have been run in North
America, South America, and Australia, U.S. implementation has been
stalled due to the absence of an acceptable implementation plan for
conversion and hard data to support a sound economic analysis, limited
interoperability with traditionally braked trains, and insufficient
capital investment required for conversion. It concluded that although
the barriers to implementation are formidable, ECP brake systems are
economically and technically ripe for adoption and should be
implemented in phases over the course of 2 to 4 years to collect hard
data supporting further implementation. BAH posits that implementing
ECP brakes on 2,800 locomotives and 80,000 cars in the Powder River
Basin (PRB) would cost the industry approximately $432 million.
However, according to BAH, the annual $157 million in anticipated
benefits--resulting from saved fuel, improved wheel and brake shoe
life, and a reduction in necessary brake inspections--will allow
railroads to recover those costs in less than three years. To justify
the investment, the BAH report says, conversion must be focused first
on the high-mileage, unit-train-type services that would most benefit
from its use.
    FRA acknowledges that BAH's fuel cost estimates are substantially
underestimated due to subsequently rising prices and that the benefits
from improved wheel life require re-evaluation since BAH was privy to
insufficient hard data. It is notable that BAH did not attempt to
quantify potential savings relating to capacity increases or emissions
decreases due to the difficulty in arriving at acceptable values.
Accordingly, the report's estimated internal rate of return should be
viewed as conservative.

VIII. Related Proceeding

    In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006,
BNSF and NS jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in parts
229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP brake
pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. The FRA Safety Board held
a fact-finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring
testimony from representatives of the petitioners, air brake
manufacturers, and labor unions. On March 21, 2007, the Safety Board
granted the petitioners' request, in part, subject to various
conditions designed to ensure that trains subject to the waiver will be
as safe as trains operated without benefit of the waiver. See Id. FRA
will closely monitor compliance with the waiver and verify brake system
and component performance characteristics using unannounced inspections
of trains subject to the waiver.

IX. Legal Impediments and Proposed Relief

    ECP brake operation provides for continuous electronic monitoring
of air brake system components condition and brake pipe pressure,
potentially limiting the need for certain physical brake inspections
currently required under part 232. Accordingly, FRA proposes modifying,
relaxing, or removing certain requirements, including intermediate
terminal inspections (Sec.  232.209), single-car air brake tests (Sec.
232.305), and the required percent of operable brakes at initial
terminal departure (Sec.  232.103(d)), as they apply to trains
operating in ECP brake mode.
    The rail industry's implementation of ECP brakes is frustrated by
such inapplicable and inefficient statutory and regulatory
requirements. Without a large-scale proliferation and implementation of
ECP brake technologies, the industry will not be able to enjoy
economies of scale and to overcome the industry-wide limits caused by
interoperability problems. FRA seeks to improve market efficiency by
providing reliable and suitable standards and procedures that will
support investments in ECP brake technology.
    The current statutory and regulatory requirements, however--
including those concerning brake inspections and the operation of
trains with defective equipment--may reduce or eliminate incentives for
railroads to implement new ECP brake technology and take advantage of
its operational and safety benefits. For example, 49 U.S.C. 20303
presents an obstacle to cost-saving, safe, and efficient long hauls
promised by ECP brakes. To avoid incurring civil penalties, operators
are required under 49 U.S.C. 20303 to transport rail vehicles with
defective or insecure equipment ``from the place at which the defect or
insecurity was first discovered to the nearest available place at which
the repairs can be made.''
    When the defective equipment is an ECP brake, stopping for a
physical inspection is not necessary, as it does not increase the safe
operation of the train. If more than 15 percent of the train's AAR
approved ECP brakes become inoperable, the train automatically stops. A
train with 85 percent operative ECP brakes will have 15 percent less
overall braking capacity than a conventional pneumatic train with 100
percent operative brakes--an important concern when operating on long
grades. However, a train with 85 percent operative ECP brakes will
still

have shorter stopping distances than a conventional pneumatic braked
train with 100 percent operative brakes. Considering the technology's
continuous self-monitoring and constant communication with the
engineer, it is highly unlikely that a train will ever reach such a
level of inoperability. Further, FRA believes that an ECP brake
operated freight train may travel non-stop to its destination, not to
exceed 3,500 miles, because foundation brake rigging and brake shoes
will safely operate over this distance and redundant intermediate brake
inspections for an ECP brake operated train moving that distance do not
increase ECP brake system safety. As an added benefit, the increased
mileage allowance would provide for coast-to-coast travel. In the
related proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, FRA's Safety Board
granted the request of BNSF and NS to allow the non-stop movement of an
ECP brake operated train to its destination, each not to exceed 3,500
miles. FRA believes that the proposed rule should codify this
regulatory relief so that it applies universally.
    Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. 20303 requires trains with defective
equipment, including brakes, to travel to the nearest repair location.
If the nearest available repair location is in a direction other than
that in which the train is traveling, the train with defective
equipment must switch the defective car out of the train and add it to
another train traveling in the direction of the repair location,
sometimes requiring a ``backhaul.'' ECP brake implementation has been
complicated by the ECP brakes system's technological incompatibility
with conventional pneumatic brake systems. To switch a car equipped
with ECP brakes into a technologically incompatible train operating
with conventional pneumatic brakes, however, will create additional
safety hazards for that train.
    The potential risks involved in combining cars with incompatible
braking systems coupled with the hazards normally associated with
switching cars in the field, likely outweigh the potential harm of
keeping the defective car in its existing ECP braked train and
traveling to a repair location that is further away. In circumstances
where the defective safety appliance is a non-brake defect, it may be
safer and more efficient to allow ECP brake equipped trains with non-
brake defective equipment to travel to the nearest forward repair
station. Moreover, due to the ability of ECP brake systems to
continuously monitor the brakes on each car in a train and to provide
specific information to the locomotive engineer regarding the location
of any car with inoperative brakes and the inherent design of such
systems to prohibit operation with less than 85 percent operative
brakes, the need to immediately set-out and handle cars with defective
brakes for repair is unnecessary. There is also no safety need to
require a railroad to incur the expense and delay involved with cutting
the defective car out of the train. Currently, freight cars with
defective mechanical conditions are permitted to be hauled long-
distances for repair. See 49 CFR 215.9. In light of the technological
advances provided by ECP brake systems, it appears logical and
necessary to permit more flexibility in moving equipment with defective
brakes when equipped with ECP brakes and hauled in a train operating in
ECP brake mode. However, the language of 49 U.S.C. 20303, prevents FRA
from providing this flexibility.
    The aforementioned requirements governing conventional pneumatic
braked trains may offset the increased safety and efficiency benefits
afforded by ECP brakes, thus eliminating the incentives for rail
operators to implement ECP brake technologies. To encourage
implementation without hindering safety, FRA proposes to invoke its
discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt ECP brake
equipped trains from the specific statutory requirements contained in
49 U.S.C. 20303. The requirements for moving defective equipment were
created over a century ago, during the infancy of pneumatic brakes and
before all cars were equipped with power brakes. With many more reasons
to stop train operation along tracks with frequent repair shops and
exponentially more employees, the legislative drafters of that time
could not have envisioned the type of safer and more efficient
technologies available today.
    Recognizing the importance of upgrading rail technologies, Congress
in 1980 passed the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee
Assistance Act (the ``Rock Island Act''), which, inter alia, provides
statutory relief for the implementation of new technologies. More
specifically, when certain statutory requirements preclude the
development or implementation of more efficient railroad transportation
equipment or other transportation innovations, the applicable section
of the Rock Island Act, currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20306, provides
the Secretary of Transportation with the authority to grant an
exemption to those requirements based on evidence received and findings
developed at a hearing.
    According to Senate Report No. 96-614, ``This section fosters rail
technological improvements by giving the Federal Railroad
Administration discretionary authority to grant exemptions from the
Safety Appliances Acts' mandatory requirements when those requirements
preclude the development or implementation of new rail technology.''
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. Rep. No. 96-
614, at 8-9 (Mar. 4, 1980) (emphases added). The House version of the
bill includes no similar provision, but the Conference substitute adds
that the authority granted FRA in this section must be exercised after
a hearing, absent an agreement between labor representatives and the
developers or operators of the new equipment or technology. Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H. Conf. Rep. No.
96-1041, Sec.  117, at 30 (May 20, 1980).
    Under 49 CFR 1.49(v), the Federal Railroad Administrator is
delegated authority to carry out the functions vested in the Secretary
by the Rock Island Act. Under this authority, FRA intends to schedule a
hearing to be set at a date established in a forthcoming notice, at
which the Administrator or his delegated representative may preside, to
receive evidence and develop findings to determine whether FRA should
invoke 49 U.S.C. 20306. The scope of the hearing will include the
following questions:
     Will allowing an ECP braked train with defective brakes to
travel to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, decrease,
maintain, or exceed the level of safety provided for a conventional
pneumatic braked train receiving a Class 1A brake inspections every
1,000 miles?
     What safety hazards, if any, will be caused by switching
an ECP braked car into a technologically incompatible train equipped
with conventional pneumatic brakes?
     What is safer for an ECP braked car with defective non-
brake parts: Switching it into a train equipped with conventional
pneumatic brakes--rendering the switched car's ECP brakes ineffective--
for backhauling to the nearest repair station or allowing it to
continue to the nearest forward repair location in the ECP brake
equipped train with more than 85 percent effective and operative
brakes?
     Does 49 U.S.C. 20303 provide a disincentive sufficient to
preclude implementation of ECP brake technology?

X. Additional Issues

A. Part 229

    In the related proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, BNSF and NS
seek relief from various provisions of parts 229 and 232. In relation
to part 229, BNSF and NS seek relief from the requirements relating to
daily locomotive inspections and electronic record keeping. At this
point in time, FRA believes that there is insufficient information
available to consider any exceptions to part 229 for operations using
ECP brake systems. In any event, FRA seeks comments and information
relating to this issue.

B. Dynamic Brake Requirements

    At the public hearing conducted in the related proceeding, BNSF
requested relief from some of the dynamic brake requirements contained
in 49 CFR part 232. FRA is unclear of what specific relief is requested
regarding dynamic brakes. Section 232.109 provides for the continued
operation of a locomotive found with inoperative dynamic brakes for a
period of up to 30 calendar days. FRA does not see how more flexibility
in this area is necessary. However, FRA invites interested parties to
comment on the requested relief or clarify the necessity of such
relief.

C. Single Car Air Brake Test Approval Procedures and Single Car Air
Brake Tests

    The proposed rules include a provision requiring the submission and
approval of single car air brake test procedures for cars with ECP
brake systems in accordance with the special approval procedures in
Sec.  232.17. At this time, the proposed rules do not modify Sec.
232.17. However, FRA reserves the right to modify Sec.  232.17 to make
clear the applicability of proposed subpart G, including, but not
limited to, adding cross-references.
    Section 232.305(a) provides that a single car air brake test may be
performed partially in accordance with ``Section 4.0, `Special Tests,'
of the Association of American Railroads Standard S-486-01, `Code of
Air Brake System Tests for Freight Equipment,' contained in the AAR
Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E (January 1,
2001).'' That standard has since been amended and FRA has approved the
use of the new Standard S-486-04 as the procedure to use when
performing a single car air brake test. Accordingly, FRA proposes to
amend Sec.  232.305(a) by replacing the directly preceding quoted text
with the following: ``Section 4.0, `Special Tests,' of the Association
of American Railroads Standard S-486-04, `Code of Air Brake System
Tests for Freight Equipment,' contained in the AAR Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices, Section E (January 1, 2004).''

D. Train Handling Information

    Section 232.111 requires railroads to adopt and comply with written
procedures ensuring that railroad train crews receiving trains are
provided accurate information concerning the train's condition. The
continuous monitoring capabilities of ECP brake systems provide
information regarding the location of equipment with inoperative or cut
out brakes. At this time, however, FRA does not see any reason for
excepting any portion of or provision contained in Sec.  232.111. FRA
believes that, if anything, ECP brake systems' continuous monitoring
capabilities will assist railroads in complying with the train handling
information rules in Sec.  232.111 by monitoring defects and
potentially allowing for the manual input of defects not monitored
electronically and then electronically providing such information to
subsequent train crews. FRA seeks comments and information on this
issue.

E. Piston Travel Limits

    For cars equipped with 8\1/2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake
cylinders receiving either a Class I brake test or a periodic
inspection while on a shop or repair track, Sec. Sec.  232.205(c)(5)
and 232.303(c) currently limit piston travel to 7 to 9 inches. An
industry-wide waiver currently in effect, however, permits piston
travel limits to range from 6 to 9 inches. FRA proposes to incorporate
that waiver into the rules by amending Sec. Sec.  232.205(c)(5) and
232.303(c) accordingly. FRA seeks comments and information on this
issue.

F. Extended Haul Trains

    Section 232.213(a)(6) requires inbound inspections for extended
haul trains and states that, ``After April 1, 2007, the inbound
inspection described in this paragraph shall not be required unless FRA
provides notification to the industry extending the requirement to
perform inbound inspections on extended haul trains.'' Section
232.213(a)(7) requires railroads to maintain a record of all defective,
inoperative, or ineffective brakes and all conditions not in compliance
with parts 215 and 231 of discovered during train movement. In
addition, that section says that, ``After April 1, 2007, the records
described in this paragraph need not be maintained unless FRA provides
the notification required in paragraph (a)(6) of this section extending
the requirement to conduct inbound inspections on extended haul
trains.''
    FRA proposes to amend Part 232 by deleting Sec. Sec.  232.213(a)(6)
and (a)(7) from the regulations. These regulations ``sunsetted'' on
April 1, 2007, without further FRA action. Accordingly, they serve no
purpose remaining in the CFR. FRA seeks comments on this proposal.

G. Part 238

    Amtrak has informally expressed interest in potentially using ECP
brake system technology for its Auto Train that runs from Lorton,
Virginia to Sanford, Florida. Amtrak has previously employed overlay
ECP braking on that train, and presumably would benefit from some
additional flexibility with respect to the conduct of intermediate
inspections. However, since FRA does not currently have sufficient
information regarding the use of ECP brake systems on passenger trains
and passenger equipment, FRA does not propose in this rulemaking to
amend 49 CFR part 238. The functions of freight and passenger trains
and cars, evidenced by the varied rules applicable to each, are too
disparate to provide a one-size-fits-all solution for ECP brake
integration and use. FRA may consider Part 238's applicability to ECP
brake systems in another rulemaking or in other proceedings. If
comments appropriate to this rulemaking are submitted, FRA reserves the
right to include provisions addressing those issues at the final rule
stage. Further, FRA would consider requests for waivers relating to the
regulation of freight trains and freight cars equipped with ECP brake
systems for passenger trains on a case-by-case basis.

XI. Section-by-Section Analysis

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 232

    Unless otherwise noted, all section references below refer to
sections in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FRA
seeks comments on all proposals made in this NPRM.

Subpart A--General

    This subpart of the proposal contains amendments to the definitions
listed in subpart A of part 232.
Section 232.5 Definitions
    FRA proposes to amend Sec.  232.5 by adding an extensive set of
definitions to introduce the regulatory relief and regulations
applicable to ECP brake systems. FRA has worded these definitions to
mirror, to the extent possible, the definitions provided in

existing AAR standards. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the
meaning of important terms that are used in the text of the proposed
rule. The proposed definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to
minimize the potential for misinterpretation of the rule. Some of the
definitions introduce new concepts or new technologies which require
further discussion.
    The proposed definitions acknowledge the two general types of ECP
brake systems--dual mode and stand-alone. The definition of a dual mode
ECP brake system, which means a brake system that can work either as a
conventional pneumatic brake system or an ECP brake system, intends to
cover both an overlay ECP brake system and an ECP brake system equipped
with an emulator CCD. The definition of CCD is intended to describe an
important and necessary part of ECP brake system technology.

Subpart G--Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems

    FRA proposes to add a new subpart G to Part 232. This proposed
subpart contains the design and operational requirements that will
provide regulatory relief and modifications to allow implementation of
ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads and to ensure the safety of
such operations.
Section 232.601 Scope
    This section contains a formal statement of the proposed rules'
purpose and scope. The proposed rules contain specific requirements
relating to the operation of freight trains and freight cars equipped
with ECP brake systems and operating in ECP brake mode. The proposed
provisions also intend to provide specific exceptions from various
requirements contained in part 232 for ECP brake equipped freight
trains and freight cars.
Section 232.602 Applicability
    As a general matter, this section proposes that these rules apply
to all railroads that operate ECP brake equipped freight trains or
freight cars on track which is part of the general railroad system of
transportation. The proposed rules will apply to freight trains
operating in ECP brake mode, freight cars equipped with ECP brake
systems, and conventionally braked freight trains and freight cars when
operated in conjunction with ECP brake equipment.
    The regulatory relief contemplated by this NPRM and the need to
ensure the safe operation of trains and vehicles equipped with this
advanced technology requires that exception of certain existing Part
232 provisions be afforded. Many of the provisions for which FRA
proposes an exception either apply awkwardly or should otherwise not
apply to ECP brake systems due to the new technology's design or
additional safety benefits. Similarly, the addition of various
requirements directly related to ECP brake systems is necessary to
ensure that the equipment is properly inspected, tested, maintained,
and safe to operate.
    To fulfill these goals and to avoid an excess of confusing cross-
references, FRA proposes to except specific provisions and an entire
subpart of Part 232 from application to ECP brake systems. Each section
of this proposed subpart contains specific exceptions from various
provisions contained in other portions of Part 232 or contain
appropriately rewritten provisions directly applicable to ECP brake
systems. Those portions and sections of Part 232 not specifically
excepted by the provisions proposed in this NPRM remain applicable to
ECP brake equipped freight trains and freight cars.
Section 232.603 Design, Interoperability, and Configuration Management
Requirements
    In order to ensure the safety and interoperability of ECP brake
systems, this section proposes to incorporate by reference the existing
AAR standards and approval procedures for ECP brake systems. The AAR,
its member railroads, and various brake manufacturers have invested
considerable time and effort in developing industry standards
addressing the design, performance, and interoperability of ECP brake
systems. FRA has reviewed the industry standards it proposes to
incorporate in this rule and has determined that the standards
effectively address and ensure the safe and proper operation of the
brake system technology. As noted in the preamble, FRA funded a FMECA,
which validated the safety and applicability of AAR's ECP brake system
standards for freight railroads.
    FRA believes that compliance with the AAR standards identified in
proposed paragraph (a) will ensure the safety and efficiency of ECP
brake equipped freight trains and freight cars. Implementation of ECP
braking systems complying with these standards will bring benefits and
efficiencies encompassing train handling, car maintenance, fuel
savings, network capacity, self-monitoring, fail-safe operation,
accurate and instantaneous brake commands throughout the train, and
continuous, real-time self-diagnostics. Paragraph (a) proposes to
require all suppliers to meet existing AAR standards when developing
and installing ECP brake systems.
    Paragraph (a) proposes the incorporation of the most recent AAR
standards related to ECP brake systems. FRA recognizes that ECP brake
systems are a growing technology and realizes that the existing AAR
standards may need to change as the technology advances. Accordingly,
FRA proposes two methods the incorporated industry standards may be
changed. Proposed paragraph (a) permits the submission of an alternate
standard under the special approval procedures contained in Sec.
232.17. In addition, proposed paragraph (f) permits the AAR or other
authorized representative of the railroad industry to seek modification
of the incorporated industry standards through the modification
procedures contained in Sec.  232.307. The modification procedures in
Sec.  232.307 were developed to permit modification of the incorporated
AAR single car test standard and FRA believes that the procedures are
equally applicable to these proposed regulations. The industry has
successfully utilized both these methods to change or modify other
industry standards incorporated in part 232 and FRA believes it is
appropriate and necessary to provide this latitude for the standards
related to ECP brake systems and components.
    Paragraph (b) proposes that all ECP brake systems receive
conditional or final approval under AAR's recently adopted Standard S-
4240 prior to use and that they maintain such approval while in use. In
this paragraph, FRA intends to prohibit the use of ECP brake systems
that do not receive conditional or final AAR approval or that cease to
comply with the incorporated AAR standards relating to ECP brake
systems. FRA has reviewed the approval procedures contained in AAR
Standard S-4240 and believes that they provide an appropriate review
process to ensure the safe and proper operation of ECP brake systems.
FRA believes that AAR is in the best position to approve those ECP
brake systems that will be used by its member railroads and, over time,
other non-member railroads interchanging traffic on the general rail
system.
    In paragraph (c), FRA proposes that all ECP brake systems meet the
configuration management requirements contained in an FRA-recognized
industry approved standard. FRA believes that configuration management
of ECP brake system hardware and software components is an absolute
requirement to ensure the

interchangeability, interoperability, compatibility and continued
proper and safe operation of ECP brake systems. Compatibility of ECP
hardware and software will have a direct effect on the safety and
reliability of ECP brake systems running on the Nation's railroads.
    The AAR approval process and Air Brake Systems Committee requires
various procedures to ensure the interoperability and
interchangeability of AAR approved ECP brake systems and their
components. These same requirements and procedures have been used for
many years to successfully manage the configuration of conventional
pneumatic AAR approved air brake valves. Therefore, FRA believes that
responsibility for the configuration management of AAR approved brake
systems and their components should continue to reside with AAR and its
Air Brake Systems Committee.
    AAR standards, including its S-4200 Series of standards for ECP
brake systems, however, do not provide requirements for hardware and
software configuration management plans. AAR is in the process of
developing standards related to ECP brake system configuration
management, as evidenced by, among other things, standards S-4240,
Sec. Sec.  5.1 and 5.2, which require ECP brake manufacturers to obtain
AAR approval for changes to approved hardware and software.
    If a configuration management standard is completed and issued
prior to the publication of this notice, FRA seeks comments during this
proposed rule's comment period on the incorporation of the respective
standard into the rules by reference. If it is published subsequent to
the publication of this notice, FRA still seeks comments during this
proposed rule's comment period and FRA will also consider other forums
for receiving comments, including, but not limited to, the public
hearing that will be held in connection with this proposal or by
issuance of a supplemental notice informing interested parties of the
standard's availability. In anticipation of AAR issuing such a standard
in the near future, FRA proposes to incorporate that standard by
reference in the final rule; provided FRA's review of the standard
determines it is acceptable.
    Although FRA prefers that the industry develop, adopt, and comply
with a recognized industry configuration management standard, FRA
recognizes that such a standard does not yet exist. Accordingly,
paragraph (c) proposes that, in lieu of compliance with an AAR software
configuration management standard, railroads may submit to FRA an
alternate configuration management plan for approval. FRA seeks
comments and information on what minimum requirements or guidelines
should be considered for such submitted plans. FRA believes that
configuration plans must be submitted for approval under Sec.  232.17
and must be structured in accordance with accepted configuration
management standards such as IEEE Std 28-1990, IEEE Standard for
Software Configuration Management Plans, American National Standards
Institute, 1990; or IEEE Std 1042-1987, IEEE Guide to Software
Configuration Management, American National Standards Institute, 1987.
FRA seeks comments on these suggested structures or any other standard
structures. FRA intends that no train shall be operated in ECP brake
mode in revenue service unless it is using an ECP brake system that
complies with a configuration management plan incorporated into the
final rule or another configuration management plan otherwise approved
by FRA.
    FRA believes that any ECP brake configuration standards should
consider issues beyond initial approval. For instance, use of improper
or out-of-date software versions for microprocessor controlled systems
has been an issue in a variety of industries. Therefore, FRA cautions
that more robust configuration management processes beyond those
already included in AAR standard S-4200 may be needed to adequately
control ECP brake system components, especially as more manufacturers
apply for AAR approval of ECP brake systems. Further, safety or
reliability issues may dictate that hardware or software configurations
be changed once ECP brake systems are put in service on a large scale
in the U.S. FRA encourages AAR, railroads, and manufacturers to ensure
their ability to continually monitor and respond to hardware and
software issues affecting ECP brake systems after initial approval.
    FRA believes that AAR is capable of setting appropriate
configuration management standards and related approval procedures. FRA
intends to rely on AAR to monitor ECP brake component approval,
configuration and compatibility. However, FRA, in its federal oversight
role will monitor the activities of the Air Brake Systems Committee and
the AAR ECP brake approval process to ensure that any safety or
reliability issues that may emerge are addressed promptly and
comprehensively. FRA will also issue additional configuration
management requirements for the operation of ECP brake systems if, in
the sole opinion of the FRA, the oversight of the AAR and the AAR Air
Brake Systems Committee proves inadequate for the continued safe
operation of ECP brake systems. In this case, FRA may take a variety of
approaches including requiring railroads and car owners to develop
their own configuration management plans for monitoring ECP brake
system interchangeability, interoperability and compatibility. FRA
seeks comments on how the rules can ensure continued monitoring of
hardware and software issues affecting ECP brake systems after initial
approval.
    Paragraph (d) of this section proposes to except a freight car or
freight train equipped with ECP brakes from certain existing provisions
contained in Part 232. FRA recognizes that Part 232 requires compliance
with other AAR standards not applicable to ECP brake systems. For
instance, section 232.103(l) requires compliance with AAR Standard S-
469-47 (``Performance Specification for Freight Brakes''), which
specifies a train's air brakes must respond to the decrease and
increase of brake pipe pressure. However, ECP brake systems respond to
an electronic signal, not brake pipe pressure, rendering S-469-47
inapplicable to ECP brake systems. Accordingly, paragraph (d) proposes
to except ECP brake systems from the requirements of AAR Standard S-
469-47.
    Subpart F of part 232 contains general requirements for introducing
new brake system technologies. More specifically, it requires, inter
alia, a pre-revenue acceptance testing plan. As FRA views existing ECP
brake system technology to be a fully mature and well tested
technology, FRA does not believe the provisions contained in subpart F
are applicable to this existing technology. When subpart F was
originally added to part 232, ECP brake technology was just beginning
to gain prominence. Since that time, experience with the technology is
far more developed and the technology is being used on many different
trains around the world. Moreover, FRA believes that its proposal to
require ECP brake systems to initially and continually comply with AAR
standards and to be approved in accordance with AAR's approval
procedures prior to being placed in service obviates the need for
existing ECP brake system technology to comply with the requirements
under subpart F. Accordingly, paragraph (d)(2) proposes an exception
from the requirements contained in subpart F freight trains and freight
cars equipped with existing ECP brake system technology that has been
conditionally or finally approved by

AAR in accordance with its approval procedures prior to the effective
date of the final rule in this proceeding. FRA has limited the
exception to ECP brake system technologies approved by AAR as of the
effective date of a final rule to provide an incentive to the industry
to move the introduction of the technology along in a timely fashion.
    In anticipation of future ECP brake technologies not currently
contemplated within the scope of the incorporated AAR standards or not
approved by AAR prior to the effective date of a final rule in this
proceeding, FRA proposes paragraph (e), which provides a procedure for
introducing such technologies without going through the pre-revenue
testing procedures contained in subpart F. Paragraph (e) permits a
party interested in using new ECP brake system technologies or using an
ECP brake system technology not approved by AAR prior to the effective
date of a final rule in this matter to file a written request with the
FRA seeking an exception from subpart F. FRA would expect any such
request to include a comprehensive narrative statement and any evidence
or facts justifying the exception of the new ECP brake technology from
the testing and demonstration requirements of subpart F. The material
should fully explain the testing or demonstration that will be
conducted pursuant to an FRA-recognized industry standard and ensure
that FRA is able to monitor such testing or demonstration. FRA's
Associate Administrator may revoke the exception in writing for any
reason after providing an opportunity for the affected party or parties
to respond.
Section 232.605 Training Requirements
    The general training requirements for railroad and contractor
employees for performing the inspection, testing, and maintenance on
brake systems are contained in Sec.  232.203. FRA proposes paragraph
(a) of this section to make clear that the training requirements
contained in Sec.  232.203 are applicable to ECP brake system
operations and to ensure that railroads update their training,
qualification, and designation programs to include provisions for these
operations. Thus, FRA proposes to require that railroad and contract
personnel responsible for performing brake system inspections, tests,
and maintenance on ECP brake systems be trained, tested, and designated
in accordance with the requirements contained in Sec.  232.203 on the
ECP brake systems they will be required to inspect, test, and maintain.
    FRA continues to believe that railroads and contractors are in the
best position to determine the precise method of training that is
required for the personnel they use to conduct required brake system
inspections, tests, and maintenance. Although FRA provides railroads
and contractors with broad discretion to develop training programs
specifically tailored to their operations and personnel, FRA will
expect railroads and contractors to fully comply with the training and
qualification plans they adopt as they apply to ECP brake operations. A
critical component of this training requires ensuring that employees
have knowledge of the specific Federal requirements that govern their
work. Accordingly, FRA proposes to require the training and
qualification plans mandated under Sec.  232.203 to include provisions
applicable to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of ECP brake
systems.
    Section 232.203(c) contains general requirements or elements which
must be part of any training and qualification plan adopted by a
railroad or contractor. FRA continues to believe that the elements
contained in this section are specific enough to ensure high quality
training and broad enough to permit a railroad or contractor to adopt a
training plan that is best suited to its particular operation. FRA
continues to believe that the required training must provide employees
with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the
tasks required for the various types of brake systems the individual
employee will be required to inspect, test, or maintain. Since FRA
expects only a limited number of employees will be involved with ECP
brake operations, a railroad or contractor may tailor its training
programs only for those individuals involved with ECP brake systems,
based on the tasks that employee will be required to perform on those
specific systems.
    Section 232.203(e) contains record keeping requirements, the
cornerstone of the training requirements. FRA continues to believe that
such records should be kept for employees inspecting, testing, and
maintaining ECP brake equipped freight cars and freight trains. Because
Sec.  232.203 and proposed Sec.  232.605 allow each railroad and
contractor the flexibility to develop a training program that best fits
its operation and does not impose specific curriculum or experience
requirements, FRA continues to believe it is vital for railroads and
contractors to maintain detailed records on the training they provide.
Such documentation will allow FRA to judge the effectiveness of the
training provided and will provide FRA with the ability to
independently assess whether the training provided to a specific
individual adequately addresses the skills and knowledge required to
perform the tasks that the person is deemed qualified to perform.
Moreover, requiring these records will deter railroads and contractors
from circumventing the training requirements and discourage them from
attempting to utilize insufficiently trained personnel to perform the
inspections and tests required by this rule. FRA also intends to make
clear that the required records may be maintained either electronically
or on paper in the same manner as required under Sec.  232.203.
    Paragraph (a) also proposes continued compliance with Sec.
232.203(f), which requires that each railroad or contractor adopt and
comply with a plan to periodically assess the effectiveness of its
training program. Although FRA agrees that a formal audit process may
not be necessary, FRA also continues to believe that railroads and
contractors should periodically assess the effectiveness of their
training programs that would include an assessment of the training
related to ECP brake systems. FRA continues to believe that periodic
assessments may be conducted through a number of different means and
each railroad or contractor may have a need to conduct the assessment
in a different manner. Paragraph (a) proposes that a railroad or
contractor institute a plan to periodically assess its training program
regarding ECP brake systems and permit the use of efficiency tests or
periodic review of employee performance as methods for conducting such
review. FRA continues to believe that many railroads, due to their
small size, are capable of assessing the quality of the training their
employees receive by conducting periodic supervisory spot checks or
efficiency tests of their employees' performance. However, FRA also
continues to believe that on larger railroads the periodic assessment
of a training program should involve all segments of the workforce
involved in the training. FRA believes it is vital that labor be
intrinsically involved in the assessment process, from beginning to
end. For example, evaluation of training techniques might best be
approached through a ``team'' method, where several observers,
including labor representatives, periodically evaluate course or
``hands-on'' training content and presentation.
    Paragraph (b) proposes to require each railroad to appropriately
amend or modify its operating rules to include safe train handling
procedures when

utilizing ECP braking systems. The developed operating rules should
address the equipment and territory operated by the railroad. FRA
continues to believe that training on proper train handling procedures
is essential to ensuring that locomotive engineers can properly handle
their trains with or without ECP braking systems.
    FRA also continues to believe that it should not specify the
specific knowledge, skill, and ability criteria that a railroad must
adopt into its locomotive engineer training program. FRA believes that
each railroad is in the best position to determine what these criteria
should be and what training is necessary to provide that knowledge,
skill, and ability to its employees operating ECP brake equipped
trains. However, to ensure that the railroads and contractors provide
and complete training, paragraph (c) proposes to require each to adopt
and comply with such criteria and training procedures and to
incorporate them into its locomotive engineer certification program
required by 49 CFR part 240.
Section 232.607 Inspection and Testing Requirements
    Except for transfer trains, the existing Part 232 regulations
require that a train receive a Class I brake test at its initial
terminal and when certain events occur en route, a Class IA brake test
every 1,000 miles and Class III brake tests when the train line cable
continuity is interrupted. When operating as an extended haul train,
the existing regulations require that a Class I brake test be performed
at the train's initial terminal and at the train's 1,500-mile location
consist, if operating further than 1,500 miles. In addition, under
certain circumstances, cars and solid blocks of cars are required to
receive either a Class I or a Class II brake test when they are added
to a train. Each of these inspections is expensive and time-consuming.
    An ECP brake system's self-monitoring capabilities, fail-safe
operation, and enhanced safety and performance provide railroads the
ability to reduce the number of physical inspections on a train and
will reduce the number of repairs to the brake system. In a letter
dated January 26, 2007, filed in the related waiver proceeding, BNSF
and NS assert that ``This performance-based technology supercedes [sic]
the need for a scheduled inspection based on the amount of mileage that
can be accumulated within the boundaries of the U.S. rail system.''
Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. Similarly, in the same docket, two ECP brake
manufacturers, Wabtec and New York Air Brake, state that when a ECP
brake system enters ``Run'' mode, it provides diagnostics, continuous
monitoring, and fault reporting to the locomotive display. According to
the manufacturers, ECP brakes provide to the locomotive monitoring and
feedback of the most important brake data and ``while it is not
economically practical to monitor for all potential brake system
failures, the increased level of monitoring and data reporting should
allow safely extending the distance between inspection points, coupled
with revised railroad procedures.'' Letter dated January 29, 2007 in
Docket No. FRA-2006-26435.
    FRA continues to believe that if a train is properly and thoroughly
inspected, with as many defective conditions being eliminated as
possible, then the train is capable of traveling distances much greater
than 1,000 miles between brake inspections. FRA's experience with
extended haul trains over the last three years has established that
trains with conventional pneumatic brake systems that are inspected by
highly qualified individuals can safely operate up to 1,500 miles
between brake inspections. FRA is not aware of any significant incident
or derailment related to a brake or mechanical component on an extended
haul train. Accordingly, in paragraph (g), FRA proposes to except
trains operating exclusively in ECP brake mode from the Class IA and
Class II brake inspections currently required under Sec. Sec.  232.207
and 232.209. FRA also proposes to except such trains from en route
Class I inspections under Sec.  232.205(a) and (b). Paragraph (g) also
proposes to except Sec.  232.211(a), which governs the locations where
Class III brake inspections must be performed. For clarity, FRA
proposes to include the events requiring the performance of a Class III
brake test for trains operating in ECP brake mode in this section of
the regulation. Accordingly, FRA proposes to except that section and
instead include paragraph (e), which is analyzed below.
    Paragraph (a) proposes continued compliance with Sec.  232.205(c)--
which describes the tasks and requirements of a Class I brake test--for
an ECP brake equipped train at its initial terminal. To offset safety
concerns regarding the proposed exceptions to intermediate inspections,
FRA proposes that Class I brake tests at initial terminals be performed
by a qualified mechanical inspector. FRA continues to believe that a
Class I brake test performed on a train at its initial terminal needs
to be as in-depth and comprehensive as possible and, thus, should be
performed by an individual possessing the knowledge not only to
identify and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment
required to be inspected, but also to recognize the interrelated
workings of the equipment and the ability to trouble-shoot and repair
the equipment. Similarly, FRA proposes that all of the mechanical
inspections required to be performed on a train at its initial terminal
be conducted by an inspector designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11 in
order to ensure that all mechanical components are in proper condition
prior to the train's departure.
    FRA believes that the regulatory relief proposed by paragraph (g)
is justified by the increased safety level provided by ECP brake
technologies and the proposed requirement under paragraph (a) that a
Class I brake test of an ECP brake equipped car be performed by a
qualified mechanical inspector at its initial terminal. The exceptions
proposed in paragraph (g), in conjunction with the requirements of
paragraph (a), would allow most ECP brake equipped and operated trains
to travel to their destinations without stopping for any required
intermediate inspections. The regulatory relief provided by the
proposed elimination of intermediate brake tests would significantly
reduce operating and train delay costs.
    In paragraph (b), FRA proposes to permit a train operating in ECP
brake mode to travel up to 3,500 miles or to its destination, whichever
is less, without an additional Class I brake inspection. FRA believes
that 3,500 miles allows virtually all ECP brake operated trains to
travel to their respective destinations and provides for coast-to-coast
travel. FRA also bases this mileage amount on the facts that foundation
brake rigging and brake shoes will safety operate this distance and
redundant intermediate inspections would not increase ECP brake system
safety. Because many unit or cycle trains operate in a continuous loop
with multiple loading and unloading locations, FRA has not included the
destination of the train as a limiting factor for them. FRA is
specifically making this distinction in order to prevent
misinterpretation of the proposal as it relates to unit or cycle
trains. As these trains may have multiple destinations, a strict
application of destination could result in Class I brake tests being
performed more frequently than intended by this proposed rule. Thus, in
paragraph (b)(2), FRA proposes to treat unit and cycle trains
differently by only requiring them to receive Class I brake inspections
by

qualified mechanical inspectors at least once every 3,500 miles. To be
clear, under the proposed rules, no ECP brake equipped freight car or
freight train would be allowed to travel more than 3,500 miles without
receiving a Class I brake inspection by a qualified mechanical
inspector.
    Currently, no extended haul train is permitted to travel more than
1,500 miles without receiving a brake inspection. For ECP brake
equipped trains, FRA proposes to more than double the currently allowed
distance to 3,500 miles. FRA acknowledges that in the related
proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, the Safety Board has provided
for the movement of ECP brake equipped trains up to 3,500 miles. FRA
proposes to codify this relief so that it would apply universally.
Accordingly, during the pendency of this rulemaking, FRA will closely
monitor those trains' operations and will collect information on the
equipment operated in those trains. FRA reserves the right to make
appropriate modifications in the final rule based on any further data
then available.
    FRA acknowledges, however, that notwithstanding the proposed
allowance of an ECP brake equipped and operated train to travel up to
3,500 miles without an additional brake inspection, instances exist
where certain trains would require the performance of a Class I brake
inspection en route. For instance, the current regulations require that
certain tests be performed when a car is off a source of compressed air
for more than 4 hours. FRA acknowledges that an ECP brake equipped
train's on board diagnostics reduce concerns relating to cars remaining
off air for too long a period. Accordingly, FRA believes that an
expansion of the time allowed off air is justified and proposes to
modify this requirement for ECP brake equipped cars. For trains
operating in ECP brake mode, FRA proposes in paragraph (c) to require a
Class I brake test by a qualified person if that train is off air for
more than 24 hours. FRA continues to believe that dangers, although
reduced, remain when an ECP brake equipped train remains off air for
too long. FRA proposes to limit off-air time to 24 hours since cars
moving in service generally have a dwell time of 24 hours or less and
to provide sufficient flexibility while allowing the industry to move
equipment without impacting timely inspections and maintaining an
acceptable level of safety. FRA also proposes that, for trains
operating in ECP brake mode and off air for more than 24 hours, the
Class I brake inspection be performed by a qualified person. FRA
acknowledges that while a qualified mechanical inspector may be
stationed at each route's initial terminal and destination, it may not
be favorable at this time to require one at each location a train
operating in ECP brake mode is off air for more than 24 hours.
Requiring a qualified mechanical inspector at each point such a train
is off air for more than 24 hours may provide a significant
disincentive for a railroad to equip its trains with ECP brake systems.
    FRA intends this requirement to also apply to trains operating in
ECP brake mode, located at its initial terminal, and off air for more
than 24 hours. In other words, under proposed paragraph (c), if at an
initial terminal a qualified mechanical inspector performs a Class I
brake test on a train operating in ECP brake mode and that train then
goes off air for more than 24 hours before departing from the initial
terminal, a qualified person must perform another Class I brake test
prior to departure. FRA believes that requiring a qualified mechanical
inspector at an initial terminal to perform a Class I brake test twice
on the same train would be unnecessary, since the second testing would
merely be a verification of the previous inspection, and possibly too
onerous. FRA does not expect this situation to occur often, since
trains rarely sit off air for more than 24 hours at its initial
terminal after receiving a Class I brake test.
    FRA's intent in proposing this narrow expansion of the 4-hour rule
is not to alter the basic tenet that equipment should be retested when
it is removed from a source of compressed air for any lengthy period of
time. The proposed 24 hour off-air requirement would apply equally to
any ECP brake equipped train, regardless of whether it is a unit or
cycle train, and would replace the 4 hour off-air requirement under
Sec.  232.205(a), which would be excepted under proposed paragraph (g),
as discussed above.
    This proposed 24-hour allowance gives railroads flexibility to
perform switching operations while ECP brake equipped trains are en
route and provides flexibility to efficiently move cars from one ECP
brake equipped train to another when necessary, yet retains the concept
that such be retested when left disconnected from a source of
compressed air for longer periods of time. The 24-hour time frame is
also consistent with the general dwell time that cars experience while
en route. FRA further believes that a limitation on the amount of time
that such equipment may be off air is necessary for ensuring that such
equipment is inspected in a timely and predictable manner. If no time
limit were imposed or if too much time was permitted, an ECP brake
equipped car could lawfully sit for days at various locations while en
route to its destination and be switched in and out of numerous trains
without ever being reinspected. Such an approach would drastically
reduce the number of times that the brake systems on such equipment
would ever be given a visual inspection from what is currently required
and, in FRA's view, would seriously degrade the safety of the trains
operating with such equipment in its consist.
    Furthermore, if an ECP brake equipped train was allowed to be off-
air for an excessive amount of time, it would be virtually impossible
for FRA to ensure that equipment is being properly retested as it would
be extremely difficult for FRA to determine how long a particular piece
of equipment was disconnected from a source of compressed air. In order
to make such a determination, FRA would have to maintain observation of
the equipment for days at a time. Consequently, the proposed rule
proposes a 24-hour limit on the amount of time equipment can be
disconnected from a source of compressed air as it maintains current
levels of safety and provides an enforceable and verifiable time limit
that FRA believes provides the railroads some additional benefit over
what is currently required both in terms of operational efficiency and
cost savings.
    In paragraph (d), FRA proposes to require that a Class I brake test
be performed by a qualified person on ECP brake equipped cars added en
route to a train operating in ECP brake mode. However, FRA believes
that this requirement may not be necessary if other safety precautions
are taken. Thus, FRA also proposes to allow such cars to not receive a
Class I brake test when being added to a train operating in ECP brake
mode if the car had previously received a Class I brake test, the train
crew is provided documentation of that test, the car has not been off
air for more than 24 hours, and a proper visual inspection is performed
prior to use or departure.
    Except in limited circumstances, the current regulations require a
Class I brake test on each car added to a train at the location it is
added to a train. See 49 CFR 232.205(b). Although FRA proposes to
except ECP brake equipped trains and cars from Sec.  232.205(b), as
discussed above, FRA also proposes to retain the basic requirement that
all cars added en route shall receive a Class I test by a qualified
person unless they

have previously received a Class I brake test by a qualified mechanical
inspector. A proper Class I brake test ensures that a car is in proper
working condition and is capable of traveling to its destination with
minimal problems en route.
    Accordingly, if a ECP brake equipped car has received a Class I
brake test by a qualified mechanical inspector within the last 3,500
miles, documentation of that test is provided to the train crew, the
car has not been off air for more than 24 hours, and a proper visual
inspection is conducted when the car is added to the train, FRA
proposes with paragraph (d) that it would be unnecessary to require an
additional Class I brake test when that car is added to an en route
train operating in ECP brake mode. However, to account for those cars
that have not received a Class I brake test by a qualified mechanical
inspector within the last 3,500 miles and that will be added to a train
operating in ECP brake mode, FRA proposes paragraph (d), which would
require a Class I brake test under those circumstances. Paragraph (d)
would be necessary in light of proposed paragraph (g) excepting
compliance with section 232.205(b). FRA contemplates that this
requirement would likely only apply to cars with overlay ECP brake
equipment that had been operating in pneumatic mode. Unless a car
operating in ECP brake mode is off air for more than 24 hours, it would
not require a Class I brake test when it is added to a new train, since
the proposed rules contemplate that the car would have already received
a Class I brake test within the previous 3,500 miles or at its initial
terminal. The documentation would be required to ensure that a Class I
brake test by a qualified mechanical inspector will be performed every
3,500 miles. Under paragraph (d), any ECP brake equipped car being
added to a train operating in ECP brake mode would require a Class I
brake test when the car has been off air for more than 24 hours for the
same reasons stated above concerning proposed paragraph (c).
    FRA believes that a visual inspection of the car's brake components
is a suitable replacement for an additional Class I brake test when the
car or cars added in these circumstances have received a Class I brake
test by a qualified mechanical inspector within the last 3,500 miles.
The visual inspection proposed in this paragraph could be performed
while the car is off air and could be conducted in conjunction with the
mechanical inspection required under part 215 whenever a car is added
to a train. Thus, FRA believes that the visual inspection proposed in
this paragraph would not impose any significant burden on the railroads
as they are already required to visually inspect the mechanical
components on any car added to a train under part 215. FRA also
acknowledges that the brake systems on cars not equipped with ECP
brakes would be inoperative after being added to a train operating in
ECP brake mode. To ensure the safe operation of such equipment and
trains, FRA proposes that the transfer of cars equipped solely with
conventional brake systems into trains operating in ECP brake mode also
be given a visual inspection to ensure their safe operation and to
ensure compliance with Sec.  232.15.
    FRA anticipates that placing a car equipped with conventional
pneumatic brakes into an ECP brake equipped train may be awkward at
best, requiring use of an electrical ``run around cable'' and manual
inputs into the locomotive control system. In a letter dated February
5, 2007, AAR provided a list of recommended ``enhancements and
modifications'' to Part 232 to facilitate the use of ECP brakes. A copy
of this document has been placed in the docket of this rulemaking. In
that communication, the AAR stated that railroads ``do not plan to
commingle non-ECP equipment in stand-alone ECP trains.'' However, FRA
believes that foreseeable--though rare--circumstances should be
considered in this rulemaking to the extent possible. Accordingly, FRA
seeks comments and information on what requirements may be necessary to
safely allow the addition of cars equipped with conventional pneumatic
brakes into an ECP brake equipped train, including, but not limited to,
the placement and securement of cables along cars equipped with
conventional pneumatic brakes to preserve their continuity between non-
consecutive cars equipped with ECP brakes and the appropriate placement
in the consist of cars equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes.
    In the event that a car would be required to receive a Class I
brake test when added to an en route train, FRA proposes that the Class
I brake test be performed by a qualified person for the same reasons
stated in the above analysis. To be clear, although any car added to a
train en route may receive a Class I inspection by a qualified person,
the entire train's travel distance is limited to its destination or the
distance remaining until the train or any individual car picked up en
route has traveled 3,500 miles since its last Class I brake inspection
performed by a qualified mechanical inspector, whichever is less. A
Class I brake inspection by a qualified person does not reset the
mileage clock for the entire train.
    FRA intends to continue to require Class III brake tests for trains
operating in ECP brake mode. However, due to the changes related to
adding cars en route and for purposes of clarity, FRA is including the
triggering events for when a Class III brake test would be required in
paragraph (e) of this section. As previously mentioned, for trains
operating in ECP brake mode, FRA proposes in paragraph (g) to except
Sec.  232.211(a), which governs the locations where Class III brake
inspections must be performed. Through paragraph (e), FRA intends to
require Class III tests on trains operating in ECP brake mode where a
locomotive or caboose is changed, a car or block of cars is added to or
removed from the train, and whenever the ECP brake system's continuity
is compromised when the train consist has not changed. FRA acknowledges
that there has been confusion in unique circumstances where a Class III
brake test may or may not be required. For instance, a Class III brake
test would not be required when a consist is cut in half, but otherwise
may remain unchanged, such as when blocking a crossing. Further, a
block of cars could be added to the rear of a train without breaking
the train line cable's continuity. Accordingly, to avoid any
misunderstanding, FRA proposes to specifically detail when a Class III
brake inspection will be required on trains operating in ECP brake
mode. All other trains, including ECP brake equipped trains operating
in conventional pneumatic mode, would remain subject to the provisions
contained in Sec.  232.211(a).
    Paragraph (f) proposes to modify certain elements of the brake
tests applicable to ECP brake equipped cars and trains operating in ECP
brake mode. Under the current regulations, tests and inspections
include brake pipe service reductions and designate specific psi
specifications. FRA believes that modifications to the brake pipe
reduction standard are appropriate to reflect the differences between
ECP brakes and conventional pneumatic brakes. For instance, control of
ECP brakes is not dependent on brake pipe pressure and ECP brake
equipped trains have a nominal brake pipe pressure of 90 psi. Further,
since brakes need only remain applied until the release signal is
received and the ECP brake system communicates through an immediate
electronic control signal, the requirement to keep the brakes applied
for a period of three minutes is unnecessary. Since the ECP brake tests

include an equivalent electronic full service reduction with
immediately provided results, the time consuming 20-psi brake pipe
reduction required in the Class I and Class III brake tests and 15-psi
brake pipe reduction required in the transfer train brake test and yard
air test may no longer be necessary. In addition, the ECP brake
system's electronic equivalent to a full service reduction may increase
safety and testing efficiency.
    In any event, brake pipe pressure remains important, since ECP
brake equipped trains rely on the pneumatic backup system for safety
purposes. Accordingly, for trains equipped with ECP brake systems, FRA
proposes in paragraph (f)(1) to replace the existing brake pipe service
reductions and increases with an alternative requirement for an
electronic signal that provides an equivalent application or release of
the brakes. FRA believes that any alternative test procedures must
include, at a minimum, either the electronic equivalent to each
existing test's brake pipe reduction requirements or the equivalent of
a full service brake pipe reduction initiated by an electronic signal.
    FRA seeks comments on this proposal, including the appropriate type
of alternative test. In light of how the brake pipe's use in an ECP
brake train will be limited to charging brake air reservoirs, FRA seeks
comments on how the existing regulatory brake pipe leakage limits
should be modified, if at all, for ECP brakes and whether changes in
the leakage requirements will affect the pneumatic backup capability of
the ECP brake system. In addition, comments should address the need to
include the specific electronic reduction that is to be made on ECP
equipped trains during the required brake tests and what type of
electronic signals would be suitable equivalents to the currently
mandated 20-psi and 15-psi brake reduction.
    Paragraph (f)(2) proposes to modify certain regulatory requirements
related to piston travel limits and adjustments during Class I brake
inspections. For instance, under Sec.  232.205(c)(5) a person
performing a Class I brake test must ensure that piston travel be
adjusted to specific distances. Although FRA believes that ECP brake
operations require specific piston travel limits, FRA recognizes that
the minimum piston travel limits contained in Sec.  232.205(c)(5) may
not be fully applicable to ECP brake systems. Since the ECP brake
system precisely measures the amount of brake cylinder pressure for
each specified application and maintains that pressure, piston travel
tolerances for ECP brakes may not require the level of specificity as
those for conventional pneumatic brake operations. Further, FRA
acknowledges that a ``one-size-fits-all'' requirement for ECP brake
system piston travel may not be ideal or applicable.
    Accordingly, paragraph (f)(2) proposes to except the minimum piston
travel limits in Sec.  232.205(c)(5) as they apply to ECP brake
systems. In place of the minimum piston travel limits required by Sec.
232.205(c), paragraph (f)(2) proposes to require railroads, while
performing Class I brake tests, to adhere to the minimum piston travel
limits or distances recommended by the applicable manufacturer. FRA
anticipates that a recommended minimum piston travel limit for each ECP
brake system will be determined by the car's design, weight, and
engineered brake ratio. FRA's basis for evaluation of manufacturer
recommendations for the minimum piston travel limits will be based on
the equivalent brake shoe force on the wheel as shown in the
appropriate calculations or tests. At this time, FRA intends to retain
the standard nominal adjustment of 7\1/2\ inches and the maximum piston
travel limit of 9 inches in accordance with of Sec.  232.205(c)(5). In
any event, FRA seeks comments on whether and how the nominal piston
travel adjustment limit should be flexible.
    FRA proposes to require such limits be stenciled or marked on the
car or badge plate in the same fashion FRA requires for systems and
equipment subject to Sec.  232.103(g). FRA believes that requiring the
affixation of a legible decal, stencil, or sticker or the equipping of
a badge plate displaying the permissible brake cylinder pistol travel
range will effectively communicate the acceptable range to train crew
members and will ensure the proper operation of a car's brakes after
being inspected. FRA believes that this information is essential in
order for a person to properly perform the required brake inspections.
FRA believes that all vehicles equipped with ECP brake systems require
marking in order to avoid confusion by those individuals responsible
for inspecting and maintaining the equipment.
Section 232.609 Handling of Defective Equipment With ECP Brake Systems
    In Sec.  232.609, FRA proposes to modify certain part 232
requirements as they apply to freight cars and freight trains equipped
with ECP brake systems and hauling defective equipment. In particular,
for such trains and cars, FRA proposes in paragraph (k) to except
certain existing requirements and in paragraphs (a) through (j) to
provide alternative requirements.
    Under Sec.  232.15 and 49 U.S.C. 20303, railroads may be immune to
civil penalty liability if a car or train with certain inoperative or
defective equipment is hauled under certain conditions. Section
232.15(a) contains various parameters which must exist in order for a
railroad to be deemed to be hauling a piece of equipment with defective
brakes for repairs without civil penalty liability. The vast majority
of the requirements contained in Sec.  232.15(a) are a codification of
the existing statutory requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 20403 and
are based on the voluminous case law interpreting those provisions. The
statutory provisions require hauling defective equipment only to the
nearest place where necessary repairs can be made and require 100
percent operative brakes from any location where such repairs can be
effectuated. Thus, because many locations where trains are initiated
with any frequency are also locations where brake system repairs can be
effectuated, the statutory provisions essentially require 100 percent
operative brakes from a train's initial terminal. FRA continues to
believe that the proposed requirements relating to the movement of
equipment with defective ECP brakes are generally consistent with the
statutory requirements, ensure the safe and proper movement of
defective equipment, and clarify the duties imposed on a railroad when
moving such equipment.
    In light of the increased safety levels produced by ECP brake
systems, FRA proposes to use its discretionary authority under 49
U.S.C. 20306 to provide an exception from the rigid statutory
provisions and modify the regulations concomitant to 49 U.S.C. 20303
governing the movement of defective equipment. Under certain
circumstances, the statute and related regulations provide immunity
from civil penalty when a train with defective equipment is hauled to
the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made,
regardless of direction. Since a train equipped with an ECP brake
system and operating in ECP brake mode with a minimum percentage of
cars with defective ECP brakes is capable of traveling safely for long
distances, FRA proposes to permit the operation of such a train and any
cars with defective ECP brakes to its destination, not to exceed 3,500
miles, for repair without civil penalty.