the rebuttable presumption that smaller QFs lack nondiscriminatory
access to markets.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Order No. 688-A, 119 FERC ] 61,305 at PP 96, 103.
    \49\ E.g., N. States Power Co., 151 FERC ] 61,110, at P 34
(2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    22. Nevertheless, the Final Rule abandons the 20 MW threshold based
on the conclusory assertion that ``it is reasonable to presume that
access to RTO/ISO markets has improved'' and it is, therefore,
``appropriate to update the presumption.'' \50\ No doubt markets have
improved. But a borderline-truism about maturing markets does not
explain how the barriers arrayed against small resources have
dissipated, why it is reasonable to ``presume'' that the remaining
barriers do not inhibit non-discriminatory access, or why 5 MW is

an appropriate new threshold for that presumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Final Rule, 172 FERC ] 61,041 at P 629 (``Over the last 15
years, the RTO/ISO markets have matured, market participants have
gained a better understanding of the mechanics of such markets and,
as a result, we find that it is reasonable to presume that access to
the RTO/ISO markets has improved and that it is appropriate to
update the presumption for smaller production facilities.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    23. Instead of any such evidence, the Final Rule notes that the
Commission uses the 5 MW as a demarcating line for other rules applying
to small resources. Specifically, it points to the fact that resources
below 5 MW can use a ``fast-track'' interconnection process, whereas
larger ones must use the large generator interconnection
procedures.\51\ But the fact that the Commission used 5 MW as the cut
off in another context hardly shows that it is the right cut off to use
in this context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Id. P 630.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. Lacking substantial evidence to support the 5 MW threshold, the
Commission falls back on a deferential standard of review.\52\ But
while judicial review of agency policymaking is deferential, it is not
toothless. The same cases on which the Commission relies require that,
when an agency's policy reversal ``rests upon factual findings that
contradict those which underlay its prior policy,'' the agency must
``provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a
new policy created on a blank slate.'' \53\ That is because reasoned
decisionmaking requires that, when an agency changes course, it must
provide ``a reasoned explanation . . . for disregarding facts and
circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.''
\54\ For the foregoing reasons, the Commission has failed to produce
any such explanation, making its change of course arbitrary and
capricious.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Id. P 637 (citing FCC v. Fox Television, 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009), for the proposition that an agency ``need not demonstrate to
a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are
better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new
policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons
for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates.'').
    \53\ Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515; Advanced Energy Economy
Comments at 6.
    \54\ Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 516; Advanced Energy Economy
Comments at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Environmental Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act

    25. In contrast to the Commission's crowing over the significance
of its PURPA overhaul, the Final Rule describes the changes adopted as
merely corrective and clarifying in nature when it comes to conducting
an environmental review.\55\ In particular, the Commission contends
that ``the changes adopted in this final rule are required to ensure
continued future compliance of the PURPA Regulations with PURPA, based
on the changed circumstances found by the Commission in this final
rule.'' \56\ In other words, because the Commission believes that the
changes adopted are necessary to conform with the statute, they are
mere corrective changes, which, in turn, qualifies them for the
categorical exemption from any environmental review under NEPA, or so
the argument goes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the
Commission must consider whether its action associated with
rulemakings will have a significant impact on the environment. See
42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.
    \56\ Final Rule, 172 FERC ] 61,041 at P 722.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. But by that logic, any Commission action needed to comply with
our various statutory mandates--whether ``just and reasonable'' or the
``public interest''--would be deemed corrective in nature and,
therefore, excluded from environmental review. The Commission, however,
fails to point to any evidence suggesting that is what the Council on
Environmental Quality contemplated when it allowed for categorical
exemptions.

IV. The Way To Revise PURPA Is To Create More Competition, Not Less

    27. It didn't have to be this way. When Congress reformed PURPA in
the 2005 Energy Policy Act amendments, it indicated an unmistakable
preference for using market competition as the off-ramp for utilities
seeking relief from their PURPA obligations.\57\ Those reforms directed
the Commission to excuse utilities from those obligations where QFs had
non-discriminatory access to RTO/ISO markets or other sufficiently
competitive constructs.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 16 U.S.C. Sec.  824a-3(m).
    \58\ See Order No. 688, 117 FERC ] 61,078 at P 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. This record contains numerous comments explaining how the
Commission could use those amendments as a way to ``modernize'' PURPA
in a manner that both promotes actual competition and reflects
Congress's unambiguous intent.\59\ For example, in a white paper
released prior to the NOPR, the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC) urged the Commission to give meaning to
the 2005 amendments by establishing criteria by which a vertically
integrated utility outside of an RTO or ISO could apply to terminate
the must-purchase obligation if it conducts sufficiently competitive
solicitations for energy and capacity.\60\ Other groups, including
representatives of QF interests, submitted additional comments on how
an approach along those lines might work.\61\ Several parties commented
on those proposals.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See Advanced Energy Economy Comments at 13; Industrial
Energy Consumers Comments at 13-14; EPSA Comments at 16.
    \60\ National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
Supplemental Comments, Docket No. AD16-16-00, Attach. A, at 8 (Oct.
17, 2018); id. (proposing the Commission's Edgar-Allegheny criteria
as a basis for evaluating whether a proposal was adequately
competitive).
    \61\ See, e.g., SEIA Supplemental Comments, Docket No. AD16-16-
000 (Aug. 28, 2019).
    \62\ See, e.g., Advanced Energy Economy Comments at 12; APPA
Comments at 29; Colorado Independent Energy Comments at 7; ELCON
Comments at 19; Public Interest Organizations Comments at 90; SEIA
Comments at 24; Xcel Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is a shame that the Commission has elected to administratively
gut its long-standing PURPA implementation regime, rather than pursuing
reform rooted in PURPA section 210(m), such as the NARUC proposal.
Pursuing an option along those lines could have produced a durable,
consensus solution to the issues before us. I continue to believe that
the way to modernize PURPA is to promote real competition, not to gut
the provisions that the Commission has relied on for decades out of
frustration that Congress has repeatedly failed to repeal the statute
itself.

    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.

Richard Glick,

Commissioner.

[FR Doc. 2020-15902 Filed 9-1-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register: February 6, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 24)]
[Notices]
[Page 6274-6275]
[DOCID:fr06fe09-36]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 176-018]

City of Escondido and Vista Irrigation District; Notice of
Settlement Agreement and Updated Application and Solicitation of
Comments

January 29, 2009.
    Take notice that the following hydroelectric application has been
updated and filed with the Commission and is available for public
inspection.
    a. Type of Application: Settlement Agreement and Updated License
Application for a New Major License.
    b. Project No.: 176-018.
    c. Date Filed: December 15, 2008.
    d. Applicant: City of Escondido and Vista Irrigation District.
    e. Name of Project: Escondido Hydroelectric Project.
    f. Location: On the San Luis Rey River in San Diego County, near
Escondido, California. The project occupies 290 acres of Federal lands
under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service and the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management. The project also occupies 66 acres of Indian
Reservation lands owned by the La Jolla, San Pasqual, and Rincon Indian
tribes.
    g. Applicant Contacts:

Lori Vereker, Utilities Director, City of Escondido, Civic Center
Plaza, 210 North Broadway, Escondido, CA 92025;
Don A. Smith, Director of Water Resources, Vista Irrigation District,
1391 Engineer Street, Vista, CA 92081,<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    h. FERC Contact: Emily Carter,<PHONE_NUMBER> or
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    i. Deadline for filing comments: March 2, 2009. Reply comments due:
March 17, 2009.
    All documents (original and eight copies) should be filed with:
Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    Additional study requests and requests for cooperating agency
status may be filed electronically via the Internet, in lieu of paper.
The Commission strongly encourages electronic filings. See 18 CFR
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's Web site
(http://www.ferc.gov) under the ``e-Filing'' link.
    j. This updated application is not ready for environmental analysis
at this time.
    k. The existing 1.5 MW Escondido project consists of: (1) Two
storage reservoirs (Lake Henshaw on San Luis Rey River and Lake
Wohlford on Escondido Creek) with a combined storage capacity of
approximately 58,000 acre-feet; (2) one well-field (Warner Ranch) that
augments flow into Lake Henshaw; (3) one diversion dam on the San Luis
Rey River; (3) four primary water conduits (Upper Escondido Canal--5.93
miles; Rincon Penstock--0.4 mile; Lower Escondido Canal--7.72 miles;
and Wohlford Penstock--0.76 mile); (4) two powerhouses (Bear Valley
powerhouse

and Rincon powerhouse; (5) public recreation facilities at Lake Henshaw
and Lake Wohlford; and (6) appurtenant facilities and features. The
Escondido project extends from Lake Henshaw at an elevation of about
2,700 feet to Bear Valley Powerhouse at an elevation of 750 feet. The
Escondido canal currently consists of approximately 58,404 feet of
gunite lined canal; 3,567 feet of tunnel; 670 feet of metal flume;
2,156 feet of inverted siphon; and 6,118 feet of pipeline.
    In the revised application, the applicant proposes to remove the
Warner Ranch well-field, the Rincon Penstock, and the Rincon powerhouse
from the project.
    l. A copy of the updated application is available for review at the
Commission in the Public Reference Room or may be viewed on the
Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov using the ``eLibrary''
link. Enter the docket number excluding the last three digits in the
docket number field to access the document. For assistance, contact
FERC Online Support at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or toll-free at 1-
866-208-3676, or for TTY,<PHONE_NUMBER>. A copy is also available for
inspection and reproduction at the address in item h above.
    You may also register online at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/
esubscription.asp to be notified via e-mail of new filings and
issuances related to this or other pending projects. For assistance,
contact FERC Online Support.
    m. With this notice, we are re-initiating consultation with the
California State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), as required by
section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, and the
regulations of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 36, CFR
800.4.

Kimberly D. Bose,
 Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-2519 Filed 2-5-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


                            Cyproconazole (128993)
                     Screening Level Usage Analysis (SLUA)
                             Date: April 10, 2015

What is a Screening Level Usage Analysis (SLUA)?
      * Available estimates of pesticide usage data for a particular active ingredient that is used on agricultural crops in the United States.
      * Pesticide usage data obtained from various sources.  The data are then merged, averaged, and rounded so that the presented information is not proprietary, business confidential, or trade secret.
What does it contain?
      * Pesticide usage data for a single active ingredient only.
      * Agricultural use sites (crops) that the pesticide is reported to be used on.
      * Available pesticide usage information from U.S. states that produce 80% or more of a crop, in most cases, or less than 80%, in rare cases, depending on the scope of the survey and available resources.
      * Annual percent of crop treated (average & maximum) for each agricultural crop.
      * Average annual pounds of the pesticide applied for each agricultural crop (i.e., for the states surveyed, not for the entire United States).
What assumptions can I make about the reported data?
      * Average pounds of active ingredient applied - Values are calculated by merging pesticide usage data sources together; averaging across all observations, then rounding.  Note:  If the estimated value is less than 500, then that value is labeled <500.  Estimated values between 500 & <1,000,000 are rounded to 1 significant digit.  Estimated values of 1,000,000 or greater are rounded to 2 significant digits.)
      * Average percent of crop treated - Values are calculated by merging data sources together; averaging by year, averaging across all years, & rounding to the nearest multiple of 5.  Note:  If the estimated value is less than 2.5, then the value is labeled <2.5.  If the estimated value is less than 1, then the value is labeled <1.
      * Maximum percent of crop treated - Value is the single maximum value reported across all data sources, across all years, & rounded up to the nearest multiple of 5.  Note:  If the estimated value is less than 2.5, then the value is labeled <2.5.
What are the data sources used?
      * USDA-NASS (United States Department of Agriculture's National Agricultural Statistics Service)  -  pesticide usage data from 2004 to 2013.
      * Private pesticide market research  -  pesticide usage data from 2004 to 2013.
      * California Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) Pesticide Use Reporting (PUR) data for 2004 to 2012.
What are the limitations to the data?
      * Additional registered uses may exist but are not included because the available surveys do not report usage (e.g., small acreage crops).
      * Lack of reported usage data for the pesticide on a crop does not imply zero usage.
      * Usage data on a particular site may be noted in data sources, but not quantified.  In these instances, the site would not be reported in the SLUA.
      * Non-agricultural use sites (e.g., turf, post-harvest, mosquito control, etc.) are not reported in the SLUA.  A separate request must be made to receive these estimates.
      * Some sites show some use, even though they are not on the label.  This usage could be due to various factors, including, but not limited to Section 18 requests, existing stocks of the chemical, data collection errors, and experimental use permits (EUPs).

                             Date: April 10, 2015
   Screening Level Estimates of Agricultural Uses of Cyproconazole (128993)
                             Sorted Alphabetically
                          Reporting Years: 2004-2013

                                Annual Average
                             Percent Crop Treated

Crop
                               Lbs. A.I. Applied
                                    Average
                                    Maximum
                                                                              1
Soybeans
                                    10,000
                                    <2.5
                                    <2.5
                                                                              2
Wheat
                                    20,000
                                    <2.5
                                    <2.5

All numbers are rounded.
  	<2.5: less than 2.5 percent of crop is treated.

SLUA data sources include:
  USDA-NASS (United States Department of Agriculture's National Agricultural Statistics Service)
Private Pesticide Market Research
These results reflect amalgamated data developed by the Agency and are releasable to the public.