[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 55 (Tuesday, March 22, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16000-16002]
[FR Doc No: 2011-6654]

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2011-0056]

Voluntary Protection Programs Information; Extension of the
Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Approval of Information
Collection (Paperwork) Requirements

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Request for public comments.

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SUMMARY: OSHA solicits public comments concerning its proposal to
extend the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) approval of the
information collection requirements contained in Voluntary Protection
Programs Information.

DATES: Comments must be submitted (postmarked, sent, or received) by
May 23, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Electronically: You may submit comments and attachments
electronically at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal
eRulemaking Portal. Follow the instructions online for submitting
comments.
    Facsimile: If your comments, including attachments, are not longer
than 10 pages, you may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693-
1648.
    Mail, hand delivery, express mail, messenger, or courier service:
When using this method, you must submit a copy of your comments and
attachments to the OSHA Docket Office, OSHA Docket No. OSHA-2011-0056,
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Room N-2625, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20210. Deliveries (hand, express mail, messenger, and courier
service) are accepted during the Department of Labor's and Docket
Office's normal business hours, 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., e.t.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and OSHA
docket number for the Information Collection Request (ICR) (OSHA-2011-
0056). All comments, including any personal information you provide,
are placed in the public docket without change, and may be made
available online at http://www.regulations.gov. For further information
on submitting comments see the ``Public Participation'' heading in the
section of this notice titled ``SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.''
    Docket: To read or download comments or other material in the
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at
the address above. All documents in the docket (including this Federal
Register notice) are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index;
however, some information (e.g., copyrighted material) is not publicly
available to read or download through the Web site. All submissions,
including copyrighted material, are available for inspection and
copying at the OSHA Docket Office.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patrick Showalter, Acting Director,
Office of Partnerships and Recognition, Directorate of Cooperative and
State Programs, OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-3700, 200
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-
2213.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The Department of Labor, as part of its continuing effort to reduce
paperwork and respondent (i.e., employer) burden, conducts a
preclearance consultation program to provide the public with an
opportunity to comment on proposed and continuing information
collection requirements in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA 95) [44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)]. This program ensures that
information is in the desired format, reporting burden (time and costs)
is minimal, collection instruments are clearly understood, and

OSHA's estimate of the information collection burden is accurate. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the OSH Act) (29 U.S.C. 651
et seq.) authorizes information collection by employers as necessary or
appropriate for enforcement of the OSH Act or for developing
information regarding the causes and prevention of occupational
injuries, illnesses, and accidents (29 U.S.C. 657). The OSH Act also
requires that OSHA obtain such information with minimum burden upon
employers, especially those operating small businesses, and to reduce
to the maximum extent feasible unnecessary duplication of efforts in
obtaining information (29 U.S.C. 657).
    The Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP) [47 FR 29025], adopted by
OSHA, established the efficacy of cooperative action among government,
industry, and labor to address employee safety and health issues and to
expand employee protection. To qualify, employers must meet OSHA's
safety and health management criteria which focus on comprehensive
management programs and active employee involvement to prevent or
control worksite safety and health hazards. Employers who qualify
generally view OSHA standards as a minimum level of safety and health
performance, and set their own more stringent standards, wherever
necessary, to improve employee protection. Prospective VPP worksites
must submit an application that includes:
    General applicant information (e.g., site, corporate, and
collective bargaining contact information).
    Injury and illness rate performance information (i.e., number of
employees and/or applicable contractors on-site, type of work performed
and products produced, North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) codes, and Recordable Injury and Illness Case Incidence Rate
information).
    Safety and health management program information (i.e., description
of the applicant's safety and health management programs including how
the programs successfully address management leadership and employee
involvement, worksite analysis, hazard prevention and control, and
safety and health training).
    OSHA uses this information to determine whether an applicant is
ready for a VPP on-site evaluation and as a verification tool during
VPP on-site evaluations. Without this information, OSHA would be unable
to determine which sites are ready for VPP status.
    Each current VPP applicant is also required to submit an annual
evaluation which addresses how that applicant is continuing its
adherence to programmatic requirements.
    In 2008, OSHA modified procedures for VPP applicants, OSHA on-site
evaluations, and annual participant self-evaluations for applicants/
participants subject to OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM)
Standard. Applicants that perform work that use or produce highly
hazardous chemicals exceeding specified limits covered under the PSM
standard must submit responses to the PSM application supplement along
with their VPP application.
    Once in the VPP, the participant is required to submit an annual
evaluation detailing its continued adherence to programmatic
requirements. Applicants covered under the PSM standard are required to
submit a PSM questionnaire, a supplemental document, as part of their
annual submission. OSHA needs this information to ensure that the
participant remains qualified to participate in the VPP between on-site
evaluations. Without this information, OSHA would be unable to
determine whether applicants are maintaining excellent safety and
health management programs during this interim period.
    In 2009, with the publication of the Federal Register Notice (FRN)
(74 FR 927, January 9, 2009), VPP revised its traditional focus on
individual fixed worksites (site-based) by adding two new ways to
participate: Mobile workforce and corporate. A significant
reorganization of the program helped clarify the multiple participation
options now available.
    Employees of VPP participants may apply to participate in the
Special Government Employee (SGE) Program. The SGE Program offers
private and public sector safety and health professionals and other
qualified participants the opportunity to exchange ideas, gain new
perspectives, and grow professionally while serving as full-fledged
team members on OSHA's VPP on-site evaluations. In that capacity, SGEs
may review company documents, assist with worksite walkthroughs,
interview employees, and assist in preparing VPP on-site evaluation
reports. Potential SGEs must submit an application that includes:
     SGE Eligibility Information Sheet (i.e., applicant's name,
professional; credentials, site/corporate contact information, etc.);
     Current Resume;
     Confidential Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 450).
    OSHA uses the SGE Eligibility Information Sheet to ensure that the
potential SGE works at a VPP site and meets the minimum eligibility
qualifications. The resume is required to provide a detailed
description of their current duties and responsibilities as they relate
to safety and health and the implementation of an effective safety and
health management program. The OGE Form 450 is used to ensure that SGEs
do not participate on on-site evaluations at VPP sites in-which they
have a financial interest.
    OSHA Challenge is designed to reach and guide employers and
companies in all major industry groups who are strongly committed to
improving their safety and health management programs and possibly
pursuing recognition in the VPP. The Challenge Administrator's
application is used to: (1) Conduct a preliminary analysis of the
applicant's knowledge of safety and health management programs; and (2)
make a determination regarding the applicant's qualifications to become
a Challenge Administrator. Once a Challenge Administrator is approved,
the program's Administrator will review each Challenge candidate's
application/annual submissions to ensure that all necessary information
is provided, prior to forwarding them to OSHA's National Office for
analysis and acceptance.

II. Special Issues for Comment

    OSHA has a particular interest in comments on the following issues:
     Whether the information collection requirements are
necessary for the proper performance of the Agency's functions,
including whether the information is useful;
     The accuracy of the Agency's estimate of the burden (time
and costs) of the information collection requirements, including the
validity of the methodology and assumptions used;
     The quality, utility, and clarity of the information
collected; and
     Ways to minimize the burden on employers who must comply;
for example, by using automated or other technological information
collection and transmission techniques.

III. Proposed Actions

    OSHA proposes to extend OMB's approval of the collection of
information (paperwork) requirements necessitated by the Voluntary
Protection Programs. The Agency is requesting an adjustment in the
burden hours from 105,965 to 115,359; a total increase of 9,394 hours.
The Agency will summarize the comments submitted in response to this
notice, and will include this summary in its request to OMB to extend
the approval of these information collection requirements.
    Type of Review: Extension of a currently approved collection.

    Title: Voluntary Protection Programs Information.
    OMB Number: 1218-0239.
    Affected Public: Business or other for-profits; individuals or
households; Federal government; state, local or tribal government.
    Number of Respondents:

VPP

300 Applications
75 Process Safety Management Applications
1,700 Annual Evaluations
425 (PSM) Annual Evaluations/Supplemental Questionnaire

Challenge

14 Challenge Administrator's Applications
210 Challenge Participant's Applications
210 Challenge Quarterly Reports
210 Challenge Annual Evaluations

 Special Government Employees

900 SGE Eligibility Information Sheets
900 Resumes
300 Confidential Financial Disclosure Forms (OGE- Form 450)
    Total Respondents: 5,244.
    Frequency: VPP applications and Challenge Administrator's and
Participant's applications are submitted once;
    VPP and Challenge Annual Evaluations are submitted annually, and
SGE applications are submitted once every three years.
    Average Time Per Response:

VPP General

200 hours for VPP Applications
20 hours for VPP Annual Evaluations

Process Safety Management

40 hours for Applications
20 hours for Annual Evaluations

Challenge

5 hours for Challenge Administrator's Applications
10 hours for Challenge Candidate Applications
5 hours for Challenge Quarterly Reports
20 hours for Challenge Annual Evaluations

Special Government Employees (SGE)

8 minutes (.13 hour) for SGE Eligibility Information Sheet
30 minutes (.50 hour) for SGE Resume
30 minutes (.50 hour) for Confidential Financial Disclosure Form
    Estimated Total Burden Hours: 115,359.
    Estimated Cost (Operation and Maintenance): $0.

IV. Public Participation--Submission of Comments on This Notice and
Internet Access to Comments and Submissions

    You may submit comments in response to this document as follows:
(1) Electronically at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal
eRulemaking Portal; (2) by facsimile (fax); or (3) by hard copy. All
comments, attachments, and other material must identify the Agency name
and the OSHA docket number for the ICR (Docket No. OSHA-2011-0056). You
may supplement electronic submissions by uploading document files
electronically. If you wish to mail additional materials in reference
to an electronic or facsimile submission, you must submit them to the
OSHA Docket Office (see the section of this notice titled ADDRESSES).
The additional materials must clearly identify your electronic comments
by your name, date, and the docket number so the Agency can attach them
to your comments.
    Because of security procedures, the use of regular mail may cause a
significant delay in the receipt of comments. For information about
security procedures concerning the delivery of materials by hand,
express delivery, messenger, or courier service, please contact the
OSHA Docket Office at<PHONE_NUMBER>, (TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>).
    Comments and submissions are posted without change at http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA cautions commenters about
submitting personal information such as social security numbers and
date of birth. Although all submissions are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index, some information (e.g., copyrighted
material) is not publicly available to read or download through this
Web site. All submissions, including copyrighted material, are
available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.
Information on using the http://www.regulations.gov Web site to submit
comments and access the docket is available at the Web site's ``User
Tips'' link. Contact the OSHA Docket Office for information about
materials not available through the Web site, and for assistance in
using the Internet to locate docket submissions.

V. Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, PhD, MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, directed the preparation of this
notice. The authority for this notice is the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506 et seq.) and Secretary of Labor's Order No. 4-2010
(75 FR 55355).

    Signed at Washington, DC, on March 17, 2011.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2011-6654 Filed 3-21-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P


[Federal Register: June 6, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 108)]
[Notices]
[Page 31311]
[DOCID:fr06jn07-74]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ES07-31-000]

Trans Bay Cable LLD; Notice of Filing

May 29, 2007.
    Take notice that on May 25, 2007, Trans Bay Cable LLC tendered for
filing amendments to the Application Under Section 204 of the Federal
Power Act for Authority to Issue Securities.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date.
Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of
that document on the Applicant and all the parties in this proceeding.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov.
 Persons unable to file electronically should submit an

original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the

``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription''
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For

TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on June 4, 2007.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E7-10817 Filed 6-5-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 128 (Wednesday, July 3, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 39968-39971]
[FR Doc No: 2013-16011]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 91, 121 and 125

[Docket No.: FAA-2013-0579; Amendment Nos. 91-329, 121-364 and 125-62]
RIN 2120-AK27

Flight Data Recorder Airplane Parameter Specification Omissions
and Corrections

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This action amends the operating regulations for flight data
recorders by correcting errors in recording rates in three different
appendices. These errors create requirements that could not be met by
certain airplanes without extensive modification, which was not
intended when the requirements were adopted. The corrected recording
rates are as intended when the applicable flight data recorder
parameter requirements were adopted, but which have been omitted from
the current publication of the regulatory text.

DATES: Effective September 3, 2013.
    Submit comments on or before August 2, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2013-0579
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without
change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11,
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action contact Chris Parfitt, Flight Standards Service, Aircraft
Maintenance Division--Avionics Maintenance Branch, AFS-360, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC
20591; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    For legal questions concerning this rule contact Karen Petronis,
International Law, Legislation and Regulations Division (AGC-200),
Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-
3073, email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

    Section 553(b)(3)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5
U.S.C.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment
procedures for rules when the agency for good cause finds that those
procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.'' Under this section, an agency, upon finding good cause, may
issue a final rule without seeking comment prior to the rulemaking.
    This rule corrects errors in the recording rates for two flight
data recorder parameters. The errors appear in three appendices to the
flight recorder requirements. The correct standards were adopted during
full notice and comment rulemakings. The nature of the errors is
explained in the preamble below. None of the errors changes a standard,
nor will there be any effect on regulated entities other than to
prevent future misunderstandings that would have been resolved when
interested persons contact the FAA.
    Accordingly, the FAA finds that further notice and comment are
unnecessary.

Comments Invited

    For the reasons noted above, the FAA is adopting this final rule
without prior notice and public comment. The Regulatory Policies and
Procedures of the Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 1134;
February 26, 1979), provide that, to the maximum extent possible,
operating administrations for the DOT should provide an opportunity for
public comment on regulations issued without prior notice.
    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency
also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy,
or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the changes. The
most helpful comments reference a specific portion of this rule,
explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting
data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, please
send only one copy of written comments, or, if you are filing comments
electronically, please submit your comments only one time.
    The FAA will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as
a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this rulemaking. Once the comment period closes, the FAA
will review and dispose of the comments filed in the rulemaking docket.
Because this is a final rule, the FAA will publish a disposition of
comments in the Federal Register. Based on the comments received, the
FAA will state whether it has decided that (i) no action is necessary
other than publishing the disposition of comments in the Federal
Register, or (ii) the FAA should prepare a revised final rule.

Proprietary or Confidential Business Information

    Do not file in the docket information that you consider to be
proprietary or confidential business information. Send or deliver this
information directly to the person identified in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. Mark the information that
is considered proprietary or confidential. If the information is on a
disk or CD ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD ROM and also
identify electronically within the disk or CD ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or confidential.
    Under Sec.  11.35(b), when the FAA is aware of proprietary
information filed with a comment, the agency does not place it in the
docket. The FAA holds it in a separate file to which the public

does not have access, and the agency places a note in the docket that
it has received it. If the FAA receives a request to examine or copy
this information, the FAA treats it as any other request under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. The FAA processes such a
request under the DOT procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701. Under that section,
the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations providing minimum
standards for other practices, methods and procedures necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority since flight data recorders are the only means available to
account for airplane movement and flight crew actions critical to
finding the probable cause of incidents or accidents, including data
that could prevent future incidents or accidents.

I. Discussion of Final Rule

    This final rule amends three appendices in 14 CFR related to flight
data recorder (FDR) requirements.
    First, Appendix E to part 91 is amended to correct what appears to
be a typographical error introduced when the rule was published.
Currently, for the altitude parameter, the sampling rate per second is
listed as 11. The correct rate has always been 1 sample per second. A
review of the original typewritten document that was submitted for
publication suggests that a stray mark caused the number to be
translated as 11. The sample rate of 1 per second was in the proposed
rule (53 FR 4314; February 12, 1988) and the final rule (54 FR 34284;
August 18, 1989). Since a sample rate of 11 is unknown in the industry
and compliance would require a major airplane equipment modification,
affected operators have understood that this was a typographical error,
and complied with the 1 sample per second rate. Despite the age of the
error, this correction does not comprise the adoption of a different
standard that will affect airplanes operating under these regulations
since any initial misunderstandings have been clarified when the agency
was contacted.
    The second and third corrections concern identical standards in
Appendix M to part 121 and Appendix E to part 125. In each Appendix,
footnote 5 was added following a petition for rulemaking from Airbus
Industries and subsequent rulemaking to adopt the changes (64 FR 46117;
August 24, 1999), as evidenced by the discussion in the preamble to
that rule. However, the current regulation lists only the adjustment
for the resolution, and not the sampling interval. This action puts the
sampling interval of once per second back in to the footnote for the
affected airplanes. Since the airplane can be operated under parts 121
or 125 using the identical standard, the appendices for each are being
corrected.
    None of these changes will require action by airplane owners,
operators or manufacturers as the affected airplanes already comply
with the requirements of the originally adopted rules and the
corrections adopted here. Since these requirements were intended in the
original rules, there is no new impact on safety. The correction of
these errors and omissions will prevent future confusion and require
less contact between the FAA and regulated entities who must comply
with the regulations.

II. Summary of the Costs and Benefits of the Final Rule

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub.
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act
(Public Law 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies
to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they
be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written
assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or
final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this final
rule.
    Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies
and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations.
If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits that a statement
to that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a
full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for this final rule. The reasoning
for this determination follows:

    This rule has minimal cost because none of the changes outlined
above will require action by airplane owners, operators or
manufacturers as the affected airplanes already comply with the
requirements of the originally adopted rules and the corrections
adopted here. Furthermore, since these requirements were intended in
the original rules, there is no new impact on safety.

    The FAA has, therefore, determined that this final rule is not a
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866, and is not ``significant'' as defined in DOT's
Regulatory Policies and Procedures.

III. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation.'' To achieve this principle, agencies are
required to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to
explain the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals
are given serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the agency may so
certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. The
certification must

include a statement providing the factual basis for this determination,
and the reasoning should be clear.
    This rule will have minimal cost because none of the changes
outlined above will require action by airplane owners, operators or
manufacturers as the affected airplanes already comply with the
requirements of the originally adopted rules and the corrections
adopted here. Furthermore, since these requirements were intended in
the original rules, there is no new impact on safety.
    Therefore, as the FAA Administrator, I certify that this rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.

B. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-39), as amended by
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this final rule and determined that
none of the rule changes will require action by airplane owners,
operators or manufacturers as the affected airplanes already comply
with the requirements of the originally adopted rules and the
corrections adopted here. Therefore this final rule will have no effect
on international trade.

C. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $143.1 million in lieu of $100
million. This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore,
the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there is no new requirement for information collection associated with
this final rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    (1) In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and
has identified no differences with these regulations.
    (2) Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.

G. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in Chapter 3, paragraph 312f and involves no
extraordinary circumstances.

IV. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency determined
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the
States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and, therefore, does not have Federalism
implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
is not a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order and it
is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.

V. How To Obtain Additional Information

A. Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of a rulemaking document my be obtained by using
the Internet--
    1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visit the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ or
    3. Access the Government Printing Office's Web page at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling<PHONE_NUMBER>.

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document,
may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble.
To find out more about SBREFA on the Internet, visit http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 91

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Transportation.

14 CFR Part 125

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1155, 40103, 40113, 40120, 44101,
44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717,
44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 47528-
47531, articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180).

0
2. In Appendix E to part 91, revise the entry for Altitude under the
column heading ``Parameters'' to read as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Installed system
                                                           \1\ minimum          Sampling     Resolution \4\ read
           Parameters                    Range             accuracy (to      interval (per           out
                                                         recovered data)        second)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                  * * * * * * *
Altitude........................  -1,000 ft. to max    100 to                1   25 to 150 ft.
                                   cert. alt. of A/C.   700
                                                        ft. (see Table 1,
                                                        TSO C51-a).

                                                  * * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS

0
3. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46105.

0
4. In Appendix M to part 121, revise footnote 5 to parameter 14a, Yaw
control position(s) (fly-by-wire), to read as follows:

Appendix M to Part 121

* * * * *
    \5\ For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 1.18%
(0.703[deg] > 0.120[deg]).
    For A330/A340 series airplanes, seconds per sampling interval =
1.
* * * * *

PART 125--CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A SEATING
CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM PAYLOAD COPACITY OF
6,000 POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH
AIRCRAFT

0
5. The authority citation for part 125 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44705, 44710-
44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722.

0
6. In Appendix E to part 125, revise footnote 5 to parameter 14a, Yaw
control position(s) (fly-by-wire), to read as follows:

Appendix E to Part 125

* * * * *
    \5\ For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 1.18%
(0.703[deg] > 0.120[deg]).
    For A330/A340 series airplanes, seconds per sampling interval =
1.
* * * * *

    Issued under authority of 49 U.S.C. 106(f) and 44701(a) in
Washington, DC, on June 21, 2013.
Michael P. Huerta,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2013-16011 Filed 7-2-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 152 (Thursday, August 6, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 47698-47712]
[FR Doc No: 2020-17221]

========================================================================
Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================

Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 152 / Thursday, August 6, 2020 /
Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2020-0686; Product Identifier 2019-NM-035-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2018-23-51, which applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-8 and
737-9 (737 MAX) airplanes. Since AD 2018-23-51 was issued, the agency
has determined that final corrective action is necessary to address the
unsafe condition. This proposed AD would require installing new flight
control computer (FCC) software, revising the existing Airplane Flight
Manual (AFM) to incorporate new and revised flightcrew procedures,
installing new MAX display system (MDS) software, changing the
horizontal stabilizer trim wire routing installations, completing an
angle of attack sensor system test, and performing an operational
readiness flight. This proposed AD would also apply to a narrower set
of airplanes than the superseded AD, and allow operation (dispatch) of
an airplane with certain inoperative systems only if certain provisions
are incorporated in the operator's existing FAA-approved minimum
equipment list (MEL). The FAA is proposing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by September
21, 2020.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For Boeing service information identified in this NPRM, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-5600;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may
view this referenced service information at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>. It is also available in the Docket for this
rulemaking, which may be found on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-
0686.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-
0686; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains
this NPRM, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for Docket Operations is listed above. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ian Won, Manager, Seattle ACO Branch,
FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206-
231-3500; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting
written comments, data, or views about this proposal. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To
ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters
should submit only one copy of the comments. Send your comments to an
address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-
2020-0686; Product Identifier 2019-NM-035-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, as well
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments received by the closing
date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed after the
comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without incurring
expense or delay. The FAA may change this NPRM because of those
comments.

Confidential Business Information (CBI)

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial or
financial information that is customarily treated as private, that you
actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to this
NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted comments
as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing CBI as
``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as confidential
under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of
this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to the person
identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Any
commentary that the FAA receives which is not specifically designated
as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

    On October 29, 2018, a Boeing Model 737-8 airplane operated by Lion
Air (Lion Air Flight 610) was involved in an accident after takeoff
from Soekarno-

Hatta International Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia, resulting in 189
fatalities. Investigation of the accident has been completed by the
Indonesian authorities (Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi
(KNKT)) with assistance from the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) and the FAA of the United States, the manufacturer, and the
operator. Reports \1\ from the accident investigation indicate that the
airplane's flight control system \2\ generated repeated airplane nose-
down horizontal stabilizer trim \3\ commands contributing to the
accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Preliminary KNKT.<IP_ADDRESS> Aircraft Accident Investigation
Report, dated November 2018, and Final KNKT.<IP_ADDRESS> Aircraft
Accident Investigation Report, dated October 2019, can be found in
the AD docket.
    \2\ The flight control system for 737 MAX airplanes includes two
flight control computers, FCC A and FCC B, which process inputs from
the pilots and aircraft sensors to move the airplane's control
surfaces.
    \3\ An airplane's nose-up or nose-down attitude is known as its
``pitch attitude.'' On the 737 MAX, the airplane's pitch attitude is
primarily controlled by a combination of two movable surfaces on the
tail of the airplane: The horizontal stabilizer, which is controlled
by electric and manual (pilot) trim inputs, and the elevator, which
is controlled by moving the control columns. ``Pitch trim'' commands
move the horizontal stabilizer. Pilots use pitch trim to adjust the
position of the horizontal stabilizer to achieve the desired flight
path and to manage the forces necessary to keep the airplane in
stable flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Following the Lion Air Flight 610 accident on October 29, 2018,
data from the flight data recorder, which is contained in the
Indonesian accident report (http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf),
indicated that a single erroneously high angle of attack (AOA) sensor
\4\ input to the flight control system while the flaps are retracted
can cause repeated airplane nose-down trim of the horizontal stabilizer
and multiple flightdeck effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ The angle of attack (or AOA) is the angle at which the
airplane wing meets the oncoming air. On the current 737 MAX, AOA is
measured by two independent AOA sensors, which are small vanes
mounted on either side of the forward exterior of the fuselage. For
the purposes of this NPRM, ``high'' AOA is a relatively large angle
(associated with flight conditions outside of the normal flight
envelope), and ``low'' AOA is a relatively small angle (associated
with flight conditions within the normal flight envelope). Although
wing lift increases with increased AOA, an excessively high airplane
nose-up AOA can be hazardous, since eventually lift can be lost,
causing the airplane to stall. A stall occurs when the airflow
around the wing is sufficiently disrupted to cause the wing to no
longer generate lift. To warn of an impending stall, the 737 MAX is
equipped with a ``stick shaker,'' which vibrates the control column,
providing tactile annunciation to the pilot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These effects include stall warning activation, airspeed disagree
alert, and altitude disagree alert,\5\ and may affect the flightcrew's
ability to accomplish continued safe flight and landing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Stall warning indication is the activation of the stick
shaker and other warnings. An airspeed disagree alert, or ``IAS
(indicated airspeed) DISAGREE'' on the 737 MAX, is a visual alert on
the airplane's primary flight displays (PFDs) that the airspeed
displayed on the captain's and first officer's PFDs, as sensed by
the pitot tubes on either side of the airplane, disagree by more
than 5 knots for more than 5 seconds. An altitude disagree alert, or
``ALT (altitude) DISAGREE'' on the 737 MAX, is a visual alert on the
PFDs that the altitude, as sensed by the static ports on either side
of the airplane, disagree by more than 200 feet for more than 5
seconds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 7, 2018, the FAA issued Emergency AD 2018-23-51 as an
interim corrective action.\6\ The FAA sent Emergency AD 2018-23-51 to
all known U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 737 MAX airplanes
to require revising certificate limitations and operating procedures of
the AFM to provide the flightcrew with runaway horizontal stabilizer
trim procedures to follow under certain conditions. The FAA sent
Emergency AD 2018-23-51 to all affected civil aviation authorities
(CAAs) at the same time. AD 2018-23-51, Amendment 39-19512 (83 FR
62697, December 6, 2018; corrected December 11, 2018 (83 FR 63561)),
was published in the Federal Register as an amendment to 14 CFR 39.13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Flight data recorder (FDR) data from the Lion Air Flight 610
accident airplane indicated that on the flight just prior to the
accident flight (Lion Air Flight 043), the airplane experienced the
same single erroneously high AOA sensor failure condition upon
takeoff that the Lion Air Flight 610 crew encountered. The
flightcrew on Lion Air Flight 043 was able to maintain continued
safe flight and land at their planned destination airport in
Jakarta. The flightcrew on Lion Air Flight 043 had no prior
awareness of this type of failure or how to respond to it. The FAA's
review of these flights and associated risk assessments provided the
basis for the revised pilot procedures contained in the interim
action of the FAA's emergency AD; specifically, the rationale was
that if pilots were provided awareness of the airplane and
flightdeck effects of this specific failure scenario and were
provided appropriate instructions via the emergency AD, this would
enable appropriate pilot response to the erroneously high AOA
failure scenario for the period of time needed to fully eliminate
this unsafe condition with a software revision to the flight control
computers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 10, 2019, a Boeing Model 737-8 airplane operated by
Ethiopian Airlines (Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302) was involved in an
accident after takeoff from Addis Ababa Bole International Airport in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, resulting in 157 fatalities. The accident is
under investigation by the Ethiopian Accident Investigation Bureau
(EAIB) with assistance from the NTSB and the FAA of the United States,
the French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety
(BEA), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the
manufacturer, the operator, and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority
(ECAA).
    The data from the flight data recorders, as summarized in reports
\7\ of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 accident and the Lion Air
Flight 610 accident, indicated that if a single erroneously high AOA
sensor input is received by the flight control system, the maneuvering
characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) \8\ can command repeated
airplane nose-down trim of the horizontal stabilizer. This unsafe
condition, if not addressed, could cause the flightcrew to have
difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive airplane
nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and impact with terrain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Ethiopian Aircraft Accident Investigation Preliminary Report
AI-01/19, dated March 2019, and the Ethiopian Interim Investigation
Report of accident MAX-8 ET-AVJ, ET-302, dated March 2020, can be
found in the AD docket.
    \8\ MCAS is a function of the Speed Trim System (STS), which is
part of the airplane's flight control system. The STS provides
automatic trim inputs to the horizontal stabilizer during manual
flight. The STS uses data from a variety of sources, such as pitot
tubes and the AOA sensors, to calculate when to make commands. MCAS
is activated only during manual flight, with flaps up, and when the
AOA sensors detect that the airplane is flying with a high AOA, such
as when climbing aggressively or performing excessively tight turns
with high bank angles. MCAS makes pitch trim commands to the
horizontal stabilizer during a high AOA event so that the 737 MAX
handling qualities are compliant with FAA regulations (including 14
CFR 25.173).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address the unsafe condition, the FAA proposes to require four
design changes: (1) Installing updated flight control software (with
new control laws) for the FCC operational program software (OPS), (2)
installing updated MDS display processing computer (DPC) software to
generate an AOA disagree alert,\9\ (3) revising certain AFM flightcrew
operating procedures, and (4) changing the routing of horizontal
stabilizer trim wires. The first design change is intended to prevent
erroneous MCAS activation. The second design change alerts the pilots
that the airplane's two AOA sensors are disagreeing by a certain amount
indicating a potential AOA sensor failure. The third design change is
intended to ensure that the flightcrew has the means to recognize and
respond to erroneous stabilizer movement and the effects of a potential
AOA sensor failure. The fourth design change is intended to restore
compliance with the FAA's latest wire separation safety standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ An AOA disagree alert, or ``AOA DISAGREE'' on the 737 MAX,
is a visual alert on the airplane's PFDs that alerts the flightcrew
of a disagreement between the angles of attack measured by each of
the airplane's two AOA sensors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these four design changes, the FAA also proposes to

require operators to conduct an AOA sensor system test and perform an
operational readiness flight prior to returning each airplane to
service. Finally, operators with an existing FAA-approved MEL would be
required to incorporate more restrictive provisions to dispatch the
airplane with certain inoperative equipment. The new master minimum
equipment list (MMEL), approved by the FAA, was published on April 10,
2020, after undergoing a public notice and comment process.

Proposed Design Changes

    The FAA proposes mandating the following changes to the 737 MAX
type design, to address the various aspects of the unsafe condition.
    To ensure that an erroneous signal from a failed single AOA sensor
does not prevent continued safe flight and landing, and specifically
that it does not generate erroneous MCAS activation, the FAA proposes
to require installation of updated FCC software with revised flight
control laws \10\ associated with MCAS. These revised flight control
laws would use inputs from both AOA sensors to activate MCAS. This is
in contrast to the original MCAS design, which relied on data from only
one sensor at a time, and allowed repeated MCAS activation as a result
of input from a single AOA sensor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ A flight control law generates commands to move flight
control surfaces based on inputs from the flightcrew and sensors on
the airplane. Flight control laws reside in software, and are
developed to generate commands from the flight control computers
that will achieve desired airplane performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The updated FCC software would also compare the inputs from the two
sensors to detect a failed AOA sensor. If the difference between the
AOA sensor inputs is above a calculated threshold,\11\ the FCC would
disable the speed trim system (STS), including its MCAS function, for
the remainder of that flight, and provide a corresponding indication of
such deactivation on the flight deck.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The calculated threshold would be a function of the
magnitude of the disagreement and the rate of change of the AOA
sensor position values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To ensure that MCAS will not command repeated movements of the
horizontal stabilizer, the revised flight control laws would permit
only one activation of MCAS per sensed high AOA event. A subsequent
activation of MCAS would be possible only after the airplane returns to
a low AOA state, below the threshold that would cause MCAS activation.
    The updated FCC software would also limit \12\ the magnitude of any
MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer, such that the final
horizontal stabilizer position (after the MCAS command) would preserve
the flightcrew's ability to control the airplane pitch by using only
the control column. The original design allowed MCAS commands to be
made without consideration of the horizontal stabilizer position--
before or after the MCAS command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The magnitude of the command varies according to parameters
such as the airplane's altitude and airspeed, and would be limited
such that after the command is made, the pilot would be able to
maintain level flight, climb, and descend, using control column
inputs only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An undesired MCAS activation could prompt the flightcrew to perform
a non-normal procedure. To ensure that after any foreseeable failure of
the stabilizer system, safe flight is not dependent on the timeliness
of the flightcrew performing a non-normal procedure, the FAA proposes
multiple changes.
    First, as previously discussed, the flight control laws would be
changed to instead use inputs from two AOA sensors for MCAS activation,
so that there would not be an undesired MCAS activation due to a single
AOA sensor failure that could lead a flightcrew to perform a non-normal
procedure.
    Second, in the event that MCAS is activated as intended (i.e.,
during a high AOA event), the updated flight control laws software
would limit the number of MCAS activations to one per high AOA event,
and limit the magnitude of any single activation so that the flightcrew
could maintain pitch control without needing to perform a non-normal
procedure.
    The FAA also proposes requiring an additional software update that
would alert the flightcrew to a disagreement between the two AOA
sensors. This disagreement indicates certain AOA sensor failures or a
significant calibration issue. The updated MDS software would implement
an AOA DISAGREE alert on all 737 MAX airplanes. Some 737 MAX airplanes
were delivered without this alert feature, by error. While the lack of
an AOA DISAGREE alert is not an unsafe condition itself, the FAA is
proposing to mandate this software update to restore compliance with 14
CFR 25.1301 and because the flightcrew procedures mandated by this AD
now rely on this alert to guide flightcrew action. As a result of the
changes proposed in this AD, differences between the two AOA sensors
greater than a certain threshold \13\ would cause an AOA DISAGREE alert
on the primary flight displays (PFDs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ More than 10 degrees difference for more than 10 seconds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Also, as a result of the installation of this revised MDS software,
operators would be required to remove ``INOP'' markers, if present,
from the electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) panel of the
airplane, because the markers would no longer be necessary, due to
other changes in the updated MDS software that are unrelated to this
unsafe condition. These markers, labeled ``INOP,'' indicate that one of
the positions on the dial that selects display settings is inoperative.
    To facilitate the flightcrew's ability to recognize and respond to
undesired horizontal stabilizer movement and the effects of a potential
AOA sensor failure, the FAA proposes to mandate revising and adding
certain operating procedures (checklists) of the AFM \14\ used by the
flightcrew for the 737 MAX. All transport category airplanes have non-
normal checklists to aid the pilots in responding to airplane failures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ The AFM is an FAA-approved document that manufacturers are
required to furnish to owners upon delivery of the airplane, and
that provides necessary safety information. See 14 CFR 25.1581. This
information includes procedures (emergency and non-normal) for
foreseeable but unusual situations that necessitate flightcrew
action. See 14 CFR 25.1585. These procedures provide the flightcrew
with instructions, including checklists, on how to respond to these
conditions. Some of these conditions require immediate action by the
flightcrew, so some checklists identify certain tasks that the
flightcrew is expected to accomplish from memory; these items are
commonly known as memory steps or ``recall'' items. Other conditions
have checklists that do not need to be memorized; these items are
commonly known as ``reference'' items.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following is a general description of the changes that would be
made to these checklists,\15\ and the purpose of each change. The FAA
will conduct an operational evaluation before finalizing these
checklists. (See Flightcrew Training section in this preamble for
further information.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ All of the checklists that the FAA proposes to revise or
add to the AFM are already part of Boeing's Quick Reference
Handbook, or QRH, for the 737 MAX (except for the IAS Disagree
checklist, which is new to both the AFM and the QRH). The QRH is a
nonregulatory tool used by flightcrews that includes information for
non-normal and emergency conditions, including AFM procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To reduce the workload on the flightcrew when they suspect that the
airspeed indications are unreliable, the FAA proposes to revise the
Airspeed Unreliable checklist of the AFM. This checklist would be
revised to (1) add a step to allow the flightcrew to determine a
reliable airspeed indication without the use of reference tables, (2)
improve the procedure for go-arounds to allow for increased use of
automation, (3) add a step to ensure that erroneous altitude
information is not transmitted via the transponder to air traffic
control (ATC), and (4) add erroneous AOA as a

potential cause for unreliable airspeed conditions.
    The Runaway Stabilizer checklist of the AFM is used when there is
undesired movement of the airplane's horizontal stabilizer. The FAA
proposes revisions to the criteria for this checklist's use, to include
when uncommanded horizontal stabilizer movement occurs continuously or
in a manner not appropriate for current flight conditions. The revised
checklist would include an explicit recall item that instructs the
flightcrew to use their thumb-actuated trim switch to reduce forces on
the control column. The checklist would also include a recall item to
use the control column and thrust levers to control the airplane's
pitch attitude and airspeed. Finally, the checklist would be revised to
add a reference item to manually trim the horizontal stabilizer for
pitch control, and note that a two-pilot effort may be used to correct
an out-of-trim condition.
    The Stabilizer Trim Inoperative checklist of the AFM would be
revised to better align with the other non-normal checklists, and
modified to provide guidance for manually trimming the stabilizer for
pitch control, noting that a two-pilot effort may be used and will not
cause system damage.
    As previously discussed, one of the design changes proposed by this
NPRM is a flight control law that would render the STS and MCAS
functions inoperative if the airplane's AOA sensors disagree. To assist
the flightcrew in properly responding to such an occurrence, a non-
normal checklist, called the Speed Trim Fail checklist, would be added
to the AFM. This checklist would be used when the STS and MCAS
functions are inoperative, and inform the flightcrew to continue normal
operation. It would also note that the STS will not provide horizontal
stabilizer trim inputs when the airplane deviates from its trimmed
airspeed.
    The FAA proposes adding the Stabilizer Out of Trim checklist to the
AFM. The Stabilizer Out of Trim checklist would be used when the
autopilot does not set the horizontal stabilizer trim correctly. Under
the current design, the STAB OUT OF TRIM light illuminates in flight to
inform the flightcrew that the airplane's autopilot is not setting the
horizontal stabilizer trim correctly. Under the new design, as part of
the aforementioned FCC software update, this light will now also
illuminate on the ground, to inform the flightcrew of a partial failure
of a flight control computer. If the airplane is on the ground, the
checklist will instruct the flightcrew to not take off. The checklist
provides additional information for the flightcrew to use if the
airplane is in flight.
    The FAA proposes to add an AOA Disagree checklist as a procedure to
the AFM, because the FAA proposes that the AOA DISAGREE alert be
available on the PFDs for all 737 MAX airplanes. Therefore, this
proposed checklist would be used when there is an indication, such as
an AOA DISAGREE alert, that the airplane's left and right AOA vanes
disagree. The checklist would inform the flightcrew to accomplish the
Airspeed Unreliable checklist.
    The FAA proposes to add the ALT Disagree checklist as a procedure
to the AFM. This checklist is used when the captain's and first
officer's altitude indicators disagree, generating an ALT DISAGREE
alert on the airplane's PFDs. This proposed checklist would provide
procedures to the flightcrew that would initially be driven by whether
there is also an IAS DISAGREE alert shown on the airplane's PFDs. The
checklist would also provide additional steps for the flightcrew to
subsequently complete for the descent, approach, and landing phases of
flight.
    The final checklist that the FAA proposes to add to the AFM is a
new IAS Disagree checklist. This checklist is used when captain's and
first officer's airspeed indicators--their ``indicated airspeed'' or
``IAS''--disagree. The checklist directs the flightcrew to accomplish
the Airspeed Unreliable checklist.
    Since this NPRM proposes to supersede AD 2018-23-51, the procedural
information required by that AD would be outdated when the final rule
is effective and therefore would be removed.
    As part of the FAA's review of these design changes, the agency
reviewed the entirety of the 737 MAX horizontal stabilizer control
system. This review revealed that the physical separation of the
horizontal stabilizer trim arm wiring and the horizontal stabilizer
trim control wiring does not meet the criteria specified in 14 CFR
25.1707. This design standard was promulgated in 2007 and therefore is
part of the certification basis of the 737 MAX but not of previous
Boeing Model 737 airplanes. Certain wiring installations must have
enough physical separation so that a wiring failure cannot create a
hazard. Since design changes must comply with FAA regulations, the FAA
proposes to require changes to the wiring installation to meet the
required physical separation between the horizontal stabilizer trim arm
wiring and the horizontal stabilizer trim control wiring. The FAA
proposes this action to bring the airplanes into regulatory compliance.

Proposed Maintenance-Related Actions

    To ensure that each airplane's two AOA sensors are functioning
properly upon return to service, the FAA proposes to mandate that
operators perform an AOA sensor system test on each airplane prior to
its return to service. This test uses a fixture to position the AOA
vane and verify that the reading provided by each AOA sensor is
accurate.
    The FAA allows operators to utilize an MEL for time-limited
operation with certain equipment inoperative, after which the system
must be fully restored. (See 14 CFR 91.213, 121.628, 125.201, and
129.14.) This proposed AD would continue to allow use of an existing
FAA-approved MEL associated with the flight control system modified by
the actions of this AD, provided that the more restrictive provisions
of figure 10 to paragraph (i) of this proposed AD are adopted into the
operator's existing FAA-approved MEL.
    Given the unprecedented length of time that the FAA has limited the
operation of these airplanes, and the importance of the flight control
system to safety, the FAA proposes to mandate an operational readiness
flight after the design changes proposed by this AD have been done, but
prior to each airplane being introduced into service.

Emergency Order of Prohibition

    On March 13, 2019, the FAA issued an Emergency Order of
Prohibition, which prohibits the operation of Boeing Model 737-8 and
737-9 airplanes by U.S.-certificated operators or in U.S. territory.
    The FAA plans to amend the Emergency Order of Prohibition in
conjunction with adopting the final rule. The amended Emergency Order
of Prohibition will address the actions that the Administrator deems
appropriate to return the affected airplanes to service.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed the following service information.
     Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-31-1860,
dated June 12, 2020, describes procedures for installation of MDS
software, a software installation verification and corrective actions,
and removal of certain INOP markers on the EFIS control panels.
     Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-27-1318,
Revision 1, dated June 24, 2020, describes procedures for changing of
the horizontal stabilizer trim wire routing installations.

     Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-00-1028,
dated July 20, 2020, describes procedures for an AOA sensor system test
and an operational readiness flight.
    This service information is reasonably available because the
information is posted in the docket and because the interested parties
otherwise have access to it through their normal course of business or
by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

FAA's Determination

    The FAA is proposing this AD because the agency evaluated all the
relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described
previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same
type design.

Proposed AD Requirements

    This proposed AD would require the following actions:
     Installing new FCC OPS software and doing a software
installation verification.
     Revising the existing AFM to incorporate new and revised
information and procedures, and to remove the information from the
applicable sections that was required by AD 2018-23-51, because that
information would be no longer applicable based on the design changes
specified in this proposed AD.
     Requiring, for operators who wish to allow dispatch of an
airplane with certain inoperative systems, incorporating certain
provisions into the operator's existing FAA-approved MEL.
    This proposed AD would also require the following actions. For
information on those procedures, see this service information at
https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2020-0686.
     Changing the horizontal stabilizer trim wire routing
installation, by accomplishing the actions identified as ``RC''
(required for compliance) in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-27-1318, Revision 1, dated June
24, 2020.
     Installing revised MDS software, doing a software
installation verification, and removing INOP markers if applicable, by
accomplishing the applicable actions identified as ``RC'' in the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 737-31-1860, dated June 12, 2020.
     Performing an AOA sensor system test, by accomplishing the
applicable actions identified as ``RC'' in the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-00-1028,
dated July 20, 2020.
     Performing an operational readiness flight, by
accomplishing the applicable actions identified as ``RC'' in the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 737-00-1028, dated July 20, 2020.

Explanation of Change to the Applicability

    AD 2018-23-51 applies to all 737 MAX airplanes. This proposed AD
would apply only to the 737 MAX airplanes identified in Boeing Special
Attention Service Bulletin 737-31-1860, dated June 12, 2020, which
identifies line numbers for airplanes with an original airworthiness
certificate or original export certificate of airworthiness issued on
or before the effective date of the original Emergency Order of
Prohibition. Airplanes that have not received an original airworthiness
certificate or original export certificate of airworthiness on or
before the date of the original Emergency Order of Prohibition will
have been modified to incorporate the changes required by this AD prior
to receiving an original, or original export, airworthiness
certificate.

Flightcrew Training

    The FAA, through an operational evaluation, will assess the impact
of the proposed aircraft design changes on pilot training. The FAA
intends to conduct this evaluation jointly with three international
civil aviation authorities: Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de
Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) Brazil, Transport Canada Civil
Aviation (TCCA), and the EASA. The FAA will issue a draft Boeing 737
Flight Standardization Board Report documenting the results of the
operational evaluation on pilot training. The FAA will post the draft
Boeing 737 Flight Standardization Board Report at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/fsb/ for public comment. You may subscribe to this
page to receive notification when the FAA posts the draft report.
    Additionally, during the operational evaluation, the FAA will
evaluate the operating procedures (checklists) proposed in this AD. If
the FAA determines that the operational evaluation results necessitate
additional changes to the checklists proposed in this AD, the FAA will
post these changes as an addendum to the draft Boeing 737 Flight
Standardization Board Report for public comment. If an addendum is
posted, the FAA will announce the availability of it in the Federal
Register. The FAA will consider the report and the comments submitted
in finalizing the AD.

Explanation of Certain Provisions for Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)

    Because some operators may use a procedural method for translating
AFM requirements that is different from that published by Boeing, the
FAA will consider approving AMOCs, as appropriate, to address those
differences. For procedural aspects (including how specific AFM wording
is translated into operationally approved documents such as a Flight
Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) or related Quick Reference Handbook
(QRH)), the FAA encourages operators, in coordination with their
principal inspectors, to contact the appropriate Aircraft Evaluation
Group (AEG) office for additional guidance.
    In addition, Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-27-1318,
Revision 1, dated June 24, 2020, specifies reporting and coordinating
any deviations from the Accomplishment Instructions with Boeing. Boeing
will coordinate deviations from ``RC'' actions with the FAA.
Documenting approval of these deviations will facilitate the approval
of AMOCs, if needed.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this proposed AD affects 73 airplanes of
U.S. registry. The agency estimates the following costs to comply with
this proposed AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost on U.S.
             Action                   Labor cost          Parts cost       Cost per product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCC OPS installation and          1 work-hour x $85   $0................  $85...............  $6,205.
 verification.                     per hour = $85.
AFM revisions...................  1 work-hour x $85   $0................  $85...............  $6,205.
                                   per hour = $85.
MDS installation and              1 work-hour x $85   $0................  $85...............  $6,205.
 verification, INOP marker         per hour = $85.
 removal.

Stabilizer wiring change........  Up to 79 work-      Up to $3,790......  Up to $10,505.....  Up to $766,865.
                                   hours x $85 per
                                   hour = Up to
                                   $6,715.
AOA sensor system test..........  40 work-hours x     $0................  $3,400............  $248,200.
                                   $85 per hour =
                                   $3,400.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has received no definitive data that would enable the
agency to provide cost estimates for the operational readiness flight
specified in this proposed AD.
    Operators that have a MEL and choose to dispatch an airplane with
an inoperative flight control system affected by this AD would be
required to incorporate certain provisions into the operator's existing
FAA-approved MEL. The FAA has determined that revising the operator's
existing FAA-approved MEL takes an average of 90 work-hours per
operator, although the agency recognizes that this number may vary from
operator to operator. Since operators incorporate MEL changes for their
affected fleet(s), the FAA has determined that a per-operator estimate
is more accurate than a per-airplane estimate. Therefore, the FAA
estimates the average total cost per operator to be $7,650 (90 work-
hours x $85 per work-hour).
    According to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this
proposed AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost
impact on affected operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA has determined that this proposed AD would not have
federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD
would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by removing Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2018-23-51, Amendment 39-19512 (83 FR 62697, December 6, 2018;
corrected December 11, 2018 (83 FR 63561)), and adding the following
new AD:

The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA-2020-0686; Product Identifier
2019-NM-035-AD.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by September 21,
2020.

(b) Affected ADs

    This AD replaces AD 2018-23-51, Amendment 39-19512 (83 FR 62697,
December 6, 2018; corrected December 11, 2018 (83 FR 63561)) (``AD
2018-23-51'').

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-8 and 737-9
airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-31-1860, dated June 12, 2020.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 22, Auto flight;
27, Flight controls; and 31, Indicating/recording systems.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by the potential for a single erroneously
high angle of attack (AOA) sensor input received by the flight
control system to result in repeated airplane nose-down trim of the
horizontal stabilizer, which, in combination with multiple
flightdeck effects, could affect the flightcrew's ability to
accomplish continued safe flight and landing.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Installation/Verification of Flight Control Computer (FCC)
Operational Program Software (OPS)

    Before further flight, install FCC OPS software version P12.1.2,
part number (P/N) 2274-COL-AC2-26, or later-approved software
versions, on FCC A and FCC B, and do a software installation
verification. During the installation verification, if the approved
software part number is not shown as being installed on FCC A and
FCC B, before further flight, do corrective actions until the
approved software part number is installed on FCC A and FCC B.
Later-approved software versions are only those Boeing software
versions that are approved as a replacement for the applicable
software, and are approved as part of the type design by the FAA
after the effective date of this AD.

    Note 1 to paragraph (g): Guidance for doing the installation and
installation verification of the FCC OPS software can be found in
Boeing 737-7/8/8200/9/10 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Section
22-11-33.

(h) Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revisions

    Before further flight, revise the existing AFM to include the
changes specified in paragraphs (h)(1) through (10) of this AD.
Revising the existing AFM to include the changes specified in
paragraphs (h)(2) through (10) of this AD may be done by

inserting a copy of figures 1 through 9 to paragraphs (h)(2) through
(10) of this AD into the existing AFM.
    (1) In the Certificate Limitations and Operating Procedures
chapters, remove the information identified as ``Required by AD
2018-23-51.''
    (2) In the Operating Procedures chapter, revise the General
paragraph to include the information in figure 1 to paragraph (h)(2)
of this AD.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.010

    (3) In the Operating Procedures chapter, replace the existing
Airspeed Unreliable paragraph with the information in figure 2 to
paragraph (h)(3) of this AD.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.011

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.012

    (4) In the Operating Procedures chapter, replace the existing
Runaway Stabilizer paragraph with the information in figure 3 to
paragraph (h)(4) of this AD.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.013

    (5) In the Operating Procedures chapter, replace the existing
Stabilizer Trim Inoperative paragraph with the information in figure
4 to paragraph (h)(5) of this AD.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.014

    (6) In the Operating Procedures chapter, add the information in
figure 5 to paragraph (h)(6) of this AD.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.015

    (7) In the Operating Procedures chapter, add the information in
figure 6 to paragraph (h)(7) of this AD.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.016

    (8) In the Operating Procedures chapter, add the information in
figure 7 to paragraph (h)(8) of this AD.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.017

    (9) In the Operating Procedures chapter, add the information in
figure 8 to paragraph (h)(9) of this AD.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.018

    (10) In the Operating Procedures chapter, add the information in
figure 9 to paragraph (h)(10) of this AD.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.019

(i) Minimum Equipment List (MEL) Provisions for Inoperative Flight
Control System Functions

    In the event that the airplane functions associated with the
flight control system as modified by this AD are inoperative, an
airplane may be operated (dispatched) only if the provisions
specified in figure 10 to paragraph (i) of this AD are incorporated
into the operator's existing FAA-approved MEL.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AU20.020

    Note 2 to paragraph (i): The MEL provisions specified in figure
10 to paragraph (i) of this AD correspond to Master Minimum
Equipment List (MMEL) items 22-10-01B, 22-10-02, 22-10-03, 22-11-01,
22-11-02, 22-11-05-02B, 22-11-06-2B, 22-11-08-01A, 22-11-08-01B, 22-
11-10A, 22-11-10B, and 27-41-01, in the existing FAA-approved Boeing
737 MAX B-737-8/-9 MMEL, Revision 2, dated April 10, 2020, which can
be found on the Flight Standards Information Management System
(FSIMS) website, https://fsims.faa.gov/PICResults.aspx?mode=Publication&doctype=MMELByModel.

(j) Installation/Verification of MAX Display System (MDS) Software,
Removal of INOP Markers

    Before further flight, do all applicable actions identified as
``RC'' (required for compliance) in, and in accordance with, the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 737-31-1860, dated June 12, 2020.

(k) Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Wire Bundle Routing Change

    Before further flight, do all applicable actions identified as
``RC'' in, and in accordance with, the Accomplishment Instructions
of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-27-1318, Revision
1, dated June 24, 2020.

(l) AOA Sensor System Test

    Before further flight, do all applicable actions identified as
``RC'' for the ``Angle of Attack (AOA) Sensor System Test''
specified in, and in accordance with, the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737-00-
1028, dated July 20, 2020.

(m) Operational Readiness Flight

    (1) Before further flight and after accomplishment of all
applicable required actions in paragraphs (g) through (l) of this
AD, do all applicable actions identified as ``RC'' for the
``Operational Readiness Flight'' specified in, and in accordance
with, the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention
Service Bulletin 737-00-1028, dated July 20, 2020. A special flight
permit is not required to accomplish the operational readiness
flight required by this paragraph.
    (2) After the operational readiness flight and before further
flight, any mechanical irregularities that occurred during the
operational readiness flight must be resolved following the
operator's FAA-approved maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable.

(n) Special Flight Permits

    Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR
21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the
actions of this AD can be performed.

(o) Credit for Previous Actions

    This paragraph provides credit for the actions specified in
paragraph (k) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the
effective date of this AD using Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 737-27-1318, dated June 10, 2020.

(p) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request
to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office,
as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of
the certification office, send it to the attention of the person
identified in paragraph (q)(1) of

this AD. Information may be emailed to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
    (3) AMOCs approved previously for AD 2018-23-51 are not approved
as AMOCs for this AD.
    (4) For service information that contains steps that are labeled
as Required for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs
(p)(4)(i) and (ii) of this AD apply.
    (i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. If a step or substep is labeled ``RC Exempt,'' then the
RC requirement is removed from that step or substep. An AMOC is
required for any deviations to RC steps, including substeps and
identified figures.
    (ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.

(q) Related Information

    (1) For more information about this AD, contact Ian Won,
Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines,
WA 98198; phone and fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-
5600; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this referenced service
information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational
Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information
on the availability of this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Issued on August 3, 2020.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-17221 Filed 8-5-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P