[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 106 (Thursday, June 2, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 31803-31821]
[FR Doc No: 2011-13340]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0857; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-156-AD;
Amendment 39-16708; AD 2011-12-01]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Koito Industries, Ltd., Seats and
Seating Systems Approved Under Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C39b,
TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD requires determining if affected seats
and seating systems and their components are compliant with certain FAA
regulations, and removing those seats, seating systems, and their
components that are shown to be unsafe from the affected fleet. This AD
was prompted by a determination that the affected seats and seating
systems may not meet certain flammability, static strength, and dynamic
strength criteria. Failure to meet static and dynamic strength criteria
could result in injuries to the flightcrew and passengers during
emergency landing conditions. In the event of an in-flight or post-
emergency landing fire, failure to meet flammability criteria could
result in an accelerated fire. We are issuing this AD to prevent
accelerated fires and injuries to the flightcrew and passengers.

DATES: This AD is effective August 1, 2011.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>) is Document Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patrick Farina, Aerospace Engineer,
Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-
4137; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; e-mail:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to
the specified products. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on
September 24, 2010 (75 FR 58340). That NPRM proposed to require
determining if affected seats and seating systems and their components
are compliant with certain FAA regulations, and removing those seats,
seating systems, and their components that are shown to be unsafe from
the affected fleet.

Ex Parte Contact

    On October 14, 2010, during two separate meetings, we met to
discuss the NPRM with the European Aviation Safety Association (EASA),
Japanese Civil Airworthiness Bureau (JCAB), Airbus, and Boeing, as well
as with other national airworthiness authorities and operators. On
October 20, 2010, we had a similar meeting with additional authorities
and operators. We emphasized that the meetings were not a substitute
for the formal comment process and would consider comments made through
the comment process identified in the NPRM. Summaries of these meetings
are posted in the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal
and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM

    Several commenters either inferred or specifically requested that
we withdraw the NPRM.
    The Association of European Airlines (AEA) stated that the combined
safety analysis carried out by EASA/FAA for the NPRM is fundamentally
flawed because it assumes ``a catastrophic failure.'' The AEA also
stated that new test data are available to the FAA. AEA added that
Koito (witnessed by the JCAB) has carried out extensive retesting of
the seats to prove they are safe and meet all of the certification
criteria. AEA concluded that these data have not been evaluated by the
FAA, which could negate the issuance of an FAA AD.
    The Association for Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA), China Airlines,
and Japan Transocean Airlines (JTA) stated that the evaluation and use
of JCAB data could negate the justification for the NPRM.
    Koito Industries (Koito) respectfully questioned the basis for the
NPRM moving forward, absent FAA verification and support that an unsafe
condition exists. Koito stated it deeply regrets the circumstances
surrounding this AD. Koito submitted that no actual unsafe condition
has been verified even for production seats where discrepancies existed
between drawings and materials used to show compliance. Koito added
that the NPRM states only that a potential unsafe condition could
exist. Koito submitted that non-compliance with regulations does not
necessarily equate to an unsafe condition. Koito stated that the
testing results will provide much-needed data for the FAA to make the
required determination under section 39.5 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 39.5), and then the FAA will be able to determine
whether a safety-of-flight issue exists that is sufficient to warrant
an AD in accordance with the requirements of section 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39). Koito concluded that issuing an AD
prior to reviewing forthcoming testing data to determine whether an
unsafe

condition exists could result in unnecessary burdens on aircraft
manufacturers and affected airlines.
    Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) stated it could not accept the issuance
of an AD prior to completion of all appropriate actions (including re-
testing, conformity assessment, and establishment of the refurbishment
plan) that should be performed by Koito. NCA stated that we should
establish a feasible compliance period based on service bulletin
recommendations and status of parts availability. We infer NCA is
requesting we withdraw the NPRM.
    EVA Airways stated that it preferred an alert service bulletin be
issued instead of an AD because a service bulletin would minimize the
impact on daily operation and minimize the cost impact on operators.
    We do not agree to withdraw the NPRM. It is a fact that some seats
have failed during testing. Failure of the seat, in combination with an
emergency landing, is considered catastrophic. The purpose of the
required initial determination (testing) is to determine which seats
might fail. The purpose of an AD is to restore the affected fleet to an
acceptable level of safety. Only those seats that fail the testing will
be required to be removed from service. EASA and the FAA have reviewed
the data generated by Koito, under the oversight of JCAB, and we have
determined that this AD is necessary to address the identified unsafe
condition. In addition, certification of these seats was obtained
through false pretenses, and thus, until the seats are re-certified in
whole, they need to be appropriately marked and actions must be done in
accordance with this AD. We have not revised the AD in this regard.

Request for Extension of Comment Period

    Multiple commenters requested an extension of the comment period,
and most wanted the extension in order to allow review of the Koito/
JCAB data. AAPA, All Nippon Airways (ANA), The Boeing Company, China
Airlines, Continental Airlines, Copa Airlines, EVA Air, Japan Airlines
International (JAL), JTA, Jett8 Airlines, Kuwait Airways, NCA, Thai
Airways, and Virgin Blue International Airlines (V Australia) requested
that the comment period be extended by 90 days in order to provide time
for the parties concerned to better understand the Koito/JCAB test
data. The AAPA and AEA stated that because the JCAB is the primary
certification and design authority for the Koito seats, and has been
able to confirm that production drawings were retained by Koito and
checked for conformity, the new JCAB data should be given credit. The
AAPA and China Airlines stated that the failure to do so would ignore
the huge potential burden the NPRM would impose on national
airworthiness authorities providing oversight and air carriers.
Continental requested that the FAA work with the JCAB to determine the
validity of the data and accept data that demonstrate compliance on
specific seat models to reduce the potential burden on the operators.
    AEA requested an extension of the comment period for six months.
AEA commented that the NPRM calls for in-service seats to be used for
testing, but that the same goal can be achieved by carrying out a
conformity evaluation of in-service seats against those tested by
Koito, under JCAB supervision.
    Koito requested an extension of the comment period for three
months. Koito stated that it is confident that its comprehensive safety
testing, conducted under strict JCAB supervision and in cooperation
with Airbus, Boeing, and JCAB-regulated airlines, will assist the FAA
and EASA in preparing a more targeted and effective AD, without
compromising in any way the level of safety that the AD seeks to
ensure. Koito added that once the FAA and EASA have thoroughly
evaluated Koito's testing methodology, procedures, and results, and are
satisfied that Koito's testing can be a reliable basis for determining
the safety of in-service seats, the testing results could be widely
shared among all the parties affected by the AD. Koito noted that this
would allow the affected parties to provide the FAA with more precise
and targeted comments before the AD is adopted. Koito also stated that
the FAA itself could gain important insights from reviewing Koito's
testing methodology and testing results before issuing a final AD.
    Airbus commented that the comment period should be extended (but
did not specify the length of the requested extension) to allow review
of the Koito/JCAB tests results.
    Singapore Airlines did not request an extension of the comment
period; however, Singapore Airlines requested that JCAB data be
evaluated by the FAA. Singapore Airlines stated that JCAB showed that
all design changes made to in-service seat models have been identified
and analyzed, with no problem identified relating to metallic parts,
and no significant differences between seats manufactured and
production drawings.
    We disagree with extending the comment period. As stated
previously, we have discussed the data in briefings with EASA and the
operators. EASA and the FAA have since reviewed the data generated by
Koito, under the oversight of JCAB, and concluded that test data from
new-build test articles can be used to demonstrate compliance to the
static strength requirements of the AD; we have added Notes 3 through
10 to this AD to provide clarification on testing. Test data from new-
build test articles can also be used for the flammability requirements
in combination with conformity of in-service seat cushions. The purpose
of this AD is to restore the affected fleet to an acceptable level of
safety. To delay this action would be inappropriate, since we have
determined that an unsafe condition exists and that the actions
required by this AD must be conducted to ensure continued safety.
Failure of the seat in combination with an emergency landing is
considered catastrophic. The required initial determination (testing)
will determine if seats do not meet FAA regulations and those that do
not could fail. Only those seats that fail the testing will be required
to be removed from service. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request for Follow-Up Briefing Session

    AAPA, China Airlines, EVA Airways, JAL, Jett8 Airlines, NCA, and
Thai Airways requested a follow-up briefing session be made to carriers
similar to the follow-up session agreed on in Cologne for carriers in
the Asian-Pacific (ASPAC) region. Kuwait Airways requested a follow-up
briefing session be made to carriers similar to the follow-up session
agreed on in Cologne for concerned carriers. ANA requested a follow-up
briefing session be made to carriers similar to the follow-up session
agreed on in Singapore.
    We agree it is beneficial for affected parties to meet again. We
plan on organizing a meeting with affected parties shortly after the AD
is published. No change to the AD is necessary regarding this issue.

Request for Consistency Between the Applicability of the FAA NPRM and
the EASA Proposed AD (PAD)

    JAL and JCAB requested consistency between the applicability of the
FAA NPRM and the EASA PAD because the NPRM applies to the component and
the PAD applies to airplanes having the component. JAL stated that in
the FAA NPRM, the proposed AD is to be applied to passenger seats
manufactured by Koito; however, the EASA PAD is applied to airplanes
equipped with passenger seats manufactured by Koito. JAL requested a
unified applicability to avoid unexpected burdens on the

airlines/operators. JCAB stated the applicability between the FAA NPRM
and EASA PAD should be further harmonized so as to avoid confusion
among authorities and operators of countries outside the U.S. and
Europe.
    We acknowledge the importance of harmonizing with EASA. The FAA has
granted an approval for the seats themselves, and so the seats are the
basis of the applicability of the FAA AD. This is different in the EASA
system, where the approval is based on airplane installation. Although
the description of the applicability is different, the overall effect
of the two ADs should be essentially the same. Nonetheless, while it is
thought that all the seat models have been identified, there may be
models not identified. Commenters have also noted that the NPRM did not
address several older types of seats, approved under technical standard
order (TSO) TSO-C39, TSO-C39a, and TSO-C127, as well as non-TSO models.
We intend to supersede this AD to address any affected seats that are
determined to not be covered by this AD. However, we have not revised
this AD in this regard.

Request To Match the Affected Seats in the Applicability of the FAA
NPRM With Those in the EASA PAD

    Several commenters requested that the affected seats in our
applicability match those in the EASA PAD. JCAB identified 74 models
listed in the NPRM that are not produced under TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or
TSO-C127a: 15 models that are approved under TSO-C127, 22 models that
are approved under TSO-C39a, and 37 models that do not have TSO
approvals. JCAB noted that seats models approved under TSO-C39a and
TSO-C127 and those without TSO approval are not covered by the proposed
AD by its current text. JCAB requested that we harmonize our
applicability with EASA's applicability.
    JCAB also stated that there are seat models listed in table 1 of
the NPRM that are not approved under TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a,
as specified in paragraph (c) of the NPRM. JCAB requested that we
revise table 1 and paragraph (c) of the NPRM to clarify the intent of
the NPRM for these seat models.
    Koito stated that the NPRM contains 32 seat model numbers that were
not produced under TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a and should be
removed.
    Boeing requested that TSO-C127 be added to the applicability of the
NPRM if the intent of the AD is to be applicable to all Koito seats.
Boeing stated that some Koito seats were certified to TSO-C127 prior to
the release of TSO-C127a.
    We agree that certain seat models that should be covered by the FAA
AD were not explicitly covered by the applicability of the NPRM.
However, we do not agree to revise the applicability of this AD. Adding
seats models to the applicability would require issuance of a
supplemental NPRM instead of a final rule. To delay this action would
be inappropriate, since we have determined that an unsafe condition
exists and that the actions required by this AD must be done to ensure
continued safety. We might issue further rulemaking to address other
seat models, including models approved under other TSOs and those
without TSO approval. The future rulemaking might revise the
applicability of the AD to include all seat models produced by Koito,
installed on any aircraft by any means. We have not revised this AD in
this regard.

Request To Revise Applicability by Removing Certain Seats Models From
Table 1

    JCAB stated that 11 models of Koito seats have seat cushions
provided by another TSO holder (TSO-C72c). We infer JCAB is requesting
that seat cushions made by another manufacturer be removed from table 1
of the NPRM.
    We do not agree. The JCAB did not identify which seat models were
issued with TSO-C72c seat cushions provided by an outside source (non-
Koito produced). Seats for which the cushion approval is independent of
the Koito TSO authorization can show compliance with the cushion
flammability requirements using the third-party approval basis under
TSO-C72c. As it is possible for the seat to be modified by a third
party to procure seat cushions by Koito, we have not revised this AD in
this regard. The TSO-C72c seat cushion is a requirement of TSO-C127a.

Request To Remove Seat Models Installed on Certain Airplanes From the
Applicability

    JCAB requested that seat models for Mitsubishi YS-11 and Fokker F-
27 airplanes, which were designed and manufactured well before the mid-
1980s, be removed from table 1 of the NPRM. JCAB stated that according
to the conclusions of the investigation conducted by Koito
Manufacturing, a parent company of Koito Industries, the fraudulent
activities by Koito Industries started in the mid-1980s. JCAB stated
its investigation revealed the same results, and therefore, it is
believed that those seats designed and manufactured before the mid-
1980s were properly certified and need not be the subject of ADs.
    We acknowledge the commenter's request. However, we have not
received data to identify seats certified without falsified data. In
addition, as discussed previously, certain seats might not be part of
the applicability of this AD because this AD only applies to seats and
seating systems having certain models numbers that are approved under
TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a. However, under the provisions of
paragraph (l) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of an
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) if sufficient data are
submitted to substantiate that the new AMOC would provide an acceptable
level of safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To List Both the Seat Model and Part Number in the
Applicability

    Airbus requested the NPRM list both the seat model and generic part
number in the AD applicability.
    We disagree. The commenter did not justify its request. We have
determined that, to capture all Koito seats, including third-party
modified seats and second-hand seats, reference to the model alone is
appropriate for the applicability of the AD. The affected model numbers
are identified in table 1 of this AD. We have not revised this AD in
this regard.

Request To Delete Fokker Services B.V. From Table 2 in the
Applicability

    Fokker Services B.V. requested we remove ``Fokker Services B.V.''
from table 2 of the NPRM. Fokker Services B.V. indicated that it did
not certificate the installation of seats or seating systems by Koito,
nor was it aware of any Koito seats installed on aircraft types on
which Fokker Services B.V. is the type certificate holder.
    We disagree. All operators must confirm whether the affected seats
and seating systems are installed. Table 2 of this AD is a non-
inclusive list of manufacturers on which the seats and seating systems
may be installed. JCAB has identified seat model AFS-105 installed at
one time on Fokker aircraft (type certificate data sheet A-817).
Although it is probable that this model has been removed and destroyed,
it has not been verified. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Explain Effect of NPRM on Imported Airplanes

    An anonymous commenter requested that we clarify the effect of the
NPRM on imported airplanes. The commenter questioned whether an
operator of a non-U.S. registered airplane can obtain a certificate of
airworthiness from the FAA after the AD is released without re-

testing Koito seats. The commenter stated that for a newly imported
airplane, the seats would be affected by the ``Parts Installation''
requirement specified in paragraph (h) of the NPRM, which does not
allow installation of a non-retested Koito seat after the effective
date of the AD.
    We agree to clarify the effect of this AD on imported airplanes.
When an operator imports an airplane onto the U.S. Register, the
airplane is subject to all applicable FAA ADs. Moving an airplane from
one register to another would not be classified as a new installation
if there is no physical design change to the subject airplane. An
imported airplane is subject to the compliance times in this AD. We
have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request for Compliance Time Extension

    Multiple commenters requested that we extend the compliance times
specified in the NPRM.
    ANA requested that we extend the compliance times to do the testing
and to remove non-compliant seats, seating systems, and components. ANA
stated that a longer compliance time is needed to do the required tests
because it will not be able to accomplish them within two years. AAPA,
ANA, and China Airlines commented that the NPRM would require operators
to take actions that are normally beyond their responsibility and
competence. China Airlines added that the NPRM ignores the economic and
operational burden that will be faced by air carriers. ANA argued that
air carriers are not experts in seat design and indicated that any seat
testing would have to be performed by a seat vendor or public test
facility.
    AAPA, China Airlines, JTA, and Thai Airways requested that the
compliance time of 2 years specified in paragraph (g) of the NPRM for
determining compliance with FAA regulations (testing) be extended to 5
years. The commenters stated that it is the responsibility of the
primary design and certificating authority (the JCAB) with the support
of Koito, in collaboration with EASA and FAA, to develop a plan of
action to ensure compliance of in-service Koito seats. The commenters
added that agencies capable of performing the testing of in-service
seating are limited and may not have sufficient resources to support
the affected air carriers. The commenters also stated that seat
providers do not necessarily have the resources or spare capacity to
support requests from air carriers required to change their seats,
especially within the 2-year compliance period operators have for seats
that have failed the testing. JTA pointed out that, as a consequence of
the problems with Koito seats, airplanes have been and are grounded.
JTA stated that airlines have no suitable pragmatic solution available
due to the lack of certified spares and the long lead-time of sourcing
replacement seats.
    AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA also requested that we extend the 6-
year compliance time for removing non-compliant seating systems
(specified in paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM) to 15 years. AAPA, China
Airlines, and JTA questioned the safety analysis used by the FAA to
establish the NPRM compliance time. JTA requested we consider that,
based on a new finding of the JCAB and 16g test results stored in Koito
computers, it can be concluded that even non-compliant seats still
offer a high level of protection. JTA also asked that we consider there
is no justification to assume this potential non-compliance will result
in an increase of fatalities and noted there have been no reported seat
failures that resulted in fatalities. JTA also stated that there are no
historical data to support that the safety analysis takes into account
the potential of seat failures resulting from high-level turbulence
events.
    AAPA, AEA, China Airlines, and JTA requested that we reconsider the
compliance times based on a revised catastrophe rate and stated that
using an accident rate of 0.15[middot]10-7 is a more
realistic base for the safety analysis. AEA added that the affected
seats would have a reduction in performance of 10% compared to the
certification requirement.
    AEA and Thai Airways commented that the lack of certified spares
and the long lead time of sourcing seats make the replacement of seats
difficult and asked for a longer compliance time to perform seat
testing and seat replacement. AEA noted that a 2-year compliance time
would ground airplanes. Thai Airways requested that the compliance time
of 2 years specified in the NPRM be extended to 5 years. Thai Airways
noted that there are a large number of seats in-service, and FAA and
EASA test facilities do not currently exist. Thai Airways stated that
replacement seats are not interchangeable because they are customized
for items such as in-flight entertainment.
    Boeing requested that the 2-year compliance time be extended to 5
years. Boeing stated that retrofit programs take at least 2 years to
certify. Boeing also stated that all the falsified tests showed that
the forward dynamic test pulses were greater than 14g. Boeing noted
that although not 16g, the test results indicate a level of safety
higher than that of 9g-only seats.
    Cathay Pacific Airways and V Australia requested that the 2-year
compliance time be extended to 4 years. Cathay Pacific stated the
extended compliance time would allow sufficient time to carry out seat
replacement during its scheduled heavy maintenance checks. Cathay
Pacific also noted it takes 18 to 24 months for a typical seat
development. V Australia noted that seat acquisition programs typically
take 18 to 21 months. Cathay Pacific also stated that seat suppliers
might not have sufficient capacity to cope with the high demand from
all the affected operators.
    Copa Airlines stated it is concerned about the compliance times of
the NPRM. EVA Airways, JAL, Singapore Airlines, and V Australia stated
the compliance times are not feasible. Copa Airlines, EVA Airways, and
JAL stated there are no step-by-step service bulletin or original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) instructions and that the NPRM should
include clear guidance on means of compliance, work instructions, and/
or requirements for facilities to conduct the tests. Copa Airlines, EVA
Airways, and Singapore Airlines stated that the high demand for
replacement parts might exceed the capacity of suppliers. Copa Airlines
and JAL added there is insufficient time to replace the seats if they
fail the testing since a new seat program takes 18 to 24 months. V
Australia also stated there is insufficient time to replace seats.
Singapore Airlines added that for airlines with a large fleet having
affected seats, the 2-year compliance time is not pragmatic because
vendors need time to design, manufacture, and install new seats. EVA
Airways and JAL also questioned the availability of test facilities.
Singapore Airlines stated that the 2-year time limit to replace seats
that fail the 16g and 9g tests would pose a hardship for operators.
    Koito suggested that we add explicit wording to paragraph (g) of
the NPRM that would allow airlines to start their testing plan with a
static performance test according to ``14 CFR 25.562(b)(3)(ii) and
(iii)'' within 2 years (to get approval for seats to remain in service
for 6 years) and continue it later with a dynamic testing according to
sections 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7) of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(14 CFR 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7)) within 6 years. Koito stated it
understands that the FAA considers this phased testing structure as an
acceptable testing plan, but also understands that this flexibility is
important to Koito's customers.
    We acknowledge that the compliance times specified in the NPRM
could be

misinterpreted. We also acknowledge that air carriers are not experts
in seat design and that testing most likely would be done by the seat
manufacturer or at a test facility.
    We have revised paragraphs (g), (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4)
of this AD to clarify the compliance times by removing the 2-year
compliance time that was specified in paragraph (g) of the NPRM and
including the applicable compliance times for the determination and
removal in paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4) of this AD.
Paragraph (g)(3) of this AD allows 6 years for the determination for
certain seating systems specified in that paragraph. Paragraph (g)(4)
of this AD allows three years for the determination for components
specified in that paragraph. It was not our intent to require the
determinations specified in paragraphs (g)(3) and (g)(4) of this AD
within the 2-year compliance time.
    We have also revised paragraph (g)(2) of this AD and added
paragraph (h) of this AD to clarify the actions and compliance times
for seating systems approved under TSO-C127a that are shown to be
compliant with sections 25.562(b)(2) and 25.562(c)(7) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(b)(2) and 14 CFR 25.562(c)(7)), but
are shown to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces. Instead of removing
non-compliant seating systems, operators may determine if the seating
systems are compliant with sections 25.561(b)(3)(ii) and
25.561(b)(3)(iii) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii)) and do not exhibit sharp
or injurious surfaces. The removal of seating systems within the
initial 2-year compliance time will only be required in the event that
the seat model is not capable of withstanding the minimum static
forward and side loads. We have not extended any other compliance times
specified in this AD.
    However, under the provisions of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will
consider requests for approval of an extension of the compliance time
if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the new
compliance time would provide an acceptable level of safety.
    In regard to one commenter's justification for extending the
compliance time, we do not agree with the suggestion that there is
evidence the level of safety offered by Koito seats is only 10% below
the applicable certification requirements. The FAA risk assessment does
not assume 100% failure in the event of a survivable emergency landing
and post-emergency landing fire, and includes both worldwide and U.S.
fleet accident rates. Seats that do not pass the static requirements
pose a significant airworthiness risk in the event of an accident and
also in the event of high-turbulence loads. Seats, seating systems, and
components that fail to meet the requirements specified in this AD must
be removed; this AD does not require replacement of seats, seating
systems, and components.
    In regard to the Koito data, we have reviewed the data available to
us and have determined this AD is necessary to address the identified
unsafe condition. As previously stated in the NPRM section ``The Role
of the Airframe Manufacturers (Airbus and Boeing) in Helping Airlines
Establish the Status of Their Seats,'' it will take cooperation among
the airlines, the seat manufacturer, and the authorities to minimize
the effects of this AD.

Request To Revise Compliance Times for Removal of Seats and Seating
Systems With Sharp or Injurious Surfaces

    Several commenters requested that we revise the compliance times
for removal of seats and seating systems that have sharp or injurious
surfaces (specified in paragraph (g)(4) of the NPRM). ANA requested
clarification of the sharp edge issue or limitation for use (TSO-C127 &
TSO-C127a). ANA stated that in the case where the static test is
performed without the sharp edge as the first confirmation test, it
will be able to use the seat for 6 years. However, ANA stated that in
case it performs the 16g test as the first confirmation test and finds
sharp edges, the seat must be removed within 2 years. Based on the
above, ANA considered that the current AD description has an
inconsistency.
    JAL stated that the NPRM requires that determination of compliance
or removal of the non-compliant seats against the sharp or injurious
surfaces criteria be accomplished within 2 years after the effective
date of the AD for the seats approved under TSO-C127a. However, JAL
suggested that since the compliance time for the dynamic testing
requirements in section 25.562 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 25.562) would be 6 years once the seats have passed the static
testing requirements in section 25.561 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 25.561), the compliance time to determine if there
are sharp or injurious surfaces in dynamic testing should be 6 years
for consistency with the dynamic testing.
    JAL also stated the NPRM does not specify the requirements and
method of compliance for the sharp or injurious surfaces. Accordingly,
JAL requested that the FAA clarify those requirements and methods by
specifying the applicable section(s) of the regulation(s) and/or
providing clear guidance information.
    We agree that the compliance time for removing seats and seating
systems that have sharp or injurious surfaces should be revised. We
have removed paragraph (g)(4) of the NPRM and added the determination
of sharp or injurious surfaces to the actions specified in paragraphs
(g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (h)(2) of this AD, as discussed previously.
The compliance times in this AD are based on the relative risk to
safety resulting from non-compliance with the different standards; it
is acceptable that the sharp edge determination be correlated with the
particular type of test (static or dynamic) being performed. Thus, we
agree that both assessments should have the same compliance time.
    As noted in the NPRM, the sharp edge determination can be made from
photographic evidence of the original Koito tests. In addition, as
noted above, the FAA will accept the determination of an FAA designee
who witnessed the test(s).

Request To Revise Compliance Times for Removing Non-Compliant Seats,
Seating Systems, and Components

    Two commenters requested that we revise the compliance times for
removing seats, seating systems, and components that are not compliant.
ANA requested that if structural failure is found, then the compliance
time for the required removal should be counted from the test
confirmation date. JAL requested that the FAA consider revising the
commencement date of the compliance time for removing seats, seating
systems, and components that are not compliant from ``the effective
date of the AD'' to ``the date when the non-compliance is determined.''
    We disagree. The commenters provide no technical justification for
revising the compliance time for removal. Operators must comply with
the actions in this AD within the compliance times specified in this AD
in order to address the identified unsafe condition. However, under the
provisions of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will consider requests for
approval of an extension of the compliance time if sufficient data are
submitted to substantiate that the new compliance time would provide an
acceptable level of safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Be Excluded From the Requirements of the NPRM

    ANA also asked to be excluded from the requirements of the NPRM by
providing a plan to replace the seats within 10 years or sell the
airplanes within 4 to 5 years.
    We disagree. The commenter did not provide justification for its
request. As stated previously, operators must comply with the actions
in this AD within the compliance times specified in this AD in order to
address the identified unsafe condition. However, under the provisions
of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of
an alternative method of compliance if sufficient data are submitted to
substantiate that the new AMOC would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify the 2-, 3-, and 6-Year Compliance Times

    Sami Kazi requested that we clarify whether the 2-, 3-, and 6- year
compliance time requirements start after the 2-year compliance time
specified in paragraph (g) of the NPRM. Sami Kazi stated that ``For
example if the AD is released on January 1, 2011 then the compliance
findings must be completed by Dec. 31, 2012. Then 2, 3 or 6 years time
periods of `Table--Summary of Proposed Actions and Requirements' start
after Dec. 31, 2012.''
    We agree to provide the following clarification of the compliance
times. The compliance times in this AD for removing non-compliant
seats, seating systems, and components do not start on the date of the
compliance findings. All compliance times in this AD are measured from
the effective date of the AD. For example, if an AD has a compliance
time of ``within 2 years after the effective date of this AD'' and the
AD has an effective date of July 1, 2011, the deadline for compliance
for actions required within 2 years is July 1, 2013.

Request To Change Paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of the NPRM

    Boeing requested that paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of the NPRM be
revised to ensure that TSO-C39b and TSO-C39c seats installed on
airplanes having 14 CFR 25.562 as their certification basis are tested
to the 14 CFR 25.562 regulations.
    We disagree. We acknowledge that TSO-C39b and TSO-C39c seats that
are installed on airplanes having 14 CFR 25.562 as their certification
basis should be tested to the 14 CFR 25.562 regulations. However, we
have not revised this AD in this regard at this time. Revising these
actions would require the issuance of a supplemental NPRM instead of a
final rule. To delay this action would be inappropriate, since we have
determined that an unsafe condition exists and that the actions
required by this AD must be conducted to ensure continued safety. We
might consider further rulemaking to address this issue.

Request for Harmonization of Remaining In-Service Time Between FAA NPRM
and EASA PAD

    AAPA, China Airlines, EVA Airways, JTA, Singapore Airlines, and
Thai Airways requested that we harmonize with EASA on the remaining
time in-service for Koito seats. AAPA and China Airlines stated that
EASA and FAA are widely recognized by national airworthiness
authorities as leading regulatory authorities, especially in the areas
of safety, type certification, and design. AAPA and China Airlines
added that it is also well understood that the FAA's and EASA's
jurisdiction covers only those air carriers operating aircraft on the
U.S. Register and in the 27 countries in the European Union,
respectively. AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA explained that it is common
practice for airworthiness authorities to adopt either the EASA or FAA
airworthiness directive; however, on implementing an AD, some
regulators elect to apply an FAA AD to the Boeing fleet and the
corresponding EASA AD to the Airbus fleet. AAPA, China Airlines, and
JTA concluded that consequently, since there is a lack of harmonization
between the FAA and the EASA proposed ADs, the end result will be a
mixed standard fleet.
    AAPA, China Airlines, JTA, and Thai Airways noted that, unlike the
FAA's NPRM, the equivalent EASA PAD 10-101 will include a 10-year
maximum limit on continued service of in-service seats, even after air
carriers have successfully passed all test requirements. EVA Airlines
stated that in the FAA NPRM, the seats may remain in service if they
meet amendment level 25-64 of sections 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7) of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7)). AAPA,
China Airlines, and JTA argued that this difference is not driven by
safety and is an unjustified cost burden. AAPA and China Airlines, and
EVA Airways and JTA urged the FAA to ask EASA to remove this 10-year
requirement to ensure harmonization.
    Singapore Airlines requested that we recommend to EASA to allow
seats to continue operation without limitation if they pass the
confidence tests--similar to the FAA.
    JCAB noted that harmonization efforts may be made to avoid possible
confusion among authorities and operators of the countries and regions
outside the U.S. and Europe. JCAB previously stated that it does not
have any plan to issue its own AD because the FAA and EASA are in a
better position to make fleet-wide risk analysis and to come up with
possible fleet-wide actions.
    We acknowledge the importance of harmonizing with EASA, and we have
coordinated with EASA on our respective ADs. However, EASA's 10-year
limiting requirement is a result of its regulatory requirements, and
the FAA is not in a position to recommend changes to this. We have
determined that seats, seating systems, and components that meet the
FAA regulations specified in this AD do not need to be removed and,
therefore, this AD does not have a 10-year limiting requirement. While
harmonization is a goal, EASA is obligated to follow its own regulatory
guidance. Given the age of many of the seats in service, it is arguable
whether the EASA 10-year requirement will have a significant effect on
airplanes affected by EASA's PAD. We have not changed this AD in this
regard.

Request for Time Extension for Spare Parts Eligibility for Installation

    Several commenters requested that we extend the time for spare
parts eligibility for installation specified in paragraph (h) of the
NPRM.
    AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA stated that since the announcement by
the JCAB of the problems associated with Koito seats, all spare parts
have been deemed not approved until Koito has finalized a
recertification process. Furthermore, AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA
stated that Koito is not permitted to make spares available even if it
has them in stock. AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA stated that, as a
consequence, air carriers are under significant pressure as they are
unable to adequately support in-service seats, and sourcing of parts
manufacturer approval (PMA) parts is a possibility, but not widely
accepted. AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA pointed out that in order to
support the requirements of the AD, spare parts are essential. AAPA,
China Airlines, and JTA urged the FAA, EASA, and JCAB to determine the
best way forward by agreeing on an approach that offers flexibility for
air carriers to source spare parts.
    Continental Airlines requested that the current inventory of spare
parts be allowed to remain eligible for installation without additional
testing

for two years from the effective date of the AD since the requirement
for replacement components places an unreasonable burden on the
operators to recertify or purge current inventory of spare parts within
the timeframe specified.
    We disagree with extending the time for spare parts eligibility for
installation specified in paragraph (i) of this AD (referred to as
paragraph (h) in the NPRM). However, we did intend to allow Koito seats
and seating systems as ``direct'' spares for the same part number seats
or seating systems based on guidance in the component maintenance
manual (a ``direct'' spare has the same part number of the part it
replaces). Therefore, we have revised paragraph (i) of this AD and a
new Note 11 to add this exception and definition.
    We have also added new paragraph (j) to this AD to allow re-
arrangement of the existing installed seats if the re-arrangement
follows the same installation instructions and limitations as the
original certification. In addition, we have added new paragraph (k) to
this AD to clarify the parts installation requirements for components
of seats and seating systems (we had included components in paragraph
(h) of the NPRM).
    Under the provisions of paragraph (l) of the final rule, we will
consider requests for approval of an extension of the compliance time
if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the change would
provide an acceptable level of safety.

Request To Remove Requirement to Determine if Seats and Seating Systems
Have Sharp or Injurious Surfaces

    Boeing stated many of the tests of the suspect seats were witnessed
by FAA ``delegates'' (designated engineering representatives (DERs) or
authorized representatives (ARs)); thus, the seats were already
reviewed for sharp edges. Boeing also stated that even after DERs
discontinued witnessing TSO tests, the photos from the tests were
provided in the test report, which was provided to the installer.
Boeing concluded that had any of the photos exhibited sharp edges, the
AR would have questioned this and required additional data or tests in
order to make the compliance finding on the installation. We infer that
Boeing is requesting that we remove the requirement to determine if
seats and seating systems have sharp or injurious surfaces, as
specified in paragraphs (g) and (g)(4) of the NPRM.
    We disagree with the request because determining if there are sharp
or injurious surfaces is necessary to address the identified unsafe
condition. Photographic evidence is not sufficient since often times it
is not close enough and the angle can readily hide defects that are not
a blatant failure. In addition, if testing was done at a lower pulse
than required, the low pulse may not show a hidden defect that would
have been evident at the required pulse. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.

Request To Revise Costs of Compliance

    AEA, EVA Airways, and Koito requested that we revise the Costs of
Compliance section of the NPRM. AEA stated that there are significant
impacts and costs involved: hundreds of million of dollars in
retrofitting seats including months--possibly years--of ground time if
seats cannot be sourced. Koito stated that the NPRM not only
underestimates the cost of the proposed AD, but in some cases
acknowledges that the cost cannot be determined. Koito noted that the
FAA did not appear to consider the replacement costs for seats, seating
systems, and their components that are found to be non-compliant. Koito
stated that the FAA should not ignore the costs of replacing seats,
seating systems, and their components that are found to be non-
compliant. EVA Airways stated the NPRM specifies a cost estimate of
approximately $875,000 for 40,365 passenger seats installed on
airplanes in the U.S. fleet. EVA Airways added that since there is no
way to know how many tests will be done and how many seats will be
modified or replaced, it is very difficult to estimate the exact cost
of this NPRM; however, because the cost for one dynamic test is about
$20,000 to $50,000, the NPRM estimate of $875,000 is low.
    We do not agree to revise the Cost of Compliance section of this
AD. We have included the estimated cost of the actions required by this
AD, which is applicable to the U.S. fleet. The AD requires a
determination and removal of non-compliant parts, and we have included
those costs. While this AD does not require replacement we recognize
that operators could choose to replace non-compliant seating systems.
However, we are unable to make an assessment of how many seats would be
required to be replaced based on the findings of the AD. We did provide
an estimated cost of replacement seats in the table ``Seat Replacement
Cost Estimates'' in the preamble of the NPRM and this final rule in the
Costs of Compliance section.
    We also do not consider it appropriate to attribute the costs
associated with aircraft ``down time'' to the AD. Normally, compliance
with the AD will not necessitate any additional down time beyond that
of a regularly scheduled maintenance hold. Even if additional down time
is necessary for some airplanes in some cases, we do not have
sufficient information to evaluate the number of airplanes that may be
so affected or the amount of additional down time that may be required.
Therefore, attempting to estimate such costs would be futile. We have
not revised this AD in this regard.

Request for Department of Transportation (DOT) and Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Review

    Koito requested that the NPRM be reviewed by the DOT and OMB, as
required by Executive Order 12866 (``E.O. 12866'') (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993) and Department of Transportation (``DOT'') Order
2100.5 (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). Koito stated that under DOT
Order 2100.5, where a rulemaking ``concerns a matter on which there is
substantial public interest or controversy,'' it should be classified
as a ``significant'' rulemaking and receive DOT Office of the Secretary
(``OST'') and Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (``OMB-OIRA'') review, consistent with E.O.
12866. Koito stated that under DOT Order 2100.5, the FAA may only avoid
cost-benefit analysis if it determines that the cost impact of the
proposal is so minimal as to not require full review.
    Koito stated that the FAA did not address the possibility that the
NPRM may adversely affect in a material way a sector of the economy,
which would have a significant impact and require further review. Koito
added that this is true especially where, as in this case, the number
of aircraft and airlines are potentially large, and where the direct
and indirect effects, including any inadvertent effect on competition
due to differences in approach in the AD requirements of EASA and the
FAA, are unknown or not taken fully into account.
    Koito noted that the FAA has witnessed very substantial public
interest and controversy, not only in the comments filed to date, but
in two widely attended public meetings in Cologne, Germany, and
Singapore. Koito concluded that under these circumstances, it would
appear appropriate to categorize this rulemaking as significant and in
need of DOT OST and OMB-OIRA review.
    China Airlines urged the FAA to recognize that the problem is not
limited to U.S.-registered carriers and any AD will have global
ramifications.
    We do not agree that this AD requires a review by the DOT OST and
OMB-

OIRA because we have determined that this AD is not a `significant'
rulemaking. ADs in general do not require an OMB review. However, when
the cost of an AD exceeds $100 million and, therefore, is economically
significant, we do coordinate the AD in accordance with all applicable
DOT and OMB requirements. For the purposes of these requirements, the
costs of an AD are based on the U.S. domestic fleet. For the purposes
of the requirements, this AD has a total cost for the U.S. fleet of
$875,000 and thus is not economically significant. In addition, ADs
correct identified unsafe conditions, rather than raise the level of
safety and cannot be assessed in terms of benefits balancing costs, as
would be the case for amendments to the airworthiness standards. This
AD does not have an annual effect on the U.S. economy of $100 million
or more nor does it adversely affect in a material way the economy, a
sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or state, local, or Tribal
governments or communities; it does not create a serious inconsistency
or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another
agency; it does not materially alter the budgetary impact of
entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; and it does not raise novel legal or
policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's
priorities, or principals set forth in E.O. 12866.
    We do recognize this AD could affect the non-U.S.-registered fleet
if mandated by airworthiness authorities of other countries. However,
this AD does not directly impact non-U.S. operators and, therefore, the
cost review is not required for the non-U.S.-registered fleet. We have
not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Provide Guidance on Testing in General and Seat Cushion
Testing, Including Allowing the Use of New-Build Test Articles

    Airbus, AEA, ANA, Continental, JAL, JCAB, and Singapore Airlines
requested that we provide guidance on testing seat cushions. Airbus
requested that the NPRM define test pass/fail criteria and provide
guidance on how the seat cushion could be tested per section 25.853(c)
of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.853(c)). Airbus stated
its concern that it is impossible to prepare a test article per
Appendix F of part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part
25) without gluing parts of the cushion. Airbus concluded that an in-
service test cushion is likely to have degraded flammability
characteristics and, thus, is not able to pass requirement criteria.
    AEA and ANA stated that the flammability test of cushions cannot be
accomplished by using a cushion removed from an in-service seat and
added that there are no test criteria for the use of used cushions. AEA
requested that we provide a practical means to allow operators and type
certificate holders to conform and procure foam test samples. AEA added
that an operator should be allowed to deviate from the test criteria.
ANA also added that testing is not feasible because it cannot obtain
the correct results due to effects of the material aging and could
result in new cushions (made per Koito drawings) being used for the
test.
    Continental requested that we work with the JCAB and Koito to
determine the specific part numbers or foam compositions in question
that led to this requirement being applied across all seat models.
Continental stated that the NPRM should identify the flammability
concerns by seat model and only those models with questionable oil burn
data should be included in the NPRM.
    JAL stated that the used cushions (cushions returned from service)
should not be used for the testing campaign and newly fabricated seat
cushions that conform to their original TSO design should be used
instead for the following reasons:
     Used cushions do not represent the new ones due to
contamination and/or deterioration and/or compression while in service;
     Cushions vary in condition;
     Due to its complexities of constructions and natures of
used materials, it may be impossible to fabricate the required quantity
of consistent test samples by using an actual cushion (by ``cut and
bond'' method); and
     Since the condition of each used cushion could be
different and no clear criterion for representative samples has been
specified, conformity determination of each cushion for testing cannot
be accomplished.
    JCAB stated that the burden on affected operators should be
minimized because operators are not expected to have in-depth technical
knowledge about certification of seats or seating systems. JCAB noted
that it is extremely important to have technical support from the
airplane manufacturer. JCAB also stated that one of its efforts is to
advise and supervise Koito in conducting re-testing of in-service
models. JCAB expressed its firm belief that the result of the re-
testing of in-service seat models by Koito is technically acceptable
and should be fully utilized by the affected operators in showing
compliance with the requirements of the NPRM.
    NCA stated that the results of the tests currently underway by
Koito should be considered valid because the test is being done under
JCAB supervision and is in accordance with FAA requirements.
    JCAB said that without data derived from re-testing, operators
would have difficulty certifying seats or seating systems and
completing all necessary re-testing within the 2-year compliance time,
which could result in operators needing to ground airplanes from which
seats are removed for re-testing. JCAB also stated that the use of in-
service seats for re-testing is not technically fair, since the
requirements cited in the NPRM are for newly produced test articles.
JCAB added that the performance of used seats is degraded and cannot be
at the same level as newly produced test articles. JCAB also stated
that even if the test results are good, there may be no seats to re-
install on the aircraft from which the tested seats were removed
because after the testing, the seats may be deformed.
    JCAB stated the proposed test for flammability is too stringent and
needs improvements, including adding background information. JCAB
requested that we provide more clarification on how the requirements of
the NPRM can be met so as to make the process more efficient and
effective. JCAB stated that it is necessary to have guidance on how the
number of tests can be minimized. JCAB also questioned if, for seats
with TSO-C39a approvals, it would not be necessary to do the
flammability test that was introduced in TSO-C39b.
    Singapore Airlines stated that we need to provide better clarity of
test instructions, such as approval of test planes, if there is a need
for authorities to be present during testing and to accept test
results. Singapore Airlines recommended that the FAA and EASA set up a
mechanism for airlines to work with EASA or the FAA through the
operators' local civil aviation authorities for approving a test plan,
witnessing, and reviewing test results to testify compliance to the FAA
NPRM and EASA PAD.
    Singapore Airlines stated that in-service seat cushions could be
contaminated and are therefore not representative of initial
flammability certification conditions. The commenter recommended that
new test cushion coupons that are built according to the approved
drawings for testing be used.

    AEA, AAPA, China Airlines, Continental, JCAB, Singapore Airlines,
and Thai Airways requested that we allow data from new-build test
articles to be used.
    AEA and Continental stated that the JCAB determined that metallic
parts were not affected by the discrepancies with Koito seats, and
therefore the dynamic/static tests performed on new seats that were
produced in accordance with the production drawing should also be
accepted. AAPA, China Airlines, JCAB, Singapore Airlines, and Thai
Airways stated that no problems have been identified related to the
metallic parts provided by suppliers and used in the construction of
Koito seats. Several commenters also noted that the results of tear-
down inspections have demonstrated that there were no significant
differences. Thai Airways also stated that the JCAB has been able to
confirm all production drawings were retained by Koito and checked for
conformity and all design changes made to each in-service seat model
have been identified, checked, and analyzed.
    Thai Airways stated that the FAA, EASA, and JCAB should update all
data for seat testing results together in order to initiate clear and
concise instructions and to support operators in decreasing the number
of applicable seat part number testing to ensure the seat integrity of
in-service seats.
    Koito respectfully requested that its testing efforts and results
be effectively reflected in the AD. Koito stated this would facilitate
and expedite compliance by airline operators with the AD requirements,
without compromising safety.
    We agree to provide guidance on seat cushion testing. Evaluation of
the Koito oil burner test has determined that the facility did not
comply with the requirements of Appendix F, part II, of part 25 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 25). Although other civil
airworthiness authorities are not required to follow U.S. regulations,
the flammability rule affects U.S. operators and was developed based on
survivable accidents in which there was loss of life. The retrofit for
all transport category airplanes operating under parts 121 and 135 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121 and 14 CFR 135) required
fire-blocked seat cushions in accordance with this flammability rule.
When TSO-C39b was issued, seats and berths approved prior to the
issuance of the TSO were allowed to be manufactured under the
provisions of their original approval. However, a specific exception
was identified. This exception was that the seat cushions must comply
with section 25.853 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
25.853), including the requirements of section 25.853(c) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.853(c)), and Appendix F, part II, of
part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 25). The
retrofit of the entire U.S. fleet was accomplished in 3 years.
    We have added Notes 3 through 10 to this AD to provide some
guidance on testing. The guidance includes allowing for new-build test
articles (with in-service article conformity), test plans, and test
reports, which must be presented to the FAA for approval. Test data
from new-build test articles can be used to demonstrate compliance to
the static requirements of the AD. Test data from new-build test
articles can also be used for the flammability requirements in
combination with conformity of in-service seat cushions. Any
difficulties encountered with test articles and resultant
interpretations can be discussed with the FAA. Consideration will be
given to aging effects on test results.

Request To Allow Newly Manufactured Seats Be Used as Representative In-
Service Seat

    AEA, ANA, Continental, EVA Airways, JAL, Koito, and V Australia
requested that newly manufactured seats produced in accordance with
Koito drawings be used as a representative case of in-service seats.
    JAL stated that use of newly produced seats should be accepted for
testing. JAL stated that, in its presentation in the Singapore meeting,
JCAB confirmed the results of the tear-down inspection; the results
indicated that using seats that conformed to the production drawings
would have no significant differences that could impact the testing.
Furthermore, JAL stated that conformity determination of each seat for
testing cannot be accomplished since the condition of each seat in
service could be different.
    We partially agree with the commenters. We have added Note 4 and
Note 8 to this AD to clarify we will allow the test of new-build test
articles in lieu of in-service seats for the static requirements in
section 25.561 of the Federal Aviation Regulation (14 CFR 25.561).
However, for the dynamic requirements in section 25.562 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562), the in-service seats will still
be required to be tested, as non-conformities in production cannot be
adequately represented.
    Also, we cannot accept all Koito data obtained under JCAB oversight
because of several factors including the fact that the maximum weight
of all the seats in a group was not tested. In addition, the results of
the re-testing of seat cushions for flammability at the Koito
laboratory are invalid due to non-compliance of the test facility.

Request for Service Information

    Copa Airlines, EVA Airways, and JAL stated there are no step-by-
step service bulletin or OEM instructions and that the NPRM should
include clear guidance on means of compliance, work instructions, and/
or requirements for facilities to conduct the tests.
    NCA requested that a service bulletin be issued, and that the AD
should refer to the service bulletin. NCA stated that operators are not
in a position to take responsibility for the manufacturer and that
Koito should issue a service bulletin. China Airlines stated that for
``regional airworthiness authorities'' to provide effective oversight,
comprehensive accomplishment instructions should be provided instead of
the high-level requirements in the NPRM.
    We do not agree that waiting for a service bulletin to be issued is
appropriate. There are many entities in industry that are able to
determine if the seats comply with the AD. An operator may outsource
this determination. We do not consider that delaying this action until
after the release of a manufacturer's service bulletin is warranted. To
delay this action would be inappropriate, since we have determined that
an unsafe condition exists and the actions required by this AD must be
performed to ensure continued safety. We have not revised this AD in
this regard.

Request To Consider Data Found in Koito Computers

    JCAB requested that we consider the data found in Koito computers.
JCAB added that raw data, mainly dynamic tests, are stored in computers
of Koito and because those data are not believed to be falsified, with
technical analysis those data may be used to show compliance with the
proposed requirements of the NPRM, if certain conditions are met.
    We do not agree that the data found in Koito computers should be
used to show compliance with this AD because we cannot confirm the
validity of the data at this time. However, if additional data are
provided that confirms the validity of the data, we will consider the
data. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Identify Seats by Grouping or Family

    AAPA, ANA, China Airlines, Eva Airways, JAL, JTA, NCA, and
Singapore Airlines requested that we allow identifying seats by
grouping or family. Several commenters questioned who will do the
identification. EVA Airways indicated that operators are not capable of
identifying seat models by groups to enable testing by similarity to
reduce cost, and requested that EASA and the FAA work with Airbus and
Boeing to group seats. Thai Airways stated that the number of sampling
seats in each applicable part number to be selected for testing has not
been defined.
    AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA requested that we modify the NPRM to
clearly indicate that a collective approach by airlines is an
acceptable approach to responding to the requirements of the AD. AAPA
stated that such an approach would allow air carriers in coordination
with airframe manufacturers to carry out a sampling of seat family/
models and the resultant data would then be considered as acceptable
justification to demonstrate compliance to the NPRM.
    JAL stated that since the airlines/operators cannot accomplish
their tasks without technical support from the airplane manufacturers,
especially in cases where a seat family extends between operators and
between the manufacturers, it requests that the FAA clearly define the
airplane manufacturers' roles. Furthermore, JAL stated that if the FAA
expects Koito to take any roles, those roles should also be specified
in the NPRM. JCAB noted that it is in a position to assist operators in
complying with the NPRM.
    We agree with the commenters and confirm that seat grouping will be
allowed to show compliance with the AD; work is ongoing by the type
certificate holders to define seat groups. However, we have not revised
this AD to specify how and who should do the work. It is expected that
the type certificate holders or suitable qualified organizations can
assist in the clustering of seat models. Seat model grouping is not
essential for compliance with the AD, but is recognized by FAA as a
means to reduce the economic burden.

Request To Explain Conformity Inspection

    AEA, Airbus, ANA, and EVA Air requested we provide guidance on how
to perform a conformity inspection of the seats.
    We disagree with revising this AD to include instructions on
conformity inspections because there are numerous ways to accomplish
this, and we want to provide flexibility for operators. This AD
requires the determination for compliance with certain FAA regulations
of seats, seating systems, and components in accordance with a method
approved by the FAA. We will provide guidance during the FAA review and
approval of the test plans submitted. Changes to the design might have
occurred between when the product was accepted for a TSO and when
production started. A simple instruction to establish conformity
through comparison to the component maintenance manual is not a
sufficient way for operators to determine airworthiness. We have not
revised this AD in this regard.

Request That the TSO Certification Level be Commensurate With the
Testing Requirement at the Time of the Original Aircraft Type
Certification

    AAPA, AEA, ANA, China Airlines, Continental Airlines, JAL, JTA,
JCAB, Koito, and Boeing requested that the TSO certification level be
commensurate with the testing requirement at the time of the original
aircraft type certification.
    AEA stated that operators should only be obliged to comply with the
original type certification basis of the aircraft. AEA also stated that
testing the seats to the latest or later requirements cannot be
justified and would increase the risk of failures dramatically as the
original seat design would not allow for this.
    JAL stated that the NPRM requires the airlines/operators to
determine compliance with the latest static structural requirements
under section 25.561(b) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
25.561(b)) at Amendment 25-64. However, JAL and AEA stated that the
side load factor defined in section 25.561(b)(3)(iii) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii)) should be consistent
with the airplane certification basis because ``new'' seats were tested
to 4g requirements at Amendment 25-64 of that regulation, whereas the
``old'' seats were tested to 1.5g requirements at Amendment 25-23 or
25-0 of that regulation in the course of original TSO design approvals.
    JCAB questioned whether it correctly understands that re-tests can
be conducted in accordance with the certification basis of airplanes/
seats. JCAB noted that for older airplanes/seats, the side load
requirement in static seats is 1.5g, while the newer requirement is 3g/
4g. JCAB also noted there is a -2g pulse shape introduced in TSO-C127a.
    Koito stated that a more appropriate level of compliance for the
requirements of the NPRM would be to the certification basis of the
aircraft or a higher amendment level, whichever an affected operator
chooses. Koito noted that it took the FAA 17 years to finalize the
regulations at Amendment 25-64 (to address retrofitting), in large part
because of technical difficulties in certifying seats to the 16g
standard, which were more sophisticated and complex than 9g seats.
Koito pointed out that when the regulations at Amendment 121-315 were
adopted, it required full compliance only for new production airplane
models. Therefore, Koito submits that requiring compliance to the most
recent amendment levels is not supported and is inconsistent with the
FAA's approach to addressing retrofitting aircraft to the higher
standards at Amendment 25-64 of the regulations. Alternatively, Koito
stated that an airplane may have a certification basis that does not
include section 25.562 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
25.562) and requested that the FAA relieve the requirements of sections
25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7)).
    We partially agree with the commenters. We agree that certain TSO
seats can be tested at the level that the TSO was issued. We have
revised paragraph (g)(1) of this AD to clarify the certification basis.
For TSO-C39b and TSO-C39c seats, the certification basis when
determining (testing) if the seats meet section 25.561 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.561) is the certification basis of the
TSO; however, for TSO-C127a seating systems, the testing remains the
same.
    Boeing also requested that a note be added regarding pulse shape to
allow the use of the pulse shape that was acceptable at the time of TSO
approval or type certification or supplemental type certification.
    We disagree with Boeing's request that a note be added regarding
pulse shape to allow the use of the pulse shape that was acceptable at
the time of TSO approval or type certification or supplemental type
certification. The current criteria for the pulse shape meets the
original intent of section 25.562(b)(2) of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(b)(2)).

Request To Accept the Use of Koito Interface Loads Reports for the
Analysis To Determine Which Seat(s) Testing is Required

    AEA requested that we accept the use of Koito interface loads
reports for the

analysis to determine which seats are tested. AEA stated that if
structure testing is to be conducted for showing compliance with the
applicable portions of the NPRM, one method to determine the
``critical'' seat(s) for testing is mentioned in Appendix 3 of FAA
Advisory Circular 25.562-1B, dated January 10, 2006. AEA stated that
one element in this determination is taking into account the highest
loaded seat leg of a seat within a ``family of seats,'' which can be
concluded from the calculated interface loads for those seats. AEA
noted that since falsification involved ``static, dynamic and
flammability testing, as well as uncontrolled changes to production
data (material and dimensional),'' we accept the use of Koito Interface
Loads Reports for the analysis to determine for which seat(s) testing
is required.
    We agree that the use of Koito interface loads reports may be
acceptable for the determination of compliance to FAA regulations
required by this AD. We note that the use of advisory circular material
may be allowed, thus Koito analysis of interface loads may be allowed.
We have added this information to Note 6 of this AD.

Request To Use Only Lower Testing Requirement

    Several commenters requested we allow testing to be done at lower
testing requirements. AEA requested that all seats that pass the 9g
requirement can remain in service. AEA stated that according to the
NPRM, seats with a 16g certification basis that fail the 16g test are
required to carry out a 9g test, and receive a 6-year grace period if
the test is passed. AEA stated that during the 16g rulemaking it was
determined that the 16g rule was not made retroactive to seats that met
the earlier 9g certification basis. Therefore, AEA stated that all
seats that pass the 9g test have shown compliance to the minimum
standard and can therefore remain in service.
    ANA stated that 16g seats (TSO-C127a) may be installed on an
airplane that itself does not have a 16g requirement. ANA asked that
the 9g confirmation test be considered sufficient.
    We disagree. This AD requires compliance with certain provisions of
the TSO. If a seat is TSO-C127a then the requirements of that TSO
apply. In addition the FAA's operational and airworthiness regulations
do not allow a downgrade of the certification basis of airplanes to an
older standard. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
    Also, Boeing stated that the certification basis of various models
of airplanes is different regarding the static side load case. Boeing
stated that airplanes (such as Boeing Model 747-400 and 767-300
airplanes) have a certification basis lower than the standards at
Amendment 25-64 of the regulations, and as such, a 1.5g side load would
be appropriate.
    We disagree. A seating system that is approved under TSO-C127a must
also meet section 25.562 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
25.562), even if the airplane has a lower certification basis. We have
not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Waive Bunsen Burner Test

    AEA requested that we waive the Bunsen burner requirement when
operators elect to perform a complete re-qualification program, as
mentioned under Note 1 of the NPRM. AEA stated that during the question
and answer session in Cologne, it was stated that relevance of Bunsen
burner test results is negligible and that absence of such test data
does not lead to an unsafe condition.
    We disagree. The comments made by EASA and FAA during the meeting
in Cologne might need further clarification. It was not stated that
compliance with section 25.853(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(14 CFR 25.853(a)), commonly referred to as the Bunsen burner test, has
no influence on the determination of the unsafe condition. It was
stated that Bunsen burner testing is not a required element of the
flammability tests to show compliance to this AD. If requalification is
chosen, showing compliance with all aspects of the applicable TSO is
required in accordance with part 21 of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(14 CFR 21). We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify When Re-Installing Seats Is Allowed

    Airbus, AEA, APA, Boeing, China Airlines, JAL, JTA, Koito, and Thai
Airways requested that we clarify when re-installing seats after
removal or reconfiguration is allowed. Airbus requested that we allow
provisions for filling the gap in the cabin following removal of seats
for confidence tests (by allowing production and installation of
complete seats of the same design) or allow reconfiguration of the
cabin without full requalification of the seats. Koito agreed with
Airbus that we should allow provisions for filling the gap. Thai
Airways stated that after removing seats for testing, there are no
instructions to address deviations from the aircraft configuration type
certificate.
    Boeing requested that we clarify the text in the ``Limitations on
Seats Found Not to Be Fully Compliant, but Are Safe to Remain in
Service'' section of the preamble of the NPRM because a couple of
sentences conflict with each other. Boeing stated that one sentence
would allow the use of direct spares (i.e., same part number) to be re-
installed in an airplane, but a different sentence specifies that any
removed seat is to be destroyed. Boeing stated this would mean that no
spare seat would exist, as indicated by the earlier sentence. Boeing
suggested the section include ``unless retained as a direct spare as
noted above. The direct spares can be re-installed in any previously
certified layout using that seat part number.'' Boeing recommended the
paragraph read as follows:

    That is, unless they are shown to fully comply with the
regulatory requirements, this proposed AD would restrict the
installation of such seats and would require specific marking. These
seats can be used as a direct spare for the same part number seat.
However, any other use of such seats would be considered a new
installation approval and would be required to comply with all
regulations. Thus, seats not meeting all regulations could not be
installed except as noted above, and if removed from an approved
arrangement, would have to be destroyed or rendered unusable in some
other manner acceptable to the FAA, unless retained as a direct
spare as noted above. The direct spares can be re-installed in any
previously certified layout using that seat part number.

    Boeing stated that the additional text clarifies that the airlines
can continue to re-configure their airplanes from, for example, their
previously certified summer layout (with lots of economy class) to
their previously certified winter layout (with less economy class) and
vice-versa.
    Boeing also recommended we clarify that re-configuration is
acceptable and suggested adding the following text:

    As an exception, when a seat(s) is removed from an airplane for
the direct purpose of testing under the context of this AD, the
remaining seats can be re-pitched to fill the vacant spot. This one-
time re-pitch following a test-seat removal is to follow the same
installation instructions and limitations as the original
certification (e.g., if the original limitations allowed 32'' to
34'' pitch, the new layout shall be pitched within that range).

    Boeing stated that although re-pitching is not a simple solution,
removing a seat for testing without allowing for a solution produces a
``hole'' or unused space in the airplane. Boeing noted that the re-
pitch will be equally as safe as the seats were before the removal of
the test seat and, in addition, leaving a ``hole'' or unused space in
the airplane leaves passengers without tray tables (which were seat-

back-mounted on the removed seat). Boeing further stated that the
``hole'' also leaves the electrical daisy-chain interrupted, which
eliminates reading lights, attendant call, and in-flight entertainment
(IFE) to the seat assemblies beyond the missing one.
    AEA and Koito stated that the preamble of the NPRM states the seats
that pass the test and remain on the airplane are ``limited on how they
can be used.'' AEA also stated that the FAA has clarified this means
that seats have to remain in the currently approved configuration and
cannot be changed, moved, or re-pitched. AEA noted that in order to
remain competitive in today's changing market, it is essential for
operators to have the ability to amend the configuration of their
aircraft to suit the market needs. AEA, AAPA, and China Airlines
requested that the FAA clarify the wording so that operators would be
allowed to reconfigure airplanes containing Koito seats. Koito stated
that it echoed the concerns raised by AEA. AEA provided the following
justification:
     Seats that have passed the confidence test will have been
shown to be safe.
     Certain reconfigurations may actually improve safety.
     Reconfigurations are usually supplemental type
certificates (STCs); in addition, all changes (including minor) related
to Koito seats are FAA-approved.
     FAA has previously stated that Koito data are approved.
     In order to provide test specimens, some operators will
need to remove seats from in-service airplanes, and this will leave a
large gap in these aircraft unless the remaining seats can be re-
pitched.
    Koito stated that preventing operators from reconfiguring seats
that are part of a supplemental type certificate would be unnecessarily
restrictive and would provide no safety benefit--nor would it be
necessary to correct a potential unsafe condition.
    JAL requested that the FAA accept the use of newly produced seats
to fill in gaps left by seats removed for testing in case newly
produced seats are not allowed for testing.
    We agree to clarify when seats and seating systems can be installed
and rearranged. We have added a new Parts Installation paragraph
(paragraph (j) of this AD) to allow certain reconfigurations. We will
consider allowing reconfiguration within the same installation
instructions and limitations as the original certification. Operators
may request approval of an AMOC in accordance with the procedures
specified in paragraph (l) of this AD. We have not revised the
``Limitations on Seats Found Not to Be Fully Compliant, but Are Safe to
Remain in Service'' section because that section of the NPRM is not
restated in this final rule.

Request To Allow Entire Seat Assemblies To Be Produced and Installed To
Replace Seats That Have Been Removed for Testing

    JAL requested the FAA accept the use of newly produced seats to
fill gaps left by seats removed for testing in case newly produced
seats are not allowed for testing.
    Boeing requested that the following be added to the ``Replacement
Components'' paragraph in the preamble of the NPRM:
    ``* * * Entire seat assemblies may also be produced and installed
to explicitly replace any seat removed from the fleet for testing under
this AD.''
    Boeing stated that removing a seat for testing without allowing for
a new replacement seat assembly to be produced leaves a ``hole'' or
unused space in the airplane. Boeing stated the replacement seat will
be identical, or at least representative of the one removed for
testing, which achieves an identical or representative level of safety
between the newly installed seat and others on the airplane.
    Additionally, Boeing reported that leaving a ``hole'' or unused
space in the airplane leaves passengers without tray tables (which were
seat-back-mounted on the removed seat). Boeing noted the ``hole'' also
leaves the electrical daisy-chain interrupted, which eliminates reading
lights, attendant call, and IFE to the seat assemblies beyond the
missing one.
    We agree. The FAA's intent is to allow new Koito seats with the
same part number to be installed to replace in-service seats used as
test articles. We have revised paragraph (i) of this AD to clarify this
issue by specifying that seats and seating systems may be removed from
service and re-installed and that new seats and seating systems may be
installed as direct spares for the same part number seats or seating
systems. The new Koito seats and seating systems are subject to this
AD.

Request To Consider Minor Failure

    AEA requested that we consider what to do if there is a minor
failure of the seats. AEA stated an example is a seat experiencing a
`minor' failure of a structural test. AEA stated in the case where a 9g
seat is tested the NPRM implies that if it fails in any way it would
require replacement in 2 years. AEA requested that a logical, safety-
based approach be applied to tests and a maximum allowed grace period
be granted should a failure be deemed as minor.
    We disagree that there is such a thing as a `minor' failure.
Existing pass/fail criteria already include consideration of the amount
of damage that is considered a failure and these criteria continue to
be valid. This AD requires that a determination be made to ensure that
seats, seating systems, and components are compliant with certain
regulations and removed if necessary. The compliance time for removal
is dependent on the failure criteria as identified in the AD. AEA
stated that replacement is required; however, this AD only requires
removal of seats, seating systems, and components that are non-
compliant. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Allow Alternative Actions

    Two commenters requested that we allow alternative action for
``replacement.'' Thai Airways stated that remedial action does not
exist if seats fail the test and the only recommendation is
replacement. ANA requested that we allow modification to comply with
the NPRM.
    We do not agree. Seats, seating systems, and components that are
non-compliant must be removed, as required by the AD. However, under
the provisions of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will consider requests
for approval of an AMOC if sufficient data are submitted to
substantiate that the new methods would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify 100% Conformity Is Not Required

    AEA requested that we confirm and clarify that a 100% conformity
inspection of all seats installed is not required and that based on
analysis the recertification of a representative test article is
acceptable. AEA stated that according to Note 1 of the NPRM, it must be
determined if the seats and seating systems and their components are
compliant with FAA regulations. Note 1 refers to recertification, i.e.,
re-qualify to the TSO.
    We agree to clarify this issue. We confirm that 100% conformity of
the in-service fleet is not required to comply with the AD in most
cases because a sampling approved by the FAA will be allowed. The AD
does not require re-qualification of the seats and seating systems,
which would involve showing compliance with all aspects of the
applicable TSOs, such as measurement and reporting of permanent

deformations and lumbar load requirements. The AD requires a
determination if the seats are compliant to the specific requirements
set forth in the AD.

Request To Clarify Guidance on Replacement Cushions

    Several commenters requested guidance on replacement cushions. AEA
requested that we allow similar bottom cushions to be accepted instead
of tested. AEA stated that according to paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM,
for seating systems approved under TSO-C127a, dynamic testing is
limited to a 16g forward load condition; however, strict adherence to
the referenced guidance of FAA Advisory Circular 25.562-1B, Appendix 3,
paragraph 9 (reference paragraph (g)(5) of the NPRM) would require
conducting a 14g down lumbar load test, if the original bottom cushion
material (i.e., foam) is not available for the manufacturing of
replacement cushions. AEA stated that since it is accepted that in-
service seats might not meet the 14g down lumbar load requirement, it
would be unreasonable to require the showing of full compliance with
this part of the regulations in case an operator is forced to replace
bottom cushions because of non-compliance with the oil burner test or
because spare cushions cannot be obtained.
    Therefore, AEA requested that we accept similar bottom cushions
with respect to stiffness and density (measured according to accepted
industry standards) to show that the performance of a replacement
bottom cushion is not worse than that of the in-service cushion.
    ANA noted that in paragraph (g)(5) of the NPRM, the reference for
the replacement is AC 25.562-1B; however, this is for a TSO-C127a seat
only, and not for TSO-C39b and TSO-C39c seats. ANA requested that we
revise this reference.
    We agree that the requirement for replacement cushions is too
restrictive for certain seating systems. We revised paragraph (g)(4) of
this AD (referred to as paragraph (g)(5) in the NPRM) to clarify that
the requirement is only for seat cushions affected by FAA Advisory
Circular 25.562-1B, dated January 10, 2006 (i.e., seat cushions
replaced on airplanes required to meet section 25.562 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562) either by their original
certification basis or post-type certificate modifications). We have
also clarified that compliance with section 25.562(c)(2) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(c)(2)), i.e. lumbar load, does not
need to be shown.

Request To Add Guidance on Pass/Fail Criteria

    Boeing requested that we add Note 4 after paragraph (g) of the NPRM
to provide information that pass/fail criteria for cracks may be
acceptable on a case-by-case basis, i.e., front fitting acceptable,
rear fitting not acceptable.
    We disagree. This information is not necessary to comply with this
AD. Guidance on acceptable damage is contained in Advisory Circular
25.562-1B. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Add Guidance on Conformity

    Boeing requested that a note be added as follows: ``If the test
article consists of a seat from the fleet (or from spares), conformity
should consist of matching the seat part number to that noted in the
test plan, of noting the general condition of the seat, of noting
revisions/modifications that have been made to the seat (typically
noted on modification placards), and of verifying the date of
manufacture.''
    We agree with the intent of the suggestion. We have added Notes 5,
6, 9, and 10 to this AD to provide guidance.

Request To Specify Specific Cushions

    AEA requested that we specify specific cushions in paragraph (g)(5)
of the NPRM. AEA requested that although not explicitly mentioned in
paragraph (g)(5) of the NPRM, the FAA should limit the applicability of
this paragraph to seat bottom and seat back cushions only, as these
represent the majority of foams on the seats. AEA stated that legrest
cushions and headrest cushions are significantly smaller when compared
to bottom and back cushions. AEA added that it is nearly impossible to
manufacture representative test sample sets of these small-sized
cushions on in-service seats.
    We agree to specify cushion types. Headrest and legrest cushions
typically have much less mass than bottom and back cushions. While the
requirements of section 25.853(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(14 CFR 25.853(c)) also apply to headrest and legrest cushions, non-
compliance of these types of cushions would not have as much effect on
safety as would non-compliance of the bottom and back cushions. We have
determined that addressing only bottom and back cushions provides an
adequate level of safety. We have revised paragraph (g)(4) of this AD
to specify that seat bottom and seat back cushion assemblies must be
shown to be compliant as specified in the AD.

Requests for Harmonization of Parts Replacement

    Singapore Airlines requested that we work with EASA and the JCAB to
harmonize parts replacement to facilitate Koito's production and
shipment of spares to airlines. Singapore stated this is especially
important to airlines that expect to continue operations with Koito
seats if their seats pass the confidence tests stipulated by EASA and
the FAA. Singapore stated that without JCAB's approval for Koito to
produce spare seats for replacement of in-service seats for the
confidence testing, airlines might end up with a ``hole'' in the
airplane (impacting IFE systems and wiring), having to approve a new
configuration, having seats destroyed during testing that cannot be re-
installed, and having a commercial impact that may affect route
performance and viability.
    Thai Airways stated that Koito could manufacture seats and seat
accessories according to FAA TSO and deliver them to the operators as
spare parts. Thai Airways requested we coordinate with the JCAB to
clarify and reconsider authorizing export of those seats as spare
parts.
    As previously stated it is the FAA's intent to allow new Koito
seats with the same part number to be installed to replace in-service
seats used as test articles. However, we do not have authority over the
production approval of Koito spare parts. JCAB is the authority and
they are aware of this issue. We have not revised this AD in this
regard.

Request To Allow Replacement of Non-Conforming Seats

    The JCAB requested that we allow the replacement of non-conforming
seats. The JCAB stated that if operators chose to correct non-
compliance found during the determination (testing) specified in the
NPRM, the seats in question have to be modified so they fully meet all
applicable requirements. The JCAB stated that there would be Koito
seats that comply with the requirements of the NPRM while not meeting
the full requirements under Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(14 CFR 25); and there would also be seats that failed to comply with
the NPRM requirements and would require modifications to achieve
compliance with the NPRM requirements. The JCAB noted that after the
modifications, the latter seats are at the same level of safety as the
former seats and, therefore,

should be allowed to continue operation without further actions. The
JCAB argued that requiring the full compliance for the latter seats is
not fair, and it may be more reasonable if operators are allowed to
continue to use seats that are modified.
    We disagree. This AD requires determining if the seats and seating
systems and their components are unsafe, based on the failure to comply
with certain key performance standards in the TSO. As clarified in Note
1 of this AD, this determination may be made by independent re-
qualification of the affected TSO article that has thorough control of
the design and production process. Seats and seating systems that fail
the determination (tests) required in the AD will be subject to the
associated limitations. Any future design change to the seats or
seating systems requires full re-certification of the seats or seating
systems. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Add Guidance on Use of Redesigned Part

    Boeing requested that we add a note allowing the use of re-designed
parts to be installed after test failure. Boeing stated that
retrofitting an entire family of seats with a new design is perceived
as a quicker path to safety and is non-punitive to airlines.
    We disagree that such a note in the AD is necessary. Seats and
seating systems that fail the determination (tests) required in the AD
will be subject to the associated limitations. Any future design change
to the seats or seating systems requires full re-certification of the
seats or seating systems. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request for FAA and EASA Harmonization of Replacement Parts

    ANA and JAL requested that we harmonize with EASA on replacement
parts. JAL commented that the FAA NPRM requires that replacement parts
meet applicable airworthiness requirements, whereas the EASA PAD
requires replacement parts to be compliant with the requirements of the
AD. JAL requested that the NPRM reflect compliance similar to the EASA
PAD since operators might have to conduct further testing to show
compliance with requirements other than flammability and injury
prevention provisions. Accordingly, JAL requested that the FAA consider
revising the requirements for the replacement parts so they are
consistent with the ones in the EASA PAD. JAL noted that airlines/
operators might have to conduct further testing to show compliance to
regulations other than the flammability and injury prevention
provisions. ANA stated there are differences regarding parts
replacement between the FAA and EASA, and ANA requested the use of the
EASA description.
    We disagree. We cannot harmonize on this issue because EASA has a
proposed 10-year removal date whereas the FAA does not. Since our AD
allows seats, seating systems, and components that are compliant to
remain on the airplane, our AD refers to the applicable airworthiness
requirements for replacement parts. We have not revised this AD in this
regard.

Request To Allow Replacement of Actuators, Hydrolocks, and Other
Structural Parts

    Several commenters requested that we allow the replacement of
actuators, hydrolocks, and other structural parts. ANA stated that
after the AD is effective, the AD requires that replacement parts
comply with the requirements of the AD. ANA added that for the
structural member, basically the new part is obviously much healthier
than the existing one (installed on seat). ANA concluded that it is not
necessary to include requirements for the spare (replacement) parts,
including an actuator, a hydrolock, and so on, which are the
standardized manufacturing parts.
    JAL stated that it is currently proposed that only wear-out
components and non-structural members may be manufactured and installed
on the seats affected by the NPRM. JAL requested that we consider
exempting the mechanical reclining control actuators even though they
may be part of structural members. JAL stated the actuators are a type
of wear-out component replaced often during maintenance. JAL added that
the ones used on the Koito seats have many suppliers, their quality and
performance were unlikely to be adversely affected by falsification,
and the replacement of actuators improves, not degrades, the
performance of existing seats.
    Koito stated that the NPRM provides only for the replacement of
wear-out component parts, such as food trays, arm rest covers, and non-
structural members. Koito stated that this strict limitation may be
disproportional as the replacement of certain parts of in-service seats
can ensure appropriate safety levels while allowing the airlines to
extend the use of these seats without having to replace them. Thus,
Koito suggested including an explicit section in the NPRM describing
possible avenues for airlines to upgrade seat performance (e.g.,
through service bulletins and kits developed by Koito) to ensure they
meet the safety requirements foreseen in the NPRM. Koito considered
this would adequately ensure safety performance, while minimizing the
burden on airlines.
    We partially agree. We disagree with the ANA request to allow other
structural parts ``and so on'' because ANA did not list specific parts.
We agree that certain parts may be allowed. The intent of this AD is to
allow Koito spares based on guidance in the component maintenance
manual. Seat cushions would need to be in compliance with the AD. A
seat, seating system, or component that fails the determination (tests)
required in the AD is subject to the associated limitations. Any future
design change (such as upgrade kit and associated Koito service
bulletin) would require full re-certification of the seat.

Request To Clarify Limitation on Seats, Seating Systems, and Components
Remaining in Service

    EVA Airways commented that the NPRM contains inconsistent
statements. EVA Airways stated that the NPRM reads that as of the
effective date of this AD, a seat, seating system, or component may be
re-installed on the airplane from which it was originally removed,
provided it is removed from service within the applicable compliance
time specified in this AD. EVA Airways also stated that the NPRM
specifies these seats can be used as direct spares for the same part
number seats. We infer that the commenter is requesting clarification
of the limitations on seats, seating systems, and components remaining
in service.
    We agree to provide clarification. As specified in paragraphs (i)
and (k) of this AD, a seat, seating system, or component that is
removed to conduct testing can be replaced with a newly built part of
the same part number or a used part of the same part number. All seats,
seating systems, and components, whether new or used, must be in
compliance with the AD within the appropriate compliance times of the
AD.

Request To Revise Paragraph (h) of the NPRM

    AEA requested that we revise paragraph (h) of the NPRM. AEA
commented that paragraph (h) of the NPRM is very restrictive to
operators who cannot obtain spare parts. ANA stated that it did not
have spare seats based on the fact that there are many seat part
numbers. Koito agreed with AEA that this provision is very restrictive
and stated that such a significant limitation would prevent
reconfiguration of airplanes containing

Koito seats. AEA requested that the wording of paragraph (h) of the
NPRM be amended to allow non-compliant seats and their components to be
used as direct spares for the same part number seat or component as
follows:

    Seats and components that successfully complete the relevant
requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD and are permitted to remain
in service for the defined length of time, are limited in how they
can be used, unless they are shown to fully comply with the
applicable airworthiness requirements. Non-compliant seats and their
components that are removed from service are not eligible for
installation on another aeroplane or by another operator except as a
direct spare for the same part number seat or component.

    We do not agree to allow installation of seats, seating systems,
and components as direct spares between other airlines and authorities.
The intent of paragraphs (i) and (k) of this AD (referred to as
paragraph (h) in the NPRM) is to limit the introduction of known bad
parts into the worldwide fleet. Non-compliant seats, seating systems,
and components are subject to the limitations of the AD. However, we
have revised paragraphs (i) and (k) of this AD to allow installation of
parts as direct spares on another airplane for a given operator,
provided the operator complies with the requirements of the AD.

Request To Revise ``Data the FAA Will Accept * * *'' Section of the
NPRM

    Boeing requested that we revise the ``Data the FAA Will Accept to
Demonstrate Compliance with the Proposed AD'' section of the preamble
of the NPRM. Boeing suggested that we replace the wording ``* * * As
noted above, tests conducted as part of the JCAB investigation may be
acceptable if the conformity of the seats in service can be verified''
with the wording ``* * * Tests conducted as part of the JCAB
investigation are acceptable if the seat model in question is part of
the family of the tested seat and if the tested seat included the
highest loaded leg * * *'' Boeing stated that the JCAB reported that
falsification of data did not relate to the structural components of
the seat and, as such, testing of test articles that are manufactured
to the level of drawings at the time of production can establish a
level of safety for the fleet.
    We disagree with revising the wording because all tests might not
be acceptable. Tests conducted as part of the JCAB investigation may be
acceptable if the conformity of the seats in service can be verified.
Operators may include not only the highest loaded leg but also such
things as the rationale for why the seat model is the critical seat in
the determined group/cluster in any proposed test plan. That section of
the NPRM is not restated in the final rule. We have not revised this AD
in this regard.

Request To Clarify Status and Validity of TSO and Tagging

    JAL, Continental, and Koito requested clarification on the validity
of TSO design approvals and tagging. JAL requested the status and
validity of TSO design approvals of Koito seats and PMAs as replacement
parts be unchanged by the AD.
    JAL requested that the FAA define the disposition of TSOs/PMAs when
operators decide to acquire new seat cushions.
    Continental stated the NPRM should include a provision to allow the
TSO to remain intact for any seats which are shown to meet the original
TSO requirements or for any seats that are brought into full
compliance.
    Koito indicated the NPRM proposes to require modification of
existing TSO tags prior to reinstallation to indicate non-compliance
with the TSO, the AD number, and applicable removal date; however, the
FAA has not proposed to revoke or suspend the TSOs. Koito requested the
NPRM only require that a tag be added to the TSO marking that specifies
the number of the AD, identifies the AD paragraphs it is in compliance
with, and a removal date, if applicable. Koito concluded that only
seats that do not comply with any requirements of the NPRM should have
all TSO markings obliterated.
    We agree to provide clarification. This AD does not address action
against the manufacturer and we have not revoked the letter of design
authorization for the TSO. However, none of the TSO markings on
existing articles produced under TSO authorizations specified in this
AD are considered valid because they were obtained in violation of the
TSO process. This includes falsified Bunsen burner tests, oil burner
tests, static tests, dynamic tests, and material certificates. If a
seat model is fully re-qualified by the TSO holder, a seat may be
entitled to a new TSO marking, with a new date, but the existing
marking cannot be validated after the fact. The JCAB stated that the
models identified in the AD have data that was either falsified or is
suspected to have been falsified. The obliteration of the TSO
identification (`TSO-XXX') is therefore required for all seats and
seating systems affected by this AD.
    The operator/owner may elect to show full compliance to the TSO as
indicated by Note 1 of this AD (Note 1 indicates that it is possible
for operators to redesign if they have a failure provided they re-
qualify the affected TSO article through a thorough control of the
design and production process). This permits the seat to remain in
service in compliance with the AD but does not negate the fact that the
TSO authorization was obtained fraudulently.
    Acquisition or use of new seat cushions that comply with section
25.853 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.853) is one way
to replace affected seat cushions. Also, use of third-party PMA seat
cushions that are obtained through test and computation is a way to do
this. PMA holders with compliance data may wish to request approval for
an alternative method of compliance with this AD. PMA seat cushions
that are obtained through ``identicality'' might not comply with the AD
as the Koito data to which the PMA is identical might have been
falsified. This AD does not address third-party PMA parts, except as
replacement parts, which are subject to the requirements specified in
``Parts Installation--Components of Seats and Seating Systems'' in
paragraph (k) of this AD. We might consider further rulemaking to
address PMA parts obtained through identicality.

Request To Add Guidance on Dynamic Testing

    Boeing requested that we add a note for paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2),
and (g)(3) of the NPRM to provide guidance on dynamic testing,
including details on maximum seat weight for family, ballast, surrogate
parts in a non-load path, and the use of the highest loaded leg.
    We acknowledge that this sort of information needs to be addressed;
however, it is appropriate for a test plan. There are current FAA
guidelines that address these items that are found in FAA AC 25.562-1B.
This level of detail is not necessary for this AD. The AD requires that
operators determine compliance in accordance with a method approved by
the FAA and each test plan may vary. We have not revised this AD in
this regard.

Request for Compliance With FAA Statement of Compliance With
Airworthiness Standards Form 8100-9

    Aeroflot submitted an e-mail in which the operator requested Koito
fill out an FAA Statement of Compliance with Airworthiness Standards
Form 8100-9. Koito responded to Aeroflot that Koito was not able to
issue the form and has never issued this form to date. Aeroflot stated
it needed approval of repairs and

spare parts. We infer Aeroflot is requesting how to show compliance
with the requirements of the AD for a specific repair for Model ARS-417
and ARS-418 seats.
    We disagree with providing specific repair information. U.S.
operators must do the actions in this AD in accordance with a method
approved by the FAA. Non-U.S. operators are not subject to this AD
unless it is mandated by their respective airworthiness authorities. We
have not revised this AD in this regard.

Clarification of Terminology

    In paragraph (h) of the NPRM we specified that parts are not
eligible for installation ``by another airline or any other aviation
entity.'' We have removed the sentence containing that phrase in
paragraphs (i) and (k) of this AD (which correspond with paragraph (h)
of the NPRM). Instead, we have added the phrase ``on airplanes operated
by the same operator'' to the sentences in paragraphs (i)(1) and (k)(1)
of this AD.
    We also revised the description of the unsafe condition in the
Summary of this AD to match the description of the unsafe condition in
paragraph (e) of this AD.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that
these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or
increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 40,365 passenger seats installed
on airplanes in the U.S. fleet. There are 278 airplanes of U.S.
registry. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour.
    The estimated cost to determine if the affected seats and seating
systems and their components are in compliance (i.e., estimate the cost
of static, dynamic and flammability testing, labor) is approximately
$100,000 for the U.S. fleet. The estimated cost of the consumed article
such as the seat row and materials consumed for flammability testing is
approximately $490,000 for the U.S. fleet. The estimated cost to remove
affected seats and seating systems and their components is
approximately $285,000 for the U.S. fleet (this estimate assumes that
the removal of all seats and seating systems in the fleet). The total
estimated cost of this AD for the U.S. fleet is $875,000.
    Operators might need to replace only certain components. It is not
feasible to include the cost of individual components in this AD
because we have no way of determining which components might need
replacement.
    Operators might need to replace the affected seat with a new seat.
The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to
replace the different types of seats. We have no way of determining how
many seats might need to be replaced after testing is done to determine
if the seats are in compliance. Certain operators might need to replace
any type of seat that are generalized by description and estimated per-
seat cost in the following table.

                                     Table--Seat Replacement Cost Estimates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Aircraft style, foot rest,
            Seat style/class                and recline mechanism               Cost per passenger seat
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economy................................  Narrow/Wide Body;            $2,300.
                                          Mechanical.
First, Business........................  Narrow Body; Mechanical....  $7,500.
Business...............................  Wide Body; Mechanical......  $10,000.
Business...............................  Wide Body; Electrical......  $25,000 to $35,000.
First..................................  Wide Body; Lay flat single   $75,000 to $150,000.
                                          place, Electrical.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2011-12-01 Koito Industries, Ltd: Amendment 39-16708; Docket No.
FAA-2010-0857; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-156-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This AD is effective August 1, 2011.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Koito Industries, Ltd., seats and seating
systems having a model number identified in table 1 of this AD that
are approved under technical standard order (TSO) TSO-C39b, TSO-
C39c, or TSO-C127a, and installed on, but not limited to, airplanes
of the manufacturers identified in table 2 of this AD, all type
certificated models in any category.

                          Table 1--Seat Models
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Model Nos.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFS-105, AFS-136,
AFS-235, AFS-315,
ARS-183, ARS-189, ARS-190,
ARS-200, ARS-242, ARS-242-TA, ARS-254, ARS-255, ARS-263, ARS-276, ARS-
 277, ARS-281, ARS-289,
ARS-29, ARS-29-03,
ARS-304, ARS-308, ARS-311, ARS-311-A, ARS-311-B, ARS-336, ARS[dash]339,
 ARS-341, ARS-347, ARS-352, ARS-354, ARS-357, ARS-360, ARS-384, ARS-385,
 ARS-392, ARS[dash]397, ARS-398,
ARS-415, ARS-417, ARS-418, ARS-419, ARS-423, ARS-424, ARS-425,
 ARS[dash]427, ARS[dash]431, ARS-437, ARS-446, ARS-447, ARS-448, ARS-
 451, ARS-452, ARS-465, ARS[dash]478, ARS-480, ARS-482, ARS-483, ARS-
 493, ARS[dash]494,
ARS-507, ARS-510, ARS-511, ARS-514, ARS-516, ARS-518, ARS-527, ARS-542,
 ARS[dash]543, ARS-550, ARS-552, ARS-553, ARS-554, ARS-571, ARS-574, ARS-
 577, ARS[dash]588, ARS-589, ARS-591, ARS-592, ARS-593, ARS-594, ARS-
 595, ARS-596, ARS[dash]597, ARS-598, ARS-599,
ARS-600, ARS-601, ARS-604, ARS-605, ARS-607, ARS-610, ARS-611, ARS-613,
 ARS[dash]615, ARS-616, ARS-617, ARS-620, ARS-626, ARS-627, ARS-629, ARS-
 636, ARS[dash]641, ARS-642, ARS-643, ARS-644, ARS-646, ARS-647, ARS-
 649, ARS-651, ARS-652, ARS-657, ARS-658, ARS-659, ARS-667, ARS-668, ARS-
 669, ARS-670, ARS[dash]671, ARS-672, ARS-673, ARS-674, ARS-694, ARS-
 697,
ARS-704, ARS-707, ARS-709, ARS-710,
ARS-813, ARS-814, ARS-815, ARS-823, ARS-831, ARS-832, ARS-833, ARS-835,
 ARS[dash]836, ARS-837, ARS-838, ARS-840, ARS-841, ARS-843, ARS-844, ARS-
 846, ARS[dash]847, ARS-849, ARS-851, ARS-852, ARS-853, ARS-857, ARS-
 858, ARS-859, ARS[dash]861, ARS-862, ARS-869,
ASS-197D,
ASS-215,
ASS-30, ASS-30-1,
B-317,
F11M11,
F44A33,
P11B31, P11B33, P11M93,
P21B33, P21B35, P21B73,
P22A23,
P32B73,
P52B41,
P56B63,
PB7-2001,
T-316,
Y11B31, Y11B33, Y11B73, Y15B73,
Y21A23, Y21B73,
Y27B73,
YE1B35,
YG7B35,
YH1B73,
YK2B73
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Table 2--Affected Airplanes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Manufacturer                       Product subtype
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airbus...........................  Transport Airplane.
The Boeing Company...............  Transport Airplane.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation....  Transport Airplane.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.  Transport Airplane.
Fokker Services B.V..............  Transport Airplane.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 25:
Equipment/Furnishings.

Unsafe Condition

    (e) This AD results from a determination that the affected seats
and seating systems may not meet certain flammability, static
strength, and dynamic strength criteria. Failure to meet static and
dynamic strength criteria could result in injuries to the flightcrew
and passengers during emergency landing conditions. In the event of
an in-flight or post-emergency landing fire, failure to meet
flammability criteria could result in an accelerated fire. The
Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to prevent
accelerated fires and injuries to the flightcrew and passengers.

Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.

Determination of Compliance and Removal

    (g) At the applicable times specified in paragraphs (g)(1),
(g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4) of this AD, determine if the seats and
seating systems and their components are compliant with FAA
regulations specified in paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and
(g)(4) of this AD, in accordance with a method approved by the
Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. For a
method to be approved, the approval must specifically refer to this
AD. Before re-installing any seat or seating system, modify the
existing TSO

tag by defacing the TSO number and letter of designation, e.g.,
overstrike the TSO identification with an ``X'' (such as ``TSO-
C127a'' is defaced to look like
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR02JN11.012

) , and add a tag that specifies non-compliance to the TSO number
and letter designation, this AD number, and removal date if
applicable.

    Note 1: Determining if the seats and seating systems and their
components are compliant may be done by independent re-qualification
of the affected TSO article that has thorough control of the design
and production process.

    Note 2: Components of seats and seating systems include any non-
metallic exposed part, assembly, or item. A component can include a
seat cushion, recline cable, hook and loop (hook and loop is a
generic term for Velcro), and a leather cover that is glued to a
seat, headrest, or arm cap.

    (1) For Koito Industries, Ltd., seats approved under TSO-C39b or
TSO-C39c: Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD,
determine if the seats are compliant with 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(ii)
and 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii) at the level that the TSO was issued
and determine if seats exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces. If any
seats are not shown to be compliant with 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(ii) and
14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii), or if any seats are shown to exhibit sharp
or injurious surfaces in testing conducted to satisfy the original
TSO authorization program or subsequent verification tests required
by this paragraph, within 2 years after the effective date of this
AD, remove the non-compliant seats.
    (2) For Koito Industries, Ltd., seating systems approved under
TSO-C127a: Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD,
determine if the seating systems are compliant with either of the
regulations specified in paragraphs (g)(2)(i) and (g)(2)(ii) of this
AD and determine if seating systems exhibit sharp or injurious
surfaces. If any seating systems are not shown to be compliant with
either of the regulations specified in paragraphs (g)(2)(i) and
(g)(2)(ii) of this AD, or if any seating systems are shown to
exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces in testing conducted to satisfy
the original TSO authorization program or subsequent verification
tests required by this paragraph, within 2 years after the effective
date of this AD, remove the non-compliant seating systems, except as
provided by paragraph (h) of this AD.
    (i) 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii).
    (ii) 14 CFR 25.562(b)(2), and 14 CFR 25.562(c)(7).
    (3) For Koito Industries, Ltd., seating systems approved under
TSO-C127a that are shown to be compliant with 14 CFR
25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii) and that are shown to
not exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces during the actions required
by paragraph (g)(2) or (h)(2) of this AD: Within 6 years after the
effective date of this AD, determine if the seating systems are
compliant with 14 CFR 25.562(b)(2), and 14 CFR 25.562(c)(7) and
determine if seating systems exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces. If
any seating systems are not shown to be compliant with 14 CFR
25.562(b)(2), and 14 CFR 25.562(c)(7), or if any seating systems are
shown to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces in testing conducted to
satisfy the original TSO authorization program or subsequent
verification tests required by this paragraph, within 6 years after
the effective date of this AD, remove the non-compliant seating
systems.
    (4) For components of Koito Industries, Ltd., seats approved
under TSO-C39b or TSO-C39c and components of seating systems
approved under TSO-C127a: Within 3 years after the effective date of
this AD, determine if the seat bottom cushion assembly and seat back
cushion assembly are shown to be compliant with 14 CFR 25.853(c). If
any seat bottom or seat back cushion assembly is not shown to be
compliant with 14 CFR 25.853(c), within 3 years after the effective
date of this AD, remove the non-compliant seat bottom and or seat
back cushion assembly. If a seat cushion is replaced on airplanes
required to meet 14 CFR 25.562 requirements (either by their
original certification basis or post-type certificate
modifications), the replacement seat cushion must have consistent
seat bottom stiffness and seat reference point locations using the
guidance found in paragraph 9 of Appendix 3 of FAA Advisory Circular
25.562-1B, dated January 10, 2006 (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory--
and--Guidance--Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/
808324bf7790fda3862571010075bcbf/$FILE/AC25.562-1b.pdf); however,
compliance with 14 CFR 25.562(c)(2), i.e. lumbar load, does not need
to be shown.
    (h) For seating systems that are shown to be compliant with the
regulations specified in paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this AD, but are
shown to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces during the tests
required to show compliance with paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this AD: Do
the actions specified in paragraph (h)(1) or (h)(2) of this AD using
a method approved in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (l) of this AD.
    (1) Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD: Remove
the non-compliant seating systems.
    (2) Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD:
Determine if the seating systems are compliant with the regulations
specified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this AD, and determine if the
seating systems exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces during the tests
required to show compliance with paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this AD. If
any seating systems are not shown to be compliant with the
regulations specified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this AD, or if any
seating systems are shown to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces in
testing conducted to satisfy the original TSO authorization program
or subsequent verification tests required by this paragraph, within
2 years after the effective date of this AD, remove the non-
compliant seating systems.

    Note 3: For airplanes not required to comply with any 14 CFR
25.562 requirements in either original certification basis or post-
type certificate modifications, the use of an FAA Part 21 Production
Approval Holder to develop and conduct the test program (in
accordance with their procedures, including the control and
oversight of the test facility) will facilitate the FAA approval
process.