[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 85 (Thursday, May 4, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20823-20825]
[FR Doc No: 2017-08828]

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Rules and Regulations
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.

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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 85 / Thursday, May 4, 2017 / Rules
and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2016-9570; Directorate Identifier 2016-NM-185-AD;
Amendment 39-18866; AD 2017-09-04]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 707 airplanes and Model 720 and 720B series
airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that undetected web
fatigue cracking caused by oil canning may exist in the aft pressure
bulkhead web. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for any
oil canning or cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead web, and
corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective June 8, 2017.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of June 8,
2017.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA
90740-5600; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>. It is also available on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
9570.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
9570; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Garrido, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712-4137; phone:
562-627-5232; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company
Model 707 airplanes and Model 720 and 720B series airplanes. The NPRM
published in the Federal Register on January 6, 2017 (82 FR 1627). The
NPRM was prompted by a determination that undetected web fatigue
cracking caused by oil canning may exist in the station 1440 aft
pressure bulkhead web. The NPRM proposed to require repetitive detailed
inspections for any oil canning or cracking of the station 1440 aft
pressure bulkhead web, and corrective actions if necessary. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the aft
pressure bulkhead web, which could grow in length and ultimately reduce
the structural integrity of the web and lead to rapid decompression of
the airplane.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and
the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Change Service Information Citation

    Boeing requested that we spell out the full title of Boeing 707
Alert Service Bulletin A3543 instead of using the shortened ``ASB
A3543.'' Boeing pointed out that using the acronym ``ASB'' instead of
spelling out ``Alert Service Bulletin'' is a change from past
practices. Boeing stated that the ``A'' in front of the service
bulletin number is short for ``Alert'' and doesn't require a new
acronym. Boeing added that the shortened citation omitted the airplane
model number, which should always be included when referring to service
information.
    We agree with the request. We have abbreviated the titles of
service bulletins to simplify ADs in response to other AD comments.
However, we did not intend to remove the airplane model number.
Therefore, we have changed the citation throughout this final rule as
requested.

Request To Clarify ``Required for Compliance (RC) Exempt'' Steps

    Boeing requested that we change paragraph (j)(4)(ii) of the
proposed AD to read ``Steps not labeled as RC, or labeled as `RC
Exempt,' may be deviated from . . . .'' Boeing stated that it intended
to include the same treatment for steps labeled ``RC Exempt'' as for
steps not labeled as RC. Boeing asserted that this needed to be
explicitly stated in paragraph (j)(4)(ii) of the proposed AD, just as
it is in paragraph (j)(4)(i) of the proposed AD.
    We disagree because we find that this additional language is not
necessary. As paragraph (j)(4)(i) of the proposed AD states, if a step
is labeled ``RC Exempt,'' then the RC requirement is removed from that
step. Therefore, steps labeled as ``RC Exempt'' are treated the same as
those not labeled RC. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the change described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and

     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    We reviewed Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated
September 15, 2016. The service information describes procedures for
repetitive detailed inspections for any oil canning or cracking of the
station 1440 aft pressure bulkhead web, and related corrective actions.
This service information is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 12 airplanes of U.S. registry. We
estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost on U.S.
              Action                    Labor cost        Parts cost    Cost per  product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection for oil canning.......  6 work-hours x $85             $0  $510 per inspection   $6,120 per
                                    per hour = $510 per                cycle.                inspection cycle.
                                    inspection cycle.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We estimate the following costs to do any additional inspections
that would be required based on the results of the initial inspection.
These cost estimates are for one oil canning location. We have no way
of determining the number of aircraft that might need these actions:

                           On-Condition Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Cost per
            Action                Labor cost     Parts cost    product
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil canning zone               1 work-hour x             $0          $85
 determination and inspection.  $85 per hour =
                                $85.
Detailed inspection and eddy   13 work-hours x            0        1,105
 current inspection for         $85 per hour =
 cracks.                        $1,105.
High frequency eddy current    2 work-hours x             0          170
 inspection for crack           $85 per hour =
 location, length, and          $170.
 orientation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have received no definitive data that would enable us to provide
cost estimates for certain corrective actions specified in this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13   [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

2017-09-04 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18866; Docket No. FAA-
2016-9570; Directorate Identifier 2016-NM-185-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective June 8, 2017.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to the airplanes, certificated in any category,
as identified in Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated
September 15, 2016, and in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
    (1) The Boeing Company Model 707-100 Long Body, -200, -100B Long
Body, and -100B Short Body series airplanes; and Model 707-300, -
300B, -300C, and -400 series airplanes.
    (2) The Boeing Company Model 720 and 720B series airplanes.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53, Fuselage.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a determination that undetected web
fatigue cracking caused by oil canning may exist in the station 1440
aft pressure bulkhead web. We are issuing this AD to detect and
correct fatigue cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead web, which
could grow in length and ultimately reduce the structural integrity
of the web and lead to rapid decompression of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Repetitive Inspections and Related Investigative and Corrective
Actions

    At the applicable time specified in paragraph 1.E.,
``Compliance,'' of Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated
September 15, 2016, except as required by paragraph (h)(1) of this
AD: Do all applicable actions specified in paragraphs (g)(1),
(g)(2), and (g)(3) of this AD, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated
September 15, 2016, except as required by paragraph (h)(2) of this
AD.
    (1) Do a detailed inspection of the station 1440 aft pressure
bulkhead web for any oil canning. Repeat the inspection at the
applicable time specified in paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of
Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated September 15, 2016.
    (2) Do all applicable related investigative actions, including
detailed, eddy current, and high frequency eddy current (HFEC)
inspections. Repeat the applicable inspections thereafter at the
applicable time specified in paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of
Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated September 15, 2016.
    (3) Do all applicable corrective actions at the applicable time
specified in paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of Boeing 707 Alert
Service Bulletin A3543, dated September 15, 2016.

(h) Service Information Exceptions

    (1) Where Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated
September 15, 2016, specifies a compliance time ``after the original
issue date of this service bulletin,'' this AD requires compliance
within the specified compliance time after the effective date of
this AD.
    (2) Where Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated
September 15, 2016, specifies to contact Boeing for repair
instructions, and specifies that action as Required for Compliance
(RC), this AD requires repair using a method approved in accordance
with the procedures specified in paragraph (j) of this AD.

(i) Special Flight Permit

    Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections
21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197
and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the airplane
can be repaired, but if any crack is found as identified in Boeing
707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated September 15, 2016,
concurrence by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), FAA, is required before issuance of the special flight
permit.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request
to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District
Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the
manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person
identified in paragraph (k) of this AD. Information may be emailed
to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
    (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD
if it is approved by the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the
Manager, Los Angeles ACO, to make those findings. To be approved,
the repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation
must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval
must specifically refer to this AD.
    (4) Except as required by paragraph (h) of this AD: For service
information that contains steps that are labeled as RC, the
provisions of paragraphs (j)(4)(i) and (j)(4)(ii) of this AD apply.
    (i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. If a step or substep is labeled ``RC Exempt,'' then the
RC requirement is removed from that step or substep. An AMOC is
required for any deviations to RC steps, including substeps and
identified figures.
    (ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.

(k) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact George Garrido,
Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Los Angeles
Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, CA 90712-4137; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>;
email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Boeing 707 Alert Service Bulletin A3543, dated September 15,
2016.
    (ii) Reserved.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-
5600; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 24, 2017.
Paul Bernado,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2017-08828 Filed 5-3-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 92 (Monday, May 13, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27961-27962]
[FR Doc No: 2013-11280]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. OR13-19-000]

Enbridge Pipelines (Illinois) LLC; Notice of Petition for
Declaratory Order

    Take notice that on May 2, 2013, pursuant to Rule 207(a)(2) of the
Commission's Rules of Practices and Procedure, 18 CFR
385.207(a)(2)(2012), Enbridge Pipelines (Illinois) LLC filed a petition
seeking a declaratory order approving priority service, rate structure,
and lottery apportionment

provisions for the proposed Southern Access Extension Project. Enbridge
Illinois states that the Project is a 165 mile pipeline designed to
transport both light and heavy crude petroleum from Flanagan, Illinois
to the pipeline hub at Patoka, Illinois, and asks that the Commission
act expeditiously on the Petition.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date. On or
before the comment date, it is not necessary to serve motions to
intervene or protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription''
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive email
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For
assistance with any FERC Online service, please email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For
TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Comment Date: 5:00 p.m. Eastern time on June 3, 2013.

    Dated: May 7, 2013.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-11280 Filed 5-10-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 169 (Friday, September 1, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 60402-60406]
[FR Doc No: 2023-18612]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2023-1720; Project Identifier MCAI-2023-00003-R]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for Airbus Helicopters Model SA-365C1, SA-365C2, and SA-365N
helicopters. This proposed AD was prompted by reports of damaged
control rod dual bearings (dual bearings) that are installed on the
tail rotor gearbox (TGB). This proposed AD would require repetitively
inspecting the TGB magnetic plug for particles, analyzing any particles
collected, taking corrective actions if necessary, and reporting
certain information. Finally, this proposed AD would allow an affected
dual bearing to be installed on a helicopter if certain actions are
accomplished, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) AD, which is proposed for incorporation by reference. The FAA is
proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 16,
2023.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow
the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2023-1720; or in person at Docket Operations between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD
docket contains this NPRM, the EASA AD, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed
above.
    Material Incorporated by Reference:
     For EASA material that is proposed for incorporation by
reference in this NPRM, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668
Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email [email protected];
internet easa.europa.eu. You may find the EASA material on the EASA
website at ad.easa.europa.eu.
     You may view this material at the FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>. The EASA material is also
available at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2023-1720.
    Other Related Service Information: For Airbus Helicopters service
information identified in this NPRM, contact Airbus Helicopters, 2701
North Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER> or
(800) 232-0323; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; or at airbus.com/en/products-services/helicopters/hcare-services/airbusworld.

You may also view this service information at the FAA contact
information under Material Incorporated by Reference above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kevin Kung, Aviation Safety Engineer,
FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone
(781) 238-7244; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed
under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2023-1720; Project Identifier
MCAI-2023-00003-R'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposal because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal
contact received about this NPRM.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Kevin
Kung, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, NY 11590; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; email [email protected]. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not
specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for
this rulemaking.

Background

    EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the
European Union, has issued a series of EASA ADs with the most recent
being EASA AD 2023-0001, dated January 4, 2023 (EASA AD 2023-0001), to
correct an unsafe condition for Airbus Helicopters Model SA 365 C1, SA
365 C2, SA 365 C3, and SA 365 N helicopters, all manufacturer serial
numbers.
    This proposed AD was prompted by reports of damaged dual bearings
that are installed on the TGB. The FAA is proposing this AD to inspect
for particles in the TGB magnetic plug. The unsafe condition, if not
addressed, could result in loss of yaw control and subsequent loss of
control of the helicopter.
    You may examine EASA AD 2023-0001 in the AD docket at
regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2023-1720.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    EASA AD 2023-0001 requires continuing close monitoring for certain
helicopters and analyzing any particles collected during required
inspections, repetitively inspecting the magnetic plug of the TGB for
particles, and corrective actions. Corrective actions include replacing
or repairing an affected TGB; sending certain information and affected
parts to the manufacturer; accomplishing a metallurgical analysis; and
replacing an affected dual bearing and other affected parts.
    Additionally, EASA AD 2023-0001 requires for certain helicopters
with an affected dual bearing installed, performing a one-time
inspection of the dual bearing.
    EASA AD 2023-0001 allows a dual bearing part number (P/N) 360A33-
4052-00 installed on a control rod of a TGB P/N 365A33-4000-00, 365A33-
4000-01, 365A33-4000-02, or 365A33-5000-00 to be installed on an
aircraft, if certain requirements are met.
    This material is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Other Related Service Information

    The FAA reviewed Airbus Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin (ASB)
No. AS365-05.00.83 and Airbus Helicopters ASB No. SA365-05.35, both
Revision 0, and both dated February 7, 2022. This service information
specifies procedures to inspect the magnetic plug of the TGB for
particles; analyze and define the particles collected; replace an
affected TGB and an affected dual bearing; perform a metallurgical
analysis; and report certain information to the manufacturer.
    The FAA also reviewed Airbus Helicopters ASB No. AS365-65.00.20
Revision 0, dated November 23, 2022. This service information specifies
procedures for a one-time inspection of a certain dual bearing and
replacement of the dual bearing if any particles are found.
    Additionally, the FAA reviewed Airbus Standard Practices Manual,
20-08-01-601, Periodical monitoring of lubricating oil checking
elements, dated July 7, 2020. This service information specifies
procedures for analyzing collected particles.

FAA's Determination

    These helicopters have been approved by EASA and are approved for
operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral
agreement with the European Union, EASA has notified the FAA about the
unsafe condition described in its AD. The FAA is proposing this AD
after determining that the unsafe condition described previously is
likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of the same type
design.

Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM

    This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified
in EASA AD 2023-0001, described previously, as incorporated by
reference, except for any differences identified as exceptions in the
regulatory text of this proposed AD and discussed under ``Differences
Between this Proposed AD and the EASA AD.''

Explanation of Required Compliance Information

    In the FAA's ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the AD
process, the FAA developed a process to use some civil aviation
authority (CAA) ADs as the primary source of information for compliance
with requirements for corresponding FAA ADs. The FAA has been
coordinating this process with manufacturers and CAAs. As a result, the
FAA proposes to incorporate EASA AD 2023-0001 by reference in the FAA
final rule. This proposed AD would, therefore, require compliance with
EASA AD 2023-0001 AD in its entirety through that incorporation, except
for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of
this proposed AD. Using common terms that are the same

as the heading of a particular section in EASA AD 2023-0001 does not
mean that operators need comply only with that section. For example,
where the AD requirement refers to ``all required actions and
compliance times,'' compliance with this AD requirement is not limited
to the section titled ``Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s)'' in
EASA AD 2023-0001. Service information referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001
for compliance will be available at regulations.gov under Docket No.
FAA-2023-1720 after the FAA final rule is published.

Differences Between This Proposed AD and the EASA AD

    EASA AD 2023-0001 applies to Airbus Helicopters Model SA 365 C3
helicopters, whereas this proposed AD would not because that model is
not FAA type-certificated.
    This proposed AD would clarify that Model SA-365N helicopters with
an affected dual bearing installed that has an unknown total number of
hours time-in-service accumulated on the dual bearing would be subject
to certain requirements in this proposed AD, whereas EASA AD 2023-0001
is unclear about those parts with an accumulated usage that cannot be
determined.
    EASA AD 2023-0001 does not clarify what is considered an anomaly
regarding the chip detector and conical housing chip detector; whereas,
for this proposed AD, an anomaly may be indicated by the magnetic
component of the TGB chip detector or the conical housing chip detector
not being magnetized. EASA AD 2023-0001 also does not clarify what is
considered good condition regarding the chip detector or conical
housing chip detector; whereas, for this proposed AD, good condition
for the chip detector is indicated when there are no signs of wear on
the locking systems (including wear on the bayonets and slotted tubes)
and good condition for the conical housing chip detector is when the
conical housing chip detector is magnetized.
    Where EASA AD 2023-0001 describes a doubt concerning the physical
characteristics of any collected particles, this AD requires performing
a metallurgical analysis. If there is any doubt remaining after
performing the metallurgical analysis, EASA AD 2023-0001 requires
contacting Airbus, whereas this proposed AD would require removing an
affected TGB from service and replacing it with an airworthy part, or
repairing the TGB in accordance with a method approved by the FAA,
EASA, or Airbus Helicopters' Design Organizational Approval.
    If any particles (including abrasion-type particles) are found on
the magnetic plug during any inspection that are outside the limits,
EASA AD 2023-0001 requires replacing each affected dual bearing with a
serviceable dual bearing, and replacing the TGB, whereas this proposed
AD would require removing each affected dual bearing and replacing with
a serviceable dual bearing, or removing the TGB from service and
replacing it with an airworthy TGB, or repairing the TGB in accordance
with a method approved by the FAA, EASA, or Airbus Helicopters' Design
Organization Approval.
    Service information referenced in EASA AD 20223-0001 permits a
pilot to perform a magnetic plug check, whereas this proposed AD would
not.
    Service information referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies
sending compliance forms, certain parts, and particles to the
manufacturer, whereas this proposed AD would require reporting certain
information but would not require sending any parts or particles to the
manufacturer.

Interim Action

    The FAA considers this proposed AD would be an interim action. If
final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further
rulemaking then.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would
affect 1 helicopter of U.S. Registry. Labor rates are estimated at $85
per work-hour. Based on these numbers, the FAA estimates the following
costs to comply with this proposed AD.
    Inspecting the magnetic plug of the TGB for particles would take
about 1 work-hour for an estimated cost of $85 per inspection and up to
$85 for the U.S. fleet, per inspection cycle.
    Inspecting a dual bearing would take about 16 work-hours for an
estimated cost of $1,360 per inspection and up to $1,360 for the U.S.
fleet. If required, replacing a dual bearing would take about 1
additional work-hour following the inspection and parts would cost
about $6,678 for an estimated cost of $6,763 per dual bearing
replacement.
    If required, analyzing collected particles would take about 1 work-
hour for an estimated cost of $85 per helicopter. If required, a
metallurgical analysis would take about 1 work-hour for an estimated
cost of $85 per instance.
    If required, replacing an O-ring would take about 1 work-hour and
parts would cost about $100 for an estimated cost of $185 per O-ring.
    If required, replacing a TGB would take about 8 work-hours and
parts would cost about $155,302 for an estimated cost of $155,982 per
replacement.
    The FAA has received no definitive data for the repair cost of a
TGB.
    If required, reporting information to the manufacturer would take
about 1 work-hour for an estimated cost of $85 per instance.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for
failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of
information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB
Control Number for this information collection is 2120-0056. Public
reporting for this collection of information is estimated to take
approximately 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing
instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
collection of information. All responses to this collection of
information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate
or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden, to: Information Collection
Clearance Officer, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood
Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177-1524.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:

Airbus Helicopters: Docket No. FAA-2023-1720; Project Identifier
MCAI-2023-00003-R.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive
(AD) by October 16, 2023.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Model SA-365C1, SA-365C2,
and SA-365N helicopters, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6520, Tail rotor
gearbox.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of damaged control rod dual
bearings (dual bearings) installed on the tail rotor gearbox (TGB).
The FAA is issuing this AD to inspect for particles in the TGB
magnetic plug. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result
in loss of yaw control and subsequent loss of control of the
helicopter.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Requirements

    Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in
accordance with, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD
2023-0001, dated January 4, 2023 (EASA AD 2023-0001).

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2023-0001

    (1) Where EASA AD 2023-0001 requires compliance in terms of
flight hours, this AD requires using hours time-in-service.
    (2) Where EASA AD 2023-0001 refers to the effective dates
specified in paragraphs (h)(2)(i) and (ii) of this AD, this AD
requires using the effective date of this AD.
    (i) March 21, 2022 (the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0038,
dated March 7, 2022).
    (ii) The effective date of EASA AD 2023-0001.
    (3) Where EASA AD 2023-0001 defines Groups, for Group 2, replace
the text ``SA 365 N helicopters with an affected part installed that
has accumulated 500 flight hours (FH) or more since first
installation on a helicopter,'' with ``SA-365N helicopters with an
affected part installed that has accumulated 500 or more total hours
time-in-service on the affected part or the total hours time-in-
service on the affected part cannot be determined.''
    (4) Where the service information referenced in EASA AD 2023-
0001 permits a pilot to perform a check of the magnetic plug, this
AD requires that action be performed by a person authorized under 14
CFR 43.3.
    (5) Where Note 1 of EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies, ``Helicopters
that were under close monitoring on March 21 2022 (the effective
date of EASA AD 2022-0038) must continue the close monitoring
procedure up to the first inspection accomplished in accordance with
the instructions of ASB 1;'' for this AD, replace that text with,
``Helicopters that are under close monitoring as of the effective
date of this AD, must continue close monitoring until the first
instance of the requirements in paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2023-0001
are completed.''
    (6) Where EASA AD 2023-0001 requires replacing the TGB and the
service information referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies
replacing the TGB, for this AD, before further flight, remove the
TGB from service and replace it with an airworthy part, or repair
the TGB in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Europe
Middle East & Africa Section, International Validation Branch, FAA;
EASA; or Airbus Helicopters' Design Organization Approval (DOA). If
approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized
signature.
    (7) Where paragraphs (5) and (6) of EASA AD 2023-0001 require
replacing an affected part, as defined in EASA AD 2023-0001, with a
serviceable part, as defined in EASA AD 2023-0001; for this AD,
remove the affected part, as defined in EASA AD 2023-0001, from
service and replace it with a serviceable part, as defined in EASA
AD 2023-0001.
    (8) Where paragraph (5) of EASA AD 2023-0001 does not specify a
compliance time; for this AD, the compliance time for those actions
is before further flight.
    (9) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies to do the actions
identified in paragraphs (h)(9)(i) and (ii) of this AD, this AD does
not include those requirements.
    (i) Comply with paragraph 2.D., except this AD requires
reporting information, including the information in Appendix 4. of
the service information, in accordance with paragraph (h)(18) of
this AD.
    (ii) Send parts and particles to Airbus Helicopters.
    (10) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies replacing the chip
detector or conical housing chip detector if there is an anomaly;
for this AD, an anomaly may be indicated by the magnetic component
of the TGB chip detector or the conical housing chip detector not
being magnetized. If there is an anomaly, this AD requires before
further flight, removing from service the TGB chip detector or the
conical housing chip detector, as applicable to your model
helicopter.
    (11) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies making sure that the chip
detector or conical housing chip detector is in good condition; for
this AD, good condition for the chip detector is indicated when
there are no signs of wear on the locking systems (including wear on
the bayonets and slotted tubes). If there are any signs of wear on
the locking systems, this AD requires, before further flight,
removing the TGB chip detector from service. Good condition for the
conical housing chip detector is when the conical housing chip
detector is magnetized. If the conical housing chip detector is not
being magnetized, this AD requires, before further flight, removing
the conical housing chip detector from service.
    (12) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies replacing the O-rings if
necessary; this AD requires, before further flight, removing any
affected O-ring from service and replacing it with an airworthy O-
ring.
    (13) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies removing an affected TGB,
returning it to an approved workshop, including sending all the
particles found in the affected part; this AD requires, before
further flight, removing an affected TGB from service and replacing
it with an airworthy part, or repairing the TGB in accordance with a
method approved by the Manager, Europe Middle East & Africa Section,
International Validation Branch, FAA; EASA; or Airbus Helicopters'
DOA. If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-
authorized signature. You are not required to send the particles
found

in the TGB to Airbus Helicopters or send an affected TGB to an
approved workshop.
    (14) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies to use tooling, this AD
allows the use of equivalent tooling.
    (15) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies discarding certain parts,
this AD requires removing those parts from service.
    (16) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies performing a metallurgical
analysis of particles if there is a doubt concerning the type, size,
or classification of any collected particle, this AD requires,
before further flight, performing a metallurgical analysis if the
type, size, or classification of any collected particle cannot be
determined.
    (17) Where the service information (including any work card)
referenced in EASA AD 2023-0001 specifies if there is any doubt
remaining (pertaining to particle classification) after performing a
metallurgical analysis, contact Airbus, this AD requires, before
further flight, removing an affected TGB from service and replacing
it with an airworthy part, or repairing the TGB in accordance with a
method approved by the Manager, Europe Middle East & Africa Section,
International Validation Branch, FAA; EASA; or Airbus Helicopters'
DOA. If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-
authorized signature.
    (18) Where the service information referenced in EASA AD 2023-
0001 requires reporting inspection results, including Appendix 4.A.,
to Airbus Helicopters, if any M50 particles are found, this AD
requires reporting those inspection results along with a detailed
description of any information and findings, and if possible,
provide photos, at the applicable time in paragraph (h)(18)(i) or
(ii) of this AD.
    (i) If the inspection was done on or after the effective date of
this AD: Submit the report within 10 days after accomplishing the
metallurgical analysis.
    (ii) If the inspection was done before the effective date of
this AD: Submit the report within 10 days after the effective date
of this AD.
    (19) This AD does not adopt the ``Remarks'' section of EASA AD
2023-0001.

(i) Special Flight Permits

    Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR
21.197 and 21.199, provided no passengers are onboard.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send
it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of
this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.

(k) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Kevin Kung, Aviation
Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY
11590; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; email [email protected].

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2023-0001,
dated January 4, 2023.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) For EASA AD 2023-0001, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3,
50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email
[email protected]; Internet easa.europa.eu. You may find the EASA
material on the EASA website at ad.easa.europa.eu.
    (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Office of
the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room
6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, email
[email protected], or go to: www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued on August 23, 2023.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2023-18612 Filed 8-31-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register: September 22, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 184)]
[Notices]
[Page 55525-55526]
[DOCID:fr22se06-155]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

Upon written request, copies available from: Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of Filings and Information Services, Washington, DC
20549.

    Extension:

    Rule 27f-1 and Form N-27F-1; SEC File No. 270-487; OMB Control
No. 3235-0546.

    Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (``Commission'') has submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget (``OMB'') a request for extension of the previously approved
collection of information discussed below.
    Section 27(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (``Act'') (15
U.S.C. 80a-27(f)) provides that ``[w]ith respect to any periodic
payment plan (other than a plan under which the amount of sales load
deducted from any payment thereon does not exceed 9 per centum of such
payment), the custodian bank for such plan shall mail to each
certificate holder, within sixty days after the issuance of the
certificate, a statement of charges to be deducted from the projected
payments on the certificate and a notice of his right of withdrawal as
specified in this section.''
    Section 27(f) authorizes the Commission to ``make rules specifying
the method, form, and contents of the notice required by this
subsection.'' Rule 27f-1 (17 CFR 270.27f-1) under the Act, entitled
``Notice of Right of Withdrawal Required to be Mailed to Periodic
Payment Plan Certificate Holders and Exemption from Section 27(f) for
Certain Periodic Payment Plan Certificates,'' provides instructions for
the delivery of the notice required by section 27(f).
    Rule 27f-1(d) prescribes Form N-27F-1 (17 CFR 274.127f-1), which
sets forth the language that custodian banks for periodic payment plans
must use in informing certificate holders of their withdrawal right
pursuant to section 27(f). The instructions to the form provide that
the notice must be on the sender's letterhead. The Commission does not
receive a copy of the Form N-27F-1 notice.
    The Form N-27F-1 notice informs certificate holders of their rights
in connection with the certificates they hold. Specifically, it is
intended to encourage new purchasers of plan certificates to reassess
the costs and benefits of their investment and to provide them with an
opportunity to recover their initial investment without penalty. The
disclosure assists certificate holders in making careful and fully
informed decisions about whether to invest in periodic payment plan
certificates.
    The frequency with which each of these issuers or their
representatives must file Form N-27F-1 notices varies with the number
of periodic payment plans sold. Commission staff spoke with
representatives of a number of firms in the industry that currently
have periodic payment plan accounts. Based upon these conversations,
the staff estimates that 3 issuers of periodic payment plan
certificates send out an aggregate of approximately 535 notices per
year. The staff further estimates that all the issuers that send Form
N-27F-1 notices use outside contractors to print and distribute the
notices, and incur no hourly burden. The estimate of annual burden
hours is made solely for the purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act,
and is not derived from a comprehensive or even a representative survey
or study of the costs of Commission rules and forms.
    Complying with the collection of information requirements of Rule
27f-1 is mandatory for custodian banks of periodic payment plans for
which the sales load deducted from any payment exceeds 9 percent of the
payment.\1\ The information provided pursuant to Rule 27f-1 will be
provided to third parties and, therefore, will not be kept
confidential. The Commission is seeking OMB approval, because an agency
may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,
a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid
control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The rule also permits the issuer, its principal underwriter,
its depositor, or its record-keeping agent to mail the notice if the
custodian bank has delegated the mailing of the notice to any of
them or if the issuer has been permitted to operate without a
custodian bank by Commission order. See 17 CFR 270.27f-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    General comments regarding the above information should be directed
to the following persons: (i) Desk Officer for the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, Room 10102, New Executive Office
Building, Washington, DC 20503 or by e-mail to:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>and (ii) R. Corey Booth, Director/Chief

Information Officer, Securities and Exchange Commission, c/o Shirley
Martinson, 6432 General Green Way, Alexandria, Virginia 22312, or by e-
mail to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Comments must be submitted to OMB within
30 days of this notice.

    Dated: September 11, 2006.
Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 06-7999 Filed 9-21-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8010-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 42 (Friday, March 3, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13494-13497]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04415]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Safety Advisory 2023-01; Evaluation of Policies and Procedures
Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: Preliminary investigation of recent train derailments
indicates the cause of, or contributing factor to, the incidents was a
mechanical failure, specifically burnt journal bearings. Accordingly,
FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory to make recommendations to enhance
the mechanical reliability of rolling stock and the safety of railroad
operations. This Safety Advisory recommends that railroads: evaluate
the thresholds for inspections based on hot bearing detector (HBD)
data; consider the use of real-time trend analyses of HBD data as a
criterion for inspection; ensure the proper training and qualification
of personnel responsible for the calibration, inspection, and
maintenance of HBDs; ensure proper inspection of rolling stock with HBD
alerts; and improve the safety culture of their organization,
particularly as it pertains to operational decisions based on HBD data.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Alexy, Associate Administrator
for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Office of Railroad
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, (202)-
493-6282.
    Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws,
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to
bind the public in any way. This document does not revise or replace
any previously issued guidance.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Federal rail safety and hazardous materials transportation
regulations (HMR) set minimum safety standards for the rail
transportation of hazardous materials.\1\ Among other things, those
regulations include packaging, hazard communication, and operational
requirements applicable to the rail transportation of all materials
designated as hazardous materials. The HMR additionally include
provisions specifically applicable to trains transporting large
quantities of certain hazardous materials known as ``high-hazard
flammable trains'' (HHFTs) and ``high-hazard flammable unit trains''
(HHFUTs).\2\ These additional regulations applicable to HHFTs and
HHFUTs include certain safety and security planning requirements,
operational restrictions, and requirements related to ensuring State
and local governments are notified of the types and quantities of
hazardous materials transported through their jurisdictions.\3\
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    \1\ 49 CFR parts 200 through 299 and 49 CFR parts 171 through
185.
    \2\ An HHFT is ``a single train transporting 20 or more loaded
tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a
single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3
flammable liquid throughout the train consist.'' An HHFUT is ``a
single train transporting 70 or more loaded tank cars containing
Class 3 flammable liquid.'' 49 CFR 171.8.
    \3\ See 49 CFR part 172, subpart I.
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    Although compliance with all applicable Federal regulations is a
critical part of ensuring the safety of rail transportation of
hazardous materials, the use of certain technologies (e.g., wayside
detectors), as FRA has previously acknowledged, has enabled railroads
to develop new methods and processes for identifying defects in rail
equipment and infrastructure as compared to those methods contemplated
under applicable Federal regulations. For example, railroads have
installed wayside detectors to assess the health of rail equipment and
infrastructure to enable the early identification of mechanical or
other defects.
    Recognizing the value of wayside detection systems, if they are
appropriately installed, maintained, and utilized, in 2015, FRA issued
Safety Advisory 2015-01 addressing the use of wheel impact load
detectors (WILDs) as

applied to HHFTs.\4\ WILDs are designed to identify wheels on a railcar
that may have flat spots or other defects. Specifically, FRA
recommended that railroads continue to install and maintain WILDs along
HHFT routes and that railroads lower the impact thresholds of the
detectors that determine when corrective actions are to be taken. FRA
also recommended that railroads use highly qualified individuals to
conduct brake and mechanical inspections on those trains.
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    \4\ https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/mechanical-inspections-and-wheel-impact-load-detector-standards-trains-transporting-large.
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    In Safety Advisory 2015-01, FRA referenced the July 6, 2013,
catastrophic rail accident in Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada, and
its tragic consequences. The Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident made clear
the risk of transporting large amounts of hazardous materials,
including large amounts of flammable liquids. FRA also referenced the
March 5, 2015, derailment of a BNSF Railway Co. train that resulted in
a release of petroleum crude oil, as well as a series of other
derailments involving crude oil and ethanol, both designated as Class 3
flammable liquid hazardous materials under the HMR.
    Each of the accidents referenced in Safety Advisory 2015-01
demonstrates the potential consequences of train derailments involving
hazardous materials, even if a train does not meet the definition of a
HHFT or HHFUT.
    Since 2021, at least five derailments occurred that were suspected
of being caused by burnt journal bearings.\5\ Three of those five
derailments, all occurring on the Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) are
discussed below. Two other derailments, reported to FRA by the Kansas
City Southern Railway (KCS), occurred on August 2, 2021, and December
3, 2021, and in both cases, wayside detectors, known as HBDs,\6\
flagged a suspect bearing, but the crews were either unable to act in
time to prevent a derailment or were directed to continue the train
move resulting in a derailment. These investigate into each of these
accidents is ongoing, but they demonstrate not only the potential
catastrophic consequences of a train derailment involving hazardous
materials, but also the importance of implementing appropriate
standards, processes, and procedures governing the use of HBDs.
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    \5\ The four derailments include two derailments reported to FRA
by the Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS) in 2021 and the Warner
Robins, Georgia, and Sandusky, Ohio, accidents discussed below. The
2021 KCS derailments occurred on August 2, 2021, and December 3,
2021, respectively, and in both cases, an HBD flagged a suspect
bearing, but the crews were either unable to act in time to prevent
a derailment or were directed to continue the train move resulting
in a derailment.
    \6\ HBDs are devices used to assess the health of railcar
bearings by monitoring their temperatures. The system consists of
the following: wheel sensors to detect an approaching train and to
turn on the scanning equipment; an axle counter; thermal sensors for
reading axle bearing temperatures (i.e., one sensor on each side of
the train); and thermal sensors for reading bearing temperatures on
each side of the train. HBD systems detect and record infrared
energy (heat) from each roller bearing. The heat signal from each
roller bearing is stored digitally and measured against pre-
established thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Warner Robins, GA--July 12, 2022

    On July 10, 2022, at 6 a.m. EDT, Train 175, consisting of 2
locomotives and 123 cars, departed Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Macon,
Georgia. During the trip, a series of warnings from HBDs of an
overheated journal bearing on one car in the consist (car PPTX 3293)
were logged into NS's wayside desk system. The dispatcher transmitted
the third alert to the crew. The crew stopped the train and inspected
the journal bearing of concern, reporting that the car behind PPTX 3293
had been sprayed with lubricating grease, which is an indication that
the journal bearing in question was leaking and defective. The crew was
instructed to continue the train movement and to ``keep an eye [on] the
axle over the next couple of detectors.'' The train arrived at Macon,
Georgia, traveling about 75 track miles and passing additional
detectors that did not record any alerts. In Macon, Train 175 was
terminated and a block of cars including PPTX 3293 was added to a
different train, Train 151. PPTX 3293 was not inspected by mechanical
personnel or set out for repair before it was added to Train 151. In
addition, during the same time, the NS system sent an email to all area
dispatchers informing them of a condemnable bearing on PPTX 3293 with a
conflicting message that if the journal bearing is deemed to be safe
for continued movement it is required to be repaired at the next switch
event. A similar message was also sent to mechanical personnel.
    Subsequently, Train 151, consisting of 3 locomotives and 139 cars,
departed Macon, Georgia, on July 12, 2022. At 5:11 p.m., after
traveling approximately 15 track miles, Train 151 passed the first HBD
in Warner Robins, GA. The HBD reported a bearing temperature on PPTX
3293 to be 263 [deg]F above the ambient temperature. After a few
minutes, the HBD emitted a warning ``talker message'' \7\ to the crew
of Train 151. The crew acknowledged that they received the message but
claimed they did not have time to react. At 5:13 p.m., the lead
locomotive of Train 151 reached a grade crossing at MP 15.98G in Warner
Robins. A dash camera from a police car at the crossing captured the
train as it approached the crossing, showing PPTX 3293 being dragged
over the crossing with one of the trucks on the ground. Train 151 then
derailed seconds after PPTX 3293 cleared the crossing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ A prerecorded auditory alert that is meant to inform train
crews of imminent hazards pertaining to equipment in their train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sandusky, OH--October 8, 2022

    On October 8, 2022, at approximately 4:20 p.m. EDT, NS Train 310-
08, consisting of 3 headend locomotives with 98 freight cars and 3
locomotives in tow (dead-in-tow), derailed 1 of the dead-in-tow
locomotives and 20 freight cars. The train was traveling east from
Elkhart, Indiana to Cleveland, Ohio when the train derailed near MP
240.
    Prior to the derailment location, the train crew did not receive
any HBD alarms for an overheated journal bearing, but instead the crew
was contacted by the dispatcher to ensure they were aware of the
suspect bearing in their train. Upon notification from the dispatcher,
the crew stopped the train and noticed smoke coming from the journal
bearing. The crew requested permission to set out the subject car
multiple times and requested support from mechanical inspectors. After
two hours, while the train remained stopped on the mainline, NS sent an
electrician to investigate the crew's report. The electrician reported
the smoke had stopped and the bearing had cooled. The crew was then
directed to move the train. After the train travelled another 7 miles,
it derailed due to a burnt journal bearing. One axle on a ``dead-in-
tow'' locomotive failed catastrophically, causing the derailment.
Initial reports state one tank car placarded UN 3257 ``HOT'' was
punctured and leaked molten paraffin wax into the surroundings. This
derailment caused power outages to approximately 1,200 residents.

East Palestine, OH--February 3, 2023

    Most recently, on February 3, 2023, a NS general merchandise train
(i.e., a train not meeting the definition of an HHFT or HHFUT) derailed
in East Palestine, Ohio. The derailment resulted in a release of
hazardous materials, which subsequently fueled extensive fires,
damaging additional rail cars, and resulting in an evacuation that
affected up to approximately 2,000 residents. Although the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is the lead agency for the
investigation into this accident and has not yet reached final
conclusions as to probable cause,

preliminary information \8\ indicates that a burnt journal bearing \9\
may have played a role in the derailment. Preliminary information also
indicates that the train that derailed in East Palestine (Train 32N)
passed at least three wayside detectors before derailing. That
information indicates that, over the course of approximately 30 miles,
the HBDs recorded an increase of over 200 degrees in the temperature of
a car's journal bearing.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/RRD23MR005.aspx.
    \9\ A journal bearing is the mechanical subassembly on each end
of the axles of a wheel set of railroad rolling stock. The journal
bearing transfers the weight of freight car, coach or locomotive to
the wheels and rails while allowing the axle to spin; the bearing
design is typically roller bearings on newer rolling stock.
    \10\ NTSB Preliminary Report, Norfolk Southern Railway Train
Derailment with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires,
East Palestine, Ohio, February 3, 2023 (issued Feb. 23, 2023, and
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On February 3, 2023, at about 8:54 p.m. EST, eastbound NS Train 32N
(comprised of 2 headend locomotives, 149 freight cars, and 1
distributed power locomotive between the 109th and 110th freight cars
in the consist) derailed 38 railcars in East Palestine, Ohio. The
derailed equipment included 11 tank cars carrying hazardous materials
that subsequently ignited, fueling fires that damaged additional
railcars and resulted in the evacuation of up to 2,000 residents. There
were no reported fatalities or injuries. Preliminary information
indicates that the cause of the derailment may have been a burnt
journal bearing, as noted above.
    As further noted above, prior to derailing, Train 32N passed HBDs.
First, at milepost (MP) 79.9 in Sebring, Ohio, an HBD recorded a
temperature of 38 [deg]F above ambient temperature for one bearing on
the 23rd car in the consist. Approximately ten miles later, Train 32N
passed a second HBD (at MP 69.01 in Salem, Ohio), which recorded a
temperature of 103 [deg]F above ambient for the same bearing on the
23rd car. Finally, approximately twenty miles later (at MP 49.81 in
East Palestine), the train passed a third HBD, which recorded the
suspect bearing's temperature at 253 [deg]F above ambient.
    NS has established the following HBD temperature thresholds (above
ambient) and procedures:
     Between 170 [deg]F and 200 [deg]F, warm bearing (non-
critical); stop and inspect.
     A difference between bearings on the same axle greater
than or equal to 115 [deg]F (non-critical); stop and inspect.
     Greater than 200 [deg]F (critical); set out railcar.
    At milepost 49.81, as Train 32N passed the third HBD, which
measured the suspect bearing's temperature as 253 [deg]F above ambient,
the HBD transmitted a critical audible alarm message instructing the
crew to slow and stop the train to inspect a hot axle. The train
engineer attempted to slow and stop the train. During this
deceleration, an automatic emergency brake application initiated, and
Train 32N came to a stop. After the train stopped, the crew observed
fire and smoke and notified authorities.
Journal Bearings and Detecting Journal Bearing Defects
    Journal bearings are critical components of freight cars that serve
to transfer the weight of the car and its cargo to the axle while
allowing the axle, and its wheels to rotate. If a journal bearing is
defective (or becomes defective while in use), the temperature of the
bearing may increase and become overheated, to the point where the
bearing ceases to effectively perform its function. In some cases,
journal bearings with relatively large defects can run at normal
operating temperatures for tens of thousands of miles before any
abnormality in their operating temperature is observed. In other cases,
a bearing's raceway (i.e., the path or groove that the bearing moves
along) may deteriorate rapidly and cause excessive roller misalignment.
The misaligned rollers generate frictional heating, which can weaken an
axle in just a few minutes and may lead to a catastrophic derailment
depending on the traveling speed of the train and the weight of the
load the car with the defective bearing is carrying.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Defect detection in freight railcar tapered-roller bearings
using vibration techniques [bond] SpringerLink.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Detecting overheated journal bearings before they fail is critical
to accident prevention. Journal bearings are sealed components, and, as
such, often do not display ``tell-tale signs'' of overheating (e.g.,
leaking lubrication), making defects in journal bearings difficult to
identify through visual inspections. HBDs can serve an important role
in early detection of bearing defects, but the effectiveness of any HBD
system depends on numerous factors, including: (1) the establishment
and adherence to adequate maintenance standards and procedures; (2) the
establishment of safe thresholds at which to act on HBD alerts; and (3)
strict adherence to procedures that prescribe actions to be taken.
    Although there are no Federal regulations requiring the use of HBDs
for freight trains, or any regulations related to the inspection,
calibration, and maintenance of this equipment, there are existing
industry standards and manufacturer recommendations that railroads
should incorporate into existing inspection and maintenance practices.
Because defects in journal bearings are difficult to identify visually,
personnel charged with inspecting equipment subject to an HBD alert
should be properly trained and qualified. FRA encourages using
personnel trained and experienced in identifying critically hot
bearings, and with the demonstrated ability to properly evaluate the
condition of a suspect bearing. Further, FRA encourages railroads to
ensure these individuals are available at all hours of operations
across a railroad's network.
    Data is critical to identifying effective HBD temperature
thresholds for action (e.g., appropriate thresholds for a stop-and-
inspect requirement, or a mandatory remove-from-service requirement).
Additionally, as the East Palestine accident demonstrates, thresholds
for temperatures measured by HBDs requiring action should be
established for both single measurement and multiple measurements in a
temperature trend analysis.
    The procedures governing the use of HBD systems should be
sufficient to ensure all employees understand the meaning of any HBD
alert and are empowered to take appropriate action in response to those
alerts. The response procedures governing any HBD system should be
commensurate with the risk (specifically consequences) of a derailment.
For trains containing hazardous materials, the potential consequence of
a derailment is catastrophic, and allowing a train transporting a
hazardous material to continue to operate, without restriction, after
an HBD alert is likely not appropriate.
    FRA recommends that railroads consider expanding application of
Association of American Railroads (AAR) Circular OT-55 (Recommended
Railroad Operating Practices for the Transportation of Hazardous
Materials).\12\ According to Circular OT-55, if a defect in a ``Key
Train'' \13\

bearing is reported by a wayside detector, but a visual inspection
fails to confirm evidence of the defect, OT-55 prohibits the train from
exceeding 30 MPH until it has passed over the next wayside detector or
it is delivered to a terminal for a mechanical inspection. If the same
car again sets off the next detector or is found to be defective, it
must be set out from the train. This also provides the railroads the
opportunity to define a defect based on new/lower thresholds for HBD
alerts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ AAR Circular No. OT-55 (CPC-1348) (available at https://public.railinc.com/documents/ot-55pdf).
    \13\ AAR Circular OT-55 defines a ``Key Train'' as a train with:
    (1) one tank car load of a Poison Inhalation Hazard, anhydrous
ammonia, or ammonia solutions; or
    (2) 20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of any
combination of hazardous material; or
    (3) One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel or High Level
Radioactive Waste.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, FRA encourages the industry to continue to utilize
wayside detection technologies such as HBDs, but notes that to realize
the benefits of these technologies, railroads should identify
appropriate HBD impact thresholds for action, and implement and adhere
to appropriate procedures for action in the event of an HBD alert,
particularly on trains transporting hazardous materials.

Recommended Railroad Actions

    In light of the above discussion, FRA recommends that railroads
take the following actions:
    1. Review existing HBD system inspection and maintenance policies
and procedures for compliance with existing industry standards and
manufacturer recommendations for HBDs.
    2. Review existing procedures to train and qualify personnel
responsible for installing, inspecting, and maintaining HBDs to ensure
they have the appropriate knowledge and skills. Railroads should also
develop and implement appropriate training on the inspection and
maintenance requirements for HBDs and provide that training at
appropriate intervals to ensure the required knowledge and skill of
inspection and maintenance personnel. Further, railroads should
evaluate their training content and training frequency to ensure any
employee who may be called upon to evaluate a suspect bearing has the
necessary training, experience, and qualifications. FRA also encourages
railroads to ensure these individuals are available at all hours of
operations across a railroad's network.
    3. Review current HBD detector thresholds in light of recent
derailments, and all other relevant available data (including data from
any close calls or near misses), to determine the adequacy of the
railroad's current thresholds. Thresholds should be established for
single measurement as well as multiple measurements of individual
bearings to enable temperature trend analysis.
    4. Review current procedures governing actions responding to HBD
alerts to ensure required actions are commensurate with the risk of the
operation involved. With regard to trains transporting any quantity of
hazardous materials, FRA recommends railroads adopt the procedures
outlined in AAR's OT-55 for key trains as an initial measure.

Conclusion

    In general, the issues identified in this Safety Advisory are
indicators of a railroad's safety culture. Implementing procedures that
ensure safety, and training personnel so those procedures become second
nature, is vital. Equally important is the commitment, throughout the
organization, to safety and empowerment of personnel to live up to that
commitment. Specifically, personnel should be encouraged and empowered
to develop procedures that may temporarily impact operations, but
maximize safety, just as those executing the procedures should be
empowered to strictly adhere to those procedures, even if it delays a
train. The railroads should evaluate their safety culture not only as
it relates to the issues indicated in this Safety Advisory, but to all
aspects of their operations.
    FRA encourages railroads to take actions consistent with the
preceding recommendations, and any other complementary actions, to
ensure the safety of rail transportation. FRA may modify this Safety
Advisory, issue additional safety advisories, or take other actions
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under its
authority.

    Issued in Washington, DC.
Amitabha Bose,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-04415 Filed 3-2-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 147 (Tuesday, July 31, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 45239]
[FR Doc No: 2012-18539]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 71

[Docket No. FAA-2011-1366; Airspace Docket No. 11-ANE-13]

Amendment of Class E Airspace; Bar Harbor, ME

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action amends the Class E airspace area at Bar Harbor,
ME, as the Surry Non-Directional Radio Beacon (NDB) has been
decommissioned and new Standard Instrument Approach Procedures have
been developed at Hancock County-Bar Harbor Airport. This action
enhances the safety and airspace management of Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) operations within the National Airspace System. This action also
makes a minor adjustment to the geographic coordinates of the airport.

DATES: Effective 0901 UTC, September 20, 2012. The Director of the
Federal Register approves this incorporation by reference action under
title 1, Code of Federal Regulations, part 51, subject to the annual
revision of FAA Order 7400.9 and publication of conforming amendments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Fornito, Operations Support
Group, Eastern Service Center, Federal Aviation Administration, P.O.
Box 20636, Atlanta, Georgia 30320; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

History

    On May 11, 2012, the FAA published in the Federal Register a notice
of proposed rulemaking to amend Class E airspace at Bar Harbor, ME (77
FR 27666) Docket No. FAA-2011-1366. Interested parties were invited to
participate in this rulemaking effort by submitting written comments on
the proposal to the FAA. No comments were received. Class E airspace
designations are published in paragraph 6005 of FAA Order 7400.9V dated
August 9, 2011, and effective September 15, 2011, which is incorporated
by reference in 14 CFR Part 71.1. The Class E airspace designations
listed in this document will be published subsequently in the Order.

The Rule

    This amendment to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)
part 71 amends the Class E airspace area at Bar Harbor, ME, to support
new Standard Instrument Approach Procedures at Hancock County-Bar
Harbor Airport. The geographic coordinates for the airport are adjusted
to be in concert with the FAAs aeronautical database. This action
enhances the safety and management of IFR operations at the airport.
    The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an
established body of technical regulations for which frequent and
routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current, is
non-controversial and unlikely to result in adverse or negative
comments. It, therefore, (1) is not a ``significant regulatory action''
under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26,
1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a Regulatory Evaluation
as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter
that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is
certified that this rule, when promulgated, will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the
criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is
found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's
authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the
FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient
use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority
as it amends controlled airspace at Hancock County-Bar Harbor Airport,
Bar Harbor, ME.

Environmental Review

    The FAA has determined that this action qualifies for categorical
exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act in accordance
with FAA Order 1050.1E, ``Environmental Impacts: Policies and
Procedures,'' paragraph 311a. This airspace action is not expected to
cause any potentially significant environmental impacts, and no
extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant preparation of an
environmental assessment.

Lists of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 71

    Airspace, Incorporation by reference, Navigation (air).

Adoption of the Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends 14 CFR Part 71 as follows:

PART 71--DESIGNATION OF CLASS A, B, C, D, AND E AIRSPACE AREAS; AIR
TRAFFIC SERVICE ROUTES; AND REPORTING POINTS

0
1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g); 40103, 40113, 40120; E.O. 10854,
24 FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389.

Sec.  71.1  [Amended]

0
2. The incorporation by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 of Federal Aviation
Administration Order 7400.9V, Airspace Designations and Reporting
Points, dated August 9, 2011, effective September 15, 2011, is amended
as follows:

Paragraph 6005 Class E airspace areas extending upward from 700
feet or more above the surface of the earth.

* * * * *

ANE ME E5 Bar Harbor, ME [Amended]

Hancock County-Bar Harbor Airport, ME
    (Lat. 44[deg]26'59'' N., long. 68[deg]21'42'' W.)

    That airspace extending upward from 700 feet above the surface
within a 7.4-mile radius of Hancock County-Bar Harbor Airport.

    Issued in College Park, Georgia, on July 20, 2012.
Barry A. Knight,
Manager, Operations Support Group, Eastern Service Center, Air Traffic
Organization.
[FR Doc. 2012-18539 Filed 7-30-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P