include procedures to ensure the integrity of each containment used to
minimize exposures to employees outside of containments (such as tarps
or structures used to keep sandblasting debris within an enclosed area
during abrasive blasting operations). Paragraphs (f)(1)(ii) and (iii)
further provide requirements for maintaining, reviewing, and evaluating
the written exposure control plan and providing access to the plan to
each employee who is, or can reasonably be expected to be, exposed to
airborne beryllium. In the construction standard, the written exposure
control plan must be implemented by a competent person, as defined by
paragraph (b) (paragraph (e)(2)).
    Paragraph (f)(1) in this final rule contains several changes from
the prior standards, as proposed in the December 2019 NPRM. First, OSHA
proposed to revise paragraph (f)(1)(i)(A) by removing the words
``airborne'' and ``or dermal contact with'' as qualifiers for exposure
to beryllium, so as to require simply a list of operations and job
titles reasonably expected to involve exposure to beryllium. Second,
OSHA proposed to revoke paragraphs (f)(1)(i)(B) and (C), which required
additional lists of operations and job titles involving exposure at or
above the action level and above the TWA PEL or STEL, respectively.
OSHA reasoned that, given the small number of operations with beryllium
exposure in construction and shipyards, the list of operations and job
titles in these categories would be the same as those required by
paragraph (f)(1)(i)(A). As such, any additional lists would be
unnecessary and redundant (84 FR at 53910-11).
    OSHA also proposed to revoke the requirements that the employer
include in the written exposure control plan procedures for minimizing
cross-contamination (paragraph (f)(1)(i)(D)) and procedures for
minimizing the migration of beryllium within or to locations outside
the workplace (paragraph (f)(1)(i)(E)) (84 FR at 53910). OSHA explained
that the original intent of these requirements was to ensure that
workers not involved in beryllium-related operations would not be
unintentionally exposed to beryllium in excess of the PEL. With respect
to the construction standard, OSHA reasoned that the requirement to
include procedures in the written exposure control plan to restrict
access to work areas where exposures to beryllium could reasonably be
expected to exceed the TWA PEL or STEL (formerly paragraph (f)(i)(E),
renumbered as (f)(i)(D)), along with the requirement that these
procedures be implemented by a competent person (paragraph (e)(2)),
would be sufficient to control cross-contamination and migration of
beryllium from abrasive blasting operations. For the shipyard standard,
OSHA retained requirements for regulated areas (paragraph (e)), which
require that employers designate areas where exposures to beryllium
could exceed the PELs and limit access to authorized employees. To
further limit cross-contamination and migration, OSHA proposed to add a
new paragraph in both the construction ((f)(1)(i)(E)) and shipyards
((f)(1)(i)(D)) standards to require that the written exposure control
plan include procedures to ensure the integrity of each containment
used to minimize exposures to employees outside the containment (such
as tarps or structures used to keep sandblasting debris within an
enclosed area during abrasive blasting operations).
    OSHA next proposed to remove the requirement that the employer
include in the written exposure control plan procedures for removing,
laundering, storing, cleaning, repairing, and disposing of beryllium-
contaminated personal protective clothing and equipment, including
respirators (paragraph (f)(1)(i)(H)), because the agency had also
proposed to remove several requirements pertaining to such procedures
(84 FR at 53911). Specifically, OSHA proposed to remove the
requirements that the employer ensure that: Beryllium-contaminated PPE
is stored and kept separate from street clothes and that storage
facilities prevent cross-contamination as specified in the written
exposure control plan (paragraph (h)(2)(iii)); beryllium-contaminated
PPE is only removed from the workplace by employees who are authorized
to do so for the purpose of laundering, cleaning, maintaining, or
disposing of such PPE (paragraph (h)(2)(iv)); PPE removed from the
workplace for laundering, cleaning, maintenance, or disposal be placed
in closed, impermeable bags or containers and labeled appropriately
(paragraph (h)(2)(v)); and any person or business entity who launders,
cleans or repairs PPE required by the standards be informed, in
writing, of the potentially harmful effects of beryllium and of the
need to handle the PPE in accordance with OSHA's beryllium standards
(paragraph (h)(3)(iii)). With the proposed removal of those paragraphs,
the remaining requirements that would relate to paragraph (f)(1)(i)(H)
include paragraphs (h)(2)(i) and (ii), pertaining to removal of PPE;
paragraph (h)(3)(i), pertaining to cleaning and maintenance of PPE; and
paragraph (h)(3)(ii), pertaining to methods of removing beryllium from
PPE. In light of the proposed removal of several of the requirements
for removing, laundering, storing, cleaning, repairing, and disposing
of beryllium-contaminated PPE, OSHA stated that it believed it
unnecessary to include such procedures in the written plan (84 FR at
53911).
    Finally, as with paragraph (f)(1)(i)(A), OSHA proposed to revise
paragraph (f)(1)(ii)(B) to refer simply to ``exposure to'' rather than
``airborne exposure to or dermal contact with'' beryllium (84 FR

at 53911).\12\ OSHA's proposal to revise this paragraph, which
previously required the employer to review, evaluate, and update the
written exposure control plan, as necessary, when notified that an
employee shows signs or symptoms associated with airborne exposure to
or dermal contact with beryllium, is consistent with other paragraphs
where the agency is simplifying the language in a similar manner (e.g.,
paragraphs (k)(3)(ii)(A) and (k)(4)(i), Medical surveillance) and is
not intended to alter the meaning of the provision. OSHA received a
number of comments on its proposed revisions to paragraph (f). These
comments and OSHA's final determinations are discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ In the Amendments to Standards section of the NPRM (84 FR
at 53951-54), which identifies precisely how the proposal would
amend the Code of Federal Regulations, OSHA inadvertently failed to
remove the word ``airborne'' as a qualifier for ``exposure'' in
paragraph (f)(1)(ii)(B) of both standards. However, the summary and
explanation of paragraph (f) clearly identified OSHA's intent to
remove both ``airborne'' and ``dermal contact with'' from the
provision and leave simply ``exposure to beryllium'' (see 84 FR at
53911). The only commenter to address the change referred to the
correct language (NJH, Document ID 2211, p. 9). Accordingly, OSHA
considers this a harmless error and has corrected the appropriate
language in the Amendments to Standards section of this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments on the Nature and Extent of Beryllium Exposure in the
Construction and Shipyards Industries

    A primary issue raised by several commenters, both with respect to
the proposed changes to paragraph (f) and to the rest of the proposal,
involved whether OSHA has appropriately characterized the jobs and
operations in the construction and shipyards industries that present
beryllium exposures of concern. On the one hand, the National
Electrical Contractors Association (NECA), the National Demolition
Association (NDA), and the Construction Industry Safety Coalition
(CISC) argued that a written exposure control plan is unnecessary in
the construction industry in light of the limited operations that
create exposures of concern. Specifically, NECA contended that
beryllium exposure in construction is limited to abrasive blasting, and
therefore ``promulgating a rule that would require all employers to
document and implement a written exposure control plan for beryllium
creates additional and undue burdens on employers and employees in the
construction industry'' (Document ID 2209, p. 1). CISC and NDA both
stated that, in order to create a written exposure control plan,
construction employers ``will be required to assess all workplace
exposures, jobs, tasks, and work to be performed to determine whether
beryllium is present in trace amounts'' (Document ID 2203, p. 16; 2205,
p. 2). According to CISC, this is a particular problem in the
construction industry because of the ``range of exposures that could
exist as a result of naturally occurring beryllium or airborne
exposures of beryllium from aggregate or other components of
construction material containing trace amounts of beryllium'' (Document
ID 2203, p. 2). Like NECA, CISC argued that it would be inappropriate
to require employers to engage in the ``daunting task'' of analyzing
beryllium exposures on their worksites, given that OSHA has not
identified exposures of concern in construction outside of abrasive
blasting with certain media (Document ID 2203, p. 16). NDA echoed CISC,
asserting that this would be an ``unnecessary burden'' and
``inappropriate'' in the construction industry (Document ID 2203, p.
2).
    CISC suggested that, instead of including a written exposure
control plan provision in the beryllium standard for construction, OSHA
should consider adding new requirements to paragraph (f) of the
ventilation standard for construction (29 CFR 1926.57) that set forth
additional protective measures to be used when abrasive blasting with
media containing <0.1 percent by weight of beryllium. These new
provisions, CISC stated, could include the requirements of written
exposure control plans, regulated areas, specified PPE, and other
provisions to protect workers in and around such abrasive blasting
(Document ID 2203, p. 16). While industry representatives NECA, NDA,
and CISC argued that OSHA's approach to the written exposure control
plan is too broad, other commenters representing unions and public
health organizations argued that the proposal is too narrow.
Specifically, these commenters took issue with OSHA's focus on abrasive
blasters and welders. Several commenters suggested potential exposure
sources apart from abrasive blasting and welding operations and argued
that some of these exposures could involve beryllium in greater than
trace amounts. For example, NJH contended that there are ``other
operations, jobs and tasks that can generate beryllium exposure in the
construction and shipyard sectors, not limited to abrasive blasting and
welding'' (Document ID 2211, p. 7). NJH cited studies involving
demolition operations at an Army site in Ohio (https://www.lrb.usace.army.mil/Missions/HTRW/FUSRAP/Luckey-Site); construction
trades workers exposed to beryllium in DOE facilities (Welch et al.,
2004 & 2013); workers performing clean-up of beryllium-using sites
(Sackett et al., 2004); workers grinding beryllium-composite tools
(Kreiss et al., 1993); and workers resurfacing copper-beryllium tools
(Mikulski et al, 2011) (Document ID 2211, p. 7) (see detailed
discussion of studies later in this section). NJH also noted,
anecdotally, that it has diagnosed CBD in contract construction workers
who worked in primary beryllium and beryllium manufacturing facilities
(Document ID 2211, p. 7).
    AFL-CIO similarly indicated that construction workers such as
laborers, welders, carpenters, surveyors, and electricians involved in
demolition, renovation, maintenance, repair, and construction projects
performed in general industry sites where beryllium was previously
used, as well as those who may use non-sparking tools, could be exposed
to beryllium (Document ID 2210, p. 5; 2239, p. 1). ACOEM likewise
argued that workers in the construction industry can be exposed from
decommissioning and demolition work (Document ID 2213, p. 3). Some
members of Congress also identified the maintenance of non-sparking
tools and working with unspecified beryllium alloys in high-tech naval
vessels as activities that expose workers to materials containing
beryllium above trace levels (Document ID 2208, p. 6).
    Relying largely on studies performed at Department of Energy
nuclear weapon sites (some of the same studies cited by NJH), NABTU
commented that workers performing maintenance, renovation, repair, and
demolition in beryllium processing facilities may be exposed to
residual beryllium in ventilation systems, floors, insulation
materials, and in floor crevices (Document ID 2202, p. 2; 2240, p. 3).
Referencing OSHA's decision in the 2017 final rule to apply the
construction standard to all occupational exposures to beryllium,
rather than limiting the requirements to abrasive blasting operations,
NABTU contended that OSHA's proposal departs from the agency's prior
conclusions without explaining this supposed departure. According to
NABTU, OSHA has abandoned its position that the construction standard
should ``cover all occupational exposures to beryllium'' and instead
``decided only to address the `primary' means of exposure'' (Document
ID 2240, pp. 2-5).
    In addition to potential exposures from existing operations, USW
contended that the proposed revisions to the construction and shipyard
standards fail to account for ``all future operations'' that might use
beryllium. By tailoring the standards to the specific exposures in
abrasive blasting and

welding operations, USW contends that OSHA is making a ``dangerous
assumption'' that it makes ``in no other health standard'' (Document ID
2212, p. 2). According to USW: ``If a new chemical product is
synthesized from 1,3-butadiene, the 1,3-butadiene standard will apply
in its entirety. If arsenic finds a new use in semiconductors, the
employer will be expected to comply with the entire arsenic standard. .
. . However, under the OSHA proposal, if metallic beryllium, a
beryllium alloy, ceramic or other compound is someday used on a
construction site or in a shipyard, exposed workers will lack important
protections enjoyed by their counterparts in general industry''
(Document ID 2212, p. 2). USW echoed NABTU's assertion that OSHA's
proposal neglects workers beyond abrasive blasters and welders and
concluded that ``[o]nly by including all the general industry
protections in the shipyard and construction standards can OSHA fulfill
[its] mandate'' to protect all workers (Document ID 2212, p. 4).
    Those commenters who participated in the public hearing also raised
these concerns in their testimony. Specifically, both NJH and USW again
identified potential exposures from beryllium-containing non-sparking
tools (Document ID 2222, Tr. 17-19, 48) and NJH discussed their
organization's past diagnoses of CBD in contract construction workers
in the primary beryllium and manufacturing industries (Document ID
2222, Tr. 48). USW again expressed concern about possible future
applications of beryllium-containing materials in construction and
shipyard work (Document ID 2222, Tr. 17-19). NABTU and AFL-CIO both
reiterated their position that construction workers are exposed through
activities other than abrasive blasting, particularly demolition,
renovation, cleanup, and similar work in facilities that make and use
beryllium-containing alloys (Document ID 2222, Tr. 84, 114-15). NABTU
concluded that construction workers operating in facilities that use
beryllium ``are not only potentially exposed to beryllium, but also,
they will have dermal exposure to dust and debris that can contain
beryllium at greater than trace amounts'' (Document ID 2222, Tr. 84-
85).
    On the whole, these commenters contend that, because there are work
processes other than abrasive blasting and welding that could expose
construction and shipyard workers to beryllium, OSHA should not remove
or modify provisions of the beryllium standards--such as the written
exposure control plan requirements--to tailor the standards to abrasive
blasting and welding operations.
    After reviewing all of these comments and the record as a whole,
OSHA has determined that the record continues to lack sufficient data
for the agency to characterize the nature, locations, or extent of
beryllium exposure in application groups in current-day construction
and shipyards sectors other than abrasive blasting and certain welding
operations. Further, although OSHA continues to recognize the
possibility of exposures beyond abrasive blasting and welding, the
agency has reason to believe concerns regarding construction workers'
dermal exposure to more than trace beryllium at general industry sites,
although potentially justified in the past, likely do not reflect
current exposures in these contexts.
    As a result, OSHA finds that it is appropriate to follow through
with its proposal to tailor certain provisions of the beryllium
standards for construction and shipyards--including the written
exposure control plan requirements--to those operations for which the
agency has data. At the same time, OSHA disagrees with NECA, NDA, and
CISC that the agency should strictly limit application of the beryllium
standards to abrasive blasting and welding operations. Accordingly,
both standards will continue to cover all occupational exposures to
beryllium in these industries that meet the requirements of paragraph
(a). OSHA's reasoning and the agency's response to each of the comments
received on these topics is explained below.

OSHA's Analysis of the Record With Respect to Beryllium Exposures in
the Construction and Shipyards Sectors

    In the 2017 final rule, OSHA based its assessment of applications
involving beryllium exposure, including its determination that abrasive
blasting and welding are the only known sources of beryllium exposure
in construction and shipyards, on the best evidence available in the
record. This included a comprehensive review of the industrial hygiene
literature; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) Health Hazard Evaluations and case studies of beryllium
exposure; site visits conducted by an OSHA contractor (Eastern Research
Group (ERG)); inspection data from OSHA's Integrated Management
Information System (IMIS) and OSHA's Information System (OIS); and
information submitted to the rulemaking docket in response to the
notice of proposed rulemaking and informal public hearings, such as a
comprehensive data set submitted by the Navy of beryllium sampling in a
wide variety of operations (see 82 FR at 2583; 2017 FEA, Document ID
2042, pp. IV-17 to IV-22; Document ID 0144, 0145).
    This review also included comments and testimony on potential
exposure from sources other than abrasive blasting and welding (82 FR
2636-40). At the time, several commenters identified many of the same
jobs and operations as those identified in this rulemaking. NIOSH
commented that construction workers may be exposed to beryllium when
demolishing buildings or building equipment, based on a study of
workers demolishing oil-fired boilers (Document ID 1671, Attachment 1,
pp. 5, 15; 1671, Attachment 21). At the initial public hearing in 2016,
NJH testified that numerous studies had documented beryllium exposure,
sensitization, and CBD in construction workers performing demolition
and decommissioning and among workers who use non-sparking tools
(Document ID 1756, Tr. 98). USW also testified that workers in the
maritime industry use and may sharpen or grind beryllium-containing
non-sparking tools and that shipyards might use beryllium for other
tasks in the future. USW further stated that beryllium is a high-tech
material and that exposure from beryllium containing alloys cannot be
ruled out in high-tech operations such as aircraft carrier or submarine
production (Document ID 1756, Tr. 270).
    After reviewing the record, OSHA determined in the 2017 final rule
that it did not have sufficient data on beryllium exposures in the
construction and shipyard industries to characterize exposures in
application groups other than abrasive blasting with beryllium-
containing slags and certain welding operations in shipyards, and that
it could not develop exposure profiles for construction and shipyard
workers engaged in activities involving non-sparking tools, demolition
of beryllium-contaminated buildings or equipment, or work with
beryllium-containing alloys (82 FR at 2639). Even so, OSHA acknowledged
USW's concerns about future beryllium use and found ``that there is
potential for exposure to beryllium in construction and shipyards
operations other than abrasive blasting.'' OSHA concluded that workers
engaged in any such operations are exposed to the same hazard of
developing CBD and other beryllium related disease (82 FR at 2639).
Thus, OSHA chose to cover all occupational exposures to beryllium in
those industries in order to ensure that the standards are broadly
effective and address all potentially harmful beryllium exposures (82
FR at 2639).

    While extending comprehensive beryllium standards to construction
and shipyards and broadly aligning the ancillary provisions across the
three sectors, OSHA also identified evidence in the record
demonstrating meaningful distinctions between the sectors, and
therefore promulgated different requirements for some ancillary
provisions. For example, OSHA included requirements pertaining to
beryllium work areas (BWAs) \13\ in the standard for general industry
but did not include such requirements in the standards for construction
and shipyards. OSHA explained that commenters such as Newport News
Shipbuilding (NNS) (Document ID 1657) and NIOSH (Document ID 1725, p.
30; 1755, Tr. 21) had brought to its attention difficulties in
establishing and maintaining BWAs in an operation such as abrasive
blasting (82 FR at 2660-61). NNS specifically highlighted the
difficulty of such a requirement where beryllium is encountered in
trace concentrations (82 FR at 2661; Document ID 1657, pp. 1-2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ As originally promulgated, the beryllium standard for
general industry required employers to establish a beryllium work
area in any area that (1) contains a process or operation that can
release beryllium, and (2) where employees are, or can reasonably be
expected to be, exposed to airborne beryllium at any level or where
there is the potential for dermal contact with beryllium (82 FR at
2736). BWAs must be demarcated by signs or other methods that
establish and inform each employee of the boundaries of the area (29
CFR 1910.1024(e)(2)). Through the May 7, 2018 DFR, OSHA later
revised the definition of a BWA so that the requirements apply only
where the process or operation involves material containing at least
0.1 percent beryllium by weight (83 FR at 19938).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Recognizing that the known exposures in construction and shipyards
are to trace beryllium, and further recognizing the difficulties
involved in establishing and maintaining BWA requirements in that
context, OSHA decided not to require employers in construction and
shipyards to establish and maintain BWAs (82 FR 2660-61). In this way,
OSHA differentiated the construction and shipyards standards from the
general industry standard and tailored portions of the former to the
particular exposures in abrasive blasting operations. OSHA thereby made
the standards more workable to implement in those sectors while
maintaining an overall framework of protections broadly similar to
those in general industry.
    After publication of the 2017 final rule, on May 7, 2018, OSHA
published a direct final rule (DFR) to clarify certain provisions of
the beryllium standard for general industry as they related to
materials containing trace amounts of beryllium (84 FR 19936).
Specifically, the DFR clarified that provisions triggered by dermal
contact with beryllium or beryllium contamination would apply only for
dust, fumes, mists, or solutions containing beryllium in concentrations
greater than or equal to 0.1 percent by weight (83 FR at 19939). OSHA
made clear that the agency only intended to regulate contact with trace
beryllium to the extent that it caused airborne exposures of concern
(83 FR at 19938).
    In the 2019 NPRM, OSHA sought to more fully tailor the construction
and shipyards standards to the known exposures in these sectors; that
is, to abrasive blasting and welding operations. OSHA recognized that,
in applying some provisions developed for general industry into the
construction and shipyards standards in the 2017 final rule, the agency
may have not fully accounted for the trace levels of beryllium in these
operations. At the same time, the agency remained open to considering
additional sources of exposure. In the NPRM and multiple times at the
public hearing, OSHA requested information and data on any additional
application groups (industries, occupations, processes, etc.) with
potential exposure to beryllium in the construction and shipyards
sectors beyond abrasive blasters and welders (84 FR at 53922; Document
ID 2222, Tr. 33-35; 44-45; 75-76; 95-96; 125-26).
    Although a number of commenters responded to OSHA's request, as
outlined above, their comments in many cases relied on anecdotal or
unverifiable assertions about additional exposure sources. For example,
NABTU and AFL-CIO listed several jobs that they contend could involve
exposure to beryllium, but provided nothing documenting current
exposures in these operations. Likewise, NJH indicated anecdotally that
they had diagnosed beryllium sensitization and CBD in contractors who
had performed work at a primary beryllium facility, but due to the
restrictions under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), they did not disclose any further information about these
cases (Document ID 2238, p. 1; 2222, Tr. 65). Such information provides
little on which the agency can rely to evaluate these suggested
exposure sources.
    While commenters did provide some evidence in the form of studies,
OSHA believes the studies referenced have limited value in analyzing
current exposures to workers in these industries. NABTU (Document ID
2240), AFL-CIO (Document ID 2239, 2244), and NJH (Document ID 2211,
2238) cited a number of studies that they contend demonstrate workers
in the construction trades are at risk of exposure to beryllium in
greater than trace quantities through work at general industry sites
that process or previously processed beryllium. Several of these
studies examined beryllium sensitization and CBD among construction
trades workers and others who had worked at DOE nuclear weapons
facilities. Two studies involved exposures at private facilities. Of
the studies submitted, OSHA had previously reviewed Kreiss et al.
(1993) and Stange et al. (2001) in the Health Effects section of the
preamble to the 2017 final rule (82 FR 2506; 2510).
    Kreiss et al. (1993) conducted a screening of current and former
workers at a plant that manufactured beryllium ceramics between 1958
and 1975, and then transitioned to metalizing circuitry onto beryllium
ceramics produced elsewhere (Kreiss et al. (1993), ``Beryllium Disease
Screening in the Ceramics Industry'' (Document ID 1478)). Five hundred
and five of the plant's then-current and retired workers who had not
previously been diagnosed with CBD or sarcoidosis participated,
including 377 current and 128 former workers. Workers' airborne
beryllium exposure was not estimated in this survey, and potential for
skin contact with beryllium was not explicitly discussed. Surveillance
for CBD was conducted on this population in 1989-1990 (Document ID
1478, p. 270).
    Kreiss et al. (1993) reported nine newly identified cases of CBD
(Document ID 1478, p. 257). The individuals diagnosed with CBD had
begun work at the facility between September 1946 and June 1983, with
most (7 of 9) hired between 1956 and 1973 (Document ID 1478, Table 2,
p. 270). Two cases (11.1 percent) of newly diagnosed CBD occurred among
18 workers who performed ventilation maintenance (Document ID 1478,
Table 7, p. 273).\14\ However, the authors noted that all workers with
CBD who reported work in ventilation maintenance had also reported work
in dry pressing and/or process development, job categories which also
had particularly high prevalence of CBD (15.8 percent and 13.6 percent,
respectively) (Document ID 1478, p. 272; Table 7, p. 273). Moreover,
the authors stated that ``persons who had worked at dusty tasks in
which [beryllium] exposures were harder to control or unlikely to be
monitored, such as dry pressing and

beryllia process development/engineering, had beryllium disease rates
between 11 percent and 16 percent,'' rates that ``are higher than those
described historically in other beryllium industries'' (Document ID
1478, p. 273). The authors also noted one case of CBD in an employee
who had begun employment eight years after beryllium production ended
(a ``dust disturber'' case) who recalled regularly dry-sweeping for a
period of 6 months in 1983 in an area that was later shown to be
contaminated by beryllium dust and had no other known source of
beryllium exposure (Document ID 1478, p. 271). NJH cited Kreiss et al.
(1993) as evidence that cleanup workers and tool grinders at general
industry sites can face risk from beryllium exposures (Document ID
2211, p. 7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ The authors did not provide detail on this ventilation
maintenance activity and it is unclear whether such work represents
a typical construction activity or a routine general industry
maintenance activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virji et al. (2019) published a study of short-term workers
employed at a primary beryllium manufacturing facility that processed
beryllium salts, beryllium metal and alloys, and beryllium oxide (Virji
et al. (2019), ``Associations of Metrics of Peak Inhalation Exposure
and Skin Exposure Indices with Beryllium Sensitization at a Beryllium
Manufacturing Facility'' (Document ID 2239)). This study examined a
group of 264 short-term workers who were hired after January 1, 1994,
and who participated in testing for beryllium sensitization in 1999.
The authors used exposure data such as personal full-shift exposure
sampling, task and area exposure measurements, and glove measurements
to create qualitative and quantitative peak inhalation metrics and skin
exposure indices (Document ID 2239, pp. 858-9). The authors reported
that their data represent ``historical workplace conditions, before the
implementation of a redesigned comprehensive prevention program'' which
included measures to reduce both inhalation and skin exposure through
improvements in engineering controls and use of personal protective
equipment and clothing; improved housekeeping; measures to minimize
migration of beryllium from work areas; and improved health and safety
and work practice training, beginning in 2000 (Document ID 2239, pp.
863, 866).
    Twenty-six of the study participants (9.8 percent) were beryllium-
sensitized, of whom six were also diagnosed with CBD. The authors noted
that maintenance work was associated with the highest rate of beryllium
sensitization (0.154 per person-year of work in the maintenance
category, which had 52.1 person-years of work in total) (Document ID
2239, Table 4, p. 865). The authors found that peak inhalation metrics,
indices, and other evidence of skin exposure, and use of material
containing beryllium salts were significantly associated with beryllium
sensitization (Document ID 2239, p. 865). It was not possible to
distinguish the effects of skin exposure from inhalation exposure
because these exposures tended to occur together (Document ID 2239, p.
867). The authors concluded that multiple beryllium exposure pathways
and types were associated with sensitization and that efforts to
prevent beryllium sensitization should focus on controlling airborne
beryllium exposures with particular attention to exposure peaks;
process characteristics (the likelihood of upset conditions, which can
lead to high short-term exposures); and minimizing skin exposure to
beryllium particles, in particular, eliminating skin contact with
beryllium salts (Document ID 2239, p. 867).
    NABTU and AFL-CIO referenced Virji et al. (2019) in support of
their objection to OSHA's proposed removal of dermal protections in the
construction and shipyard standards (Document ID 2239, p. 2; 2240, pp.
5-6). NABTU noted that some workers at the beryllium producing facility
who were not directly involved in beryllium-related operations
nevertheless became sensitized to beryllium; that maintenance work
(including shutdown maintenance, as is performed by contract
construction workers) was associated with the highest rates of
beryllium sensitization; and that the study authors found a strong
association between dermal exposure and beryllium sensitization
(Document ID 2240, pp. 5-6). NABTU concluded that Virji et al.'s study
``lends further support to the need to ensure workers handle their
clothing and other personal protective equipment in ways that minimize
the potential that either they, their family members or others who may
handle the PPE are incidentally exposed.'' Furthermore, ``despite the
importance of the required procedures to restrict access to work areas
where exposures may exceed the PEL and the presence of a competent
person--provisions NABTU fully supports--those protections do not
adequately compensate for the potential that beryllium will migrate
into other work areas'' (Document ID 2240, pp. 5-6). AFL-CIO also
commented that Virji et al. showed the importance of controlling skin
exposure to beryllium in order to prevent beryllium sensitization
(Document ID 2239, p. 2).
    Several of the studies cited by NABTU, AFL-CIO, and NJH examined
beryllium sensitization and CBD among construction trades workers and
others who had worked at DOE nuclear weapons facilities, including
Stange et al. (2001), Sackett et al. (2004), Welch et al. (2004), and
Welch et al. (2013). The commenters cited these studies as evidence
that construction trades people can be exposed to greater than trace
amounts of beryllium while conducting cleanup, demolition, and
deconstruction activities in buildings where beryllium was previously
released and accumulated in settled dust.
    Stange et al. (2001) examined the prevalence of beryllium
sensitization and CBD by job category among 5,713 individuals tested in
the Rocky Flats Beryllium Health Surveillance Program, which offered
surveillance for any current or former employee who believed they may
have been exposed to beryllium at the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site (Stange, et al. (2001), ``Beryllium sensitization and
chronic beryllium disease at a former nuclear weapons facility''
(Document ID 1403)).\15\ Eighty-one cases of CBD and an additional 154
cases of beryllium sensitization were identified among workers for whom
job and location (building) histories could be verified (Document ID
1403, p. 408). The prevalence of beryllium sensitization was found to
be highest among beryllium machinists (11.4 percent) and health physics
technicians (11.9 percent) (Document ID 1403, Table III, p. 410). Cases
were also identified among custodial employees (5.64 percent) and other
job titles that were thought to have only minimal potential for
exposure to beryllium (Document ID 1403, pp. 405, 410). AFL-CIO and NJH
have referenced Stange et al.'s (2001) findings as evidence that
construction work at beryllium-using facilities can involve risk from
beryllium exposures (Document ID 2244, p. 3; 0155, p. 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ In 1991, the Beryllium Health Surveillance Program (BHSP)
was established at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Facility to offer
BeLPT screening to current and former employees who may have been
exposed to beryllium (Stange et al. (1996), Document ID 0206).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sackett et al. (2004) examined BeLPT results and medical
evaluations of 2,221 workers employed at a nuclear weapons facility
during decontamination and decommissioning (Sackett et al. (2004),
``Beryllium medical surveillance at a former nuclear weapons facility
during cleanup operations'' (Document ID 1811, Att. 13)). Workers'
airborne beryllium exposure was not estimated in the study, and
potential for skin contact with beryllium was not explicitly discussed.
The authors found

19 cases of beryllium sensitization. Of eight sensitized individuals
who underwent full clinical evaluation for CBD, two were diagnosed with
CBD. Seven beryllium-sensitized workers were hired after the start of
decontamination and decommissioning (Document ID 1811, Att. 13, p.
953). AFL-CIO, quoting a previously submitted comment from the Colorado
School of Public Health (Document ID 2136), stated that Sackett et
al.'s study showed ``that beryllium can cause harm to workers during
this process [of decontamination and decommissioning], even when
workers have been provided, certified, and trained in the appropriate
use of PPE'' (Document ID 2244, p. 9). NJH similarly commented that
this study demonstrates the potential for exposure during cleanup of
beryllium-using sites (Document ID 2211, p. 7).
    Welch et al. (2004) presented BeLPT surveillance results among
construction trades workers who had formerly been employed at three DOE
sites where beryllium was present (Hanford Nuclear Reservation in
Richland, Washington; the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee; and the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina) (Welch
et al. (2004), ``Screening for Beryllium Disease Among Construction
Trade Workers at Department of Energy Nuclear Sites'' (Document ID
1815, Attachment 58, p. 207)). Beryllium at these sites had been
present in fuel fabrication and R&D (Hanford); from nuclear waste
disposal, an antimony-beryllium source rod reactor failure, copper-
beryllium tools, chipping of beryllium in glove-box operations, and
possible beryllium machining (Savannah River Site); and from assembly
and disassembly of nuclear weapons and machining, grinding, and forming
of beryllium compounds and alloys (Oak Ridge) (Document ID 1815,
Attachment 58, p. 208). The authors examined sensitization among 3842
former workers who completed at least one BeLPT from the screening
program's beginning (1996) through September 30, 2002 (Document ID
1815, Attachment 58, pp. 208, 212; Welch et al (2013), Document ID
2238, Attachment 8, p. 1). Workers' airborne beryllium exposure was not
estimated in the study, nor were surface concentrations of beryllium
reported. Welch et al. noted that their study population was ``quite
different'' from previous studies involving concurrently exposed
workers in production facilities, ``in that the participants are
construction workers, and had to have left construction employment at
the site to be eligible. Many had left employment years before the
examination took place'' (Document ID 1815, Attachment 58, p. 214).
Moreover, approximately 70 percent of the study population (2,759/
3,842) had been hired more than 20 years prior to BeLPT testing
(Document ID 1815, Attachment 58, Table VI, p. 214), placing the hire
date for the majority of the study population prior to September 30,
1982.
    The authors found 54 cases of beryllium sensitization (defined as
two abnormal BeLPT results) among the 3,842 tested workers (1.4
percent), and further reported finding a 2.2 percent prevalence of
possible sensitization (85 former workers with one or more abnormal
BeLPT results). Possible cases occurred among machinists (5.6 percent;
6/107), plumbers/steam fitters (4.1 percent; 5/123), millwrights (3.2
percent; 7/214), sheetmetal workers (2.5 percent; 5/199), carpenters
(2.0 percent; 7/250), pipefitters (2.0 percent; 14/690), electricians
(1.8 percent; 13/707), and laborers (1.2 percent; 7/603) (Document ID
1815, Attachment 58, Table IV, p. 213). Five workers were diagnosed
with CBD (Document ID 1815, Attachment 58, p. 215).
    Welch et al. (2013) published another study of former construction
trades workers who had worked at DOE sites, using BeLPT results from
DOE's updated screening program, which had been expanded to 27 sites
after the publication of Welch et al (2004) (Welch et al. (2013),
``Beryllium Disease Among Construction Trade Workers at Department of
Energy Nuclear Sites'' (Document ID 2238, Attachment 8)). Workers'
airborne beryllium exposure was not estimated in the study, nor were
surface concentrations of beryllium reported. Welch et al. (2013) did
not present information on all study participants' dates of hire or
employment, but did report that the mean year of first employment at a
DOE site was 1,973 for workers diagnosed with CBD and 1,976 for
sensitized workers who were not diagnosed with CBD (Document ID 2238,
Attachment 8, Table II, p. 7).
    Among 13,810 former construction workers tested as part of the
screening program between 1998 and 2010, Welch et al. (2013) identified
189 cases of beryllium sensitization and reported that 28 (0.2 percent)
were diagnosed with CBD (of 86 who were medically evaluated) (p. 5).
They noted that prevalence of sensitization greater than 2 percent
occurred among sheet metal workers (2.4 percent; 19/786), roofers (2.8
percent; 3/108) and boilermakers (2.9 percent: 8/274) (Document ID
2238, Attachment 8, Table IV, p. 8; p. 10).
    The authors reported that the 2013 results showed patterns similar
to those of the 2004 study in that both the overall rate of beryllium
sensitization (1.4 percent) and the prevalence of CBD found among
beryllium-sensitized workers were ``lower than those reported in a
number of other populations, such as currently exposed workers in
production facilities.'' They attributed these findings to the
participants' indirect exposure to beryllium via skin contact with
beryllium-contaminated surfaces and with inhalation of re-entrained
beryllium dust, rather than from working directly with beryllium in
operations such as machining (Document ID 2238, Attachment 8, p. 6).
The authors emphasized that their surveillance of construction workers
had helped DOE personnel to identity and mitigate those exposures which
still exist at the facility and helped focus attention on the risk for
beryllium exposure among current demolition workers at these facilities
(Document ID 2238, Attachment 8, p. 10). NJH and AFL-CIO pointed to the
Welch et al.'s findings in both the 2004 and 2013 studies as evidence
that construction trades workers doing contract work in beryllium-using
industries face a risk from beryllium exposure (Document ID 2211, p. 7;
2244, p. 9).
    OSHA has reviewed each of the studies submitted by the commenters.
Each of the studies support OSHA's determination that beryllium
exposure presents a serious risk of material health impairment to
workers. However, OSHA finds that the studies are of limited value in
determining current exposures faced by those construction and shipyards
workers covered by the beryllium standards for two reasons. First, as
acknowledged by NJH (Document ID 2238, p. 1), the studies do not
contain relevant exposure data. Such data would be needed to
characterize the airborne and/or dermal exposures of workers in those
studies, to evaluate with reasonable accuracy the processes and
operations where significant beryllium exposures may have led to cases
of beryllium sensitization and CBD, and to determine whether those same
processes and operations would be likely to contribute to workers' risk
in current-day facilities. This was the same reason that OSHA
determined in the 2017 final rule that it could not develop exposure
profiles for some of these same operations (see 82 FR at 2639).
    Perhaps more importantly, OSHA doubts that these studies reflect
current conditions in general industry facilities. The studies appear
to primarily involve

populations with many members exposed before the 1990s, when the use of
the BeLPT in screening for CBD led both DOE and some private firms to
adopt and increasingly strengthen beryllium exposure control
strategies.\16\ The studies evaluating former construction trades
workers largely involve populations who were first exposed before DOE
and private industry sites--such as those studied by Kreiss et al
(1993) and Virji et al. (2019)--began to strengthen exposure controls
in the mid-1990s, and long before OSHA issued comprehensive beryllium
standards in 2017. As noted above, approximately 70 percent of the
study population (2,759/3,842) had been hired more than 20 years prior
to BeLPT testing (Document ID 2238, Attachment 8, Table VI, p. 214),
placing the hire date for the majority of the study population prior to
September 30, 1982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ In DOE and in private industry, general awareness of
beryllium-related risks at airborne levels lower than the previous
OSHA PEL of 2 ug/m\3\ was low until the early 1990s, when use of the
BeLPT by researchers such as Kreiss et al. brought greater
understanding of the need to better control beryllium exposures. By
1993, beryllium had been identified as a significant source of
occupational disease risk within the DOE complex, and by 1996, DOE
had established an interim Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention
Program rule, which was finalized in 1999 (Document ID 2238,
Attachment 8, pp. 1-2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Importantly, these studies do not account for the effect of OSHA's
beryllium standard for general industry (29 CFR 1910.1024), which
addresses the primary sources of exposure in these studies--
insufficiently controlled beryllium-releasing processes and settled or
re-entrained dust containing beryllium--and is designed to drastically
reduce beryllium exposures in general industry facilities. To comply
with its obligations under the general industry standard, the host
employer at a general industry site today will have implemented
beryllium work areas or regulated areas around processes that create
beryllium exposures of concern (29 CFR 1910.1024(e)), will have
instituted engineering controls and work practices to control exposures
(29 CFR 1910.1024(f)), and will have implemented housekeeping measures
that will prevent the accumulation or re-entrainment of settled dust
containing beryllium (29 CFR 1910.1024(j)). These measures, combined
with the general industry employer's duty under the hazard
communication standard to inform any construction employer entering the
area of the potential for hazardous beryllium exposure and the
precautionary measures needed to protect employees (29 CFR
1910.1024(m); 29 CFR 1910.1200(e)(2)), are designed to ensure that
construction employees entering the general industry site are not
exposed to active beryllium-releasing processes or accumulated
beryllium in the work area and are able to avoid any remaining risk of
beryllium exposure.
    In sum, the most that these studies can tell us is that in the
past, construction employees at general industry sites with beryllium
exposure from poorly controlled processes became sensitized to
beryllium and, in some cases, developed CBD. This information supports
OSHA's determination that beryllium exposure presents a serious health
risk. It does not, however, demonstrate that construction employees who
enter a general industry site today--with the engineering and work
practice controls, housekeeping, and other requirements of the
beryllium general industry standard--will be exposed to and require
protection from dermal contact with beryllium in more than trace
amounts.
    With respect to potential exposure from the dressing or sharpening
of beryllium-containing non-sparking tools, NJH (Document ID 2211, p.
7; 2238, p. 2) referred OSHA to two studies by Mikulski et al. that
found exposure to beryllium through machining and grinding of copper-
beryllium (Cu-Be) 2 percent alloy tools, even when done only
occasionally, was associated with increased risks of beryllium
sensitization (``Risk of Beryllium Sensitization in a Low-Exposed
Former Nuclear Weapons Cohort from the Cold War Era'' (2011a) (Document
ID 2238, Attachment 4); ``Prevalence of Beryllium Sensitization Among
Department of Defense Conventional Munitions Workers at Low Risk for
Exposure. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine'' (2011b)
(Document ID 2238, Attachment 5)). These studies reported the results
of a DOE program that screened former workers at a nuclear weapons
assembly site for beryllium sensitization as part of that agency's
Former Worker Program established in 1996. The site in question
operated beginning in 1941 as a Load, Assembly and Pack (LAP) facility
for the Department of Defense (DOD) conventional munitions operations;
from 1949 to mid-1975 it was shared with DOE for production of nuclear
weapons; and in 1975 DOE activities ceased at this site (Document ID
2238, Attachment 4, p. 195).
    Although OSHA acknowledges the findings of the Mikulski studies,
which involved exposures at a DOD facility prior to 1975, comments and
hearing testimony received in response to the NPRM suggest that the
dressing or sharpening of non-sparking tools is not an exposure source
of concern for workers in the construction and shipyards sectors
covered by the beryllium standards. At the public hearing, NABTU--which
had earlier in the rulemaking process raised concerns about exposure
from such tools (Document ID 2202, p. 19)--indicated that they had
attempted but were not able to find specific examples of construction
trades workers dressing or sharpening non-sparking tools (Document ID
2222, Tr. 88). Likewise, when asked about the prevalence of these tools
in construction, the representative from USW stated that he had
personally used beryllium-containing non-sparking tools on a few
occasions many years ago, but that he could only speculate as to how
often they are used today. He further testified that he did not know
why one would use these tools over other non-sparking tools that do not
contain beryllium (Document ID 2222, Tr. 32-34).
    Other commenters raised doubts about the extent of exposure from
non-sparking tools. The SCA identified the use of non-sparking tools in
shipyards, but noted that these are ``infrequently used, and
intermittent'' (Document ID 2204, p. 2). SCA did not identify how often
or by whom these tools are dressed or sharpened, which, as the
representative from USW recognized (Document ID 2222, Tr. 32), is the
process during which beryllium exposure might occur. Materion, while
noting that they do not serve the non-sparking tool market, stated that
the dressing of non-sparking tools could result in exposure to
beryllium above the action level but also noted that the other primary
producer of copper beryllium--which does serve that market--has a
program through which its customers can return their non-sparking tools
for sharpening at no cost (Document ID 2237, p. 3). That exposure from
this source is unlikely is supported by exposure data in the record,
submitted by the Navy and private shipbuilding establishments, showing
that the primary exposure source in shipyards is abrasive blasting with
some additional exposures during welding operations (Document ID 0144,
p. 3-4; 0145; 1166).\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Some commenters also stated that potential sources of
beryllium exposure in these sectors include work at landfills that
receive beryllium-containing materials (Document ID 2202, Attachment
1, p. 2); work on high-tech aircraft and submarines (Document ID
2208, p. 6); and work as machinists and surveyors (Document ID 2210,
p. 4). OSHA notes that many of these categories would appear to be
jobs that are not covered by the construction or shipyards
standards, either because they are likely covered by the general
industry standard or because they relate to ``uniquely military
equipment, systems, and operations'' (see Executive Order 12196; 29
CFR 1960.2(i)). Regardless, as with the other operations identified,
the record lacks data from which OSHA could evaluate exposures in
these operations.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA continues to recognize the possibility that some construction
and shipyard workers could be exposed to beryllium through activities
other than abrasive blasting and welding. However, the record continues
to lack key data about these potential exposures, including how often
the exposures occur, who is exposed, the duration of the exposures, the
type and extent of exposure, or any controls that may be in place to
address them. Without this data, OSHA lacks sufficient information to
characterize the nature, locations, or extent of beryllium exposure in
application groups other than abrasive blasting with beryllium-
containing slags and certain welding operations. Importantly, with
respect to commenters' assertion that these additional exposures
include a risk solely from dermal contact with more than trace
beryllium, either from construction work at general industry sites that
handle beryllium or through the use of non-sparking tools, OSHA finds
that the record does not demonstrate that this continues to be a
concern, for the reasons already discussed.
    Therefore, the agency finds that it is appropriate at this time to
tailor certain aspects of the final standards--such as the written
exposure control plan requirements--to those operations for which the
agency has sufficient data to demonstrate worker exposure to beryllium
at levels of concern, to properly characterize and evaluate the
exposures, and to develop appropriate measures to address them. By
ensuring that these provisions of the beryllium standards for
construction and shipyards are no more complex or onerous than is
needed to protect workers, OSHA believes the final standards will
improve compliance and thereby more effectively protect these workers.
    At the same time, OSHA disagrees with industry commenters who
contend that the protections of the beryllium standards for
construction and shipyards should only apply to abrasive blasters and
welders. OSHA maintains that all beryllium-exposed workers in
construction and shipyards should be afforded protections from
beryllium exposure (see 84 FR at 51377) and, to the extent that
exposures from sources other than abrasive blasting and welding do
occur, the beryllium standards for construction and shipyards continue
to provide these protections. Both standards continue to apply to all
occupational exposure to beryllium that meets the requirements of
paragraph (a). OSHA declines to adopt CISC's suggestion that the agency
simply incorporate new requirements into paragraph (f) of the
ventilation standard for construction (29 CFR 1926.57), so as to apply
them only to abrasive blasters, as this would leave unprotected
employees who might be exposed in operations OSHA has not identified or
in the future. This is consistent with OSHA's typical approach to
substance-specific standards, which generally apply broadly to all
occupational exposure to a substance, rather than to particular
operations (see, e.g., 29 CFR 1926.1126(a)(1) (Chromium (IV)); 29 CFR
1926.1127(a) (Cadmium); 29 CFR 1910.1028(a)(1) (Benzene); 29 CFR
1910.1053(a) (Respirable Crystalline Silica)). With respect to CISC's
assertion that construction employers will have to evaluate every task
and material on their worksite to determine whether beryllium is
present in trace amounts (Document ID 2203, p. 16), the agency
emphasizes that this is not the case. Although the beryllium standard
applies to occupational exposure to beryllium in all forms, compounds,
and mixtures in the construction industry, paragraph (a)(3) exempts
from coverage materials containing less than 0.1 percent beryllium by
weight where the employer has objective data demonstrating that
employee exposure to beryllium will remain below the action level of
0.1 [micro]g/m\3\, as an 8-hour time weighted average, under any
foreseeable conditions. As explained below, apart from certain abrasive
blasting media, those materials at the typical construction site that
the agency has identified as containing beryllium in trace amounts
(i.e. rock, soil, concrete, and brick) are not likely to release
airborne beryllium above the action level under foreseeable conditions
and therefore do not typically trigger the requirements of the
standard. Further, for any additional materials containing comparably
low levels of beryllium, an employer may rely on objective data that
employees will not be exposed above the PEL for total airborne dust to
qualify for the exemption under paragraph (a)(3).
    OSHA's analysis of its own sampling data demonstrates that
exposures from rock, soil, and concrete are highly unlikely to exceed
the action level in typical circumstances (see Beryllium Air Samples at
Construction Sites: An Analysis of OSHA OIS Sample Results 2012-2018,
Document ID 2235). This data shows that, given the low levels of
beryllium in rock, soil, and concrete, airborne dust concentrations
would have to be extremely high for exposures to even approach the
beryllium action level. The same is true for brick, which may contain
beryllium in trace amounts comparable to these materials.\18\ These
dust concentrations would typically exceed the PEL for total airborne
dust, or particulates not otherwise classified (PNOC), long before the
beryllium action level is reached. In the case of concrete, the level
of airborne dust required to reach the beryllium action level would
also surpass the PEL for crystalline silica many times over. Thus, the
action level would only be reached under extremely dusty conditions--
such as those produced during abrasive blasting operations--that would
also exceed the PELs for PNOC and crystalline silica.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The beryllium content of soil and rock averages less than 2
ppm while the beryllium content of concrete is typically less than 1
ppm (Document ID 2235, pp. 2, 6). Some bricks may contain up to 50
percent fly ash, which in turn may contain beryllium in trace
amounts (see 2017 FEA, Document ID 2014, pp. IV-651 to IV-652).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA considers this data sufficient to demonstrate that exposure to
rock, soil, concrete, and brick at the typical construction site will
not result in beryllium exposure above the action level under
foreseeable conditions. As such, when performing tasks at the typical
construction site, exposure to these materials will not trigger the
requirements of the beryllium standard. Outside of these materials and
certain abrasive blasting media, OSHA is not aware of any other
building materials at the typical construction site that contain
beryllium. However, for any material containing comparable levels of
beryllium, an employer may rely on objective data that exposures in its
operations are consistently below the PEL for PNOC to demonstrate that
exposure from these materials would not exceed the beryllium action
level under foreseeable conditions.
    The agency notes that if a construction employer has reason to
believe that the materials at its particular worksite contain beryllium
at levels significantly above average or that a particular process
produces abnormally high levels of dust such that beryllium exposure
might foreseeably reach the action level (e.g., where total dust is
likely to exceed the PEL for PNOC), that employer would be required to
comply with the applicable provisions of the beryllium standard. These
circumstances, however, will not

be typical of the average construction site.
    OSHA also disagrees with commenters such as NABTU (Document ID
2240, p. 2) who suggest that the agency has abandoned its prior
position regarding the coverage of the construction and shipyards
standards. While OSHA acknowledged in the 2017 final rule the
``potential for exposure'' outside of abrasive blasting and welding and
determined that any such exposure should be covered by the beryllium
standards for construction and shipyards (a position the agency
maintains), OSHA made no finding in the 2017 final rule that workers in
the construction industry are currently at risk from dermal contact at
general industry sites or from the dressing or sharpening of non-
sparking tools. On the contrary, the agency was clear that it lacked
data to characterize or quantify exposures from additional sources (82
FR at 2639). The agency's finding in this rulemaking that these
particular sources of exposure are likely not a concern in the
construction and shipyards sector is not a change from its previous
position, as the agency took no position on the issue in the 2017 final
rule. Where OSHA did originally include provisions aimed solely at
dermal contact in the construction and shipyards standards that it now
intends to remove, this was due to the agency borrowing provisions from
the general industry standard without appropriately accounting for the
trace exposures in abrasive blasting and welding as they pertain to
dermal contact.\19\ Inclusion of these provisions was not based on a
finding by OSHA that the provisions were necessary to address exposures
beyond abrasive blasting and welding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ As has been noted, the agency did specifically tailor some
provisions to abrasive blasting; for example, deciding not to extend
the beryllium work area requirements of the general industry
standard to construction and shipyards. In that case, commenters
specifically identified the requirement as unworkable when dealing
with materials containing beryllium in trace amounts (see 82 FR at
2661).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the same time, some commenters misconstrue the agency's focus on
the ``primary'' sources of exposure as the agency ignoring the
possibility of different exposures. This is not the case. Rather, OSHA
finds that the standards as revised will maintain protections in all
likely exposure scenarios while more appropriately addressing the
operations from which exposures regularly occur. This approach is
consistent with the agency's position in the 2017 final rule, as
evidenced by the agency's decision at that time to tailor several
provisions of the standards to abrasive blasting operations, as
discussed above.
    With respect to the USW's assertion that OSHA must consider
potential future uses of beryllium that do not currently exist
(Document ID 2222, Tr. 18-19), the agency agrees and again emphasizes
that the beryllium standards for both construction and shipyards
continue to apply to all beryllium exposures, present or future, that
meet the requirements of paragraph (a). At the same time, OSHA declines
to fashion the standards around hypothetical exposures which the agency
cannot quantify or evaluate, rather than around those operations for
which it has data. The agency remains free to further revise the
standard in the future if new processes or uses of beryllium warrant
such a change.
    The agency also notes that the inability of stakeholders to provide
relevant data on exposures outside of abrasive blasting and welding,
suggests that such exposures, if they occur, are rare. As such,
acknowledging the possibility of these exposures does not alter OSHA's
previous analysis with respect to the economic and technological
feasibility of the beryllium standards for construction and shipyards.
OSHA has no reason to believe that these rare exposures, if they occur,
would mean that compliance with the PEL can no longer be met in most
operations most of the time or that the beryllium standards will now
imperil the existence of the construction and shipyards industries (see
82 FR at 2583).
    In summary, after considering the comments received and the record
as a whole, the agency has determined that it is appropriate to tailor
certain ancillary provisions of the beryllium standards for
construction and shipyards to abrasive blasting and welding operations,
the two operations for which it has relevant data. At the same time,
the agency maintains its position that the construction and shipyards
standards should continue to apply to all occupational exposure to
beryllium in these sectors. Based on the record, OSHA has determined
that the standards, as revised, continue to address the known exposures
of concern in the construction and shipyards sectors, as well as
potential exposures outside of abrasive blasting and welding
operations, and will not result in reduced protections for workers in
these industries. This is true with respect to the proposed revisions
to paragraph (f)(1), as well as to other revisions proposed on the
basis that the primary beryllium exposures in construction and
shipyards take place during abrasive blasting and welding operations.
OSHA remains open to revisiting these issues in the future and
continues to welcome data and information on additional operations with
potential exposure to beryllium in the construction and shipyards
sectors.
    In addition to the comments regarding exposure to beryllium in
contexts other than abrasive blasting and welding, one commenter
further challenged the agency's preliminary determination that welding
in shipyards is not likely to produce skin exposures of concern.
Specifically, USW stated, ``OSHA acknowledges that welding with
beryllium-copper rods and wire can expose workers to beryllium, but
dismisses the hazards of dermal contact on the grounds that such
contact with materials exceeding 0.1 percent is unlikely. However
beryllium-copper rods typically contain 2 percent beryllium'' (Document
ID 2212, p. 3).
    With respect to the limited welding operations in shipyards, OSHA
explained in the NPRM that, although these operations may involve base
materials or fume containing more than 0.1 percent beryllium by weight,
OSHA has reason to believe that skin or surface contamination is not an
exposure source of concern. Specifically, a 2007 study by Cole
indicated that the beryllium content of beryllium aluminum alloy
welding fume samples was lower than expected given the beryllium
content of the base metal (84 FR at 53906). One commenter, USW
(Document ID 2212), took issue with OSHA's preliminary determination
with respect to welding. However, they did not discuss the Cole study,
nor provide additional evidence to contradict OSHA's position with
respect to skin and surface contamination in this operation.
    USW pointed to an information sheet on beryllium copper welding
wire and rods published by U.S. Alloy Company that, it claimed, ``warns
users against grinding, cutting, or polishing [a] weld without proper
protection'' (Document ID 2212, p. 3; Attachment A). According to USW,
``welds are often subjected to the operations the manufacturer warned
against, sometimes by workers other than welders, and there is no
indication that OSHA considered them'' (Document ID 2212, p. 3).
However, the information sheet USW provided nowhere mentions a dermal
contact risk from these welding rods. Rather, it states that ``care
should be taken to avoid inhaling the welding fumes,'' including
``purging the area by drawing off any of the fumes with smoke eaters
and having the operators wear a mask'' (Document 2212, Attachment A).
Importantly, the portion to which USW

refers reads ``[d]ust or fumes generated by machining, grinding,
sawing, blasting, polishing, buffing, brazing, soldering, welding or
thermal cutting of the casting can produce airborne contaminants that
are hazardous'' (Document 2212, Attachment A) (emphasis in the
original). Rather than demonstrating a dermal contact risk from
beryllium copper welding wire and rod, OSHA finds that the lack of any
mention of such a risk in the manufacturer's information sheet supports
OSHA's finding that such exposures are not a concern in this
context.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ NJH also commented that coal slag may contain more than
trace amounts, citing a study by the Center to Protect Workers'
Rights (CPWR) that ``found that beryllium was present at a
concentration of 4 parts per million (ppm) in coal slag samples
analyzed prior to blasting, and measured airborne beryllium
concentrations of up to 9.5 [mu]g/m\3\ during abrasive blasting
tasks, far above trace amounts'' (Document ID 2211, p. 7). OSHA
notes that 4 ppm, or 0.0004 percent by weight, is well under the 0.1
percent beryllium by weight that OSHA treats as ``trace'' for the
purposes of these standards (82 FR at 2610).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments Specific to Paragraph (f)(1)

    In addition to these broader comments about the appropriate
application group in the construction and shipyards sectors, OSHA
received a number of additional comments specifically addressing the
written exposure control plan requirements of paragraph (f)(1). Two
stakeholders commented broadly on the importance of written exposure
control plans. The AFL-CIO and NABTU stated that written exposure
control plans are essential to providing employers with a clear plan
for exposure identification and control (Document ID 2210, p. 6;
Document ID 2202, p. 5). NABTU emphasized the importance of the written
plan's description of engineering controls, work practices, and
substitute materials for each task and a description of how employers
will protect workers not engaged directly in beryllium-exposed tasks,
by limiting access to work areas where beryllium-exposed tasks such as
abrasive blasting occur (Document ID 2202, p. 6). Without a written
plan, both groups asserted, employers are unlikely to adequately
control beryllium exposure (Document ID 2210, p. 6; Document ID 2202,
p. 6). NABTU further emphasized that when planning for worker
protection during tasks involving beryllium, employers must account for
the unique toxicity of beryllium by creating a written exposure control
plan specifically addressing beryllium exposures (Document ID 2202, p.
5).
    The remainder of this section details the comments received with
respect to each proposed revision in paragraph (f)(1) and provides
OSHA's final determination.
    OSHA's proposed revisions to paragraph (f)(1)(i)(A) received no
comment apart from the general concerns discussed above regarding
OSHA's assessment of beryllium exposures outside of abrasive blasting
and welding. Therefore, OSHA is finalizing its proposal to modify
paragraph (f)(1)(i)(A) to refer simply to ``exposure'' rather than
``airborne exposure to or dermal contact with'' by removing the words
``airborne'' and ``or dermal contact with'' as qualifiers for exposure
to beryllium. OSHA notes that these changes are consistent with other
paragraphs where the agency is simplifying the language in a similar
manner (e.g., paragraphs (k)(3)(ii)(A) and (k)(4)(i), Medical
surveillance), and is not intended to alter the meaning of the
provision.
    OSHA is also finalizing its proposal to revoke paragraphs
(f)(1)(i)(B) and (C) of both the construction and shipyards standards,
which previously required lists of operations and job titles involving
exposure above the action level and above the TWA PEL or STEL,
respectively. OSHA's proposals to revoke these paragraphs received
little comment apart from the general concerns discussed above
regarding the potential for exposures in contexts other than abrasive
blasting and welding. As discussed there, OSHA has concluded that it is
appropriate to tailor certain aspects of the beryllium standards for
construction and shipyards to the limited number of operations known to
involve beryllium exposure in construction and shipyards. Given the
small number of operations with known beryllium exposure in these
industries, OSHA maintains that the operations and job titles in these
categories would be largely the same as those for which exposure to
beryllium is reasonably expected. OSHA therefore believes it sufficient
to require that an employer identify those operations and job titles
that result in exposure to beryllium in any form and that fall within
the scope of the standards, and that any additional lists would be
unnecessary and redundant.
    With respect to OSHA's proposal to add a new paragraph in both the
construction ((f)(1)(i)(E)) and shipyards ((f)(1)(i)(D)) standards to
require that the written exposure control plan include procedures used
to ensure the integrity of each containment used to minimize exposures
to employees outside the containment, no commenter objected to the
addition of this requirement, while NJH supported it (Document ID 2211,
p. 8). As OSHA explained in the NPRM, this requirement will ensure that
any containment used is not compromised such that employees outside of
the containment are potentially exposed to beryllium at levels above
the TWA PEL or STEL. The need for this requirement is reinforced by
comments from USW identifying issues with gaps and leaks from ``make
shift containment'' (Document ID 2124, page 10) and noting that
beryllium can escape from abrasive blasting containments (Document ID
2222, Tr. 27-28). After considering the comments and the record as a
whole, OSHA is finalizing this provision as proposed.
    AFL-CIO disagreed with OSHA's proposal to remove paragraphs
(f)(1)(i)(D) and (E) of the standards, which required the employer to
include in the written exposure control plan procedures for minimizing
cross-contamination and migration of beryllium within or to locations
outside the workplace. AFL-CIO characterized these provisions as
``essential to reduce cumulative exposure to beryllium for workers in
high exposure operations and to protect other workers who do not
perform beryllium tasks but would be exposed to beryllium due to the
lack of cross contamination and migration minimization procedures''
(Document ID 2210, p. 6).
    AFL-CIO also argued that OSHA's proposed requirement for written
exposure control plans to include procedures used to ensure the
integrity of each containment used to minimize exposures to employees
outside of containments would be insufficient to control the migration
of beryllium (Document ID 2210, p. 6). AFL-CIO stated that ``OSHA is
requiring containments that would create a higher concentration of
beryllium dust inside the enclosure [and] relying on the protection of
PPE,'' while revising paragraph (f) and paragraphs (h)(2) and (3) to no
longer require employers to use specific procedures to ensure that PPE
is safely doffed. According to AFL-CIO, this will increase the
cumulative exposure risk for abrasive blasters and increase the risk of
cross-contamination and migration of beryllium, thereby exposing
workers with no respiratory or dermal protection (Document ID 2210, p.
7).
    OSHA disagrees, firstly, with AFL-CIO's contention that the
proposed requirement for written exposure control plans to include
procedures used to ensure the integrity of each containment would lead
to increased beryllium exposures to workers inside

the enclosure. This final rule does not require the use of
containments, but rather requires that when an employer chooses to use
a containment, it is used in such a way that employees outside of the
containment are not exposed to beryllium at levels above the TWA PEL or
STEL. In other words, this requirement merely ensures that
containments, when used, accomplish their intended function. Workers
inside the containment continue to receive the protections of the
requirements for use of PPE (paragraph (h)(1)) and respiratory
protection (paragraph (g)(1)(ii)-(iii)), as well as the requirements
that PPE not be removed or cleaned in a manner that releases beryllium
into the air (paragraph (h)(2)(ii), (h)(3)(ii)). For this reason, OSHA
finds that adding a requirement that the written control plan include
such procedures will not lead to increased beryllium exposures to
workers inside such containments.
    Furthermore, OSHA disagrees with AFL-CIO's position that the
previous requirements to document procedures for minimizing cross-
contamination and migration in the written exposure control plan are
necessary to protect workers in the context of the specific exposures
in construction and shipyards sectors. In the general industry context,
requirements relating to cross-contamination and migration serve to
address concerns about both airborne and dermal exposures (see 82 FR at
2668-69). At the same time, OSHA has explained that it does not intend
provisions aimed at protecting workers from the effects of dermal
contact to apply in the case of materials containing only trace amounts
of beryllium absent significant airborne exposures (84 FR at 53906).
OSHA maintains that the primary exposures in construction and shipyards
are from abrasive blasting with material containing trace amounts of
beryllium and limited welding operations. Moreover, as explained above,
while the agency recognizes the potential for other exposure sources in
these sectors, the record does not demonstrate that potential exposures
involve a risk of dermal contact to beryllium in more than trace
amounts.
    In the 2017 final rule, OSHA tailored portions of the written
exposure control plan requirements in construction and shipyards to the
particular exposures in abrasive blasting operations. Specifically, the
agency chose not to include in the construction and shipyards standards
a requirement that employers keep surfaces as free as practicable of
beryllium, as it had done in the general industry standard, finding
that such a requirement would be impracticable in abrasive blasting
operations (82 FR at 2669). At the same time, the agency applied other
provisions, developed for the general industry context, without
appropriately accounting for the trace amounts of beryllium in the
construction and shipyards sectors. In these sectors, where the record
evidence on dermal exposure in modern-day worksites is limited to trace
amounts of beryllium and where the agency otherwise has reason to
believe dermal contact is not an exposure source of concern, OSHA now
finds that it is appropriate to further tailor these provisions to
focus on ensuring that workers not involved in beryllium-related
operations are not exposed to airborne beryllium in excess of the PELs.
    Several provisions of both standards work together to protect
workers near abrasive blasting and welding operations from exposures
above the PELs. In the construction standard, the written exposure
control plan must include procedures to restrict access to work areas
where exposures to beryllium could reasonably be expected to exceed the
TWA PEL or STEL (renumbered in this final rule as paragraph
(f)(1)(i)(D)), and the requirement that these procedures are to be
implemented by a competent person (paragraph (e)(2)). In the shipyard
standard, requirements for regulated areas (paragraph (e)) require that
employers designate areas where exposures to beryllium could exceed the
PELs and limit access to authorized employees. OSHA has retained these
requirements in this final rule. Further, the housekeeping requirements
of both standards (paragraph (j)) require cleaning methods that
minimize the likelihood of re-entrainment of beryllium-containing dust
when cleaning up dust produced by abrasive blasting operations.
    In addition, as discussed above, OSHA is finalizing its proposal to
add a new paragraph in both the construction ((f)(1)(i)(E)) and
shipyards ((f)(1)(i)(D)) standards to require that the written exposure
control plan include procedures used to ensure the integrity of each
containment (such as tarps or structures used to keep sandblasting
debris within an enclosed area) used to minimize exposures to employees
outside the containment. This requirement will further limit airborne
exposures for employees outside of the containment where an employer
uses a containment. Finally, both standards require the employer to
ensure that personal protective clothing and equipment required by the
standard is not removed in a manner that disperses beryllium into the
air (paragraph (h)(2)(ii)), which will serve to limit migration of
beryllium and reduce airborne exposure from re-entrainment.
    With respect to the AFL-CIO's assertion that procedures regarding
the integrity of containments are insufficient to protect workers, OSHA
makes two points. First, comments in the record indicate that
containments can be effective in containing dust during abrasive
blasting, if appropriate procedures are used to ensure their integrity.
As noted by the USW and AFL-CIO, there are times that the abrasive
blasting media can compromise the integrity of the containment
(Document ID 2124, pp. 10-11, 13; 1756, Tr. 246-49; 2210, p. 6).
However, under these circumstances OSHA expects that operations would
be suspended to repair the containment. According to the testimony from
USW during the public hearing for the 2017 final rule, this practice
already takes place in some shipyard operations (Document ID 1756, Tr.
262-63). USW further identified the use of negative pressure with
containments as a feasible and effective way to ensure their integrity;
a method that is already used in the context of bridge repair (Document
ID 1756, Tr. 264).
    Second, OSHA reiterates that it does not intend for the added
provision on containments alone to protect workers from exposures
exceeding the PEL. Rather, the agency intends this added provision to
complement the written plan's procedures to restrict access to work
areas where exposures to beryllium could reasonably be expected to
exceed the TWA PEL or STEL (renumbered as paragraph (f)(1)(i)(D) of the
construction standard), the requirement that these procedures are to be
implemented by a competent person (paragraph (e)(2) of the construction
standard) and requirements for regulated areas (paragraph (e) of the
shipyard standard), to ensure that workers not directly involved in
beryllium-related operations would not be exposed to beryllium above
the PELs.
    OSHA has determined that these requirements will adequately ensure
that workers in shipyards and construction not directly involved in
beryllium-related work will not be exposed to beryllium in excess of
the TWA PEL or STEL, and is therefore finalizing its proposal to revoke
the requirements that the employer include in the written exposure
control plan procedures for minimizing cross-contamination (former
paragraph (f)(1)(i)(D)) and procedures for minimizing the migration of
beryllium within or to locations outside the

workplace (former paragraph (f)(1)(i)(E)).
    The AFL-CIO also disagreed with OSHA's proposal to remove paragraph
(f)(1)(i)(H), which in the 2017 rule required employers to document
procedures for removing, laundering, storing, cleaning, repairing, and
disposing of beryllium-contaminated PPE, from the written exposure
control plan. The AFL-CIO argued that these procedures protect workers
from further exposing themselves to beryllium when putting on and
removing PPE and prevent cross-contamination and migration of beryllium
to other areas of the worksite (Document ID 2210, p. 6). NJH similarly
argued that procedures should be in the written exposure control plan
to identify and minimize beryllium exposures to workers involved in
cleaning and maintaining PPE, as well as containments. If exposures are
generated in a process, they stated, then PPE to protect the worker is
contaminated and should be handled as required in the 2017 final rule
(Document ID 2211, p. 9).
    OSHA disagrees with the AFL-CIO and NJH that all of the 2017 final
rule's requirements for removing, laundering, storing, cleaning,
repairing, and disposing of beryllium-contaminated PPE are necessary in
the construction and shipyards context. As OSHA explains in the summary
and explanation for paragraph (h), Personal Protective Clothing and
Equipment, OSHA has determined that it is appropriate to remove certain
requirements pertaining to laundering, storing, and disposal of PPE
from the construction and shipyard standards. Specifically, OSHA is
removing three provisions from paragraphs (h)(2) and (3): The
requirement to ensure that each employee stores and keeps beryllium-
contaminated PPE separate from street clothing and that storage
facilities prevent cross-contamination as specified in the written
exposure control plan (paragraph (h)(2)(iii)); to ensure that PPE
removed from the workplace for laundering, cleaning, maintenance, or
disposal be placed in closed, impermeable bags or containers labeled in
accordance with the standards' employee information and training
requirements and the Hazard Communication standard (paragraph
(h)(2)(v)); and to inform, in writing, any person or business entity
who launders, cleans, or repairs PPE required by the standards of the
potentially harmful effects of exposure to airborne beryllium and
dermal contact with beryllium, and of the need to handle the PPE in
accordance with the standards (paragraph (h)(3)(iii)). OSHA is removing
paragraph (h)(2)(iii) because it applies only to ``beryllium
contaminated'' PPE (i.e., contaminated with beryllium in concentrations
greater than or equal to 0.1 percent by weight), and thus would never
be triggered by the operations to which OSHA is tailoring these
standards and because the sanitation standards applicable to
construction and shipyards provide the necessary protections for the
storage of PPE (see further discussion below in the summary and
explanation for paragraph (i)). OSHA is removing paragraphs (h)(2)(v)
and (h)(3)(iii) because they protect downstream handlers of PPE who (to
OSHA's knowledge) are not engaged in any tasks that could generate
airborne exposures at levels of concern. Accordingly, OSHA has
determined these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed.
    In light of OSHA's decision to eliminate several of the
requirements in paragraph (h), OSHA believes that it is unnecessary to
require the employer to document all of the procedures that were
previously included in paragraph (f)(1)(i)(H). However, OSHA finds that
it is appropriate to retain those requirements of paragraph (f)(1) that
pertain to provisions that OSHA has not eliminated. Specifically, the
construction and shipyards standards still require the employer to
ensure that PPE required by the standard is not removed in a manner
that disperses beryllium into the air (paragraph (h)(2)(ii)). Both
standards still require the employer to ensure that all reusable
personal protective clothing and equipment required by this standard is
cleaned, laundered, repaired, and replaced as needed to maintain its
effectiveness (paragraph (h)(3)(i)). And, both standards still require
the employer to ensure that beryllium is not removed from PPE required
by the standard by blowing, shaking or any other means that disperses
beryllium into the air (paragraph (h)(3)(ii)). In addition, OSHA has
decided to revise former paragraph (h)(2)(iv) (renumbered as
(h)(2)(iii)) to require that the employer ensure that no employee with
reasonably expected exposure above the TWA PEL or STEL removes personal
protective clothing or equipment from the worksite unless it is first
cleaned in accordance with paragraph (h)(3) (see the Summary and
Explanation for paragraph (h)).
    OSHA's 2017 final rule would have required employers in
construction and shipyards to include information pertaining to these
provisions in their written exposure control plans. For these
provisions, OSHA agrees with the aforementioned commenters that
paragraph (f)(1) should retain the documentation requirements that were
promulgated in the 2017 final rule. Therefore, OSHA is adding a
requirement for employers to include, in their written exposure control
plans, procedures for removing, cleaning, and maintaining personal
protective clothing and equipment in accordance with paragraph (h) of
this standard. Specifically, OSHA is finalizing its proposal to remove
paragraph (f)(1)(i)(H), and is adding a new paragraph (f)(i)(F) to each
standard, instructing employers that their written exposure control
plans must include such procedures.
    NABTU also expressed its belief that OSHA must retain the
standards' procedures for minimizing cross-contamination and migration
of beryllium, and urged OSHA to retain paragraph (f)(1)(i)(H) (Document
ID 2240, pp. 5-6). In support, NABTU noted that some workers at a
beryllium producing facility studied by Virji et al. (2019) who were
not directly involved in beryllium-related operations nevertheless
became sensitized to beryllium, including some involved in shutdown
maintenance, and that the study authors found a strong association
between dermal exposure and beryllium sensitization (Document ID 2240,
pp. 5-6). As discussed above in this Summary and Explanation for
paragraph (f)(1), OSHA does not agree that the Virji study indicates
that employees in the construction and shipyards industries are
currently exposed to dermal contact with beryllium in greater-than-
trace concentrations. OSHA has determined that it is appropriate to
tailor these standards to abrasive blasting and welding operations, and
preventing cross-contamination and migration of beryllium-containing
dust in such operations, where the dust contains only trace amounts of
beryllium, is only necessary to prevent beryllium-containing dust from
being re-entrained and creating an additional inhalation risk to
workers who already have airborne exposure to beryllium at levels of
concern (e.g., workers in and around beryllium-releasing operations,
rather than workers in distant areas of the worksite or downstream from
beryllium-releasing operations).
    OSHA received one comment on its proposal to revise paragraph
(f)(1)(ii)(B) to refer simply to ``exposure to'' rather than ``airborne
exposure to or dermal contact with'' beryllium (84 FR at 53911),
consistent with other paragraphs in which OSHA proposed to simplify the
language in a similar manner (e.g., paragraph (f)(1)(i)(A), Written
exposure control plan;

paragraphs (k)(3)(ii)(A) and (k)(4)(i), Medical surveillance). As
revised, the paragraph requires the employer to review and evaluate the
effectiveness of each written exposure control plan and update it, as
necessary, when notified an employee shows signs or symptoms associated
with exposure to beryllium. NJH agreed that the proposed change would
simplify the reading of the standard (Document ID 2211, p. 9). Having
received no comments opposing this change, OSHA is finalizing this
provision as proposed.
    NJH also suggested that if OSHA makes this change, the agency
should also provide a definition of the term ``exposure'' (Document ID
2211, p. 9). OSHA disagrees. The term ``exposure'' and closely related
terms such as ``exposed'' appear in nearly every paragraph of the
standard, referring variously to airborne exposure, dermal exposure, or
both. OSHA has carefully written the regulatory text and the
accompanying summary and explanation to clearly indicate which meaning
of exposure is intended in each instance, typically by including a
qualifier such as ``airborne'' or ``dermal'' when a specific type of
exposure is involved. Because the intended meaning of the term varies
somewhat from instance to instance, the agency finds that adding a
definition of ``exposure'' to the standard may lead to confusion and
misunderstanding regarding many provisions of the standard, and
maintains that explaining the agency's meaning in each instance of the
term is appropriate. With respect to paragraph (f)(1)(ii)(B), by
including no qualifier for the term exposure, OSHA ensures that the
provision will be triggered whenever an employee shows signs or
symptoms associated with any type of exposure to beryllium.

Paragraph (f)(2) Engineering and Work Practice Controls

    Paragraph (f)(2) of this final rule requires employers to use
engineering and work practice controls to reduce and maintain employee
airborne exposure to beryllium to or below the TWA PEL and STEL, unless
they can demonstrate that such controls are not feasible. If an
employer demonstrates that it is not feasible to reduce airborne
exposure to or below the PELs through engineering and work practice
controls, the employer must implement and maintain engineering and work
practice controls to reduce airborne exposure to the lowest levels
feasible and supplement these controls by using respiratory protection
in accordance with paragraph (g) of this standard.
    Paragraph (f)(2) of the 2017 construction and shipyards standards
also required the implementation of engineering and work practice
controls to limit employee airborne exposure to beryllium. However, in
addition to the requirement to implement controls where exposures
exceed the TWA PEL or STEL, the 2017 standards required employers to
implement at least one engineering or work practice control whenever
exposures exceeded the action level. Specifically, paragraph (f)(2)(i)
of the 2017 standards required that where exposures are, or can
reasonably be expected to be, at or above the action level, employers
were to implement at least one of the following control measures to
reduce airborne exposure: (1) Material and/or process substitution
(paragraph (f)(2)(i)(A)); (2) isolation, such as ventilated partial or
full enclosures (paragraph (f)(2)(i)(B)); (3) local exhaust
ventilation, such as at the points of operation, material handling, and
transfer (paragraph (f)(2)(i)(C)); or (4) process control, such as wet
methods and automation (paragraph (f)(2)(i)(D)). Paragraph (f)(2)(ii)
exempted an employer from this requirement if the employer can
establish that the controls are infeasible, or that airborne exposure
is below the action level, using no fewer than two representative
personal breathing zone samples taken at least seven days apart, for
each affected operation. Additionally, if after implementing at least
one of the controls required by paragraph (f)(2)(i), airborne exposures
still exceeded the PEL or STEL, paragraph (f)(2)(iii) required the
employer to implement additional engineering and work practice controls
to reduce exposure below these limits. If the employer demonstrated
that it is not feasible to reduce exposures below the TWA PEL and STEL
through engineering and work practice controls, paragraph (f)(2)(iv)
required the employer to implement controls to reduce exposure to the
lowest feasible level and supplement the controls through the use of
respirator protection in accordance with paragraph (g) of the standard.
    In the 2019 NPRM, OSHA proposed two changes to paragraph (f)(2) of
the construction and shipyards standards. First, OSHA proposed to
remove the requirement that employers implement engineering and work
practice controls at the action level and instead to require such
controls only for operations where exposures exceed, or can reasonably
be expected to exceed, the PEL or STEL. Second, OSHA proposed to
combine the remaining provisions of paragraphs (f)(2)(i) through (iv)
into a single paragraph (f)(2).
    The requirement to implement controls at or above the action level
in the 2017 construction and shipyard standards was derived from the
general industry standard, which requires that employers implement at
least one type of engineering control for each operation in a beryllium
work area that releases airborne beryllium, unless the employer can
demonstrate that airborne exposure is below the action level or that
the controls are infeasible. In the 2017 final rule, OSHA found that
the action level was a ``reasonable and administratively convenient
benchmark'' when attempting to address significant risk below the PELs
while not unnecessarily burdening employers where controls would
provide little or no benefit (82 FR at 2674). At the same time, the
agency recognized that OSHA health standards usually require
engineering controls only where exposures exceed the PELs (82 FR at
2673).
    In this rulemaking, OSHA has reconsidered this approach to
engineering and work practice controls in the construction and
shipyards contexts. Because exposure to beryllium in construction and
shipyards is almost exclusively limited to abrasive blasting and
welding, OSHA preliminarily determined in the 2019 NPRM that requiring
engineering controls where exposures are between the action level and
the PEL is not reasonably appropriate for these industries. OSHA
reasoned that the technological feasibility analysis for the 2017 final
rule showed abrasive blasting with mineral grit typically generates
airborne beryllium exceeding the PEL even after implementing
engineering controls, thus triggering requirements for respirator use
for employees where exposures remain above the PEL (82 FR at 2584).
Furthermore, welders in shipyards are already required to use local
exhaust ventilation as well as air-line respirators (84 FR at 53910-
11). Thus, in the context of abrasive blasting and welding, the
previous requirement to implement one engineering control where
exposure are between the action level and the PEL will not result in
any additional protection to workers. Accordingly, OSHA proposed to
require engineering and work practice controls in construction and
shipyards only where exposures exceed the TWA PEL or STEL. As
acknowledged in the 2017 final rule, this approach is consistent with
OSHA's typical approach to health standards (84 FR at 53910).
    OSHA received several comments on this proposed change. NABTU
stated

generally that OSHA should retain the 2017 standards' protections
against airborne exposures in paragraph (f)(2) (Document ID 2240, p. 6)
and NJH commented that they ``agree with OSHA that it is important to
retain the requirement to implement engineering and work practice
controls to achieve compliance with the PEL and STEL'' (Document ID
2211, p. 9). AFL-CIO specifically urged OSHA to retain the requirement
to require engineering and work practice controls at the action level,
arguing that the construction standard should require the same level of
protection as the general industry standard to avoid creating a ``two-
tiered protection system'' (Document ID 2210, p. 7). They argued that
not requiring engineering controls at the action level ``places any
potentially exposed workers between the action level and the PEL at
risk . . . by not requiring the hierarchy of controls for these
workers'' \21\ (Document ID 2210, p. 7). In post-hearing comments, they
further argued that ``[t]he hierarchy of controls is the most effective
way to reduce exposures by controlling releases at the source, rather
than near the worker,'' as the 2017 final rule required wherever
beryllium exposures meet or exceed the action level (Document ID 2244,
p. 15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The ``hierarchy of controls'' refers to the policy of
requiring employers to install and implement all feasible
engineering and work practice controls before relying on respirator
use to protect employees (see 82 FR at 2476).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AFL-CIO additionally cited USW's comments on the 2015 beryllium
NPRM for the proposition that engineering and work practice controls
should be required ``at the earliest, yet feasible time'' (Document ID
2244, p. 15). In the cited comments, USW had argued for requiring
engineering or work practice controls for any operation generating
airborne beryllium particulate, as USW and Materion had jointly
recommended for general industry, noting that such a requirement ``is
entirely feasible, and would reduce a risk OSHA has shown to be
significant'' (Document ID 1681, p. 11).
    OSHA disagrees with AFL-CIO's assertion that triggering controls on
the PELs will reduce protection for workers in the construction and
shipyards industries. As explained in the 2019 NPRM, OSHA's
technological feasibility analysis concluded that workers performing
abrasive blasting with mineral grit would typically experience
exposures in excess of the TWA PEL even after implementing engineering
controls (84 FR at 53910; 82 FR at 2584). Therefore, in the case of
abrasive blasting, the requirement to implement at least one
engineering or work practice control where exposure meets or exceeds
the action level would achieve no further protections than the proposed
requirement to implement engineering and work practice controls only
when exposure exceeds the PEL. Similarly, in the case of welding, the
welding standard for shipyards already requires the use of local
exhaust ventilation and air line respirators when welding with
beryllium-containing base or filler metals (29 CFR 1915.51(d)(2)(iv)).
Therefore, the previous requirement would likewise not provide any
further protections for employees exposed to beryllium through welding;
work practice controls are already being used regardless of level of
exposure.
    As explained above in the Summary and Explanation for paragraph
(f)(1), OSHA has determined, based on the record, that beryllium
exposures in construction and shipyards are limited almost exclusively
to abrasive blasting and a limited number of welding operations in
shipyards, and that it is appropriate to tailor certain provisions of
the beryllium standards to these operations. Because in these
operations the requirement to implement engineering and work practice
controls where exposures are between the action level and PEL would
provide no additional protection to workers, OSHA has determined it is
appropriate to remove this requirement from the construction and
shipyards standards.
    At the same time, OSHA agrees with AFL-CIO and NJH that reliance on
the hierarchy of controls remains important for protecting employees in
the construction and shipyards sector. That is why the agency has
retained a specific requirement in paragraph (f)(2) for construction
and shipyard employers to implement engineering and work practice
controls where feasible to achieve compliance with the PEL and STEL, as
OSHA has required in other health standards. Where it is not feasible
to reduce exposures to or below the PELs, paragraph (f)(2) continues to
require employers to implement and maintain engineering and work
practice controls to reduce airborne exposure to the lowest levels
feasible and supplement these controls by using respiratory protection
in accordance with paragraph (g) of the standard. This approach is
consistent with OSHA's application of the hierarchy of controls to all
other standards applicable to construction and shipyards that require
the use of engineering controls to minimize toxic dust. For example,
the ventilation standard in construction, 29 CFR 1926.57(f)(2)(ii),
requires the concentration of respirable dust or fume in the breathing
zone of the abrasive blasting operator or any other worker to remain
below the levels specified in 29 CFR 1926.55.
    After reviewing the comments received and the record as a whole,
OSHA is finalizing its proposal to revise paragraph (f)(2) to remove
the requirement that employers implement engineering and work practice
controls wherever exposures are between the action level and PEL. OSHA
received no comments on its additional proposal to combine the
remaining provisions of paragraphs (f)(2)(i) through (iv) into a single
paragraph (f)(2) and is therefore finalizing paragraph (f)(2) as
proposed.

Paragraph (g) Respiratory Protection

    Paragraph (g) of this final rule requires the provision and use of
respiratory protection under several conditions to protect against
exposure to beryllium. Paragraph (g)(1) requires employers to provide
respiratory protection at no cost to employees and to ensure that
employees utilize such protection in the following circumstances: (i)
During periods necessary to install or implement feasible engineering
and work practice controls where airborne exposure exceeds, or can
reasonably be expected to exceed, the TWA PEL or STEL (paragraph
(g)(1)(i)); (ii) during operations, including maintenance and repair
activities and non-routine tasks, when engineering and work practice
controls are not feasible and airborne exposure exceeds, or can
reasonably be expected to exceed, the TWA PEL or STEL (paragraph
(g)(1)(ii)); (iii) during operations for which an employer has
implemented all feasible engineering and work practice controls when
such controls are not sufficient to reduce airborne exposure to or
below the TWA PEL or STEL (paragraph (g)(1)(iii)); and (iv) when an
employee who is eligible for medical removal under the standard chooses
to remain in a job with airborne exposure at or above the action level
(paragraph (g)(1)(iv)).
    This final rule includes one change from paragraph (g)(1) as
promulgated in the 2017 final rule. In the NPRM, OSHA proposed removing
previous paragraph (g)(1)(iv), which required the use of respiratory
protection during emergencies, from both the construction and shipyards
standards.\22\ As explained previously in this preamble in the summary
and explanation for paragraph (b), OSHA also proposed removing the
definition of ``emergency''--defined as ``any uncontrolled release of
airborne

beryllium''--from both standards. OSHA reasoned that any uncontrolled
release of airborne beryllium in these industries, such as from the
failure of blasting control equipment or a spill of abrasive blasting
media, would only occur during the performance of routine tasks--i.e.,
abrasive blasting and welding--that are already associated with the
airborne release of beryllium (84 FR at 53911). During these processes,
OSHA anticipates that employees working in the immediate vicinity of an
uncontrolled release of airborne beryllium would already be using
respiratory protection pursuant to the other provisions in paragraph
(g)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ As a result, OSHA also proposed to renumber paragraph
(g)(1)(v) as (g)(1)(iv) in both standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three commenters addressed OSHA's proposal to strike paragraph
(g)(1)(iv). In both their pre-hearing comments and at the public
hearing, the AFL-CIO argued that OSHA ``makes the faulty assumption''
that all types of worksites and emergencies--i.e., fires, floods,
chemical releases--will create the same conditions and warrant the same
type of response to beryllium exposure (Document ID 2210, Comments, p.
5; Tr., Document ID 2222, p. 119). They further commented that although
workers with the highest beryllium exposures (i.e., abrasive blasters)
may use full protective equipment, other workers that do not typically
wear such equipment might be exposed in the case of an emergency or
even during normal working conditions (Document ID 2210, Comments, p.
5). Finally, they argued that it is important to tailor emergency
procedures to the specific type of work environment (Document ID 2210,
Comments, p. 5).
    North America's Building Trade Unions (NABTU) likewise commented
that breaches in abrasive blasting containments could expose workers to
beryllium who are not otherwise typically exposed (Tr., Document ID
2222, pp. 86, 91-92; Document ID 2240, pp. 7-8). NABTU conceded that,
with respect to abrasive blasters and welders, the only type of
emergency it could envision was a breach in the abrasive blasting
containment (Tr., Document ID 2222, pp. 102-03). However, in their
post-hearing brief, NABTU argued that OSHA's proposal ignores workers
who perform shut-down maintenance, decontamination, and clean-up work
in beryllium processing facilities (Document ID 2240, pp. 7-8). The
union cited records from a primary beryllium facility indicating that
the facility had experienced leaks, spills, and evacuations due to
events such as fires, which could result in the unexpected release of
beryllium. NABTU argued that the removal of emergency provisions in the
construction standard would result in different protective measures
being applied for general industry and construction employees in these
facilities. Finally, NABTU urged the importance of including exposures
from emergencies in medical and work histories ``to ensure that
pertinent information about potential exposures is not overlooked.''
    NJH agreed with OSHA that abrasive blasting and welding operations
may not result in emergencies (Document ID 2211, p. 6). However, NJH
further stated that, because the uncontrolled release of beryllium can
occur at any time during operations such as abrasive blasting, ``all
workers should be put in respirators and they should be cleaned and
maintained as detailed in the beryllium standard for general industry''
(Document ID 2211, p. 9). NJH also commented that, although they agree
the term ``emergency'' can be struck from the standards, any exposure
above the PEL should trigger medical surveillance that was previously
provided after an emergency--that is, without regard to the requirement
in paragraph (k)(1)(i)(B) that employees be exposed above the action
level for more than 30 days per year (Document ID 2211, p. 6-7; Tr.,
Document ID 2222, pp. 56-7).
    After considering these comments and the record as a whole, OSHA is
finalizing its proposal to eliminate the emergency provision from
paragraph (g). With respect to some commenters' concerns that OSHA is
overlooking workers or operations outside of abrasive blasters and
welders, the agency makes several observations. First, paragraph
(g)(1)(ii) requires employees engaged in maintenance, repair
activities, and non-routine tasks to wear respiratory protection when
engineering and work practice controls are not feasible and airborne
exposure exceeds, or can reasonably be expected to exceed, the TWA PEL
or STEL. This provision would apply in scenarios such as breached
containments or spills that create a risk of airborne exposure.
Moreover, paragraph (g)(1)(iii) requires respirator use during
operations where feasible engineering and work practice controls are
not sufficient to reduce airborne exposure to or below the TWA PEL or
STEL. As OSHA has previously noted, any employees who are not abrasive
blasters or welders but who are in the vicinity of such operations--
such as pot tenders or cleanup workers--are already required to wear
respiratory protection because of their proximity to operations known
to create airborne beryllium exposures above the TWA PEL or STEL (see
84 FR at 53920).\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ In the 2017 Final Rule, OSHA found that pot tender and
cleanup work are usually remote from the abrasive blasting operation
or occur prior to or after the operation is complete (82 FR at 2686-
87). As such, OSHA notes that only a subset of these workers (those
performing their tasks during and adjacent to the abrasive blasting
operation) would potentially be exposed during an event such as a
containment rupture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, as with other areas of the proposal, the commenters suggest
that OSHA is ignoring construction and shipyards workers in operations
outside of abrasive blasting and welding who may be exposed to
beryllium. The commenters primarily point to workers who perform
construction work at general industry sites that process beryllium and
workers who dress non-sparking tools (see, e.g., Document ID 2210,
Comments, pp. 4-5; 2240, pp. 7-8). As explained previously in this
preamble, OSHA repeatedly requested information and data on application
groups outside of abrasive blasting and welding, but no commenters have
provided data sufficient for OSHA to draw any conclusions about
exposures in these contexts. For the same reason, OSHA lacks any
information on potential exposures from ``unexpected releases of a
chemical, fires, [or] floods'' in these contexts (see AFL-CIO, Document
ID 2210, Comments, p. 5). For the reasons already stated, OSHA had
determined that, given this lack of data, it is appropriate to tailor
the construction and shipyards beryllium standards to those operations
for which the agency has sufficient data to demonstrate worker exposure
to beryllium at levels of concern, to properly characterize and
evaluate the exposures, and to develop appropriate measures to address
them. Moreover, as discussed previously, OSHA expects that beryllium
exposures during processes outside of abrasive blasting and welding, if
they occur, are rare. Given the rarity of these exposures during normal
processes, the agency expects that emergency exposures in these
contexts would be exceedingly rare, to the point of not being
reasonably foreseeable. For a full discussion of OSHA's reasoning on
these points, see the summary and explanation of paragraph (f)(1).
    In the operations for which OSHA does have sufficient data (i.e.,
abrasive blasting and welding operations), the agency has determined
that it is unnecessary to trigger respiratory protection requirements
on the occurrence of an emergency. As OSHA noted in the NPRM, and as at
least one commenter agreed (Document ID 2211,

p. 6), any uncontrolled release of beryllium in these operations will
not create exposures that differ from the normal conditions of work and
workers should already be protected by the other provisions of
paragraph (g). Accordingly, OSHA is finalizing its proposal to remove
paragraph (g)(1)(iv) from the beryllium standards for construction and
shipyards.\24\
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    \24\ As to NJH's suggestion that, in light of the removal of
emergency triggers in the standards, OSHA should amend paragraph (k)
to require medical surveillance for any exposure above the action
level or PEL, rather than for those exposed over the action level
for 30 days, OSHA addresses this in the summary and explanation of
paragraph (k). Likewise, with respect to NABTU's comment that
exposures during emergencies should be included in employees'
medical and work histories, OSHA addresses this comment in the
summary and explanation for paragraph (k)(4). Finally, NJH's comment
that all respirators should be cleaned as required in general
industry is addressed in the summary and explanation of paragraphs
(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Paragraph (h) Personal Protective Clothing and Equipment

    Paragraph (h) of the beryllium standards for the construction and
shipyards industries (29 CFR 1926.1124(h) and 1915.1024(h),
respectively) provides requirements relating to personal protective
clothing and equipment (PPE). Paragraph (h)(1) requires employers to
provide and ensure the use of PPE in accordance with the written
exposure control plan required under paragraph (f)(1) of this standard
and OSHA's Personal Protective and Life Saving Equipment standards for
construction (29 CFR part 1926, subpart E) where airborne exposure
exceeds, or can reasonably be expected to exceed, the TWA PEL or STEL.
Employers are expected to choose the appropriate type of PPE for their
employees based on the results of the employer's hazard assessment (82
FR at 2682), and the employer must list in the written exposure control
plan the PPE that is required under paragraph (h)(1) (see paragraph
(f)(1)(i)(C)). Paragraph (h)(2) governs the removal of PPE,\25\ and
requires employers to ensure that each employee removes PPE required by
this standard at the end of the work shift or at the completion of all
tasks involving beryllium, whichever comes first, and that PPE is not
removed in a manner that disperses beryllium into the air.
Additionally, under the PPE cleaning and replacement provisions in
paragraph (h)(3), employers must ensure that all reusable PPE required
by the standard is cleaned, laundered, repaired, and replaced as needed
to maintain its effectiveness, and that beryllium is not removed from
PPE by blowing, shaking or any other means that disperses beryllium
into the air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Paragraph (h)(2) of the construction and shipyards
beryllium standards was titled ``Removal and storage.'' As explained
below, OSHA is removing the provisions in paragraph (h)(2) that
pertain to the storage of PPE. Accordingly, OSHA has revised the
title of paragraph (h)(2) to read ``Removal of PPE.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule finalizes the proposed changes to paragraph (h) in the
2019 NPRM, including OSHA's proposal to remove the requirement,
formerly designated paragraph (h)(1)(ii), to provide and ensure the use
of PPE when there is reasonably expected dermal contact with beryllium
(see 84 FR at 53913). As explained in the NPRM, OSHA did not intend for
the standards' provisions aimed at protecting workers from the effects
of dermal contact with beryllium to apply to operations that involve
materials containing only trace amounts of beryllium absent significant
airborne exposures (84 FR at 53912 (citing 83 FR at 19938); see also 84
FR at 53905-06). In the construction and shipyards sectors, the
operations that cause airborne exposure to beryllium that can exceed
the TWA PEL or STEL are either abrasive blasting operations, which
involve materials or generate particulate matter containing less than
0.1 percent beryllium by weight, or welding operations in shipyards,
where the process and materials do not present a dermal contact risk.
OSHA thus proposed to remove the requirement to provide and ensure the
use of PPE when there is reasonably expected dermal contact with
beryllium because it was not aware of any operations in the
construction or shipyard sectors in which dermal contact with beryllium
would occur at levels above trace amounts, making such a provision
unnecessary.
    OSHA received comments challenging the underlying premise that
abrasive blasting operations and welding operations in shipyards would
not result in dermal contact with beryllium at levels above trace
amounts. Specifically, NJH, citing a study indicating that beryllium
was ``present at a concentration of 4 parts per million (ppm) in coal
slag samples analyzed prior to blasting, and measured airborne
beryllium concentrations of up to 9.5 [mu]g/m3 during abrasive blasting
tasks,'' questioned OSHA's determination that abrasive blasting
operations only contain or produce materials containing trace
concentrations of beryllium (Document ID 2211, p. 7). Additionally, USW
contested OSHA's statement that skin or surface contamination is not
likely to result from welding operations in shipyards, stating that
``beryllium-copper rods typically contain 2 percent beryllium and at
least one manufacturer warns users against grinding, cutting or
polishing the weld without proper protection,'' and alleging that
``welds are often subjected to the operations the manufacturer warned
against, sometimes by workers other than welders'' (Document ID 2212,
p. 3; see also Document ID 2222, Tr. 31 (USW stating that it believes
that welding rods containing up to 2 percent are sometimes used, but
USW does not know how often)). In support, USW pointed to an
information sheet on beryllium copper welding wire and rods published
by U.S. Alloy Company (Document ID 2212, Attachment A).
    OSHA responded to these comments in the summary and explanation
section for paragraph (f). In short, NJH's concern is misplaced because
the 4 ppm of beryllium documented in the coal slag samples in the study
that NJH cited, which would amount to 0.0004 percent by weight, is a
trace amount within OSHA's usage of that term (0.1 percent beryllium by
weight or less). So too is USW's concern about skin contamination
during welding operation. As OSHA explained in the NPRM, the agency's
understanding that the amount of beryllium oxide to form on the surface
of materials being welded in shipyards is likely far lower than would
be expected based solely on the percentage of beryllium in the base
metal is based on a study by Cole, 2007 (84 FR at 53906; see Document
ID 0885, p. 685). USW's comment does not discuss this study, nor does
it offer evidence to undermine the conclusions that OSHA has drawn from
it (see above, Summary and Explanation for paragraph (f)(1)). The
information sheet from U.S. Alloy Company that USW included with its
comment makes no mention of a dermal contact risk from the welding rods
used in the operation, and instead warns that action ``should be taken
to avoid inhaling the welding fumes'' (Document 2212, Attachment A).
OSHA finds that the lack of any mention of a risk of dermal contact
with beryllium in the information sheet supports OSHA's determination
that dermal exposures are not a concern in welding operations.
    OSHA also received several comments expressing concern that, by
removing from the standards the provisions that are solely aimed at
preventing dermal contact with beryllium (including paragraph
(h)(1)(ii)), OSHA would expose workers to a significant risk of harm,
and would be abandoning its position in the 2017 final rule that all
construction and shipyard industry employees within the scope of the
standards need protection against dermal contact with beryllium
(Document ID 2210, p. 4, 7; 2212, p. 4;

2239, p. 1; 2240, p. 5; 2244, pp. 8-10; see also Document ID 2222, Tr.
117-18). Relatedly, commenters expressed concern that OSHA's proposed
revisions would not sufficiently protect workers who may be exposed to
dermal contact with dust, fumes, or mists containing beryllium in
greater-than-trace concentrations in operations other than abrasive
blasting and welding, such as maintenance, renovation, repair and
demolition operations at locations where beryllium operations were
performed; maintenance of non-sparking tools; or, in new operations
that construction and shipyards employers may undertake in the future
(Document ID 2202, p. 2; 2208, pp. 6-7; 2210, pp. 4-5, 7; 2211, pp. 1,
7-8, 10; 2212, pp. 2-4; 2213, pp. 3-4; 2239, pp. 1-2; 2240, pp. 3-5;
2242, pp. 2-3; 2244, p. 13; see also Document ID 2222, Tr. 17-19, 32,
47-48, 84-87, 114-15, 131).
    OSHA also fully responded to these comments in the Summary and
Explanation for paragraph (f). In short, OSHA has not changed its
position on the employees who require protection from dermal contact
with beryllium in the construction and shipyards sectors, nor has it
changed its position that all employers with operations that fall
within the scope of the standards must comply with their terms. OSHA
has not changed (or proposed to change) the scope of the standards,
which are broadly drawn to cover all occupational exposure to beryllium
in all forms, compounds, and mixtures in construction, except those
articles and materials specifically exempted. The standards continue to
require employers to apply provisions related to dermal contact,
through the provision of PPE and other measures, when airborne
exposures exceed the TWA PEL or STEL. OSHA's removal of the provisions
solely aimed at preventing dermal contact with beryllium without
airborne exposures furthers the agency's intent to tailor the
construction and shipyards beryllium standards to the specific
operations on which it has data documenting significant exposures of
concern (i.e., abrasive blasting operations and welding operations in
shipyards).
    When the agency applied some of the ancillary provisions that it
developed for general industry employers into the construction and
shipyards standards in the 2017 final rule (such as the provisions
triggered on dermal contact with beryllium or beryllium contamination),
OSHA did not fully account for the trace levels of beryllium involved
in construction and shipyards operations. As OSHA clarified in the 2018
general industry DFR (83 FR at 19938-39), OSHA only intended the
provisions triggered by dermal contact with beryllium or beryllium
contamination to apply to dust, fumes, mists, or solutions containing
beryllium in concentrations greater than or equal to 0.1 percent by
weight. The agency did not intend to regulate contact with trace
beryllium absent significant airborne exposures. Given that abrasive
blasting operations do not involve materials containing beryllium in
more than trace concentrations, and the welding operations in shipyards
that create airborne exposures of concerns do not pose a risk of skin
contamination, OSHA recognized in the 2019 NPRM that the provisions in
the construction and shipyards beryllium standards triggered on dermal
contact with beryllium or beryllium contamination (such as paragraph
(h)(i)(ii)) would never be triggered (see, e.g., 84 FR at 53906,
53913).\26\
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    \26\ OSHA notes that the term ``beryllium contamination'' is not
defined in the construction and shipyards standards. In the DFR for
general industry, to clarify OSHA's intent that the standard's
requirements aimed at reducing the effect of dermal contact with
beryllium should not apply to areas where there are no processes or
operations involving materials containing at least 0.1% beryllium by
weight, the DFR defined ``beryllium-contaminated or contaminated