[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 66 (Monday, April 7, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 19177-19250]
[FR Doc No: 2014-07469]

Vol. 79

Monday,

No. 66

April 7, 2014

Part II

Department of Transportation

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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

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49 CFR Part 571

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Visibility; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 66 / Monday, April 7, 2014 / Rules
and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162]
RIN 2127-AK43

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Visibility

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: To reduce the risk of devastating backover crashes involving
vulnerable populations (including very young children) and to satisfy
the mandate of the Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of
2007, NHTSA is issuing this final rule to expand the required field of
view for all passenger cars, trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
buses, and low-speed vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of less than
10,000 pounds. The agency anticipates that today's final rule will
significantly reduce backover crashes involving children, persons with
disabilities, the elderly, and other pedestrians who currently have the
highest risk associated with backover crashes. Specifically, today's
final rule specifies an area behind the vehicle which must be visible
to the driver when the vehicle is placed into reverse and other related
performance requirements. The agency anticipates that, in the near
term, vehicle manufacturers will use rearview video systems and in-
vehicle visual displays to meet the requirements of this final rule.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective June 6, 2014.
    Compliance Date: Compliance is required, in accordance with the
phase-in schedule, beginning on May 1, 2016. Full compliance is
required on May 1, 2018.
    Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions for reconsideration of
this final rule must be received not later than May 22, 2014.
    Incorporation by Reference: The incorporation by reference of
certain publications listed in the standard is approved by the Director
of the Federal Register as of June 6, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule must refer
to the docket and notice number set forth above and be submitted to the
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For technical issues: Mr. Markus Price, Office of Vehicle Rulemaking,
Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, Facsimile:<PHONE_NUMBER>, NVS-121.
For legal issues: Mr. Jesse Chang, Office of the Chief Counsel,
Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, Facsimile:<PHONE_NUMBER>, NCC-112.

    The mailing address for these officials is: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    a. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act and
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
    b. Safety Problem
    c. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    d. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    e. Summary of Comments on the NPRM
    f. Public Hearing and Workshop
    g. Additional 2012 Research
    h. Additional SCI Case Analysis
    i. Updates to NCAP
III. Final Rule and Response to Comments
    a. Summary of the Final Rule
    b. Applicability
    c. Alternative Countermeasures
    d. Field of View
    e. Image Size
    f. Test Procedure
    g. Linger Time, Deactivation, and Backing Event
    h. Image Response Time
    i. Display Luminance
    j. Durability Testing
    k. Phase-In
    l. Remaining Issues
    m. Effective Date
IV. Estimated Costs and Benefits
    a. System Effectiveness
    b. Benefits
    c. Costs
    d. Market Adoption Rate
    e. Net Impact
    f. Cost Effectiveness and Regulatory Alternatives
V. Regulatory Analyses
VI. Regulatory Text

I. Executive Summary

    The Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007
(``K.T. Safety Act'' or ``the Act'') directs this agency to amend
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 111 \1\ ``to expand
the required field of view to enable the driver of a motor vehicle to
detect areas behind the motor vehicle to reduce death and injury
resulting from backing incidents, particularly incidents involving
small children and disabled persons.'' \2\ In other words, the K.T.
Safety Act requires that this agency conduct a rulemaking to amend
FMVSS No. 111 in a manner so as to address a safety risk identified by
Congress in the Act--namely, the risk of death and injury that can
result from backover crashes. Further, the language chosen by Congress
particularly directs the agency to consider crashes involving children
and persons with disabilities.
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    \1\ FMVSS No. 111, currently titled ``Rearview mirrors'' is
renamed by today's final rule as ``Rear visibility.''
    \2\ Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007,
(Public Law 110-189, 122 Stat. 639-642), Sec.  4 (2007).
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    With some variations, the requirements in today's final rule
generally adopt the requirements proposed in the NPRM that expand the
required field of view in FMVSS No. 111 to include a 10-foot by 20-foot
zone directly behind the vehicle.\3\ Today's final rule applies these
requirements to all passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and low-speed
vehicles \4\, with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000
pounds or less. Given the currently available information regarding the
backover safety risk, the available backing aid technologies, etc., the
agency believes that systems fulfilling the requirements adopted by
today's final rule are the most effective and the most cost-effective
systems available for meeting the safety need specified in the K.T.
Safety Act. We believe that the systems meeting the requirements of
today's rule also afford the best protection to children and persons
with disabilities.
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    \3\ Prior to adoption of today's rule, the required field of
view for passenger vehicles specified that these vehicles have an
inside rearview mirror that provides a view from 61 meters behind
the vehicle to the horizon. Multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks
and buses with a GVRW of 4,536 kg or less may certify to the
passenger car requirements or provide large planar outside mirrors
on both the driver's side as well as the passenger's side that
provide a view to the rear along the sides of the vehicle. Passenger
cars are required to have a planar outside mirror on the driver's
side that provides a view to the rear along the side of the vehicle.
This rule does not change these field of view requirements from
FMVSS No. 111, but adds additional requirements.
    \4\ A low-speed vehicle is defined as a 4-wheeled vehicle, with
a GVWR of less than 3000 lbs, and whose speed attainable in 1 mile
on a paved level surface is greater than 20 mph and no greater than
25 mph. See 49 CFR Part 571.3. Like all other vehicle types covered
under today's final rule, LSVs are required to provide the driver
with a rearview image meeting the requirements specified in the
regulatory text at the end of this document regardless of whether
the vehicle has any significant blind zone. However, like other
manufacturers, low-speed vehicle manufacturers can petition NHTSA
for an exemption or for rulemaking. The issue of how today's final
rule applies to LSVs is discussed in further detail in Section III.
b. Applicability, below.

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Available Information Continues to Show that the NPRM Approach is the
Best Approach

    After the proposed rule, the agency received public comments
through two separate comment periods and two public meetings. Further,
the agency conducted additional research to ensure that the analysis
supporting today's final rule is robust. While a significant amount of
information has been obtained since the NPRM, none of the additional
information supports the agency departing from the general approach
proposed in the NPRM. The additional information is useful because it
enables the agency to refine its understanding of the technical
capabilities of the manufacturers to meet the requirements of today's
rule and the relevant costs/benefits of today's rule. Nonetheless,
among the various types of rear visibility systems available for study,
agency testing and other currently available information support the
following claims:
    (1) Drivers using rear visibility systems meeting the field of view
requirements of today's final rule avoid crashes with an unexpected
test object at a statistically significant higher rate than drivers
using the standard complement of vehicle equipment.
    (2) Such systems (e.g., rearview video systems) consistently
outperform other rear visibility systems (e.g., sensors-only or mirror
systems) due to a variety of technical and driver-use limitations in
those other systems.
    (3) Rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of today's
rule are the only systems that can meet the need for safety specified
by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (the backover crash risk) because
the other systems afford little or no measureable safety benefit.
    (4) Systems meeting the requirements of today's final rule are not
only the most effective system at addressing the backover crash risk
but also the most cost-effective.
    Thus, NHTSA's believes that the rear visibility system requirements
in today's final rule (expanding the required field of view to include
the 20-foot by 10-foot zone immediately behind the vehicle) are the
only method for addressing the backover safety risk identified in the
K.T. Safety Act that is rationally supported by the totality of the
available data.

Recent Market Developments Have Substantially Reduced Costs

    The agency's latest analysis has shown that 73% of vehicles covered
under today's final rule will be sold with rearview video systems by
2018. This new development in the market means that today's rule will
require less change to the market than we had previously anticipated.
Assuming the 73% market adoption rate, it would cost $546 to $620
million to equip the remaining 27% of vehicles in 2018 without a rear
visibility system. Those systems would also produce $265 to $396
million in monetized benefits.
    While we have data to demonstrate what we predict will be the state
of the market in 2018, we are unable to determine with any reasonable
certainty the precise extent to which other potential events (e.g., the
K.T. Safety Act and the rulemaking process) beyond ``pure market
forces'' might also be a factor. However, in order to reflect this
uncertainty in estimating the likely benefits and costs, NHTSA
considered different methods for establishing a baseline market
adoption rate of rear visibility systems. The purpose of this analysis
was to capture, in addition to the effects of issuing this final rule,
the potential effects of the K.T. Safety Act (and the rulemaking
process mandated by the Act) upon the rearview video system market
adoption. While assessing different alternative baselines is useful in
estimating these different market scenarios, all of these analyses
continue to show that the approach adopted in today's final rule is the
best approach for addressing the backover safety problem.
    Accordingly, we have developed an analysis that presents a range of
both the benefits and costs of this rule based on a range of adoption
rates. At the top-end of the range of adoption rates is the assumption
that all current and projected installations are due purely to market
forces, meaning that 73% of the new vehicle fleet will be equipped with
rearview video systems by 2018. At the low-end of the range of adoption
rates, we adopt the assumption that half of the increase in the market
adoption trend as a result of the data from MY2014 is attributable to
``pure market forces'' and half is not.\5\ Assuming these top and low
end estimated adoption trends, the market adoption attributable to
``pure market demand'' in 2018 would be between 59% and 73%. Assuming
this range of market adoption, $546 million to $924 million in costs
and $265 million to $595 million in monetized benefits are attributable
to the final rule, the rulemaking process, and the K.T. Safety Act.
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    \5\ Further information about these alternative baselines is
available in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis accompanying this
document in the docket referenced at the beginning of this document.

                Table 1--Estimated Costs and Benefits Under 59% and 73% Market Adoption Scenarios
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                                                                      73% Adoption             59% Adoption
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Annual Benefits (2010 $)......................................         $265 M to $396 M         $398 M to $595 M
Annual Costs (2010 $).........................................         $546 M to $620 M         $827 M to $924 M
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    As described in detail, below, and in the Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis (FRIA), the agency believes that the top-end assumption is
both more likely than the low end (given the strong market incentives
in providing rearview video systems) and presents a better picture of
the results of issuing today's final rule. Accordingly, for ease of
presentation, the discussions of the costs and benefits presented both
in this preamble and the FRIA present only those numbers associated
with this assumption. However, the agency does present detailed
information concerning the costs and benefits of the low-end assumption
in Section IV. D. of this preamble and (in more detail) Chapter VIII.
D. of the FRIA.

Benefits Are Expected To Be Substantial

    This rule is expected to decrease the risks to children, persons
with disabilities, and other pedestrians from being injured or killed
in a backover crash. Backover crashes are specifically defined as
crashes where non-occupants of vehicles (such as pedestrians or
cyclists) are struck by vehicles moving in reverse. Our assessment of
available safety data indicates that (on average) there are 267
fatalities and 15,000 injuries (6,000 of which are incapacitating \6\)
resulting from backover

crashes every year. Of those, 210 fatalities and 15,000 injuries \7\
are attributable to backover crashes involving light vehicles
(passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), trucks, buses,
and low-speed vehicles) with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. Further,
the agency has found that children and elderly adults are
disproportionately affected by backover crashes. Our data indicate that
children under 5 years old account for 31 percent of the fatalities
each year, and adults 70 years of age and older account for 26 percent.
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    \6\ The Manual on Classification of Motor Vehicle Traffic
Accidents (ANSI D16.1) defines ``incapacitating injury'' as ``any
injury, other than a fatal injury, which prevents the injured person
from walking, driving or normally continuing the activities the
person was capable of performing before the injury occurred''
(Section 2.3.4)
    \7\ Due to rounding, injuries for light vehicles and all
vehicles are estimated to be 15,000.
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    Rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of today's final
rule are predicted to have an effectiveness of between 28 and 33
percent--substantially higher than other systems (e.g., sensor-only
systems) that are currently available. Applying that estimated
effectiveness to the latest information on the target population, the
aforementioned systems are expected to save 58 to 69 lives each year
(not including injuries prevented) once the entire on road vehicle
fleet is equipped with systems meeting today's rules requirements
(anticipated by approximately 2054).\8\ However, because our latest
information indicates that as much as 73% of new vehicles sold will
have rearview video systems by 2018, the lives saved and injuries
prevented by equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles are approximately
a quarter of this total. Thus, we believe that there will still be 13-
15 fatalities and 1,125-1,332 injuries prevented annually that are a
result of equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles that we do not
anticipate will have rear visibility systems by 2018.\9\ While our
estimated annual benefits, beginning in model year 2018, will not be
fully realized until 2054, they will increase over time from the phase-
in date as vehicles with these systems continue to make up an
increasing percentage of the overall vehicle fleet. Taking into account
that a larger portion of miles traveled by a given model year is
achieved early in the overall life of that model year, we estimate that
roughly two thirds of the lifetime benefits for MY2018 will be realized
by 2028.
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    \8\ Like all new safety standards, benefits realized from these
systems will rise steadily in proportion to the increase of new
vehicles meeting the requirements adopted today within the vehicle
fleet operating on the public roads. In other words, as new vehicles
meeting the new standard replace older vehicles, more vehicles
operating on the road will have the new safety countermeasure and
more benefits will be realized. As with all standards, it takes time
to replace the whole vehicle fleet. While the full rate of annual
anticipated benefits will likely not be realized until 2054, the
rate of annual benefits will rise each year commensurate with new
vehicle sales and the proportion of the miles traveled in those new
vehicles.
    \9\ This figure shows the incremental lives saved and injuries
prevented by equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles that are not
projected to have rear visibility systems in 2018. It compares what
the data show will be the market position for adoption of rearview
video systems by 2018 and the 100% compliance requirement in 2018
(established by today's final rule). Because this figure measures
what we project the market would (in fact) be in 2018, it does not
account for any potential market adoption that is attributable to
manufacturers responding to events that are unrelated to ``pure
market forces'' (e.g., the passage of the K.T. Safety Act or this
rulemaking process). As further explained below, there are a number
of reasons why it is especially difficult in the case of this rule
to quantify the market adoption that is attributable to the K.T.
Safety Act or this rulemaking process. However, we acknowledge that
these events may have had an effect on the market adoption of
rearview video systems and we have attempted to capture this
potential effect below in section IV. Estimated Costs and Benefits.

             Table 2--Estimated Annual Quantifiable Benefits
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits
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Fatalities Reduced.....................  13 to 15.
Injuries Reduced.......................  1,125 to 1,332.
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    In addition to the fatalities and injuries prevented, systems
meeting today's final rule are expected to yield benefits over the
lifetime of the vehicle as a result of avoiding property damage. While
damage to rear visibility systems are a potential source of additional
repair cost as a result of rear-end collisions, the agency calculates
that these costs will be offset by the benefits realized by vehicle
owners as a result of avoiding property-damage-only backing collisions
and yield a net benefit \10\ between $10 and $13 per vehicle (over the
lifetime of the vehicle). In monetary terms, the benefits that are a
result from issuing today's final rule (i.e., not counting the systems
already being installed by the automakers) are expected to be between
$265 and $396 million annually when considering both fatalities/
injuries prevented and the property-damage-only collisions avoided.
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    \10\ This ``net benefit'' is a comparison between the cost of
repairing/replacing damaged rear visibility systems and the benefit
of avoiding property damage-only crashes. The costs of the rear
visibility system and other benefits of these systems are not taken
into account in this ``net benefit.''
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    As the agency is conscious of the costs of today's rule and the
costs of rear visibility systems in general, the agency has made every
effort to ensure that the benefits of today's rule are as accurately
estimated as possible. Thus, various new pieces of information have
been incorporated into the analysis in today's final rule that lead to
different benefits estimates from those in the NPRM. The major
differences include a more refined target population estimate, updated
voluntary installation rate information, and more refined system
effectiveness estimates. As explained further in this document,
additional data from our crash databases \11\ enabled the agency to
more accurately estimate the size of the target population by sampling
a greater number of years of data. Further, new data regarding the rate
of adoption of rear visibility systems has enabled the agency to
project the rate of adoption through the first full compliance year in
today's rule. Finally, the agency was able to conduct additional
research since the NPRM to further examine driver use of rear
visibility systems by examining a wider range of driver demographics
and an additional vehicle type. The additional research adds to the
robustness of the agency's analysis of rear visibility system
effectiveness through a larger sampling of research participants. While
none of the aforementioned new information creates a rational basis for
the agency to alter its decision from the NPRM in any significant
fashion, the agency believes that it was prudent to ensure that the
benefits of today's rule are estimated as accurately as possible due to
the costs of this rulemaking required under the K.T. Safety Act. The
available information continues to show that rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of this rule are the most effective (and the
most cost-effective) systems at addressing the backover safety problem.
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    \11\ The updates that we have incorporated into our analysis
include updates to the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS),
the National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System
(NASS-GES), and the Not-in-Traffic Surveillance (NiTS) system.
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    Further, the agency notes that there continue to be substantial
benefits of this rule that are not easily quantifiable in monetary
terms. The agency recognizes that victims of backover crashes are
frequently the most vulnerable members of our society (such as young
children, the elderly, or persons with disabilities). As these persons
often have special mobility needs or are too young to adequately
comprehend danger, it seems unlikely that solutions such as increased
public awareness or audible backing warnings will be sufficient to
prevent the safety risk of backover crashes. Further, the agency
recognizes that most people place a high value on the lives of

children and that there is a general consensus regarding the need to
protect children as they are unable to protect themselves. As backover
crash victims are often struck by their immediate family members or
caretakers, it is the Department's opinion that an exceptionally high
emotional cost, not easily convertible to monetary equivalents, is
often inflicted upon the families of backover crash victims.

Costs of Today's Final Rule

    The agency acknowledges that the costs of today's rule are
significant. We anticipate rear visibility systems will cost
approximately $43 to $45 for vehicles already equipped with a suitable
visual display and between $132 and $142 for all other vehicles.
Accordingly, based on an annual new vehicle fleet of 16.0 million
vehicles and considering the number of vehicles we anticipate will
already have rear visibility systems by 2018, we believe the costs
attributable to equipping the remaining 27% of vehicles (that are not
projected to have rear visibility systems in 2018) will range from $546
to $620 million annually.\12\
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    \12\ We note that the costs to low-speed vehicles are a small
portion (less than 1%) of the vehicle fleet sales each year. We have
assumed that the costs to low-speed vehicles to comply with the
requirements of today's final rule are the same as other vehicles
and taken those costs into account in this estimate.

                  Table 3--Estimated Installation Costs
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs (2010 $)
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Full system installation per         $132 to $142.
 vehicle.
Camera-only installation per         $43 to $45.
 vehicle.
Total Fleet........................  $546 M to $620 M.
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    In addition to taking steps to ensure that the benefits of today's
rule are accurately estimated, the agency also took steps to ensure
that the estimated costs of this rule are accurate. Most importantly,
two pieces of additional information have enabled the agency to arrive
at a more refined estimate of the costs of today's rule that differ
from the NPRM. First, the agency has a more robust estimate of the per
unit costs of rear visibility systems meeting the requirements of
today's rule because the agency performed a tear down study that
analyzed the ``bolt-by-bolt'' costs of rear visibility systems and the
agency incorporated an analysis of the production savings that occur
over time due to efficiencies in the manufacturing process and
increases in volume. Second, the aforementioned updated adoption rate
of rear visibility systems has been incorporated not only in our
analysis of the benefits but also of the costs of today's rule. Based
on the aforementioned revised estimates for costs and benefits, the net
cost per equivalent life saved for rear visibility systems meeting the
requirements of today's final rule ranges from $15.9 to $26.3 million.

                  Table 4--Estimated Cost Effectiveness
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Equivalent Life Saved
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Rearview Video Systems............  $15.9 to $26.3 million *.
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* The range presented is from a 3% to 7% discount rate.

  Table 5--Summary of Benefits and Costs Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (Millions 2010$) MY2018 and Thereafter
                                                      \13\
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                                                      Primary                                      Discount rate
                    Benefits                         estimate      Low estimate    High estimate        (%)
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Lifetime Monetized..............................            $265            $305            $305               7
Lifetime Monetized..............................            $344            $396            $396               3
Costs:
    Lifetime Monetized..........................            $546            $620            $557               7
    Lifetime Monetized..........................            $546            $620            $557               3
Net Impact:
    Lifetime Monetized..........................           -$281           -$315           -$252               7
    Lifetime Monetized..........................           -$202           -$224           -$161               3
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This Rule is the Least Costly Rule that Meets the Requirements of the
K.T. Safety Act
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    \13\ The different estimates in this chart show some of the
different potential technology options. The Primary Estimate is the
lowest installation cost option (which assumes manufacturers will
use a 130[deg] camera and will utilize any existing display units
already offered in their vehicles). The Low Estimate and High
Estimate provide the estimated minimum and maximum net impacts
possible. The Low Estimate is the 180[deg] camera and assumes that
manufacturers will install a new display to meet the requirements of
today's rule. It represents the minimum overall benefit estimate as
it has the largest negative net impact. Conversely, the High
Estimate is the 180[deg] camera and assumes that manufacturers that
currently offer vehicles with display units are able and choose to
use those existing display units to meet the requirements of today's
rule. This represents the maximum overall benefit estimate because
it has the smallest negative net impact.
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    Throughout this rulemaking process, the agency has been sensitive
to the costs of today's rule and has sought to ensure that the
requirements adopted impose the least amount of regulatory burden on
the economy while still achieving Congress' goal of reducing fatalities
and injuries resulting from backover crashes. Thus, through the
information received by the agency through the comment periods and
public workshops, the agency has explored and adopted various methods
in order to avoid imposing unnecessary regulatory burdens on the
industry and to afford as much flexibility as possible.
Phase-in Schedule
    To that end, today's final rule establishes a flexible phase-in
schedule that affords the manufacturers the maximum amount of time
permitted by the K.T. Safety Act to achieve full compliance (48 months
after the publication of this rule). The phase-in schedule established
by today's rule, excluding small volume and multi-stage manufacturers,
is as follows:
     0% of the vehicles manufactured before May 1, 2016;
     10% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2016,
and before May 1, 2017;
     40% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1, 2017,
and before May 1, 2018; and
     100% of the vehicles manufactured on or after May 1,
2018.\14\
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    \14\ As further discussed below, the latest data show that the
adoption rate of rearview video systems has increased significantly
in recent years. As a result, we anticipate that many manufacturers
will be able to meet the phase-in schedule with little adjustment to
their current manufacturing plans.

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    In addition to affording manufacturers the maximum amount of time
permitted under the K.T. Safety Act to achieve full compliance, the
agency adopts the back-loaded phase-in schedule proposed in the NPRM
and does not separately evaluate light trucks and passenger cars for
the purposes of the phase-in in order to further increase flexibility.
    Further, the agency learned from the comments that, while the
rearview video systems currently used by manufacturers are able to meet
most of the requirements established in today's rule, they may not meet
the entire set of requirements beyond the field of view requirements
including the image size, linger time, response time, durability, and
deactivation requirements. While the agency continues to believe that
those requirements are essential in ensuring the quality of rear
visibility systems in the long run, today's final rule does not require
that manufacturers comply with the requirements beyond the field of
view for purposes of the phase-in period. In making this decision, the
agency notes that the estimated benefits from the NPRM would not be
significantly affected by the delayed phase-in of certain requirements,
as those estimates were based on research conducted using rear
visibility systems that were not designed to conform to all of the
aforementioned performance requirements. In addition, we have
considered the significant additional costs in compelling manufacturers
to conduct equipment redesigns outside of the normal product design
cycle. In order to avoid significantly increasing the cost of this rule
and to enable manufacturers to focus resources, instead, on deploying
rear visibility systems in a greater number of vehicles in the near
term, today's final rule delays the aforementioned requirements until
the end of the 48 month phase-in period.
Response Time Test Procedure and the ``Backing Event''
    As with the phase-in schedule, the agency received various comments
regarding the timing of the presentation of the rearview image to the
driver that suggested approaches that would tend to decrease the costs
and increase flexibility for manufacturers while still preserving
ability of the required rear visibility systems to address the backover
safety problem. While today's rule adopts the proposal from the NPRM
requiring rear visibility systems to display an image of the required
field of view to the driver within 2.0 seconds after the driver places
the vehicle in the reverse direction, the agency learned through the
comments received that this requirement can be more burdensome for
manufacturers if the system response time is tested immediately after
the vehicle is started. Thus, as described further in this document,
the agency has adopted a test procedure in today's final rule to
condition the vehicle prior to evaluating rear visibility system
response time. As this test procedure is based on the available data on
real world driving conditions, the procedure affords manufacturers
additional flexibility to design the initialization process for their
rear visibility systems while still ensuring that the required rearview
image is available at a time that is useful to a driver conducting
backing maneuvers.
    Further, today's final rule adopts a ``backing event'' definition
in order to afford manufacturers additional design flexibility while
still addressing the safety concerns that the agency intended to
address with the proposed linger time and deactivation requirements in
the NPRM. As further described in this document, the agency proposed
linger time and deactivation requirements in the NPRM in order to
ensure that the required rearview image is available to the driver at
the appropriate time without becoming a distraction at an inappropriate
time. Through the comments, the agency learned that the relatively
inflexible linger time and deactivation requirements proposed in the
NPRM could inhibit other safety and convenience features from being
implemented by manufacturers (e.g., views designed to assist trailer
hitching, parking, etc.). Thus, today's final rule adopts a definition
of ``backing event'' and uses this definition to establish the points
in time that the rearview image is required to be presented to the
driver while still affording manufacturers the flexibility to implement
additional safety and convenience features for the drivers.
Durability Testing and Luminance Requirements
    Finally, the agency also modified the durability requirements to
apply on a component level and did not adopt the luminance requirements
to avoid imposing unnecessary testing burdens on the manufacturers
where such burdens were not likely to produce a corresponding safety
benefit. Through the comments received, the agency learned that
ensuring a minimum level of durability of rear visibility system
components can be achieved through component level testing rather than
testing at the vehicle level. Further, the agency learned that
luminance requirements alone would not ensure the quality of the image
provided to the driver and would instead unnecessarily restrict the
technologies that manufacturers can use to present the required
rearview image to the driver. Thus, as further discussed in this
document, the agency adopts the durability requirements from the NPRM
at a component level and does not adopt the luminance requirements in
today's final rule.

Other Methods to Reduce Costs and Increase Flexibility Do Not Fulfill
the K.T. Safety Act

    While the agency has made the aforementioned changes to the
requirements proposed in the NPRM that are aimed at reducing costs
while still preserving the safety benefits of today's rule, other
methods to reduce costs that were explored (or suggested in the
comments received) are not adopted in today's final rule because they
do not meet the need for safety (and do not meet the requirements of
the K.T. Safety Act).
Requiring a Lower-Cost Countermeasure or Utilizing More Performance-
Oriented Standards
    Throughout this rulemaking process, the agency has explored various
countermeasure technologies and evaluated their ability to address the
backover safety problem as required by the K.T. Safety Act. The agency
conducted research to evaluate the effectiveness of various currently
available technologies including additional mirrors, reverse sensors,
and rearview video systems. After extensive testing, the agency
concluded that drivers require the ability to see the area directly
behind the vehicle in order to successfully avoid striking a pedestrian
or an unexpected obstacle. In other words, rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of today's rule are the only currently
available systems that can meet the need for safety specified by
Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (backover crashes). The agency arrived
at this conclusion after observing in our research that sensor-only
systems have various technical limitations that lead to inconsistent
object detection and that drivers with sensor-only systems generally
either failed to respond to the sensor system's audio warning, or
paused only momentarily before resuming the backing maneuver. Further,
our research indicates that drivers were unable to avoid targets behind
the vehicle when assisted with additional rear-mounted mirrors such as
rear convex ``look-down'' or cross-view mirrors. We concluded that the
limited field of view and significant distortion/

minification in such mirrors prevent drivers from successfully
detecting and avoiding targets behind the vehicle. As these sensor-only
and mirror-based rear visibility systems have demonstrated little to no
success in inducing drivers to stop a backing maneuver to avoid a crash
with a pedestrian behind the vehicle, their lower cost is outweighed by
the substantially reduced benefits that are likely to be achieved by
these systems. Thus, the agency believes that rear visibility systems
meeting the requirements of today's rule are not only the most
effective systems at addressing the backover safety problem but also
the most cost effective system. Further, to adjust the requirements in
today's rule to accommodate these other systems would not fulfill the
requirements of the K.T. Safety Act as these other systems cannot be
reasonably expected to address the backover crash problem.
    Consistent with the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
today's final rule establishes ``a minimum standard for motor vehicle
or motor vehicle equipment performance.'' \15\ While we acknowledge
some commenters' desire for a more performance-oriented approach to the
backover safety problem, we conclude that today's final rule is as
performance-oriented as possible while still achieving the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act's requirement that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards ``meet the need for safety.'' \16\ As Congress recognized
when it enacted the Motor Vehicle Safety Act,\17\ there is no clear
distinction between standards that regulate performance versus those
that regulate design. All safety standards necessarily will affect and
preclude certain designs because the design of vehicles and equipment
affects the quality of their performance. The extent to which a safety
standard will restrict particular design is purely a matter of
degree.\18\ Thus, to fulfill all the applicable statutory requirements,
the agency designs requirements to be as broad (i.e., performance-
oriented) as possible without hindering the standard's ability to
``meet the need for safety.'' Our decisions in today's final rule
follow this strategy. As we discuss in detail in Section III, below,
the available data show that providing a driver with a view of the area
behind the vehicle is currently the most effective way available to
reduce backover crashes, as contemplated by the K.T. Safety Act. Thus,
while today's rule requires systems to show a rearview image to the
driver (in order to meet the need for safety), the rule uses
performance-oriented requirements to enable manufacturers flexibility
in determining how to present that image to drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9).
    \16\ See 49 U.S.C. 30111(a).
    \17\ For example, Senator Magnuson recognized that standards are
not either performance standards or design standards (i.e., there is
not a dichotomy between the two) when he said that some safety
standards would necessarily determine the configuration of some
vehicle components. See 112 C.R. 20600 (Aug. 31, 1966).
    \18\ Courts have also recognized the difficulty in applying the
distinction between performance and design standards in concrete
situations (because specifying performance often entails
restrictions on design) and did not invalidate safety standards
based on their indefinite place on the conceptual spectrum between
performance and design. See Washington v. Dept. of Transp., 84 F.3d
1222, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Wood v. General Motors Corp.,
865 F.2d 395, 416-17 (1st Cir. 1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Department
of Transp., 515 F.2d 1053515 F.2d at 1058-59 (6th Cir. 1975)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We further note, as we did in the NPRM, that technology is rapidly
evolving. Thus, while today's final rule concludes that the most
effective and currently available systems present the driver with a
rearview image, the final rule does not require that a specific
technology be used to provide a driver with an image of the area behind
the vehicle, nor does today's rule preclude manufacturers from
providing additional countermeasure technologies to supplement the
required rear visibility system.
Applying Requirements by Vehicle Type
    Further, the comments suggested, and the agency considered, the
possibility of applying the rear visibility system requirements of
today's rule by vehicle type. However, today's rule does not prescribe
different requirements by vehicle type and applies the rear visibility
requirements to all motor vehicles with a GVWR less than 10,000 pounds
(except motorcycles and trailers) as directed by the K.T. Safety Act.
As described above, the available data does not show that other
currently available rear visibility systems (not meeting the
requirements in today's rule) are able to effectively address the
backover safety risk that the agency is required to address under the
K.T. Safety Act. Thus, to apply different requirements by vehicle type
in this rulemaking would mean applying the requirements of today's rule
to only certain vehicle types and excluding others.
    The agency does not believe that it can exclude any vehicle types
covered by the K.T. Safety Act from this rule. While the K.T. Safety
Act affords the agency discretion to apply different requirements to
different vehicle types, the Act does not allow the agency to exclude
(and apply no requirements to) any vehicle type covered by the K.T.
Safety Act. Further, as discussed further in this preamble, the
available data indicate that all vehicle types suffer from significant
rear blind zones and contribute to backover crashes at a rate that is
similar to their proportion of the vehicle fleet.\19\ Thus, to exclude
vehicles covered under the K.T. Safety Act from the requirements in
today's rule would not only fail to meet the requirements of the K.T.
Safety Act, but would also fail to address the backover safety need. As
the vehicles covered by the K.T. Safety Act contribute proportionally
to backover crashes resulting in an injury or a fatality, the agency
believes that it is reasonable to apply the requirements of today's
rule to all vehicles with a GVWR under 10,000 pounds (except
motorcycles and trailers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ As discussed further in this document, all vehicles
contribute to backover crashes at a rate that's similar to their
proportion of the fleet. For example, passenger cars comprise 57% of
the vehicle fleet and are responsible for 52% of backover injuries.
Utility vehicles are 17% of the fleet and are responsible for 16% of
the backover injuries. Vans are 10% of the fleet and responsible for
11% of the backover injuries. Pickup trucks are 16% of the fleet and
responsible for 14% of the injuries. However, some vehicle types
contribute to more fatalities than other vehicle types.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion
    Given the requirements of the K.T. Safety Act and the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (``Vehicle Safety Act''), the
totality of the available data continue to show that rear visibility
systems meeting the requirements in today's final rule are the most
effective and the most cost-effective countermeasure available to
address the backover safety problem identified by Congress in the K.T.
Safety Act. Data from agency testing and other currently available
information continue to show that drivers using rearview video systems
experience a statistically significant beneficial effect in avoiding a
collision with an unexpected rear obstacle. As the agency seeks to
achieve the goals of the K.T. Safety Act in the least burdensome
fashion, the agency has made various modifications to the requirements
in today's final rule. However, this final rule adopts the requirement
from the NPRM that the driver must be afforded a view of the 20-foot by
10-foot zone directly behind the vehicle. The data continue to show
that rear visibility systems with this characteristic are the most
effective solution available to address the backover safety problem
that the agency is required to address under the K.T. Safety Act. To
adopt requirements allowing countermeasures without this

characteristic or applying the requirements in this rule to only a
subset of the vehicle types specified in the K.T. Safety Act would not
fulfill the requirements of that Act.
    Throughout this rulemaking process the agency has been sensitive to
the potential costs of today's rule and has explored multiple potential
methods for reducing the potential burden of today's rule. Although the
additional information received by the agency since the NPRM affords
the agency a more refined understanding of the potential costs and
benefits of today's rule, no comments or research data received provide
the agency with a rational basis to adopt requirements that would
permit rear visibility systems other than those permitted in today's
rule. While the costs of the rule exceed its quantifiable benefits,
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 call upon us to assess the costs and
benefits of a rulemaking, including those costs and benefits that are
difficult to quantify and, unless prohibited by statute, choose the
regulatory alternative that maximizes net benefits. Further, to the
extent permitted by law, regulations must be designed in the most cost-
effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. As summarized
later in this document and explained in detail in the accompanying
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, the agency has carefully considered
all impacts of this rule and has chosen the most cost-effective option
in meeting the statutory mandate. All available information and agency
analysis continues to demonstrate that rear visibility systems meeting
the requirements of today's rule are the most effective, least
burdensome, and most cost-effective systems that can address the
backover safety risk and fulfill the requirements of the K.T. Safety
Act. Thus, the agency has chosen the most cost-effective means of
achieving Congress's purpose in enacting the K.T. Safety Act. Moreover,
as detailed in the NPRM and again discussed here in this final rule,
the Department maintains that there are significant unquantifiable
considerations associated with this rule, in particular the young age
of many victims and the fact that many drivers involved in backover
crashes are relatives or caretakers of the victims, that support this
action.

II. Background and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

a. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act and National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

General Requirements
    Subsection 2(b) of the K.T. Safety Act directs the Secretary of
Transportation to initiate rulemaking to revise FMVSS No. 111 to expand
the required field of view so as to enable drivers of motor vehicles to
detect areas behind the motor vehicle. In the same section, Congress
explained that the purpose of this requirement is to reduce death and
injury resulting from backover crashes--especially crashes involving
young children and disabled persons. The Act permitted the Secretary to
prescribe different requirements for different vehicle types. It
further allowed the Secretary to achieve the goals of the Act through
the provision of additional mirrors, sensors, cameras, or other
technology that could expand the driver's field of view.
    The K.T. Safety Act did not intend to cover all motor vehicles that
are regulated under the Vehicle Safety Act.\20\ While subsection 2(e)
of the K.T. Safety Act defines the term ``motor vehicle,'' for its
purposes, as all vehicles covered under the Vehicle Safety Act, it
specifically excludes all vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating
greater than 10,000 pounds, motorcycles, and trailers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The Vehicle Safety Act defines a ``motor vehicle'' as ``a
vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured
primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does
not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.'' 49 U.S.C.
30102(a)(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that subsection 2(b) prescribes amendments to a Federal motor
vehicle safety standard, this rulemaking is governed not only by the
K.T. Safety Act, but also by the requirements of the Vehicle Safety
Act. The relevant provisions in the Vehicle Safety Act are those in
section 30111 of title 49 of the United States Code. Section 30111
states that the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor
vehicle safety standards. Each standard shall be practicable, meet the
need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms. When
prescribing a motor vehicle safety standard under this chapter, the
Secretary shall consider relevant available motor vehicle safety
information; consult with appropriate State or interstate authorities
(including legislative committees); consider whether a proposed
standard is reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the particular
type of motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment for which it is
prescribed; and consider the extent to which the standard will carry
out the purposes of the Vehicle Safety Act.
Deadlines
    Congress enacted the K.T. Safety Act on February 28, 2008. The Act
directed the Secretary to initiate rulemaking to amend FMVSS No. 111
within 12 months of enactment (February 28, 2009). The Act further
directed the Secretary to publish a final rule amending FMVSS No. 111
within 36 months of enactment (February 28, 2011). In the event that
any of the aforementioned deadlines could not be met, subsection 4
required the Secretary to establish a new deadline and notify the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate of
the new deadlines and the reasons the deadlines specified in the Act
could not be met.
    On February 25, 2011, the agency determined that the deadline for
publication of today's final rule could not be met and the Secretary
sent notice to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation of the Senate as required by the K.T. Safety Act.\21\
While the NPRM was published on December 7, 2010 and provided for a 60-
day comment period, the agency determined that an additional 45-day
comment period would be necessary. The agency informed Congress of its
intent to hold a public hearing and technical workshop in order to
facilitate the exchange of ideas over the backover safety problem. The
agency also stated that additional time was required in order to
analyze the information acquired in these two public meetings. Thus, as
required by the K.T. Safety Act, the Secretary sent the aforementioned
notification and established December 31, 2011 as the new deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0148.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, due to the large volume of comments and the complexity of
the issues discussed in this rulemaking, the Secretary determined that
more time was necessary to complete the final review process. Thus, the
Secretary sent additional notifications to the required committees
establishing the new deadline of February 29, 2012.\22\ A subsequent
deadline of December 31, 2012 was established on February 28, 2012 when
the Secretary sent additional notifications to the required committees

explaining that further research and analysis would be necessary in
order to ensure that the final requirements are as efficient and
protective as possible.\23\ Specifically, the letter noted that
additional analysis and/or research of a wider range of driver and
vehicle types would help to ensure that the final rule is appropriate
and that the underlying analysis is robust. As further described below,
the agency conducted additional research and analysis to expand the
vehicle, driver, and obstacle presentation methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0230.
    \23\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0231.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the agency completed this additional research in 2012, the
Secretary determined that additional time would be necessary to
finalize this rule and sent the notifications to the required
committees under the K.T. Safety Act establishing a deadline of January
2, 2015.\24\ Given that vehicles with rearview video systems are
increasingly prevalent in the light vehicle fleet, we believed that
additional analysis of crashes investigated by the Special Crash
Investigations program would contribute significantly to our
understanding of the backover crash problem. More specifically, the
agency attempted to identify and analyze crashes involving vehicles
with rearview video systems in order to refine further its
understanding of how the proposed requirements address the real world
safety risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0251.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As further discussed below, the agency could not identify as many
cases for analysis as it hoped (potentially because rearview video
systems are already having an impact on reducing backover crashes).
Only two cases involving vehicles with rearview video systems could be
identified and these cases are analyzed in the sections that follow.
However, due to the lack of available cases, the agency believes that
further delay of the rule is unlikely to yield much additional
information for analysis. Thus, after considering these new facts along
with the safety implications of further delay, the Department has
decided that it is appropriate to issue today's final rule at this
time--before the January 2, 2015 deadline.
Phase-in
    In addition to these requirements, the K.T. Safety Act required
that the safety standards prescribed pursuant to the Act establish a
phase-in period for compliance. The Act further required that the
phase-in period prescribe full compliance with the aforementioned
safety standards no later than 48 months after issuance of the final
rule. The K.T. Safety Act instructed the Secretary to consider whether
to require a phase-in schedule based on vehicle type according to data
regarding the frequency of backover incidents for each vehicle type.

b. Safety Problem

Definition of the Backover Problem and Summary of the Available Data
    In the ANPRM and NPRM, we specifically described a backover as a
type of incident, in which a non-occupant of a vehicle (e.g., a
pedestrian or cyclist) is struck by a vehicle moving in reverse. As a
majority of backover crashes occur off of public roadways, NHTSA's
traditional methodologies for collecting data as to the specific
numbers and circumstances of backover incidents could not give the
agency a complete picture of the scope and circumstances of these types
of incidents. Thus, in addition to statistics from traditional sources
such as FARS \25\ and NASS-GES \26\, our research has utilized
information from the ``Not-in-Traffic Surveillance'' (NiTS) system
which collects information about all non-traffic crashes, including
non-traffic backing crashes. Based on the aforementioned sources, NHTSA
estimated that backing crashes of all types result in approximately 410
fatalities and 42,000 injuries each year. Of those, the subset of
backover crashes (crashes involving non-occupants of vehicles such as
pedestrians and cyclists) comprises 267 fatalities and 15,000 injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ The Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) is a
nationwide census that provides yearly data regarding fatal injuries
suffered in motor vehicle traffic crashes. See NHTSA, NCSA Reports
and Publications, http://www.nhtsa.gov/FARS.
    \26\ The National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates
System (NASS-GES) is a nationally representative sample of police
reported motor vehicle crashes. See NHTSA, NASS General Estimates
System, http://www.nhtsa.gov/NASS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Of these backover crashes, not all involve the vehicle types
contemplated by Congress in the K.T. Safety Act (cars, trucks, MPVs,
and vans with GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less). When only these vehicles
are taken into account, the data indicate that a total population of
210 fatalities and 15,000 injuries \27\ are due to light vehicle
backover crashes.\28\ However, the data are less clear when examining
the distribution of backover crashes by vehicle type. Table 6
illustrates that pickup trucks and MPVs are statistically
overrepresented in backover fatalities when compared to all non-backing
traffic injury crashes and to their proportion of the vehicle fleet
with a GVWR of less than 10,000 pounds. Our analysis revealed that
while these vehicle types were statistically overrepresented in
backover-related fatalities, they were not significantly
overrepresented in backover crashes generally. In other words, these
data indicate that while these types of vehicles are proportionately
involved in backover crashes, those involving light trucks and sport
utility vehicles are more likely to be fatal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Due to rounding, injuries for both light vehicles and all
vehicles are estimated to be 15,000.
    \28\ See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.

                                    Table 6--Passenger Vehicle Backover Fatalities and Injuries by Vehicle Type \29\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                % of Non-
                  Backing vehicle type                      Fatalities         % of          Estimated    Estimated % of      Backing       % of Fleet
                                                                            Fatalities       injuries        injuries         crashes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car.....................................................              59              28           8,000              52              58              57
Utility Vehicle.........................................              56              27           2,000              16              18              17
Van.....................................................              23              11           2,000              11               7              10
Pickup..................................................              68              33           2,000              14              15              16
Other Light Vehicle.....................................               3               2           1,000               7               2               0
Passenger Vehicles......................................             210             100          15,000             100             100             100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FARS 2007-2011, NASS-GES 2007-2011, NiTS 2007-2011.
Note: Estimates may not add up to totals due to independent rounding.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Our data further indicated that young children under the age of 5
and adults over the age of 70 are disproportionately represented in
passenger vehicle backover crashes. Table 7 details the ages for
fatalities and injuries for backover crashes involving all vehicles as
well as those involving passenger vehicles only. It also details the
proportion of the U.S. population in each age category from the 2007
U.S. Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program for comparison. When
restricted to backover fatalities involving passenger vehicles,
children under 5 years old account for 39 percent of the fatalities and
adults 70 years of age and older account for 29 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Id.

                     Table 7--All Backover Crash Fatalities and Injuries by Victim Age \30\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Percent of       Estimated    Estimated % of    Percent of
          Age of victim             Fatalities      fatalities       injuries        injuries       population
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  All Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under 5.....................              84              31           1,000               6               7
    5-10........................               8               3           1,000               4               7
    10-19.......................               4               1           1,000               9              14
    20-59.......................              73              27           7,000              49              55
    60-69.......................              27              10           2,000              11               8
    70+.........................              70              26           3,000              20               9
    Unknown.....................               2               1              *0               1  ..............
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...................             267             100          15,000             100             100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under 5.....................              82              39           1,000               6               7
    5-10........................               8               4           1,000               4               7
    10-19.......................               1               1           1,000               9              14
    20-59.......................              38              18           7,000              48              55
    60-69.......................              19               9           2,000              11               8
    70+.........................              61              29           3,000              21               9
    Unknown.....................               1               0              *0               1  ..............
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...................             210             100          15,000             100             100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * indicates estimate less than 500, Estimates do not add up to totals due to independent rounding.
Note: Source: US Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 2007 Population Estimates; FARS 2007-2011, NASS-
  GES 2007-2011, NiTS 2007-2011.

    In addition, we examined the data specifically in regards to
children under the age of 5. Table 8 (below) presents passenger vehicle
backover fatalities by year of age for victims less than 5 years old.
Out of all backover fatalities involving passenger vehicles, 24 percent
(49 out of 210) of victims are 1 year of age and younger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Id.

   Table 8--Breakdown of Backover Crash Fatalities Involving Passenger
               Vehicles for Victims Under Age 5 Years \31\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Percent of
                  Age of victim (years)                     fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.......................................................               2
1.......................................................              59
2.......................................................              21
3.......................................................              11
4.......................................................               7
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................             100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: US Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 2007 Population
  Estimates; FARS 2007-2011, NASS-GES 2007-2011, NiTS 2007-2011

    Separately, the agency also examined the FARS and NASS-GES data
from 2007-2010 in order to determine whether or not any persons with
disabilities were involved in backover crashes. During the four-year
period between 2007 and 2010, the agency identified one case in the
FARS database involving a vision-impaired pedestrian where the backover
crash resulted in a fatality. When examining the same timeframe, the
agency identified two backover cases in the NASS-GES database that
involved persons in wheelchairs that resulted in injuries. Under both
databases, the agency found other cases where the individual was
specified as ``impaired'' (1 in FARS, and 11 in NASS-GES). While the
agency cannot identify the specific type of ``impairment'' that the
individual had at the time of the backover crash, these individuals may
have had a disability (permanent or temporary) at the time of the
backover crash.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ The FARS and NASS-GES coding system has a separate category
for individuals that were alcohol-impaired. However, the FARS and
NASS-GES coding system does not differentiate between persons that
have physical disabilities (e.g., individuals using crutches) and
persons impaired by substances that are not alcohol (e.g., wrong
dosage of medication). Thus, while persons with temporary or
permanent disabilities could be included in this category, the
database information is not specific enough for the agency to
determine what portion of these persons had a physical disability at
the time of the backover crash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Special Crash Investigation of Backover Crashes
    As reported in the ANPRM and the NPRM, NHTSA conducted an analysis
of police-reported backover crashes through a Special Crash
Investigation (SCI) program during the earlier stages of this
rulemaking. The SCI program operates by receiving notifications of
potential backover cases from several different sources including media
reports, police and rescue personnel, contacts within NHTSA, reports
from the general public, as well as notifications from the NASS. For
purposes of that analysis of SCI cases, an eligible backover case was
defined as a crash in which a light passenger vehicle's back plane
strikes or passes over a person who is either positioned to the rear of
the vehicle or is approaching from the side. These cases investigated
were more likely to be cases involving children--however, some cases
did involve adults. The majority of notifications received did not meet
the criteria for case assignment. Typically, the reasons for not
pursuing further include: (1) The reported crash configuration is
outside of the scope of the program; (2) minor incidents with no
fatally or seriously injured persons; or (3) incidents where
cooperation cannot be established with the involved parties. As an
example, many reported incidents are determined to be side or frontal
impacts, which were not investigated for the purposes of this
rulemaking. The agency was less likely to investigate a case involving
an adult unless the adult was seriously injured or killed or if the
backing vehicles were equipped with backing or parking aids.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ The SCI cases reviewed by NHTSA are available in the SCI
Electronic Case Viewer at http://www.nhtsa.gov/SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency conducted these investigations because the special crash
investigations enhance the agency's understanding of the different
circumstances that can lead to a backover crash. As the SCI cases
revealed, there are a number of variables that can lead to a backover
crash. NHTSA completed special crash investigations of 58 backover
cases.\34\ The 58 backing vehicles in these cases comprised 18
passenger cars, 22 MPVs, 5 vans (including minivans) and 13 pickup
trucks. For cases in which an estimated speed for the backing vehicle
was available, the speed of the backing vehicle ranged between
approximately 0.62 and 10 mph. Of the 58 SCI backover cases, the vast
majority (55) occurred in daylight conditions. Further, half of the
cases investigated by NHTSA involved a non-occupant fatality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ While NHTSA analyzed a total of 58 SCI cases during the
course of its research, some analyses were completed before all 58
cases were available. For example, when NHTSA analyzed crash
avoidability using data from the SCI cases only 50 cases were
available. See Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, available in the
docket number referenced at the beginning of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the cases investigated by NHTSA, most of the victims were either
children (who were too short to be seen behind the vehicle), or adults
who had fallen or were bent over and were also thus not in the driver's
field of view. Specifically, 51 of the cases involved children (ranging
in age from less than 8 months old up to 13 years old) who were struck
by vehicles.\35\ Of the 8 adult victim cases investigated by NHTSA, 4
were in an upright posture either standing or walking. Of the remaining
four adult victims documented in the SCI cases, one was bending over
behind a backing vehicle to pick up something from the ground, one was
an elderly person who had fallen down in the path of the vehicle prior
to being run over, and the postural orientation of the remaining two
was unknown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ As the selection of SCI cases, media reports, and other
sources of information available to NHTSA on backover crashes may
tend to report more heavily on accidents involving vulnerable
populations such as children or the elderly, the information
contained in the SCI cases analyzed in this rulemaking may be over
representative of the incidence of backovers involving these
populations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on NHTSA's analysis of the quantitative data and narrative
descriptions of how the 58 SCI-documented backover crashes transpired,
NHTSA estimated the general path that the victim took prior to each
backover crash. We note that this analysis is unable to identify the
victim's location, speed, and trajectory at a time that is relevant to
the backover crash (i.e., after the vehicle has begun the backing
maneuver). However, this analysis does enhance the agency's
understanding of the varied circumstances that can lead to a backover
crash. The breakdown of the victim's path of travel prior to being
struck is as follows: 41 were approaching from the right or left of the
vehicle at some point in time prior to being struck by the vehicle, 12
were in the path of the backing vehicle, 4 were unknown, and one was
``other.''
    Subsequent to the ANPRM, NHTSA further analyzed these SCI backover
cases to assess how far the vehicle traveled before striking the
victim. Distances traveled for the cases investigated by NHTSA ranged
from 1 to 75 feet. Overall, as shown in Table 9 below, this analysis
showed that in 77 percent of the real-world, SCI backover cases
investigated by NHTSA, the vehicle traveled less than 20 feet. While
the subset may or may not be nationally representative of all backing
crashes, we believe this information from the SCI cases is useful in
the development of a required visible area and the associated
development of a compliance test.

   Table 9--Average Distance Traveled by Backing Vehicle for First 58 SCI Backover Cases and Percent of Backover Crashes That Could Be Avoided Through
                                                              Various Coverage Ranges \36\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Average
                                                                             distance
                                                           Number of SCI  traveled prior      7ft (%)        15ft (%)        20ft (%)        35ft (%)
                                                               cases         to strike
                                                                               (ft.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car.....................................................              18            13.7              39              56              78              89
SUV.....................................................              22            13.4              27              68              82             100
Minivan.................................................               4            31.0              25              50              50              75
Van.....................................................               1            54.5               0               0               0               0
Pickup..................................................              13            17.2              38              69              69              92
All Light Vehicles......................................              58            26.0              33              63              77              93
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Analysis of Backover Crash Risk by Monte Carlo Simulation
    NHTSA also calculated backover crash risk as a function of
pedestrian location using a Monte Carlo simulation.\37\ Data from a
recent NHTSA study of drivers' backing behavior,\38\ such as average
backing speed and average distance covered in a backing maneuver, were
used to develop a backing speed distribution and a backing distance
distribution that were used as inputs to the simulation. Similarly,
published data 39 40 41 characterizing walking and running
speeds of an average 1-year-old child were also used as inputs. A Monte
Carlo simulation was performed that drew upon the noted vehicle and
pedestrian motion data to calculate a probability-based risk weighting
for a test area centered behind the vehicle. The probability-based risk
weightings for each grid square were based on the number of pedestrian-
vehicle backing crashes predicted by the simulation for trials for
which the pedestrian was initially (i.e., at the time that the vehicle
began to back up) in the center of one square of the grid of 1-foot
squares spanning 70 feet wide by 90 feet in range behind the vehicle. A
total of 1,000,000 simulation trials were run with the pedestrian
initially in the center of each square.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ These distances do not indicate the distance between the
victim and the vehicle at the start of the backing maneuver because
it shows the distance that the vehicle traveled before striking the
pedestrian. The SCI cases do not have sufficient detail to enable
the agency to determine the location of the pedestrian at the
beginning of the backing maneuver.
    \37\ 74 FR 9484.
    \38\ Mazzae, E.N., Barickman, F.S., Baldwin, G.H.S., and Ranney,
T.A. (2008). On-Road Study of Drivers' Use of Rearview Video Systems
(ORSDURVS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS
811 024.
    \39\ Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways, 2003 Edition. Washington, DC: FHWA, November 2003.
    \40\ Milazzo, J.S., Rouphail, J.E., and Alien, D.P. (1999).
Quality of Service for Interrupted-Flow Pedestrian Facilities in
Highway Capacity Manual 2000. Transportation Research Record, No.
1678 (1999): 25-31.
    \41\ Chou, P., Chou, Y., Su, F., Huang, W., Lin, T. (2003).
Normal Gait of Children. Biomedical Engineering--Applications, Basis
& Communications, Vol. 15 No. 4 August 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The output of this analysis calculated relative crash risk values
for each grid square representing a location behind the vehicle. The
results suggested that, if pedestrians were randomly distributed in
areas behind the vehicle, an area 12 feet wide by 36 feet long centered
behind the vehicle would address pedestrian locations having relative
crash risks of 0.15 and higher (with a risk value of 1.0 being located
directly aft of the rear bumper). To address crash risks of 0.20 and
higher, an area 7 feet wide and 33 feet long centered behind the
vehicle would need to be covered. The analysis showed that an area
covering approximately the width of the vehicle out to a range of 19
feet would encompass risk values of 0.4 and higher.

c. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    In response to the K.T. Safety Act, NHTSA initiated rulemaking to
amend FMVSS No. 111 to improve a driver's ability to see areas to the
rear of a motor vehicle to reduce backover incidents by publishing an
ANPRM in the Federal Register on March 4, 2009. In addition to
complying with the statutory deadline for initiating rulemaking, we
published the ANPRM in order to solicit public comment on the current
state of research and the efficacy of available countermeasures. In
this notice, we acknowledged the backover safety problem and its
disproportionate effect on small children and the elderly. We further
described our ongoing research efforts and presented a series of
specific questions for public comment.
    The research presented in the ANPRM focused on four major topic
areas. The first area involved the nature of backover incidents and
backing crashes generally. We presented the details of documented
backover incidents, including the locations of backover victims, the
paths the victims took to enter the path of the vehicle, and the
visibility characteristics of the vehicles involved. In the ANPRM, we
outlined the information we had regarding these crashes, whether the
lack of visibility played a significant role, and whether or not the
characteristics of a class or type of vehicle could be considered a
contributing factor.
    The second area of focus involved the evaluation of various
strategies regarding the vehicles types and the appropriate rear
visibility countermeasure. We presented three possible strategies in
the ANPRM and requested public comment. The first strategy raised by
the ANPRM was to ensure that the vehicles which are over-represented in
terms of fatalities and injuries would have their rear field of view
improved. Such a strategy would have focused on vehicles such as pickup
trucks or MPVs, which were presumed to be overrepresented. The second
strategy explored sought to establish a minimum blind zone area for
vehicles under 10,000 pounds. Our research at the time suggested that a
vehicle's rear blind zone area may be statistically correlated with its
rate of backing crashes. Using this correlation, we conjectured that it
may have been possible to determine which vehicles warranted certain
rear visibility improvements based on the size of their rear blind
zones and the setting of a ``threshold.'' Finally we also explored the
possibility that the rear visibility countermeasures should be applied
uniformly to all vehicles contemplated by the K.T. Safety Act.
    The third topic focused on the evaluation of various
countermeasures. After consulting past agency research, industry and
other outside sources, as well as conducting new research, four types
of countermeasures were presented and described in the ANPRM. These
countermeasures included direct vision (i.e., what can be seen by a
driver glancing directly out a vehicle's windows), rear-mounted convex
mirrors, rear object detection sensors

(such as ultrasonic or radar-based devices), and rearview video (RV)
systems. While we noted that research was still ongoing, the ANPRM
described how these systems work, how well they perform in identifying
pedestrians, and how effectively drivers may use them.
    Finally, the fourth topic involved consideration of technical
specifications and test procedures that could be used to describe and
evaluate the performance aspects of direct view, rear-mounted convex
mirrors, rear object detection sensors, and rearview video (RV)
systems. The agency presented preliminary information on potential
technical specifications and test procedures and solicited information
on how these specifications and procedures should be refined for the
purposes of developing repeatable compliance tests.
    In addition to presenting these four areas of research, NHTSA also
requested comment on more than forty specific questions in the ANPRM.
We requested public input on a variety of topics including studies on
the effectiveness of various indirect rear visibility systems (i.e.,
devices that aid a driver in seeing areas around a vehicle, such as
mirrors or video systems) that have been implemented in the U.S. and/or
abroad, and technological possibilities that could enhance the
reliability of existing technologies. Further, the agency sought
information on the costs of implementation of all available
technologies to develop more robust cost and benefit estimates.
    In response to the ANPRM, the agency received comments from 37
entities, including industry associations, automotive and equipment
manufacturers, safety advocacy organizations, and 14 individuals.
Generally, the comments covered the main research areas detailed in the
ANPRM. With regard to the issue of which vehicles most warrant improved
rear visibility, vehicle manufacturers generally desired to focus any
expansion of rear visibility on the particular types of vehicles (i.e.,
trucks, vans, and MPVs within the specified weight limits) that they
believed posed the highest risk of backover crash fatalities and
injuries. However, vehicle safety organizations and equipment
manufacturers generally suggested that all vehicles need to have
expanded rear fields of view.
    With regard to the issue of what technology would be effective at
expanding the rear field of view for a driver, commenters discussed
additional mirrors, sensors, and rearview video combined with sensors.
Some commenters provided input regarding test procedure development and
rear visibility countermeasure characteristics, such as visual display
size and brightness, and graphic overlays superimposed on a video
image. Some also discussed whether it is appropriate to allow a small
gap in coverage immediately behind the rear bumper. Finally, commenters
generally agreed with the cost estimates provided by the agency.
However, the Consumers Union and Magna comments did suggest that our
estimates of the cost of individual technologies seemed high and that
there would be larger cost reductions over time than the agency had
indicated.
    Because the ANPRM had an extremely broad scope, the comments
addressed a wide variety of issues and provided a large amount of
information. A more extensive discussion of the ANPRM, the comments
that the agency received in response, and our analysis and response to
these comments is available in the NPRM. However, specific comments on
the ANPRM which are relevant to our discussion of today's final rule
are also referenced by issue in section III, Final Rule and Response to
Comments.

d. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    After evaluating the comments on the ANPRM and conducting
additional research, we published an NPRM on December 7, 2010.\42\ In
that notice, we proposed to apply the rear visibility requirements to
all passenger cars, MPVs, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less by specifying an area behind the vehicle
that a driver must be able to see when the vehicle is in reverse gear.
The proposal tentatively concluded that drivers need to be able to see
a visual image of a 32-inch tall cylinder with a 12-inch diameter
behind the vehicle over an area 5 feet to either side of the vehicle
centerline by 20 feet in longitudinal range from the vehicle's rear
bumper surface. We further proposed various performance criteria for
the visual display including luminance, rearview image response time,
and image linger and driver deactivation restrictions, as well as
durability requirements. Pursuant to the K.T. Safety Act, the NPRM also
proposed a phase-in schedule for compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ 75 FR 76186.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM proposed to apply rear visibility improvements to all
passenger cars, MPVs, trucks, buses, and low-speed vehicles with a GVWR
of 10,000 pounds or less because the available data showed no clear
basis for excluding certain vehicles. As noted above, the ANPRM and the
commenters on the ANPRM explored various possibilities for establishing
rear visibility countermeasures which would be applied based on vehicle
type (such as MPVs, trucks, and buses) or based on a blind zone
threshold. However, as the available data indicated that substantial
numbers of fatalities and injuries are caused by all types of light
vehicles, we did not propose in the NPRM to limit the application of
rear visibility countermeasures by vehicle type. Further, our data
showed that applying the rear visibility countermeasure by a blind zone
area threshold lacked a sufficient statistical basis. The available
data demonstrated that vehicles with comparatively small blind zones
still had similar backover crash rates as other vehicles. In addition,
the agency concluded that applying rear visibility countermeasures to
all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less would most closely
follow the intent of Congress in the K.T. Safety Act. Thus, the NPRM
proposed to apply the rear visibility improvements to all vehicles
contemplated by Congress under the K.T. Safety Act.
    We also expressed in the NPRM our view that rearview video systems
represent the most effective technology available to address the
problem of backover crashes. Our data showed that rear-mounted convex
mirrors and sensor-based object detection systems offered few benefits
compared to rearview video systems due to system performance and driver
use issues. Studies conducted by NHTSA showed that sensors and mirrors,
while able to detect pedestrians to some degree, simply did not induce
the driver response needed to prevent backover crashes. The NPRM noted
that a sensor-activated warning of the presence of an obstacle often
does not lead to a successful (i.e., timely and sufficient) crash
avoidance response from the driver unless the driver is also provided
with visual confirmation of obstacle presence. Thus, the NPRM proposed
to afford the driver a visual display which offered a view of the area
immediately behind the vehicle.
    In the NPRM, we tentatively concluded that the area covered by the
proposed rearview countermeasure should be 20 feet by 10 feet. In
making this determination, we used various sources of information
including the comments received from the ANPRM, the available safety
data, our review of special investigations of backover crashes, and a
computer simulation. For example, we examined the typical distances
that backover-crash-involved vehicles traveled from the location at

which they began moving rearward to the location at which they struck a
pedestrian. We tentatively concluded that an area with a width of 10
feet (5 feet to either side of a rearward extension of the vehicle's
centerline) and a length of 20 feet extending backward from a
transverse vertical plane tangent to the rearmost point on the rear
bumper encompasses the highest risk area for children and other
pedestrians to be struck. Thus, we proposed in the NPRM that test
objects, of a particular size, within that area must be visible to
drivers when they are conducting backing maneuvers.
    In the NPRM we also expressed our view that, in order to maintain
the level of effectiveness that we have seen in our testing of existing
rearview video systems, we needed to propose a minimum set of
performance requirements. Specifically, the NPRM set forth requirements
for the performance of the visual display luminance, a minimum rearview
image size, a rearview image response time requirement, durability
requirements for exterior components, and provisions against driver
deactivation and excessive rearview image linger. In drafting these
proposed requirements, the agency strove to afford manufacturers
flexibility to meet these requirements as they see fit (such as through
the development of new technologies). Since we stated in the NPRM that
most, if not all, rearview video systems that would likely be used by
manufacturers to meet the proposed minimum set of requirements already
met these requirements, we did not believe that the adoption of these
additional requirements would increase the cost of this existing
technology.
    Further, pursuant to section 2(c) of the K.T. Safety Act, we
proposed a phase-in schedule that would be completed within 48 months
of the publication of the final rule. Because we anticipated publishing
a final rule by the statutory deadline of February 28, 2011, we noted
that the rule must require full compliance not later than February 28,
2015. However, we were conscious of the fact that, for safety standard
compliance purposes, model years begin on September 1 and end on August
31 and that February 28 falls in the middle of a model year. Thus, the
agency tentatively concluded that vehicle manufacturers would need, as
a practical matter, to begin full compliance at the beginning of that
model year, i.e., on September 1, 2014. Accordingly, NHTSA proposed the
following phase-in schedule:
     0% of the vehicles manufactured before September 1, 2012;
     10% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2012, and before September 1, 2013;
     40% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2013, and before September 1, 2014; and
     100% of the vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2014.
    Finally, the NPRM also proposed a compliance test with which to
evaluate the field of view and image size requirements. The proposed
test would utilize a photography camera with an imaging sensor located
at the eye point of a 50th percentile male. The test procedure would
then take a photograph of the test objects designed to simulate the
height and width of an 18-month-old toddler as they are presented in
the rear visibility system display. This photograph would then be used
to assess the compliance of the rear visibility system by determining
if the required portions of the seven test objects, located along the
perimeter of the required field of view, are visible and displayed at a
sufficient size.

e. Summary of Comments on the NPRM

    In response to the NPRM, the agency received comments from a wide
variety of commenters including trade associations, manufacturers,
advocacy groups, parts suppliers, and individuals. The advocacy groups
submitting comments included KidsAndCars.org, the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Automotive Occupant Restraints Council,
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Consumers Union, and the
Advocates for Highway Safety (the Advocates). In addition to the trade
associations representing manufacturers including the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers (the Alliance), the National Truck Equipment
Association (NTEA), the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association
(MEMA), the School Bus Manufacturers Technical Council, and Global
Automakers, we also received comments from individual vehicle
manufacturers such as Toyota Motor North America (Toyota), Volkswagen
Group of America (Volkswagen), Porsche Cars North America (Porsche),
Ford Motor Company (Ford), American Honda Motor Co. (Honda), Mercedes-
Benz USA (Mercedes), General Motors Company (General Motors), and BMW
Group (BMW). Additionally, the equipment manufacturers commenting on
the NPRM included Brigade Electronics (Brigade), Gentex Corporation
(Gentex), Magna Mirrors and Magna Electronics (Magna), Sony Electronics
(Sony), Panasonic Corporation of North America (Panasonic), Sense
Technologies, Rosco Vision Systems (Rosco), Rearscope North America
(Rearscope), Continental, Valeo, IFM Electronic (IFM), and Delphi.
Finally, the agency also received approximately 150 comments from
individual commenters. In general, the commenters expressed support for
the goals of this rulemaking pursuant to the K.T. Safety Act. However,
many offered various recommendations on the most appropriate manner
through which to achieve those goals.
    The primary issue raised by the advocacy groups concerned our
proposed test procedure for evaluating compliance with the field of
view requirement. The advocacy groups were concerned that, as the
proposed test procedure did not require that the field of view begin at
the bumper, nor did it require that a large portion of the first row of
test objects (placed 1 foot behind the bumper) be visible, significant
blind spots can exist in a theoretically compliant rear visibility
system. Citing the SCI cases and the Monte Carlo simulation used by the
agency to determine the proposed coverage area of the field of view
requirement, the advocacy groups requested that the final rule address
these potential blind zones. Another issue raised by the advocacy
groups involved their recommendation that image response time be
reduced to 1.0 second or less. The advocacy groups asserted that there
is a significant safety risk that drivers may begin backing their
vehicles without the benefit of the rear visibility system if they are
not promptly presented with the required field of view.
    On the other hand, while vehicle manufacturers generally support
the rule, the most significant concern raised by the manufacturer
comments focused on the cost and feasibility of specific performance
requirements within the proposed phase-in schedule. First, the
manufacturers asserted that the agency was wrong to assume, as it did
in the NPRM, that most rearview video systems that are currently in use
by the manufacturers would meet all of the proposed requirements in the
NPRM. For example, many manufacturers commented that their current
rearview video systems would not be able to meet the response time
requirement under certain situations. The NPRM proposed a response time
requirement which prescribed that the compliant rearview image must be
displayed within 2.0 seconds of selecting the reverse gear. The
manufacturers commented that many of their rear visibility systems
require initialization time and would not be able to meet the response
time if the reverse gear was selected soon after the vehicle is
activated. Thus, many

manufacturer comments requested various vehicle preconditions that
would accommodate their rear visibility system initialization process.
Similarly, the manufacturers were concerned their existing systems
would not fully meet all of the image size, display luminance,
deactivation, and linger time requirements.
    As a result, the manufacturers were concerned that the proposed
phase-in schedule would require that the manufacturers conduct
redesigns to their existing rear visibility systems outside of the
normal product development cycle. They contended in their comments that
such a scenario would significantly increase the costs and burdens of
compliance. Thus, the manufacturers requested that the agency delay
some of the aforementioned requirements until the end of the statutory
phase-in deadline in order afford manufacturers time to redesign their
rear visibility systems in conjunction with the normal vehicle redesign
schedule.
    The equipment manufacturer comments, to varying degrees, contended
that their products were able to meet the proposed requirements in the
NPRM. Generally, commenters such as Sony, Magna, and Gentex expressed
confidence that their products can be used to bring a vehicle into
compliance with the proposed requirements. However, other suppliers,
such as Sense Technologies, IFM Electronic, and Valeo, stated that the
NPRM should not have concluded that technologies such as mirrors and
sensors were not suitable countermeasures. In addition, suppliers
offered comments as to the potential new rear visibility systems
technologies that were being developed (such as automatic brake
intervention, combination sensor/video systems, infrared or Doppler
radar systems, etc.). Thus, many supplier comments requested that the
agency avoid setting requirements that restrict the development of new
technologies and rearview functions.
    Finally, individual commenters expressed either general support or
general opposition to the goals of this rule. The individual commenters
expressing support for this rule generally cite the vulnerability of
the population that is most likely to be victimized by this safety
risk. A significant portion of these commenters either suffered a
significant personal loss due to a backing crash or had an acquaintance
who suffered a significant personal loss due to a backing crash. On the
other hand, commenters opposed to this rule cited its high costs and
questioned its potential effectiveness. Of these commenters, many
opined that the more prudent manner in which to address the safety
risks related with backover incidents is through driver training and
education.

f. Public Hearing and Workshop

    After publishing the NPRM, the agency decided to further solicit
comments from the public by holding a public hearing and a technical
workshop. On March 2, 2011, the agency published a notice in the
Federal Register announcing these events.\43\ The technical workshop
was held on March 11, 2011 at NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center
in East Liberty, Ohio. The goal of this workshop was to provide a forum
in which interested commenters could demonstrate their specific
concerns with the agency's proposed test procedure. The public hearing
was held on March 23, 2011, at the NHTSA headquarters in the U.S.
Department of Transportation in Washington DC. This hearing provided an
opportunity for the agency to hear from advocacy groups, organizations
that provide rearview countermeasures, and the families of backover
crash victims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ 76 FR 11417.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The participants in the technical workshop included representatives
from Volkswagen, Sense Technologies, the Alliance, Global Automakers,
Honda, Ford, Mitsubishi, and KidsAndCars.org. The participants
generally presented areas they believed could be clarified regarding
the proposed test procedure. The majority of the areas discussed were
also presented in the various comments submitted in response to the
NPRM such as durability testing, deactivation issues, and luminance
testing. However, certain unique comments (such as concerns regarding
vehicle loading procedure, rearview mirror positioning, etc.) were
discussed during the technical workshop. These issues will be
identified and responded to in conjunction with the written comments in
the sections that follow.
    The participants in the public hearing included KidsAndCars.org,
the National Consumers League, the Consumers Union, Sense Technologies,
Annabelle's Angels, the Advocates, the Consumer Federation of America,
and family members of victims of backover crashes including the
Auriemma, Ivison, Dahlen, Gridley, Gulbransen, Nelson, and Anthony
families. The participants in the public hearing expressed general
support for the proposed rule. In addition to reiterating some of the
technical comments that the advocacy groups submitted on the NPRM,
participants in the public hearing generally underscored the high non-
economic and human cost that is associated with backover incidents.
KidsAndCars.org noted that in 70 percent of the cases that they have
compiled, the child victim was a direct relative of the driver. Mr.
Patrick Ivison, a 16 year old who was a victim of a backover crash as a
toddler, also testified to the many challenges that he faces by living
with the lifelong injuries that he suffered. Participants also noted
other unquantifiable costs such as parents who commit suicide when they
are unable to forgive themselves for their involvement in a backover
crash.
    The families of victims cited the inability of drivers to see
behind vehicles as an important danger. Many of their cases involved
drivers who had walked around the rear of the vehicle or had been
present at the rear of the vehicle shortly before entering the vehicle
and beginning the reverse maneuver. The Consumers Union also noted
observational evidence that children often walk along the rear bumpers
of vehicles as they travel to the other side of the vehicle. In
general, the participants in the public hearing refuted the idea that
victims of backover incidents are limited to irresponsible parents or
caretakers.

g. Additional 2012 Research

    As described above, the agency conducted additional research and
analysis covering a wider range of driver and an additional vehicle
type. Specifically, the additional testing parameters examined whether
variations in driver and vehicle type would have any impacts on NHTSA's
estimates regarding drivers' use of backing aid technologies to avoid
backover crashes.

Research Design--Wider Range of Vehicle Types and Drivers

    In order to examine whether variations in driver and vehicle type
would have any unanticipated impacts on NHTSA's estimates, the agency
conducted additional testing utilizing a sedan. Further, the agency
sought to more closely balance the ratio of male and female
participants in this latest study and include a broader age range among
the study participants.
    In terms of vehicle type, NHTSA's previous studies had focused on
minivans and crossover utility vehicles to examine drivers' use of
backing aid technologies. While we acknowledge that vehicles have
different blind zones (and that this would intuitively have an impact
on the backover crash risk), the agency believes that our previous

research evaluating human behavior using a single vehicle can be
applied across the vehicle fleet. We believe this is appropriate
because the data show that virtually all vehicles have a blind zone
that covers at least the area directly behind the vehicle where our
Monte Carlo simulation suggested that backover crash risk is the
highest. Thus, the agency's previous studies, for example utilizing the
Honda Odyssey to examine effectiveness in avoiding backover crashes,
should approximate the vast majority of vehicles on the road.
    However, the agency decided to conduct an additional study using a
midsized sedan (the Nissan Altima). We note that the choices of vehicle
type for testing were constrained to vehicles that had significant
numbers of drivers both with and without cameras. Thus, we were unable
to test vehicles at the extremes for large or small blind zone sizes.
However, we reasoned that while drivers of a smaller vehicle may not
have an actual improved view of the what the Monte Carlo simulation
indicates would be relevant area behind the vehicle, as compared to a
minivan or SUV, it may be possible that their behavior can be different
due to drivers' own perception of the size of the vehicle blind zone.
Thus, additional testing was designed to ensure that this factor would
not have any unanticipated effects on NHTSA's estimates on the ability
of drivers to use backing aid technologies to avoid backover crashes.
    In terms of driver demographics, the agency more closely balanced
the ratio of male and female participants in the 2012 study. Further,
the agency sought to include a broader age range among the study
participants (earlier studies had participants between the ages of 25
and 55). The agency believes that the participants in NHTSA's earlier
studies can approximate the performance of drivers involved in backover
crashes because (when faced with a potential backover crash situation)
all drivers are unable to see the relevant areas behind the vehicle
with the greatest crash risk. Further, we assumed that different
characteristics between various driver demographics (such as age or
gender) would not affect drivers' use of backing aid systems. However,
the agency decided to examine further this assumption as well. While
all drivers would have the same opportunity to view a pedestrian using
a rearview video system, NHTSA decided to include participants with a
broader set of driver demographic characteristics to see whether or not
the inclusion of these drivers would lead to a statistically different
result due to potential unforeseen factors (e.g., comfort level with
the system). Thus, NHTSA's 2012 research included drivers of broader
age and gender characteristics.

Research Design--New Test Object Presentation (Laterally Moving Test
Object)

    In addition to examining a different type of vehicle and a wider
range of drivers, the agency also had the opportunity to examine how
drivers would react to a different obstacle presentation method.
Through this test, the agency sought to determine if a different test
object presentation could have any unanticipated effects on the
agency's estimates of the driver's ability to use backing aid
technologies to avoid backover crashes. Thus, separately, the new
research also included a different backover test where the test object
laterally moved into the vehicle's backing path from the passenger side
of the vehicle (in addition to utilizing the original test object
presentation method where the test object would pop-up behind the
vehicle).
    As the intent of these studies was to isolate the ability of the
driver to use the backing aid technology to avoid a backover crash with
a test object that is otherwise unseen and unanticipated, the agency
designed its previous tests to utilize a pop-up test object
presentation.\44\ Because the agency is aware that many cases involve
drivers who walked around their vehicles before getting into the
vehicle and starting a backing maneuver, we designed this pop-up test
method to represent the surprise presence of the pedestrian--including
the pedestrian's movement into the vehicle's backing path. The pop-up
presentation method is a reasonable representation of a person that is
either not visible to the driver using the standard vehicle equipment
(for the duration of the backing maneuver), or visible to the driver
using the same equipment (but was not observed by the driver). We
believe that the pop-up presentation method is a reasonable estimate of
these two conditions because the test object is presented to the test
participant after he/she has begun the backing maneuver. In other
words, the presentation of the test object is limited to the time after
the test participant has checked his/her surroundings and decided that
they could conduct a backing maneuver. As there is no evidence to
suggest that any significant portion of the victims of backover crashes
were a result of a driver intentionally backing over a pedestrian, the
aforementioned two situations likely represent the vast majority of
situations in which persons are injured or killed in backover crashes.
We assume that a driver who has observed a person moving behind the
vehicle using rearview mirrors would attempt to stop immediately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ The test presented the pop-up test object only after the
driver had backed the vehicle a specified distance. In other words,
the driver began his backing maneuver before the test object
appeared.
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    However, the agency is aware that backover crashes involve a wide
variety of factors (e.g., the movement of the pedestrian, the time at
which the vehicle's backing maneuver begins, the trajectory/speed of
the vehicle, etc.). Thus, the agency's new research included a
different obstacle presentation method to help determine whether the
new obstacle presentation could have any unanticipated effects on the
driver's ability to use the rearview video system. By maintaining
consistency with the pop-up test object presentation method (e.g., in
vehicle model, obstacle presentation time in the rearview video system,
etc.), the agency designed a similarly reasonable test to approximate
the surprise presence of a pedestrian (that measures the same crash
situations as the pop-up presentation method).\45\ In doing so, the
agency sought to determine whether driver use of the rearview video
system would be statistically different if the test object was
presented in a fashion where it approached the vehicle laterally from
the passenger side. Thus, the agency's 2012 research included the new
presentation method where the test object enters the vehicle's backing
path from the passenger side in addition to the original pop-up test
object presentation method.
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    \45\ Further information on the test parameters are available in
the research report (Rearview Video System Use by Drivers of a Sedan
in an Unexpected Obstacle Event). This report is available in Docket
No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253.
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Summary of Research Test Conditions
    For those aforementioned reasons, the agency tested three different
conditions as outlined in Table 10, below. In all test conditions for
the 2012 research, the agency used the Nissan Altima (a midsized sedan)
as the test vehicle. Further, the agency closely balanced the ratio of
male and female participants and included drivers above age 18.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.004

Research Results
    The test conditions described above can be used to answer two
questions. The first is whether or not (using the same pop-up test
object presentation method) the new drivers and vehicle type (more
balanced gender distribution, the different vehicle type, and the
broader age range) would contribute to a result that was statistically
different. The second is whether or not (using similar driver
demographic characteristics and the same vehicle) the different test
object presentation method (moving test object versus pop-up test
object) would produce a statistically different result.
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    \46\ The baseline (no system) test condition with a pop-up test
object was not tested in NHTSA's 2012 research. As in NHTSA's
previous studies, the pop-up test object is presented in the
vehicle's blind zone and the driver does not have an opportunity to
view the test object through the vehicle mirrors or direct vision.
In NHTSA's previous studies, no driver was able to avoid a collision
with the pop-up test object without the use of a rear visibility
system. As the Nissan Altima blind zone also prevents the driver
from seeing the area where the pop-up test object would deploy,
drivers would likewise be unable to avoid a collision with the pop-
up test object in the baseline test condition.
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    After completing 143 tests using the three aforementioned test
conditions, the agency obtained the following results:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR07AP14.005

    Among all of NHTSA's test conditions in the 2012 research
(including both test object presentation methods), the rearview video
system increased drivers' ability to avoid crashes with the test
objects. In each of the cases, the difference between the baseline (no
rear visibility system) condition and the rearview video system
condition was statistically significant. In other words, all of the
test data continue to show that rearview video systems have a
statistically significant effect of improving the driver's ability to
avoid a backover crash.
    However, in spite of the aforementioned new test parameters
(vehicle/driver types and obstacle presentation method) that were
introduced into NHTSA's 2012 research, the results do not show that the
new test parameters created statistically different results from
NHTSA's previous studies.\47\ When comparing the results of the Nissan
Altima pop-up obstacle tests (with the additional driver demographic
characteristics) to NHTSA's previous studies using the Honda Odyssey
and the same test object presentation method, the results do not show
that the inclusion of the different vehicle type and additional driver
demographic characteristics led to a statistically different
result.\48\ Finally,

when comparing the results of the moving test object presentation
method and the pop-up test object presentation method (utilizing the
same vehicle and driver demographic characteristics), the results also
did not show a statistical difference.\49\
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    \47\ While the agency's research included as many participants
as time and resources permitted, the agency's new research
parameters yielded lower, but not statistically different
effectiveness estimates compared to its previous research. We
acknowledge that testing additional participants may have enabled
the agency to detect a statistical difference between these factors.
However, the agency is not currently aware of any research that can
indicate what this difference would be.
    \48\ See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253, Rearview Video System
Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle Scenario. While
this comparison shows that the data does not indicate a
statistically different result due to the combination of the new
driver demographics and vehicle type, the data also does not
indicate whether or not the individual driver or vehicle type
factors could have yielded a statistically different result. We note
that in a separate analysis of the data from NHTSA's previous
studies using the Honda Odyssey (where obstacle presentation,
participant age, and vehicle type are all consistent) the male and
female drivers did not crash with the test objects at statistically
different rates.
    \49\ An analysis of the statistical significance of the
difference between the pop-up and moving test object presentation
methods is available in the research report titled ``Rearview Video
System Use by Drivers of a Sedan in an Unexpected Obstacle
Scenario.'' See Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0162-0253.
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h. Additional SCI Case Analysis

    As described above, the agency began a new effort to identify and
analyze SCI cases that involved vehicles with rearview video systems.
The agency's intention was to examine any such cases available in order
to better understand how the performance requirements proposed in the
NPRM address the real world backover safety risk.\50\
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    \50\ The agency's SCI program conducts detailed investigations
for specific crashes that fall under a variety of crash types that
NHTSA has decided to research (e.g., backover crashes). As a part of
this program, NASS reports to NHTSA any cases that fall under the
crash types that NHTSA has identified when sampling police
jurisdictions. In addition, SCI teams search the internet and other
sources to help identify these cases. For this particular research
effort, NHTSA specifically instructed the SCI program to identify
cases from their respective sources of information that are backover
crashes involving vehicles with rearview video systems. We also
instructed the SCI program to conduct a search of any existing
reported cases to identify whether any were backover crashes
involving vehicles with rearview video systems.
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    Given the volume of comments received and the issues raised on
those comments, the agency believed that SCI case analysis may indicate
whether some of those concerns raised in the comments warrant further
analysis. For example, in the NPRM, the agency proposed to test the 20-
foot by 10-foot zone behind the vehicle using various test objects and
the agency subsequently received various comments on whether testing
using those test objects would ensure that the rearview video system
would cover the areas behind the vehicle associated with the greatest
backover crash risk. The agency reasoned, that an SCI case where a
rearview video system was installed on the vehicle could offer
additional insight into whether a crash happened under circumstances
where a rearview video system covering the required portions of the
test objects did not show the pedestrian behind the vehicle. After
reviewing all the available cases prior to today's final rule, the
agency identified two cases involving vehicles with rearview video
systems.
     Case No. DS11008: In the first case, an elderly man
driving a 2006 Prius (equipped with an OEM \51\ rearview video system)
struck an elderly woman in his driveway.\52\ The technical report
states that the elderly man was reversing the Prius along the driveway
at a private residence when he struck an elderly woman standing in the
driveway directly behind the vehicle. The driver stated that he did not
remember whether he used any of the vehicle's mirrors or the vehicle's
rearview video system but recalls looking straight ahead prior to the
impact with the non-motorist. The driver stopped the vehicle after
hearing yelling. The non-motorist sustained a contusion to the left
knee and possible left rib fractures. She was transported to a local
hospital several hours after the incident.
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    \51\ OEM refers to equipment that was originally installed on
the vehicle as produced by the manufacturer.
    \52\ Case No. DS11008. The technical report is available at the
SCI XML Case Viewer Web site (http://www-nass.nhtsa.dot.gov/nass/sci/SearchForm.aspx).
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     Case No. CR13011: In the second case, a 30-year-old male
driver of a 2010 BMW X5 (equipped with an OEM rearview video system)
struck a non-motorist while reversing his vehicle in a parking lot.\53\
The narrative in the report states that the non-motorist had stopped
directly behind the vehicle because the non-motorist was distracted by
flying birds. The driver selected the reverse gear (automatically
activating the vehicle's rearview video system) and released his foot
from the brake. The driver reapplied the brake as soon as he identified
the non-motorist in the rearview image. However, the vehicle did not
come to a complete stop before striking the non-motorist. The driver
stated that when the vehicle is first started, the display (that is
used to show the rearview image) has a boot sequence. The driver stated
that he allowed the vehicle to begin reversing prior to the rearview
image appearing in the vehicle display. The non-motorist sustained no
significant injury and stood up unassisted after the incident. The non-
motorist declined further medical treatment after being evaluated by
paramedics.
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    \53\ Case No. CR13011. The technical report is available at the