[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 209 (Tuesday, October 29, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57897-57903]
[FR Doc No: 2019-23552]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-87388; File No. SR-LCH SA-2019-008]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; LCH SA; Notice of Filing of a
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Updated 2018 Version of the
Recovery Plan

October 23, 2019.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder \2\ notice is hereby given that
on October 8, 2019, Banque Centrale de Compensation, which conducts
business under the name LCH SA (``LCH SA''), filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the proposed rule change
described in Items I, II and III below, which Items have been prepared
primarily by LCH SA. The Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the
Proposed Rule Change

    LCH SA is proposing to adopt an updated recovery plan (the ``RP'')
in accordance with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(ii). The text of the proposed
rule change has been annexed as Exhibit 5. LCH SA has requested
confidential treatment of the material submitted as Exhibit 5.

II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, LCH SA included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. LCH SA has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A,
B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of these statements.

A. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    On September 28, 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') adopted amendments to Rule 17Ad-22 \3\ pursuant to
Section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ``Act'') \4\
and the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010
(``Clearing Supervision Act'') \5\ to establish enhanced standards for
the operation and governance of those clearing agencies registered with
the Commission that meet the definition of a ``covered clearing
agency,'' as defined by Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5) \6\ (collectively, the new
and amended rules are herein referred to as ``CCA rules'').
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    \3\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22.
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78q.
    \5\ 12 U.S.C. 5461 et seq.
    \6\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(5).
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    LCH SA is a covered clearing agency under the CCA rules and
therefore is subject to the requirements of the CCA rules, including
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3). The CCA rules require that covered clearing
agencies, among other things, ``establish, implement, maintain and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to . . .
maintain a sound risk management framework for comprehensively managing
legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment,
custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by the covered
clearing agency, which . . . includes plans for the recovery and
orderly wind-down of the covered clearing agency necessitated by credit
losses, liquidity shortfalls, losses from general business risk, or any
other losses''.\7\ As a central counterparty recognized under the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (``EMIR''),\8\ LCH SA is also
subject to prudential requirements, as well as requirements regarding
its operations and oversight. As a credit institution based in the
European Union, LCH SA is also subject to Directive 2014/59/EU, as
supplemented, requiring institutions to draw up and maintain recovery
plans setting forth options for measures to be taken by the institution
to restore its financial position following a significant deterioration
of its financial position.
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    \7\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(3)(ii).
    \8\ Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central
counterparties and trade repositories.
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    Specific guidance has been given on Recovery for CCP by CPMI IOSCO.
Within the CPMI IOSCO principles for financial market infrastructures
(PFMI) it is outlined that all systemically important FMIs should have
a comprehensive and effective recovery plan. For this purpose, it has
issued the report ``recovery of financial market infrastructures''
containing guidance on recovery plans, content of a recovery plan in
October 2014 and a guidance relating resilience and recovery in 2017.
    Furthermore, regulations are under preparation on a European level
outlining the Recovery and Resolution measures for CCPs.
    As described in more detail below, the purpose of the RP is to
maintain the continuity of critical services in times of extreme stress
and to facilitate the recovery of LCH SA agency. Among other things,
the RP seeks to: (i) Identify if and to what level LCH SA's service are
critical for the market and what internal or external services/systems
are critical for the continuity of LCH SA's activity; (ii) outline the
scenario under which recovery of the LCH SA might be necessary; (iii)
define the early warning indicators and triggers for initiating the
recovery measures under the RP, including the market conditions or
events that could trigger it; (iv) define the governance framework to
trigger these recovery measures; (v) identify the available recovery
tools to manage crisis situations and to restore business as usual; and
(vi) perform a quantitative and qualitative assessment if the recover
tools meet the CPMI IOSCO criteria for recovery instruments.
    The RP also includes a detailed summary of the overall business and
regulatory framework that LCH SA operates in, including identification
of applicable regulations, company structure, detail regarding the LCH
SA business lines and geographical spread, and information regarding
the interaction between LCH SA and its parent entity (the ``Parent'').
    The RP also contains an FMI analysis, which analyses LCH SA
relationship with other financial market infrastructure (e.g.
settlement platforms, trade repositories, etc) and institutions used by
LCH SA or its clearing members such a payment and settlement agents.
    The RP covers all scenarios, which may potentially prevent LCH SA
from providing its critical services:

--The default of one or multiple Clearing Member(s) on one or several
of its markets, where LCH SA has to re-establish the matched book and
may have allocate any uncovered credit losses to its own capital or to
surviving clearing members.
--Potential and actual liquidity shortfalls as result of a clearing
member or allied clearing house default.
--The default of an investment counterparty of LCH SA or any other
investment losses resulting from changes in the market value on the
investments.
--A loss resulting from an operational risk event or any other event
which impacts the critical services provided by LCH SA and particularly
legal and operational risk (including Fraud) which finally would erode
LCH SA's capital.

--Failure of a critical IT service provider. A special focus has been
made on LCH Ltd as a provider of critical services to LCH SA given the
fact that LCH Ltd is also a CCP and part of the same group.
--Poor business performance or loss of critical contracts with
Exchanges.
--Operational or financial failure of an FMI (e.g. allied clearing
house/(I) CSD/Trades Repository).

    The updated 2018 version of the RP includes the following main
improvements:

--CC&G Rulebook changes: Consultation with clearing members and
National Competent Authorities have been completed and LCH SA has
implemented the rules relating to CC&G service closure during 2018.
This has resolved a potential liquidity risk relating to a CC&G
default.
--Critical service providers: LCH SA has implemented a new framework to
manage critical service providers, this framework has been approved in
the LCH SA Board and a new list of critical service providers has been
put together which is part of this RP.
--Cyber scenario: The RP includes now more details on the management of
a cyber-scenario and the Cyber Crisis Management Plan has been added as
a new recovery tool. The purpose of this document is to provide a
framework of procedures allowing LCH SA to respond to cyber incidents
in case of cyber crisis. As such, the process defined is to be
activated in case of detection of a cyber incident that could
potentially cause a significant impact on LCH SA business objectives.
--Capital related recovery tools: The quantitative assessment section
of the recovery plan now includes more details on the monitoring of
capital related recovery tools like surplus capital, variable payments
and dividend payments.
--Recovery tools for non-Euro transactions and collateral: LCH SA has
to its disposal GMRA's to raise liquidity on USD and GBP, access to FX
markets and can perform payments in alternative currency (EUR) as a
last resort.
--LCH Ltd exit plan: LCH Ltd provides IT services to LCH SA and a
practical approach on how LCH SA will manage a potential wind down of
LCH Ltd is now included in the RP.
1. Identification of Critical Services and Operations
    With respect to the critical services that might impact the
continuity of LCH SA's operations, the proposed RP provides that an
assessment has been done in accordance with guidance by the Financial
Stability Board (``FSB'') on identification of critical functions and
shared services. LCH SA has assessed that the clearing services LCH SA
provides to participants with respect to the markets identified in the
RP are deemed critical for purposes of the RP. Overall the services
provided in respect of all markets are critical because: (1) The volume
of the activity on certain markets may be very significant, (2) most of
the business on the relevant market is cleared through LCH SA or (3)
the suspension of the clearing service could impact materially the
functioning of the market; the level of global market share with
respect to certain products is high; and LCH SA's service are used by
significant clearing firms. Moreover, a transfer of the clearing
activity to another CCP is technically and organizationally complex to
perform on short notice.
    The RP also identifies those shared operations which LCH SA depends
on to perform critical services to members, including those critical
departments and services and systems within its corporate group and
those provided by others. The RP identifies the main operating units
within LCH SA that play a critical role in providing services as well
as those enterprise systems that are critical for LCH SA's ongoing
operations. Such systems are categorized as (i) Tier 1 Enterprise
Critical (which is the most important category and where a failure may
have direct impact on the continued functioning of LCH SA); (ii) Tier 2
Business Critical (which is a category of systems where business may
not be able to proceed as usual in the event of a failure); and (iii)
Tier 3 Business Support (which are non-critical systems). In addition,
the RP identifies those services provided by its affiliates (including
its Parent) and third-party service providers through a comprehensive
framework that are essential to LCH SA's operations as well as the
agreements governing such relationships.
    The RP describes that LCH SA maintains comprehensive exit
management plans should LCH Ltd initiate its own recovery and wind-down
plan, cease to operate following a Business continuity or Cyber event,
or notify LCH SA of its termination of services. as well as the
corresponding recovery tools in each case.
    The RP also describes the business continuity procedures and exit
management plans that LCH SA would initiate upon the failure of a
critical third-party service provider including LCH Ltd. This is
managed under relevant services agreement between LCH Ltd and LCH SA so
that LCH SA can continue to offer its services in case of a potential
failure.
2. Identification of Possible Stress and Recovery Scenarios
    The RP categorizes potential stress scenarios in two ways as a
result of either: (i) Clearing member defaults and (ii) non-clearing
member events. Clearing member defaults are identified as those losses
that threaten LCH SA's ability to operate as a going concern through
either uncovered credit losses or liquidity shortfalls created as a
result of a default by one or more members. Non-clearing member
defaults are defined as losses impacting capital adequacy arising from
risks, including, without limitation, general business risks,
operational events, custody and investment risks, or risks on the
interoperability link.
    The RP then identifies, prior to implementing any of the recovery
strategies described therein, the day-to-day risk measures in place to
assure provision of the critical services performed where these are
insufficient the recovery plan will be triggered.
    With respect to clearing member defaults, the LCH SA risk framework
provides mitigations for uncovered credit losses due to a member
default. LCH SA follows high standards to assess financial resources
against member portfolios, including initial margin model covering the
potential loss from any member default to a 99.7% confidence level over
the applicable holding period, margin add-ons to deal with specific
member portfolios risks such as concentration, liquidity risk and
sovereign risk, and default fund sizing to cover simultaneous default
of the 2 members having the largest stress testing losses beyond the
99.7% confidence level. Stress tests are applied by LCH SA in order to
assess whether financial resources are calibrated to handle systemic
risks. In addition, a reverse stress resting procedure is used to
ascertain adequacy of financial resources held against member
positions. The stress testing framework is reviewed on an annual basis.
    Further, reverse stress testing exercise is conducted at least
quarterly for each default fund and is subject to review by LCH
Executive Risk Committee. Risk monitoring mechanisms have been
established in order to anticipate and identify any credit or market
risks with respect to a clearing member, including daily monitoring of
credit watch lists by LCH SA's credit risk department.

    The RP covers the default of one or multiple Clearing Member(s) on
one or several of its markets, where LCH SA has to re-establish the
matched book and may have allocate any uncovered credit losses to its
own capital or to surviving clearing members.
    With respect to liquidity shortfalls as a result of the clearing
member default, the existing liquidity risk management framework seeks
to manage liquidity risk by requiring certain minimum liquidity
coverage ratio and using reserve stress testing to identify plausible
scenarios where the liquidity coverage ratio falls below 100%, as well
as considering the liquidity impact as a result of the default of its
liquidity line provider.
    LCH SA would leverage on the reserve stress testing scenarios and
the liquidity line provider's default to define the liquidity recovery
scenarios.
    In addition, the RP provides that LCH SA uses a set of early
warning indicators and management actions to mitigate liquidity risk
prior to implementing RP. To the extent a clearing member default has
occurred, LCH SA would perform increased risk monitoring, including
preparation of liquidity risk reports that would be produced several
times a day.
    The RP covers the potential and actual liquidity shortfalls as
result of a clearing member or allied clearing house default.
    For operational risks, the RP provides that on a monthly basis,
control assessments, incident and audit recommendations are reviewed
and adjusted as appropriate. On a yearly basis, a risk and control
self-assessment is performed whereby all risks are reassessed. The
operational risk department performs second line challenge on all these
activities. In addition, all ``major'' or ``high'' incidents are
processed through a detailed incident review to identify actions to
further improve the control environment.
    LCH SA performs a business impact analysis where it identifies all
critical systems and departments and has in place a global business
continuity strategy which outlines the strategy to maintain critical
services in case of a disaster. The RP further identifies events,
including cyber-attacks, failure of a critical service provider,
failure of data providers and exchanges, failure of LCH SA's Parent,
and reputational events as potential operational risks that could
threaten its continued functioning.
    The RP covers both a loss resulting from an operational risk event
(for example resulting from a fraud) or any other event which impacts
the critical services provided by LCH SA (e.g. failure in the provision
of service by a third party, unavailability of primary place of work,
Staff unavailability to a point where the continuity of operations may
be compromised or the occurrence of a cyber-event).
    The most important operational exposures within SA relates to Cyber
risk:

--Third party liability, associated damages and defense costs arising
from the following, amongst others: Privacy and confidentiality,
Network security, Media liability, Regulatory costs and fines, Internal
investigation; cover combines the Civil Liability and Crime policy only
for Third Party related Liabilities and the Cyber policy;
--Business Interruption, caused by a Cyber incident or a software
malfunction.

    The definition of a cyber crisis involves several notions which,
according to the ISO 27000 standard, can be described as follows:

--A security event is an identified occurrence of a system, service or
network state indicating a possible breach of information security
policy or failure of controls, or a previously unknown situation that
can be security relevant
--A security incident is a single or a series of unwanted or unexpected
information security events that have a significant probability of
compromising business operations and threatening information security.

    The following scenarios are possible for a cyber attack:

--Attempts (either failed or successful) to gain unauthorized access to
a system or its data
--Security breach or potential security breach
--Unauthorized scan or probe
--Unwanted disruption or denial of service
--Malicious code or virus
--Unauthorized processing or storage of data
--Networking system failure (widespread)
--Application or database failure (widespread)
--Etc.

    A crisis management plan has been developed to manage the risks
listed above. It comprises:

--The procedure to identify the priority of an incident and decide
whether to activate the Crisis Management Plan (Triaging Procedure);
--The procedure to notify the hierarchy (Escalation Procedure) and
activate the Crisis Management Team (Crisis Management Team Activation
Plan);
--The Tactical Procedures used to fuel the decision-making process,
depending on the crisis scenario;
--The Communication Procedures used to dress the guidelines of the
notification of the incident;
--The several contact registries necessary to swiftly notify the
relevant contacts.

    A specific change in the plan has been to detail the case of a
failure of LCH Ltd which provides critical IT service to LCH SA. The
following scenarios have been identified:
    1. A Business continuity event affecting LCH Ltd. This is mitigated
through highly resilient systems described in the business continuity
plan.
    2. A sale of LCH SA. In this case, LCH Ltd would continue to
provide the service over the period required to exit and described in
detail in the exit plan. The plan states the main steps that would be
followed.
    3. A Wind-down of LCH Ltd. In this case, LCH Ltd will have
insufficient resources to continue as a CCP but will continue to
provide the service for 6 months supported by its wind down capital.
The plan describes the steps that would be followed to replicate the
exact IT service provided by LCH Ltd on short notice.
    Business risk is managed by the relevant individual business lines
and requires frequent monitoring of results against budget and
financial plans, with a second line challenge performed by the risk and
finance departments to verify if sufficient capital buffers are
available for applicable business risks. In addition, LCH SA conducts a
yearly review of business risk scenarios to define potential loss
scenarios under foreseeable conditions and the LCH SA finance
department monitors key metrics, including revenues and quarterly
financial information. Investment risk and second line monitoring is
also conducted with respect to interest rate risk, aggregate credit
risk exposure, daily mark-to-market limits, and internal credit scores
for investment counterparties.
    The RP also considers that LCH SA is connected to a broad range of
financial market infrastructures, including central securities
depositories, settlement platforms and interoperating central
counterparties and identifies the types of operational or financial
failures that could restrict LCH SA's ability to operate.
    Finally, the RP identifies a series of scenarios which, taken
together, could

also impact the continued functioning of critical services.
3. Triggers for RP
    The RP includes a detailed list of events, which if they were to
occur would trigger the implementation of a specific action identified
in the RP.
    The RP provides that a clearing member default will be identified
through credit risk monitoring and review of external information
indicating a default. Each LCH SA business line then applies its own
default management process under which a default management group
identifies and manages the phases of the default management process and
the application of the default waterfall. The possible triggers for the
RP include: (i) A clearing member default, in which case the default
procedures will be initiated to reestablish the matched book; (ii)
several default events may lead to more than one replenishment of Skin
in the Game (iii) mutualized default fund contributions per specific
default have been consumed, in which case unfunded resources will be
used to keep LCH SA appropriately funded.
    Each LCH SA business lines maintain its own default management
process and waterfall, but, in general, the RP describes the tools used
in the event of a clearing member default. The default management
process is used to re-establish the matched book of LCH SA and return
back to business as usual and therefore considered as a recovery tool.
The relevant governance for the management of a default is followed as
described in the paragraph 5.
    When covering the relevant credit losses related to a default
event, first, LCH SA looks to the defaulting clearing member's margin.
These amounts are already held by LCH SA and are available to manage
the default of a clearing member and, as such, are not considered to be
a trigger of the RP. Second, LCH SA looks to the defaulting clearing
member's default fund contribution, which may be allocated to the
defaulting clearing member's shortfalls. Again, this action is within
the control of LCH SA and does not impact the capital adequacy of LCH
SA, so is also not considered a trigger for the RP. Third, in line with
requirements under EMIR, LCH SA is required to hold capital equivalent
to 25 percent of LCH SA's minimum net capital requirement against which
default losses can be applied against liquid available capital. In
addition, excess capital is held to replenish such amount within the
relevant EMIR deadline. Where multiple defaults occur over a longer
time period and lead to multiple replenishments of Skin in the Game,
this may lead to start up of the recovery plan and application of
capital conservation measures. Fourth, should losses arising from a
clearing member default be consumed by the defaulter's margin and
default fund contribution and subsequently LCH SA's contribution from
capital, LCH SA may look to non-defaulting member default fund
contributions. Those amounts are pre-funded by members and held and
controlled by LCH SA for the purposes of managing a default and, thus,
the utilization of those amounts is not considered an application of
the RP. However, LCH SA has the right to trigger an assessment of the
defaults as to reestablish the fund to its original size, and such an
assessment is considered to be a recovery measure under the RP.
Finally, when it is no longer possible for LCH SA to make assessments
and all pre-funded default fund contributions have been used, recovery
measures under the RP, as described below, will be implemented.
    With respect to liquidity shortfall triggers, LCH SA runs a daily
liquidity assessment and monitors key liquidity drivers. In the event
that these fall below a specific level, the RP will be triggered. In
addition, the occurrence of a clearing member default or the failure of
a third-party providing settlement and payment services to clearing
member may also result in increased monitoring, and in the event that
LCH SA does not have sufficient liquid resources to meet liquidity
needs, the RP would be triggered.
    With respect to non-clearing member default events, the RP
identifies those events with more particularity and identifies the
specific triggers for the RP with respect to such events:
    For investment losses, which are defined as losses related to the
default of an investment counterparty or losses incurred as a result of
extreme market conditions, the RP is triggered if losses are greater
than the maximum regulatory capital allocated to this activity. For
operational risk events, the RP is triggered upon any operational
losses that consume the regulatory capital LCH SA holds against the
relevant risks; failure of a third party which impacts the provision of
LCH SA's services; and reputational events impacting LCH SA's
reputation with clearing members and partners. With respect to business
risks, the RP is triggered upon a loss that consumes the regulatory
capital LCH SA holds against the relevant risks. The RP may also be
triggered upon the failure of other financial market infrastructures or
a failure in the delivery of services including a cyber-event.
4. Identification and Assessment of Recovery Tools
    The RP identifies the various recovery tools that may be applied by
LCH SA upon the triggering of the RP, using again the same distinction
between clearing member default events and non-clearing member events.
    For clearing member default scenarios, the existing stages of the
LCH SA default management process have been used as the framework for
identifying and confirming the appropriate tools to use in the event of
a clearing member default. The RP describes the default management
process in detail and summarizes the actions to be taken at each phase,
including, as mentioned above, (i) reestablishing the matched book,
(ii) default fund assessments, (iii) service continuity charges, and
(iv) voluntary payments. To the extent that the default fund and
assessments cannot manage the losses accumulated from the clearing
member default and any service continuity or voluntary service
continuity contributions received are not sufficient to cover the
relevant losses, the service closure phase of the default management
process is triggered and all outstanding contracts will be closed out
as of the clearing day following such determination and all relevant
losses are allocated to the clearing members. If the RP is triggered as
a result of a liquidity shortfall, the RP provides that LCH SA may use
its central bank credit line to deposited securities received on behalf
of defaulting clearing member(s). The amounts of non-Euro liquidity are
very low and LCH SA has appropriate liquidity lines but also has
recovery tools in place for this for example the possibility to pay in
alternative currency (Euro).
    Other potential tools to manage liquidity stress situation are
limits with respect to illiquid collateral or, if necessary apply
increased haircuts on certain types of collateral to incentivize the
use of more liquid collateral as well or apply specific liquidity
margins.
    The measures should assure that LCH SA has sufficient liquid
resources at all times. As a last resort, under its rulebook, LCH SA
could defer funding for the settlement platform for a limited period of
time.
    As to non-clearing member events, the tool that is used under the
RP will depend on the nature of the event, but for most investment,
business, and operational risks, LCH SA has its capital surplus that it
can allocate losses against. Further, LCH SA can put in place several
measures for capital

conservation and LCH SA also maintains insurance coverage for specific
operational risk events. As a last resort, LCH SA may also initiate a
capital raising strategy in order to obtain an injection of capital to
replenish any consumed capital.
    In order to cope with a liquidity stress situation, LCH SA has the
possibility to use non-Euro collateral to raise liquidity. The
repurchase agreements will then realise the required currency liquidity
requirements needed to satisfy the outgoings resulting from the member
default. Non-euro bonds deposited as non cash collateral by surviving
members can be used for repo transactions and CALM should perform repo
transactions with Gilt/T-bills as collateral in order to raise
liquidity. CaLM has multi-currency GMRA signed with a number of
investment banks, which will allow CaLM to do bilateral transactions.
If liquidity is received in non-euro currencies through bilateral repo
transaction this can be transformed into Euro through the recovery tool
``FX markets''. CALM also has its disposal some Triparty repo agreement
signed to do cross currency repo transactions, where liquidity is
received directly in Euro from Gilt or USD securities.
    For any shortfall in a particular currency SA has the ability to
enter into a FX Transaction with a range of counterparties. LCH SA also
has the possibility to transform liquidity received through bilateral
repo transaction of collateral in USD and GBP into Euro.
    Article <IP_ADDRESS> of CDSClear rulebook and instruction I.V.4-2 of the
SA Rulebook allows LCH to convert amounts owed to members into such
other currency or currencies, using a reasonable/prevailing rate of
exchange. In the application of this regulation, LCH SA is therefore
able to resolve a specific currency liquidity shortfall by completing
the required transaction in an alternate currency than the original
obligation.
    A ``Cyber Crisis Management Plan'' has been developed which provide
a framework of procedures allowing LCH SA to respond to cyber incidents
in case of cyber crisis. As such, the process defined is to be
activated in case of detection of a cyber incident that could
potentially cause a significant impact on LCH SA business objectives.
Cyber incidents can develop rapidly and business impact can quickly
escalate. The objective of this framework is to manage cyber events or
incident in a way that:
     Limits the damage, increases the confidence in
stakeholders and reduces recovery time and costs,
     facilitate systematic and efficient response,
     empowered decision making,
     all response activities are recognised and coordinated.
    LCH SA monitors on a monthly basis if it meets the EMIR capital
requirements and in addition it monitors sufficient ``surplus/buffers
capital'' is available to assure recovery of the CCP from both CMD and
non-CMD losses under single scenarios (e.g. default of a clearing
member on one or several services, default on an investment
counterpart) and combined scenarios (e.g. Failure of a clearing member
which is also acting as an investment counterparty). Associated to each
scenario is attached one or several indicators and the capital coverage
tools available in each case. In addition to the capital requirements
and available headroom, LCH SA follows indicators such as the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio, the aggregate credit risk and market risk exposure on
its investment portfolio, operational risk and business risks
indicators. Capital coverage instruments include prefunded capital
surplus and buffers, limitation of credit and market risks and
therefore of potential losses and insurance coverage. The capital and
buffers are monitored in order to allow LCH SA to always be in a
situation to replenish the SIG within one month, if the CCP was to face
multiple defaults. The liquidity coverage ratio indicator ensures that
LCH SA will always be in a situation to have access to sufficient
liquidity provided either from its own cash or by the ECB even in very
extreme cases as no capital coverage is possible in a liquidity stress
scenario. The Aggregate Risk Exposure and Market Risk limits on the
investment portfolio are in place to ensure that capital will be
sufficient to cover any reasonable losses. Operational risk is followed
to ensure that operational risk capital can be replenished if the
insurance policy does not cover the loss event. Finally, business risk
scenarios are monitored to ensure LCH SA has sufficient capital for
replenishment if required.
    Next to the surplus capital, the LCH Board may decide to withhold
Dividend payment and Variable bonus payment to be used as additional
buffers.
    If an event resulted in a major disruption of its activities, LCH
SA would initiate its business continuity strategy, which establishes
an enterprise wide RP and response proportionate to the event which
aims to minimize the impact of a major disruption on LCH SA's critical
business and resources, or in case of a cyber-event LCH will trigger
the cyber crisis management plan. For any disruption or loss of key
third-party service provider, LCH SA would be able to exercise several
contractual rights and maintains exit plans which are intended to
safeguard the continuity of services. LCH SA also maintains back up
procedures and protocols that would be initiated if there is an impact
on critical services of FMIs, for example its ability to collect margin
within T2 under an emergency platform. Finally, LCH SA maintains a
crisis communication plan, which outlines the procedure for
communicating with clearing members and partners in the event of a
disruption.
    With respect to each recovery tool identified, the RP also seeks to
assess that each tool possesses the following characteristics:
Comprehensive; effective, including as to reliability, timeliness;
transparent, provides appropriate incentives, and results in a minimum
negative impact. To confirm that each recovery tool does, in fact, have
these characteristics, the RP considers as to each: The barriers or
constraints within the tool itself; the steps and time to implement (if
not already available as a tool); the likely effectiveness of the tool;
any risk of execution; the potential impacts on participants and
markets generally; the sequencing of the use of the tools where
multiple tools may be required; and the legal basis of the tool. The RP
also includes a qualitative and quantitative assessment to provide an
indication of the likelihood and severity of a potential recovery
situation and whether the tools included in the RP are adequate.
5. Governance Requirements
    The creation of the RP and its approval is subject to a number of
layers of governance approval. At a high level, the LCH SA Management
Committee is responsible for the preparation of the RP and
implementation of the monitoring and the recovery tools set forth in
the RP. Before submission to the LCH SA Risk Committee, the RP is
reviewed and validated by the Executive Risk Committee of LCH Group.
The LCH SA Risk committee, which includes independent directors, then
reviews, challenges (if needed), and recommends the RP for approval by
the LCH SA board. Final approval of the RP rests with the LCH SA Board.
    At a more granular level, the RP identifies the groups and
individuals within LCH SA that are responsible for the various aspects
of the RP.
    A clearing member default will be managed in accordance with the
relevant procedures. The Default Management Group (``DMG'') is
responsible for the management of the default while all critical
decisions are

escalated and submitted to the LCH SA Default Crisis Management Team
(``DCMT''). All decision which may lead to the triggering of recovery
measures are subject to discussion in the DCMT and approval of the LCH
SA CEO.
    With respect to non-clearing member events, the management of those
events will depend on the nature of the event. For example, investment
losses and liquidity shortfalls are managed from a first line of
defense, which attempts to control risks within the risk appetite
parameters set by the Board, and then are escalated as appropriate.
Operational risks are managed in accordance with the operational risk
policy approved by the Board and reporting and second line challenges
are performed by the operational risk department. Business risk is
managed by individual business lines and requires frequent monitoring
of results against budget and financial plans, with a second line
challenge performed by the risk and finance departments to verify if
sufficient capital buffers are available for the applicable business
risks.
    Upon the occurrence of a clearing member default, the recovery
measures that will apply are clearly set forth in LCH SA's rulebook and
LCH SA's CEO has the authority to trigger the different stages in the
waterfall process, but will consult with DCMT and regulators prior to
taking any action. In addition, the RP provides that the LCH SA will
also activate an emergency board meeting for approval (if reasonably
possible). Upon receipt of information relevant to a scenario causing
non-default losses, the LCH SA management committee will consider
whether a recommendation to formally invoke the RP should be made to
the LCH SA Board. Upon receipt of a recommendation for action, the LCH
SA Board will consider the information presented to determine if the RP
should be formally invoked.
6. Plan Testing and Maintenance
    The RP requires that LCH SA conduct testing and review of member
default rules and associated procedures through the running of periodic
``fire drills'' which simulate member default scenarios. According to
the RP, the fire drills are intended to simulate all aspects of a
member default, including the auctioning of the defaulting members
portfolio to non-defaulting members (where appropriate) and involves
the participation of members and relevant functions within the LCH SA
organization. Further, because one of the main scenarios contemplated
under the RP is a clearing member default, the testing of this element
(i.e. the tools to recover from uncovered credit losses or liquidity
shortfalls arising from a member default) will be incorporated into
each relevant fire drill cycle. As noted in the RP, LCH SA performs an
annual multi-service fire drill and service specific fire drills are
performed at least annually and testing for non-default events are
incorporated into the fire drill regime as well. Should either the
periodic testing or other change within LCH SA result in the need to
amend the RP, the RP will be revised in accordance with the governance
requirements identified above.
(b) Statutory Basis
    LCH SA believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the requirements of Section 17A of the Act and the regulations
thereunder, including the standards under Rule 17Ad-22.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \10\ requires, among other things,
that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to promote the prompt
and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions to
assure safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the custody or
control of the clearing agency or for which it is responsible, and in
general to protect investors and the public interest. LCH SA believes
that the RP will permit it to initiate recovery upon the occurrence of
certain trigger events to maintain continuity of critical services or
orderly wind down in accordance with the applicable requirements of
Rule 17Ad-22 \11\ and LCH SA's rules. The RP is designed to formalize
and set out the risk framework and measures that LCH SA will use to
ensure its stability and recovery in the event of a crisis in order to
be able to maintain its critical business processes and operations.
Specifically, the RP would describe the LCH SA risk framework and
process applicable to identify measure, monitor and manage the risks
faced by LCH SA in the provision of clearing, settlement and risk
management services when a crisis event occurs. The RP would serve as a
means of addressing, credit risk, market risk, general business risk,
operational risk, and other risks that may otherwise threaten the
viability of LCH SA. The RP would also support the stability of LCH SA
as a clearing house that is part of the broader financial markets and
seeks to promote the protection of market participants from the risk of
default by a clearing member of LCH SA or an unforeseen operational or
business event that impacts LCH SA's continued functioning. The RP also
facilitates the prompt clearance and settlement of the securities as it
will enable LCH to levy additional resources to match the positions,
limit the volume of fails and more generally avoid the market
disruption that would be caused by the default of the CCP. The
objective of the RP is to maintain the viability of the CCP and bring
back the company to normal business, thereby ensuring that the
securities and funds that the members have deposited as guarantees be
fully returned to the market participants. In that regard, LCH SA
believes that the RP supports the public interest, in line with Section
17A(b)(3)(F) \12\ of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \11\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22.
    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The RP would also be consistent with the specific relevant
requirements of Rule 17Ad-22, including under 17Ad-22(e)(2) and (3)
\13\. Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) \14\ provides that a covered clearing agency
shall have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent and
clearly prioritize the safety and efficiency of the covered clearing
agency, to support the public interest requirements in Section 17A of
the Act applicable to clearing agencies, and the objectives of owners
and participants. LCH SA believes that the RP is consistent with these
requirements. The RP includes extensive governance requirements that
clearly identify the lines of responsibility with respect to the RP. As
described above, at a high level, the LCH SA Management Committee is
responsible for the preparation of the RP and implementation of the
monitoring and the recovery tools set forth in the RP. The LCH SA Risk
committee, which includes clearing member representatives, then
reviews, challenges (if needed), and recommends the RP for approval by
the LCH SA board. Final approval of the RP rests with the LCH SA Board,
which includes, among other categories, non-executive Chair,
independent directors and user directors. At a more granular level, the
RP identifies the groups and individuals within LCH SA that are
responsible for the various aspects of the RP. Therefore, LCH SA
believes that the RP contains governance arrangements that are clear
and transparent and clearly prioritize the safety and efficiency of the
covered clearing agency, to support the public interest requirements
and the objectives of owners and participants, and is,

therefore, consistent with the requirements of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2) and (3).
    \14\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3) \15\ requires that a covered clearing agency
maintain a sound risk management framework for comprehensively managing
legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment,
custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by the covered
clearing agency, which must include plans for the recovery and orderly
wind-down of the covered clearing agency necessitated by credit losses,
liquidity shortfalls, losses from general business risk, or any other
losses. The RP is designed to maintain the continuity of critical
services in times of extreme stress and to facilitate the recovery of
LCH SA in the event of extreme (loss) scenarios, as part of LCH SA's
comprehensive risk management framework. As described above, the RP
seeks to identify those services which could impact the continuity of
LCH SA's operations, implement early warning indicators to identify
potential recovery scenarios and define the triggers for initiating the
RP, and clearly identify the recovery tools available under the RP.
Accordingly, LCH SA believes the RP is consistent with Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(3).\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(3).
    \16\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition

    Section 17A(b)(3)(I) of the Act requires that the rules of a
clearing agency not impose any burden on competition not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.\17\ LCH SA does
not believe the proposed rule change would impact or impose any burden
on competition. The proposed rule change would establish and maintain
LCH SA's RP in accordance with the CCA rules. The RP would not affect
clearing member's access to services offered by LCH SA or impose any
direct burden on clearing members. To the contrary, the RP seeks to
identify the key risks and to establish appropriate recovery measures
to ensure LCH SA's ability to operate in the event of an extreme loss.
Accordingly, the proposed rule change would not unfairly inhibit market
participants' access to LCH SA's services or disadvantage or favor any
particular user in relationship to another user. Therefore, LCH SA does
not believe that the proposed rule change imposes any burden on
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments relating to the proposed rule change have not been
solicited or received. LCH SA will notify the Commission of any written
comments received by LCH SA.

D. Extension of Time Period for Commission Action

    LCH SA does not consent to the extension of the time period listed
in Section 19(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for
Commission action.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-LCH SA-2019-008 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-LCH SA-2019-008. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of LCH SA and on LCH SA's website
at https://www.lch.com/resources/rules-and-regulations/proposed-rule-changes-0. All comments received will be posted without change. Persons
submitting comments arecautioned that we do not redact or edit personal
identifying information from comment submissions. You should submit
only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-LCH SA-2019-008 and should
be submitted on or before November 19, 2019.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-23552 Filed 10-28-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 250 (Wednesday, December 31, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78849-78850]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30582]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EC14-126-000]

Wisconsin Energy Corporation; Integrys Energy Group, Inc.; Notice
of Filing

    Take notice that on December 19, 2014, Wisconsin Energy Corporation
and Integrys Energy Group, Inc. (Merger Applicants) submitted a filing
in response to the Commission's data request.\1\ Merger Applicants'
filing is hereby noticed as an amendment to their application for
purposes of section 33.11(a) of the Commission's regulations (18 CFR
33.11(a) (2014)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Letter Requesting Additional Information, Nov. 19, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214 (2014)). Protests will
be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action
to be taken, but will not serve to make protesters parties to the
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices,
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date.
Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of
that document on the Applicant and all the parties in this proceeding.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an
original and 14 copies

of the protest or intervention to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription''
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive email
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For
assistance with any FERC Online service, please email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For
TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Comment Date: 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on January 19, 2015.

    Dated: December 22, 2014.
 Kimberly D. Bose,
 Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-30582 Filed 12-30-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 66 (Friday, April 5, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20684-20685]
[FR Doc No: 2013-07902]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

[Docket No. USCG-2013-0068]

Towing Safety Advisory Committee; Vacancies

AGENCY: United States Coast Guard.

ACTION: Request for applications.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The United States Coast Guard (the Coast Guard) is requesting
applications from qualified candidates seeking consideration for
appointment as public members to the Towing Safety Advisory Committee
(TSAC). TSAC advises the Coast Guard on matters relating to shallow-
draft inland and coastal waterway navigation and towing safety.

DATES: Applications for TSAC membership must include a cover letter and
resume. Note that all materials must be received on or before May 20,
2013.

ADDRESSES: Send your cover letter and resume via one of the following
methods:
     By mail: Alternate Designated Federal Official (ADFO) of
TSAC, Commandant, (CG-OES-2)/TSAC U.S. Coast Guard, 2100 Second St.
SW., STOP 7126, Washington, DC 20593-7126;
     By fax to<PHONE_NUMBER>; or
     By email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: CDR Rob Smith, Designated Federal
Official (DFO) of TSAC; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; or
email at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: TSAC is governed by the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. (Pub. L. 92-463) and was originally
established in the Department of Transportation (Pub. L. 96-380, which
was most recently amended by section 621 of the Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-281). The Committee advises the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on matters
relating to shallow-draft inland and coastal waterway navigation and
towing safety. This advice also assists the Coast Guard in formulating
the position of the United States regarding the towing industry in
advance of International Maritime Organization meetings.
    The Committee meets at least twice a year either in the Washington
DC area or in cities with large towing centers of commerce and
populated by high concentrations of towing industry and related
businesses. It may also meet for extraordinary purposes. Subcommittees
may conduct intercessional telephonic meetings when necessary for
specific tasking. The 18 members include:
     Seven members representing the Barge and Towing industry,
reflecting a regional geographical balance.
     One member representing the offshore mineral and oil
supply vessel industry.
     One member representing holders of active licensed Masters
or Pilots of towing vessels with experience on the Western Rivers and
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway.
     One member representing the holders of active licensed
Masters of towing vessels in offshore service.
     One member representing Masters who are active ship-
docking or harbor towing vessels.
     One member representing licensed or unlicensed towing
vessel engineers with formal training and experience.

     Two members representing Port districts, port authorities
or terminal operators.
     Two members representing Shippers (of whom one must be
engaged in the shipment of oil or hazardous materials by barge).
     Two members drawn from the General Public.
    The Coast Guard is currently considering applications for six (6)
positions that will become vacant on September 30, 2013:
     Three representatives from the Barge and Towing industry.
     One representative from port districts, port authorities
or terminal operators.
     One person representing licensed or unlicensed towing
engineers with formal training and experience.
     One person representing shippers.
    To be eligible, applicants should have expertise, knowledge, and
experience relative to the position in the towing industry, marine
transportation, or business operations associated with shallow-draft
inland and coastal waterway navigation and towing safety. Registered
lobbyists are not eligible to serve on Federal advisory committees.
Registered lobbyists are lobbyists required to comply with provisions
contained in the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-65, as
amended by Title II of Pub. L. 110-81). Each member serves for a term
up to three (3) years. Members may be considered to serve consecutive
terms. All members serve at their own expense and receive no salary, or
other compensation from the Federal Government.
    DHS does not discriminate in employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, political affiliation, sexual
orientation, gender identity, marital status, disabilities and genetic
information, age, membership in an employee organization, or any other
non-merit factor.
    If you are interested in applying to become a member of the
Committee, submit your application materials indicating the position
you wish to fill; specify your area of expertise, knowledge and
experience that qualify you for service on TSAC; and submit your
complete package to ADFO William J. Abernathy via one of the
transmittal methods provided above. Note that during the pre-selection
vetting process, applicants may be asked to provide their date of birth
and social security number.
    To visit our online docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov.
enter the docket number (USCG-2013-0068) in the Search box, and click
``Search''. Please do not post your resume on this site.

    Dated: April 1, 2013.
J.G. Lantz,
Director of Commercial Regulations and Standards.
[FR Doc. 2013-07902 Filed 4-4-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 33 (Thursday, February 19, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Page 8867]
[FR Doc No: 2015-03443]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Notice of Commission Staff Attendance

    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) hereby gives
notice that members of the Commission's staff may attend the following
meeting related to the transmission planning activities of Public
Service Company of Colorado, Tucson Electric Power Company, UNS
Electric, Inc., Public Service Company of New Mexico, Arizona Public
Service Company, El Paso Electric Company, Black Hills Power, Inc.,
Black Hills Colorado Electric Utility Company, LP, Cheyenne Light,
Fuel, & Power Company, Nevada Power Company, and Sierra Pacific Power
Company:

WestConnect Regional Planning Process Stakeholder Meeting

February 19, 2015, 12:30 p.m.-4:00 p.m. (PST)

    The above-referenced meeting will be held at: NV Energy, 7155
Lindell Road, Las Vegas, NV 89118.

    The above-referenced meeting will be via web conference and
teleconference.
    The above-referenced meeting is open to stakeholders.
    Further information may be found at http://www.westconnect.com/filestorage/02-19-15_WestConnect_Stakeholder_Meeting_Agenda.pdf.
The discussions at the meeting described above may address matters at
issue in the following proceedings:

Docket No. ER13-75, Public Service Company of Colorado
Docket No. ER13-1469
Docket No. ER15-416

Docket No. ER13-77, Tucson Electric Power Company
Docket No. ER13-1461
Docket No. ER15-433

Docket No. ER13-78, UNS Electric, Inc.
Docket No. ER13-1462
Docket No. ER15-434

Docket No. ER13-79, Public Service Company of New Mexico
Docket No. ER13-1447
Docket No. ER15-413

Docket No. ER13-82, Arizona Public Service Company
Docket No. ER13-1450
Docket No. ER15-411

Docket No. ER13-91, El Paso Electric Company
Docket No. ER13-1465
Docket No. ER15-426

Docket No. ER13-96, Black Hills Power, Inc.
Docket No. ER13-1472
Docket No. ER15-431

Docket No. ER13-97, Black Hills Colorado Electric Utility Company, LP
Docket No. ER13-1474
Docket No. ER15-430

Docket No. ER13-120, Cheyenne Light, Fuel, & Power Company
Docket No. ER13-1471
Docket No. ER15-432

Docket No. ER15-428, Nevada Power Company and Sierra Pacific Power
Company
Docket No. ER13-1466
Docket No. ER15-423
Docket No. ER15-424

    For more information, contact Gabe Aguilera, Office of Energy
Market Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at (202) 502-
8489 or<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
    Dated: February 12, 2015.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-03443 Filed 2-18-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, DC

Issued by the Department of Transportation on January 25, 2006

   NOTICE OF ACTION TAKEN -- DOCKET OST-2004-16997

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________

This serves as notice to the public of the action described below, taken
by the Department official indicated (no additional confirming order
will be issued in this matter).

Application of CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. (CONTINENTAL) filed 12/30/05
for:

XX  Amended exemption for two years under 49 U.S.C. 40109 to provide the
following service:

Scheduled foreign air transportation of persons, property, and mail
between a point or points in the United States and a point or points in
the Dominican Republic.

Applicant reps: R. Bruce Keiner<PHONE_NUMBER>    DOT Analyst: Thuy H.
Cooper<PHONE_NUMBER>

D I S P O S I T I O N

XX  Granted (subject to conditions, see below)

XX  Granted Continental the authority to integrate this authority with
its existing certificate and   exemption authority (subject to
conditions, see below)

The above action was effective when taken: January 25, 2006, through
January 25, 2008.

Action taken by:   Paul L. Gretch, Director

		    Office of International Aviation

XX  The authority granted is consistent with the aviation agreement
between the United States and the Dominican Republic of 1986 and the
overall state of aviation relations between the United States and the
Dominican Republic.

Except to the extent exempted or waived, this authority is subject to
the terms, conditions, and limitations indicated:

XX Holder’s certificates of public convenience and necessity

XX Standard exemption conditions (attached)

Conditions: The route integration authority granted is subject to the
condition that such operations are consistent with the applicable
bilateral aviation agreements.  Furthermore, (a) nothing in the award of
the route integration authority granted should be construed as
conferring upon Continental rights (including fifth-freedom intermediate
and/or beyond rights) to serve markets where U.S. carrier entry is
limited unless Continental first notifies the Department of its intent
to serve such a market and unless and until the Department has completed
any necessary carrier selection procedures to determine which carrier(s)
should be authorized to exercise such rights; and (b) should there be a
request by any carrier to use the limited-entry route rights that are
included in Continental’s authority by virtue of the route integration
authority granted here, but that are not then being used by Continental,
the holding of such authority by route integration will not be
considered as providing any preference for Continental in a competitive
carrier selection proceeding to determine which carrier(s) should be
entitled to use the authority at issue.

________________________________________________________________________
___

On the basis of data officially noticeable under Rule 24(g) of the
Department's regulations, we found the applicant qualified to provide
the exemption services authorized.

Under authority assigned by the Department in its regulations, 14 CFR
Part 385, we found that (1) our action was consistent with Department
policy; (2) grant of the authority was consistent with the public
interest; and (3) grant of the authority would not constitute a major
regulatory action under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.
To the extent not granted, we denied all requests in the referenced
Docket.  We may amend, modify, or revoke the authority granted in this
Notice at any time without hearing at our discretion.

Persons entitled to petition the Department for review of the action set
forth in this Notice under the Department’s regulations, 14 CFR
§385.30, may file their petitions within seven (7) days after the date
of issuance of this Notice.  This action was effective when taken, and
the filing of a petition for review will not alter such effectiveness.

An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide
Web at:

  HYPERLINK "http://dms.dot.gov//reports/reports_aviation.asp"
http://dms.dot.gov//reports/reports_aviation.asp

U.S. Carrier Exemption Conditions

In the conduct of the operations authorized, the U.S. carrier
applicant(s) shall:

(1)  Hold at all times effective operating authority from the government
of each country served;

(2)  Comply with applicable requirements concerning oversales contained
in 14 CFR 250 (for scheduled operations, if authorized);

(3)  Comply with the requirements for reporting data contained in 14 CFR
241;

(4)  Comply with requirements for minimum insurance coverage, and for
certifying that coverage to the Department, contained in 14 CFR 205;

(5)  Except as specifically exempted or otherwise provided for in a
Department Order, comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 203, concerning
waiver of Warsaw Convention liability limits and defenses;

(6)  Comply with all applicable requirements of the Federal Aviation
Administration and with all applicable U.S. Government requirements
concerning security, including, but not limited to, 49 CFR Part 1544.
To assure compliance with all applicable U.S. Government requirements
concerning security, the holder shall, before commencing any new service
(including charter flights) to or from a foreign airport, contact its
International Principal Security Inspector (IPSI) to advise the IPSI of
its plans and to find out whether the Transportation Security
Administration has determined that security is adequate to allow such
airport(s) to be served; and

(7)  Comply with such other reasonable terms, conditions, and
limitations required by the public interest as may be prescribed by the
Department of Transportation, with all applicable orders and regulations
of other U.S. agencies and courts, and with all applicable laws of the
United States.

The authority granted shall be effective only during the period when the
holder is in compliance with the conditions imposed above.

05/2004

 The application also seeks renewal of Continental’s existing
city-pair specific exemption authority to serve the New
York/Newark-Punta Cana, Dominican Republic market.  We note that the
broader amended authority that the applicant seeks, and that we are
granting in this Notice, subsumes the existing city-pair specific
authority.  The carrier’s renewal request also seeks renewal of route
integration authority specific to the New York/Newark-Punta Cana market.
 However, the application is silent on route integration as concerns the
broader amended authority.  On our own initiative, we are granting
Continental route integration authority for all U.S.-Dominican Republic
points.

 PAGE


[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 34 (Monday, February 22, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8712-8713]
[FR Doc No: 2016-03597]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[EPA-HQ-OPPT-2015-0789; FRL-9942-66]

Chlorinated Paraffins; Request for Available Information on PMN
Risk Assessments; Extension of Comment Period

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice; extension of comment period.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: EPA issued a notice in the Federal Register of December 23,
2015, requesting new available data on certain chlorinated paraffins in
different industries and for different uses, to inform the risk
assessments for chlorinated paraffins submitted as Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) Premanufacture Notices (PMNs). This document extends
the comment period for 30 days, from February 22, 2016 to March 23,
2016.

DATES: Comments, identified by docket identification (ID) number EPA-
HQ-OPPT-2015-0789, must be received on or before March 23, 2016.

ADDRESSES: Follow the detailed instructions provided under ADDRESSES in
the Federal Register document of December 23, 2015 (80 FR 79886) (FRL-
9940-13).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical information contact:
Kenneth Moss, Chemical Control Division (7405M), Office of Pollution
Prevention and Toxics, Environmental Protection

Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20460-0001;
telephone number:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email address<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    For general information contact: The TSCA-Hotline, ABVI-Goodwill,
422 South Clinton Ave., Rochester, NY 14620; telephone number: (202)
554-1404; email address<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This document extends the public comment
period established in the Federal Register document of December 23,
2015 (80 FR 79886) (FRL-9940-13), which requested new available data on
certain chlorinated paraffins in different industries and for different
uses, to inform the risk assessments for chlorinated paraffins
submitted as Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Premanufacture Notices
(PMNs). Commenters requested additional time to research and submit
more detailed comments concerning this action. In order to give all
interested persons the opportunity to comment fully, EPA is hereby
extending the comment period, which was set to end on February 22,
2016, to March 23, 2016.
    To submit comments, or access the docket, please follow the
detailed instructions provided under ADDRESSES in the Federal Register
document of December 23, 2015. If you have questions, consult the
technical person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.

    Dated: February 17, 2016.
Maria J. Doa,
Director, Chemical Control Division, Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxics.
[FR Doc. 2016-03597 Filed 2-17-16; 4:15 pm]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 54 (Wednesday, March 22, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14799-14800]
[FR Doc No: 2017-05644]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Docket No. DOT-OST-2017-0010]

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology
(OST-R); Request for Clearance for an Information Collection: Annual
Tank Car Survey

AGENCY: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R), DOT.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The BTS is seeking approval from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for an information collection related to tank car
facilities to obtain an estimate of tank cars projected to be modified
or built to the new safer Department of Transportation (DOT) standards.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before
May 22, 2017.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by Docket No. DOT-OST-
2017-0010 through the Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments. You may also submit comments identified by DOT Docket ID
Number DOT-OST-2017-0010 to the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), Dockets Management System (DMS). You may submit your comments by
mail or in person to the Docket Clerk, Docket Management System, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., West Building
Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590. Comments should identify the docket
number as indicated above. Paper comments should be submitted in
duplicate. The DMS is open for examination and copying, at the above
address, from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal
holidays. If you wish to receive confirmation of receipt of your
written comments, please include a self-addressed, stamped postcard
with the following statement: ``Comments on Docket DOT-OST-2017-0010.''
The Docket Clerk will date stamp the postcard prior to returning it to
you via the U.S. mail. Please note that due to delays in the delivery
of U.S. mail to Federal offices in Washington, DC, we recommend that
persons consider an alternative method (the Internet, fax, or
professional delivery service) to submit comments to the docket and
ensure their timely receipt at U.S. DOT. You may fax your comments to
the DMS at<PHONE_NUMBER>. Comments can also be viewed and/or submitted
via the Federal Rulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
    Please note that anyone is able to electronically search all
comments received into our docket management system by the name of the
individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment if submitted
on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; pages 19475-19570)
or you may review the Privacy Act Statement at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Clara Reschovsky, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Research and Technology, Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Room E34-409, Washington, DC 20590, Telephone (202) 366-
2857.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with the requirements of 44
U.S.C. Section 3506(c)(2)(A) (the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995),
this notice announces the intention of the BTS to request the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB's) approval for an information collection
related to Section 7308 of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation
Act (Pub. L. 114-94; the ``FAST Act''). Specifically, Section 7308(c)
of the FAST ACT directs the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a
survey of tank car facilities to obtain an estimate of tank cars
projected to be modified or built to the new safer Department of
Transportation (DOT) Specification 117 or 117R. In order to satisfy the
FAST Act requirements, BTS is planning the data collection. BTS invites
comments on its intention to collect information from tank car
retrofitting and manufacturing facilities on the planned and projected
number of tank cars to be retrofitted or manufactured beginning the
next calendar year, annually. Any facility identified with the capacity
to modify or build new tank cars to the 117 or 117R specification, as
described in Section 7308(c) of the FAST Act will be included in the
survey identified in this notice and submit the results to the Bureau
of Transportation Statistics (BTS) no later than 60 days upon request.
Individual responses to the survey will be kept confidential and a
summary report of aggregate findings will be provided to:
    (1) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate; and
    (2) The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House
of Representatives.
    In addition, this summary report will also be published to the BTS
Web page.
    Title: Annual Tank Car Survey.
    Background: On December 4, 2015, President Barack Obama signed
legislation entitled ``Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of
2015,'' or the ``FAST Act.'' See Public Law 114-94. The FAST Act
includes the ``Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety Improvement
Act of 2015'' (see Sections 7001 through 7311) and instructs the
Secretary of Transportation to make specific regulatory amendments to
the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180),
including requirements for certain persons to report the progress
toward modifying rail tank cars used for the transportation of Class 3
flammable liquids in accordance with the timeline established in
Section 7304 of the FAST Act.
    This notice is applicable to Section 7308(c) of the FAST Act which
directs the Secretary to conduct an annual survey of tank car shops to
acquire projections of the number of tank cars to be built or
manufactured to the new safer specifications. This includes those tank
cars modified to the DOT Specification 117R, or equivalent, as well as
any new tank cars built to the DOT Specification 117, or equivalent.
Modified tank cars will include, but may not be limited to, those
previously built to Specifications: DOT105, DOT109, DOT111, DOT112,
DOT114, DOT115, and DOT120.
    Respondents: Across the nation there are approximately 400 tank car
facilities that are currently registered or certified to build or
modify tank cars. However, the majority of these do not have the
capacity to modify or build to the 117 or 117R Specifications. It is
estimated that, at most, 140 tank car shops possess the required
capacity to build or modify to these new safer requirements.
    Estimated Average Burden per Response: It is estimated that 140
facilities will provide one response each to this request for
information on an annual basis, and that it will take approximately 30
minutes to complete, including record keeping and reporting. This
notice is intended to accurately account for the annual burden.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden: The estimated burden is equal to 70
annual burden hours (i.e., 140 responses per year x 0.5 hour per
response). The total burden cost is estimated at $3,342 (i.e., 70
burden hours x $47.74 per hour for a manager in Transportation,
Storage, and Distribution).

    Frequency: The survey frequency is prescribed by Section 7308(d) of
the FAST Act. Specifically, this section requires the Secretary to
conduct the survey under Section 7308(c) annually until May 1, 2029.
    Public Comments Invited: Interested parties are invited to send
comments regarding any aspect of this information collection,
including, but not limited to: (1) The necessity and utility of the
information collection for the proper performance of the functions of
the DOT; (2) the accuracy of the estimated burden; (3) ways to enhance
the quality, utility, clarity and content of the collected information;
and (4) ways to minimize the collection burden without reducing the
quality of the collected information. Comments submitted in response to
this notice will be summarized and/or included in the request for OMB's
clearance of this information collection.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 9, 2017.
Patricia S. Hu,
Director, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Research and Technology.
[FR Doc. 2017-05644 Filed 3-21-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P


                                OLENE S. WALKER
Governor

                              GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE
Lieutenant Governor
                                OLENE S. WALKER
Governor

                              GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE
Lieutenant Governor
                                State of Utah

                      Department of Environmental Quality

                           Dianne R. Nielson, Ph.D.
Executive Director

                            DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY
                               Richard W. Sprott
Director

                                State of Utah

                      Department of Environmental Quality

                           Dianne R. Nielson, Ph.D.
Executive Director

                            DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY
                               Richard W. Sprott
Director

150 North 1950 West  ::  PO Box 144820  ::  Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4820 :: phone<PHONE_NUMBER> :: fax<PHONE_NUMBER>
T.D.D.<PHONE_NUMBER> ::  www.deq.utah.gov

                                                              DAQE-GN0796034-04

July 5, 2017

Russell L. Christensen
Geneva Steel
P.O. Box 2500
Provo, Utah  84603

Dear Mr. Christensen:

Re:  Emission Credit Order

This Order establishes the emissions credits listed below and confirms their entry into the Emissions Credit Registry. These credits are based on actual and enforceable reductions established by the cancellation of the following Approval Orders.

BAQE-367-91	DAQE-368-91 	DAQE-643-91 	DAQE-1138-93
DAQE-0010-94 	DAQE-732-94 	DAQE-540-95 	DAQE-1075-95
DAQE-1160-95 	DAQE-0023-96 	DAQE-287-96 	DAQE-288-96
DAQE-373-96 	DAQE-591-96 	DAQE-653-96 	DAQE-048-97
DAQE-368-97 	DAQE-844-97 	DAQE-170-98 	DAQE-300-99
DAQE-301-99 	DAQE-302-99 	DAQE-303-99

                                   Pollutant
                               Previous Credits
                                  (tons/year)
                         Credits Created by this Order
                                  (tons/year)
                            Total Emission Credits
                                  (tons/year)
                                 PM10 Actuals
                                      187
                                    1572.7
                                    1759.7
                                  SO2 Actuals
                                    295.99
                                    1015.1
                                    1311.09
                                  NOx Actuals
                                     705.2
                                    3529.0
                                    4234.2
                                      VOC
                                       0
                                     451.0
                                     451.0
                                      CO
                                       0
                                       0
                                       0

A summary of the updated Emissions Credit Registry for Utah County is enclosed.  Please feel free to call John D. Jenks at<PHONE_NUMBER> if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Richard W. Sprott,Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board

RWS:JJ:re

Enclsoure


     UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

                             OFFICE OF CHEMICAL SAFTEY
AND POLLUTION PREVENTION

RE:  	Meeting with BASF, Eastman Chemical Company (Eastman) and EPA to discuss conditions of use for phthalates and phthalic anhydride

List of Documents
 Meeting Summary
 Attendees
Meeting Summary
On November 21, 2019, EPA met with BASF and Eastman to discuss use information on phthalates and phthalic anhydride. EPA provided a general overview of the prioritization and the risk evaluation process under TSCA section 6. BASF and Eastman provided their knowledge and expertise about numerous phthalates and discussed specific phthalate uses, properties, replacements, and movement within the market among other things.

Attendees
EPA:
Alex Smith
Bethany Masten
Claire Brisse
Darlene Leonard
Doug Parsons
Eliane Catilina
Eva Cappuccilli
Jordan Garbin
Lea Carmichael
Marc Edmonds
Peter Gimlin
Sarah Cox
Susan Makris
Victoria Ellenbogen

BASF:
Steven Goldberg
Patrick Harmon

Eastman:
Scott Boito