[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 225 (Wednesday, November 21, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 69754-69759]
[FR Doc No: 2012-28231]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Parts 2 and 35

[Docket No. RM11-26-000]

Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.

ACTION: Policy statement.

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SUMMARY: The Commission issues this policy statement to provide
guidance regarding its evaluation of applications for electric
transmission incentives under section 219 of the Federal Power Act. In
the six years since the Commission implemented section 219 by issuing
Order No. 679, the Commission has acted on numerous applications for
transmission incentives. The Commission has now determined it would be
beneficial to provide additional guidance and clarity with respect to
certain aspects of its transmission incentives policies under section
219 of the Federal Power Act and Order No. 679. In particular, the
Commission: reframes its nexus test to focus more directly on the
requirements of Order No. 679; expects applicants to take all
reasonable steps to mitigate the risks of a project, including
requesting those incentives designed to reduce the risk of a project,
before seeking an incentive return on equity (ROE) based on a project's
risks and challenges; provides general guidance that may inform
applications for an incentive ROE based on a project's risks and
challenges; and promotes additional transparency with respect to the
impacts of the Commission's incentives policies. The Commission finds
that the additional guidance provided through this policy statement is
necessary to encourage transmission infrastructure investment while
maintaining just and reasonable rates, consistent with section 219 of
the Federal Power Act. The Commission will apply this policy statement
on a prospective basis to incentive applications received after the
date of its issuance.

DATES: Effective November 15, 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
David Borden, Office of Energy Policy and Innovation, 888 First Street
NE., Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Andrew Weinstein, Office of General Counsel, 888 First Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman; Philip D. Moeller,
John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.

Policy Statement

(Issued November 15, 2012)

    1. The Commission issues this policy statement to provide guidance
regarding its evaluation of applications for electric transmission
incentives under section 219 of the Federal Power Act (FPA).\1\ In the
six years since the Commission implemented section 219 by issuing Order
No. 679,\2\ the Commission has acted on numerous applications for
transmission incentives. The Commission has now determined it would be
beneficial to provide additional guidance and clarity with respect to
certain aspects of its transmission incentives policies under section
219 of the Federal Power Act and Order No. 679. In particular, the
Commission: reframes the nexus test to focus more directly on the
requirements of Order No. 679; expects applicants to take all
reasonable steps to mitigate the risks of a project, including
requesting those incentives designed to reduce the risk of a project,
before seeking an incentive return on equity (ROE) based on a project's
risks and challenges; provides general guidance that may inform
applications for an incentive ROE based on a project's risks and
challenges; and promotes additional transparency with respect to the
impacts of the Commission's incentives policies. The Commission finds
that the additional guidance provided through this policy statement is
necessary to encourage transmission infrastructure investment while
maintaining just and reasonable rates, consistent with section 219 of
the FPA. The Commission will apply this policy statement on a
prospective basis to incentive applications received after the date of
its issuance.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824s (2006).
    \2\ Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform,
Order No. 679, 71 FR 43294 (Jul. 31, 2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,222 (2006), order on reh'g, Order No. 679-A, 72 FR 1152 (Jan. 10,
2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,236, order on reh'g, 119 FERC ]
61,062 (2007).
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I. Background

    2. Section 1241 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 added a new
section 219 to the FPA. The Commission implemented section 219 by
issuing Order No. 679, which established by rule incentive-based rate
treatments for investment in electric transmission infrastructure for
the purpose of benefiting consumers by ensuring reliability and
reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission
congestion. Since the issuance of Order No. 679, the Commission has
evaluated more than 85 applications representing over $60 billion in
potential transmission investment.
    3. On May 19, 2011, the Commission issued a notice of inquiry (NOI)
seeking public comment regarding the scope and implementation of the
Commission's incentives policies. The Commission received over 1,500
pages of comments reflecting a wide range of perspectives on the
Commission's incentives policies. The Commission appreciates the robust
participation by the diverse group of commenters, and has carefully
considered the comments received in formulating this policy statement.
The Commission's issuance of this policy statement is driven by its
experience applying its incentives policies to individual incentive

applications and comments received in response to the NOI.

II. Policy Statement

    4. As noted above, the Commission through this policy statement
provides additional guidance with respect to certain aspects of its
incentives policies. Specifically, the Commission: reframes the nexus
test to focus more directly on the requirements of Order No. 679;
expects applicants to take all reasonable steps to mitigate the risks
of a project, including requesting those incentives designed to reduce
the risk of a project, before seeking an incentive ROE based on a
project's risks and challenges; provides general guidance that may
inform applications for an incentive ROE based on a project's risks and
challenges; and promotes additional transparency with respect to the
impacts of the Commission's incentives policies. Each of these issues
and the Commission's corresponding clarifications are discussed further
below.
    5. We note that many aspects of the Commission's incentives
policies are not addressed in this policy statement. For example, in
Order No. 679, the Commission stated that applicants could seek
incentives thereunder regardless of their ownership structure,\3\ and
that the Commission would evaluate incentive applications on a case-by-
case basis.\4\ The Commission also established rebuttable presumptions
to assist in determining whether proposed facilities satisfy the
statutory threshold of section 219.\5\ In Order No. 679 and subsequent
cases applying incentives policies, the Commission has addressed the
granting of incentive ROEs that are not based on the risks and
challenges of a project, such as incentive ROEs for RTO membership or
Transco formation. With respect to aspects of the Commission's
incentives policies not addressed in this policy statement, we decline
to provide additional guidance at this time.
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    \3\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at P 4. Section
219(b)(1) requires that the Commission establish rules for
incentives, ``* * * regardless of the ownership of the facilities.''
16 U.S.C. 824s(b)(1).
    \4\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at P 43.
    \5\ Id. P 58.
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A. Application of the Nexus Test

    6. Order No. 679 established the ``nexus test,'' which requires
applicants to demonstrate a connection between the incentive(s)
requested under Order No. 679 and the proposed investment, and that the
incentive(s) requested address the risks and challenges that a project
faces. In Order No. 679, the Commission stated that each incentive:

    ``* * * will be rationally tailored to the risks and challenges
faced in constructing new transmission. Not every incentive will be
available for every new investment.
    Rather, each applicant must demonstrate that there is a nexus
between the incentive sought and the investment being made. Our
reforms therefore continue to meet the just and reasonable standard
by achieving the proper balance between consumer and investor
interests on the facts of a particular case and considering the fact
that our traditional policies have not adequately encouraged the
construction of new transmission.'' \6\
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    \6\ Id. P 26.

    7. The Commission refined the nexus test in Order No. 679-A,
finding that, in applying the nexus test, the Commission should look at
whether the total package of incentives is rationally tailored to the
risks and challenges of constructing new transmission.\7\ The
Commission stated that this approach would protect consumers by
recognizing that requested incentives that reduce risk might obviate
the need for an incentive ROE based on a project's risks and
challenges, or otherwise justify a lower incentive ROE based on a
project's risks and challenges.
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    \7\ Order No. 679-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,236 at P 27. See
also 18 CFR 35.35(d) (2006) (``Incentive-based rate treatments for
transmission infrastructure investment. * * * The applicant must
demonstrate that the facilities for which it seeks incentives either
ensure reliability or reduce the cost of delivered power by reducing
transmission congestion consistent with the requirements of section
219, that the total package of incentives is tailored to address the
demonstrable risks or challenges faced by the applicant in
undertaking the project, and that resulting rates are just and
reasonable.* * *'')
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    8. Subsequent to Order No. 679 and Order No. 679-A, the Commission
further refined its application of the nexus test by clarifying that
the determination of whether a project is ``routine'' or ``non-
routine'' is particularly probative in evaluating whether the nexus
test was satisfied. In Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, the
Commission concluded that, once an applicant demonstrates that a
project is not routine, the nexus test is satisfied and the project is
deemed to face risks and challenges that merit incentive(s).\8\
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    \8\ 120 FERC ] 61,084, at PP 52-54 (2007) (BG&E).
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    9. The Commission recognizes that there are a wide range of views
on its application of the nexus test and, in particular, the
Commission's use of the routine/non-routine analysis as a proxy for the
nexus test. Most commenters in the NOI are supportive of the nexus
test's focus on evaluating risks and challenges to determine whether a
project merits incentives. Some commenters offer additional criteria
for assessing risks and challenges, while others are more critical of
the nexus test and assert that it is insufficient and requires change.
With respect to the Commission's use of the routine/non-routine
analysis in reviewing incentive applications since BG&E, some
commenters support the continued use of the routine/non-routine
analysis, while others seek more clarity from the Commission.
    10. Based on experience to date with the application of Order No.
679, the Commission now believes it is essential to re-frame its
application of the nexus test to focus more directly on the
requirements adopted in Order Nos. 679 and 679-A.\9\ The Commission
will no longer rely on the routine/non-routine analysis adopted in BG&E
as a proxy for the nexus test. While prior orders found that analysis
probative, based on our experience to date applying our incentives
policies and the comments received in response to the NOI, we believe
it is necessary to analyze the need for each individual incentive, and
the total package of incentives, instead of relying on a proxy.
Consistent with Order No. 679-A, the Commission will continue to
require applicants seeking incentives to demonstrate how the total
package of incentives requested is tailored to address demonstrable
risks and challenges. Applicants ``must provide sufficient explanation
and support to allow the Commission to evaluate each element of the
package and the interrelationship of all elements of the package. If
some of the incentives would reduce the risks of the project, that fact
will be taken into account in any request for an enhanced ROE.'' \10\
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    \9\ 18 CFR 35.35(d).
    \10\ Order No. 679-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,236 at P 27.
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B. Risk-Reducing Incentives

    11. The Commission authorizes a company's base ROE utilizing a
range of reasonableness resulting from a discounted cash flow (DCF)
analysis that is applied to a selected proxy group representing firms
of comparable risk. The resulting base ROE authorized by the Commission
is designed to account for many of the risks associated with
transmission investment and to support that investment. Nonetheless,
the Commission recognizes that there may be risks associated with
investment in particular transmission projects that are not accounted
for in the base ROE. In Order No. 679, the Commission recognized that
some transmission incentives--such as recovery of 100 percent of
Construction Work in

Progress (CWIP), recovery of 100 percent of pre-commercial costs as an
expense or as a regulatory asset, and recovery of 100 percent of
prudently incurred costs of transmission facilities that are abandoned
for reasons beyond the applicant's control--reduce the financial and
regulatory risks associated with transmission investment.\11\ The
Commission reaffirms in this policy statement that these risk-reducing
incentives may mitigate risk not accounted for in the base ROE, and we
therefore expect incentives applicants to first examine the use of
risk-reducing incentives before seeking an incentive ROE based on a
project's risks and challenges.\12\
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    \11\ See Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at PP 115,
117, and 163.
    \12\ The Commission clarifies that placing a priority on risk-
reducing incentives does not require separate applications for risk-
reducing incentives and an incentive ROE based on a project's risks
and challenges. Rather, in a single application an applicant could
first demonstrate how risk-reducing incentives are utilized and then
seek to demonstrate, as discussed further below, that remaining
risks and challenges merit an incentive ROE based on the project's
risks and challenges.
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    12. The CWIP and pre-commercial cost incentives both serve as
useful tools to ease the financial pressures associated with
transmission development by providing up-front regulatory certainty,
rate stability and improved cash flow, which in turn can result in
higher credit ratings and lower capital costs.\13\ Specifically, the
CWIP incentive addresses timing issues associated with the recovery of
financing costs for large transmission investments and allows recovery
of a return on construction costs during the construction period rather
than delaying cost recovery until the plant is placed into service. The
Commission has also found that allowing companies to include 100
percent of CWIP in rate base would result in greater rate stability for
customers by reducing the ``rate shock'' when certain large-scale
transmission projects come on line.\14\
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    \13\ See Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at PP 115,
117, and 163.
    \14\ See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and Pub. Serv. Elec.
and Gas Co., 135 FERC ] 61,229 (2011). See also PPL Elec. Utils.
Corp., 123 FERC ] 61,068, at P 43 (2008), reh'g denied 124 FERC ]
61,229.
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    13. Regarding 100 percent recovery of pre-commercial cost as an
incentive, the Commission has permitted recipients of this incentive to
expense and recover pre-commercial costs that would otherwise be
capitalized in CWIP, thus providing for earlier cost recovery and
improving early stage project cash flows. The Commission has also made
deferred cost recovery available to applicants to address cost recovery
restrictions at the state level and to provide greater flexibility for
applicants to recover costs, recognizing that deferred cost recovery is
intended to ``* * * increase the certainty of cost recovery to
encourage more transmission investment.'' \15\ The Commission also
recognizes the usefulness of deferred cost recovery of pre-commercial
costs for applicants who do not have a formula rate in effect prior to
incurring pre-commercial costs, by allowing the applicant to defer all
such costs not included in CWIP as a regulatory asset until the
applicant has a formula rate in effect for cost recovery.\16\ The
Commission has previously found that this incentive provides up-front
regulatory certainty and can reduce interest expense, improve coverage
ratios, and assist in the construction of transmission projects.\17\
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    \15\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at PP 175, 178.
    \16\ See, e.g., Atlantic Grid, 135 FERC ] 61,144 (2011). Like
the pre-commercial cost incentive, all transmission incentives are
intended to be available to all existing utilities and non-incumbent
utilities.
    \17\ See, e.g., DATC Midwest Holdings, L.L.C., 139 FERC ] 61,224
(2012).
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    14. Regarding the incentive that allows for 100 percent recovery of
prudently incurred costs of transmission facilities that are abandoned
for reasons beyond the control of the transmission owner, the
Commission has found this incentive reduces the regulatory risk of non-
recovery of prudently incurred costs.\18\ The Commission has previously
stated that, in addition to the challenges presented by the scope and
size of a project, factors like various federal and state siting
approvals introduce a significant element of risk. Granting this
incentive ameliorates such risk by providing companies with more
certainty during the pre-construction and construction periods.\19\
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    \18\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at P 163.
    \19\ See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and Pub. Serv. Elec.
and Gas Co., 135 FERC ] 61,229 (2011).
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    15. In the NOI, numerous commenters discuss the interplay of risk-
reducing incentives on the need for and appropriate level of an
incentive ROE. For example, Certain State and Consumer-Owned Entities
state that if a project's risks exceed the risk that is accounted for
in the base ROE, incentives may be appropriate.\20\ Other commenters
state that the Commission should strike an appropriate balance between
consumer and investor interests, and that if incentives are compounded
without consideration of the reduced risk effect of some of the
incentives, this approach tips the risk in favor of the investor and to
the detriment of the transmission customer. Numerous commenters also
argue that risk-reducing incentives mitigate the need for an incentive
ROE based on a project's risks and challenges to attract investment.
For example, Joint Commenters \21\ note that the biggest risks for
transmission projects relate to siting and permitting delays, cash flow
shortage, or abandonment concerns, but argue that, even where the level
of these risks is unusually high, they can be mitigated by granting
risk-reducing incentives. Joint Commenters further contend that, when
incentives are appropriate, risk-reducing incentives should be the
first (and often the only) incentives considered.\22\ Other commenters
point out that risk also is mitigated through the assurance of cost
recovery at the state level.
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    \20\ Certain State and Consumer-Owned Entities September 12,
2011 Comments at 39. Certain State and Consumer-Owned Entities
include Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, Attorney
General for the State of Connecticut, Connecticut Office of Consumer
Counsel, Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Delaware Public
Service Commission, Public Advocate of Delaware, Attorney General
for the State of Illinois, Maine Public Utilities Commission,
Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, Massachusetts
Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, New England Conference of
Public Utilities Commissioners, Attorney General for the State of
New Hampshire, New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., New
Hampshire Office of Consumer Advocate, New Hampshire Public
Utilities Commission, Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission and
Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, Attorney General for the
State of Rhode Island, Vermont Department of Public Service, and
Vermont Public Service Board.
    \21\ Joint Commenters include Joint Comments of American Forest
& Paper Association, American Public Power Association, California
Municipal Utilities Association, California Public Utilities
Commission, City and County of San Francisco, Connecticut Office of
Consumer Counsel, Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Indiana
Utility Regulatory Commission, Maryland Office of People's Counsel,
Modesto Irrigation District, Montana Public Service Commission,
National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates, New
England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners, New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities,
New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel, Northern California Power
Agency, Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel, Old Dominion
Electric Cooperative, Organization of MISO States, Pennsylvania
Office of Consumer Advocate, Public Power Council, Public Service
Commission of the State of New York, Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, South Dakota
Public Utilities Commission, State of Maine, Office of the Public
Advocate, Transmission Agency of Northern California, the Vermont
Department of Public Service, and the Vermont Public Service Board.
    \22\ Joint Commenters September 12, 2011 Comments at 80.
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    16. In Order No. 679-A, the Commission stated that a project that
receives risk-reducing transmission incentives, like those discussed
above,

would likely face lower risks. Therefore, that project may not warrant
an incentive ROE, or may warrant a lower incentive ROE, based on the
project's risks and challenges.\23\ Based on the Commission's
experience under Order No. 679, and after careful consideration of
comments on the NOI as to the benefits of risk-reducing incentives, the
Commission clarifies that many risks not accounted for in the base ROE
can be alleviated through risk-reducing incentives such as those
discussed earlier in this section. In cases where an incentive ROE
based on risks and challenges is requested in combination with risk-
reducing incentives, the Commission must carefully apply its total
package analysis to ensure that the effect of the risk-reducing
incentives is appropriately accounted for in determining whether an
incentive ROE based on risks and challenges is warranted, and if
warranted, what level is appropriate. For this reason, the Commission
expects incentives applicants to seek to reduce the risk of
transmission investment not otherwise accounted for in its base ROE by
using risk-reducing incentives before seeking an incentive ROE based on
a project's risks and challenges.\24\
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    \23\ Order No. 679-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,236 at P 27.
    \24\ The Commission appreciates that non-incumbents seeking
incentives may face challenges implementing some risk-reducing
incentives because they may not have the appropriate rate structures
in place under which to effectuate these transmission incentives. In
such instances, the Commission anticipates subsequent section 205
filings by non-incumbent incentive applicants for cost recovery. As
noted above, all transmission incentives are intended to be
available to all existing utilities and non-incumbent utilities.
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C. Incentive ROEs Based on Project Risks and Challenges

    17. Some commenters in the NOI suggest that the Commission
specifically identify project characteristics or risks and challenges
that would merit an incentive ROE. We decline to do so. Instead, we
will continue to allow applicants the flexibility necessary to
demonstrate why their projects may merit an incentive ROE, and at what
level, based on those project's risks and challenges, but we provide
general guidance below that may inform applications for this type of
transmission incentive.
1. Showings and Commitments for Remaining Risks and Challenges
    18. As discussed above, many of the risks not captured by
traditional ratemaking policies can be addressed through risk-reducing
incentives. While the record in the NOI proceeding does not show that
incentive ROEs have resulted in significant rate increases for
consumers,\25\ incentive ROEs likely put more upward pressure on
transmission rates than risk-reducing incentives. Therefore incentive
applicants should first examine risk-reducing incentives.
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    \25\ See, ITC Holdings Corp. September 12, 2011 Comments at 16:
``The incentives granted to transmission projects have had generally
positive, not negative, effects on consumer rates and service,
especially when improved reliability, reduced congestion and access
to a more diverse supply of generation, including renewable
resources, are taken into account. One reason for this is that the
cost of transmission incentives is small compared to the cost of
energy, distribution and congestion.''
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    19. However, a project may face certain risks and challenges that
may not be addressed through either the traditional ratemaking policies
or risk-reducing incentives. In such instances, an incentive ROE based
on a project's risks and challenges may be appropriate.\26\ Based on
the Commission's experience under Order No. 679 and the comments
received on the NOI, the Commission expects applicants seeking an
incentive ROE based on a project's risks and challenges to make the
following four showings as part of their application for that
incentive.
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    \26\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at P 94.
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a. Identification of Risks and Challenges
    20. When applying for an incentive ROE based on the project's risks
and challenges, applicants will first be expected to demonstrate that
the proposed project faces risks and challenges that are not either
already accounted for in the applicant's base ROE or addressed through
risk-reducing incentives. To make this demonstration, the Commission
suggests that applicants identify risks and challenges specific to the
project for which an incentive ROE is being requested.
    21. Investments in the following types of transmission projects
\27\ may face the types of risks and challenges that may warrant an
incentive ROE based on the project's risks and challenges that are not
either already accounted for in the applicant's base ROE or could be
addressed through risk-reducing incentives:
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    \27\ These investments could include both investment in new
transmission facilities, as well as investment in transmission
upgrades, retrofits, and projects that modernize the existing
transmission grid.
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    1. Projects to relieve chronic or severe grid congestion that has
had demonstrated cost impacts to consumers;
    2. Projects that unlock location constrained generation resources
that previously had limited or no access to the wholesale electricity
markets;
    3. Projects that apply new technologies to facilitate more
efficient and reliable usage and operation of existing or new
facilities.\28\
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    \28\ Examples of projects that meet this description include
those that create additional incremental capacity without
significant construction (e.g., through the use of dynamic line
rating), that allow for more efficient balancing of variable energy
resources, and/or that provide increased grid stability. In
addition, the Commission is concerned that its current practice of
granting incentive ROEs and risk-reducing incentives may not be
effectively encouraging the deployment of new technologies or the
employment of practices that provide demonstrated benefits to
consumers. Accordingly, the Commission remains open to alternative
incentive proposals aimed at supporting projects that achieve these
ends.
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    22. This list is not exhaustive, but rather indicative of the types
of projects that the Commission believes, based on its experience and
expertise with respect to industry trends and system investment needs,
may warrant an incentive ROE based on the project's risks and
challenges. More generally, the Commission anticipates that applicants
will seek an incentive ROE based on a project's risks and challenges
for projects that provide demonstrable consumer benefits by making the
transmission grid more efficient, reliable, and cost-effective. Thus,
consistent with our statements in Order No. 679, we note that
reliability-driven projects may be considered for an incentive ROE
based on a project's risks and challenges, but only if they present
specific risks and challenges not otherwise mitigated by available
risk-reducing incentives.\29\
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    \29\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at P 94.
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    23. Under our current incentive policies, the Commission considers
an applicant's proposed use of an advanced transmission technology
both: (1) as part of the overall nexus analysis, accounting for the
risks and challenges associated with utilizing such advanced technology
into that overall nexus analysis; \30\ and (2) where an applicant seeks
a stand-alone incentive ROE based on its utilization of an advanced
technology.\31\ The Commission

continues to encourage the deployment of advanced technologies that
``increase the capacity, efficiency, or reliability of an existing or
new transmission facility.'' \32\ However, the Commission is concerned
that its current approach may contribute to confusion, including with
respect to the distinct standards that the Commission applies in these
two contexts. To address this concern, the Commission will no longer
consider requests under Order No. 679 for a stand-alone incentive ROE
based on an applicant's utilization of an advanced technology. Instead,
as noted above, the Commission will consider transmission projects that
apply advanced technologies as indicative of the types of projects
facing risks and challenges that may warrant an incentive ROE. As a
result, we will consider deployment of advanced technologies as part of
the overall nexus analysis when an incentive ROE is sought.
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    \30\ See Tallgrass Transmission, LLC, 125 FERC ] 61,248, at P 59
(2008) (``[t]he associated challenges can be incorporated into the
overall nexus analysis, but the technology does not, in and of
itself, appear to justify a separate advanced technology adder.'');
RITELine Indiana & Illinois LLC, 137 FERC ] 61,039 at P 62 (2011).
    \31\ See The United Illuminating Co., 126 FERC ] 61,043, at P 14
(2009) (``In reviewing requests for separate adders for advanced
technology, the Commission reviews record evidence to decide if the
proposed technology warrants a separate adder because it reflects a
new or innovative domestic use of the technology that will improve
reliability, reduce congestion, or improve technology.''). See also
NSTAR Elec. Co., 127 FERC ] 61,052 at P 27 (2009).
    \32\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at P 298.
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b. Minimization of Risks
    24. The Commission expects an applicant that requests an incentive
ROE based on a project's risks and challenges to demonstrate that it is
taking appropriate steps and using appropriate mechanisms to minimize
its risks during project development. For example, risks may be reduced
through the risk-reducing incentives described in section II.B, or
through mitigating costs by implementing best practices in their
project management and procurement procedures. Applicants should
consider taking measures tailored to mitigate the various risks
associated with their transmission projects and to identify such
measures in their applications. For example, applicants may take
measures to mitigate risks associated with siting and environmental
impacts by pursuing joint ownership arrangements. The Commission
encourages incentives applicants to participate in joint ownership
arrangements and agrees with commenters to the NOI that such
arrangements can be beneficial by diversifying financial risk across
multiple owners and minimizing siting risks.\33\
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    \33\ Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,222 at PP 354, 357;
Order No. 679-A FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,236, at P 102. See also
Central Maine Power Company, 125 FERC ] 61,182, at P 61 (2008); Xcel
Energy, 121 FERC ] 61,284 at P 55 (2007). Evidence regarding whether
an applicant for incentives considered joint ownership arrangements
may be relevant in assessing whether the applicant took appropriate
steps to minimize its risks during project development.
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c. Consideration of Alternatives
    25. The Commission expects applicants for an incentive ROE based on
a project's risks and challenges to demonstrate that alternatives to
the project have been, or will be, considered in either a relevant
transmission planning process or another appropriate forum. Such a
showing should help identify the demonstrable consumer benefits of the
proposed project and its role in promoting a more efficient, reliable
and cost-effective transmission system.\34\
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    \34\ This showing draws on recommendations made by commenters in
the NOI, who suggested that the Commission require an assessment of
lower cost alternatives to any proposed transmission project as part
of a filing requesting transmission incentives.
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    26. The Commission appreciates that there may be timing challenges
for applicants making this showing, and thus the Commission will be
flexible in the approaches it allows for applicants to make this
showing. In particular, this showing could be satisfied through
participation in open processes that are already in existence. For
example:
    1. The applicant could show that its project was, or will be,
considered in an Order No. 890 or Order No. 1000-compliant transmission
planning process that provides the opportunity for projects to be
compared against transmission or non-transmission alternatives.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ In making this showing, the applicant need not show that
its project was selected in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation. Instead, the focus would be on whether
the project was or will be considered in a process where it could be
compared to other projects and shown to be preferable to any
alternatives that were evaluated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. The applicant could show that its project was considered by a
local regulatory body, such as a state utility commission, that
evaluated alternatives to its proposed project (transmission or non-
transmission alternatives) and determined that the proposed
transmission project is preferable to the alternatives evaluated.
    27. The above approaches should not be seen as exclusive, however,
and the Commission will remain open to alternative methods to making
this showing.\36\
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    \36\ For example, projects that are required to complete an
environmental impact statement (EIS) may submit the analysis on the
consideration of alternatives, per the requirements of the EIS, as
making such a showing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Commitment to Cost Estimates
    28. Finally, the Commission expects applicants for an incentive ROE
based on a project's risks and challenges to commit to limiting the
application of the incentive ROE based on a project's risks and
challenges to a cost estimate. For example, the Commission has approved
an applicant's proposal to limit the incentive ROE based on a project's
risks and challenges to the cost estimate utilized at the time of RTO
approval.\37\ Our intent is not to be prescriptive as to how applicants
might structure this commitment; instead, the Commission is open to
approaches that control transmission development costs and provide more
transparency regarding how incentives will be applied to costs beyond
initial estimates.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ RITELine Illinois & Indiana LLC, 137 FERC ] 61,039, at P 5
(2011).
    \38\ Concern about the effects of allowing transmission
incentives to be applied to costs over those estimated was expressed
by a number of commenters in the NOI proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. The Commission recognizes the challenges of determining the
appropriate cost estimate for a project. For example, most applicants
seek incentives from the Commission at a relatively early stage in the
project development process, often before state siting or other
processes raise challenges that can impact the design and ultimate cost
of a project. One option may be for applicants to commit to limiting
the application of an incentive ROE based on a project's risks and
challenges to the last cost estimate relied upon to include or retain
the project in a regional transmission planning process.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ If factors outside applicant's control cause significant
deviation from the cost estimate upon which the ROE incentive was
initially granted, the Commission can revisit that cost estimate
(e.g., a regional planner requires significant acceleration of a
project construction timeline).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    30. The Southwest Power Pool Regional State Committee (SPP RSC) in
its comments on the NOI identifies a definitive cost estimate that
would serve as the initial threshold limit for an incentive ROE, a 10%
dead-band above or below the definitive cost estimate around which
changes in costs are shared equally between shareholders and customers,
and a provision for addressing cost increases that are outside the
control of the transmission owner.\40\ The Commission believes that
aspects of the SPP RSC proposal highlighted here may provide useful
guidance to applicants when seeking incentive ROEs based on a project's
risks and challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ SPP RSC September 12 Comments at 5, 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Conclusion

    31. As noted above, the Commission is relying on its experience and
expertise with respect to industry trends and system investment needs
to provide additional guidance and clarity through this policy
statement. Six years after

issuing Order No. 679, the Commission believes that it is appropriate
and in the public interest to evaluate the impacts of its incentives
policy and give guidance as to how the Commission will implement that
incentives policy going forward. In order to further the mandate of FPA
section 219 and encourage transmission investment in the future, the
Commission will continue to monitor its incentives policy and may
identify new policy issues, trends, and developments in transmission
investment that may warrant modifications to the Commission's
incentives policy. As part of this effort, the Commission will
continually assess measures to further transparency in its incentives
policy and the impacts of that policy on consumers.

IV. Document Availability

    32. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
    33. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
    34. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web
site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202-502-
6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
    By the Commission. Commissioner Clark is not participating.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-28231 Filed 11-20-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register: October 19, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 201)]
[Notices]
[Page 64368-64370]
[DOCID:fr19oc10-92]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-63072; File No. SR-NYSEAmex-2010-97]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate
Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by NYSE Amex LLC Amending the
Exchange Price List

October 7, 2010.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that, on October 1, 2010, NYSE Amex LLC. (``NYSE Amex'' or the
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I and II
below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission
is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend its 2010 Price List for equities to
amend the fees charged for taking liquidity and the rebates for
providing liquidity for Nasdaq securities traded pursuant to unlisted
trading privileges and incorporate an enhanced rebate for larger
displayed orders in trades above $5.00 in lieu of the standard rebate,
as well as assess monthly fees for the use of all ports that provide
connectivity to its equity trading systems. In its table of credits
applicable to Supplemental Liquidity Providers (``SLPs''), the Exchange
is modifying language referencing the SLP quoting requirement to
reflect a recent rule filing that changed the standard from 3% to 5% of
the regular trading day in any calendar month in order to receive a
financial rebate. The amended pricing will take effect on October 1,
2010. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the
Exchange's Web site at http://www.nyse.com, at the Exchange's principal
office, on the Commission's Web site at http://www.sec.gov, and at the
Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to amend its 2010 Price List for equities to
modify the structure of (i) fees charged for taking liquidity and (ii)
rebates for adding liquidity, to market participants, Supplemental
Liquidity Providers (``SLPs'') and Designated Market Makers (``DMMs''),
for Nasdaq securities traded pursuant to unlisted trading privileges
whose share price is $1.00 or more.
    Currently, market participants, SLPs and DMMs are charged a fee of
$0.0013 per share for orders in Nasdaq securities traded pursuant to
unlisted trading privileges that take liquidity. Under the proposal,
the fee will be $0.0023 per share for orders that take liquidity.
    Market participants, other than DMMs and SLPs, that provide
liquidity in Nasdaq securities traded pursuant to unlisted trading
privileges are currently paid a rebate of $0.0019 per share. Under the
proposal, such market participants will be paid a rebate of $0.0030 per
share.
    Currently, for orders in Nasdaq securities traded pursuant to
unlisted trading privileges that provide liquidity, DMMs, and SLPs that
meet their quoting requirements pursuant to Rule 107B, are paid a
rebate of $0.0021 per share, and SLPs that do not meet their quoting
requirements are paid a rebate of $0.0019 per share for orders that
provide liquidity. Under the proposal, the rebate will be $0.0031 per
share for

orders that provide liquidity for both DMMs and SLPs that meet their
quoting requirements while SLPs that provide liquidity but do not meet
their quoting requirements will be paid a rebate of $0.0030 per share.
    Additionally, in lieu of the above rebates, the Exchange is
proposing to provide a block rebate of $0.0036 per share for executions
of displayed liquidity to all market participants and SLPs that provide
liquidity in orders in Nasdaq securities traded pursuant to unlisted
trading privileges that originally display a minimum of 5,000 shares
with a trading price of at least $5.00 per share, for as long as the
order is not cancelled in [sic] amount that would reduce the original
displayed amount below 5,000 shares. For example, if a 10,000 share
order priced above $5.00 displays 10,000 shares, and is then partially
executed in the amount of 4,000 shares, the executed 4,000 shares
receive the block rebate. The remaining 6,000 shares are still eligible
for the block rebate. Additionally, if a 10,000 share order priced
above $5.00 displays 10,000 shares, and is then partially canceled in
the amount of 6,000 shares, the remaining 4,000 shares will not be
eligible for the block rebate and would receive the regular rebate when
traded. Finally, if a 10,000 share order priced above $5.00 displays
10,000 shares, and is then partially executed in the amount of 2,000
shares, the executed 2,000 shares receive the block rebate, and the
remaining 8,000 shares are still eligible for the block rebate.
However, if the client then cancels 6,000 shares, the remaining 2,000
shares are not eligible for the block rebate and will receive the
regular rebate when traded. DMMs will receive a block rebate of $0.0036
per share in Nasdaq securities traded pursuant to unlisted trading
privileges for executions of the displayed portions of s-Quotes that
provide liquidity and display 5,000 shares or more at the time of
execution with a trading price of at least $5.00 per share.
    Additionally, the Exchange proposes to amend its 2010 Price List
for equities to assess monthly fees for the use of all ports that
provide connectivity to its equity trading systems. A number of other
markets already charge such fees, but the Exchange has not previously
done so.
    The level of activity with respect to a particular port will not
affect the assessment of monthly fees, so even if a particular port
that is available to a participant is not used, the participant will
still be billed for that port. The monthly fee for ports will be $100
per pair per month up to five pairs, then $500 for each additional five
pairs. For example, the fee for seven pairs of ports will be $1,000 per
month. Billing for ports will be based on the number of ports on the
third business day prior to the end of the month.
    In its table of credits applicable to SLPs, the Exchange is
modifying language referencing the SLP quoting requirement to reflect a
recent rule filing that changed the standard from 3% to 5% of the
regular trading day in any calendar month in order to receive a
financial rebate.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62792 (August 30,
2010), 75 FR 54407 (September 7, 2010) (File No. SR-NYSEAmex-2010-
85).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These changes are intended to be effective immediately for all
transactions beginning October 1, 2010.
2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with the provisions of Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act''),\4\ in general, and Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,\5\ in
particular, in that it is designed to provide for the equitable
allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its
members and other persons using its facilities. The Exchange believes
that the proposal does not constitute an inequitable allocation of
fees, as all similarly situated member organizations will be charged
the same amount and access to the Exchange's market is offered on fair
and non-discriminatory terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \5\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A) \6\ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule 19b-
4 \7\ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other charge
imposed by NYSE Amex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \7\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://
www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an e-mail to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2010-97 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2010-97. This
file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used.
To help the Commission process and review your comments more
efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all
comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments,
all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that
are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating
to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person,
other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website
viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between
the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be
available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the
Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the
Commission does not edit personal identifying information from

submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make
available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-
NYSEAmex-2010-97 and should be submitted on or before November 9, 2010.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-26109 Filed 10-18-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 127 (Wednesday, July 2, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 37757]
[FR Doc No: 2014-15462]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Docket ID FEMA-2104-0010; OMB No. 1660-0010]

Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for OMB
Review; Comment Request; Implementation of Coastal Barrier Legislation.

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will submit the
information collection abstracted below to the Office of Management and
Budget for review and clearance in accordance with the requirements of
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The submission will describe the
nature of the information collection, the categories of respondents,
the estimated burden (i.e., the time, effort and resources used by
respondents to respond) and cost, and the actual data collection
instruments FEMA will use.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before August 1, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments on the proposed information
collection to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office
of Management and Budget. Comments should be addressed to the Desk
Officer for the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and sent via electronic mail to
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or faxed to<PHONE_NUMBER>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information or
copies of the information collection should be made to Director,
Records Management Division, 500 C Street SW., Room 7NE, Washington, DC
20472-3100, facsimile number<PHONE_NUMBER>, or email address<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Collection of Information

    Title: Implementation of Coastal Barrier Legislation.
    Type of information collection: Extension, without change, of a
currently approved information collection.
    Form Titles and Numbers: None.
    Abstract: When an application for flood insurance is submitted for
buildings located in a Coastal Barrier Resource System (CBRS) or an
otherwise protected area, one of the following types of documentation
must be submitted as evidence of eligibility: (a) Certification from a
community official stating the building is not located in a designated
CBRS area; (b) A legally valid building permit or certification from a
community official stating that the start date of a building's
construction preceded the date that the community was identified in the
CBRS; or (c) Certification from the governmental body overseeing the
area indicating that the building is used in a manner consistent with
the purpose for which the area is protected.
    Affected Public: Individuals or households; Businesses or other for
profits; Not-for-profit institutions; Farms; and State, local or Tribal
governments.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 1600.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 400.
    Estimated Cost: The estimated annual operations and maintenance
costs for technical services is $1,600.00. There is no annual start-up
or capital costs. The change in number of respondents since the 60 day
Federal Register Notice (79 FR 12699 (March 6, 2014)) is based on an
updated calculation of flood insurance applications received requiring
this CBRS documentation. The estimated total annual burden hour and
cost have been updated to reflect this adjusted estimated number of
respondents.

    Dated: June 23, 2014.
Charlene D. Myrthil,
Director, Records Management Division, Mission Support Bureau, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2014-15462 Filed 7-1-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-11-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 194 (Tuesday, October 10, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69919-69920]
[FR Doc No: 2023-22402]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER23-2967-000]

Toms River Net Meter Solar, LLC; Supplemental Notice That Initial
Market-Based Rate Filing Includes Request for Blanket Section 204
Authorization

    This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding of
Toms River Net Meter Solar, LLC's application for market-based rate
authority, with an accompanying rate tariff, noting that such
application includes a request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR
part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of
liability.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426,

in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Anyone filing a
motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of that document on
the Applicant.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with
regard to the applicant's request for blanket authorization, under 18
CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of
liability, is October 23, 2023.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with internet
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically may mail similar pleadings to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426. Hand delivered submissions in docketed
proceedings should be delivered to Health and Human Services, 12225
Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
    In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) using
the ``eLibrary'' link. Enter the docket number excluding the last three
digits in the docket number field to access the document. At this time,
the Commission has suspended access to the Commission's Public
Reference Room, due to the proclamation declaring a National Emergency
concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), issued by the
President on March 13, 2020. For assistance, contact the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission at [email protected] or call toll-free,
(886) 208-3676 or TYY,<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    The Commission's Office of Public Participation (OPP) supports
meaningful public engagement and participation in Commission
proceedings. OPP can help members of the public, including landowners,
environmental justice communities, Tribal members and others, access
publicly available information and navigate Commission processes. For
public inquiries and assistance with making filings such as
interventions, comments, or requests for rehearing, the public is
encouraged to contact OPP at<PHONE_NUMBER> or [email protected].

    Dated: October 3, 2023.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-22402 Filed 10-6-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P