CALCULATION SHEET SIGNATURE Arash Hooshangi DATE 04/ 13/ 04 CHECKED _____________________________________ DATE_________

PROJECT 304( m) Biennial Plan 2004/ 2005: Petroleum Refining Industry Detailed Study CALC NO._____________

SUBJECT Toxic Equivalents for Dioxins Reported in 2000 to TRI FILENAME Q:\ 304m\ Updated TRI and PCS Databases\ Petroleum Refining\ Petroleum Refining. mdb This document outlines the steps taken to calculate toxic equivalents ( TEQ) for dioxin discharges reported to the 2000 TRI. For risk assessment purposes, toxicity equivalency factors ( TEFs) for dioxin congeners were developed, with the TEF of 2,3,7,8 TCDD equal to 1.0 ( WHO/ 97, see attached reference). The dioxin and dioxin like compound category in TRI consists of 17 individual chemicals ( congeners). The TEFs for the 17 dioxin congeners in the TRI category are listed in the Dioxin_ TEF table of the MS Access database.

1. Calculation of TEQ for TRI Discharges where the Facility Reported Dioxin Distribution.

Query 132b: a. Identifies refineries that report dioxin congener distributions and also report dioxin discharges to wastewater ( or POTWs). b. Multiplies total dioxin discharge for facility by individual congener distributions and TEFs to calculate the congener TEQ. c. Sums the TEQ result for all 17 congeners to arrive at a total TEQ for facility dioxin discharges.

2. Calculation of TEQ for TRI Discharges where the Facility Did Not Report Dioxin Distribution.

Query 133: Calculates the average congener distribution reported to TRI by petroleum refineries.

Query 134b: a. Identifies refineries that report dioxin discharges to wastewater ( or POTWs) but do not report congener distributions. b. Multiplies total dioxin discharge for facility by average congener distributions ( Query 133) and TEFs to calculate the congener TEQ. c. Sums the TEQ result for all 17 congeners to arrive at a total TEQ for facility dioxin discharges.

3. Query 135b: combines the above two queries ( 132b and 134b).

4. Result The complete list of petroleum refining dioxin TEQs ( in lbs and grams) is presented in the following spreadsheet: Q:\ 304m\ Petroleum Refining\ Reports and Memos\ Dioxin TEQ\ TRI TEQ QA/ QC First, please check the Dioxin_ TEF table to ensure correct TEF values are entered for dioxin congeners. Second, please check the queries ( 132b, 133, 134b, and 135b) to ensure that TEQ calculations are correct. CALCULATION SHEET SIGNATURE Arash Hooshangi DATE 04/ 13/ 04 CHECKED _____________________________________ DATE_________

PROJECT 304( m) Biennial Plan 2004/ 2005: Petroleum Refining Industry Detailed Study CALC NO._____________

SUBJECT Toxic Equivalents for Dioxins Reported in 2000 to TRI FILENAME Q:\ 304m\ Updated TRI and PCS Databases\ Petroleum Refining\ Petroleum Refining. mdb Sample Calculations Dioxin 1: 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 Heptachlorodibenzofuran, TEF= 0.01 Facility: 98221SHLLLWESTM ( reported dioxin distribution) Dioxin 1 distribution = 15.9 % Total dioxin loads: 0.01146392 lbs Dioxin 1 TEQ= TEF * distribution * total dioxin load = 0.01 * 15.9% * 0.01146392 = 1.823E 05 TEQ Facility: 59101CNCBL401SO ( did not report dioxin distribution) Total dioxin load: 0.0003561752 lbs Dioxin 1 average distribution = 16.93 % Dioxin 1 TEQ= TEF * average distribution * total dioxin load = 0.01 * 16.93%* 0.0003561752 = 6.03E 07 TEQ


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 12, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62575-62577]
[FR Doc No: 2023-19672]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2023-N-0579]

Mayya Tatsene: Final Debarment Order

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is issuing an order
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) permanently
debarring Mayya Tatsene from providing services in any capacity to a
person that has an approved or pending drug product application. FDA
bases this order on a finding that Ms. Tatsene was convicted of a
felony under Federal law for conduct that relates to the regulation of
any drug product under the FD&C Act. Ms. Tatsene was given notice of
the proposed permanent debarment and was given an opportunity to
request a hearing to show why she should not be debarred. As of July 8,
2023 (more than 30 days after receipt of the notice, as prescribed by
regulation), Ms. Tatsene has not responded to the notice. Ms. Tatsene's
failure to respond and request a hearing within the prescribed
timeframe constitutes a waiver of her right to a hearing concerning
this action.

DATES: This order is applicable September 12, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Any application by Ms. Tatsene for special termination of
debarment under section 306(d)(4) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C.
335a(d)(4)) may be submitted as follows:

Electronic Submissions

     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments. An application
submitted electronically, including attachments, to https://www.regulations.gov will be posted to the docket unchanged. Because
your application will be made public, you are solely responsible for
ensuring that your application does not include any confidential
information that you or a third party may not wish to be posted, such
as medical information, your or anyone else's Social Security number,
or confidential business information, such as a manufacturing process.
Please note that if you include your name, contact information, or
other information that identifies you in the body of your comments,
that information will be posted on https://www.regulations.gov.
     If you want to submit an application with confidential

information that you do not wish to be made available to the public,
submit the application as a written/paper submission and in the manner
detailed (see ``Written/Paper Submissions'' and ``Instructions'').

Written/Paper Submissions

     Mail/Hand Delivery/Courier (for written/paper
submissions): Dockets Management Staff (HFA-305), Food and Drug
Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, Rm. 1061, Rockville, MD 20852.
     For a written/paper application submitted to the Dockets
Management Staff, FDA will post your application, as well as any
attachments, except for information submitted, marked, and identified,
as confidential, if submitted as detailed in ``Instructions.''
    Instructions: All applications must include the Docket No. FDA-
2023-N-0579. Received applications will be placed in the docket and,
except for those submitted as ``Confidential Submissions,'' publicly
viewable at https://www.regulations.gov or at the Dockets Management
Staff between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday,<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Confidential Submissions--To submit an application with
confidential information that you do not wish to be made publicly
available, submit your application only as a written/paper submission.
You should submit two copies total. One copy will include the
information you claim to be confidential with a heading or cover note
that states ``THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.'' The
Agency will review this copy, including the claimed confidential
information, in its consideration of your application. The second copy,
which will have the claimed confidential information redacted/blacked
out, will be available for public viewing and posted on https://www.regulations.gov. Submit both copies to the Dockets Management
Staff. Any information marked as ``confidential'' will not be disclosed
except in accordance with 21 CFR 10.20 and other applicable disclosure
law. For more information about FDA's posting of comments to public
dockets, see 80 FR 56469, September 18, 2015, or access the information
at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-09-18/pdf/2015-23389.pdf.
    Docket: For access to the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov
and insert the docket number, found in brackets in the heading of this
document, into the ``Search'' box and follow the prompts and/or go to
the Dockets Management Staff, 5630 Fishers Lane, Rm. 1061, Rockville,
MD 20852 between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, 240-402-
7500. Publicly available submissions may be seen in the docket.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jaime Espinosa, Division of Compliance
and Enforcement, Office of Policy, Compliance, and Enforcement, Office
of Regulatory Affairs, Food and Drug Administration, at<PHONE_NUMBER>,
or [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Section 306(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act requires debarment of an
individual from providing services in any capacity to a person that has
an approved or pending drug product application if FDA finds that the
individual has been convicted of a felony under Federal law for conduct
relating to the regulation of any drug product under the FD&C Act.
    On January 10, 2023, Mayya Tatsene was convicted in the U. S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York when the court
entered judgment of conviction against her, after her plea of guilty,
to one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. 1349 and one count of Wire Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343.
    The underlying facts supporting the conviction are contained in the
Information, entered into the docket on May 29, 2019, and from the
transcript of Ms. Tatsene's guilty plea hearing which occurred on May
29, 2019. Ms. Tatsene was an employee of AMA Laboratories (AMA), a
consumer product testing company in Rockland County, New York. At AMA,
Ms. Tatsene was employed as the clinical laboratory director and,
between 2005 and 2017, was in charge of the Repeat Insult Patch Test
laboratory at AMA. AMA purported to test the safety and efficacy of
cosmetics, sunscreens, and other products on specified numbers of
volunteer panelists in exchange for fees paid by consumer products
companies. The customers who engaged AMA to run these tests on their
products used the results to determine whether those products were safe
and effective. From at least in or about 2005, through in or about
April 2017, Ms. Tatsene and AMA personnel defrauded AMA's customers in
excess of $25 million by testing products on materially lower numbers
of panelists than the numbers specified and paid for by AMA's
customers. Ms. Tatsene and other AMA employees made materially false
and misleading statements about the results of the tests to AMA's
customers. Specifically, Ms. Tatsene and other AMA employees falsely
represented to AMA's customers that AMA had tested the products on the
number of panelists specified by the laboratory's customers. Ms.
Tatsene and other AMA employees sent its customers laboratory results
containing false information via interstate email and facsimile
communications.
    Based on this conviction, FDA sent Ms. Tatsene by certified mail on
May 25, 2023, a notice proposing to permanently debar her from
providing services in any capacity to a person that has an approved or
pending drug product application. The proposal was based on a finding,
under section 306(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act, that Ms. Tatsene was
convicted, as set forth in section 306(l)(1) of the FD&C Act, of a
felony under Federal law for conduct relating to the regulation of a
drug product under the FD&C Act. The proposal also offered Ms. Tatsene
an opportunity to request a hearing, providing her 30 days from the
date of receipt of the letter in which to file the request, and advised
her that failure to file a timely request for a hearing would
constitute an election not to use the opportunity for a hearing and a
waiver of any contentions concerning this action. Ms. Tatsene received
the proposal on June 8, 2023. She did not request a hearing within the
timeframe prescribed by regulation and has, therefore, waived her
opportunity for a hearing and any contentions concerning her debarment
(21 CFR part 12).

II. Findings and Order

    Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Human and Animal
Food Operations, under section 306(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act, under
authority delegated to the Assistant Commissioner, finds that Ms.
Tatsene has been convicted of a felony under Federal law for conduct
relating to the regulation of a drug product under the FD&C Act.
    As a result of the foregoing finding, Ms. Tatsene is permanently
debarred from providing services in any capacity to a person with an
approved or pending drug product application, effective (see DATES)
(see section 306(a)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(A)(ii) of the FD&C Act. Any person
with an approved or pending drug product application who knowingly
employs or retains as a consultant or contractor, or otherwise uses in
any capacity the services of Ms. Tatsene during her debarment, will be
subject to civil money penalties (section 307(a)(6) of the FD&C Act (21
U.S.C. 335b(a)(6))). If Ms. Tatsene provides services in any capacity
to a person with an approved or pending drug product application during
her period of debarment, she will be subject to civil money penalties
(section 307(a)(7) of the FD&C Act). In addition, FDA will not

accept or review any abbreviated new drug application from Ms. Tatsene
during her period of debarment, other than in connection with an audit
under section 306 of the FD&C Act. Note that, for purposes of sections
306 and 307 of the FD&C Act, a ``drug product'' is defined as a ``drug
subject to regulation under section 505, 512, or 802 of this Act [(21
U.S.C. 355, 360b, 382)] or under section 351 of the Public Health
Service Act [(42 U.S.C. 262)]'' (section 201(dd) of the FD&C Act (21
U.S.C. 321(dd))).

    Dated: September 7, 2023.
Lauren K. Roth,
Associate Commissioner for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2023-19672 Filed 9-11-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4164-01-P


[Federal Register: July 11, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 132)]
[Notices]
[Page 37744]
[DOCID:fr11jy07-51]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER07-907-000]

Bruce Power Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Order

July 3, 2007.
    Bruce Power Inc. (Bruce Power) filed an application for market-
based rate authority, with an accompanying rate schedule. The proposed
market-based rate schedule provides for the sale of energy and capacity
at market-based rates. Bruce Power also requested waivers of various
Commission regulations. In particular, Bruce Power requested that the
Commission grant blanket approval under 18 CFR part 34 of all future
issuances of securities and assumptions of liability by Bruce Power.
    On June 29, 2007, pursuant to delegated authority, the Director,
Division of Tariffs and Market Development--West, granted the requests
for blanket approval under Part 34 (Director's Order). The Director's
Order also stated that the Commission would publish a separate notice
in the Federal Register establishing a period of time for the filing of
protests. Accordingly, any person desiring to be heard concerning the
blanket approvals of issuances of securities or assumptions of
liability by Bruce Power should file a protest with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice
and Procedure. 18 CFR 385.211, 385.214 (2004).
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests is
July 30, 2007.
    Absent a request to be heard in opposition to such blanket
approvals by the deadline above, Bruce Power is authorized to issue
securities and assume obligations or liabilities as a guarantor,
indorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security of another
person; provided that such issuance or assumption is for some lawful
object within the corporate purposes of Bruce Power, compatible with
the public interest, and is reasonably necessary or appropriate for
such purposes.
    The Commission reserves the right to require a further showing that
neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected by
continued approvals of Bruce Power's issuance of securities or
assumptions of liability.
    Copies of the full text of the Director's Order are available from
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426. The Order may also be viewed on the Commission's
Web site at http://www.ferc.gov, using the eLibrary link. Enter the

docket number excluding the last three digits in the docket number
filed to access the document. Comments, protests, and interventions may
be filed electronically via the Internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR
385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's Web site
under the ``e-Filing'' link. The Commission strongly encourages
electronic filings.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-13466 Filed 7-10-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


Keith Barnett/RTP/USEPA/US
04/17/2006 10:14 AM	To
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Andy O'Hare"<EMAIL_ADDRESS>cc

bcc

Subject
Stakeholder List for the issue of the use of Coal Flyash as a Feedstock to
Cement Kilns and Notice of a future Stakeholder Meeting

		If  you are receiving this email you are on my stakeholders list
concerning the issue of the use of coal flyash as a feedstock to cement
kilns.   The issue raised is as follows:

		(Excerpt for the preamble of the proposed amendments to the Portland
Cement NESHAP)

		We are also aware that some cement kilns purchase fly ash from utility
boilers as an additive feedstock.  There is concern that as a result of
controlling mercury in utility boilers, the purchased fly ash may now have
a higher mercury content than is the current norm.  The result would be
that mercury emissions reductions achieved by controlling utility boilers
would be offset by the release of this previously controlled mercury in a
cement kiln when the fly ash is used as an additive.  At this time, we are
uncertain if the use of fly ash from utility boilers that are controlling
their mercury emissions will be significant.  One possible solution would
be to ban the use of fly ash from a utility boiler that is controlling
mercury as an additive to cement kiln feed.  We are specifically
soliciting comment on a potential ban, or any other methods to address
this issue.

		Since we originally raised this issue we have been informed that even in
the absence of mercury controls, coal flyash can have substantial amounts
of mercury and can be a significant contributor to total mercury emissions
from a cement kiln.

		Note that we are not concerned with the addition of flyash to cement , we
are only concerned when the flyash passes through the cement kiln.

		Based on  discussions with commenters on this issue and other EPA offices
I have developed a stakeholder list of persons who have an interest and
knowledge to offer on this issue.  The list is as follows:

		Keith Barnett - EPA, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Project
Lead for the Portland Cement NESHAP
		Ken Ladwig - Electrical Power Research Institute
Andy O'Hare - Portland Cement Association
Steven Silverman - EPA, Office of General Counsel
Brian Gasiorowski - Lafarge North America
Carl Koch - EPA, Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation, Sectors
Strategy Group
John Sager - EPA, Office of Solid Waste
Susan Thorneloe - EPA, Office of Research and Development
Bill Maxwell - EPA, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
Steve Fruh - EPA, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
Julie Gevrenov - EPA, Region 5
Dave Goss - American Coal Ash Association
Tom Feeley - DOE
Alexander Livnat - EPA, Office of Solid Waste
		Leonard Lazarus - EPA, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

		If anyone has other names they believe should be on  this list please
contact me.

		I am tentatively planning a stakeholder meeting, probably the week of May
8 in DC. I am going to hold off until the information being gathered by
DOE is available.  When we meet on this issue I want to be able to look at
the data the has already been complied.

		I have developed a list of questions that I think we need to answer before
EPA can make an informed decision on any regulations on the use of flyash
as a feedstock to a cement kiln.  These questions,and my thoughts on data
available to answer them, are as follows:

		What are the mercury contents of fly ash?   DOE is compiling data and the
Agency has also done studies.  I think by the end of April we will have a
lot of data on this.
		What specific raw materials does the fly ash replace? My understanding is
that fly ash is used to replace shale or clay.
		What are the typical mercury contents of the replaced raw materials? I am
not sure if there are data to answer this question - there may be USGS
information - I haven't checked yet.
		What other impacts does the addition of fly ash have on the kiln, if any?
Does it affect fuel use, does it affect other emissions?  Are there any
data to quantify these impacts?  If not, can the impacts be estimated
based on some type of combustion calculations?  I have heard qualitative
answers to these questions - but have no quantitative data.  However,
cement plants are already using flyash.  I have to assume  that they did
some type of analysis on what the impacts were because they would have to
insure that the substitution did not adversely affect product quality.  To
the extent that these data are already available,  we could discuss these
impacts at the stakeholders meeting.
		If anyone can think of something I have missed let me know.
		I have not developed a detailed agenda for the first meeting, but my
thinking is the meeting would begin in mid-morning and last through the
afternoon.  We would ask participants with data to provide to send us the
data prior to the meeting and we would discuss the available data in the
order of the questions above.  Again. if anyone has suggestion on agenda
topics, contact me.
		Keith W. Barnett
US/EPA OAQPS, SPPD/MMG
Mail Code D243-02
Research Triangle Park, NC  27711
919-541-5605
barnett.keith@epa.gov


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55505-55512]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23120]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0126; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-236-AD;
Amendment 39-18267; AD 2015-19-04]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection
program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to
the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural
failure.

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0126; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 757 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12431). The NPRM was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or
inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel
shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural
failure.

Record of Ex Parte Communication

    In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts

from design approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed
certain comments addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with
Airlines for America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry.
All of the comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed
in this final rule in response to comments submitted by other
commenters. A discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking
docket at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating
Docket No. FAA-2014-0126.

Clarification of Certain Terminology

    Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 12431, March 5, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014)

    American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) is
not a safety concern, and that Boeing has not recommended any interim
action on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing
the issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated
valve (MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA also noted that in a
previous NPRM for Model 757 airplanes, it had submitted data showing
the failure of the actuator was unlikely and that coupled with the
likelihood of an erroneous indication occurring at the same time, the
latent hazard was even more improbable. AA stated the same analysis
applies to this NPRM. We infer that AA is requesting the NPRM be
withdrawn.
    We disagree with AA's request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition exists that
warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes developing a
modification that will address the identified unsafe condition. Boeing
did not formally comment on whether it considers this issue to be an
unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the required interim
actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel shutoff valve
actuator that is failed latently in the open valve position will occur
during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if
certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme engine or APU
damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event were to occur
during flight, the crew procedures for such an event would not stop the
fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU. The continued flow of
fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion
event.
    The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe
engine or APU damage events be minimized. Therefore, we require, for
each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires
can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle
or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe
damage.
    The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required
inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following
latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed
this final rule in this regard.

Requests To Revise the Proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) To
Limit the Applicability Specified in Certain Figures

    DHL and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise the proposed
AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to limit the applicability specified in
figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD to airplanes
with fuel shutoff valve actuators on which the identified unsafe
condition exists.
    DHL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) should
make it clear that airworthiness limitations (AWL) numbers 28-AWL-ENG
and 28-AWL-APU do not apply to airplanes that are equipped with the
actuators made by supplier V35840, having part number (P/N) AV31-1
(Boeing P/N S343T003-111), for the engine fuel shutoff valve and APU
fuel shutoff valve. DHL stated that the deficiencies identified in the
NPRM are related to potential common mode failures, which affect
integral electronic circuit boards that commutate the brushless motor
and control the position indicating signals on some actuators made by
supplier V73760. DHL also stated that fuel shutoff valve P/N AV31-1
(Boeing P/N S343T003-111) is not susceptible to the type of deficiency
described in the NPRM because this valve uses brushes and mechanical
switches rather than electronic circuit boards to commutate the motor
and to control position indicating signals.
    UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) did
not specify which MOV actuator part number the proposed AD applies to.
UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and
777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL also
stated there are known issues with this MOV actuator part number, and
presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001.
    We agree with the commenters' requests to limit the applicability
specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to
airplanes with the actuators on which the identified unsafe condition
exists. Only two fuel shutoff valve actuator designs are susceptible to
the identified unsafe condition specified in this final rule, and it
would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the inspections on
airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible valves installed. We
have changed the Applicability column in figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the limitations apply to Model
757 airplanes on which fuel shutoff valve actuator P/N MA20A2027
(Boeing P/N S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003-66) is
installed at the engine and APU fuel shutoff valve positions.

Requests To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational
Check

    AA and US Airways requested that the compliance time for the
initial accomplishment of the operational

check be extended after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection
program revision.
    AA requested that the compliance time be revised to 60 days after
accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision. AA stated
that the extended time of 60 days is for publishing the new criteria,
for distribution of cards and manuals/checklists, and for the initial
compliance time to be taken into account. AA stated that the 7-day
compliance time is not justified by the failure rates for this safety
concern. AA also stated that the compliance deadline would therefore
become unclear.
    US Airways requested that the compliance time be extended to 7 days
after the 30-day compliance time for the maintenance or inspection
program revision. US Airways stated that accomplishing the initial
compliance time based on completion of adding to the maintenance
program would make the compliance deadline very difficult to track as
making program changes is typically not a closely tracked process.
    We partially agree with the commenters' requests to extend the
initial compliance time for the actions specified in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD. We have changed the initial compliance time
for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD to 10 days. A compliance time of 10 days is consistent with
regulatory actions for other affected airplane models and with the
initial compliance time in figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD. We
have determined that the initial compliance time for the check
represents an appropriate time in which the required actions can be
performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, while still
maintaining an adequate level of safety.
    In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the
safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance
schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The
manufacturer does not expect a large number of latently failed fuel
shutoff valve actuators to be discovered. Existing parts stores are
expected to be sufficient, and parts can be repositioned in time to
support the initial checks. However, under the provisions of paragraph
(i)(1) of this AD, we might consider requests for adjustments to the
compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an
adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety.

Request To Change Compliance Time Intervals to Flight Cycles

    US Airways requested that the compliance time intervals be changed
to specify flight cycles. US Airways stated that it has heard of no
evidence suggesting the subject condition is a function of time and
believes the condition would likely only occur either at engine or APU
start or shutdown. US Airways also stated that it and other operators
utilize its airplanes on long-haul trips that span many time zones. US
Airways stated that, according to a report from the airplane
manufacturer during the fourth quarter of 2013, 68 percent of the
operators had a daily utilization rate of 3.3 flight cycles, and 95.4
percent had a daily utilization rate of 4.7 flight cycles.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. While the failure of the
fuel shutoff valve is likely associated with the cycling of the valve,
the purpose of the inspections is to minimize the exposure to flights
that are initiated with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is latently
failed in the open position. Operators may request approval of an AMOC
in accordance with the provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this
AD to change the interval to a cycle-based interval, provided it
includes at least one check each day for the engine fuel shutoff valves
and that the data substantiate that the request would provide an
acceptable level of safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Requests To Extend the Repetitive Inspection Interval for the Engine
Fuel Shutoff Valves

    AA and UAL requested that the daily repetitive inspection interval
for the engine fuel spar valve be extended.
    AA requested that we add a choice to the proposed AD (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014) to allow monitoring the disagreement light in
combination with checking the actuator itself every 100 flight hours or
50 flight cycles, whichever occurs later. AA stated that this means to
check the indication and physically check the closure of the engine and
APU fuel spar valve at 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, whichever
occurs later, as an alternative maintenance task. AA stated that Model
767-400 series airplanes identified in the NPRM having Directorate
Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) are allowed 10
days to inspect the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and
commanded closed. AA stated that 10 days equates closely to 100 flight
hours/50 flight cycles. AA also stated that Model 757 and 767 airplanes
have the same actuator valve and indication, except that Model 767-400
series airplanes do not have a disagreement light.
    UAL requested that we extend the daily interval for AWL number 28-
AWL-ENG to 10 days. UAL stated that Model 757-200 and -300 series
airplanes and Model 767-400 series airplanes use the same MOV actuator.
UAL stated that the interval for Model 757-200 and -300 series
airplanes is daily while the Model 767-400 series airplanes is 10 days.
    We disagree with the commenters' requests. For the engine fuel
shutoff valve, an interval increase from daily to every 10 days, or to
the later of 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, would result in at
least 10 times as many flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine
fire. The daily check has been deemed practical because in practice it
likely means the flightcrew will need to watch a light just above the
FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine. As AA
stated, Model 767-400ER series airplanes do not have the disagreement
light, so the inspection is more complex. As a result, we determined it
is not practical to require this inspection on a daily basis on Model
767-400ER airplanes. We have not changed the inspection interval for
Model 757 airplanes addressed in this AD.

Request for Operational Check Relief

    AA requested that any recurring interval include only the days or
flight cycles when the airplane is in revenue service, or when an APU
is in operational status. AA stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014) does not account for airplanes in routine maintenance or
in an out-of-service condition. AA also proposed that a provision for
the APU on the minimum equipment list (MEL) be included in the proposed
AD. AA stated that once an APU is returned to service from the MEL, the
``10 day or 100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later''
interval would be restarted. AA stated that any task interval in the
proposed AD should have the mechanism to exclude the elapsed time when
the aircraft or APU is non-operational, since the latent failure
finding task is not accumulating time toward a next potential latent
failure.
    We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree to limit
operational checks to days when the airplane is in revenue service or
when an APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in
operation. We have

added a note in the Interval column of figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD indicating that the operational check for the
engine and APU is not required on days when the airplane is not used in
revenue service. We have revised figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD
to include a note stating that the check must be done before further
flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service. We have also
revised figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to state that the check
must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has
been 10 or more calendar days since the last check.
    However, we disagree with restarting the 10-day interval once an
APU is returned to service. The interval for the operational check of
the APU fuel shutoff valve should not be extended simply because the
APU was out of service for a time. It is likely that this check will be
done as a matter of course whenever an APU is returned to service.

Request To Add Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the
Operational Check

    UAL requested that we add a requirement to the proposed AD (79 FR
12431, March 5, 2014) to provide electrical power before performing the
operational check required by figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of
the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to
perform the check and other maintenance might be underway, which could
deactivate required circuits.
    We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is
required. In item C.1. of figure 1 and item A.2. of figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added an instruction to supply
electrical power to the airplane using standard practices when
performing the operational check.

Request To Allow Flightcrew To Perform Certain AD Requirement Without
Principal Operations Inspector (POI) Approval

    Allegiant Air requested the proposed verbiage that states ``(unless
checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principle [sic]
operations inspector)'' be revised to ``the operational check can be
performed either as a maintenance action or as a flightcrew action.''
Allegiant Air stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014)
allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the
operational check. Allegiant Air stated that section 91.403(c) of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) requires the affected
operator to accomplish the test provided by the airworthiness
limitation. Allegiant Air also stated that FAA Master Minimum Equipment
List (MMEL), Policy Letter 25, Revision 16, dated April 2, 2010 (PL-25
is designated as MMEL Global Change GC-164) (http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/policy%20letters/pl-025_r16.htm) provides allowance for ``other
personnel'' to be qualified and authorized to perform certain functions
that do not require the use of tools or test equipment. Allegiant Air
stated that this change would eliminate the need for a second approval
process (via the POI), while providing an equivalent level of safety.
    We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree that the
AWL allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the
operational check. We consider it to be very important that the
expectations as to what must be done to check the operation of the fuel
shutoff valve, as defined in figures 1 and 2 to paragraph (g) of this
AD, be well understood by all parties, and yet we want to provide the
maximum flexibility to operators.
    If an operator chooses to have the flightcrew accomplish the check,
the POI is in the best position to make sure this check is done
properly. However, it is also acceptable for an operator to choose to
accomplish the check as a maintenance action and record compliance as
specified in section 43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 43.11(a)) without POI involvement. In addition, affected operators
may apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions
specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data
substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Request for Clarification Regarding the Use of the MEL

    US Airways requested clarification on the use of the MEL. US
Airways asked if operators may still apply the MEL and be in compliance
with the requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014)
if the SPAR VALVE light becomes inoperative. US Airways stated the
maintenance action specified by the MEL should meet the intent of the
proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US Airways stated that the
operational checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD are
predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. US Airways also
stated that MEL 28-40-2 of the FAA Boeing B757 Master Minimum Equipment
List (MMEL), Revision 30a, dated June 9, 2014, provides relief should
the indication be inoperative, and the proposed AD requirements should
provide the same relief.
    We disagree with providing MEL relief for an inoperative fuel
shutoff valve indication because MEL relief could potentially allow the
fuel shutoff valve to be inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue
operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility in regard to
verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is operational. In
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added item D., ``Perform
an Inspection to the Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator Position,'' to verify
the valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel shutoff valve
indication does not function properly.

Request To Clarify Recording Requirements

    US Airways requested that we provide a more complete explanation of
the requirements regarding the documentation of accomplishment of the
requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US
Airways stated that typically, AD-mandated actions require
documentation of accomplishment. US Airways stated that it should be
made clear whether logbook entries would be required should the
flightcrew perform the required actions in an approved manner, such as
part of a procedure checklist.
    We agree that clarification is necessary. This AD requires
including the information in figure 1 and figure 2 of paragraph (g) of
the AD in the maintenance or inspection program. However, the AD does
not require accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 and figure
2 of paragraph (g) of the AD. The actions specified in the figures in
this AD are done, and remain enforceable, as part of the airworthiness
limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as the required
checks. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do the check
in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, that same
action would be considered an operational task (not maintenance), and
therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. In that case, operators
should follow their normal processes for operational activities,
including necessary POI involvement. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.

Request To Clarify Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights

    UAL requested that we clarify certain requirements of the proposed
AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that, in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, item C.5.a. and item C.6.a. (item
C.6.a. and item C.7.a., respectively, in this AD) instruct to move the
left and right FUEL CONTROL switches, respectively, to the RUN
position, but do not instruct to monitor the left and right SPAR VALVE
disagreement lights, unlike item C.5.c and item C.6.c. of the proposed
AD. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify the left
and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right FUEL
CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position.
    We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the
left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right
FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position during that portion
of the operational check. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Explanation of Error in the Published Version of the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014)

    The model designation for The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes is
missing from the SUMMARY section of the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5,
2014). This information has been added to this final rule.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously, and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition;
and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014).
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Interim Action

    We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved,
and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 590 airplanes of U.S. registry.
    We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost per       Cost on U.S.
               Action                        Labor cost           Parts cost        product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness           1 work-hour x $85 per                $0              $85          $50,150
 Limitation.                           hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

2015-19-04 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18267; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0126; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-236-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF,
-200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and,
in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
structural failure.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program

    Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
airworthiness limitations Nos. 28-AWL-ENG and 28-AWL-APU, by
incorporating the information specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section
of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial
compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1
and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days after
accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision
required by this paragraph.

      Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
                                                Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ENG..................  ALI            DAILY...............  ALL................  Engine Fuel Shutoff
                                             INTERVAL NOTE: Not    APPLICABILITY NOTE:   Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
                                              required on days      Only applies to      Position Indication
                                              when the airplane     airplanes with an    Operational Check.
                                              is not used in        MA20A2027           Concern: The fuel spar
                                              revenue service.      (S343T003-56) or     valve actuator design
                                              The check must be     MA30A1001            can result in airplanes
                                              done before further   (S343T003-66)        operating with a failed
                                              flight once the       actuator installed   fuel spar valve
                                              airplane is           at the engine fuel   actuator that is not
                                              returned to revenue   spar valve           reported. A latently
                                              service.              position.            failed fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator could prevent
                                                                                fuel shutoff to an
                                                                                engine. In the event of
                                                                                certain engine fires,
                                                                                the potential exists
                                                                                for an engine fire to
                                                                                be uncontrollable.
                                                                                Perform one of the
                                                                                following checks/
                                                                                inspection of the fuel
                                                                                spar valve position
                                                                                (unless checked by the
                                                                                flightcrew in a manner
                                                                                approved by the
                                                                                principal operations
                                                                                inspector).
                                                                                A. Operational check
                                                                                during engine shutdown
                                                                                1. Do an operational
                                                                                check of the left
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator.
                                                                                a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand is moved
                                                                                to the CUTOFF position,
                                                                                verify the left SPAR
                                                                                VALVE disagreement
                                                                                light on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand
                                                                                illuminates and then
                                                                                goes off.
                                                                                b. If the test fails
                                                                                (light fails to
                                                                                illuminate), before
                                                                                further flight, repair
                                                                                faults as required
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
                                                                                2. Do an operational
                                                                                check of the right
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator.
                                                                                a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand is moved
                                                                                to the CUTOFF position,
                                                                                verify the right SPAR
                                                                                VALVE disagreement
                                                                                light on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand
                                                                                illuminates and then
                                                                                goes off.
                                                                                b. If the test fails
                                                                                (light fails to
                                                                                illuminate), before
                                                                                further flight, repair
                                                                                faults as required
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
                                                                                B. Operational check
                                                                                during engine start
                                                                                1. Do an operational
                                                                                check of the left
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator.
                                                                                a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand is moved
                                                                                to the RUN position,
                                                                                verify the left SPAR
                                                                                VALVE disagreement
                                                                                light on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand
                                                                                illuminates and then
                                                                                goes off.
                                                                                b. If the test fails
                                                                                (light fails to
                                                                                illuminate), before
                                                                                further flight, repair
                                                                                faults as required
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
                                                                                2. Do an operational
                                                                                check of the right
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator.
                                                                                a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand is moved
                                                                                to the RUN position,
                                                                                verify the right SPAR
                                                                                VALVE disagreement
                                                                                light on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand
                                                                                illuminates and then
                                                                                goes off.
                                                                                b. If the test fails
                                                                                (light fails to
                                                                                illuminate), before
                                                                                further flight, repair
                                                                                faults as required
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
                                                                                C. Operational check
                                                                                without engine
                                                                                operation
                                                                                1. Supply electrical
                                                                                power to the airplane
                                                                                using standard
                                                                                practices.
                                                                                2. Make sure all fuel
                                                                                pump switches on the
                                                                                Overhead Panel are in
                                                                                the OFF position.

                                                                                3. If the APU is
                                                                                running, open and
                                                                                collar the L FWD FUEL
                                                                                BOOST PUMP (C00372)
                                                                                circuit breaker on the
                                                                                Main Power Distribution
                                                                                Panel.
                                                                                4. Make sure LEFT and
                                                                                RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
                                                                                on the Aft Aisle Stand
                                                                                are in the NORMAL (IN)
                                                                                position.
                                                                                5. Make sure L and R
                                                                                Engine Start Selector
                                                                                Switches on the
                                                                                Overhead Panel are in
                                                                                the OFF position.
                                                                                6. Do an operational
                                                                                check of the left
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator.
                                                                                a. Move L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand to the
                                                                                RUN position and wait
                                                                                approximately 10
                                                                                seconds.
                                                                                NOTE: It is normal under
                                                                                this test condition for
                                                                                the ENG VALVE
                                                                                disagreement light on
                                                                                the quadrant control
                                                                                stand to stay
                                                                                illuminated.
                                                                                b. Move L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand to the
                                                                                CUTOFF position.
                                                                                c. Verify the left SPAR
                                                                                VALVE disagreement
                                                                                light on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand
                                                                                illuminates and then
                                                                                goes off.
                                                                                d. If the test fails
                                                                                (light fails to
                                                                                illuminate), before
                                                                                further flight, repair
                                                                                faults as required
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
                                                                                7. Do an operational
                                                                                check of the right
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator.
                                                                                a. Move R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand to the
                                                                                RUN position and wait
                                                                                approximately 10
                                                                                seconds.
                                                                                NOTE: It is normal under
                                                                                this test condition for
                                                                                the ENG VALVE
                                                                                disagreement light on
                                                                                the quadrant control
                                                                                stand to stay
                                                                                illuminated.
                                                                                b. Move R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                switch on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand to the
                                                                                CUTOFF position.
                                                                                c. Verify the right SPAR
                                                                                VALVE disagreement
                                                                                light on the quadrant
                                                                                control stand
                                                                                illuminates and then
                                                                                goes off.
                                                                                d. If the test fails
                                                                                (light fails to
                                                                                illuminate), before
                                                                                further flight, repair
                                                                                faults as required
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
                                                                                8. If the L FWD FUEL
                                                                                BOOST PUMP circuit
                                                                                breaker was collared in
                                                                                step 3, remove collar
                                                                                and close.
                                                                                D. Perform an inspection
                                                                                of the fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator position
                                                                                NOTE: This inspection
                                                                                may be most useful
                                                                                whenever the SPAR VALVE
                                                                                light does not function
                                                                                properly.
                                                                                1. Make sure the L FUEL
                                                                                CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                quadrant control stand
                                                                                is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                position.
                                                                                NOTE: It is not
                                                                                necessary to cycle the
                                                                                FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                do this inspection.
                                                                                2. Inspect the left
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator located in the
                                                                                left rear spar.
                                                                                NOTE: Access is through
                                                                                access panel 551EBX.
                                                                                a. Verify the manual
                                                                                override handle on the
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator is in the
                                                                                CLOSED position.
                                                                                b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                actuator that is not in
                                                                                the CLOSED position
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
                                                                                3. Make sure the R FUEL
                                                                                CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                quadrant control stand
                                                                                is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                position.
                                                                                NOTE: It is not
                                                                                necessary to cycle the
                                                                                FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                do this inspection.
                                                                                4. Inspect the right
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator located in the
                                                                                right rear spar.
                                                                                NOTE: Access is through
                                                                                access panel 651EBX.
                                                                                a. Verify the manual
                                                                                override handle on the
                                                                                engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                actuator is in the
                                                                                CLOSED position.
                                                                                b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                actuator that is not in
                                                                                the CLOSED position
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication
                                                Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-APU..................  ALI            10 DAYS.............  ALL................  APU Fuel Shutoff Valve
                                                                                Position Indication
                                                                                Operational Check.
                              .............  INTERVAL NOTE: Not    APPLICABILITY NOTE:  Concern: The APU fuel
                                              required on days      Only applies to      shutoff valve actuator
                                              when the airplane     airplanes with an    design can result in
                                              is not used in        MA20A2027            airplanes operating
                                              revenue service.      (S343T003-56) or     with a failed APU fuel
                                             Must be done before    MA30A1001            shutoff valve actuator
                                              further flight with   (S343T003-66)        that is not reported. A
                                              an operational APU    actuator installed   latently failed APU
                                              if it has been 10     at the APU fuel      fuel shutoff valve
                                              or more calendar      shutoff valve        actuator could prevent
                                              days since last       position.            fuel shutoff to the
                                              check..                                    APU. In the event of
                                                                                certain APU fires, the
                                                                                potential exists for an
                                                                                APU fire to be
                                                                                uncontrollable.
                                                                                Perform the operational
                                                                                check of the APU fuel
                                                                                shutoff valve position
                                                                                indication (unless
                                                                                checked by the
                                                                                flightcrew in a manner
                                                                                approved by the
                                                                                principal operations
                                                                                inspector).
                                                                                A. Do an operational
                                                                                check of the APU fuel
                                                                                shutoff valve position
                                                                                indication.
                                                                                1. If the APU is
                                                                                running, unload and
                                                                                shut down the APU using
                                                                                standard practices.
                                                                                2. Supply electrical
                                                                                power to the airplane
                                                                                using standard
                                                                                practices.
                                                                                3. Make sure the APU
                                                                                FIRE switch on the Aft
                                                                                Aisle Stand is in the
                                                                                NORMAL (IN) position.
                                                                                4. Make sure there is at
                                                                                least 700 lbs (300 kgs)
                                                                                of fuel in the Left
                                                                                Main Tank.
                                                                                5. Move APU Selector
                                                                                switch on the Overhead
                                                                                Panel to the ON
                                                                                position and wait
                                                                                approximately 10
                                                                                seconds.
                                                                                6. Move APU Selector
                                                                                switch on the Overhead
                                                                                Panel to the OFF
                                                                                position.
                                                                                7. Verify the APU FAULT
                                                                                light on the Overhead
                                                                                Panel illuminates and
                                                                                then goes off.
                                                                                8. If the test fails
                                                                                (light fails to
                                                                                illuminate), before
                                                                                further flight
                                                                                requiring APU
                                                                                availability, repair
                                                                                faults as required
                                                                                (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                25-11).
                                                                                NOTE: Dispatch may be
                                                                                permitted per MMEL 28-
                                                                                25-2 if APU is not
                                                                                required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals

    After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23120 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P