[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 30 (Thursday, February 13, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8155-8161]
[FR Doc No: 2020-02170]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM19-10-000]

Transmission Planning Reliability Standard TPL-001-5

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 (Transmission System Planning
Performance Requirements), submitted by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule will become effective April 13, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Eugene Blick (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>Leigh Anne Faugust (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    1. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),
the Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 (Transmission
System Planning Performance

Requirements).\1\ The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization
(ERO), submitted Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 for Commission approval
in response to directives in Order No. 786.\2\ As discussed in this
final rule, we determine that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 improves
upon currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 by addressing:
(1) The study of single points of failure of protection systems; and
(2) planned maintenance outages and stability analysis for spare
equipment strategies.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
    \2\ Transmission Planning Reliability Standards, Order No. 786,
145 FERC ] 61,051 (2013).
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    2. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 are
responsive to the directives in Order No. 786 regarding planned
maintenance outages and stability analysis for spare equipment
strategies.\3\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is responsive in that it
requires each planning coordinator and transmission planner to perform
an annual planning assessment of its portion of the bulk electric
system considering a number of system conditions and contingencies with
a risk-based approach. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 are also responsive to the concerns identified in Order No. 754
regarding the study of a single point of failure on protection
systems.\4\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 contains revisions to the
planning events (Category P5) and extreme events (Stability 2.a-h)
identified in Table 1 (Steady State and Stability Performance Planning
Events and Steady State and Stability Performance Extreme Events), as
well as the associated footnote 13, to provide for a more comprehensive
study of the potential impacts of protection system single points of
failure.
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    \3\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051, at PP 40, 89.
    \4\ Interpretation of Transmission Planning Reliability
Standard, Order No. 754, 136 FERC ] 61,186, at P 19 (2011).
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    3. For more common scenarios (i.e., planning events), the planning
entity must develop a corrective action plan if it determines through
studies that its system would experience performance issues.\5\ For
less common scenarios that could result in potentially severe impacts
such as cascading (i.e., extreme events), the planning entity must
conduct a comprehensive analysis to understand both the potential
impacts on its system and the types of actions that could reduce or
mitigate those impacts.\6\
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    \5\ NERC defines ``Corrective Action Plan'' as, ``A list of
actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a
specific problem.'' Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability
Standards (May 13, 2019) (NERC Glossary).
    \6\ NERC defines ``Cascading'' as, ``The uncontrolled successive
loss of System Elements triggered by an incident at any location.
Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption that
cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area
predetermined by studies.'' NERC Glossary.
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    4. Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is also responsive to Order No.
786 by modifying the requirements for stability analysis to require an
entity to assess the impact of the possible unavailability of long lead
time equipment, consistent with the entity's spare equipment strategy.
Accordingly, pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission
approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.
    5. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), the Commission
proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to
modify the Reliability Standard to require corrective action plans for
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault if planning studies indicate potential cascading.\7\ As
discussed below, we determine not to adopt the proposed directive.
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    \7\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5); Transmission Planning Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 FR 30,639
(Jun. 27, 2019), 167 FERC ] 61,249, at P 5 (2019) (NOPR).
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I. Background

A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards

    6. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\8\ Pursuant
to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a process to
select and certify an ERO,\9\ and subsequently certified NERC.\10\
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    \8\ Id. 824o(e).
    \9\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, 114
FERC ] 61,104, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, 114 FERC ] 61,328
(2006).
    \10\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ]
61,062, order on reh'g and compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006),
aff'd sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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B. Industry Advisory

    7. On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an advisory report notifying
industry that failure of a single component of a protection system
caused three significant system disturbances in the previous five
years.\11\ In the Industry Advisory, NERC stated that ``[p]rotection
system component failures may render a protective scheme inoperative,
which could result in N-1 transmission system contingencies evolving
into more severe or even extreme events.'' \12\ NERC advised registered
transmission owners, generator owners, and distribution providers ``to
address single points of failure on their protection systems, when
identified in routine system evaluations, to prevent N-1 transmission
system contingencies from evolving into more severe events or even
extreme events.'' \13\ NERC also advised industry to begin preparing an
estimate of the resource commitment required to review, re-engineer,
and develop a workable outage and construction schedule to address
single points of failure.
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    \11\ Industry Advisory, Protection System Single Point of
Failure (March 30, 2009), https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/2009%20Advisories/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf (Industry
Advisory).
    \12\ Id. at 2.
    \13\ Id. at 1.
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C. Order No. 754

    8. On November 17, 2009, NERC submitted a petition requesting
approval of NERC's interpretation of Reliability Standard TPL-002-2,
Requirement R1.3.10. In the resulting Order No. 754, the Commission
determined that ``there may be a system protection issue that merits
further exploration by technical experts'' and that there is ``an issue
concerning the study of the non[hyphen]operation of
non[hyphen]redundant primary protection systems; e.g., the study of a
single point of failure on protection systems.'' \14\ To address this
concern, the Commission directed ``Commission staff to meet with NERC
and its appropriate subject matter experts to explore the reliability
concern, including where it can best be addressed, and identify any
additional actions necessary to address the matter.'' \15\ The
Commission also directed NERC ``to make an informational filing . . .
explaining whether there is a further system protection issue that
needs to be addressed and, if so, what forum and process should be used
to address that issue and what priority it should be accorded relative
to other reliability initiatives planned by NERC.'' \16\
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    \14\ Order No. 754, 136 FERC ] 61,186, at P 19 (2011).
    \15\ Id. P 20.
    \16\ Id.

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    9. Commission staff then hosted a technical conference in October
2011 on single points of failure, which resulted in four consensus
points and the following problem statement: ``[t]he group perceives a
reliability concern regarding the comprehensive assessment of potential
protection system failures by registered entities. The group agrees on
the need to study if a [reliability] gap exists regarding the study and
resolution of a single point of failure on protection systems.'' \17\
One outcome of the 2011 technical conference, as described in the 2012
Informational Filing, was that the NERC Board of Trustees approved the
issuance of a data request to aid in assessing whether single points of
failure in protection systems pose a reliability concern.\18\
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    \17\ NERC, Order No. 754 Single Point of Failure Technical
Meeting Notes at 8 (October 24-25, 2011).
    \18\ 2012 NERC Informational Filing at 7 (stating that the data
request ``is based on an approach that utilizes . . . a three-phase
(3[Oslash]) fault and assesses simulated system performance against
performance measures'').
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    10. Over the next two years, NERC collected data from transmission
planners that it used to assess protection system single points of
failure. This assessment examined in detail the protection systems
related to nearly 4,000 buses. The findings were presented in a
September 2015 report that concluded that single points of failure on
protection systems posed a reliability risk that warranted further
action.\19\ After considering alternatives, the 2015 Report recommended
that NERC modify Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 to maximize reliability
of protection system performance and align with the directives in Order
No. 754. In particular, the 2015 Report recommended that three-phase
faults involving protection system failures be assessed as an extreme
event in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4. As an extreme event under
Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Part 4.5, an entity is required to
evaluate, but not implement, possible actions designed to mitigate
cascading.\20\ Notably however, the report did not recommend elevating
three-phase faults with a protection system failure to a planning event
under Part 2.7, which requires a corrective action plan when analysis
indicates an inability to meet performance requirements. The report
explained that the ``[p]robability of three-phase fault with a
protection system failure is low enough that it does not warrant a
planning event.'' \21\
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    \19\ NERC, Order No. 754 Assessment of Protection System Single
Points of Failure Based on the Section 1600 Data Request, at 11
(September 2015) (2015 Report).
    \20\ Id.
    \21\ Id. at 9.
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D. Order No. 786

    11. In Order No. 786, the Commission approved the currently-
effective version of the transmission system planning standard,
Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, and issued several directives to NERC.
First, the Commission expressed concern that the six (6) month outage
duration threshold in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Requirement R1
could exclude planned maintenance outages of significant facilities
from future planning assessments.\22\ The Commission determined that
planned maintenance outages of less than six (6) months in duration may
result in relevant impacts during one or both of the seasonal off-peak
periods, and that prudent transmission planning should consider
maintenance outages at those load levels when planned outages are
performed to allow for a single element to be taken out of service for
maintenance without compromising the ability of the system to meet
demand without loss of load. The Commission further determined that a
properly planned transmission system should ensure the known, planned
removal of facilities (i.e., generation, transmission, or protection
system facilities) for maintenance purposes without the loss of
nonconsequential load or detrimental impacts to system reliability such
as cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding. The
Commission directed NERC to modify the Reliability Standards to address
these concerns.
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    \22\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051 at PP 40-45.
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    12. Second, while stating that NERC had met the Commission's Order
No. 693 directive to include a spare equipment strategy for steady
state analysis in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, the Commission
determined that a spare equipment strategy for stability analysis was
not addressed in the standard.\23\ The Commission stated that a similar
spare equipment strategy for stability analysis should exist that
requires studies to be performed for no or single contingency
categories \24\ with the conditions that the system is expected to
experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time
equipment. Rather than direct a change at that time, however, the
Commission directed NERC to consider the issue during the next review
cycle of Reliability Standard TPL-001-4.\25\
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    \23\ Id. PP 85, 88-89 (citing Mandatory Reliability Standards
for the Bulk-Power System, Order No. 693, 118 FERC ] 61,218, at P
1786, order on reh'g, Order No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007)).
    \24\ See Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Table 1--Steady State &
Stability Performance Planning Events, Categories P0, P1, and P2.
    \25\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051 at PP 88-89.
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E. NERC Petition and Reliability Standard TPL-001-5

    13. On December 7, 2018, NERC submitted Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 for Commission approval.\26\ NERC maintains that Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5 addresses the Order No. 786 directives. With regard
to protection system single points of failure, NERC indicates that
Table 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential system contingencies required to
be evaluated by the planner.\27\ Table 1 includes three parts: (1)
Steady State & Stability Performance Planning Events; (2) Steady State
& Stability Performance Extreme Events; and (3) Steady State &
Stability Performance Footnotes. Table 1 describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential system contingencies required to
be evaluated by the planner. The table categorizes the events as either
``planning events'' or ``extreme events.'' The table lists seven
contingency planning events (P1 through P7) that require steady-state
and stability analysis as well as five extreme event contingencies:
Three for steady-state and two for stability.
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    \26\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is available on the
Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM19-
10-000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com.
    \27\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 includes an expanded list of
protection system components for single points of failure studies.
The selected list of components account for: (1) Those failed non-
redundant components of a protection system that may impact one or
more protection systems; (2) the duration that faults remain
energized until delayed fault clearing; and (3) the additional
system equipment removed from service following fault clearing
depending on the specific failed non-redundant component of a
protection system. NERC Petition at 16.
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    14. According to NERC, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 includes
certain modifications to better ensure that planning entities are
performing a more complete analysis of potential protection system
single points of failure issues on their systems and taking appropriate
action to address these concerns. NERC explains that Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5 contains revisions to both the Table 1 planning
event (Category P5) and extreme events (Stability 2.a-h) and the
associated footnote 13 to provide for more comprehensive study of the
potential impacts of protection system single points of failure.

    15. NERC states that where the study of a protection system single
point of failure for a single-line-to-ground fault (i.e., a Category P5
event) identifies cascading, a corrective action plan is required.\28\
NERC considers this a relatively commonplace scenario, and NERC
explains that an entity would be required to develop a corrective
action plan if it determines that its system would be unable to meet
the performance requirements of Table 1 for the Category P5 event.
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    \28\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5, Table 1 (Steady State and
Stability Performance Planning Events), Category P5 requires the
study of a single-line-to-ground faulted element (e.g., generator,
transmission circuit or transformer) along with a failure to operate
of a non-redundant component of the protection system (i.e., a
single point of failure) protecting the faulted element.
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    16. In contrast, the revisions treat a protection system single
point of failure in combination with a three-phase fault as an extreme
event that does not require a corrective action plan. NERC asserts that
the three-phase fault scenario is much less common than the single-
line-to-ground fault scenario. According to NERC, like the other
extreme events in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5, the three-phase fault
scenario, while rare, could result in more significant impacts to an
entity's system.\29\ Under this approach, if an entity determines that
its system will experience cascading as a result of a three-phase fault
scenario, the entity would evaluate possible actions designed to reduce
the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of the event; however, a
corrective action plan would not be required.
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    \29\ Order No. 693, 118 FERC ] 61,218 at P 1826 (describing
extreme events as ``events resulting in loss of two or more elements
or cascading'').
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    17. NERC explains that the likelihood of a three-phase fault event
occurring and resulting in the most severe impacts would be small based
on an historical analysis of NERC data on protection system
misoperation. NERC states that it reviewed over 12,000 protection
system misoperation in its Misoperation Information Data Analysis
System database reported since 2011, of which only 28 involved three-
phase faults. Of those, NERC states that 10 involved breakers that
failed to operate, and the remaining 18 involved breakers that were
slow to operate.\30\ NERC contends that a failure to operate may
indicate an instance of a protection system single point of failure.
While the potential for severe impacts from such events remains, NERC
asserts that none of the 10 failure to trip scenarios reported since
2011 resulted in events that reached the threshold for reporting under
Reliability Standard EOP-004 (Event Reporting).\31\ With regard to the
Order No. 786 directives, NERC maintains that Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 provides for a more complete consideration of factors for
selecting which known outages will be included in near-term
transmission planning horizon studies.
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    \30\ NERC Petition at 26, n.55.
    \31\ Reliability Standard EOP-004-3 (Event Reporting),
Attachment 1: Reportable Events, contains a list of thresholds for
reporting certain events to NERC. Examples of reporting thresholds
include: Loss of firm load for 15 minutes or more if 300 MW or
greater for entities with a previous year's demand of at least 3,000
MW, or 200 MW or greater for all other entities.
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F. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    18. On June 20, 2019, the Commission issued a NOPR that proposed to
approve Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as the Reliability Standard
largely addresses the directives in Order No. 786. The NOPR also
proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to
modify the Reliability Standard to require corrective action plans for
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault if planning studies indicate potential cascading.\32\ The
NOPR stated that NERC had not adequately justified categorizing
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault as an extreme event that only requires study, but not a
corrective action plan, when there is the potential for cascading. The
NOPR also expressed concern with NERC's assessment that such events do
not necessitate corrective action plans because of their rarity. The
NOPR proposed to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability
Standard for approval within twelve (12) months from the effective date
of a final rule.
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    \32\ NOPR, 167 FERC ] 61,249 at P 1.
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    19. In addition to inviting comment on the proposed directive, the
NOPR sought comment on: (1) How many corrective action plans are
expected for protection system single points of failure in combination
with a three-phase fault if a study indicates cascading, so the
Commission could better understand the potential for increased costs
and other implementation issues; and (2) the Commission's proposal to
direct NERC address the directive within twelve (12) months of the
effective date of the final rule.
    20. The Commission received ten sets of NOPR comments. We address
below the issues raised in the NOPR and the comments submitted in
response. The Appendix to this final rule lists the entities that filed
comments.

II. Discussion

    21. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission
approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. We conclude
that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is an improvement over currently-
effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 and will improve Bulk-Power
System reliability by requiring enhanced transmission system planning
regarding the study of protection system single points of failure in
combination with a single-line-to-ground fault, as discussed in Order
No. 754. The Commission also approves the associated violation risk
factors, violation severity levels, and implementation plan.
    22. The Commission determines that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5
satisfies the Order No. 786 directives regarding planned maintenance
outages and stability analysis for spare equipment strategies. First,
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 provides for a more complete
consideration of factors for selecting which known outages will be
included in near-term transmission planning horizon studies. The
modifications in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 also address the
Commission's concern that the exclusion of known outages of less than
six (6) months in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4
could result in outages of significant facilities not being studied.
Second, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 modifies requirements for
stability analysis to require an entity to assess the impact of the
possible unavailability of long lead time equipment, consistent with
the entity's spare equipment strategy. For these reasons, the
Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.
    23. In addition, the Commission determines not to direct NERC to
develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standards to
require corrective action plans to address protection system single
points of failure in combination with a three-phase fault if planning
studies indicate potential cascading. We are persuaded by NERC and
other commenters of the improbability of single points of failure in
combination with three-phase faults resulting in cascading outages.\33\
Our determination is also supported by the 2015 Report's assessment
that the probability of an adverse system impact from a three-phase
fault accompanied by a protection system failure is low

enough that it does not warrant being a planning event (i.e., requiring
a corrective action plan). Although the Commission previously noted
that there is an average of approximately one three-phase fault event
every three (3) months since 2011, only ten indicated instances of a
protection system single point of failure, which we agree is a rare
occurrence. Given the NERC standard drafting team's assessment of the
improbability of single points of failure in combination with three-
phase faults resulting in cascading outages, we determine that it is
reasonable to address such occurrences as extreme events only requiring
analysis and evaluation of possible mitigating actions designed to
reduce adverse impacts.
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    \33\ See, e.g., NERC Petition 25-26, NERC Comments at 5, Trade
Associations Comments at 5-6.
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    24. Further, we do not adopt BPA's recommendation, as an
alternative to the NOPR directive, for NERC to conduct a two-year pilot
to determine whether the types of actions that could reduce or mitigate
the impacts of single point of failure events are a cost-effective
means of ensuring reliability.\34\ As discussed above, we conclude that
the record reflects the infrequent nature of single points of failure
in combination with three-phase faults resulting in cascading outages
and therefore justifies our determination not to adopt the NOPR
directive.
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    \34\ BPA Comments at 2-3.
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Other Issues Raised in NOPR Comments

    25. MISO's comments include recommendations apart from the issues
discussed above. First, MISO recommends revising Reliability Standard
TPL-001-5 to address the need for planned outage flexibility in the
planning horizon. MISO contends that since very few planned outages are
scheduled in the planning horizon, the Reliability Standard omits
consideration of planned (i.e., known) outages in the planning
assessment. MISO states that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 does not
define the term ``known'' outages. MISO believes that the industry
stakeholders will primarily interpret the term ``known'' to require
that only scheduled outages be included in transmission planning
models. MISO maintains that because the eventual occurrence of a future
planned outage is certain to occur, such planned outages should be
considered ``known'' for purposes of applying Reliability Standards to
the transmission planning process.
    26. Second, MISO recommends adding instrument transformers (i.e.,
current transformers and voltage transformers) to Reliability Standard
TPL-001-5, Table 1, Footnote 13 to define protection system non-
redundancies. MISO observes that instrument transformers are components
listed in the NERC definition of protection system and, according to
NERC, represent valid single points of failure.

Commission Determination

    27. The Commission agrees with MISO that ``because the eventual
occurrence of a future planned outage is certain to occur, such planned
outages should be considered `known' for purposes of applying
Reliability Standards to the transmission planning process.'' \35\ As
MISO observes, the Commission stated in Order No. 786 that a ``properly
planned transmission system should ensure the known, planned removal of
facilities (i.e., generation, transmission or protection system
facilities) for maintenance purposes without the loss of non-
consequential load or detrimental impacts to system reliability such as
cascading, voltage instability or uncontrolled islanding.'' \36\
Moreover, the Commission indicated in Order No. 786 that known planned
facility outages (i.e. generation, transmission or protection system
facilities) should be addressed so long as their ``planned start times
and durations may be anticipated as occurring for some period of time
during the planning time horizon.'' \37\ Given these statements, we are
not convinced that registered entities will interpret ``known'' in
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 to mean scheduled, as MISO contends.
Accordingly, we decline to adopt MISO's recommendation to modify the
Reliability Standard.
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    \35\ MISO Comments at 5.
    \36\ Order No. 786, 45 FERC ] 61,051 at P 41.
    \37\ Id. P 44.
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    28. The Commission also declines to direct NERC to include
instrument transformer (i.e., current transformers and voltage
transformers) failure as a single component failure in Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5, Footnote 13. The standard drafting team explained
in the Technical Rationale document for Reliability Standard TPL-001-5
that the ``[System Protection and Control Subcommittee and System
Modeling and Analysis Subcommittee] report described voltage or current
sensing devices [i.e., current transformers and voltage transformers]
as having a lower level of risk of failure to trip due to robustness
and likelihood to actually cause tripping upon failure. Therefore,
these components of a Protection System are omitted from Footnote 13.''
\38\ While it contends that ``ignoring instrument transformers . . . is
contrary to good utility practice,'' MISO acknowledges that
``instrument transformers are generally more robust than the other
components of a protection system.'' \39\ Based on this record, the
Commission declines to adopt MISO's recommendation.
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    \38\ NERC Petition, Exhibit F (Technical Rationale) at 5.
    \39\ MISO Comments at 12.
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III. Information Collection Statement

    29. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) \40\ requires each federal
agency to seek and obtain the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
approval before undertaking a collection of information (including
reporting, record keeping, and public disclosure requirements) directed
to ten or more persons or contained in a rule of general applicability.
OMB regulations require approval of certain information collection
requirements imposed by rules (including deletion, revision, or
implementation of new requirements).\41\ Upon approval of a collection
of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and expiration
date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this rule will
not be penalized for failing to respond to the collection of
information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB
Control Number.
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    \40\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-21.
    \41\ 5 CFR 1320.
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    30. The Commission is submitting these reporting and recordkeeping
requirements to OMB for its review and approval under section 3507(d)
of the PRA. The Commission solicits comments on the Commission's need
for this information, whether the information will have practical
utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected or
retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden,
including the use of automated information techniques.
    31. Burden Estimate: \42\ The estimated burden \43\ and cost \44\
for the

requirements contained in this final rule follows:
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    \42\ ``Burden'' is the total time, effort, or financial
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or
disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency. For
further explanation of what is included in the information
collection burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3.
    \43\ The estimated burden is a one-time burden estimate in
addition to the already approved burden estimate in Reliability
Standard TPL-001-4.
    \44\ Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) figures for May 2018 (Sector 22, Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate that Office and
Administrative Support (Occupation code: 43-0000) would perform the
functions associated with recordkeeping requirements, at an average
hourly cost (for wages and benefits) of $42.11. We estimate the
functions associated with reporting requirements would be performed
by an Electrical Engineer (Occupation code: 17-2051) at an average
hourly cost (including wages and benefits) of $68.17. These
occupational categories' wage figures are averaged and weighted
equally as follows: ($42.11 hour + $68.17 hour) / 2 = $55.14/hour.
The resulting wage figure is rounded to $55.00/hour for use in
calculating wage figures in the final rule in Docket No. RM19-10-
000.

                                          FERC-725N, Modifications Due to Final Rule in Docket No. RM19-10-000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Annual number                                               Total annual burden
         Areas of modification           Number of respondents \45\    of responses    Total number     Average burden & cost     hours & total annual
                                                                      per respondent   of responses         per response                  cost
                                        (1).........................             (2)     (1) * (2) =  (4).....................  (3) * (4) = (5)
                                                                                (3)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single Point of Failure (one-time)....  214 (PC/TP).................               1             214  16 hrs. (reporting: 12    3,424 hrs. & $188,320.
                                                                                hrs.; recordkeeping: 4    (reporting, 2,568 hrs.
                                                                                hrs.); $880.              & $141,240, &
                                                                                recordkeeping, 856
                                                                                hrs., $47,080).
Spare Equipment Strategy (one-time)...  214 (PC/TP).................               1             214  4 hrs. (reporting: 2      856 hrs. & $47,080
                                                                                hrs.; recordkeeping: 2    (reporting, 428 hrs. &
                                                                                hrs.); $220.              $23,540; recordkeeping,
                                                                                428 hrs. & $23,540).
Plan Maintenance Outage (one-time)....  214 (PC/TP).................               1             214  16 hrs. (reporting: 12    3,424 hrs. & $188,320
                                                                                hrs.; recordkeeping: 4    (reporting, 2,568 hrs.
                                                                                hrs.) $880.               & $141,240;
                                                                                recordkeeping, 856 hrs.
                                                                                & $47,080).
Sub-Total for Reporting Requirements..  ............................  ..............  ..............  ........................  5,564 hrs.; $306,020
Sub-Total for Recordkeeping             ............................  ..............  ..............  ........................  2,140 hrs.; $117,700
 Requirements.
                                       -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................  ............................  ..............             642  ........................  7,704 hrs.; $423,720
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. This final rule will not significantly change existing burdens
on an ongoing basis. The Commission estimates a one-time burden
increase for Year 1 only because Year 1 represents a one-time task not
repeated in subsequent years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The number of respondents is based on the NERC Registry on
November 21, 2019, which showed 8 entities registered as planning
coordinators (PCs), 139 entities registered as transmission planners
(TPs), ad 67 entities registered as both PCs and TPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: Transmission
Planning (TPL) Reliability Standards.
    Action: Revision to FERC-725N information collection.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0264.
    Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for-
profit institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: One Time.
    Necessity of the Information: This final rule approves the
requested modifications to a Reliability Standard pertaining to
transmission planning. As discussed above, the Commission approves
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2)
because it improves upon the currently-effective Reliability Standard
TPL-001-4.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed Reliability Standard
TPL-001-5 and determined that its action is necessary to implement
section 215 of the FPA. The Commission has assured itself, by means of
its internal review, that there is specific, objective support for the
burden estimates associated with the information requirements.
    34. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, [Attention:
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, email:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>].
    Submit comments concerning the collection of information and the
associated burden estimate to the Commission in this docket, and to the
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503, [Attention: Desk
Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. For security
reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by email to:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Comments submitted to OMB should include
FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264.

IV. Environmental Analysis

    35. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\46\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\47\ The actions proposed
herein fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987)
(cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284).
    \47\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    36. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \48\ generally
requires a description and analysis of rulemakings that will have
significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small entities.\49\ The Small
Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops the
numerical definition of a small business.\50\ The SBA revised its size
standard for electric utilities (effective January 22, 2014) to a
standard based on the number of employees, including affiliates (from
the prior standard based on megawatt hour sales).\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
    \49\ Id.
    \50\ 13 CFR 121.101.
    \51\ Id. 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is expected to impose an
additional burden on 214 entities \52\ (PCs and TPs). Of the 214
affected entities discussed above, we estimate that approximately 10
percent of the affected entities are small entities. We estimate that
each of the 21 small entities to whom the proposed modifications to
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 apply will incur one-time costs
of approximately $1,980 per entity to implement the proposed
Reliability Standard. We do not consider the estimated costs for these
21 small entities to be a significant economic impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Public utilities may fall under one of several different
categories, each with a size threshold based on the company's number
of employees, including affiliates, the parent company, and
subsidiaries. We are using a 500-employee threshold due to each
affected entity falling within the role of Electric Bulk Power
Transmission and Control (NAISC Code: 221121).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that this final rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.

VI. Document Availability

    39. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
    40. From FERC's Home Page on the internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
    41. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's
website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    42. These regulations are effective April 13, 2020. The Commission
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. The rule will be provided
to the Senate, House, Government Accountability Office, and the SBA.

    By the Commission.
    Issued: January 23, 2020.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

    Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.

Appendix--List of Commenters

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Abbreviation                           Commenter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AF&PA.............................  American Forest and Paper
                                     Association.
APS...............................  Arizona Public Service Company.
BPA...............................  Bonneville Power Administration.
Carder............................  William Carder.
MISO..............................  Midcontinent Independent System
                                     Operator, Inc.
NERC..............................  North American Electric Reliability
                                     Corporation.
Pugh..............................  Theresa Pugh.
Trade Associations................  American Public Power Association,
                                     Edison Electric Institute, Large
                                     Public Power Council, National
                                     Rural Electric Cooperative
                                     Association.
Tri-State.........................  Tri-State Generation and
                                     Transmission Association, Inc.
TVA...............................  Tennessee Valley Authority.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2020-02170 Filed 2-12-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register: February 28, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 39)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 9909]
[DOCID:fr28fe06-7]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

29 CFR Parts 1926 and 1928

[Docket No. S-270-A]
RIN 1218-AC15

Roll-Over Protective Structures

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Final rule; confirmation of effective date.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: OSHA is confirming the effective date of its direct final rule
reinstating its original construction and agriculture standards that
regulate the testing of roll-over protective structures used to protect
employees who operate wheel-type tractors. The direct final rule stated
that it would become effective on February 27, 2006 unless significant
adverse comment was received by January 30, 2006. OSHA received only
one comment on the direct final rule, which it has determined is not a
significant adverse comment.

DATES: The direct final rule published on December 29, 2005 is
effective February 27, 2006. For the purpose of judicial review, OSHA
considers February 28, 2006 as the date of issuance.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Press Inquiries: Kevin Ropp, OSHA
Office of Communications, Room N-3647, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-
1999. General and technical information: Mark Hagemann, Acting
Director, Office of Safety Systems, Directorate of Standards and
Guidance, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S.
Department of Labor, Room N-3609, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20210; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

ADDRESSES: In compliance with 28 U.S.C. 2112(a), OSHA designates the
Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health as the recipient
of petitions for review of the final standard. The Associate Solicitor
may be contacted at the Office of the Solicitor, Room S-4004, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
20210, telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 7, 1996, OSHA published a technical
amendment in the Federal Register that revised a number of its
standards, including the construction and agriculture standards that
regulate testing of roll-over protective structures (``ROPS'') (61 FR
9228); employers use these structures to protect employees who operate
wheel-type tractors. The revision removed the original, detailed ROPS-
testing standards and referred instead to national consensus standards
for substantive ROPS-testing requirements.
    Several years after issuing the 1996 technical amendment, the
Agency determined that differences existed between its original
construction and agriculture ROPS standards and the ROPS standards
adopted under the 1996 technical amendment, and that these differences
have a substantial impact on the regulated community. Based on this
determination, OSHA found that reinstating the original OSHA standards
through a direct final rule was necessary and appropriate; it published
this direct final rule in the Federal Register on December 29, 2005 (70
FR 76979).
    The Agency stated in the direct final rule that it would consider
as significant adverse comments only those comments that addressed: (1)
The lawfulness of the procedures used to promulgate the 1996 technical
amendment as these procedures related to the ROPS testing provisions;
and (2) whether a few minor revisions made to the original ROPS
standards were unreasonable or inappropriate. OSHA received only one
public comment on the direct final rule, which it has determined is not
a significant adverse comment. The commenter recommended several
technical clarifications to the original ROPS provisions and
accompanying figures. The Agency will address these recommendations in
a subsequent Federal Register notice. In the present notice, OSHA is
confirming that the effective date for the December 29, 2005 direct
final rule on ROPS is February 27, 2006. For purposes of judicial
review, OSHA considers February 28, 2006 to be the date of issuance.

List of Subjects

29 CFR Part 1926

    Construction industry, Motor vehicle safety, Occupational safety
and health.

29 CFR Part 1928

    Agriculture, Motor vehicle safety, Occupational safety and health.

Authority and Signature

    This document was prepared under the direction of Jonathan L.
Snare, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20210. The Agency is issuing this final rule under the
following authorities: Sections 4, 6, and 8 of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657); Section 3704 of the
Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.);
Secretary of Labor's Order 5-2002 (67 FR 65008); and 29 CFR Part 1911.

    Signed at Washington, DC on February 21, 2006.
Jonathan L. Snare,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor.
[FR Doc. 06-1835 Filed 2-27-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-26-P


[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 136 (Friday, July 15, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 41744-41745]
[FR Doc No: 2011-17758]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 52

[EPA-R09-OAR-2011-0537; FRL-9432-1]

Revisions to the California State Implementation Plan, South
Coast Air Quality Management District

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: EPA is proposing to approve revisions to the South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD) portion of the California State
Implementation Plan (SIP). These revisions concern volatile organic
compound (VOC) emissions from consumer paint thinner & multi-purpose
solvents and metalworking fluids & direct-contact lubricants. We are
proposing to approve local rules to regulate these emission sources
under the Clean Air Act as amended in 1990 (CAA or the Act).

DATES: Any comments on this proposal must arrive by August 15, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments, identified by docket number EPA-R09-OAR-
2011-0355, by one of the following methods:
    1. Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. Follow
the on-line instructions.
    2. E-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    3. Mail or deliver: Andrew Steckel (Air-4), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency Region IX, 75 Hawthorne Street, San Francisco, CA
94105-3901.
    Instructions: All comments will be included in the public docket
without change and may be made available online at http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided,
unless the comment includes Confidential Business Information (CBI) or
other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute.
Information that you consider CBI or otherwise protected should be
clearly identified as such and should not be submitted through http://www.regulations.gov or e-mail. http://www.regulations.gov is an
``anonymous access'' system, and EPA will not know your identity or
contact information unless you provide it in the body of your comment.
If you send e-mail directly to EPA, your e-mail address will be
automatically captured and included as part of the public comment. If
EPA cannot read your comment due to technical difficulties and cannot
contact you for clarification, EPA may not be able to consider your
comment. Electronic files should avoid the use of special characters,
any form of encryption, and be free of any defects or viruses.
    Docket: Generally, documents in the docket for this action are
available electronically at http://www.regulations.gov and in hard copy
at EPA Region IX, 75 Hawthorne Street, San Francisco, California. While
all documents in the docket are listed at http://www.regulations.gov,
some information may be publicly available only at the hard copy
location (e.g., copyrighted material, large maps), and

some may not be publicly available in either location (e.g., CBI). To
inspect the hard copy materials, please schedule an appointment during
normal business hours with the contact listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Adrianne Borgia, EPA Region IX, (415)
972-3576<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This proposal addresses the following local
rules: SCAQMD Rule 1143, ``Consumer Paint Thinner & Multi-Purpose
Solvents'' and SCAQMD Rule 1144, ``Metal Working Fluids & Direct-
Contact Lubricants,'' In the Rules and Regulations section of this
Federal Register, we are approving these local rules in a direct final
action without prior proposal because we believe these SIP revisions
are not controversial. If we receive adverse comments, however, we will
publish a timely withdrawal of the direct final rule and address the
comments in subsequent action based on this proposed rule. Please note
that if we receive adverse comment on an amendment, paragraph, or
section of this rule and if that provision may be severed from the
remainder of the rule, we may adopt as final those provisions of the
rule that are not the subject of an adverse comment.
    We do not plan to open a second comment period, so anyone
interested in commenting should do so at this time. If we do not
receive adverse comments, no further activity is planned. For further
information, please see the direct final action.

    Dated: June 23, 2011.
Jared Blumenfeld,
Regional Administrator, Region IX.
[FR Doc. 2011-17758 Filed 7-14-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P