commences at take-off. The current ``beginning of launch,'' as defined
in the definition of ``launch'' refers only to launches from a U.S.
launch site, and is silent with regard to launches from sites outside
the United States. Although the FAA issues launch licenses for launches
from non-U.S. launch sites if the operator is a citizen

of the U.S., the FAA considers it outside its authority to license
preflight activities that take place at a non-U.S. launch site in light
of the statutory definition of launch that explicitly refers to
``activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle . . . when
those activities take place at a launch site in the United States.''
The FAA also believes that this interpretation is necessary because of
issues of sovereignty and liability under international law. For these
non-U.S. launch sites, the FAA has historically licensed launches
beginning at ignition, or if there is no ignition, then at the first
movement that initiates flight. In order to provide clarity for launch
operators launching from non-U.S. sites, the FAA is proposing to codify
this approach in part 450.
    In addition to addressing issues in the current definition of
``launch'' regarding when launch begins, the FAA proposes to clarify
when launch ends. First, the FAA would move the provisions in the
current definition of launch regarding end of launch to proposed Sec.
450.3. Second, the FAA would remove the distinction between ELVs and
RLVs, which is consistent with one of the overall goals of this
proposed rule. Overall, the substance of the current provisions related
to end of launch currently located in Sec.  401.5 would not change.
Specifically, launch ends:
    1. For an orbital launch of an ELV, after the licensee's last
exercise of control over its vehicle whether on orbit or a vehicle
stage impacting on Earth;
    2. For an orbital launch of an RLV, after deployment of all
payloads or if there is no payload, after the launch vehicle's first
steady state orbit; and
    3. For a suborbital launch of either an ELV or RLV that includes
reentry, launch ends after reaching apogee; or for a suborbital launch
that does not include a reentry, launch ends after the vehicle or
vehicle component lands or impacts on Earth.
    In all these cases, activities on the ground to return either the
launch site or the vehicle or vehicle component to a safe condition are
part of launch and could possibly extend the end of launch. In the
rare, yet to be seen, situation of a suborbital launch that does not
require an FAA launch license but does require a reentry license,
launch ends after the vehicle reaches apogee. In addition, the FAA
would move the provisions related to reentry readiness and returning
the vehicle to a safe state on the ground to proposed Sec.  450.3.
Including these reentry provisions in the scope of a vehicle operator
license would clarify an operator's responsibilities regarding post-
flight ground operations related to returning the vehicle to a safe
state on the ground.
    Finally, the FAA proposes to modify the definition for reentry.
Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines reentry as: to return or attempt to
return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload or human
beings, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth. In 2000,
the FAA codified the current regulatory definition of reentry in the
final rule, Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing Regulations. Section 401.5 defines ``reenter;
reentry'' as: To return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry
vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space
to Earth. The term ``reenter; reentry'' includes activities conducted
in Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness, and that
are critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of
property during reentry flight. The term ``reenter; reentry'' also
includes activities conducted on the ground after vehicle landing on
Earth to ensure the reentry vehicle does not pose a threat to public
health and safety or the safety of property. As noted earlier, the FAA
proposes to revise the definition to mirror the statute and move the
provisions related to reentry readiness and returning the vehicle to a
safe state on the ground to proposed Sec.  450.3.

B. Ground Safety Requirements

    This proposal would revise current ground safety requirements to
make them more flexible, scalable, and adaptable to varying types of
launch and reentry operations. The proposal seeks to ensure that the
FAA's oversight of ground operations at U.S. launch sites would only
cover activities that are hazardous to the public and critical assets.
Specifically, as proposed in Sec.  450.179, an operator would be
required to protect the public from adverse effects of hazardous
operations and systems associated with preparing a launch vehicle for
flight, returning a launch or reentry vehicle to a safe condition after
landing, or after an aborted launch attempt, and returning a site to a
safe condition. An operator would be required to conduct a ground
hazard analysis (proposed Sec.  450.185) and comply with certain
prescribed hazard controls during those preflight activities that
constitute launch. In addition, an operator would be required to comply
with other ground safety and related application requirements in
proposed part 450.
    The FAA proposed the part 417 ground safety regulations in the 2000
NPRM \163\ and codified it in the 2006 final rule. The 2006 final rule
adopted ground safety standards governing the preparation of a launch
vehicle for flight. The final rule specified that in order for a launch
operator to meet part 417 ground safety requirements, an operator must
conduct a ground hazard analysis to meet the requirements of subpart E,
part 417, as well as a toxic release hazard analysis to meet the
requirements of Sec.  417.227. For launches conducted from a Federal
launch range, a launch operator could rely on an LSSA as an alternative
means of demonstrating compliance with the FAA's part 417 ground safety
rules. Because most licensed ground operations were covered by the LSSA
approach, the FAA did not begin to exercise the ground safety
requirements in part 417 until 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ Licensing and Safety requirements for Launch, NPRM. 65 FR
63922 (October 25, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Beginning in 2016, the FAA received several applications for launch
licenses from non-Federal launch sites.\164\ Applicants were required
to demonstrate compliance with the ground safety regulations in part
417. During the FAA's evaluation, the agency found that many of its
ground safety requirements were overly burdensome, highly prescriptive,
and did not include criteria for determining public safety.
Furthermore, the FAA discovered the requirements were out-of-date with
commercial space transportation practices and operations, and in some
cases duplicated other state and Federal regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ The FAA's first license application involving a launch
from a non-Federal launch range was from SpaceX for operations at
pad 39A in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The FAA completed its evaluation
and issued SpaceX the license on February 2017. Astra Space
originally applied for a launch license from a non-Federal launch
range in June 2017, and the FAA issued its license March 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Part 431 does not include explicit ground safety requirements.
However, the scope of a launch license under part 431 includes
preparing a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United
States. In conducting its safety review under Sec.  431.31, the FAA
must determine whether an applicant is capable of launching an RLV and
payload, if any, from a designated launch site without jeopardizing
public health and safety and the safety of property. The FAA evaluates
on an individual basis all public safety aspects of a proposed RLV
mission to ensure they are sufficient to support safe conduct of the
mission, including ground safety. In licenses issued under part 431,
the FAA has required operators to address reasonably

foreseeable hazards to ensure the safety of pre- and post-flight ground
operations. The lack of clarity in part 431 is problematic, and would
be fixed by the ground safety requirements in this proposal.
    The ARC recommended that the FAA create ground safety regulations
that are flexible and streamlined, continue to protect the public, and
are not duplicative of other state or Federal authorities. The ARC
provided four primary recommendations for ground safety. First, the ARC
recommended the FAA allow operators to determine what activities and
operations would be covered under FAA regulations by performing an
analysis to define hazards. Second, the ARC recommended the FAA scale
the scope of what is considered licensed activities based on each
operator's unique operations. Third, the ARC recommended the FAA focus
its regulatory authority solely on those things that affect public
safety. Finally, the ARC recommended the FAA only regulate those things
that are not already overseen by other governmental authorities.
    The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendations that ground safety
regulations should be flexible, performance-based, and utilize a ground
hazard analysis that determines the best methods for protecting the
public. The proposed ground safety regulations would rely on a system
safety approach to allow flexibility by stripping away specific design
requirements, establishing more performance-based requirements, and
giving the operator flexibility in satisfying these requirements.
Specifically, an operator would conduct a ground hazard analysis
(proposed Sec.  450.185), and comply with prescribed hazard controls.
In addition to any mitigations identified in the ground hazard
analysis, the proposed regulations would require several prescribed
hazard controls, including an accounting of how the operator would
protect members of the public who enter areas under their control,
provisions on how the operator would mitigate hazards created by a
countdown abort, an explanation of the operator's plans for controlling
fires, and generic emergency procedures an operator would implement. As
will be discussed later, operators using toxic materials would have to
perform a toxic release hazard analysis (proposed Sec.  450.187), show
how it would contain the effects of a toxic release, or how the public
would be protected from those risks from toxic releases. Operators
would also be required to develop an explosive siting plan (proposed
Sec.  450.183) and to coordinate with licensed launch and reentry site
operators (proposed Sec.  450.181).
1. Ground Safety: Identifying First Hazardous Activity
    In proposed Sec.  450.3, an operator would have the flexibility to
determine for its particular operation when the first preflight
activity that poses a hazard to the public begins in coordination with
the FAA. An operator could identify the arrival of the vehicle or its
major components at the launch site as the beginning of hazardous
operations, which is consistent with current practice. This option
would provide a clear demarcation of when launch begins that is easily
understood by both an operator and the FAA. The license would cover all
ground operations that may present a hazard to the public from the time
flight hardware first arrives at the launch or reentry site to the end
of launch or reentry.
    Alternatively, an operator could identify some other action, after
the arrival of the vehicle or its major components at the launch site,
as the beginning of hazardous activities. As discussed earlier in the
scope of a vehicle operator license discussion, this option would be
available for those operations where the arrival of the launch vehicle
does not constitute the beginning of hazardous activities. It would
also provide flexibility to operators because the start of hazardous
launch operations is unique to each operator's circumstances. These
hazardous launch operations would include the pressurizing or loading
of propellants into the vehicle or launch system,\165\ operations
involving a fueled launch vehicle,\166\ or the transfer of energy
necessary to initiate flight.\167\
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    \165\ This would include the loading of propellants or
pressurants, where there are potential hazards such as overpressure,
explosion, debris, deflagration, fire, and toxic material release.
The operations that are typically performed include wet dress
rehearsals, cold flow, returning the vehicle to a safe state
following a scrub, and tests that might be performed while the
vehicle is being fueled.
    \166\ This would include static fire or tests with a fully-
fueled integrated vehicle.
    \167\ This would include activities that involve placing the
launch vehicle into a state that would enable it to achieve
suborbital or orbital flight. Even if traditional propellants are
not used, the energy needed to escape Earth's gravity is significant
and the initiation of the action to launch a vehicle could
potentially have significant impact to public safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While this option offers greater flexibility, it would require that
an applicant talk with the FAA during pre-application consultation to
identify which activity would be the beginning of hazardous launch
operations. This is necessary for the FAA to scope its requirements
accordingly, and so that the applicant knows what to include in its
application. Early interactions with the FAA would allow a potential
applicant to work with the FAA to determine which preflight operations
constitute launch and therefore must occur under a license. An
applicant that elects to identify an activity after the arrival of a
launch vehicle or associated major components at a launch site as the
beginning of launch should be prepared to discuss its operations with
the FAA so that the FAA can determine that operations occurring prior
to that point would not pose a threat to public safety. Note that under
this proposal, indemnification and reciprocal waiver of claims coverage
would start when launch begins as it does under current regulations. In
other words, financial responsibility requirements would apply from the
first hazardous operation until launch ends.
2. Ground Safety: Ground Hazard Analysis
    Proposed Sec.  450.185 (Ground Hazard Analysis) would require an
operator to complete a ground hazard analysis which would include a
thorough assessment of the launch vehicle, the launch vehicle
integrated systems, ground support equipment, and other launch site
hardware. The analysis would include an identification of hazards, a
risk assessment, an identification and description of mitigations and
controls, and provisions for hazard control verification and
validation. Although the analysis might incorporate employee safety and
mission assurance, this proposal would only require an applicant to
identify the hazards that affect the public, and how an operator would
mitigate those hazards.
    Proposed Sec.  450.185(a) would require an operator to identify
hazards. A hazard is a real or potential condition that could lead to
an unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, serious
injury, or damage to or loss of equipment or property. The FAA proposes
separating ground hazards into two primary categories: System and
operational hazards. System hazards would include, but would not be
limited to, vehicle over-pressurization, sudden energy release
including ordnance actuation, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, fire
or deflagration, radioactive materials, toxic release, cryogens,
electrical discharge, and structural failure. Operational hazards would
be hazards introduced to the launch site through procedures and
processes that occur during vehicle processing. Operational hazards
would include propellant handling and

loading, transporting vehicles or components, vehicle system
activation, and related tests.
    Once an operator has identified hazards, proposed Sec.  450.185(b)
would require an operator to conduct a risk assessment. In other words,
an operator would have to evaluate each hazard to determine the
likelihood and the severity of that hazard. This assessment should
identify the likelihood of each hazard causing a casualty. This
assessment should also account for the likelihood of each hazard
causing major damage to public property or critical assets. Public
property, in this case, means any property not associated with the
operation. Critical assets means an asset that is essential to the
national interests of the United States, and includes property,
facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense,
or assured access to space for national priority missions.
    Proposed Sec.  450.185(c) would require an operator to identify
mitigations or controls used to eliminate or mitigate the severity or
likelihood of identified hazards. An operator would be required to
demonstrate, as part of its ground hazard analysis, that the
mitigations or controls reduce the likelihood of each hazard that may
cause (1) death or serious injury to the public to an extremely remote
likelihood, and (2) major damage to public property or critical assets
to a remote likelihood. These qualitative thresholds are the same as
those in Sec.  437.55(a)(3) and proposed Sec.  450.109(a)(3). A hazard
control is a preventative or mitigation measure that reduces the
likelihood of the hazard or ameliorates its severity.
    Proposed Sec.  450.185(d) would require an operator to identify and
describe the risk elimination and mitigation measures required to
satisfy the risk criteria in proposed Sec.  450.185(c). Under current
industry standards, these measures include one or more of the
following: Design for minimum risk, incorporate safety devices, provide
warning devices, or implement procedures and training, as previously
discussed in reference to the analogous flight hazard analysis
requirement in Sec.  450.109(a)(4).\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ MIL-STD-882E, section 4.3.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, proposed Sec.  450.185(e) would require an operator to
demonstrate through verification and validation that the risk
elimination measures meet the remote and extremely remote standards
discussed earlier. Verification is an evaluation to determine that
safety measures derived from the ground hazard analysis are effective
and have been properly implemented. Verification provides measurable
evidence that a safety measure reduces risk to acceptable levels.
Validation is an evaluation to determine that each safety measure
derived from the ground hazard analysis is correct, complete,
consistent, unambiguous, verifiable, and technically feasible.
Validation ensures that the right safety measure is implemented, and
that the safety measure is well understood.
    While this proposal would require an operator to complete a full
ground hazard analysis as described previously, an operator would not
need to submit this analysis in its entirety as part of its vehicle
operator license application. Rather in proposed Sec.  450.185(f), the
FAA would require an applicant to provide a description of the ground
safety hazard analysis methodology, a list of the systems and
operations involving the vehicle or payload that may cause a hazard to
the public, and the results of the ground hazard analysis that affect
the public. Although the results of the ground hazard analysis would be
unique to each applicant's operations, the ground hazard analysis
application deliverables should have common elements. Specifically, the
ground hazard analysis should contain the hazards that have a high
likelihood or high severity of affecting the public. The analysis
should include controls for the hazards that mitigate the risk to the
public and all of the other requirements shown in Sec.  450.185. Common
hazards that affect public safety, which the FAA would expect to be
addressed in a ground hazard analysis, include propellant loading,
ordinance installation or actuation, proximity to pressurized systems
during operations, certain lifting operations (such as solid rocket
motors and payload integration), operations which could result in toxic
release, and RF testing. Fundamentally, if the operator identifies a
hazard that affects the public, it must be properly documented and
mitigated to reduce the risk to the public. It should be noted that any
part of the ground hazard analysis could be reviewed during inspection.
3. Ground Safety: Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls
    In addition to those mitigations an operator would implement as a
result of its ground hazard analysis, proposed Sec.  450.189 (Ground
Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls) would require an operator to
implement certain prescribed hazard controls during the ground
operations period of launch or reentry. These prescribed hazard
controls would require that an operator document how it would protect
members of the public who enter areas under the operator's control,
mitigate hazards created by a countdown abort. They would also require
the operator's plans for controlling fires and emergency procedures.
    Specifically, proposed Sec.  450.189(b) would require an operator
to document a process for protecting members of the public who enter
any area under the operator's control. Although the public would be
protected from many hazards because they are excluded from safety clear
zones and prevented from entering the site during certain hazardous
operations, an operator should account for the protection of the public
when they are allowed to be on the site. The proposed rule would
require an operator to develop procedures to identify and track members
of the public while on site, and methods to protect the public from
hazards in accordance with the ground hazard analysis and the toxic
hazard analysis. For example, the operator could have plans in place to
control who enters its site, whether or not members of the public on
site will be escorted, how the public will be made aware of and
protected from hazards, and if members of the public will be required
to wear personal protective equipment.
    This rule would also require an operator to establish, maintain,
and perform procedures for controlling certain hazards in the event of
a countdown abort or recycle operation. Current Sec.  417.415(b)
requires an operator to meet specific requirements for safing their
vehicle, maintaining control of their FSS, and controlling access to
the site until it is returned to a safe state. This rule would require
a more performance-based approach to ensuring the safety of the vehicle
and the site following a countdown abort or recycle operation in order
to accommodate many different types of flight safety systems and
operations.
    Proposed Sec.  450.189(c) would require that an operator, following
a countdown abort or recycle operation, establish, maintain, and
perform procedures for controlling hazards related to the vehicle and
returning the vehicle, stages, or other flight hardware and site
facilities to a safe condition. In all of these instances, this
proposal would require an operator to have provisions in place to keep
the public safe while returning the launch vehicle or launch site back
to a safe condition. If a launch vehicle does not lift-off after a
command to initiate flight, an operator would be required to ensure
that the vehicle and any payload are in a safe configuration, prohibit
the public from entering into any identified hazard areas until the
site

is returned to a safe condition, and maintain and verify that any FSS
remains operation until certain that the launch vehicle does not
represent a risk of inadvertent flight. These more specific
requirements would be levied on an operator in the event of a failure
to lift-off after a command to initiate because a launch vehicle can be
in a particularly hazardous state.
    This proposed requirement is similar to Sec.  417.415(b), which
requires a launch operator to establish procedures for controlling
hazards associated with a failed flight attempt where an engine start
command was sent, but the launch vehicle did not lift-off. These
procedures must include maintaining and verifying that each flight
termination system remains operational, assuring that the vehicle is in
a safe configuration, and prohibiting launch complex entry until the
launch pad area safing procedures are complete.
    Proposed Sec.  450.189(d) would require an operator to have in
place reasonable precautions for reporting and controlling any fire
that occurs during launch and reentry activities in order to prevent
the occurrence of secondary hazards such as a brush fire caused by a
static fire test or some related ground launch activity. These
secondary hazards, if not controlled, could reach pressure vessels or
other related equipment causing more damage. An operator may choose to
meet industry standards or fire codes as a means of satisfying this
requirement.
    Proposed Sec.  450.189(e) would require an operator to establish
general emergency procedures that address how emergencies would be
handled at the site. An emergency has the potential to directly affect
the public or create secondary hazards that may affect the public;
therefore, implementation of these procedures are critical for safety
of the public. An emergency would include any event that would require
an evacuation, or a response from emergency officials such as the fire
department or emergency medical technicians. Additionally, the
establishment of general emergency procedures would allow the operator
to have roles, responsibilities, and plans in place in advance of an
emergency to reduce the effects of any emergency on the public. Section
417.111(c)(15) currently requires an operator to have generic emergency
procedures in place for any emergency that may create a hazard to the
public, and this rule would replace those prescriptive requirements
with performance-based requirements.
    Proposed Sec.  450.189(f) would require an applicant to submit its
process for protecting members of the public who enter any area under
the operator's control. This process would be submitted as part of an
applicant's vehicle operator license application.
4. Ground Safety: Coordination With a Licensed Launch or Reentry Site
Operator
    Under proposed Sec.  450.181(a), for a launch or reentry conducted
from or to a Federal launch or reentry site or a site licensed under
part 420 or 433, an operator must coordinate with the site operator
because the two entities each have public safety responsibilities
during ground operations. Specifically, an operator must coordinate
with the site operator to ensure public access is controlled where and
when necessary to protect public safety, to ensure launch or reentry
operations are coordinated with other launch and reentry operators and
other affected parties to prevent unsafe interference, to ensure that
any ground hazard area does not unnecessarily interfere \169\ with
continued operation of the launch or reentry site, and to ensure prompt
and effective response in the event of a mishap that could impact
public safety. This is similar to Sec.  417.9(b)(2), which requires a
launch operator to coordinate with a launch site operator and provide
any information on its activities and potential hazards necessary for
the launch site operator to determine how to protect any other launch
operator, person, or property at the launch site. Part 431 requires an
agreement between a launch or reentry operator and any site operator in
Sec.  431.75. In addition, in the mission readiness review requirements
in Sec.  431.37(a), an operator must involve launch site and reentry
site personnel and verify their readiness to provide safety-related
launch property and launch services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ The FAA has proposed minimum requirements for ground
hazard areas based on safety thresholds, either toxic hazard areas
or other hazard areas derived from the ground hazard analysis, but
has always allowed operators to propose to clear areas larger than
necessary to ensure greater safety. In consultation with NASA and
the Department of Defense, the FAA discovered that FAA approved
ground hazard areas were having adverse impacts on neighboring space
operations in easily avoidable ways. As such, the FAA has proposed
ground hazard areas be coordinated with the affected launch or
reentry site operators prior to licensing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a launch or reentry conducted from or to a site licensed under
part 420 or 433, Sec.  450.181(b) would require an operator to also
coordinate with the site operator to establish roles and
responsibilities for reporting, responding to, and investigating any
mishap during ground activities at the site. The same mishap plan
requirements in proposed Sec.  450.173 would apply to a site operator
leaving open the assignment of roles and responsibilities between a
site and launch or reentry operator for reporting, responding to, and
investigating mishaps during ground operations. Proposed Sec.
450.181(b) is designed to ensure those roles and responsibilities are
established.
    As part of its application, an applicant would be required to
describe how it is coordinating with a Federal or licensed launch or
reentry site operator in compliance with this section. As discussed
earlier, in reference to proposed Sec.  450.147, a vehicle operator
would be required to submit as part of its vehicle operator license
application references to any agreements with other entities utilized
to meet any requirements of this section. In this context, agreements
may include security, access control services, any lease agreements for
launch sites, services used for hazard controls or analysis, or any
agreement with local emergency or government services.
5. Ground Safety: Explosive Site Plan
    Proposed Sec.  450.183 (Explosive Site Plan) would require an
applicant to include an explosive site plan as part of its vehicle
operator license application, if it proposes to conduct a launch or
reentry from or to a site exclusive to its own use. The explosive site
plan would have to demonstrate compliance with the explosive siting
requirements of Sec. Sec.  420.63, 420.65, 420.66, 420.67, 420.69, and
420.70. Currently for exclusive use sites, Sec.  417.9(c) requires a
launch operator to satisfy the requirements of the public safety
requirements of part 420. With proposed Sec.  450.183, the FAA is
clarifying that the only requirements from part 420 that need be
conducted by an exclusive use operator is the explosive safety
requirements.
6. Ground Safety: Toxic Hazards During Ground Operations
    Proposed Sec.  450.187 contains requirements for toxic hazard
mitigation for ground operations. This is discussed later in the
``Additional Technical Justification and Rationale'' section, in the
subsection on toxic hazards for flight, due to the commonality of toxic
requirements for ground operations and flight.

Process Improvements

A. Safety Element Approval

    This proposal would modify part 414 to enable applicants to request
a safety

element approval in conjunction with a license application as provided
in proposed part 450. Proposed Sec.  450.39 (Use of Safety Element
Approval) would allow an applicant to use any vehicle, safety system,
process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety
element approval under part 414 without the FAA's reevaluation of that
safety element during a license application evaluation to the extent
its use is within its approved envelope. Finally, this proposal would
change the part 414 term from ``safety approval'' to ``safety element
approval'' to distinguish it from ``safety approval'' as used in parts
415, 431, and 435, and proposed part 450, because these terms, as
discussed later in this section, have entirely different meanings.
i. Part 414 and 415 Safety Approval Clarification
    As defined in current Sec.  414.3, a safety approval is an FAA
document containing an FAA determination that one or more safety
elements, when used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter,
or situation, will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of
property. As listed in the Act, safety elements include: (1) Launch
vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any
identified component thereof; or (2) qualified and trained personnel,
performing a process or function related to licensed launch activities
or vehicles. In contrast, parts 415, 431, and 435 reference ``safety
approval'' to mean an FAA determination that an applicant is capable of
launching a launch vehicle and its payload without jeopardizing public
health and safety, and safety of property. Other chapter III parts,
including parts 431 and 435, reference ``safety approval'' as described
in part 415.
    The use of identical terms in parts 414, 415, 431, and 435 to
reference different meanings has caused confusion. Therefore, the FAA
proposes to distinguish these terms by changing the part 414 term to
``safety element approval.'' This proposed term more accurately
reflects the substance of a part 414 safety approval of a particular
element that may be used to support the application review for one or
more launch or reentry licenses. Other than the addition of ``element''
to the current term, the part 414 definition and related references in
parts 413 and 437 would remain the same. The FAA would make conforming
changes throughout parts 413, 414, and 437, where a part 414 safety
approval is referenced, to change those references to ``safety element
approval.'' The term ``safety approval'' would maintain the same
meaning as that in current 415, 431 and 435 where it appears in the
proposed rule.
ii. Part 414 Safety Element Approval \170\ Application Submitted in
Conjunction With a License Application
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    \170\ For readability and ease of understanding, this section
refers to a current part 414 safety approval as a safety element
approval, regardless of whether the discussion is referencing the
current regulations or the proposed regulations. For direct
quotations, the FAA retains the previous term ``safety approval.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Part 414 enables a launch and reentry operator to use an approved
safety element within a specified scope without a re-examination of the
element's fitness and suitability for a particular launch or reentry
proposal. A safety element approval may be issued independent of a
license, and it does not confer any authority to conduct activities for
which a license is required under chapter III. A safety element
approval does not relieve its holder of the duty to comply with all
applicable requirements of law or regulation that may apply to the
holder's activities.
    The ARC recommended that an applicant for a launch or reentry
license be able to identify one or more safety elements included in the
applicant's license application and to request review of those safety
elements for a safety element approval concurrent with the license
application review.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ ARC Report, p. 24-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendation. The FAA notes that
its practice has always been to accept references to information
provided in a previous license application so long as the applicant can
demonstrate the relevance of that information to the current
application. The FAA also relies on previous evaluations where it
analyzed compliance with a particular requirement if the same operator
submits a more recent application using the same analysis. The proposed
changes would codify this approach for safety element approval
applications in proposed Sec.  450.39 \172\ and the relevant sections
in part 414.
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    \172\ Proposed Sec.  450.39 is similar to Sec.  437.21(c) for
experimental permits, which states that if an applicant proposes to
use any reusable suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service,
or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety approval under
part 414, the FAA will not reevaluate that safety element to the
extent its use is within its approved envelope. Parts 415 and 431 do
not have similar sections because they were developed before part
414 was issued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposal would allow an applicant to request a safety element
approval as part of its vehicle operator license application.
Specifically, this rule would provide a process in proposed Sec.
414.13 to apply for a safety element approval concurrently with a
license application. These safety element approval applications
submitted in conjunction with a license would largely use information
contained in a license application to satisfy part 414 requirements.
This would alleviate the need to provide separate applications for a
vehicle operator license and a safety element approval. The FAA
envisions safety element approvals in conjunction with a license
application to cover the same safety elements as delineated in Sec.
414.3.
    Using similar processes as for part 414, the FAA would determine
whether a safety element is eligible for a safety element approval. The
FAA would base its determination on criteria in proposed part 450. The
applicant would be required to specify the sections of the license
application that support its application for a safety element approval.
The technical criteria for reviewing a safety approval submitted as
part of a vehicle operator license application would be limited to the
requirements of proposed part 450. This limitation would simplify the
safety element approval process by eliminating the need to provide a
Statement of Conformance letter, as required under current Sec.
414.1(c)(3) for a safety element approval separate from a vehicle
operator license application. To avoid this limitation to proposed part
450 criteria, an applicant could apply for a safety element approval
separate from a vehicle operator license. However, there is no
difference between a safety element approval issued through a separate
application or a vehicle operator license application.
    Finally, the FAA proposes to remove the requirement stating that,
for each grant of a safety element approval, the FAA will publish in
the Federal Register a notice of the criteria that were used to
evaluate the safety element approval application, and a description of
the criteria. The FAA provided the rationale for this notification in
the preamble to a proposed rule.\173\ The FAA explained that the
purpose of this notification requirement was to make clear the criteria
and standards the FAA used to assess a safety element. However, the FAA
has found that this requirement is unnecessary, and has potentially
discouraged applications for safety element approvals due to concerns
that proprietary data may be disclosed. Going forward, a safety element
approval application submitted concurrently with a vehicle operator
license application would be evaluated

based only on criteria in proposed part 450. For other safety element
approvals, experience has shown that there is no need to publish the
criteria because the FAA's determinations were not based on any
uniquely-derived standard. In fact, all eight safety element approvals
granted by the FAA have been evaluated against regulations in 14 CFR
chapter III. Therefore, the FAA proposes to revise the requirement in
current Sec.  414.35 (re-designated as Sec.  414.39) such that safety
element approval evaluation criteria, whether related to an application
submitted concurrently with a license application or separately, would
not require publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ Safety Approvals, NPRM, 70 FR 32191, 32198 (June 1, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the FAA's proposal to not require publication of evaluation
criteria, the confidentiality provision under current Sec.  414.13(d)
\174\ is no longer necessary. That provision notifies applicants that
if proposed criteria is secret, proprietary, or confidential, it may
not be used as a basis to issue a safety approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ Current Sec.  414.13 would be renumbered in this proposal
as Sec.  414.17 to maintain sequential section numbering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Incremental Review of a License Application

    In response to the ARC recommendations, the FAA proposes to amend
part 413 and to include language in proposed part 450 to allow an
applicant the option for an incremental review of the safety approval
portion of its application.
    Under 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1), the FAA is required by statute to
issue or deny a launch or reentry license not later than 180 days after
accepting an application. Under the same statute, the FAA must inform
the applicant of any pending issue and action required to resolve the
issue not later than 120 days after accepting an application. To ensure
that the FAA has sufficient time to complete a thorough review to
evaluate whether the applicant complies with the FAA's commercial space
transportation regulations in the prescribed time frame, Sec.  413.11
states the FAA screens the application to determine if it contains
sufficient information for it to begin its review. It also states that
if the application is so incomplete or indefinite that the FAA cannot
start to evaluate it, the FAA will notify the applicant accordingly. In
accordance with internal policy, the FAA aims to make this complete
enough determination within two calendar weeks after receiving the
application. When the FAA accepts an application, the 180-day review
period begins on the date that the FAA received the application. If the
FAA accepts an application as complete enough to review, the FAA works
with applicants to identify additional information and documentation
needed to demonstrate regulatory compliance, and advises applicants
when those materials are needed. If the additional materials are not
provided within an appropriate time frame, the FAA tolls the review
period, stopping the counting of time towards the 180-day deadline.
Once the FAA has completed its review, it issues a license, or informs
the applicant, in writing, that the license application is being denied
and states the reasons for denial.
    Industry representatives have expressed frustration both with a
lack of clarity as to what is ``complete enough'' for the FAA to accept
an application and begin review and with the 180-day review period. The
FAA seeks comment on how the FAA can improve the clarity of ``complete
enough'' to address past frustrations. For an applicant that is in the
early stages of development, there are challenges with compiling all of
the documentation in parallel with their vehicle development. First-
time applicants regularly underestimate the amount of time needed for
licensing. For nearly all applicants, much of the vehicle and mission
information is only refined and finalized within the 180-day review
period, which may subject the application to tolling and business risk
to the applicant's timeline for launch operations. The timing of the
issuance of an FAA authorization has never caused a delay to a launch
or reentry operation, but the FAA is cognizant that there could be
impacts on an operator even absent an operation delay.
    In part to address these issues, and bearing in mind that a written
application is the means by which the FAA determines whether a launch
or reentry operator can conduct a launch or reentry safely, the FAA
invited the ARC to describe how the FAA might modify its application
process to improve efficiency for both the FAA and applicants. The ARC
suggested in part that the FAA allow for an incremental or modular
application and review process. Specifically, the ARC recommended that
the application review process should be modified to allow for
incremental approvals of subsections to guide a focused review and
avoid tolling. The recommendation suggested further that, rather than
180 days for review of an entire application, the FAA should assign a
brief period for each subsection or module.
    The current application process is already modular to an extent.
The FAA has issued payload determinations outside of a license,
primarily for payload developers seeking early assurances that their
payload would be permitted to be launched. The FAA has even conducted
preliminary policy reviews to provide similar assurances to future
applicants on a less formal basis. Despite these allowances, the vast
majority of FAA commercial space licensing evaluation time is spent on
evaluating the safety implications of a license application. Because
this proposed rule seeks to convert the prescriptive safety
requirements to performance-based criteria, the FAA believes that it
may be possible to develop a flexible safety review process that can
afford applicants early determinations, providing an applicant more
flexibility and control over the timing of the licensing process.
    The ARC also recommended that the FAA reduce its application review
time. The ARC focused on differentiating between experienced and
inexperienced operators in order to decrease FAA review time of license
applications. While the FAA agrees that experienced operators may
require shorter application review times, it should be noted that this
would likely be due to familiarity with the application process, more
streamlined application materials that lend themselves to a more
efficient review, and established processes that have been through FAA
review previously (such as ground safety analyses). While the proposed
incremental review process would empower operators to better define
when certain portions of an application are reviewed and would allow an
operator that has satisfied certain requirements early to receive
credit for those portions of its application in advance, other
proposals in this rulemaking, such as safety element approvals
concurrent with a license application, flexible time frames, and
reduced application burdens, would probably serve to reduce review
times more effectively than an incremental application process.
Nevertheless, the modular nature of payload determinations, policy
approvals, environmental evaluations, and financial responsibility
requirements, and the more granular incremental review of compliance
with the safety approval requirements would allow an applicant to seek
partial approval of an application as soon as a portion is ready to be
evaluated. These approvals would allow an operator to better manage its
timeline and any potential timeline risk. The flexible nature of this
proposal would allow the FAA to further engage with industry and
establish new best practices and greater efficiencies for

both government evaluators and our commercial partners. The option of
using an incremental approach would provide more flexibility to
operators who are able to provide portions of their application in
advance.
    In proposed Sec.  450.33 (Incremental Review and Determinations),
the FAA would revise the launch and reentry regulations to allow for an
incremental review application submission option for vehicle operator
license applicants. Because the current regulations already allow an
operator to submit the payload, policy, environmental, and financial
responsibility portions of its application independently, the FAA
proposes that the incremental review process apply specifically to the
safety approval portion of a license application. Given the large
variety of applicant experience, proposed operations, and company
timelines, the FAA recognizes a need for flexibility. Accordingly, the
FAA is proposing amendments to part 413 and regulatory language in
proposed part 450 to allow for incremental application submission and
determinations. This incremental review application process would not
replace the traditional review of a full, complete application
submitted at once--the incremental review would be an optional path to
obtaining an FAA license determination that allows an applicant to
choose an application submission process that suits their business
model and program needs.
    The FAA is proposing in Sec.  450.33(a) that, prior to any
submission, an applicant would be required to identify to the FAA that
it plans to avail itself of the incremental review and determination
application process. During pre-application consultation, the FAA would
work with an applicant towards an incremental review process that is
aligned to both the development process for an applicant and the
necessities of the FAA's evaluation framework. The FAA proposes to
coordinate with applicants during pre-application consultation to
determine the following: (1) Appropriate portions of an operator's
application that could be submitted and reviewed independently; (2) the
application and review schedule with dates of key milestones; (3) the
applicant's planned approach to demonstrate compliance with each
applicable regulation, to include any foreseeable requests for waiver;
and (4) the scope of the proposed action being applied for, the
identification of any novel safety approaches or other potentially
complicating factors, and how those will be addressed during the
licensing process.
    The details of an applicant's incremental application process would
have to be approved by the FAA in accordance with proposed Sec.
450.33(b) prior to application submission and the FAA could issue
determinations towards a safety approval resulting from those reviews,
in accordance with proposed Sec.  450.33(c). An applicant would be able
to propose sections of the safety approval portion of its application
that the FAA could review independently. This process would allow an
applicant to submit completed sections, for example the System Safety
Program, to the FAA early, rather than wait until the entire
application was complete enough. The FAA would also be able, where
appropriate, to review and make determinations on these increments
prior to a full licensing determination. It would also allow an
applicant to identify more challenging or lengthy portions of an
application that could be submitted earlier to avoid delays and tolling
closer to a launch date. The FAA believes this process would improve
predictability for applicants seeking assurances against business
risks. As the FAA gains more experience with the incremental
application process, the FAA may issue guidance for the process or an
example of a process that has been found to satisfy the intent of the
regulation.
    The FAA considered the ARC's recommendations for predetermined
modules, but identified several concerns in attempting to model the
practice of such a process. The ARC provided a flow diagram that
partitioned the evaluation process into nine conceptual 30-day modules,
with the proposal that those modules could be reviewed in serial or in
parallel. As noted earlier, the FAA is statutorily limited to a 180-day
review process, so any review of modules in serial could not exceed 180
days. The ARC recommended that if the modules are submitted in parallel
for concurrent review, extra time should be provided for FAA review up
to 90 days to allow for dependent analyses. The ARC recommendation
asserted the importance that the modules are independent in terms of
content, when possible, but correctly acknowledged that some modules
will necessarily depend on others.\175\ The FAA seeks to provide as
much flexibility as practicable in the proposed process to enable
innovative business practices and schedules that contemplate frequent
launches and reentries, but many aspects of the safety evaluation are
interdependent, and the FAA requires certain material from one aspect
of a safety evaluation to inform and remain consistent with other
aspects. Furthermore, operators generally develop and define standards,
methodologies, processes, preliminary designs, and plans for an aspect
of their evaluation long before they are able to submit advanced
analysis products or testing results. The FAA seeks comment on how a
formal incremental review process would account for the statutory 180-
day review period, when application increments or modules are likely to
be submitted and reviewed at very different time periods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ ARC Report, p. 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To enable incremental application submission and review, the FAA is
proposing to amend Sec.  413.1 to broaden the term application to
encompass either a full application submitted for review or an
application portion submitted under the incremental review process. In
making this amendment, the FAA would be able to accommodate
applications submitted under either process. The FAA proposes to retain
the pre-application consultation requirement of Sec.  413.5, which is
streamlined by the proposed removal of Sec.  415.105 and its
duplicative requirement for a more prescriptive pre-application
consultation process. Under this proposal, an operator would be
required to identify whether it wants to enter into the incremental
application process during pre-application consultation. Should an
operator elect to submit its application incrementally, it would work
with the FAA to detail what is needed for each application portion to
begin review. In proposing an approach to incremental review, the FAA
expects that an applicant would consider the following:
    1. Application increments submitted at different times should be
not be dependent on other increments to the extent practicable.
    2. Application increments should be submitted in a workable
chronological order. In other words, an applicant should not submit an
application increment before a separate application increment on which
it is dependent. For example, the FAA would not expect to agree to
review a risk analysis before reviewing a debris analysis or
probability of failure analysis because the risk analysis is directly
dependent on the other two analyses.
    3. An applicant should be able to clearly identify all the
regulations and associated application materials that would be required
for each application increment, and should be able to demonstrate to
the FAA that all the applicable regulations are covered by the
separately submitted portions.

    4. Examples of application increments that may be suitable for
incremental review include: System Safety Program, Preliminary Safety
Assessment for Flight, Flight Safety Analysis Methods, and FSS Design.
    The FAA seeks comment on the incremental approach generally. The
FAA further seeks comment on any other useful guidelines that an
applicant should consider when crafting an incremental approach.
Finally, the FAA also seeks comment on any other safety approval
sections of a license application that would be appropriate for
incremental review.
    Finally, the FAA would amend Sec.  413.15 to provide that the time
frame for any incremental review and determinations would be
established with an applicant on a case-by-case basis during pre-
application consultation. The FAA would continue to work with
applicants during the pre-application phase to assist applicants in
navigating the FAA's regulations and identifying potential challenges.

C. Time Frames

    Chapter III regulations include a number of prescriptive time frame
requirements that the FAA proposes to make more flexible. In 2016, the
FAA conducted a review of the time frames in chapter III and found that
many could be made more flexible without any discernable impact on
safety. During meetings with the Commercial Spaceflight Federation
(CSF) \176\ in 2017 and 2018, some members of industry expressed
concern about the FAA's restrictive time frame requirements. The ARC
also stated that the current regulatory time frames and requirements
for submission of changes is onerous and untenable for high flight
rates.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) states that
its mission is ``to promote the development of commercial human
spaceflight, pursue ever-higher levels of safety, and share best
practices and expertise throughout the industry.'' Its member
businesses and organizations include commercial spaceflight
developers, operators, spaceports, suppliers and service providers.
    \177\ ARC Report, p. 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In consideration of the industry's comments and the FAA's review of
chapter III time frames, the FAA proposes in Sec.  450.15 to increase
flexibility by allowing an operator the option to propose alternative
time frames that better suit its operations. The FAA would revise the
time frame requirements in parts 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431,
437, and 440 that are overly burdensome and may result in waiver
requests. Further, the FAA would, after reviewing the operator's
request for an alternative time frame, provide the FAA's expected
review period to make its determination on the proposed alternative
time frame. The proposed revisions to parts 415, 417, and 431 would be
included in new proposed part 450. For ease of reference, the FAA would
list all revised chapter III time frames in proposed appendix A to part
404.
    Proposed Sec.  450.15(b) would inform the operator to submit its
request for an alternative time frame in writing. The ``in writing''
provision could be in the form of a formal letter or email sent
electronically to the email address [email protected], with the
subject line ``Alternative Time Frame Request.'' If an operator would
like to send the request in hardcopy, it would mail the request to the
Federal Aviation Administration, Associate Administrator for Commercial
Space Transportation, Room 331, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington,
DC 20591; Attention: Alternative Time Frame Request. The FAA
anticipates that an operator would submit these requests during the
pre-application consultation or during the application process, and not
after a license has been issued. At a minimum, the operator would be
required to submit its request before the time frame specified in the
regulations. Note, the FAA would need time to process the request. For
example, if a requirement states that an operator must submit a
document 30 days before launch, the operator may not submit a request
for an alternative time frame 30 days before launch or later. Also,
under the proposal, the requested alternate time frame must be
specific. For example, an operator could request to submit a document
15 days before launch, but not ``as soon as possible.'' The FAA would
provide the operator its decision in writing.
    Proposed Sec.  404.15(c) would provide the conditions under which
the Administrator would agree to an alternative time frame. That is,
the FAA would review and agree to an alternative time frame if the
proposed alternative time frame would allow time for the FAA to conduct
its review and make the requisite findings. For example, the default
time frame in proposed Sec.  450.213(b) for a licensee to submit to the
FAA certain payload information would be not less than 60 days before
each mission conducted under a license. The FAA uses the information to
verify that each payload fits within any approved class of payload
under the license, and to address any issues that may arise. The FAA
may only need a shorter time frame for this effort if the approved
payload classes are well defined and unlikely to generate payload-
specific issues. As another example, the default time frame in proposed
Sec.  450.213(d) for a licensee to submit to the FAA certain flight
safety system test data would be no later than 30 days before flight.
The FAA may agree to a shorter time frame for an experienced operator
that uses a proven flight safety system.

D. Continuing Accuracy of License Application and Modification of
License

    The FAA proposes to consolidate continuing accuracy requirements
currently in Sec. Sec.  417.11 and 431.73 in proposed Sec.  450.211.
The proposed rule would preserve the standards in Sec. Sec.  417.11 and
431.73. In addition, it would allow an applicant to request approval of
an alternate method for requesting license modifications during the
application process. This option currently only exists in Sec.  437.85
for experimental permits.
    Under the current regulations, an operator must ensure that any
representation contained in a license application is accurate for the
entire term of a license. After the FAA issues a launch license, an
operator must apply to the FAA for a license modification if any
representation that is material to public health and safety or safety
of property is no longer accurate (commonly referred to as ``material
change''). An application to modify a license must be prepared and
submitted in accordance with part 413. The licensee must indicate what
parts of its license application or license terms and conditions would
be affected by a proposed modification.
    Although license applications are often updated during the
application process, the application, as fixed at the time of license
issuance, becomes part of the licensing record. After issuing the
license, the FAA deems any material change to a representation in the
application to be a modification to the license. However, changes may
occur after a license is issued, particularly among operators that are
developing new systems or incorporating innovative technology. The FAA
does not wish for the material change requirement to deter those
changes intended to improve operations. Although the FAA and operators
may not always agree on what constitutes a material change, the FAA
works with the operator to resolve any issues and reduce uncertainties.
    Regarding compliance with an issued license, the ARC recommended
that information needed prior to each launch, as long as it is within
the approved flight envelope, should be minimized and a centralized,
automated

system for submitting preflight information should be established.
Continuing accuracy reviews should be limited to an assessment of the
risks created by the change. The ARC further recommended that if the
regulations continued to use the term ``material change,'' then that
term should be defined in the regulations, guidance, or pre-application
agreement.
    The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendations. While there already
exist avenues by which a licensee can minimize the need for license
modifications,\178\ this rule would adopt an approach from Sec.  437.85
where the FAA may identify the types of changes that a permittee may
make to a reusable suborbital rocket design without invalidating the
permit. In proposed Sec.  450.211, the FAA may approve an alternate
method for requesting license modifications if requested during the
application process. The FAA envisions that this approach would permit
an applicant during the application process to propose a method that is
responsive to its anticipated types of changes after a license is
issued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ A license applicant may circumvent or lessen the need for
frequent license modification due to material change by providing in
its application a range of payloads, flight trajectories, hazard
areas, and orbital destinations, so as to encompass more flexibility
in actual licensed operations. A license applicant may also create
acceptable processes for making changes to safety critical systems
and their components, mission rules, hazard areas, and safety
organization, that limit the need for license modifications. Part of
these processes would include a mechanism for informing FAA of the
change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the recommendation for the development of a centralized
automated system for submitting preflight information, while the FAA
has been flexible in accepting application material and license updates
submitted in electronic format, it recognizes that an improved system
is desirable. The FAA is exploring mechanisms to facilitate these
submissions.
    Finally, the FAA agrees with the ARC recommendation that it should
develop guidance on what constitutes a ``material change'' and has
identified the following areas that often constitute a material change:
    1. Safety-critical system or component changes (e.g., flight safety
system) that may affect public safety, including--
    a. Substitution of an existing safety-critical component with a
component with a new part number or manufacturer (reflecting changed
dimensions, changed functional or performance specifications, or
changed manufacturing process).
    b. Modifications to a safety critical component deemed necessary by
an anomaly investigation, and requiring re-verification by test or
inspection.
    c. Rework or repair of a safety-critical component after
inspections or tests revealed fabrication or assembly imperfections.
    d. Reuse, after an earlier launch or reentry, of safety-critical
systems or components, requiring refurbishment, re-qualification
testing, and re-acceptance testing.
    2. Hazard analysis changes that may affect public safety such as
the validity of the hazard analysis, mitigation measure, or
verification of a safety critical system or component.
    3. Flight safety rule changes that may affect public safety such as
flight commit criteria associated with public safety.
    4. Hazard area changes that may affect public safety, including the
dimensions of the area.
    5. Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) related changes that affect the
validity of the assumptions used to establish the MPL (e.g., change in
the number of personnel within a hazard area, change in trajectory
resulting in more overflight of people or property, increase in vehicle
size with more propellant, hazardous materials, or potential debris).
    6. Environmental Assessment related changes that affect the
validity of an environmental assessment (e.g., changes to mitigation
measures outlined in a record of decision or environmental impact
statement).
    7. Safety organization changes that may affect public safety such
as changes to the roles and responsibilities of the safety organization
or personnel, including changes in contractual safety services.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ As discussed earlier in the preamble, the proposed rule
would eliminate the current requirement to name a specific
individual as the safety official. Instead, the NPRM would allow for
one person or several persons to perform the safety official
functions, and, the operator would be required to designate a
position, not a specific individual, to accomplish the safety
official functions. Therefore, under this proposal, if the operator
changes the specific individual performing the safety official
functions, that would not constitute a material change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Critical documents or processes that may affect public safety.
    The FAA believes that this list provides guidance to help operators
better understand what constitutes a material change. As the industry
continues to develop and the FAA identifies material changes, it will
consider providing more detailed guidance.

Other Changes

A. Pre-Application Consultation

    As discussed earlier, the ARC recommended that the FAA require the
pre-application process only for new operators or new vehicle programs.
For all other operations, the ARC recommended that pre-application
occur at the operator's discretion.\180\ The FAA does not agree that
pre-application should be discretionary for anyone. In light of the
various flexibilities proposed in this rule, pre-application
consultation would remain critical to assist operators with the
licensing process, especially those that choose to avail themselves of
the flexibilities provided in this proposal. These flexibilities
include incremental review, timelines, and the performance-based nature
of many of the regulatory requirements. Pre-application consultation
eases the burden on both the applicant and the FAA during the
application process by identifying and resolving issues that allow
applicants to submit application materials the agency can accept as
complete enough for review. That being said, pre-application
consultation with an experienced operator conducting an operation
substantively similar to one previously licensed would likely be an
abbreviated process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ ARC Report, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the ARCs request for defined review times, the FAA
considered an approach to pre-application consultation that would
culminate in a mutually agreeable ``compliance plan.'' Under this
approach, a compliance plan would be developed collaboratively between
the applicant and the FAA. Key milestones that could be established by
the compliance plan would include, but would not be limited to, the
planned dates of the formal application submittal, the FAA's licensing
determination, and the submission of any required information that is
unavailable at the time of formal application submittal. The FAA chose
not to propose this requirement because it could be overly burdensome,
possibly delay an application submittal, and the compliance plan could
require frequent updates. However, the FAA would be open to commenters'
views on how to best develop a voluntary pre-application product, such
as a compliance plan.

B. Policy Review and Approval

    The FAA currently reviews a launch and reentry license application
to determine whether it presents any issues affecting national security

interests, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of
the United States. As part of its review and in accordance with section
50918 of the Act, the FAA consults with the Department of State,
Department of Defense, and other executive agencies, as appropriate.
The Department of Defense assesses the effect of the launch on U.S.
national security, and the Department of State assesses its effect on
foreign policy interests and international obligations of the United
States. For good practice, the FAA also consults with NASA, the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
for counsel on those U.S. interests related to the primary
responsibilities of each agency. As such, the FAA coordinates with the
FCC and NOAA over matters related to frequency licensing and Earth
imaging, respectively, and with NASA for matters particularly related
to its assets in space.
    Section 415.25 currently contains application requirements for a
policy review of the launch of a vehicle other than an RLV, Sec.
431.25 for the launch and reentry of an RLV, and Sec.  435.23 for the
launch of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV.\181\ To date, these
informational requirements have served their purpose well. However, the
FAA believes that the current informational requirements should be
modified to relieve the applicant of unnecessary burden and to improve
the utility of the information requested for a policy review.
Currently, Sec. Sec.  415.25(b) and 431.25(b) both require an applicant
to identify structural, pneumatic, propellant, propulsion, electrical
and avionics systems. Section 431.25(b) also requires an applicant to
identify thermal and guidance systems used in the launch vehicle, and
all propellants. Although identifying the aforementioned systems is
important for a safety review, the FAA believes that this information
is not critical for a policy review, which addresses whether the launch
or reentry presents issues affecting national security interests,
foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ These sections require an applicant to provide basic
information about the launch or reentry vehicle, its ownership,
launch site, flight azimuths, trajectories, associated ground tracks
and instantaneous impact points, sequence of planned events or
maneuvers during flight, range of nominal impact areas for all spent
motors and other discarded mission hardware, and for each orbital
mission, the range of intermediate and final orbits of each vehicle
upper stage, and their estimated orbital lifetimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA proposes to consolidate the policy review requirements
contained in Sec. Sec.  415.25 and 431.25 under proposed Sec.  450.41
(Policy Review and Approval). In doing so, the FAA would retain the
substance of the current requirements while further tailoring the
informational requirements toward a policy review. Also, the FAA would
replace the launch or reentry vehicle description requirements with
vehicle description requirements that are more appropriate for a policy
review. Finally, the FAA would require the applicant to provide flight
azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous
impact points, and contingency abort \182\ profiles, if any, for the
duration of the licensed activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ The FAA proposes to revise the definition in Sec.  401.5
of ``contingency abort'' to mean a flight abort with a landing at a
planned location that has been designated in advance of vehicle
flight. The proposed definition is discussed later in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, proposed Sec.  450.41(e)(2) would replace the current
requirement to identify structural, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical,
thermal, guidance and avionics systems with a requirement to describe
the launch or reentry vehicle and any stages, including their
dimensions, type and amounts of all propellants, and maximum thrust. As
previously mentioned, currently required information is not critical
for a policy review because policy determinations do not require the
same level of technical detail as a safety review and do not need to
delve into vehicle design specifics. Instead, the information required
by proposed Sec.  450.41(e)(2) would provide the FAA and its
interagency partners with the scope of the proposed activity that is
more pertinent to a policy review. Moreover, the FAA anticipates that
the proposed changes would be significantly less burdensome for an
applicant, as the information is readily available and requires minimal
effort to provide. In contrast, the currently required information,
while also readily available, might be extensive and require more
effort to compile.
    Additionally, it is unclear that the requirements to supply flight
azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous
impact points, currently found in Sec. Sec.  415.25(d)(2) and
431.25(d)(2), apply for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e.,
from lift-off to the end of licensed activities). For example,
applicants previously have interpreted the requirement to supply flight
azimuths and trajectories to end at orbital insertion because that is
when ground tracks and instantaneous impact points vanish. However,
during interagency coordination for policy reviews of orbital missions,
NASA and the Department of Defense have repeatedly, and specifically,
requested information from the FAA concerning the trajectories of upper
stages after orbital insertion in order to determine the potential for
the proposed mission to jeopardize the safety of government property in
outer space or national security.
    Therefore, in addition to consolidating Sec. Sec.  415.25(d)(2) and
431.25(d)(2) into proposed Sec.  450.41(e)(4)(ii), the FAA would add
language to clarify that the requirement to supply flight azimuths,
trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact
points applies for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e., lift
off to the end of launch). This clarification would eliminate the need
for the FAA to request additional information from an applicant to
satisfy inquiries from NASA and the Department of Defense during policy
reviews and prevent any unnecessary delays to the policy review
process.

C. Payload Review and Determination

    The FAA proposes to consolidate the payload review requirements.
The agency would also remove the requirement to identify the method of
securing the payload on an RLV, add application requirements to assist
the interagency review, such as the identification of approximate
transit time to final orbit and any encryption, clarify the FAA's
relationship with other federal agencies for payload reviews, and
modify the 60-day notification requirement currently found in
Sec. Sec.  415.55 and 431.53.
    While speaking of payload reviews, it is important to keep in mind
the definitions of launch vehicle and payload as defined in FAA
regulations. The FAA is not proposing to amend these definitions. A
launch vehicle is a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload in,
outer space or a suborbital rocket. A payload is an object that a
person undertakes to place in outer space by means of a launch vehicle,
including components of the vehicle specifically designed or adapted
for that object. Thus, a payload can become a reentry vehicle. For
example, the Dragon is a payload when it is launched on the Falcon 9
and a reentry vehicle when it reenters from Earth orbit. The FAA
believes that any component attached to, or part of, a launch or
reentry vehicle that has an intended use in space other than
transporting itself or a payload, is in fact a payload. For example,
the FAA has treated canisters of cremains attached to a stage left in
orbit as payloads.

    Pursuant to Sec.  415.51, unless the payload is exempt from review
under Sec.  415.53, the FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to
determine whether an applicant, payload owner, or operator has obtained
all the required licenses, authorization, and permits. The FAA further
determines whether a payload's launch would jeopardize public health
and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign
policy interests, or international obligations of the United States.
Similarly, both Sec.  431.51 for launch and reentry of an RLV and Sec.
435.41 for reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV, require the
FAA to review a payload to examine the policy and safety issues related
to the proposed reentry of a payload.
    Current Sec. Sec.  415.59 and 431.57 also require the applicant to
submit basic payload information to allow the FAA to conduct a payload
review. While the information requirements for payload review in
Sec. Sec.  415.59 and 431.57 are similar, they are not identical. Both
sections require that an applicant provide the payload's physical
dimensions and weight; owner and operator; orbital parameters for
parking, transfer, and final orbits; and hazardous materials, as
defined in Sec.  401.5, and radioactive materials, and the amounts of
each. However, Sec.  415.59 requires an applicant to provide the name
and class of the payload, the intended payload operations during the
life of the payload, and the delivery point in flight at which the
payload will no longer be under the licensee's control. Whereas, Sec.
431.57 requires an applicant to provide either the payload name or
payload class and function; the physical characteristics of the payload
in addition to the payload's dimensions and weight; the explosive
potential of payload materials, alone and in combination with other
materials found on the payload or RLV during reentry; and the method of
securing the payload on the reusable launch vehicle. It also replaces
delivery point with designated reentry site(s); and requires the
identification of intended payload operations during the life of the
payload. With respect to hazardous materials, Sec.  431.57 also
requires the applicant to identify the container of the hazardous
materials, in addition to the type and amount, because how the
hazardous materials are contained is important for reentry.
    The FAA believes that the current payload review informational
requirements necessitate modification to improve the utility and
efficiency of payload review. During interagency review, other agencies
have requested information from the FAA for the amount of time a
payload will take to reach its final orbital destination. This
information allows the agencies to assess the payload's potential to
impact their operations. However, current regulations do not contain an
informational requirement that the applicant provide this information.
As a result, the FAA often must make additional requests to the
applicant in order to provide the requesting agencies with the
information.
    In the past, most non-government payloads were telecommunications
or remote sensing satellites for which there were well-established
regulatory regimes. Operators are now proposing payloads with new
intended uses such as servicing other satellites and mapping frequency
use. The capabilities of payloads continue to grow; for example,
cubesats are appearing in great numbers with unique capabilities. As a
result, it is possible that these new uses may pose threats to national
security, such as the resolution of on-board cameras that might be used
to survey national security space assets. Consequently, payload reviews
increasingly need to address the threat that these new uses and
capabilities might pose to U.S. national security, either unintentional
or malicious.
    Additionally, Sec.  415.53 provides that the FAA does not review
payloads regulated by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. Section
431.51 provides that the FAA does not review payloads subject to
regulation by other federal agencies. However, neither of these
regulations reflect current practice. In practice, the FAA includes
payload information in its interagency reviews for all payloads, with
the exception of certain U.S. Government payloads for which information
is unavailable due to national security concerns, because Sec.  415.51
provides that the safety requirements apply to all payloads, regardless
of whether the payload is otherwise exempt. Even though the FAA
conducts a review of all payloads, the FAA does not impinge on the
authority of the FCC or the Department of Commerce, nor question the
decision of the FCC or NOAA to approve communications or remote sensing
satellites. It does not question the decision of another federal agency
concerning its payloads. More accurately, while the FAA may conduct a
review of all payloads, the FAA does not make a payload determination
on what it considers an ``exempt'' payload.
    Changes in the types of payloads that are being launched or
proposed have also complicated the scope of FAA payload reviews and
demonstrated that the language exempting certain payloads from review
is overly restrictive. The FAA has made payload determinations for
payloads that will undoubtedly require FCC or NOAA licensing, but the
proposed payload missions were beyond the scope of communications or
remote sensing. These payloads were examined in the interagency process
and neither the FCC nor NOAA took exception to the FAA's approach.
    Section 50918 of Title 51 of the U.S. Code mandates that the
Secretary of Transportation consult with the Secretary of Defense on
matters affecting national security, the Secretary of State on matters
affecting foreign policy, and the heads of other agencies when
appropriate. Section 50919(b) states that chapter 509 of Title 51 does
not affect the authority of the FCC or Department of Commerce. The
language of FAA regulations exempting from review those payloads
subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC, NOAA, and other agencies, is
more restrictive regarding the FAA's authority than what is required in
the statutory mandate of 51 U.S.C. 50918 and 50919. The genesis of this
more-limited role by the FAA came from the Report of House of
Representatives, May 31, 1984, that accompanied H.R. 3942.
Specifically, the report stated: ``[t]he Committee intends that the
Secretary not review or otherwise evaluate the merits of communications
satellites licensed and approved by the FCC, other than to assure the
proper integration of such payload with the launch vehicle and its
launch into orbit.'' At that time, almost all non-government payloads
were communications or remote sensing satellites, regulated by the FCC
and NOAA, respectively.
    When DOT published the initial licensing regulations in 1988, the
preamble noted that the payloads subject to existing payload regulation
included only telecommunications satellites licensed by the FCC and
remote sensing satellites licensed by NOAA. It went on to state that
payloads that were not subject to review by DOT included all domestic
payloads not presently regulated by the FCC or NOAA and all foreign
payloads. Almost any domestic payload, even if it is not a
telecommunications satellite, however, requires FCC licensing because
it will invariably have a U.S.-owned or -operated transmitter for
telemetry purposes. Therefore, it appears that the intention of the
rule was only to exclude from FAA regulation telecommunications
satellites licensed by the FCC and likewise, remote sensing satellites
licensed by

NOAA, and not any satellite with a transmitter licensed by the FCC or
with some incidental remote sensing capability.
    In recent years, there have been proposals for commercial payloads
where the primary purpose might be scientific or exploratory or even
artistic. Despite their primary purpose, these payloads almost always
require an FCC license because they have transmitters for telemetry.
Similarly, some payloads also require approval by NOAA even though
remote sensing may be ancillary to the main purpose. Without an
interagency review, the FAA has no direct means of knowing whether a
payload is exempt from review and, as a result, has initiated
interagency reviews. These reviews also serve the purpose of alerting
the other agencies to launches of payloads that might jeopardize U.S.
national security or foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States, even if they are exempt from an FAA
payload review. Although the FAA has not to date been faced with the
Department of Defense or the Department of State raising concerns
through the interagency review regarding national security or foreign
policy for an ``exempt'' payload, the FAA believes that it would be its
responsibility to convey those concerns to the appropriate agencies for
resolution.
    The ARC asserts that the payload reviews being conducted are more
detailed than necessary to assure the protection of ``public health and
safety.'' The ARC recommended that payloads that stay within the
vehicle, have non-hazardous materials, or those that have previously
been approved for flight, should not require reviews. It recommended
that safety goals can be met by only requiring reviews for hazardous
payloads that could impact ``public health and safety.'' The ARC also
stated that it would be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous
payloads ejected from the launch vehicle in reportable quantities using
the existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101. It believes such an approach
would reduce unnecessary paperwork and subsequent FAA review for
``benign payloads,'' and the reduction of burden on the FAA to review
``non-safety related payloads'' would support industry's increased
flight tempo and reduce FAA review times.
    The FAA does not agree with the ARC recommendation that payloads
that stay within the vehicle, payloads that are non-hazardous
materials, or those that have previously been approved for flight
should not require reviews. The fact that a payload remains on or
within the launch or reentry vehicle does not change the function of
the payload. The payload's intended use in space or changes in the
orbit of the vehicle to accommodate the payload operation might present
issues because it could affect NASA or Department of Defense assets
either due to its orbit or function. For example, the Department of
Defense has concerns regarding payloads that may pass close enough to
its assets to photograph them. The FAA recognizes that some payloads,
such as canisters of cremains, attached to an upper stage, might have
little or no safety or policy implications. However, a review is still
necessary to make that determination. Obviously, the absence of
hazardous materials also removes some safety concerns; however, as
previously discussed, hazardous materials are not the only concern
addressed in the payload review.
    While payloads that stay within a vehicle, do not contain hazardous
materials, or have previously been approved may require less scrutiny,
a payload review is still required because the FAA is statutorily
mandated under 51 U.S.C. 50904(c) to determine whether a license
applicant or payload owner or operator has obtained all required
licenses, authorization, and permits. If no license or authorization or
permit is required by another federal agency, the FAA must determine
whether a launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United States. Similarly, while
potentially it might be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous
payloads ejected from a launch vehicle in reportable quantities using
existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101, the FAA must still comply with
the statutory requirements imposed on it by 51 U.S.C. 50904(c). Both
the FAA's current and proposed regulations reflect this statutory
requirement.
    As for payloads that have previously been approved for launch, the
FAA already authorizes classes of payloads under Sec. Sec.  431.53 and
415.55, but it still requires identification of the specific payload at
least 60 days prior to the launch in order to confirm that the payload
fits within the authorized class and to coordinate with other federal
agencies. The FAA currently does not make a new payload determination
if a payload fits within a class of payloads authorized under a
particular license, but the review is still necessary to confirm there
are no issues that affect public health and safety, the safety of
property, or national security. The more defined the payload class, the
less the likelihood of any issues once the specific payload is
identified. For series of virtually identical payloads, the FAA has
authorized the entire series. A payload or launch operator can work
with the FAA to facilitate and expedite payload approvals by defining
payload classes to accommodate possible payloads. Also, payload classes
authorized for one operator will usually be authorized for another
operator. The FAA acknowledges that the current 60-day notification
requirement might be unnecessary for certain well-defined payload
classes and proposes to modify this requirement to permit a shorter
notification on a case-by-case basis. The FAA anticipates that the
notification requirement would be specified either in the separate
payload determination or in a vehicle operator license.
    The ARC recommended that payloads that contain hazardous materials
in Federally-reportable quantities be reviewed in 15 days. The FAA does
not agree with the ARC's recommendation because there are other
considerations regarding intended operations in space that might affect
national security or the safety of property. For example, a payload may
have the capability of observing or interfering with U.S. national
security assets or violate a provision of a treaty.
    The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for a payload
review currently contained in subparts D of parts 415, 431, and 435 in
proposed Sec.  450.43 (Payload Review and Determination). The proposed
consolidation would retain most of the current payload review
requirements. The limited changes the FAA proposes to the payload
requirements are discussed in this section.
    The FAA proposes to modify the relationship with other agencies by
removing the misleading statement that the FAA does not review payloads
that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of
Commerce. Specifically, the FAA proposes to modify the regulation to
reflect that while it does not review those aspects of payloads that
are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce, it
still reviews the payloads to determine their effect on the safety of
launch. The FAA also consults with other agencies to determine whether
their launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United States. Proposed Sec.
450.43(b) would provide that the FAA would not make a payload
determination over those aspects of payloads that are subject to
regulation by the FCC or the

Department of Commerce. The FAA does not intend to interfere with any
requirement that these agencies might impose or with approvals or
denials. This clarification is merely a recognition of current practice
regarding payloads that do not easily fit into the existing regulatory
rubric.
    The FAA also proposes not to retain the specific reference to NOAA
in Sec.  415.53(a). Although commercial remote sensing is currently
licensed by NOAA's Office of Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory
Affairs (CRSRA), the Secretary of Commerce recently proposed merging
CRSRA with NOAA's Office of Space Commerce and moving them directly
under the Office of the Secretary of Commerce. As a result, proposed
Sec.  450.43(b) would revise the description of which payloads are
exempt, to clarify that a payload planning to conduct remote sensing
operations would be exempt if licensed by any office within the
Department of Commerce.
    In consolidating the informational requirements in parts 415, 431,
and 435, the FAA proposes to eliminate information requirements
concerning the method of securing a payload that was a requirement
under Sec.  431.57(g) for RLVs because that information is not relevant
to a payload review. The FAA considered replacing that informational
requirement with a more general one to provide the potential of the
payload to affect the dynamics of the vehicle. However, the FAA
determined such information was more pertinent to the vehicle operator
and should instead be included in systems safety analysis for the
launch or reentry, if appropriate.
    Proposed Sec.  450.43(i)(1) also would require an applicant to
provide an expanded description for the payload that would include its
composition and any hosted payloads in addition to the current
requirements of physical dimensions and weight. The FAA proposes to ask
for any foreign ownership of the payload or payload operator. In
addition, the FAA would add the approximate transit times to final
orbit for the payload. The FAA proposes to elaborate what it means by
intended payload operations during the life of the payload by adding
its anticipated life span and any planned disposal. Further, it
proposes a requirement to describe any encryption associated with data
storage on the payload and transmissions to or from the payload.
Encryption helps ensure against cyber intrusion, loss of spacecraft
control, and potential debris-causing events. The FAA is proposing
these additions to the information requirements for launches to assist
other federal agencies because NASA and the Department of Defense
frequently have requested this information in response to the FAA's
interagency review in order to determine whether the proposed payload
would jeopardize the safety of government property in outer space, or
U.S. national security.
    The FAA also proposes to add a general requirement that it may
request any other information necessary to make a determination based
on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security
or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United
States. The FAA believes that it would rarely invoke this provision but
believes that it is crucial to address unique payloads.
    The FAA anticipates that for payload classes--as distinguished from
specific payloads--the applicant might only be able to provide a range
of expected transit times and would find this acceptable. Similarly,
for classes of payloads the FAA would find it appropriate to provide
ranges for information related to size of the payload and quantities of
hazardous materials. It also proposes to add the explosive potential of
payload materials, alone and in combination with other materials on the
payload for launches, as it already does for reentries because the
information is equally relevant to the safety of a launch as for a
reentry.
    The FAA anticipates that these additional data requirements would
impose minimal burden, if any, on the applicant. For example, the
payload operator should already have detailed plans for moving its
payload to its final destination, and the explosive equivalent for most
materials is easily calculated using readily-available information. As
another example, in requesting information about what encryption, if
any, is used, the FAA is not asking for a detailed account of
encryption methodology. Many operators are already using 256-bit
Advanced Encryption Standard encryption (AES-256) to protect commercial
telemetry, tracking, and control data links and mission data
transmission or storage. In this case, an operator would only need to
state that it uses AES-256. These additional data requirements help
inform the overall evaluation of a payload.
    By specifying in its regulations what is required to expedite the
FAA's payload review process without the need to make supplemental
requests to an applicant to address interagency concerns, and the
applicant would avoid having to respond to such requests. The FAA seeks
comment on this proposed approach.

D. Safety Review and Approval

    As part of its current licensing process under parts 415 and 431,
the FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether a proposed launch
or reentry will jeopardize public health and safety and safety of
property. The FAA would not change the philosophy or purpose of a
safety review in this rulemaking. As with the current regulations, an
applicant would have to satisfy the safety requirements in order to
obtain a license to conduct a launch or reentry. Only a vehicle
operator license applicant would be eligible to apply for a safety
approval, and may apply for a safety approval separately and
incrementally. As with current regulations, the FAA would advise an
applicant, in writing, of any issues raised during a safety review that
would impede issuance of a license, and the applicant may respond in
writing, or amend its license application in accordance with Sec.
413.17. This proposal would also not change the process by which the
FAA denies a license, and the recourse afforded an applicant if a
license is denied.
    For launches and reentries from, or to, a Federal launch range or
any launch or reentry site where a Federal launch range provides
safety-related launch or reentry services or property by contract, the
FAA would accept the service or property as meeting the relevant
requirements of proposed part 450, as long as the FAA determines that
the Federal launch range's safety requirements for the launch or
reentry services or property provided satisfy those requirements. Note
that a Federal launch range could, at the direction of the operator,
provide FSA products such a debris risk analyses or flight safety
limits analyses, directly to the FAA on behalf of an operator.
    While the FAA is not proposing to change the philosophy and purpose
of a safety review and approval, the FAA is proposing changes to the
requirements to obtain a safety approval. The FAA proposes to locate
the application requirements for a safety approval in proposed Sec.
450.45 (Safety Review and Approval), in paragraph (e), and throughout
proposed subpart C.
    The application requirements in proposed Sec.  450.45(e) are
general and not specific to any safety requirement, and would include
information not covered explicitly in proposed subpart C. Proposed
Sec.  450.45(e)(1) would address basic requirements for an application,
such as the inclusion of a glossary of terms and a listing of
referenced material. This proposed requirement is similar to current
Sec.  415.107, although

the proposed regulation would not include the requirement for an
application to be logically organized, with a clear and consistent page
numbering system, and topics cross-referenced. The FAA expects an
applicant to ensure its application meets these basic organizational
standards without explicitly requiring them.
    In proposed Sec.  450.45(e)(2), the FAA would require an applicant
to submit information about its launch or reentry site. This proposed
requirement is similar to current Sec.  415.109(a), with the addition
of references to a reentry site.
    In proposed Sec.  450.45(e)(3), the FAA would require an applicant
to submit information about its launch or reentry vehicle, including
safety critical systems. This proposed requirement is similar to
current Sec.  415.109(b), but would include reentry vehicles in
addition to launch vehicles.
    In proposed Sec.  450.45(e)(4), the FAA would require an applicant
to submit a generic launch or reentry processing schedule that
identifies any readiness activities, such as reviews and rehearsals,
each safety-critical preflight operation, and day of flight activities.
Although the proposed regulations do not necessarily require reviews or
rehearsals, should the applicant propose them to meet readiness
requirements, they should be included in the schedule. This proposed
requirement is similar to current Sec.  415.119, but with the addition
of reentry vehicles.
    Proposed Sec.  450.45(e)(5) would apply to any proposed launch or
reentry with a human being on board the vehicle, and would require an
applicant to demonstrate compliance with certain safety requirements in
part 460. This proposed requirement is similar to current Sec.  415.8,
except that it would include reentry vehicles.
    Proposed Sec.  450.45(e)(6) would address the potential launch or
reentry of radionuclides, similar to current Sec.  415.115(b) but with
the addition of reentries. Because such proposals are rare, it is the
current practice of the FAA to address the public safety issues on a
case-by-case basis. This proposed rule would not change this approach.
    Lastly, in proposed Sec.  450.45(e)(7), the FAA would reserve the
right to request additional information if necessary. This request
would include information incorporated by reference in the license
application, such as a previous application submittal. The FAA could
also request additional products that would allow the FAA to conduct an
independent safety analysis. The FAA periodically conducts independent
system safety and flight safety analyses in order to gain a deeper
understanding of the safety issues associated with a launch or reentry
proposal. This independent analysis is particularly important for novel
systems or operations. The FAA proposes to continue this practice with
this rulemaking.
    Proposed subpart C would contain the remainder of the application
requirements for a safety approval. With some exceptions, discussed
later, each safety requirement in proposed subpart C has application
requirements articulated at the end of each section. Under current
regulations for ELVs, application requirements are contained in part
415, while safety requirements are contained in part 417. Under current
regulations for RLVs contained in part 431, application requirements
and safety requirements are not distinguished so clearly. The proposed
approach is designed to clearly separate safety requirements from
application requirements.
    However, the following proposed sections do not include application
requirements, either because they introduce other sections or because
the FAA would not require a demonstration of compliance to obtain a
license:
    1. Sec.  450.101: This section would address the core public safety
criteria for launching a launch vehicle or reentering a reentry
vehicle. An applicant would demonstrate that it can meet these criteria
in other parts of proposed subpart C.
    2. Sec.  450.113 (Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope and
Applicability): This section would address the scope and applicability
of the FSA requirements contained in Sec. Sec.  450.113 through
450.141.
    3. Sec.  450.157: This section would include requirements for
communication procedures, but an applicant would not have to
demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license.
    4. Sec.  450.159: This section would include requirements for
preflight procedures. Similar to proposed Sec.  450.157, an applicant
would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to
obtain a license.
    5. Sec.  450.169: This section would include requirements for
launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis. An applicant would not
have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a
license, but it would have to provide certain information to the FAA
prior to a launch or reentry.
    6. Sec.  450.179 (Ground Safety--General): This section would
address the scope and applicability of the ground safety requirements
contained in Sec. Sec.  450.181 (Coordination with a Site Operator)
through 450.189.

E. Environmental Review

    The FAA proposes to consolidate environmental review requirements
for launch and reentry operators in a single section, as proposed Sec.
450.47 (Environmental Review). Currently, these requirements are set
forth in Sec. Sec.  415.201, 415.203, 431.91, 431.93, and 435.61. In
addition, the FAA proposes to revise current Sec. Sec.  420.15, 433.7,
433.9, and 437.21 to conform to the changes in proposed Sec.  450.47.
Apart from consolidation, these proposed revisions would not alter the
current environmental review process.
    The FAA is responsible for complying with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable environmental
laws, regulations, and Executive Orders prior to issuing a launch or
reentry license. To comply with NEPA, the FAA must first determine
whether the licensing action requires a Categorical Exclusion (CATEX),
an Environmental Assessment (EA), or an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). A CATEX is appropriate when actions, individually or
cumulatively, do not have a significant effect on the human
environment. An EA broadly documents evidence and analysis necessary to
determine whether a proposed action may significantly affect the human
environment requiring the preparation of an EIS or results in a finding
of no significant impact (FONSI). If the action may significantly
affect the human environment, NEPA requires preparation of an EIS. An
EIS is a thorough analysis of a proposed action's impacts on the
environment, including a public involvement process.
    Under current FAA practice, the issuance of a new launch or reentry
license does not fall within the scope of a CATEX. However, an
applicant may provide data and analysis to assist the FAA in
determining whether a CATEX could apply (including whether an
extraordinary circumstance exists) to a license modification. Examples
include modifications that are administrative in nature or involve
minor facility siting, construction, or maintenance actions. If a CATEX
does not apply to the proposed action, but it is not anticipated to
have significant environmental effects, then NEPA requires the
preparation of an EA instead. The FAA may prepare an EA using
applicant-provided information. In the alternative, an applicant may
prepare an EA with FAA oversight. When NEPA requires an EIS for
commercial space actions, the FAA uses third-party contracting to

prepare the document. That is, the FAA selects a contractor to prepare
the EIS, and the license applicant pays the contractor. Finally, if an
EA or EIS was previously developed, the FAA may require a written re-
evaluation of the environmental document to ensure the document's
continued adequacy, accuracy and validity.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and
Procedures, provides a more detailed description of the FAA's
policies and procedures for NEPA and CEQ compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would not alter the current environmental review
requirements. However, the consolidation of the launch and reentry
regulations would require a consolidation of the environmental review
requirements.

F. Additional License Terms and Conditions, Transfer of a Vehicle
Operator License, Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License

    As discussed earlier in this preamble, the FAA proposes to
consolidate, under proposed part 450, the differing types of launch and
reentry licenses, currently in parts 415, 431, and 435, into a single
vehicle operator license. As part of this consolidation, the FAA would
combine specified sections of parts 415, 431, and 435 into proposed
sections of part 450, such that the consolidated requirements would
apply to a single vehicle operator license. Except for these changes,
the current requirements would remain the same. The specific proposed
changes are identified below.
1. Additional Terms and Conditions
    The FAA proposes to consolidate the current additional terms and
conditions requirements in Sec. Sec.  415.11, 431.11, and 435.11 into
proposed Sec.  450.9 (Additional License Terms and Conditions) without
substantive change. Therefore, the proposed requirement would state
that the FAA may amend a vehicle operator license at any time by
modifying or adding terms and conditions to the license to ensure
compliance with the Act and regulations.
2. Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License
    The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements to transfer a
license in current Sec. Sec.  415.13, 431.13, and 435.13 into proposed
Sec.  450.11 (Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License). Although the
location of the requirements would change, the requirements themselves
would not substantively change.
    The proposed requirements would continue to provide that only the
FAA may transfer a vehicle operator license; and, that an applicant
must submit a license application to transfer a license according to
the provisions of part 413 and the requirements of proposed part 450.
Also, like the current requirements, the proposal would require an
applicant to satisfy all of the approvals and determinations required
under part 450 before the FAA would transfer a license to an applicant,
and the FAA would retain the ability to incorporate by reference any
findings made part of the record to support the initial licensing
determination and to modify a license to reflect any changes necessary
because of a license transfer.
3. Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License
    The FAA proposes to consolidate in proposed Sec.  450.13 (Rights
Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License) the requirements in
current Sec. Sec.  415.15, 431.15, and 435.15 regarding the rights that
are not conferred by issuance of a license. Although the location of
the requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not
substantively change.
    The proposed requirements would continue to state that issuance of
a vehicle operator license does not relieve a licensee of its
obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or
regulation that may apply to its activities. In addition, the proposal
would state the issuance of a license does not confer any proprietary,
property or exclusive right in the use of any Federal launch range or
related facilities, airspace, or outer space.

G. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements, and Practices

    Proposed Sec.  450.177 (Unique Policies, Requirements and
Practices) would require an operator to review operations, system
designs, analysis, and testing, and to identify any unique launch or
reentry hazards not otherwise addressed by proposed part 450,
consistent with current regulations and practice. An operator would be
required to implement any unique safety policy, requirement, or
practice needed to protect the public from the unique hazard. In its
application, an operator would have to identify any unique safety
policy, requirement, or practice, and demonstrate that each it protects
public health and safety and the safety of property.
    Proposed Sec.  450.177 would also provide that the FAA may identify
and impose a unique policy, requirement, or practice, as needed, to
protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In
its application, an operator would need to demonstrate that each unique
safety policy, requirement, or practice imposed by the FAA protects
public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States.
    Proposed Sec.  450.177 is largely the same as Sec.  417.127 with
two differences. Section 417.127 requires an applicant to file a
request for license modification for any change to a unique safety
policy, requirement, or practice. The FAA would not incorporate this
requirement in proposed part 450 because it is duplicative given the
general license modification requirement in proposed Sec.  450.177.
Also, Sec.  417.127 applies only when necessary to protect the public,
whereas proposed Sec.  450.177(b) would also apply to national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States. This is necessary to
cover the full scope of FAA's licensing authority.
    The purpose for this proposed section is the same as for current
Sec.  417.127. As the space transportation industry continues to grow,
advances in technology and implementation of innovations by launch and
reentry operators will likely introduce new and unforeseen safety
challenges. These unique challenges will require FAA officials and
operators to collaborate on a case-by-case basis to identify and
mitigate those unique hazards to public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States not specifically addressed by proposed part 450.

H. Compliance Monitoring

    The FAA proposes to combine the compliance monitoring requirements
of parts 417 and 431 into Sec.  450.209 (Compliance Monitoring). In
combining the requirements, the FAA would adopt Sec.  417.23. The FAA
currently conducts safety inspections to ensure a licensee complies
with applicable regulations, the terms and conditions of its license,
and representations the licensee made in its application.
    Compliance monitoring requirements are codified in Sec. Sec.
417.23, 431.83, and 435.51. Section 417.23 requires that a launch
operator cooperate with and allow Federal officers or employees access
to observe any of its activities associated with the conduct of a
licensed launch, and provide the FAA with a console for monitoring the
countdown's progress, and the communication on all channels of the
countdown communication network. The requirements of Sec. Sec.
417.23(a) and 431.83 are nearly identical in that both require a
licensee to cooperate with and

to allow Federal officers or employees access to observe any of its
activities associated with the conduct of a licensed RLV mission.
However, unlike Sec.  417.23, Sec.  431.83 does not require a licensee
to provide a console to the FAA for monitoring all the channels on the
countdown communication network.
    Monitoring the communications channels--including countdown,
anomaly, range coordination, surveillance, and weather--is a vital part
of compliance monitoring and safety inspection operations, regardless
of operation type. Under part 417, a licensee cooperates with the FAA
and provides its inspectors with access and consoles to observe the
activities associated with the licensed launch. As a result, the FAA is
able to monitor all communication channels, and has access to the
safety official and the mission director through the communications
panel and through a phone line. FAA inspectors regularly monitor an
operator's communications channels. In doing so, an inspector can
become aware of issues that arise during a countdown. These issues may
include vehicle health, ground operations, FSS health, range readiness,
clearance of surveillance and hazard areas, weather, and countdown
procedures. Additionally, listening to the communications channels also
gives an inspector a sense of an operator's safety culture, rigor, and
readiness. In addition, inspectors can communicate face-to-face with
the safety official and the mission director, if necessary, because
they are typically collocated.
    Although there is a requirement in part 431, and incorporated by
reference in part 435, that an operator cooperate with safety
inspectors, there is no specific requirement for the licensee to
provide access to all communication channels. The FAA has had to
discuss with the operator what channels will be available for
monitoring during these operations. Some operators have contended that
their employees will not be as forthcoming with information if they
know FAA inspectors are listening. However, being able to hear how the
operator communicates during critical operations is necessary for
inspectors to determine compliance and to address problems before they
occur. Since inspectors cannot physically listen to all channels
concurrently, an inspector will listen to one or more channels that can
provide situational awareness and information used to determine
compliance. The necessary discussions require additional time and may
cause a delay, consume man-hours, and is a cost to both the government
and the operator during the license application phase, or potentially
during a launch countdown.
    Regarding the contention that personnel are less likely to discuss
problems if inspectors are monitoring their conversation, the FAA
strives to be as unobtrusive as possible so as not to affect
operations. Additionally, the purpose of compliance monitoring is not
to punish operators. Rather, channel monitoring and on-site inspection
allows inspectors to identify potential licensing issues and alert the
operator, so it can take action to maintain or return to compliance.
This approach ensures safety while minimizing impacts to the operator.
There have been many instances where inspectors noticed incorrect test
setups for FSS checks, for example, or other issues during compliance
monitoring that would affect public safety, and informed the operator
so they could be corrected before safety was impacted.
    Compliance monitoring is important for ensuring public safety and
requires that FAA safety inspectors be exposed to actual operations in
order to be trained, qualified, and capable of performing their safety-
critical role. Because safety inspectors are trained to detect non-
compliances, they need to have access to, and the discretion to see and
hear, as much of the operation as they deem necessary. Observing
activities for training and familiarization purposes benefits both the
inspectors and the operator because the more familiar an inspector is
with an operation, the better he or she can perform the inspection.
Knowledgeable inspectors cause less operational impacts because they
ask fewer questions and are less likely to incorrectly identify a non-
compliance.
    The FAA proposes to combine the compliance monitoring requirements
of Sec. Sec.  417.23 and 431.83 in proposed Sec.  450.209. The proposed
regulation would primarily adopt those requirements in Sec.  417.23,
but ``launch operator'' would be replaced by ``licensee'', and
``licensed launch'' would be replaced by ``licensed launch or
reentry.'' Additionally, the FAA proposes to allow an operator the
option to provide the FAA with means other than a console for
monitoring the communication and countdown channels. For example, a
smaller company may operate without consoles, in which case the
operator may provide the FAA with radio monitoring and a location in
close proximity to the necessary data to monitor launch. As a result,
the compliance monitoring requirements of proposed Sec.  450.209 would
apply to all launch and reentry operations, thereby capturing licensed
launch operations under current part 417 and licensed RLV operations
under current part 431. Proposed Sec.  450.209 also codifies current
FAA practice for conducting compliance monitoring of part 435
operations.
    Proposed Sec.  450.209(b) would require the licensee to provide the
FAA with a console or other means for monitoring the countdown and
communication network. This proposed requirement would alleviate the
issues that result from extended negotiations. The option for ``other
means'' would provide the operator with some flexibility, as the FAA
recognizes that operations may occur with temporary infrastructure and
a console may be an unrealistic request. In this case, the operator
would be expected to provide the FAA with an alternative method to
monitor communications that is approved by the FAA prior to operations.

I. Registration of Space Objects

    The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for the
registration of space objects in proposed Sec.  450.217 (Registration
of Space Objects). These requirements currently reside in Sec. Sec.
417.19 and 431.85 and are largely identical. This proposal would not
change the substantive requirements of either section, except to add a
registration requirement for objects owned by a foreign entity.
    The 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Registration Convention), to which the United States is a
signatory, requires details about the orbit of each space object. To
that end, current regulations require an applicant to provide
information on space objects that the FAA forwards to the Department of
State. The Department of State then registers the objects with the
United Nations as required by the Registration Convention. Since
enacting these current regulations, the Department of State has
requested that the FAA also provide this information for objects
possibly owned by foreign entities.
    Current registration of space objects requirements is codified in
Sec.  417.19, applicable to ELVs, and Sec.  431.85, applicable to RLVs.
The two provisions are substantively identical in all respects but one.
That is, they both require the registration of any object placed in
space by a licensed mission, unless the object is owned and registered
by the U.S. Government or owned by a foreign entity. Similarly, both
sections require the licensee to submit information about the space
object's international designator, the date and location of the
mission, the general function of the space object, and

the final orbital parameters. The sole substantive distinction is that
Sec.  431.85 also requires an operator to notify the FAA when it
removes a space object.
    Proposed Sec.  450.217 would deviate from current Sec. Sec.  417.19
and 431.85 by requiring the registration of foreign-owned space
objects. The FAA would not require the licensee to determine the
owner's nationality. The Department of State would use this information
to ensure that other nations meet their obligations by registering
their foreign objects. Proper registration of all objects owned by
foreign entities would allow for the protection of the United States
from liability associated with these objects.
    Otherwise, the FAA would retain the same informational
requirements. It would continue to require a licensee to submit
information about the space object's international designator, the date
and location of the mission, the general function of the space object,
and the final orbital parameters. Additionally, proposed Sec.  450.217
would retain current Sec.  431.85's requirement that an operator notify
the FAA when it removes a space object.

J. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, Records,