[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 56 (Monday, March 24, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15987-15988]
[FR Doc No: 2014-06344]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[ Docket Nos. CP14-96-000; PF13-16-000]

Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC; Notice of Application

    Take notice that on February 28, 2014, Algonquin Gas Transmission,
LLC (Algonquin), 5400 Westheimer Court, Houston, Texas 77056, filed in
the above referenced docket an application pursuant to sections 7(b)
and 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) for the proposed Algonquin
Incremental Market Project (AIM Project). Specifically, Algonquin
requests authorization to: (i) construct, install, operate, and
maintain approximately 37.6 miles of take-up and relay, loop, and
lateral pipeline facilities, and appurtenances in New York,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts; (ii) modify six existing compressor
stations in New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, resulting in the
addition of 81,620 horsepower (HP) of compression; (iii) modify 24
existing metering and regulating (M&R) stations and construct three new
M&R stations; (iv) abandon certain existing facilities; and (v)
approval of the pro forma tariff records to establish the incremental
AIM Project firm transportation rate, an incremental fuel percentage
applicable to service on the AIM Project, and the initial recourse
rates for service on the West Roxbury Lateral (which is part of the
proposed AIM Project, but has separate rate schedules). Algonquin
states that the AIM Project will provide a total of 342,000 dekatherms
per day of firm transportation service. Algonquin estimates the cost of
the AIM Project to be approximately $971,551,683, all as more fully set
forth in the application which is on file with the Commission and open
to public inspection. The filing is available for review at the
Commission in the Public Reference Room or may be viewed on the
Commission's Web site web at http://www.ferc.gov using the ``eLibrary''
link. Enter the docket number excluding the last three digits in the
docket number field to access the document. For assistance, contact
FERC at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or call toll-free,<PHONE_NUMBER> or
TYY,<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Any questions concerning this application may be directed to Berk
Donaldson, Director, Rates and Certificates, Algonquin Gas
Transmission, LLC, PO Box 1642, Houston, Texas 77251-1642, by telephone
at<PHONE_NUMBER> or by facsimile at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    On June 28, 2013, the Commission staff granted Algonquin's request
to utilize the Pre-Filing Process and assigned Docket No. PF13-16-000
to staff activities involved in the AIM Project. Now, as of the filing
of the February 28, 2014 application, the Pre-Filing Process for this
project has ended. From this time forward, this proceeding will be
conducted in Docket No. CP14-96-000, as noted in the caption of this
Notice.
    Pursuant to section 157.9 of the Commission's rules (18 CFR 157.9),
within 90 days of this Notice, the Commission staff will either:
complete its environmental assessment (EA) and place it into the
Commission's public record (eLibrary) for this proceeding; or issue a
Notice of Schedule for Environmental Review. If a Notice of Schedule
for Environmental Review is issued, it will indicate, among other
milestones, the anticipated date for the Commission staff's issuance of
the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) or EA for this
proposal. The filing of the EA in the Commission's public record for
this proceeding or the issuance of a Notice of Schedule for
Environmental Review will serve to notify federal and state agencies of
the timing for the completion of all necessary reviews, and the
subsequent need to complete all federal authorizations within 90 days
of the date of issuance of the Commission staff's FEIS or EA.
    There are two ways to become involved in the Commission's review of
this project. First, any person wishing to obtain legal status by
becoming a party to the proceedings for this project should, on or
before the comment date stated below file with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, a
motion to intervene in accordance with the requirements of the
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.214 or
385.211) and the Regulations under the NGA (18 CFR 157.10). A person
obtaining party status will be placed on the service list maintained by
the Secretary of the Commission and will receive copies of all
documents filed by the applicant and by all other parties. A party must
submit seven copies of filings made in the proceeding with the
Commission and must mail a copy to the applicant and to every other
party. Only parties to the proceeding can ask for court review of
Commission orders in the proceeding.
    However, a person does not have to intervene in order to have
comments considered. The second way to participate is by filing with
the Secretary of the Commission, as soon as possible, an original and
two copies of comments in support of or in opposition to this project.
The Commission will consider these comments in determining the
appropriate action to be taken, but the filing of a comment alone will
not serve to make the filer a party to the proceeding. The Commission's
rules require that persons filing comments in opposition to the project
provide copies of their protests only to the party or parties directly
involved in the protest.
    Persons who wish to comment only on the environmental review of
this project should submit an original and two copies of their comments
to the Secretary of the Commission. Environmental commentors will be
placed on the Commission's environmental mailing list, will receive
copies of the environmental documents, and will be notified of meetings
associated with the Commission's environmental review process.
Environmental commentors will not be required to serve copies of filed
documents on all other parties. However, the non-party commentors will
not receive copies of all documents filed by other parties or issued by
the Commission (except for the mailing of environmental documents
issued by the Commission) and will not have the right to seek court
review of the Commission's final order.
    The Commission strongly encourages electronic filings of comments,
protests and interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link
at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should
submit an original and 7 copies of the protest or intervention to the
Federal Energy regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington,
DC 20426.
    Comment Date: April 8, 2014.

    Dated: March 18, 2014.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-06344 Filed 3-21-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


Farm ID # _______________

Methyl Bromide Critical Use Exemption Enterprise Budget Work Sheets Methyl Bromide Tomatoes  Southwest  Single Crop Yield Cartons Per Acre IFAS Average 1,400 Farm Information Cost Information IFAS Farm Information Acre Carton Acre Carton Pre Harvest Production Costs:

Fertilizer 350.25 Fumigant 530.00 Crop Protection Materials 827.19 Transplants/ Seeds 336.00 Stakes 67.50 Plastic String 37.50 Plastic Mulch/ Irrigation Tubing 524.40 Frost Protection Machinery: Irrigation 614.67 Non irrigation 333.68 Plastic Mulch/ Drip Tape Disposal 280.24 Scounting 35.00 Labor Costs: Tractor Drivers 193.55 Direct Labor 472.75 Miscellaneous 145.00 Interest 252.90 Fixed Costs: Land Cost 450.00 Supervision 1,039.55 Overhead 1,299.42 Total Pre Harvest Production Costs: 7,789.60 $ 5.56 $  $ # DIV/ 0!

Harvesting 1,078.00 $ 0.77 $ # DIV/ 0!

Packing, Selling & Related Overhead 3,976.00 $ 2.84 $ # DIV/ 0!

TOTAL COST: 12,843.60 $ 9.17 $  $ # DIV/ 0! Farming Costs:

DCTM_ ARP. xls August 3, 2003


DRAFT LAND MID-CYCLE SUBCOMMITTEE

AGENDA

Friday, April 18, 2007

11:00am – 1:00 pm Eastern Time

Participation by Teleconference Only

866-299-3188

code:<PHONE_NUMBER>#

11:00-11:10am	Welcome	Dr. Charlie Menzie,

	-  Roll Call	Subcommittee Chair

	- Overview of Agenda

11:10-11:15 am	Administrative Procedures	Heather Drumm

		Subcommittee DFO

11:15-11:30 am	Material Overview	Dr. Randy Wentsel

Office of Research and Development

11:30-11:50 am	Overview of Charge/	Dr. Charlie Menzie,

	Rating Program Performance	Subcommittee Chair &

Phillip Juengst, Office of Research and Development

11:50-12:10 pm	Overall Progress Review	Dr. Randy Wentsel

Office of Research and Development

12:10-12:35 pm	Updated MYP Review	Dr. Randy Wentsel

		Office of Research and

		Development

12:35-12:40 pm	Public Comment

12:40-1:00 pm 	Preparation for Next Call and Face-to-Face 	Dr. Charlie Menzie,

	Meeting	Subcommittee Chair

	- Discuss Writing Assignments

	- Identify Additional Information Needs

1:00 pm	Adjourn

            A Federal Advisory Committee for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Research and Development


[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 171 (Tuesday, September 4, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44955-44964]
[FR Doc No: 2018-19061]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-83969; File No. SR-DTC-2017-022]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Depository Trust Company;
Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1,
To Amend the Loss Allocation Rules and Make Other Changes

August 28, 2018.
    On December 18, 2017, The Depository Trust Company (``DTC'') filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') proposed
rule change SR-DTC-2017-022, pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder
\2\ to amend DTC's application of the Participants Fund, loss
allocation rules, voluntary retirement process for Participants, the
return of certain deposits to former Participants, and make other
conforming and technical changes.\3\ The proposed rule change was
published for comment in the Federal Register on January 8, 2018.\4\ On
February 8, 2018, the Commission

designated a longer period within which to approve, disapprove, or
institute proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the
proposed rule change.\5\ On March 20, 2018, the Commission instituted
proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed
rule change.\6\ On June 25, 2018, the Commission designated a longer
period for Commission action on the proceedings to determine whether to
approve or disapprove the proposed rule change.\7\ On June 28, 2018,
DTC filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change to amend and
replace in its entirety the proposed rule change as originally filed on
December 18, 2017.\8\ The Commission did not receive any comments. This
order approves the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1
(hereinafter, ``Proposed Rule Change'').
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ On December 18, 2017, DTC filed the proposed rule change as
advance notice SR-DTC-2017-804 with the Commission pursuant to
Section 806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act entitled the Payment, Clearing, and
Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (``Clearing Supervision Act'')
and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) of the Act (``Advance Notice''). 12 U.S.C.
5465(e)(1) and 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i), respectively. The Advance
Notice was published for comment in the Federal Register on January
30, 2018. In that publication, the Commission also extended the
review period of the Advance Notice for an additional 60 days,
pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(H) of the Clearing Supervision Act. 12
U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(H); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82582
(January 24, 2018), 83 FR 4297 (January 30, 2018) (SR-DTC-2017-804).
On April 10, 2018, the Commission required additional information
from DTC pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(D) of the Clearing
Supervision Act, which tolled the Commission's period of review of
the Advance Notice until 60 days from the date the information
required by the Commission was received by the Commission. 12 U.S.C.
5465(e)(1)(D); see 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(E)(ii) and (G)(ii); see
Memorandum from the Office of Clearance and Settlement Supervision,
Division of Trading and Markets, titled ``Commission's Request for
Additional Information,'' available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/dtc-an.shtml. On June 28, 2018, DTC filed Amendment No. 1 to the
Advance Notice to amend and replace in its entirety the Advance
Notice as originally filed on December 18, 2017, which was published
in the Federal Register on August 6, 2018. Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 83746 (July 31, 2018), 83 FR 38357 (August 6, 2018) (SR-
DTC-2017-804). DTC submitted a courtesy copy of Amendment No. 1 to
the Advance Notice through the Commission's electronic public
comment letter mechanism. Accordingly, Amendment No. 1 to the
Advance Notice has been publicly available on the Commission's
website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/dtc-an.shtml since June 29,
2018. On July 6, 2018, the Commission received a response to its
request for additional information in consideration of the Advance
Notice, which, in turn, added a further 60 days to the review period
pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(E) and (G) of the Clearing Supervision
Act. 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(E) and (G); see Memorandum from the Office
of Clearance and Settlement Supervision, Division of Trading and
Markets, titled ``Response to the Commission's Request for
Additional Information,'' available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/dtc-an.shtml. The Commission did not receive any comments. The
proposal, as set forth in both the Advance Notice and the proposed
rule change, each as modified by Amendments No. 1, shall not take
effect until all required regulatory actions are completed.
    \4\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82426 (January 2, 2018),
83 FR 913 (January 8, 2018) (SR-DTC-2017-022).
    \5\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82670 (February 8,
2018), 83 FR 6626 (February 14, 2018) (SR-DTC-2017-022, SR-FICC-
2017-022, SR-NSCC-2017-018).
    \6\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82914 (March 20, 2018),
83 FR 12978 (March 26, 2018) (SR-DTC-2017-022).
    \7\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83510 (June 25, 2018),
83 FR 30791 (June 29, 2018) (SR-DTC-2017-022, SR-FICC-2017-022, SR-
NSCC-2017-018).
    \8\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83629 (July 13, 2018),
83 FR 34246 (July 19, 2018) (SR-DTC-2017-022) (``Notice of Amendment
No. 1''). DTC submitted a courtesy copy of Amendment No. 1 to the
proposed rule change through the Commission's electronic public
comment letter mechanism. Accordingly, Amendment No. 1 to the
proposed rule change has been publicly available on the Commission's
website at https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/dtc.htm since June 29,
2018.
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I. Description

    The Proposed Rule Change consists of proposed changes to DTC's
Rules, By-Laws and Organization Certificate of DTC (``Rules'') \9\ in
order to (1) modify the application of the Participants Fund; (2)
modify the loss allocation process; (3) align DTC's loss allocation
rule among the three clearing agencies of The Depository Trust &
Clearing Corporation (``DTCC'')--Fixed Income Clearing Corporation
(``FICC'') (including the Government Securities Division (``FICC/GSD'')
and the Mortgage-Backed Securities Division (``FICC/MBSD'')), National
Securities Clearing Corporation (``NSCC''), and DTC (collectively, the
``DTCC Clearing Agencies''); \10\ (4) modify the voluntary retirement
process; (5) reduce the time within which DTC is required to return a
former Participant's Actual Participants Fund Deposit; and (6) make
conforming and technical changes. Each of these proposed changes is
described below. A detailed description of the specific rule text
changes proposed in this Proposed Rule Change can be found in the
Notice of Amendment No. 1.\11\
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    \9\ Each capitalized term not otherwise defined herein has its
respective meaning as set forth in the Rules, available at http://www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures.aspx.
    \10\ DTCC is a user-owned and user-governed holding company and
is the parent company of DTC, FICC, and NSCC. DTCC operates on a
shared services model with respect to the DTCC Clearing Agencies.
Most corporate functions are established and managed on an
enterprise-wide basis pursuant to intercompany agreements under
which it is generally DTCC that provides a relevant service to a
DTCC Clearing Agency.
    \11\ See Notice of Amendment No. 1, supra note 8.
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A. Application of the Participants Fund

    Under current Section 3 of Rule 4, if a Participant is obligated to
DTC and fails to satisfy any obligation, DTC may, in such order and in
such amounts as DTC shall determine in its sole discretion (1) apply
some or all of the Actual Participants Fund Deposit of such Participant
to such obligation; (2) pledge some or all of the shares of Preferred
Stock of such Participant to its lenders as collateral security for a
loan under the End-of-Day Credit Facility; \12\ and/or (3) sell some or
all of the shares of Preferred Stock of such Participant to other
Participants (who shall be required to purchase such shares pro rata
their Required Preferred Stock Investments at the time of such
purchase), and apply the proceeds of such sale to satisfy such
obligation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ DTC states that it maintains a 364-day committed revolving
line of credit with a syndicate of commercial lenders, renewed every
year. DTC further states that the committed aggregate amount of the
End-of-Day Credit Facility (currently $1.9 billion) together with
the Participants Fund constitute DTC's liquidity resources for
settlement. Based on these amounts, DTC sets Net Debit Caps that
limit settlement obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current Rule 4 provides a single set of tools and a common process
for the use of the Participants Fund for both (1) liquidity purposes to
complete settlement among non-defaulting Participants, if one or more
Participants fails to settle, and (2) the satisfaction of losses and
liabilities due to Participant defaults \13\ or non-default losses that
are incident to the business of DTC.\14\ For both liquidity \15\ and
loss scenarios, current Section 4 of Rule 4 provides that an
application of the Participants Fund would be apportioned among
Participants ratably in accordance with their Required Participants
Fund Deposits, less any additional amount that a Participant was
required to Deposit to the Participants Fund pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 9(A).\16\ Current Section 4 of Rule 4 provides that if DTC incurs
a loss or liability which is not satisfied by charging the Participant
responsible for causing the loss or liability, DTC may, in its sole
discretion and in such amount as DTC would determine, charge the
existing retained earnings and undivided profits of DTC.
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    \13\ DTC states that the failure of a Participant to satisfy its
settlement obligation constitutes a liability to DTC. Insofar as DTC
undertakes to complete settlement among Participants other than the
Participant that failed to settle, that liability may give rise to
losses as well.
    \14\ Section 1(f) of Rule 4 defines the term ``business'' with
respect to DTC as ``the doing of all things in connection with or
relating to the Corporation's performance of the services specified
in the first and second paragraphs of Rule 6 or the cessation of
such services.'' Supra note 9.
    \15\ DTC states that, in contrast to NSCC and FICC, DTC is not a
central counterparty and does not guarantee obligations of its
membership. DTC states that the Participants Fund is a mutualized
pre-funded liquidity and loss resource. Therefore, in contrast to
NSCC and FICC, DTC does not have an obligation to ``repay'' the
Participants Fund, and the application of the Participants Fund does
not convert to a loss.
    \16\ Section 2 of Rule 9(A) provides, in part, ``[a]t the
request of the Corporation, a Participant or Pledgee shall
immediately furnish the Corporation with such assurances as the
Corporation shall require of the financial ability of the
Participant or Pledgee to fulfill its commitments and shall conform
to any conditions which the Corporation deems necessary for the
protection of the Corporation, other Participants or Pledgees,
including deposits to the Participants Fund . . . .'' Supra note 9.
Pursuant to the proposed change, the additional amount that a
Participant is required to Deposit to the Participants Fund pursuant
to Section 2 of Rule 9(A) would be defined as an ``Additional
Participants Fund Deposit.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the current Rules, after the Participants Fund is applied
pursuant to Section 4, DTC must promptly notify each Participant and
the Commission of the amount applied and the reasons therefor. Current
Rule 4 further requires Participants whose Actual Participants Fund
Deposits have been ratably charged to restore their Required
Participants Fund Deposits, if such charges create a deficiency. Such
payments are due upon demand. Iterative pro rata charges relating to
the same loss or liability are permitted in order to satisfy the loss
or liability.
    Rule 4 currently provides that a Participant may, within 10
Business Days after receipt of notice of any pro rata charge, notify
DTC of its election to terminate its business with DTC, and the
exposure of the terminating Participant for pro rata charges would be
capped at the greater of (1) the amount of its Aggregate Required
Deposit and Investment, as fixed immediately prior to the time of the
first pro rata charge, plus 100 percent of the amount thereof, or (2)
the amount of all prior pro rata charges attributable to the same loss
or liability with respect to which the Participant has not timely
exercised its right to terminate.
    Proposed Section 3 of Rule 4 would provide that a Participant
Default occurs

when a Participant becomes a Defaulting Participant pursuant to Rule
9(B) or is otherwise obligated to DTC pursuant to the Rules and
Procedures, and fails to satisfy any such obligation. The proposal
would clarify that DTC would apply some or all of the Actual
Participants Fund Deposit of a Defaulting Participant to its obligation
to satisfy the Participant Default, to the extent necessary to
eliminate such obligation. If such application would be insufficient to
satisfy such obligation, DTC may, in its sole discretion, to the extent
necessary to satisfy such obligation (1) pledge some or all of the
shares of Preferred Stock of such Participant to its lenders as
collateral security for a loan under the End-of-Day Credit Facility,
and apply the proceeds of such loan to satisfy such obligation; and/or
(2) sell some or all of the shares of Preferred Stock of such
Participant to other Participants (who shall be required to purchase
such shares pro rata their Required Preferred Stock Investments at the
time of such purchase), and apply the proceeds of such sale to satisfy
such obligation.
    The proposed change would also amend and add provisions to separate
use of the Participants Fund as a liquidity resource to complete
settlement, reflected in proposed Section 4 of Rule 4, and for loss
allocation, reflected in proposed Section 5 of Rule 4. DTC states that
the proposed changes reinforce the distinction between the mechanisms
to complete settlement on a Business Day, and to mutualize losses that
may result from a failure to settle or other loss-generating events.
DTC also states that the change would more closely align the loss
allocation provisions of proposed Section 5 of Rule 4 to similar
provisions of the NSCC and FICC rules, to the extent appropriate.
    Proposed Section 4 would address the situation of a Defaulting
Participant failure to settle if the application of the Actual
Participants Fund Deposit of that Defaulting Participant, pursuant to
proposed Section 3, is not sufficient to complete settlement among
Participants other than the Defaulting Participant (each, a ``non-
defaulting Participant'').\17\
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    \17\ As described above, proposed Rule 4 splits the liquidity
and loss provisions to more closely align to similar loss allocation
provisions in NSCC and FICC rules. Pursuant to the proposed change,
DTC would also align, where appropriate, the liquidity and loss
provisions within proposed Rule 4. DTC would retain the existing
Rule 4 concepts of calculating the ratable share of a Participant,
charging each non-defaulting Participant a pro rata share of an
application of the Participants Fund to complete settlement,
providing notice to Participants of such charge, and providing each
Participant the option to cap its liability for such charges by
electing to terminate its business with DTC. However, pursuant to
the proposed change, DTC would modify these concepts and certain
associated processes to more closely align with the analogous
proposed loss allocation provisions in proposed Rule 4 (e.g., Loss
Allocation Notice, Loss Allocation Termination Notification Period,
and Loss Allocation Cap).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Section 4 would expressly state that the Participants Fund
shall constitute a liquidity resource which may be applied by DTC, in
such amounts as it may determine, in its sole discretion, to fund
settlement among non-defaulting Participants in the event of the
failure of a Defaulting Participant to satisfy its settlement
obligation on any Business Day. Such an application of the Participants
Fund would be charged ratably to the Actual Participants Fund Deposits
of the non-defaulting Participants on that Business Day. In connection
with the use of the Participants Fund as a liquidity resource to
complete settlement when a Participant fails to settle, the proposed
rule would introduce the term ``pro rata settlement charge,'' in order
to distinguish application of the Participants Fund to fund settlement
from pro rata loss allocation charges that would be established in
proposed Section 5 of Rule 4.
    The pro rata settlement charge for each non-defaulting Participant
would be based on the ratio of its Required Participants Fund Deposit
to the sum of the Required Participants Fund Deposits of all such
Participants on that Business Day (excluding any Additional
Participants Fund Deposits in both the numerator and denominator of
such ratio). The calculation of each non-defaulting Participant's pro
rata settlement charge would be similar to the current Section 4
calculation of a pro rata charge except, as DTC states, that, for
greater simplicity, it would not include the current distinction for
common members of another clearing agency pursuant to a Clearing Agency
Agreement.\18\ DTC states that it would be based on the Required
Participants Fund Deposits as fixed on the Business Day of the
application of the Participants Fund, as opposed to the current
language ``at the time the loss or liability was discovered.'' \19\ The
proposed change would require DTC, following the application of the
Participants Fund to complete settlement, to notify each Participant
and the Commission of the charge and the reasons therefor (``Settlement
Charge Notice'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Rule 4, Section 4(a)(1), supra note 9. DTC states that it
has determined that this option is unnecessary because, in practice,
DTC would never have liability under a Clearing Agency Agreement
that exceeds the excess assets of the Participant that defaulted.
    \19\ DTC states that this change would provide an objective date
that is more appropriate for the application of the Participants
Fund to complete settlement, because the ``time the loss or
liability was discovered'' would necessarily have to be the day the
Participants Fund was applied to complete settlement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed change would provide each non-defaulting Participant
an opportunity to elect to terminate its business with DTC and thereby
cap its exposure to further pro rata settlement charges. As proposed,
Participants would have five Business Days \20\ from the issuance of
the first Loss Allocation Notice in any round to decide whether to
terminate its business with DTC, and thereby benefit from its
Settlement Charge Cap. In addition, the proposal would change the
beginning date of such notification period from the receipt of the
notice to the date of the issuance of the Settlement Charge Notice.\21\
A Participant that elects to terminate its business with DTC would,
subject to its cap, remain responsible for (1) its pro rata settlement
charge that was the subject of the Settlement Charge Notice, and (2)
all other pro rata settlement charges until the Participant Termination
Date. The proposed cap on pro rata settlement charges of a Participant
that has timely notified DTC of its election to terminate its business
with DTC would be the amount of its Aggregate Required Deposit and
Investment, as fixed on the day of the pro rata settlement charge that
was the subject of the Settlement Charge Notice, plus 100 percent of
the amount thereof (``Settlement Charge Cap''). The proposed Settlement
Charge Cap would be no greater than the current cap.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ DTC states a five Business Day period would be sufficient
for a Participant to decide whether to give notice to terminate its
business with DTC in response to a settlement charge. In addition, a
five Business Day pro rata settlement charge notification period
would conform to the proposed loss allocation notification period in
this proposed change and in the proposed changes for NSCC and FICC.
    \21\ DTC states that setting the start date of the notification
period to an objective date would enhance transparency and provide a
common timeframe to all affected Participants.
    \22\ Current Section 8 of Rule 4 provides for a cap that is
equal to the greater of (a) the amount of its Aggregate Required
Deposit and Investment, as fixed immediately prior to the time of
the first pro rata charge, plus 100 percent of the amount thereof,
or (b) the amount of all prior pro rata charges attributable to the
same loss or liability with respect to which the Participant has not
timely exercised its right to limit its obligation as provided
above. Supra note 9. The alternative limit in clause (b) would be
eliminated in proposed Section 8(a) in favor of a single defined
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DTC states that the pro rata application of the Actual Participants
Fund Deposits of non-defaulting Participants to complete settlement
when there is a Participant Default is

not the allocation of a loss. A pro rata settlement charge would relate
solely to the completion of settlement. The proposed loss allocation
concepts described below would not apply to pro rata settlement
charges.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ DTC states that proposed Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 4
together relate, in whole or in part, to what may happen when there
is a Participant Default. Proposed Section 3 is designed to be the
basic provision of remedies if a Participant fails to satisfy an
obligation to DTC. Proposed Section 4 is designed to be a specific
remedy for a failure to settle by a Defaulting Participant (i.e., a
specific type of Participant Default). Proposed Section 5 is
designed to be a remedial provision for a Participant Default when,
additionally, DTC ceases to act for the Participant and there are
remaining losses or liabilities. DTC states that if a Participant
Default occurs, the application of proposed Section 3 would be
required, while the application of proposed Section 4 would be at
the discretion of DTC. Whether or not proposed Section 4 has been
applied, once there is a loss due to a Participant Default and DTC
ceases to act for the Participant, proposed Section 5 would apply.
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B. Changes to the Loss Allocation Process

    DTC's current loss allocation rules address the use of the
Participants Fund for both liquidity purposes to complete settlement
among non-defaulting Participants, and for the satisfaction of losses
and liabilities due to Participant defaults or certain other losses or
liabilities incident to the business of DTC, together. For both
liquidity and loss scenarios, current Section 4 of Rule 4 provides that
DTC may apply some or all of the Actual Participants Fund Deposits of
all other Participants, and/or charge the existing retained earnings
and undivided profits of DTC.
    Currently, if DTC applies the Actual Participants Fund Deposits,
any loss or liability will be apportioned among Participants ratably in
accordance with their Required Participants Fund Deposits, less any
additional amount that a Participant was required to Deposit to the
Participants Fund pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 9(A). Current Section 4
of Rule 4 provides that if there is an unsatisfied loss or liability,
DTC may, in its sole discretion, charge the existing retained earnings
and undivided profits of DTC.
    DTC proposes to change the manner in which each of the aspects of
the loss allocation process described above would be employed. The
proposal would clarify or adjust certain elements, and introduce
certain new loss allocation concepts, as further discussed below. In
addition, the proposal would address the loss allocation process as it
relates to losses arising from or relating to multiple default or non-
default events in a short period of time, also as described below.
    DTC proposes five key changes to enhance DTC's loss allocation
process. Specifically, DTC proposes to make changes regarding (1) the
Corporate Contribution, (2) the Event Period, (3) the loss allocation
round and notice, (4) the loss allocation termination notice and cap,
and (5) the governance around non-default losses, each of which is
discussed below.
(1) Corporate Contribution
    Current Section 4 of Rule 4 provides that if there is an
unsatisfied loss or liability, DTC may, in its sole discretion and in
such amount as DTC would determine, charge the existing retained
earnings and undivided profits of DTC. Under the proposed change, DTC
would replace the discretionary application of an unspecified amount of
retained earnings and undivided profits with a mandatory, defined
Corporate Contribution. The proposed Corporate Contribution would apply
to losses and liabilities that are incurred by DTC with respect to an
Event Period, whether arising from a Default Loss Event or Declared
Non-Default Loss Event, before the allocation of losses to
Participants.\24\
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    \24\ The proposed change would not apply the Corporate
Contribution if the Participants Fund is used with respect to a pro
rata settlement charge. However, if, after a Participant Default,
the proceeds of the sale of the Collateral of the Participant are
insufficient to repay the lenders under the End-of-Day Credit
Facility, and DTC has ceased to act for the Participant, the
shortfall would be a loss arising from a Default Loss Event, the
Corporate Contribution would be applied.
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    The proposed Corporate Contribution would be defined to be an
amount equal to 50 percent of DTC's General Business Risk Capital
Requirement.\25\ DTC's General Business Risk Capital Requirement, as
defined in DTC's Clearing Agency Policy on Capital Requirements,\26\
is, at a minimum, equal to the regulatory capital that DTC is required
to maintain in compliance with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(15) under the Act.\27\
The proposed Corporate Contribution would be held in addition to DTC's
General Business Risk Capital Requirement. Proposed Rule 4 also would
further clarify that DTC can voluntarily apply amounts greater than the
Corporate Contribution against any loss or liability (including non-
default losses) of DTC, if the Board of Directors, in its sole
discretion, believes such to be appropriate under the factual situation
existing at the time. As proposed, if the Corporate Contribution is
fully or partially used against a loss or liability relating to an
Event Period, the Corporate Contribution would be reduced to the
remaining unused amount, if any, during the following 250 Business Days
in order to permit DTC to replenish the Corporate Contribution.\28\
Under the proposal, Participants would receive notice of any such
reduction to the Corporate Contribution.
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    \25\ DTC calculates its General Business Risk Capital
Requirement as the amount equal to the greatest of (1) an amount
determined based on its general business profile, (2) an amount
determined based on the time estimated to execute a recovery or
orderly wind-down of DTC's critical operations, and (3) an amount
determined based on an analysis of DTC's estimated operating
expenses for a six month period.
    \26\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81105 (July 7,
2017), 82 FR 32399 (July 13, 2017) (SR-DTC-2017-003, SR-NSCC-2017-
004, SR-FICC-2017-007).
    \27\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(15).
    \28\ DTC states that 250 Business Days would be a reasonable
estimate of the time frame that DTC would be required to replenish
the Corporate Contribution by equity in accordance with DTC's
Clearing Agency Policy on Capital Requirements, including a
conservative additional period to account for any potential delays
and/or unknown exigencies in times of distress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Event Period
    DTC states that in order to clearly define the obligations of DTC
and its Participants regarding loss allocation and to balance the need
to manage the risk of sequential loss events against Participants' need
for certainty concerning their maximum loss allocation exposures, DTC
proposes to introduce the concept of an Event Period to the Rules to
address the losses and liabilities that may arise from or relate to
multiple Default Loss Events and/or Declared Non-Default Loss Events
that arise in quick succession. Specifically, the proposal would group
Default Loss Events and Declared Non-Default Loss Events occurring
within a period of 10 Business Days (``Event Period'') for purposes of
allocating losses to Participants in one or more rounds, subject to the
limits of loss allocation as explained below.\29\
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    \29\ DTC states that having a 10 Business Day Event Period would
provide a reasonable period of time to encompass potential
sequential Default Loss Events and/or Declared Non-Default Loss
Events that are likely to be closely linked to an initial event and/
or a severe market dislocation episode, while still providing
appropriate certainty for Participants concerning their maximum
exposure to allocated losses with respect to such events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the case of a loss or liability arising from or relating to a
Default Loss Event, an Event Period would begin on the day on which DTC
notifies Participants that it has ceased to act for a Participant (or
the next Business Day, if such day is not a Business Day). In the case
of a Declared Non-Default Loss Event, an Event Period would begin on
the day that DTC notifies Participants of the Declared Non-Default Loss
Event (or the next Business Day, if such day is not a Business Day). If
a subsequent Default Loss Event or Declared Non-Default

Loss Event occurs during an Event Period, any losses or liabilities
arising out of or relating to any such subsequent event would be
resolved as losses or liabilities that are part of the same Event
Period, without extending the duration of such Event Period.
    An Event Period may include both Default Loss Events and Declared
Non-Default Loss Events, and there would not be separate Event Periods
for Default Loss Events or Declared Non-Default Loss Events occurring
during overlapping 10 Business Day periods. The amount of losses that
may be allocated by DTC, subject to the required Corporate
Contribution, and to which a Loss Allocation Cap would apply for any
Participant that elects to terminate its business with DTC in respect
of a loss allocation round, would include any and all losses from any
Default Loss Events and any Declared Non-Default Loss Events during the
Event Period, regardless of the amount of time, during or after the
Event Period, required for such losses to be crystallized and
allocated.\30\
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    \30\ Each Participant that is a Participant on the first day of
an Event Period would be obligated to pay its pro rata share of
losses and liabilities arising out of or relating to each Default
Loss Event (other than a Default Loss Event with respect to which it
is the CTA Participant) and each Declared Non-Default Loss Event
occurring during the Event Period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DTC states that in order to enhance clarity, the proposed change
would define ``Default Loss Event'' as the determination by DTC to
cease to act for a Participant (``CTA Participant'') pursuant to Rule
10, Rule 11, or Rule 12. The proposed change also would define
``Declared Non-Default Loss Event'' as the determination by the Board
of Directors that a loss or liability incident to the clearance and
settlement business of DTC may be a significant and substantial loss or
liability that may materially impair the ability of DTC to provide
clearance and settlement services in an orderly manner and will
potentially generate losses to be mutualized among Participants in
order to ensure that DTC may continue to offer its services in an
orderly manner.
(3) Loss Allocation Round and Loss Allocation Notice
    Under the proposal, a loss allocation ``round'' would mean a series
of loss allocations relating to an Event Period, the aggregate amount
of which is limited by the sum of the Loss Allocation Caps of affected
Participants (a ``round cap''). When the aggregate amount of losses
allocated in a round equals the round cap, any additional losses
relating to the applicable Event Period would be allocated in one or
more subsequent rounds, in each case subject to a round cap for that
round. DTC may continue the loss allocation process in successive
rounds until all losses from the Event Period are allocated among
Participants that have not submitted a Termination Notice in accordance
with proposed Section 6(b) of Rule 4.
    Each loss allocation would be communicated to Participants by the
issuance of a notice that advises each Participant of the amount being
allocated to it (``Loss Allocation Notice''). The calculation of each
Participant's pro rata allocation charge would be similar to the
current Section 4 calculation of a pro rata charge except that it would
not include the current distinction for common members of another
clearing agency pursuant to a Clearing Agency Agreement.\31\ In
addition, it would be based on the Required Participants Fund Deposits
as fixed on the first day of the Event Period, as opposed to the
current language ``at the time the loss or liability was discovered.''
\32\
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    \31\ See supra note 18.
    \32\ DTC states that this change would provide an objective date
that is appropriate for the new proposed loss allocation process,
which would be designed to allocate aggregate losses relating to an
Event Period, rather than one loss at a time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Each Loss Allocation Notice would specify the relevant Event Period
and the round to which it relates. Multiple Loss Allocation Notices may
be issued with respect to each round, up to the round cap. The first
Loss Allocation Notice in any first, second, or subsequent round would
expressly state that such Loss Allocation Notice reflects the beginning
of the first, second, or subsequent round, as the case may be, and that
each Participant in that round has five Business Days \33\ from the
issuance of such first Loss Allocation Notice for the round (such
period, a ``Loss Allocation Termination Notification Period'') to
notify DTC of its election to terminate its business with DTC (such
notification, whether with respect to a Settlement Charge Notice or
Loss Allocation Notice, a ``Termination Notice'') pursuant to proposed
Section 8(b) of Rule 4, and thereby benefit from its Loss Allocation
Cap. In other words, the proposed change would link the Loss Allocation
Cap to a round in order to provide Participants the option to limit
their loss allocation exposure at the beginning of each round. After a
first round of loss allocations with respect to an Event Period, only
Participants that have not submitted a Termination Notice, in
accordance with proposed Section 8(b) of Rule 4, would be subject to
further loss allocation with respect to that Event Period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Current Section 8 of Rule 4 provides that the time period
for a Participant to give notice of its election to terminate its
business with DTC in respect of a pro rata charge is 10 Business
Days after receiving notice of a pro rata charge. DTC states that it
is appropriate to shorten such time period from 10 Business Days to
five Business Days because DTC needs timely notice of which
Participants would not be terminating their business with DTC for
the purpose of calculating the loss allocation for any subsequent
round. DTC states that five Business Days would provide Participants
with sufficient time to decide whether to cap their loss allocation
obligations by terminating their business with DTC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DTC's current loss allocation provisions provide that if a charge
is made against a Participant's Actual Participants Fund Deposits, and
as result thereof the Participant's deposit is less than its Required
Participants Fund Deposit, the Participant will, upon demand by DTC, be
required to replenish its deposit to eliminate the deficiency within
such time as DTC shall require. Under the proposal, Participants would
receive two Business Days' notice of a loss allocation, and be required
to pay the requisite amount no later than the second Business Day
following the issuance of such notice.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ DTC states that allowing Participants two Business Days to
satisfy their loss allocation obligations would provide Participants
sufficient notice to arrange funding, if necessary, while allowing
DTC to address losses in a timely manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(4) Termination Notice and Loss Allocation Cap
    DTC's current Rules provide that a Participant may terminate its
business with DTC by notifying DTC. DTC proposes to enhance the
termination procedure to clarify and align with the rules of NSCC and
FICC, where appropriate. As proposed, Participants would have five
Business Days from the issuance of the first Loss Allocation Notice in
any round to decide whether to terminate its business with DTC, and
thereby benefit from its Loss Allocation Cap. The start of each round
\35\ would allow a Participant the opportunity to notify DTC of its
election to terminate its business with DTC after satisfaction of the
losses allocated in such round. In addition, DTC would also change the
beginning date of such notification period from the receipt of the
notice to the date of the issuance of the first Loss Allocation Notice
for any round. Pursuant to the proposed change, a Participant would be
able to elect to terminate its membership by following the requirements
in proposed Section

8(b) of Rule 4: (1) Specify in its Termination Notice an effective date
of termination (``Participant Termination Date''), which date shall be
no later than 10 Business Days following the last day of the applicable
Loss Allocation Termination Notification Period; (2) cease all
activities and use of DTC's services other than activities and services
necessary to terminate the business of the Participant with DTC; and
(3) ensure that all activities and use of DTC services by such
Participant cease on or prior to the Participant Termination Date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Under the proposal, a Participant would only have the
opportunity to terminate after the first Loss Allocation Notice in
any round, and not after each Loss Allocation Notice in any round.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the current Rules, the exposure of the terminating
Participant for pro rata charges would be capped at the greater of (1)
the amount of its Aggregate Required Deposit and Investment, as fixed
immediately prior to the time of the first pro rata charge, plus 100
percent of the amount thereof, or (2) the amount of all prior pro rata
charges attributable to the same loss or liability with respect to
which the Participant has not timely exercised its right to terminate.
Under the proposal, if a Participant timely provides notice of its
election to terminate its business with DTC as provided in proposed
Section 8(b) of Rule 4, its maximum payment obligation with respect to
any loss allocation round would be the amount of its Aggregate Required
Deposit and Investment, as fixed on the first day of the Event Period,
plus 100 percent of the amount thereof (``Loss Allocation Cap'').\36\
DTC may retain the entire Actual Participants Fund Deposit of a
Participant subject to loss allocation, up to the Participant's Loss
Allocation Cap. If a Participant's Loss Allocation Cap exceeds the
Participant's then-current Required Participants Fund Deposit, the
Participant would still be required to pay for the excess amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The alternative limit in clause (b) would be eliminated in
proposed Section 8(b) in favor of a single defined standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the first round and each subsequent round of loss
allocation would allocate losses up to a round cap of the aggregate of
all Loss Allocation Caps of those Participants included in the round.
If a Participant provides notice of its election to terminate its
business with DTC, it would be subject to loss allocation in that
round, up to its Loss Allocation Cap. If the first round of loss
allocation does not fully cover DTC's losses, a second round will be
noticed to those Participants that did not elect to terminate in the
previous round; however, the amount of any second or subsequent round
cap may differ from the first or preceding round cap because there may
be fewer Participants in a second or subsequent round if Participants
elect to terminate their business with DTC as provided in proposed
Section 8(b) of Rule 4 following the first Loss Allocation Notice in
any round.
(5) Declared Non-Default Loss Event
    The Rules currently permit DTC to apply the Participants Fund to
non-default losses,\37\ provided that such loss or liability is
incident to the business of DTC. DTC proposes to enhance the governance
around non-default losses that would trigger loss allocation to
Participants by specifying that the Board of Directors would have to
determine that there is a non-default loss that may be a significant
and substantial loss or liability that may materially impair the
ability of DTC to provide clearance and settlement services in an
orderly manner and would potentially generate losses to be mutualized
among the Participants in order to ensure that DTC may continue to
offer clearance and settlement services in an orderly manner. The
proposed change would provide that DTC would then be required to
promptly notify Participants of this determination, which would be
referred to as a ``Declared Non-Default Loss Event.'' In addition, DTC
proposes to specify that (1) the Corporate Contribution would apply to
losses or liabilities arising from a Default Loss Event or a Declared
Non-Default Loss Event, and (2) the loss allocation process would be
applied in the same manner regardless of whether a loss arises from a
Default Loss Event or a Declared Non-Default Loss Event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Non-default losses may arise from events such as damage to
physical assets, a cyber-attack, or custody and investment losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Voluntary Retirement Process

    Section 1 of Rule 2 provides that a Participant may terminate its
business with DTC by notifying DTC in the appropriate manner.\38\ To
provide additional transparency to Participants with respect to the
voluntary retirement of a Participant, and to align, where appropriate,
with the proposed rule changes of NSCC and FICC with respect to
voluntary termination, DTC is proposing to add proposed Section 6(a) to
Rule 4, which would be titled, ``Upon Any Voluntary Retirement.''
Proposed Section 6(a) of Rule 4 would (1) clarify the requirements for
a Participant that wants to voluntarily terminate its business with
DTC, and (2) address the situation where a Participant submits a
Voluntary Retirement Notice and subsequently receives a Settlement
Charge Notice or the first Loss Allocation Notice in a round on or
prior to the Voluntary Retirement Date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Section 1 of Rule 2 provides, in relevant part, that ``[a]
Participant may terminate its business with the Corporation by
notifying the Corporation as provided in Sections 7 or 8 of Rule 4
or, if for a reason other than those specified in said Sections 7
and 8, by notifying the Corporation thereof; the Participant shall,
upon receipt of such notice by the Corporation, cease to be a
Participant. In the event that a Participant shall cease to be a
Participant, the Corporation shall thereupon cease to make its
services available to the Participant, except that the Corporation
may perform services on behalf of the Participant or its successor
in interest necessary to terminate the business of the Participant
or its successor with the Corporation, and the Participant or its
successor shall pay to the Corporation the fees and charges provided
by these Rules with respect to services performed by the Corporation
subsequent to the time when the Participant ceases to be a
Participant.'' Supra note 9. DTC is proposing to modify the
provision to clarify that the termination would be subject to
proposed Section 6 of Rule 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, DTC is proposing that if a Participant elects to
terminate its business with DTC pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 2 for
reasons other than those specified in proposed Section 8 (a ``Voluntary
Retirement''), the Participant would be required to: (1) Provide a
written notice of such termination to DTC (``Voluntary Retirement
Notice''), as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 2; (2) specify in the
Voluntary Retirement Notice a desired date for the termination of its
business with DTC (``Voluntary Retirement Date''); (3) cease all
activities and use of DTC services other than activities and services
necessary to terminate the business of the Participant with DTC; and
(4) ensure that all activities and use of DTC services by the
Participant cease on or prior to the Voluntary Retirement Date.\39\
Proposed Section 6(a) of Rule 4 would provide that if the Participant
fails to comply with the requirements of proposed Section 6(a), its
Voluntary Retirement Notice would be deemed void.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Typically, a Participant would ultimately submit a notice
after having ceased its transactions and transferred all securities
out of its Account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, proposed Section 6(a) of Rule 4 would provide that if a
Participant submits a Voluntary Retirement Notice and subsequently
receives a Settlement Charge Notice or the first Loss Allocation Notice
in a round on or prior to the Voluntary Retirement Date, such
Participant must timely submit a Termination Notice in order to benefit
from its Settlement Charge Cap or Loss Allocation Cap, as the case may
be. In such a case, the Termination Notice would supersede and void the
pending Voluntary Retirement Notice submitted by the Participant.

D. Accelerated Return of Former Participant's Clearing Fund Deposit

    Current Rule 4 provides that after three months from when a Person
has ceased to be a Participant, DTC shall return to such Person (or its
successor in interest or legal representative) the amount of the Actual
Participants Fund Deposit of the former Participant plus accrued and
unpaid interest to the date of such payment (including any amount added
to the Actual Participants Fund Deposit of the former Participant
through the sale of the Participant's Preferred Stock), provided that
DTC receives such indemnities and guarantees as DTC deems satisfactory
with respect to the matured and contingent obligations of the former
Participant to DTC. Otherwise, within four years after a Person has
ceased to be a Participant, DTC shall return to such Person (or its
successor in interest or legal representative) the amount of the Actual
Participants Fund Deposit of the former Participant plus accrued and
unpaid interest to the date of such payment, except that DTC may offset
against such payment the amount of any known loss or liability to DTC
arising out of or related to the obligations of the former Participant
to DTC.
    DTC proposes to reduce the time, after a Participant ceases to be a
Participant, at which DTC would be required to return the amount of the
Actual Participants Fund Deposit of the former Participant plus accrued
and unpaid interest, whether the Participant ceases to be such because
it elected to terminate its business with DTC in response to a
Settlement Charge Notice or Loss Allocation Notice or otherwise.
Pursuant to the proposed change, the time period would be reduced from
four years to two years. All other requirements relating to the return
of the Actual Participants Fund Deposit would remain the same.
    DTC states that the four year retention period was implemented at a
time when there were more deposits and processing of physical
certificates, as well as added risks related to manual processing, and
related claims could surface many years after an alleged event. DTC
states that the change to two years is appropriate because, currently,
as DTC and the industry continue to move toward automation and
dematerialization, claims typically surface more quickly. Therefore,
DTC states that a shorter retention period of two years would be
sufficient to maintain a reasonable level of coverage for possible
claims arising in connection with the activities of a former
Participant, while allowing DTC to provide some relief to former
Participants by returning their Actual Participants Fund Deposits more
quickly.

E. Conforming and Technical Changes

    DTC proposes to make various conforming and technical changes
necessary to harmonize the remaining current Rules with the proposed
changes. Such changes include, but are not limited to, (1) inserting,
deleting, or changing various terms, sentences, or headings for clarity
and consistency; (2) consolidating certain sections of the Rules for
clarity; and (3) amending Rule 1 (Definitions; Governing Law) to add
cross-references to proposed terms that would be defined in Rule 4.

II. Discussion and Commission Findings

    Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act \40\ directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements
of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such
organization. After careful review, the Commission finds that the
Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the requirements of the Act and
the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to DTC. In particular,
the Commission finds that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act,\41\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(viii) under the
Act,\42\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)(i) under the Act,\43\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13)
under the Act,\44\ and Rules 17Ad-22(e)(23)(i) and (ii) under the
Act.\45\
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    \40\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
    \41\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \42\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(viii).
    \43\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(7)(i).
    \44\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(13).
    \45\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(23)(i) and (ii).
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act

    Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act requires, in part, that a
registered clearing agency have rules designed to promote the prompt
and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions, to
assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the
custody or control of the clearing agency, to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a national system for the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of securities transactions, and to protect
investors and the public interest.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the proposal to clarify the
application of Participants Fund would promote the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of securities transactions. As described
above, the proposal would clarify that if a Participant fails to
satisfy its obligations, the Participant's Actual Participants Fund
Deposit would be used to eliminate any unpaid obligations of that
Participant to DTC. Further, the proposal would modify the application
of the Participants Fund, and clarify that the Participants Fund may be
used (1) as a liquidity resource for DTC to fund settlement among non-
defaulting Participants, and (2) to satisfy losses and liabilities of
DTC in the loss allocation process. In addition, the proposal would add
the term ``Participant Default'' to current Section 3 to clarify that
proposed Section 3 would apply when there is a failure of a Participant
to satisfy any obligation to DTC.
    By establishing a more explicit right to use the Participants Fund
as a liquidity resource under the above-described circumstances, DTC
would have clearer authority to access such funds during stress events,
enabling DTC to better manage its liquidity risks and, thus, payment
obligations to Participants to help ensure settlement finality. As
such, the Commission believes that the proposed change to clarify the
application of Participants Fund would better enable DTC to continue to
promptly and accurately clear and settle securities transactions during
the stress events.
    The Commission also believes that the proposal to change the loss
allocation process is designed to assure the safeguarding of securities
and funds which are in the custody or control of the clearing agency.
As described above, DTC proposes to make a number of changes to its
loss allocation process. First, DTC would establish a mandatory
Corporate Contribution to be applied to DTC's losses and liabilities.
The proposed Corporate Contribution would be defined to be an amount
equal to 50 percent of DTC's General Business Risk Capital Requirement.
The proposed changes also would clarify that the proposed Corporate
Contribution would apply to both Default Loss Events and Declared Non-
Default Loss Events. Moreover, the proposal specifies that if the
Corporate Contribution is applied to a loss or liability relating to an
Event Period, then for any subsequent Event Periods that occur during
the 250 business days thereafter, the Corporate Contribution would be
reduced to the remaining, unused portion of the Corporate Contribution.
The Commission believes that these changes set clear expectations about
how and

when DTC's Corporate Contribution would be applied to help address a
loss, and allow DTC to better anticipate and prepare for potential risk
exposures that may arise during an Event Period.
    Second, as described above, DTC proposes to introduce the concept
of an Event Period, which would group Default Loss Events and Declared
Non-Default Loss Events occurring within a period of 10 Business Days
for purposes of allocating losses to Participants in one or more
rounds. Under the current Rules, every time DTC incurs a loss or
liability, DTC will initiate its current loss allocation process by
applying its retained earnings and allocating losses. However, the
current Rules do not contemplate a situation where loss events occur in
quick succession. Accordingly, even if multiple losses occur within a
short period, the current Rules dictate that DTC start the loss
allocation process separately for each loss event. Having multiple loss
allocation calculations and notices from DTC and Termination Notices
from Participants after multiple sequential loss events could heighten
operational complexity and, therefore, risk for DTC, since DTC would
have to process and track multiple notices while performing its other
critical operations during a time of significant stress.
    Therefore, the Commission believes that the proposed change to
introduce an Event Period would provide a more defined and transparent
structure, compared to the current loss allocation process described
immediately above, helping to reduce complexity in and the resources
needed to effectuate the process, thus mitigating operational risk.
Overall, such an improved structure should enable both DTC and each
Participant to more effectively manage the risks and potential
financial obligations presented by sequential Default Loss Events and/
or Declared Non-Default Loss Events that are likely to arise in quick
succession, and could be closely linked to an initial event and/or
market dislocation episode. In other words, the proposed Event Period
structure should help clarify and define for both DTC and Participants
how DTC would initiate a single defined loss allocation process to
cover all loss events within 10 Business Days. As a result, all loss
allocation calculation and notices from DTC and potential Termination
Notices from Participants would be tied back to one Event Period
instead of each individual loss event.
    Third, as described above, the proposal would improve upon the
current loss allocation approach laid out in DTC's Rules by providing
for a loss allocation round, a Loss Allocation Notice process, a
Termination Notice process, and a Loss Allocation Cap. A loss
allocation round would be a series of loss allocations relating to an
Event Period, the aggregate amount of which would be limited by the
round cap. When the losses allocated in a round equals the round cap,
any additional losses relating to the Event Period would be allocated
in subsequent rounds until all losses from the Event Period are
allocated among Participants. Each loss allocation would be
communicated to Participants by the issuance of a Loss Allocation
Notice. Each Participant in a loss allocation round would have five
Business Days from the issuance of such first Loss Allocation Notice
for the round to notify DTC of its election to terminate its business
with DTC, and thereby benefit from its Loss Allocation Cap. The Loss
Allocation Cap of a Participant would be the amount of its Aggregate
Required Deposit and Investment, as fixed on the first day of the Event
Period, plus 100 percent of the amount thereof. Participants would have
two Business Days after DTC issues a first round Loss Allocation Notice
to pay the amount specified in the notice.
    The Commission believes that the changes to (1) establish a
specific Event Period, (2) continue the loss allocation process in
successive rounds, (3) clearly communicate with its Participants
regarding their loss allocation obligations, and (4) effectively
identify continuing Participants for the purpose of calculating loss
allocation obligations in successive rounds, are designed to make DTC's
loss allocation process more certain. In addition, the changes are
designed to provide Participants with a clear set of procedures that
operate within the proposed loss allocation structure, and provide
increased predictability and certainty regarding Participants'
exposures and obligations. Furthermore, by grouping all loss events
within 10 Business Days, the loss allocation process relating to
multiple loss events can be streamlined. With enhanced certainty,
predictability, and efficiency, DTC would then be able to better manage
its risks from loss events occurring in quick succession, and
Participants would be able to better manage their risks by deciding
whether and when to withdraw from membership and limit their exposures
to DTC. Furthermore, the proposed changes are designed to reduce
liquidity risk to Participants by providing a two-day window to arrange
funding to pay for loss allocation, while still allowing DTC to address
losses in a timely manner.
    Fourth, as described above, DTC proposes to clarify the governance
around Declared Non-Default Loss Events by providing that the Board of
Directors would have to determine that there is a non-default loss that
may be a significant and substantial loss or liability that may
materially impair the ability of DTC to provide its services in an
orderly manner. DTC also proposes to provide that DTC would then be
required to promptly notify Participants of this determination and
start the loss allocation process concerning the loss stemming from a
Declared Non-Default Loss Event. The Commission believes that these
changes should provide an orderly and transparent procedure to allocate
a non-default loss by requiring the Board of Directors to make a
definitive decision to announce an occurrence of a Declared Non-Default
Loss Event, and requiring DTC to provide a notice to Participants of
the decision. The Commission further believes that an orderly and
transparent procedure should result in a risk management process at DTC
that is more robust as a result of enhanced governance around DTC's
response to non-default losses.
    Collectively, the Commission believes that the proposed changes to
DTC's loss allocation process would provide greater transparency,
certainty, and efficiency to DTC regarding the amount of resources and
the instances in which DTC would apply the resources to address risks
arising from Default Loss Events and Declared Non-Default Loss Events,
which could occur in quick succession. The Commission believes that the
transparency, certainty, and efficiency would afford DTC better
predictability regarding its risk exposure, and in turn, would allow a
risk management process at DTC that is more effectively responsive to
such events and would improve DTC's ability to continue to operate in a
safe and sound manner during such events. Therefore, the Commission
believes that these proposed changes would better equip DTC to assure
the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the custody or
control of DTC.
    The Commission believes that the proposed rule changes to (1)
provide additional transparency to Participants with respect to
voluntary retirement, and (2) align DTC's loss allocation rules with
the loss allocation rules of the other DTCC Clearing Agencies, to the
extent practicable and appropriate, are designed to remove impediments
to and perfect the mechanism of a national system for the prompt and
accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions. As
described above, the

proposal provides that if a Participant submits a Voluntary Retirement
Notice and subsequently receives a Settlement Charge Notice of the
first Loss Allocation Notice in a round on or prior to the Voluntary
Retirement Date, such Participant must timely submit a Termination
Notice in order to benefit from its Settlement Charge Cap or Loss
Allocation Cap, as the case may be. This proposed change helps to
eliminate uncertainty as to the obligations of a Participant that
submits a termination notice to DTC pursuant to the current Rules, and
later receives a Settlement Charge Notice or a Loss Allocation Notice
pursuant to the proposed Rules. In addition, the alignment of DTC's
loss allocation rules with the other DTCC Clearing Agencies is designed
to help provide consistent treatment for firms that are participants of
multiple DTCC Clearing Agencies. The Commission believes that providing
consistent treatment through consistent procedures among the DTCC
Clearing Agencies would help firms that participate in multiple DTCC
Clearing Agencies from encountering unnecessary complexities and
confusion stemming from differences in procedures regarding loss
allocation processes, particularly at times of significant stress.
Accordingly, by (1) eliminating uncertainty as to the obligations of
retiring Participants to DTC, and (2) removing potential unnecessary
complexities and confusion due to different loss allocation rules of
the DTCC Clearing Agencies, the Commission believes that the proposal
is designed to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
national system for the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of
securities transactions.
    The Commission believes that the proposed rule changes to (1)
reduce the time within which DTC is required to return the Actual
Participants Fund Deposit of a former Participant from four years to
two years, and (2) make conforming and technical changes necessary to
harmonize the current Rules with the proposed changes are designed to
protect investors and the public interest. First, the Commission
believes that the reduction in time to return the deposits would enable
firms that have exited DTC to have access to their funds sooner than
under the current Rules. While acknowledging that the reduction in time
could lesson DTC's flexibility in liquidity management for the period
between two years and four years, the Commission believes that DTC's
procedures would continue to protect DTC and its clearance and
settlement services because the rule would maintain the provisions that
DTC (1) may offset the return of funds against the amount of any loss
or liability of DTC arising out of or relating to the obligations of
the former Participant, and (2) could retain the funds for up to two
years. Therefore, DTC could maintain a necessary level of coverage for
possible claims arising in connection with the DTC activities of a
former Participant. Second, the conforming and technical changes are
designed to provide clear and coherent Rules concerning loss allocation
process to DTC and its Participants. The Commission believes that clear
and coherent Rules should help enhance the ability of DTC and
Participants to more effectively plan for, manage, and address the
risks and financial obligations that loss events present to DTC and its
Participants. Accordingly, the Commission believes that these two
changes are designed to protect investors and public interest by (1)
reducing financial risks for DTC's former Participants, and (2)
providing clear and coherent Rules to DTC and Participants.
    For the reasons above, the Commission believes that the Proposed
Rule Change is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.\47\
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    \47\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(viii)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(viii) under the Act requires, in part, that a
covered clearing agency \48\ establish, implement, maintain and enforce
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to effectively
identify, measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to
participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and
settlement processes, including by addressing allocation of credit
losses the covered clearing agency may face if its collateral and other
resources are insufficient to fully cover its credit exposures.\49\
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    \48\ A ``covered clearing agency'' means, among other things, a
clearing agency registered with the Commission under Section 17A of
the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1 et seq.) that is designated
systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel
(``FSOC'') pursuant to the Clearing Supervision Act (12 U.S.C. 5461
et seq.). See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(5) and (6). On July 18, 2012,
FSOC designated DTC as systemically important. U.S. Department of
the Treasury, ``FSOC Makes First Designations in Effort to Protect
Against Future Financial Crises,'' available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1645.aspx.
Therefore, DTC is a covered clearing agency.
    \49\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(viii).
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    As described above, the proposal would revise the loss allocation
process to address how DTC would manage loss events, including
Defaulting Loss Events. Under the proposal, if losses arise out of or
relate to a Defaulting Loss Event, DTC would first apply its Corporate
Contribution. If those funds prove insufficient, the proposal provides
for allocating the remaining losses to the remaining Participants
through the proposed process. Accordingly, the Commission believes that
the proposal is reasonably designed to manage DTC's credit exposures to
its Participants, by addressing allocation of credit losses.
    Therefore, the Commission believes that DTC's proposal is
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(viii) under the Act.\50\
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    \50\ Id.
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C. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)(i)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)(i) under the Act requires, in part, that a
covered clearing agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to effectively
measure, monitor, and manage the liquidity risk that arises in or is
borne by the covered clearing agency, including measuring, monitoring,
and managing its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely
basis, and its use of intraday liquidity, by maintaining sufficient
liquid resources to effect same-day settlement of payment obligations
with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of foreseeable
stress scenarios.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ 240.17Ad-22(e)(7)(i).
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    As described above, the proposal would clarify that the
Participants Fund may be used as a liquidity resource which may be
applied by DTC to fund settlement among non-defaulting Participants. In
addition, the proposal would provide a separate procedure to charge the
Participants Fund to use it as a liquidity resource. The proposed
change is designed to help DTC manage its settlement and funding flows
on a more timely basis and better effect same day settlement of payment
obligations in certain foreseeable stress scenarios.
    Therefore, the Commission believes that the proposal is reasonably
designed to help DTC effectively manage liquidity risk in a timely
manner to complete settlement, and accordingly is consistent with Rule
17Ad-22(e)(7)(i).\52\
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    \52\ Id.
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D. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13) under the Act requires, in part, that a covered
clearing agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce written
policies and

procedures reasonably designed to ensure the covered clearing agency
has the authority to take timely action to contain losses and liquidity
demands and continue to meet its obligations.\53\
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    \53\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(13).
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    As described above, the proposal would establish a more detailed
and structured loss allocation process by (1) applying a defined and
mandatory Corporate Contribution to a loss; (2) introducing an Event
Period; (3) introducing a loss allocation round and notice process; (4)
modifying the termination process and the cap of terminating
Participant's loss allocation exposure; and (5) providing the
governance around a non-default loss. The Commission believes that each
of these proposed changes helps establish a more transparent and clear
loss allocation process and authority of DTC to take certain actions,
such as announcing a Declared Non-Default Loss Event, within the loss
allocation process. Further, having a more transparent and clear loss
allocation process as proposed would provide clear authority to DTC to
allocate losses from Default Loss Events and Declared Non-Default Loss
Events and take timely actions to contain losses, and continue to meet
its clearance and settlement obligations.
    Therefore, the Commission believes that DTC's proposal is
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13) under the Act.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23)(i) and (ii)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23)(i) under the Act requires that a covered
clearing agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to publicly disclose all
relevant rules and material procedures, including key aspects of its
default rules and procedures.\55\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23)(ii) under the Act
requires that a covered clearing agency establish, implement, maintain
and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to
provide sufficient information to enable participants to identify and
evaluate the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by
participating in the covered clearing agency.\56\
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    \55\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(23)(i).
    \56\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(23)(ii).
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    As described above, the proposal would publicly disclose how DTC's
Corporate Contribution would be calculated and applied. In addition,
the proposal would establish and publicly disclose a detailed procedure
in the Rules for loss allocation. More specifically, the proposed
changes would establish an Event Period, loss allocation rounds, a
termination process followed by a settlement charge process or loss
allocation process, and a Loss Allocation Cap that would apply to
Participants after termination. Additionally, the proposal would align
the loss allocation rules across the DTCC Clearing Agencies, to help
provide consistent treatment, and clarify that non-default losses would
trigger loss allocation to Participants. The proposal would also
provide for and make known to members the procedures to trigger a loss
allocation procedure, contribute DTC's Corporate Contribution, allocate
losses, and withdraw and limit Participant's loss exposure.
Accordingly, the Commission believes that the proposal is reasonably
designed to (1) publicly disclose all relevant rules and material
procedures concerning key aspects of DTC's default rules and
procedures, and (2) provide sufficient information to enable
Participants to identify and evaluate the risks by participating in
DTC.
    Therefore, the Commission believes that DTC's proposal is
consistent with Rules 17Ad-22(e)(23)(i) and (ii) under the Act.\57\
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    \57\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(23)(i) and (ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Conclusion

    On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
proposal is consistent with the requirements of the Act and in
particular with the requirements of Section 17A of the Act \58\ and the
rules and regulations thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Act,\59\ that proposed rule change SR-DTC-2017-022, as modified by
Amendment No. 1, be, and it hereby is, approved \60\ as of the date of
this order or the date of a notice by the Commission authorizing DTC to
implement advance notice SR-DTC-2017-804, as modified by Amendment No.
1, whichever is later.
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    \59\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \60\ In approving the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission has
considered the Proposed Rule Change's impact on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \61\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\61\
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-19061 Filed 8-31-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 164 (Tuesday, August 25, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51469-51470]
[FR Doc No: 2015-20913]

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 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 117

[Docket No. USCG-2015-0723]

Drawbridge Operation Regulations; Northeast Cape Fear River,
Wilmington, NC

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of deviation from drawbridge regulation.

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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard has issued a temporary deviation from the
operating schedule that governs the Isabel S. Holmes Bridge across the
Northeast Cape Fear River, mile 1.0, at Wilmington, NC. This deviation
is necessary to facilitate the annual Beach2Battleship Iron and Half-
Iron Distance Triathlons. This deviation allows the bridge to remain in
the closed-to-navigation position.

DATES: This deviation is effective from 9:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. on October
17, 2015.

ADDRESSES: The docket for this deviation, [USCG-2015-0723], is
available at http://www.regulations.gov. Type the docket number in the
``SEARCH'' box and click ``SEARCH''. Click on Open Docket Folder on the
line associated with this deviation. You may also visit the Docket
Management Facility in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the
Department of Transportation West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this
temporary deviation, call or email Mr. Hal R. Pitts, Bridge
Administration Branch Fifth District, Coast Guard; telephone (757)

398-6222, email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>If you have questions on viewing
the docket, call Cheryl Collins, Program Manager, Docket Operations,
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The North Carolina Department of
Transportation, who owns and operates the Isabel S. Holmes Bridge, has
requested a temporary deviation from the current operating regulations
set out in 33 CFR 117.829(a), to facilitate the annual Beach2Battleship
Iron and Half-Iron Distance Triathlons.
    Under the normal operating schedule for the Isabel S. Holmes Bridge
across the Northeast Cape Fear River, mile 1.0, at Wilmington, NC in 33
CFR 117.829(a); the draw will be closed to pleasure craft from 6 a.m.
to 6 p.m. every day except at 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. when the draw will
open for all waiting vessels; the draw will open on signal for
Government and commercial vessels at all times; the draw will open for
all vessels on signal from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. The bridge has a vertical
clearance in the closed-to-navigation position of 40 feet above mean
high water.
    Under this temporary deviation, the bridge will be closed to
navigation from 9:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. on October 17, 2015. The Northeast
Cape Fear River is used by a variety of vessels including small
commercial fishing vessels, recreational vessels and tug and barge. The
Coast Guard has carefully coordinated the restrictions with commercial
and recreational waterway users.
    Vessels able to pass through the bridge in the closed position may
do so at anytime. The bridge will be able to open for emergencies and
there is no alternate route for vessels unable to pass through the
bridge in the closed position. The Coast Guard will also inform the
users of the waterways through our Local and Broadcast Notice to
Mariners of the change in operating schedule for the bridge so that
vessels can arrange their transits to minimize any impacts caused by
the temporary deviation.
    In accordance with 33 CFR 117.35(e), the drawbridge must return to
its regular operating schedule immediately at the end of the effective
period of this temporary deviation. This deviation from the operating
regulations is authorized under 33 CFR 117.35.

    Dated: August 19, 2015.
Hal R. Pitts,
Bridge Program Manager, Fifth Coast Guard District.
[FR Doc. 2015-20913 Filed 8-24-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P