[Federal Register: September 3, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 171)]
[Notices]
[Page 51551-51556]
[DOCID:fr03se08-144]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.

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SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a
petition (Defect Petition DP08-001) submitted by Mr. William Kronholm
to NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) by letter dated
January 10, 2008, under 49 U.S.C. 30162. The Petition requests that the
agency commence a proceeding to determine the existence of a defect
related to motor vehicle safety within the electronically actuated
throttle control system that is allegedly causing sudden and
uncontrolled acceleration in model year (MY) 2006 to 2007 Toyota Tacoma
pickup trucks (vehicles).
    After conducting a technical review of the material cited and
provided by the petitioner and other information, and taking into
account several considerations, including, among others, allocation of
agency resources, agency priorities, and the likelihood that additional
investigation would result in a finding that a defect related to motor
vehicle safety exists, NHTSA has concluded that further investigation
of the issues raised by the petition is not warranted. The agency
accordingly has denied the petition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Scott Yon, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable Federal
motor vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to
motor vehicle safety. 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed
petition, the agency conducts a technical review of

the petition, material submitted with the petition, and any additional
information. Sec.  552.6. After considering the technical review and
taking into account appropriate factors, which may include, among
others, allocation of agency resources, agency priorities, and the
likelihood of success in litigation that might arise from a
determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to motor vehicle
safety, the agency will grant or deny the petition. Sec.  552.8.

II. Defect Petition Background Information

    The Petitioner, Mr. William Kronholm of Helena, Montana, purchased
a new model year (MY) 2006 Toyota Tacoma pickup (VIN 5TEUU42N26Z258969,
Petitioner's vehicle) on May 10, 2006. The vehicle is equipped with a
V6 engine (4.0 L, 1GR-FE), five speed automatic transmission, air
conditioning (A/C), cruise control, antilock brakes (ABS), limited slip
rear differential, and four-wheel drivetrain (4WD), and was
manufactured in April 2006. The Petitioner's vehicle is also equipped
with an electronically actuated throttle control system.\1\ The
Petitioner is the primary driver of the Petitioner's vehicle and he
drove the vehicle for approximately 24,500 miles without experiencing a
problem with the throttle control system.
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    \1\ The design of the Tacoma throttle control system is similar
to that reviewed in PE04-021. Interested persons can refer to this
investigation for more information on the basic design and operation
of the system.
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    On the morning of January 5, 2008, the Petitioner and his wife
drove the vehicle to a cross-country skiing area about 100 miles from
their home. After skiing several hours, they returned home on Rt. 141.
During the return trip, the Petitioner pulled off the road and stopped
briefly at the intersection with Rt. 271. The transmission was placed
in Park and the engine was left running.
    When the Petitioner was ready to resume the trip south on Rt. 141,
he engaged Drive and allowed the vehicle to move forward under its own
power (without accelerator pedal application). As he approached the
intersection, and while braking and checking for oncoming traffic, he
sensed that the vehicle was not slowing as expected from the brake
application.\2\ He struggled with the vehicle for about 10 seconds,
continuing to press on the brake, before regaining control of the
vehicle. By this time the vehicle had moved about 7 to 10 meters beyond
where the Petitioner had intended to stop, coming to rest in the
southbound lane of Rt. 141. He was alarmed by the event and wasn't
quite sure what had happened. However, he could not identify a specific
problem with his vehicle, so he continued driving.
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    \2\ His wife also recognized that the vehicle was not stopping
as she had expected, or that something was wrong, and she asked her
husband what was going on.
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    When the Petitioner arrived at his home, he began to back the
vehicle into his short driveway.\3\ While steering the vehicle into the
driveway and using the brake to regulate the vehicle speed, the
Petitioner reports that the vehicle began to accelerate suddenly in the
rearward direction. He applied the brakes forcefully, which slowed the
vehicle,\4\ but he was concerned that he was nearing the garage door.
He concluded that his vehicle was out of control and, fearing a crash,
he turned the ignition switch off. He estimates the duration of this
event was approximately 10 seconds. He subsequently restarted the
vehicle and it operated normally.
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    \3\ There is a slight grade that would allow the vehicle to
reverse without accelerator application.
    \4\ The Petitioner states his vehicle's rear wheels were
spinning freely as he recalls hearing the sound of gravel hitting
the inside of the rear wheel wells.
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    Due to the similarity with his earlier incident, and since both
incidents had occurred within a two hour period, he suspected that a
defect with his vehicle was the likely cause. He conducted some
research, including finding some related news articles and news
broadcasts via Web research that reported similar occurrences on other
MY 2006 and 2007 Tacoma vehicles. He also found the NHTSA Web site,
where he filed his Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) report (ODI
10214130) and conducted a VOQ search for other Tacoma reports similar
to his. His search identified a number of reports for MY 2006 and 2007
Tacoma vehicles that he considered similar to the incidents he had
experienced, as well as a small number of reports for peer vehicles
(non-Toyota) of similar age, usage, and design type.
    The Petitioner took his Tacoma to a local Toyota dealer on January
7, 2008, advised it of the two incidents he had experienced, and
requested that they inspect the vehicle for a potential problem or
defect that caused the unintended accelerations. The dealership tested
the vehicle, inspected the air intake, throttle and accelerator pedal
wiring, and checked for any stored diagnostic codes or service messages
in the engine control unit. The dealer also checked for any pertinent
bulletins or ``health'' updates. The dealer could not duplicate the
unintended acceleration, no codes were stored and no bulletins or
updates were available. No repairs were made and the vehicle was
returned to the Petitioner.
    The Petitioner filed a Defect Petition (DP) with NHTSA that was
received in NHTSA on January 18, 2008. The petition identified his
previous VOQ and discussed his research on Tacoma and peer vehicle VOQs
with throttle control complaints. He requested that NHTSA open an
investigation into sudden and uncontrolled acceleration on the MY 2006
and 2007 Toyota Tacoma vehicles. In a letter to Toyota dated January
25, 2008, the Petitioner described the two ``spontaneous and
uncommanded sudden acceleration incidents in the span of less than two
hours'' and the results of his search for related complaints on the
NHTSA Web site. The letter takes issue with Toyota's response to his
and other complaints of sudden acceleration and requests that Toyota
conduct a ``full and complete investigation of the defect'' in his
Tacoma.\5\
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    \5\ See http://www.safercar.gov under VOQ report ODI 10214130 to
view the 1/25/2008 letter.
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    ODI contacted the Petitioner on January 24, 2008, to advise that we
received his petition. During this call, ODI staff briefly reviewed the
specifics of the two incidents the Petitioner reported and requested
that he provide the ODI numbers of the reports he identified in his
petition for both the Toyota and non-Toyota vehicles. During this
conversation, the Petitioner confirmed his assessment that during both
incidents, his vehicle's brake system had functioned properly and that
the cause of the incidents was a failure of the throttle control
system, specifically that the throttle control system opened the
throttle without accelerator pedal application. In other words, the
vehicle self-accelerated. In his opinion, this acceleration made the
vehicle difficult to control and unsafe to operate.
    The Petitioner provided a list of 37 VOQ reports via e-mail, 33 for
Toyota Tacoma, including the Petitioner's report ODI 10214130, and four
for non-Toyota pickups.\6\ The Toyota Tacoma reports included 16
reports on MY 2006 and 17 reports on MY 2007 Tacoma. ODI notes that two
reports (10180652 and 10181486) were submitted by the

same complainant, and one (10184332) was submitted by a Canadian
consumer.
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    \6\ ODI numbers for MY 2006 Tacoma: 10152011, 10172030,
10183012, 10184332 (Canadian vehicle), 10184375, 10184416, 10184759,
10185253, 10186996, 10191371, 10201595, 10202727, 10211100,
10212718, 10214130, 10215598. For MY 2007 Tacoma: 10180652,
10181411, 10181486 (same complainant as 10180652), 10182045,
10187789, 10197535, 10198196, 10199820, 10201655, 10202283,
10207528, 10208120, 10208868, 10208890, 10212294, 10212602,
10212656. For non-Toyota products: 10166548, 10183144, 10199048,
10203722.
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    In response to the petition, ODI opened Defect Petition (DP) 08-001
on January 31, 2008. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to
Toyota on February 8, 2008, with a response due date of March 28, 2008.
The IR letter sought information relating to a range of potential
consumer complaints and defined the MY 2004 \7\ to 2008 Tacoma models
as the subject vehicles.\8\ Toyota requested and was granted extensions
to the original response date, with partial submissions made on the
agreed upon dates, and the submission was completed on April 25,
2008.\9\ Toyota also conducted a technical meeting with ODI on May 21,
2008.
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    \7\ The MY 2004 vehicles are an earlier design version that used
different engines and body style.
    \8\ This was done to ensure a comprehensive sample of the types
of complaints Toyota received.
    \9\ Some portions of the response were submitted with a request
for confidentiality.
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III. NHTSA Review--VOQ Data

    ODI began its assessment of the petition by attempting to contact
each of the persons who had submitted a VOQ report on a Tacoma, as
identified by the Petitioner. We interviewed 26 of the 31
consumers.\10\ In the interviews, consumers described events that could
be attributed to a throttle control system issue. Their concerns
stemmed from a variety of vehicle operating conditions and driving
circumstances. Some owners described events similar to the Petitioner's
allegations, in that unintended acceleration occurred on vehicles
equipped with an automatic transmission while slowing or stopped. Other
complainants described unintended acceleration that was minor in
comparison to the events that the Petitioner described. Other owners
described events that varied significantly from what the Petitioner
reported. For example, some consumers described events that occurred on
manual transmission vehicles at highway speeds when the clutch was
depressed, while others reported that a condition only occurred after
the accelerator pedal had been depressed significantly (intentionally)
or only when the cruise control or A/C system was engaged. Some
consumers reported events occurring when more than one of these
conditions was present.
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    \10\ The five remaining consumers failed to respond to requests
for an interview, or could not be contacted.
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    After the initial interviews, ODI elected to expand its analysis to
include a broader representation of Tacoma reports in the VOQ complaint
database. Noting that the DP subject vehicles were of a consistent
design type (generation) from MY 2005 through MY 2008,\11\ we searched
the complaint database to identify all reports potentially involving
the throttle control system for MY 2005 and later Tacoma vehicles.
Table 1 shows the number of Tacoma VOQ reports, by MY, that include an
allegation possibly related to the throttle control system. We
attempted to interview each person who submitted a report. We have
interviewed 64 of these 97 consumers (about 66%).
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    \11\ At MY 2005, the Tacoma vehicle line underwent a major
design revision from the MY 2004 vehicle, with a new body style and
powertrain being introduced.

                                      Table 1--Unique Tacoma Throttle Control System Complaints, Through 5/31/2008
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MY.................................................................            2005             2006             2007             2008           Totals
Complaints.........................................................              18               36               38                5               97
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    As shown in Table 1, there were fewer reports for MY 2005 Tacoma
reports than for MY 2006 and 2007. When vehicles share a common design
configuration over more than one model year, there typically tends to
be higher rates of reports on the older vehicles than the newer ones.
The trend found here may reflect an abnormal variability or another
factor such as more recent publicity.
    Based on the report descriptions and the interviews conducted, ODI
separated the consumer complaints into (1) those that may involve the
throttle control system, (2) those that did not relate to the throttle
control system (or that relate to a different system or component), and
(3) those that we could not categorize, often because of limited
information. The analysis revealed that some VOQs implicate more than
one of the above issues, resulting in a total of 104 discrete
complaints in these three categories.
    Of the 104 complaints, 59 relate or may relate to the throttle
control system. These complaints include allegations of high idle speed
on cold start; short duration (less than one second), small magnitude
vehicle surges while the vehicle is at rest and in gear (possibly
related to A/C system operation); excessive engine speed and
transmission downshifts when the cruise control is engaged and the
vehicle encounters an uphill grade; and failure of the engine to return
to ``idle'' in a normal manner while at highway speeds when the clutch
is depressed for shifting (termed by Toyota as ``catalyst
protection'').
    Regarding the vehicle's throttle control system, we note that
NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) conducted testing on
a MY 2007 Tacoma for compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 124, Accelerator Controls in September 2007. In a
November 23, 2007, report, OVSC indicated that the Tacoma throttle
control system is compliant with the requirements set forth in FMVSS
No. 124.\12\ OVSC completed this testing prior to the opening of DP08-
001.
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    \12\ See http://nhthqnwws111.odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/docservlet/
Artemis/Public/OVSC/2007/Test%20Reports/TRTR-639126-2007.PDF for
vehicle specification, test results, and details on obtaining more
information.
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    Of the 59 complaints that may be related to the vehicle's throttle
control system, two of the complaints (about three percent) related to
high idle speed on cold start. None of these reports allege a crash or
injury. NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC) conducted
testing to compare two MY 2008 Tacoma (four- and six-cylinder engines
with automatic transmissions) to 15 other non-Tacoma vehicles. The
objective was to determine the engine RPM and the sustaining brake
pedal force (effort required to maintain a stationary position) during
cold start.\13\ For the vehicles tested, the Tacoma idle speeds and
pedal forces were both above the average of the 17 vehicles tested but
within the range of values measured.
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    \13\ This work was completed prior to the opening of DP08-001
also.
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    Thirty-seven of the 59 complaints (about 63 percent) related to a
short duration, small magnitude vehicle surge increase while the
vehicle is at rest and in gear. None of these reports allege a crash or
injury. In assessing the safety consequence of these at-rest surge
complaints, we note first that these events occur only on vehicles
equipped with automatic transmissions. Like many other vehicles, the
Tacoma idle speed varies depending on whether the A/C compressor is
engaged. We note also that the A/C compressor operates

when the front windshield defroster is enabled, regardless of the state
of the A/C compressor switch.
    In our IR to Toyota, we asked the company to explain the
functionality of the Tacoma A/C system and how it affects the idle
speed. According to Toyota's response, there is a modest increase in
idle speed when the AC compressor engages. With this functionality, it
is possible for the vehicle to inch forward if, after it is stopped and
in gear, the driver applies only enough braking to prevent the vehicle
from rolling forward under normal conditions without the A/C engaged
and the A/C compressor subsequently engages. However, a small
additional brake force suppresses this forward movement.
    Some of these 37 consumers, typically those with 4WD, reported that
within about five seconds after stopping the vehicle, they experienced
a surge that felt like a sharp jolt in the vehicle as though a
following driver had tapped the rear bumper (some consumers reported
looking in the rearview mirror to see if this was the case). The
duration of the jolt was very short (< 1 second), would occur only once
per stop, and occurred randomly--perhaps on a weekly basis or less
frequently. Consumers did not report a simultaneous change in engine
speed, so it is unclear if this issue involves the vehicle's throttle
control system.\14\ We were not able to simulate this event on a
vehicle. However, to the extent that these events could be related to
the throttle control system, we note that consumers reported they
easily controlled vehicle movement with normal brake force.
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    \14\ Some consumer's have alleged that the vehicle's drivetrain
or suspension causes the condition.
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    Eleven of the 59 complaints (about nineteen percent) involve
excessive engine speed and transmission downshifts when the cruise
control is engaged and the vehicle encounters an uphill grade. None of
these reports allege a crash or injury. We note that this occurs only
on vehicles equipped with automatic transmissions and cruise control,
and that it appears to be more prevalent on the four cylinder models.
We identified VOQ report ODI 10183271 that provided detailed
information regarding this issue. The report states that while on the
interstate with the cruise control engaged and set within a speed range
of about 65 to 75 miles per hour, if the vehicle encounters an uphill
grade, the vehicle will first downshift to a lower gear, then apply
additional throttle, resulting in the engine revving to a high RPM.\15\
The VOQ alleges that the combined effect of downshifting then opening
the throttle can cause a yaw or loss of control condition and that a
crash could result, and that a near crash incident occurred on one
occasion.\16\
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    \15\ He states that he met with a Toyota technical
representative and observed the results of test work they conducted.
The consumer claims that the test results verified the system
operated in the manner described in his report, though he did not
obtain copies of the test results.
    \16\ See the VOQ report ODI 10183271 for details of the near
loss of control incident that was alleged.
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    We interviewed this consumer \17\ and discussed the results of
testing conducted on his vehicle by a local Toyota dealer. He provided
a description of what he learned from Toyota's testing, and agreed to
allow us to inspect his vehicle. We met with him on March 12, 2008, and
test drove the vehicle on local interstates where he had previously
experienced the alleged event. We connected a commercially available
test device to the vehicle's diagnostic connector to monitor throttle
and transmission data. We confirmed that when the vehicle cruise
control is set to a specific speed range and it encounters an incline,
the transmission will downshift to second gear and the engine will rev
to a high RPM. However, we could not confirm that the transmission
downshift preceded the throttle application. To the contrary, the data
showed that the transmission downshift was in response to throttle
opening, similar to what would occur if the operator were to manually
apply the accelerator pedal under similar circumstances (same speed
range, on an incline). We do not perceive a significant safety risk
related to this phenomenon.
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    \17\ The complainant is an engineer who owns a four cylinder
Tacoma with automatic transmission.
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    Nine of the 59 complaints (about 15 percent) relate to an alleged
failure of the engine to return to ``idle' in a normal manner while at
highway speeds when the clutch is depressed for shifting (what Toyota
describes as catalyst protection). One of these reports alleges a crash
with no injury, as discussed below. We note first that this event only
occurs on vehicles equipped with four cylinder engines and manual
transmission. The condition is typically described in reports as a
failure of the engine to return to normal idle speed and an increase in
engine speed that occurs when the clutch is depressed while shifting
from 4th to 5th gear (see ODI 10150731, 10157923, 10175527, and
10208505).
    In its IR response, Toyota described the system used on four
cylinder vehicles to protect the long-term durability of the catalytic
converter, a component of the emissions control system. Toyota reported
that under certain operating conditions and when the accelerator pedal
is not being depressed (i.e., an overrun condition), the vehicle's
catalytic converter can be damaged if there is inadequate air flow
through the engine. In simplified terms, the throttle control system
opens the throttle without driver input to provide a minimal airflow
through the engine. This can produce a temporary elevated idle speed if
the clutch is depressed. However, according to Toyota's IR response,
the air flow increase by the throttle control system is limited so that
it does not result in a net power output to the vehicle. Toyota advised
that while increased air flow diminishes engine braking (deceleration
caused by engine drag in an overrun condition), it cannot produce
vehicle acceleration.
    VRTC testing of a MY 2006 Tacoma equipped with a four cylinder
engine and manual transmission verified that the catalyst protection
feature operated as Toyota described.\18\ We confirmed that the
strategy is only implemented when the transmission is in 4th or 5th
gear and note that when the clutch was depressed we observed free-wheel
engine speeds as high as 3,000 RPMs. However, at the road speeds where
this occurred (60 to 75 MPH), and with the limited amount of airflow
involved, the effect on vehicle control, though perhaps annoying to
consumers, did not appear to be consequential.
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    \18\ Also, Toyota demonstrated this system to ODI during the May
21, 2008, technical meeting.
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    One VOQ report (ODI 10152011) alleged that this operation caused
the operator to lose control of his vehicle and crash on a rural/semi-
urban Colorado roadway. However, the road was snow-covered at the time
of the crash. Based on the information in the report, the vehicle was
travelling at a high speed when the crash occurred (70 MPH on a snow-
covered rural/semi-urban road). Since speed and road conditions may
have been a factor, the incident described in this report is of little
probative value with regard to the alleged defect described in the
petition.
    Beyond the 59 reports, ODI identified 19 reports that did not
relate to the throttle control system, or that relate to a different
system or component. Fourteen of these appear to have been caused by
floor mat interference with the accelerator pedal, including 4 crashes
and 3 injuries. The other five reports were related to dual pedal
application, where the operator inadvertently depresses both the

accelerator pedal and the brake pedal when intending to apply the brake
only. One of these reports alleges a minor crash with no injury (ODI
10221144). These five complaints involve vehicles equipped with
automatic transmissions. When dual pedal application occurs, the
vehicle moves forward further than the driver intends. During ODI
interviews, complainants reported that they had inadvertently applied
both the brake and gas pedals at the same time. Three complainants
determined this prior to filing VOQs (ODI 10210488, 10221144, and
10223599), one concluded it after filing and disclosed it during the
interview (ODI 10208868), and one mentioned that this may have been a
factor during our interview (ODI 10198196). To the extent that causes
are identified that are not related to the electronic throttle control
system but which may raise possible safety defect issues, such as floor
mat interference or pedal placement, ODI will continue to examine them
as part of our regular screening process and will open investigations
if warranted.
    In a few reports, consumers questioned the design of the pedal
configuration, suggesting that the pedals were too close to one another
(lateral separation) or that there was insufficient step-over \19\
clearance. We note that, dimensionally speaking, the pedal
configuration of the MY 2005 to 2008 Tacoma is typical of other light
trucks and passenger vehicles. Some complainants noted that they had
been wearing larger or stiffer than usual shoes, such as work boots,
when the dual pedal application occurred, and they reported that this
was a factor in the occurrence.
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    \19\ This is the difference in the height (distance) of the
pedals from the floor board.
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    Related to this topic, ODI interviewed the Petitioner and inspected
his Tacoma at his home on March 26, 2008. In an earlier interview, the
Petitioner advised that he was wearing his cross-country ski boots
(shoes) when his two incidents occurred, so we took this opportunity to
look at them. The cross country ski shoes (Merrell brand, men's size
9\1/2\), unlike down-hill ski boots, are similar in size and width to a
work boot with the exception of an extension at the toe of the boot
that acts as a binding for the ski. The binding is of the same
thickness as the sole of the shoe and it extends forward (outward) from
the shoe about \5/8\ of an inch. During a test drive, we noted that the
Petitioner used his right foot to operate the brake and gas pedal, and
that he lifts and relocates his foot when he transitions from one pedal
to another.\20\
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    \20\ The toe of the Petitioner's foot is oriented to the right
of his heel when he applies either the brake or gas pedal.
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    Considering that the shoes may have played a role in his incidents,
we discussed the issue of dual pedal application with the Petitioner.
He noted that he skied two to three times per year, that he typically
drove with his ski shoes on to save time at the ski facility, and that
he had never had a problem before. Additionally, he noted that he had
made this same trip using the Tacoma a few times the prior ski season
without incident. We asked the Petitioner to assess the vehicle with
his ski shoes on to see if he could apply both pedals at the same time
and to advise us of his findings. He subsequently reported that it was
possible for him to inadvertently hit both pedals while wearing the ski
shoes but that his foot had to be in an abnormal orientation for this
to occur, one that would be plainly obvious to him. In his estimation
this was not the cause of his two incidents.
    Finally, for the remaining 26 complaints, these are reports where
we have assessed the available information from the complainants, yet
we are unable to identify a cause that may be related to the vehicle's
throttle control system or, in many cases, any specific cause or
explanation. These reports allege 13 crashes with four injury
allegations (one minor, two moderate, one severe). In some cases, the
VOQ was inconclusive and the consumer filing the VOQ could not be
contacted for an interview. However, in no instances did the
complainants report or allege a specific component failure or
replacement, the illumination of a warning indicator, the detection of
a stored trouble or fault code, or the identification of any other
physical evidence supporting a vehicle-based problem. The incidents
occur randomly and are therefore unable to be reproduced for testing or
further analysis.\21\
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    \21\ As an example of the type of analysis possible, for the
Petitioner's vehicle, we have interviewed the Petitioner (multiple
times), interviewed his wife (she was a passenger for one of the
incidents), conducted a physical inspection of the Petitioner's
vehicle, reviewed the Petitioner's vehicle service and warranty
history, test driven the Petitioner's vehicle, and monitored the
Petitioner's vehicle diagnostic/control system using a commercially
available diagnostic tool; the Petitioner's vehicle has not
exhibited another incident as of this date.
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IV. NHTSA Review--Toyota IR Response Data

    ODI reviewed the information Toyota provided in its IR response for
the MY 2005 to 2008 vehicles.22 We reviewed the population data and
provide the number of vehicles by MY and transmission type in Table 2.

                                                 Table 2--Vehicle Population by MY and Transmission Type
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                                                                      2005              2006              2007              2008*            Totals
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Auto..........................................................           111,625           152,727           134,665            83,828           482,845
Manual........................................................            40,013            42,441            31,156            19,105           132,715
    Totals....................................................           151,638           195,168           165,821           102,933          615,560
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*--partial MY.

    We reviewed Toyota's responses to several other questions to ensure
we fully understood any product or design changes, the studies of
issues relevant to the alleged defect conducted by Toyota, the design
and operation of the systems that interact with the throttle control
system, and Toyota's assessment of the possible problem with the Tacoma
throttle control system. We did not identify any information indicating
a product- or component-based issue that could explain or cause a
throttle control system failure.
    We conducted a limited review of the responses to questions
regarding the complaint and warranty data. Our review of the field
report, legal claim,\23\ and warranty claim data did not identify any
concern or trend. We also conducted an analysis of the consumer
complaints as described below. Table 3 shows the count of consumer
complaints by MY.
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    \23\ The legal claims were duplicative of the consumer reports,
which were also reviewed.

                       Table 3--Consumer Complaint Counts by MY From Toyota's IR Response
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       2005            2006            2007            2008            Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consumer Complaints.............             176             167              90              13             446
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We based our review of the Toyota consumer complaints on the
information provided in the IR response. We first note that the trend
we saw in the VOQ data--that the MY 2006 and 2007 vehicles were over-
represented (or MY 2005 was under represented)--does not appear in the
consumer complaint data submitted by Toyota. In fact, Toyota's consumer
complaint data do not suggest any identifiable reporting trend for any
MY(s).
    In reading the consumer complaint reports, we noted most were
similar to the complaints identified in the VOQ reports. Accordingly,
we followed the same approach used for VOQ reports and conducted an
analysis of a random sample of consumer complaints. We reviewed 133
reports \24\ from MYs 2005 to 2008 and identified 142 separate
complaint types. ODI categorized 96 (about 68%) of the complaints as
potentially related to the vehicle's throttle control system, 23 (about
16%) as not related to the throttle control system (or related to a
different system or component), and 23 (about 16%) as not permitting us
to identify a cause that relates to the vehicle's throttle control
system.\25\ These proportions are similar to the VOQ analysis.
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    \24\ We actually reviewed 143 reports but deemed 10 reports fell
outside the scope of the alleged defect.
    \25\ As with the VOQ reports, these consumer complaints did not
contain evidence of a vehicle causation but were simply allegations
that the vehicle had suffered a throttle control system-related
incident. Based on this analysis, we estimate that of the 257 MY
2006 and 2007 Toyota consumer complaints, about 40 would be in this
category. This number will be reflected as the manufacturer failure
counts in the closing resume for DP08-001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the crashes and injuries reported in the Toyota IR response, we
reviewed the reports for the MY 2006 and 2007 Tacoma (since these were
the subject of the DP request) where a crash or injury was alleged.
From these reports, we identified 33 unique incidents. Eight of these
incidents, with three injuries, were duplicates of reports to ODI that
we had reviewed. For the remaining 25 reports unique to the Toyota
response, we determined that four reports, with no injuries, fell
outside the scope of the alleged defect (these involved brake system or
other unrelated issues), two involved dual pedal application errors,
and six involved other issues not related to the throttle control
system. For the remaining 13 crash allegations, with one injury
allegation, we were unable to make an assessment of the underlying
cause of the crash.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ None of the 25 reports contained any specific evidence of a
failure of the throttle control system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion

    ODI's review of the petition, assessment of VOQs, interviews of
persons who filed VOQs, testing, and review of Toyota's IR response
reveals that about three-quarters of the complaints involved various
explained aspects of the Tacoma's throttle control system that do not
seem to present a significant safety risk under most circumstances, or
did not involve a failure of the throttle control system. For the
remaining quarter, although there may have been an issue with the
throttle control system as one possible explanation, we have been
unable to determine a throttle control related or any underlying cause
that gave rise to the complaint. For those vehicles where the throttle
control system did not perform as the owner believes it should have,
the information suggesting a possible defect related to motor vehicle
safety is quite limited. In our view, additional investigation is
unlikely to result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle
safety exists with regard to the Tacoma's throttle control system or a
NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect
as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the requested
investigation. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and
prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's
safety mission, the petition is denied. This action does not constitute
a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The
agency will take further action if warranted by future circumstances.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at 49
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

    Issued on: August 25, 2008.
Daniel C. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E8-19994 Filed 9-2-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 187 (Thursday, September 26, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 59306-59308]
[FR Doc No: 2013-23437]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0826; Directorate Identifier 2011-SW-046-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter France Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2,
and SA330J helicopters. This proposed AD would prohibit use of the
hydraulic hoist in helicopters equipped with certain parts and
configurations until a hoist beam lower fitting protector is installed.
This proposed AD is prompted by a report that the hoist cable jammed
during a rescue at sea. The proposed actions are intended to prevent
the hoist cable from jamming and subsequent cable failure, which could
result in injury and damage to the helicopter.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by November 25,
2013.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: Send comments to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to the ``Mail'' address between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the Docket Operations Office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the foreign
authority's AD, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for the Docket Operations Office
(telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.
    For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
American Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX
75052; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER> or<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>;
or at http://www.eurocopter.com/techpub. You may review the referenced
service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel,
Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas
76137.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Grant, Aviation Safety
Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting
written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to
the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might
result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To
ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters
should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed
electronically, commenters should submit only one time.
    We will file in the docket all comments that we receive, as well as
a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, we
will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments filed after the comment period has
closed if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay.
We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD
No. 2009-0271R1, dated July 8, 2011, to correct an unsafe condition for
Eurocopter Model AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L1, AS332L2, and SA330J
helicopters with certain hoist beams installed. EASA advises that
during a hoisting operation, a hydraulic hoist cable jammed against the
base of the supporting strut of a dual hoist tray installation.
According to EASA, the load was transferred to the back-up electrical
hoist and safely brought on board. However, the jamming of the
hydraulic hoist cable against the strut damaged the back-up electrical
hoist power supply harness, which is routed through the area, resulting
in a short circuit that fused and ruptured the cable. EASA reports that
this condition, if not corrected, could lead to further incidents of
hoist cable jamming and subsequent cable failure, which could result in
personal injuries and damage to the helicopter.

FAA's Determination

    These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of
France and

are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our
bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its technical representative,
has notified us of the unsafe condition described in its AD. We are
proposing this AD because we evaluated all known relevant information
and determined that an unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop
on other products of the same type design.

Related Service Information

    Eurocopter has issued one Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (EASB),
Revision 3, dated July 6, 2011, with three different numbers. EASB No.
25.02.08 is for civil and military Model AS332-series helicopters; EASB
No. 25.01.29 is for military Model AS532-series helicopters; and EASB
No. 25.39 is for civil and military Model SA330-series helicopters. The
EASB originally provided instructions to prevent the main hydraulic
hoist cable from becoming jammed and damaged in the fixed fitting of
the hoist beam lower fitting. The revisions add further instructions
and expand the effectivity to more helicopters and helicopter equipment
configurations. The revisions also extend some compliance deadlines,
and revise some instructions to account for improved installation
procedures. After further investigation, the most recent revisions
remove some helicopter models from the list of applicable helicopters.

Proposed AD Requirements

    This proposed AD would require installing a placard that prohibits
raising or lowering the load in case of a cable jam. If the hoist
control electrical harness is routed at the base of the hoist
supporting strut, the proposed AD would require disabling the hoist
pyrotechnic shear function and installing placards that state the hoist
pyrotechnic shear function is disabled. The proposed AD would also
require either installing a hoist beam lower fitting protector or
installing placards that prohibit operating the hydraulic hoist.

Differences Between This Proposed AD and the EASA AD

    Our AD would differ from the EASA AD as follows:
    The EASA AD requires certain actions before the next flight, while
we would require the same actions before the next hoisting operation.
    The EASA AD sets calendar dates that have passed for compliance,
while we set compliance based on hours time-in-service.
    The EASA AD misidentifies the Eurocopter SA330J service bulletin
number and paragraph number in its required actions for Model SA330J
helicopters. This proposed AD would require compliance with paragraph
2.B.4 of Eurocopter Emergency Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.39,
Revision 3, dated July 5, 2011.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 20 helicopters of
U.S. Registry and that work hours would average $85 an hour. Based on
these estimates, we would expect the following costs:
     The cost for installing and removing placards is minimal.
     Disabling the hoist pyrotechnic shear function would
require 1 work-hour and no parts would be needed for a cost of $85 per
helicopter, $1,700 for the U.S. fleet.
     Installation of the hoist beam lower fitting protector for
Model AS332 helicopters without a right hand (RH) sliding door and
without a short footstep would require 6 work-hours for a labor cost of
$510 per helicopter. Parts would cost $4,760 for a total cost of $5,270
per helicopter.
     Installation of the hoist beam lower fitting protector and
short footstep with lower side protector for Model AS332 helicopters
without a RH sliding door and with a short footstep would require 12
work-hours for a labor cost of $1020 per helicopter. Parts would cost
$26,891 for a total cost of $27,401 per helicopter.
     Installation of the hoist beam protector for Model AS332
helicopters with a RH sliding door would require 3 work-hours for a
labor cost of $255 per helicopter. Parts would cost $20,858 for a total
cost of $21,113 per helicopter.
     Installation of the hoist beam protector for Model SA330J
helicopters would require 3 work-hours for a labor cost of $255 per
helicopter. Parts would cost $4,774 for a total cost of $5,029 per
helicopter.
    Enabling the hoist pyrotechnic shear function would require 1 work-
hour and no parts would be needed for a cost of $85 per helicopter.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed, I certify this proposed regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
    3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that
it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
    4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply
with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

Eurocopter France (Eurocopter): Docket No. FAA-2013-0826;
Directorate Identifier 2011-SW-046-AD.

(a) Applicability

    (1) This AD applies to the following helicopters, certificated
in any category:
    (i) Eurocopter Model AS332C, AS332L, AS332 L1, and AS332 L2
helicopters with a hoist beam, Part Number (P/N) 330A87-2345-00, -
01, -02, -03, -04, -05, or -06, installed with a single or double
hoist plate; and
    (ii) Eurocopter Model SA330J helicopters with a hoist beam, P/N
330A87-2345-00, -01, -02, -03, -04, -05, or -06, installed with a
single hoist plate.

(b) Unsafe Condition

    The unsafe condition is defined as hoist cable jamming and
subsequent cable failure, which could result in injuries or damage
to the helicopter.

(c) Comments Due Date

    Comments are due November 25, 2013.

(d) Compliance

    You are responsible for performing each action required by this
AD within the specified compliance time unless accomplished
previously.

(e) Required Actions

    (1) Before the next hoist operation:
    (i) For all helicopters, install a placard in full view of the
hoist operator that states: ``IN CASE OF CABLE JAM AGAINST STRUT DO
NOT ATTEMPT TO RAISE OR LOWER LOAD''.
    (ii) For helicopters with a hoist control electrical harness
routed at the base of the hoist supporting strut:
    (A) Disable the hoist pyrotechnic shear function.
    (B) Install a placard on the instrument panel in full view of
the flight crew that states:
    ``HOIST PYROTECHNIC SHEAR FUNCTION DISABLED''.
    (C) Install a placard in full view of the hoist operator that
states:
    ``HOIST PYROTECHNIC SHEAR FUNCTION DISABLED. IN CASE OF
    NECESSITY, CUT THE HOIST CABLE WITH THE SHEARS LOCATED IN THE
    CABIN.''
    (iii) For helicopters listed in Paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this AD
with a tray-mounted double hoist installed with the back-up
electrical hoist power supply harness routed at the base of the
hoist supporting strut, do one of the following:
    (A) Install a hoist beam lower fitting protector in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B.2.b of
Eurocopter Emergency Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.02.08, Revision
3, dated July 6, 2011 (EASB), and if a short footstep, P/N 332P21-
9000-00 or 332P21-2052-01, is installed, also install the short
footstep with lower side protector in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B.2.c.2, of the EASB; or
    (B) Install two placards, one in full view of the flight crew
and one in full view of the the hoist operator, that state:
    ``IN-FLIGHT OPERATION OF THE HOIST IS PROHIBITED.''
    (2) Within 60 hours time-in-service:
    (i) For helicopters listed in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this AD
without a tray-mounted double hoist installed with the back-up
electrical hoist power supply harness routed at the base of the
hoist supporting strut and without a right hand sliding door, P/N
332A22-1165-01, installed, do one of the following:
    (A) Install a hoist beam lower fitting protecter in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B.2.b, of the EASB
and if a short footstep, P/N 332P21-9000-00 or 332P21-2052-01, is
installed, also install the short footstep with lower side protector
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph
2.B.2.c.2, of the EASB; or
    (B) Install two placards, one in full view of the flight crew
and one in full view of the hoist operator, that state:
    ``IN-FLIGHT OPERATION OF THE HOIST IS PROHIBITED.''
    (ii) For helicopters listed in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this AD
with a right hand sliding door, P/N 332A22-1165-01, installed, do
one of the following:
    (A) Install a hoist beam lower fitting protector in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B.5, of the EASB;
or
    (B) Install two placards, one in full view of the flight crew
and one in full view of the hoist operator, that state:
    ``IN-FLIGHT OPERATION OF THE HOIST IS PROHIBITED.''
    (iii) For Model SA330J helicopters, do one of the following:
    (A) Install a hoist beam lower fitting protector in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B.4, of Eurocopter
Emergency Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.39, Revision 3, dated July
5, 2011; or
    (B) Install two placards, one in full view of the flight crew
and one in full view of the hoist operator, that state:
    ``IN-FLIGHT OPERATION OF THE HOIST IS PROHIBITED.''
    (3) For any helicopter that has been modified per paragraph
(e)(1)(iii)(A), (e)(2)(i)(A), (e)(2)(ii)(A), or (e)(2)(iii)(A) of
this AD, do the following before the next hoist operation:
    (i) Re-establish the hoist pyrotechnic shear function if
disabled per paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(A).
    (ii) Remove any placards if installed as required by paragraph
(e)(1)(i), (e)(1)(ii)(B), (e)(1)(ii)(C), (e)(1)(iii)(B),
(e)(2)(i)(B), (e)(2)(ii)(B), or (e)(2)(iii)(B).

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs
for this AD. Send your proposal to: Robert Grant, Aviation Safety
Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>;
email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating
certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you
notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the local flight standards district office or
certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft
complying with this AD through an AMOC.

 (g) Additional Information

    The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) AD No. 2009-0271R1, dated July 8, 2011. You may view
the EASA AD at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and
locating it in Docket No. FAA-2013-0826.

 (h) Subject

    Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 7100, Powerplant
System.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 17, 2013.
Gwendolynne O'Connell,
Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2013-23437 Filed 9-25-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P