[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 113 (Thursday, June 12, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 33677-33679]
[FR Doc No: 2014-13665]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0898 Special Conditions No. 25-526-SC]

Special Conditions: Airbus Model A350-900 Series Airplane;
Composite Fuselage In-Flight Fire/Flammability Resistance

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for Airbus Model A350-900
series airplanes. These airplanes will have a novel or unusual design
feature associated with the in-flight fire and flammability resistance
of the composite fuselage. Experience has shown that eliminating fire
propagation on the surface of interior and insulating materials
enhances survivability since the threats from an in-flight fire (e.g.,
toxic gas emission and smoke

obscuration) are typically by-products of a propagating fire. The
Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes must provide protection against
an in-flight fire propagating along the surface of the fuselage.
Special conditions are needed to address this design feature. The
applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special
conditions contain the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: Effective July 14, 2014.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gardlin, FAA, Airframe/Cabin
Safety, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 98057-3356;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; facsimile<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On August 25, 2008, Airbus applied for a type certificate for their
new Model A350-900 series airplane. Later, Airbus requested and the FAA
approved an extension to the application for FAA type certification to
June 28, 2009. The Model A350-900 series has a conventional layout with
twin wing-mounted Rolls Royce Trent engines. It features a twin aisle
9-abreast economy class layout, and accommodates side-by-side placement
of LD-3 containers in the cargo compartment. The basic Model A350-900
series configuration will accommodate 315 passengers in a standard two-
class arrangement. The design cruise speed is Mach 0.85 with a Maximum
Take-Off Weight of 602,000 lbs.
    Experience has shown that eliminating fire propagation on the
surface of interior and insulating materials enhances survivability
since the threats from an in-flight fire (e.g., toxic gas emission and
smoke obscuration) are typically by-products of a propagating fire. The
Airbus Model A350-900 series airplane must provide protection against
an in-flight fire propagating along the surface of the fuselage.
    In the past, fatal in-flight fires have originated in inaccessible
areas of the aircraft where the thermal/acoustic insulation located
adjacent to the aluminium aircraft skin has been the path for flame
propagation and fire growth. Concern over the fire performance of
thermal/acoustic insulation was initially raised by five incidents in
the 1990's which revealed unexpected flame spread along the insulation
film covering material. In all cases, the ignition source was
relatively modest and, in most cases, was electrical in origin (e.g.,
electrical short circuit, arcing caused by chafed wiring, ruptured
ballast case). From 1972 until 2003 these materials were required to
comply with a basic ``Bunsen burner'' requirement per Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.853(a), 25.855(d), and part 25,
Appendix F, part I, paragraph (a)(1)(ii). These requirements prescribed
that insulation materials must be self-extinguishing after having been
subjected to the flame of a Bunsen burner for 12 seconds, in accordance
with the procedures defined in part 25, Appendix F, part I, paragraph
(b)(4). The average burn was not to exceed eight inches and the average
flame time after removal of the flame source was not to exceed 15
seconds. Drippings from the test specimen were not to continue to flame
for more than an average of five seconds after falling.
    Further concern with the flammability of thermal/acoustic
insulation was raised by the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of
Canada during their investigation of the fatal Swiss Air MD-11 in-
flight fire accident that occurred in September 1998 and involved 229
fatalities. TSB investigators reported that the fatal fire appeared to
have been confined to the area above the cockpit and forward cabin
ceiling and involved the insulation blankets. On August 21, 2001, the
TSB recommended that flammability standards for interior materials
should be based on realistic ignition scenarios and prevent the use of
materials that sustain or propagate a fire.
    In 1996, the FAA Technical Center began a program to develop new
fire test criteria for insulation films directly relating to the
resistance of in-flight fire propagation. The current test standard was
evaluated as well as another small-scale test method that has been used
by airplane manufacturers to evaluate flame propagation on thermal/
acoustic insulation materials. An inter-laboratory comparison of these
methods revealed a number of deficiencies. Other small-scale tests
developed by the FAA Technical Center did demonstrate that some
insulation films would ignite and propagate flame in a confined space.
As a result, a series of large-scale fire tests were conducted in a
mock-up of the attic area above the passenger cabin ceiling. In a
confined space, ignition and flame propagation may occur because of
more extensive radiating heat and the trapping of melted film/scrim.
Temperature (heat release) data was recorded and the degree of flame
propagation was observed from the large-scale tests. A radiant panel
test standard for flooring materials was a test method that provided
good correlation to the large-scale model. The test method involved
subjecting a material to a pilot flame while the material is heated by
a radiant panel.
    The previously described development program resulted in a new test
method (radiant panel test) and test criteria specifically established
for improving the in-flight fire ignition/flame propagation of thermal/
acoustic insulation materials. A new part 25 airworthiness standard,
Sec.  25.856, became effective in September 2003, Amendment 25-111,
requiring that all thermal/acoustic insulation materials installed in
the fuselage must comply to this flammability and flame propagation
requirement. The standards are intended to ``reduce the incidence and
severity of cabin fires, particularly those ignited in inaccessible
areas where thermal acoustic insulation materials are typically
installed.''

Type Certification Basis

    Under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, Airbus
must show that the Model A350-900 series airplane meets the applicable
provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-
129.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Model A350-900 series because of a
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed
under Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar
novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also
apply to the other model under Sec.  21.101.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Model A350-900 series must comply with the fuel-vent
and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise-
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a
finding of regulatory adequacy under Sec.  611 of Public Law 92-574,
the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.''
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19,
under Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis
under Sec.  21.17(a)(2).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Airbus Model A350-900 series airplane incorporates the
following novel or unusual design features: Fuselage fabricated with
composite materials.

Discussion

    The Airbus Model A350-900 series airplane makes extensive use of
composite materials in the fabrication of the majority of the wing,
fuselage skin, stringers, spars, and most other structural elements of
all major sub-assemblies of the airplane. Despite the major change from
aluminum to composite material for the fuselage, the Model A350-900
series must have in-flight survivability such that the composite
fuselage does not propagate a fire. A methodology for assessing the in-
flight fire survivability of an all-composite fuselage is therefore
needed.
    The FAA believes that one way to assess the survivability within
the cabin of the Model A350-900 series airplane is to conduct large-
scale tests. This large-scale test would utilize a mock-up of an Airbus
Model A350-900 series airplane fuselage skin/structure section of
sufficient size to assess any tendency for fire propagation. The fire
threat used to represent the realistic ignition source in the airplane
would consist of a 4'' x 4'' x 9'' polyurethane foam block and 10 ml of
Heptane. This ignition source provides approximately three minutes of
flame time and would be positioned at various points and orientations
within the mocked up installation to impinge on those areas of the
fuselage considered to be most crucial.
    This fire threat was established based on an assessment of a range
of potential ignition sources, coupled with possible contamination of
materials. The FAA considers this a severe fire threat, encompassing a
variety of scenarios. However, should ignition or fire sources of a
greater severity be identified, the special condition or its method of
compliance would need to be modified in order to take the more severe
threat into account.
    These special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.

Discussion of Comments

    Notice of proposed special conditions No. 25-13-33-SC for the
Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes was published in the Federal
Register on November 15, 2013 (78FR68775). No comments were received,
and the special conditions are adopted as proposed.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions apply to Airbus Model
A350-900 series airplanes. Should Airbus apply later for a change to
the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same
novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to
that model as well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on the Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes. It is not a rule of
general applicability.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for Airbus Model A350-900 series
airplanes.

Composite Fuselage In-Flight Fire/Flammability Resistance

    In addition to the requirements of Sec.  25.853(a) governing
material flammability, the following special condition applies:
    The Airbus Model A350 composite fuselage structure must be shown to
be resistant to flame propagation under the fire threat used to develop
Sec.  25.856(a). If products of combustion are observed beyond the test
heat source, they must be evaluated and found acceptable.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on: April 22, 2014.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2014-13665 Filed 6-11-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register: November 14, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 221)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 67374-67376]
[DOCID:fr14no08-6]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0729; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-052-AD;
Amendment 39-15700; AD 2008-22-05]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900,
Falcon 900EX, and Falcon 2000 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued following the
discovery of a potential chafing between the rheostat of the 3rd
crew member control panel reading light and the air gasper flexible
hose, or with the electrical wires nearby. If le[f]t uncorrected,
this chafing may expose the metallic spiral armature of the flexible
hose, or damage the electrical wires insulation, which could result
in a short-circuit generating sustained overheating and smoke
emission.

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective December 19, 2008.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of December 19,
2008.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1137; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on July 7, 2008 (73 FR
38346). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:

    This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued following the
discovery of a potential chafing between the rheostat of the 3rd
crew member control panel reading light and the air gasper flexible
hose, or with the electrical wires nearby. If le[f]t uncorrected,
this chafing may expose the metallic spiral armature of the flexible
hose, or damage the electrical wires insulation, which could result
in a short-circuit generating sustained overheating and smoke
emission.
    This AD requires an inspection of the air gasper installation in
the 3rd crew control panel of the LH [left-hand]and RH [right-
hand]crew closet for interference and damage and applicable related
corrective actions.

The corrective actions include replacing the flexible hoses and
installing ROUNDIT insulation sleeving to the wires near the rheostat.
You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD
docket.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We considered the single comment received.

Request To Include New Service Information

    Dassault recommends that the AD reflect the updated service
information that was issued after the date of the MCAI. Dassault states
that the most recent revisions of the service information are as
follows:
     Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F900-360, Revision 1,
dated February 15, 2008.
     Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F900EX-261, Revision
1, dated February 15, 2008.
     Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F2000-316, Revision 1,
dated February 15, 2008.
    We agree to change the AD to reflect the current service
information. Revision 1 of the service information contains an
editorial change that does not affect the procedures. Table 1 of
paragraph (f) of the AD has been changed accordingly, and we have added
new paragraph (g) and Table 2 to the AD to give credit for actions
performed according to the original versions of the service
information.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the available data, including the comment received, and
determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the
AD with the change described previously. We determined that this change
will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the
scope of the AD.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences
are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 335 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take 4 work-hours per product to comply
with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $80
per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD
to the U.S. operators to be $107,200, or $320 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>) is in the
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13   [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

AD 2008-22-05 Dassault Aviation: Amendment 39-15700. Docket No. FAA-
2008-0729; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-052-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective December
19, 2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900
airplanes from serial number (S/N) 1 to 200 inclusive; Model Falcon
900EX airplanes from S/N 1 to 129 inclusive; and Model Falcon 2000
airplanes from S/N 1 to 210 inclusive; when fitted with a third crew
member control panel; certificated in any category.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 25:
Equipment/Furnishings.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
    This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued following the
discovery of a potential chafing between the rheostat of the 3rd
crew member control panel reading light and the air gasper flexible
hose, or with the electrical wires nearby. If le[f]t uncorrected,
this chafing may expose the metallic spiral armature of the flexible
hose, or damage the electrical wires insulation, which could result
in a short-circuit generating sustained overheating and smoke
emission.
    This AD requires an inspection of the air gasper installation in
the 3rd crew control panel of the LH [left-hand]and RH [right-
hand]crew closet for interference and damage and applicable related
corrective actions.

The corrective actions include replacing the flexible hose and
installing ROUNDIT insulation sleeving to the wires near the
rheostat.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done: Within 7 months after the effective
date of this AD, do a detailed inspection of the air gasper
installation in the 3rd crew member control panel of the left-hand
and right-hand crew closet for interference and damage, and do all
applicable related corrective actions as instructed in the
Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable service information
listed in Table 1 of this AD. Corrective actions must be done before
further flight.

                      Table 1--Service Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dassault Mandatory Service
            Bulletin--              Revision--           Date--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
F900-360.........................            1  Feb. 15, 2008.
F900EX-261.......................            1  Feb. 15, 2008.
F2000-316........................            1  Feb. 15, 2008.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (g) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the service information listed in Table 2 of this AD
are acceptable for compliance with the requirements of paragraph
(f).

                   Table 2--Credit Service Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Dassault Service Bulletin--                     Date--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
F900-360...............................  July 20, 2005.

F900EX-261.............................  July 20, 2005.

F2000-316..............................  July 27, 2005.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

FAA AD Differences

    Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (h) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom
Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

    (i) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0013, dated January 24, 2008, and the
service information listed in Table 1 and Table 2 of this AD, for
related information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (j) You must use the service information specified in Table 3 of
this AD to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD
specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Dassault Falcon Jet, P.O. Box 2000, South Hackensack, New Jersey
07606; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; Internet http://
www.dassaultfalcon.com.
    (3) You may review copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at NARA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>,
or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-
locations.html.

               Table 3--Material Incorporated by Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dassault Mandatory Service
            Bulletin--              Revision--           Date--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
F900-360.........................            1  Feb. 15, 2008.
F900EX-261.......................            1  Feb. 15, 2008.
F2000-316........................            1  Feb. 15, 2008.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 10, 2008.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
 [FR Doc. E8-25639 Filed 11-13-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


Technical Support Document (TSD) for the Response to the September 2010 Section 126 Petition from New Jersey Regarding SO2 Emissions from the Portland Generating Station

                      Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0081

Summary of 1-Hour SO2 Monitoring Data from the Columbia Monitor in Warren County, New Jersey

                      U.S Environmental Protection Agency

                                  March 2011

             TSD for Columbia Monitor in Warren County, New Jersey

Air monitoring data collected at a newly established air monitoring site are consistent with our finding that emissions from the Portland Plant significantly contribute to nonattainment and interfere with maintenance of the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS in New Jersey.

New Jersey established the Columbia Site SO2 monitor in Warren County in the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA).  The site is located approximately one mile from the Portland Plant, near the area predicted to exceed the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS based on the air modeling discussed in the preamble to this proposed rule and the modeling TSD.

The majority of the collected data are still considered preliminary.  The data appear in EPA's AQS database and AIRNow database (i.e., AirNowTech).

Quality assured data have been uploaded to EPA's Air Quality System (AQS) database from the monitor's official starting date of September 23, 2010 through the end of the third quarter on September 30, 2010.  The fourth quarter data for 2010 (October 1, 2010 through December 31, 2010) should be uploaded to the AQS by March 31, 2011.  Data in the AQS database have been fully quality controlled.

The data collected since January 1, 2011 have not been fully quality controlled or validated by the state, and are considered preliminary.  This data appear only in AirNowTech, and will be uploaded into the AQS database after being fully quality controlled and assured by New Jersey.

Additionally, the SO2 data from the Columbia monitor have yet to be certified by the State.  States typically certify their data in blocks of a calendar year at a time.  EPA rules require 2010 air sampling data to be certified by the State by May 1, 2011 and 2011 data  to be certified by New Jersey by May 1, 2012.

The Columbia monitor is a Federal Reference Method monitor and uses the pulsed fluorescent method of analysis.  The monitor meets the proper siting criteria as directed in Part 58 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Appendix E to Part 58  -  Probe and Monitoring Path Siting Criteria for Ambient Air Quality Monitoring).

The primary SO2 1-hour standard is at a level of 75 parts per billion (ppb).  The design value is calculated by taking the 99[th] percentile of the maximum daily 1-hour averages for each of 3 consecutive years.  These three 99[th] percentile values are averaged together to get a design value for that monitor.  If the design value is greater than 75 ppb, it is violating the SO2 NAAQS.

Since we do not have a complete 3 year data set, 75 ppb is used as a benchmark to determine whether there is a possibility of an SO2 NAAQS violation.  The monitor data exceeded the 75 ppb benchmark on ten days during the September 2010  -  February 2011 time period.  The top 10 maximum daily values and the date they were measured from the period September 23, 2010 through February 28, 2011 are:
                                   Max (PPB)
                                     Date
                                      183
                                  10/30/2010
                                      163
                                   1/24/2011
                                      136
                                   9/24/2010
                                      133
                                   1/22/2011
                                      111
                                   2/13/2011
                                      105
                                   2/16/2011
                                      92
                                   9/29/2010
                                      85
                                   2/23/2011
                                      83
                                  12/30/2010
                                      78
                                   2/14/2011

Data for the entire period can be seen in the chart below.  The red line represents the level of the 1-hour SO2 standard (75 ppb).

The chart below compares data from the Columbia monitor with all of the other SO2 monitors in New Jersey.  The Columbia monitor was set up to measure concentrations from a local source whereas the other SO2 monitors in New Jersey were set up to measure concentrations from population centers.  Again, the red line represents the 75 ppb standard.