or Authorization (COA), allowing Federal, State, and local governments,
law enforcement agencies, and public universities to perform numerous
tasks with UAS, including search-and-rescue, border patrol, and
research. The 2016 Rule allows for certain operations of small UAS in
the airspace of the United States without the need for airworthiness
certification, exemptions, or certificates of waiver or authorization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ 81 FR 42064.

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    The 2016 Rule also imposed certain restrictions on small UAS
operations. The restrictions include a prohibition on nighttime
operations, limitations on operations conducted during civil twilight,
restrictions on operations over people, a requirement for all
operations to be conducted within visual line of sight, and other
operational, airspace, and pilot certification requirements. Since the
rule took effect on August 29, 2016, most low-risk small UAS operations
that were previously authorized on a case-by-case basis under Public
Law 112-95 section 333 are now considered routine operations. These
operations are now permitted within the requirements of part 107
without further interaction with the FAA. Publishing Part 107 was the
first significant regulatory step to enable lower risk, less complex
UAS operations.
    Part 107 opened the airspace of the United States to the vast
majority of routine small UAS operations, allowing flight within visual
line of sight while maintaining flexibility to accommodate future
technological innovations. Part 107 allows individuals to request
waivers from certain provisions, including those prohibiting operations
over people and beyond visual line of sight. Petitions for waivers from
the provisions of part 107 must demonstrate that the petitioner has
provided sufficient mitigations to safely conduct the requested
operation.
    On October 5, 2018, Congress enacted Public Law 115-254, also known
as the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018 amended Part A of subtitle VII of title 49, United States Code by
inserting a new chapter 448 titled Unmanned Aircraft Systems and
incorporating additional authorities and mandates to support the
further integration of UAS into the airspace of the United States,
including several provisions that specifically deal with the need for
remote identification of UAS. Section 376 of the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018 requires the FAA to perform testing of remote
identification technology and to assess the use of remote
identification for the development of UTM.
    Additionally, congressional action supports the implementation of
remote identification requirements for most UAS. Section 349 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 included a provision indicating that the
Administrator is not prohibited from promulgating rules relating to the
standards for remotely identifying owners and operators of UAS and
associated unmanned aircraft.\12\ The provision denotes Congress's
acknowledgment that remote identification is an essential part of the
UAS regulatory framework. Section 349 also does not prohibit the
Administrator from promulgating rules generally applicable to unmanned
aircraft related to updates to the operational parameters for unmanned
aircraft used for limited recreational operations, the registration and
marking of unmanned aircraft, and other standards consistent with
maintaining the safety and security of the airspace of the United
States.\13\
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    \12\ See 49 U.S.C. 44809.
    \13\ Id.
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    Lastly, on February 13, 2019, the FAA published three rulemaking
documents in the Federal Register as part of the next phase for
integrating small UAS into the airspace of the United States. The first
of such documents was an interim final rule titled ``External Marking
Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft,'' \14\ in which the FAA
required small unmanned aircraft owners to display the registration
number assigned by the FAA on an external surface of the aircraft. The
second rulemaking document was a notice of proposed rulemaking titled
``Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People,'' \15\ in
which the FAA proposed to allow operations of small unmanned aircraft
over people in certain conditions and operations of small UAS at night
without obtaining a waiver. The third rulemaking document was an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking titled ``Safe and Secure
Operations of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems,'' \16\ in which the FAA
sought information from the public on whether and under which
circumstances the FAA should promulgate new rules to require stand-off
distances, additional operating and performance restrictions, the use
of UAS Traffic Management (UTM), additional payload restrictions, and
whether the agency should prescribe design requirements and require
that unmanned aircraft be equipped with critical safety systems.
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    \14\ 84 FR 3669.
    \15\ 84 FR 3856.
    \16\ 84 FR 3732.
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IV. Need for Remote Identification of UAS Operating in the Airspace of
the United States

A. Maintaining the Safety and Efficiency of the Airspace of the United
States

    The FAA is both the civil aviation authority and the air navigation
service provider (ANSP) for the United States. The FAA has statutory
responsibilities to set standards and certify aircraft, airmen, and
facilities. In addition, the FAA is responsible for ensuring the safe
and efficient use of navigable airspace. The FAA carries out its
responsibilities by developing air traffic rules, assigning the use of
airspace, and controlling air traffic through a complex network of
airport towers, air route traffic control centers, and flight service
stations.
    The FAA is responsible for serving tens of thousands of commercial
and private aircraft operating in 29 million square miles of airspace
each day. Through its air traffic management (ATM) system, the FAA
coordinates the movements of these aircraft to ensure they operate at
safe distances from each other and manages disruptions to normal air
traffic flow. The FAA's ability to manage air traffic in the airspace
of the United States is predicated on the agency knowing who is
operating in the airspace and, if necessary, on being able to
communicate with those airspace users.
1. Existing Cooperative Surveillance System
    The ATM system relies on appropriately equipped aircraft to provide
the surveillance services necessary to ensure the safety and efficiency
of the airspace of the United States. In addition to ground-based
equipment such as primary and secondary radar, participating aircraft
use ATC transponders and ADS-B Out to participate in the ATM's
cooperative surveillance environment. Transponders emit a radio
frequency response when they are interrogated by ground-based secondary
radar systems. Part of the response is the Mode 3/A code which is a
four digit number ranging from 0000 to 7777 that allows ATC to identify
aircraft under radar surveillance and correlate the target to a flight
plan. Other information provides ATC with the location of the aircraft,
which is shown on ATC radar displays. After January 1, 2020, aircraft
will be required to equip with ADS-B Out to operate in certain
airspace.
    Some UAS, such as those operating in Class A airspace, are already
equipped with transponders and ADS-B Out and operate in accordance with
existing rules. But for the majority of UAS, especially those operating
at low altitudes, the existing cooperative surveillance system is not
capable of providing the necessary services.
    Currently, there is no regulatory requirement mandating the remote
identification of unmanned aircraft other than the existing equipment
rules in part 91 for transponders that are applicable to aircraft in
certain airspace and ADS-B Out, which will be required

for aircraft in certain airspace after January 1, 2020. Because the
majority of UAS operations occur at low altitudes, the existing rules
do not adequately provide for awareness of who is operating in the
airspace. The FAA is therefore proposing to require the remote
identification of UAS to enable the agency to identify unmanned
aircraft flying in the airspace of the United States and locate the
operators of those aircraft. Remote identification equipment would
provide identifying information for UAS similar to how ADS-B and
transponders provide identifying information for manned aircraft. This
information would also be essential for the management of the flow of
air traffic as more UAS integrate into the airspace of the United
States.
    The FAA does not propose the use of transponders or ADS-B Out for
remote identification for three primary reasons. First, the use of
these technologies would require significant additional infrastructure,
including radars and receivers, to cover the lower altitudes of the
airspace of the United States where unmanned aircraft are expected to
primarily operate. Second, the FAA expects that, due to the volume of
unmanned aircraft operations projected, the additional radio frequency
signals would saturate the available spectrum and degrade the overall
cooperative surveillance system. Finally, transponders and ADS-B Out do
not provide any information about the location of control stations, as
these systems were designed for manned aircraft. For these reasons, the
FAA has determined that existing cooperative surveillance systems are
incapable of supporting UAS remote identification and is proposing a
new cooperative surveillance technology specifically for UAS. However,
the proposal does not prohibit the use of ADS-B In, if the ADS-B In
equipment is manufactured and installed in accordance with FAA
requirements and guidance.\17\
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    \17\ See Advisory Circulars 20-172B and 90-114A.
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2. Current Challenges With Associating UAS With Their Owners and
Operators
    All manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft weighing over 0.55 pounds,
and any unmanned aircraft operated pursuant to 14 CFR part 107 or part
91 (irrespective of weight) are subject to FAA's aircraft registration
and marking requirements. These requirements are the fundamental means
for the FAA to physically identify manned and unmanned aircraft
operating in the airspace of the United States and to associate them
with their owners. The FAA recognizes that current registration and
marking requirements are most useful when the aircraft is static or
when information regarding the aircraft and its owner is needed without
a direct link to the aircraft itself. In the case of unmanned aircraft
in flight, however, registration and marking alone are insufficient to
identify the aircraft and to locate the person manipulating the flight
controls of a UAS. This is due to both the small size of most unmanned
aircraft and to the fact that the person manipulating the flight
controls of the UAS is not co-located with the aircraft. The
Registration Rule acknowledged that the registration of small unmanned
aircraft would provide a means by which to quickly identify the
aircraft in the event of an incident or accident involving a small UAS.
The Registration Rule also acknowledged that registration of small
unmanned aircraft would provide an immediate and direct opportunity for
the FAA to educate small UAS owners on safety requirements before they
begin operating. The Registration Rule did not, however, envision the
use of registration numbers as a means to identify or locate the small
UAS owner or the person manipulating the flight controls of the UAS
during real-time flight operations.
    The small size of most unmanned aircraft makes it difficult--if not
impossible--to read their registration numbers from the ground,
preventing proper identification of the unmanned aircraft while it is
in flight. Although it is true that manned aviation faces similar
identification issues (since aircraft registration marks may be
impossible to read from the ground when the aircraft is flying at
certain altitudes or speeds), there is an important distinction between
manned and unmanned aviation that makes the inability to read a
registration number from the ground less problematic in manned
aviation. In manned aviation, the pilot-in-command is co-located with
the aircraft and is therefore more easily identifiable, even if such
identification occurs after landing.
    In addition, pilots of manned aircraft are often required to, or
choose to, maintain two-way communications with air traffic control
(ATC) for purposes of receiving air traffic services. This
communication helps ascertain the identity and intent of the pilot in
command. Furthermore, transponders and ADS-B Out systems transmit
unique codes that allow ATC to identify and distinguish aircraft from
others flying in the airspace of the United States, as discussed in the
preceding section. These means of identification are not currently
required or feasible for UAS. The challenge of identifying UAS would
only increase with the proliferation of BVLOS operations--when pilots
will likely be located far away from the unmanned aircraft location.
3. Situational Awareness
    The ability to know the location of unmanned aircraft operating in
the airspace of the United States and to identify and locate their
operators creates situational awareness of operations conducted in the
airspace of the United States, fosters accountability of the operators
and owners of UAS, and improves the capabilities of the FAA and law
enforcement to investigate and mitigate careless, hazardous, and
noncompliant operations. This contributes to safety in air commerce and
the efficient use of the airspace of the United States.
    Remote identification would provide greater situational awareness
of UAS operating in the airspace of the United States to other aircraft
in the vicinity of those operations and also provide information to
airport operators. Manned aircraft, especially those operating at low
altitudes where UAS operations are anticipated to be the most
prevalent, such as helicopters and agricultural aircraft, could carry
the necessary equipment to display the location of UAS operating
nearby. Facility operators could use remote identification information
to know about UAS operating near an airport, airfield, or heliport,
regardless of the airspace in which the facility is located. This would
provide a level of awareness that is currently unavailable for those
facilities and the aircraft operating nearby. For example, an aircraft
preparing to take off from an airport in Class G airspace may have
access to greater information (e.g., number and location of UAS, types
of operations conducted in the airspace, etc.) than currently
available.
4. Compliance and Enforcement
    The safety of the airspace of the United States largely depends on
aircraft operators following the prescribed rules and being accountable
for their actions. The FAA needs the ability to identify aircraft and
their owners to ensure adequate oversight of the operations (e.g.,
facilitate the identification of noncompliant or unauthorized
operations). When unsafe operations are discovered, the FAA is required
to adequately address safety issues that may adversely affect the
airspace of the United States as well as people and property on the
ground. To accomplish this, the FAA needs a means

to locate UAS operators--in near real-time, if necessary--to take
immediate or subsequent action to mitigate safety issues or security
threats. Thus, the FAA believes that the remote identification
requirements in this proposed rule are necessary to ensure the safety
of the airspace of the United States.
    If an operator is unwilling or unable to comply with, or is
deliberately flouting regulations, the FAA could employ legal
enforcement action, including civil penalties and certificate actions,
as appropriate, to address violations and help deter future violations.
Civil penalties for violations of the federal aviation regulations
range from a maximum per violation penalty of $1,466, for individual
operators, to $33,333 for large companies. In addition, Congress
granted the FAA authority to assess civil penalties of up to $20,000
against an individual who operates a UAS and in so doing knowingly or
recklessly interferes with a law enforcement, emergency response, or
wildfire suppression activity. The FAA may take enforcement action
against anyone who conducts an unauthorized UAS operation or operates a
UAS in a way that endangers the safety of the airspace of the United
States. This authority is designed to protect users of the airspace as
well as people and property on the ground.

B. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM)

    The FAA, in an effort to further integrate UAS into the airspace of
the United States, is collaborating with other government agencies and
industry stakeholders to develop unmanned aircraft systems traffic
management (UTM) separate from, but complementary to, the ATM system.
The term ``UTM'' refers to a set of third-party services and an all-
encompassing framework for managing multiple UAS operations. This
vision for UTM includes services for flight planning, communications,
separation, and weather, among others. The FAA believes that remote
identification facilitates the long-term implementation of UTM by
providing greater awareness of all aircraft, including unmanned
aircraft, operating in a particular area. UTM would help enable
increased UAS operations in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace,
including airspace where no air traffic separation services are
currently provided.
    The vision for UTM \18\ relies on third parties' ability to supply
services, under FAA's regulatory authority, where such services do not
currently exist. The FAA envisions community-based traffic management,
where UAS operators have the responsibility for the coordination,
execution, and management of a safe operating environment. UTM would be
designed to support the demand and expectations for a broad spectrum of
UAS operations with ever-increasing complexity and risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/2018-UTM-ConOps-v1.0.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The concept of UTM is predicated on layers of information sharing
and exchange, from operator to operator, aircraft to aircraft, and
operator to the FAA, to achieve safe operations. Operators would share
their flight intent with each other and coordinate to de-conflict and
safely separate trajectories. Remote identification is a crucial first
step in the development of these UTM services.

C. Facilitating Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations

    Providing a means to conduct routine BVLOS operations is a critical
step in the integration of UAS operations in the airspace of the United
States. The technologies and procedures necessary to enable BVLOS
operations have been the focus of past and current research by the FAA
and others.\19\ The research indicated that for UAS to conduct safe,
routine BVLOS operation, UAS should be able to detect both cooperative
and non-cooperative aircraft (manned and unmanned) so they can maintain
a safe distance from those aircraft. Cooperative aircraft are those
that are providing information that identifies the location of the
aircraft, typically through a standardized and receivable electronic
radio frequency broadcast or other type of transmission. Non-
cooperative aircraft are those that are not providing any information
regarding their location.
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    \19\ https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/integration_pilot_program/; https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/completed/; http://www.assureuas.org/projects/detectandavoid.php
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A UAS that broadcasts or transmits remote identification
information would contribute to a cooperative operating environment.
Operators of UAS could use remote identification information available
from a Remote ID USS or broadcast directly from other unmanned aircraft
to know the location of UAS operating nearby. Such data could be used
in UAS detect-and-avoid and aircraft-to-aircraft communication systems
to aid in unmanned aircraft collision avoidance. Under UTM, when the
locations of other unmanned aircraft become known, the UAS operators
would be able to maintain a safe distance from those aircraft.
    Although remote identification of UAS does not, in and of itself,
permit BVLOS operations, it is a key stepping stone to the future
ability to conduct those operations. Without remote identification of
UAS, BVLOS operations on a large scale are not feasible, and the
foundational building blocks of UTM--which is necessary to enable
routine BVLOS operations--are not established.

D. National Security and Law Enforcement Efforts

    This proposed rule would serve the public interest by assisting
government efforts to address illegal activity and protect national
security. The safety and security benefits described in this section
are consistent with the FAA's responsibilities to assist law
enforcement agencies in their efforts to enforce laws related to
regulation of controlled substances, to the extent consistent with
aviation safety,\20\ and to prescribe regulations necessary for safety
in air commerce and national security.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ 49 U.S.C. 40101(d).
    \21\ 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Federal, State, and local law enforcement and national security
agencies have expressed their desire for new regulations to reduce and
address the security threats associated with illegal or threatening UAS
operations as well as the ability to discriminate between compliant and
non-compliant operations. The FAA recognizes the increasing
availability and potential use of UAS for illegal activities such as
the carrying and smuggling of controlled substances, illicit drugs, and
other dangerous or hazardous payloads; the unlawful invasion of
privacy; illegal surveillance and reconnaissance; the weaponization of
UAS; sabotaging of critical infrastructure; property theft; disruption;
and harassment. The misuse of UAS for these purposes presents a direct
threat to public safety. Such misuse also presents a hazard to safety
in air commerce. Such risks are multiplied with the increasing
sophistication of technology, the availability of UAS equipment, and
the proliferation of UAS operations across the airspace of the United
States.
    Unmanned aircraft operators who know they cannot easily be
identified are more likely to engage in careless, reckless, or
dangerous behavior because they believe they will not be caught. These
operators could engage in evasive maneuvering to avoid pursuit, violate
airspace restrictions, engage in unauthorized night or BVLOS
operations, fly too close to other aircraft,

or operate in weather conditions beyond the capability of the unmanned
aircraft or the person flying it. Such behavior could create severe
safety hazards not only to other manned and unmanned aircraft in the
surrounding airspace, but also to persons and property on the ground.
    Additionally, UAS operators that do not comply with applicable law
create a unique security challenge. On average, six sightings of UAS
allegedly conducting unauthorized operations are reported to the FAA
each day. Additionally, based on information provided by other U.S.
Government agencies, there may be many additional UAS sightings
involving unauthorized or illegal operations not reported to the FAA.
Although collisions with aircraft are rare, there have been two
confirmed unmanned aircraft collisions with manned aircraft: an Army
Blackhawk helicopter in New York City in September 2017, and a small
twin-engine passenger aircraft approaching Quebec City's Jean Lesage
International Airport in October 2017. In all of these circumstances,
remote identification could have enabled immediate identification of
the UAS and enabled law enforcement to find the location of the control
station for near real-time response and investigation.
    Owners of critical infrastructure, airports, and venues for mass
gatherings have expressed concern over the security of their facilities
after sightings of UAS of unknown identity and intent. Many sightings
are at night, when it may be more difficult to see and identify the
unmanned aircraft or find the operator. Owners and facility managers of
sports stadiums and other open-air venues are particularly concerned,
given the concentration of people present during an event. Malicious
UAS activities designed to disrupt and gain media attention are a
distinct threat with the potential to inflict delays, fear, injuries,
and significant economic losses across a variety of critical
infrastructure sectors, including airports, public facilities, and
energy production infrastructure.
    On April 11, 2019, numerous spectators visually spotted a UAS
operating during a Major League Baseball game.\22\ Although law
enforcement were able to eventually identify the operator within 24
hours due to a municipally-owned detection system, remote
identification would likely have allowed them to find the operator and
control station much more quickly and address the issue in real time.
After law enforcement confiscated the UAS involved in the April 2019
incident and were able to review its flight log, they learned that the
operator had flown over a previous World Series game at the same
stadium--violating an FAA Temporary Flight Restriction and numerous
safety regulations.
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    \22\ https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/redsox/2019/04/13/drone-fenway-park-juvenile/3457190002/. Accessed June 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A UAS that was not approved to operate over people was used to drop
pamphlets over large crowds outside a concert venue and a university
event in May, 2019, in Sacramento, California.\23\ This event was
similar to two incidents in 2017 when a UAS was used to drop leaflets
at two California National Football League games.\24\ Although security
and law enforcement personnel at the stadium used rudimentary tactics
to eventually identify the accused operator, the lack of remote
identification made real-time location of the operator impossible.\25\
Security professionals have raised concerns that unmanned aircraft that
have not been determined to be safe to fly over a large gathering of
people may pose a safety hazard, and a UAS dropping objects could
potentially pose a greater threat by releasing hazardous substances or
creating a stampede of frightened spectators fleeing the area. Although
social media postings helped identify the operator in some cases, such
information rarely helps law enforcement officers address a potential
threat in real time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ https://www.newsweek.com/drone-used-drop-nazi-leaflets-ariana-grande-concert-sacramento-bites-bridge-1414933. Accessed June
11, 2019.
    \24\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/sacramento-area-resident-charged-flying-drone-over-nfl-games-violation-national-defense. Accessed June 10, 2019.
    \25\ Id.
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    Multiple pilot reports of a UAS approximately 10 miles away from
Newark Airport led to a disruption in arrivals in January 2019 that
impacted other airports on the East Coast for several hours.\26\ The
more than 30-hour disruption of flights at London's Gatwick Airport in
December 2018,\27\ as well as brief disruptions at airports in
Dubai,\28\ Dublin,\29\ and Frankfurt \30\ within the last year, further
demonstrate the potential for significant operational and financial
impact from the presence of an unauthorized UAS in and around an
airport. UAS operators have not been identified in any of these airport
events. Remote identification of UAS would potentially prevent
disruptions such as these by enabling real time action by the FAA,
airport facilities, and law enforcement.
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    \26\ https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/01/22/drone-activity-halts-air-traffic-newark-liberty-international-airport/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c0e920a9e756. Accessed June 11,
2019.
    \27\ https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/21/gatwick-airport-reopens-limited-number-of-flights-drone-disruption. Accessed
June 11, 2019.
    \28\ http://www.digitaljournal.com/tech-and-science/technology/q-a-recent-airport-shutdowns-need-drone-interdiction-technology/article/543680. Accessed June 11, 2019.
    \29\ https://dronelife.com/2019/02/22/flights-were-grounded-at-dublin-airport-after-another-drone-sighting/. Accessed June 11,
2019.
    \30\ https://www.ecnmag.com/news/2019/03/drone-sightings-interrupt-germanys-frankfurt-airport. Accessed June 10, 2019.
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    Remote identification would also aid in preventing terrorist
attacks. Recent reports in the news including the Islamic State of Iraq
and Ash-Sham's modifications of commercial UAS,\31\ the assassination
attempt of Nicol[aacute]s Maduro in Venezuela,\32\ a foiled plot in the
United Kingdom to fly an unmanned aircraft into an airliner,\33\ and a
bomb-laden unmanned aircraft flown by Huthi forces and detonated over a
military parade in Yemen \34\ illustrate the ways in which UAS may be
used to threaten life, critical infrastructure, and national security.
Remote identification of UAS would enable national security agencies
and law enforcement to quickly identify potential threats and act to
prevent such incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/07/Islamic-State-and-Drones-Release-Version.pdf. Accessed June 11, 2019.
    \32\ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45073385.
Accessed June 9, 2019.
    \33\ https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/724185/Terror-drone-plot-Britain-UK-spies-foil. Accessed June 11, 2019.
    \34\ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/houthi-drones-kill-several-at-yemeni-military-parade-idUSKCN1P40N9.
Accessed June 11, 2019.
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    The use of UAS to smuggle contraband into correctional facilities
is also increasingly common.\35\ Even inexpensive consumer-grade UAS
models have sufficient payload and technical capabilities to carry
illicit and dangerous items over prison walls. Recent efforts by law
enforcement, for example, have included the investigation and
prosecution of an individual who illegally operated a consumer-grade
UAS with the intent to deliver contraband (marijuana) into a

Georgia state prison. The prosecution ultimately resulted in a guilty
plea in the Middle District of Georgia to a charge of operating an
aircraft eligible for registration knowing that the aircraft is not
registered to facilitate a controlled substance offense. The defendant
received a sentence of 48 months in prison.\36\ Remote identification
will assist law enforcement in their efforts to find and stop operators
who attempt to engage in similar conduct.
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    \35\ https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/prisons-try-to-stop-drones-from-delivering-drugs-porn-and-cellphones-to-inmates/2016/10/12/645fb102-800c-11e6-8d0c-fb6c00c90481_story.html?utm_term=.22b0427db4d0. Accessed June 11,
2019.
    \36\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdga/pr/illegal-drone-operator-sentenced-attempting-drop-drugs-georgia-state-prison.
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    Four Federal departments \37\ have the authority to deploy counter-
UAS systems to detect and mitigate credible threats posed by UAS.\38\
Remote identification of UAS would provide these departments with
increased awareness of UAS operations conducted across certain
geographical areas of interest. That information would aid the
determination of whether UAS represent a threat that must be met with
counter-UAS capabilities. In particular, remote identification would
provide these departments with crucial information about the owner of
the UAS, and the control station's location in near real-time,
supplementing and enriching information obtained via UAS detection
capabilities. The FAA believes that the ability to identify the owner
and the location of the control station would help these Federal
agencies to more accurately assess risk and take action commensurate
with that risk.
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    \37\ Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of
Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice.
    \38\ 10 U.S.C. 130i; 50 U.S.C. 2661; 6 U.S.C. 124n.
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    In addition, certain public safety activities have been hampered by
the inability to identify UAS and their locations. While there are
numerous examples, in one case, a UAS interfered with a police
helicopter assisting with a cliff rescue; \39\ in another case, a UAS
interfered with a police helicopter assisting a fire response.\40\ In
2017, a helicopter performing security for the United Nations General
Assembly struck an unmanned aircraft, causing more than $100,000 worth
of damage to the helicopter.\41\ Remote identification would enable the
FAA, first responders, and law enforcement officers to more easily
determine who is operating in the airspace, providing important
information to help determine appropriate responses to ensure the
safety and security of the airspace of the United States and the people
on the ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/01/30/pacifica-drone-operator-arrested-for-interfering-with-helicopter-rescue-mission/.
    \40\ https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/College-Park-Man-Arrested-For-Flying-Drone-Near-5-Alarm-Fire-Monday-420369903.html.
    \41\ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-drone/u-s-probing-collision-between-civilian-drone-army-helicopter-idUSKBN1CA1Z0.
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    Although Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies are
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of illegal
activities, the FAA retains the regulatory and civil enforcement
authority and oversight over aviation activities that create hazards
and pose threats to the safety of flight in air commerce. Both safety
and security enforcement are extremely difficult absent a remote
identification requirement that enables the prompt and accurate
identification of UAS and operators.

V. Related International Activities

    The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) does not
prescribe any remote identification equipage for UAS. However, as of
the date of publication of this proposed rule, ICAO advisory groups are
developing material addressing UTM and UAS operations under instrument
flight rules (IFR). The European Union, the Direction
G[eacute]n[eacute]rale de l'Aviation Civile (France Civil Aviation
Authority), and the Civil Aviation Administration Denmark (Denmark
Civil Aviation Authority) have also proposed various actions and
advisory group activity for remote identification.
    With the exception of Italy and Qatar, no individual ICAO-member
Civil Aviation Authority has remote identification requirements for
UAS. The Italian Civil Aviation Authority requires aircraft with a
maximum takeoff weight of more than 55 pounds (25kg) to have certain
equipage that transmits flight parameters and owner/operator data.
Aircraft compliant with these requirements must also meet data storage
standards. The Qatar Civil Aviation Authority requires that certain UAS
operations be conducted with prescribed geo-fencing and electronic
identification systems.
    In May 2017, the European Commission published a notice of proposed
amendment which included proposed rules for remote identification. That
proposed amendment would require UAS to broadcast a unique physical
serial number of the unmanned aircraft compliant with standard ANSI/
CTA-2063, the geographical position of the unmanned aircraft and its
height above the takeoff point, the direction and speed of the unmanned
aircraft, and the geographical position of the unmanned aircraft
takeoff point. During the first half of 2019, the European Commission
finalized and adopted the following rules for remote identification:
(1) The Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019
on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned
aircraft systems, and (2) the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)
2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation
of unmanned aircraft. The regulations address the design and
operational requirements for unmanned aircraft and include a
requirement for unmanned aircraft to be individually identifiable, but
do not impose a European standard for remote identification.
    As adopted, the regulations require the local broadcast of
information about an unmanned aircraft in operation, including the
marking of the unmanned aircraft to demonstrate conformity with the
applicable requirements, so that the information may be obtained
without physical access to the unmanned aircraft. The remote
identification requirements adopted by the European Commission include
the following:
    (a) Allowing the upload of the UAS operator registration number in
accordance with Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and
exclusively following the process provided by the registration system;
    (b) Ensuring, in real time during the whole duration of the flight,
the direct periodic broadcast from the unmanned aircraft using an open
and documented transmission protocol, of the following data, in a way
that they can be received directly by existing mobile devices within
the broadcasting range:
    (1) the UAS operator registration number;
    (2) the unique physical serial number of the unmanned aircraft
compliant with standard ANSI/CTA-2063;
    (3) the geographical position of the unmanned aircraft and its
height above the surface or take-off point;
    (4) the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground
speed of the unmanned aircraft; and
    (5) the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not
available, the take-off point.
    (c) Ensuring that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under
paragraph (b)(2) through (5).

VI. Aviation Rulemaking Committee

    On July 15, 2016, Congress passed the FAA Extension, Safety, and
Security Act of 2016 (Pub. L. 114-190). Pursuant to section 2202 of
that Act, the Administrator and the Secretary were tasked with
convening industry stakeholders to facilitate the development of
consensus standards for

remotely identifying operators and owners of UAS and associated
unmanned aircraft. As part of the standards development, the
Administrator was directed to consider: (1) Requirements for remote
identification of UAS; (2) requirements for different classifications
of UAS; and (3) the feasibility of the development and operation of a
publicly accessible online database of unmanned aircraft and operators,
and criteria for exclusion from the database.
    To comply with the Congressional mandate, on May 4, 2017, the
Administrator chartered the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Identification (ID) and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
(UAS-ID ARC) to inform the FAA on technologies available for remote
identification and tracking of UAS and to make recommendations for how
remote identification and tracking could be implemented.\42\ The FAA
charged the UAS-ID ARC with the following three objectives:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The UAS-ID ARC was composed of 74 members representing
aviation community and industry member organizations, law
enforcement agencies and public safety organizations, manufacturers,
researchers, and standards bodies that are involved in the promotion
and production of UAS and in addressing security issues surrounding
the operation of UAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Identify, categorize, and recommend available and emerging
technology for the remote identification and tracking of UAS.
     Identify the requirements for meeting the security and
public safety needs of the law enforcement, homeland defense, and
national security communities for the remote identification and
tracking of UAS.
     Evaluate the feasibility and affordability of available
technical solutions, and determine how well those technologies address
the needs of the law enforcement and air traffic control communities.
Develop evaluation criteria and characteristics for making decisions,
and rate the available technical solutions provided.
    The Administrator was also tasked with submitting a report to
Congress regarding any standards developed and issuing regulations
based on the standards developed. On June 30, 2017, the Administrator
sent a letter to the Chairman of the Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee detailing the FAA's considerations and efforts
in supporting the development and implementation of Remote ID
standards.

A. ARC Recommendations Final Report

    The members of the UAS-ID ARC were organized into working groups.
Working Group One (WG1) was tasked with identifying, categorizing, and
recommending available and emerging technologies for the remote
identification and tracking of UAS. WG1 identified and analyzed eight
viable technology solutions, falling into two broad categories: (1)
Direct broadcast solutions; and (2) network publishing solutions.\43\ A
detailed discussion of the eight viable technology solutions, as well
as tables summarizing WG1's analysis of those solutions can be found in
the ARC Recommendations Final Report (Recommendations Report),
available in the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ The eight viable technology solutions WG1 identified are:
(1) Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B); (2) Low
Power Direct RF; (3) Networked Cellular; (4) Satellite; (5) SW-based
Flight Notification with Telemetry; (6) Unlicensed Integrated C2;
(7) Physical Indicator; and (8) Visual Light Encoding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Working Group Two (WG2) was tasked with identifying the
requirements for meeting the security and public safety needs of the
law enforcement, homeland defense, and national security communities
for the remote identification and tracking of UAS. WG2 identified two
general categories of UAS ID and tracking needs: (1) Incident
investigation; and (2) active monitoring of heightened awareness areas.
To achieve the goals of both categories, WG2 determined that all UAS
meeting certain threshold requirements would need to be tracked,
whether passively or actively, from commencement to termination of each
operation.\44\ WG2 further concluded that information regarding the
position of the aircraft, the location of the control station, and the
identity of the remote pilot would help maintain a safe and secure
environment for the general public and public safety officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ WG2 determined that UAS with either of the following
characteristics should be required to comply with remote
identification and tracking requirements: (1) Those that have the
ability to navigate between more than one point without direct and
active control of the pilot; or (2) those that have a range from
control station greater than 400 feet and real-time remotely
viewable sensor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The working groups presented their findings and conclusions to the
full UAS-ID ARC for consideration in making its recommendations. The
UAS-ID ARC submitted its Recommendations Report to the FAA on September
30, 2017. Although some decisions were not unanimous, the ARC reached
general agreement on many of its recommendations.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Appendix D of the ARC's Recommendations Report contains
dissenting opinions submitted by ARC members, as well as a chart
showing a breakdown of how ARC members voted on the final report.
The Recommendations Report is available in the docket for this
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Applicability of Remote ID and Tracking Requirements
    In its Recommendations Report, the ARC presented two options for an
applicability threshold for the ID and tracking requirements and
recommended the FAA give due consideration to both of those options.
    Option 1: All UAS are required to comply with remote identification
and tracking requirements except under any of the following
circumstances:
     The unmanned aircraft is operated within visual line of
sight of the remote pilot and is designed to not be capable of flying
beyond 400 feet of the remote pilot.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ The ARC noted that it is not intending to encompass drone
racing at very low altitudes on a closed course that may be
authorized by operation, by location, or some other mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The unmanned aircraft is operated in compliance with 14
CFR part 101, unless the unmanned aircraft:
    [cir] Is equipped with advanced flight systems technologies that
enable the aircraft to navigate from one point to another without
continuous input and direction from the remote pilot.
    [cir] Is equipped with a real-time downlinked remote sensor that
provides the remote pilot the capability of navigating the aircraft
beyond visual line of sight of the remote pilot.
     The UAS is operated under ATC and contains the equipment
associated with such operations (including ADS-B, transponder, and
communication with ATC).
     The UAS operation is exempt from ID and tracking
requirements by the FAA (e.g., for the purposes of law enforcement,
security or defense, or under an FAA waiver).
    Option 2: UAS with either of the following characteristics are
required to comply with remote identification and tracking
requirements:
     Ability of the aircraft to navigate between more than one
point without direct and active control of the pilot.
     Range from control station greater than 400 feet and real-
time remotely viewable sensor.
    The ARC also recommended that, regardless of which option for
applicability the FAA chooses, UAS operating under the following
circumstances be exempt from the remote identification and tracking
requirement:
     The UAS is operated under ATC and contains the equipment
associated with such operations (including ADS-B, transponder, and
communication with ATC).
     The UAS operation is exempt from ID and tracking
requirements by the

FAA (e.g., for the purposes of law enforcement, security or defense, or
under an FAA waiver).
    The ARC further recommended the FAA do the following regarding the
applicability of remote identification and tracking requirements:
     Include a waiver mechanism in the remote identification
and tracking rule.
     Apply the remote identification and tracking requirements
to the remote pilot, not to the manufacturer of the UAS.
     Require manufacturers to label their products to indicate
whether they are capable of meeting applicable remote identification
and tracking requirements.
     Consider whether unmanned aircraft equipped with advanced
flight system technologies that are strictly for safety purposes and
that keep the aircraft within visual line of sight of the remote pilot,
such as a ``return to home'' feature, should be exempt from remote
identification and tracking requirements, provided the safety features
cannot be readily altered or reprogrammed.
    Some ARC members objected to both of the applicability options
presented in the Recommendations Report, favoring instead a weight-
based threshold for applicability, with remote identification and
tracking requirements applying to any UAS or model aircraft weighing
250 grams or more. These members also argued that there should be no
exemption from the remote identification and tracking requirements for
unmanned aircraft operated in compliance with part 101 (i.e., model
aircraft).\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Section 336 of Public Law 112-95, the underlying authority
for 14 CFR part 101 Subpart E- Special Rule for Model Aircraft, was
repealed by section 349 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018,
Public Law 115-254.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Method To Provide Remote ID and Tracking Information
    The ARC recommended two methods for UAS to provide remote
identification and tracking information: (1) Direct broadcast; and (2)
network publishing to an FAA-approved internet-based database. With
regard to direct broadcast capabilities, the ARC recommended the FAA
adopt an industry standard for data transmission, which may need to be
created, to ensure unmanned aircraft equipment and public safety
receivers are interoperable, as public safety officials may not be able
to equip with receivers for all possible direct broadcast technologies.
With regard to network publishing, the ARC recommended that information
held by Third Party Providers (TPP) or UAS Service Suppliers (USS) be
governed by restrictive use conditions imposed on the TPP/USS related
to the use and dissemination of any data and information collected.
3. Tiered Approach to Remote ID and Tracking Requirements
    The ARC recommended the following tiered approach to direct
broadcast and network publishing requirements:
     Tier 1--Direct broadcast (locally) or Network publish: UAS
in this tier would be required to direct broadcast both ID and tracking
information so that any compatible receiver nearby can receive and
decode the ID and tracking data. If a network is available, network
publishing to an FAA-approved internet-based database satisfies this
requirement. A UAS would fall into Tier 1 if it does not qualify for an
exemption from remote identification and tracking requirements (exempt
UAS are referred to as Tier 0) and does not meet the conditions for
Tier 2 or Tier 3. For example UAS conducting most part 107 operations
would fit into Tier 1.
     Tier 2--Direct broadcast (locally) and Network publish:
UAS in this tier would be required to broadcast (locally) ID and
tracking data and network publish ID and tracking data to an FAA-
approved internet-based database. An example of UAS that may fall into
Tier 2 would be UAS that are conducting waivered operations that
deviate from certain part 107 operating rules, and where the FAA
determines that Tier 2 ID and tracking are required as a condition of
the waiver.
     Tier 3--Flight under part 91 rules: UAS in this tier would
have to adhere to the rules of manned aircraft as defined in 14 CFR
part 91. This tier is intended for aircraft that are integrated into
the manned aircraft airspace. An example of UAS that may fall into Tier
3 are those whose unmanned aircraft weighs above 55 pounds and
operating BVLOS, in IFR conditions, or operating in controlled
airspace.
4. Stages of Implementation of Remote ID and Tracking Rule
    The ARC recommended the following three stages for implementing a
remote identification and tracking rule:
     Pre-rule--Broaden UAS safety education efforts and
continue the UAS detection pathway research with industry stakeholders.
     Before final rule is enacted--Work to scope standards
needed to enable direct broadcast and network publishing technologies
for implementing the remote identification and tracking requirement on
new equipment and existing equipment; ensure that standards for ID and
tracking technology move forward at a rapid pace; and work closely with
industry stakeholders on developing the ideal architecture for the PII
System.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ The ARC report defines ``PII System'' as follows: ``PII
System includes processes and technology (direct broadcast or
network publishing) that enables approved users to associate UAS ID
with the FAA System of Records. This system would include the
database where remote pilot/owner/operator PII [personally
identifiable information] is housed for access by authorized
users.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     After final rule enacted--Allow a reasonable grace period
to carry out retrofit of UAS manufactured and sold within the United
States before the final rule (with grace period ending) when retrofit
options are inexpensive and easy to implement.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ The FAA notes that the ARC only discussed establishing a
grace period for implementation of remote identification. The ARC
did not discuss or address grandfathering of existing UAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Minimum Data Requirements for Remote ID and Tracking
    The ARC recommended a set of minimum data requirements for remote
identification and tracking of UAS. Under the ARC's recommendation,
availability of the following types of data related to the unmanned
aircraft or associated control station would be required: (1) Unique
identifier of the unmanned aircraft; (2) tracking information for the
UAS; and (3) identifying information of the UAS owner and remote pilot.
Availability of the following types of data related to the unmanned
aircraft or associated control station would be optional: (1) Mission
type; (2) route data; and (3) operating status of the unmanned
aircraft. The ARC also recommended that the specific data elements to
be provided by the UAS operator should vary depending on the nature of
the operation. Finally, the ARC recommended that some data elements be
provided prior to flight (e.g., via the internet), while other data
elements be provided in real-time while the UAS is in flight.
6. ATC Interoperability
    With respect to ATC interoperability with the remote identification
and tracking system, the ARC recommended the following:
     The FAA should identify whether BVLOS operations would
routinely occur without an IFR flight plan, and if so, under what
operational conditions.
     Any proposal for using ADS-B frequencies in the solution
for UAS ID and tracking would have to be analyzed for the impact on the
performance of current and future Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR),
Airborne

Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), and ADS-B.
     The UAS ID and tracking system should interoperate with
the ATC automation such that target information from the ID and
tracking ground system, including ID and position, can be passed to ATC
automation.
     FAA automation should by default filter out UAS ID and
tracking system targets from the ATC display that fall outside of
adapted airspace deemed to be of interest to ATC.
     FAA automation and the UAS ID and tracking system should
be able to display designated UAS targets of interest to ATC personnel.
7. Airports and Critical Infrastructure
    The ARC recommended the FAA do the following related to airports
and critical infrastructure:
     Incorporate implementation costs of critical
infrastructure facilities into rulemaking analysis.
     Identify an approach and timeline to designating approved
technologies for airports and critical infrastructure facilities, and
address any legal barriers to implementing approved technologies.
     Provide guidance to airports on any impact or interference
to safe airport operations including how UAS ID and tracking may impact
definition of UAS Facility Maps, security procedures, and risk
assessments of UAS operations.
8. Related Issues
    Finally, the ARC identified related issues it determined could have
an impact on the implementation of effective UAS ID and tracking
solutions, and recommended the following for FAA's consideration:
     Access to data related to direct broadcast and network
publishing--The FAA should implement three levels of access to the
information that is either broadcast or captured and contained in the
appropriate database: (1) Information available to the public (the
unmanned aircraft unique identifier); (2) information available to
designated public safety and airspace management officials (personally
identifiable information (PII)); and (3) information available to the
FAA and certain identified Federal, State, and local agencies (all
relevant tracking data).
     PII--The United States government should be the sole
keeper of any PII collected or submitted in connection with new UAS ID
and tracking requirements.
     Governmental UAS Operations--The remote identification and
tracking system should include reasonable accommodations to protect the
operational security of certain governmental UAS operations.

B. FAA Response to ARC Report

    The ARC was tasked with considering both identification and
tracking of UAS; however, the ARC did not provide any specific
recommendations related to tracking of UAS. The FAA has developed this
proposed rule to require only the identification of UAS. Although the
FAA is not proposing any requirements related to the use of remote
identification information for tracking UAS, the FAA acknowledges that
third parties could potentially track UAS operations in the airspace of
the United States by developing systems that use information provided
to Remote ID USS or through broadcasts. Similar third party
applications exist today, such as FlightAware and Flightradar24, that
track and display information about manned aircraft operations in the
airspace of the United States.
    Although there was general agreement that certain UAS operations
should be excluded from a remote identification requirement, the ARC
did not reach consensus on the applicability of such a requirement. The
ARC's two recommended approaches would have provided for significant
numbers of UAS without remote identification.\50\ The FAA believes that
there is a need to identify as many UAS as possible because a
comprehensive approach increases the usefulness of a remote
identification system. Moreover, some of the ARC's applicability
recommendation hinged on whether the UAS in question would have certain
sensor capabilities. After consideration, the FAA determined that the
sensor capabilities of a particular UAS should not be a factor in
determining whether the aircraft should have remote identification. UAS
without sensor capabilities can still be operated in a manner that may
pose a threat to public safety, national security, and the safety and
efficiency of the airspace of the United States and therefore the FAA
determined that this recommendation would not meet the objective of
this proposed rule. Accordingly, the FAA is proposing that the majority
of UAS should have remote identification, regardless of the sensors
installed on the unmanned aircraft. However, the FAA acknowledges that
remote identification is not necessary for certain UAS operations
conducted in an FAA-recognized identification area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The ARC recommended the following options:
    Option 1:
    Except for those members who strongly favor a weight-based
threshold for applicability and those members who strongly oppose an
exemption for model aircraft operated in compliance with 14 CFR part
101 . . ., the ARC recommends that all UAS be required to comply
with remote ID and tracking requirements except under the following
circumstances:
    1. The unmanned aircraft is operated within visual line of sight
of the remote pilot and is not designed to have the capability of
flying beyond 400' of the remote pilot.
    2. The unmanned aircraft is operated in compliance with 14 CFR
part 101, unless the unmanned aircraft:
    a. Is equipped with advanced flight systems technologies that
enable the aircraft to navigate from one point to another without
continuous input and direction from the remote pilot.
    b. Is equipped with a real-time downlinked remote sensor that
provides the remote pilot the capability of navigating the aircraft
beyond visual line of sight of the remote pilot.
    3. The UAS is operated under ATC and contains the equipment
associated with such operations (including ADS-B, transponder, and
communication with ATC).
    4. The UAS operation is exempt from ID and tracking requirements
by the FAA (e.g., for the purposes of law enforcement, security or
defense, or under an FAA waiver).
    Option 2:
    Except for those members who strongly favor a weight-based
threshold for applicability . . ., the ARC recommends UAS with
either of the following characteristics must comply with remote ID
and tracking requirements:
    1. Ability of the aircraft to navigate between more than one
point without direct and active control of the pilot.
    2. Range from control station greater than 400' and real-time
remotely viewable sensor.
    The ARC further recommends that UAS operating under the
following circumstances be exempt from the remote ID and tracking
requirement:
     The UAS is operated under ATC and contains the
equipment associated with such operations (including ADS-B,
transponder, and communication with ATC).
     The UAS operation is exempt from ID and tracking
requirements by the FAA (e.g., for the purposes of law enforcement,
security or defense, or under an FAA waiver).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA acknowledges the dissenting opinion within the ARC
regarding using weight as the sole determinant of whether an unmanned
aircraft should be required to have remote identification. While an
exclusion to any remote identification requirement based on weight or
operational performance could make sense from a law enforcement and
security perspective, the same cannot be said from the perspective of
the overall safety of the airspace of the United States. Because remote
identification could be used in the near term to provide situational
awareness, and because remote identification would ultimately be a
foundational element of a UTM system, it is important for most UAS
operated in the airspace of the United States to comply with the remote
identification requirements.
    The FAA does not believe that weight alone should be the
determining factor

for whether a UAS is required to comply with remote identification. UAS
may be used in a wide variety of types of operations that may present a
range of safety and security risks, regardless of the weight of the
unmanned aircraft. The FAA believes that the remote identification
requirement should be tied to the unmanned aircraft registration
requirement because the FAA, national security agencies, and law
enforcement agencies have a need to correlate remote identification and
registration data. If an unmanned aircraft is required to be
registered, or its owner chooses to register the unmanned aircraft,
then the UAS would have to comply with remote identification.
Accordingly, under current regulations unmanned aircraft weighing less
than 0.55 pounds would not be required to comply with the remote
identification requirements unless they are registered under part 47 or
part 48 (e.g., to comply with the operating requirements of part 91 or
part 107). Changes to the registration requirements in part 47 or part
48 (e.g., to require unmanned aircraft weighting less than 0.55 pounds
to register) would have a direct impact on which UAS would have to
comply with remote identification.
    The FAA does not agree with the recommendation that model aircraft,
referred to throughout this proposal as limited recreational operations
for consistency with 49 U.S.C. 44809, should be excluded from the
remote identification requirements. Unmanned aircraft used in limited
recreational operations required to register under part 47 or part 48
would be subject to the proposed remote identification requirement. The
agency is, however, proposing a means for such aircraft to operate
without remote identification equipment. Under the proposed rule, UAS
would be permitted to operate without remote identification equipment
if they are operated within visual line of sight and within an FAA-
recognized identification area.
    The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendation for the methods of
transmission for the remote identification message elements. The FAA
agrees that requiring the broadcasting of messages directly from the
unmanned aircraft and the transmission of messages over the internet is
an appropriate approach because it provides a more complete picture of
unmanned aircraft in the airspace of the United States. Moreover, this
would support the development of UTM. Thus, the FAA proposes to require
both the broadcast of the message elements and their transmission
through the internet to a Remote ID USS for standard remote
identification UAS.
    Regarding the ARC's recommendation for a tiered approach for remote
identification, the FAA agrees that some UAS, depending on their
capabilities, may meet the intent of this proposed rule by only
transmitting through the internet to a Remote ID USS. To accommodate
these types of UAS, the FAA is proposing that a limited remote
identification unmanned aircraft that is designed to operate no more
than 400 feet from its control station be required to transmit
information regarding the control station only. Standard remote
identification UAS would be required to broadcast and transmit the
remote identification message elements for both the unmanned aircraft
and the control station.
    The ARC identified a range of 400 feet as the maximum distance that
an unmanned aircraft could be operated from its control station where a
law enforcement officer could reasonably locate and identify the
operator of the unmanned aircraft by visual means only. The FAA agrees
with the ARC determination that 400 feet is a reasonable distance for
visually associating an unmanned aircraft with the location of its
control station, and has included a 400-foot range limitation in the
requirements for limited remote identification UAS.
    The FAA agrees with some of the ARC's recommendations related to
the transmission of message elements. Specifically, the FAA agrees that
a unique identifier should be broadcast or transmitted, as appropriate,
and be part of the unmanned aircraft's Certificate of Aircraft
Registration. The FAA also agrees that the location of the unmanned
aircraft and the control station should be broadcast or transmitted, as
appropriate. However, the FAA is not proposing for the identity of the
owner of the UAS to be included in the message elements, because the
message elements would generally be available to the public. The
message elements that the FAA is proposing are the minimum necessary to
achieve the FAA's safety and security goals while avoiding potential
privacy concerns. UAS owner information would still be available to the
FAA and law enforcement because the FAA would retain the ability to
correlate the unmanned aircraft's unique identifier with the unmanned
aircraft's registration information.
    The ARC also recommended a number of message elements that could be
optionally transmitted. The FAA concurs with the ARC's recommendation
to include the emergency status of the UAS, which could include lost-
link or downed aircraft, as part of the remote identification message
elements, and therefore proposes to include it as a requirement of the
proposed rule. This proposed rule does not preclude broadcasting or
transmitting information, as appropriate in addition to the minimum
required message elements, although any additional message elements
would have to be incorporated as a part of an FAA-accepted means of
compliance.
    The FAA disagrees with the ARC's recommendation that the
identifying information required to be transmitted would be based on
the type of operation. The FAA believes that all of the message
elements proposed should be broadcast or transmitted, as appropriate,
by a UAS from takeoff to landing, regardless of the type of operation
being conducted. By requiring the broadcast or transmission, as
appropriate, of all message elements from takeoff to landing, the FAA
is able to garner basic remote identification information that
contributes to the development and operation of comprehensive UTM and
ultimately enhances the safety and security of the airspace of the
United States.
    The FAA agrees with the ARC that the UAS operator should be
responsible for ensuring that his or her UAS complies with the remote
identification requirements. Ultimately, it would be the operator's
responsibility to operate in compliance. That said, the FAA understands
that responsibility for meeting UAS design and production requirements
should not fall on UAS operators. Accordingly, the FAA is proposing
requirements for UAS producers to ensure that UAS are designed and
produced in a way that ensures reliable functionality of the remote
identification equipment with minimal additional responsibilities for
the UAS operator.
    The FAA concurs with the ARC's recommendation that manufacturers
label UAS to indicate that they comply with the requirements being
proposed in this rule, and is proposing that all producers of standard
remote identification UAS and limited remote identification UAS label
their unmanned aircraft accordingly. The FAA believes that a labeling
requirement would communicate to prospective operators, after-market
purchasers, law enforcement, and other persons whether a UAS complies
with

the remote identification requirements.\51\
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    \51\ In addition to the ARC feedback, during the development of
this NPRM, the FAA received two letters specific to remote
identification of UAS, one from the Academy of Model Aeronautics and
the other from the Small UAV Coalition. Both letters provided their
respective organizations' views on the policies that the FAA should
propose in this rule. Neither of these letters were considered in
the development of this rule. Both letters have been placed in the
docket for this rulemaking.
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VII. Terms Used in This Proposed Rule

    The FAA is proposing to define a number of new terms to facilitate
the implementation of remote identification of UAS.
    In part 1, definitions and abbreviations, the FAA is proposing to
add definitions of unmanned aircraft system, unmanned aircraft system
service supplier, and visual line of sight to Sec.  1.1.
    The FAA is proposing that unmanned aircraft system (UAS) means an
unmanned aircraft and its associated elements (including communication
links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are
required for the safe and efficient operation of the unmanned aircraft
in the airspace of the United States.
    The FAA is proposing that unmanned aircraft system service supplier
means a person qualified by the Administrator to provide aviation-
related services to unmanned aircraft systems.
    The FAA is proposing that visual line of sight means the ability of
a person manipulating the flight controls of the unmanned aircraft or a
visual observer (if one is used) to see the unmanned aircraft
throughout the entire flight with vision that is unaided by any device
other than corrective lenses.
    The FAA recognizes that the term visual line of sight is already
used in part 107. The term is specifically described in Sec.
107.31(a). However, the FAA believes that providing a definition in
Sec.  1.1 would ensure that the term is used consistently throughout
all FAA regulations. Therefore, the FAA is proposing to use the
description of visual line of sight contained in Sec.  107.31, without
the part 107-specific regulatory requirements, as the basis for the
definition of the term visual line of sight in Sec.  1.1.\52\ To
account for the use of the term in proposed part 89 and the potential
use of the term in other parts of 14 CFR, the FAA is proposing to
include a slightly modified version of the description used in part
107. Part 107 remote pilots and visual observers would still be bound
by the specific provisions of Sec.  107.31 absent a waiver.
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    \52\ In relevant part, 14 CFR 107.31(a) describes visual line of
sight as with vision that is unaided by any device other than
corrective lenses, the remote pilot in command, the visual observer
(if one is used), and the person manipulating the flight control of
the small unmanned aircraft system must be able to see the unmanned
aircraft throughout the entire flight in order to: (1) Know the
unmanned aircraft's location; (2) Determine the unmanned aircraft's
attitude, altitude, and direction of flight; (3) Observe the
airspace for other air traffic or hazards; and (4) Determine that
the unmanned aircraft does not endanger the life or property of
another.
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    In Sec.  1.2, abbreviations and symbols, the FAA is proposing to
add the abbreviation USS to mean an Unmanned Aircraft System Service
Supplier.
    The FAA is proposing to add a new part 89, Remote Identification of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, to title 14, chapter I, subchapter F, Air
Traffic and General Operating Rules. In part 89, Sec.  89.1, the FAA is
proposing to include the following definitions:
    Amateur-built unmanned aircraft system means an unmanned aircraft
system the major portion of which has been fabricated and assembled by
a person who undertook the construction project solely for their own
education or recreation.\53\
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    \53\ As currently proposed, amateur-built UAS would not include
unmanned aircraft kits where the majority of parts of the UAS are
provided to the operator as a part of the sold product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Broadcast means to send information from an unmanned aircraft using
radio frequency spectrum.
    Remote ID USS means a USS qualified by the Administrator to provide
remote identification services.

VIII. Applicability of Remote Identification Requirements

    The FAA is proposing to require a new set of technologies, systems,
and guidelines for the remote identification of UAS. The proposal
includes requirements that apply to operators of UAS, requirements for
the development of means of compliance, and requirements that apply to
designers and producers of UAS.
    The FAA is proposing to add a new part 89, Remote Identification of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, to 14 CFR, chapter I, subchapter F, Air
Traffic and General Operating Rules. The operating requirements in
subpart B of part 89 would apply to persons operating unmanned aircraft
registered or required to be registered under part 47 or part 48. The
FAA is proposing to tie the remote identification requirements to the
registration requirements because the remote identification data
broadcast or transmitted from a UAS is meant to be correlated to the
registration data of such UAS. To facilitate the correlation of data,
the FAA proposes certain changes to the registration requirements in
parts 47 and 48, which are discussed in section IX of this preamble.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to revise part 48 to require the
individual registration of unmanned aircraft.\54\ The FAA also proposes
to require that all registrations of unmanned aircraft with remote
identification include the serial number assigned by the producer of
the unmanned aircraft. The serial number would be used to provide a
unique identity to each unmanned aircraft for remote identification
purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Currently, 14 CFR part 48 allows owners with UAS operated
for limited recreational purposes to register multiple unmanned
aircraft under a single registration number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The operating requirements of the proposed rule would also apply to
persons operating foreign civil unmanned aircraft in the United States
and to persons operating UAS exclusively within FAA-recognized
identification areas. The operating requirements of the proposed rule
would not apply to aircraft of the Armed Forces of the United States
because these aircraft are not required to be registered under part 47
or part 48.
    The design and production requirements in subpart F of proposed
part 89 would apply to persons responsible for the design and
production of UAS produced for operation in the United States. The
design and production requirements would not, however, apply to the
following UAS, unless they are intentionally produced with remote
identification (i.e., a standard remote identification UAS or limited
remote identification UAS): amateur-built UAS and UAS of the United
States Government. Producers of UAS weighing less than 0.55 pounds
(current weight threshold for requirement to register) may, but would
not be required to, comply with the proposed remote identification
design and production requirements.
    The FAA anticipates that industry stakeholders would develop means
of compliance (which may include consensus standards) that UAS
designers and producers would use to comply with the requirements of
this proposed rule. Any person or entity could submit a means of
compliance for acceptance by the FAA if it meets the requirements in
subpart D of proposed part 89.

IX. Changes to Registration Requirements

    Under the proposed rule, persons operating unmanned aircraft
registered or required to be registered under part 47 or part 48, would
have to comply

with the remote identification requirements of proposed part 89. The
FAA is proposing to tie the remote identification requirements to the
registration of unmanned aircraft because the FAA and law enforcement
agencies need the ability to correlate remote identification
information with registration data to obtain more complete information
regarding the ownership of unmanned aircraft flying in the airspace of
the United States. Aircraft registration requirements are the
foundation for both identifying aircraft and for promoting
accountability and the safe and efficient use of the airspace of the
United States by both manned and unmanned aircraft. With limited
exceptions, all aircraft are required to be registered under part 47 or
part 48; therefore, nearly all UAS operating in the airspace of the
United States would have to comply with the remote identification
requirements, thereby enhancing the overall safety and efficiency of
the airspace of the United States.
    Parts 47 and 48 of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
implement the registration requirements codified in 49 U.S.C. 44101-
44103. Additional statutory requirements address the registration of
unmanned aircraft; specifically, 49 U.S.C. 44809(a)(8) requires
unmanned aircraft used in limited recreational operations to be
registered and marked in accordance with chapter 441 of Title 49 of the
United States Code. Furthermore, under 49 U.S.C. 44809(f), the
Administrator is not prohibited from promulgating rules relating to the
registration and marking of unmanned aircraft including unmanned
aircraft used in limited recreational operations.\55\
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    \55\ Section 336 of Public Law 112-95, which prohibited the FAA
from implementing new regulations on certain recreational UAS
operations, was repealed by section 349 of the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018, Public Law 115-254.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the current registration requirements, no person may operate
an unmanned aircraft in the airspace of the United States unless it has
been registered by its owner pursuant to part 47 or part 48, or unless
the aircraft is excepted from registration. There are two exceptions to
the registration requirements for unmanned aircraft: (1) Unmanned
aircraft of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (2) most
unmanned aircraft weighing 0.55 pounds or less on takeoff, including
everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft.
Small unmanned aircraft operating under 14 CFR part 91 and part 107 are
required to register under part 47 or part 48 regardless of weight.

A. Registration Under Part 47

    Registration under part 47 is required for:
    (1) Unmanned aircraft weighing 55 pounds or more;
    (2) small unmanned aircraft intended to be operated outside of the
territorial airspace of the United States; and
    (3) small unmanned aircraft registered through a trust or voting
trust (e.g., to meet U.S. citizenship requirements).
    Registration under part 47 is available for:
    (1) Any unmanned aircraft (including small unmanned aircraft) that
needs--or desires--an N-number registration (e.g., to operate outside
the United States); or
    (2) when public recording is needed for unmanned aircraft-related
loans, leases, or ownership documents.
    To register under part 47, the unmanned aircraft must not be
registered under the laws of a foreign country, and must be:
    (1) Owned by a citizen of the United States;
    (2) owned by an individual citizen of a foreign country lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States;
    (3) owned by a corporation not a citizen of the U.S. when the
corporation is organized and doing business under U.S. Federal or State
laws, and the aircraft is based and primarily used in the United
States; or
    (4) owned by the U.S. Government, or a State, or local governmental
entity.
    The registration process under part 47 is paper-based and commences
with the filing of an Aircraft Registration Application (AC Form 8050-
1) with the FAA Aircraft Registry. At a minimum, applicants must
provide evidence of ownership (e.g., a traditional bill of sale, a
contract of conditional sale, a lease with purchase option, or an heir-
at-law affidavit), provide a certification of eligibility for
registration, and pay a registration fee. Additional documentation may
be required, particularly for amateur-built aircraft and aircraft
imported from foreign jurisdictions. Additional information required
may include a builder certificate describing the type of aircraft and a
comprehensive description of the aircraft (e.g., make, model, serial
number, engine manufacturer, type of engine, number of engines, maximum
takeoff weight, and number of seats). Persons such as corporate
registrants, trustees, and non-citizen corporations must file
additional documentation evidencing their legal structures,
authorities, and related data that supports registration. Aircraft
previously recorded in foreign registries must file proof of
deregistration. In the case of amateur-built aircraft, either the owner
or builder must designate the aircraft model name and serial number.
    Once an unmanned aircraft is registered, the FAA issues a
Certificate of Aircraft Registration (AC Form 8050-3) to the aircraft
owner. The FAA has clarified that, in the case of unmanned aircraft,
the Certificate of Aircraft Registration may be maintained at the
pilot's control station rather than on the unmanned aircraft and must
be made available for inspection upon request.\56\ The certificate
expires three years after date of issuance.\57\ A Certificate of
Aircraft Registration may be renewed by submitting a renewal
application and paying a renewal fee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See Memorandum to John Duncan, from Mark W. Bury, Assistant
Chief Counsel for International Law, Legislation, and Regulations
(August 8, 2014).
    \57\ Section 556 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires
the Administrator to initiate a rulemaking to increase the duration
of aircraft registrations for noncommercial general aviation
aircraft to 7 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unmanned aircraft registered under part 47 must comply with the
identification and registration marking requirements in subparts A and
C of 14 CFR part 45. Under part 45, the aircraft must display certain
marks consisting of the Roman capital letter ``N'' (denoting U.S.
registration) followed by the registration number of the aircraft. The
N-number must be: (1) Painted on the aircraft or affixed to the
aircraft by some other permanent means; (2) have no ornamentation; (3)
contrast in color with the background; and (4) be legible.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See 14 CFR 45.21(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Registration Under Part 48

    Part 48 provides a web-based aircraft registration process for
small unmanned aircraft to facilitate compliance with the statutory
requirement that all aircraft register prior to operation.\59\ A small
unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on takeoff, including
everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft, may
be registered under either part 47 or part 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See 80 FR 78593 (December 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Owners of small unmanned aircraft used in civil operations
(including commercial operations), limited recreational operations,\60\
or public aircraft operations, among others, are

eligible to register under part 48. Currently, unmanned aircraft may be
registered in one of two ways: (1) Under an individual registration
number issued to each aircraft; or (2) under a single registration
number issued to an owner of multiple unmanned aircraft used
exclusively for limited recreational operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ This proposal uses the term ``limited recreational
operations'' when discussing registration requirements under part
48. Part 48 uses the term ``model aircraft'' to describe
recreational UAS operations. The FAA considers that model aircraft
under part 48 are consistent with the ``limited recreational
operations'' described in 49 U.S.C. 44809, therefore ``limited
recreational operations'' has been used throughout to ensure
consistency of terminology with current statutory requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the owner of a small unmanned aircraft intends to use it at any
point for a purpose other than exclusively for limited recreational
operations as defined in 49 U.S.C. 44809, the owner must register that
aircraft individually and obtain a unique registration number for the
aircraft. The aircraft registration must include the: (1) Name of the
applicant; (2) applicant's physical address; (3) applicant's email
address; (4) aircraft manufacturer and model name; (5) aircraft serial
number, if available; and (6) any other information required by the
Administrator.
    If the owner of multiple small unmanned aircraft intends to use the
aircraft exclusively for limited recreational operations, part 48
currently allows the owner to register once and to obtain a single
registration number that constitutes the registration number for all of
the owner's small unmanned aircraft. This means that multiple aircraft
may display the same registration number when the unmanned aircraft are
used exclusively for limited recreational operations. Applicants for a
single Certificate of Aircraft Registration for multiple unmanned
aircraft must provide: (1) The applicant's name; (2) the applicant's
physical address; (3) the applicant's email address; and (4) any other
information required by the Administrator. This option does not require
the applicant to provide the unmanned aircraft manufacturer, model, or
serial number.
    Once an unmanned aircraft is registered, the FAA issues a
Certificate of Aircraft Registration, which contains a registration
number composed of multiple alphanumeric characters. A part 48
registration number is not the traditional N-number issued under part
47.
    Small unmanned aircraft registered under part 48 may not operate
unless they display a unique identifier in a way that is readily
accessible and visible upon inspection of the aircraft. The unique
identifier must be either: (1) The registration number issued to an
individual or the registration number issued to the aircraft by the
Registry upon completion of the registration process; or (2) the small
unmanned aircraft serial number, if authorized by the Administrator and
provided with the application for Certificate of Aircraft Registration.
Most commonly, the unique identifier displayed is the FAA registration
number.

C. Issues With the Current Registration Requirements and Proposed
Changes

    The current registration requirements do not provide for aircraft-
specific data of all aircraft, information fundamentally necessary for
remote identification, due to the differing requirements of parts 47
and 48.
    Part 47 requires the individual registration of aircraft and the
submission of an aircraft's serial number as part of the application
for a Certificate of Aircraft Registration. These requirements are
consistent with the remote identification framework proposed in this
NPRM because the FAA would be able to correlate the aircraft-specific
registration data (i.e., serial number) obtained under part 47 to the
remote identification data which would have to be broadcast or
transmitted by unmanned aircraft under the current proposal. This is
not the case with the current registration requirements of part 48.
    Currently, part 48 allows for registration of multiple unmanned
aircraft used exclusively for limited recreational operations under a
single Certificate of Aircraft Registration without requiring the
applicant to submit the aircrafts' serial numbers.\61\ This means that
the FAA has no aircraft-specific data for aircraft operated under a
single Certificate of Aircraft Registration. Second, part 48 requires
the provision of an unmanned aircraft's serial number, only if
available, and only if the aircraft is registered individually. This
means that the FAA does not have a data set that includes the serial
numbers of all unmanned aircraft registered under part 48 and cannot
correlate the registration data to the remote identification data which
would be broadcast or transmitted by unmanned aircraft under the
proposed rule. Thus, the FAA believes that the current registration
requirements of part 48 are not sufficient to support the remote
identification framework proposed in this NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ As of November 25, 2019, are currently 1,081,329
recreational flyers registered under part 48--but because these
registrants do not currently register each individual UA the FAA
does not have administrative data on the number or type of
recreational UAs being flown. As a point of comparison, as of
November 25, 2019, under part 48 there are also 417,663 UAs
registered individually as non-model unmanned aircraft (largely part
107 operations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A change to the registration requirements of part 48 is therefore
necessary to enable the FAA to gather all of the necessary data to
support the unique identification of unmanned aircraft registered under
part 48. The lack of aircraft-specific data for aircraft registered
under part 48 inhibits the FAA and law enforcement agencies from
correlating the remote identification data proposed in this rule with
data stored in the Aircraft Registry. Thus, the FAA proposes to revise
part 48 to require the individual registration of all small unmanned
aircraft and the provision of additional aircraft-specific data. Owners
of small unmanned aircraft would have to complete the registration
application by providing aircraft-specific information in addition to
basic contact information. This means that every small unmanned
aircraft registered under part 48 would need to have its own
Certificate of Aircraft Registration. To ease the financial burden on
operators who previously registered multiple model aircraft under a
single registration number, the FAA would explore ways to minimize the
registration fee when multiple aircraft are registered at the same
time.
    Specifically, the proposed changes would include the removal of
Sec. Sec.  48.100(b) and 48.115, which currently allow small unmanned
aircraft used exclusively as a model aircraft to be registered under a
single Certificate of Aircraft Registration without unique identifying
information. Sections 48.100(a) and 48.110, which require unique
identifying information, would become the sole means for registration
under part 48 and would be revised to reflect all of the requirements
that apply to the individual registration of small unmanned aircraft
under part 48. Conforming changes would be made throughout part 48 to
reflect the removal of Sec. Sec.  48.100(b) and 48.115 and the
transition to a single form of registration under part 48.
    The FAA believes the proposed revisions are necessary to implement
the remote identification framework because individual aircraft
registration under part 48 would allow the FAA to gather aircraft-
specific data that is essential for remote identification. Furthermore,
the proposed transition to an individual aircraft registration system
under part 48 would harmonize these requirements with the individual
aircraft registration requirements of part 47.

D. Proposed Changes to the Registration Requirements To Require a
Serial Number and Telephone Number as Part of the Registration Process

    As discussed in section XII.C.1 of this preamble, this proposed
rule would require a unique identifier as part of the

message elements used to remotely identify UAS. A serial number is a
unique number assigned to an aircraft--typically at the time of
production--and does not change in case of a sale or transfer of
ownership. The proposed revision of part 48 would require the provision
of an unmanned aircraft's serial number at the time of registration.
This proposed requirement is essential for the remote identification
framework proposed in this NPRM. The serial number requirement would
enable the FAA to correlate the data broadcast or transmitted by the
UAS with the registration data in the Aircraft Registry to associate an
unmanned aircraft with its registered owner. The requirement would also
allow the FAA to distinguish one unmanned aircraft from another
operating in the airspace of the United States and would facilitate the
identification of non-registered unmanned aircraft flying in the
airspace of the United States, which may warrant additional oversight
or action by the FAA, national security agencies, or law enforcement
agencies.
    There has been little to no standardization regarding the issuance
or use of serial numbers by UAS. The FAA believes that standardizing
the issuance and use of serial numbers is necessary to successfully
implement the remote identification requirements of the proposed rule.
The standardization of the issuance and use of serial numbers would
prevent a situation where two or more UAS are issued the same serial
number. Thus, the FAA is proposing to add a new Sec.  47.14 to require
the owners of standard remote identification unmanned aircraft and
limited remote identification unmanned aircraft registered under part
47 to list in the Certificate of Aircraft Registration the serial
number issued by the manufacturer of the unmanned aircraft in
accordance with the requirements of proposed part 89. According to the
manufacturing requirements in proposed Sec.  89.505, the serial number
would have to comply with the ANSI/CTA-2063-A serial number standard.
    The FAA is also proposing to revise Sec.  48.100(a) to require a
serial number for every small unmanned aircraft. Consistent with the
proposed changes in part 47, Sec.  48.100(a)(5) would require the owner
of any standard remote identification unmanned aircraft or limited
identification unmanned aircraft to list in the Certificate of Aircraft
Registration the serial number issued by the manufacturer of the
unmanned aircraft in accordance with the production requirements of
part 89. Per the production requirements in proposed Sec.  89.505, such
serial number would have to comply with the ANSI/CTA-2063-A serial
number standard.
    Owners of amateur-built unmanned aircraft would have to comply with
the serial number requirement in proposed Sec.  48.100(a)(5) if the
unmanned aircraft are designed and produced as standard remote
identification unmanned aircraft or limited identification unmanned
aircraft. The proposed revisions to Sec.  48.100(a) would also require
the owners of amateur-built unmanned aircraft to list in the
Certificate of Aircraft Registration a manufacturer and model name of
their choice.
    Additionally, the FAA is proposing to update the registration
information requirements to include one or more telephone number(s) for
the applicant. Although registration data corresponds to the owner of
the unmanned aircraft rather than the operator, the FAA believes that
due to the nature and scope of most small UAS operations, it is
reasonable to expect a significant number of unmanned aircraft owners
to also be the operators of the aircraft or in close contact with the
operators of the aircraft. Requiring owners of unmanned aircraft to
provide their telephone number(s) as part of the registration process
would assist FAA and law enforcement to disseminate safety and
security-related information to the registrant in near real-time. This
additional information would be retained by the FAA and only disclosed
as needed to authorized law enforcement or Federal agencies.

E. Request for Comments Regarding Serial Number Requirements

    The FAA acknowledges that some unmanned aircraft may not have
serial numbers that comply with the ANSI/CTA-2063-A serial number
standard. Some examples include unmanned aircraft manufactured prior to
the compliance date of the final rule that follows this notice of
proposed rulemaking (assuming the producer of the unmanned aircraft is
unable to modify the aircraft or push an upgrade to assign an ANSI/CTA-
2063-A compliant serial number), some amateur-built unmanned aircraft,
and foreign-built unmanned aircraft with no serial numbers or with
serial numbers that do not comply with ANSI/CTA-2063-A. Since these
unmanned aircraft do not comply with the remote identification
requirements for standard remote identification UAS or limited remote
identification UAS, the proposed rule requires their operation be
restricted to FAA-recognized identification areas. Accordingly, the FAA
has not imposed a requirement for the owners of such unmanned aircraft
to obtain an ANSI/CTA-2063-A compliant serial number and to list it in
the Certificate of Aircraft Registration or the Certificate of
Identification. The FAA welcomes detailed comments on whether and why
it should require the owners of UAS without remote identification to
have to obtain an ANSI/CTA-2063-A compliant serial number and to list
it in the Certificate of Aircraft Registration or the Certificate of
Identification and whether there would be any costs associated with
obtaining a compliant serial number. The FAA also welcomes comments on
whether the Agency should issue ANSI/CTA-2063-A compliant serial
numbers to such aircraft when registered or re-registered by their
owners.

F. Serial Number Marking

    The FAA emphasizes that small unmanned aircraft owners are not
required to affix the serial number to the exterior of the aircraft.
However, nothing in the proposed regulation would preclude the owners
from choosing to do so. The FAA envisions that producers may mark the
exterior of unmanned aircraft with serial numbers that comply with the
ANSI/CTA-2063-A serial number standard, and that such serial numbers
could be used to meet the marking requirements of part 48, subpart C.
This could alleviate the need to mark each UAS with the registration
number. The FAA seeks specific comments on whether UAS producers should
be required to affix the serial number to the exterior of all standard
remote identification UAS and limited remote identification UAS. Please
explain why or why not and provide data to support your response.

X. Operating Requirements for Remote Identification

A. Requirement To Broadcast or Transmit

    Under the proposed rule, no person would be able to operate a UAS
in the airspace of the United States unless the UAS has remote
identification capability meeting the requirements of this proposed
rule (i.e., a standard remote identification UAS or limited remote
identification UAS) or if the UAS has no remote identification
equipment but is otherwise identified by operating exclusively within
visual line of sight and within an FAA-recognized identification area.
    The FAA is proposing to require all UAS with remote identification
to broadcast or transmit the appropriate remote identification message
elements from takeoff to landing. The agency is also proposing that no
person would be

able to operate a UAS with remote identification unless the UAS is
transmitting (for limited remote identification UAS) or transmitting
and broadcasting (for standard remote identification UAS) the
appropriate message elements. The remote identification message
elements are described in greater detail in section XII.C of this
preamble. Furthermore, the FAA proposes to prohibit the operation of
UAS with remote identification if the remote identification equipment
and functionality have been disabled without the authorization of the
Administrator.
    UAS would have to comply with the remote identification
requirements in one of three ways, depending on the capabilities of the
UAS. To help operators determine whether a particular UAS has remote
identification, the FAA is proposing to require that all persons
responsible for the production of standard remote identification UAS
and limited remote identification UAS label the unmanned aircraft to
indicate whether the UAS complies with the remote identification
requirements of this proposed rule and whether the UAS is standard
remote identification or limited remote identification. A person would
therefore be able to determine what type of UAS they have and if it has
remote identification capability simply by visual inspection of the
unmanned aircraft.
1. Standard Remote Identification UAS
    Standard remote identification UAS would be required to transmit
certain message elements through the internet to a Remote ID USS (an
FAA-qualified third party discussed in section XIV of this preamble)
and to broadcast the same message elements directly from the unmanned
aircraft using radio frequency spectrum in accordance with 47 CFR part
15, where operations may occur without an Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) individual license. These message elements would
include: The UAS Identification (either the unmanned aircraft's serial
number or session ID); latitude, longitude, and barometric pressure
altitude of both the control station and the unmanned aircraft; a time
mark; and an emergency status code that would broadcast and transmit
only when applicable.
    A standard remote identification UAS would be required to broadcast
and transmit the remote identification message elements from takeoff to
landing. If the internet is available at takeoff, the standard remote
identification UAS would have to connect to the internet and transmit
the message elements through that internet connection to a Remote ID
USS and would also be required to broadcast the message elements
directly from the unmanned aircraft. If the internet is unavailable at
takeoff, the standard remote identification UAS would only be required
to broadcast the message elements directly from the unmanned aircraft.
If the internet is available, but the UAS cannot connect to a Remote ID
USS, the UAS would be designed such that it could not take off. This is
discussed in more detail in section XII.D.6 of this preamble.
    The FAA is proposing to define ``broadcast'' as sending information
from an unmanned aircraft using radio frequency spectrum. Under the
proposed rule, only standard remote identification UAS would be able to
broadcast remote identification message elements. The reasons for
prohibiting limited remote identification UAS from broadcasting message
elements is explained in section XII.D.14 of this preamble.
    A standard remote identification UAS that loses connection to the
internet or that can no longer transmit to a Remote ID USS after
takeoff would be able to continue its flight, as long as it continues
broadcasting the message elements. If a standard remote identification
UAS experiences an in-flight loss of broadcast capability, regardless
of whether it is connected to a Remote ID USS, the operator would have
to land the unmanned aircraft as soon as practicable. This is necessary
because a loss of the broadcast capability is an indication of a remote
identification equipment failure, whereas loss of connectivity to the
internet or a Remote ID USS could be attributed to unavailability of a
service outside the control of the UAS operator. In addition, a
functioning broadcast capability is necessary in order for remote
identification information to be available in areas that do not have
wireless internet connectivity. For example, during a BVLOS operation,
the unmanned aircraft could be operating over a rural area that does
not have wireless internet connectivity, but, through the command and
control link, the unmanned aircraft has connectivity with a control
station that is in turn connected to the internet and transmitting to a
Remote ID USS. If the unmanned aircraft is in a location that does not
have wireless internet connectivity, then for any local third-party
observers attempting to identify the unmanned aircraft the only
accessible source of remote identification information would be the
broadcast. To support compliance with this requirement, the FAA is
proposing that standard remote identification UAS have a monitoring
feature that would notify the person manipulating the flight controls
of the UAS if the broadcast capability was lost.
    The FAA expects that the proposed design and production
requirements of this rule would facilitate a person's compliance with
the proposed operating requirements (e.g., transmission requirement).
The FAA intends for compliance with the remote identification
requirements to be simple and straightforward for individuals operating
UAS produced in accordance with a current FAA-accepted means of
compliance. For example, a standard remote identification UAS would
automatically transmit and broadcast the message elements and its
design would prevent it from taking off when the remote identification
capability is not functioning. Under this rule, the remote
identification capability would be considered not functioning when the
equipment does not work or is unable to perform its intended function
or when the remote identification message elements are not transmitted
or broadcast in accordance with the requirements of the proposed rule.
Under this proposed rule, all UAS with remote identification would be
designed and produced such that the remote identification functionality
is always enabled and cannot be disabled except as otherwise authorized
by the Administrator. UAS with remote identification would be designed
and produced to notify the person manipulating the flight controls of
the UAS of any remote identification malfunctions, failures, or
anomalies.
2. Limited Remote Identification UAS
    Limited remote identification UAS are UAS that are designed and
produced such that the aircraft is not capable of operating more than
400 feet from the control station and cannot broadcast the remote
identification message elements identified in proposed Sec.  89.305 or
Sec.  89.315. Under the proposed rule, persons operating limited remote
identification UAS would be required to fly within visual line of sight
at all times. Limited remote identification UAS would be required to
connect to the internet and transmit the appropriate message elements
through that internet connection to a Remote ID USS. Unlike standard
remote identification UAS, if a limited remote identification UAS
cannot connect to the internet or transmit through an internet
connection to a Remote ID USS, the UAS would not be able to take off.

Again, unlike with standard remote identification UAS, if a limited
remote identification UAS loses connectivity to the Remote ID USS in
flight, the person manipulating the flight controls of the UAS would be
required to land as soon as practicable. The limited remote
identification UAS would not be able to continue its flight because it
cannot broadcast remote identification message elements.
    A limited remote identification UAS is not permitted to broadcast
remote identification message elements using radio frequency spectrum
because the broadcast function is only applicable to standard remote
identification UAS. If remote identification broadcast capability is
added to a limited remote identification UAS, it would not have been
subject to the design and production requirements of this rule and
could result in erroneous, non-compliant, or incorrectly formatted
messages being broadcast, undermining the fundamental purposes of this
rule. However, the proposal does not prohibit designers, producers, or
operators from including a capability for limited remote identification
UAS to broadcast information or data unrelated to remote
identification, such as a camera feed or telemetry data.
    The message elements for limited remote identification UAS would
include: The UAS Identification (either the unmanned aircraft's serial
number or session ID); latitude, longitude, and barometric pressure
altitude of the control station; a time mark; and an emergency status
code that would transmit only when applicable.
    Table 4 provides a summary of the differences between standard
remote identification UAS and limited remote identification UAS.

 Table 4--Summary of Differences Between Standard Remote Identification
                UAS and Limited Remote Identification UAS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Standard remote     Limited remote
                                  identification UAS  identification UAS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Message elements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UAS Identification (serial        YES...............  YES.
 number or session ID).
Unmanned aircraft:..............
    Latitude and longitude,       YES...............  NO.
     barometric pressure
     altitude:
Control station:................
    Latitude and longitude,       YES...............  YES.
     barometric pressure
     altitude:
A time mark identifying the       YES...............  YES.
 Coordinated Universal Time
 (UTC) time of applicability of
 a position source output.
An indication of the emergency    YES...............  YES.
 status of the UAS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Connectivity prior to takeoff
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet and Remote ID USS......  YES...............  YES.
Broadcast.......................  YES...............  NO.
If, at takeoff, the UAS cannot    Broadcast.........  Do not take off.
 connect to the internet.
If, at takeoff, the UAS is        Do not take off...  Do not take off.
 connected to the internet, but
 is not transmitting to a Remote
 ID USS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In-flight loss of remote identification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
If, during flight, the UAS loses  Broadcast.........  Land as soon as
 the connection to the internet                        practicable.
 or stops transmitting to the
 Remote ID USS.
If, during flight, the UAS loses  Land as soon as     N/A.
 its ability to broadcast the      practicable.
 message elements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Range limitation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range limitation from control     None; operation     Limited to
 station.                          would have to       operations within
                                   comply with all     400 feet of
                                   other operating     control station.
                                   requirements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Broadcasting from the unmanned aircraft at any point
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Broadcast limitation............  Standard remote     Limited remote
                                   identification      identification
                                   unmanned aircraft   unmanned aircraft
                                   must broadcast      cannot broadcast
                                   remote              remote
                                   identification      identification
                                   message elements.   message elements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. UAS Without Remote Identification
    Under the proposed rule, the vast majority of UAS would be required
to remotely identify. The FAA understands, however, that not all UAS
would be able to meet this requirement. For example, some UAS
manufacturers may be able to bring UAS produced before the compliance
date of this rule into compliance, but others might not. In addition,
certain amateur-built UAS might not be equipped with remote
identification equipment. The FAA is proposing operating rules in Sec.
89.120 to allow these aircraft to continue to operate without remote
identification equipment. A UAS that would not qualify as either a
standard remote identification UAS or a limited remote identification
UAS would only be allowed to operate under two circumstances. The first
circumstance is where the UAS operates within visual line of sight and
within the boundaries of an FAA-recognized identification area. An FAA-
recognized identification area is a defined geographic area where UAS
without remote identification can operate. In the proposed Sec.
89.120(a), the

phrase ``operated within an FAA-recognized identification area'' means
that both the unmanned aircraft and the person manipulating the flight
controls of the UAS would be required to be located within the FAA-
recognized identification area from takeoff to landing. FAA-recognized
identification areas are described in section XV of this preamble. Note
that this operating exception from remotely identifying only applies to
those UAS that do not have remote identification; anyone operating a
standard or limited remote identification UAS would continue to be
bound by the operating rules applicable to their UAS, even if he or she
is located inside an FAA-recognized identification area during the
flight.
    The second circumstance in which a UAS that is not a standard
remote identification UAS or limited remote identification UAS could be
operated without remote identification is where the person operating
the UAS has been authorized by the Administrator to operate the UAS for
the purpose of aeronautical research or to show compliance with
regulations. In this context, the FAA would consider aeronautical
research to be limited to the research and testing of the unmanned
aircraft, the control systems, equipment that is part of the unmanned
aircraft (such as sensors), and flight profiles, or development of
specific functions and capabilities for the UAS. Under this provision,
producers and other persons authorized by the Administrator, would have
the ability to operate UAS prototypes without remote identification
exclusively for researching and testing the UAS design, equipment, or
capabilities. This provision does not extend to any other type of
research using a UAS.
    Additionally, a person authorized by the Administrator would be
permitted to conduct flight tests and other operations to show
compliance with an FAA-accepted means of compliance for remote
identification, or airworthiness regulations, including but not limited
to flights to show compliance for issuance of type certificates and
supplemental type certificates, flights to substantiate major design
changes, and flights to show compliance with the function and
reliability requirements of the regulations.

B. Prohibition From Using ADS-B To Satisfy Remote Identification
Requirements

    The FAA proposes to prohibit the use of ADS-B Out to meet remote
identification requirements in this rule. The FAA determined that both
the ADS-B message elements and the infrastructure required to receive
the ADS-B message elements are incompatible with the current need for
remote identification at lower altitudes. ADS-B does not provide
information regarding the location of a UAS control station. Thus, it
would not advance the FAA's need to associate a control station with
the actual unmanned aircraft it controls. Further, because ADS-B
receivers do not provide sufficient low altitude coverage, ADS-B Out
would not align well with the FAA's vision for the development of UTM.
Finally, the FAA determined that the use of ADS-B Out by UAS would
generate undue signal saturation and would create an overall safety
hazard for manned aircraft due to the potentially high numbers of UAS
which may be operating in the airspace at any given time. For these
reasons, the FAA is proposing in Sec.  89.125 to prohibit ADS-B Out
equipment from being used to comply with the remote identification
requirements of part 89.

C. Internet Availability and Transmission to a Remote ID USS

    The FAA is proposing to require standard remote identification UAS
and limited remote identification UAS to connect automatically to the
internet, when available, and transmit remote identification message
elements through that internet connection to a Remote ID USS. The FAA
is also proposing a related performance requirement for standard remote
identification UAS and limited remote identification UAS to
continuously monitor the connectivity to the internet and the
transmission of remote identification message elements to a Remote ID
USS and notify the person manipulating the flight controls of the UAS
if that connection is lost or the UAS is no longer transmitting to the
Remote ID USS. Because of this proposed performance requirement for the
UAS, the person manipulating the flight controls of the UAS would be
aware at all times of whether the UAS was connected to the internet and
transmitting to a Remote ID USS.
    The FAA believes an internet-based solution is appropriate, when
the internet is available, because the internet is the largest, most
multifaceted, and prevalent platform for data transmission. Under the
proposed rule, the internet would be considered available if cellular
or other forms of wireless internet connectivity such as Wi-Fi are
available in an operational area with sufficient signal strength to
maintain a connection between the UAS and the internet. UAS with remote
identification would automatically connect to the internet when it is
available, similar to how wireless devices, such as smart phones,
connect automatically to the internet when there is sufficient signal
strength and coverage.
    If the internet is available but the operator's Remote ID USS is
not working, the operator would be required to either connect to
another Remote ID USS or the UAS would be restricted from taking off.
In the unlikely event that all Remote ID USS become unavailable at the
same time but the internet remains available, no standard or limited
remote identification UAS would be able to take off. The FAA assumes
this situation would be extremely unlikely. The FAA seeks public
comment on whether there are ways to address this extremely unlikely
situation within the framework of the rule as proposed.
    After connecting to the internet, a standard remote identification
UAS or limited remote identification UAS must transmit the remote
identification message elements to a Remote ID USS. The FAA anticipates
that there will be some Remote ID USS available to the general public
and that others will be private. Under the proposed rule, a Remote ID
USS would be considered available as long as that Remote ID USS
provides remote identification services to the general public at the
time the standard remote identification UAS or limited remote
identification UAS is being operated. A private or restricted access
Remote ID USS would be considered available only to UAS operators who
receive remote identification services from that Remote ID USS. For
example, if Company ABC sets up a private Remote ID USS to provide
remote identification services exclusively to its fleet of UAS, then
the private Remote ID USS would only be available to the UAS operators
of Company ABC. In comparison, if Company XYZ sets up a Remote ID USS
that can be accessed by the general public for remote identification
services, then Company XYZ's Remote ID USS would be considered
available to all operators of UAS flying in the airspace of the United
States, irrespective of whether that access requires a monetary cost.
The FAA is not proposing to establish specific requirements regarding
Remote ID USS business models, (e.g., charging fees, requiring user
agreements, and requiring information from Remote ID USS users). The
FAA believes that operators will choose a Remote ID USS that best meets
their operational needs. The FAA further discusses some of its
assumptions related to Remote ID USS business models in the
accompanying

Regulatory Impact Analysis, where it assumes (while acknowledging
significant uncertainty) the average publicly available Remote ID USS
will charge $2.50 as a monthly subscription ($30 annually) cost to
users of its service.

D. In-Flight Loss of Connectivity With a Remote ID USS or Loss of
Functionality

    The FAA foresees situations where the person manipulating the
flight controls of a UAS would need to receive an indication that the
connection to a Remote ID USS has been lost mid-flight. Under this
proposal, standard remote identification UAS would be produced with the
capability to both connect to the internet and, through that
connection, transmit to a Remote ID USS and to broadcast. The broadcast
capability provides continuous remote identification information and
continues to provide remote identification when connectivity to the
internet is lost or the unmanned aircraft is no longer transmitting to
a Remote ID USS. If the connection to the internet or to a Remote ID
USS is lost after takeoff, the person manipulating the flight controls
would be allowed to continue operating the UAS as long as it is still
broadcasting the remote identification message elements. If, however, a
standard remote identification UAS loses its ability to broadcast the
message elements, the person manipulating the flight controls of the
UAS would be required to land the unmanned aircraft as soon as
practicable. This is necessary because a loss of the broadcast
capability is an indication of a remote identification equipment
failure.
    Because limited remote identification UAS cannot broadcast remote
identification message elements, if the UAS loses connection to the
internet or to a Remote ID USS, then the person manipulating the flight
controls would have to land the unmanned aircraft as soon as
practicable. The FAA considers this to be the safest course of action