from high-frequency traders looking to earn rebates, which may be
exacerbated through the offer of large rebates, particularly amongst
higher volume exchange members.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ Excessive intermediation here refers to excessive quoting
in sufficiently liquid securities in order to earn rebates, which
crowds out investors from being able to supply liquidity. Large
rebates can increase quoting activity from high-frequency traders
looking to earn rebates. Because rebates are paid when a quote is
hit by a marketable order, obtaining high priority in the queue at
each tick is essential to such strategies. High-frequency,
proprietary traders are generally better able to obtain such
priority, and consequently investors may have less opportunity to
profitably fill their trades using limit orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A broad ban would fully prohibit volume-based discounts in the
closing auctions, where the tiers are based on a member's overall
trading volume, which may benefit both high- and low-volume exchange
members if this unbundling results in a more level playing field for
intraday trading. As a consequence of unbundling, broker-dealers may be
less constrained by the incentive to direct intraday order flow to a
primary listing exchange so as to qualify for higher discounts for
their principal order flow during the closing auctions. Instead, the
broker-dealer may place greater weight on execution quality or rebates
received, to the ultimate benefit of the broker-dealer and the
customer. Unbundling that weakens primary listing exchanges' market
power over intraday trading may also lead to lower average transaction
fees for intraday trading, further benefitting broker-dealers.
    Banning volume-based transaction fees for both principal and
agency-related order flow may expand the range of profitable
opportunities for new and smaller exchanges while limiting persistent
concentration across the largest exchanges. A ban on volume-based
transaction pricing is likely to reduce the degree to which exchange
members concentrate their order flow on exchanges by removing the
incentive to concentrate order flow caused by volume-based pricing
which is discussed in section IV.B.3. As also discussed in section
IV.B.3 it is likely the case that principal order flow is more
responsive to changes in transaction pricing and so extending the
prohibition of volume-based pricing to principal order flow would
likely result in less order flow concentration. Compared to the volume-
based transaction pricing ban for agency-related volume under the
proposal, a full ban on volume-based transaction pricing may result in
greater dispersion of order flow across the exchanges, potentially
leveling the playing field among larger and smaller exchanges in this
regard, since a full ban would also remove the incentive to concentrate
principal order flow on exchanges offering volume tiers.\260\ Unlike
the proposal, eliminating volume-based pricing for all orders would
reduce the incentive to concentrate order flow for all orders rather
than potentially increase the concentration of principal order flow as
a means of offsetting the effects of prohibiting volume-based pricing
for agency-related order flow.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ Broker-dealers seeking to execute a proprietary order may
choose to route it to an exchange for the purpose of increasing the
likelihood of qualifying for a volume tier even if, absent tier
considerations, they would choose to route to another exchange.
Extending the prohibition of volume-based pricing to principal
orders would remove this effect and could result in a greater
dispersion in order flow over exchanges, which might increase the
competitiveness of less dominant exchanges. See section IV.C.1.a.iii
for a discussion of how increased order flow dispersion might
benefit lower-volume exchanges.
    \261\ See section IV.D.2.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Banning the tying of volume-based tiering in the closing auctions
for both agency-related and principal order flow may further contribute
to a dispersion of order flow across exchanges, to the benefit of the
less dominant exchanges. Tying execution costs in the closing auction
to the firm's overall trading volume on the same platform can alter the
level of competition for intraday trading across exchanges.\262\ It
provides a way for primary listing exchanges, which facilitate closing
auctions with large-scale liquidity, to extend their market power to
intraday trading. Prohibiting tiers for both agency-related and
principal order flow in the closing auctions may further contribute to
a shift in order flow towards non-listing exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See section IV.D.2.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A ban on both principal and agency-related flow would constrain the
exchanges' ability to adjust their pricing schedules for principal flow
in a way that preserves their existing competitive advantages. Shutting
down volume-based tiers for both agency-related and principal order
flow would limit the potential for exchanges to employ strategic
behavior under a ban on only agency-related order flow, since this
behavior may otherwise serve to preserve the competitive advantage of
the largest exchanges.\263\ For example, to counter the potential loss
of agency volume, the higher-volume exchanges may re-adjust their
pricing schedules for principal order flow. For instance, deeper
discounts for increases in principal order flow may serve to both (1)
further incentivize the submission of inframarginal principal limit
orders and (2) constrain the newer, smaller

exchanges' ability to effectively compete with the dominant exchanges.
The dominant exchanges' ability to consolidate principal flow increases
the attractiveness of their exchange services, which in turn helps the
exchanges better attract agency order flow. Exchanges may adapt to the
proposal in a way that not only preserves their dominance over the
smaller exchanges but also confers even more favorable rebates for top-
tiered principal order flow. As previously noted, aside from high-
frequency trading firms and market-makers, exchange members with the
largest principal order flow also tend to be high-volume players in
terms of their agency order flow. Consequently, increased discounts for
principal trading activities may potentially offset some of their
profit loss from higher transaction fees on agency order flow. The
possibility of cross-subsidization where transaction fees on agency-
related trading are used to subsidize better pricing for principal
trading activities, along with the possibility that broker-dealers may
effectively transform agency trades into principal trades if they
switch from an agency model to a principal model, means that the high-
volume broker-dealers' competitive advantage may persist even under a
ban on pricing tiers for agency flow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \263\ See section IV.D.1 for discussion of how exchanges may
adjust their price schedules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A by-product of the full ban on volume-based transaction pricing
would be to dampen the possibility that broker-dealers transition to an
inventory-holding model, thereby reducing systemic risk associated with
holding inventory.\264\ A full volume-based ban may not only lessen the
high-volume broker-dealers' tier advantages from principal trading but
also limit the increase in inventory risk across these players that
shift towards greater reliance on principal trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ For a discussion concerning the incentive broker-dealers
may have to carry larger inventory position with which to
internalize customer orders see section IV.C.1.b.iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that volume-based transaction pricing helps exchanges
better retain order flow, a ban on both agency-related and principal
order flow may increase cost to exchanges in the form of forgone
revenue and the cost to broker-dealers in the form of forgone surplus.
Section IV.E.1 discusses how volume-based pricing, viewed as a price
discrimination mechanism or in a mechanism-design (screening) context,
can be an effective way for exchanges to extract increasing levels of
order flow and expand total surplus. Some of the forgone order flow
loss under a full ban would be order flow streamed to off-exchange
venues, as volume-based transaction pricing may help exchanges compete
with off-exchange venues.\265\ The additional loss of such order flow
would increase the costs of the rule for those exchanges, but this
change in order flow would be a benefit to the off-exchange venues that
receive it instead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Ban Volume-Based Pricing for All Orders Except Registered Market
Makers
    As an alternative to the proposed prohibition of volume-based
transaction pricing for agency-related orders in NMS stocks, the
Commission might instead prohibit exchanges from offering volume-based
transaction pricing for all volume in NMS stocks, but subject to a
carve-out only for displayed liquidity providing orders from exchange
registered market makers in their registered or appointed symbols where
the registered market maker is subject to minimum continuous quotation
and minimum quote width standards that meet or exceed the highest such
standards in place among national securities exchanges.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ See, e.g., NYSE Rule 104 (for an example of a rule that
concerns quotation requirements). Such exchange rules would
typically impose, for example, maximum quotation widths (i.e., the
spread between the bid to buy and the offer to sell) as well as time
at the inside requirements (i.e., time where the market maker must
be quoting at least as good as the national best bid and offer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the current trading environment, many stock exchanges also offer
separate volume-based rebates to their registered market makers as a
means of incentivizing additional liquidity provision in the form of
displayed quotations. For example, one exchange has rebate tiers for
its market makers with qualification based on the percent of time the
registered market maker quotes at the NBBO and the average size of
those quotes in addition to the volume of liquidity provided.\267\
Similar to the volume-based pricing tiers offered to non-market-maker
exchange members these volume-based market maker pricing tiers are
designed to attract the order flow of high-volume market makers who
contribute significantly to the overall liquidity on the exchange.\268\
As described in section IV.B.1.a, exchanges compete to attract
competitively priced liquidity and they do so, in part, by offering
variable pricing terms to their registered market makers which award
them with better rebates/fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ See NYSE pricing schedule, available at https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/NYSE_Price_List.pdf.
    \268\ For additional discussion regarding the incentives
introduced by volume-based pricing tiers see section IV.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This alternative would allow exchanges to incentivize their
registered market makers, through transaction pricing incentives, to
maintain displayed quotations. It would not permit volume-based
exchange transaction pricing incentives for non-displayed quoting
activity, including non-displayed orders, orders not in the market
maker's assigned or registered symbols (which would not be subject to
the quantitative and qualitative market making standards under an
exchange's rules). It also would not allow exchanges to determine
volume-based transaction fees based on total orders or customer orders.
Rather, the carve-out would allow volume-based transaction pricing only
for the types of orders specified above.
    Allowing exchanges to incentivize displayed quotations from their
registered market makers allows exchanges to continue to reward members
for becoming, and remaining, registered market makers and for posting
displayed quotations that are visible to and accessible by all market
participants. Those displayed quotations provide an important and
central public source of price transparency that can directly benefit
investors, as displayed quotations are used for many purposes including
informing trading decisions, establishing security valuations, and
performing index calculations. Allowing exchanges to continue to offer
transaction pricing incentives to encourage public displayed quotes,
where those quotes are subject to quantitative and qualitative
standards contained in exchange rules, could benefit the public
interest.
    Because this alternative would involve a prohibition on volume-
based exchange transaction pricing for all NMS stocks, the discussion
and analysis above about extending the prohibition to also include
proprietary volume, including the baseline, the costs and benefits, and
the effects, applies equally to this alternative and is hereby
incorporated by reference. This ban might also reduce excessive
intermediation, i.e., excessive quoting from high-frequency traders
looking to earn rebates, which may be exacerbated through the offer of
large rebates, particularly amongst higher volume exchange members,
though not from registered market makers.
    A prohibition on volume-based exchange transaction pricing for both
agency-related and principal order flow that carves out displayed
liquidity adding orders submitted by exchange

registered market makers in their registered or assigned symbols, where
the registered market maker is subject to minimum continuous quotation
and minimum quote width standards that meet or exceed the highest such
standards in place among national securities exchanges, would result in
a number of differences in benefits and costs compared to the proposal.
Those differences are identical to the differences discussed above for
the alternative involving a prohibition on volume-based exchange
transaction fees for both agency-related and principal order flow
without a carve out, except where otherwise discussed directly below.
    Under a ban on volume-based exchange transaction pricing with a
registered market maker displayed quote carve out, there would be less
need for disclosures regarding the number of exchange members
qualifying for volume-based tiers, as fewer members would be eligible
for volume-based tiers and it would only apply to displayed quotes.
This alternative could be implemented with a transparency measure for
those tiers eligible for the displayed quote carve-out, or with no
additional disclosures. We request comment on these different
possibilities below. While this alternative would allow some volume-
based exchange transaction pricing for displayed quoting activity of
exchange registered market makers, that is only a subset of principal
trading. Under this alternative, volume-based exchange transaction
pricing would not be available for liquidity removing orders, non-
displayed orders, or orders not in one of the registered market maker's
assigned or registered symbols because those are not liquidity-adding
quotations for which the registered market maker is subject to the
exchanges' quotation requirements. The significantly narrowed scope of
what would be subject to the disclosures under Rule 6b-1(c), and the
limited subset of members and trading activity to which they would
apply, could significantly limit the usefulness of the disclosures to a
point where the benefits may not justify the costs. Accordingly, this
alternative would not require the proposed transparency disclosures.
    Under this alternative, there would be no anti-evasion provision
because members would not be able to evade a broad prohibition through
activity such as mismarking orders to qualify for tiered pricing
because volume-based tiered transaction pricing would no longer be
permitted except for orders that exchanges closely track because
exchanges need to identify, monitor, and count that activity for
compliance with the applicable exchange market making requirements,
including quantitative quotation standards. Thus, the same activity
that counts towards the registered market maker's quotation would be
eligible for tiered pricing under the carve out.
    For the same reason, under this alternative, exchanges would not be
required to have policies and procedures reasonably designed to detect
and deter members from engaging in practices that evade the prohibition
because the only type of activity that would be eligible for tiered
pricing would be the specially designated activity that counts towards
the market maker's displayed quotation requirement.
    The Commission does not expect that there would be a substantial
increase in the number of exchange registered market makers under this
alternative even though the continued allowance of volume-based
transaction pricing for exchange registered market makers could make
becoming one attractive. The requirements and obligations associated
with being a registered market maker likely make the prospect of
becoming a registered market maker for the purpose of receiving volume-
based pricing on liquidity providing orders not economically
viable.\269\ Further, because the activity that would be subject to the
carve-out would be subject to those exchange market making requirement
rules, any attempt to evade the prohibition would result in members
engaging in trading activity that would become subject to those market
making quoting requirements. Accordingly, an anti-evasion provision
would not serve a comparable purpose and would not be necessary with a
broad ban that has a limited carve-out for registered market makers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ In particular, being a market maker involves regulatory,
technology and operational burdens such as having algorithmic
trading strategies and servers in order to meet the quoting
requirements, and other affirmative obligations of a registered
market maker, while doing the fewest possible unwanted trades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar to the alternative discussed in section IV.E.1 featuring a
prohibition on volume-based exchange transaction pricing for both
agency-related and principal order flow, this alternative may result in
less market fragmentation and simplify markets and that discussion
applies equally to this alternative.
    As exchanges would continue to be able to offer volume-based
transaction pricing to market makers in their registered or appointed
symbols where the registered market maker is subject to qualitative and
quantitative quotation standards that meet or exceed the highest such
standards in place among national securities exchanges, exchanges would
be incentivized to adopt more rigorous quantitative and qualitative
market making requirements. Consequently, competition could increase
for the provision of displayed quotes, which should promote price
discovery and liquidity provision to the benefit of investors and the
public interest.
    For a ban with a limited carve-out for registered market maker
quoting, exchanges should readily be able to ascertain the applicable
market-making activity because it is subject to existing quantitative
exchange quoting requirements. Exchanges would not need to ascertain
the capacity of other interest because those would be subject to the
broader prohibition. Accordingly, a prohibition with a limited carve-
out for registered market makers should also be simpler for exchanges
to implement than a prohibition on tiered transaction pricing for
agency-related volume.
    As discussed in the alternative for a prohibition on volume-based
exchange transaction pricing for both agency-related and principal
order flow, the prohibition with a limited carve out for registered
market makers could also provide benefits to lower-volume exchange
members that currently pay the highest prices if exchanges respond by
offering lower fees and higher rebates for non-market making order
flow. In turn, that could reduce these members' transaction costs.
However, members that receive the highest rebates and pay the lowest
fees may see their transaction costs increase if exchanges reduce those
incentives when they discontinue offering volume-based transaction
pricing. A ban with a limited carve-out for registered market makers
could preserve some, or all, of the incentivized fee and rebate levels
that a registered market maker currently receives.
    A ban with a limited carve-out for registered market makers also
would prohibit volume-based discounts for both agency-related and
principal order flow in the closing auctions except for the registered
market maker limited carve out. Similar to the first alternative,
members who are not market makers may be less constrained to direct
intraday order flow to a primary listing exchange so as to qualify for
higher discounts during the closing auctions. Instead, the member may
place greater weight on execution quality or rebates received for just
intraday order flow, to the ultimate benefit of the broker-dealer and
the customer. Unbundling that weakens primary listing exchanges'

market power over intraday trading may also lead to lower average
transaction fees for intraday trading, further benefitting broker-
dealers that are not market makers.
    The distortions in intraday routing decisions faced by principal
traders, as mentioned in section IV.B.3, do not apply in the same
manner to registered market makers, for whom market making requirements
can provide incentives to concentrate order flow on particular
exchanges.
    Because registered market maker quoting currently involves passive
displayed liquidity provision, registered market makers cannot direct
flow to an exchange intraday in the same manner that a non-market
making member can, though they can increase their quoting activity in
the expectation that they would receive more executions. Some types of
exchange registered market makers face more significant quoting
obligations and trading volume requirements than other types of
exchange registered market makers. To meet stringent obligations, those
types of market makers might be more reluctant to reroute orders to
exchanges for which they are not designated market makers. Compared to
non-market making broker-dealers, tying discounts in the closing
auction on intraday volume might not have as large an effect at
reducing market makers' surplus. While a full ban could result in
greater dispersion in trading activities across exchanges and a loss of
order flow to off-exchange venues, a limited carve-out for registered
market makers could induce these members to concentrate more quoting
activities on certain exchanges. Under this alternative, new and lower-
volume exchanges could offer incentives to attract registered market
maker members and could combine that with higher market making
standards. The adjustments in market makers' obligations and benefits
might result in the exchange more frequently setting the best prices
and having more available liquidity, which would attract liquidity-
removing order flow and increase the exchange's market share.
    Under the ban with a limited carve-out for registered market
makers, competitive advantages for high-volume broker-dealers might
still exist, but the advantage would be largely limited to registered
market makers. Unlike ordinary principal trading that only involves the
proprietary trading member, displayed liquidity providing orders from
exchange registered market makers in their registered or appointed
symbols benefits investors and markets by contributing to price
formation and liquidity provision. Accordingly, a limited carve-out for
registered market makers could allow exchanges to continue to
incentivize their members to become and remain registered market makers
and quote and thereby confer a broader benefit to the market generally
compared to an incentive on non-market-making principal trading.
    To the extent that volume-based transaction pricing helps exchanges
better retain order flow, a prohibition on volume-based exchange
transaction fees for both agency-related and principal order flow with
a limited carve out for registered market makers may, as is the case
for the first alternative, increase costs to dominant exchanges in the
form of forgone revenue and the cost to high-volume members in the form
of forgone surplus. A ban with a limited carve-out for registered
market makers would mitigate these increased costs by allowing
exchanges to offer volume-based pricing to their registered market
makers on their displayed liquidity-adding volume in their registered
or assigned symbols where applicable market making standards apply,
thus potentially retaining some of that transaction volume.
3. Proceed With Transparency Provisions for All Orders Without Tiers
Prohibition
    The proposal would prohibit volume-based transaction pricing for
agency-related flow and would mandate transparency for principal-flow.
Alternatives 1 and 2 would broaden the volume-based transaction pricing
prohibition, making transparency irrelevant for Alternative 1, though
possibly relevant for Alternative 2. Alternatively, the Commission
could opt not to prohibit volume-based tiers for either agency or
principal-related volume in NMS stocks, but rather expand the
disclosures under proposed Rule 6b-1(c) to all orders.\270\
Specifically, under this alternative, the Commission would require
exchanges to disclose periodically certain information if they offer
volume-based transaction pricing for any NMS stocks, for both principal
and agency-related orders.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ The SEC Investor Advisory Committee previously recommended
that the Commission enhance disclosures to provide transparency
about rebate tier practices at exchanges. Specifically, it
recommended that the Commission receive monthly disclosures from
exchanges concerning the volume of trades that receive a rebate and
the rebate amounts broken down by volume ranges. In addition, it
recommended public disclosure on an aggregated basis of rebate
information broken down by tiers. See Recommendation of the SEC
Investor Advisory Committee Regarding Exchange Rebate Tier
Disclosure (Jan. 24, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/exchange-rebate-tier-disclosure.pdf. See also supra Request for Comment No. 24
(requesting comment on additional items for the monthly transparency
disclosures, including the volume of shares qualifying for each
tier, the dollar amounts involved, and the average transaction fee
paid and rebate received by members).
    \271\ The Commission also could expand the disclosures to all
NMS securities, which would include listed options in addition to
NMS stocks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Expanding the disclosure under proposed Rule 6b-1(c) to all volume
in NMS stocks, the added transparency would have benefits similar to
those of Rule 6b-1(c) described in the proposal.\272\ It would allow
interested persons greater access to information about the eligibility
of each exchange's members for its volume-based transaction pricing
tiers. It would improve the information set for those commenting during
the SRO filing process. These comments, in turn, might assist the
Commission in determining whether a filing is consistent with the
Exchange Act. As the impact of their transaction pricing schedules
would become evident to other members and the commenting public,
greater transparency could perhaps place pressure on exchanges to adopt
less ``bespoke'' volume-based transaction pricing.\273\ It is possible
that the appearance of a pricing scheme which appears to
disproportionately favor a small number of exchange members might make
an exchange more likely to voluntarily adopt price schedules with a
more even distribution of tier qualification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ See supra section IV.C.3.a.
    \273\ See supra section IV.C.3.b.ii for additional discussion of
the possible effect that the proposed disclosures may have on
exchange pricing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One issue that is unlikely to be addressed by transparency alone
would be the self-reinforcing competitive advantage for high-volume
exchange members, including high-volume firms that trade in a principal
capacity. Among lower-volume broker-dealers, those who route some or
all of their orders through higher-volume exchange members serve to
reinforce the competitive advantage of high-volume exchange members.
Compared to Alternatives 1 and 2, transparency alone might not help
level the playing field between exchanges that employ volume-based
tiers and those that do not.\274\ In

addition, the transparency-only alternative might not address the
incentive for members of more than one exchange to concentrate their
trading, particularly agency-related orders, on one particular exchange
in order to qualify for that exchange's volume-based tiers, so as to
achieve lower fees and higher rebates. Likewise, this alternative would
be unlikely to address the related conflict of interest between members
and customers that can arise when the member executes an agency-related
order (i.e., the incentive for a member to route the order to one
particular exchange over others and retain the benefit for itself,
assuming it does not pass through that better exchange transaction
pricing to its customer). Finally, this alternative is unlikely to
address the incentive for a listing exchange to exploit demand for
participating in the closing auction by offering discounts on auction
orders to members who send volume, particularly agency-related volume,
into the intraday trading session--a practice that may contribute to
listing exchanges preserving or extending their market power at the
expense of non-listing exchanges and potentially exchange members.
However, compared to the proposal, this alternative would not lead to
an advantage of principal brokerage models over agency ones. We request
comment below on the relative benefits of the proposed ban versus
transparency and mechanisms through which transparency would address
the problems identified in the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ As discussed in sections IV.B.1.b and IV.B.2, it would be
more difficult for exchanges that do not employ volume-based pricing
to effectively compete against those that do, since without volume-
based pricing exchange members would not be incentivized to
concentrate their order flow on those exchanges. Additionally, lower
volume exchanges that are newer also face competitive hurdles
because it would be more costly for them to offer higher tier
rebates similar to the higher volume exchanges due to their lower
trading volume.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Banning the Linking of Volume-Based Tiers for Closing Auctions to
Consolidated Volume
    The Commission might ban conditioning closing auctions' transaction
fees on consolidated volume. Under this alternative, current volume-
based discounts for trading during regular hours would continue, but
execution costs for the closing auction would no longer be based on a
member's continuous order book volume. Offering discounts for closing
auction pricing linked to overall volume is a practice known as
``auction linked pricing.''
    This ban would likely alter the level of inter-exchange
competition, diverting more intraday order flow to small, non-listing
exchanges. Conditional pricing, or qualifications for price discounts
on one product depending on the purchase levels of other products, has
been shown to harm competition when firm(s) with market power are able
to foreclose rival(s) from a portion of the market or drive rivals out
of the market entirely.\275\ Similar intuition may apply to an exchange
context under the current baseline, where price discounts for
participation in the closing auctions are conditioned on consolidated
volume. Because conditional pricing for closing auctions provides
incentive for broker-dealers to stream intraday volume to the same
listing exchanges, tying provides a way for listing exchanges with
market power over their closing auctions to partially expand their
dominance to intraday trading. A ban on conditional pricing may provide
a more level playing field for inter-exchange competition and result in
lower transaction fees for the average broker-dealer participating
during regular trading hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, ``The Strategic Use
of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving
Industries'', 33 RAND J. Econ. 194(Summer 2002). Michael D.
Whinston, ``Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion'', 80 Am. Econ. Rev.
837 (Sept. 1990). See also a discussion of tying from W. Kip
Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, and David E. M. Sappington, Economics
of Regulation and Antitrust, Chapter 7 Vertical Mergers and Vertical
Restraints, pages 296-312 (5th ed. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ban would likely benefit small, non-listing exchanges at the
cost of primary listing exchanges. Tying provides a way for listing
exchanges to soften competition and potentially charge higher
transaction fees for trading during regular hours, compared to a regime
where exchanges compete for order flow for the ``standalone'' market
for intraday trading. Un-tying execution cost in the closing auction to
total volume reduces a broker-dealer's incentive to route to a primary
listing exchange during regular hours, in anticipation of participating
in the closing auction on the same platform. Unbundling the auction and
continuous order book trading decisions could increase non-listing
exchanges' profits at the expense of the listing exchanges' profits.
    Prohibiting tying auction fees to broker-dealers' overall volume
may alter consumers' choices in a way that leads to improvement of
broker-dealers' welfare. To qualify for lower fees during closing
auctions, broker-dealers may make intraday order routing decisions that
are suboptimal. Unbundling the closing auction trading decisions and
order routing choices during regular hours may ultimately be in the
broker-dealers' best interests, especially in combination with the fact
that competition across exchanges may lower average transaction fees
during regular trading hours.
    Removing the conditioning of closing auction tiers on consolidated
volume removes an additional pricing advantage for high-volume broker-
dealers, who may already be trading at dramatically reduced prices
because of their tier qualifications from intraday trading. Tiers
applied to trading volume from broker-dealers' continuous order book
confers an outsized pricing advantage to the high-volume broker-
dealers. One concern is that the interaction of the high-volume broker-
dealers' tiered pricing advantage and high fixed market data and
connectivity costs creates significant disadvantage for lower-volume
firms.\276\ Pricing tiers for the closing auctions may accentuate the
barrier-to-entry for lower-volume firms, in an industry that has seen
no salient growth of nascent firms in recent years. Prohibiting volume-
based pricing for the closing auctions removes one potential source of
barrier-to-entry for lower-volume broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ See supra section IV.B.4.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Among incumbent exchange members participating in the closing
auctions, prohibiting ``auction linked pricing'' may increase low-
volume broker-dealers' profits derived from closing auctions while
decreasing high-volume broker-dealers' profits. Unlinking transaction
fees for closing auctions to member's overall trading volume may induce
exchanges to reduce the execution cost differentials between high- and
low-volume participants in the closing auctions. Because the execution
cost for low-volume members may be reduced, these members who share
their reduced input costs with customers can better attract agency
order flow from investors and non-members. On the other hand,
prohibiting ``auction linked pricing'' may lessen high-volume members'
advantage in directing agency order flow to the closing auctions.
    Removing only the closing auctions' volume criteria that are tied
to overall trading volume preserves the volume-based pricing schemes
for intraday trading, a potential dimension along which firms compete
and a practice that may be welfare-enhancing. For a different market
setting where the authors examine pricing schedules that embody
discounts for greater demand or utilization, the authors find that
firms compete more aggressively to offer size discounts in response to
increased competition from rivals.\277\ The paper highlights volume-
based discount as a channel through which newspaper firms compete with
one another as means to retain orders for advertising. This

observation, along with the fact that price discrimination schemes may
enhance both the price-setting firms' and the customers' overall
welfare if they lead to greater demand,\278\ suggests that volume-based
tiers may potentially be a welfare-enhancing outcome of competition
across exchanges. Despite the caveat that high-volume broker-dealers
may disproportionately benefit from volume-based discounts, pricing
tiers for intraday trading may be worth preserving because of their
welfare-enhancing potentials. On the other hand, a number of studies
have shed light on ways in which tying prices for complementary goods
(or markets) can be effectively used by firms to (1) extract more
surplus from customers \279\ or (2) expand its market power from a
dominant market to complementary markets.\280\ Without salient cost
synergies from bundling (i.e., concentrating limit book order flow and
participation in closing auction on the same listing exchange) or an
enhancement in overall demand for broker-dealers, welfare-reducing
tying justifies a ban on linking tiers for closing auctions to intraday
trading volumes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \277\ Meghan Busse and Marc Rysman, ``Competition and Price
Discrimination in Yellow Pages Advertising'', 36 Rand J. Econs. 378
(2005).
    \278\ See supra section IV.D.1.
    \279\ Gregory S. Crawford, ``The Discriminatory Incentives to
Bundle in the Cable Television Industry'', 6 Quantitative Mktg. &
Econ. 41 (2008).
    \280\ See Katherine Ho, Justin Ho, & Julie Holland Mortimer,
``The Use of Full-Line Forcing Contracts in the Video Rental
Industry'', 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 686 (2012), for an empirical
analysis. See Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, ``The Strategic
Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving
Industries'', 33 Rand J. Econ. 194 (Summer 2002), for theoretic
analysis. Michael D. Whinston, ``Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion'', 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 837 (Sept. 1990). See also a
discussion of tying from W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, and
David E. M. Sappington, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust,
Chapter 7 Vertical Mergers and Vertical Restraints, 296-312 (5th ed.
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Require Disclosures of Volume-Based Pricing in Proprietary Volume in
NMS Stocks To Be Posted on Exchange Websites or Submitted Through a
Different System
    The Commission considered requiring equities exchanges post the fee
and rebate tiers disclosures in Inline XBRL on their websites, either
in addition to, or instead of, filing the disclosures in EDGAR.\281\
Requiring exchanges to place the structured fee tiers disclosures only
on exchange websites would relieve exchanges of the need to apply for
EDGAR filing access and adjust their compliance systems to submit the
disclosures in EDGAR, thus reducing costs on exchanges. However, a
website posting requirement would also decrease the ease of retrieving
and consolidating the new disclosures, because data users would need to
visit each equities exchange's website to retrieve the disclosed
information and manually incorporate those disclosures into datasets
(or pay a third party to do so). In addition, the data quality
associated with the disclosures could decrease under a website-only
requirement, because website postings would not be subject to
programmatic checks for nondiscretionary errors (such as text where
there should only be numbers). Such accessibility and data quality
issues could impede the objective of the proposal, which is to provide
the Commission and the public with insight into the application of an
exchange's volume-based transaction pricing schedule and to provide
information that could facilitate assessment of the level of
competition among exchanges and the impact of pricing tiers on
intermarket competition. Requiring exchanges to place the structured
fee tiers disclosures only on exchange websites would relieve exchanges
of the need to apply for EDGAR filing access and adjust their
compliance systems to submit the disclosures through EDGAR, thus
reducing burdens on exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ Certain Commission rules require registrants to post
structured disclosures on their individual websites. For example,
market centers (including equities exchanges) are required to post
order execution disclosures on their websites in pipe-delimited
ASCII. See 17 CFR 242.605(a)(1) and (2); Securities and Exchange
Commission File No. 4-518 (National Market System Plan Establishing
Procedures Under Rule 605 of Regulation NMS). Broker-dealers are
required to post order routing disclosures on their websites using a
custom XML schema designed by the Commission for those disclosures.
See 17 CFR 242.606. Nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations are required to post credit rating history disclosures
on their websites in XBRL. See 17 CFR 240.17g-7(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Requiring exchanges to place the structured disclosures both on
exchange websites and on EDGAR would not relieve exchanges of the need
to apply for EDGAR filing access and adjust their compliance systems to
submit the disclosures in EDGAR, and thus would not reduce costs on
exchanges. In addition, while adding a website disclosure requirement
may make it likelier that investors accustomed to accessing exchange
websites for transaction pricing schedules would access those
disclosures, the Commission believes the fee and rebate tiers
information, when submitted electronically to the Commission, likely
would be equally accessible to the parties most likely to access the
information on a regular basis (e.g., broker-dealer exchange members,
financial data aggregators and other market participants).\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \282\ The Commission recently proposed rules to require certain
registered entities, including exchanges, to file new cybersecurity
risk and incident history disclosures in EDGAR and post copies of
those disclosures on their individual websites. See Cybersecurity
Risk Management Rule for Broker-Dealers, Clearing Agencies, Major
Security-Based Swap Participants, the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, National Securities Associations, National
Securities Exchanges, Security-Based Swap Data Repositories,
Security-Based Swap Dealers, and Transfer Agents, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 97142 (Mar. 15, 2023), 88 FR 20212 (Apr. 5,
2023). In the proposing release, the Commission stated its belief
that retail investors (as well as other market participants) would
have an interest in accessing the cybersecurity disclosures. See id.
at 20308.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Alternatively, the Commission could require the disclosures to be
submitted through another filing system, specifically the Electronic
Form Filing System (``EFFS'') through which exchanges presently file
their proposed pricing changes on Form 19b-4. Using EFFS would reduce
the burdens on exchanges by relieving them from the need to apply for
EDGAR filing access and adjust their compliance systems to submit the
disclosures using EDGAR. Use of EFFS would allow the Commission to
centralize the collection of the disclosures and could still allow for
the application of programmatic checks for nondiscretionary errors.
However, EFFS would need to be expanded to accept the disclosures in
Inline XBRL format, and a mechanism would need to be implemented to
make the disclosures available to the public.
6. Require a Different Structured Data Language for the Disclosures of
Volume-Based Pricing in Proprietary Volume in NMS Stocks
    The Commission also considered requiring that exchanges make the
disclosures in a different machine-readable structured data language
than Inline XBRL. The Commission considered requiring equities
exchanges to submit the proposed disclosures in an eXtensible Markup
Language (``XML'')-based data language specific to that form (``custom
XML'' or, here, ``Tiers-specific XML''). Currently, certain registrants
make filings in EDGAR in custom XML data languages that are specific to
particular forms.\283\ For custom XML filings, filers typically are
provided the option to either submit the filing directly to the EDGAR
system in the relevant custom XML data language, or to manually input
the information into a fillable web-based form developed by the
Commission that converts the

completed form into a custom XML document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ For example, security-based swap entities file Form SBSE
in a custom XML language specific to that form. See section 8.2.19
of the EDGAR Filer Manual (Volume II) version 66 (Jun. 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with the proposed Inline XBRL requirement, a custom XML
requirement would allow the Commission to download the proposed
information in a structured, machine-readable form, facilitating
efficient access, organization, and evaluation of the disclosed
information. Furthermore, if any filers were to use the fillable web-
based form to provide their information under a custom XML requirement,
those filers would forgo the compliance costs related to structuring
their fee and tier-based disclosures.
    However, the Commission believes the use of Inline XBRL for the fee
and rebate tiers disclosures would provide advantages that the use of
Tiers-specific XML would not. First, XBRL uses and implements existing
accounting and reporting standards,\284\ which facilitates the
coordination and sharing of financial information. Thus, Inline XBRL
would be well-suited to handle data about proprietary volume-based
pricing tiers on equities exchanges. Second, the Commission believes
creating a custom XML schema for the fee and rebate tiers disclosures
would be less efficient than leveraging the existing Inline XBRL
architecture, because doing so would involve re-creating features that
XBRL already offers through its taxonomies and related data elements
within those taxonomies.\285\ Lastly, the use of a standard structured
data language such as Inline XBRL would allow equities exchanges and
market participants to leverage an existing ecosystem of software
tools, service providers and related infrastructure that support XBRL
tagging.\286\ Thus, the Commission believes the use of a custom XML
schema designed specifically for a particular regulatory form, while an
improvement over unstructured forms, would not provide the same level
of benefit as the use of a global, interoperable standard data language
such as Inline XBRL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ See Donna Johaneman & Louis Matherne, Harmonizing
Accounting and Data Standards, XBRL.us, Dec. 23, 2019, available at
https://xbrl.us/harmonizing-accounting-data-standards/ (``As a data
standard, [XBRL] is designed to support an existing accounting
standard by unambiguously conveying details about that accounting
standard reporting requirement.''). For example, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board assumed the ongoing development of the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (``GAAP'') Taxonomy from
the SEC in 2010 to keep it current with GAAP. XBRL: What Is it? Why
the FASB? Who Uses It?, FASB.org, available at https://www.fasb.org/page/PageContent?pageId=/staticpages/what-is-xbrl.html&isstaticpage=true; see also IFRS Accounting Taxonomy 2023,
XBRL.org, available at https://www.xbrl.org/news/ifrs-accounting-taxonomy-2023/.
    \285\ See, e.g., Standard Taxonomies, SEC.gov, available at
https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/edgartaxonomies; Taxonomies, XBRL.us,
available at https://xbrl.us/home/filers/sec-reporting/taxonomies/.
    \286\ XBRL International is a global, nonprofit consortium that
oversees the XBRL standard. Introduction to XBRL, XBRL.org,
available at https://www.xbrl.org/the-standard/what/an-introduction-to-xbrl/. XBRL US is a jurisdiction of XBRL International. See also
Membership Organizations, XBRL.us, available at https://xbrl.us/join-us/membership/xusmembers/; Membership List, XBRL.org, available
at https://www.xbrl.org/the-consortium/about/membership-list/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Remove Structured Data Language Requirement for Disclosures of
Volume-Based Pricing in Proprietary Volume in NMS Stocks
    The Commission also considered not including the proposed
requirement that exchanges submit the disclosures in a structured data
language. Such an alternative would result in an incremental reduction
in cost to equities exchanges associated with filing the fee tiers
disclosures. However, the absence of any structured data language
requirement would significantly reduce the benefits of the proposal
because the fee tiers data would be more difficult for the Commission
and market participants to assemble, review, and analyze. The use of
HTML, ASCII, PDF, or another unstructured format for the proposed
disclosures would force user of the data, including Commission staff
and market participants, to manually transcribe information from the
disclosures into datasets for aggregation, analysis, and comparison of
the proprietary volume-based pricing data, or pay a third party to do
so. This would impede data users such as financial analysts from
producing reports and analyses about equities exchange fee tiers
practices and trends that market participants could find useful.

F. Request for Comment

    The Commission is sensitive to the potential economic effects,
including costs and benefits, of the proposed rule. The Commission has
identified certain costs and benefits associated with the proposal and
requests comment on all aspects of its preliminary economic analysis,
including with respect to the specific questions below. The Commission
encourages commenters to identify, discuss, analyze, and supply
relevant data, information, or statistics regarding any such costs or
benefits. In addition, the Commission has the following specific
requests:
    31. Is there a lack of transparency for exchange price schedules?
Does a lack of information on how many exchange members qualify for
each volume-based tier in a given month inhibit public comment on
exchange fees?
    32. The Commission discussed above how the presence of volume-based
transaction pricing on exchanges introduces a potential conflict of
interest, because it gives broker-dealers an incentive to route agency-
based volume in a way that minimizes exchange fees for the broker-
dealer. Is such a conflict of interest present? The Commission requests
comment on the impact of such potential conflicts of interest.
    33. Does volume-based transaction pricing promote concentration in
the broker-dealer business? Specifically, does it offer an advantage to
larger broker-dealers that makes it harder for small broker-dealers to
compete? Does this make it more difficult for new broker-dealers to
enter the NMS equity brokerage business than it would be without
volume-based transaction pricing?
    34. Do commenters believe that there are relevant factors which
were not discussed in the Commission's characterization of the relevant
baseline for the proposed rule? Please describe any additional baseline
details that you believe are relevant for understanding the impact of
the proposed rule.
    35. Is the Commission's description of current exchange pricing
accurate, including the practice of volume tiering and using auction
linked pricing to attract volume outside of the auction? Are there
additional details about these practices which you believe are relevant
to understanding their impact?
    36. Do fees and rebates play a role in attracting order flow to
exchanges? How sensitive are market participants to fees and rebates
when making decisions about where to route orders? Do transaction fees
and rebates significantly influence an exchange's market share?
    37. What is the role of volume-based transaction pricing and its
impact on what different market participants pay?
    38. Does tying closing auction prices to intraday volume have an
impact on the market share exchanges are able to obtain for intraday
volume?
    39. How does volume-based transaction pricing impact order routing
incentives for broker-dealers? Does the impact involve a potential
conflict of interest?
    40. Is the Commission's characterization of the market to provide
access to exchanges to non-members through things like sponsored access
and direct market access accurate? Are there any relevant factors which
were not discussed in the Commission's characterization of the

baseline for the market to provide exchange access?
    41. What is the current effect of volume-based tiering on broker-
dealer services? Does current volume-based tiering create a barrier to
entry in the market for NMS equity brokerage services?
    42. Is there substantial dispersion in the size of broker-dealer
exchange members? What effect does such dispersion have on the market
to provide exchange access and the role of volume-based transaction
pricing in that market?
    43. What is the current level of tier transparency? Does the lack
of public knowledge of the number of exchange members that qualify for
each tier affect the ability of the public to submit informed comments
on exchange fees?
    44. Are there any additional benefits from increased transparency
the Commission did not discuss?
    45. Is the Commission's assessment of the benefits of EDGAR and
Inline XBRL requirements accurate?
    46. What other benefits or costs to investors may arise from
exchanges voluntarily adopting different price schedules after the
implementation of the transparency provisions?
    47. Do commenters agree with the Commission's assessment of the
implementation costs associated with the transparency provision of the
proposed rule? Are there any technical aspects which were not discussed
which would affect any implementation costs? Do commenters agree with
how the Commission has characterized the costs associated with the
requirement for structured data, and the EDGAR filing requirement?
    48. Will there be reputation costs and other monetary costs related
to changes exchanges may make to their tiered pricing in response to
the transparency requirements, as the Commission describes above?
    49. Are there any additional benefits or costs of the transparency
provisions that the Commission did not discuss?
    50. Do commenters agree with the Commission's assessment of the
benefits stemming from the effects of the volume-based prohibition on
agency-related order pricing and competition among broker-dealers? In
particular, would lower-volume exchange members end up with lower fees
and higher rebates under such a ban? Would a flat fee and rebate for
agency-related volume increase competition among broker-dealers to
provide exchange access? Would investors benefit from the lower prices
for lower-volume exchange members and lower barriers to entry in the
NMS equity brokerage business?
    51. Would prohibiting the application of volume-based pricing for
agency-related order flow and the proposed disclosure provisions
promote or impede competition between exchanges? Does the Commission
adequately capture the costs and benefits resulting from the effect of
the proposed rule on competition among exchanges?
    52. What impact would an elimination of volume-based pricing on
agency-related order flow have on the NBBO, including the spread width
and depth of displayed interest at the NBBO?
    53. Would the prohibition of volume-based pricing for agency-
related order flow affect order-routing decisions by reducing the
conflict of interest between members and customers in agency order
routing?
    54. Would the execution quality of agency-related orders improve by
reducing the incentive to concentrate order flow on a small number of
exchanges?
    55. Do commenters agree with the Commission's assessment of the
costs from the effect of the rule on competition among broker-dealers?
Do you agree that the rebates earned will likely decrease and the fees
paid will increase for the higher-volume broker-dealer members? Would
these costs also affect non-members that work with higher-volume
exchange members to trade?
    56. Do commenters agree with the Commission's description of the
indirect costs and reduction in efficiency which may result from a
reduction of order-flow executed by higher-volume exchange members on
exchanges?
    57. How likely is the proposed prohibition of volume-based pricing
for agency-related order flow to result in broker-dealers moving to an
inventory model? Do commenters agree with the Commission's assessment
of the costs of the proposed rule resulting from increased principal
trading?
    58. Would the proposed rule affect the ability of exchanges to
compete with off-exchange venues? Do commenters agree with the
Commission's assessments of the costs from order flow potentially
moving to off-exchange venues?
    59. Are there any additional benefits or costs from the prohibition
of volume-based transaction pricing for agency-related volume that you
believe the Commission did not discuss?
    60. Do commenters agree with the Commission's assessment of the
benefits and costs from the proposed rule's requirements that exchanges
adopt rules and policies and procedures to prevent evasion?
    61. Do commenters agree with the Commission's assessment of the
impact of the proposed rule on efficiency, competition, and capital
formation?
    62. The Commission requests comment on the effects of an
alternative that implements a ban on volume-based transaction pricing
for all exchange order types.
    63. How important are the various privileges afforded to registered
market makers by the exchanges to their willingness to participate and
ability to function effectively? What is the effect of registered
market makers on exchange liquidity?
    64. Do commenters believe that volume-based transaction pricing
serves a unique role in the function of registered market makers? In
particular, do such tiers improve the participation of registered
market makers, or improve their performance on exchange as a market
maker? Do such tiers create a barrier to entry for smaller registered
market makers? What is the effect of volume-based tiering on
competition among registered market makers to provide liquidity in a
given security?
    65. If the Commission prohibited the application of volume-based
pricing for all order types with a carve-out for the application of
volume-based pricing only for registered market makers, would requiring
the monthly disclosure of the number of members which qualify for any
tiers which fall within the carve-out provide meaningful information?
Could knowledge of the distribution of tier qualification across
registered market makers influence order-routing decisions?
    66. How impactful would the proposed disclosure provisions,
expanded to apply to all volume-based tiers, without any prohibition on
the application of volume-based pricing, be on addressing competitive
imbalances between broker-dealers? Do there exist data to support
conclusions on such impacts? Would the proposed disclosure provisions
influence order routing decisions by exchange members?
    67. Would the information revealed through the monthly disclosure
of the number of exchange members qualifying for each pricing tier,
absent any prohibition of the application of volume-based pricing,
meaningfully influence future exchange transaction price schedules?
Would the disclosures promote exchange competition? Do there exist data
to support conclusions on such influence?
    68. The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the costs of

the proposal to require equities exchanges to provide the proposed
tiers disclosures electronically on EDGAR in Inline XBRL. Are there
costs that the Commission has over- or understated? Are there
additional costs that the Commission has not mentioned? Please explain
your answer.
    69. Are the Commission's assessment of the costs of the
requirements to provide the proposed disclosures in Inline XBRL
correct? Please explain why or why not. Would the use of a different
structured data language impact the cost of the structuring
requirement? Please explain why or why not.
    70. Is the Commission's assessment of the costs of the requirements
to provide the disclosures to the public using EDGAR correct? Please
explain why or why not. How would the costs change if the Commission
required exchanges to post the disclosures on their individual websites
rather than submit the disclosures using EDGAR?
    71. Should the proposed fee tiers disclosures be provided in a
structured data language other than Inline XBRL? For example, should
exchanges structure the proposed fee tiers disclosures using a custom
XML schema specific to those disclosures? Why or why not?
Alternatively, should exchanges structure the proposed fee tiers
disclosures using a pipe-delimited ASCII format rather than Inline
XBRL? Why or why not? Should the Commission instead require the
proposed fee tiers disclosures be provided in an unstructured format?
Are there other alternatives related to structured data languages that
would be appropriate? How would the use of a different language impact
the usability and accessibility of the tables for data users? What time
or expense is associated with the recommended structured data language?
Would a particular structured data language require any filers or users
to license commercial software they otherwise would not, and, if so, at
what expense?

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \287\ requires Federal
agencies, in promulgating rules, to consider the impact of those rules
on small entities. Section 603(a) \288\ of the Administrative Procedure
Act,\289\ as amended by the RFA, generally requires the Commission to
undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis of all proposed rules, or
proposed rule amendments, to determine the impact of such rulemaking on
``small entities.'' \290\ Section 605(b) of the RFA states that this
requirement shall not apply to any proposed rule or proposed rule
amendment which, if adopted, would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \288\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \289\ 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
    \290\ The Commission has adopted definitions for the term
``small entity'' for purposes of Commission rulemaking in accordance
with the RFA. Those definitions, as relevant to this proposed
rulemaking, are set forth in 17 CFR 240.0-10 (Rule 0-10). See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18451 (Jan. 28, 1982), 47 FR
5215 (Feb. 4, 1982) (File No. AS-305).
    \291\ See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would apply only to national securities exchanges
registered with the Commission that trade NMS stocks. Rule 0-10(e)
states that the term ``small business,'' when referring to an exchange,
means any exchange that has been exempted from the reporting
requirements of 17 CFR 242.601 (Rule 601 of Regulation NMS), and is not
affiliated with any person (other than a natural person) that is not a
small business or small organization as defined in Rule 0-10.\292\ The
exchanges subject to this proposed rulemaking do not satisfy this
standard. Therefore, none of the exchanges that would be subject to the
proposed rule are ``small entities'' for purposes of the RFA.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(e).
    \293\ See also Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 82873 (Mar.
14, 2018), 83 FR 13008, 13074 (Mar. 26, 2018) (File No. S7-05-18)
(Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks Proposing Release); 55341 (May
8, 2001), 72 FR 9412, 9419 (May 16, 2007) (File No. S7-06-07)
(Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations proposing
release); Access Fee Proposal, supra note 17, at 87 FR at 80357.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the above reasons, the Commission certifies that proposed Rule
6b-1 would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities for purposes of the RFA.
    The Commission requests comment regarding this certification. In
particular, the Commission solicits comment on the following:
    72. Do commenters agree with the Commission's certification? If
not, please describe the nature of any impact on small entities and
provide empirical data to illustrate the extent of the impact.

VI. Consideration of Impact on the Economy

    For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996, or ``SBREFA,'' \294\ the Commission must advise OMB
whether a proposed regulation constitutes a ``major'' rule. Under
SBREFA, a rule is considered ``major'' where, if adopted, it results in
or is likely to result in (1) an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more; (2) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers
or individual industries; or (3) significant adverse effects on
competition, investment, or innovation. The Commission requests comment
on whether this proposal would be a ``major rule'' for purposes of the
SBREFA. The Commission also requests comment on the potential effect of
proposed Rule 6b-1 on the U.S. economy on an annual basis; any
potential increase in costs or prices for consumers or individual
industries; and any potential effect on competition, investment, or
innovation. Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and
other factual support for their views to the extent possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996)
(codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. and as a note
to 5 U.S.C. 601).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Statutory Authority

    Pursuant to the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), and
particularly sections 2, 3(b), 5, 6, 11, 11A, 15, 15A, 17, 19, 23(a),
24, and 36 thereof, 15 U.S.C. 78b, 78c(b), 78e, 78f, 78k, 78k-1, 78o,
78o-1, 78q, 78s, 78w(a), 78x, and 78mm, the Commission is proposing to
amend Sec. Sec.  232.101 and 232.405 and is proposing new Sec.  240.6b-
1, as set forth below.

List of Subjects

17 CFR Part 232

    Electronic filing, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Securities.

17 CFR Part 240

    Fees, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

Text of the Proposed Rules

    In accordance with the foregoing, the Securities and Exchange
Commission proposes to amend title 17, chapter II of the Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 232--REGULATION S-T--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
ELECTRONIC FILINGS

0
1.The general authority citation for part 232 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 77c, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s(a), 77z-3,
77sss(a), 78c(b), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78w(a), 78ll, 80a-6(c),
80a-8, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-37, 80b-4, 80b-6a, 80b-10, 80b-11, 7201
et seq.; and 18 U.S.C. 1350, unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
2. Amend Sec.  232.101:

0
a. In paragraph (a)(1)(xxx), by removing the word ``and'' from the end
of the paragraph;
0
b. In paragraph (a)(1)(xxxi), by removing the period and adding it its
place ``; and''; and
0
c. By adding paragraph (a)(1)(xxxii).
    The addition reads as follows:

Sec.  232.101   Mandated electronic submissions and exceptions.

    (a) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) * * *
    (xxxii) Disclosures provided pursuant to Sec.  240.6b-1(c) of this
chapter.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec.  232.405 by:
0
a. Revising the introductory text, and paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3)(i)
introductory text, (a)(3)(ii), (a)(4), and (b)(1) introductory text;
0
b. Adding paragraph (b)(6); and
0
c. Revising Note 1 to Sec.  232.405.

    The revisions and addition read as follows:

Sec.  232.405   Interactive Data File submissions.

    This section applies to electronic filers that submit Interactive
Data Files. Section 229.601(b)(101) of this chapter (Item 601(b)(101)
of Regulation S-K), General Instruction F of Form 11-K (Sec.  249.311
of this chapter); paragraph (101) of Part II--Information Not Required
to be Delivered to Offerees or Purchasers of Form F-10 (Sec.  239.40 of
this chapter), Sec.  240.13a-21 of this chapter (Rule 13a-21 under the
Exchange Act), paragraph 101 of the Instructions as to Exhibits of Form
20-F (Sec.  249.220f of this chapter), paragraph B.(15) of the General
Instructions to Form 40-F (Sec.  249.240f of this chapter), paragraph
C.(6) of the General Instructions to Form 6-K (Sec.  249.306 of this
chapter), Sec.  240.17Ad-27(d) of this chapter (Rule 17Ad-27(d) under
the Exchange Act), Note D.5 of Sec.  240.14a-101 of this chapter (Rule
14a-101 under the Exchange Act), Item 1 of Sec.  240.14c-101 of this
chapter (Rule 14c-101 under the Exchange Act), General Instruction I of
Form F-SR (Sec.  249.333 of this chapter), General Instruction C.3.(g)
of Form N-1A (Sec. Sec.  239.15A and 274.11A of this chapter), General
Instruction I of Form N-2 (Sec. Sec.  239.14 and 274.11a-1 of this
chapter), General Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-3 (Sec. Sec.  239.17a
and 274.11b of this chapter), General Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-4
(Sec. Sec.  239.17b and 274.11c of this chapter), General Instruction
C.3.(h) of Form N-6 (Sec. Sec.  239.17c and 274.11d of this chapter),
General Instruction 2.(l) of Sec.  274.12 of this chapter (Form N-8B-
2), General Instruction 5 of Sec.  239.16 of this chapter (Form S-6),
General Instruction C.4 of Form N-CSR (Sec. Sec.  249.331 and 274.128
of this chapter), and Sec.  240.6b-1(c) of this chapter (Rule 6b-1(c)
under the Exchange Act) specify when electronic filers are required or
permitted to submit an Interactive Data File (Sec.  232.11), as further
described in note 1 to this section. This section imposes content,
format, and submission requirements for an Interactive Data File, but
does not change the substantive content requirements for the financial
and other disclosures in the Related Official Filing (Sec.  232.11).
    (a) * * *
    (2) Be submitted only by an electronic filer either required or
permitted to submit an Interactive Data File as specified by Item
601(b)(101) of Regulation S-K, General Instruction F of Form 11-K
(Sec.  249.311 of this chapter); paragraph (101) of Part II--
Information Not Required to be Delivered to Offerees or Purchasers of
Form F-10 (Sec.  239.40 of this chapter), Sec.  240.13a-21 of this
chapter (Rule 13a-21 under the Exchange Act), paragraph 101 of the
Instructions as to Exhibits of Form 20-F (Sec.  249.220f of this
chapter), paragraph B.(15) of the General Instructions to Form 40-F
(Sec.  249.240f of this chapter), paragraph C.(6) of the General
Instructions to Form 6-K (Sec.  249.306 of this chapter), Rule 17Ad-
27(d) under the Exchange Act, Note D.5 of Rule 14a-101 under the
Exchange Act, Item 1 of Rule 14c-101 under the Exchange Act, General
Instruction I to Form F-SR (Sec.  249.333 of this chapter), General
Instruction C.3.(g) of Form N-1A (Sec. Sec.  239.15A and 274.11A of
this chapter), General Instruction I of Form N-2 (Sec. Sec.  239.14 and
274.11a-1 of this chapter), General Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-3
(Sec. Sec.  239.17a and 274.11b of this chapter), General Instruction
C.3.(h) of Form N-4 (Sec. Sec.  239.17b and 274.11c of this chapter),
General Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-6 (Sec. Sec.  239.17c and 274.11d
of this chapter), General Instruction 2.(l) of Sec.  274.12 of this
chapter (Form N-8B-2), General Instruction 5 of Sec.  239.16 of this
chapter (Form S-6), General Instruction C.4 of Form N-CSR (Sec. Sec.
249.331 and 274.128 of this chapter), or Rule 6b-1(c) under the
Exchange Act (Sec.  240.6b-1(c) of this chapter), as applicable;
    (3) * * *
    (i) If the electronic filer is not a management investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a et
seq.), a separate account as defined in section 2(a)(14) of the
Securities Act (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(14)) registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, a business development company as defined in
section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(48)), a unit investment trust as defined in Section 4(2) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-4), a national securities
exchange as defined in 17 CFR 242.600(b)(53) (Rule 600(b)(53) of
Regulation NMS), or a clearing agency that provides a central matching
service, and is not within one of the categories specified in paragraph
(f)(1)(i) of this section, as partly embedded into a filing with the
remainder simultaneously submitted as an exhibit to:
* * * * *
    (ii) If the electronic filer is a management investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a et
seq.), a separate account (as defined in section 2(a)(14) of the
Securities Act (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(14)) registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, a business development company as defined in
section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(48)), a unit investment trust as defined in Section 4(2) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-4), a national securities
exchange as defined in 17 CFR 242.600(b)(53) (Rule 600(b)(53) of
Regulation NMS), or a clearing agency that provides a central matching
service, and is not within one of the categories specified in paragraph
(f)(1)(ii) of this section, as partly embedded into a filing with the
remainder simultaneously submitted as an exhibit to a filing that
contains the disclosure this section requires to be tagged; and
    (4) Be submitted in accordance with the EDGAR Filer Manual and, as
applicable, Item 601(b)(101) of Regulation S-K, General Instruction F
of Form 11-K (Sec.  249.311 of this chapter), paragraph (101) of Part
II--Information Not Required to be Delivered to Offerees or Purchasers
of Form F-10 (Sec.  239.40 of this chapter), Rule 13a-21 under the
Exchange Act, paragraph 101 of the Instructions as to Exhibits of Form
20-F (Sec.  249.220f of this chapter), paragraph B.(15) of the General
Instructions to Form 40-F (Sec.  249.240f of this chapter), paragraph
C.(6) of the General Instructions to Form 6-K (Sec.  249.306 of this
chapter), Rule 17Ad-27(d) under the Exchange Act, Note D.5 of Rule 14a-
101 under the Exchange Act, Item 1 of Rule 14c-101 under the Exchange
Act, General Instruction I to Form F-SR (Sec.  249.333 of this
chapter), General Instruction C.3.(g) of Form N-1A (Sec. Sec.  239.15A
and 274.11A of this chapter), General Instruction I of Form N-2
(Sec. Sec.  239.14 and 274.11a-1 of this chapter), General Instruction
C.3.(h) of

Form N-3 (Sec. Sec.  239.17a and 274.11b of this chapter), General
Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-4 (Sec. Sec.  239.17b and 274.11c of this
chapter), General Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-6 (Sec. Sec.  239.17c
and 274.11d of this chapter); Instruction 2.(l) of Sec.  274.12 of this
chapter (Form N-8B-2); General Instruction 5 of Sec.  239.16 of this
chapter (Form S-6); General Instruction C.4 of Form N-CSR (Sec. Sec.
249.331 and 274.128 of this chapter), or Rule 6b-1(c) under the
Exchange Act (Sec.  240.6b-1(c) of this chapter).
    (b) * * *
    (1) If the electronic filer is not a management investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a et
seq.), a separate account (as defined in section 2(a)(14) of the
Securities Act (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(14)) registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, a business development company as defined in
section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(48)), a unit investment trust as defined in Section 4(2) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-4), a clearing agency
that provides a central matching service, or a national securities
exchange as defined in 17 CFR 242.600(b)(53) (Rule 600(b)(53) of
Regulation NMS), an Interactive Data File must consist of only a
complete set of information for all periods required to be presented in
the corresponding data in the Related Official Filing, as applicable,
no more and no less, from all of the following categories:
* * * * *
    (6) If the electronic filer is a national securities exchange as
defined in 17 CFR 242.600(b)(53) (Rule 600(b)(53) of Regulation NMS),
an Interactive Data File must consist of the disclosure provided
pursuant to Sec.  240.6b-1(c) of this chapter (Rule 6b-1(c) under the
Exchange Act).
* * * * *
    Note 1 to Sec.  232.405:
    Item 601(b)(101) of Regulation S-K specifies the circumstances
under which an Interactive Data File must be submitted and the
circumstances under which it is permitted to be submitted, with respect
to Sec. Sec.  239.11 (Form S-1), 239.13 (Form S-3), 239.25 (Form S-4),
239.18 (Form S-11), 239.31 (Form F-1), 239.33 (Form F-3), 239.34 (Form
F-4), 249.310 (Form 10-K), 249.308a (Form 10-Q), and 249.308 (Form 8-K)
of this chapter. General Instruction F of Form 11-K (Sec.  249.311 of
this chapter) specifies the circumstances under which an Interactive
Data File must be submitted, and the circumstances under which it is
permitted to be submitted, with respect to Form 11-K. Paragraph (101)
of Part II--Information not Required to be Delivered to Offerees or
Purchasers of Form F-10 (Sec.  239.40 of this chapter) specifies the
circumstances under which an Interactive Data File must be submitted
and the circumstances under which it is permitted to be submitted, with
respect to Form F-10. Paragraph 101 of the Instructions as to Exhibits
of Form 20-F (Sec.  249.220f of this chapter) specifies the
circumstances under which an Interactive Data File must be submitted
and the circumstances under which it is permitted to be submitted, with
respect to Form 20-F. Paragraph B.(15) of the General Instructions to
Form 40-F (Sec.  249.240f of this chapter) and Paragraph C.(6) of the
General Instructions to Form 6-K (Sec.  249.306 of this chapter)
specify the circumstances under which an Interactive Data File must be
submitted and the circumstances under which it is permitted to be
submitted, with respect to Sec. Sec.  249.240f (Form 40-F) and 249.306
of this chapter (Form 6-K). Rule 17Ad-27(d) under the Exchange Act
specifies the circumstances under which an Interactive Data File must
be submitted with respect the reports required under Rule 17Ad-27. Note
D.5 of Sec.  240.14a-101 of this chapter (Schedule 14A) and Item 1 of
Sec.  240.14c-101 of this chapter (Schedule 14C) specify the
circumstances under which an Interactive Data File must be submitted
with respect to Schedules 14A and 14C. Rule 13a-21 under the Exchange
Act and General Instruction I to Form F-SR (Sec.  249.333 of this
chapter) specify the circumstances under which an Interactive Data File
must be submitted, with respect to Form F-SR. Item 601(b)(101) of
Regulation S-K, paragraph (101) of Part II--Information not Required to
be Delivered to Offerees or Purchasers of Form F-10, paragraph 101 of
the Instructions as to Exhibits of Form 20-F, paragraph B.(15) of the
General Instructions to Form 40-F, and paragraph C.(6) of the General
Instructions to Form 6-K all prohibit submission of an Interactive Data
File by an issuer that prepares its financial statements in accordance
with Sec. Sec.  210.6-01 through 210.6-10 of this chapter (Article 6 of
Regulation S-X). For an issuer that is a management investment company
or separate account registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(15 U.S.C. 80a et seq.) or a business development company as defined in
section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(48)), or a unit investment trust as defined in Section 4(2) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-4), General Instruction
C.3.(g) of Form N-1A (Sec. Sec.  239.15A and 274.11A of this chapter),
General Instruction I of Form N-2 (Sec. Sec.  239.14 and 274.11a-1 of
this chapter), General Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-3 (Sec. Sec.
239.17a and 274.11b of this chapter), General Instruction C.3.(h) of
Form N-4 (Sec. Sec.  239.17b and 274.11c of this chapter), General
Instruction C.3.(h) of Form N-6 (Sec. Sec.  239.17c and 274.11d of this
chapter), General Instruction 2.(l) of Form N-8B-2 (Sec.  274.12 of
this chapter), General Instruction 5 of Form S-6 (Sec.  239.16 of this
chapter), and General Instruction C.4 of Form N-CSR (Sec. Sec.  249.331
and 274.128 of this chapter), as applicable, specifies the
circumstances under which an Interactive Data File must be submitted.
For national securities exchanges as defined in 17 CFR 242.600(b)(53)
(Rule 600(b)(53) of Regulation NMS), Rule 6b-1(c) under the Exchange
Act (Sec.  240.6b-1(c) of this chapter) specifies the circumstances
under which an Interactive Data File must be submitted.

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934

0
4. The general authority citation for part 240 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3,
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f,
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78j-4, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o,
78o-4, 78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll,
78mm, 80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, 7201 et
seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C.
1350; and Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L.
112-106, sec. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise
noted.
* * * * *
0
5. Add Sec.  240.6b-1 to read as follows:

Sec.  240.6b-1   Volume-Based Exchange Transaction Pricing for NMS
Stocks.

    (a) A national securities exchange shall not offer volume-based
transaction fees, rebates, or other incentives in connection with the
execution of agency or riskless principal orders in NMS stocks, as
defined in 17 CFR 242.600(b)(55) (Rule 600(b)(55) of Regulation NMS).
For purposes of this section, the term riskless principal means a
transaction in which, after having received an order to buy from a
customer, the broker or dealer purchased the security from another
person to offset a contemporaneous sale to such customer or, after
having received an order to sell from a customer, the broker or dealer
sold the

security to another person to offset a contemporaneous purchase from
such customer.
    (b) A national securities exchange that offers volume-based
transaction fees, rebates, or other incentives in connection with the
execution of proprietary orders in NMS stocks for the account of a
member shall:
    (1) Have rules to require members to engage in practices that
facilitate the exchange's ability to comply with the prohibition in
paragraph (a) of this section; and
    (2) Establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed to detect and deter members from
receiving volume-based transaction pricing in connection with the
execution of agency or riskless principal orders in NMS stocks.
    (c) A national securities exchange that offers volume-based
transaction fees, rebates, or other incentives in connection with the
execution of proprietary orders in NMS stocks for the account of a
member shall submit electronically to the Commission the following
information each calendar month within five calendar days after the end
of the month, which will be made publicly available:
    (1) The number of members that executed proprietary orders in NMS
stocks for the member's account on the exchange during the month; and
    (2) For each volume-based transaction fee, rebate, and other
incentive, a summary table that includes the following information:
    (i) A label to identify the base fee or rebate;
    (ii) A label to identify each pricing tier that corresponds to the
label used in the exchange's pricing schedule;
    (iii) The amount of the fee, rebate, or other incentive identified;
    (iv) An explanation of the tier requirements; and
    (v) The total number of members that qualified for the base fee,
base rebate, or each tier during the month.
    (3) The disclosures required under this paragraph (c) shall be
provided in an Interactive Data File in accordance with 17 CFR 232.405
(Rule 405 of Regulation S-T).

    By the Commission.

    Dated: October 18, 2023.
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-23398 Filed 11-3-23; 8:45 am]
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 22 (Thursday, February 2, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 7127]
[FR Doc No: 2023-02201]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Docket No. FRA-2010-0029]

Amtrak's Request To Conduct Regression Testing of Its Certified
Positive Train Control System

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of availability and request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document provides the public with notice that on January
6, 2023, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) submitted
a document entitled ``Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES
II) Regression Test Waiver Request,'' to FRA. Amtrak asks FRA to
approve its request to conduct regression testing of its FRA-certified
ACSES II positive train control (PTC) system on its PTC-equipped track.

DATES: FRA will consider comments received by April 3, 2023. FRA may
consider comments received after that date to the extent practicable
and without delaying implementation of valuable or necessary
modifications to a PTC system.

ADDRESSES: All comments concerning this proceeding should identify the
agency name and Docket Number FRA-2010-0029, and may be submitted on
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for
submitting comments. For convenience, all active PTC dockets are
hyperlinked on FRA's website at https://railroads.dot.gov/train-control/ptc/ptc-annual-and-quarterly-reports. All comments received
will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov; this
includes any personal information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gabe Neal, Staff Director, Signal,
Train Control, and Crossings Division, telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, email:
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 6, 2017, FRA certified Amtrak's
ACSES II PTC system under title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
section 236.1015 and title 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) 20157(h).
Pursuant to 49 CFR 236.1035, a railroad must obtain FRA's approval
before field testing an uncertified PTC system, or a product of an
uncertified PTC system, or any regression testing of a certified PTC
system on the general rail system. See 49 CFR 236.1035(a). Please see
Amtrak's test request for the required information, including a
complete description of Amtrak's Concept of Operations and its specific
test procedures, including the measures that will be taken to ensure
safety during testing.
    Amtrak's test request is available for review online at https://www.regulations.gov (Docket No. FRA-2010-0029). Interested parties are
invited to comment on the test request by submitting written comments
or data. During its review of the test request, FRA will consider any
comments or data submitted. However, FRA may elect not to respond to
any particular comment, and under 49 CFR 236.1035, FRA maintains the
authority to approve, approve with conditions, or deny the test request
at its sole discretion.

Privacy Act Notice

    In accordance with 49 CFR 211.3, FRA solicits comments from the
public to better inform its decisions. DOT posts these comments,
without edit, including any personal information the commenter
provides, to https://www.regulations.gov, as described in the system of
records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at https://www.transportation.gov/privacy. See https://www.regulations.gov/privacy-notice for the privacy notice of regulations.gov. To facilitate
comment tracking, we encourage commenters to provide their name, or the
name of their organization; however, submission of names is completely
optional. If you wish to provide comments containing proprietary or
confidential information, please contact FRA for alternate submission
instructions.

    Issued in Washington, DC.
Carolyn R. Hayward-Williams,
Director, Office of Railroad Systems and Technology.
[FR Doc. 2023-02201 Filed 2-1-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 240 (Friday, December 15, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 87047]
[FR Doc No: 2023-27595]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Docket No. FAA-2023-1427]

Agency Information Collection Activities: Requests for Comments;
Clearance of Renewed Approval of Information Collection: National
Flight Data Center Web Portal

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, FAA
invites public comments about our intention to request the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) approval to renew an information
collection. The Federal Register Notice with a 60-day comment period
soliciting comments on the following collection of information was
published on June 26, 2023. The collection involves aeronautical
information detailing the physical description and operational status
of all components of the National Airspace System (NAS). The
information to be collected will be used to update government,
military, and private aeronautical databases, charts, publications,
flight management systems, and in-flight tracking products.

DATES: Written comments should be submitted by January 16, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Written comments and recommendations for the proposed
information collection should be sent within 30 days of publication of
this notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. Find this particular
information collection by selecting ``Currently under 30-day Review--
Open for Public Comments'' or by using the search function.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Graybill by email at:
[email protected]; phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Public Comments Invited: You are asked to comment on any aspect of
this information collection, including (a) Whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary for FAA's performance; (b) the
accuracy of the estimated burden; (c) ways for FAA to enhance the
quality, utility and clarity of the information collection; and (d)
ways that the burden could be minimized without reducing the quality of
the collected information.
    OMB Control Number: 2120-0754.
    Title: National Flight Data Center Web Portal.
    Form Numbers: AD1-ADCP, AD3-ACC.
    Type of Review: Renewal of an information collection.
    Background: The Federal Register Notice with a 60-day comment
period soliciting comments on the following collection of information
was published on June 26, 2023 (88 FR 41464). 49 U.S.C 40103,
``Sovereignty and Use of Airspace,'' authorizes and directs the FAA to
develop plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace. The
National Flight Data Center (NFDC) is the authoritative government
source for collecting, validating, storing, maintaining, and
disseminating aeronautical data concerning the United States and its
territories to support real-time aviation activities. The information
collected ensures the safe and efficient navigation of the national
airspace. The information collected includes, but is not limited to,
data regarding airport associated city, CTAF, UNICOM, facility use,
runway lighting, airport sketches and diagrams, proposed aircraft call
signs, and general remarks. NFDC collects this information and
maintains it in the National Airspace System resources (NASR) database.
NASR serves as the official repository for NAS data and is provided to
government, military, and private producers of aeronautical databases,
chants, publications, flight management systems, and in-flight tracking
products at no charge. Information will be collected via digital forms.
Failure to collect this information would result in obsolete and
inaccurate data being reflected on aviation products.
    Respondents: Approximately 5,211 representatives of U.S. public
airports; airlines; and aircraft operators. Average of 6,495 responses
annually.
    Frequency: Information to be collected on occasion.
    Estimated Average Burden per Response: 20 minutes for AD1-ADCP, 20
minutes for AD3-ACC, 24 minutes for Call Signs.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden: 2,170 hours.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 12, 2023.
John L. Graybill,
Aeronautical Information Specialist, Data Systems Team, Aeronautical
Information Services, AJV-A35.
[FR Doc. 2023-27595 Filed 12-14-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P