Major Renovation............................           38           20           10           65          N/A           31          N/A           72
    New Construction............................          100           80           80           65          N/A          100          N/A          N/A
Residential Housing:
    Small Project...............................           38            0            0           31           45           83           93          N/A
    Medium Project..............................           45            5            0           45           58           83           93          N/A
    Large Project...............................           65           30           10           72           83           83           93          N/A
Apartments, Hotels, and Dormitories:
    All Projects................................           38           75           20           51           41           51          N/A          N/A
Streets and Highways:
    Repair Storm Drain/Sewer-Local Street.......           82           80           75           96           96           94           97           97
    Install New Storm Drain/Sewer System........           89           85           85           96           98           96           98           98
    Lane Expansion on Major Interstate..........           93           90           90           96           99           96           99           99
Bridges:
    Small Project...............................           82            0            5          100          N/A          100          100          100
    Medium Project..............................           82            0           80          100          N/A          100          100          100
    Large Project...............................           82            5            5          100          N/A          100          100          100
Dams and Reservoirs:
    Small Project...............................           52           50           60           72           68           52          100          100
    Medium Project..............................           72           50           70           84           76           60          100          N/A
    Large Project...............................           88           95          100          100          N/A          100          100          N/A
Storm Sewers and Flood Control:
    Small Project...............................           63           50           50          100          N/A           56          N/A          N/A
    Medium Project..............................           93           80           80          100          N/A          100          N/A          N/A
    Large Project...............................           93           80           80          100          N/A          100          N/A          N/A
Sewer, Water, and Waste Treatment Plants:
    Small Renovation............................           63           50           30           93          N/A           63          N/A           85
    Major Renovation............................           63           50           30           93          N/A           63          N/A           85
    New Construction............................           63           50           30           93          N/A           63          N/A           85
Tanks:
    Minor Installation/Renovation (Small                   60           45           40           85           64           71           67           71
     Contractor)................................
    Minor Installation/Renovation (Medium                  71           60           60           93           71           78           82           78
     Contractor)................................
    New Construction/Major Renovation (Large               85           80           80           96           82           85           89           85
     Contractor)................................
Hydroelectric Power Plants:
    Small Project...............................           64           90           95           96          100           71           86          N/A
    Medium Project..............................           82           95          100          100          N/A           78          100          N/A
    Large Project...............................           89           95          100          100          N/A           86          100          N/A
Other Power Plants:
    Medium Project..............................           70           95           80           85          N/A           78           78           74
    Large Project...............................           96           95           95          100          N/A           96          100           96
Electric Substations:
    Small Project...............................           96           95           95           96          N/A           96           96           96
    Medium Project..............................           96           95           95           96          N/A           96           96           96
    Large Project...............................           96           95           95           96          N/A           96           96           96
Natural Gas Plants:
    Small Upgrade...............................           55           40           40           93          100           78           55           55
    Major Renovation............................           70           60           50          100          100           93          N/A          N/A
    New Construction............................           93           90           90          100          N/A           93          100          100
Space Facilities:
    Small Project...............................           93           90           90          100          N/A           93          N/A          N/A

    Medium Project..............................           93           90           90          100          N/A           93          N/A          N/A
    Large Project...............................           93           90           90          100          N/A           93          N/A          N/A
Manufacturing Facilities:
    New Construction............................           43           50           50           86          N/A           65           43           43
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Current compliance rates for attendant training are nearly identical to the rates for entry training, but may be somewhat lower for some project
  categories based on estimates provided by CONSAD's 1995 industry expert panel. See CONSAD report (2005) for details.
N/A = Not Applicable (treated as ``0%'' in calculations).
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA, Directorate of Standards and Guidance, Office of Regulatory Analysis-Safety.

Table IV-7--Loaded Hourly Labor Rates Applied in OSHA's Cost Analysis of
         the Final Standard for Confined Spaces in Construction
                             [2009 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Labor category                          Wage rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Construction supervisor.................................          $42.16
Skilled worker..........................................           29.60
General construction employee...........................           24.93
Clerical employee.......................................           22.53
Unskilled worker........................................           22.67
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Department of Labor, OSHA, Directorate of Standards and
  Guidance, Office of Regulatory Analysis-Safety, based on data from
  Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009 Occupational Employment Statistics
  (OES) Survey.

4. Benefits and Net Benefits
Introduction
    The final standard will improve the safety of workers who encounter
confined spaces in construction. Confined spaces represent special
safety problems because it can be difficult to exit them and it may be
difficult to provide aid if an incident occurs in a confined space.
There are also certain types of hazards, such as low oxygen levels,
accumulations of dangerous gases, and engulfment by water that are
particularly likely to be found in confined spaces. As a result, OSHA
developed a programmatic approach to assure the safety of workers who
must work in the vicinity of confined spaces. This programmatic
approach includes provisions for identifying confined spaces and the
hazards they may contain; removing the hazards if possible; restricting
entry through a permit system where employers cannot remove the hazard;
providing appropriate testing and equipment when employees must enter a
space; providing for attendants; and arranging for rescue services when
emergencies occur in a confined space.
    Independent researchers found that a similar system in general
industry significantly reduced confined-spaces incidents (Seong and
Mendeloff, Assessing the Accuracy of OSHA's Projections of the benefits
of New Safety Standards, 2004). The Seong and Mendeloff paper estimates
at least a fifty percent reduction in total deaths in two BLS fatality
categories: ``inhalation in enclosed, restricted, or confined spaces,''
and ``depletion of oxygen in enclosed, restricted, or confined
spaces,'' following the implementation of the general industry rule.
These two categories would include a number of kinds of events not
covered by the general industry confined space standard, such as
inhalation of toxic substances in a room (for example, there are some
fatalities every year from using paint or paint strippers in ordinary
rooms not adequately ventilated for the purposes of heavy chemical use
that nevertheless would not be confined spaces). These kinds of events
would be included in the denominator of Seong and Mendeloff analysis
but would not be affected by the general industry confined space rule.
The Seong and Mendeloff analysis does not attempt to determine if the
incidents included in its analysis occurred in a confined space, much
less whether the confined spaces rule was being followed. OSHA believes
that most of the remaining confined space incidents in general industry
are the result of failure to follow that standard. Compliance with the
provisions of this standard will reduce accidents, injuries, and
fatalities in confined spaces in construction. In particular, the
number of injuries and fatalities from causes such as asphyxiation,
lethal gas, chemical burns, explosions, drowning, and failed rescue
attempts will decline.
    For the Preliminary Economic Analysis (PEA), OSHA developed
estimates of the benefits associated with the proposed standard by
estimating the numbers of fatalities and injuries likely prevented by
full compliance, and then applied monetary values to them. Table IV-8
shows the Agency's estimate of the annualized monetary benefits
associated with the final standard. The remainder of this section
details OSHA's methodology for estimating those benefits.

          Table IV-8--Estimated Value of Annualized Benefits *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Benefits                Number         Monetized value
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities Avoided................       5.2  $45.2 million. \a\
Injuries Avoided..................       780  $48.4 million. \b\
                                   -------------------------------------
  Total...........................  ........  $93.6 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* In 2009 dollars.
\a\ Based on an estimated value of $8.7 million per fatality avoided.
\b\ Based on an estimated value of $62,000 per injury avoided.

Estimation of Prevented Fatalities
    In the analysis CONSAD Research Corporation (CONSAD) submitted to
OSHA and which OSHA reviewed and approved for use in the PEA, the
CONSAD researchers used OSHA's Integrated Management Information System
(IMIS) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries (CFOI) to develop the estimated safety benefits
or the number of fatalities and injuries potentially avoided as a
result of this standard. Using these sources, CONSAD gathered data on
the number of fatal and non-fatal construction-related accidents
involving the entry of a confined space by applying a search criterion
relevant to both confined spaces and construction work. For data
collected from the IMIS database, CONSAD searched for accident reports
with construction industry SIC codes of 15, 16, and 17, and then
manually reviewed those reports and the narratives of the accidents for
factors indicative of an enclosed or confined space-related injury.
Such factors included specific

types of environmental hazards, certain events and human errors, as
well as the type and source of an injury (see Section 4.1.1 of the
CONSAD Report for a detailed list of the factors; Docket ID: OSHA-2007-
0026-0003). Outside of the search criteria, CONSAD also reviewed
incident reports where the Agency cited employers for violations of
other OSHA standards involving constructions hazards similar to those
hazards found in confined spaces; however, OSHA assured that the
analysis excluded any cases involving a confined-space entry or cases
largely involving work activity covered by OSHA standards--subpart P,
subpart S, subpart V or any General Industry standard.
    For data collected from CFOI, BLS provided CONSAD with a research
data file, procured under a confidentiality agreement, which contained
detailed information about work-related fatalities such as employee
occupation, industry, worker activity, the type and source of the
injury, the event, the location of the accident, as well as a narrative
description as to how the injury occurred. CONSAD used the BLS Confined
Space Fatality Study--1992 (BLS, 1992b) as a reference guide for
developing the screening criteria used to identify fatal confined-space
accidents in the CFOI file since the BLS study also used CFOI data and
defined a confined space similar to OSHA's General Industry confined-
spaces standard. Figure 4.1 of the CONSAD Report shows a detailed list
of the factors used to screen the CFOI data file for confined-space
accidents. Like the data used from the IMIS database, CONSAD manually
reviewed each CFOI record and eliminated any accident that did not
involve a confined space or that involved work activity covered by
another OSHA standard.
    From the IMIS database, CONSAD reviewed fatality and injury cases
that occurred during the period of April 1984 to October 2001, and
identified a total of 102 accidents related to confined spaces in
construction. These accidents resulted in 84 fatalities and 88
injuries. The complete list of these accidents, along with their
narratives, is available in Appendix C.1 of the CONSAD Report. Since
the CFOI program did not begin collecting work-related fatality data
from all 50 states and the District of Columbia until 1992, any data
prior to 1992 was incomplete and, therefore, eliminated from further
analysis. As a result, CONSAD only reviewed cases from the CFOI
research data file that occurred during the period of 1992 to 2000,
identifying a total of 21 accidents related to confined spaces in
construction that resulted in a total of 24 fatalities. Due to the
confidentiality agreement made between CONSAD and BLS, the details of
these cases were not made available for public viewing. In an effort to
be consistent with the data-collection process used with the CFOI data,
CONSAD limited its analysis of the IMIS fatality and injury data to the
period of 1992 to 2000. Using this constraint, the IMIS data yielded a
total of 44 accidents related to confined spaces in construction that
resulted in 34 fatalities and 39 injuries. Collectively from these two
data sources, CONSAD was able to identify a total of 65 accidents
related to confined spaces in construction during the period of 1992 to
2000 in which 58 fatalities and 39 injuries occurred.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ While there is overlap between fatalities and injuries
reported in OSHA IMIS and BLS CFOI, using information such as date,
time, place, and names of affected individuals and firms allowed the
contractor to find the unique incidents reported in each database.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the PEA, OSHA used the 58 selected fatalities from the 9-year
period of 1992 to 2000 as a baseline to develop an estimate of the
number of fatalities and injuries that this standard would potentially
prevent. At that time, OSHA estimated that there was an average of 6.44
\35\ confined-spaces-in-construction fatalities per year. In Section
4.3 of the CONSAD Report, CONSAD, with the assistance of its safety
professional, did a further analysis of the fatality data used to
estimate the safety benefits in the PEA and developed a methodology for
determining the likelihood of preventing an accident with full
compliance with the provisions of this standard. Using the expertise of
CONSAD's safety engineer, CONSAD assigned each accident used in the
analysis a ranking of 1 to 4, with 1 meaning that it was highly
unlikely that the standard would prevent the victim's fatality or
injury, and 4 meaning that is was highly likely that the standard would
prevent the victim's fatality or injury. CONSAD then translated these
rankings into probabilities that the standard would prevent each
fatality or injury, using percentages of 5 percent for a ranking of 1,
35 percent for a ranking of 2, 65 percent for a ranking of 3, and 95
percent for a ranking of 4.\36\ CONSAD subsequently aggregated the data
and drew the conclusion that full compliance with the standard would
prevent, on average, 91 percent of the fatalities and injuries.\37\
OSHA reviewed and approved the CONSAD analysis and applied this
probability prevention rate to the fatality estimate of 6.44 fatalities
per year, and estimated in the PEA that full compliance with the
provisions of this standard would prevent an estimated 5.9 (rounded to
6) confined-spaces-in-construction fatalities per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ A commenter stated that ``it is unknown and not reported
how OSHA has determined these figures. Practically, it is unknown
how there could be a .44 fatality'' (ID-0100). OSHA notes that the
estimated number of preventable fatalities can take on decimal
values since it is an average value.
    \36\ CONSAD estimated a maximum effectiveness in preventing
fatalities of 95 percent because the researchers believed that even
a reasonable effort at compliance would not result in perfect
compliance. OSHA believes that this percentage is very conservative
as the standard has multiple layers of protection that assure that
even fail to comply with some requirements, there are further
protections to preventing fatalities and for reducing fatalities to
injuries. The standard is unlikely to prevent any fatalities only
when the employer completely fails to identify a space as a confined
space and, thus, fails to take any of the appropriate measures.
However, if there is a complete failure to identify a confined
space, the employer will incur no costs.
    \37\ Thus, the vast majority of the accidents had a rating of 4
and a 95 percent probability of prevention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter, Associated General Contractors of America (AGCA),
commissioned a report by Dr. N. Mike Helvacian (ID-222) that made
several criticisms of the methodology for estimating prevented
fatalities and injuries in the PEA. The report characterized the
approach to assigning prevention probabilities to accidents as ``a
subjective assessment that cannot be reproduced by other safety
professionals'' (p. 57). Another commenter stated that there was no
basis for the estimate that full compliance with the final standard
would eliminate 90 percent of fatalities and injuries (ID-100).
    In light of such comments, as well as other comments received on
the proposed rule and the PEA, OSHA reevaluated the original fatalities
used to develop the benefits estimates and revised its values
accordingly, as shown in Table IV-8. Based on the IMIS data, the CONSAD
analysis showed 44 accidents during the period of 1992 to 2000 (listed
in Appendix C.1 of the CONSAD Report, beginning at CONSAD Accident
Number 57 and ending with CONSAD Accident Number 100), of which 34
fatalities and 39 injuries were reported.\38\ Of those 44 accidents, 27
of them included fatalities listed, along with their narratives, in
Table IV-9 below.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Note that an accident could involve several workers, with
some injured and some killed.
    \39\ Table IV-9 only provides the narratives of the fatalities
(with injuries omitted) shown in Appendix C.1 of the CONSAD Report;
the CONSAD accident number listed for each accident in the table
refers to the location of the narrative for that accident in the
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to a confidentiality agreement made with the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, OSHA did not include details

of the accidents gathered from the CFOI database in the PEA or this
FEA. However, the CONSAD report provides a detailed description of the
methodology used to collect construction-related accidents involving
confined-space entries from the CFOI database; OSHA made this
description available for public viewing and commenting in the docket
under Docket ID: OSHA-2007-0026-003.
    OSHA still believes that CONSAD's analysis of the number of
accidents that would be prevented by the standard given full compliance
is reasonable. First, no existing standard provides a comprehensive
approach to confined spaces in construction. There is an existing
construction standard requiring employers to train employees in
confined-space hazards. However, this existing standard does not
specify what constitutes a confined space, nor does it specify the
contents of the training that would serve to prevent fatalities or
injuries due to confined-space hazards. There are also rules governing
specific hazards, such as immediately dangerous to life and health
(IDLH) atmospheres and hazardous gases, but OSHA did not adapt these
rules to the specific circumstances of confined spaces; therefore,
these rules are unlikely to provide adequate protection to workers when
they encounter the hazards within a confined space. As demonstrated by
the number of fatalities and injuries between 1992 and 2000, and
confirmed by the supplemental data indicating that the fatalities and
injuries continued to mount in more recent years, the existing rules
have not been effective in preventing confined-space fatalities in
construction. OSHA shares the belief of the ACCSH, as well as the other
industry representatives who recommended that OSHA conduct this
rulemaking, that a rule specific to confined spaces in construction
could prevent these fatalities in a way that existing rules do not.
    Table IV-9 shows fatalities occurring as a result largely of
atmospheric hazards--either insufficient oxygen or the presence of
lethal gases, particularly carbon monoxide or hydrogen sulfide--all of
which this standard would prevent. This standard also could prevent
fatalities that resulted from construction-related explosions or fires.
In addition, a number of the fatalities were the result of would-be
rescuers entering a confined space to assist another employee and
succumbing to the same hazard, a result this standard would prevent.
    Perfect compliance with the final standard would prevent all of
these fatalities in several ways. First, identification of confined
spaces would trigger the need for analysis and testing for possible
hazards, as well as restrictions to prevent unauthorized entry. To the
extent employers find hazards but cannot remove them, a system of
controls would go into place. This system would prevent casual entry
into confined spaces, such as occurred in CONSAD accident number 76 and
entry by an employee working alone as occurred in the accidents with
CONSAD accident numbers 72 and 84.\40\ When entry was necessary, there
would need to be appropriate and continuous testing, and employers
would have to install ventilation to remove the atmospheric, or
explosion and fire, hazards, or provide appropriate PPE. Better data
sharing also may prevent some accidents, such as accident number 92.
These factors would prevent most fatalities resulting from to
atmospheric or explosion hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Hereafter, this discussion will refer to all incidents by
their CONSAD accident numbers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent these measures failed, the final standard also
includes provisions for rescue, and prohibitions against unauthorized
rescue entries. Rescue provisions may not prevent all fatalities that
result from hazards such as explosions, but they can be crucial when
atmospheric hazards are present. Adequate rescue might prevent
fatalities that do not result in instant death. For example, quick
withdrawal of workers from an explosive atmosphere or workers suffering
from asphyxiation (followed by adequate first-aid measures) could
prevent many fatalities. The rescue provisions would also prevent
fatalities due to entry of inadequately equipped rescuers, either by
removing the need for entry (providing non-entry rescue capability) or
by assuring that the rescuers have adequate equipment for entry. Such
rescue-related fatalities occurred in accidents 72, 84, and 97, and
nearly occurred in several other accidents such as accident number 92.
    In addition to atmospheric hazards, Table IV-9 shows a few other
types of hazards. These include drowning and physical hazards such as
dislodged plugs. The provisions for upstream-warning systems might
prevent some of these drownings. Several of the accidents involved
physical hazards posed by pipe plugs (or exposure to the physical
hazards only temporarily restrained by the pipe plug); the requirements
in the final standard to remove or isolate physical hazards through
physical barriers or other means, rather than temporarily controlling
the physical hazards, would eliminate employee exposure to such hazards
during a confined-space entry and prevent some of these drownings. For
example, having water bypass an area, rather than relying on a plug to
hold the water, would prevent some of these accidents. The ability to
quickly remove an injured employee with a retrieval line would also
prevent a fatal accident in some cases. In many cases, better hazard
awareness, compliance with permit-program requirements that prohibit
entry when hazards are present, and the use of retrieval lines and
other rescue procedures would make a difference.
    Based on this review, OSHA believes that CONSAD's estimate that the
standard would prevent 91 percent of the confined-space fatalities in
their database seems reasonable. In almost all cases, multiple
provisions would, if fully followed, completely prevent the fatalities.
However, this estimate is in some senses a maximum estimate of the
effectiveness of the standard. The estimate assumes full compliance,
and OSHA's experience in general industry shows that perfect compliance
with a similar standard was not achieved.\41\ It is also possible,
though none of the accidents examined illustrate this phenomenon, that
an employer might have confined space incident even when in compliance
with the standard due to an unanticipated equipment failure (such as an
air hose developing leaks) or gross human error (such as an attendant
falling asleep). However, not a single incident OSHA has examined
occurred in a situation in which an employer was in compliance with the
provisions of the standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Seong and Mendeloff (2004) have found that past OSHA safety
regulations' effectiveness at reducing occupational hazard-related
mortality has been substantially lower than estimated by OSHA. It
should be noted that (1) OSHA is forecasting effectiveness with full
compliance and Seong and Mendeloff measured effectiveness given
actual compliance, and (2) OSHA uses a fundamentally different
approach to estimating benefits to this (and most other) safety
standards than was used in the analyses the Seong and Mendeloff
study reviewed. Nevertheless, this study potentially provides
empirical support for the characterization of 91 percent as an upper
bound in terms of the benefits that will actually be realized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this Final Economic Analysis (FEA), OSHA revised its estimates
with the same methodology used in the PEA, but also added supplementary
data (i.e., Table IV-10, described later in this section) whereby the
Agency used new data to address a commenter's point and to confirm the
continuing validity of the original data.
    Several commenters questioned generally whether OSHA properly
included the accidents used to estimate benefits in the PEA, but did
not point

to any specific accidents that they would remove from the list of IMIS
fatalities provided in the public record for this rulemaking. One of
these commenters, the Associated General Contractors of Texas--Highway,
Heavy, Utilities and Industrial Branch (AGCT), stated that OSHA did not
specify the industry sectors in which the fatalities and injuries
occurred (ID-0124).
    AGCT also asserted that ``most potential exposures to confined
space hazards in the construction industry occur in connection with
excavation operations,'' and that other standards adequately address
these hazards (ID-124). Another commenter stated that the PEA included
accidents in trenches, while the proposed standard excluded trenching
work (ID-035). In response, OSHA notes that the proposed standard did
not apply to non-sewer construction work regulated by 29 CFR part 1926,
subpart P--Excavations. However, the proposed standard applied to sewer
work that fell under subpart P and, therefore, the inclusion of some
accidents in trenches was consistent with the scope of the proposed
rule. Final Sec.  1926.1201(b) eliminates the distinction between non-
sewer construction work and other construction work; the final standard
clearly states that it does not apply to work regulated by 29 CFR part
1926, subpart P. As a result, the FEA does not include the costs and
benefits associated with accidents occurring in trench-related
activities unless they also involve confined spaces other than the
trench (e.g., a pipe placed inside the trench).
    In addition, AGCT asserted, without support, ``Most sewer related
fatalities involve municipal workers who are not covered by OSHA
standards'' and expressed concern that it would be unfair and improper
for OSHA to include benefits to municipal workers not covered by OSHA
standards (ID-124). AGCT did not, however, point to any examples in the
IMIS fatality data on the record that involved municipal workers. OSHA
reexamined the 1992-2000 IMIS data and did not find any indication that
these examples involved fatalities of municipal workers. Moreover,
while AGCT's assertion may hold true with respect to the normal
maintenance activities in sewers typically performed by municipal
workers, AGCT did not distinguish in its comments between municipal-
worker fatalities resulting from sewer work performed as part of
construction and normal maintenance activities. To the contrary, it is
OSHA's understanding that private contractors perform most sewer-
construction activities.
    Another commenter, Edison Electric Institute, stated that the
analysis did not explain the basis for determining how the included
accidents involved construction work, and that the analysis should
exclude ``public sector'' work (ID-210, Tr. pp. 98-100). OSHA limited
the accidents that served as the basis of the benefits analysis in the
PEA to construction work based on the industry code of the employer of
the worker involved in the accident. The final standard covers
employers subject to OSHA enforcement authority and engaged in
construction activity not covered by 29 CFR part 1926, subparts Y--
Commercial Driving Operations, P--Excavations, or S--Underground
Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams, and Compressed Air, so the final
standard covers ``public sector'' work only to the extent that such
work is within OSHA's enforcement authority. To the extent that
``public sector'' work means work conducted by municipal employees,
OSHA refers to its response in the previous paragraph.
    In response to these criticisms, OSHA reviewed the fatalities in
the CONSAD IMIS database with respect to the issue of whether a
construction standard would cover those accidents. First, the standard
would cover municipal workers in state-plan states. However, there is
not a single instance in Table IV-9 that identifies a municipal worker
as a fatality. As CONSAD reported, all fatalities were for firms in a
construction SIC code, and not for firms in a local government SIC
code. Some commenters may believe, incorrectly, that contracted
construction work funded by a municipality in a non-state plan state is
not subject to OSHA standards; if the work involves an employee of a
private-sector employer, that employer is subject to OSHA standards
regardless of whether or not a local government funds the work.
    OSHA then examined whether the general industry standard or any
other OSHA standards covered the fatalities. It is difficult to
determine coverage from the IMIS descriptions alone, so OSHA examined
what standards it cited at the time of the fatality investigation. Even
this approach may be unreliable because there may be a citation for a
violation associated with a fatality inspection that did not involve a
violation that directly contributed to the fatality. OSHA found that
only two fatality accidents (89 and 99) had any citations under general
industry standards. Absent a clear indication of a causal link between
the general industry work cited and the fatality, OSHA is reluctant to
remove these accidents. Moreover, even if these fatalities were the
result of general industry activity, OSHA believes that it should
include these two fatalities as prevented by the construction standard
because it is possible that the employer believed the activities
constituted construction work and, therefore, not covered by the
general industry standard. With the promulgation of this final rule, it
will now be clear that all confined spaces are subject to an OSHA
standard, and that similar precautions apply to these spaces.
    With respect to excavations, OSHA found only three accidents in
which it cited the excavation standard (66, 80, and 86). However, OSHA
believes that in all three cases, the fatality occurred in a confined
space. The accident investigator identified the worksite in Accident 66
as a confined space. Accident 80 describes an entry into a manhole,
which normally means a confined space. Accident 86 describes the
activities as ``finish up work,'' implying the excavation phase of the
project was complete when the accident occurred.
    Several of the accidents involved underground activities, so OSHA
examined the accidents for citations to subpart S, OSHA's underground
construction standards. OSHA did not find any such citations and,
therefore, did not exclude any accidents on that basis.
    As a result of the decision, discussed in the cost analysis in this
FEA, to exclude costs in state-plan states that adopted some provisions
of a confined-spaces standard for construction, OSHA examined whether
any of the fatalities involved citations to a state confined-spaces-in-
construction standard. OSHA found two such cases--Accidents 67 and 82.
Accident 67 occurred in Alaska, which has a comprehensive confined-
space-in-construction standard that included almost all of the
provisions in this final confined-space standard. OSHA decided not to
include this fatality in the list of fatalities that this standard
would prevent given full compliance with the rule. Accident 82,
however, occurred in a state that required only mechanical ventilation
of confined spaces, and no other provisions of this OSHA standard. OSHA
believes that a full confined-space program compliant with this
standard would prevent this accident, while a simple ventilation
requirement would not.

                            Table IV-9--Confined Spaces in the Construction Industry
                                     Fatal Accidents and Injuries--1992-2000
                                        [As listed in the Consad report]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
      Consad accident No.           Year      Industry SIC     Type of confined      reported       Inspection/
                                                  code              space           fatalities     activity No.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
57............................         1992            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       109472456
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
At approximately 11:30 a.m. on April 16, 1992, Employee #1 entered a 15 ft. 9 in. deep manhole that was part of
 a new sewer line installation project in order to plug two sewer lines with wing nut plugs. Employee #2 and a
 third employee were at the top of the manhole watching as Employee #1 entered the hole and inserted one plug
 near the top, then proceeded down the ladder to the bottom to install the second plug, which took approximately
 4 minutes to install. Employee #1 then stated he was hot, started up the ladder, and fell unconscious to the
 floor. Employee #2 entered the manhole and attempted to sit Employee #1 upright. Employee #2 then began feeling
 faint and started up the ladder to exit. A little more than halfway up he passed out and was left hanging from
 the ladder. The third employee then ran for help. A superintendent tied a rope around himself, held his breath,
 and rescued Employee #2, who was transported to the hospital, where, after undergoing a blood gas test, he was
 treated for carbon monoxide exposure. Employee # 1 died from acute carbon monoxide poisoning before he was
 retrieved from the manhole. The company had no confined space entry procedure in place for this particular job
 site because they did not consider new manholes to reasonably pose a risk to workers. No measuring equipment
 was used to detect toxic or combustible gases and oxygen levels. No mechanical ventilation was used. No rescue
 equipment was available.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
61............................         1992            1799  Other..............               1       115562290
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
At approximately 7:45 a.m. on October 27, 1992, Employee #1 was preparing to fiberglass the interior surface of
 a swimming pool that measured 30 ft long and 16 ft wide with a depth of 4 ft at the shallow end and 9 ft at the
 deep end. Overnight, a water faucet adjacent to the pool had leaked water into the pool. Employee #1 was
 removing the standing water in the bowl of the deep end. Initially, he used a sponge and bucket to remove the
 water. Later, he used about 2 gal of acetone to help accelerate evaporation of the remaining water. He then
 used a non-explosion-proof shop vacuum to vacuum the remaining water-acetone mixture. Switching on the vacuum
 created a spark that ignited the acetone vapor in the bowl of the pool. The resulting explosion and fire caused
 second- and third-degree burns on 70 percent of his body. Employee #1 was hospitalized until November 12, 1992,
 when he died of complications.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
64............................         1993            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       114834930
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
On September 17, 1993, Employee #1, of Dan's Excavating Inc., a laborer on a sewer construction crew, entered a
 26 ft deep manhole to check the line sight glass for water levels. After he had climbed to the bottom of the
 manhole, Employee #1 made a noise as if he were clearing his throat and then started climbing back out. When
 Employee #1 was 6 to 8 ft from the top he looked up, let go of the ladder, and fell backward to the bottom of
 the manhole. Employee #1 died of asphyxia. The atmosphere had not been tested before he entered the manhole.
 When it was later tested at the manhole level from which Employee #1 fell, an oxygen deficiency was found.
 Citations were issued for serious violations of R408.40121(1), R408.40121(2), and R408.41115(8).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
65............................         1994            1771  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       124771049
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 was applying grout in a manhole. There had been a 20 to 36 in. rubber plug installed into a 36 in.
 sewer line that entered the manhole in which Employee #1 was working. For some unexplained reason, the rubber
 plug exploded, hitting Employee #1 and forcing him down the downflow side of the sewer line. Employee #1 died
 at the scene of severe head injuries.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
66............................         1994            1629  Undetermined.......               1       107232167
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 entered a confined space with a lighted torch. The atmosphere was not tested and contained an
 explosive concentration of propane gas. The propane gas exploded, sending the employee approximately 20 feet in
 the air, and igniting his clothing. Employee #1 sustained 2nd- and 3rd-degree burns over 70 percent of his
 body. He died of respiratory arrest two days later. A propane torch had been left on in the space overnight and
 the flame had gone out, allowing propane to accumulate. Citations were issued.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
67............................         1994            1623  Undetermined.......               1       124078163
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 died of asphyxia when he was directed to enter a confined space without full compliance with
 confined space standards and associated procedures.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
68............................         1994            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       109054866
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employees #1, #2, and #3 were in a dry well modifying sewer mains. Fluids left in the pipe for three months
 flowed into the work area. The fermenting fluids released hydrogen sulfide gas. Employees #1 and #2 were
 hospitalized. Employee #1 died of asphyxiation. Employee #2 is in a long term health care facility in
 Westchester, NY. Employee #3 was treated and released.

69............................         1994            1794  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       110465739
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on November 21, 1994, Employee #1 and a coworker, laborers, began removing the rubber
 bladder plugs from a 48 inch storm sewer drain system to allow the construction site to drain off standing
 water captured by the blocked line. They climbed into the 10 foot deep manhole D-2, and placed two jointed
 pieces of 2 by 4s against the end of the metal portion on the rubber bladder plug and the manhole wall to
 prevent the plug from being swept downstream in the 48 inch storm sewer drain pipe. They then climbed out of
 manhole D-2. Air pressure was released from the plug installed in the storm sewer drain pipe in manhole D-2 to
 allow the stored water to pass. Employee #1 told his coworker to release the air pressure from the plug in
 manhole mixing box D-3, located approximately 71 feet away and upstream adjacent to the flightline. When the
 coworker arrived at mixing box D-3, it was under water. The employees conversed and the coworker was told to
 take the air release valve assembly out of the air vent hose to completely deflate the upstream plug. The
 employees knew this plug was secured by a rope attached to mixing box D-3. They stood around the opening to
 manhole D-2, and conversed when they noticed the 2 by 4 brace holding the rubber bladder plug in manhole D-2 in
 the inflow pipe was coming loose. Employee #1 entered manhole D-2 without an access ladder and attempted to
 shore up the brace by stomping it back into a horizontal position while standing on the lip of the outbound
 pipe. He was washed down the storm drain and drowned.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
70............................         1995            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       116508169
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 was standing on a ladder while removing the rubber plug of an 8 inch sewer line in a manhole. He
 fell from the ladder into the bottom of the manhole, which contained waste product. Employee #1 attempted to
 climb out, but fell backward into the manhole. Employee #1 drowned in the bio-residue that was at the bottom of
 the manhole.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72............................         1995            1542  Pit................               2       108724915
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
At approximately 7:45 a.m. on November 9, 1995, Employees #1 and #2 were dismantling a scaffold that was
 approximately 12 ft above an open 45 ft by 60 ft excavation. Employee #1 allegedly fell into the pit on the
 west side. Employee #2 ran to the ladder on the east side of the pit to help. He collapsed at the bottom of the
 pit by the ladder. Employees #3 and #4 also went into the pit by the east side ladder. Employee #3 collapsed
 behind the ladder on a dirt mound about 3 to 5 ft above the bottom of the pit. While descending the ladder,
 Employee #4 began to feel lightheaded and weak in the knees, and was pulled out of the pit by two Reynolds
 employees. Two coworkers, who were fire brigade members, also responded to the emergency. One descended the
 ladder without SCBA and collapsed at the bottom of the pit on top of Employee #2. The other coworker also
 started down the ladder without SCBA, began to feel lightheaded and weak in the knees, and was pulled out by
 Reynolds employees. Employees #1 through #3 died of asphyxia and Employee #4 was hospitalized for approximately
 one month. Argon gas had been used instead of compressed air to operate a pump that removed water from the pit.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
76............................         1996            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       300602943
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 and a coworker were assigned to search for a missing plug in one of several manholes in an active
 sewer system. They opened three manholes, climbed down 12 ft, and used a flashlight to look in the 15 in.
 pipes. Employee #1 then went into a fourth manhole, where he was overcome by toxic gases. He died several hours
 later.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
77............................         1996            1629  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       300947256
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1, a laborer, and his foreman arrived at a manhole to open a mechanical valve at the bottom of the
 manhole. While Employee #1 was removing the manhole cover, the foreman was 5 ft away at his truck getting the
 air tester. When the foreman turned around to go back to the manhole, he saw the top of Employee #1's head
 disappear into it. The foreman then looked down into the manhole and saw that Employee #1 was unconscious. The
 foreman tested the air in the manhole and obtained a reading of 14% oxygen. He immediately called 911, and
 Employee #1's body was retrieved by the local fire department with the use of SCBAs. OSHA's testing of the
 manhole showed oxygen levels of between 12 and 14 percent. Tests for carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulfide, and
 flammable vapors were negative. Tests for carbon dioxide were positive, with a reading of 35,000 ppm.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
78............................         1997            1711  Pit................               1       116308453
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 was working at the bottom of a 10 ft deep pit when he passed out. A coworker who went down to rescue
 him started to feel sick, so he emerged from the pit and called for help. He then reentered the pit with a
 second coworker, who passed out before Employee #1 could be rescued. The first coworker was again able to
 escape. Emergency Services arrived and extricated Employee #1 and the second coworker from the pit. Employee #1
 died of asphyxia from inhalation of argon gas.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

79............................         1997            1794  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       127317493
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 4, 1997, Employee #1 entered a recently constructed 8 ft deep by 4 ft
 diameter manhole to retrieve a clod of dirt on the bottom. He was one his way out when he fell back in and lost
 consciousness. Employee #1 died of asphyxia. He apparently was overcome by high levels of methane gas.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
80............................         1997            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       122227283
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
At approximately 4:30 p.m. on August 4, 1997, Employees #1 through #3 were working on a sewer system project in
 a residential area. Employee #1 descended into a 12 ft deep manhole to apply jointing compound and to remove
 some laser sighting equipment. After several minutes, Employees #2 and #3 noticed that Employee #1 had
 collapsed. They shouted to the foreman, who ran to the manhole, surveyed the situation, and immediately called
 911 from his truck. Meanwhile, Employees #2 and #3 entered the manhole to rescue Employee #1. Employee #3 later
 stated that he did not notice any unusual odors, but that he and Employee #2 began to feel dizzy during their
 rescue efforts. They lifted Employee #1 to coworkers at the surface, after which Employee #3 climbed out of the
 manhole and collapsed. Employee #2 tried to ascend the ladder, but collapsed to the bottom of the manhole.
 Employees #2 and #3 were taken to separate hospitals and treated for carbon monoxide exposure. Employee #1 was
 taken to the emergency room, where he was pronounced dead. The autopsy report listed the cause of death as
 carbon monoxide inhalation. The employer had confined space entry procedures in place, but did not implement
 them. At the time of the accident, there was no rescue equipment near the manhole and testing was not done for
 toxic or combustible gases prior to the employees' entry. No mechanical ventilation was used for the manhole.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
82............................         1998            1794  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       127298925
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 died of asphyxiation when he entered a sewer bore casing. Employee #1 entered the sewer bore casing
 when the casing struck a rock and was unable to get out. A second employee also went into the casing but
 managed to get out.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
83............................         1998            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       301312757
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
A construction crew of four men was tying an old sewer line into the new sewer system. Employee #1 broke a plug
 within the new sewer line and began to climb up the ladder toward the opening of the manhole. Gas rushed from
 behind the plug and overcame him, causing him to fall back into the hole. The second employee saw Employee #1
 fall back into the manhole. He quickly went down to rescue him. The second employee partially reached the
 bottom of the hole before he decided to come back up. The two remaining employees eventually went down into the
 hole. The second employee managed to get out of the manhole and summon help. The Fire Department Rescue Team
 retrieved the third and fourth employees before they became totally incapacitated. Employee #1 died of
 asphyxiation. The other three employees were sent to the hospital for medical treatment.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
84............................         1998            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               2       110040383
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employees #1 and #2 were part of a construction crew building an extension sewer line that was to tap into an
 existing city line. The crew had exposed one side of a manhole in the city sewer line and a subcontractor had
 core-drilled a hole in it for placement of the new line. Some concrete remained intact after the drilling was
 completed. Employee #1 was lowered into the manhole using a chain draped over a rock bar. He was immediately
 overcome by the high levels of hydrogen sulfide. Employee #2 attempted to rescue him but was also overcome by
 the fumes. Both workers were killed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
85............................         1998            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       302098892
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 entered a 9 ft deep manhole to apply sealant to the connecting concrete rings. This was the last,
 and the deepest, of the six manholes he had entered. Shortly after reaching the bottom, Employee #1 was
 overcome by hydrogen sulfide gas that had collected in the manhole. He was killed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
86............................         1998            4911  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       301768784
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Some employees were installing a French drain system to collect water seeping from a slurry pond. The employees
 were entering the catch basin to do the final touch-up work by riding the bucket of a backhoe down into the
 basin. One of the employees, a 57-year old supervisor, was engulfed by vapors that were later found to be
 hydrogen sulfide. He died of inhalation of toxic fumes. Four other employees were hospitalized for exposure to
 the hydrogen sulfide.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

89............................         1999            7699  Tank...............               1       302710413
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
An employee was painting the interior of a 15,000-gallon water storage tank with epoxy primer paint. An airless
 spray was being used for this task. An organic vapor air purifying respirator was in use and three small
 exhaust fans were drawing from the 12-in. pipe openings in the tank. The employee was found dead at the bottom
 of the section of the tank used for initial filling and settling. There was no confined space program or
 procedure in place at the time of the incident and the employee was working alone without the knowledge of the
 supervisor(s). The medical examiner's report stated that death was caused by an overexposure to organic vapors
 consistent with those found in the paint formulation (MiBK, Toluene, Xylene). The Atlantic City Fire Department
 Confined Space Rescue Team had measured approximately 3 of the LEL for these vapors at the time they removed
 the deceased from the tank.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
90............................         1999            1799  Other..............               1       302558580
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 was spraying Sunflex, a waterproofing substance, inside the bottom half of a 7 ft by 5 ft by 9 ft
 concrete stoop while the coworker went to their truck to get more insulating boards. When the coworker
 returned, he found Employee #1 collapsed at the bottom of the stoop. Employee #1 was rushed to the hospital,
 where he later died.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
92............................         1999            1794  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       303139166
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 entered a new manhole approximately 21 ft in depth and was overcome, lost consciousness, and was
 unresponsive. Employee #2 entered the manhole in an attempt to rescue Employee #1 and was also overcome and
 lost consciousness. Two additional co-workers attempt[ed] to rescue Employee's #1 and #2 but became dizzy,
 disoriented and experienced shortness of breath. These employees were able to exit the manhole. The manhole had
 been installed approximately two weeks earlier and was placed over an existing and active sewer line which had
 not yet been tapped. Employee #1 was pronounced dead at the scene and Employee #2 was hospitalized.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
95............................         2000            1731  sewer/pipe/manhole.               2       119947521
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Two employees of an electrical contractor were working in a 7.9-meter-deep sump manhole at a water desalination
 facility site under construction. An employee of a general contractor found the employees unconscious at the
 bottom of the manhole. An outside rescue service from a local fire department responded and found the
 atmosphere in the manhole to contain 8 percent oxygen at the bottom of the sump. The two employees died of
 hypoxic asphyxia. Post accident evaluations found oxygen levels as low as 2 percent and elevated levels of
 nitrogen and carbon dioxide. The sump was found to be in contact with warm, moist soil through a series of
 interconnected perforated pipes designed to drain excess groundwater. It was suspected that biological activity
 in the surrounding soil consumed the available oxygen and generated excess levels of nitrogen and carbon
 dioxide.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
97............................         2000            1623  sewer/pipe/manhole.               2       303961155
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
At approximately 12:15 p.m. on September 26, 2000, Employees #1 and #2 were trying to unclog a sewer line.
 Employee #1 entered the north manhole to place a bucket that would catch all the debris coming out of the pipe.
 Employee #2 was able to release the blockage in the south manhole, and the water moved to the north manhole.
 Employee #1, who was still there, called for help and Employee #2 ran to his assistance. Both workers succumbed
 to gas present in the pipe, and died of asphyxia.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
98............................         2000            1771  sewer/pipe/manhole.               1       303185839
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 inserted an inflatable plug into a storm sewer pipe located at a street drain so that the pipe could
 be pumped of water in order to perform concrete work at the other end of the pipe. He was half way in the drain
 and was pushing on the inflatable plug to check its fit. The plug burst and blew him down an intersecting pipe
 where he drowned.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
99............................         2000            1799  Other..............               1       303682223
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employees #1 and #2, who worked for a nested maintenance contractor, were finishing the turnaround of the sulfur
 recovery complex at a refinery. They were removing a 14 in. isolation blind from the overhead inlet of a
 horizontal receiver vessel. The vessel was part of an amine treating unit that had been emptied, steamed out,
 and drained a few days before. After several attempts, the overhead piping had been replaced and the blinds had
 been removed and reinstalled. Employees #1 and #2 were working from a scaffold when they were exposed to strong
 hydrogen sulfide emissions from the vessel. Employee #1 staggered away, but within minutes had lapsed into
 unconsciousness and died. Employee #2 managed to escape and reach grade level. He was hospitalized for
 observation and released with no lasting effects. The vessel had accumulated sour gas from a connected overhead
 gas line, tied into nearby sulfur trains that were operating at relatively low pressure. The source was a
 single leaking 12 in. gate valve that had been closed and locked out. Employees #1 and #2 were working without
 respiratory protection or gas detection equipment. The valve inspection program, lockout/tagout program, and
 respiratory protections were found lacking. At the time of the accident, the foreman was also overseeing other
 crews at the site.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL NUMBER OF FATALITIES: 31

TOTAL NUMBER OF FATALITIES PREVENTABLE BY THE CONFINED-SPACES-IN-CONSTRUCTIONS PROVISIONS: 30
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OSHA IMIS database, analyzed by OSHA, Directorate of Standards and Guidance and Directorate of
  Construction.

    OSHA also reviewed the narratives for accuracy. OSHA found
duplicate fatalities reported for CONSAD Accident Numbers 65, 69, and
72, and removed those duplicates from the analysis. In this regard,
Appendix C.1 of the CONSAD Report erroneously shows two fatalities for
accident number 65, two fatalities for accident 69, and three
fatalities for accident 72. The IMIS database for these cases, however,
reported a total of one, one, and two fatalities, respectively. OSHA
then reduced the 34 fatalities cited in the initial IMIS data report to
a final total of 30 fatalities for the period of 1992 to 2000 to
account for the three duplicative fatalities, in addition to removing
the fatality described in CONSAD Accident number 67, discussed
previously. OSHA notes that the original CONSAD analysis may not
include all confined-space accidents. For example, the supplemental
analysis at the end of this chapter found several confined spaces where
there were electrical hazards; the CONSAD analysis did not include any
electrical hazards. It is possible that the original analysis
incorrectly excluded confined spaces when the only hazards were
electrical.
    Due to a confidentiality agreement with BLS, OSHA could not publish
detailed information about the CFOI data used in the PEA, and OSHA no
longer has access to the research file containing the data. To account
for the possibility of human error of the initial review of the CFOI
data, OSHA made a proportionate reduction in the total fatality count
of the CFOI data used in the PEA. Applying a factor of 30/34 (derived
from the adjusted count for IMIS fatalities due to reporting errors) to
the initial CFOI fatality count of 24, the total number of CFOI
fatalities decreased to 21.
    Therefore, for this FEA, OSHA concluded that a total of 51
construction-related fatalities due to confined-spaces entries occurred
during the nine-year period from 1992 to 2000. Full compliance with the
provisions of this standard would prevent an average of 5.7 fatalities
each year related to confined spaces in construction; applying a
probability prevention rate of 91 percent, the standard would prevent
5.2 fatalities each year.
    AGCA noted that the results from a survey of 74 of AGCA's members,
employing 28,900 full-time workers, showed no fatalities in confined
spaces, and only two fatalities in construction, between 2005 and 2007
(p. 59). The finding that 74 employers had no fatalities in confined
spaces over a three-year period does not detract from, or contradict,
OSHA's analysis. OSHA believes that such a result is perfectly
consistent with the estimate that, from 1992 to 2000, there was an
average of 5.7 preventable confined-space fatalities per year among the
millions of workers engaged in construction covered by this standard.
    Another comment from the AGCA report made several points asserting
that a standard on confined spaces in construction was unnecessary.
First, AGCA claimed that the rate of fatal and serious injuries ``in
the affected industries'' is declining, and, second, that OSHA's
analysis is deficient because it does not compare the construction
rates with rates across other industries. The report states that
``[t]he injury trends have cost and benefit implications for assessing
the proposal on a forward looking basis, which are not considered in
the OSHA report'' (p. 58). In this case, the analysis of confined space
incidents for the period 2006 to 2009 show a slight increase, rather
than a decline, in the number of fatalities as compared to the original
1992 to 2000 period analyzed for the original PEA. OSHA therefore finds
no reason to reduce benefits or costs as result of a long term trend
toward safer practices in confined spaces. The report does not support
its claim that OSHA's analysis was somehow deficient in not comparing
the rates of injury in construction with the rates in other industries,
but OSHA notes that construction activities generally have high injury
rates. Moreover, contrary to the commenter's assertion that the
fatality rate is declining in comparison to the older set of data
analyzed in the PEA, when OSHA analyzed newer fatality data from
between 2006 and 2009 (see Table IV-10) for the purpose of confirming
the result under the older data, OSHA did not observe any decline.
Instead, it found the annual fatality rate for confined spaces in
construction over this period to be higher than during the earlier
period.
    The National Utility Contractors Association (NUCA) urged OSHA to
model the construction rule on the general industry rule, as OSHA did
in this final rule. In this comment, NUCA stated:

    It is also our opinion that there is no sound evidence to
support the view that a new and separate standard for construction
will reduce the number of confined space injuries and fatalities. *
* * Therefore, issuing a new, separate standard for construction
will not only create untold confusion, but also an unnecessary
burden--with no improvement in safety--on all contractors who have
been successfully using the General Industry Standard as a guideline
to safe entry into confined spaces.

(ID-075.)

    NUCA also suggested the new classification system in the proposed
rule would have little benefit in terms of reduced accidents in
confined spaces, but did not provide specific data to support their
claims (ID-075). Other commenters pointed to the absence of fatalities
among employers that complied with the general industry standard when
engaged in construction activities (e.g., ID-035 and ID-113).
    As discussed extensively in the preamble, this final rule is much
more similar to the general industry rule than was the proposed rule,
and it includes a number of cost-saving measures not in the proposed
rule. For example, this final rule excludes work performed under
subparts S and entirely from the scope of the standard and allows
suspension of the permit in certain circumstances. At the same time,
the final rule for construction also includes several important
distinctions and clarifications in comparison to the general industry
standard. For example, the new rule defines the term ``controlling
employer'' and shifts some of the duties that the general industry

standard assigns to the host employer to the controlling employer. This
difference is important in the many situations, of which there are
several reported in the database, involving host employers who need
construction work but may not directly run the confined-space program.
    This final rule for construction also requires continuous
monitoring for atmospheric hazards during permit entries and during
entries under the alternative procedures specified in Sec.
1926.1203(e). With the improved technology available today, continuous
monitoring involves few costs beyond the cost of the regular monitoring
required by the general industry standard. Further, such monitoring is
necessary in confined spaces where conditions change as the work
progresses, either through the introduction of an unexpected substance
into the permit space, as in accidents number 68 and 78, or the
substances used as part of the work result in new hazards as in
accidents number 89 and 90.
    To further evaluate and confirm its finding that this final
standard would reduce the number of fatalities and injuries when
entering construction-related confined spaces, OSHA added a
supplemental table (Table IV-10 shown below) using more recent accident
data, and modified its methodology for selecting relevant confined-
space fatalities. The Agency did not rely on this data in reaching any
of the findings legally required to support this rulemaking, but the
Agency concludes that this supplemental analysis confirms the overall
validity of the data on which it based those findings.
    The Agency examined selected narratives of fatal accidents that
occurred in the years 2006 through 2009 and recorded in OSHA's IMIS
database. To identify fatal accidents in confined spaces, OSHA
conducted a terminology search of fatal accident narratives using a
list of several terms appearing in confined-spaces-in-construction
work.\42\ To limit the analysis to accidents related to construction
activities, OSHA identified construction-related accidents by those
employers classified under the two-digit Standard Industrial
Classification codes of 15, 16, and 17. As with the older data, OSHA
also screened the accidents for citations to subparts P (Excavations)
and S (Underground Construction). OSHA reviewed the cases and selected
only those cases covered by this final standard and that the final
standard would, with reasonable certainty, prevent if employer complied
fully with its provisions. In sum, OSHA identified 23 records involving
31 fatalities from 2006 through 2009 that met all of the above criteria
(construction-related activities; in SIC 15, 16, or 17; involved a
confined space covered by this final standard; and were preventable by
compliance with the provisions of the final standard). Table IV-10
presents these cases, along with a brief narrative for each case taken
verbatim from the IMIS records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The list of search terms included the following: Confined
space, hole, pit, bin, boiler, manhole, tank, incinerator, scrubber,
pier, sewer, transformer, vault, duct, storm drain, water main,
drilled shaft, enclosed, enclosed beam, crawlspace, trench, tunnel,
vessel, digester, lift station, cesspool, silo, air receiver, sludge
gate, air preheater, step up transformer, turbine, chiller, bag
house, mixer, reactor, and cofferdam.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the narratives demonstrate, these accidents usually resulted
from a failure to follow multiple provisions in the final standard. For
example, in several of the accidents listed in Table IV-10, workers
died or received injuries after entering confined spaces to attempt
rescue. These accidents were preventable had employers followed
appropriate rescue procedures, provided proper training, posted an
attendant to prevent unauthorized entry, or through a combination of
these steps, all prescribed by this final standard. In most other
examples, the prohibition on entry without a permit program in place
would prevent employee exposure to the hazard.
    For the purposes of determining how the different provisions of the
standard prevent the accidents identified in the supplemental analysis,
OSHA grouped the provisions by general purpose. For example, OSHA
grouped all provisions related to evaluation and classification of
standards into one heading called ``Classification and Evaluation,''
and grouped all of the provisions related to setting up and
implementing a permit system under the heading of ``Permit System''.
OSHA used these headings to avoid a confusing list of overlapping and
interdependent provisions, and to compare benefits to costs later in
this section.
    The Agency sometimes attributed an accident to a set of provisions
even though it was unclear from the accident abstract whether the
employer followed that provision on a voluntary basis. Therefore,
although OSHA accounts for baseline compliance in terms of costs, it
does not account for baseline compliance in terms of potential
monetized benefits. OSHA believes from the descriptions of the
fatalities and injuries presented in Table IV-10 that baseline
compliance with most provisions, though high when examining compliance
across all affected industries, was minimal in the situations in which
these accidents occurred. It is unlikely that the accidents detailed in
this chapter would occur had the affected firms had a proper confined-
spaces program in place. Following some groups of provisions, such as
ventilation and hazard isolation, would have assured that the accidents
could not have possibly happened.
    OSHA also used the term ``potentially'' in this analysis to
describe the prevention of some accidents because, as noted above, some
accident descriptions are unclear. The Agency also used the term
because some provisions, such as the training and information-exchange
provisions, do not directly and automatically prevent accidents, but
instead contribute to the likelihood that employers will correctly
follow other provisions and, therefore, prevent accidents. In the final
section of this chapter, OSHA presents a break-even sensitivity
analysis to examine further the number of injuries and fatalities that
would need to be prevented for the benefits of this standard to equal
its costs.
    In some cases, a state had a confined-spaces rule in place at the
time the accident occurred. In one accident, the state rule was a
comprehensive rule similar to this final rule. OSHA removed this
accident from the database. In other cases, the state rule included
only some of the provisions in OSHA's final standard. In these cases,
OSHA did not list provisions in the OSHA standard that are also
mirrored in the state rule, but listed the OSHA provisions not mirrored
in the state rule.
    In the remainder of this section, OSHA describes the groups of
provisions that it used in analyzing accidents, and the criteria for
determining whether the provision could potentially prevent the
accident. Some accidents involved more than one fatality, and, in these
cases, different sets of provisions might be relevant to different
fatalities.
    Evaluation, Classification, and Notification Provisions: This group
includes all provisions related to requirements to identify and
classify confined spaces, such as Sec. Sec.  1926.1203(a) and
1926.1203(b). The evaluation and classification provisions can trigger
other employer duties, such as an employer duty to prevent entry under
Sec.  1926.1203(c), or to condition entry in accordance with Sec.
1926.1203(d). For the purposes of this analysis, this group includes
the provisions of Sec.  1926.1203(c) that require employers to use
barriers or other means

necessary to prevent unauthorized entry to a confined space. Since no
other preventive measures would go into effect without such evaluation
and classification, OSHA found that these provisions had potentially
preventive effects for all accidents examined.
    Information-Exchange Provisions: This group includes all provisions
related to requirements for host contractors, controlling contractors,
and other contractors to exchange information, such as Sec.
1926.1203(h). The accident descriptions are unclear regarding
information-exchange activities. OSHA classified an accident as
potentially prevented by these provisions if the description indicated
the presence of more than one contractor or if the accident took place
in an existing structure (mainly sewers) where information about the
existing structure would almost certainly be known beforehand. OSHA did
not consider the accident potentially prevented by this provision if it
took place in a home or in new construction projects, unless there was
an indication of multiple contractors present. In those cases, there is
not typically a host employer with relevant knowledge about hidden
hazards available, but there may be multiple employers present. Because
the accident descriptions do not typically indicate whether there were
multiple employers on a site, this approach may underestimate the
number of multi-contractor sites.
    Permit-Program Provisions: This group includes the provisions
requiring a permit program or alternative procedures for entry, as well
as the requirements for setting up and implementing systems, such as
Sec. Sec.  1926.1203(d), 1926.1203(e), and 1926.1204(a). OSHA
determined that these provisions could have a role in potentially
preventing accidents in all situations except where the entry took
place by explicit orders of a supervisor or where the entry was for
rescue purposes. (These two exceptions might be violations of these
requirements, but it is unlikely that a permit system could prevent
casualties related to rescue entry (though they might prevent the need
for such entry) or entries explicitly approved by supervisors.) OSHA
also noted situations in which an entry seemed to be unnecessary (such
as entries to retrieve dropped items) and, therefore, was extremely
unlikely to take place under a permit system with clear prohibitions on
unauthorized entry. OSHA determined that all such accidents involving
unnecessary entries would be preventable had employers complied with
these provisions.
    Early-Warning-System and Atmospheric-Testing or -Monitoring
Provisions: This group includes all provisions that require or imply
the need for atmospheric testing or monitoring, including Sec.
1926.1203(a) (when monitoring is necessary for identification),
Sec. Sec.  1926.1204(b), 1926.1204(c), and 1926.1204(e). OSHA
determined that these provisions could have a role in preventing
accidents in all situations involving asphyxiation (whether due to lack
of oxygen or toxic gasses) or a build-up of explosive vapors. This
group also includes the requirement in Sec.  1926.1204(e)(1)(iii) to
monitor for non-isolated engulfment hazards, such as liquids flowing
through a sewer system. OSHA determined that this provision could
prevent accidents in which employees drown or asphyxiate when liquids
or other flowables that were not previously in the confined space
entered the space in the absence of barriers or other isolation methods
designed to contain such hazards.
    Ventilation and Hazard-Isolation Provisions: This group includes
all provisions that require or imply the need for ventilation, as well
as isolation of physical hazards, such as parts of Sec.  1926.1203(e)
and portions of Sec.  1926.1204. OSHA included an accident as
potentially preventable by these provisions whenever the accident
occurred as a result of a hazard inside the confined space. For most of
these accidents, either ventilation or hazard-isolation measures, such
as disabling and locking out electrical hazards temporarily, could
prevent the accident. For other accidents, such as some drownings,
arranging for the bypass of water or other liquid solutions might have
been possible, thereby preventing the accident.
    Provisions Requiring an Attendant: This group includes all
provisions that require or imply the need for an attendant when someone
is inside the confined space. The attendant in most cases has two
duties: (1) Assuring that continuous monitoring takes place (if it is
appropriate) and warning the person to exit the space if necessary; and
(2) conducting an appropriate non-entry rescue. For the purposes of
this analysis, OSHA listed an accident as potentially preventable had
an attendant been present if there was no notation of another person
present when someone entered the confined space. There are many other
situations in which the lack of an attendant may have been responsible
for the accident because the person present was not continually
assessing the conditions inside the permit space or was incapable of
conducting a non-entry rescue or summoning rescue or emergency
services; however, other provisions are more likely to potentially
prevent such accidents.
    Rescue-Capability Provisions: This group includes all provisions,
such as Sec. Sec.  1926.1204(i) and 1926.1211, that require the
development and implementation of a plan addressing rescue capability
and summoning emergency services, with the plan involving non-entry
rescue when feasible. For the purposes of this analysis, OSHA listed an
accident as potentially preventable by improved rescue capability for
(1) all cases of asphyxiation when quick removal of endangered workers
from the confined space and prompt treatment were necessary to prevent
the fatality, and (2) for other accidents, such as drowning and
electroshock, when timely removal and treatment might have an effect.
OSHA did not consider this provision to have the potential to prevent
deaths resulting from burns, even though it is possible that more
immediate treatment or rescue before combustion occurred would mediate
or prevent the accident. OSHA also noted under this provision the
special, and all too numerous, cases when the rescuer(s) became a
fatality.
    Training Provisions: This group includes all provisions that
require employers to develop and implement training, such as Sec. Sec.
1926.1207 and 1926.1208. OSHA found that better training could
potentially prevent all of the accidents, except for one accident that
was preventable using only appropriate physical barriers.
    Equipment Provisions: This group includes all provisions that
require the employer to (1) provide necessary equipment, such as
communication equipment, necessary for attendants to perform their
duties (Sec.  1926.1203(d)(3)), or (2) develop appropriate lighting
(Sec.  1926.1204(d)(5)). For the purposes of this analysis, OSHA listed
an accident as potentially preventable by these provisions when
employees working together had difficulties communicating or there was
an indication of inadequate lighting or general difficulty locating
physical hazards before contacting them. There are some provisions in
this group that OSHA did not analyze in terms of their potential to
prevent accidents. These provisions include requirements for barriers
and disposable coveralls. However, OSHA's methods of searching for
confined-space accidents could not identify the accidents that these
provisions would prevent.

                            Table IV-10--Confined Spaces in the Construction Industry
                                     Fatal Accidents and Injuries--2006-2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 1
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006..................................         1611  sewer......................               2       309775443
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
An employee climbed down into a sewer vault to retrieve a tool he dropped and lost consciousness. A second
 employee entered the sewer vault in an attempt to rescue his co-worker and also lost consciousness. Both
 employees died.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program (1 of 2 fatalities)
(Not Ventilation and Hazard Isolation; Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring; or Rescue
 Capacity because these were already required in the State where the accident took place)
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 2
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006..................................         1623  storm drain................               1       308437631
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 and his crew were installing storm drainage pipes in an older neighborhood. During the installation
 of the drainage pipes, damage had been caused on the existing natural gas pipe lines in the neighborhood. The
 odor of gas was present prior to the day of the installation, and the local gas company had been contacted to
 identify and repair the leaks. The smell of gas was still present and noticed by the supervisor, employees and
 others; however, the supervisor did not contact the gas company to investigate the odor, and to locate the
 leak. The supervisor also did not remove the employees from the excavation where the gas odor existed, and did
 not test the atmosphere of the excavation to determine if there was a hazardous atmosphere or condition in the
 excavation. The supervisor directed Employee #1 to enter the 48-inch diameter drainage pipe line to retrieve a
 laser surveying machine that was located approximately 90 feet within the pipe line. Natural gas that had
 escaped from two breaks in the gas line had accumulated within the storm drain pipe line. While Employee #1 was
 in the pipe line, the natural gas within it ignited. The specific ignition source was not identified. Even
 though severely burned, Employee #1 was able to exit the storm drain pipe line, and was taken to the hospital.
 Six days later, he died as a result of his injuries.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring
Attendant
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 3
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006..................................         1623  sewer......................               1       310350418
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Three employees were working on a sewer system that was newly installed and not yet in use. A section of the
 line had been plugged and tested for leakage. Employee #1 entered the sewer vault, which was approximately 15
 to 20 feet deep, to remove a plug. Employee #1 collapsed into approximately 6 inches of unidentified liquid at
 the bottom of the sewer vault. Employee #2 entered the sewer vault to assist Employee #1. Employee #2 also
 collapsed at the bottom of the sewer vault. Employee #3 attempted to provide assistance to Employees #1 and #2.
 Employee #3 began to feel ill about halfway down and then decided to emerge from the sewer vault. Fire/EMS
 Department responded to the scene. Co-workers of the employees attached a hose approximately 19 feet long to an
 air compressor and used it to blow air into the sewer vault. Employee #2 regained consciousness and was able to
 assist in rescuing Employee #1 and himself from the sewer vault. All three employees were transported to area
 hospitals. Employee #1 later died at the hospital. Employees #2 and #3 were treated, hospitalized, and released
 in the following days.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program
(Not Ventilation and Hazard Isolation, Atmospheric Monitoring, or Rescue capacity because these were already
 required in the State where the accident took place)
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 4
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1541  manhole....................               1       311032809
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1, while doing an elevation survey of the invert of a storm water pipe in a manhole, entered the
 manhole to find the bottom of the pipe. While in the manhole, Employee #1 was overcome due to a lack of oxygen
 and died. Employee #2 entered the same manhole, and was also overcome. Employee #2 was hospitalized and
 released the next day.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program (Entry very preventable)
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring Attendant
Rescue Capacity
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 5
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1623  lift station...............               4       307043844
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
The victim was in the process of assisting another company with the replacement of a sump pump in an underground
 lift station which collected draining and leached water from a construction debris landfill. Three employees of
 the other company entered the lift station and succumbed to exposure to hydrogen sulfide gas. The victim had
 entered the lift station in an attempt to assist/rescue the three victims from the other company, and also
 succumbed to hydrogen sulfide gas. Rescue services arrived at the scene and performed air quality monitoring
 which revealed that the victim and the three victims from the other company were exposed to concentrations of
 up to 200 PPM of hydrogen sulfide gas. Body retrievals were initiated at that point. The lift station was
 determined to be a permit-required confined space. The other company (host employer) had not evaluated the lift
 station to determine that it was a permit-required space. Both companies had not developed and implemented a
 written permit space program.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program (3 of 4 fatalities)
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring
Rescue Capacity (Attempted rescue resulted in a fatality)
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 6
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1623  manhole....................               2       310177456
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employees #1 and #2 were working in an approximately 7 ft diameter water vault located about 16 ft underground.
 The vault contained a 12 in. water main and a 4 in. water main that was equipped with a water meter. The vault
 had been constructed approximately ten days earlier and had sat undisturbed until the day of the accident, when
 the employees were scheduled to conduct a pressure test of the system. Employee #1, the foreman, went down into
 the vault to read the meter. When he did not return, Employee #2, a laborer, looked down through the manhole
 cover and saw Employee #1 laying on the ground. Employee #2 called out to a coworker that Employee #1 was down
 and then entered the vault through the manhole and climb down the ladder. The coworker came over to the manhole
 and saw Employee #1 on the ground and Employee #2 hanging upside down, with his leg caught between the ladder
 rungs. Neither employee responded to the coworker's calls. The coworker also started down the manhole but
 noticed an overpowering musty odor and abruptly stopped and exited. The Fire Department and paramedics
 responded to the job site and retrieved Employees #1 and #2, both of whom had died. At the time of rescue the
 Fire Department's four gas meters measured the oxygen level in the vault at approximately 9.2 ppm. In its
 referral to OSHA, the Fire Department referenced two workers who succumbed to an IDLH atmosphere.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program (1 of 2 fatalities)
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring
Rescue Capacity (Attempted rescue resulted in a fatality)
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 7
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1623  manhole....................               2       310253398
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 and Employee #2 were both asphyxiated when they entered a 12 ft manhole to perform grouting work.
 Employee #1 entered the 12 ft manhole and collapsed. Employee #2 entered the manhole to help Employee #1 and
 then Employee #2 collapsed. This was the company's first time performing sewer line work and Employee #1 and #2
 entered the space without required testing. The employer did provide a tripod winch system over the manhole
 with cable attached to rescue harness. In addition, a scott gas detector was used to detect any gases in hole;
 none was detected. The oxygen level however was 8 near the top of the hole and 3 at or near the bottom of the
 hole.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit program (1 of 2 fatalities)
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring Provisions
Rescue Capacity (Attempted rescue resulted in a fatality)
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 8
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1623  manhole....................               1       311354807
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 entered manhole to remove line plugs to activate a manhole sewer system, the manhole was 10.5 ft
 deep. The probable cause of death was H2S poisoning as a result of employee working in a sewer manhole; this is
 according to the county's forensic science department. The manhole had not been entered and was not monitored
 for toxicity, oxygen level or explosive levels. No tripod was in-place for emergency retrieval of Employee #1.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring Provisions
Attendant
Rescue Capacity
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported     Activity No. 9
                                            SIC                                     fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1721  crawl space................               2       126192012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1, a painting contractor, was hired by the property owner to apply primer over the creosote floor
 joists. Employee #1 and #2 were working in a crawl space under the bedroom of the residence applying primer to
 the floor joists. The incandescent work lamp or a broken light bulb ignited the vapors from the primer. The two
 employees were burned and died. The other employees suffered minor burn injuries. The contributing causal
 factors: The air in the crawl space was not flushed or purged of flammable vapors and no air testing to
 determine whether dangerous air contamination or oxygen deficiency existed. Arson and homicide investigators
 were called to the scene and were investigating the cause of the accident, which appeared to be accidental. The
 crawlspace was located underneath one of the bedrooms and was measured between 21 in. to 22 in. from the
 foundation to the floor of the bedroom.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program
(Not Ventilation and Hazard Isolation because this was already required in the State where the accident took
 place)
(Not Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring because this was already required in the State
 where the accident took place)
Attendant
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008..................................         1711  lift station...............               2       312320666
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:

Employee #1 entered a sewer lift station to check for leaks in the line. Employee #1 was overcome by hydrogen
 sulfide gas. A second employee entered the station to retrieve Employee #1, and also was overcome by the gas.
 Both employees died from overexposure to hydrogen sulfide gas.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring Provisions
Rescue Capacity (Attempted rescue resulted in a fatality)
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          11
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009..................................         1623  manhole....................               1       313122616
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #3 fell into a manhole and suffered a head injury and was life-flighted to the hospital. Employee #2
 became unconscious in a manhole and was rescued and life-flighted to the hospital. Employee #1 entered the
 manhole to attempt rescue of employee #2 and became unconscious and died before he could be rescued.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring Provisions
Rescue Capacity (Attempted rescue resulted in a fatality)
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009..................................         1791  tank.......................               1       311964886
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 was found unresponsive on scaffolding in the residential water tank in which he was performing stick
 welding on the interior overhead of the tank. He was removed from the tank, and emergency services summoned. He
 could not be revived. The medical examiner determined that core body temperature of employee #1 exceeded 109
 degrees Fahrenheit, indicating that the preliminary cause of death was hyperthermia.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation (ventilation required beyond the amount needed to address welding fumes)
Attendant
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009..................................         1794  manhole....................               1       309620219
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
An employee entered into 18-in. manhole to retrieve part of laser equipment and was overcome by methane and lack
 of oxygen. He died of asphyxiation.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program (Entry very preventable)
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring Provisions
Attendant
Rescue Capacity
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009..................................         1794  tunnel.....................               1       313553604
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
Employee #1 was inside a 24 inch pipe that ran through a tunnel underneath a highway. Employee #1 was
 approximately 140 feet inside the pipe when a rain storm flooded the pipe drowning the employee.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Information Exchange
Permit Program
Attendant
Rescue Capacity
Training
Early Warning System
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006..................................         1711  Crawl space................               1       309539559
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
On August 7, 2006, Employee #1, of Mesquite Plumbing Company, entered the crawl space of a house undergoing
 renovations to insulate a new plumbing fixture that a coworker had installed. During the course of his work he
 contacted a live wire and was electrocuted.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Attendant
Rescue Capacity
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006..................................         1623  manhole....................               1       310345053
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
On September 28, 2006, Employee #1, a construction worker, fell into a concrete manhole structure. He suffered a
 fractured neck and back. Employee #1 was flown by helicopter to the hospital, where he died.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Equipment (lack of cover or methods of assuring safety when a cover is removed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1521  crawl space................               1       120205794
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
On July 23, 2007, Employee #1, age 19, and a coworker were reinstalling an electrical outlet into a new bathroom
 wall after it had been removed from the pre-existing wall. The 120-volt outlet electrical box was energized and
 lying on the floor. Employee #1 went into a crawl space under the house while the coworker went to the
 electrical panel and shut off the power to the home. Employee #1 was having trouble seeing in the darkness of
 the crawl space, and he asked the coworker to turn on the power so he could use a halogen lamp that had a cord
 running up through the floor and into an outlet in the kitchen. When the coworker turned on the power, this
 also energized the electric conductors that Employee #1 was wiring in the junction box. He was lying on his
 back under the floor, on top of the water line for the home. This pipe had been used to ground the electrical
 system of the house when it was built and Employee #1 was electrocuted when he connected the wires. The
 coworker, hearing a noise, tried to communicate with Employee #1. When he did not get a response, he again
 turned off the electricity to the house. The coworker alerted the owner and tried to call 911 on his cell
 phone, but could not get through. He and the owner tried to call 911 on the house's land line, but it was
 electrically-based, and so they once again turned on the power to place the call. The owner then cut a hole in
 the floor, removed Employee #1 from the crawl space, and attempted CPR until paramedics arrived. The coroner
 stated cause of death was low voltage electrocution.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Attendant
Training

Equipment (lighting)
Rescue Capacity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007..................................         1741  boiler.....................               1       311213326
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
On December 11, 2007, Employee #1 was part of a crew engaged in stone work at a residential site. To complete
 the job, they covered the chimney with plastic. Once the plastic was in place, the coworkers went to put away
 the tools for the night, and left Employee #1 to stitch close [ ] any openings in the plastic covering. The
 chimney housed the vent for an Ultra 310 boiler system. When the coworkers returned, they found Employee #1,
 unconscious, in the plastic enclosure. He died of carbon monoxide poisoning.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program (Entry very preventable)
(Not Ventilation and Hazard Isolation or Rescue Capacity because this was already required in the State where
 the accident took place)
Attendant
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008..................................         1711  crawl space................               1       311794093
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
On or about 3:30 p.m. on November 6, 2008, Employee #1, a 31 year-old-male working for Atm Plumbing, was working
 in a crawl space under a private house. The crawl space was wet from recent rains. Employee #1 was using a
 manual operated pipe cutter to cut a water pipe when he received an electrical shock and became unconscious.
 Employee #2 was also under the house using a trouble light to illuminate the work area was not using a GFCI.
 Unbeknown to Employee #1 the water pipe that he was working on was also used for the electrical grounding
 system for the house. Employee #2 pulled him out of the crawl space. Paramedics transported Employee #1 to a
 local hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Attendant
Training
Equipment
Rescue Capacity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008..................................         1711  duct.......................               1       311815492
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:
On May 21, 2008, Employee #1 was with a crew installing a steel security grate inside the duct system of a 10-
 ton Trane air conditioning system (Model Number THC120A4RGAOW2B, Serial Number<PHONE_NUMBER>L) that was located on
 a roof. As he crawled into the duct to weld the grate into place, the back of his head contacted an energized
 heat strip on the air conditioning unit coil. Employee #1 was electrocuted. The electrical power to the air
 conditioning unit had not been deenergized and locked or tagged out.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Rescue Capacity
Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008..................................         1742  attic......................               1       312098551
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of Accident:

On May 17, 2008, Employee #1 was spraying foam insulation in the enclosed attic space of a two story, single-
 family home that was undergoing renovations. He had accessed the attic via an aluminum ladder through a hole in
 the second floor ceiling. A flash fire occurred, killing Employee #1. Inadequate ventilation contributed to the
 buildup of vapors. The ignition source was not determined.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Early Warning System and Atmospheric Testing or Monitoring (Work may have caused build-up of vapors)
Attendant
Training
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                                                                                Number of
                 Year                     Industry      Type of confined space       reported      Activity No.
                                            SIC                                     fatalities          22
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2009..................................         1731  crawl space................               1       313555591
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Description of Accident:
On August 18, 2009, Employee #1 was installing a new direct TV cable. Employee #1 was crawling under the house
 and came into contact with an energized wire. He was electrocuted.

Provisions That Could Potentially Have Prevented the Fatality:
Evaluation and Classification
Permit Program
Ventilation and Hazard Isolation
Rescue Capacity
Attendant
Training
Total Number of Fatalities: 30