[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 147 (Thursday, July 31, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 44603-44633]
[FR Doc No: 2014-18037]

Vol. 79

Thursday,

No. 147

July 31, 2014

Part VI

Environmental Protection Agency

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40 CFR Part 68

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs
Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 79 , No. 147 / Thursday, July 31, 2014 /
Proposed Rules

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 68

[EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328; FRL-9911-62-OSWER]
RIN 2050-ZA07

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7)

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Request for information.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in response to
Executive Order 13650, requests comment on potential revisions to its
Risk Management Program regulations and related programs. In this
Request for Information (RFI), the Agency asks for information and data
on specific regulatory elements and process safety management
approaches, the public and environmental health and safety risks they
address, and the costs and burdens they may entail. The EPA will use
the information received in response to this RFI to inform what action,
if any, it may take.

DATES: Comments and additional material must be received on or before
October 29, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments and additional materials, identified by
docket EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 by any of the following methods:
     http://www.regulations.gov: Follow the on-line
instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Send comments to: OSWER Docket, EPA Docket Center,
Mail Code 2822-1T, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania
Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20460, Attention Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-
2014-0328. Please include two copies of your comments.
     Hand delivery: Deliver two copies of your comments to:
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Docket Center, Room 3334, 1301
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC, Attention Docket ID No. EPA-
HQ-OEM-2014-0328. Such deliveries are only accepted during the docket's
normal hours of operation and special arrangements should be made for
deliveries of boxed information.
    Instructions: Direct your comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-
2014-0328. The EPA's policy is that all comments received will be
included in the public docket without change and may be made available
online at http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal
information provided, unless the comment includes information claimed
to be confidential business information (CBI) or other information
whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Do not submit information
that you consider to be CBI or otherwise protected through
www.regulations.gov. The http://www.regulations.gov Web site is an
``anonymous access'' system, which means the EPA will not know your
identity or contact information unless you provide it in the body of
your comment. If you submit an electronic comment, the EPA recommends
that you include your name and other contact information in the body of
your comment and with any disk or CD-ROM you submit. If the EPA cannot
read your comment due to technical difficulties and cannot contact you
for clarification, the EPA may not be able to consider your comment.
Electronic files should not include special characters or any form of
encryption and be free of any defects or viruses. For additional
information about the EPA's public docket, visit the EPA Docket Center
homepage at: http://www.epa.gov/dockets.
    Docket: The EPA has established a docket for this information
request under Docket ID Number EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328. All documents in
the docket are listed in the regulations.gov index. Although listed in
the index, some information is not publicly available, e.g., CBI or
other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Certain
other material, such as copyrighted material, will be publicly
available only in hard copy. Publicly available docket materials are
available either electronically in regulations.gov or in hard copy at
the EPA Docket Center, EPA West, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Ave. NW.,
Washington, DC. The Public Reading Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30
p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. The telephone
number for the Public Reading Room is<PHONE_NUMBER>, and the telephone
number for the EPA Docket Center is<PHONE_NUMBER>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For more detailed information on
specific aspects of this RFI, contact Mr. James Belke, Chemical
Engineer, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Emergency Management, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20460;
telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    Electronic copies of this RFI and related news releases are
available at EPA's Web page at http://www.epa.gov/emergencies. Copies
of this RFI are also available at http://www.regulations.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Here are the contents of today's notice.

I. Background
    A. Statutory Authority
    B. Executive Order 13650
    C. EPA Risk Management Program Regulations
II. Discussion and Request for Data, Information, and Comments
    A. Introduction
    B. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy
Changes
    C. Items in OSHA's RFI Relevant to EPA's RMP Regulation
    1. Update the List of Regulated Substances
    a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances
    b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives
    c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate
    d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards
    e. Adding Other Categories of Substances
    f. Removing Certain Substances From the List or Raising Their
Threshold Quantity
    g. Lowering the Threshold Quantity for Substances Currently on
the List
    2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements
    3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
    4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements To Cover Any Safety-
Critical Equipment
    5. Require Owners and Operators To Manage Organizational Changes
    6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits
    7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability
    D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information
    1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis
    2. Emergency Drills To Test a Source's Emergency Response
Program or Plan
    3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated
Substances
    4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements
    5. Compliance With Emergency Response Program Requirements in
Coordination With Local Responders
    6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements
    7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for
Processes Involving Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together
    8. Public Disclosure of Information To Promote Regulatory
Compliance and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks
    9. Threshold Quantities and Off-Site Consequence Analysis
Endpoints for Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline
Level Toxicity Values
    10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data
    11. The ``Safety Case'' Regulatory Model
    12. Streamlining RMP Requirements

I. Background

A. Statutory Authority

    The statutory authority for this action is provided by section
112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)) and by
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA),
(42 U.S.C. 11001-11050), which was enacted as Title III of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99- 499),
(SARA).

B. Executive Order 13650

    On August 1, 2013, President Obama signed Executive Order 13650,
entitled Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security. The Executive
Order establishes the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working
Group (``Working Group''), co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Administrator of EPA, and the Secretary of Labor or their
designated representatives at the Assistant Secretary level or higher,
and composed of senior representatives of other Federal departments,
agencies, and offices. The Executive Order requires the Working Group
to carry out a number of tasks whose overall aim is to prevent chemical
accidents, such as the explosion that occurred at the West Fertilizer
facility in West, Texas, on April 17, 2013.
    Section 6 of the Executive Order is entitled ``Policy, Regulation,
and Standards Modernization'', and among other things, requires certain
federal agencies to consider possible changes to existing chemical
safety and security regulations. Specifically, section 6(e)(ii) of the
Executive Order requires the Secretary of Labor to issue a RFI designed
to identify issues related to modernization of the Process Safety
Management (PSM) standard and related standards necessary to meet the
goal of preventing major chemical accidents. The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) published a RFI responsive to this
portion of the order on December 9, 2013 (78 FR 73756; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-09/pdf/2013-29197.pdf). The OSHA RFI
requested information on 17 potential policy and rulemaking topics
relating to modernization of the PSM standard and other related OSHA
standards.
    While Executive Order 13650 does not specifically direct EPA to
publish a similar RFI, EPA believes it is an appropriate step for
several reasons. First, section 6(a)(i) of the order requires the
Working Group to develop options for improved chemical facility safety
and security that identify ``improvements to existing risk management
practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives,
Government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations.'' With
regard to EPA specifically, section 6(c) of the order requires the
Administrator of EPA and the Secretary of Labor to ``review the
chemical hazards covered by the Risk Management Program (RMP) and the
Process Safety Management Standard (PSM) and determine if the RMP or
PSM can and should be expanded to address additional regulated
substances and types of hazards.'' Information collected through this
action will inform the results of this review.
    Second, the EPA RMP regulation closely tracks the accident
prevention measures contained in the OSHA PSM standard because Section
112(r)(7)(D) of the CAA requires EPA to coordinate the RMP regulation
with ``any requirements established for comparable purposes'' by OSHA.
Consequently, the OSHA PSM standard and EPA RMP regulation are closely
aligned in content, policy interpretations, Agency guidance, and
enforcement. Since the inception of these regulations, EPA and OSHA
have coordinated closely on their implementation in order to minimize
regulatory burden and avoid conflicting requirements for regulated
facilities. For example, owners and operators of RMP-covered processes
also subject to the OSHA PSM standard will generally have met their RMP
accident prevention program obligations if they have properly
implemented their PSM program. This RFI will allow EPA to evaluate any
potential updates to the RMP regulation in parallel to OSHA's
evaluation of potential updates to the PSM standard. Lastly, this RFI
addresses a number of added topics in which the Agency is interested
that are not raised in the OSHA RFI.
    Topics are divided into two categories--those addressed in parallel
to the OSHA RFI, and additional topics not raised by OSHA. Readers are
encouraged to review the OSHA RFI in detail, as this notice does not
always reiterate OSHA's full justification on the same or similar
topics.
    Information collected under this RFI will inform EPA as it
considers what actions, if any, may be necessary to update the RMP
regulations. It does not commit the Agency to rulemaking. If the Agency
elects to undertake rulemaking, it will do so in accordance with
established rulemaking procedures as set forth in the Clean Air Act
section 307(d), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d).

C. EPA Risk Management Program Regulations

    Both EPA's 40 CFR part 68 RMP regulation \1\ and OSHA's 29 CFR
1910.119 PSM standard were authorized in the Clean Air Act (CAA)
Amendments of 1990 (1990 CAAA), in response to a number of catastrophic
chemical accidents occurring worldwide that had resulted in public and
worker fatalities and injuries, environmental damage, and other
community impacts. OSHA published the PSM standard in 1992 (57 FR 6356,
February 24, 1992), as required by section 304 of the 1990 CAAA, using
its authority under 29 U.S.C. 653.
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    \1\ 40 CFR part 68 is titled, ``Chemical Accident Prevention
Provisions,'' but is more commonly known as the ``RMP regulation,''
the ``Risk Management Program,'' or ``the RMP.'' The RMP may also
refer to the document required to be submitted under subpart F of 40
CFR part 68, the Risk Management Plan. This document generally uses
RMP or Risk Management Program to refer to 40 CFR part 68. See
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/rmp/ for more information on the Risk
Management Program.
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    The 1990 CAAA added to the accidental release provisions under CAA
section 112(r). The statute required EPA to develop a list of at least
100 regulated substances for accident prevention and related thresholds
(CAA section 112(r)(3)-(5)), authorized accident prevention regulations
(CAA section 112(r)(7)(A)), and required EPA to develop ``reasonable
regulations'' requiring facilities with over a threshold quantity (TQ)
of a regulated substance to undertake accident prevention steps and
submit a ``risk management plan'' to various local, state, and federal
planning entities (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)).
    EPA published the RMP regulation in two stages. The Agency
published the list of regulated substances and TQs in 1994 (59 FR 4478,
January 31, 1994) (the ``list rule'') \2\ and published the RMP final
regulation, containing risk management requirements for covered
sources, in 1996 (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996).3 4 Both the
OSHA PSM standard and the EPA RMP regulation aim to prevent or minimize
the consequences of accidental chemical releases through implementation
of management program elements that integrate technologies, procedures,
and

management practices. In addition to requiring implementation of
management program elements, the RMP regulation requires covered
sources to submit a document summarizing the source's risk management
program--called a risk management plan--to EPA. The RMP regulation
required covered sources to comply with its requirements and submit
initial risk management plans to EPA by June 21, 1999.
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    \2\ Documents and information related to development of the list
rule can be found in the EPA docket for the rulemaking, docket
number A-91-74.
    \3\ Documents and information related to development of the RMP
regulation can be found in EPA docket number A-91-73.
    \4\ The 40 CFR Part 68 RMP regulations apply to owners and
operators of stationary sources that have more than a TQ of a
regulated substance within a process. The regulations do not apply
to chemical hazards other than listed substances held above a TQ
within a regulated process.
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    The RMP establishes three ``program levels'' for regulated
processes:
    Program level 1 applies to processes that would not affect the
public in the case of a worst-case release and with no accidents with
specific off-site consequences within the past five years. Program 1
imposes limited hazard assessment requirements and minimal prevention
and emergency response requirements.
    Program level 2 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 or
subject to Program 3, and imposes streamlined prevention program
requirements, including safety information, hazard review, operating
procedures, training, maintenance, compliance audits, and incident
investigation elements. Program 2 also imposes additional hazard
assessment, management, and emergency response requirements.
    Program level 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 and
either subject to OSHA's PSM standard under federal or state OSHA
programs or classified in one of ten specified North American
Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes listed at 40 CFR
68.10(d)(1). Program 3 imposes elements nearly identical to those in
OSHA's PSM standard as the accident prevention program. The Program 3
prevention program includes requirements relating to process safety
information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training,
mechanical integrity, management of change, pre-startup review,
compliance audits, incident investigations, employee participation, hot
work permits, and contractors. Program 3 also imposes the same hazard
assessment, management, and emergency response requirements that are
required for Program 2.
    EPA believes the RMP regulation has been effective in preventing
and mitigating chemical accidents in the United States and protecting
human health and the environment from chemical hazards. However, major
incidents, such as the West, Texas explosion, highlight the importance
of reviewing and evaluating current practices and regulatory
requirements, and applying lessons learned to advance process safety
management where needed. This RFI seeks public input on process safety
and risk management issues relevant to the RMP regulation to inform
potential actions that may further reduce the number of chemical
accidents within the United States.

II. Discussion and Request for Data, Information, and Comments

A. Introduction

    This section discusses each RMP item and provides specific
questions to collect data, information, and comments. The Agency
invites the public to respond to any questions for which they have
specific knowledge, data, or information, regardless of their
involvement in RMP-covered operations. Note that at several points in
this document, we discuss whether modifying, clarifying, strengthening,
or making more explicit a requirement is an appropriate way to address
an issue. The solicitation of comment on these matters should not be
read as EPA, OSHA, the Department of Justice, or any other federal
entity suggesting legal ambiguity in the relevant regulations or
recognizing a particular interpretation by any regulated entity of
either CAA section 112(r) or the RMP regulation. For purposes of this
comment solicitation, exploration of ways to further clarify particular
aspects of the current regulations should not be viewed as an
indication that the current language is inadequate, or in any way
undermines our ability to enforce these regulations as written.

B. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy
Changes

    As part of this RFI, the Agency is requesting data and information
on the potential costs and economic impacts of amending regulatory
requirements relevant to the various issues identified, including any
possible significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. EPA requests that commenters discuss potential economic
impacts, whenever possible, in terms of quantitative benefits (e.g.,
reductions in injuries, fatalities, and property damage), costs (e.g.,
compliance costs, including paperwork burden, or decreases in
production), and offsets to costs (e.g., less need for maintenance and
repairs, less loss or waste of product) when responding to the
questions in this RFI. EPA also requests that commenters provide data
and information on economic effects that any amendments may have on
market conditions or services (e.g., market structure and
concentration), and in particular, any special circumstances related to
small entities, such as potential market-structure disruptions or
uniquely high costs that small entities may bear.
    EPA requests that commenters discuss economic impacts in as
specific terms as possible. For example, if a regulatory or policy
change would necessitate additional employee training, then helpful
information would include the following: The training courses
necessary; the types of employees or contractors who would receive the
training; topics covered; any retraining necessary; and the training
costs if conducted by a third-party vendor or in-house trainer. The
Agency invites comment on the time and level of expertise required to
implement potential regulatory or policy changes discussed in this RFI,
even if dollar-cost estimates are not available. For discussion of
equipment-related costs, EPA requests that commenters estimate relevant
factors, such as purchase price, cost of installation, cost of
equipment maintenance, cost of training, and expected life of the
equipment. The Agency also requests that, when responding to the
questions in this RFI, commenters discuss any disproportionate impacts
to communities near chemical facilities, particularly with respect to
economically distressed, low-income, or predominantly minority
communities. For example, disproportionate impacts could be changes
that affect the number of local residents employed at a facility or the
number of residents affected by a release from a facility. Commenters
should also include specific information about any technical
feasibility issues or implementation challenges associated with any of
the possible revisions discussed in thie RFI. EPA also welcomes input
on which potential amendments to regulatory requirements should be
given priority for further development over any others along with the
basis for such prioritization. For example, identify those issues
posing a greater safety risk than others; those requiring less time or
effort to amend; those with less costs to industry; or other reasons.

C. Items in OSHA's RFI Relevant to EPA's RMP Regulation

    This section discusses items that are the same or related to items
in the OSHA RFI that could also apply to or affect the RMP regulation.
Each item discussion is followed by specific questions to collect data,
information, and comments on each item.

1. Update the List of Regulated Substances
    Section 112(r)(3) of the 1990 CAAA authorized EPA to develop a list
of at least 100 substances which, in the case of an accidental release,
are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death,
injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or to the
environment. EPA was required to use, but was not limited to, the list
of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) published under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), with modifications as
appropriate. The initial list was also to include 16 substances
specified by statute. EPA was to consider the following criteria: (1)
The severity of any acute adverse health effects associated with
accidental releases of the substances; (2) the likelihood of accidental
releases of the substances; and (3) the potential magnitude of human
exposure to accidental releases of the substances. The TQ for each
substance was to account for the toxicity, reactivity, volatility,
dispersibility, combustibility, or flammability of the substance, and
the amount that if accidentally released could cause death, injury or
serious adverse effects on human health. The list may not include any
air pollutant for which a national primary ambient air quality standard
has been established (except anhydrous sulfur dioxide which is required
by statute to be included on the list), nor any CAA title VI
stratospheric ozone pollutants. The list may be revised by EPA or by
petition and it must be reviewed at least every 5 years.
    The August 1999 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and
Fuels Regulatory Relief Act amended section 112(r)(4) of the CAA to
exempt from RMP reporting ``a flammable substance when used as a fuel
or held for sale as a fuel at a retail facility . . . because of the
explosive or flammable properties of the substance, unless a fire or
explosion caused by the substance will result in acute adverse health
effects from human exposure to the substance, including the unburned
fuel or its combustion byproducts, other than those caused by the heat
of the fire or impact of the explosion.'' However, flammable substances
used as a feedstock or held for sale as fuel at a wholesale facility
are still covered.
    The list now consists of two categories of chemicals--77 toxic
substances and 63 flammable substances. The regulated substances and
TQs are found in 40 CFR 68.130. The list of toxic substances is based
on a subset of the EHS acute toxics found in 40 CFR part 355. The RMP
list of substances was further limited to gases and volatile liquids
(vapor pressure equal to or greater than 10 mm of mercury (Hg) at 25
[deg]C), focusing accident prevention regulations on those chemicals
that were more likely to become airborne and have an adverse effect
beyond a facility's fence line in the event of an accidental release.
    Flammable gases and volatile flammable liquids with the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) flammability ratings of 4 (i.e.,
gases and liquids having a flash point below 73 [deg]F (22.8 [deg]C)
and a boiling point below 100 [deg]F (37.8 [deg]C)) were listed. Only
chemicals in commercial production were included on the list and
several non-EHS toxic chemicals were listed based on high production
volumes and accident history. Most of the sixteen substances mandated
by statute were also identified through the listing criteria for toxic
or flammable substances.
    The 1994 final list rule included as covered chemicals, any ``high
explosives'' which were explosives classified by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) as Class 1, Division 1.1 and listed as such in 49
CFR 172.101 (the Hazardous Materials Table). Subsequently, the
explosives were deleted from coverage in 1998 (63 FR 640, January 6,
1998) \5\ due to settlement of litigation with the Institute for
Manufacturers of Explosives (IME) (discussed in more detail below).
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    \5\ Documents and information related to deleting explosives
from the list of RMP-regulated substances can be found in EPA docket
number A-96-08.
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    EPA is requesting information on whether the Agency should modify
the list of regulated substances by:

 Adding other toxic or flammable substances
 Adding high and/or low explosives
 Adding ammonium nitrate
 Adding reactive substances and reactivity hazards
 Adding other categories of substances
 Removing certain substances from the list or raising their TQ
 Lowering the TQ for substances currently on the list

    Each of these areas is briefly discussed below.
a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances
    EPA is interested in determining whether there are other substances
that meet the established acute toxicity or flammability criteria for
listing, are in commerce, and are present in sufficient quantities that
would present a risk to the community if accidentally released.
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    i. What other chemical lists or other sources of information should
be reviewed to identify acutely toxic or flammable chemicals meeting
the RMP listing criteria?
    ii. What chemicals, if any, should EPA add to the RMP list of
regulated toxic and flammable substances? Please provide references to
the acute toxicity studies, sources of flammability information or
summary results of such studies, information showing that the chemical
meets the listing criteria or examples of incidents related to the
hazards associated with the chemicals.
    iii. Please provide any information on the annual amount of the
individual substance manufactured, imported or used, the extent of its
availability in commerce and the types of U.S. industries that
manufacture, import, or use the substance.
    iv. What would be the economic impacts of adding other toxic or
flammable chemicals to the RMP list of substances? Are there any
special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider
with respect to adding such chemicals to the RMP list of substances?
b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives
    In light of the April 17, 2013 explosion in West, Texas involving
ammonium nitrate (AN) fertilizer, EPA is reconsidering whether it
should include explosives on the RMP list. In addition to raising
concerns about AN, this accident has shifted attention to how well
facilities handling other potentially explosive materials are
safeguarding communities from their hazards and whether emergency
responders are prepared to deal with accidents involving such
materials, whether or not they are designed to be used as explosives.
This subsection of the RFI addresses explosives other than AN--Further
discussion of regulating AN, including AN fertilizer, is covered later
in this section.
    EPA listed high explosives on the RMP list in 1994 but removed them
on January 6, 1998 (63 FR 640) (see discussion below regarding
settlement of litigation with IME).
    The 1994 final RMP list rule (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994)
included Division 1.1 explosives--a category of high explosives defined
by DOT classification. DOT Division 1.1 explosives are those that
present a mass explosion hazard, which is an explosion that affects
almost the entire load instantaneously. Explosives were

initially listed because of their potential to cause off-site effects
from blast waves. In addition, EPA believed that potential gaps existed
in emergency planning and response communication that made risk
management planning appropriate for sources with explosives.
    EPA chose to list only DOT Division 1.1 explosives because EPA's
analysis indicated that low explosives, which primarily pose a fire
hazard rather than a mass explosion hazard, were less likely to cause a
catastrophic event when compared to the same quantity of high
explosives. The deflagration or burning of a low explosive generates
lower pressures and is less destructive than the detonation of a high
explosive, although the Agency recognized that it may be possible for
some low explosives to detonate under unusual conditions, with effects
similar to the detonation of a high explosive. The DOT Division 1.1
explosives were listed because of their potential to readily detonate,
causing off-site impacts. High explosives were listed as a class,
rather than as individual substances, because explosives are usually
mixtures or formulations rather than specific chemicals. An individual
chemical could be a component of a high explosive or a low explosive,
or could be non-explosive, depending on various factors, such as
particle size, concentration, and other components of the formulation.
    The Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) petitioned for judicial
review challenging the final listing of high explosives (IME v. EPA,
D.C. Cir. No. 94-1276). Among IME's objections to the rule were that
existing regulations by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF), DOT, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA),
and OSHA already adequately regulated DOT Division 1.1 explosives. In a
settlement with IME, the Agency agreed to propose delisting explosives
and IME agreed to undertake certain measures to enhance local emergency
response and dismiss its case if EPA ultimately delisted high
explosives (61 FR 13858, March 28, 1996). The measures that IME agreed
to take included the following:
     IME member companies would post at their facilities
warning signs at all normal access routes stating, ``Danger. Never
Fight Explosive Fires. Explosives are stored on this site,'' and
providing an emergency phone number.
     Whenever a new Division 1.1 commercial explosives storage
or manufacturing location is established at a temporary job site, IME
member companies will notify Local Emergency Planning Committees
(LEPCs) and other local authorities (e.g., fire departments and law
enforcement agencies) of the type, quantity, and location of explosives
on site.
     At Division 1.1 commercial explosives storage or
manufacturing locations with 5,000 pounds or more of Division 1.1
explosives (not including temporary job sites) where preparation of
emergency response plans is not already required, IME member companies
would prepare emergency response plans, notify LEPCs and other local
authorities of the type, quantity, and location of explosives on site,
provide the emergency response plans to local emergency responders, and
respond to reasonable requests for information from said authorities.
     IME member companies also would inform their customers and
IME would inform other non-IME commercial explosives manufacturers of
the contents of the Settlement Agreement and the actions to be taken.
    EPA proposed to delist high explosives from the RMP list on April
15, 1996 (61 FR 16598) and removed high explosives in a January 6, 1998
final rule (63 FR 640). The preambles to both rules discuss the
measures IME was to take to enhance local emergency response.
    Even after the removal of high explosives from the RMP list, most
forms of explosives (not just high explosives) remain subject to
hazardous chemical inventory reporting requirements under EPCRA. The
owner or operator of any facility with more than a reporting threshold
of any hazardous chemical requiring a safety data sheet (formerly
material safety data sheet) under the OSHA Hazard Communication
Standard is required to submit safety data sheets to their State
Emergency Response Commission (SERC), LEPC, and local fire department,
and to annually report their inventory of hazardous chemicals to their
SERC, LEPC, and local fire department.\6\ This information should
better prepare local authorities to respond to emergencies at
facilities that handle hazardous chemicals, including explosives.
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    \6\ See 40 CFR part 370.
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    ATF regulates ``explosive materials'' which are defined as
explosives, blasting agents, water gels and detonators. Explosive
materials include, but are not limited to, all items in the ``List of
Explosive Materials,'' which is published annually.\7\
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    \7\ The 2013 List of Explosive Materials can be found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-28/pdf/2013-25370.pdf.
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    ATF regulations \8\ provide specific construction requirements for
storage of explosive materials in magazines and limit the amount of
these materials that can be stored in each magazine. Such magazines
must be regularly inspected and meet the Table of Distance requirements
which specify distances that the materials must be stored away from
inhabited buildings, public highways, and passenger railways, to ensure
an accidental explosion will not produce blast waves that are hazardous
to people at distances where the public could be affected. ATF inspects
licensed facilities to ensure the safe and secure storage of
explosives, their proper inventory and control, and accurate
recordkeeping. However, ATF does not inspect or regulate manufacturing
processes.\9\
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    \8\ 27 CFR part 555, Subpart K.
    \9\ Sierra Chemical Co. Final Investigation Report, CSB, 9-23-
1988.
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    OSHA regulates the manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale,
transportation, and use of explosives and blasting agents under its
Occupational Safety and Health Standards for explosives and blasting
agents (29 CFR 1910.109). Section 1910.109(k)(2) of this standard also
requires that explosive manufacturers meet the requirements of the PSM
standard (29 CFR 1910.119). OSHA regulations provide construction
requirements for explosive materials storage magazines and specify
minimum distances between magazines with explosives and blasting
agents, between stores of AN and blasting agents, and between blasting
agents and inhabited buildings, passenger railroads, and public
highways. Regulations involving the storage of all grades of AN,
including fertilizer grade, but not blasting agents, are found at 29
CFR 1910.109(i).
    Significant accidents involving explosives have raised questions
concerning whether existing safety regulations are adequate. An April
8, 2011 explosion at Donaldson Enterprises in Waikele, Hawaii, killed
five workers who were disposing of fireworks. The U.S. Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigated the explosion and
determined that gaps in federal regulations--specifically with regard
to dismantling and disposal of explosives--contributed to the
accident.\10\ The January 7, 1998, explosion at the Sierra Chemical
Company's Kean Canyon explosives manufacturing plant prompted the state
of Nevada to develop regulations

covering certain explosives manufacturing facilities under the state's
Chemical Accident Prevention Program,\11\ which is similar to EPA's RMP
regulation.
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    \10\ CSB Report No. 2011-06-I-HI.
    \11\ http://ndep.nv.gov/bapc/capp/capmore.html.
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    EPA is seeking information relating to the potential regulation of
explosives under the RMP. EPA requests information on the following
questions:
    i. Should EPA reconsider listing explosives on the RMP list? What
are the safety gaps in current regulations and practice (e.g., EPCRA,
other federal programs, state programs, and industry efforts) that can
best be filled by expansion of the RMP? Are there other approaches for
filling any such safety gaps? What type of explosive materials should
be covered and why? How many facilities manufacture, store or use
explosives and what are the typical quantities stored on-site by type
of facility or industry? What TQs should be established, and what
should be the basis for the TQs? If EPA were to list explosives and
establish a TQ at 5,000 pounds (the same TQ that was established for
explosives in the 1994 list rule), how many facilities would exceed
that TQ and potentially be regulated?
    ii. Are there other incidents involving the manufacture and
processing of explosive materials that should be reviewed to determine
if covering these operations under the RMP would decrease the risk of
an accidental explosion affecting an off-site community? Does the
presence of explosives impose unique risks on rural, disadvantaged, or
otherwise environmentally burdened communities?
    iii. Should the RMP regulation apply to manufacturers of
explosives, end users, and/or explosive recyclers?
    iv. If the RMP regulation is amended to cover explosives, should
EPA consider establishing requirements for safe separation distances
between explosive materials and public receptors similar to those
required by ATF and OSHA (see section II.D.4 of this RFI for additional
discussion of stationary source location requirements)? What other
requirements should EPA consider? Which if any of these requirements
could have prevented or minimized the impacts of specific historical
accidents?
    v. What would be the economic impacts of adding explosives to the
RMP list of substances? Are there any special circumstances involving
small entities that EPA should consider with respect to adding
explosives to the RMP list of substances?
    vi. As an alternative to expanding the scope of the RMP, would
expanded use of EPCRA information (such as better integration of
information on explosive hazards into local emergency plans) and other
governmental and industry programs (including voluntary programs) be
able to address safety gaps? What are the advantages and disadvantages
of such an approach relative to expansion of the RMP?
c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate
    As previously discussed, EPA listed high explosives on the RMP list
in 1994 but removed them on January 6, 1998 (63 FR 640). Some forms of
AN formulated as explosives would have been covered under the 1994 RMP
list rule, but the rule would not have included AN fertilizer, which
was not classified as and was not intended to function as an explosive.
However, the explosion at West Fertilizer has highlighted the explosive
properties of AN fertilizer under certain conditions (heat, shock,
contamination and/or confinement) and its potential to adversely impact
communities if it decomposes and detonates.
    Industry manufactures millions of tons of AN annually in the United
States. High-density or fertilizer-grade AN, with Chemical Abstracts
Service Registry Number (CASRN) 6484-52-2, is commonly used in
fertilizer; low-density or technical-grade AN is used to manufacture
explosives or blasting agents. Approximately 80% of AN is used in
explosives and blasting agents and 20% is used as a fertilizer.
    Blasting agents are relatively low sensitivity explosives which
cannot be initiated by blasting caps and are unlikely to explode except
under special conditions. A blasting agent is a fuel plus oxidizer,
intended for blasting, and not otherwise classified as an explosive.
Blasting agents are frequently formulated with AN as the oxidizer.
    Ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO or AN/FO) is a blasting agent
widely used in coal mining, quarrying, metal mining, and civil
construction. Mining and construction sites that use ANFO may not be as
likely to have explosions adversely affecting the public because they
are often remote.
    AN has an NFPA instability rating of 3, indicating it is capable of
detonation, explosive decomposition, or explosive reaction; ignition
requires a strong initiating source or heating the substance under
confinement. Stored AN is generally stable, but explosions of AN can be
severe and have resulted in many injuries and fatalities.
    There are several examples of accidents involving AN. As discussed
earlier, on April 17, 2013, an AN explosion at the West Fertilizer
Company storage and distribution facility in West, Texas involving
about 30 tons of AN killed 15 people and injured over 160 others. As an
initial action, EPA and its partner agencies OSHA and ATF issued an
updated chemical advisory on the safe storage, handling, and management
of AN.\12\
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    \12\ Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and Management
of Ammonium Nitrate, EPA 550-S-13-001, published by EPA, OSHA, and
ATF, August 2013. http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/AN_advisory.pdf.
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    The deadliest industrial accident in United States history was an
AN explosion in Texas City, Texas, on April 16, 1947. In that case, the
initial explosion of a ship carrying AN, and the subsequent chain
reaction of fires and explosions in other ships and nearby oil-storage
facilities, killed at least 581 people and injured thousands of others.
The AN was coated with wax, a combustible material, to prevent caking.
New process technologies and safe practices introduced in the 1950s
eliminated the use of wax coatings and AN currently produced for
fertilizer use contains less than 0.2 percent combustible material.
Ammonium nitrate with more than 0.2 percent combustible substances is
now regulated by DOT as an explosive material with specific storage
requirements and restrictions in cargo vessels.
    On September 21, 2001, a massive explosion occurred in a warehouse
at the Azote de France fertilizer factory in Toulouse, France,
involving 200-300 tons of AN, which was stored in bulk in a hangar. The
explosion resulted in the death of 30 people, 2,500 injuries, the
destruction of the factory, and an additional 10,000 buildings being
heavily damaged. The exact cause of this accident remains unknown.
Storage of incompatible material with AN is believed to have been a
factor.
    On December 13, 1994 at Terra Industries in Port Neal, Iowa, AN
solution exploded in a neutralizer vessel in a manufacturing process
that was in standby mode, causing four deaths.\13\ The blast resulted
in major plant damage, including damage to on-site ammonia tanks,
creating an ammonia cloud that resulted in the evacuation of 2,500
people.
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    \13\ http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/cterra.pdf.
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    EPA is requesting information on how to best address the safe
storage, handling and risk management of AN. Despite its widespread use
as an explosive and as a fertilizer, AN explosions are rare, but when
they do

occur, can result in deaths, injuries, and extensive property damage.
    Currently, AN is not a listed substance under the RMP regulation.
29 CFR part 1910.109(k)(2) requires that the manufacture of explosives
shall also meet the requirements contained in Sec.  1910.119, thus
manufacturing of explosives containing AN would be covered under PSM
regulations. OSHA does not regulate AN storage and handling by
distributors and users under the PSM standard, but it does regulate
certain processes and activities involving AN under other specific
standards (see below). Therefore, under federal regulations, AN
distributors, such as bulk fertilizer retailers, are not required to
implement any RMP or PSM accident prevention program elements (such as
conducting a process hazard analyses, developing written operating
procedures, etc.), perform an off-site consequence analysis, or develop
an emergency action plan or emergency response plan.
    ATF regulates the storage and handling of AN as an explosive
material (either as part of an explosive or as a blasting agent) (27
CFR 555.201-224). The ATF regulations specify construction requirements
for storage magazines, limitations on the type and amount of material
that can be stored in each type of magazine and minimum distances that
must be maintained between AN in explosive materials and public
receptors and between AN and explosives and blasting agents.
    OSHA regulates the storage, handling, and transportation of AN when
it is used in explosives, water slurries, gels or blasting agents
(29CFR 1910.109 (a)-(h), (k)) or when stored on-site with explosives or
blasting agents, including their storage at use sites and mixing and
packaging operations. The requirements detail various procedures and
safeguards that must be followed for these operations. The OSHA
standard requires minimum specified separation distances between AN and
explosives or blasting agents stored on the same site. Construction
requirements for buildings and bulk storage bins containing blasting
agents (which can contain AN) are also specified.
    OSHA also regulates bulk storage of AN over 1,000 pounds in a
building or structure in the form of crystals, flakes, grains, or
prills including fertilizer grade, dynamite grade, nitrous oxide grade,
technical grade, and other mixtures, but not blasting agents,
containing 60 percent, or more, AN by weight, in 29 CFR 1910.109(i).
This standard limits the dimensions of piles of bagged AN and bulk AN
in storage bins, and specifies the conditions for storage and the type
of the construction materials for storage bins. The standard does not
specify minimum separation distances between stored AN and public
receptors such as are required for explosives and blasting agents. The
standard requires separation of AN from incompatible or combustible
materials and use of fire-resistive building materials if combustible
materials are stored within a certain distance. A building with more
than 2,500 tons of bagged ammonium nitrate must be equipped with an
automatic sprinkler system.
    OSHA's PSM standard covers some reactive chemicals. Ammonium
nitrate, although it is a reactive chemical (oxidizer) and met the
original criteria that OSHA used to add substances for coverage, was
not covered by the PSM standard. The Explosives and Blasting Agents
standard is a specification standard based on a consensus standard,
while PSM is a performance-based standard and would require employers
to put management systems in place that would include requirements to
evaluate hazards and follow industry recognized best practices. As
explained above above, OSHA issued an RFI seeking, among other items,
comments on potential revisions to its PSM standard and its Explosives
and Blasting Agents standard. The RFI specifically invited comments on
safe work practices for storing, handling, and managing ammonium
nitrate and on regulatory requirements to improve its approach to
preventing the hazards associated with ammonium nitrate. OSHA is
working to determine whether ammonium nitrate hazards are best handled
in the Explosives and Blasting Agents standard, the PSM standard, or a
combination of both, and will pursue any appropriate regulatory changes
as expeditiously as possible. As OSHA develops its approach to improve
workplace safety associated with ammonium nitrate hazards, EPA will
consider if additional action to protect the community is needed to
complement OSHA regulations. EPA is considering whether the coverage
provided to ammonium nitrate facilities will be sufficient or whether
ammonium nitrate should be included in the RMP regulation.
    Because past AN accidents with adverse effects off-site, such as
blast waves, have typically involved its storage in large quantities,
EPA could list AN on the RMP list with a high threshold in order to
prioritize process safety requirements for those facilities and
locations where large amounts of AN are stored. When EPA had included
high explosives on the RMP list, the TQ was based on a trinitrotoluene
(TNT) equivalent weight; EPA could determine a threshold amount for AN,
based on a TNT-equivalent weight calculation adjusted for AN.\14\ The
RMP requirements for AN could be established at the statutory minima
with more specific provisions tailored to particular types of
facilities, e.g., manufacturers, fertilizer distributors and other
facilities that have large amounts of explosives, blasting agents or
fertilizers. EPA is authorized under CAA section 112(r)(5) to establish
a greater TQ for, or to exempt entirely, any substance that is a
nutrient used in agriculture when held by a farmer. Therefore, farmers
who hold AN for use as a fertilizer could be exempted entirely in the
same way as EPA has exempted farmers holding ammonia for use as a
fertilizer (see 40 CFR 68.125).
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    \14\ TNT equivalent-weight calculation is a method for
estimating the quantity of an explosive required to produce blast
effects at various distances from the source of the explosion. The
method uses the scaling law of distances, which relates quantity of
explosive material and distance for a given overpressure. For
explosives other than TNT, an empirically-derived equivalency factor
is used to account for differences between the explosive
characteristics of the actual explosive and those of an equivalent
weight of TNT. Additional information on EPA's threshold methodology
for high explosives can be found in the Technical Background
Document, Development of Threshold Quantities for List of Regulated
Substances for Accidental Release Prevention, Clean Air Act Section
112(r). See: Technical Background Document for the Development of
Threshold Quantities for List of Regulated Substances for Accidental
Release Prevention, Clean Air Act Section 112(r). Original
Docket A-91-74, document  III-B-2, June 21, 1992.
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    Alternatively, under CAA 112(r)(7)(A), EPA could require safe
storage practices of solid AN forms similar to the practices required
in the OSHA standard for Explosives and Blasting Agents at 29 CFR
1910.109(i) or in the NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code, Chapter 11.
Promulgating regulations separate from the RMP requirements may be more
appropriate to cover facilities whose handling of this chemical does
not involve typical manufacturing and processing operations normally
seen with chemicals that are hazardous gases and liquids, such as
fertilizer distribution facilities. However, manufacturers of AN who
handle molten and liquid AN in processes involving chemical reactions,
at elevated temperature and pressure, or in process vessels, tanks,
pumps and associated control equipment may be more appropriately
covered by the RMP regulation.
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    i. Are there safety gaps in the current regulations for AN that
could be

addressed using regulations under CAA section 112(r)? Should EPA
regulate AN under CAA section 112(r) authority to improve chemical
safety practices at facilities handling AN? What types of AN and AN
facilities should be subject to the RMP regulations to prevent chemical
accidents involving AN that could have adverse effects, such as blast
overpressure, on the public, environment and off-site property? Should
EPA consider safety regulations to cover the storage and handling of AN
fertilizer only and continue to rely on ATF regulations and OSHA
standards to cover AN in explosives and blasting agents? What role
should voluntary industry programs (such as the one undertaken by IME
for high explosives) have in a decision on whether safety gaps exist
that warrant regulation under the RMP? Please discuss the economic
impacts associated with the potential regulation of AN under CAA
section 112(r), including any special circumstances involving small
entities that EPA should consider.
    ii. Should EPA amend the RMP requirements to address the hazard
posed by AN? If so, what specific requirements would be appropriate for
AN? Alternatively, should EPA use its regulatory authority under CAA
112(r)(7)(A) to require more tailored safety steps for facilities
handling AN and list AN at a high threshold to better focus these
requirements on fewer holders of large quantities that pose the
greatest risk? What would be the benefits of regulating AN under the
RMP regulations as opposed to only maintaining the current SDS and
hazardous chemical inventory reporting already required under EPCRA?
    iii. If EPA were to regulate AN under 40 CFR part 68, what quantity
of AN poses a sufficient hazard to be covered? What would be the basis
for establishing this TQ?
    iv. Does your facility store, handle, or manage AN? If so, in what
form (e.g., solid, liquid) and in what grade (e.g., high density, low
density)? If you are not a manufacturer of AN, how does your facility
process or use AN? What quantities of AN are typically stored at your
facility at one time?
    v. Are there any other standards, including consensus standards,
applicable to AN storage, handling, and management that your facility
follows? If so, which ones?
    vi. Please provide any data or information on accidents involving
the storage, handling, and management of AN that affected people or
property.
    vii. Please provide data on the population surrounding AN sites,
including socio-economic information and other environmental burdens on
surrounding communities.
    viii. If EPA were to regulate AN under CAA Section 112(r), should
EPA exempt farmers who store AN for use as a fertilizer? How many
farmers would be eligible for such an exemption? Should there be any
limits on such an exemption, such as maximum quantity on-site at any
given time? Please provide the reasoning and any available data
supporting your views.
d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards
    Although the chemicals listed in 40 CFR 68.130 were listed based on
their toxicity or flammability, a number of them could be considered
reactive chemicals based on a variety of metrics, including consensus
standard sources. For example, the RMP list currently includes three
chlorosilanes listed as toxic substances.\15\ These compounds are
included on the list because their levels of acute toxicity based on
animal studies met the RMP listing criteria. However, they primarily
produce acute toxic effects on exposed populations because of their
rapid and intensive reaction with moisture in the air to produce
hydrogen chloride, which can cause acute injury to any body tissue
contacted as well as nasal, throat, or lung irritation, coughing,
wheezing, and shortness of breath. Nevertheless, while certain listed
substances such as these are reactive, the RMP list does not
specifically focus on reactive chemicals. There are other chemicals
that do not meet the RMP listing criteria, but could potentially be
listed based on the hazards of their reaction byproducts (e.g., other
chlorosilanes that produce hydrochloric acid upon release to the air).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ These include methyltrichlorosilane (CASRN 75-79-6),
dimethyldichlorosilane (CASRN 75-78-5), and trimethylchlorosilane
(CASRN 75-77-4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA has long been aware of the hazards associated with reactive
chemicals. In the January 19, 1993 proposed rule for listing substances
(58 FR 5102), we considered whether to include on the list chemicals
whose reactive properties could cause effects, in the event of an
accident, that would impact nearby communities. In order to meet the
conditions in CAA section 112(r)(3) for the listing of substances, EPA
sought to determine the common physical-chemical characteristics or
properties that would be used as criteria to identify a set of
chemicals to be listed and to provide the technical basis for these
criteria. For toxic and flammable substances, the listing criteria
included inherent properties of the chemical substances, such as
physical state or boiling point, that are indicators of the potential
to pose a severe threat to the community. EPA attempted to evaluate the
hazards associated with reactive substances and develop an adequate
technical basis to determine potential effects on the community. One
difficulty is that it is not feasible for national listing decisions to
take into account process- and site-specific factors, which can vary
widely. EPA has instead addressed these factors in the accident
prevention regulations (e.g., owners and operators implement hazard
controls based on a PHA or hazard review that identifies the specific
hazards of their regulated processes). Using criteria from other
organizations, for example, an NFPA instability rating of 4 assigned to
materials that are readily capable of detonation, explosive
decomposition, or explosive reaction at normal pressures and
temperatures provides important information but gives little indication
of the potential impact on a community from an accident that takes
place inside an industrial facility. The 1993 proposed rule requested
comments from the public on approaches that could be used to evaluate
the consequences to communities from incidents involving reactive
substances. However, very few comments were received and no specific
methods or listing criteria were identified by commenters. Several
commenters suggested that a small number of highly reactive chemicals,
specifically those that have toxic byproducts as a result of
degradation or combustion, and have been involved in serious accidents,
be added to the list. Several other commenters suggested deferring the
listing of reactive substances based on the complexity of the technical
issues, the lack of a methodology to screen reactive hazards, and the
expectation that reactive substances are unlikely to migrate off-site.
    Serious accidents involving reactive chemicals have called
attention to their hazards and raised questions regarding whether
reactive chemicals are adequately regulated. In response to a 1995
chemical explosion that killed five workers at Napp Technologies, Inc.,
in Lodi, New Jersey, OSHA and EPA investigated the accident and
concluded in a jointly-issued report \16\ that the explosion was most
likely triggered by an uncontrolled chemical reaction of water, sodium
hydrosulfite, and aluminum powder. However this

investigation did not result in any changes in OSHA or EPA regulations.
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    \16\ EPA/OSHA, EPA/OSHA Joint Chemical Accident Investigation
Report--Napp Technologies, Inc., Lodi, New Jersey (EPA-550-R-97-002,
October, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In August 2000, after investigating a runaway reaction at Morton
International in Patterson, New Jersey that injured nine employees, the
CSB initiated a comprehensive review of reactive hazards nationwide and
issued a final report \17\ in 2002 with recommendations to reduce the
number and severity of such incidents. The report recommended that EPA
revise the RMP regulation to address catastrophic reactive hazards that
have the potential to seriously impact the public, including those
resulting from self-reactive chemicals and combinations of chemicals
and process-specific conditions. It also recommended coverage of
chemicals based on a class of highly reactive properties, similar to
the way the existing PSM standard defines a class of flammable liquids
or gases. The CSB argued that a performance-based approach to
evaluating reactive hazards would allow for both a comprehensive
analysis and flexibility in implementation, but cautioned that a proper
analysis would require expertise in reactivity hazards.
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    \17\ CSB, Hazard Investigation--Improving Reactive Hazard
Management, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(Report No. 2001-01-H, October 2002). http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/ReactiveHazardInvestigationReport.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CSB also recommended that EPA modify the accident reporting
requirements in risk management plans and in ``RMP*Info'' (EPA's
database for risk management plans) to define and record reactive
incidents and add the term ``reactive incident'' to the four existing
``release events'' in EPA's current 5-year accident reporting
requirements (Gas Release, Liquid Spill/Evaporation, Fire, and
Explosion). According to CSB, structuring the information collection in
this way would allow EPA and its stakeholders to identify and focus
resources on industry sectors that experienced the incidents; chemicals
and processes involved; and impacts on the public, the workforce, and
the environment. Consequently, in 2004 EPA amended the format for risk
management plan submissions to include uncontrolled chemical reactions
on the list of possible accident causes that covered sources may select
when completing five-year accident history reports. Since amending the
format, 29 reactive chemical incidents have been reported in RMPs
submitted to EPA. In total, these accidents resulted in zero deaths, 48
injuries, 190 people evacuated, approximately $3 million in off-site
property damage, and approximately $33 million in onsite property
damage. Processes in 16 different NAICS codes were involved in these
incidents; however, processes in NAICS 325211 (Plastics Material and
Resin Manufacturing) accounted for 9 of the incidents. No other NAICS
code accounted for more than 3 incidents.
    One approach to regulating reactive hazards is the approach adopted
in the New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA), which
includes a ``List of Individual Reactive Hazardous Substances,'' as
well as a list of ``Reactive Hazard Substances Mixture Functional
Groups.'' \18\ TCPA includes substances with certain functional groups
and molecular structures that have been identified as highly reactive,
based on scientific research and accident history. Under the TCPA,
covered facilities must determine if any of the chemicals they are
intentionally mixing include components on the Functional Group list.
If so, then the facility must determine the heat of the reaction and
the corresponding TQ for TCPA coverage. This approach takes into
account not only certain specific chemicals, but also their overall
reactivity in determining the level of coverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act is the
state's process safety regulation. It adopts the federal RMP
requirements, and includes additional state-level requirements. See
http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/index.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2010, the NFPA published the first edition of its Hazardous
Materials Code (NFPA 400). NFPA 400 was subsequently updated in 2012
(i.e., NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code, 2013 Edition).\19\ NFPA 400
specifies storage, use, and handling requirements for various
categories of hazardous materials, including unstable (reactive) solids
and liquids, water reactive solids and liquids, and others. EPA could
adopt similar requirements as the basis for reactive hazards
regulations.
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    \19\ http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/product.asp?pid=40013&cookie_test=1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA is considering including reactive chemicals on the RMP list and
is seeking information on potential approaches to addressing reactive
hazards, including the approach used in the TCPA, application of the
requirements contained in NFPA 400, or others. EPA requests information
on the following questions:
    i. What are the best criteria to use in classifying reactive
hazards? How do you identify a reactive chemical or a reactive mixture?
    ii. Should EPA add reactive chemicals to the list of RMP-covered
chemicals in 40 CFR 68.130? If so, which chemicals? What criteria
should EPA consider using to establish TQs for reactive chemicals?
Should EPA add only specific chemicals, or groups of chemicals defined
by particular chemical characteristics?
    iii. Should EPA list additional chlorosilanes as toxic substances
on the RMP list due to their reactive hazard due to formation of
hydrochloric acid when a chlorosilane is accidentally released into the
air and reacts with moisture?
    iv. If your facility is covered by the New Jersey TCPA, have those
requirements been effective in protecting human health and the
environment from reactive hazards? Please describe any economic impacts
associated with TCPA coverage (e.g., costs and benefits, cost savings,
shifts in usage of reactive chemicals, special circumstances involving
small entities, etc.).
    v. Should EPA revise the RMP regulation to use chemical functional
groups similar to those in the TCPA \20\ to define hazardous reactive
mixtures? If so, which chemical functional groups should EPA use?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The definition of ``reactive hazard substance (RHS)
mixture'' in the TCPA references a list of chemical functional
groups specified in N.J.A.C. 7:31-6.3(a), Table I, part D, Group II.
Whether any of the chemical functional groups are present determines
in part coverage of an RHS mixture under the TCPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    vi. Does your facility follow NFPA 400 for reactive hazards? If so,
please describe the economic impacts associated with following NFPA 400
(e.g., cost of additional equipment, cost of additional training,
benefits of quality management, special circumstances involving small
entities, etc.). Is following NFPA 400 an effective way of protecting
human health and the environment from reactive hazards? Please explain.
    vii. Has your facility implemented a reactive-hazards management
program other than a program specified by the TCPA and NFPA 400? If so,
please describe your facility's program, whether it protects human
health and the environment more or less than the TCPA and NFPA 400,
whether it is voluntary or mandatory and, if the latter, under what
authority, any economic impacts associated with the program, and any
special circumstances involving small entities.
    viii. What alternative regulatory approach to TCPA or NFPA 400, if
any, should EPA consider using to address reactive hazards? What would
be the economic impacts of this approach and would there be any special
circumstances involving small entities? Are there specific requirements
that EPA should consider adding to the RMP regulations to ensure that
owners and

operators adequately manage reactive hazards?
    ix. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near
misses, or other safety-related incidents involving reactive hazards
not covered under the existing RMP regulation. What reactive-hazards
management requirements might have prevented these incidents if they
had been included in the RMP regulation?
e. Adding Other Categories of Substances
    This section addresses substances which are not traditionally
classified as highly toxic, flammable, or explosive but that have
nonetheless caused or contributed to serious accidents. Other
categories of substances beyond highly toxic and flammable liquids and
gases could cause death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human
health or the environment in the event of an accident. For example,
certain types of flammable and explosive solids and non-volatile
liquids can explode and cause blast waves that have the potential to
injure people and cause property damage beyond a facility's fence line.
Such explosions or detonations could involve categories of chemicals
not currently regulated as RMP substances or previously discussed in
this section as potential additions to the RMP list. Examples of these
include organic peroxides, oxidizers, combustible dusts or other
flammable solids.
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    i. Should EPA consider adding organic peroxides, oxidizers,
combustible dusts, flammable solids, or other additional types of
chemicals to the RMP list? Are there any particular chemicals belonging
to these or other classes which present a high hazard that could cause
adverse effects beyond a facility's fence line in the event of an
accidental release?
    ii. If a particular new category of chemicals should be considered
for inclusion on the RMP list, what criteria should be used to
prioritize the hazard(s) and determine which chemicals should be
listed?
    iii. If EPA were to add combustible dusts to the lists of covered
chemicals, are there categories of dusts, such as agricultural dusts
(e.g., grain dust, pesticide dust, etc.), that should be excluded? What
factors, such as existing handling practices, accident history, and
potential risk to surrounding communities should EPA consider in
evaluating potential exclusions?
f. Removing Certain Substances From the List or Raising Their Threshold
Quantity
    EPA is also seeking information on whether certain substances
should be removed from the current list of regulated substances. There
are six RMP chemicals (four toxic, two flammable) for which EPA has
never received a RMP report. The four toxic chemicals are arsenous
trichloride (CASRN 7784-34-1), cyanogen chloride (CASRN 506-77-4),
sulfur tetrafluoride (CASRN 7783-60-0), and tetramethyl lead (CASRN 75-
74-1). The two flammable chemicals are: chlorine monoxide (CASRN 7791-
21-1) and ethyl nitrite (CASRN 109-95-5). EPA's 2012 Chemical Data
Reporting (CDR) information on the production and use of chemicals
manufactured or imported into the United States also showed no
facilities reporting any data for these six chemicals, when searched by
CASRN.\21\ EPA's Envirofacts system,\22\ which contains reporting on
chemicals from the various environmental databases and reporting
systems managed by EPA, also did not show any reports for these six
substances, when searched by CASRN. A search of the E-Plan database,
which contains EPCRA Tier II Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory
reports for most states, showed that four of the six chemicals were
reported in E-Plan for filing year 2012, but only one facility each
reported for three of the chemicals and five facilities reported for
sulfur tetrafluoride. However, E-Plan only contains reports from about
40 states, and for several of these, the database does not contain
complete information. The search results show that four of the six
chemicals are in commerce, although the Tier II amounts reported on
site were below RMP reporting thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ http://www.epa.gov.cdr/. However, manufacturing or
production volume data was only required for CDR when 2011 site-
specific production volume for reportable chemicals equaled or
exceeded 25,000 pounds. Chemicals manufactured only for non-TSCA
uses such as pesticides or chemicals regulated by the FDA are not
required to be reported under CDR. Also, small manufacturers
(including importers) are generally exempt from CDR requirements if
their annual company sales do not exceed certain limits.
    \22\ http://www.epa.gov/enviro/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One of the sixteen substances mandated by Congress for the initial
listing of regulated substances for accident prevention was toluene
diisocyanate (TDI). In order to ensure that all forms of TDI were
listed, the RMP list of toxic substances contains three listings
representing this chemical, including both the 2,4 and 2,6 isomers
(also listed as EHSs) and unspecified isomers or mixture of isomers
(not listed as an EHS), all of which have distinct separate CAS
Registry numbers.

Toluene, 2,4-diisocyanate.........  CASRN...............        584-84-9
Toluene, 2.6-diisocyanate.........  CASRN...............         91-08-7
Toluene diisocyanate, unspecified   CASRN...............      26471-62-5
 isomer.                                                            \23\

    Although the vapor pressure for TDI is relatively low at ambient
temperature (< 0.5 mm Hg) and does not meet the vapor pressure listing
criteria of >= 10 mm Hg for a regulated toxic substance, EPA believed
that the language of CAA section 112(r)(3) precluded the Agency from
omitting TDI from the initial list of RMP substances. The Senate Report
on its version of the 1990 CAAA \24\ says ``the Administrator is not
authorized to remove substances from the initial list.'' The format of
CAA 112(r)(3), which mandates the initial list contain certain
chemicals and requires a more expansive list by rulemaking, first
appears in the Senate Bill. However, the statute itself does not
prohibit later deletions of substances that were mandated for inclusion
on the initial list. The final enacted CAA section 112(r)(3) authorizes
both additions and deletions from the list, in contrast to the version
in the Senate Report that only authorized additions.\25\ The enacted
language is similar to the structure of the hazardous air pollutant
(HAP) ``initial list'' under CAA section 112(b), which authorizes
revisions and deletions and is cross-referenced in CAA section
112(b)(3) for its revision procedures. Fifty-three accidents involving
TDI have been reported in RMP accident history reports since 1995, but
none of these resulted in fatalities or off-site injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ This CASRN is used for the ``generic TDI'' for any mixture
of the 2,4-TDI and 2,6-TDI isomers, of varying ratio between the two
specific isomers.
    \24\ Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1989, Senate Report No. 228, 101st Congress, 1st
Session 211 (1989), page 220.
    \25\ See Senate Report at 560 (section 129(c)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently the TQ for all three TDI listings is 10,000 pounds. EPA
is considering whether the TQ for TDI

should be higher because its much lower vapor pressure would result in
a lower volatilization rate and less potential for an air release. The
current TQs were assigned based on a ranking scheme using a Level of
Concern (LOC) based on acute toxicity and the potential for airborne
dispersion. For each chemical, a ranking factor was calculated that
equaled the LOC divided by an air dispersion factor (V). Chemicals were
assigned TQs of 500, 1,000, 2,500, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 or 20,000
pounds based on the order of magnitude ranges of the ranking factors.
The LOC was based on the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
(IDLH) level developed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) or an approximation of the IDLH based on animal
toxicity data. For gases, V = 1, while for liquids, V was based on a
volatilization model using the molecular weight and boiling point of
the chemical. The TQ methodology is described in detail and the ranking
factors for each chemical are provided in the Technical Background
Documents for the Development of Threshold Quantities,\26\ which are
available in the public docket for this notice. The minimum level of TQ
was set at 500 pounds to represent a drum sized container. The highest
TQ of 20,000 pounds represented typical handling quantities and allowed
the range of thresholds to better reflect the relative hazards among
the listed toxic chemicals.
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    \26\ USEPA. June 21, 1992. Technical Background Document for the
Development of Threshold Quantities for List of Regulated Substances
for Accidental Release Prevention, Clean Air Act Section 112(r).
Original Docket A-91-74, document  III-B-2.
    USEPA. January 14, 1994. Technical Background Document
Supporting Development of Threshold Quantities for Regulated
Substances under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. Original
Docket A-91-74, document  V-B-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Applying EPA's TQ ranking methodology, the ranking factor for TDI
was 0.73, which was midrange for the toxic substances assigned the TQ
of 10,000 pounds. Other toxic chemicals assigned the 10,000 pounds TQ
had ranking factors ranging from 0.3 to 0.9. The acute toxicity of TDI
is relatively high compared to most of the other toxic chemicals. The
LOC toxicity value of TDI is 0.07 g/m\3\ (10 ppm) and the LOC toxicity
values for the other toxic chemicals range from 0.0025 g/m\3\ to 4.9 g/
m\3\ (the lower the LOC toxicity value, the more toxic the chemical).
    Although the vapor pressure of TDI is much less than the cutoff
vapor pressure of 10 mm Hg used to select other liquid toxic
substances, the air dispersion factor (V) does not use the vapor
pressure at ambient temperature to determine the volatilization rate.
Instead, the equation for calculating V uses the boiling point of the
chemical to reflect worst case conditions of accidental releases that
are likely to involve heat (e.g., fires, exothermic runaway reactions,
or upset process conditions), which cause more rapid volatilization of
the liquid.
    To assign TDI a TQ based on its vapor pressure, a different
rationale would have to be used for determining the threshold such as
using ambient liquid temperature conditions instead of boiling liquid
temperatures for calculating the air dispersion factor V. EPA is
requesting information on whether the methodology for assigning TQs
should be changed to account for the much lower vapor pressure of TDI,
and if so, information on a rationale for how it should be done.
    One consideration for retaining TDI on the list of substances
despite its low vapor pressure is that TDI is known as a potent dermal
and lung sensitizer. In sensitized individuals, exposure to even small
amounts of diisocyanates may cause allergic reactions such as asthmas
and severe breathing difficulties. The LOC toxicity value for TDI was
based on a 1990 IDLH value of 10 ppm, which has since been revised to
2.5 ppm.\27\ The Acute Exposure Guideline Level-2 (AEGL-2) for a 1-hour
exposure has been established at 0.083 ppm \28\ which is a
concentration above which it is predicted that the general population,
including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or
other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired
ability to escape (see section II.D.9 later for further discussion
about AEGLs). However, neither the revised IDHL or AEGL values are
based on exposures of individuals or animals sensitized to TDI. Thus,
some accidental releases of TDI that would not cause severe acute
health effects in most individuals, may trigger breathing problems or
severe allergic reactions in sensitized individuals. The sensitizing
nature of TDI should be considered when evaluating whether to raise the
TQ of TDI and perhaps should be considered as a reason for lowering the
TQ instead of raising it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/584849.html.
    \28\ http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/tsd47.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One of the flammable chemicals on the RMP list, 1,3-pentadiene
(CASRN 504-60-9), fails to meet the flammability criteria discussed
earlier in this section. Its inclusion in the RMP list of flammable
substances was due to a typographical error in the boiling point of the
substance as reported by one reference source. NFPA had listed the
boiling point for 1,3-pentadiene as -43 [deg]C,\29\ but according to
other data sources, it is actually + 43 [deg]C, which is above the
cutoff of 37.8 [deg]C for an NFPA flammability 4 rating. NFPA has since
corrected the boiling point and changed the flammability rating to
3.\30\ Therefore, 1,3- pentadiene does not meet the flammability and
volatility criteria for RMP-listed flammable substances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ NFPA. 1994. NFPA 325 Guide to Fire Hazard Properties of
Flammable Liquids, Gases and Volatile Solids, 1994 ed. National Fire
Protection Association, Pg 325-77.
    \30\ NFPA. 2010. NFPA Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous
Materials, 14th ed., Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids,
Gases, and Volatile Solids. National Fire Protection Association.
Pg. 325-95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    i. Would it be appropriate for EPA to delete TDI (a substance
mandated by Congress to be included on the initial RMP list) from the
RMP toxic substances list because its vapor pressure does not meet the
vapor pressure listing criteria established by EPA?
    ii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI, would it be appropriate
for EPA to continue to list TDI on the RMP list but with a higher TQ
for RMP reporting? Should the methodology for assigning TQs account for
the much lower vapor pressure of TDI, and if so, how should this be
done? Currently, the TQ for all three TDI listings is 10,000 pounds.
    iii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI because it is a
sensitizer, should EPA continue to list TDI on the RMP list but with a
lower TQ because of its unique toxicity, and if so, what should be the
basis for setting a lowered TQ?
    iv. Are there other listed substances that should have a higher TQ?
If so, which ones, what are the appropriate TQs, and why?
    v. Should EPA delete from the RMP list any of the six substances
for which the Agency has not received any RMP report if the Agency
believes that they are not widespread in commerce or only stored in
quantities well below the RMP TQ? EPA requests any available
information about the extent of these six chemicals' manufacture and
use in commerce, including any annual amounts manufactured, imported or
used in the U.S.
    vi. Is there any reason that EPA should not delete 1, 3-pentadiene
from the RMP list as it does not meet the listing criteria for
flammable substances and was erroneously listed? Are there any other
RMP substances that are known to be listed based on erroneous data?

g. Lowering the Threshold Quantity for Substances Currently on the List
    EPA is also seeking information on whether the TQ for any
substances currently on the list should be reduced:
    i. Are the current TQs protective of human health and the
environment, or are there certain substances for which the TQ is too
high? If so, which substances? For such substances, what TQ should EPA
establish and what would it be based on?
    ii. What would be the economic impacts of any lowering of the TQ
which might be warranted? Are there any special circumstances involving
small entities that EPA should consider with respect to lowering of a
TQ?
2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements
    Approaches to chemical process safety have continued to evolve
since both the RMP regulation and OSHA PSM standard were promulgated.
New management system elements and best practices are now being used to
address human health, worker safety and environmental protection.
Lessons learned from data collected in RMP submissions regarding safety
management systems have also informed EPA's perspective on the issue.
The Agency is requesting information on the management system elements
OSHA has identified in their RFI, but with a focus on their
applicability to the RMP requirements, and how they can enhance the
protection of human health and the environment.
    Like OSHA, EPA is considering three elements taken from the Risk
Based Process Safety Program recommended by the Center for Chemical
Process Safety (CCPS): \31\ (1) Measurements and Metrics; (2)
Management Review and Continuous Improvement; and (3) Process Safety
Competency. A ``Measurements and Metrics'' element would require the
facility to establish performance and efficiency indicators to track
the effectiveness of the risk management system and to identify
opportunities for improvement of its elements and work activities. This
element would guide facilities in measuring the real-time performance
of their process safety management systems An example of a measurement
and metrics indicator would be to track the frequency of process upsets
and near-miss accidents. A ``Management Review and Continuous
Improvement'' element would focus on ongoing ``due diligence''
management reviews that fill the gap between day-to-day work activities
and periodic formal audits. This element would require facilities to
regularly evaluate the management systems in place, as opposed to
waiting for an incident to occur, or for scheduled audits to identify
deficiencies. A ``Process Safety Competency'' element would encompass
three interrelated activities: (1) To continuously improve on knowledge
and competency, (2) to ensure appropriate information is available to
those who need it, and (3) to consistently apply lessons learned. The
main focus of this competency element is organizational learning, so
that the process knowledge can be applied to situations in order to
effectively manage risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for
Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety,
New York, Wiley, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency is also requesting information on two additional
management-system elements that were identified by OSHA in their review
of relevant safety standards promulgated by other federal agencies.
Specifically, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)
promulgated revisions to their Safety and Environmental Management
Systems (SEMS II) requirements (78 FR 20423; April 5, 2013) to help
ensure the safe operations of their regulated facilities. The revisions
included a number of management-system elements not addressed in the
RMP regulation. The two elements the Agency is focusing on are a ``Stop
Work Authority'' and an ``Ultimate Work Authority.'' In its SEMS II
Fact Sheet,\32\ BSEE describes these elements as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Safety-and-Environmental-Management-Systems-SEMS/Fact-Sheet/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Developing and implementing a stop work authority that
creates procedures and authorizes any and all offshore industry
personnel who witness an imminent risk or dangerous activity to stop
work.
     Developing and implementing an ultimate work authority
that requires offshore industry operators to clearly define who has the
ultimate work authority on a facility for operational safety and
decision-making at any given time.
    While the requirements under SEMS II focus on offshore facilities
under the jurisdiction of BSEE, the concept of requiring these elements
may be applicable to facilities subject to the RMP regulation.
Established procedures for any and all employees on the facility to
implement a stop work authority when witnessing an activity that
creates a threat of danger, and clearly defined requirements
establishing who has the ultimate authority on the facility for
operational safety and decision making at any given time could help to
better protect human health and the environment.
    In addition to the management system elements identified in the
OSHA RFI, EPA is also interested in receiving public comment on whether
there are other accident prevention elements that should be considered
for inclusion in the RMP regulation. The Agency notes that both the
CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety and the BSEE SEMS
regulations contain additional management system elements not present
in the RMP regulation. One such element is ``conduct of operations''
which CCPS defines as ``the execution of operational and management
tasks in a deliberate and structured manner.'' Conduct of operations
includes a variety of measures such as formal communications between
workers, work groups, and work shifts. It also involves establishing
clear rules governing access to key process areas, such as control
rooms, performing regular tours or rounds to monitor equipment status
and keeping written shift logs of equipment status and ongoing process
activities, maintaining clear and accurate labeling for process
equipment, and maintaining good housekeeping in process areas.
    Another element contained in the CCPS Guidelines is ``process
safety culture.'' CCPS defines process safety culture as ``the
combination of group values and behaviors that determine the manner in
which process safety is managed.'' Poor safety culture can lead to
accidents by allowing production pressures to overshadow safety
concerns, or by limiting the free exchange of important safety
information among plant personnel. Safety culture has been implicated
in recent serious accidents, such as the August 2012 accident at the
Chevron refinery in Richmond, California. In that accident, the CSB
found indications that a weak safety culture may have led to the
normalization of deviance in the refinery's mechanical integrity
management system. Consequently, the California Interagency Working
Group on Refinery Safety published a report concluding that both the
California OSHA PSM requirements and the California Accidental Release
Prevention RMP requirements should be strengthened to require
California refineries to conduct safety culture assessments at least
every three years.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ California Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety:
Improving Public and Worker Safety at Oil Refineries, California
Environmental Protection Agency, February 2014, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/Publications/Reports/2014/RefineryRpt.pdf.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The BSEE SEMS regulations contain requirements to conduct a ``Job
Safety Analysis.'' BSEE indicates that the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is
an operations/task level hazard analysis technique used to identify
risks to personnel associated with their job activities. The Agency is
requesting public comment on whether these or other additional
management system elements should be added to the RMP regulation, and
whether and how these elements relate to prevention of accidental
releases.
    Additionally, the Agency seeks public comment on whether management
system elements that are currently contained within the RMP regulation
should be modified, clarified or strengthened. For example:
     Contractors are increasingly used in a variety of roles at
chemical process facilities, yet the RMP rule imposes fewer safety
requirements on contractor owners and operators than on the owners and
operators of the regulated stationary source. In October 2007, five
contractor workers were killed at Xcel Energy, in Georgetown, Colorado,
when a fire occurred inside a tunnel at the company's hydroelectric
power plant. The CSB found that inadequate contractor safety practices
and oversight contributed to the accident; \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ CSB, Investigation Report--Xcel Energy Hydroelectric Plant
Penstock Fire, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(Report No. 2008-01-I-CO, August 2010). http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Xcel_Energy_Report_Final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The RMP rule requires owner/operators to conduct a Process
Hazard Analysis (PHA) for Program 3 processes and a hazard review for
Program 2 processes. PHAs and hazard reviews are intended to identify
potential equipment malfunctions or human errors that could cause an
accidental release, and safeguards needed to prevent such malfunctions
and errors. However, the rule does not explicitly describe the types of
failure scenarios or damage mechanisms that must be considered during
PHAs and hazard reviews, and during some compliance inspections EPA has
reviewed PHAs and hazard reviews that did not address failure scenarios
such as natural disasters (e.g., floods, earthquakes, hurricanes,
etc.), corrosion, vehicle collisions, and others. Additionally, the
rule requires hazard reviews to be ``updated'', and PHAs to be
``updated and revalidated'' at least every five years, but does not
clearly define what is required in order for a hazard review to be
updated or for a PHA to be updated and revalidated. EPA is interested
in receiving comment on whether PHA and hazard review requirements
should be clarified, and whether hazard review and PHA updates should
be required more frequently than every five years, or whether certain
events should trigger hazard review or PHA updates prior to the next
scheduled 5-year update.
     The Pre-Startup Review element (section 68.67) requires
the owner or operator to perform a pre-startup review for new
stationary sources and for modified stationary sources when the
modification is significant enough to require a change in the process
safety information. However, the rule does not clearly state what
modifications would require a change in process safety information.
Also, EPA notes that process unit startup is a significantly more
hazardous period compared to normal process operations, and that
serious accidents such as the March 23, 2005 explosion at the BP
America refinery in Texas City, Texas have occurred during process
startup even when no significant equipment modifications were made to
the process during the preceding turnaround.
    EPA requests information on any additional management-system
elements or on potentially modifying, clarifying or expanding existing
elements, including those discussed in this RFI, which would serve to
improve protection of human health and the environment. The Agency
welcomes data and information on management-system elements from
consensus standards, safety organizations, federal standards, or other
sources that could increase process safety if the RMP regulation were
expanded to include them. The Agency invites the public to respond to
any questions for which they have specific knowledge, data, or
information, regardless of their involvement in RMP-regulated
operations. Specifically, EPA requests information on the following
questions:
    a. Does your facility follow any management-system elements not
required under part 68 for RMP-regulated operations? If so, please
describe the additional management-system elements, the safety
benefits, any economic impacts associated with following the elements,
and any special circumstances involving small entities.
    b. Would expanding the scope of the RMP regulation to require
additional management-system elements, or expanding the scope of
existing RMP management-system elements, improve the protection of
human health and the environment? Should EPA require safety culture
assessments, job safety analyses, or any of the other new management
system elements described above? If so, please describe the elements,
the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with expanding the
scope of the RMP regulation in this way, and any special circumstances
involving small entities that EPA should consider. Would current staff
at a facility be able to implement these additional elements or would
new staff need to be hired?
    c. In systems using management and metrics, how do facilities
develop useful leading indicators? Do you track the frequency of events
such as process upsets, accidental releases, and ``near miss''
incidents? Does tracking such events allow managers and employees to
make changes that prevent accidental releases? What other metrics and
indicators do you use, and how do they help prevent releases?
    d. Would requiring RMP facilities to conduct periodic safety
culture assessments meaningfully strengthen the safety culture
incentives that already exist, such as avoidance of deaths, injuries,
property and environmental damage, production loss, community impacts,
damage to company reputation, etc., that may result from accidents?
    e. Would expansion of the RMP employee participation provision to
include requirements such as the SEMS II stop-work authority, or other
efforts to involve employees in all management-system elements, enhance
protection of human health and the environment?
    f. Are there any other management-system elements in the existing
RMP regulation that EPA should expand or clarify (e.g., a new
requirement that facilities perform a root-cause analysis for incidents
under Sec.  68.81, clarify PHA and hazard review requirements, require
more frequent PHA and hazard review updates, strengthen contractor
requirements, or require pre-startup reviews prior to all process
startups)? If so, please describe the additional requirements, the
safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with expanding the RMP
regulation in this way, and any special circumstances involving small
entities that EPA should consider.
    g. Are there any data or information on accidents, near misses, or
other safety-related incidents that the facility could have prevented
by following management-system elements not currently required under
the RMP regulation?
    h. What would be the paperwork burden associated with the revisions
to management-system elements discussed above? What special skills or
training would employees need to implement

these elements, including associated reporting and recordkeeping
requirements? What would be the costs of additional reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, including costs for worker training and any
required data management system upgrades?
3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized
and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
    The OSHA PSM standard's references to recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) are almost identical to
those contained in Subpart D of 40 CFR part 68 (i.e., Program 3
Prevention Program). Sec.  68.65(d)(2) requires the owner or operator
to ``document that equipment complies with recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices.'' At facilities with ``existing
equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards,
or practices that are no longer in general use,'' Sec.  68.65(d)(3)
further requires the owner or operator to ``determine and document that
the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating
in a safe manner.'' These requirements parallel the requirements in
paragraphs (d)(3)(ii) and (d)(3)(iii) of Sec.  1910.119, respectively,
with the only difference being that OSHA uses the term ``employer''
where EPA uses the term ``owner or operator.'' The RMP rule and PSM
standard also contain identical references to RAGAGEP in Sec.  68.73/
Sec.  1910.119(j) (i.e., Mechanical Integrity). Additionally, Subpart C
of 40 CFR part 68 (i.e., Program 2 Prevention Program) contains
references to RAGAGEP in Sec.  68.48 (Safety information) and Sec.
68.56 (Maintenance).
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    a. What does your facility use as a definition for RAGAGEP? Would
adding a definition for RAGAGEP to the RMP rule improve understanding
of RMP requirements and prevent accidental releases? If so, what
specific definition for RAGAGEP should EPA add to the RMP rule? What
would be the economic impacts of adding such a definition?
    b. From what sources (e.g., codes, standards, published technical
reports, guidelines, etc.) does your facility select applicable RAGAGEP
for operations covered under the PSM standard?
    c. Does your facility evaluate updates to its selected RAGAGEP? If
so, how does your facility monitor any updates, and how often do you
evaluate them?
    d. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near
misses, or other safety-related incidents involving failure to evaluate
and/or implement updates to applicable RAGAGEP for RMP-covered
processes. Would requiring employers to evaluate and/or implement
updates to applicable RAGAGEP prevent such accidental releases?
    e. Should owners or operators covered by the applicable provisions
of the RMP regulation be required to evaluate updates to applicable
RAGAGEP? Should owners and operators be required to comply with new
RAGAGEP requirements that occur after the owner or operator's initial
compliance with the applicable provision of the RMP regulation? How
would such updates or new requirements be identified? What would be an
appropriate time period in which to conduct this evaluation and/or to
comply with updated RAGAGEP? What would be the economic impacts of this
change?
    f. Would a requirement to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP be
more appropriate in another paragraph of the RMP rule? For example,
should such a requirement become part of the Process Hazard Analysis
revalidation requirements at Sec.  68.67(f), or the management of
change requirements at Sec.  68.75? How would EPA incorporate such a
requirement for Program 2 processes?
4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements To Cover Any Safety-
Critical Equipment
    EPA is interested in receiving information on whether the scope of
the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP rule should be expanded
to cover the mechanical integrity of any safety-critical equipment, and
whether additional mechanical integrity requirements should be added to
the rule's provisions. In its RFI, OSHA notes that the mechanical
integrity provisions of the PSM standard apply to six specific
categories of equipment, including pressure vessels and storage tanks,
piping systems (including piping components such as valves), relief and
vent systems and devices, emergency shutdown systems, controls
(including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks), and
pumps. While these categories of equipment encompass most safety-
critical equipment within regulated processes, during some compliance
inspections EPA has observed that facilities have failed to apply
mechanical integrity program measures to certain additional types of
equipment and systems that could reasonably be judged to be critical to
process safety. Examples of such equipment would include computer
software systems that interact with process components, electrical
power systems, and other utility systems that interact with pumps,
valves, or control systems.
    EPA notes that the RMP Program 2 maintenance requirements, which
were intended as a streamlined version of the mechanical integrity
requirements for Program 3 processes, apply to all process equipment,
rather than being restricted to specific categories of equipment. This
potentially causes the unintended result where certain aspects of a
process subject to Program 2 must meet more rigorous maintenance
requirements than the same equipment located in a Program 3 process.
EPA is interested in receiving feedback on whether expanding the scope
of the Program 3 mechanical integrity requirements or reducing the
scope of the Program 2 maintenance requirements would appropriately
address this potential discrepancy.
    In addition to expanding the scope of the rule's existing
mechanical integrity provisions to cover any safety critical equipment,
EPA is also interested in whether additional requirements should be
added to this section, or whether any existing requirements need to be
clarified. For example, emergency shutdown systems are one type of
process equipment covered under the rule's mechanical integrity
provisions. However, the regulation does not explicitly require that
all covered sources install emergency shutdown systems.
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    a. Should EPA amend the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP
rule to explicitly cover all safety critical process equipment? If so,
what type(s) of equipment? Did you identify safety-critical equipment
not explicitly covered under Sec.  68.73? If so, how did your facility
determine that the equipment was safety-critical, and does your
facility treat the equipment as if it were RMP-covered for safety or
other reasons? Did you identify the equipment as safety-critical
through an RMP process hazard analysis?
    b. Please provide any data or information on accidental releases,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents related to the
mechanical integrity of safety-critical equipment not explicitly
covered under Sec.  68.73.
    c. Would expanding the scope of Sec.  68.73 to explicitly cover the
integrity of all equipment critical to process safety make it more
likely to prevent accidental releases?
    d. Should EPA add additional requirements to the mechanical
integrity provisions, or clarify any existing

provisions? For example, should the Agency require that certain types
of covered facilities install emergency shutdown systems, such as
redundant power supplies, emergency flares, vents, or scrubbers, etc.,
in order to prevent accidental releases resulting from uncontrolled
emergency shutdowns?
    e. Are there any other provisions of this section that should be
enhanced or clarified? Does labeling Sec.  68.73 as ``Mechanical
Integrity'' cause owners and operators to disregard or neglect the
maintenance, functionality, or integrity of process components that
would not typically be considered ``mechanical'' components, such as
electrical and computer systems?
    f. What would be the economic impacts of revising the mechanical
integrity provisions as discussed above? Are there any special
circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with
respect to revising the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP?
5. Require Owners and Operators To Manage Organizational Changes
    In its RFI, OSHA notes that while the PSM standard requires
employers to establish and implement written procedures to manage
change, including all modifications to equipment, technology,
procedures, raw materials, and processing conditions other than
replacement in kind, the standard does not explicitly require employers
to follow management-of-change procedures for organizational changes,
such as changes in management structure, budget cuts, or personnel
changes. However, OSHA highlights a policy interpretation indicating
that it is OSHA's view that the PSM standard does cover organizational
changes if the changes have the potential to affect process safety.
Additionally, OSHA notes the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery accident,
where the CSB identified a lack of organizational management of change
as a significant causal factor in the accident.
    The RMP rule contains management of change requirements for Program
3 processes (see Sec.  68.75) that are virtually identical to the PSM
standard. Therefore, EPA is also interested in receiving public comment
on whether the RMP rule's management of change requirements should be
expanded to include management of organizational changes.
    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    a. What do you consider to be an organizational change within the
context of process safety management practices? For example, would you
consider the following, or similar, changes to be organizational
changes: Reducing the number of operators in a shift; changing from 5-
day to 7-day operations; changing from 8-hour to 12-hour operator
shifts; replacing a unit manager; reducing the facility operations or
maintenance budget; relocating a technical group to a remote corporate
location; changing a supervisory or compensation structure; or hiring
contractors to do work formerly performed by employees of the regulated
facility? Are there other examples of organizational changes that may
be relevant to safety management practices?
    b. If your facility has established and implemented written
procedures for management of organizational changes, please describe
any economic impacts associated with the procedures. Please note any
implementation challenges that may be associated with requiring that
such procedures be developed and followed.
    c. Would clarifying Sec.  68.75 with an explicit requirement that
employers manage organizational changes prevent accidental releases?
What would be the economic impact of such a clarification? Are there
any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should
consider with respect to this option?
    d. Please describe any organizational changes made in your facility
that have had the potential to affect process operations. Were
management-of-change procedures followed before making the changes?
    e. What do you consider to be the best safety practices concerning
management of organizational change?
    f. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near
misses, or other safety-related incidents involving the failure to
manage organizational change. Would following management-of-change
procedures under Sec.  68.75 have prevented these incidents?
6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits
    Sections 68.58 and 68.79 of the RMP regulation (Program 2 and 3
Compliance Audits) are almost identical in language to that found in
1910.119(o) of the OSHA PSM standard, with PSM's focus on worker safety
and RMP's on protecting human health and the environment. Both section
68.58 and 68.79 require that ``the owner or operator shall audit the
compliance with the provisions of the subpart at least every three
years.'' In addition, both require that ``the compliance audit shall be
conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process.''
Neither OSHA nor EPA requires employers to use a third-party in
conducting compliance audits.
    There may be advantages to third-party audits. For example, OSHA's
RFI discusses CSB's findings concerning a lack of rigorous compliance
audits in the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery explosion accident. OSHA's
settlement with BP Texas City required BP to retain a third-party
compliance auditor with adequate experience.\35\ The CCPS argues that
experienced third-party auditors, like those provided by consulting
companies, can provide the most objectivity.\36\
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    \35\ United States of America Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, BP Products North America Inc. Settlement Agreement,
September 21, 2005.
    \36\ American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for
Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety,
New York, Wiley, 2007.
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    Additionally, BSEE's Safety and Environmental Management Systems
(SEMS) standard, 30 CFR 250, Subpart S, requires that audits be
conducted by independent third-parties subject to BSEE approval, or to
avoid conflict of interest, personnel that are considered to be
qualified by the employer. In their revisions to the SEMs II final
rule, BSEE discussed its third-party-auditing requirements.
    EPA seeks information on whether to revise 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79
to require facility owners and operators to use a third-party for
compliance audits, on whether requiring a third-party auditing process
would increase protection of human health and the environment, and on
whether the existing compliance audit requirements are sufficiently
clear or if changes should be made to strengthen the audit
requirements. Specifically, EPA requests information on the following
questions:
    a. Does your facility use a third-party for conducting compliance
audits under Sec.  68.58 and Sec.  68.79 for safety or other reasons?
What was the basis for that decision? How has it affected the overall
safety record of your facility?
    b. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near
misses, or other safety-related incidents that could have been
prevented by conducting more effective compliance audits for operations
covered under Sec.  68.58 and Sec.  68.79. What were the deficiencies
in those audits? Were the audits in question conducted by in-house
staff or a third party?
    c. Would revising Sec.  68.58 and Sec.  68.79 to require owners and
operators of RMP-regulated facilities to use a third-party for
compliance audits help prevent accidental releases? What would be the
economic impacts of revising Sec.  68.58

and Sec.  68.79 in this way (e.g., typical consultant fees, additional
work hours required, special circumstances involving small entities,
etc.)?
    d. Should EPA revise Sec.  68.58 and Sec.  68.79 to require owners
and operators to use compliance auditors (internal or third-party) with
certain minimum credentials or certifications? If so, what minimum
credentials or certifications should the Agency require?
    e. How should owners/operators of RMP-regulated facilities address
the findings of the third-party auditor? Should EPA amend the RMP rule
to require owners/operators to document how they addressed each of the
findings of the third-party auditor? Should a timeframe for addressing
those findings be included in the RMP regulation? Should EPA include a
procedure for how an owner/operator may appeal the findings of the
third-party auditor?
    f. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses
to conduct a full compliance audit under Sec.  68.58 or Sec.  68.79, as
appropriate? Would such a requirement create a perverse incentive to
underreport incidents or near misses?
    g. During compliance inspections at multiple-process sources, EPA
inspectors have noted that some owners or operators have audited only a
subset of covered processes at the source. Should EPA clarify Sec.
68.58 and Sec.  68.79 to explicitly indicate that all covered processes
must receive a full compliance audit at least every three years?
    h. Does the identity of the auditor (e.g., in-house, contractor,
professionally-certified, party licensed by EPA) affect the credibility
of the audit for potentially impacted communities?
7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability
    RMP Program 2 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 or
subject to Program 3, whereas Program 3 applies to processes not
eligible for Program 1 and either subject to OSHA's PSM standard under
federal or state OSHA programs or classified in one of ten specified
NAICS codes (see section II.B.10 for a listing of Program 3 NAICS
codes). A review of the current RMP national database indicates that
approximately 5,360 RMP facilities have reported Program 2 processes
within their RMP (in most cases, these facilities have reported a
single covered process). Approximately 4,000 (75 percent) of these are
bulk agricultural chemical distributors such as West Fertilizer. These
facilities generally store large quantities of anhydrous ammonia, as
well as other agricultural chemicals, for distribution or sale.
Although the presence of anhydrous ammonia above an RMP TQ in a process
would normally make that process subject to both Program 3 requirements
(assuming it did not qualify for Program 1 by virtue of its remote
location and lack of accident history) as well as OSHA PSM, these
facilities generally claim that they are exempt from the OSHA PSM
standard, and therefore eligible for RMP Program 2, based on the OSHA
``retail facility'' exemption in 29 CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i).
    In its RFI, OSHA has requested information on whether that Agency
should change its enforcement policy for retail facilities. OSHA notes
that its current application of the PSM exemption for retail facilities
is inconsistent with the normal meaning of ``retail'' and the
explanation of the purpose of the exemption provided in the preamble to
the PSM standard. The OSHA RFI states: ``As stated in the preamble,
OSHA chose to exclude retail facilities from PSM coverage because the
limited container, package, or allotment sizes of the chemicals
typically found at these facilities do not present the same safety
hazards as those encountered at establishments working with large, bulk
quantities of materials. . . . As a result of increased workplace
hazards associated with large, bulk quantities of highly hazardous
chemicals, OSHA believes that only retail-trade facilities listed in
NAICS sectors 44 and 45 that sell highly hazardous chemicals in small
containers, packages, or allotments to the general public qualify for
the retail-facilities exemption in 29 CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i).''
    If OSHA were to change its policy such that only facilities selling
small containers, packages, or allotments to the general public would
qualify for the retail facilities exemption, EPA believes that
virtually every bulk agricultural chemical distribution facility
process currently claiming Program 2 eligibility under the RMP
regulation would henceforth be subject to Program 3 (unless the process
were to meet Program 1 eligibility criteria).
    Of the remaining (i.e., non-agricultural) Program 2 processes, over
70 percent are water or wastewater treatment facilities located in
states without federally-delegated, state-run occupational safety and
health programs. These facilities are generally not subject to PSM
requirements because they are operated by state or municipal government
employees, who are not subject to federal OSHA standards in states
without delegated OSHA programs, (i.e., federal OSHA only regulates
private employers). It is a peculiarity of the RMP regulation that two
identical RMP-covered water or wastewater treatment plants--one located
in a state with a state OSHA program and the other in a state without a
state-delegated OSHA program--are subject to different levels of
accident prevention requirements under the RMP rule. Non-PSM-covered
water and wastewater treatment facilities are not classified as Program
3, by definition. Water and wastewater treatment facilities are covered
under the RMP regulation due to the presence of large quantities of
highly toxic substances, such as chlorine and sulfur dioxide. Processes
in private industry sectors involving similar quantities of these
chemicals are virtually always subject to Program 3 as a result of
their risk to nearby receptors. EPA is interested in receiving public
comment on whether RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants
that are not eligible for Program 1 should also be subject to RMP
Program 3, regardless of whether or not they are located in a state
with a federally-delegated OSHA program.
    Other than bulk agricultural chemical distributors and water and
wastewater treatment facilities, there are fewer than 400 RMP
facilities currently reporting Program 2 processes to EPA. Of these,
EPA believes that approximately half are either non-agricultural bulk
chemical distributors that would also become Program 3 in the event
that OSHA were to restrict eligibility for its PSM retail exemption, or
processes that incorrectly reported as Program 2 in their RMP (i.e.,
processes that are actually already subject to Program 3). In summary,
if OSHA were to restrict eligibility for its retail exemption to
facilities selling small containers, packages, or allotments to the
general public, and EPA were to require all RMP-covered water and
wastewater treatment plants not eligible for Program 1 to comply with
Program 3, EPA believes that there would be approximately 200 RMP-
covered processes nationwide that would remain eligible for Program 2.
In light of these facts, EPA invites comment on whether it should
modify Program 2 eligibility criteria, or alternatively, eliminate
Program 2 and require all formerly Program 2 processes to comply with
Program 3 or Program 1 requirements.\37\
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    \37\ This would mean that formerly Program 2 processes would
henceforth be subject to the 5 Program 3 management system elements
not required under Program 2 (i.e., Management of change, Pre-
startup review, Employee participation, Hot work permits, and
Contractors), as well as the more rigorous versions of the 7 Program
3 elements for which there are Program 2 analogs (e.g., Mechanical
integrity under Program 3 vs Maintenance under Program 2).

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    EPA requests information on the following questions:
    a. Do you currently operate a facility with Program 2 covered
processes? Please indicate what type of Program 2 process your facility
operates. Do you implement accident prevention measures that go beyond
RMP Program 2 for this process? If so, why? What additional prevention
elements do you use? Do you believe Program 2 requirements are
necessary for the safe operation of this process? Do you have any
Program 2 processes that may be adequately managed under Program 1?
Please explain the basis for your views.
    b. Do you operate a water or wastewater treatment plant that is
subject to the RMP regulation? If so, what level of accident prevention
requirements do you believe are warranted for such facilities? If you
operate a Program 2 process at a water or wastewater treatment plant,
how much additional burden would be involved in implementing the
additional RMP elements required for Program 3 processes?
    c. Should RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants that
are not eligible for Program 1 always be subject to RMP Program 3,
regardless of whether or not they are located in a state with a
Federally-delegated OSHA program? Why or why not?
    d. If OSHA restricts its retail exemption to facilities selling
regulated substances in small containers, should EPA eliminate RMP
Program level 2 entirely or alternatively, modify Program 2 prevention
elements or otherwise change the eligibility criteria for Program 2? If
so, why?
    e. Would eliminating Program level 2 simplify rule compliance for
the regulated universe and improve human and environmental health and
safety, or does the current three-tiered prevention program framework
under the RMP provide an appropriate level of protection?
    f. What would be the economic impacts of modifying or eliminating
Program level 2? Are there any special circumstances involving small
entities that EPA should consider with respect to modifying or
eliminating Program 2?

D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information

    This section discusses items that were not previously raised in the
OSHA RFI. Each item discussion is followed by specific questions to
collect data, information, and comments on each issue.
1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis
    EPA has recognized the importance of considering safer technology
and alternatives techniques \38\ that may result in improved process
safety. EPA's existing guidance \39\ on the ``general duty clause'' in
CAA section 112(r)(1) states that, ``The owners and operators should
try to substitute less hazardous substances for extremely hazardous
substances or minimize inventories when possible. This is usually the
most effective way to prevent accidents and should be the priority of a
prevention program.'' EPA encourages sources to continue to examine and