[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 68 (Monday, April 9, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 21312-21357]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7995]

Vol. 77

Monday,

No. 68

April 9, 2012

Part IV

Department of Transportation

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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Parts 229 and 238

Locomotive Safety Standards; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 68 / Monday, April 9, 2012 / Rules
and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229 and 238

[Docket No. FR-2009-0095; Notice No. 3]
RIN 2130-AC16

Locomotive Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: FRA is revising the existing regulations containing Railroad
Locomotive Safety Standards. The revisions update, consolidate, and
clarify the existing regulations. The final rule incorporates existing
industry and engineering best practices related to locomotives and
locomotive electronics. This includes the development of a safety
analysis for new locomotive electronic systems. FRA believes this final
rule will modernize and improve its safety regulatory program related
to locomotives. In accordance with the requirements of the Executive
Order 13563 (E.O. 13563), this final rule also modifies the existing
locomotive safety standards based on what has been learned from FRA's
retrospective review of the regulation. As a result, FRA is reducing
the burden on the industry by modifying the regulations related to
periodic locomotive inspection and headlights.

DATES: This final rule is effective June 8, 2012. Petitions for
reconsideration must be received on or before June 8, 2012. Petitions
for reconsideration will be posted in the docket for this proceeding.
Comments on any submitted petition for reconsideration must be received
on or before July 23, 2012.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration or comments on such petitions:
Any petitions and any comments to petitions related to Docket No. FRA-
2009-0095, may be submitted by any of the following methods: Web site:
Federal eRulemaking Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without
change to http://www.regulations.gov including any personal
information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act information
related to any submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or to
Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles Bielitz, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Motive Power & Equipment Division, RRS-14,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC (telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, email charles.bielitz@dot.gov),
or Michael Masci, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal
Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
(telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
IV. Proceedings to Date
V. General Overview of Final Rule Requirements
    A. Remote Control Locomotives
    B. Electronic Recordkeeping
    C. Brake Maintenance
    D. Brakes, General
    E. Locomotive Cab Temperature
    F. Headlights
    G. Alerters
    H. Locomotive Electronics
    I. Periodic Locomotive Inspection
    J. Rear End Markers
    K. Locomotive Horn
    L. Risk Analysis Standardization and Harmonization
    M. Locomotive Cab Securement
    N. Diesel Exhaust in Locomotive Cabs
    O. Federalism Implications
    P. E.O. 13563 Retrospective Review
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
    A. Amendments to Part 229 Subparts A, B, and C
    B. Part 229 Subpart E--Locomotive Electronics
    C. Amendments to Part 238
VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Privacy Act

I. Executive Summary

    The requirements that are being established by this final rule are
based on: existing waivers that have been granted by FRA's Safety
Board; existing clarifications of requirements that are currently being
enforced; new developments in technology related to locomotives; and in
part, on a Railroad Safety Advisory Committee recommendation. On
February 22, 2006, FRA presented, and the RSAC accepted, the task of
reviewing existing locomotive safety needs and recommending
consideration of specific actions useful to advance the safety of rail
operations. The RSAC established the Locomotive Safety Standards
Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task. The Working Group
met twelve times between October 30, 2006, and April 16, 2009. The
Working Group successfully reached consensus on the following
locomotive safety issues: locomotive brake maintenance, pilot height,
headlight operation, danger markings placement, load meter settings,
reorganization of steam generator requirements, and the establishment
locomotive electronics requirements based on industry best practices.
The full RSAC voted to recommend the consensus issues to FRA on
September 10, 2009.
    The Working Group did not reach consensus on several locomotive
safety issues. Thus, FRA independently developed a proposal containing
requirements related to: remote control locomotives, alerters,
locomotive cab securement, equipping new and remanufactured locomotive
cabs with air conditioning units, and a minimum permissible locomotive
cab temperature. FRA also independently developed a proposal for
locomotive securement. FRA has incorporated the Working Group's views
to the extent possible.
    In accordance with the requirements of E.O. 13563, this final rule
also modifies the existing locomotive safety standards based on what
has been learned from FRA's retrospective review of the regulation.
E.O. 13563 requires agencies to review existing regulations to identify
rules that are overly burdensome, and when possible, modify them to
reduce the burden. As a result its retrospective review, FRA is
reducing the burden on the industry by

modifying the regulations related to periodic locomotive inspection and
headlights. FRA believes that the modifications related to periodic
locomotive inspection and headlights in this final rule will not reduce
safety.

Overview of Final Rule Requirements

Remote Control Locomotives
    The rule related to remote control locomotives includes design and
operation requirements, as well as, inspection, testing, and repair
requirements. FRA's Remote Control Locomotive Safety Advisory,
published in 2001, is the basis for the requirements. All of the major
railroads have adopted the recommendations contained in the advisory,
with only slight modifications to suit their individual operations, and
the Association of American Railroads (AAR) issued an industry standard
that adopted the most significant requirements of the Safety Advisory.
During several productive meetings, the Working Group identified many
areas of agreement regarding the regulation of remote control
locomotive equipment. On issues that produced disagreement, FRA
gathered useful information. Informed by the Working Group discussions
and the comments to the NPRM related to this proceeding, this final
rule will codify the industry's best practices related to the use and
operation of remote control locomotives.
Electronic Recordkeeping
    The development and improved capability of electronic recordkeeping
systems has led to the potential for safe electronic maintenance of
records required by part 229. Since April 3, 2002, FRA has granted a
series of waivers permitting electronic recordkeeping with certain
conditions intended to ensure the safety, security and accessibility of
such systems. See FRA-2001-11014. Based on the information gathered
under the experiences of utilizing the electronic records permitted
under these existing waivers, the Working Group discussed, and agreed
to, generally applicable requirements for electronic recordkeeping
systems. This final rule will establish generally applicable
requirements based on the Working Group's recommendation.
Brake Maintenance
    The revisions to locomotive air brake maintenance are based on this
extensive history of study and testing. Over the last several decades,
FRA has granted several conditional waivers extending the air brake
cleaning, repair, and test requirements of Sec. Sec.  229.27 and
229.29. These extensions were designed to accommodate testing of the
reliability of electronic brake systems and other brake system
components, with the intent of moving toward performance based test
criterion with components being replaced or repaired based upon their
reliability. This final rule will establish generally applicable
requirements based on the Working Group's recommendation.
Brakes, General
    At a MP&E Technical Resolution Committee (TRC) meeting in December
of 1999, the representatives from NYAB Corporation, a brake
manufacturer, asserted that a problem with a faulty automatic or
independent brake valve will not create an unsafe condition when the
locomotive is operating in the trail position, provided the locomotive
consist has a successful brake test (application and release) from the
lead unit. The reason offered was that in order for a locomotive to
operate in the trailing position, the automatic and independent brake
valves must be cut-out. FRA agrees, and currently applies this
rationale in regards to performing a calendar day inspection. The
calendar day inspection does not require that the operation of the
automatic and independent brake controls be verified on trailing
locomotives. The Working Group agreed, and recommended adding a tagging
requirement to prevent a trailing, non-controlling locomotive with
defective independent or automatic brakes from being used as a
controlling locomotive. FRA adopted this recommendation in the NPRM and
retains it in this final rule.
Locomotive Cab Temperature
    In 1998, FRA led an RSAC Working Group to address various cab
working condition issues. To aid the Working Group discussions, FRA
conducted a study to determine the average temperature in each type of
locomotive cab commonly used at the time. The study concluded that at
the location where the engineer operates the locomotive, each
locomotive maintained an average temperature of at least 60 degrees.
The window and door gaskets were maintained in proper condition on the
locomotives that were studied. Now that the locomotive safety standards
are in the process of being revised, FRA is incorporating existing
industry practice into the regulation in an effort to maintain the
current conditions. In addition to increasing the minimum cab
temperature from 50 [deg]F to 60 [deg]F, FRA believes that requiring
railroads to continue their current practice of equipping new
locomotives with air conditioning units inside the locomotive cab and
maintaining those units during the periodic inspection required by
Sec.  229.23, will maintain the existing level of railroad safety.
Headlights
    The revisions to the headlight requirements incorporate waiver FRA
2005-23107 into part 229. The waiver permits a locomotive with one
failed 350-watt incandescent lamp to operate in the lead until the next
daily inspection, if the auxiliary lights remain continuously
illuminated. Under the existing requirements, a headlight with only one
functioning 200-watt lamp is not defective and its condition does not
affect the permissible movement of a locomotive. However, the existing
requirements are more restrictive for a 350-watt lamp. A locomotive
with only one functioning 350-watt lamp in the headlight can be
properly moved only under the conditions of Sec.  229.9. This final
rule modifies the treatment of locomotives with a failed 350-watt lamp
to allow flexibility, and be consistent with the current treatment of
200-watt lamps. In accordance with E.O. 13563, this modification will
reduce the downtime for locomotives with certain headlight defects, and
thereby, reduce the burden on the rail industry.
Alerters
    An alerter is a common safety device that is intended to verify
that the locomotive engineer remains vigilant and capable of
accomplishing the tasks that he or she must perform while operating a
locomotive. An alerter will initiate a penalty brake application to
stop the train if it does not receive the proper response from the
engineer. As an appurtenance to the locomotive, an alerter must operate
as intended when present on a locomotive. Section 20701 of Title 49 of
the United States Code prohibits the use of a locomotive unless the
entire locomotive and its appurtenances are in proper condition and
safe to operate in the service to which they are placed. Under this
authority, FRA has issued many violations against railroads for
operating locomotives equipped with a non-functioning alerter. Alerters
are currently required on passenger locomotives pursuant to Sec.
238.237 (67 FR 19991), and are present on most freight locomotives. A
long-standing industry standard currently contains various requirements
for locomotive alerters. See AAR Standard S-5513, ``Locomotive Alerter
Requirements,'' (November 26, 2007). FRA believes that the requirements
proposed in the NPRM

and retained in this final rule related to alerters incorporate
existing railroad practices and locomotive design, and address each of
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations
discussed below in section v., ``General Overview of the Final Rule
Requirements.''
Locomotive Electronics
    This final rule retains requirements proposed in the NPRM that
prescribe safety standards for safety-critical electronic locomotive
control systems, subsystems, and components including requirements to
ensure that the development, installation, implementation, inspection,
testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of those
products will achieve and maintain an acceptable level of safety. This
final rule is also establishing standards to ensure that personnel
working with safety-critical products receive appropriate training. Of
course, each railroad would be able to prescribe additional or more
stringent rules, and other special instructions, provided they are
consistent with the proposed standards.
Periodic Locomotive Inspection
    The Working Group was unable to reach consensus on whether current
locomotive inspection intervals and procedures are appropriate to
current conditions. On June 22, 2009, FRA granted the Burlington
Northern Santa Fe's (BNSF) request for waiver from compliance with the
periodic locomotive inspection requirements. See Docket FRA-2008-0157.
BNSF stated in their request that each of the subject locomotives are
equipped with new self-diagnostic technology and advanced computer
control, and that the locomotives were designed by the manufacturer to
be maintained at a six month interval.
    Based on the initial results of the waiver, FRA identified the
periodic locomotive inspection as a potential candidate for reducing
the regulatory burden on the rail industry, as required by E.O. 13563.
FRA's continued observations of test during joint inspections of the
brake systems shows that the waiver has been successful. As there is no
material difference between the locomotive models covered by the BNSF
waiver and other self diagnostic microprocessor-based locomotives, FRA
is modifying the existing periodic inspection requirements to provide
for a 184-day inspection interval for all locomotives equipped with
microprocessor-based control systems with self-diagnostic capabilities.
Locomotive Cab Securement
    By letter dated September 22, 2010, in response to a conductor
being shot and killed during an attempted robbery on June 20, 2010, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET) requested that
FRA require door locks on locomotive cab doors. Under current industry
practice, many locomotive cab doors are not locked. According to BLET's
letter, requiring the use of door locks would impede unauthorized
access to the locomotive cab and reduce the risk of violence to the
train crew when confronted by a potential intruder.
    In the NPRM, FRA requested comments on the various securement
options that are currently available on locomotive cab doors, and
whether equipping the locomotive cab with a securement device would
improve safety. Based on its review of comments received, FRA believes
that locomotive cab securement can potentially prevent unauthorized
access to the locomotive cab, and thereby increase train crew safety.
Consequently, FRA is establishing in this final rule a requirement for
new and remanufactured locomotives to be equipped with a securement
device.

Expected Benefits

    This final rule includes numerous regulatory clarifications and
adoption of most current part 229 waivers. The primary costs or burdens
in this final rule are from the alerters, periodic inspection change
and revised minimum (i.e., cold weather) cab temperature requirements.
The savings will accrue from fewer train accidents, fewer future
waivers, and waiver renewals. In addition, savings would also accrue
from a reduction in downtime for locomotives due to changes to
headlight and brake requirements. Finally the railroad industry will
accrue significant cost savings from a change in the periodic
inspection requirement for micro-processor based locomotives. For the
20-year period analyzed, the estimated quantified costs total $56.2
million, and the present value (PV) (7 percent) of the estimated costs
is $27.7 million. The uniform adoption of some waivers will provide
cost savings from a reduction in locomotive downtime. For example, the
headlight and brake maintenance waiver incorporations will reduce
future industry-wide locomotive downtime, because locomotives that are
not currently covered by the waivers will be permitted to continue in
use. FRA also anticipates a small reduction in future accidents from
the proposed alerter requirements. For the 20-year period, the
estimated quantified benefits total $806.8 million, and the PV (7
percent) of the estimated quantified benefits is $385 million.

                          Costs for Final Rule
    [Note dollars are discounted (7%) and all costs are for a 20-year
                                 period]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Periodic Inspection.....................................     $20,820,604
AFM Calibration.........................................         136,335
Alerters--Requirement and Trip Test.....................       4,495,455
Cab Temperature: Heaters, Maintenance & Insulation......         889,503
Locomotive Electronics: File Notice & Training Documents       1,338,763
End Plates..............................................          21,187
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................      27,701,846
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         Benefits for Final Rule
  [Note dollars are discounted (7%) and all benefits are for a 20- year
                                 period]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction in Locomotive Downtime--Headlights............      $1,588,995
Reduction in Locomotive Downtime--Brakes................       2,118,660
Reduced Train Accidents--Due to Alerter Requirement.....       2,318,972
Cost Savings--Reduction in Waivers......................         975,325
Savings: High Voltage Danger Signs/Markings.............         317,799
Periodic Inspection: Increased Time Interval............     377,825,552
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................     385,145,303
------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

    FRA has broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety. The
Federal railroad safety laws (formerly the Locomotive Boiler Inspection
Act at 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-
20703) prohibit the use of unsafe locomotives and authorize FRA to
issue standards for locomotive maintenance and testing. In order to
further FRA's ability to respond effectively to contemporary safety
problems and hazards as they arise in the railroad industry, Congress
enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (Safety Act) (formerly
45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq., now found primarily in chapter 201 of Title
49). The Safety Act grants the Secretary of Transportation rulemaking
authority over all areas of railroad safety (49 U.S.C. 20103(a)) and
confers all powers necessary to detect and penalize violations of any
rail safety law. This authority was subsequently delegated to the FRA
Administrator (49 CFR 1.49). Until July 5, 1994, the

Federal railroad safety statutes existed as separate acts found
primarily in title 45 of the United States Code. On that date, all of
the acts were repealed, and their provisions were recodified into title
49 of the United States Code. All references to parts and sections in
this document shall be to parts and sections located in Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.
    Pursuant to its general statutory rulemaking authority, FRA
promulgates and enforces rules as part of a comprehensive regulatory
program to address the safety of, inter alia, railroad track, signal
systems, communications, rolling stock, operating practices, passenger
train emergency preparedness, alcohol and drug testing, locomotive
engineer certification, and workplace safety. In 1980, FRA issued the
majority of the regulatory provisions currently found at 49 CFR part
229 addressing various locomotive related topics including: inspections
and tests; safety requirements for brake, draft, suspension, and
electrical systems, and locomotive cabs; and locomotive cab equipment.
Since 1980, various provisions currently contained in part 229 have
been added or revised on an ad hoc basis to address specific safety
concerns or in response to specific statutory mandates.
    Topics for new regulation typically arise from several sources. FRA
continually reviews its regulations and revises them as needed to
address emerging technology, changing operational realities, and to
bolster existing standards as new safety concerns are identified. It is
also common for the railroad industry to introduce regulatory issues
through FRA's waiver process. Several of FRA's requirements contained
in this final rule have been partially or previously addressed through
FRA's waiver process. As detailed in part 211, FRA's Railroad Safety
Board (Safety Board) reviews, and approves or denies, waiver petitions
submitted by railroads and other parties subject to the regulations.
Petitions granted by the Safety Board can be utilized only by the
petitioning party. By incorporating existing relevant regulatory
waivers into part 229, FRA intends to extend the reach of the
regulatory flexibilities permitted under those waivers. Although, FRA
is altering a number of regulatory requirements, the comprehensive
safety regulatory structure remains unchanged.
    The requirement that a locomotive be safe to operate in the service
in which it is placed remains the cornerstone of Federal regulation.
Title 49 U.S.C. 20701 provides that ``[a] railroad carrier may use or
allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when
the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances: (1) are in
proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of
personal injury; (2) have been inspected as required under this chapter
and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under
this chapter; and (3) can withstand every test prescribed by the
Secretary under this chapter.''
    The statute is extremely broad in scope and makes clear that each
railroad is responsible for ensuring that locomotives used on its line
are safe. Even the extensive requirements of part 229 are not intended
to be exhaustive in scope, and with or without that regulatory
structure, the railroads remain directly responsible for finding and
correcting all hazardous conditions. For example, even without these
regulations, a railroad would be responsible for repairing an
inoperative alerter and an improperly functioning remote control
transmitter, if the locomotive is equipped with these devices.
    On July 12, 2004, the AAR, on behalf of itself and its member
railroads, petitioned FRA to delete the requirement contained in 49 CFR
229.131 related to locomotive sanders. The petition and supporting
documentation asserted that contrary to popular belief, depositing sand
on the rail in front of the locomotive wheels will not have any
significant influence on the emergency stopping distance of a train.
While contemplating the petition, FRA and interested industry members
began identifying other issues related to the locomotive safety
standards. The purpose of this task was to develop information so that
FRA could potentially address the issues through the RSAC.
    The locomotive sanders final rule was published on October 19, 2007
(72 FR 59216). FRA continued to utilize the RSAC process to address
additional locomotive safety issues. On September 10, 2009, after a
series of detailed discussions, the RSAC approved and provided
recommendations on a wide range of locomotive safety issues including,
locomotive brake maintenance, pilot height, headlight operation, danger
markings, and locomotive electronics. FRA generally proposed the
consensus rule text for these issues with minor clarifying
modifications on January 12, 2011. See 76 FR 2199. The RSAC was unable
to reach consensus on the issues related to remote control locomotives,
cab temperature, and locomotive alerters. Based on its consideration of
the information and views provided by the RSAC Locomotive Safety
Standards Working Group, FRA also proposed rule text related to the
non-consensus items. Id. Many comments were submitted to the public
docket in response to the NPRM. The comment period closed on March 14,
2011. FRA is issuing this final rule after considering the comments.

III. RSAC Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety
program issues. The Committee includes representation from interested
parties, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and
manufacturers, and other interested parties. A list of member groups
follows:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO)
American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials
(AASHTO)
American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA)
Amtrak
AAR
Association of Railway Museums (ARM)
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM)
BLET
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED)
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) *
High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA)
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA) *
League of Railway Industry Women *
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP)
National Association of Railway Business Women *
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
NTSB *
Railway Supply Institute (RSI)
Safe Travel America (STA)
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte *
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
Transport Canada*
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC)
United Transportation Union (UTU)

    * Indicates associate membership.

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and after
consideration and debate, the RSAC may accept or reject the task. If
accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a
given task. The task force then provides that information to the
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to
the RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority
of the RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff
has played an active role at the working group level in discussing the
issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the
recommendation and the agency exercises its independent judgment on
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal. If the
working group or the RSAC is unable to reach consensus on
recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the issue
through conventional practices including traditional rulemaking
proceedings.

IV. Proceedings to Date

    On February 22, 2006, FRA presented, and the RSAC accepted, the
task of reviewing existing locomotive safety needs and recommending
consideration of specific actions useful to advance the safety of rail
operations. The RSAC established the Working Group to handle this task
and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, included the following:

APTA
ASLRRA
Amtrak
AAR
ASRSM
BLET
BMWE
BRS
BNSF Railway Company (BNSF)
California Department of Transportation
Canadian National Railway (CN)
Canadian Pacific Railway (CP)
Conrail
CSX Transportation (CSXT)
Florida East Coast Railroad
General Electric (GE)
Genesee & Wyoming Inc.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
IBEW
Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS)
Long Island Rail Road
Metro-North Railroad
MTA Long Island
National Conference of Firemen and Oilers
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)
Public Service Commission of West Virginia
Rail America, Inc.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Agency
SMWIA
STV, Inc.
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
Transport Canada
Union Pacific Railroad (UP)
UTU
Volpe Center
Wabtec Corporation
Watco Companies

    The task statement approved by the full RSAC sought immediate
action from the Working Group regarding the need for, and usefulness
of, the existing regulation related to locomotive sanders. The task
statement established a target date of 90 days for the Working Group to
report back to the RSAC with recommendations to revise the existing
regulatory sander provision. The Working Group conducted two meetings
that focused almost exclusively on the sander requirement. The meetings
were held on May 8-10, 2006, in St. Louis, Missouri, and on August 9-
10, 2006, in Fort Worth, Texas. Minutes of these meetings have been
made part of the docket in this proceeding. After broad and meaningful
discussion related to the potential safety and operational benefits
provided by equipping locomotives with operative sanders, the Working
Group reached consensus on a recommendation for the full RSAC.
    On September 21, 2006, the full RSAC unanimously adopted the
Working Group's recommendation on locomotive sanders as its
recommendation to FRA. The next twelve Working Group meeting addressed
a wide range of locomotive safety issues. The meetings were held at the
following locations on the following days:

Kansas City, MO, October 30 & 31, 2006;
Raleigh, NC, January 9 & 10, 2007;
Orlando, FL, March 6 & 7, 2007;
Chicago, IL, June 6 & 7, 2007;
Las Vegas, NV, September 18 & 19, 2007;
New Orleans, LA, November 27 & 28, 2007;
Fort Lauderdale, FL, February 5 & 6, 2008;
Grapevine, TX, May 20 & 21, 2008;
Silver Spring, MD, August 5 & 6, 2008;
Overland Park, KS, October 22 & 23, 2008;
Washington, DC, January 6 & 7, 2009; and
Arlington, VA, April 15 & 16, 2009.

    At the above listed meetings, the Working Group successfully
reached consensus on the following locomotive safety issues: locomotive
brake maintenance, pilot height, headlight operation, danger markings
placement, load meter settings, reorganization of steam generator
requirements, and the establishment locomotive electronics
requirements. Throughout the preamble discussion in the NPRM and this
final rule, FRA refers to commentsviews, suggestions, or
recommendations made by members of the Working Group. When using this
terminology, FRA is referring to views, statements, discussions, or
positions identified or contained in the minutes of the Working Group
meetings. These documents have been made part of the docket in this
proceeding and are available for public inspection as discussed in the
ADDRESSES portion of this document. These points are discussed to show
the origin of certain issues and the course of discussions on those
issues at the task force or working group level. We believe this helps
illuminate factors FRA has weighed in making its regulatory decisions,
and the logic behind those decisions.
    The reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the full RSAC
makes recommendations to FRA, and it is the consensus recommendation of
the full RSAC on which FRA is primarily acting in this proceeding. As
discussed above, the Working Group reported its findings and
recommendations to the RSAC at its September 10, 2009 meeting. The RSAC
approved the recommended consensus regulatory text proposed by the
Working Group, which accounts for the majority of the NPRM issued in
this proceeding. 76 FR 2199. The specific regulatory language
recommended by the RSAC was amended slightly for clarity and
consistency. FRA independently developed proposals related to remote
control locomotives, alerters, and locomotive cab temperature, issues
that the Working Group discussed, but ultimately did not reach
consensus. Id. Many comments were submitted to the public docket in
response to the NPRM. The comment period closed on March 14, 2011. FRA
is issuing this final rule after considering the comments.

V. General Overview of Final Rule Requirements

    The retrospective review requirements of E.O. 13563, trends in
locomotive operation, concern about the safe design of electronics,
technology advances, and experience applying Federal regulations
provide the main impetus for the revisions to FRA's existing standards
related to locomotive safety. An overview of some of the major areas
addressed in this final rule is provided below.

A. Remote Control Locomotives

    Remote control devices have been used to operate locomotives at
various locations in the United States for many years, primarily within
yards and certain industrial sites. Railroads in Canada have
extensively used remote control locomotives for more than a decade. FRA
began investigating remote control operations in 1994 and held its
first public hearing on the subject in mid-1990s to gather information
and examine the safety issues relating to this new technology. On July
19, 2000, FRA conducted a technical conference in which interested
parties, including rail unions, remote control systems suppliers, and
railroad representatives, shared their views and described their
experiences with remote control operations.
    On February 14, 2001, FRA published a Safety Advisory in which FRA
issued recommended guidelines for conducting remote control locomotive
operations. See 66 FR 10340, Notice of Safety Advisory 2001-01, Docket
No. FRA-2000-7325. By issuing these recommendations, FRA sought to
identify a set of ``best practices'' to guide the rail industry when
implementing this technology. As this was an emerging technology, FRA
believed the approach served the railroad industry by providing
flexibility to both manufacturers designing the equipment and to
railroads using the technology in their operations, while reinforcing
the importance of complying with all existing railroad safety
regulations. All of the major railroads have adopted the
recommendations contained in the advisory, with only slight
modifications to suit their individual operations.
    In the Safety Advisory, FRA addressed the application and
enforcement of the Federal regulations to remote control locomotives.
FRA discussed the existing Federal locomotive inspection requirements
and the application of those broad requirements to remote control
locomotive technology. The Safety Advisory explains that: ``although
compliance with this Safety Advisory is voluntary, nothing in this
Safety Advisory is meant to relieve a railroad from compliance with all
existing railroad safety regulations [and] [t]herefore, when procedures
required by regulation are cited in this Safety Advisory, compliance is
mandatory.'' Id. at 10343. For example, the Safety Advisory states that
the remote control locomotive ``system must be included as part of the
calendar day inspection required by section 229.21, since this
equipment becomes an appurtenance to the locomotive.'' Id. at 10344.
Another example of a mandatory requirement mentioned in the Safety
Advisory is that the remote control locomotive ``system components that
interface with the mechanical devices of the locomotive, e.g., air
pressure monitoring devices, pressure switches, speed sensors, etc.,
should be inspected and calibrated as often as necessary, but not less
than the locomotive's periodic (92-day) inspection.'' Id.; see also 49
CFR 229.23. Thus, the Safety Advisory made clear that the existing
Federal regulations require inspection of the remote control locomotive
equipment.
    The Safety Advisory also addressed the application of various
requirements related to the operators of remote control locomotives.
The Safety Advisory states that ``each person operating an RCL [remote
control locomotive] must be certified and qualified in accordance with
part 240 [FRA's locomotive engineer rule] if conventional operation of
a locomotive under the same circumstances would require certification
under that regulation.'' Id. at 10344. In 2006, FRA codified additional
requirements to address specific operational issues such as situational
awareness. See 71 FR 60372.
    During several productive meetings, the Working Group identified
many areas of agreement regarding the regulation of remote control
locomotive equipment. On issues that produced disagreement, FRA
gathered useful information. Informed by the Working Group discussions
and the comments to the NPRM related to this proceeding, this final
rule will codify the industry's best practices related to the use and
operation of remote control locomotives.

B. Electronic Recordkeeping

    The development and improved capability of electronic recordkeeping
systems has led to the potential for safe electronic maintenance of
records required by part 229. Since April 3, 2002, FRA has granted a
series of waivers permitting electronic recordkeeping with certain
conditions intended to ensure the safety, security and accessibility of
such systems. See FRA-2001-11014. Based on the information gathered
under the experiences of utilizing the electronic records permitted
under these existing waivers, the Working Group discussed, and agreed
to, generally applicable requirements for electronic recordkeeping
systems. This final rule establishes generally applicable requirements
based on the Working Group's recommendation.

C. Brake Maintenance

    Advances in technology have increased the longevity of locomotive
brake system components. In conjunction with several railroads and the
AAR, FRA has monitored the performance of new brake systems since the
Locomotive Safety Standards regulation was first published in 1980. See
45 FR 21092. The revisions to locomotive air brake maintenance are
based on this extensive history of study and testing. Over the last
several decades, FRA has granted several conditional waivers extending
the air brake cleaning, repair, and test requirements of Sec. Sec.
229.27 and 229.29. These extensions were designed to accommodate
testing of the reliability of electronic brake systems and other brake
system components, with the intent of moving toward performance based
test criterion with components being replaced or repaired based upon
their reliability.
    In 1981, FRA granted a test waiver (H-80-7) to eight railroads,
permitting them to extend the annual and biennial testing requirements
contained in Sec. Sec.  229.27 and 229.29, in order to conduct a study
of the safe service life and reliability of the locomotive brake
components. On January 29, 1985, FRA expanded the waiver to permit all
railroads to inspect the 26-L type brake equipment on a triennial
basis. In the 1990's, the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CP) and the
Canadian National Railroad (CN) petitioned the FRA to allow them to
operate locomotives into the United States that received periodic
attention every four years. The requests were based on a decision by
Transport Canada to institute a four-year inspection program following
a thorough test program in Canada. In November 2000, FRA granted
conditional waivers to both the CN and CP, extending the testing
interval to four years for Canadian-based locomotives equipped with 26-
L type brake systems and air dryers. The waiver also requires all air
brake filtering devices to be changed annually and the air

compressor to be overhauled not less than every six years. In 2005,
this waiver was extended industry-wide. See FRA-2005-21325.
    In 2009, AAR petitioned for a waiver that would permit four year
testing and maintenance intervals for locomotives that are equipped
with 26-L type brake equipment and not equipped with air dryers. The
petition assumed that the testing and maintenance intervals that are
appropriate for locomotives equipped with air dryers are also
appropriate for locomotives without air dryers. FRA denied the request,
but granted a limited test program to determine whether the addition of
operative air dryers on a locomotive merits different maintenance and
testing requirements. FRA recognizes that the results of the test plan
may indicate that locomotives that are not equipped with air dryers
merit the same treatment as locomotives that operate without air
dryers.
    The New York Air Brake Corporation (NYAB) sought by waiver, and was
granted, an extension of the cleaning, repairing, and testing
requirements for pneumatic components of the CCBI and CCBII brake
systems (FRA-2000-7367, formerly H-95-3), and then modification of that
waiver to include its new CCB-26 electronic airbrake system. The
initial waiver, which was first granted on September 13, 1996, extended
the interval for cleaning, repairing, and testing pneumatic components
of the NYAB Computer Controlled Brake (CCB, now referred to as CCB-I)
locomotive air brake system under 49 CFR 229.27(a)(2) and 49 CFR
229.29(a) from 736 days to five years. The waiver was modified to
include NYAB's CCB-II electronic air brake system on August 20, 1998.
    To confirm that the extended brake maintenance interval did not
have a negative effect on safety, FRA required quarterly reports
listing air brake failures, both pneumatic and electrical, of all
locomotives operating under the waiver including: Locomotive reporting
marks; and the cause and resolution of the problem. All verified
failures were required to be reported to FRA prior to disassembly, so
that NYAB, the railroad, and FRA could jointly witness the disassembly
of the failed component to determine the cause. The last quarterly
submission to FRA listed 1,889 CCBI and 1,806 CCBII equipped
locomotives in the United States, all of which were operating at high
levels of reliability and demonstrated safety. All past tests and
teardown inspections confirm the safety and reliability of the five
year interval.
    Based on successful performance of the two NYAB electronic air
brake systems under the conditions of the 1996 and 1998 waivers, the
waiver was extended for another five years on September 10, 2001 and
the conditions of the waiver were modified on September 22, 2003. NYAB
described the new CCB-26 electronic air brake system as an adaptation
of the CCB-II system designed to be used on locomotives without
integrated cab electronics. It used many of the same sub-assemblies of
pneumatic valves, electronic controls and software (referred to as line
replaceable units or LRUs) as the CCB-II. Some changes were made to
simplify the system while maintaining or increasing the level of
safety. For example, the penalty brake interface was changed to mimic
the 26L system interface, allowing for a fully pneumatic penalty brake
application. Also, the brake cylinder pilot pressure development has
been simplified from an electronic control to a fully pneumatic version
based on proven components.
    Much of the software and diagnostic logic which detects critical
failures and takes appropriate action to effect a safe stop has been
carried over from CCB-II. Overall, NYAB characterized the CCB-26 as
being more similar to CCB-II than CCB-II is to CCB-I. As a final check
on the performance of the CCB-26 system, it was included in the
existing NYAB failure monitoring and recording systems. For the reasons
above, FRA extended the waiver of compliance with brake maintenance
requirements to locomotives equipped with CCB-26 brake systems.
    Similarly, WABCO Locomotive Products (WABCO), a Wabtec company,
sought and was granted an extension of the cleaning, repairing, and
testing requirements for pneumatic components of the EPIC brake systems
(FRA-2002-13397, formerly H-92-3), and then modification of that waiver
to include its new FastBrake line of electronic airbrake systems. The
initial waiver conditionally extended to five years the clean, repair
and test intervals for certain pneumatic air brake components contained
in Sec. Sec.  229.27(a)(2) and 229.29(a) for WABCO's EPIC electronic
air brake equipment. WABCO complied with all of the conditions of the
waiver. Specifically, WABCO provided regular reports to FRA including
summaries of locomotives equipped with EPIC brake systems and all
pneumatic and electronic failures. FRA participated in two joint
teardown inspections of EPIC equipment after five years of service in
June 2000 and May 2002. After five years of service, the EPIC brake
systems were found to function normally. No faults were found during
locomotive tests, and the teardown revealed that the parts were clean
and in working condition.
    In support of its proposal to extend brake maintenance for
FastBrake brake systems, WABCO stated that virtually all of the core
pneumatic technology that has been service proven in EPIC from the time
of its introduction and documented as such under the provisions of the
above waiver and were transferred into FastBrake with little or no
change. They asserted that a further reduction of pneumatic logic
devices had been made possible by the substitution of computer based
logic. WABCO also provided a discussion of the similarities between the
EPIC and FastBrake systems as well as the differences, which are
primarily in the area of electronics rather than pneumatics. In
conclusion, WABCO stated that the waiver could be amended without
compromising safety. For the reasons above, FRA granted the waiver
petition.
    Over time, several brake systems have been brought into a
performance based standard. FRA, along with railroads and brake valve
manufacturers, has participated in a series of brake valve evaluations.
Each evaluation was performed after extended use of a particular brake
valve system to determine whether it can perform safely when used
beyond the number of days currently permitted by part 229. The Working
Group agreed with the evidence of success and the overall approach
taken by FRA. As a result, the Working Group reached consensus on the
brake maintenance standards. That consensus recommendation was included
in the NPRM and is retained in this final rule.

D. Brakes, General

    In December of 1999, a TRC, consisting of FRA and industry experts,
met in Kansas City to consider the proper application of the phrase
``operate as intended'' contained in Sec.  229.46 when applied to
trailing, non-controlling locomotives. Extensive discussion failed to
reach consensus on this issue, but revealed valuable insight into the
technical underpinnings and operational realities surrounding the
issue. The Working Group revived this issue, and after lengthy
discussion, reached consensus.
    Generally, even if a locomotive has a defective brake valve that
prevents it from functioning as a lead locomotive, its brakes will
still properly apply and release when it is placed and operated as a
trailing locomotive. This situation can apply on either a pneumatic 26-
L application or on the electronic versions

of the locomotive brake. The electronic brake often will have the
breaker turned off, thus making the brake inoperative unless it is
being controlled by another locomotive.
    Based on reading the plain language of the existing regulation, it
is not clear under what conditions a trailing, non-controlling
locomotive operates as intended. The existing regulation provides that
``the carrier shall know before each trip that the locomotive brakes
and devices for regulating all pressures, including but not limited to
the automatic and independent brake valves, operate as intended * * *''
See 49 CFR 229.46. One could reasonably argue that a trailing non-
controlling locomotive is operating as intended when the brakes are
able to apply and release in response to a command from a controlling
locomotive, because the locomotive is not intended to control the
brakes when it is used in the trailing position. It could also be
argued that the trailing, non-controlling locomotive's automatic and
independent brake valves must be able to control the brakes whenever it
is called on to do so. Under this reading, a trailing, non-controlling
locomotive does not operate as intended when it is not able to control
the brakes.
    At the TRC meeting, the representatives from NYAB Corporation, a
brake manufacturer, asserted that a problem with a faulty automatic or
independent brake valve will not create an unsafe condition when the
locomotive is operating in the trail position, provided the locomotive
consist has a successful brake test (application and release) from the
lead unit. The reason offered was that, in order for a locomotive to
operate in the trailing position, the automatic and independent brake
valves must be cut-out. FRA agrees, and currently applies this
rationale in regards to performing a calendar day inspection. The
calendar day inspection does not require that the operation of the
automatic and independent brake controls be verified on trailing
locomotives. The Working Group agreed, and recommended adding a tagging
requirement to prevent a trailing, non-controlling locomotive with
defective independent or automatic brakes from being used as a
controlling locomotive. FRA adopted this recommendation in the NPRM and
retains it in this final rule.

E. Locomotive Cab Temperature

    In 1998, FRA led an RSAC Working Group to address various cab
working condition issues. To aid the Working Group discussions, FRA
conducted a cold weather study to determine the average temperature in
each type of locomotive cab commonly used at the time. The study
concluded that at the location where the engineer operates the
locomotive, each locomotive maintained an average temperature of at
least 60 degrees. The window and door gaskets were maintained in proper
condition on the locomotives that were studied. Now that the locomotive
safety standards are in the process of being revised, FRA is
incorporating existing industry practice into the regulation in an
effort to maintain the current conditions. For review, the 1998 study
has been included in the public docket related to this proceeding.
    In addition to increasing the minimum cab temperature from 50
[deg]F to 60 [deg]F, FRA believes that requiring railroads to continue
their current practice of equipping new locomotives with air
conditioning units inside the locomotive cab and maintaining those
units during the periodic inspection required by Sec.  229.23, will
maintain the existing level of railroad safety. Current literature
regarding the effect of low temperature on human performance indicates
that performance decreases when the temperature decreases below 60
[deg]F. Similarly, the literature regarding the effect of high
temperature and humidity indicates that performance decreases when
temperatures increase above 80 [deg]F, and that performance decreases
to an even greater extent when the temperature increases above 90
[deg]F. Ergonomics, 2002 vol. 45, no. 10, 682-698. Please note that
when discussing high temperatures in the research about the effects on
human performance, the term temperature means the Wet Bulb Globe
temperature or WBGT. When discussing accident statistics the
temperatures reported were ambient not accounting for humidity and
radiant heat sources.
    In many occupational settings, it is desirable to minimize the
health and safety effects of temperature extremes. Depending upon the
workplace, engineering controls may be employed as well as the
management of employee exposure to excess cold or heat using such
methods as work-rest regimens. Because of the unique nature of the
railroad operating environment, the locomotive cab can be viewed as a
captive workplace where the continuous work of the locomotive crew
takes place in a relatively small space. For this reason, in an
excessively hot cab, a locomotive crew member may have no escape from
extreme temperatures, since they cannot be expected to readily
disembark the train and rest in a cooler environment as part of a work-
rest regimen without prior planning by the railroad. As such, FRA
expects reliance upon engineering controls to limit temperature
extremes. When FRA considered controls for cold and hot temperature cab
environments, FRA learned that there is a range of engineering controls
available that can be employed. Some of these controls are presently
employed to affect the cab temperature environment. Controls include
isolation from heat sources such as the prime mover; reduced emissivity
of hot surfaces; insulation from hot or cold ambient environments; heat
radiation shielding including reflective shields, absorptive shielding,
transparent shielding, and flexible shielding; localized workstation
heating or cooling; general and spot (fan) ventilation; evaporative
cooling; chilled coil cooling systems.
    Locomotive crew performance is directly linked to railroad safety
through the safe operation of trains. Locomotive engineers are
responsible for operating trains in a safe and efficient manner. This
requires the performance of cognitive tasks, including the mathematical
information processing required for train handling, constant vigilance,
and accurate perception of the train and outside environment.
Conductors are responsible for maintaining accurate train consists,
including the contents and position of hazardous materials cars, for
confirming the aspects and indications of signals, and for ensuring
compliance with written orders and instructions. A decrease in
performance of any of these tasks that can be anticipated from relevant
scientific findings should be avoided where amelioration can be
applied.
    Based on the preceding discussion and its review of existing
literature on the subject, FRA believes it is appropriate to limit
minimum locomotive cab temperature and also require that new
locomotives be equipped with an air conditioning unit inside the
locomotive cab. To ensure that an air conditioning unit is properly
maintained, the unit should be inspected and maintained so that it
works properly and meets or exceeds the manufacturer's minimum
operating specifications during the periodic inspection that is
required by Sec.  229.23. Comments by AAR indicate that this is
consistent with the current industry schedule. FRA believes that
requiring the railroads to maintain their air conditioning units in a
manner that meets or exceeds the manufacturer's minimum operating
specifications should result in the sufficient maintenance of the
units. FRA will monitor air conditioning maintenance performed by
railroads to ensure that it

is being properly an adequately performed. If FRA determines that the
prescribed level of maintenance is insufficient to ensure the proper
functioning of the air conditioning units, FRA will consider taking
regulatory action to address the issue in a future rulemaking.
    AAR submitted comments stating that new locomotives have been
ordered with air conditioning units for many years and that they are
maintained at the periodic inspection, and that these practices are
expected to continue. FRA believes that requiring railroads to continue
to equip new locomotives with air conditioning units inside the
locomotive cab and maintaining those units during the periodic
inspection required by Sec.  229.23, will maintain the existing level
of railroad safety.
    AAR and the U.S. Army's Joint Munitions Command submitted comments
stating that a maximum temperature requirement that is intended to
prevent excessive heat stress from affecting locomotive crew
performance inside the locomotive cab: would not address a safety
issue; would be difficult to accurately measure inside the locomotive
cab; and, would be overly burdensome. The UTU and the BLET submitted
comments supporting the establishment of a maximum temperature
requirement. The comments stated that such a requirement would improve
locomotive crew performance during operation of the locomotive. FRA
believes that the issues need to be considered further before a
determination can be made as to whether a maximum temperature
requirement would be appropriate. The RSAC has recently tasked a
working group with addressing issues related to fatigue management. FRA
believes that the fatigue management working group is an appropriate
forum for further exploring issues related to the potential benefits
that could result from requiring a limit to the permissible maximum
locomotive cab temperature.

F. Headlights

    The revisions to the headlight requirements incorporate waiver FRA
2005-23107 into part 229. The waiver permits a locomotive with one
failed 350-watt incandescent lamp to operate in the lead until the next
daily inspection, if the auxiliary lights remain continuously
illuminated. Under the existing requirements, a headlight with only one
functioning 200-watt lamp is not defective and its condition does not
affect the permissible movement of a locomotive. However, the existing
requirements are more restrictive for a 350-watt lamp. A locomotive
with only one functioning 350-watt lamp in the headlight can be
properly moved only under the conditions of section 229.9. This final
rule modifies the treatment of locomotives with a failed 350-watt lamp
to allow flexibility, and be consistent with the current treatment of
200-watt lamps. In accordance with E.O. 13563, this modification will
reduce the downtime for locomotives with certain headlight defects, and
thereby, reduce the burden on the rail industry.
    Testing showed that production tolerances for the 350-watt
incandescent lamp cause most individual lamps to fall below the 200,000
candela requirement at the center of the beam. As such, two working
350-watt lamps are required to ensure 200,000 candela at the center of
the beam. Testing also showed that the 350-watt incandescent lamp
produced well over 100,000 candela at the center of the beam, and its
high power and the position of the filament within the reflector causes
the lamp to be brighter than the 200-watt incandescent lamp at all
angles greater than approximately 2.5 degrees off the centerline. In
other words, the only area in which the 350-watt lamp produces
insufficient illumination is within 2.5 degrees of the centerline. The
new requirement compensates for the reduced amount of illumination by
requiring the auxiliary lights to be aimed parallel to the centerline
of the locomotive and illuminate continuously.
    Significantly, in 1980, when FRA promulgated the 200,000 candela
requirement it could not take into consideration the light produced by
auxiliary lights, because they were not required and not often used.
Today, there is light in front of a locomotive produced by both the
headlight and the auxiliary lights. When discussing AAR's request that
the final rule permit locomotives with a nonfunctioning 350-watt lamp
to operate without restriction, FRA stated that AAR's comments ``may
have merit when considering locomotives with auxiliary lights aimed
parallel to the centerline of the locomotive.'' See 69 FR 12533. While
the auxiliary lights on some locomotives are aimed parallel to the
centerline, on many others the auxiliary lights are aimed so that their
light will cross 400 feet in front of the locomotive. The regulations
only require auxiliary lights to be aimed within 15 degrees of the
centerline. FRA is not aware of a basis for assuming that the light
from two auxiliary lights complying with the regulations in any fashion
would be insufficient, when combined with a 350-watt headlight lamp.

G. Alerters

    An alerter is a common safety device that is intended to verify
that the locomotive engineer remains vigilant and capable of
accomplishing the tasks that he or she must perform while operating a
locomotive. An alerter will initiate a penalty brake application to
stop the train if it does not receive the proper response from the
engineer. As an appurtenance to the locomotive, an alerter must operate
as intended when present on a locomotive. Section 20701 of Title 49 of
the United States Code prohibits the use of a locomotive unless the
entire locomotive and its appurtenances are in proper condition and
safe to operate in the service to which they are placed. Under this
authority, FRA has issued many violations against railroads for
operating locomotives equipped with a non-functioning alerter. Alerters
are currently required on passenger locomotives pursuant to Sec.
238.237 (67 FR 19991), and are present on most freight locomotives. A
long-standing industry standard currently contains various requirements
for locomotive alerters. See AAR Standard S-5513, ``Locomotive Alerter
Requirements,'' (November 26, 2007).
    After several productive meetings, the Working Group reached
partial consensus on requirements related to the regulation of
alerters. For those areas where agreement could not be reached, FRA has
fully considered the information and views of the Working Group members
and the recommendations made by the NTSB in developing the requirements
related to locomotive alerters.
    On July 10, 2005, at about 4:15 a.m., two Canadian National (CN)
freight trains collided head-on in Anding, Mississippi. The collision
occurred on the CN Yazoo Subdivision, where the trains were being
operated under a centralized traffic control signal system on single
track. Signal data indicated that the northbound train, IC 1013 North,
continued past a stop (red) signal at North Anding and collided with
the southbound train, IC 1023 South, about \1/4\ mile beyond the
signal. The collision resulted in the derailment of six locomotives and
17 cars. Approximately 15,000 gallons of diesel fuel were released from
the locomotives and resulted in a fire that burned for roughly 15
hours. Two crewmembers were on each train; all four were killed. As a
precaution, about 100 Anding residents were evacuated; fortunately,
they did not report any injuries. Property damages exceeded $9.5
million and

clearing and environmental cleanup costs totaled approximately
$616,800.
    The NTSB has issued a series of safety recommendations that would
require freight locomotives to be equipped with an alerter. On April
25, 2007, the NTSB determined that a contributing cause of the head-on
collision in Anding, Mississippi, was the lack of an alerter on the
lead locomotive, which if present, could have prompted the crew to be
more attentive to their operation of the train. See Recommendation R-
07-1. That recommendation provides as follows: ``[r]equire railroads to
ensure that the lead locomotives used to operate trains on tracks not
equipped with a positive train control system are equipped with an
alerter.''
    Another NTSB recommendation relating to locomotive alerters was
issued as a result of an investigation into the collision of two
Norfolk Southern Railway freight trains at Sugar Valley, Georgia, on
August 9, 1990. In that incident, the crew of one of the trains failed
to stop at a signal. The NTSB concluded that the engineer of that train
was probably experiencing a micro-sleep or was distracted. Based on
testing, it was determined that as the train approached the stop
signal, the alerter would have initiated an alarm cycle. The NTSB
concluded that the engineer ``could have cancelled the alerter system
while he was asleep by a simple reflex action that he performed without
conscious thought.'' As a result of the investigation, the NTSB made
the following recommendation to the FRA: ``[i]n conjunction with the
study of fatigue of train crewmembers, explore the parameters of an
optimum alerter system for locomotives. See NTSB Recommendation R-91-
26.
    Typically, alerter alarms occur more frequently as train speed
increases. Unlike the Sugar Valley, Georgia, accident in which the
train had slowed and entered a siding before overrunning a signal, the
northbound train in the Anding, Mississippi, remained on the main track
at higher speeds. Had an alerter been installed, there was a four
minute time period after passing the approach signal during which the
alerter would have activated four to five times. It seems unlikely that
the engineer could have reset the alerter multiple times by reflex
action without any increase in his awareness. Therefore, the NTSB
determined that an alerter likely would have detected the lack of
activity by the engineer and sounded an alarm that could have alerted
one or both crewmembers. Had the crew been incapacitated or not
responded to the alarm, the alerter would have automatically applied
the brakes and brought the train to a stop. The NTSB concluded that had
an alerter been installed on the lead locomotive of the northbound
train, it may have prevented the collision.
    The NTSB also closely examined the use of locomotive alerters when
investigating the sideswipe collision between two Union Pacific
Railroad (UP) freight trains in Delia, Kansas, on July 2, 1997. In that
accident, a train entered a siding but did not stop at the other end,
and it collided with a passing train on the main track. The NTSB
concluded that ``had the striking locomotive been equipped with an
alerter, it may have helped the engineer stay awake while his train
traveled through the siding.'' As a result of its investigation, the
NTSB made the following recommendation to the FRA: ``[r]evise the
Federal regulations to require that all locomotives operating on lines
that do not have a positive train separation system be equipped with a
cognitive alerter system that cannot be reset by reflex action.'' See
NTSB Recommendation R-99-53.
    FRA believes that the requirements proposed in the NPRM and
retained in this final rule related to alerters incorporate existing
railroad practices and locomotive design, and address each of the NTSB
recommendations discussed above. As with all of FRA's regulatory
requirements, the requirements related to alerters are minimum Federal
safety requirements that do not prohibit railroads from doing more to
improve railroad safety. Based on industry meetings, FRA understands
that the industry is considering establishing industry requirements
that would be more restrictive than the Federal requirements. FRA fully
supports such an effort by the industry.

H. Locomotive Electronics

    After extensive discussion, the Working Group reached consensus on
the requirements related to locomotive electronic systems that were
proposed in the NPRM. Advances in electronics and software technology
have resulted in changes to the implementation of locomotive control
systems. Technology changes have allowed the introduction of new
functional capabilities as well as the integration of different
functions in ways that advance the building, operation, and maintenance
of locomotive control systems. FRA encourages the use of these advanced
technologies to improve safe, efficient, and economical operations.
However, the increased complexities and interactions associated with
these technologies increase the potential for unintentional and
unplanned consequences, which could adversely affect the safety of rail
operations.
    The NPRM proposed requirements that would prescribe safety
standards for safety-critical electronic locomotive control systems,
subsystems, and components including requirements to ensure that the
development, installation, implementation, inspection, testing,
operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of those products will
achieve and maintain an acceptable level of safety. The NPRM also
proposed standards to ensure that personnel working with safety-
critical products receive appropriate training. Of course, each
railroad would be able to prescribe additional or more stringent rules,
and other special instructions, provided they are consistent with the
final rule.
    FRA also recognizes that advances in technology may further
eliminate the traditional distinctions between locomotive control and
train control functionalities. Indeed, technology advances may provide
for opportunities for increased or improved functionalities in train
control systems that run concurrent with locomotive control. Train
control and locomotive control, however, remain two fundamentally
different operations with different objectives. FRA does not want to
restrict the adoption of new locomotive control functions and
technologies by establishing regulations for locomotive control systems
intended to address safety issues associated with train control.

I. Periodic Locomotive Inspection

    The Locomotive Safety Standards Working Group was unable to reach
consensus on whether current locomotive inspection intervals and
procedures are appropriate to current conditions. On June 22, 2009, FRA
granted the BNSF request for waiver from compliance with the periodic
locomotive inspection requirements. See Docket FRA-2008-0157. BNSF
stated in their request that each of the subject locomotives are
equipped with new self-diagnostic technology and advanced computer
control, and that the locomotives were designed by the manufacturer to
be maintained at a six month interval.
    The modern locomotive equipped with microprocessor-based controls
has diagnostics that monitor the functioning of locomotive equipment
and record faults, particularly with respect to features relevant to
the periodic inspection. Major faults are instantly addressed. Minor
faults are addressed through later data analysis. In some cases,
railroads have the capability of

analyzing the data remotely, without the need for the locomotive to be
shopped. Among the features addressed by the self-diagnostic equipment
on the locomotive models covered by this petition are the ground relay,
locked power axle, slipped pinion, and traction motor flashover. Other
faults monitored include contactor faults, electrical feedback signal
faults, and electronic air brake faults. If the system detects an air
brake system failure, the system goes into fail-safe mode. Another
feature of these models is that the maintenance interval recommended by
the manufacturers is 184 days. In 1980, the 92-day periodic-inspection
interval instituted by FRA reflected the maintenance intervals
recommended by the manufacturers at that time.
    The model locomotives that are the subject of the above noted
waiver use a very viscous oil instead of grease to lubricate the
pinions and bull gears on traction-motor wheel assemblies. The oil does
not degrade with age or thicken or thin as ambient temperature varies.
Years of use have demonstrated that there is no need to check oil
levels or replenish the lubricant frequently. Other relevant features
of the modern locomotive include:
     Traction motor brushes last well over 184 days (most last
one year);
     Improved seals and gaskets, greatly reducing the
occurrence of fluid leaks and the need to inspect gusseted and sealed
joints;
     Improved insulation protecting against the deterioration
of locomotive wiring (microprocessors have reduced the generation of
heat, which also enhances wiring life); and,
     The traction motor support bearings are completely sealed
roller bearings, with lubrication only required when wheels are
changed.
    In the waiver petition, BNSF requested that the required 92-day
periodic inspection be performed at 184-day intervals on subject
locomotives, if qualified mechanical forces perform at least one of the
required daily inspections every 31 days and FRA non-complying
conditions that are discovered en-route or during any daily inspection
are moved to a mechanical facility capable of making required repairs.
Pursuant to the conditions of the waiver, data were collected on the
locomotives' performance and joint FRA/BNSF inspections were conducted.
The data show that safety was not impacted by extending the periodic
inspection interval to 184 days. Based on the initial results of the
waiver, FRA identified the periodic locomotive inspection as a
potential candidate for reducing the regulatory burden on the rail
industry, as required by E.O. 13563. FRA's continued observations of
tests during joint inspections of the brake systems shows that the
waiver has been successful. As there is no material difference between
the locomotive models covered by the BNSF waiver and other self
diagnostic microprocessor-based locomotives, FRA is modifying the
existing periodic inspection requirements to provide for a 184-day
inspection interval for all locomotives equipped with microprocessor-
based control systems with self-diagnostic capabilities.

J. Rear End Markers

    In 2003, the U.S. DOT's Office of Governmental Affairs received a
letter from Senator Feinstein on behalf of one of her constituents. The
individual suggested a revision to FRA's rear end marker regulation,
which is found in part 221. Specifically, the constituent suggested
that Federal regulations should require trains with distributive power
on the rear to have a red marker, because a red marker would make for a
safer operating environment by giving a rail worker a better indication
of whether he or she is looking at the rear or front end of the train.
The individual made reference to a recent fatality involving a BNSF
conductor who jumped from his train because he observed a headlight
that he mistakenly believed was a train on the same track, directly
ahead of his train. As FRA is currently reviewing its existing
requirements for locomotive safety standards, FRA requested comments on
this rear end marker issue. AAR submitted the only comment related to
this issue, stating that no changes should be made to the existing
requirements based on the single incident mentioned above. FRA agrees
that at this time there is not enough evidence to merit a change to the
existing requirements.

K. Locomotive Horn

    In the NPRM, FRA solicited comments regarding methods currently
being used by railroads to test locomotive horns as required by Sec.
229.129. More than one method of testing could satisfy the current
testing requirements. AAR submitted the only comment on this issue,
stating that an accepted ANSI or SAE standard should satisfy the
requirement. However, based on AAR's comment, it is unclear which
specific ANSI and SAE standards would be applicable to locomotive horn
testing. FRA has been considering whether certain current methods of
testing should be preferred, or additional methods should be permitted.
AAR's comment did not provide enough specific information to justify
modifying the existing locomotive horn requirements. At this point, the
great majority of initial locomotive horn testing has been performed,
and there is no clear need to modify the requirements.

L. Risk Analysis Standardization and Harmonization

    FRA notes that it has been actively implementing, whenever
practical, performance regulations based on the management of risk. In
the process of doing so, a number of different system safety
requirements, each unique to a particular regulation, have been
promulgated. While this approach is consistent with the widely, and
deeply, held conviction that risk management efforts should be
specifically tailored for individual situations, it has resulted in
confusion regarding the applicable regulatory requirements. This, in
turn, has defeated one of the primary objectives of using performance
based regulations, reduction in costs from simplifying regulations.
    The problem is not the concept of tailoring, but the lack of
standard terms, basic tools, and techniques. Numerous directives,
standards, regulations, and regulatory guides establish the authority
for system safety engineering requirements in the acquisition,
development, and maintenance of hardware and software-based systems.
The lack of commonality makes extremely difficult the task of training
system safety personnel, evaluating and comparing programs, and
effectively monitoring and controlling system safety efforts for the
railroads, their vendors, and the government. Even though tailoring
will continue to be an important system safety concept, at some point
FRA believes the proliferation of techniques, worksheets, definitions,
formats, and approaches has to end, or at least some common ground has
to be established.
    To accomplish this, FRA is harmonizing risk management process
requirements across all regulations that have been promulgated by the
agency. This will implement a systematic approach to hardware and
software safety analysis as an integral part of a project's overall
system safety program for protecting the public, the worker, and the
environment. Harmonization enhances compliance and improves the
efficiency of the transportation system by minimizing the regulatory
burden. Harmonization also facilitates interoperability among products
and systems, which benefits all

stakeholders. By overcoming institutional and financial barriers to
technology harmonization, stakeholders could realize lower life-cycle
costs for the acquisition and maintenance of systems. FRA will pursue
appropriate, cost effective, performance based standards containing
precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or
definitions of characteristics, to ensure that materials, products,
processes and services are fit for purpose, and present an acceptable
level of risk that are applicable across all elements of the railroad
industry. FRA believes that establishing a safety analysis requirement
in this final rule that is based on best engineering practices and
standards in section 237.307 is consistent with goal of standardization
and harmonization.

M. Locomotive Cab Securement

    On June 20, 2010, a CSX Conductor was shot and killed in the cab of
the controlling locomotive of his standing train in New Orleans, during
an attempted robbery. The Locomotive Engineer assigned to that train
was also wounded by gunfire during the incident. This incident was
particularly tragic, because it resulted in a fatality. By letter dated
September 22, 2010, in response to this incident, the BLET requested
that FRA require door locks on locomotive cab doors. Under current
industry practice, many locomotive cab doors are not locked. According
to BLET's letter, requiring the use of door locks would impede
unauthorized access to the locomotive cab and reduce the risk of
violence to the train crew when confronted by a potential intruder.
    In the NPRM, FRA requested comments on the various securement
options that are currently available on locomotive cab doors, and
whether equipping the locomotive cab with a securement device would
improve safety. Based on its review of comments received, FRA believes
that locomotive cab securement can potentially prevent unauthorized
access to the locomotive cab, and thereby increase train crew safety.
    The BLET and UTU submitted comments stating that locks should be
designed to open from within the locomotive cab without the use of a
key. Locomotive cab securement demands a careful and balanced approach,
because when emergencies requiring emergency egress or rescue access
occur, securement systems must not hinder rapid and easy egress by
train crews or access by emergency responders without undue delay. A
latching device (e.g., a dead-bolt arrangement) is sufficient to
satisfy this requirement. This final rule requires that each locomotive
or remanufactured locomotives ordered on or after the effective date of
the final rule, or placed in service for the first time on or after six
months from the effective date of the rule, be equipped with a
securement device. However, FRA believes that the decision whether to
use the securement device is best left to the discretion of each
railroad.
    AAR submitted comments stating that the railroad industry is
currently developing a securement standard that will address safety
concerns. Based on information gathered while attending industry
meetings, FRA understands that the railroad industry is working on
producing a standard that will require a securement device on the
outside of an unattended locomotive cab. FRA believes that the industry
is moving in the right direction on this issue and will continue to
monitor the development of a new standard. If FRA determines that the
actions currently being undertaken by the industry are not sufficient
to ensure the proper securement of locomotive cabs from the outside,
FRA will consider taking regulatory action to address this issue in a
future rulemaking.
    A Battalion Fire Chief from Fairfax County, Virginia, submitted
comments stating that a rapid-entry box system (similar to a realtor's
lock-box system) would ensure access by emergency responders into a
locked locomotive cab. FRA believes that a rapid-entry box system could
improve emergency responder access into the locomotive cab. However, at
this time, FRA believes it would be impractical to require such a
system, due to the potential cost of equipping all locomotives with the
locks, the significant logistic challenges involved with distributing
keys to emergency responders throughout the country, and the inability
of FRA to ensure that those keys are secure.

N. Diesel Exhaust in Locomotive Cabs

    In response to the NPRM, AAR submitted comments requesting that FRA
clarify the meaning of existing Sec.  229.43. Section 229.43 requires
that locomotives be built with exhaust systems that are properly
designed to convey engine exhaust from the engine and release it
outside of the locomotive, and to ensure that the exhaust system is
maintained to prevent leaks of exhaust into an occupied locomotive cab.
FRA has been consistent in its enforcement of this requirement. FRA has
not discovered locomotive exhaust systems that have noncompliant
designs. However, FRA has found mechanical defects (e.g., a cracked
exhaust manifold) in locomotive exhaust systems that permit exhaust to
be released into an occupied locomotive cab, and has routinely issued
violations for the railroads' failure to comply with Sec.  229.43.
    Diesel exhaust from the locomotive engine that is released into an
occupied locomotive cab causes a safety risk. The exhaust can adversely
affect the train crew and their ability to operate the locomotive
safely. Inside the locomotive cab, the exhaust causes an inhalation
hazard and will reduce the train crew's vision and comfort. However,
FRA did not intend for Sec.  229.43 to prevent any and all diesel
exhaust from being present in an occupied locomotive cab. It would be
impracticable to try to eliminate all diesel exhaust in the locomotive
cab. A locomotive that is standing with its windows open and its engine
not running next to an active highway will most likely be found to have
some measurable quantity of diesel exhaust in the cab, due to the
traffic from the highway. The same would be found if the locomotive
were located in a similar circumstance in an active marine port.
Similarly, FRA does not believe that it is possible to prevent the re-
entry of diesel exhaust into the locomotive cab through windows or
ventilation system intakes, and has never enforced the existing
regulation in such a manner.

O. Federalism Implications

    One commenter suggested that FRA should add language to its
discussion of the federalism implications of this final rule to clarify
the pre-emptive effect of the rule. The discussion of federalism
contained in the NPRM explains the federalism implications of the
Locomotive Inspection Act and the existing Locomotive Safety Standards.
See 76 FR 2224. FRA believes that the discussion of federalism
implications is clear, and that changes to the final rule regarding the
pre-emptive effect of the rule are not necessary.

P. E.O. 13563 Retrospective Review

    In accordance with the requirements of E.O. 13563, this final rule
modifies the existing locomotive safety standards based on what has
been learned from FRA's retrospective review of the regulation. E.O.
13563 requires agencies to review existing regulations to identify
rules that are overly burdensome, and when possible, modify them to
reduce the burden. As a result of its retrospective review, FRA is
reducing the burden on the industry by modifying the regulations
related to periodic locomotive inspection and

headlights. FRA believes that the modifications related to periodic
locomotive inspection and headlights in this final rule will not reduce
safety.

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

    This section-by section analysis of the final rule is intended to
explain the rationale for each section of the final rule. The analysis
includes the requirements of the rule, the purpose that the rule will
serve in enhancing locomotive safety, the current industry practice,
and other pertinent information. The regulatory changes are organized
by section number. FRA sought comments on all proposals made in the
NPRM and considered the comments in issuing this final rule.

A. Amendments to Part 229 Subparts A, B, and C

Section 229.5 Definitions
    This section contains a set of definitions that are being
introduced into the regulation. FRA intends these definitions to
clarify the meaning of important terms as they are used in the text of
the final rule. The definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to
minimize the potential for misinterpretation of the rule. The
definition of alerter introduces an unfamiliar term which requires
further discussion.
    ``Alerter'' means a device or system installed in the locomotive
cab to promote continuous, active locomotive engineer attentiveness by
monitoring select locomotive engineer-induced control activities. If
fluctuation of a monitored locomotive engineer-induced control activity
is not detected within a predetermined time, a sequence of audible and
visual alarms is activated so as to progressively prompt a response by
the locomotive engineer. Failure by the locomotive engineer to
institute a change of state in a monitored control, or acknowledge the
alerter alarm activity through a manual reset provision, results in a
penalty brake application that brings the locomotive or train to a
stop. For regulatory consistency FRA is utilizing the same definition
as the one provided in part 238. FRA intends for a device or system
that satisfies an accepted industry standard including, but not limited
to, AAR Standard S-5513, ``Locomotive Alerter Requirements,'' dated
November 26, 2007, to constitute an alerter under this definition.
    New definitions for terms related to remote control locomotives are
also being established. The terms, ``Assignment Address,'' ``Locomotive
Control Unit,'' ``Operator Control Unit,'' ``Remote Control
Locomotive,'' ``Remote Control Operator,'' and ``Remote Control
Pullback Protection'' are common to the industry. FRA notes that new
technology may lead to new systems that fit these definitions. For
example, ``Remote Control Pullback Protection'' is currently a form of
global positioning system containment system that uses automated
equipment identifier tags to either stop the RCL or limit its speed so
that the RCL remains within its work zone. A system that utilizes new
technology that either stops the RCL or limits its speed so that the
RCL remains within its work zone could also satisfy the definition. On
February 14, 2001, FRA published a Safety Advisory in which FRA issued
recommended guidelines for conducting remote control locomotive
operations. See 66 FR 10340, Notice of Safety Advisory 2001-01, Docket
No. FRA-2000-7325. The Safety Advisory includes definitions for each of
the terms. FRA's definitions for these terms are informed by the Safety
Advisory and Working Group discussions.
    ``Controlling locomotive'' means a locomotive from where the
operator controls the traction and braking functions of the locomotive
or locomotive consist, normally the lead locomotive. This definition is
being added to help identify which locomotives are required to be
equipped with an alerter, and when the alerter is required to be
tested.
Section 229.7 Prohibited Acts and Penalties
    Minimal changes are being made in this section to update the
statutory reference and the statutory penalty information.
Section 229.15 Remote Control Locomotives
    After working with the railroad industry for many years to provide
a framework for the safe use, development, and operation of remote
control devices, FRA is formally codifying safety standards for remote
control operated locomotives. For convenience, this section is being
divided into two headings: design and operation; and inspection and
testing.
    Generally, the design and operation requirements are intended to
prevent interference with the remote control system, maintain critical
safety functions if a crew is conducting a movement that involves the
pitch and catch of control between more than one operator, tag the
equipment to notify anyone who would board the cab that the locomotive
is operating in remote control, and bring the train to a stop if
certain safety hazards arise. The inspection and testing requirements
are intended to ensure that each remote control locomotive would be
tested each time it is placed in use, and ensure that the operator is
aware of the testing and repair history of the locomotive. It is FRA's
understanding that virtually all railroads that operate remote control
locomotives have already adopted similar standards, and that they have
proven to provide consistent safety for a number of years.
    A comment was received suggesting that FRA should add an
introductory paragraph to proposed Sec.  229.15 to address the
applicability of the section. FRA believes that the applicability of
this section is clear based on the description of applicability
contained in Sec.  229.6. FRA does not intend to apply the requirements
of Sec.  229.15 differently than other requirements contained in part
229.
    Another comment was received stating that the language of proposed
Sec.  229.15, if it remains unchanged in the final rule, would
establish requirements that result in existing legacy configurations
becoming noncompliant. According to the commentor, the legacy systems
that they identify have been operating safely and to the railroads'
satisfaction for years, and therefore, should be permitted to continue
in operation as compliant systems under the requirements contained in
Sec.  229.15. It is not clear which requirements would affect these
legacy systems, but FRA does not intend this final rule to make any
specific legacy configurations noncompliant.
    BLET and UTU submitted comments stating that FRA should replace the
proposed language of paragraph Sec.  229.15(a)(12)(ii), ``throttle or
speed control,'' with ``speed selector.'' FRA is not adopting this
suggestion. FRA believes that the suggested language change would
exclude throttle/brake units. In the proposed rule, FRA did not intend
to exclude throttle/brake units. The Working Group reached consensus on
this specific issue, and FRA continues to believe that an OCU should
have throttle capabilities in order to safely operate throttle/brake
units.
    AAR and HCRQ submitted comments stating that FRA should clarify
proposed paragraph Sec.  229.15(a)(7). Proposed paragraph Sec.
229.15(a)(7) requires an RCL to initiate a full service application of
the locomotive and train brakes, and eliminate locomotive tractive
effort, when main reservoir pressure drops below 90 psi. The proposed
language did not specifically exclude an RCL that is stationary. Under
specific conditions, such as charging a lengthy cut of cars in

winter conditions, it is not uncommon for the main reservoir pressure
to drop marginally. In such cases when the main reservoir pressure
drops below 90 psi, it's not a sign of a system failure. Instead, the
drop in pressure is an acceptable consequence given the conditions. FRA
intended paragraph Sec.  229.15(a)(7) to apply to moving RCLs and not
stationary RCLs. To clarify FRA's intent, the language of this
paragraph has been amended to include the words ``while RCL is
moving.''
    AAR also submitted comments stating that there is no wheel slide
issue on RCLs, and that currently wheel slip is often indicated by the
RCL equipment and not by the OCU. FRA's proposal, in paragraph Sec.
229.15(a)(12)(xi), would have required the OCU to provide an audio/
visual indication of wheel slip/slide. FRA agrees with AAR's comment
and is amending the final rule by removing the wheel slide requirement
that was in the proposal, and by permitting wheel slip to be indicated
by the RCL as well as the OCU.
    HCRQ submitted comments stating that FRA should permit the OCU to
provide either an audio or visual indication of RCL movement. Proposed
Sec.  229.15(a)(12)(xii) would require an audio indication of RCL
movement. HCRQ asserts that a visual notification should be sufficient,
because it is equally effective. The Working Group reached consensus on
this specific issue, and FRA continues to believe that an audio
indication is the most effective method for indicating RCL movement.
People, who are present in the yard where the RCL movement is taking
place, are more likely to hear a warning than they are to see a
warning. In a yard, vision can be obstructed by equipment or
structures. Thus, FRA is retaining the proposed provision in this final
rule.
    In Sec.  229.15(a)(13)(iii)(B) of the NPRM, FRA proposed requiring
primary OCUs to be equipped with a 15 second tilt bypass feature, and
secondary OCUs to be equipped with a 60 second tilt bypass feature.
Based on its review of comments received, FRA is modifying the proposed
provision in this final rule and is requiring the tilt bypass on both
OCUs to be set at 60 seconds. AAR and HCRQ submitted comments stating
that the requirement for the length of the tilt bypass should be 60
seconds, because all but one of the existing OCU models have a tilt
bypass feature that is set to 60 seconds and some actions commonly
performed by OCU operators exhaust more than 15 seconds and up to 60
seconds. An OCU operator may take longer than 15 seconds to throw a
switch, set brakes, or lace together brake hoses. FRA agrees that 15
seconds may not be enough time for an OCU operator to complete certain
actions, but also understands that in most instances the operator of
the secondary OCU will be the one who is responsible for those actions
and that in general pushing a button on an OCU will extend the length
of the tilt bypass for an additional 15 seconds. However, in the
proposal FRA did not consider the fact that the majority of OCUs are
set at 60 seconds, and that it would add a cost to the industry to
modify some OCUs to 15 seconds. FRA also recognizes that during a RCL
operation, a crew member may switch from operating the primary OCU to
operating the secondary OCU, and vice versa. Allowing both the primary
and secondary OCUs to be set to 60 seconds, consistent with the great
majority of existing models, will avoid confusion during such a switch.
Section 229.19 Prior Waivers
    FRA is updating the language in Sec.  229.19 to address the
handling of prior waivers of requirements in part 229 under the final
rule. A number of existing waivers are incorporated into the final rule
and others may no longer be necessary in light of the rule. The NPRM
allowed railroads the opportunity to assert that their existing waiver
is necessary, and should be effective after the final rule is adopted.
No comments were received related to this section, and FRA is retaining
the language as proposed. As a result, waivers from any requirement of
this part, issued prior to effective date of this final rule will
terminate on the date specified in the letter granting the waiver, and
if no date is specified, then the waiver will automatically terminate 5
years from the effective date of the rule.
    On February 28, 2007, in a notice, FRA proposed the sunset of
certain waivers granted for the existing locomotive safety standards.
72 FR 9059. The proposal urged grantees to submit existing waivers for
consideration for renewal in light of potential revisions to the
regulation, and explained FRA's interest in treating older waivers
consistently with newer waivers that were limited to five years. The
five-year limitations were issued as far back as March of 2000. The
notice also established a docket to receive waivers for consideration.
    In addition, the notice discussed the possibility of requiring
current grantees to re-register waivers. To streamline the process, FRA
did not include a re-registration requirement.
Section 229.20 Electronic Recordkeeping
    As explained in paragraph (a), FRA is establishing standards for
electronic recordkeeping that a railroad may elect to utilize to comply
with many of the recordkeeping provisions contained in this part. As
with any records, replacing a paper system that requires the physical
filing of records with an electronic system and the large and
convenient storage capabilities of computers, will result in greater
efficiency. Increased safety will also result, as railroads will be
able to access and share records with appropriate employees and FRA
quicker than with a paper system. To be acceptable, electronic
recordkeeping systems must satisfy all applicable regulatory
requirements for records maintenance with the same degree of confidence
as is provided with paper systems. The requirements are consistent with
a series of waivers that FRA has granted since April 3, 2002 (Docket
Number FRA-2001-11014), permitting electronic recordkeeping with
certain conditions intended to ensure safety. In this section, FRA is
adopting the Working Group's consensus regulatory text for electronic
recordkeeping that was approved and recommended to FRA by the RSAC on
September 10, 2009. The standards are organized into three categories:
(1) Design requirements, (2) operational requirements, and (3)
availability and accessibility requirements.
    To properly serve the interest of safety, records must be accurate.
Inspection of accurate records will reveal compliance or non-compliance
with Federal regulations and general rail safety practices. To ensure
the authenticity and integrity of electronic records, it is important
that security measures be in place to prevent unauthorized access to
the data in the electronic record and to the electronic system.
Paragraphs (b)(1) through (5) are intended to help secure the accuracy
of the electronic records and the electronic system by preventing
tampering, and other forms of interference, abuse, or neglect.
    Paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) are intended to utilize the improved
safety capabilities of electronic systems. The requirements of
paragraph (c)(1) cover both inspection and repair records. AAR
submitted comments in response to the NPRM stating that the person who
is performing the activity, and therefore required to make the record
within 24 hours as required by paragraph (c)(1), may be prevented from
making the record by Hours of Service laws. FRA

believes that the proposal addressed this issue. In the proposal, for
situations when the Hours of Service laws would potentially be
violated, the electronic system would be required to prompt the person
to input the data as soon as he or she returns to duty. Because the
issue was addressed in the proposal, FRA does not believe that any
changes related to the issue are warranted.
    To properly serve the interest of safety, the electronic records
and the electronic recordkeeping system must be made available and
accessible to the appropriate people. FRA must have access to the
railroads' electronic records and limited access to the electronic
recordkeeping systems to carry out its investigative responsibilities.
During Working Group discussions, a member representing railroad
management explained that his railroad currently can produce an
electronic record within ten minutes, but that a paper record may take
up to two weeks. As such, the rule provides up to fifteen days to
produce paper copies and requires that the electronic records will be
provided upon request.
Section 229.23 Periodic Inspection: General
    This section requires railroads that choose to maintain and
transfer records as provided for in Sec.  229.20, to print the name of
the person who performed the inspections, repairs, or certified work on
the Form FRA F 6180-49A that is displayed in the cab of each
locomotive. This will allow the train crew to know who did the previous
inspection when they board the locomotive cab. This requirement was
proposed in the NPRM and is being retained in the final rule. As
discussed above in section I., ``Periodic Locomotive Inspection,'' FRA
is also modifying the existing periodic inspection requirements
contained in this section to provide for a 184-day inspection interval
for all locomotives equipped with microprocessor-based control systems
with self-diagnostic capabilities.
Section 229.25 Test: Every Periodic Inspection
    Paragraphs (e) and (f) are added to this section to include
inspection requirements for remote control locomotives and locomotive
alerters during the periodic inspection. As discussed above, FRA is
establishing new regulations for remote control locomotives, see Sec.
229.15, and locomotive alerters, see Sec.  229.140. For convenience,
the maintenance for remote control locomotives and locomotive alerters
that would properly be conducted at intervals matching the periodic
inspection are being incorporated into this section. As proposed in the
NPRM, the existing paragraph (d) related to steam generators has been
removed from this section and added to Sec.  229.114. As discussed
below, FRA is consolidating all of the requirements related to steam
generators into Sec.  229.114. The other paragraphs in this section are
also being reorganized to accommodate the removal of paragraph (d).
Section 229.27 Annual Tests
    FRA is amending paragraph (b) of this section by deleting the
following previous language: ``The load meters shall be tested'' from
the paragraph. The modification clarifies the regulatory language to
reflect the current understanding and application of the load meter
requirement. FRA issued a clarification for load meters on AC
locomotives on June 15, 1998. In a letter to GE Transportation Systems
in March 2005, FRA issued a similar clarification of the requirements
related to testing load meters on DC locomotives. The letter explained
that on locomotives that are not equipped with load meters there are no
testing requirements. Similarly, if a locomotive is equipped with a
load meter but is using a proven alternative method for providing
safety, and no longer needs to ascertain the current or amperage that
is being applied to the traction motors, there are no testing
requirements for the dormant load meter. Load meters have been
eliminated or deactivated on many locomotives because the locomotives
are equipped with thermal protection for traction motors and no longer
require the operator to monitor locomotive traction motor load amps.
    FRA is also removing the existing paragraph (a) from this section
and merging it into the brake requirements contained in Sec.  229.29 of
this final rule. Section 229.29 concerns brake maintenance, and as
discussed below, is being reorganized by this final rule to consolidate
all existing locomotive brake maintenance into one regulation.
Section 229.29 Air Brake System Calibration, Maintenance, and Testing
    This section is re-titled by this final rule, and existing
requirements are now consolidated and better organized to improve
clarity. Because Sec.  229.29 concerns only brakes, it is be re-titled,
``Air Brake System Calibration, Maintenance, and Testing'' to more
accurately reflect the section's content. Existing Sec.  229.27(a),
which also addresses brake maintenance is being integrated into this
section for convenience and clarity. Recordkeeping requirements for
this section are being moved from existing paragraphs (a) and (b), and
merged into a single new paragraph (g). The date of air flow method
(AFM) indicator calibration is being added to this section and will be
required to be recorded and certified in the remarks section of Form
F6180-49A under paragraph (g) of this final rule.
    The brake maintenance requirements contained in this section of the
final rule extend the intervals at which required brake maintenance is
performed for several types of locomotive brake systems. The length of
the intervals reflects the results of studies and performance
evaluations related to a series of waivers that have been granted by
FRA, starting in 1981 and continuing to present day. Overall, the type
of brake maintenance that is required remains the same. The existing
regulation provides for two levels of brake maintenance. Existing Sec.
229.27(a) required routine maintenance for filters and dirt collectors,
and brake valves and existing Sec.  229.29(a) requires maintenance for
certain brake components including parts that can deteriorate quickly
and pieces of equipment that contain moving parts. To better tailor the
maintenance requirements to the equipment needs and based on
information ascertained from various studies and performance
evaluations conducted by FRA over the last decade, filters and dirt
collector maintenance are now being required more frequently than brake
valve maintenance. As a result, this final rule establishes three
levels of brake maintenance instead of two.
    In the NPRM, FRA stated that it was studying the effect, if any,
that air dryers have on the maintenance of brake systems, and FRA
sought comment. AAR submitted comments stating that there is no safety
reason to treat the air dryer equipped locomotives differently than
locomotives that are not equipped with air dryers. As evidence, AAR
cites the results of the joint teardown tests that railroads have
conducted with FRA as a condition to existing brake maintenance
waivers. FRA believes that early indications from teardown testing of
electronic air brake systems beyond five years in service support AAR's
comments. However, because many tests and teardowns remain to be done,
FRA believes that it is premature to discount the potential positive
effects of air dryers on extending the life of certain brake
components.
    Paragraph (f)(2) sets maintenance intervals at four years for slug
units that are semi-permanently attached to a host locomotive. Slugs
are used in situations where high tractive effort is more

important than extra power, such as switching operations in yards. A
railroad slug is an accessory to a diesel-electric locomotive. It has
trucks with traction motors but is unable to move about under its own
power, as it does not contain a prime mover to produce electricity.
Instead, it is connected to a locomotive, called the host, which
provides current to operate the traction motors.
    In this final rule, FRA is incorporating locomotive brake
maintenance requirements from part 238 into this section for
convenience. FRA believes that there is some benefit to moving all of
the locomotive brake maintenance requirements, including MU
locomotives, from part 238 to part 229. Amtrak submitted comments
stating that moving the requirements into part 229 would force them to
remove entire Acela trainsets from service when any defects are found
on a power car. In addition, Amtrak requested that Acela power cars be
reclassified so that requirements from part 229 do not apply to Acela
power cars. FRA believes that the reclassification of power cars would
be outside of the scope of this rulemaking proceeding, and therefore,
cannot be properly addressed in this final rule. However, FRA is open
to discussing this issue further, outside of this rulemaking
proceeding. FRA does not believe that moving the brake maintenance
requirements into part 229 results in any change to the treatment of
Acela power cars under the Federal railroad safety laws. It appears
that Amtrak's concern is based on a misinterpretation of FRA's
proposal. Contrary to Amtrak's assertion, FRA is not changing the
existing Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance (ITM) requirements for
Tier II passenger equipment under part 238. Only brake maintenance
requirements are being moved to part 229, and their movement does not
affect the Tier II ITM.
    Paragraph (g)(1) requires that the date of AFM indicator
calibration shall be recorded and certified in the remarks section of
Form F6180-49A. AAR submitted comments stating that there is no need to
keep a separate record of the AFM calibration date, because the date
would be the same as the date of the periodic inspection. FRA
understands that, although the frequency of the periodic inspection and
the AFM indicator calibration may be the same for some locomotives,
they may not be conducted on the same day, because the AFM indicator
calibration is not part of the periodic inspection. FRA recognizes that
many railroads choose to perform the AFM indicator calibration and the
periodic inspection at the same time, but other railroads may choose to
schedule the AFM calibration on a date other than the date of the
periodic inspection. Therefore, FRA believes a separate record of the
AFM indicator calibration date is necessary and is retaining paragraph
(g)(2) of the final rule as proposed.
Section 229.46 Brakes: General
    FRA is clarifying this section, and establishing standards for the
safe use of a locomotive with an inoperative or ineffective automatic
or independent brake control system. The section permits a locomotive
with a defective air brake control valve to run until the next periodic
inspection that is required by Sec.  229.23. However, the requirement
to place a tag on the isolation switch will notify the crew that the
locomotive can be used only if it complies with the conditions
contained in paragraph 229.46(b) until it is repaired.
    The conditions contained in paragraphs (b)(2) through (6) clarify
what it means for the brakes to operate as intended, as required by
this section. Some Working Group members stated that the automatic and
independent brake valves are not intended to function on a trailing
unit that is isolated from the train's air brake system, therefore they
were ``operating as intended'' when not operating at all. Generally,
when a unit is found with an automatic or independent brake defect, the
railroad may choose to move the unit to a trailing position, and
because it is in a trailing position, it may be dispatched without
record of the need for maintenance. Paragraph (b)(1) explicitly permits
units with inoperative or ineffective automatic and/or independent
brake valves to be used in the trailing position. Generally, paragraphs
(b)(2) through (6) ensure that the trailing unit is handled safely, and
that appropriate records are kept and repairs are made. Paragraph
(b)(2) requires that the railroad and the locomotive, and/or air brake
manufacturer determine that the control locomotive can safely operate
with the defective unit in the trailing position.
    AAR submitted comments stating that the railroad should not be
required to consult with the locomotive or air brake manufacturer,
because the railroad is capable of making the safety determination on
its own. FRA believes that input from the manufacturers will improve
the safety determination. The manufacturers are experts on the
sophisticated electronically controlled air brake systems that are
currently in use in the railroad industry (e.g. air brake systems that
contain forced lead software). It is only prudent to consult with the
manufacturer when assessing the capabilities of the air brake system.
    GE submitted comments asking what kind of documentation will be
required from the locomotive manufacturer in support of the
determination required by paragraph (b)(2). The requirement contained
in (b)(2) is intended to ensure that a proper safety determination is
made based on the relevant knowledge of the manufacturer and the
railroad. The locomotive and/or airbrake manufacturer should provide
the railroad with technical information that is sufficient to establish
the proper means for isolating or disabling the inoperative or
ineffective automatic and/or independent air brake control valve,
explaining how it does not pose a risk to the safe control of the
automatic and independent brake systems by the controlling locomotive
and, any other information that the manufacturer believes is relevant.
Section 229.61 Draft System
    FRA is removing the requirement related to MCB contour 1904
couplers currently contained in paragraph (a)(1), because it is out
dated. The existing requirement prohibits the use of a MCB contour 1904
coupler, if the distance between the guard arm and the knuckle nose is
more than 5\1/8\ inches. FRA understands that the MCB contour 1904
coupler design has not been used in the railroad industry since the
1930s. Most, if not all, of the current locomotive fleet are equipped
with Type E couplers. For these couplers, the maximum distance
permitted between the guard arm and the knuckle nose is 5\5/16\ inches,
as identified in existing paragraph (a)(1). In the NPRM, FRA sought
comments as to whether any locomotives are currently being operated
with MCB contour 1904 couplers, and whether the requirement related to
MCB contour 1904 couplers should be removed from the locomotive safety
standards. FRA also proposed the reorganize the remaining paragraphs in
this section to accommodate the removal of paragraph (a)(1). AAR
submitted the only comment on this issue, stating that it is unaware of
any locomotives that are currently operating with MCB contour 1904
couplers, and AAR suggested removing the requirement from the
locomotive safety standards. FRA agrees with AAR's comment and believes
that the MCB contour 1904 coupler design is no longer being used in the
railroad industry, and therefore, the requirement is no longer needed.
Consequently, the final rule adopts the provision as proposed.

Section 229.85 High Voltage Markings: Doors, Cover Plates, or Barriers
    FRA is clarifying this section. The purpose of this section is to
warn people of a potential shock hazard before the high voltage
equipment is exposed. A conspicuous marking on the last cover, door, or
barrier guarding the high voltage equipment satisfies the purpose of
this section. Many locomotives have multiple doors in front of high
voltage equipment. Often there is a door on the car body that provides
access to the interior of the car body which contains high voltage
equipment that is guarded by an additional door, for example, main
generator covers and electrical lockers. FRA's intent has been to
require the danger marking only on the last door that guards the high
voltage equipment. Thus, FRA has slightly modified the language
currently contained in this section to make this intent clear and
unambiguous. To further clarify the intent of this section, FRA is also
changing the title.
    MTA submitted comments stating that the proposed wording did not
make clear the intent of the change, which as noted in the preamble, is
to require the warning marking on the last object before accessing the
high voltage equipment. According to MTA, if one did not read the
preamble, it would not be apparent that ``direct'' was meant to convey
this intent and the wording would be too subjective. MTA did not
explain why it believes that the word ``direct'' is too subjective or
provide language that would better clarify the intent of this section.
FRA continues to believe that the word ``direct,'' as used in the
proposed language, sufficiently identifies the cover, door, or barrier
that is located immediately in front of the high voltage equipment. The
Working Group reached consensus on the proposed language with agreement
that the proposed language would require the danger marking only on the
last door that guards the high voltage equipment. Based on the Working
Group's consensus, and without alternative language to consider, FRA is
adopting the proposed language in the final rule without change. If
needed, FRA believes that the explanation of the intent of the
requirement that is contained in this preamble will add clarity to the
rule text.
Section 229.114 Steam Generator Inspections and Tests
    FRA is adding this section in order to consolidate the steam
generator requirements contained in various sections of part 229 into a
single section. Current requirements related to steam generators could
be found in Sec. Sec.  229.23, 229.25, and 229.27. Consolidating the
requirements into one section makes them easier to find for the
regulated community, and helps simplify and clarify each of the
sections that currently include a requirement related to steam
generators. The requirements contained in this section are not intended
to change the substance of any of the existing requirements.
Section 229.119 Cabs, Floors, and Passageways
    In paragraph (d), FRA is raising the minimum allowable temperature
in an occupied locomotive cab from 50 degrees to 60 degrees. Each
occupied locomotive cab would be required to maintain a minimum
temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit when the locomotive is in use. FRA
recognizes that it takes some time for the cab to heat up when the
locomotive is first turned on, and that some crew members may prefer to
work in slightly cooler temperatures and temporarily turn off the
heater. Thus, this requirement will only be applicable in situations
where the locomotive has had sufficient time to warm-up and where the
crew has not adjusted that temperature to a personal setting.
    In paragraph (e), FRA is clarifying the existing requirement
related to the continuous barrier on an open-end platform by adding a
hyphen between words ``open'' and ``end.'' In the old part 230, issued
in 1968, paragraph 230.229 (g) addressing the required continuous
barrier, contains the wording ``Safe and suitable means shall be
provided for passage between units with open-end platforms.'' The
hyphen makes clear that the requirement is referring to locomotive
platforms that are open at the end, and not locomotive platforms that
are open to the sky. In 1980, when the Locomotive Safety Standards were
revised, the hyphen was inadvertently removed without explanation, and
without intention to change the meaning of the existing requirement.
FRA believes that reinserting the hyphen clarifies the requirement
without changing it.
    In paragraphs (g) and (h), FRA is establishing requirements related
to air conditioning units inside of locomotive cabs. Paragraph (g) will
require all new locomotives to be equipped with an air conditioning
unit. The requirement will only apply to locomotives ordered after the
effective date of the rule and to any locomotive placed in service
after the effective date of the final rule. Paragraph (h) will require
air conditioning units on such locomotives to be maintained during the
periodic inspection that is required by Sec.  229.23. FRA expects the
maintenance to be sufficient to sustain or restore proper functionality
of the air conditioning unit, meeting or exceeding the manufacturer's
minimum operating specifications. FRA believes that requiring the
railroads to maintain their air conditioning units in a manner that
meets or exceeds the manufacturer's minimum operating specifications
should result in the sufficient maintenance of the units. FRA will
monitor air conditioning maintenance performed by railroads to ensure
that it is being properly and adequately performed. If FRA determines
that the prescribed level of maintenance is insufficient to ensure the
proper functioning of the air conditioning units, FRA will consider
taking regulatory action to address the issue in a future rulemaking.
    FRA understands that railroad's often replace defective air
conditioning units, rather than make repairs. If a railroad elects to
replace its air conditioning unit during the periodic inspection, the
replacement will be considered appropriate maintenance.
    In paragraph (i), FRA is requiring new locomotives to be equipped
with a securement device that will secure each locomotive cab from the
inside. The locomotive cab is secured when the door cannot be opened
from the outside by an unauthorized person, unless broken by force. A
dead-bolt type arrangement can satisfy this requirement, but FRA
expects that other designs may also satisfy this requirement. The
requirement will apply only to locomotives ordered after the effective
date of the rule and to any locomotive placed in service 6 months after
the effective date of the final rule to allow railroads a reasonable
amount of time to comply. However, FRA does expect all new locomotives,
as of the implementation date of paragraph Sec.  229.119(i), to fully
comply with the new requirements.
Section 229.123 Pilots, Snowplows, End Plates
    FRA is clarifying paragraph (a) of this section. Based on
experience applying the regulation, FRA recognizes that a reasonable,
but improper, reading of the existing language could lead to the
incorrect impression that a pilot or snowplow is not required to extend
across both rails. To prevent this misunderstanding and to clarify the
existing requirement, the phrase ``pilot, snowplow or end plate that
extends across both rails'' is substituted for ``end plate which
extends across both rails, a pilot, or a snowplow.'' FRA believes this
language makes clear that any of the

above mentioned items must extend across both rails.
    Due to the height of retarders in hump yards, it is not uncommon
for the pilot, snowplow, or endplate to strike the retarder during
ordinary hump yard operations. To accommodate the retarders and prevent
unnecessary damage, FRA has issued waivers to permit more clearance
(the amount of vertical space between the bottom of the pilot,
snowplow, or endplate and the top of the rail) in hump yards, if
certain conditions are met. FRA is adding paragraph (b) to this section
to obviate the need for individual waivers by incorporating these
conditions into the revised regulation. The conditions that were