of takeoff is not justified because there is insufficient benefit
relative to the related costs and privacy issues. Several commenters
suggested ensuring that network remote identification is isolated from
C2 frequencies to prevent the hijacking of UAS.
    Many commenters, including the Medina County Office of Emergency
Management and Homeland Security, expressed concerns about the
potential to ground hundreds or thousands of UAS nationwide, including
UAS performing public safety operations, if there is a dedicated denial
of service or similar cyberattack which causes an outage of Remote ID
USS. Other commenters expressed concerns about someone hacking a Remote
ID USS or spoofing broadcast remote identification to make it appear
erroneously as if there are UAS in flight. Several commenters stated
that some government agencies

have discontinued their use of some foreign-made UAS due to security
concerns and mentioned that it is not in the best interests of national
security to require private users to transmit similar surveillance
information through the internet. In some cases, operators are
operating the types of UAS that the government has stopped using for
security reasons.
    Commenters expressed concerns about non-State actors as well as
adversarial nations. Various commenters highlighted the national
security implications of certain remote identification data becoming
available to the public. Unmanned Systems Canada asked for the network
requirement to be optional until each Remote ID USS can demonstrate
sufficient security and reliability and stated that a properly licensed
and registered UAS operation should not be grounded if a connection to
a Remote ID USS is not available.
    Commenters such as Juniper Unmanned mentioned that some commercial
operations supporting critical infrastructure involve strict
cybersecurity rules and prohibit internet connectivity during flight
operations.
    Many commenters involved in emergency response expressed concerns
with relying on the internet to comply with the requirement to
transmit. Similarly, several state government agencies and universities
noted that their UAS enforcement and research activities would be
greatly restricted if the FAA were to adopt the requirement for the UAS
to connect to the internet and transmit to a Remote ID USS without a
suitable alternative means of compliance that would permit the UAS to
take off and operate when internet access is not available.
    Zipline and the Alabama Department of Transportation noted that the
requirement to connect to a Remote ID USS if the internet is available
would prevent a person from using a UAS to support emergency response
operations if the internet is available but the UAS cannot reliably
interface with a Remote ID USS.
    Many commenters expressed concerns with the requirement that Remote
ID USS retain the remote identification message elements for 6 months
from the date the remote identification message elements are received.
Some commenters cited shorter FAA record retention periods for other
information while others contended the 6-month term was not long
enough. Various commenters expressed support for the record retention
requirements, noting that access to the data is useful for law
enforcement, regulatory compliance, and legitimate safety, security,
compliance, accident, and incident investigation purposes.
    The Consumer Technology Association and Wing Aviation, LLC stated
that the final rule should restrict access to historical data by
government, limit the collection and aggregation of remote
identification data by third parties, and ensure privacy. The Small UAV
Coalition urged the FAA to prohibit Remote ID USS from sharing
information with Federal, State, or local governments absent a law
enforcement or national security interest or consent of the UAS
operator.
    Many commenters noted the potential costs, complexity, and
operational restrictions associated with network remote identification
requirements and expressed concerns that they may foster a culture of
non-compliance. Many commenters observed that the use of a
subscription-based service would prove costly for some UAS operators.
Many commenters stated that monthly subscription fees would be unfair
to those who do not fly that regularly for a variety of reasons.
    Many commenters expressed concerns about the cost of depending on
internet service via cellular phones or other enabled devices that
would be required to support network remote identification. They also
expressed concerns about the costs of subscribing to a Remote ID USS.
Both recreational and commercial operators expressed concerns about the
cost of the data plans that would be required to serve multiple UAS.
One UAS services company estimated increased monthly costs of $360 to
$500 a month for cellular services. Several commenters noted that
adding an additional device, such as an unmanned aircraft, to a
cellular data plan to support direct transmission to the internet
generally costs $30 to $70 a month, and one commenter noted this is
likely to be the largest part of many users' overall operating costs.
    The Alliance for Drone Innovation opposed a network requirement for
remote identification, noting that many UAS in use today, including
model aircraft, model helicopters, and racing aircraft, would be
burdened with increased costs for equipment, data plans, and USS
subscriptions because they do not currently have a way to connect to
the internet. SenseFly expressed concerns about the cost that designers
and producers of remote identification UAS will incur if they are
required to make UAS compatible with different internet providers.
    A significant number of commenters expressed privacy concerns with
the proposed requirement to have UAS transmit remote identification
data to Remote ID USS. Many individuals opposed having third parties
collect information including, but not limited to, their name, address,
and location. Some commenters also mentioned that the requirement to
transmit their location could cause business and tactical issues,
particularly for businesses or persons that want or need to ensure
their flight data remains confidential or out of reach of most parties.
Many commenters indicated that the pilot and flight data should only be
made available to law enforcement and Federal entities.
    Many commenters contended that the best way to ensure privacy is to
encrypt certain remote identification data (e.g., control station or
unmanned aircraft location) and to make it available only to the FAA
and law enforcement. Amazon Prime Air commented that the FAA could
mitigate the potential loss of user privacy by requiring position and
velocity data to be encrypted or by requiring security protocols that
can provide law enforcement with real time access while enhancing
privacy. A significant number of commenters opposed making the data
transmitted to a Remote ID USS available to the general public.
    Commenters expressed concerns that a UAS operator's data could be
sold or provided to third parties. Other commenters were concerned
about requiring companies to provide sensitive information to a Remote
ID USS. Many expressed concerns that the information could be hacked.
Other commenters expressed concern over where the privacy data would
reside and what regulations would be in place to prohibit United States
citizens' data from being sent and sold overseas.
    Multiple commenters expressed the view that unfettered access by
law enforcement to remote identification data could lead to specific
monitoring of the media by law enforcement agencies and impact the
freedom of the press.
    Several commenters noted that cellular networks are optimized to
work with ground-based equipment rather than airborne equipment and
suggested that it is not practical to provide an internet connection to
a UAS using terrestrial cellular networks due to reliability that is
much lower than typical aviation requirements; the potential for
numerous UAS to interfere with ground-based users; and the downward
tilt and narrow vertical beam width of the cellular base transceiver
station used to optimize battery life for ground-based user equipment.

    Several commenters noted that their control stations connect to
their unmanned aircraft only through Wi-Fi which makes an internet
connection impossible when away from Wi-Fi access and others noted that
they fly using tablets or unique monitors which do not include cellular
access.
    A number of commenters generally supported the broadcast
requirement for remote identification. The commenters noted that many
UAS are already capable of broadcasting UAS information or could be
upgraded with equipment or software to meet the remote identification
requirements, for a one-time cost. Commenters noted the various
benefits of broadcast remote identification, such as independence; ease
of compliance due to the capabilities of existing systems; tamper
resistance; and simplicity regarding account management, data plans
needed for large fleets, and cost. Commenters noted that broadcast
remote identification is sufficient for law enforcement to determine
the identity and location of the operator in VLOS operations.
    Many commenters suggested the FAA should view broadcast-only remote
identification as sufficiently safe and secure for achieving remote
identification. The commenters stated that broadcast-only should be
sufficient because standard remote identification UAS operations are
permitted when the internet is not available, or when the UAS loses its
connection to the Remote ID USS, as long as the unmanned aircraft is
broadcasting. Many commenters also noted that broadcast remote
identification may provide an affordable and effective path to
compliance for many existing UAS that currently have the ability to
broadcast telemetry data in the proposed radio frequency spectrum via
the command-and-control link.
    Various commenters noted that a broadcast solution is less
expensive, simpler, and provides increased privacy when compared to
network solutions; and that other UAS or manned aircraft without an
internet connection will not be able to detect a limited remote
identification UAS using only network remote identification.
    Many commenters noted that European Union requirements permit
operations with only broadcast remote identification. The EU Aviation
Safety Agency noted that under EU regulations, ``broadcast'' is
mandatory, while the ``network'' or ``limited'' remote identification
is optional.
    Discover Flying Club and Phirst Technologies suggested permitting a
broadcast-only option for remote identification UAS, with governments
or third party companies responsible for receiving and collecting
remote identification data, as needed, in specific locations. The
American Civil Liberties Union mentioned that broadcast remote
identification is sufficient to meet security needs to identify hostile
UAS and for public awareness.
    In further support of a broadcast-only option, many commenters,
such as Motorola Solutions, Inc., stated that natural disasters and
search and rescue operations often take place in areas of limited
internet coverage. They mentioned that instead of requiring ``trusted
users'' to comply with remote identification, the FAA should allow them
to operate broadcast-only. The Edison Electric Institute and other
electric and power associations stressed the importance of broadcast
remote identification to ensure the UAS continues to send out the
message elements in the event of lost internet connectivity. The
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association and the Northwest
Electric Power Cooperative recommended creating a broadcast-only option
for limited remote identification UAS to permit safe operation in
remote areas.
    Other commenters opposed a broadcast-only remote identification
solution, stating that it could introduce unnecessary risks to law
enforcement due to the potential for frequency congestion on unlicensed
spectrum. Amazon Prime Air, Verizon, Skyward, and others noted
weaknesses of the broadcast solution, such as broadcast coverage
limitations due to altitude, terrain, interference, and power. Most of
these commenters also recognized that broadcast may still be required
for specific operations, such as in areas with no internet access or
areas where a local, independent source of remote identification
information is required for safety or security purposes. Many industry
commenters were concerned with the requirement to broadcast their data,
because it could impact their ability to keep their customers' flight
information private and could potentially be used by their competitors.
    Some commenters expressed support for a network-only remote
identification solution, noting the advantages of network remote
identification such as the capability for stronger authentication,
availability regardless of proximity to the UAS, ability to share
additional message elements, availability of internet access, and
importance to further development of UTM and traffic deconfliction.
AirMap agreed that network remote identification is appropriate when
the internet is available, to support UTM, and to enable a greater
volume of flights. AirMap indicated that operations with only network
remote identification would permit tighter control of personally
identifiable information (PII), eliminate the possibility of data
scraping from aircraft broadcasts, help with operator location
security, maintain the privacy of UAS delivery service customers, and
offer tiered data access so that law enforcement has access to
different data than the general public.
    AT&T Services, CTIA--The Wireless Association, GSMA, and Qualcomm
supported network remote identification, noting benefits such as
greater security than broadcast on unlicensed frequencies, encryption,
available cellular infrastructure already driven by external demand for
increased data service, device authentication to support positive
identification, and support for the development of UTM.
    Some commenters supported the role of Remote ID USS to receive the
required message elements, the framework of using a contractual MOA to
govern the Remote ID USS, and the idea that LAANC served as a model for
the concept.
    FAA Response: The FAA has carefully considered the wide variety of
perspectives received in public comments as well as the need for remote
identification of unmanned aircraft. Throughout the process of
integrating unmanned aircraft into the airspace of the United States,
the FAA has taken a phased, incremental approach that fosters industry
innovation while meeting the corresponding safety and security needs
that are presented. The FAA believes this should be the case with
remote identification of unmanned aircraft as well.
    The FAA continues to work toward full integration of UAS into the
airspace of the United States by partnering with industry to develop
UTM and facilitate advanced unmanned aircraft operations, like BVLOS.
However, the FAA has determined that a broadcast-based remote
identification system that provides for immediate awareness of unmanned
aircraft in the widest variety of settings will be adequate to support
the phased, incremental approach, while allowing the UAS industry
additional time to continue developing the network-based UTM ecosystem.
    The FAA recognizes concerns related to an internet connectivity
requirement, such as internet availability or connectivity issues;
increased costs for UAS upgrades; internet data plans; Remote ID USS
subscriptions; and

reduced air and ground risk when operating in remote areas with less
air traffic and lower population density. The FAA acknowledges the
ability to connect to the internet is dependent on a variety of factors
including geographic coverage of cellular internet networks, wide-scale
network disruptions, or natural disasters. The FAA agrees with
commenters that unmanned aircraft operations should not be
unnecessarily restricted when the internet is not available or not
sufficient to establish and maintain a connection to a Remote ID USS
provided the unmanned aircraft is broadcasting the required message
elements.
    There are some remote areas where an operator cannot connect to the
internet, such as locations where cellular or other internet signals
are not available or sufficient to establish and maintain a connection
to a Remote ID USS. While loss of the broadcast capability is an
indication of a remote identification equipment failure, loss of
connectivity to the internet or a Remote ID USS could be attributed to
a lack of internet availability that is outside the control of the
unmanned aircraft operator. A functioning broadcast capability is
necessary for remote identification information to be available in
areas that do not have internet availability.
    The FAA is not adopting the requirement to transmit message
elements through the internet to a Remote ID USS in this rule at this
time. While the FAA recognizes the potential benefits of network remote
identification as stated by several commenters, the FAA believes a
broadcast-only solution is sufficient, for the time being and given the
types of unmanned aircraft operations that are currently allowed, to
maintain the safety and security of the airspace of the United States
given the types of operations that are authorized in the operating and
airspace regulations.
    Certain commenters suggested allowing unmanned aircraft operators
to choose between either broadcast or network remote identification.
These commenters suggested that while a Remote ID USS-dependent
solution might be overly burdensome to certain types of recreational or
small-scale commercial operators, some operators may prefer network
remote identification. These commenters noted that network remote
identification allows operators to better protect the privacy of their
operations from the general public, which may have benefits for
consumers receiving sensitive deliveries or to protect a company's
confidential business information regarding where they operate.
According to these commenters, allowing either broadcast or network
remote identification would permit operators to transmit remote
identification information via the mechanism most appropriate for their
use, while ensuring that the public still had the capability of rapidly
identifying nearby unmanned aircraft.
    The FAA notes that this rule does not preclude industry from
establishing Remote ID USS-like networks where entities can exchange
remote identification information to facilitate a safer and more
efficient airspace of the United States. The FAA encourages further
development and maturation of UTM concepts, especially those that
consider aviation safety national security, and law enforcement needs.
However, as indicated in the NPRM, broadcasting the message elements
has always been considered a critical aspect of remote identification,
even in situations when the NPRM also allowed for network transmission.
The FAA believes that broadcasting the message elements is fundamental
to ensuring that remote identification information is always accessible
to members of the public, and as such, the FAA does not agree with
commenters' suggestions to allow unmanned aircraft operators to choose
between broadcast and network remote identification.
    The FAA agrees with the commenters who proposed that broadcast
remote identification is sufficient to provide the required remote
identification message elements to support typical unmanned aircraft
operations and satisfy security requirements. Broadcast remote
identification does not rely on internet availability, and is a secure
method that is less susceptible to widespread failure caused by
malicious actors or systems outages. Broadcast remote identification is
also an independent, less expensive, and less complex method of
providing the required remote identification message elements. The FAA
has determined that a requirement for unmanned aircraft to broadcast
remote identification information will provide the FAA, law
enforcement, the general public, and other parts of the aviation
community with real-time information about unmanned aircraft operations
in any area in which broadcast signals can be received. The broadcast
will permit detection of unmanned aircraft and will permit law
enforcement and the general public that receives the broadcasted
message elements to have information about the unmanned aircraft
location as well as information about the control station or takeoff
location. Personal wireless devices that are capable of receiving 47
CFR part 15 frequencies, such as smart phones, tablets, or other
similar commercially available devices, will be able to receive
broadcast remote identification information directly without reliance
on an internet connection.
    After reviewing the comments and further consideration, the FAA
decided to modify the proposal and, as finalized, this rule only
requires unmanned aircraft to broadcast the message elements.
Accordingly, the FAA has eliminated all requirements for unmanned
aircraft to connect to the internet to transmit to a Remote ID USS.

B. Limited Remote Identification UAS

1. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The NPRM proposed that limited remote identification UAS would only
have to transmit the remote identification message elements through an
internet connection to a Remote ID USS. As discussed in section VII.A
of this preamble, limited remote identification UAS are no longer a
viable concept for this rule. Accordingly, this final rule has
eliminated all proposed requirements related to limited remote
identification UAS.
2. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Only a few commenters supported the proposed limited
remote identification UAS. Commenters who supported the proposed
requirements wanted the FAA to move forward with implementing its
proposed policies.
    Many commenters were opposed to the concept and requirements for
limited remote identification UAS and believed the FAA should not adopt
those requirements. Commenters noted that many areas in the United
States, particularly remote and rural areas, do not have reliable
internet access due to cellular coverage limitations, signal
obstructions caused by terrain and obstacles, poor connection quality,
or temporary outages. Many commenters noted that the costs, complexity,
and operational restrictions associated with network remote
identification requirements may foster a culture of non-compliance. As
a result, many commenters suggested eliminating or substantially
altering limited remote identification UAS.
    Several commenters suggested there was no need for the limited
remote identification concept. DJI Technology appreciated the attempt
to create a concept intended to impose a lower burden and ease for
compliance for less capable UAS that pose less risk but suggested the
limited remote identification UAS concept is virtually

useless as proposed. Degenkolb Engineers noted that any controller
designed to meet limited remote identification UAS requirements could
be upgraded to meet the standard remote identification UAS requirements
at trivial cost.
    Other commenters suggested the limited remote identification UAS
concept would create unnecessary complexity and would not contribute to
flight safety. They recommended permitting broadcast options for
limited remote identification UAS, which could provide the unmanned
aircraft location information to suitably equipped manned aircraft at
any altitude without dependency on network solutions or command and
control links.
    Many commenters weighed in on specific aspects of limited remote
identification UAS, including the proposed 400-foot range limitation,
the requirement to fly within visual line of sight, and the requirement
to land the aircraft in the event the connection with the Remote ID USS
was lost.
    FAA Response: A common theme in the public comments received
regarding the limited remote identification UAS concept was a general
dissatisfaction and disagreement with the operating and design
requirements of the proposed concept. The FAA attempted to provide a
regulatory framework to accommodate existing unmanned aircraft without
remote identification so they could be modified or retrofitted in a
manner to provide remote identification capabilities. The FAA agrees
with the commenters who argued that limiting unmanned aircraft to
operating only where internet connectivity is available limits the
utility and marketability of such unmanned aircraft. However, the FAA
does not agree with commenters who supported only a single concept for
remote identification. The FAA believes that a remote identification
option is necessary for owners of existing unmanned aircraft without
built-in remote identification capability who do not wish to operate
solely at FAA-recognized identification areas. For that reason, the FAA
is incorporating into this rule a concept known as ``remote
identification broadcast module'' to allow persons to retrofit an
unmanned aircraft by equipping it with a broadcast module that enables
compliance with the operating requirements of this rule. The remote
identification broadcast module concept is discussed in section VII.D
of this preamble.
    The FAA acknowledges all of the comments related to limited remote
identification UAS and took them into consideration as a part of its
decision to eliminate the concept.

C. Standard Remote Identification Unmanned Aircraft

1. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA is adopting the requirements for standard remote
identification unmanned aircraft in Sec.  89.110, as discussed below. A
key difference from the NPRM is that the Agency has decided to
eliminate the requirement for the standard remote identification
unmanned aircraft to transmit the remote identification message
elements through the internet to a Remote ID USS. This rule only
requires the standard remote identification unmanned aircraft to
broadcast the remote identification message elements directly from the
unmanned aircraft from takeoff to shutdown. The FAA is also updating
the term to ``standard remote identification unmanned aircraft, as
opposed to ``standard remote identification UAS'' for clarity purposes.
See section IV.A for an in-depth discussion regarding the use of
unmanned aircraft instead of UAS. The modifications in Sec.  89.110
mainly reflect the change to the broadcast-only solution, or changes
made for clarity purposes.
    The FAA clarifies that unmanned aircraft without remote
identification may be upgraded to standard remote identification
unmanned aircraft if the upgrade enables the unmanned aircraft to meet
all of the remote identification requirements of this rule.
i. Use of Standard Remote Identification Unmanned Aircraft
    A person operating a standard remote identification unmanned
aircraft that complies with Sec.  89.110 can operate the unmanned
aircraft outside of FAA-recognized identification areas. Standard
remote identification unmanned aircraft can be used irrespective of the
operating rules that apply to the specific flight. For example, a
standard remote identification unmanned aircraft could be used in
limited recreational operations conducted under 49 U.S.C. 44809, or
operations conducted under part 91, part 107, part 135, or any other
operating part.
ii. Elimination of Network Transmission Requirement
    As previously stated, the FAA proposed to require standard remote
identification UAS to transmit the remote identification message
elements through the internet to a Remote ID USS and to broadcast the
same message elements directly from the unmanned aircraft using radio
frequency spectrum. After reviewing public comments and further
consideration of a significant amount of comments, the FAA decided to
amend the regulatory framework for standard remote identification
unmanned aircraft by eliminating the requirement to transmit the
message elements through the internet to a Remote ID USS. As adopted,
Sec.  89.110 is now a broadcast-only solution where standard remote
identification unmanned aircraft are required to broadcast the message
elements directly from the unmanned aircraft. The FAA determined that
the requirement, as adopted, facilitates compliance with this rule and,
at this time, meets the safety and security needs of the FAA, national
security agencies, and law enforcement.
iii. Remote Identification Equipment and Message Elements
    The person operating a standard remote identification unmanned
aircraft must ensure the unmanned aircraft is broadcasting the standard
remote identification unmanned aircraft message elements. This
broadcast equipment must be functional from takeoff to shutdown of the
unmanned aircraft and must not be disabled.
    The operator of a standard remote identification unmanned aircraft
must ensure the unmanned aircraft is broadcasting the message elements
listed in Sec.  89.305. The message elements broadcast by standard
remote identification unmanned aircraft include a unique identifier; an
indication of the control station's latitude, longitude, and geometric
altitude; an indication of the unmanned aircraft's latitude, longitude,
and geometric altitude; an indication of the velocity of the unmanned
aircraft; a time mark; and an indication of the emergency status of the
unmanned aircraft. The requirement to broadcast the remote
identification message elements applies from takeoff to shutdown of the
unmanned aircraft. The message elements for standard remote
identification unmanned aircraft are discussed in more detail in
section VIII.A of this preamble. The minimum performance requirements
for standard remote identification unmanned aircraft are discussed in
more detail in section VIII.B of this preamble.
    The FAA adopts design and production requirements for standard
remote identification unmanned aircraft in subpart F of part 89. The
production requirements are meant to help a person comply with the
operational requirements that apply to standard

remote identification unmanned aircraft. The Agency intends for
compliance with the remote identification requirements to be simple and
straightforward for individuals operating standard remote
identification unmanned aircraft produced in accordance with an FAA-
accepted means of compliance. For example, a standard remote
identification unmanned aircraft must automatically broadcast the
remote identification message elements, and its design must prohibit it
from taking off if the broadcast equipment is not functional.
iv. Serial Number Requirements
    A person may operate a standard remote identification unmanned
aircraft if its serial number is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration
of compliance, or the standard remote identification unmanned aircraft
is covered by a design approval or production approval issued under
part 21.
    The serial number issued to the standard remote identification
unmanned aircraft must be included in the application for registration
of the unmanned aircraft under part 47 or 48 and may not be duplicative
of a serial number associated with a different certificate of aircraft
registration. For owners registering small unmanned aircraft
exclusively for limited recreational operations under 49 U.S.C. 44809,
more than one serial number may be included on a single Certificate of
Aircraft Registration. The registration requirements that apply to
standard remote identification unmanned aircraft are discussed in more
detail in section XV of this preamble. Alternatively, the serial number
of the unmanned aircraft must be provided to the FAA in a notice of
identification pursuant to Sec.  89.130 prior to the operation. The
requirements that apply to foreign registered civil unmanned aircraft
operating in the airspace of the United States are discussed in section
XVI of this preamble.
2. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: The Air Line Pilots Association, International mentioned
that only standard remote identification UAS should be permitted to
access LAANC airspace.
    FAA Response: Considering the requirement for all unmanned aircraft
to broadcast remote identification information, the FAA finds that
access to controlled airspace via the LAANC process does not require
additional restrictions.
    Comments: Some commenters strongly supported the requirement for
standard remote identification UAS to transmit via a network and
broadcast, noting that each system has strengths that address the other
system's weaknesses to support safety, security, and future operational
capabilities. Others supported the standard remote identification UAS
requirements provided the rule maintains the option to continue to
operate when there is no connection to the internet or transmission to
a Remote ID USS.
    FAA Response: For the reasons explained in section VII.A of the
preamble, the FAA has decided to eliminate the network-based
requirements from this rule at this time. Accordingly, in accordance
with Sec.  89.110(a), standard remote identification unmanned aircraft
must broadcast the remote identification message elements directly from
the unmanned aircraft.
    Comments: Some commenters suggested the FAA consider requiring
operators to comply with either a broadcast or a network requirement,
but not both, unless requiring both is necessary for specific
operations such as BVLOS. Commenters suggested the requirement to
simultaneously broadcast remote identification data that is transmitted
to the network does not add any substantial public safety or security
benefit.
    FAA Response: The FAA is not adopting the requirement to transmit
message elements through the internet to a Remote ID USS in this rule.
While the FAA recognizes the potential benefits of network remote
identification, as stated by several commenters, the FAA believes a
broadcast-only solution is sufficient, at this time, to maintain the
safety and security of the airspace of the United States. The FAA
agrees with the commenters who proposed that a broadcast-only solution
is sufficient at this time to provide the required remote
identification message elements to support typical unmanned aircraft
operations and satisfy security concerns.

D. Remote Identification Broadcast Modules

1. Discussion of the Final Rule
    This rule finalizes the regulatory framework that allows persons to
equip unmanned aircraft with remote identification broadcast modules to
enable them to identify remotely. See Sec.  89.115(a) of this rule. As
previously mentioned in section VII.D of this preamble, the remote
identification broadcast module concept is a retrofit option that
replaces the limited remote identification UAS regulatory framework of
the proposed rule and provides flexibility to operators of unmanned
aircraft that do not meet the requirements for standard remote
identification unmanned aircraft. The concept allows unmanned aircraft
built without remote identification (e.g., existing unmanned aircraft
fleet, home-built unmanned aircraft) to be operated outside of FAA-
recognized identification areas because the broadcast modules enable
the unmanned aircraft to broadcast the remote identification message
elements required by this rule. Through this regulatory framework, the
FAA is also allowing a pathway for existing unmanned aircraft that have
certain broadcast capabilities and equipment already integrated to be
upgraded to meet the requirements of a remote identification broadcast
module.
    The FAA decided to incorporate this concept into this rule after
reviewing public comments and considering the significant concerns
raised with respect to the limited remote identification UAS framework.
The FAA determined a remote identification broadcast module facilitates
compliance with this rule and, at this time, meets the safety and
security needs of the FAA, national security agencies, and law
enforcement. The concept is broadcast-based and does not require a
person to connect to the internet to identify remotely, as the limited
remote identification UAS proposal did. This shift allows unmanned
aircraft with remote identification broadcast modules to operate in
areas where the internet is unavailable. In addition, by making this a
broadcast solution, the FAA has determined that the 400-foot range
limitation included in the proposed requirements for limited remote
identification UAS is no longer warranted and has removed the design
constraint. However, the FAA has determined that persons manipulating
the flight controls of UAS where the unmanned aircraft is equipped with
remote identification broadcast modules must be able to see the
unmanned aircraft at all times throughout the operation. Commenters
generally supported a visual line of sight requirement for unmanned
aircraft operations that do not meet the requirements for standard
remote identification unmanned aircraft and therefore FAA is
incorporating the restriction into the operating requirements for
unmanned aircraft with remote identification broadcast modules.\19\
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    \19\ The FAA emphasizes that this rule does not relieve any
existing visual-line-of-sight requirements. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.
44809(a)(3); 14 CFR 107.31 and 107.33. The purpose of the visual-
line-of-sight provision of this rule is to impose a separate visual-
line-of-sight requirement on unmanned aircraft operated with remote
broadcast modules to ensure that these aircraft are operated within
visual line of sight even if the existing operating requirements are
changed through future integration efforts.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirements for unmanned aircraft with remote identification
broadcast modules are discussed below.
i. Use of Remote Identification Broadcast Modules
    The FAA adopts the requirements in Sec.  89.115(a) for the
operation of unmanned aircraft equipped with remote identification
broadcast modules. A person may equip an unmanned aircraft with a
remote identification broadcast module by securing or integrating a
remote identification broadcast module to the unmanned aircraft or by
other means (e.g., software upgrade). The operating requirements for
unmanned aircraft equipped with remote identification broadcast modules
are the same irrespective of how the broadcast module is secured to the
unmanned aircraft or integrated into the unmanned aircraft.
    Remote identification broadcast modules allow operators of unmanned
aircraft without remote identification (e.g., existing unmanned
aircraft and unmanned aircraft excepted under Sec.  89.501(c) from the
design and production requirements of this rule) to operate outside of
an FAA-recognized identification area. For example, a home-built
unmanned aircraft can be produced without remote identification and can
be operated without remote identification in an FAA-recognized
identification area. However, if an operator wishes to operate a home-
built unmanned aircraft outside of an FAA-recognized identification
area, he or she can do so by equipping the unmanned aircraft with a
remote identification broadcast module.
    A person may use an unmanned aircraft equipped with a remote
identification broadcast module in operations conducted under any
operating rule (e.g., limited recreational operations conducted under
49 U.S.C. 44809, or operations conducted under part 91, part 107, part
135, or any other operating part). However, as discussed below,
operations of unmanned aircraft equipped with remote identification
broadcast modules are limited to visual line of sight of the person
manipulating the flight controls of the UAS.
ii. Remote Identification Equipment and Message Elements
    The operator of an unmanned aircraft with a remote identification
broadcast module must ensure that the remote identification broadcast
module is broadcasting the message elements listed in Sec.  89.315 of
this rule and that the remote identification broadcast module is listed
on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance. The message elements
broadcast by remote identification broadcast modules include a unique
identifier; an indication of the unmanned aircraft latitude, longitude,
and geometric altitude; an indication of the unmanned aircraft take-off
location latitude, longitude, and geometric altitude; an indication of
the unmanned aircraft velocity; and a time mark. The requirement to
broadcast the remote identification message elements applies from
takeoff until shutdown of the unmanned aircraft.
    The remote identification broadcast module message elements are
identical to those for standard remote identification unmanned
aircraft, with the exception of the unmanned aircraft take-off location
and altitude, which replaces the control station location and altitude,
and the emergency status which is only a required message element for
the standard remote identification unmanned aircraft. The take-off
location and altitude indications are intended to provide an
approximate location of the UAS operator, based on an expectation that
the UAS operator is located in close proximity to the unmanned aircraft
take-off location and altitude. The FAA believes this is an appropriate
assumption for VLOS operations. The requirement to indicate the take-
off location and altitude enables the retrofit installation of remote
identification broadcast modules on unmanned aircraft because the take-
off location and altitude can be measured by a stand-alone broadcast
module without any dependency on external systems or equipment.
    Further, the FAA is not requiring that an unmanned aircraft with a
remote identification broadcast module broadcast an indication of the
emergency status of the unmanned aircraft. To indicate an emergency
status, the remote identification equipment would likely need to be
integrated into the unmanned aircraft and designed to recognize
specific aircraft failure modes or off-nominal situations. Because
remote identification broadcast modules can be installed on existing
unmanned aircraft with different characteristics, the FAA finds that an
emergency status indication for remote identification broadcast modules
presents too many technological challenges to require at this time.
    The message elements and minimum performance requirements for
remote identification broadcast modules are discussed in more detail in
section IX of this preamble.
iii. Broadcast Module Installation and Instructions
    As previously mentioned, this rule allows a person to use an
unmanned aircraft equipped with a remote identification broadcast
module. The person installing the remote identification broadcast
module must perform the retrofit in accordance with the instructions
provided by the producer of the remote identification broadcast module
to ensure that the broadcast module is compatible with the unmanned
aircraft, that the installation is completed successfully, and that the
remote identification functionality is compliant with all the
requirements of this rule.
iv. Serial Number Requirements
    The producer of remote identification broadcast modules must issue
each module a serial number that complies with ANSI/CTA-2063-A in
accordance with Sec.  89.505. The serial number must be listed on an
FAA-accepted declaration of compliance.
    The serial number must be included in the application for
registration of the unmanned aircraft under part 47 or 48 and may not
be duplicative of a serial number associated with a different
certificate of aircraft registration. For owners registering small
unmanned aircraft exclusively for limited recreational operations under
49 U.S.C. 44809, more than one serial number may be included on a
single Certificate of Aircraft Registration. The registration
requirements that apply to unmanned aircraft with remote identification
broadcast modules are discussed in more detail in section XV.A of this
preamble. Foreign registered civil unmanned aircraft must provide the
serial number of the unmanned aircraft or remote identification
broadcast module to the FAA in a notice of identification pursuant to
Sec.  89.130 prior to the operation in the airspace of the United
States. The requirements that apply to foreign registered civil
unmanned aircraft operating in the airspace of the United States are
discussed in section XVI of this preamble.

v. Operations Restricted to Visual Line of Sight
    Operations of unmanned aircraft with remote identification
broadcast modules must be conducted so that the person manipulating the
flight controls of the UAS is able to see the unmanned aircraft at all
times throughout the operation. Commenters generally supported a visual
line of sight requirement for unmanned aircraft operations that do not
meet the requirements for standard remote identification unmanned
aircraft and therefore the FAA is incorporating the restriction into
the operating requirements for unmanned aircraft with remote
identification broadcast modules.
2. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Many commenters recommended that the FAA permit an add-on
component or module that comes from an FAA-approved manufacturer. These
commenters recommended permitting stand-alone broadcast modules that
could be serialized to enable off the shelf solutions and lower the
cost for existing UAS and amateur-built UAS to meet the remote
identification requirements via broadcast, network, or both. Some
suggested a beacon or broadcast remote identification requirement with
no network requirement.
    Many commenters suggested the FAA allow remote identification add-
on equipment that can be mounted on UAS that were originally
manufactured without remote identification. Many commenters also
recommended permitting modules that could be registered to a specific
user and swapped between multiple UAS so existing UAS and amateur-built
UAS can meet remote identification requirements. One commenter
suggested the FAA move forward with a simple and minimally burdensome
solution such as an add-on broadcast module for limited remote
identification UAS instead of the proposed requirements. Another
commenter suggested allowing the use of an external broadcast module
that could be changed as technology changes or additional airspace is
available and noted that the European Union and France permit external
modules.
    Many commenters supported a broadcast remote identification option
that would permit operations in areas with no internet access or in the
event of Remote ID USS outages.
    The National Transportation Safety Board noted that broadcast
remote identification may support aircraft-to-aircraft collision
avoidance capability, but it was unclear whether a network remote
identification could as well.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees with public comments and has revised
this rule to include the remote identification broadcast module
concept. An unmanned aircraft produced, built, or assembled without
remote identification can now be equipped with a remote identification
broadcast module that broadcasts the message elements required by this
rule. Since an unmanned aircraft with a remote identification broadcast
module is able to identify remotely, the unmanned aircraft can be
operated outside of an FAA-recognized identification area.

E. Other Broadcast Requirements Applicable to Standard Remote
Identification Unmanned Aircraft and Unmanned Aircraft With Remote
Identification Broadcast Modules

1. Broadcast Directly From the Unmanned Aircraft
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    This rule requires standard remote identification unmanned aircraft
and unmanned aircraft with remote identification broadcast modules to
broadcast the remote identification message elements directly from the
unmanned aircraft.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Several commenters suggested permitting the control
station to broadcast the required message elements.
    FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with commenters because of the
likelihood of decreased reception range caused by terrain or ground
obstacles. In addition, if the unmanned aircraft were to go outside the
range of the remote identification broadcast from the control station,
persons near the unmanned aircraft may not be able to identify it.
Therefore, the FAA maintains the requirement that the remote
identification message elements must be broadcast directly from the
unmanned aircraft.
2. Broadcast From Takeoff to Shutdown
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed that a person would be able to operate a UAS with
remote identification only if the UAS sends the remote identification
message elements from takeoff to shutdown. The FAA requested comments
regarding when automatic Remote ID USS connections should be required.
Though the Remote ID USS connection is no longer required in this rule,
the responses were instructive and helped inform the Agency's decision
to modify the requirement, as it applies to the broadcast of message
elements by standard remote identification unmanned aircraft and remote
identification broadcast modules.
    The FAA is finalizing this rule to require the broadcast of message
elements directly from the unmanned aircraft from takeoff to shutdown.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Commenters stated the remote identification requirements
should only apply for the duration of the flight and should not apply
to unmanned aircraft that are active but not flying. Many of these
commenters cited difficulties in performing maintenance on unmanned
aircraft if the connection was required at power up when the UAS is not
intended to be flown. One individual suggested the connection
requirement should apply when the unmanned aircraft is in motion.
    Many commenters offered options to the proposed requirement. They
proposed requiring UAS to broadcast from takeoff to landing, from start
up to shutdown, and start up to landing. The responses were generally
divided into two main considerations: When the UAS should start to
broadcast and when it should cease to broadcast.
    Commenters who believed the UAS should transmit the message
elements from the time the UAS is started up mentioned that a certain
amount of time is needed to establish connectivity to the network. Some
suggested there is a need or value for law enforcement to gain
awareness of the operation prior to flight. Others mentioned a UAS
should not be required to broadcast any message elements while powered
on, as long as actual flight is not intended or commenced (e.g., when a
person powers on the UAS to conduct maintenance or download data).
    Some commenters believed the UAS should continue to broadcast until
the UAS lands while others believed it should broadcast until the UAS
is shutdown. Those supporting the landing cutoff noted the unmanned
aircraft is no longer in the airspace of the United States upon landing
and there is no longer a safety risk because the unmanned aircraft is
no longer in the air. They also mentioned a person may want to keep the
power on (e.g., to conduct maintenance or download data) for some time
prior to shutdown. Other commenters mentioned the broadcast should end
upon shutdown because it would grant additional time for law
enforcement and other security partners to locate the unmanned
aircraft, after it

lands, which could help identify an operator.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees with comments supporting a broadcast
requirement that begins at takeoff rather than start up because
different unmanned aircraft have different startup sequences and may
not all be capable of broadcasting remote identification elements at
the same point in their startup process. Takeoff is the first part of
an unmanned aircraft operation that is common to all unmanned aircraft,
which is why FAA has decided to tie the requirement to begin
broadcasting to takeoff. In addition, unmanned aircraft are often
powered on for purposes other than flight, such as conducting
maintenance or configuring the unmanned aircraft hardware and software.
Finally, unmanned aircraft that are powered on indoors, where
maintenance typically occurs, would likely not be able to generate some
of the remote identification message elements, making such a
requirement ineffective.
    The FAA also agrees with comments supporting the extension of the
broadcast requirement until the unmanned aircraft is shutdown because
the additional data can assist the Agency and law enforcement to
identify unmanned aircraft or operators engaged in unsafe or illegal
operation. The FAA does not agree with commenters that believe once an
unmanned aircraft lands there is no longer the potential for safety
risk because in many cases, the safety risk is the result of careless
or clueless operators that will continue the potentially unsafe
behavior without FAA or law enforcement intervention. Requiring
unmanned aircraft to broadcast the message elements until the unmanned
aircraft is shutdown provides additional time for the FAA or law
enforcement to locate an unmanned aircraft operator, even after the
unmanned aircraft has landed. Therefore, after reviewing public
comments and giving further consideration, the FAA decided to modify
the proposal and adopts the requirement so unmanned aircraft must
broadcast the required message elements from takeoff to shutdown.
3. In-Flight Loss of Remote Identification Broadcast
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    A standard remote identification unmanned aircraft must perform a
self-test and provide a notification to the person manipulating the
flight controls of the UAS if the remote identification equipment is
not functioning properly. In addition, a standard remote identification
unmanned aircraft must be designed to not take off if it fails the
self-test.
    A remote identification broadcast module must also perform a self-
test and provide a notification to the person manipulating the flight
controls of the UAS if the remote identification equipment is not
functioning properly. Unmanned aircraft operators may only use remote
identification broadcast modules that pass the self-test.
    Both standard remote identification unmanned aircraft and remote
identification broadcast modules must continuously monitor their
performance while in use and provide an indication if the remote
identification equipment is not functioning properly. If the remote
identification equipment provides an indication of failure or
malfunction during flight, the unmanned aircraft operator must land the
unmanned aircraft as soon as practicable. The FAA notes that it does
not expect unavailability of GPS or other types of location services
(as the rule does not require GPS specifically) to result in a
notification to the unmanned aircraft operator nor require the operator
to land the unmanned aircraft as soon as practicable. The FAA expects
that means of compliance will stipulate that only equipment failures or
malfunctions would trigger a notification to the operator that the
unmanned aircraft was no longer broadcasting the message elements.
    When determining how and when to land the unmanned aircraft as soon
as practicable, the FAA expects the person manipulating the flight
controls of the UAS to operate in a manner that minimizes risk to other
users of the airspace and people and property on the ground, while
using aeronautical decision making to quickly and safely land the
unmanned aircraft at a suitable landing area. The FAA recommends
including UAS remote identification contingency planning, including
plans for landing as soon as practicable, as part of a pre-flight
assessment.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Many commenters recommended clarification of the proposed
requirement to ``land as soon as practicable'' in the event that remote
identification information does not transmit or broadcast. Many other
commenters noted it is more appropriate to notify the operator that
remote identification equipment is not working properly than to
forcibly ground a UAS by design.
    To reduce the need for case-by-case authorizations, the Association
of American Railroads and the United States Rail Subsidiaries of the
Canadian National Railway Company requested amending proposed Sec.
89.110(b) to state that ``land as soon as practicable'' does not apply
when remote identification cannot be transmitted because there is a
potential to interfere with critical communication systems, when law
enforcement is responding to an emergency situation, disaster response,
critical infrastructure protection, or in other situations with the
potential to jeopardize public safety. Commenters suggested permitting
emergency operations with specific stipulations, such as operating
within VLOS, determining there is no undue risk to persons or property
on the ground or risk to UAS or manned aircraft in flight, and
notifying local law enforcement. A few commenters were concerned that
improper application of these requirements would result in automatic
power shut down in flight.
    FAA Response: The requirement to ``land as soon as practicable''
does not require an immediate landing upon notification of a failure of
the broadcast equipment, but instead requires remote pilots to use
aeronautical decision making to quickly and safely land the unmanned
aircraft while considering the suitability of the landing area and the
safety of other aircraft, as well as persons and property on the
ground.
    While there may be some operations, such as emergency or disaster
response, where continued unmanned aircraft operations, even in the
presence of a broadcast equipment failure, may provide significant
societal benefit, the FAA does not find that any particular activity
warrants a specifically stated exception in the regulation from the
requirement to land as soon as practicable. Instead, authorizations may
be granted on a case-by-case basis if there is sufficient justification
and an acceptable level of safety.

F. Unmanned Aircraft Without Remote Identification

1. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed to allow unmanned aircraft without remote
identification capabilities to operate in specific areas, referred to
as FAA-recognized identification areas, or under a deviation authority
granted by the Administrator. The FAA adopts the substance of this
requirement with minor adjustments. Accordingly, the vast majority of
unmanned aircraft operated in the airspace of the United States must
identify remotely; however, unmanned aircraft without remote
identification may operate if they meet certain requirements. Mainly,
the

operation of unmanned aircraft without remote identification is
allowed: (1) Under Sec.  89.115(b) if the person manipulating the
flight controls of the UAS is able to see the unmanned aircraft at all
times throughout the operation, and within the boundaries of an FAA-
recognized identification area; or (2) under Sec.  89.120 when the
Administrator authorizes operations without remote identification where
the operation is solely for the purpose of aeronautical research or to
show compliance with regulations.
2. Operations at FAA-Recognized Identification Areas
    A person may operate an unmanned aircraft without remote
identification if that operation is within the boundaries of an FAA-
recognized identification area and the person manipulating the flight
controls of the UAS is able to see the unmanned aircraft at all times
throughout the operation. As the FAA explained in the NPRM, the phrase
``operated within an FAA-recognized identification area'' means that
both the unmanned aircraft and the person manipulating the flight
controls of the UAS must be located within the boundaries of the FAA-
recognized identification area from takeoff to landing. However, this
rule does not allow for the remote identification capability to be
disabled, unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator. Therefore,
a person operating a standard remote identification unmanned aircraft
or an unmanned aircraft with a remote identification broadcast module
must continue to identify remotely when operating in an FAA-recognized
identification area.
i. Public Comments Regarding Operations at FAA-Recognized
Identification Areas
    Many commenters agreed with the concept of FAA-recognized
identification areas. Others expressed concerns, however, that the FAA-
recognized identification areas would be too limited to address
adequately the needs of hobbyists who primarily fly amateur-built or
home-built UAS. The commenters noted that these operators tend to have
dozens of UAS, many of which do not have navigation equipment to
determine location. Commenters also expressed concerns about increased
cost of travel and membership in national and local community-based
organizations. Many commenters, including commercial operators,
modelers, UAS racers, and educational groups, believed the FAA-
recognized identification areas would be the only option for certain
persons to continue to fly UAS and stated the cost of upgrading a UAS
to one with built-in remote identification could be cost prohibitive.
    Many commenters expressed concerns that they will be confined to
operating their existing UAS at an FAA-recognized identification area
due to prohibitions or complexities of adding remote identification
equipment to their existing UAS. Commenters expressed concerns about
continued operations of existing UAS, particularly for recreational
users operating under current rules, and asked the FAA to consider how
to provide a cost-effective path to compliance, or otherwise
``grandfather'' those UAS, including amateur-built UAS and model
aircraft, to support operations outside of FAA-recognized
identification areas and otherwise prevent obsolescence.
    Commenters also noted specific types of UAS are not permitted to
operate at many existing flying fields that are likely to be FAA-
recognized identification areas. These UAS include quad copters, racing
UAS, and UAS conducting first person view (FPV) operations. Many
commenters noted that crowding a large number of existing unmanned
aircraft operators into a limited number of FAA-recognized
identification areas could make it difficult to have sufficient space
to fly or could increase collision and crash risk due to radio
interference and proximity of aircraft when numerous unmanned aircraft
are flown at once. The commenters noted the likely number of FAA-
recognized identification areas would not provide sufficient capacity
to accommodate operations of hundreds of thousands of current UAS that
would not be permitted to fly elsewhere. In addition, several
commenters noted increased UAS activity and noise at flying fields is
likely to increase tension with neighboring communities. Some
commenters also noted many existing flying fields have limited hours.
    Dragonfly UAS and many other commenters noted many flying fields
are consumed by surrounding development and recommended permitting a
greater number of FAA-recognized identification areas to be approved
over time and at private property sites.
    Some commenters expressed concerns that existing recreational
flying fields might not be eligible to become FAA-recognized
identification areas and that this would negatively affect recreational
flyers.
    The government of the District of Columbia objected to permitting
operations in an FAA-recognized identification area because there would
be no mechanism to ensure those UAS without remote identification
cannot be operated illegally in other locations. The National Business
Aviation Association contended that limiting operations to FAA-
recognized identification areas seems unrealistic and unmanageable.
    A few commenters objected to relying on FAA-recognized
identification areas and questioned whether this requirement would
conflict with 49 U.S.C. 44809. Many individual, industry, and
organizational commenters recommended eliminating the FAA-recognized
identification area concept altogether. Others suggested that the FAA
provide alternative paths for existing UAS without remote
identification, including recreational UAS and traditional model
aircraft, to comply with the remote identification requirements.
    Many commenters believed the FAA-recognized identification area
concept does not adequately address model aircraft events and other UAS
competitions, including those that raise money for charity and
impromptu flight events. These commenters noted many events take place
in locations that are unlikely to request a designation or that are
unlikely to be approved as an FAA-recognized identification area, such
as airports serving manned aircraft or other public locations that are
likely to be ineligible. Many commenters suggested the FAA implement a
simple authorization process for UAS events, with some commenters
recommending an application-based request and approval system similar
to LAANC. The Drone Racing League noted they would be unable to provide
any first-person view racing events in the United States due to the
VLOS and FAA-recognized identification area requirements. They also
requested the final rule permit commercial UAS events with input and
specific authorization by the FAA, similar to other aviation events
such as air shows.
    Instead of being limited to operating in FAA-recognized
identification areas, UAS Colorado recommended allowing community-based
organizations to self-verify their fields and permit letters of
agreement to operate on airports, and recommended developing a LAANC-
style system to allow self-reporting of location for non-compliant UAS
as well as organized events that are not in FAA-recognized
identification areas.
ii. FAA Response
    The FAA does not agree with the feedback from commenters who
believe FAA-recognized identification areas are

unnecessary to accommodate operations of unmanned aircraft without
remote identification or believe there are better pathways for
accommodating the operation of UAS without remote identification. Other
proposals for enabling operations without remote identification do not
enable an observer to determine readily which unmanned aircraft are
expected to be broadcasting, and which are not. The Agency determined
there is a need for a space for unmanned aircraft without remote
identification to continue to operate and therefore adopts a policy to
allow operations of unmanned aircraft without remote identification
when operated within the boundaries of an FAA-recognized identification
area and within visual line of sight.
    To address the commenters who expressed concerns with the policy
that limited the types of entities that could request to establish an
FAA-recognized identification area and the available time for making
such requests, this rule expands the types of entities that can apply
for the establishment of FAA-recognized identification area and removes
the deadline for applications. These changes are discussed in sections
XII.B and XII.C of the preamble. The FAA is effecting these changes in
response to concerns regarding the availability and utility of FAA-
recognized identification areas that allow continued operations of
unmanned aircraft without remote identification. In addition, the FAA
believes the concept incorporated into this rule allowing unmanned
aircraft to equip with remote identification broadcast modules provides
a practical way for unmanned aircraft without remote identification to
be upgraded or modified to meet the remote identification requirements,
which reduces the need to operate at FAA-recognized identification
areas.
    FAA-recognized identification areas are locations where unmanned
aircraft without remote identification can operate, but these areas are
not limited to only unmanned aircraft without remote identification;
other unmanned aircraft may also be operated in these areas to the
extent otherwise permitted in accordance with all applicable
regulations. Therefore, unmanned aircraft with remote identification
can also be operated within the boundaries of an FAA-recognized
identification area.
    Though FAA-recognized identification areas would not be authorized
for temporary use, the FAA expects that instances such as air shows or
temporary drone racing events would be handled, where warranted,
through authorization from the Administrator to deviate from the remote
identification operating rules.
3. Operations for Aeronautical Research
    The second way a person can operate an unmanned aircraft without
remote identification is pursuant to an authorization from the FAA
Administrator for the purpose of aeronautical research or to show
compliance with regulations. As explained in the NPRM, the FAA
considers aeronautical research to be limited to the research and
testing of the unmanned aircraft, the control systems, equipment that
is part of the unmanned aircraft (such as sensors), and flight
profiles, or development of specific functions and capabilities for the
UAS. Producers and other persons authorized by the Administrator have
the ability to operate unmanned aircraft prototypes without remote
identification exclusively for researching and testing the unmanned
aircraft design, equipment, or capabilities; or to conduct research,
development, and testing necessary for UAS infrastructure, systems, and
technologies, including but not limited future UTM and United States
Government counter-UAS capabilities. A person may also be authorized by
the Administrator to conduct flight tests and other operations with
non-compliant remote identification equipment to show compliance with
an FAA-accepted means of compliance for remote identification or
airworthiness regulations. These types of unmanned aircraft operations
could include flights to show compliance for issuance of type
certificates and supplemental type certificates, flights to
substantiate major design changes, and flights to show compliance with
the function and reliability requirements of the regulations. This
deviation authority does not extend to any other type of research using
an unmanned aircraft.
    As discussed in section XIV.B.5, UAS designed or produced
exclusively for the purpose of aeronautical research are excepted from
the production requirements of subpart F of this rule. The production
exceptions are discussed in section XIV.B of this preamble.
i. Public Comments Regarding Operations for Aeronautical Research
    Though some commenters objected to allowing UAS without remote
identification to operate outside of FAA-recognized identification
areas for only aeronautical research purposes, many organizations,
companies, and individual commenters generally supported the concept,
with numerous suggestions to ensure research, development, and
innovation are not unnecessarily restricted. Other commenters noted
that only permitting aeronautical research was unnecessarily stifling
for UAS research initiatives that are ongoing in multiple fields, such
as forestry, wildlife biology, geology, agriculture, hydrology, and
other fields utilizing geographic information systems.
    Some commenters suggested adding exceptions to accommodate
education, such as training students, model airshows, and other
educational events. Ax Enterprize mentioned that work testing UAS
situation awareness systems should be permitted. Wing Aviation
recommended the FAA to outline factors that weigh in favor of this
authorization, such as a controlled access location with effective
mitigations to ensure operation containment. SRP Aero asked how long it
will take to grant an authorization to permit test flights of prototype
UAS. A commenter from Evergreen State College asked the FAA to consider
permitting research and emergency operations in remote areas.
    The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, the
General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the University of Maryland
UAS Test Site, and the University of Alabama in Huntsville requested
that the FAA specifically clarify what kinds of operations qualify
under the ``aeronautical research'' exception to ensure it is not too
restrictive, such as development activities, non-production and
experimental prototypes, avionics interfaces, and concept of operations
development. AiRXOS, the Commercial Drone Alliance, FlyGuys Inc., and
others requested that commercial research be expressly listed as
permitted under ``aeronautical research,'' and requested the FAA to
clarify that research conducted in an FAA-recognized identification
area does not require FAA approval. To prevent the restriction of
research activities, the University of Texas--Austin recommended
expanding the aeronautical research exception to cover other
educational uses, and the Small UAV Coalition recommended expanding
this exception to include commercial and academic research and
development activities. Verizon and Skyward suggested FAA approval
should not be required for research activities and suggested permitting
FAA-recognized identification area applications for the purpose of
research, development, testing, and product evaluation.

ii. FAA Response
    In this rule, the FAA adopts the deviation authority to allow
persons authorized by the Administrator to conduct operations without
remote identification where the operation is solely for the purpose of
aeronautical research or to show compliance with regulations. At this
time, the FAA has decided that there is no need to expand the types of
operations that qualify for a deviation from the operating rules and
notes that the examples provided by commenters (e.g., non-aeronautical
research, data collection, or educational activities) can be conducted
using unmanned aircraft with remote identification, or using unmanned
aircraft without remote identification at an FAA-recognized
identification area.
    The FAA envisions that UAS operated for aeronautical research would
typically be experimental, prototype, or testbed systems operated for
specific purposes under special operating conditions and limited
durations. These types of unmanned aircraft are not typically available
to the general public for purchase or use.
    The FAA does not believe it is necessary to provide additional
information regarding what types of operations constitute
``aeronautical research'' beyond what was provided in the NPRM and this
rule. FAA notes that intending to conduct aeronautical research simply
authorizes the operator to apply for a deviation; if requests for a
deviation show confusion as to the meaning of this term in spite of the
guidance in this rule, FAA may issue additional guidance at that time.

VIII. Message Elements and Minimum Performance Requirements: Standard
Remote Identification Unmanned Aircraft

    The FAA proposed certain requirements for remote identification
message elements and minimum performance requirements for standard
remote identification UAS. The FAA adopts those requirements with the
changes and adjustments described below.

A. Message Elements for Standard Remote Identification Unmanned
Aircraft

    The FAA proposed requiring certain minimum message elements
necessary to meet the objectives of this rule. The proposed message
elements were: (1) The UAS Identification; (2) an indication of the
control station's latitude and longitude; (3) an indication of the
control station's barometric pressure altitude; (4) an indication of
the unmanned aircraft's latitude and longitude; (5) an indication of
the unmanned aircraft's barometric pressure altitude; (6) a time mark;
and (7) an indication of the emergency status of the UAS.
    After reviewing public comments and further consideration, the FAA
adopts the seven message elements proposed with some modifications and
adds an eighth message element: Velocity. The FAA explains these
requirements, including changes from the NPRM, in the following
subsections.
1. Unmanned Aircraft Unique Identifier
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The NPRM discussed that the UAS Identification message element
establishes the unique identity of UAS operating in the airspace of the
United States. The FAA proposed that this message element would consist
of one of the following: (1) A serial number assigned to the unmanned
aircraft by the person responsible for the production of the standard
remote identification UAS; or (2) a session identification number
(session ID) assigned by a Remote ID USS.
    The FAA proposed to allow UAS operators to use a session ID
assigned by a Remote ID USS as the UAS Identification instead of the
unmanned aircraft serial number. The FAA explained that the association
between a given session ID and the unmanned aircraft serial number
would not be available to the public through the broadcast message.
This association would be available to the issuing Remote ID USS, the
FAA, and other authorized entities, such as law enforcement. Where a
session ID would have been issued, the FAA explained that the Agency
and authorized entities would have the means to correlate the session
ID to the UAS serial number and would consequently be able to correlate
the unmanned aircraft serial number to its registration data. The FAA
also proposed that a UAS would be designed to broadcast its serial
number regardless of whether the unmanned aircraft has been registered
or not.
    The FAA adopts the UAS Identification message element concept, but
instead uses the more general term ``unique identifier'' in this rule
and clarifies that the unique identifier is applicable to the unmanned
aircraft and not the UAS. However, because the FAA has eliminated the
Remote ID USS-related requirements, the FAA plans to develop an
alternative strategy for assignment of session ID to UAS operators. The
FAA is retaining the concept that the session ID will be uniquely
identifiable such that law enforcement and the FAA will be able to
correlate each session ID to a specific unmanned aircraft serial
number, but that this ability will not be publicly available. The FAA
will consider existing policies, such as the Privacy ICAO Address (PIA)
program for aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out, when developing the
session ID policy.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Many commenters expressed support for the session ID
concept to protect the privacy of operations while deterring
irresponsible operators. Pierce Aerospace recommended a unique session
ID be created by default to protect privacy. Qualcomm and Streamline
Designs both supported session IDs assigned by a Remote ID USS but
suggested permitting the operator to cycle through a set of temporary
IDs or have a session ID assigned with a time limit rather than
requiring a unique session ID for each flight, to minimize the burden
of assigning unique identifiers for short flights typical of many UAS.
    Kittyhawk supported the concept of assigning a session ID, and
submitted survey data showing the importance of privacy for the
majority of those pilots surveyed. Sky Eye Network recommended
permitting the session ID option without an additional charge for
operators due to the required Remote ID USS subscription to receive a
session ID. The News Media Coalition supported the session ID concept
to protect the privacy of journalists operating UAS, but was concerned
about how to generate a unique session ID when operating in an area
with no internet availability.
    Some commenters, including the New Hampshire Department of
Transportation and Unifly, suggested permitting registration numbers to
be broadcast or transmitted for aircraft identification as well as
serial numbers or session ID while controlling access to the UAS and
pilot registration database, similar to vehicle license plates and
current manned aircraft requirements. Unifly also noted that this would
be consistent with European Regulation 2019/945 and the ASTM F3411-19
Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking.
    One commenter was concerned about the requirement to broadcast or
transmit the serial number as it may be difficult to keep the same
serial number due to quality control issues in the event of major
repairs to the UAS, such as repairs to the UAS or control station
transmitters, or other parts.

    AiRXOS and Motorola supported the session ID concept for most
missions, but further recommended developing a ``trusted user'' process
to allow law enforcement to flag missions for which Remote ID USS
should not provide information to the general public. The Alabama
Department of Transportation and the District of Columbia office of the
Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice commented that while session
ID offers privacy to the UAS operator, it could be a hindrance for
identification that unscrupulous operators may exploit, which may
negate the security benefit.
    Airlines for America (A4A) opposed the option for Remote ID USS to
issue and assign session IDs. A4A thought session ID was not justified,
stating that the combination of session ID and the UAS pilot being at a
different location than the UAS provided additional privacy for UAS
operators than other airspace users, which may be a disincentive to
safe operating practices. Several other commenters suggested that the
Session ID option could reduce accountability and inadvertently
increase unsafe and irresponsible operations due to the added privacy.
    The American Civil Liberties Union noted that session ID will not
shield individuals from tracking by the government but will likely
shield corporate operators from public scrutiny by removing public
ability to track a UAS across multiple flight sessions. They suggested
permitting session ID for individuals but not commercial operators, and
that government UAS be subject to a higher level of scrutiny and
disclosure. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) suggested
the FAA avoid session IDs to reduce potential UAS identification
problems for the public and ensure that UAS identity is not masked.
    FAA Response: Many commenters provided suggestions on how to
implement the session ID concept, including cost models, how operators
could use a session ID, or how Remote ID USS could issue them. The FAA
finds that the performance-based requirements allow the unmanned
aircraft community to innovate and find the solutions that work best
but still meet the safety and security objectives of the rule.
    Some commenters suggested the registration number also be allowed
as a UAS Identification message element. The addition of the
registration number would likely require operator input and be
susceptible to misuse, omission, or errors, and would require
validation by an external system and require the external system to
have access to registration information, which would create privacy and
security concerns. As noted by a commenter, sharing of the registration
data might lead others to misuse that information. Hence, the FAA finds
that adding the registration number to the identification message
element does not provide enough benefits to warrant the added
complexity and potential for misuse of its addition.
    An individual commenter noted the difficulty of having the unmanned
aircraft and control station both transmit the same serial number if a
repair was needed that necessitated the remote identification equipment
of one element needing replacement. The FAA expects that standard
remote identification unmanned aircraft will incorporate remote
identification equipment that is highly integrated into the various
unmanned aircraft components. Therefore, such repair actions would be
undertaken by a specialist or someone trained by the manufacturer and
that person would be capable of ensuring the proper functionality of
the remote identification equipment post repair.
    The FAA agrees with many commenters that the session ID option
strikes a balance between protecting the privacy of individual
operations while still deterring irresponsible operators. The public
can use remote identification messages with a session ID to report
suspicious UAS operations to law enforcement, and law enforcement can,
in coordination with the FAA, establish the identity of the responsible
persons. The FAA agrees with commenters that session IDs must be
traceable to enable the FAA and authorized entities to know the
corresponding unmanned aircraft serial number or registration number
for each individual session ID. The FAA does not agree, however, that
session ID be the default option, and instead finds that both session
ID and the serial number are equally acceptable. Thus, industry and
individual operators are free to choose the option that best meets
their needs.
    The FAA proposed that a session ID would be assigned by a Remote ID
USS. Because this rule does not retain the requirement for standard
remote identification unmanned aircraft to have an internet connection
to a Remote ID USS, the FAA plans to develop an alternative strategy
for assignment of session ID to unmanned aircraft operators. The FAA
will consider existing policies, such as the Privacy ICAO Address (PIA)
program for aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out, when developing the
session ID policy. Pursuant to the Department of Transportation's
procedures regarding significant guidance documents,\20\ FAA will seek
public comment on the session ID policy prior to finalizing it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See 49 CFR 5.41(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. An Indication of the Control Station's Latitude and Longitude
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed that standard remote identification UAS broadcast
and transmit to a Remote ID USS the latitude and longitude of its
control station. The FAA did not propose a specific type of position
source used to determine this information, to allow the greatest
flexibility to designers and producers of UAS. The FAA proposed to
require that the person manipulating the flight controls of the UAS be
co-located with the control station; therefore, knowing the control
station location would also provide the location of the person
manipulating the flight controls of the UAS. This message element would
be used by the FAA and authorized entities to locate the UAS operator
when necessary for the safety, security, or efficiency of aircraft
operations in the airspace of the United States. The FAA adopts this
message element as proposed.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: A significant number of commenters, representing manned
and unmanned aviation, manufacturers, users of unmanned aircraft, some
State and local law enforcement agencies, and numerous individuals
opposed the proposed requirement to provide the location of the control
station to the public and cited a number of reasons including ensuring
the safety of the person manipulating the flight controls of the UAS.
Commenters expressed concerns about the privacy of their operations and
that this information could increase the dangers for UAS operators and
their property potentially resulting in assault, home invasion, and
theft of their UAS and other equipment. Other commenters who opposed
providing the ground control station location provided examples of
confrontations, threats (including threats with firearms), and assaults
that they or others have received during operations or referenced media
reports of incidents involving confrontations, assaults of UAS
operators, and people shooting at unmanned aircraft if their location
becomes public. Many of these commenters supported the FAA and properly
authorized law enforcement or government agencies gaining access to
control station location information, but were concerned that making
this

information available to the public would increase the danger for UAS
operators and their property. See section X of this preamble for a
discussion of privacy issues raised by commenters, and section XI of
this preamble for a discussion of law enforcement access to remote
identification information.
    Commenters suggested that requiring the control station location
would reduce the compliance rate. Others expressed concern for the
safety of UAS operations if the remote pilot in command is distracted
due to questions or a confrontation from a member of the public who has
tracked the pilot using control station location information.
Commenters noted that public availability of control station location
information is contrary to current practices for manned aircraft
pilots, such as locked cockpit doors as well as takeoffs and landings
that occur at secure locations on airport property.
    Many commenters suggested that instead of making the control
station location publicly available, issues regarding UAS operations
are best addressed by noting the session ID or operator ID and
contacting appropriate law enforcement agencies who can use that
information to initiate an investigation. Many commenters suggested
that the location of the control station should be encrypted and
available only to the FAA and law enforcement but not to the general
public, or location data should be degraded or obfuscated if the
general public is permitted access. Several commenters were concerned
about the safety of UAS operators and other support staff engaged in
law enforcement or emergency management operations, and asked the FAA
to justify the safety or security reason for the public to have access
to the control station location. Many commenters referenced the UAS
Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (UAS-ID ARC)
recommendation that only the unmanned aircraft unique identifier should
be available to the public and asked the FAA to explain why that
recommendation was discarded.
    Some commenters referred to the ASTM F3411-19 Standard
Specification for Remote ID and Tracking, which supports making control
station location available only to authorized users and permits the use
of takeoff location in lieu of control station location. Others
referenced international standards with similar requirements. Ax
Enterprize suggested that UAS operator contact information is generally
preferable to control station location information.
    Several commenters expressed alternatives for providing the
location of the control station. Instead of providing the control
station location as proposed, Digital Aerolus recommended requiring the
location of the control station ``when available'' to permit UAS
operations in areas of poor GPS coverage, such as indoors, underground,
or under bridges. Qualcomm suggested masking the control station
location or assigning a separate session ID to the control station, so
that this information is only available to the Remote ID USS, FAA, and
law enforcement. The North Carolina Department of Transportation
commented that control station location information should be available
not only to law enforcement, but also to other first responders so UAS
interference can be addressed quickly in emergency response situations
such as hurricanes.
    The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International broadly
supported making operator location publicly available but suggested the
FAA consider ways to protect this potentially private or confidential
information, such as an opt-out or a trusted operator status that would
only reveal the location to law enforcement and government agencies.
    FAA Response: While many commenters from a variety of backgrounds
opposed the requirement to share the control station location publicly,
the FAA finds that the requirement, as proposed, is necessary to meet
the core objectives of this rulemaking effort to promote the safety and
efficiency of the airspace of the United States. The inclusion of the
control station location enables the remote identification message to
create a direct link between an unmanned aircraft and its operator;
promoting the accountability inherent in manned aviation. Some
commenters raised the issue that the availability of this information
could put remote pilots at greater risk of assault, theft, or other
crimes. Though the FAA acknowledges the concerns expressed by
commenters regarding personal safety, the FAA emphasizes that there are
rules against interfering with an aircraft. The FAA finds that removal
of the proposed requirement is not the appropriate solution, rather
community outreach and other precautions are better suited to tackle
these issues. Some commenters noted that sharing of the control station
location is counter to the current practice of locking aircraft doors;
however, the FAA finds that the analogous and appropriate practice
would be to operate from a secure or restricted access location as
necessary.
    Many commenters suggested the FAA modify the proposed regulation to
allow for the control station location to only be available to specific
entities such as the FAA and law enforcement. Though some commenters
suggested using encryption techniques to accomplish this, the FAA finds
that implementation of such a nuanced requirement would be highly
complex, costly, and impractical. The FAA does not intend to limit who
can receive the broadcast messages, and allowing encryption of certain
message elements would limit who can receive the broadcast messages
only to those with the capability to decrypt the messages. Allowing
encryption is inconsistent with the FAA's policy that the remote
identification message elements should be publicly available
information. Further, as some commenters suggested, different
situations may necessitate certain emergency responders or other
individuals to make contact with a remote pilot. In these situations, a
privacy or encryption implementation may prohibit the on-scene
individuals from having the critically needed information. In addition,
an encryption requirement would present technical challenges leading to
increased cost and complexity. For example, encryption key management
could require standard remote identification unmanned aircraft,
broadcast modules, and authorized receivers to have internet
connectivity and specialized software, increasing the cost of this rule
and potentially creating cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Therefore, the
FAA adopts the control station location requirement as proposed.
    The FAA acknowledges that location sensors such as GPS systems have
physical limitations such as not being operational in certain urban
environments. While some intermittent loss of position data is
acceptable, this rule is being finalized in a performance-based manner
and the FAA expects that industry will use a variety of inputs (such as
GPS and cellular signals) to estimate position such that the unmanned
aircraft is able to generate the complete remote identification message
in its intended operating environment.
    The FAA acknowledges that the UAS industry is rapidly evolving and
that unmanned aircraft are controlled using a multitude of methods. The
FAA, however, continues to require all unmanned aircraft operating in
the airspace of the United States be controllable by a responsible
person or remote pilot. Therefore, the FAA adopts this rule in a
performance-based manner that allows industry to innovate and use

the appropriate solution that meets the requirements, yet is adapted to
the control scheme of the particular unmanned aircraft. If the person
is controlling the flight through non-physical flight controls, then
that person's location would be used as the control station location.
For example, if the UAS utilizes a wrist device, then the location of
the wrist device could be used as the control station location. For
camera tracking technologies, the unmanned aircraft could use its own
location estimate plus the same tracking system to calculate the
location of the remote pilot.
3. An Indication of the Control Station's Altitude
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed that standard remote identification UAS have an
indication of the control station's barometric pressure altitude,
referenced to standard sea level pressure of 29.92 inches of mercury or
1013.2 hectopascals. This information can be used to approximate the
control station's height above ground level. Understanding height above
ground level is necessary to help locate an operator in circumstances
under which the person manipulating the flight controls of the UAS is
not at ground level, such as a person operating a UAS from the roof of
a building.
    In the NPRM, the FAA considered and rejected a requirement to
indicate the control station's geometric altitude, which is a measure
of altitude provided by GPS that is not affected by atmospheric
pressure. The FAA stated that barometric pressure altitude is a more
precise measurement than geometric altitude and is the standard
altitude reference for aviation. The FAA requested comments regarding
whether both barometric pressure altitude and geometric altitude of the
control station should be part of the remote identification message
elements.
    After considering comments and engaging in further analysis, the
FAA is finalizing the requirement that standard remote identification
unmanned aircraft include an indication of control station altitude as
a required message element, but replaces the requirement to indicate
barometric pressure altitude with geometric altitude. There are several
reasons for this change from the proposal. First, barometric pressure
sensors are not as common on unmanned aircraft control stations as GPS-
based altitude sensors, and they also require more calibration,
testing, and maintenance. Second, geometric altitude is more compatible
with the GPS technologies integrated into smart devices, which are
often used as the control station for recreational unmanned aircraft.
Third, a performance-based geometric altitude requirement allows
industry to use the right combination of technologies to produce a
sufficiently accurate altitude estimate for the intended environment.
The FAA expects that UAS will use GPS to determine geometric altitude
measured as height above ellipsoid referenced to the WGS-84 datum. The
FAA also anticipates UAS could utilize cellular and other signals to
complement the GPS signal and provide for a robust solution.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Several commenters suggested that control station location provides
sufficient detail and that identifying altitude is unnecessary and
could render many devices such as tablets and cell phones obsolete for
use as a control station. Other commenters supported the need to
understand whether an operator is on the ground or on the roof.
    Many commenters recommended that control station barometric
altitude not be a required message element because many control
stations do not have the capability to report this information
accurately and compliance will be difficult and costly. UAS Colorado
and Wing Aviation also noted the lack of available barometric pressure
settings to adjust a sensitive altimeter as well as stating that this
capability does not exist for UAS ground stations.
    Many commenters recommended using geometric altitude for control
stations, suggesting that it would be of greater usefulness,
reliability, and less technically complex to integrate into UAS. One
commenter suggested that barometric altitude is appropriate because
geometric altitude may encounter difficulties with coverage and
multipath errors in urban areas or areas with rising terrain or other
obstacles.
    Some commenters suggested requiring geometric altitude while
permitting but not requiring barometric pressure altitude. Others
suggesting permitting one or the other, while others recommended
requiring both. Several commenters recommended a performance-based
altitude requirement rather than specifying either barometric or
geometric. Others recommended different requirements depending on
whether the operation was for recreational or commercial purposes. One
commenter suggested permitting use of the barometric pressure altitude
of the unmanned aircraft at takeoff as a substitute to providing real
time barometric pressure altitude.
    FAA Response: After reviewing public comments and giving further
consideration, the FAA adopts this message element to require geometric
altitude for the control station instead of barometric pressure
altitude, for the reasons described above.
    The FAA declines to require both barometric pressure and geometric
altitude as there are no significant benefits associated with such a
requirement. Geometric altitude alone is sufficient to meet the safety
and security needs being addressed by this rule. Further, requiring
both forms of altitude indications would necessitate additional
equipment, testing, and maintenance that would increase UAS costs.
Also, the FAA declines to use the take-off altitude instead of the
control station altitude as standard remote identification unmanned
aircraft will already have a means to indicate the control station
latitude and longitude. The FAA expects that providing an indication of
the control station geometric altitude will not add significant cost or
complexity to the remote identification equipment, and provides a
substantially higher safety and security benefit, especially in urban
areas.
4. An Indication of the Unmanned Aircraft's Latitude and Longitude
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed that standard remote identification UAS provide
the position of the unmanned aircraft using its latitude and longitude,
which could be derived from a position source, such as a GPS receiver.
The purpose of this message element is to associate a specific unmanned
aircraft with its associated control station position. It would also be
used to provide situational awareness to other aircraft, both manned
and unmanned, operating nearby.
    The FAA adopts this message element as proposed.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Many commenters, including commenters from manned and
unmanned aviation, manufacturers, users of unmanned aircraft, some
State and local law enforcement agencies, and numerous individuals
opposed the proposed requirement to provide the location of the
unmanned aircraft to the public. Commenters expressed concerns about
the privacy of their operations and that this information could
increase the dangers for UAS operators and their property potentially
resulting in assault, home invasion, and theft of their UAS and other
equipment. Other commenters

who opposed providing the unmanned aircraft location provided examples
of confrontations, threats (including threats with firearms), and
assaults that they or others have received during operations or
referenced media reports of incidents involving confrontations,
assaults of UAS operators, and people shooting at unmanned aircraft if
their location becomes public. Robotic Research opposed the requirement
to share unmanned aircraft location, and stated they cannot publicly
broadcast the position of their unmanned aircraft due to the
sensitivity of their platforms and missions.
    Instead of making the unmanned aircraft location public, many
commenters, suggested the public should only have access to the UAS
session ID or other identification to support reporting unsafe
operations to the appropriate authorities. Some of these commenters
suggested, if unmanned aircraft location is available to the public, it
should be an approximated or obfuscated location and only available
within a limited distance of the public requestor. Other commenters
suggested using technology to limit the information available to the
public. The Experimental Aircraft Association recommended permitting
operators to opt-out of providing remote identification data accessible
to the public if that data is only needed by the FAA and law
enforcement.
    Many commenters agreed that FAA, law enforcement, and other
appropriate government agencies, including first responders should have
access to unmanned aircraft location information. A few commenters
noted that this proposed requirement would be similar to making airline
information available. Some commenters supported sharing unmanned
aircraft location information even if they are concerned about public
access to control station location.
    Airbus UTM and the Electronic Privacy Information Center
recommended standardizing message formats for standard and limited
remote identification UAS by requiring unmanned aircraft location
information, to support better identification and operational
capabilities. Pierce Aerospace recommended requiring unmanned aircraft
and control station location for standard remote identification UAS,
though they suggested an exception for amateur and recreational
operations that abide by a volume-based UTM capability.
    Many commenters stated transmitting unmanned aircraft location
information would be burdensome because most model aircraft are not
equipped with GPS or other navigation equipment and there are not many
solutions currently available.
    Commenters expressed concern about how this would affect indoor UAS
operations, noting that GPS is not available or reliable indoors, and
that these activities are not currently regulated but will become
regulated by default, because new commercially built unmanned aircraft
would be prohibited from flight, even indoors, by the manufacturing
regulations proposed. American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers
were concerned this proposed requirement would eliminate unmanned
aircraft tank inspections, which is one of the best use cases for UAS
in the oil and gas industry.
    Other commenters expressed concern about the effect of this
requirement on operations that take place in locations with limited
GPS. Digital Aerolus recommended requiring the location of the unmanned
aircraft ``when available'' to permit UAS operations in areas of poor
GPS coverage, such as indoors, underground, or under bridges. A
commenter recommended either permitting transmission of the last known
unmanned aircraft location or operator location, permitting operators
to manually specify they are indoors to override the remote
identification requirement when GPS is not available.
    FAA Response: Though many commenters opposed the inclusion of the
unmanned aircraft location message element due to privacy and safety
concerns, the FAA finds this message element is a foundational part of
remote identification. By including this message element, the remote
identification message allows the FAA, law enforcement, and the public
to have awareness of unmanned aircraft operations and correlate the
location of unmanned aircraft with the location of their respective
operators. The availability of this information will promote
accountability and trust in the unmanned aircraft community overall.
Further, remote identification in combination with community outreach
will foster a better public understanding of the important role
unmanned aircraft play in the economy and society overall. Some
commenters raised the issue that the availability of this information
could put remote pilots at greater risk of assault, theft, or other
crimes. As noted previously, though the FAA acknowledges the concerns
expressed by commenters regarding personal safety and the marginal risk
created by broadcasting a control station's location, the FAA
emphasizes that there are statutory prohibitions against interfering
with an aircraft. Additionally, there are local, State, and Federal
laws against assault, theft, and other crimes.
    Many commenters suggested that this message element should only be
available to specific entities and not be publicly available, but the
FAA finds this would adversely impact the intended transparency of
remote identification information and the effectiveness of this rule.
The public availability of the unmanned aircraft location as well as
all the other message elements allows persons to associate each element
of the unmanned aircraft and control station with a unique identifier.
The FAA notes that the broadcast range of remote identification
information will have a finite limit based on signal strength
limitations for unlicensed devices.
    The FAA agrees with the comments that supported the inclusion of
this message element and found the sharing of the unmanned aircraft
location is similar to how airlines and other pilots share their
aircraft locations publicly through ADS-B Out broadcasts. The FAA
further agrees with these commenters that the accountability, safety,
and security benefits exceed the suggested privacy impacts.
    The FAA does not agree with the commenters who suggested that
inclusion of this message element would hinder their ability to fly
unmanned aircraft indoors or in specific outdoor environments due to
lack of GPS coverage. The FAA expects that there will be a variety of
ways for industry to implement the requirement to indicate the unmanned
aircraft's latitude and longitude under different environmental
conditions, including when a position source such as GPS, is
unavailable. For example, when position information is not available, a
means of compliance may specify that the remote identification
equipment broadcast all zeros for the indication of latitude and
longitude to show that the position is unknown. This would allow an
unmanned aircraft to take off even when position information is
unavailable. These design options will be described in each FAA-
accepted means of compliance. Because of this flexibility, the FAA does
not consider that this message element will negatively impact
operations indoors. In addition, for unmanned aircraft intended to
routinely operate in areas where there is no GPS coverage, operators
may choose to use an unmanned aircraft that relies on a position source
other than GPS. The FAA declines to include a requirement where the
unmanned aircraft only broadcasts the message element of latitude and
longitude when the

position source is ``available.'' The location of the unmanned aircraft
is an essential element of remote identification, and the FAA considers
that the addition of this language would add unnecessary design
complexity and uncertainty over whether the unmanned aircraft was
required to broadcast the position information. However, as noted
previously, the FAA would consider means of compliance that include a
standardized message for when that position source is unavailable.
    The applicability of this rule does not extend to unmanned aircraft
manufactured solely for indoor use. Further, the FAA adopts this
requirement using a performance-based approach that allows industry to
use technologies best suited for the intended environment. Location
estimation can be done using GPS in combination with cellular and other
signals to work in a greater number of urban and even indoor
environments. Smart device manufacturers commonly employ these
techniques. The FAA thus finds that the inclusion of this message
element will not significantly hinder the ability for people to conduct
operations in areas with poor GPS coverage.
5. An Indication of the Unmanned Aircraft's Altitude
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed to require standard remote identification UAS
indicate the unmanned aircraft's barometric pressure altitude
referenced to standard sea level pressure of 29.92 inches of mercury or
1013.2 hectopascals. The purpose of this information would be to
establish a standard altitude reference for UAS operating in the
airspace of the United States. It can also be used to provide
situational awareness to other aircraft, both manned and unmanned,
operating nearby. As with control station altitude, the FAA requested
comments on whether to require barometric pressure or geometric
altitude.
    After considering comments and engaging in further analysis, the
FAA adopts the requirement that standard remote identification unmanned
aircraft include an indication of the unmanned aircraft's altitude as a
required message element. As with the message element indicating
control station altitude, the FAA replaces the requirement to indicate
barometric pressure altitude with geometric altitude. This change is
made for the same reasons explained in the discussion of control
station altitude message elements, above.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: Commenters provided many of the same comments for
unmanned aircraft altitude as they did for control station altitude,
including support for barometric, geometric, either barometric or
geometric, both barometric and geometric, and neither. Airbus UTM
agreed with the use of barometric rather than geometric altitude,
because barometry is how altitude is typically defined in the airspace
of the United States today, and the control station, Remote ID USS, or
other service provider will be able to make adjustments based on
locally reported barometric pressure to make more accurate comparisons
to manned aircraft. One other commenter suggested that barometric
altitude is more appropriate than geometric altitude, which may
encounter difficulties with coverage and multipath errors in urban
areas or areas with rising terrain or other obstacles.
    Several commenters, including AirMap, suggested that geometric or
GPS altitude be required instead of barometric pressure altitude.
Commenters suggested that barometric pressure altitude should not be
required or should be optional. The Small UAV Coalition and Streamline
Designs suggested that FAA should not require unmanned aircraft
barometric pressure altitude because most unmanned aircraft use
geometric altitude almost exclusively, and many unmanned aircraft do
not have barometric pressure altitude capability so compliance will be
difficult and costly. ANRA Technologies noted that many unmanned
aircraft use geometric altitude as their primary reference and
suggested that should be the requirement, with barometric pressure
altitude as an optional element. Because remote identification is not
being used to ensure aircraft separation, Amazon Prime Air commented
that permitting geometric altitude for standard remote identification
UAS would not negatively impact safety or accountability, and would
improve compliance by leveraging current designs in smart phones and
other equipment with GPS receivers.
    The Virginia Tech Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership recommended
using geometric altitude instead of barometric pressure altitude due to
errors in static pressure systems, complexity of adding those to the
unmanned aircraft, and lack of critical need when remote identification
is not intended for navigation or deconfliction. Another commenter
asked the FAA not to require new sensors that would add more weight or
require more power for the UAS, such as barometric sensors or a
coordinated universal time clock, when similar information is already
provided on UAS that have navigation and telemetry information.
    Airlines for America and AiRXOS recommended requiring both the
barometric and the geometric altitude to provide redundancy and better
ensure safe separation of unmanned and manned aircraft; one commenter
noted that manned aircraft use both barometric and geometric altitude,
so these elements should be transmitted if the unmanned aircraft is
capable. Wingcopter recommended using barometric altitude as the main
information source but also using geometric altitude for comparison and
error detection, especially to provide a higher level of safety for
higher risk operations.
    A commenter from the Johns Hopkins University noted that ground
users, such as law enforcement, will need remote identification
altitude information presented in a different format because they may
not be experienced with barometric pressure altitudes. They recommended
the FAA require transmission of both barometric and geometric altitude
as well as a containment value and probability of exceedance, which
could be met by fusing altitude and position data from multiple
sources.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees with the commenters that supported
using geometric altitude instead of barometric pressure altitude for
the unmanned aircraft. The FAA believes that an indication of the
unmanned aircraft geometric altitude provides sufficient information to
meet the safety and accountability goals of remote identification.
Further, the FAA agrees that barometric altimetry equipment is less
prevalent than GPS-based geometric altimetry in UAS and could add
unnecessary complexity both in integration as well as operation. To
align with the change from barometric pressure altitude to geometric
altitude for the control station altitude message element, the FAA
adopts a requirement to indicate the geometric altitude of the unmanned
aircraft rather than the barometric pressure altitude.
    The FAA declines to require both geometric and barometric altitude
reporting because geometric altitude alone meets the safety and
security needs for this rule. While both forms of altitude reporting
would add a layer of redundancy, the additional cost and complexity is
not warranted for the core intended functions of remote identification
information.

    The FAA agrees with a performance-based requirement that is
technology agnostic. The FAA envisions that industry could meet the
altitude requirement by using a variety of technologies and signals
including GPS and cellular, and still report geometric altitude using a
common reference frame.
    The FAA acknowledges that users of remote identification
information such as law enforcement may not be experienced with
different types of altitude reporting. The FAA envisions that
standardized software would be available to these users to display the
data in an easy to understand format that suits their unique needs. The
FAA also finds that the requirements are sufficient to ensure
standardized reporting by UAS in a manner that is processed by software
to support display applications.
6. Time Mark
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed to require a time mark identifying the Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC) time of applicability of a position source output.
A position source output is the latitude and longitude coordinates of
the unmanned aircraft or control station, as applicable. The time of
applicability is a record of the UTC time when the unmanned aircraft or
control station was at a particular set of coordinates. The FAA adopts
this requirement as proposed.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: No commenters objected to the FAA proposal to require a
time mark as a remote identification message element. The Small UAV
Coalition agreed with the requirement for a time mark. Digital Aerolus
noted that internal UAS systems will gradually lose synchronization
when location services are not available, and recommended updating the
requirements to reflect this possibility by adding ``when location
services are available'' or similar language. Unifly recommended
permitting external ``add-on'' equipment such as a remote
identification module that provides remote identification, GNSS, and
time information.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees that synchronization may be a problem
when location services are not available but finds that this situation
would not be a limiting factor to the generation of remote
identification messages because the message also includes location
information. The FAA adopts the requirement as proposed.
7. An Indication of the Emergency Status of the UAS
i. Discussion of the Final Rule
    The FAA proposed to require standard remote identification UAS to
include a message element that specifies a code indicating the
emergency status, which could include lost-link, downed aircraft, or
other abnormal status of the UAS. The FAA adopts this requirement as
proposed.
    The FAA anticipates that an industry standard for remote
identification would specify the different emergency codes applicable
to unmanned aircraft affected by this rule. This message element could
be initiated manually by the person manipulating the flight controls of
the UAS or automatically by the UAS, depending on the nature of the
emergency and the UAS capabilities. The purpose of this message element
would alert others that the UAS is experiencing an emergency condition
and would indicate the type of emergency.
    The FAA expects that this message element may provide an indication
of UAS that are lost-link, are in a low battery or low fuel state, or
are in other off-nominal or failure modes that might result in
unexpected behaviors that other airspace users or people in the
vicinity would benefit from knowing. The FAA anticipates that the
emergency status indication would be used by display applications
available to pilots and the general public to indicate when a UAS is
experiencing an off-nominal event, such as lost-link, that may not be
clear by visual observation alone.
    The FAA envisions that industry, through consensus standards
bodies, will develop and incorporate specific implementations of the
message element into a means of compliance that balances utility,
safety, and privacy.
ii. Public Comments and FAA Response
    Comments: One commenter supported sharing the emergency status of
the UAS as proposed. Another commented recommended removing this
requirement, questioning its utility. Other commenters requested that
the requirement be explained in greater detail and specificity. Wing
Aviation suggested UAS not be required to transmit non-critical, off-
nominal conditions that do not affect compliance or security, and
recommended amending the requirement to ``critical emergency status.''
Theia recommended that the emergency status of a downed UAS should not
be shared with the public because of the safety and security risks.
    FAA Response: The FAA acknowledges the request for greater
specificity regarding what types of off-nominal situations should be
included in the emergency status indication, but the FAA believes that
the UAS industry is in the best position to determine this criteria,
and any specificity provided by the FAA at this time may not provide
flexibility for future changes as UAS technology evolves. As such, the
FAA adopts the requirement as proposed without requiring any specific
implementation.
8. Velocity
    In the NPRM, the FAA asked for public comments on whether standard
remote identification UAS should broadcast other message elements. A
number of commenters recommended requiring speed or velocity as
required message elements.
    After reviewing these comments and further consideration, the FAA
decided to require velocity as an additional message element for
standard remote identification unmanned aircraft. By adding an
indication of the unmanned aircraft's velocity, the remote
identification message set will better align with existing remote
identification standards, such as ASTM F3411-19 and international
implementations, as well as provide a complete description of an
unmanned aircraft's state to the FAA, law enforcement, and the public.
The FAA envisions that the velocity message element would be a three-
dimensional vector that conveys horizontal and vertical speed, as well
as the direction of movement of the aircraft. The FAA notes that the
velocity message element, when used to display unmanned aircraft flight
information, includes both speed and direction information. The FAA is
not prescribing specific requirements for UAS velocity, and expects
this message element to be incorporated into a means of compliance
which will be reviewed and evaluated as a part of the acceptance
process.
9. Other Message Elements
    As stated above, in the NPRM, the FAA asked for public comments on
whether standard remote identification UAS should broadcast other
message elements. As described below, the FAA received a number of
comments on different message elements that could be included. After
review and careful consideration, the FAA determined that, except for
velocity (described above), the FAA would not adopt requirements for
additional message elements.
    Comments: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab supported
the concept of a common message structure

and recommended this be further applied to Remote ID USS as well, to
ensure that UAS are not compatible with only one Remote ID USS. One
commenter agreed that message elements other than those proposed did
not yield enough benefit to necessitate recording and transmitting.
Wing Aviation recommended that required message elements be aligned to
the ASTM F3411-19 Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking to
reflect established industry consensus, specifically mentioning
barometric altitude and emergency status.
    A few commenters suggested requiring message elements to note if
the remote pilot is part 107 certified, if the UAS is properly
registered, and to add the LAANC approval code or COA identification.
UPS Flight Forward suggested adding the direction of flight and mode of
flight (manual, automated, autonomous) to the required message
elements. The Stadium Managers Association also recommended adding
message element(s) to help future-proof remote identification in the
event of a UAS operating automatically or autonomously miles away from
the control station, such as mode of flight, flight path, and intended
destination. The Utah Department of Transportation recommended
requiring speed, UAS attitude (pitch, roll, and yaw), and power status
as a message element. The Air Line Pilots Association International,
the Consumer Technology Association, the Port of Long Beach, and the
Small UAV Coalition recommended requiring message elements reporting
current velocity, direction, and route, such as magnetic course and
ground speed, with the Small UAV Coalition noting that this would be
consistent with remote identification proposals in the European Union.
A few commenters suggested adding message elements for horizontal and