[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 220 (Thursday, November 16, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 53403-53411]
[FR Doc No: 2017-24803]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 35

[Docket No. RM16-5-001; Order No. 831-A]

Offer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Order on rehearing and clarification.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is granting in part
and denying in part requests for rehearing and clarification of its
determinations in Order No. 831, which amended its regulations to
address incremental energy offer caps in markets operated by regional
transmission organizations and independent system operators.

DATES: This rule is effective January 16, 2018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Emma Nicholson (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected]
Pamela Quinlan (Technical Information), Office of Energy Market
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected]
Anne Marie Hirschberger (Legal Information), Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20426,<PHONE_NUMBER>, [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                            Table of Contents

                                                         Paragraph Nos.

I. Introduction......................................                  1
II. Discussion.......................................                  5
    A. Offer Cap Structure...........................                  5
        1. Hard Cap Level............................                  6
        2. Implementation of the Hard Cap............                 13
    B. Verification Requirement......................                 18
        1. Expected Costs............................                 19
        2. Verification of Imports...................                 30
    C. Costs Included in Cost-Based Incremental                       34
     Energy Offers...................................
        1. Requests for Rehearing/Clarification......                 34
        2. Determination.............................                 37
III. Information Collection Statement................                 41
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification.........                 44
V. Document Availability.............................                 45
VI. Effective Date...................................                 48

I. Introduction

    1. On November 17, 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) issued Order No. 831.\1\ Order No. 831 addresses the
incremental energy offer component of a resource's supply offer, which
is a financial component consisting of costs that vary with a
resource's output or level of demand reduction. Incremental energy
offers are one of the components used to calculate locational marginal
prices (LMPs). California Independent System Operator Corporation
(CAISO), ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE), Midcontinent Independent System
Operator, Inc. (MISO), New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
(NYISO), and Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) currently have a $1,000/
MWh cap on incremental energy offers (offer cap), and PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) currently has an offer cap of $2,000/MWh
on cost-based offers.\2\
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    \1\ Offer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 FR 87,770 (Dec.
5, 2016), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 (2016) (Order No. 831).
    \2\ Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at PP 11-13.
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    2. In Order No. 831, the Commission amended its regulations to
require that each regional transmission organization and independent
system operator (RTO/ISO): (1) Cap each resource's incremental energy
offer at the higher of $1,000/MWh or that resource's verified cost-
based incremental energy offer; and (2) cap verified cost-based
incremental energy offers at $2,000/MWh when calculating LMPs (hard
cap).\3\ Resources with verified cost-based incremental energy offers
above $2,000/MWh will be eligible to receive uplift.\4\ In response to
comments on the Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking,\5\ the Commission clarified that each RTO/ISO or Market
Monitoring Unit must verify that any incremental energy offer above
$1,000/MWh reasonably reflects the associated resource's actual or
expected costs, as opposed to only the resource's actual costs, prior
to using that offer to calculate LMP.\6\
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    \3\ Id. P 1.
    \4\ Id. P 78.
    \5\ Offer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 FR 5951 (Feb. 4,
2016), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,714, at PP 3 (2016) (NOPR).
    \6\ Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 139.
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    3. With respect to treatment of cost-based incremental energy
offers above $2,000/MWh, the Commission stated that it expects RTOs/
ISOs to use such offers to determine merit-order dispatch, and it cited
PJM as an example of an RTO/ISO that uses cost-based incremental energy
offers above $2,000/MWh to determine merit-order dispatch, but limits
cost-based incremental energy offers to $2,000/MWh for purposes of
calculating LMP.\7\ The Commission found that imports should be
permitted to offer above $1,000/MWh, but will not be subject to
verification.\8\ Finally, while Order No. 831 did not require RTOs/ISOs
to include an adder above cost in cost-based incremental energy offers
above $1,000/MWh, the Commission stated that if an RTO/ISO chooses to
retain existing rules that allow for an adder above cost or proposes
any new adders above cost, such adders may not exceed $100/MWh.\9\
However, in Order No. 831, the Commission did not require RTOs/ISOs to
change the costs they currently include in cost-based incremental
energy offers, and it did not address whether verifiable opportunity
costs are subject to the $100/MWh limit on adders.
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    \7\ Id. P 90.
    \8\ Id. P 192.
    \9\ Id. P 207.
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    4. On December 19, 2016, the Commission received four requests for
rehearing and/or clarification of Order No. 831 which raise issues
related to the structure of the offer cap, the verification
requirement, and the costs included in cost-based incremental energy
offers. TAPS filed a request for rehearing and clarification. NYISO
filed a request for clarification and, alternatively, request for
rehearing. AMP/APPA filed a request for rehearing. Exelon filed a
motion for clarification and request for rehearing.\10\ For the reasons
discussed below, we grant in part and deny in part the requests for
rehearing and clarification.
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    \10\ The Independent Market Monitor for PJM (PJM Market Monitor)
filed an answer to Exelon's motion for clarification and request for
rehearing. MISO filed comments in support of NYISO's request for
clarification and, alternatively, request for rehearing. Rule
713(d)(1) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure
prohibits answers to requests for rehearing. 18 CFR 385.713(d)(2)
(2017). We therefore reject the answer of the PJM Market Monitor. We
will treat MISO's comments as an answer and as a result reject them.
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II. Discussion

A. Offer Cap Structure

    5. The requests for rehearing and clarification regarding the offer
cap structure focus on the level of the hard cap and the implementation
of the hard cap.
1. Hard Cap Level
a. Request for Rehearing
    6. TAPS seeks rehearing and argues both that the $2,000/MWh hard
cap level established by the Commission is not supported by substantial
evidence, and that the $1,724/MWh offer cited in Order No. 831 was not
a legitimate cost-based incremental energy offer.\11\ Rather, TAPS
states, the $1,724/MWh offer was the estimated cost of a resource
calculated according to PJM's Cost Development Guidelines, but the
actual cost of that resource was less than $1,500/MWh. TAPS argues
that, given the large discrepancy between estimated and actual costs,
it was inappropriate for the Commission to rely on an estimated $1,724/
MWh offer as the basis for the $2,000/MWh hard cap level. TAPS asserts
that, even if it was appropriate for the Commission to rely upon
estimated costs, the Commission should not have used the $1,724/MWh
level, since it was estimated using a methodology that is not compliant
with Order No. 831. TAPS contends that the Commission should instead
set the hard cap level at $1,500/MWh or, alternatively, at $1,800/MWh
if the Commission determines that there was a legitimate cost-based
incremental energy offer of $1,724/MWh.\12\ TAPS also argues that the
Commission failed to meaningfully address the analytical evidence TAPS
presented in its comments supporting a $1,500/MWh hard cap.\13\
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    \11\ TAPS Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 2 (citing Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Canadian
Ass'n of Petroleum Producers v. FERC, 254 F.3d 289 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(Canadian Ass'n of Petroleum Producers)).
    \12\ Id. at 5-11.
    \13\ Id. at 10 (citing Canadian Ass'n of Petroleum Producers,
254 F.3d at 299 (an agency's ``failure to respond meaningfully'' to
objections raised by a party renders its decision arbitrary and
capricious)).
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b. Determination
    7. We deny TAPS' request for rehearing of the $2,000/MWh level of
the hard cap. In Order No. 831, the Commission determined that a hard
cap was necessary to limit any adverse impact on LMPs due to imperfect
information about a resource's short-run marginal costs that might
arise during the verification process.\14\ The Commission also
recognized that a hard cap that is too low might suppress LMPs below
the marginal cost of production.\15\ In determining the $2,000/MWh
level of the hard cap, the Commission therefore struck a balance
between competing goals: (1) Limiting any adverse impacts on LMPs due
to imperfect information during the verification process and (2)
reducing the likelihood of suppressing LMPs below the marginal cost of
production.
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    \14\ Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 87.
    \15\ Id. P 91.
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    8. The overall offer cap structure set forth in Order No. 831 and
the overall market structure of RTOs/ISOs in which the offers arise
affected the balance struck by the Commission in setting the level of
the hard cap. The hard cap does not stand alone, meaning that it is not
the only way of ensuring that an offer does not reflect the exercise of
market power and that the price resulting from an incremental energy
offer is just and reasonable. In balancing the competing goals, the
Commission effectively recognized that the hard cap serves as a
backstop to the mitigation established through both the cost-based
requirement and the verification process--the other elements of the
offer cap structure. The cost-based offer requirement serves a
``mitigation function'' \16\ by requiring incremental energy offers
above $1,000/MWh be cost-based. The verification requirement also
addresses market power concerns.\17\ The hard cap ``limit[s] the
adverse impact that any imperfect information about resources' short-
run marginal costs during the verification process could have on
LMPs.'' \18\ The Commission factored in these two other elements of the
offer-cap structure in balancing the competing goals to set the level
of the hard cap.
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    \16\ Id. P 83.
    \17\ Id. P 139.
    \18\ Id. P 87.
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    9. In setting that level, the Commission also considered the
overall market structure of RTOs/ISOs--a structure designed to ensure
that markets are competitive and not subject to the exercise of market
power, through for instance, existing market power mitigation
processes.\19\ The hard cap

also serves as backstop to those existing market mitigation
processes.\20\
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    \19\ Cf. id. PP 85-90. Additionally, all six RTOs/ISOs have
market power mitigation rules designed to prevent market
participants from exercising market power. See, e.g., California
Independent System Operator Corporation, eTariff, 39; ISO New
England Inc., Markets and Services Tariff, Market Rule 1, Appendix
A; Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., FERC Electric
Tariff, Module D; New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Market
Administration and Control Area Services Tariff, Attachment H; PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., Intra-PJM Tariffs, OATT, Tariff Operating
Agreement, Attachment M; and Southwest Power Pool, Inc., OATT, Sixth
Revised Volume No. 1, Attachment AF.
    \20\ Cf. id. P 89.
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    10. Based on the record, the Commission set the level of the hard
cap to $2,000/MWh. The Commission determined that $2,000/MWh was the
level that short-run marginal costs would rarely exceed.\21\ The cost-
based incremental energy offer of $1,724/MWh referenced in Order No.
831, and which TAPS questions, regardless of the methodology by which
it was derived, was only one point of reference for the Commission
within the context of the broader record. Specifically, the Commission
also examined the evidence in the record regarding high natural gas
prices that occurred during the Polar Vortex when some resources
experienced short-run marginal costs above $1,000/MWh.\22\
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    \21\ See id. n.200 (citing Envtl. Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d
1057, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (``it is within the scope of the
agency's expertise to make such a prediction about the market it
regulates, and a reasonable prediction deserves our deference
notwithstanding that there might also be another reasonable
view.''). See also Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FERC, 883 F.2d 117,
124 (1989) (``It is also quite clear FERC may make predictions--
``[m]aking . . . predictions is clearly within the Commission's
expertise'' and will be upheld if ``rationally based on record
evidence.'') (citing East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 863
F.2d 932, 938-39 (1988) (citing Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC,
824 F.2d 981, 1008 (1987)))).
    \22\ Id. P 92.
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    11. The alternative $1,500/MWh and $1,800/MWh hard cap levels that
TAPS proposed would result in a balance different than the one chosen
by the Commission. Lower hard cap levels such as these would increase
the likelihood of suppressing prices below the marginal cost of
production and would thereby run contrary to the Commission's price
formation efforts to ensure that LMPs reflect the short-run marginal
cost of the marginal resource. We therefore reject TAPS' request for
rehearing and the alternative hard cap levels proposed. As stated
above, we continue to find that the $2,000/MWh hard cap reasonably
balances reducing the likelihood of suppressing LMPs while limiting any
adverse impact on LMPs from imperfect information about resources'
short-run marginal costs during the verification process.
    12. Further, we reject TAPS' argument that the Commission failed to
meaningfully address its $1,500/MWh alternative proposal. The
Commission addressed this alternative in adopting the $2,000/MWh hard
cap.\23\ In any event, in a rulemaking, the Commission need not respond
to every comment or analyze every alternative. Rather, the Commission
must respond to ``comments which, if true. . .would require a change in
an agency's proposed rule.'' \24\ The Commission's determination
regarding the $2,000/MWh hard cap is not invalidated merely because
there may be a reasonable alternative.\25\
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    \23\ Id.
    \24\ American Min. Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1187-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (American Min. Congress) (citing Thompson v. Clark, 741
F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Thompson); ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d
1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir.1987) (ACLU)).
    \25\ See United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1169-70
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (United Distribution Cos.) (``FERC correctly
counters that the fact that AEPCO may have proposed a reasonable
alternative . . . is not compelling. The existence of a second
reasonable course of action does not invalidate an agency's
determination.'').
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2. Implementation of the Hard Cap
a. Requests for Rehearing/Clarification
    13. NYISO seeks clarification that Order No. 831 does not require
that incremental energy offers above $2,000/MWh be used to determine
merit-order dispatch in all RTOs/ISOs, and, in the alternative, seeks
rehearing on this issue.\26\ NYISO states that, to the extent the
Commission intended to establish a requirement, the Commission did not
seek comment on the requirement in the NOPR, did not demonstrate that
the requirement must be imposed on all RTOs/ISOs in order to ensure
just and reasonable rates, and did not consider the burdens the
requirement would impose on NYISO.\27\
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    \26\ See Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 90
(``With respect to the treatment of cost-based incremental energy
offers above $2,000/MWh, we expect RTOs/ISOs to use such offers to
determine merit-order dispatch. We note that the Commission allowed
this approach when accepting PJM's current offer cap structure. . .
.'' '').
    \27\ NYISO Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 5, 11-13.
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    14. NYISO asserts that such a requirement would introduce foreign
market design elements into NYISO that were developed by PJM to be
compatible with its own pricing method, market rules, and software.\28\
Specifically, NYISO explains that PJM's design accommodates
discrepancies between schedules and price, using a secondary ex post
process to determine LMPs that is separate from the process for
determining resource schedules. However, NYISO states that it uses a
common ex ante process to determine both locational based marginal
prices (LBMPs) and resource schedules. NYISO asserts that, because its
process utilizes the same offers for scheduling and pricing, it would
be challenging to allow resources to be committed and scheduled based
on validated incremental energy offers above $2,000/MWh, but then cap
the offers for purposes of calculating LBMPs and ancillary services
prices. According to NYISO, this would require resource-intensive and
potentially costly software changes, make validation of prices and
schedules more complex, and require NYISO to redirect resources from
other efforts that are more certain to benefit consumers and markets.
Additionally, NYISO contends that implementing an offer cap that only
limits the offer prices used to determine LBMPs can lead to a
divergence between resource schedules and prices that can harm market
participants.\29\
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    \28\ NYISO also maintains that RTOs/ISOs do not need to have
identical software or market rules, and that the practical ability
to implement software changes justifies accommodating regional
circumstances. Id. at 6 (citing N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 142
FERC ] 61,202, at PP 24-26 (2013); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.,
133 FERC ] 61,246, at P 25 (2010)).
    \29\ Id. at 7-11.
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    15. In addition, NYISO requests clarification that RTOs/ISOs are
permitted to apply the same offer cap to both incremental energy and
minimum generation offers,\30\ and in the alternative seeks rehearing
on this issue. Currently, NYISO's tariff applies a $1,000/MWh offer cap
to all day-ahead and real-time energy offers, including minimum
generation offers. NYISO argues that applying different offer caps to
incremental energy offers and minimum generation offers could
incentivize suppliers to artificially shape their offers to conform to
the different offer caps rather than offer in a manner that accurately
reflects a resource's costs, which would result in less optimal
commitment, dispatch, and pricing. Furthermore, NYISO states that if
minimum generation offer caps are lower than incremental energy offer
caps, generators may not offer to supply energy if they do not expect
to be able to recoup their costs.\31\ NYISO also states that the
Commission previously granted waiver of the $1,000/MWh offer cap on
both incremental energy offers and minimum generation offers in

response to spikes in natural gas costs caused by the Polar Vortex.\32\
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    \30\ In NYISO, the first block in a resource's incremental
energy offer is called a ``minimum generation bid'' and includes the
costs a resource incurs to operate at its economic minimum operating
level. NYISO, Manual 11--Day-Ahead Scheduling Manual, Sec. 4.3.3.
(October 2016) http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/documents/Manuals_and_Guides/Manuals/Operations/dayahd_schd_mnl.pdf.
    \31\ NYISO Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 13-15.
    \32\ Id. at 13 (citing N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 146 FERC
] 61,061, at PP 2-4, 20 (2014)).
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b. Determination
    16. Regarding NYISO's concerns on economic merit-order dispatch, we
clarify that Order No. 831 did not require cost-based incremental
energy offers above $2,000/MWh to be used to determine economic merit-
order dispatch. We recognize that some RTO's/ISO's existing commitment,
dispatch, and pricing algorithms are structured differently, and the
Commission in Order No. 831 did not require RTOs/ISOs to change their
current practices or software to use cost-based incremental energy
offers above $2,000/MWh for determining economic merit-order dispatch.
However, in the event that RTOs/ISOs must select from several offers
above $2,000/MWh, we encourage RTOs/ISOs to make those selections on a
least-cost basis when possible, in order to minimize the cost to serve
load.
    17. We also clarify that application of the offer cap and
verification requirement adopted in Order No. 831 to minimum generation
offers, as NYISO requests, is appropriate. Applying different offer
caps to minimum generation and incremental energy offers could give
resources the incentive to shape their offers in a manner that does not
reflect their costs.\33\ Furthermore, this application is consistent
with prior Commission orders regarding NYISO's offer cap discussed
above.\34\
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    \33\ See id. at 14.
    \34\ See supra P 15.
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B. Verification Requirement

    18. The requests for rehearing regarding the verification
requirement focus on the use of expected costs in the verification
requirement and whether to subject imports to the verification
requirement.
1. Expected Costs
    19. The requests for rehearing regarding expected costs include the
definition of expected costs and whether they should be included in the
regulatory text as well as market power concerns related to the use of
expected costs in the verification process.
a. Definition and Regulatory Text
i. Requests for Rehearing
    20. AMP/APPA seek rehearing of Order No. 831, arguing that the
Commission was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to provide a
reasonable justification for allowing sellers' expected costs to set
LMP, and that the Commission also unjustifiably expanded the definition
of cost-based offers to include ``expected'' costs. According to AMP/
APPA, in order for LMPs to send accurate signals regarding the actual
cost of producing energy, LMPs should be based on actual costs. AMP/
APPA argue that, since some commenters stated that pre-verification of
actual costs would not be possible, the Commission should have
concluded that offers above $1,000/MWh should not set LMP, and instead,
required such costs to be recovered via uplift.\35\
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    \35\ AMP/APPA Request for Rehearing at 9-13 (citing Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n); United Distrib. Cos., 88 F.3d
at 1169).
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    21. Exelon requests rehearing of the fact that the regulatory text
does not include the ``actual or expected'' phrase when it describes
the costs to be verified. Exelon argues that the current regulatory
text fails to adequately capture the Commission's intent described in
the preamble, specifically that costs may be either actual or expected.
Exelon asserts that, in order to avoid confusion and also satisfy due
process and regulatory notice requirements, the Commission should amend
the regulatory text to specify that the verified costs can be ``actual
or expected.'' \36\
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    \36\ Exelon Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 6-8 (citing
U.S. v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Upton v.
SEC, 75 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1996); General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d
1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
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ii. Determination
    22. We disagree with AMP/APPA's argument that the use of expected
costs in the verification process to set LMPs was arbitrary and
capricious, and thus deny its request for rehearing. The record
demonstrates that certain natural gas resources do not know their
actual short-run marginal costs at the time they submit their
incremental energy offers, and thus it is just and reasonable, and
consistent with current practice, for such resources to offer based on
their expected costs.\37\ Given this record, the Commission
appropriately responded to the many comments filed by clarifying in
Order No. 831 that market participants could offer based on expected
costs. In circumstances when actual costs are not known, a resource
offer based on expected short-run marginal cost constitutes a
competitive offer. Further, contrary to AMP/APPA's assertion, in Order
No. 831 the Commission did not expand the definition of the specific
types of short-run marginal costs that a resource could include in its
cost-based incremental energy offer above $1,000/MWh, but rather, the
Commission stated that it expected that the RTO/ISO would build on its
existing mitigation processes for calculating or updating cost-based
incremental energy offers. Further, in Order No. 831, the Commission
required an RTO/ISO to explain in its compliance filing what factors it
will consider in the verification process for cost-based incremental
energy offers above $1,000/MWh and whether such factors are currently
considered in existing market power mitigation provisions. Thus, the
Commission was not arbitrary and capricious because its decision to
permit verified expected costs above $1,000/MWh to set LMP is
consistent with current RTO/ISO practices that allow cost-based
incremental energy offers to be based on expected, rather than actual
costs, as demonstrated in the record.\38\
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    \37\ See Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at PP 104-
108.
    \38\ See id. PP 106-107.
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    23. We grant Exelon's request to amend the regulatory text by
adding the words ``actual or expected'' as suggested by Exelon. We
agree that these revisions will provide more certainty to market
participants and more clearly state the Commission's intention that
both actual and expected costs over $1,000/MWh may be submitted for
verification.
b. Market Power Concerns
i. Requests for Rehearing
    24. AMP/APPA seek rehearing contending that Order No. 831 is
arbitrary and capricious because it fails to address market power
concerns that may arise if resources exaggerate expected costs included
in cost-based incremental energy offers above $1,000/MWh.\39\ According
to AMP/APPA, there are strong incentives for an owner of a fleet of
resources, for example, to inflate expected costs of one resource
during a constrained period in order to increase earnings for all of
its resources. AMP/APPA further argue that there is an opportunity to
inflate costs because natural gas prices are higher during constrained
periods, and this is also when the price of natural gas is less
transparent because the price paid by a market seller for gas on the
bilateral market is farthest away from index prices.\40\
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    \39\ AMP/APPA Request for Rehearing at 13-16 (citing Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43).
    \40\ Id. at 13-15 (citing Joint Comments of PJM and SPP, Docket
No. RM16-5-000, at 10-11 (filed Apr. 4, 2016); Comments of ISO-NE
Market Monitor, Docket No. RM16-5-000, at 7 (filed Apr. 4, 2016)).
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    25. AMP/APPA further assert that Order No. 831 failed to address
whether

allowing offers above $1,000/MWh to set LMP could lead to market power
concerns in the natural gas market.\41\ In support of this position,
AMP/APPA reference the PJM Market Monitor's comments in the Order No.
831 proceeding stating that removing the offer cap entirely could
exacerbate market power in the natural gas markets and also impact
electricity markets.\42\ AMP/APPA further note that the Internal Market
Monitor for ISO-NE (ISO-NE Market Monitor) stated that, in ISO-NE.,
raising the offer cap could expose the energy markets to uncompetitive
conditions in the natural gas markets.\43\ AMP/APPA therefore propose
that offers above $1,000/MWh should be based upon actual costs in order
to be used to set LMP, since the use of expected costs can exacerbate
market power concerns, but offers above $1,000/MWh based on expected
costs should be recovered via uplift.\44\
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    \41\ Id. at 15-16.
    \42\ Id. at 15 (citing PJM Market Monitor, Comments, Docket No.
RM16-5-000, at 4 (filed Apr. 4, 2016)).
    \43\ Id. (citing ISO-NE Market Monitor, Comments, Docket No.
RM16-5-000, at 3 (filed Apr. 4, 2016)).
    \44\ Id. at 17.
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    26. AMP/APPA seek rehearing of Order No. 831, arguing that the
Commission's use of expected costs in setting LMP was arbitrary and
capricious, and that the Commission did not explain its departure from
relevant precedent.\45\ Specifically, AMP/APPA argue that allowing
expected costs to be used to verify cost-based incremental energy
offers above $1,000/MWh contravenes the Federal Power Act (FPA) and is
inconsistent with precedent requiring certain safeguards when granting
market-based rates. AMP/APPA maintain that the Commission's authority
under the FPA to grant market-based rate authority has been upheld in
court because the Commission periodically conducts ex ante examinations
of a public utility's market power as well as enforceable ex post
reporting.\46\ According to AMP/APPA, however, Order No. 831 never
requires RTOs/ISOs or Market Monitors to ensure that the market-
clearing LMPs resulting from a seller's offer exceeding $1,000/MWh are
actually cost-based. AMP/APPA assert that permitting verification based
on expected costs does not meet the ex post reporting requirement that
would allow the Commission to determine whether these expected costs
and resulting market-clearing prices are just and reasonable. AMP/APPA
therefore conclude that Order No. 831 is unlawful because the
Commission cannot rely on market forces to regulate rates in lieu of
imposing reporting requirements on generators.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Id. at 8 (citing PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665
F.3d 203, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S.
at 43; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)).
    \46\ Id. at 5 (citing California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383
F.3d 1006, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2004)).
    \47\ Id. at 6-8 (citing Blumenthal v. FERC, 552 F.3d 875, 882-83
(D.C. Cir. 2009); FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 399 (1974)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Determination
    27. We deny AMP/APPA's request for rehearing and alternative
proposal regarding market power concerns and the use of expected costs.
We disagree with AMP/APPA that incremental energy offers above $1,000/
MWh based on expected costs present market power concerns; the
verification requirement in Order No. 831 was specifically designed to
address market power concerns and ensure that all incremental energy
offers above $1,000/MWh are indeed cost-based. Pursuant to the
verification requirement, resources may only submit incremental energy
offers above $1,000/MWh if they are cost-based, and the RTO/ISO or
Market Monitoring Unit must verify that any such offer reasonably
reflects that resource's actual or expected short-run marginal costs.
Incremental energy offers above $1,000/MWh may not be used to calculate
LMPs if such offers cannot be verified by the RTO/ISO or Market
Monitoring Unit prior to the market clearing process. In Order No. 831,
the Commission specifically found that ``the verification requirement
reasonably addresses market power concerns associated with incremental
energy offers above $1,000/MWh because such offers will be required to
be cost-based, which should deter attempts by resources to exercise
market power.'' \48\ The verification requirement in Order No. 831 is
therefore designed to prevent the concerns AMP/APPA raise about
resources including ``inflated'' or ``exaggerated'' expected costs in
cost-based incremental energy offers above $1,000/MWh.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 144.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. We reject as unsupported AMP/APPA's claim that the Final Rule
did not address concerns about market power in the natural gas market.
The excerpts from the PJM Market Monitor's and ISO-NE Market Monitor's
comments that AMP/APPA included in its request for rehearing expressed
general concern about removing a hard cap in energy markets given
potential concerns about market power in natural gas markets. However,
Order No. 831 did not remove a hard cap in energy markets--it adopted a
$2,000/MWh hard cap. As discussed above, we balanced several
considerations in adopting a $2,000/MWh but the fact that a hard cap
continues to remain in place addresses the comments AMP/APPA cites, to
the extent there is market power in the natural gas markets.
Additionally, the excerpt from the ISO-NE Market Monitor's comments
cited by AMP/APPA discusses the relationship between natural gas
markets and energy markets and expresses general concerns about limited
transparency into the competitive conditions in natural gas spot
markets. Again, the $2,000/MWh hard cap addresses this concern as it
recognizes that the verification process required by Order No. 831 may
be less effective during extreme conditions in the natural gas
market.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See id. P 87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. We deny AMP/APPA's request for rehearing regarding market-based
rates because Order No. 831 does not depart from Commission precedent,
and the Commission's action was not arbitrary and capricious. Contrary
to AMP/APPA's claims, a market participant with market-based rate
authority that submits a cost-based incremental offer above $1,000/MWh
for a resource would continue to be subject to the existing reporting
and other requirements that are imposed on entities with market-based
rate authority,\50\ consistent with the precedent cited by AMP/APPA.
Further, contrary to AMP/APPA's assertions, the verification process
specifically requires that the RTO/ISO or Market Monitoring Unit ensure
that incremental energy offers are in fact cost-based, meaning that the
offer must reasonably reflect that resource's actual or expected short-
run marginal costs.\51\

As discussed above, the record demonstrates that it is appropriate to
use expected costs in the verification of cost-based incremental energy
offers because when actual costs are not known, a resource offer based
on expected short-run marginal cost constitutes a competitive
offer.\52\ In Order No. 831, the Commission stated that ``[a] cost-
based incremental energy offer is based on the associated resource's
short-run marginal cost, which constitutes a competitive offer free
from the exercise of market power.'' \53\ Therefore, the use of
expected costs in the verification process does in fact allow the
Commission to determine whether the resulting market clearing prices
would be just and reasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ For example, entities with market-based rate authority must
file Electric Quarterly Reports with the Commission, consistent with
Order Nos. 2001 and 768. Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements,
Order No. 2001, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,127, reh'g denied, Order
No. 2001-A, 100 FERC ] 61,074, reh'g denied, Order No. 2001-B, 100
FERC ] 61,342, order directing filing, Order No. 2001-C, 101 FERC ]
61,314 (2002), order directing filing, Order No. 2001-D, 102 FERC ]
61,334, order refining filing requirements, Order No. 2001-E, 105
FERC ] 61,352 (2003), order on clarification, Order No. 2001-F, 106
FERC ] 61,060 (2004), order revising filing requirements, Order No.
2001-G, 120 FERC ] 61,270, order on reh'g and clarification, Order
No. 2001-H, 121 FERC ] 61,289 (2007), order revising filing
requirements, Order No. 2001-I, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,282 (2008);
Elec. Mkt. Transparency Provisions of Section 220 of the Fed. Power
Act, Order No. 768, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,336 (2012), order on
reh'g, Order No. 768-A, 143 FERC ] 61,054 (2013). They must also
timely report to the Commission any change in status that would
reflect a departure from the characteristics the Commission relied
upon in granting their market-based rate authority. 18 CFR 35.42
(2017).
    \51\ See Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 140
(``[A]n RTO/ISO or a Market Monitoring Unit must verify that cost-
based incremental energy offers above $1,000/MWh reasonably reflect
a resource's actual or expected costs.'').
    \52\ See supra P 22.
    \53\ Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Verification of Imports
a. Request for Rehearing
    30. TAPS seeks rehearing of Order No. 831's exemption of all
imports from the verification requirement for incremental energy offers
above $1,000/MWh and asserts that it is unjust and unreasonable and
arbitrary, and that it puts internal and external resources on unequal
footing.\54\ According to TAPS, the Commission's finding that some
imports are not resource-specific and therefore cannot have their costs
verified does not support exempting all imports from the verification
requirement. Therefore, TAPS proposes that only resource-specific
imports whose costs are verified by the receiving RTO/ISO should be
able to set LMP, while other imports with offers above $1,000/MWh that
are not verified should receive uplift payments if their costs are
verified after-the-fact. TAPS further argues that failing to verify the
costs of imports presents a greater opportunity and incentive for
generators to exercise market power. TAPS presents a hypothetical
example of a market participant that owns generators both inside and
outside of an RTO/ISO and asserts that such a market participant could
use its external generators to make import offers above $1,000/MWh that
its internal generators would not be permitted to make. TAPS states
that, if the market participant's external resource sets the LMP in the
RTO/ISO (i.e., as an import), all of that market participant's internal
resources would receive infra-marginal rents. According to TAPS, such
behavior would be difficult to monitor because Order No. 831 does not
require cost information from external resources. TAPS therefore argues
that, on rehearing, the Commission should prevent import offers above
$1,000/MWh from setting LMP in the importing RTO/ISO unless the import
offer costs are verified in advance, and that the Commission should
only permit uplift payments to imports that have been cost-verified
after-the-fact.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ TAPS Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 12-15.
    \55\ Id. at 12-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Determination
    31. We deny TAPS' request for rehearing regarding the treatment of
imports. In Order No. 831, the Commission found that exempting
incremental energy offers from imports above $1,000/MWh from the
verification requirement was justified because imports are not
similarly situated to internal resources.\56\ Because they are not
similarly situated, it was not arbitrary or capricious to treat import
offers from external resources differently than offers from internal
resources. Specifically, the Commission found that internal resources
and imports are not similarly situated because, based on the
record,\57\ it may be impossible to identify the costs underlying an
import offer because they are not resource-specific. Further, Order No.
831 remains consistent with current market power mitigation measures in
RTOs/ISOs that generally apply to internal resources but not to
imports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 195.
    \57\ See, e.g., id. PP 180, 183, 185.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. With respect to TAPS' proposed alternative which would prevent
import offers above $1,000/MWh from setting LMP if the costs cannot be
verified, we reject it because, as supported in the record,\58\ we
continue to find that such a prohibition could discourage imports at
times when they are most needed to provide additional supply and
increased competition.\59\ Further, as the Commission explained in
Order No. 831, such a prohibition could also result in uneconomic flows
between RTOs/ISOs.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See, e.g., id. PP 179, 181, 188-189.
    \59\ Id. P 193.
    \60\ Id. P 194.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. In Order No. 831, the Commission also considered market power
concerns similar to those raised by TAPS in its rehearing request, but
did not find that they warranted requiring cost-verification for import
offers above $1,000/MWh. The Commission explained that because ``market
participants can import energy from adjacent markets and sell that
energy in the RTO/ISO energy market . . . it is difficult for external
resources in an adjacent market to withhold.'' \61\ The hypothetical
example TAPS presents in its request for rehearing does not persuade us
otherwise. First, and as the Commission explained in Order No. 831, it
is unlikely that a resource-specific import transaction can
successfully withhold energy from the destination market because any
resource-specific import transaction is also competing against an
import transaction that simply buys from the export market at the
prevailing export market price. Second, the import offer in that
example would only benefit a market participant that owns a fleet of
internal and external generation (which is online and being compensated
at the LMP in TAPS' hypothetical example) if the import offer actually
cleared the importing RTO/ISO's energy market. However, such an import
offer would only clear this market at a price above $1,000/MWh if it
were below the verified cost-based incremental energy offers of other
internal resources and below other import offers. Thus, such an import
would be beneficial to the importing RTO/ISO market as it would lower
the clearing price compared to a situation without it. Therefore, TAPS'
example demonstrates that imports can lower an importing RTO/ISO's LMP,
which supports the Commission's rationale for allowing import offers
above $1,000/MWh to set LMP.\62\ For these additional reasons, we find
that the regulations regarding the treatment of imports in Order No.
831 are just and reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious and reject
TAPS' proposal to prevent import offers above $1,000/MWh from setting
LMP in the importing RTO/ISO unless the import offer's costs have been
verified. For similar reasons, we deny TAPS' proposal regarding uplift
payments to imports. Finally, we note that in Order No. 831, the
Commission stated it would consider RTO/ISO proposals under FPA section
205 to verify or otherwise review the costs of imports or exports and/
or develop additional mitigation provisions for import and export
transactions with offers above $1,000/MWh.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Id. P 196.
    \62\ Order No. 831 does not apply to emergency purchases, such
as emergency import purchases. See id. P 198.
    \63\ Id. P 197.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Costs Included in Cost-Based Incremental Energy Offers

1. Requests for Rehearing/Clarification
    34. Exelon requests clarification, and alternatively rehearing,
that the Commission did not intend to exclude any particular categories
of variable costs, particularly those not tied to the price of the
commodity associated with the resource's fuel supply. Exelon asserts
that a resource's cost-based incremental energy offer is comprised not
only of those costs linked to the price of fuel, but also of other
variable costs, including but not limited to balancing costs and
transportation costs. Exelon states that if the Commission does not
grant its requested clarification, then it seeks rehearing on the basis
that exclusion of other variable costs from cost-based incremental
energy offers would lead to an unjust and unreasonable result.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Exelon Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 4-6, 7-8
(citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43; NorAm Gas
Transmission Co. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1158, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1998); PPL
Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. TAPS requests clarification, and alternatively rehearing,
regarding whether opportunity costs may be recovered in addition to the
$100/MWh adder.\65\ TAPS asserts that in Order No. 831, the Commission
did not respond to the arguments it raised in response to the NOPR, did
not explicitly state whether the $100/MWh adder includes opportunity
costs, and did not state whether RTOs/ISOs can allow opportunity costs
when developing their verification methodologies. TAPS asks the
Commission to clarify that if an RTO/ISO allows adders, the maximum
total amount of such adders, including both opportunity costs and any
other difficult-to-quantify costs, cannot exceed $100/MWh. TAPS asserts
that, if the Commission intended to permit RTOs/ISOs to propose
verification methodologies that allow for the recovery of opportunity
costs in addition to the $100/MWh adder, the Commission should grant
rehearing because opportunity costs should not be allowed under the
``extreme'' price levels at issue in this proceeding.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ TAPS Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 2 (citing
Canadian Ass'n of Petroleum Producers, 254 F.3d 289).
    \66\ Id. at 16-18 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 126 FERC
] 61,145, at P 28 n.34 (2009) (``The opportunity cost associated
with providing `must run' output is the value associated with the
lost opportunity to produce energy during a higher valued time
period within the year.'')).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. NYISO requests that the Commission clarify that, when
calculating uplift payments for the recovery of verified costs, only
actual, documented out-of-pocket costs should be paid after-the-fact
and that no risk-related adders or opportunity costs be allowed when
cost information is not submitted in a sufficiently timely manner to
permit review and verification. NYISO states that it is concerned that
the submission of legitimate, verifiable costs that exceed the $1,000/
MWh offer cap close in time to the day-ahead or real-time market close
could deny NYISO sufficient time to perform cost verification. NYISO
states that this could cause the resource's offer to be mitigated to a
level that does not include the unverified, additional costs and could
cause the resource to be committed when it would not have otherwise
been or receive a larger schedule than it otherwise would have. NYISO
asserts that its requested clarification would ensure all resources
have an incentive to submit timely information to the RTO/ISO.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ NYISO Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Determination
    37. We deny Exelon's request for clarification, and alternatively
rehearing, regarding whether the verification requirement intended to
exclude particular categories of actual or expected costs, particularly
variable costs that are non-fuel related costs. In Order No. 831, the
Commission neither required RTOs/ISOs to change the methodologies they
currently use to develop cost-based offers in order to satisfy the
verification requirement nor prescribed the specific types of short-run
marginal costs that could be included in cost-based incremental energy
offers above $1,000/MWh. We do not prejudge what types of costs RTOs/
ISOs may propose as part of their compliance filings.
    38. We deny TAPS' request for clarification, and alternatively
rehearing, regarding whether the $100/MWh limit on adders applies to
opportunity costs. Opportunity costs are legitimate short-run marginal
costs and not adders above cost. Cost-based incremental energy offers
based on opportunity costs may currently set LMP in many RTOs/ISOs.
Given that, in Order No. 831, the Commission did not require RTOs/ISOs
to change the specific costs that they permit resources to include in
cost-based incremental energy offers, resources in RTOs/ISOs that
permit the use of opportunity costs in this manner may continue to do
so after implementing Order No. 831. Because opportunity costs should
be considered part of a cost-based incremental energy offer, whether or
not the offer exceeds $1,000/MWh, verifiable opportunity costs should
not be subject to the $100/MWh limit on adders above cost. We do not
prejudge the validity of including verifiable opportunity costs in
cost-based incremental offers above $1,000/MWh or the verification
methods of such costs that RTOs/ISOs may propose as part of their
compliance filings. We also reject TAPS' argument that the Commission
failed to meaningfully address its arguments stating that opportunity
costs should not be permitted at the ``extreme'' prices contemplated in
this rulemaking.\68\ As stated above, in a rulemaking, the Commission
need not respond to every comment or analyze every alternative.\69\ As
explained here, opportunity costs are legitimate short-run marginal
costs that should be considered part of a cost-based incremental energy
offer, regardless of whether that offer exceeds $1,000/MWh. Some
current RTO/ISO practices permit cost-based incremental energy offers
based on opportunity costs to set LMP, and the Commission in Order No.
831 did not require RTOs/ISOs to change which costs they may include in
cost-based incremental energy offers. Therefore, TAPS' comments would
not have resulted in a change in the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ TAPS Request for Clarification/Rehearing at 17-18.
    \69\ See supra P 12 (citing American Min. Congress, 907 F.2d at
1187-88; (citing Thompson, 741 F.2d at 408; ACLU, 823 F.2d at
1581)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    39. We grant NYISO's request for clarification regarding the
calculation of uplift payments. Resources are only eligible to receive
uplift payments to make them whole to, at most, their submitted cost-
based incremental energy offers if the associated offer and cost
information is submitted in a sufficiently timely manner and verified
by the RTO/ISO, meaning offers and supporting information must be
provided consistent with RTO/ISO offer submission guidelines and
approved by the RTO/ISO or Market Monitoring Unit. Consistent with
Order No. 831, the after-the-fact uplift payment that a resource would
be eligible to receive if its cost-based incremental energy offer above
$1,000/MWh is not verified prior to market clearing shall include only
actual verifiable costs. We agree with NYISO that opportunity costs,
like other costs, must be submitted in a timely manner. However, we
clarify that if a resource avails itself of an RTO's/ISO's current
rules to allow a resource to include opportunity costs in its cost-
based incremental energy offer, then that RTO/ISO must give that
resource an

opportunity to recover those opportunity costs through an uplift
payment, subject to verification. We further clarify that a resource
may not receive uplift payments for incremental energy costs in excess
of the costs included in its verified incremental energy offer. That
is, a resource may not submit a cost-based incremental energy offer
based on expected costs prior to the market clearing process and
subsequently receive uplift payments to make it whole to an offer above
the $/MWh level(s) of its offer(s).\70\ In this instance, allowing a
resource to receive uplift in excess of its verified cost-based
incremental energy offer could give that resource the incentive to
submit offers that do not reflect its actual short-run marginal costs
and could thus result in inefficient resource selection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ For example, a resource may not submit a $2,300/MWh offer
based on expected short-run marginal cost that is verified and
clears the market and receive uplift associated with incremental
energy costs above $2,300/MWh, even if that resource's actual short-
run marginal cost, based on an after-the-fact review, is $2,500/MWh.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    40. Further, such after-the-fact uplift payments may not include
any adders above cost, including risk related adders, because actual
costs are known after-the-fact.\71\ This finding is consistent with
Commission precedent regarding PJM's requests for waivers of certain
tariff provisions related to its offer cap.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,387 at P 146.
    \72\ In the 2015 PJM offer cap order, the Commission found that
``the 10 percent adder [above costs] is unjust and unreasonable as
applied to ex post review of documented costs, because the cost
[sic] are no longer uncertain.'' See PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 153
FERC ] 61,289, at P 31 (2015). See also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,
149 FERC ] 61,059, at P 13 (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Information Collection Statement

    41. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) \73\ requires each federal
agency to seek and obtain Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
approval before undertaking a collection of information directed to ten
or more persons or contained in a rule of general applicability. OMB's
regulations,\74\ in turn, require approval of certain information
collection requirements imposed by agency rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520.
    \74\ 5 CFR 1320 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. The Commission is amending its regulations to clarify what the
Commission already required in Order No. 831--that either actual or
expected costs included in incremental energy offers above $1,000/MWh
may be submitted for verification. The Commission estimates that there
will be no net change to burden.
    43. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, Office
of the Executive Director, email: [email protected], phone: (202)
502-8663, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>]. Comments concerning the requirements of
this rule may also be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission].
For security reasons, comments should be sent by email to OMB at
[email protected]. Comments submitted to OMB should refer to
FERC-516C and OMB Control Number 1902-0287.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    44. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \75\ generally
requires a description and analysis of rules that will have significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The RFA does
not mandate any particular outcome in a rulemaking. It only requires
consideration of alternatives that are less burdensome to small
entities and an agency explanation of why alternatives were rejected.
The Commission has determined that there will not be a significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities, therefore these
requirements under the RFA do not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Document Availability

    45. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A, Washington DC
20426.
    46. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
    47. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web
site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202-502-
6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].

VI. Effective Date

    48. These regulations are effective January 16, 2018.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35

    Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Non-discriminatory open
access transmission tariffs.

    By the Commission.

    Issued: November 9, 2017.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.

Regulatory Text

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends part 35,
chapter I, title 18, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 35--FILING OF RATE SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS

0
1. The authority citation for part 35 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  16 U.S.C. 791a-825r, 2601-2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42
U.S.C. 7101-7352.

0
2. Revise Sec.  35.28(g)(9) to read as follows:

Sec.  35.28   Non-discriminatory open access transmission tariff.

* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (9) A resource's incremental energy offer must be capped at the
higher of $1,000/MWh or that resource's cost-based incremental energy
offer. For the purpose of calculating Locational Marginal Prices,
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators
must cap cost-based incremental energy offers at $2,000/MWh. The actual
or expected costs underlying a resource's cost-based incremental energy
offer above $1,000/MWh must be verified before that offer can be used
for purposes of calculating Locational Marginal Prices. If a resource
submits an incremental energy offer above $1,000/MWh and the actual or
expected costs underlying that offer cannot be verified before the
market clearing process begins, that offer may not be used to calculate
Locational Marginal Prices and the resource would be eligible for a
make-whole payment if that resource is dispatched and the

resource's actual costs are verified after-the-fact. A resource would
also be eligible for a make-whole payment if it is dispatched and its
verified cost-based incremental energy offer exceeds $2,000/MWh. All
resources, regardless of type, are eligible to submit cost-based
incremental energy offers in excess of $1,000/MWh.

[FR Doc. 2017-24803 Filed 11-15-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 153 (Tuesday, August 9, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 48840]
[FR Doc No: 2011-20155]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

 [Project Nos. 14136-000; 14139-000]

Lock+\TM\ Hydro Friends Fund XXXV Riverbank Hydro No. 4, LLC;
Notice of Competing Preliminary Permit Applications Accepted for Filing
and Soliciting Comments, Motions To Intervene, and Competing
Applications

    On April 1, 2011, Lock+\TM\ Hydro Friends Fund XXXV (Hydro Friends)
and Riverbank Hydro No. 4, LLC (Riverbank Hydro) filed preliminary
permit applications, pursuant to section 4(f) of the Federal Power Act,
proposing to study the feasibility of a hydropower project at the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) Lock and Dam No. 5, located on the
Mississippi River near Minnesota City, Minnesota, in Winona County,
Minnesota, and Buffalo County, Wisconsin. The sole purpose of a
preliminary permit, if issued, is to grant the permit holder priority
to file a license application during the permit term. A preliminary
permit does not authorize the permit holder to perform any land-
disturbing activities or otherwise enter upon lands or waters owned by
others without the owners' express permission.
    Hydro Friends' proposed Project Oscar Project No. 14136-000 would
consist of: (1) A 109-foot-wide, 40-foot-high lock frame module placed
in a new gate constructed in the downstream portion of an inactive,
incomplete auxiliary lock of the Lock and Dam No. 5; (2) a 109-foot-
wide, 40-foot-high lock frame module placed east of the movable section
of the Lock and Dam No. 5 in an existing levee of the east abutment;
(3) a new switchyard and control room located on the eastern side of
the dam; and (4) a new 3-mile-long, 115-kilovolt transmission line
extending from the switchyard to a nearby distribution line which would
feed the project power to the grid. Each lock frame module would
consist of ten 7-foot-diameter hydropower turbines each rated at 650
kilowatts (kW) based on a design head of 9 feet with a total rated
capacity per module of 6.5 megawatts (MW) resulting in a total project
installed capacity of 13 MW. Each module would be equipped with fish/
debris screens located upstream of each module and control door
assemblies that can open and close off flow to the units when needed.
The project's average annual generation would be 79,770 megawatt-hours
(MWh), and the project would operate run-of-release.
    Applicant Contact: Mr. Wayne F. Krouse, Managing Partner, Lock+\TM\
Hydro Friends Fund XXXV, 5090 Richmond Avenue 390, Houston, TX
77056, phone<PHONE_NUMBER>, extension 709.
    Riverbank Hydro's Mississippi 5 Hydroelectric Project No. 14139-000
would consist of: (1) A forebay and intake structure equipped with a
trashrack constructed upstream of the powerhouse on the east section of
the dam in the existing levee of the east abutment; (2) a reinforced
concrete powerhouse containing five turbine-generators each with a
rating of 4,000 kW for a total project installed capacity of 20 MW; (3)
a tailrace directing river flows back into the Mississippi River; and
(4) a 13.1-mile-long, 69-kV transmission line feeding the project power
to an existing transmission line. The intake, powerhouse, and tailrace
dimensions would be determined during the permit period. The project's
average annual generation would be 87,000 MWh at a head range of 5.0 to
9.5 feet, and the project would operate run-of-release.
    Applicant Contact: Kuo-Bao Tong, Riverbank Power Corporation, Royal
Bank Plaza, South Tower, P.O. Box 166, 200 Bay Street, Suite 3230,
Toronto, ON, Canada M5J 2J4, phone<PHONE_NUMBER>, extension 154.
    FERC Contact: Sergiu Serban<EMAIL_ADDRESS>(202) 502-
6211.
    Deadline for filing comments, motions to intervene, competing
applications (without notices of intent), or notices of intent to file
competing applications: 60 days from the issuance of this notice.
Competing applications and notices of intent must meet the requirements
of 18 CFR 4.36. Comments, motions to intervene, notices of intent, and
competing applications may be filed electronically via the Internet.
See 18 CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's
Web site http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp. Commenters can
submit brief comments up to 6,000 characters, without prior
registration, using the eComment system at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/ecomment.asp. You must include your name and contact information
at the end of your comments. For assistance, please contact FERC Online
Support. Although the Commission strongly encourages electronic filing,
documents may also be paper-filed. To paper-file, mail an original and
seven copies to: Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    More information about each project, including a copy of the
applications, can be viewed or printed on the ``eLibrary'' link of the
Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp.
Enter the docket number (P-14136-000, or P-14139-000) in the docket
number field to access the document. For assistance, contact FERC
Online Support.

    Dated: August 3, 2011.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-20155 Filed 8-8-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 53 (Tuesday, March 19, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16903-16905]
[FR Doc No: 2013-06250]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-69130; File No. SR-C2-2013-012]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change
To Amend the Fees Schedule

March 13, 2013.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that on March 1, 2013, C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated (the
``Exchange'' or ``C2'') filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described
in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the
Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments
on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.

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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend its Fees Schedule. The text of the
proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's Web site (http://www.c2exchange.com/Legal/), at the Exchange's Office of the Secretary,
and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to amend its transaction fees for simple,
non-complex orders in equity options classes to state that C2 Market-
Makers will not be assessed a fee for Maker trades with any non-Public
Customer market participants. This means that when a C2 Market-Maker is
the Maker in a transaction, the C2 Market-Maker will not be assessed a
fee unless the Taker in the transaction is a Public Customer. The
purpose of the proposed change is to incentivize C2 Market-Makers to
quote more aggressively.
    The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to the
Exchange and, in particular, the requirements of Section 6(b) of the
Act.\3\ Specifically, the Exchange believes the proposed rule change is
consistent with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,\4\ which requires that
Exchange rules provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues,
fees, and other charges among its Trading Permit Holders and other
persons using its facilities. The Exchange believes that proposed
change is reasonable because it will allow C2 Market-Makers to avoid
paying a transaction fee for transactions for which they previously
paid a transaction fee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange believes that providing this Maker fee exemption to C2
Market-Makers and not to other market participants is equitable and not
unfairly discriminatory because C2 Market-Makers take on a number of
obligations, including quoting obligations and the need to purchase
permits, that some other market participants do not have. Further,
offering a fee exemption for C2 Market-Makers (and only C2 Market-Maker
Makers), who are the market participants that do the vast majority of
quoting, incentivizes more and narrower quoting, thereby encouraging
liquidity provision, which is vital to the marketplace and benefits all
market participants. The Exchange believes that assessing Maker fees
for C2 Market-Makers who trade with Public Customers while not
assessing Maker fees for C2 Market-Makers who trade with other market
participants is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because the
Exchange already pays a rebate for Public Customer Taker transactions,
and thus if the Exchange were to also not collect a fee from the C2
Market-Maker in such transactions, it would result in the Exchange
paying for such transactions without collecting any revenue (a net
negative), which would not be economically prudent. Further, market
participants (including C2 Market-Makers) generally prefer to execute
their orders against Public Customer orders, and therefore it is
justifiable for them to be still be assessed a fee for such preferable
executions.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    C2 does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any
burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The Exchange does not believe
that the proposed rule change will impose an unnecessary burden on
intramarket competition because, while it will provide C2 Market-Makers
with a fee exemption that other market participants do not receive,
this change is intended to incentivize C2 Market-Makers, who are the
market participants that do the vast majority of quoting, to provide
more and narrower quoting, thereby encouraging liquidity provision,
which is vital to the marketplace and benefits all market participants.
Further, C2 Market-Makers take on a number of obligations, including
quoting obligations and the need to purchase permits, that some other
market participants do not have. The Exchange does not believe that the
proposed rule change will impose an unnecessary burden on intermarket
competition because it is designed to encourage more and narrower
quoting, which would make C2 a more attractive trading venue for
Market-Makers as well as other market participants on other exchanges
who could benefit from C2's improved quotes. As such, to the extent
that the proposed change may make C2 a more attractive trading venue
for market participants on other exchanges, such market participants
can always elect to become C2 market participants.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    The Exchange neither solicited nor received comments on the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A) of the Act \5\ and paragraph (f) of Rule 19b-4 \6\
thereunder. At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed
rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission will institute proceedings to
determine whether the proposed rule change should be approved or
disapproved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \6\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please include
File Number SR-C2-2013-012 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary,

Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC
20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-C2-2013-012. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-C2-2013-012 and should be
submitted on or before April 9, 2013.
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    \7\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\7\
Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-06250 Filed 3-18-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 136 (Thursday, July 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 42036-42037]
[FR Doc No: 2015-17460]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket No. USCG-2011-0228]
RIN 1625-AA00

Safety Zone, Brandon Road Lock and Dam to Lake Michigan including
Des Plaines River, Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, Chicago River, and
Calumet-Saganashkee Channel, Chicago, IL; Between Mile Markers 296.1
and 296.7

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of enforcement of regulation.

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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce a segment of the Safety Zone;
Brandon Road Lock and Dam to Lake Michigan including Des Plaines River,
Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, Chicago River, Calumet-Saganashkee
Channel on all waters of the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal between
Mile Marker 296.1 to Mile Marker 296.7 at specified times from August
3, 2015, through September 18, 2015. This action is necessary to
protect the waterway, waterway users, and vessels from the hazards
associated with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's trial tests on the
water for the Asian Carp studies.
    During the enforcement periods listed below, entry into,
transiting, mooring, laying-up or anchoring within the enforced area of
this safety zone by any person or vessel is prohibited unless
authorized by the Captain of the Port Lake Michigan or her designated
representative.

DATES: The regulations in 33 CFR 165.930 will be enforced
intermittently from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Monday

through Friday, from August 3, 2015, through August 14, 2015. In the
event of a postponement of the trial tests due to inclement weather or
other unforeseen circumstances, this zone will be enforced
intermittently from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Monday through Friday from
August 24, 2015, through September 18, 2015, excluding September 7,
2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this
document, call or email LT Lindsay Cook, Waterways Department, Coast
Guard Marine Safety Unit Chicago, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, email address
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Coast Guard will enforce a segment of
the Safety Zone; Brandon Road Lock and Dam to Lake Michigan including
Des Plaines River, Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, Chicago River,
Calumet-Saganashkee Channel, Chicago, IL, listed in 33 CFR 165.930.
Specifically, the Coast Guard will enforce this safety zone on all
waters of the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal between Mile Marker 296.1
to Mile Marker 296.7. Enforcement will occur intermittently from 8 a.m.
to 6 p.m. on Monday through Friday, from August 3, 2015, through August
14, 2015. In the event of a postponement of the trial tests due to
inclement weather or other unforeseen circumstances, this zone will be
enforced intermittently from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on August 17, 2015,
through September 18, 2015, excluding September 7, 2015.
    This enforcement action is necessary because the Captain of the
Port Lake Michigan has determined that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service's trial tests on the water for Asian Carp studies pose risks to
life and property. Because of these risks, it is necessary to control
vessel movement during the operations to prevent injury and property
loss.
    In accordance with the general regulations in Sec.  165.23 of this
part, entry into, transiting, mooring, laying up, or anchoring within
the enforced area of this safety zone by any person or vessel is
prohibited unless authorized by the Captain of the Port Lake Michigan
or her designated representative.
    Vessels that wish to transit through the safety zone may request
permission from the Captain of the Port Lake Michigan. Requests must be
made in advance and approved by the Captain of the Port before transits
will be authorized. Approvals will be granted on a case by case basis.
The Captain of the Port representative may be contacted via U.S. Coast
Guard Sector Lake Michigan on VHF channel 16.
    This document is issued under authority of 33 CFR 165.930 and 5
U.S.C. 552(a). In addition to this publication in the Federal Register,
the Captain of the Port Lake Michigan will also provide notice through
other means, which may include Broadcast Notice to Mariners, Local
Notice to Mariners, local news media, distribution in leaflet form, and
on-scene oral notice. Additionally, the Captain of the Port Lake
Michigan may notify representatives from the maritime industry through
telephonic and email notifications.

    Dated: June 30, 2015.
A.B. Cocanour,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port, Lake Michigan.
[FR Doc. 2015-17460 Filed 7-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


[Federal Register: August 7, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 153)]
[Notices]
[Page 46001]
[DOCID:fr07au08-52]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 2482-078]

Erie Boulevard Hydropower, L.P.; Notice of Availability of
Environmental Assessment

July 30, 2008.
    An environmental assessment (EA) is available for public review.
The EA was prepared for an application filed by Erie Boulevard
Hydropower, L.P on April 21, 2008, requesting the Commission's
authorization to permit the Saratoga County Water Authority (SCWA) to
withdraw water at a rate of 14 million gallons per day from the Sherman
Island reservoir for municipal use.
    The EA evaluates the environmental impacts that would result from
permitting the SCWA to withdraw water from the Sherman Island
reservoir. The proposal would include the construction of a screened
intake facility placed on the bottom of the reservoir and a section of
buried pipe that would extend to a pumping station located outside the
project boundary. The EA finds that approval of the application would
not constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.
    A copy of the EA is attached to a Commission order titled ``Order
Approving Non-Project Use of Lands and Waters'', issued July 30, 2008
and is available for review at the Commission in the Public Reference
Room, or it may be viewed on the Commission's Web site at http://
www.ferc.gov using the eLibrary link. Enter the docket number ``P-
2482'' in the docket field to access the document. For assistance, call
toll-free 1-(866)-208-3372 or<PHONE_NUMBER> (for TTY).

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E8-18059 Filed 8-6-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 75 (Thursday, April 18, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 23246]
[FR Doc No: 2013-09159]

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-9804-4]

Meeting of the Environmental Financial Advisory Board; Public
Notice

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice of a public meeting.

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SUMMARY: The United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
Environmental Financial Advisory Board (EFAB) will hold a public
meeting on May 15-16, 2013. EFAB is an EPA advisory committee chartered
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to provide advice and
recommendations to EPA on creative approaches to funding environmental
programs, projects, and activities.
    The purpose of this meeting is to hear from informed speakers on
environmental finance issues, proposed legislation, and EPA priorities;
to discuss activities and progress with regard to current EFAB work
projects; and to consider recent requests for assistance from EPA
offices.
    Environmental finance discussions are expected on the following
topics: clean air technology; tribal environmental programs; transit-
oriented development in sustainable communities, energy efficiency/
green house gas emissions reduction; drinking water pricing and
infrastructure investment; and green infrastructure.
    The meeting is open to the public; however, seating is limited. All
members of the public who wish to attend the meeting must register in
advance, no later than Friday, May 3, 2013.

DATES: The full board meeting will be held on Wednesday, May 15, 2013
from 1:30 p.m. to 5 p.m., Eastern Time and Thursday, May 16, 2013 from
9-5 p.m., Eastern Time.

ADDRESSES: Potomac Yard Two, North Entrance, Room 4120, 2733 Crystal
Drive, Arlington, VA 22202.
    Registration and Information Contact: To register, get additional
information and for information on access or services for individuals
with disabilities, please contact Sandra Williams, U.S. EPA, at (202)
564-4999 or<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Request for accommodations for
individuals with disabilities should be made 10 days prior to the
meeting, to allow processing time of your request.

    Dated: April 12, 2012.
Joseph L. Dillon,
Director, Center for Environmental Finance.
[FR Doc. 2013-09159 Filed 4-17-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P