[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 143 (Friday, July 24, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 44994-45030]
[FR Doc No: 2020-13604]

Vol. 85

Friday,

No. 143

July 24, 2020

Part III

Department of Transportation

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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

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49 CFR Parts 172, 173, 174, et al.

Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 143 / Friday, July 24, 2020 / Rules
and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 172, 173, 174, 179, and 180

[Docket No. PHMSA-2018-0025 (HM-264)]
RIN 2137-AF40

Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: PHMSA, in coordination with the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), is amending the Hazardous Materials Regulations
(HMR) to allow for the bulk transport of ``Methane, refrigerated
liquid,'' commonly known as liquefied natural gas (LNG), in rail tank
cars. This rulemaking authorizes the transportation of LNG by rail in
DOT-113C120W specification rail tank cars with enhanced outer tank
requirements, subject to all applicable requirements and certain
additional operational controls. The enhancements to the outer tank are
indicated by the new specification suffix ``9'' (DOT-113C120W9).

DATES:
    Effective date: This rule is effective August 24, 2020.
    Voluntary compliance date: Voluntary compliance is authorized July
24, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Ciccarone, Standards and
Rulemaking Division,<PHONE_NUMBER>, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, or Mark Maday, Federal Railroad Administration,
(202) 366-2535, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Abbreviations and Terms

AAR Association of American Railroads
APA Administrative Procedure Act
ASNT American Society of Non-destructive Testing
ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials
AWS American Welding Society
BLET Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
BNSF Burlington Northern Santa Fe
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission
CTMV Cargo Tank Motor Vehicle
DOT Department of Transportation
DOT-SP Department of Transportation Special Permit
DP Distributed Power
EA Environmental Assessment
ECP Electronically Controlled Pneumatic
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
E.O. Executive Order
EOT End of Train
ERG Emergency Response Guidebook
ETS Energy Transport Solutions, LLC
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FRSA Federal Railroad Safety Act
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GRL Gross Rail Load
HHFT High-Hazard Flammable Train
HLRW High Level Radioactive Waste
HMEP Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness
HMT Hazardous Materials Table
HMTA Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations
IAFC International Association of Fire Chiefs
IAFF International Association of Fire Fighters
IBR Incorporation by Reference
IFR Interim Final Rule
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MLI Multi-Layer Insulation
NASFM National Association of State Fire Marshals
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NJDEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NYDEC New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
NYDHSES New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Services
NYDOT New York State Department of Transportation
OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
PRD Pressure Relief Device
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
PSR Physicians for Social Responsibility
RSI Railway Supply Institute
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RIN Regulatory Identifier Number
RSI-CTC Railway Supply Institute Committee on Tank Cars
SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel
SI Super Insulation
TTD Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO
The Center The Center for Biological Diversity
TC Transport Canada
TDG Transportation of Dangerous Goods
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
UN United Nations
U.S.C. United States Code
VCE Vapor Cloud Explosion

Table of Contents

I. Overview
II. NPRM and Background
    A. Petition for Rulemaking (P-1697)
    B. Regulatory Review
    C. DOT Special Permit 20534
III. Amendments to the HMR Adopted in This Final Rule
    A. Existing HMR Requirements for Rail Transport of Flammable
Cryogenic Material
    B. The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car
    C. Additional Operational Controls for LNG Transportation
IV. Summary and Discussion of Comments to the Rulemaking Docket
    A. Tank Car Design
    B. Operational Controls
    C. Environmental Impacts
    D. Economic Analysis
    E. Emergency Response
    F. Comments of General Opposition
    G. Comments From the Puyallup Tribe
    H. Comments Beyond the Scope of This Rulemaking
V. Section-by-Section Review
VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
    A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
    B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
    C. Executive Order 13771
    D. Executive Order 13132
    E. Executive Order 13175
    F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Policies and Procedures
    G. Paperwork Reduction Act
    H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
    I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    J. Environmental Assessment
    K. Privacy Act
    L. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
    M. Executive Order 13211
List of Subjects

I. Overview

    In this final rule, PHMSA is authorizing the transportation of LNG
by rail tank car, pursuant to Federal Hazardous Materials
Transportation law (Federal hazmat law; 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.),
because we have determined that bulk rail transport is a safe
alternative for this energy product. The final rule authorizes the
transportation of LNG by rail in DOT-113 tank cars, which have an
established track record of safety in transporting other cryogenic
flammable materials. The DOT-113 tank car authorized for LNG service
will be enhanced with an outer tank that is thicker and made of steel
with a greater puncture resistance to provide an added measure of
safety and crashworthiness. Additionally, there will be operational
controls in the form of enhanced braking requirements, remote

monitoring, and route analysis, which are intended to exceed current
safety requirements for other flammable cryogenic materials.
    PHMSA's mission is to protect people and the environment by
advancing the safe transportation of energy products and other
hazardous materials that are essential to our daily lives. To do this,
the agency establishes national policy, sets and enforces standards,
conducts research to prevent incidents, and prepares the public and
first responders to reduce consequences if an incident does occur.
PHMSA and FRA share responsibility for regulating the transportation of
hazardous materials by rail and take a system-wide, comprehensive
approach that focuses on prevention, mitigation, and response to manage
and reduce the risk posed to people and the environment. In line with
PHMSA's mission and shared responsibility with FRA for oversight of the
rail transport of hazardous materials, PHMSA is issuing this final rule
to authorize the transportation of LNG by rail in DOT-113C120W
specification rail tank cars with enhanced outer tank material and
thickness (those enhancements to be indicated by the specification
suffix ``9''), subject to operational controls for braking, monitoring,
and route analysis.
    This authorization conforms to the intent and purpose of the HMR
(49 CFR parts 171-180), which are designed to ensure the safe
transportation of all hazardous materials packagings (including tank
cars). Collectively, the HMR combine packaging design and maintenance,
operational controls, package handling, employee training, hazard
communication, emergency response information, and security plan
requirements to safeguard transportation. These measures help ensure
that hazardous contents safely remain within a package during the
course of transportation while also providing for public awareness and
appropriate response mechanisms. Supplemental to the HMR, PHMSA
oversees a Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) grant
program that provides funding to the emergency response community for
training and planning purposes, furthering appropriate response
efforts.
    The United States leverages domestic technology improvements to
transform American life through increased natural gas production and
energy independence. As a result, the United States is today the
world's largest natural gas producer through economical production from
shale and other unconventional formations.\1\ Transportation of natural
gas, however, can be constrained by the capacity of existing
transportation infrastructure, which negatively affects regions with
insufficient access to pipelines or ports. This constraint on capacity,
coupled with increased natural gas production in the United States, has
resulted in the consideration of using rail transport to help
efficiently deliver natural gas to domestic U.S. and international
markets.
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    \1\ CRS, ``An Overview of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas:
Resources and Federal Actions,'' 7-5700, Summary, (2015).
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    Authorizing the use of proven DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars
to transport LNG will allow the rail industry to play a role in the
safe, efficient transport of this important energy product for the 21st
century. LNG--referred to as ``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' \2\
within the HMR--has been transported safely by trucks on highways and
by marine vessels for over 40 years in the United States, and over 50
years internationally. However, the HMR did not authorize the bulk
transport of LNG in rail tank cars prior to this rulemaking action,
instead permitting rail transport of LNG only on an ad hoc basis as
authorized by the conditions of a PHMSA special permit (49 CFR 107.105)
or in a portable tank secured to a rail car pursuant to the conditions
of an FRA approval. The recent expansion in U.S. natural gas production
has increased interest in a programmatic approach to using
appropriately the nation's rail infrastructure to facilitate efficient
transportation of LNG. In response to that interest, PHMSA, in
coordination with the FRA, issues this final rule to amend the HMR to
permit the bulk transport of LNG in DOT-113C120W specification rail
tank cars with enhanced outer tank requirements (those enhancements to
be indicated by the specification suffix ``9''), subject to operational
controls for braking, monitoring, and routing.
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    \2\ Use of this description in quotes and with methane
capitalized reflects the proper shipping name as listed in the Sec.
172.101 Hazardous Materials Table.
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    In addition, this final rule satisfies the directive in Executive
Order (E.O.) 13868 [84 FR 15495, April 19, 2019] to propose, consistent
with applicable law, regulations that ``treat LNG the same as other
cryogenic liquids and permit LNG to be transported in approved rail
tank cars.'' \3\ E.O. 13868 recognizes the leading role that the United
States plays in producing natural gas, the importance of improving the
United States' capacity to supply natural gas, including LNG, to
domestic and international markets, and the need to continue to
transport this energy product in a safe and efficient manner. In
issuing this final rule, PHMSA furthers the purposes and policies set
forth in E.O. 13868 by enabling an additional safe, reliable, and
efficient transportation alternative for bringing domestically produced
natural gas to existing, and potentially new, markets.
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    \3\ PHMSA notes that it first announced in the ``Spring 2018
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions'' [83
FR 27085] that it had initiated a ``pre-rule'' action on LNG by
Rail, and subsequently announced that it would proceed with an NPRM
in the ``Fall 2018 Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions'' [83 FR 57803]. While these
actions notified the public of PHMSA's intention to develop propose
a regulatory framework for the safe rail transportation of LNG,
PHMSA had not published a proposed rulemaking by the time the
President issued E.O. 13868 on April 10, 2018.
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    The present action is based on a longstanding understanding of the
properties of LNG and an evidence-based approach to the safety of the
DOT-113 tank cars designed and used to transport flammable cryogenic
materials. At the same time, in promulgating this final rule, and as it
does with other hazardous materials, PHMSA recognizes that there is
ongoing and potential future research related to the transportation of
LNG by all modes. The Agency will continue to use this research to
inform potential future regulatory activity, as appropriate.
    In the following table, PHMSA provides an overview of: (1) The
requirements for LNG transportation in tank cars pursuant to DOT
Special Permit 20534 (DOT-SP 20534),\4\ issued to Energy Transport
Solutions, LLC (ETS) during the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
\5\ comment period to authorize ETS's rail transportation of LNG along
specific routes; (2) the requirements proposed in the October 24, 2019
NPRM; and (3) the requirements adopted in this final rule. Requirements
related to the thermal performance of the DOT-113C120W tank car are
unchanged from the NPRM (75 psig maximum start to discharge pressure;
maximum pressure when offered; and design service temperature). But
this final rule, after consideration of comments received in the docket
and to provide additional operational controls and crashworthiness for
LNG tank cars, adopts supplemental requirements to those initially
proposed in the NPRM: Remote monitoring of pressure and location for
LNG tank cars in

transportation; two-way end-of-train (EOT) or distributed power (DP)
system for trains transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of LNG in a
continuous block, or 35 or more loaded tank cars of LNG throughout the
train; and a requirement that railroads comply with Sec.  172.820 route
planning requirements. In addition, to account properly for the
properties of LNG, this final rule raises the maximal filling density
limit to 37.3% from the proposed 32.5%. Finally, in this final rule
PHMSA is also adopting enhanced outer tank requirements compared with
the requirements that apply to other DOT-113C120W-specification tank
cars, including a thicker 9/16th inch outer tank made from high quality
TC-128B normalized steel. Compliance with these enhanced outer tank
requirements will be indicated by the new specification suffix ``9''
(DOT-113C120W9).
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    \4\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2019-0100-3006.
    \5\ Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail NPRM [84
FR 56964].

                   Table 1--Summary of DOT-SP 20534, NPRM Proposals, and Final Rule Components
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                                                LNG requirements
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                                          DOT special permit
                Topics                          20534                     NPRM                  Final rule
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Approval of LNG......................  Permitted between        Permitted Nationwide...  Permitted Nationwide.
                                        Wyalusing, PA and
                                        Gibbstown, NJ, with no
                                        intermediate stops.
Remote Monitoring....................  Required as a condition  Not Required...........  Required as a Special
                                        of the DOT-SP.                                    Provision for LNG.
Maximum Start to Discharge Pressure..  Not Specified..........  75 psig................  75 psig.
Maximum Pressure when Offered for      15 psig................  15 psig................  15 psig.
 Transportation.
Design Service Temperature...........  Not Specified..........  Minus 260 [deg]F.......  Minus 260 [deg]F.
Maximum Permitted Filling Density      32.5%..................  32.5%..................  37.3%.
 (percent by weight).
When is a two-way end-of-train (EOT)   Required when a train    Not Proposed...........  Required when a train
 or a distributed power (DP) system     is transporting 20 or                             is transporting 20 or
 required.                              more tank cars                                    more loaded tank cars
                                        authorized under this                             of LNG in a continuous
                                        special permit.                                   block or 35 or more
                                                                                loaded tank cars of
                                                                                LNG throughout the
                                                                                train.
Route Controls.......................  Authorized only on one   Not Proposed...........  Must comply with
                                        route.                                            172.820.
Minimum Wall Thickness of the Outer    Shell: \7/16\''........  Shell: \7/16\''........  Shell and Tank Head:
 Tank Shell and the Outer Tank Heads.  Tank Head: \1/2\''.....  Tank Head: \1/2\''.....   Enhanced \9/16\''.
Required Outer Tank Steel Type(s)....  As specified in AAR      As specified in AAR      AAR TC 128, Grade B
                                        Specifications for       Specifications for       normalized steel
                                        Tank Cars, Appendix M.   Tank Cars, Appendix M.   plate.
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II. NPRM and Background

    PHMSA on October 24, 2019, in consultation with the FRA, published
the NPRM proposing to authorize the transport of LNG by rail. PHMSA
issued the NPRM in response to a petition for rulemaking (P-1697) \6\
from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and a review of
existing regulations.
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    \6\ PHMSA-2017-0020-0002.
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    The NPRM proposed a framework for transporting LNG by rail safely
by designating an authorized packaging, and by determining how the
packaging would be filled safely. PHMSA chose the DOT-113C120W
specification tank car packaging designed for flammable cryogenic
material. This packaging has been transporting similar flammable
cryogenic materials for decades with no fatalities or serious injuries.
As for the filling/loading controls, PHMSA proposed a maximum start-to-
discharge pressure of 75 psig, a maximum permitted filling density of
32.5 percent by weight, a maximum pressure when offered for
transportation of 15 psig, and a design service temperature of minus
260 degrees Fahrenheit. The maximum offering pressure of 15 psig
proposed in the NPRM is consistent with the 20-day transportation
requirement for cryogenic materials and the allowable average daily
pressure rise of 3 psig per day during transportation.
    In the NPRM, PHMSA also proposed operational controls consistent
with the existing requirements of the HMR, and invited comment on
whether existing regulations and the operational controls in AAR's
Circular OT-55 entitled ``Recommended Railroad Operating Practices For
Transportation of Hazardous Materials'' \7\ are sufficient. The NPRM
also sought comment on the potential need for additional operating
controls. Beyond the operational controls already included for other
flammable cryogenic materials transported by rail, PHMSA specifically
referenced train length and composition, speed restrictions, braking
requirements, and routing requirements as potential areas of interest
to provide for enhanced operational control requirements. PHMSA also
encouraged commenters to provide data on the safety or economic impacts
associated with any additional operational controls, including analysis
of the safety justification or cost impact of their implementation.
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    \7\ The freight rail industry developed the first edition of OT-
55, which details railroad operating practices for hazardous
materials, in the late 1980s, as part of an inter-industry hazardous
materials rail safety task force that also included the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (now the American Chemistry Council) and
the Railway Progress Institute (now the Railway Supply Institute).
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    PHMSA also received a request from the Offices of the Attorneys
General of New York and Maryland to extend the 60-day comment period
for the NPRM an additional 30 days. PHMSA issued a notice \8\ on
December 23, 2019, extending the comment period until January 13, 2020.
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    \8\ Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail;
Extension of Comment Period [84 FR 70491], https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/23/2019-27656/hazardous-materials-liquefied-natural-gas-by-rail-extension-of-comment-period.

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A. Petition for Rulemaking (P-1697)

1. AAR's Petition for Rulemaking and the NPRM
    On January 17, 2017, AAR submitted a petition for rulemaking to
PHMSA, entitled ``Petition for Rulemaking to Allow Methane,
Refrigerated Liquid to be Transported in Rail Tank Cars'' (P-1697),
requesting revisions to the Hazardous Materials Table (HMT; Sec.
172.101) and Sec.  173.319 of the HMR that would permit the
transportation of LNG by rail in DOT-113 tank cars. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq. requires Federal agencies to
give interested persons the right to petition an agency to issue,
amend, or repeal a rule. 5 U.S.C. 553(e). PHMSA's rulemaking procedures
at Sec.  106.95 allow interested persons to ask PHMSA to add, amend, or
repeal a regulation by filing a petition for rulemaking along with
information and arguments supporting the requested action. In May 2018,
PHMSA accepted P-1697 in accordance with Sec.  106.105 by notifying AAR
that the request merited consideration in a future rulemaking.\9\
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    \9\ PHMSA-2017-0020-0005.
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    In its petition, AAR proposed that PHMSA amend the entry for
``United Nations (UN) 1972, Methane, refrigerated liquid'' in the HMT
to add a reference to Sec.  173.319 in Column (8C) authorizing
transport in rail tank cars. Additionally, AAR proposed that PHMSA
amend Sec.  173.319 to include specific requirements for DOT-113 tank
cars used for the transportation of LNG, and suggest that the
authorized tank car specifications be DOT-113C120W and DOT-
113C140W.\10\ AAR further proposed amending Sec.  173.319(d)(2) to
include maximum filling densities comparable to those specified for
cargo tanks containing LNG in Sec.  173.318(f)(3). AAR argued that
``LNG should be authorized for rail transportation because it is a safe
method of transporting this commodity, LNG shippers have indicated a
desire to use rail to transport it, and because railroads potentially
will need to transport LNG for their own use as a locomotive fuel.''
With respect to shipper demand, AAR contended the following:
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    \10\ The HMR do not authorize the DOT-113C140W specification
tank car for hazardous materials transportation. See section ``III.
A. Tank Car Specification'' of the NPRM for further discussion.

    The only way to transport LNG is by obtaining special approval
from PHMSA for rail transport, or by transporting it via highway;
and that notwithstanding the requirement for a special approval,
customers have expressed interest in shipping LNG by rail from
Pennsylvania to New England, and between the U.S. and Mexico.
Authorizing transportation of LNG by rail likely would stimulate
more interest. In addition, several railroads are actively exploring
LNG as a locomotive fuel. If railroads are to use LNG-powered
locomotives, they would need to supply LNG along their networks.
Transporting LNG in tank cars would be an optimal, if not essential,
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way to transport LNG to those locations.

    Furthermore, with respect to rail as a safe method of
transportation, AAR noted:

    Rail is undeniably safer than over-the-road transportation of
LNG, and transport via that mode should be facilitated. The reason
the hazardous materials regulations do not currently authorize the
transportation of LNG by rail is simply that there was a lack of
demand for rail transport of LNG when PHMSA authorized DOT-113 tank
cars for the transportation of cryogenic liquids and listed the
cryogenic liquids that could be transported in those cars. There was
no determination that rail was an unsuitable mode of transporting
LNG.

    In the NPRM, PHMSA noted that AAR's requested action fits generally
into the existing structure of the HMR, which combines packaging design
and maintenance, operational controls, package handling, employee
training, hazard communication, emergency response information, and
security plan requirements to ensure safe transportation of hazardous
materials. In the NPRM, PHMSA also requested public comment on the
proposals present in AAR's petition, including their potential to
reduce regulatory burdens, enhance domestic energy production, and
impact safety.
2. The Center for Biological Diversity's Response to P-1697
    On May 15, 2017, the Center for Biological Diversity (the Center)
submitted a comment to P-1697, recommending that PHMSA deny AAR's
petition for rulemaking because of potential environmental impacts of
transporting LNG. The Center commented that PHMSA should not proceed in
evaluating the petition request until the Agency has conducted a
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) evaluation, prepared an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or Environmental Assessment (EA),
and provided opportunity for public review and comment in accordance
with Federal hazmat law, as applicable. PHMSA regulations do not
require PHMSA to conduct a NEPA evaluation at the time it responds to a
petition, and PHMSA has not taken such actions historically as part of
its decision whether to accept or deny a petition for rulemaking. As
result, PHMSA did not prepare an EA or EIS prior to responding to P-
1697. This decision was made with the knowledge that PHMSA would be
required to conduct a NEPA analysis as part of a potential rulemaking.
    When PHMSA published the NPRM, it prepared a draft EA, see Section
V. J. ``Environmental Assessment'' of the NPRM. A final EA for the
rulemaking is included in the rulemaking docket as part of the analysis
for the final rule.

B. Regulatory Review

    On October 2, 2017, DOT published a notice \11\ in the Federal
Register expressing Department-wide plans to review existing
regulations and other agency actions to evaluate their continued
necessity, determine whether they are crafted effectively to solve
current problems, and evaluate whether they potentially burden the
development or use of domestically produced energy resources. As part
of this review process, DOT invited the public to provide input on
existing rules and other agency actions that have potential for repeal,
replacement, suspension, or modification.
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    \11\ Notification of Regulatory Review, Docket No. DOT-OST-2017-
0069 [82 FR 45750].
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    The Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials Transportation
(Interested Parties) submitted a comment \12\ supporting the
authorization of LNG for rail tank car transport. Specifically, the
Interested Parties noted in its comment that LNG shares similar
properties to other flammable cryogenic materials currently authorized
by rail tank car and

has already been moved in the United States under a special permit.
Additionally, they noted that Transport Canada authorizes LNG for
transportation by rail in DOT-113-equivalent rail cars and that there
is increased commercial demand for rail transport of LNG within the
United States and between the United States and Mexico.
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    \12\ Comment from Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials
Transportation, Document No. DOT-OST-2017-0069-2591, at: https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2591. The
Interested Parties is a volunteer-run coalition of organizations
that share an interest in legislative and regulatory issues related
to the safe and secure domestic and international transportation of
hazardous materials. Interested Parties members include associations
representing hazardous materials shippers, carriers, packaging
manufacturers and other related groups, including the Agricultural
Retailers Association; American Chemistry Council; American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers; American Trucking Associations;
American Pyrotechnics Association; Association of HazMat Shippers;
The Chlorine Institute; Compressed Gas Association; Council on the
Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles; Dangerous Goods Advisory
Council; The Fertilizer Institute; Gases and Welding Distributors
Association; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International Liquid
Terminals Association; International Vessel Operators Dangerous
Goods Association; Medical Device Battery Transport Council;
National Association of Chemical Distributors; National Private
Truck Council; National Tank Truck Carriers; Plastics Industry
Association; Petroleum Marketers Association of America;
Radiopharmaceutical Shippers & Carriers Conference; Railway Supply
Institute, Inc.; Reusable Industrial Packaging Association; Sporting
Arms Ammunition Manufacturers Institute; The Sulphur Institute; and
the Utility Solid Waste Activities Group.
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    After consideration of the issues, PHMSA is acting on the comment
from the Interested Parties by amending the HMR to allow for bulk
transport of LNG by rail in a DOT-113 specification tank car.
Additionally, this action supports the objectives of the Notification
of Regulatory Review because it is expected to ``promote [the] clean
and safe development of our Nation's vast energy resources, while
avoiding regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy
production, constrain economic growth, and prevent job creation.''

C. DOT Special Permit 20534

    On August 21, 2017, PHMSA received an application for a special
permit from ETS to authorize the transportation in commerce of
``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' in DOT-113C120W tank cars.
    Upon completion of its preliminary evaluation of the application,
PHMSA published for public comment a Notice of Draft Environmental
Assessment for a Special Permit Request for Liquefied Natural Gas by
Rail in the Federal Register on June 6, 2019.\13\ The notice requested
comment on potential safety, environmental, and any additional impacts
that should be considered as part of the special permit evaluation
process. The docket for the draft Environmental Assessment enclosed a
draft special permit. The notice was initially published with a 30-day
comment period and was extended an additional 30 days after requests
from numerous stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and private individuals. The extended comment period closed on
August 7, 2019 and PHMSA received 2,994 comments.
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    \13\ Hazardous Materials Safety: Notice of Availability of the
Draft Environmental Assessment for a Special Permit Request for
Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail [84 FR 26507].
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    On December 5, 2019, PHMSA granted DOT-SP 20534 to ETS authorizing
the transportation of LNG in DOT-113C120W tank cars between Wyalusing,
Pennsylvania, and Gibbstown, New Jersey, with no intermediate stops,
and subject to certain operational controls. Some of the operational
controls required by the special permit had not been proposed in the
draft special permit; PHMSA introduced those additional operational
controls in response to comments received and additional documentation
provided by the applicant, as well as to further reduce risk by
supplementing the robust safety regime established by the HMR. Those
information requests also were intended to increase PHMSA and FRA's
knowledge of ETS's operations to inform later decisions on DOT-SP 20534
and the HMR. Specifically, PHMSA added the following requirements to
the special permit:
    (1) Each tank car must be operated in accordance with Sec.  173.319
except for the identified maximum permitting filling density, maximum
operating pressure, and remote sensing equipment as specified in the
special permit;
    (2) Shipments are authorized between Wyalusing, Pennsylvania, and
Gibbstown, New Jersey, with no intermediate stops.
    (3) Within 90 days after issuance, the grantee shall prepare and
submit a plan providing per shipment quantities, timelines, and other
actions to be taken for moving from single car shipments to multi-car
shipments, and subsequently to unit trains (20 or more tank cars).
    (4) Trains transporting 20 or more tank cars authorized under this
special permit must be equipped and operated with a two-way end of
train device as defined in 49 CFR 232.5 or distributed power as defined
in 49 CFR 229.5.
    (5) Prior to the initial shipment of a tank car under this special
permit, the grantee must provide training to emergency response
agencies that could be affected between the authorized origin and
destination. The training shall conform to NFPA-472, a voluntary
consensus standard developed by the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) establishing minimum competencies for responding to
hazardous materials emergencies, including known hazards in emergencies
involving the release of LNG, and emergency response methods to address
an incident involving a train transporting LNG.
    (6) While in transportation, the grantee must remotely monitor each
tank car for pressure, location, and leaks.
    Following issuance of DOT-SP 20534, PHMSA published a notice \14\
in the Federal Register that PHMSA had added DOT-SP 20534 and documents
supporting the special permit decision--the Special Permit Evaluation
Form and Final Environmental Assessment--to the docket for the HM-264
NPRM (Docket No. PHMSA-2018-0025) for consideration by the public
because of the overlapping subject matter. PHMSA invited comments on
DOT-SP 20534 operational controls to be submitted to the HM-264
rulemaking docket by December 23, 2019.\15\ PHMSA noted it would
consider any additional comments on the operational controls included
in DOT-SP 20534, which was posted to the HM-264 rulemaking docket to
aid in determining appropriate operational controls for this final
rule. PHMSA encouraged commenters to provide data on the safety or
economic impacts associated with operational controls in the special
permit, including analysis of the safety benefits and the potential
cost-benefit impact of implementing those or other operational
controls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Hazardous Materials: Notice of Issuance of Special Permit
Regarding Liquefied Natural Gas [84 FR 67768].
    \15\ On December 23, 2019, PHMSA extended the comment period to
January 13, 2020 [84 FR 70491].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Amendments to the HMR Adopted in This Final Rule

    In this final rule, PHMSA is authorizing LNG, a well characterized
and understood material, for transportation in a specific rail car
packaging that has a long, safe record carrying similar cryogenic
materials, including flammable materials. Additionally, to provide an
additional level of safety and in response to comments, PHMSA is
adopting certain supplemental packaging integrity enhancements and
operational controls.

A. Existing HMR Requirements for Rail Transport of Flammable Cryogenic
Material

    Federal hazmat law, 49 U.S.C. 5103, requires PHMSA \16\ to
designate material or a group or class of material as hazardous when it
determines that transporting the material in commerce in a particular
amount and form may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety or
property, and to prescribe regulations for the safe transportation of
hazardous material in commerce. Transportation includes the movement of
that hazardous material and any loading, unloading, or storage
incidental to the movement.\17\ These statutory provisions are
implemented within PHMSA regulations at 49 CFR parts 171 to 180 (i.e.,
the HMR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The authority was delegated by the Secretary of
Transportation in 49 CFR 1.97.
    \17\ 49 U.S.C. 5102(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The HMR prescribe a comprehensive suite of requirements for
hazardous material classification, hazard communication, emergency
response

information, training, packaging, and material handling. These
requirements are designed to prevent the release of hazardous materials
in transportation, and in the event of a release, to provide emergency
responders and the public with necessary information to protect
themselves and mitigate the consequences of the release to the greatest
extent possible. The HMR are a proven hazardous material regulatory
system well suited to manage the risks of LNG transportation in rail
tank cars. The robust requirements already in place in the HMR for
packaging, rail car handling, hazard communication and training address
many of the safety concerns related to the transportation of LNG by
rail. Moreover, PHMSA works closely with other Federal and State
partners to enforce the requirements of the HMR.
1. Packaging
    Selecting proper packaging for a hazardous material is a critical
step in the HMR safety system. Hazardous materials packaging must be
chemically and physically compatible with the material contained in the
package, also known as the lading. The packaging must be able to
withstand all conditions normally encountered during transportation,
which include humidity and pressure changes, shocks, and vibrations.
The HMR authorize many types of packagings for hazardous materials,
ranging in size from 1 milliliter glass sample tubes, to 30,000-gallon
railroad tank cars. Different modes of transportation (highway, air,
rail, and vessel) and varying volumes of hazardous materials present
different challenges, and require a variety of packaging designs to
account for different conditions encountered in transportation. Tank
cars used for rail transportation must be designed to withstand
exposure to weather, in-train forces and switching, vibrations, dynamic
forces, and exposure to the lading they transport.
    Cryogenic materials pose unique challenges for selecting
appropriate transportation packaging. The lading's extreme cold
properties render most types of packaging material too brittle to
maintain containment during transportation. Therefore, all cryogenic
packagings in the HMR are required to be constructed from specific
steel alloys with physical properties that enable them to retain their
strength and ductility at the lading's extreme low temperatures.
    Another challenge that must be considered is ensuring that the
lading remains at these cold temperatures during transportation.
Temperature maintenance of the lading prevents expansion and
overpressure conditions, or possible activation of the transportation
vessel's pressure relief device. To help ensure that neither scenario
occurs during transportation, all bulk packagings authorized in the HMR
for transportation of flammable cryogenic materials (e.g., DOT-113 tank
cars, MC-338 cargo tanks, and UN T75 portable tanks) are built as a
``tank-within-a-tank'' design. The inner tank contains the cryogenic
material. The space between the inner and outer tanks is evacuated to a
high degree of vacuum (absolute pressure less than 75 microns of
mercury or 0.0001 atmospheres). The outer surface of the inner tank is
wrapped with a high-grade insulation consisting of multiple layers of a
thin reflecting material such as an aluminum foil sandwiched between a
thin non-conducting paper type material. Alternately, the physical
insulation may also be made of fine grained perlite particles filling
the void space between the inner and outer tanks. The combined effect
of vacuum in the annular space between the inner and outer tanks
together with the physical insulation substantially reduces the heat
transfer from the atmosphere to the lading, thus effectively
maintaining the lading temperature within safe limits during
transportation. Furthermore, the outer tank shields the inner tank from
physical damage, exposure to the elements, and in-train forces, while
providing structural support to the packaging.
    Tank car design is a mature field, and the requirements for
designing and building a tank car able to withstand the conditions
encountered during transportation are codified in part 179 of the HMR.
An industry publication, AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended
Practices, Section C--III, Specifications for Tank Cars, Specification
M-1002 (AAR Specifications for Tank Cars), is incorporated by reference
into the HMR. HMR tank specifications and standards are aligned with
authoritative design and construction standards found in the ASME
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section VIII, Division 1 Rules
for Construction of Pressure Vessels, and welding requirements found in
ASME BPVC Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications. The inner and
outer tanks are designed to ASME BPVC Section VIII Division 1 using the
design margins and loading conditions for pressure vessels. The ASME
BPVC Section VIII Division 1 design margin and loading conditions
determine the design thickness of both the inner and outer tanks.
However, the HMR prescribe minimum thicknesses requirements for both
tanks. American Welding Society (AWS) standards are used during
manufacturing to ensure that the welding performed has quality control
systems and is performed by qualified personnel. The DOT-113 tank car
requirements in the HMR incorporate elements of rigorous engineering
standards, including the ASME BPVC as well as the AAR Specifications
for Tank Cars, M-1002. M-1002 in turn draws on well-established
industry standards of the AWS, ASTM, American Society of Non-
destructive Testing (ASNT) as well as ASME, for design, materials,
fabrication, testing and inspection requirements. The ASME BPVC,
Section VIII, Division 1, has become the international benchmark
standard for pressure vessel design for a multitude of industries,
including transportation. These standards impose criteria for forming,
fabricating, inspecting, and testing pressure vessels and their
components and for qualifying welders, welding operators, and welding
procedures to ensure the soundness of pressure vessels. Starting from
these rigorous design principles, the specification requirements in
part 179 of the HMR add design requirements to address conditions
encountered in transportation and not necessarily applicable to
stationary storage. For example, the HMR require the use of specific
steels that balance toughness, strength, and weldability with being
able to withstand extremely low temperatures.
    Like other bulk packagings, cryogenic packagings authorized in the
HMR, including DOT-113 tank cars, have requirements for safety relief
devices, also referred to as pressure relief devices (PRDs). PRDs are
designed to vent the contents of the tank in a controlled manner to
prevent the inner tank from suffering a catastrophic failure or
explosion due to pressure-increasing events, such as exposure to fire.
DOT-113 tank cars have two different PRDs: (1) A pair of reclosing
pressure relief valves (PRVs), which operate on a temporary basis to
relieve inner tank pressure and bring it back to safe levels; and (2) a
pair of non-reclosing safety vents (rupture disk) that open at a
pressure higher than the start to discharge pressure of the PRVs and
remain open once the disk ruptures. The latter devices are a failsafe
in the event the primary PRVs fail to perform as intended.
    The HMR explicitly authorize LNG for transportation in UN T75
insulated portable tanks that are loaded onto railroad flat cars and
MC-338 cargo

tanks, which are both tank-within-a-tank designs. Both bulk packagings
have an established safety record for LNG and other flammable cryogenic
materials over many years of transportation, demonstrating the high
level of safety provided by the tank-within-a-tank design. On May 4,
1963, the Interstate Commerce Commission Safety and Service Board
published final rule Order 57 [28 FR 4495], which authorized the
transportation of liquefied hydrogen in a DOT-113 tank car. The DOT-113
specification itself was adopted into the HMR on December 1, 1962 in
final rule Order 56 [27 FR 11849]. Prior to adoption, the DOT-113
design had been authorized to transport liquefied hydrogen by special
permits, documents issued by PHMSA and its predecessor agencies that
permit a variance from the requirements of the HMR provided an
equivalent level of safety is maintained. PHMSA and its predecessor
agencies have used special permits to evaluate new transportation
technologies and practices prior to authorizing them for broader use.
Liquefied ethylene, a flammable cryogenic material with physical
properties (including flammability range and cryogenic state) similar
to LNG, has been authorized for transportation in DOT-113C120W tank
cars since the publication of final rule HM-115, Cryogenic Liquids [48
FR 27674, June 16, 1983]. The DOT-113C120W tank car was authorized by
special permit prior to adoption in the HMR.
    It is essential to ensure that cryogenic lading remains below a
maximum temperature during transportation. The HMR address this
currently by requiring tank car owners to ensure the thermal integrity
of DOT-113 packages through measurement of thermal performance
throughout the life of the tank. Specifically, the HMR prohibit the
transportation of a DOT-113 if the average daily pressure rise in the
tank exceeded 3 psig during the prior shipment. The insulation located
in the annular space between the outer and inner tanks can lose its
effectiveness over time due to conditions encountered during
transportation, through settling of the insulation or through the
development of micro vacuum leaks. New multi-layer insulation systems
do not suffer settling problems, but are still susceptible to the
degradation of vacuum and therefore must be monitored in the same way
as older insulation systems. As the effectiveness of the insulation
system lessens, more thermal energy can be transmitted to the inner
tank and the lading. The rate of thermal energy transfer can be
determined by measuring the pressure the lading exerts on the inner
tank at the time the material is offered, and after the material
arrives at its destination. If the average daily pressure rise during
transportation exceeds 3 psig, the thermal integrity of the tank must
be tested. This testing involves measuring either pressure rise or
calculated heat transfer over a 24-hour period. When the pressure rise
test is performed, the absolute pressure in the annular space of the
loaded tank car may not exceed 75 microns of mercury at the beginning
of the test and may not increase more than 25 microns during the 24-
hour period. If the tank fails the thermal integrity test, it must be
removed from hazardous material transportation service until it has
been repaired and passes the required thermal integrity tests. This
system of thermal integrity management has proven to be an effective
way of preventing unsafe pressure increases during transportation for
the existing DOT-113 fleet, and PHMSA expects that it will continue to
be effective for DOT-113s used in LNG service.
    The flammability and low-temperature hazards presented by LNG in
transportation are well understood. The DOT-113C120W tank car has a
well-established safety record transporting similar cryogenic flammable
materials. The construction specifications for the steel used for
fabricating the inner tank of the DOT-113C120W tank car requires it to
withstand a (design) service temperature of -260 [deg]F, which is also
the temperature of LNG at atmospheric pressure (i.e., LNG is not cooled
below this temperature). The austenitic steel required for the inner
tank retains all necessary strength and ductility at -260 [deg]F, and
is suitable for use to -423 [deg]F the shipping temperature of
liquefied hydrogen, a far lower temperature than it would be exposed to
in LNG service.
2. Hazard Communication
    Once the lading has been properly packaged, the HMR prescribe an
extensive system of multi-layered hazard communication tools designed
to provide information on the type and location of hazardous materials
present to transportation employees, emergency responders, and the
public. The discussion below will focus on hazard communication
requirements specific to rail transportation, but similar requirements
exist for highway, vessel, and air transport, with variations to
account for specific challenges applicable to each mode of
transportation.
    The HMR require that a tank car containing a hazardous material
conspicuously display placards on each side and each end of the car.
The diamond-shaped placards are designed to be instantly recognizable
to any trained emergency responder or transportation employee. Placards
allow for quick identification of the DOT hazard class or division of
the material being transported by their color, symbol, and the numeral
entered in the bottom corner of the placard. Specifically, for DOT-113
tank cars transporting flammable gases such as LNG, the placard must
also be placed on a white square background to increase the contrast
and visibility of the placard in accordance with Sec.  172.510(a)(3),
and as a visual signal of the special handling procedures for DOT-113
tank cars transporting flammable gases. Tank cars must additionally be
marked on each side and each end with the UN ID number of the hazardous
material being carried. This marking is typically displayed on a white
rectangle in the center of the placard. Moreover, tank cars loaded with
flammable gases, like LNG, are required to be marked on two sides with
the key words of the proper shipping name, or the common name of the
material being transported. Therefore, a tank car transporting LNG will
be marked with the words ``Methane, refrigerated liquid'' or ``Natural
gas, refrigerated liquid'' on two sides of the tank car.
    The train crew is required to maintain a document which identifies
the position in the train of each rail car containing a hazardous
material. The crew is also required to maintain emergency response
information for each hazardous material carried in the train. This
emergency response information must include specific information
related to the material being transported, including:
    [cir] Immediate hazards to health;
    [cir] Risks of fire or explosion;
    [cir] Immediate precautions to be taken in the event of an accident
or incident;
    [cir] Immediate methods for handling fires;
    [cir] Initial methods for handling spills or leaks in the absence
of fire; and
    [cir] Preliminary first aid measures.
    As one method of compliance with these requirements, train crews
often carry the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG),\18\ a joint
publication of PHMSA, Transport Canada, the Secretariat of
Communication and Transport of Mexico, and interested parties from
government and industry,

to supplement emergency response information provided by the person
shipping the hazardous material. The ERG is intended for use by
emergency services personnel to provide guidance for initial response
to hazardous materials transportation incidents. The ERG cross-
references specific materials with incident response information,
including firefighting instructions and evacuation distances. The ERG
is made widely available, as PHMSA provides millions of free copies of
the ERG to emergency responders in every State, and several commercial
publishers have copies available for purchase. Smartphone applications
of the ERG are also available. The ERG includes instruction to handle
incidents involving flammable cryogenic materials such as LNG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/ERG2016.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the document carried by the train crew is required to
display clearly the emergency response telephone number for each
hazardous material transported in the train. The phone number must be
easily recognizable to the train crew, or any other person using the
train document in an emergency. The telephone number must be of a
person who either: (1) Is knowledgeable of the hazardous material being
shipped, and has comprehensive emergency response and incident
mitigation information for that material; or (2) has immediate access
to a person who possesses such knowledge and information. The emergency
response telephone number must be monitored at all times the material
is in transportation. A telephone number that requires a call back
(such as an answering service, answering machine, or beeper device)
does not meet this requirement. The emergency response telephone number
may be monitored by the person offering the hazardous material, or an
agency or organization capable of, and accepting responsibility for,
providing the comprehensive emergency response and incident mitigation
information.
    The railroad industry has also developed its own electronic hazard
communication aids, beyond the requirements of the HMR. Specifically,
the AAR, in conjunction with its members and Railinc (an AAR technology
subsidiary), has developed and deployed an application called
AskRail.\19\ The AskRail app links to the freight railroad industry's
train and railcar information database maintained by Railinc. AskRail
provides an emergency responder who has registered to use the service
with detailed information about the type and location of all cars
carrying hazardous materials in a train including emergency response
guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ https://public.railinc.com/products-services/askrail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This existing system of hazard communication under the HMR,
supplemented by industry efforts such as AskRail, accurately
communicates the hazards presented by hazardous materials to emergency
responders, transportation employees, and the public and contributes to
proper emergency response when accidents occur in transportation.
3. Training
    The HMR requirements for safe transportation of hazardous materials
also encompass training for all hazmat employees involved in the
transportation of hazardous material. See part 172 subpart H. Training
is the cornerstone of compliance with the HMR, because only properly
trained employees can ensure the applicable HMR requirements are
followed appropriately. All hazmat employees must be trained and tested
by their employer to perform their HMR-related functions correctly and
safely. This includes employees who prepare a hazardous material
package for transportation, transport hazardous materials (e.g., the
train crew), or unload hazardous material. See Sec.  171.8. In
accordance with Sec.  172.704, training must cover:
    [cir] General awareness of HMR requirements;
    [cir] Function-specific training applicable to the particular
functions performed by the employee (e.g., proper loading procedures
for flammable cryogenic material);
    [cir] Safety;
    [cir] Security awareness; and
    [cir] In-depth security training, when applicable.
    Training must be documented in accordance with Sec.  172.704(d),
and repeated at least every 3 years.
4. Security Plans
    The HMR also address security requirements for certain high-risk
hazardous materials. Offerors and carriers of materials listed in Sec.
172.800 must develop and adhere to a transportation security plan for
hazardous materials. Security plans are required of any offeror or
carrier of flammable gas in a quantity over 792 gallons, which is far
below the volume of a single tank car of LNG or similar flammable
cryogenic material. Security plans must include an assessment of
transportation security risks for shipments of the hazardous materials,
including site-specific or location-specific risks associated with
facilities at which the hazardous materials listed in Sec.  172.800 are
prepared for transportation, stored, or unloaded incidental to
movement, and appropriate measures to address the assessed risks.
Specifically, security plans must address three elements:
    [cir] Personnel security. Measures to confirm information provided
by job applicants hired for positions that involve access to and
handling of the hazardous materials covered by the security plan.
    [cir] Unauthorized access. Measures to address the assessed risk
that unauthorized persons may gain access to the hazardous materials
covered by the security plan or transport conveyances being prepared
for transportation of the hazardous materials covered by the security
plan.
    [cir] En route security. Measures to address the assessed security
risks of shipments of hazardous materials covered by the security plan
en route from origin to destination, including shipments stored
incidental to movement.
    Properly implemented security plans decrease the risk that a
shipment of hazardous material, including LNG, can be used in an attack
against persons or critical infrastructure within the United States.
5. Preparing a Packaging for Transportation
    Hazardous materials packages must be prepared and filled in such a
way to ensure that there can be no detectable release of hazardous
materials to the environment during conditions normally incident to
transportation. Specifically, for LNG, there are several existing
requirements in the HMR that address the proper filling of a DOT-113
tank car to ensure safe transportation of the commodity. These package
preparation requirements include:
     As provided in Sec.  173.31, when the car is offered into
transportation, the offeror must inspect the tank car and all closures
prior to movement (i.e., the pre-trip inspection); and
     Filling density restrictions and loading pressure
restrictions in Sec.  173.319 for cryogenic material.
    The filling and loading restrictions in Sec.  173.319 are based on
the physical properties of each flammable cryogenic material and are
designed to ensure that during transportation, the inner tank will not
experience a pressure rise that triggers the PRVs to activate.
6. Route Planning
    The HMR address requirements for rail route planning in Sec.
172.820. Trains

meeting the following criteria are required to assess the safety and
security risks along transportation routes (Sec.  172.820(c)) and
perform an alternative route analysis (Sec.  172.820(d)):
    (1) More than 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) in a single carload of a
Division 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 explosive;
    (2) A quantity of a material poisonous by inhalation in a single
bulk packaging;
    (3) A highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive)
material, as defined in Sec.  173.403 of this subchapter; or
    (4) A high-hazard flammable train (HHFT) as defined in Sec.  171.8
of this subchapter.
    Historically, there has been considerable public and Congressional
interest in the safe and secure rail routing of security-sensitive
hazardous materials (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 \20\
directed the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, to publish a rule governing the rail routing of security-
sensitive hazardous materials. On December 21, 2006, PHMSA, in
coordination with FRA and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), published an
NPRM under Docket HM-232E (71 FR 76834), which proposed to revise the
current requirements in the HMR applicable to the safe and secure
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Specifically, the HM-
232E NPRM proposed to require rail carriers to compile annual data on
specified shipments of hazardous materials, use the data to analyze
safety and security risks along rail routes where those materials are
transported, assess alternative routing options, and make routing
decisions based on those assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ53/PLAW-110publ53.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the HM-232E NPRM, PHMSA solicited comments on whether the
proposed requirements should also apply to flammable gases, flammable
liquids, or other materials that could be weaponized, as well as
hazardous materials that could cause serious environmental damage if
released into rivers or lakes. Commenters who addressed this issue
indicated that rail shipments of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives;
PIH materials; and highway-route controlled quantities of radioactive
materials pose significant rail safety and security risks warranting
the enhanced security measures proposed. Commenters generally did not
support enhanced security measures for a broader list of materials than
were proposed in the NPRM.
    PHMSA adopted the NPRM's proposed security measures in an April 16,
2008 Interim Final Rule (IFR) (73 FR 20752) which was subsequently
amended by a November 26, 2008 final rule (73 FR 72182). The 2008 IFR
and final rule imposed a series of rail routing requirements in Sec.
172.820. Carriers must compile annual data on certain shipments of
explosive, PIH, and radioactive materials; use the data to analyze
safety and security risks along rail routes where those materials are
transported; assess alternative routing options; and make routing
decisions based on those assessments. In accordance with Sec.
172.820(e), the carrier must select the route posing the least overall
safety and security risk. The carrier must retain in writing all route
review and selection decision documentation. Additionally, the rail
carrier must identify a point of contact on routing issues involving
the movement of covered materials and provide that contact information
to the appropriate State, local, and tribal personnel.
    PHMSA proposed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, in Sec.  174.310(a)(1),
to modify the rail routing requirements specified in Sec.  172.820 to
apply to any HHFT. The routing requirements discussed in the NPRM
reflect the practices recommended by the NTSB in recommendation R-14-
4,\21\ and are in widespread use across the rail industry for security-
sensitive hazardous materials. An overwhelming majority of commenters
expressed support for additional routing requirements for HHFTs and
thus, PHMSA finalized the proposed requirements.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ https://www.ntsb.gov/publications/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-14-004.
    \22\ 80 FR 26644.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this final rule, PHMSA makes any railroad that transports a
quantity of LNG in a tank car subject to the route planning
requirements in Sec.  172.820.
7. Operational Controls
    In addition to requirements for packaging, hazard communication,
training, and security plans that must be met before the hazardous
material is offered for transportation, the HMR contain operational
controls requirements for the safe transportation of hazardous
materials in tank cars. These requirements include specific provisions
for handling flammable cryogenic materials similar to LNG, including
loading and unloading requirements for tank cars in Sec. Sec.  173.31
and 174.67, which help prevent movement of tank cars during loading/
unloading operations, help prevent other rail equipment from
approaching tank cars during loading/unloading through use of derails,
bumpers, or lining switches to prevent entry, and include specific
instructions that tank car unloading personnel are required to follow,
such as attendance of the unloading operation and care of tools used
for unloading.
    Other operational controls include an unloading requirement in
Sec.  174.204 that requires that tank cars containing a flammable
cryogenic material must be unloaded directly from the car to permanent
storage tanks of sufficient capacity to receive the entire contents of
the car. Finally, switching restrictions in Sec.  174.83(b) prohibit a
DOT-113 specification tank car displaying a Division 2.1 (flammable
gas) placard, including a DOT-113 specification tank car containing a
residue of a Division 2.1 material (e.g., LNG), from being cut off
while in motion, coupled into with more force than is necessary to
complete the coupling, or struck by any car moving under its own
momentum. These special handling requirements protect DOT-113 tank cars
from experiencing unnecessary impact forces during switching.
Compliance with these switching restrictions is highlighted by the
special white background for the flammable gas placard required by
Sec.  172.510 for DOT-113, and a marking requirement for the tank car
which indicates that the cars may not be humped or cut off while in
motion (see Sec.  179.400-25).
    Additionally, three operational controls currently address the
expedited movement of a tank car transporting hazardous materials,
delivery of tank cars containing gases and cryogenic material, and
notification of delays in transit. First, Sec.  174.14 requires that a
carrier must forward each shipment of hazardous materials promptly and
within 48 hours (Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excluded), after
acceptance at the originating point or receipt at any yard, transfer
station, or interchange point, except that where biweekly or weekly
service only is performed, a shipment of hazardous materials must be
forwarded on the first available train. Furthermore, Sec.  174.14(b)
states that a tank car loaded with any Division 2.1 material (which
would include LNG), may not be received and held at any point, subject
to forwarding orders, to defeat the purpose of this requirement for the
expedited movement of a hazardous material, or to

defeat the requirements of Sec.  174.204 for tank car delivery of gases
such as cryogenic liquids. Section 174.204 prohibits tank cars
containing Class 2 materials from being unloaded unless the shipment is
consigned for delivery to an unloading facility on private tracks, and
prohibits the storage of Division 2.1 (flammable) cryogenic material.
If a tank car containing Class 2 material cannot be delivered to a
private track for unloading, the regulation does allow the car to be
unloaded on a rail carriers tracks provided the lading is piped
directly from the tank car to permanent storage tanks. Finally, in
accordance with Sec.  173.319, the shipper must notify FRA whenever a
tank car containing any flammable cryogenic material is not received by
the consignee within 20 days from the date of shipment.
8. Risk Based Framework
    The HMR address the risks inherent in the transportation of
hazardous materials through comprehensive packaging, hazard
communication, training, security planning, and material- and mode-
specific operational controls.
    The HMR regulate 435 million shipments of hazardous materials every
year and by all modes of transportation, with an average of 20
hazardous material incidents resulting in death and serious injury each
year, most of which occur in the highway mode. The existing HMR
requirements are robust and will adequately address the risks posed by
transportation of LNG in DOT-113C120W tank cars. However, in this final
rule, PHMSA is adopting certain additional safety measures designed to
further reduce those risks. These safety measures are discussed in
detail in the following section.

B. The DOT-113C120W Specification Tank Car

    PHMSA considers the existing DOT-113C120W tank car a suitable
packaging for transportation of LNG by rail. The inner tank is capable
of withstanding the cryogenic temperatures and chemical properties of
LNG, and the thermal protection system is capable of maintaining LNG at
a safe pressure and temperature throughout transportation. However, in
this final rule, to improve crashworthiness and in response to comments
received, PHMSA requires that DOT-113C120W tank cars used for LNG
transportation must be constructed with a thicker outer tank, and that
the outer tank be constructed of a higher quality steel currently
required for construction of DOT-117A and PIH/TIH tank car tanks. PHMSA
has determined that the thicker outer tank in DOT-117A and PIH/TIH tank
cars improved crashworthiness. The DOT-117A crashworthiness improvement
results are discussed below. Additionally, PHMSA is adopting the
proposals for maximum offering pressure as proposed in the NPRM, but is
amending the maximum filling density to 37.3%.
1. Suitability of the DOT-113C120W Tank Car for LNG
    The DOT-113C120W tank car has a long history of safe transportation
of flammable cryogenic material similar to LNG. The safe history of
DOT-113C120W tank cars used for the transportation of other cryogenic
materials such as ethylene since 1983 (and earlier under special
permits) is a key factor in determining that this tank car design is
appropriate for the transportation of LNG. Please see our discussion of
the history of the DOT-113 specification in ``Section III.A. Existing
HMR Requirements for Rail Transport of Flammable Cryogenic Gas'' for
further details.
    DOT-113C120W rail tank cars are vacuum-insulated tank-within-a-tank
designs (similar to a thermos bottle) consisting of an inner alloy
stainless steel tank enclosed within a carbon steel outer tank
specifically designed for the transportation of cryogenic material,
such as liquid hydrogen, oxygen, ethylene, nitrogen, and argon.
Additionally, the design and use of the DOT-113 specification tank car
includes added safety features--such as protection systems for piping
between the inner and outer tanks, multiple PRDs (pressure relief
valves and vents), and insulation--that contribute to an excellent
safety record throughout its 50 years of service. The HMR currently
authorize the DOT-113C120W specification tank car, the same
specification being authorized for LNG in this rule, for another
flammable cryogenic material, ethylene, which has chemical properties
similar to those of LNG.
    The DOT-113 tank car requirements in the HMR incorporate elements
of rigorous engineering standards, including the ASME BPVC as well as
the AAR Specifications for Tank Cars, M-1002. M-1002 in turn draws on
well-established industry standards of the American Society for Testing
and Materials (ASTM), American Society of Non-destructive Testing
(ASNT), as well as ASME, for design, materials, fabrication, testing
and inspection requirements. The ASME BPVC, Section VIII, Division 1,
is the international benchmark standard for pressure vessel design for
a multitude of industries, including transportation. Starting from
these rigorous design principles, the specification requirements in
part 179 of the HMR add design requirements to address conditions
encountered in transportation and not necessarily applicable to
stationary storage. For example, the HMR require the use of specific
steels that balance toughness, strength, and weldability with being
able to withstand extremely low temperatures.
    When cryogenic ethylene is transported in DOT-113C120W
specification tank cars, it is offered at cryogenic service temperature
(defined in Sec.  173.115(g) as colder than -90 [deg]C), as LNG would
be in this final rule. The delimiter letter ``C''--as used in ``DOT-
113C120W''--indicates the car is designed for a loading and shipping
temperature as low as -260 [deg]F (-162 [deg]C) (see the specification
requirements in Sec.  179.401-1 for DOT-113C120W tank cars). Negative
260 [deg]F corresponds to the temperature at which LNG converts from a
gas to a liquid. The HMR do not permit the filling of a tank car below
its service temperature (see Sec.  173.319(a)(4)(ii)). However, should
the inner tank experience colder temperatures, the 300-grade austenitic
stainless steels, 304/304L, permitted for the inner tank, are
authorized to withstand the much lower service temperature of cryogenic
hydrogen, 423 [deg]F.
    Similarly, the standard heat transfer rate assigned to the DOT-
113C120W tank car in Sec.  179.401-1, a maximum of 0.4121 Btu per day
per pound of water capacity, is consistent with the requirements for
the other bulk packages authorized for LNG in the HMR (MC 338 cargo
tanks and UN T75 portable tanks), and packages authorized by DOT
Special Permits. The specific design properties of the DOT-113C120W,
including service temperature and thermal performance, make it an
appropriate packaging for safe transportation of LNG, in the same way
that the packaging is currently used to transport cryogenic ethylene.
2. Materials of Construction for DOT-113 Tank Cars
    In the United States, storage vessels for LNG are designed and
constructed in accordance with ASME BPVC Section VIII Rules for
Construction of Pressure Vessels, Division 1. To maintain the low
temperature, LNG storage tanks are usually made with an inner and outer
tank with insulating material between and a vacuum applied to the
annular space.

a. Inner Tank
    ASTM A240/240M 300-grade austenitic stainless steels, 304/304L, are
the only steels authorized in the HMR for constructing the inner tank
of a DOT-113 tank car. The major elements in these steels are: Carbon--
0.08% (0.03%); manganese--2.00% (both); chromium--18.0-20.00% (both);
nickel--8.00-11.00% (8.00-12.00%); and the remainder iron. The role of
chromium and nickel in the 304/304L grade steels is to: (1) Retain the
Face Centered Cubic (FCC) atomic structure which gives 304/304L its
strength, ductility and toughness down to cryogenic temperatures and
(2) provide a corrosion resistant passive layer. The tensile strength
of 304/304L steel is 70,000-75,000 psi with Charpy V-notch toughness
(resistance to brittle failure) values in the range of 80-130 ft. lbs.
at -320 [deg]F (minimum Charpy V-notch failure value is 60 ft. lbs.),
below the temperature range encountered during LNG transportation. The
service environment of a railroad tank car is dynamic and severe and
can result in the accumulation of impact and fatigue damage. Austenitic
stainless steels, which are readily weldable using qualified welders
and welding procedures, are therefore well-suited for use in the
construction and repair of tank cars.
    For storage tanks, ASME design criteria allow for the use of 300-
grade stainless steels or ASTM A553 Standard Specification for Pressure
Vessel Plates, Alloy Steel, Quenched and Tempered 7, 8, and 9% Nickel.
Both the 304/304L and A553 steels have similar nickel content limits,
but utilize the nickel to achieve strength and toughness in different
ways. The A553 steel is a heat treatable, ``quench and tempered'' type
of steel with the nickel helping to form martensite, a strong but
brittle metallurgical product. The quench and tempering treatment makes
welding A553 difficult, requiring expertise in welding procedure
development and operator skill which adds risk to its use for tank
cars. By contrast, the nickel content in 304/304L stainless steels
facilitates the formation of austenite, a strong, tough and ductile
form of steel, which maintains its physical properties at cryogenic
temperatures. This, coupled with its excellent weldability, make it the
clear choice for cryogenic tank cars.
    The inner tank has a minimum thickness requirement of 3/16th inch
(after forming) unless increased through a calculated formula in
179.400-8, which increases thickness based on inner diameter of the
tank. The calculations used to determine the thickness of the inner
tank are aligned with the ASME BPVC Section VIII Division 1 and align
with all other tanks used for cryogenic materials. Typically, DOT-113
inner tanks exceed the minimum value of 3/16th inch thickness to
conform to ASME calculations and to avoid localized thinning arising
from manufacturing processes and the variation in the thickness of
steel sourced from steel mills. Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA
maintains the current requirements for inner tanks.
b. Outer Tank
    For DOT-113 tank cars, plate materials listed in M-1002 Appendix M
must be used for the outer tank. Industry practice has been to
fabricate the external tank from ASTM A516-70 steel. A516-70 steel has
provided reliable performance in the service history of DOT-113 tank
cars. However, PHMSA in this final rule is authorizing rail transport
of LNG in DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars with enhanced outer tank
thickness and materials (with a specification suffix ``9'' added to
denote those enhancements). Specifically, this final rule requires DOT-
113C120W9-specification tank cars carrying LNG to have a minimum outer
tank thickness of 9/16'' (compared to 7/16'' for other DOT-113C120W-
specification tank cars). Further, those thicker outer tanks must be
made of TC-128 Grade B (TC-128B) normalized steel. TC-128B normalized
steel is currently used for TIH and flammable liquid tank car designs
and its manufacturing process produces a more puncture resistant steel
as compared to A516-70 steel. AAR TC-128 Grade B normalized steel is a
high-strength, fine-grained carbon-manganese-silicon steel intended for
fusion-welded tank car tanks in service at moderate and lower
temperatures. By normalizing (heating the steel to 1600 [deg]F and air
cooling) TC-128 steel and controlling its chemistry, the outer tank of
an LNG tank car made from TC-128 Grade B steel has a reduced
probability of tank failure due to cracking and an increased resistance
to puncture compared to ASTM A516-70 steel.
    The TC-128 Grade B normalized carbon steel used to construct the
outer tank for DOT-113C120W9 tank cars does not maintain the same
strength and ductility at the cryogenic temperatures of the lading.
However, this is not a safety concern for DOT-113 tank cars. Existing
DOT-113C120W tank cars used in cryogenic ethylene service have outer
tanks constructed of ASTM A516-70 carbon steel. ASTM A516-70 is also
not resistant to cryogenic temperatures, and has been used safely in
the outer tank of DOT-113C120W tank cars for decades. Similarly, the
steel used to construct the outer tanks of other ``tank-within-a-tank''
cryogenic packagings, including MC-338 cargo tanks, UN T75 portable
tanks, and ocean-going LNG tanker ships, is not resistant to cryogenic
temperature.
    LNG in these packagings is contained during transportation in an
inner stainless-steel tank or tank lined with cryogenic compatible
liners, which maintains strength and ductility at cryogenic
temperatures, while the outer tank provides accident protection and
structural support to the packaging. The only way LNG can be released
from the inner tank of a rail tank car to the void space between the
inner and outer tanks is if the inner tank is compromised. In a rail
accident, a puncture of the inner tank can occur only after the outer
tank is breached. In such a scenario, any LNG released from the breach
of the inner tank will also be released into the environment and not be
contained in the space between the two tanks even if the outer tank is
made of stainless steel that maintains strength and ductility at
cryogenic temperatures. Therefore, there is no safety advantage in
making the outer tank of stainless steel. On other hand, making the
outer tank of stainless steel able to withstand cryogenic temperatures
in addition to withstanding the in-train forces during transportation,
providing puncture resistance, and ensuring structural support for the
tank car would be prohibitively expensive (especially if the thickness
is the same as or thicker than the adopted 9/16th inch TC-128 Grade B
normalized carbon steel design).
    As explained further below, PHMSA expects that each of the
enhancements provided for in the final rule will improve tank car
crashworthiness.
c. Determination of Inner and Outer Tank Requirements
    PHMSA is maintaining the requirements for the inner tank. ASTM A
240/A 240M, Type 304 or 304L steel has the correct balance of strength,
durability, and weldability for use in transportation applications for
cryogenic materials, as demonstrated over many years of use. However,
due to the possibility of LNG being transported in blocks of tank cars
within each train that are larger than the blocks of tank cars that are
typically used for rail transportation of other flammable cryogenic
liquids, and in response to comments, PHMSA is authorizing in this
final rule rail transportation of LNG

in DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars with enhanced outer tank
thickness and materials (those enhancements to be indicated by the
specification suffix ``9'') to obtain improved crashworthiness.
    The inner tank design of DOT-113C120W9 tank cars will be identical
to other DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars, and will have the same
safety features to vent the contents in the event of an unsafe pressure
increase. In essence, the lading retention capabilities of the DOT-
113C120W9 and other DOT-113C120W-specification tank cars are identical,
with specific enhancements to the outer tank of the tank car design
being employed to increase crashworthiness.
    The outer tank enhancements for the DOT-113C120W9 incorporate the
best available technology for the outer tank of a tank car with little
additional manufacturing costs. Increasing wall thickness and the use
of normalized steel (which increases the ductility of the steel) of the
outer tank wall together provide enhanced crashworthiness for the tank
car. Previously, there was limited economic rationale to amend the
outer tank characteristics for the DOT-113C120W tank car to incorporate
those elements because of the small size of the fleet and the small
number of tank cars within each train. The existing level of safety
provided by the DOT-113C120W tank car and existing operational controls
is sufficient for the current use scenarios, as shown by the safety
history of that tank car with over 100,000 shipments.
    Currently, because of market demand and usage patterns for
ethylene, DOT-113 tank cars are transported as part of mixed commodity
freight trains at one to three cars per train. However, as the number
of tank cars within a train increases--in blocks of cars larger than
three or in unit trains--there is a higher probability that a car
containing a flammable cryogenic material such as LNG will be involved
should a derailment or other accident occur.
    PHMSA cannot predict the number of DOT-113C120W9 tank cars per
train the LNG market will support, but we know that from ETS's
application for DOT-SP 20534, that it has plans to operate unit trains
of at least 80 cars per train at some point in the future. With the
possibility of larger numbers of cars in LNG transportation, PHMSA and
FRA have determined that applying improved outer tank requirements is
feasible from a manufacturing and economic perspective. Given the
feasibility of securing a more robust tank car design within prevailing
manufacturing processes across North America, PHMSA determined that the
authorization for transporting LNG by rail can achieve an additional
safety margin by employing the more robust car design described herein.
    If a tank car containing LNG is breached during a derailment, the
LNG will behave largely the same way as crude oil or ethanol. The LNG
lading will be released as a very cold liquid, creating an LNG pool
that could catch on fire. Employing a thicker outer shell will reduce
the puncture probability of the inner tank, and thus mitigate the
consequences of the derailment. Moreover, a tank car is estimated to
have a service life of approximately 50 years. DOT-113 tank cars
compliant with the enhanced outer shell requirements are projected to
cost 3% more to manufacture. When divided by the large number of
carloads that would be carried during a DOT-113's 50-year service life,
the 9/16th inch TC-128B normalized steel outer tank is highly cost-
effective in that it will mitigate the consequences of derailment
involving LNG by reducing the number of tanks punctured in the unlikely
event of an accident. See our discussion of modeling crashworthiness in
Section III. B. 6. ``Finite Element Modeling and Validation'' for
additional information.
3. Safety History
    DOT-113 tank cars have a demonstrated safety record of over 50
years. More than 100,000 rail shipments of cryogenic material in DOT-
113 tank cars have taken place with no reported fatalities or serious
injuries occurring due to a train-accident caused release of product.
Only twice--during the 2011 incident in Moran, KS and the 2014 incident
in Mer Rouge, LA--did the inner tank of a DOT-113 tank car release
product due to damage sustained during an accident. LNG transportation
by rail in currently authorized packaging also has a demonstrated,
albeit brief, safety history. Since LNG was authorized to be shipped by
rail in T-75 UN containers, PHMSA and FRA have no record of any rail
incidents involving these packagings.
4. Crashworthiness Assessment/Field Tests
    PHMSA and FRA are confident, based on rigorous modeling, testing,
and experience (described in detail in below), that the DOT
specification tank cars, enhanced with a 9/16th inch outer tank made of
TC-128 Grade B normalized steel, will provide sufficient
crashworthiness in accident scenarios compared to tank cars
manufactured from 7/16th inch A516-70 steel outer tanks. As part of the
analysis conducted for the Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, (HM-251; 80 FR 26643, May 8,
2015) along with the final rule RIA, PHMSA determined that there was a
reduction in the number of tank cars punctured when increasing the
outer tank thickness from 7/16th inch to 9/16th inch of TC-128 Grade B
normalized steel with a train traveling at 40 mph.
    This final rule will require the same increase in thickness of the
same type of steel as was required in the HM-251 final rule for DOT-117
tank cars. PHMSA, therefore, expects a similar increase in safety
benefits from the use of enhanced outer tank thickness and improved
materials.
5. Comparison of Derailments
    In the following table, FRA compared three derailment accidents
that occurred in relatively similar conditions. All accidents involved
trains travelling at similar speeds, in similar weather conditions, and
with a similar number of cars derailed. The tank cars that derailed in
Guernsey, Saskatchewan, had a tank thickness of 9/16th inch and had 62
percent fewer shell punctures than the tank cars that derailed in
Casselton, North Dakota, and 69 percent fewer tank punctures than the
tank cars that derailed in Arcadia, Ohio. The tank cars involved in the
Casselton and Arcadia derailments had a tank thickness of 7/16th inch.
These scenarios validate the extensive modeling and simulations done
and provide evidence of the substantial safety benefit of requiring an
outer tank thickness of 9/16th inch in the construction of the DOT-
113C120W tank car that is being authorized for the transportation of
LNG by rail in this rule.

                                       Table 3--Comparison of Derailments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Derailment location
                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Guernsey, SK            Casselton, ND             Arcadia, OH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Derailment date......................  2/6/2020...............  12/30/2013.............  2/6/2011.
Temp at Time of Derailment...........  -18 [deg]C (0 [deg]F)..  -18 [deg]C (-1 [deg]F).  -4 [deg]C (25 [deg]F).
Train speed (MPH)....................  42.....................  48.....................  42.
Type of cars (Specification).........  DOT 117J (286K)........  DOT 111 Legacy (263K)..  DOT 111 Legacy (263K).
Shell Thickness......................  9/16th inch............  7/16th inch............  7/16th inch.
Total cars derailed..................  32.....................  20.....................  32.
Total cars breached..................  8......................  19.....................  30.
Head Punctures.......................  0......................  3......................  10.
Shell Punctures......................  5......................  13.....................  16.
Fittings Compromised.................  3......................  10.....................  13.
Product(s) released..................  UN 1267 Crude Oil......  UN 1267 Crude Oil......  UN 1987 Ethanol.
Fire Occurred........................  Yes....................  Yes....................  Yes.
Thermal Ruptures.....................  No.....................  Yes....................  Yes.
Approximate size of derailment area..  900'L x 250'W (est)....  600'L x 600'W..........  1200'L x 450'W.
General topography of derailment area  Flat field, raised RR    Flat/straight tangent    Flat field, raised RR
                                        bed.                     track.                   bed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Finite Element Modeling and Validation
    FRA's Research program, in coordination with PHMSA, funded the
development and continued refinement of Finite Element (FE) Models for
a variety of tank car specifications as well as computer simulation of
impacts and derailments. FE modeling is a widely-used method for
evaluating the effects of stresses on components or structures and is
used in the fields of structural analysis, heat transfer, and fluid
flow. Within the FRA research program, component and full scale tests
results are used to validate the computer simulations and their
assumptions and boundary conditions. Full scale test results are
compared to simulation results, including the overall force-time or
force-indentation histories, the puncture/non-puncture outcomes, the
rigid body motions of the tank car, the internal pressures within the
lading, and the energy absorbed by the tank during the impact.
    The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center)
supports the FRA in this research effort, and has performed pre- and
post-test FE analyses corresponding to several component and full-scale
shell impact tests. Validated models and computer simulations are a
necessary alternative to full-scale impact testing which are time
consuming, expensive, and challenging to perform.
    A primary purpose for a pre-test simulation is to estimate the
threshold puncture speed of the test ram car. The puncture speed of the
tank car is the speed at which, under the test conditions, the initial
kinetic energy of the ram car is equal to the energy necessary to
puncture the inner and outer tank. The threshold puncture speed is the
maximum speed at which the tank car can be impacted under the
prescribed conditions without resulting in a tear to the inner and
outer tanks that would allow its lading to escape.
    Results of recent tests and simulations demonstrate the potential
improvement in crashworthiness from the outer tank enhancements set
forth in this final rule. In November 2019 FRA conducted a full-scale
impact test of a DOT-113C120W tank car at TTC in Pueblo, CO.\23\
According to the test report, the initial kinetic energy imparted to
the inner and outer tanks was about 2.8 Million ft.-lbs. Further, it is
estimated that the residual energy (after puncture of the inner and
outer tanks) was about 25% of the initial energy. Accordingly, the
puncture energy of the DOT-113 tank is about 75% of 2.8 Million ft.-
lbs., or 2.1 Million ft.-lbs. A separate full-scale impact test was
performed on a DOT-117J100W specification tank car equipped with a
jacket and thermal protection material. A review of the test report
suggests that the tank (made of TC-128B normalized steel) absorbed an
energy of about 1.9 Million ft.-lbs., without puncture. The report also
notes that under those conditions, the tank was near puncture. PHMSA
estimates the puncture capacity of the DOT-117 car to be about 2
Million ft.-lbs. Comparing the puncture capacities of the two tank
specifications (DOT-113 @2.1 Million ft.-lbs., and the DOT-117 @2
Million ft.-lbs.), their performances are very similar, and that the
DOT-113 might even have a slightly higher puncture resistance. The two
tank cars have about the same cumulative thickness. Therefore, based on
the puncture tests and modeling, PHMSA and FRA anticipate that
increasing the outer tank thickness of the DOT-113 from 7/16 to 9/16 (a
28.5% increase), and requiring the use of the more puncture-resistant
TC-128B normalized steel, will add about 20-30% to the puncture
resistance (i.e., reduction in number of punctures) of the DOT-
113C120W9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Full-Scale Shell Impact Test of a DOT-113 Tank Car, RR 20-
03, February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The above comparison of testing and simulation results was used to
determine the suitability of the DOT-113 tank car for LNG service, as
well as to determine the increased safety gained by using a 9/16th inch
thick outer tank shell of TC-128 Grade B, normalized steel. Further, a
similar model was created in the Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car
Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
[HM-251, 80 FR 26643] rulemaking to help evaluate how effectively the
increased thickness improved on the DOT-111 tank car (predecessor to
the DOT-117). The results of that modeling were factored into design of
the current DOT-117 specification tank car which improved on the DOT-
111 tank car design.
7. Loading and Preparation for Offering
    In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting a 37.3 percent maximum
filling density for LNG, which will allow for approximately 2 percent
outage below the inlet of the pressure control valve to prevent the
venting of liquid material at start-to-discharge pressure, thus
ensuring the safe transportation of LNG. In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed a
32.5 percent filling density. However, PHMSA has determined a 37.3
percent maximum filling density is appropriate

because it is consistent with outages determined to be safe for LNG in
other packagings such as MC-338 cargo tanks and UN T75 portable tanks.
This maximum filling density is also more conservative than maximum
filling densities set in the HMR for other flammable cryogenic
materials, which allows for 0.5 percent outage at the start-to-
discharge pressure. See Sec.  173.319(b)(1). Additionally, a 37.3
percent maximum filling density harmonizes with Canada's Transportation
of Dangerous Goods (TDG) regulations which have been in place since
2015.
    PHMSA expects that any tank car containing a cryogenic material
will be delivered to its destination within 20 days of offering, and
requires notification of any car that has not reached its destination
within this timeframe. See Sec.  173.319(a)(3). Therefore, PHMSA is
adopting a 15 psig maximum offering pressure, as proposed, which is
appropriate for the transportation of LNG and is consistent with the
level of safety provided to other flammable cryogenic materials. The
HMR do not prohibit shippers from offering a tank car of LNG at a lower
pressure.
8. Review Approval Provision to Exceed Weight
    On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule amending the HMR to
incorporate provisions contained in several widely used or longstanding
special permits that have an established safety record. The final rule,
Hazardous Materials: Incorporation of Special Permits into Regulations
(75 FR 27205, May 14, 2010), in part, amended the HMR to allow certain
rail tank cars transporting hazardous materials to exceed the gross
weight on rail limitation of 263,000 pounds upon approval of the FRA.
On January 25, 2011, the FRA published a notice (76 FR 4250) of FRA's
approval pursuant to the Final Rule of the operation of certain tank
cars in hazardous materials service that exceed 263,000 pounds and
weigh up to 286,000 pounds gross rail load (GRL). In 2002, AAR adopted
a revised industry standard related to railroad freight cars weighing
over 263,000 pounds GRL and weighing up to 286,000 pounds. This revised
industry standard, AAR Standard S-286 (adopted 2002, revised 2003,
2005, 2006), Free/Unrestricted Interchange for 286,000 pound GRL Cars
(S-286), is applicable to rail freight cars manufactured, rebuilt or
modified on or after January 1, 2003, and is the existing industry
standard for designing, building, and operating rail cars at gross
weights over 263,000 pounds and up to 286,000 pounds. S-286 sets forth
industry-tested practices for designing, building, and operating rail
cars at gross weights over 263,000 pounds and up to 286,000 pounds. S-
286 provides for the free interchange among carriers of cars built to
meet its requirements.
    In this rulemaking, DOT-113 tank cars in LNG service will be
required to have an outer tank that is 9/16th inch thick (after
forming) and made from TC-128 Grade B, normalized steel plate.
Depending on the specific design characteristics of a tank car
manufactures approved car design, PHMSA and FRA determined that simply
the use of 9/16th inch TC-128, Grade B normalized steel for the outer
tank would not increase the GRL above 263,000 pounds; however, PHMSA
and FRA understand that operators may select certain specification
designs that may place the rail car at a GRL over 263,000 pounds.
    In an effort to maintain consistency with FRA's current approval
(see 76 FR 4250, January 25, 2011) of newly manufactured railroad tank
cars with a GRL exceeding 263,000 pounds, this final rule will amend
the HMR to state that tank cars manufactured for LNG service after (the
effective date of this final rule) may be loaded to a maximum GRL of
286,000 provided the tank car meets the following criteria:
    1. Tank car is constructed in accordance with S-286.
    2. The outer shell and heads are constructed with TC-128 Grade B,
normalized steel.
    This aligns with the action PHMSA and FRA took when creating the
DOT-117 specification and does not place a new burden on tank car
manufacturers. A tank car manufacturer may therefore consider their
design ``approved'' provided it meets the two conditions above, with no
application to FRA or PHMSA required.

C. Additional Operational Controls for LNG Transportation

    In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to rely on the operational controls
already required in the HMR for the transportation by rail of other
flammable cryogenic materials, and invited comment on whether
additional operational controls may be warranted. PHMSA encouraged
commenters to provide data on the safety or economic impacts associated
with any proposed operational controls, including analysis of the
safety justification or cost impact of implementing operational
controls.
    In this final rule, PHMSA is amending the HMR to adopt operational
controls beyond the current extensive requirements of the HMR. These
additional operational controls consist of requirements for:
     A two-way end-of-train (EOT) device or distributed power
(DP) for trains with 20 continuous tank cars of LNG, or 35 tank cars of
LNG throughout the entire train;
     Location and inner tank pressure monitoring for each tank
car containing LNG; and
     Compliance with Sec.  172.820 route planning requirements
(i.e., rail routing).
    PHMSA and FRA believe that the current requirements of the HMR
ensure a robust level of safety for the transport of LNG by rail that
is further reinforced by widely-adopted voluntary industry standards in
AAR Circular OT-55. Additionally, the new operational controls in this
final rule will add a still greater margin of safety to address the
risks posed by LNG transportation in DOT-113C120W tank cars.
1. AAR Circular OT-55
    AAR Circular OT-55 (OT-55) outlines operational controls for trains
meeting the industry definition of a ``Key Train,'' including speed
restrictions, track requirements, storage requirements, and the
designation of ``Key Routes,'' which are subject to additional
inspection and equipment requirements. OT-55 defines a ``Key Train'' as
any train with:
     One tank car load of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard
(PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia (UN1005),
or ammonia solutions (UN3318);
     20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of any
combination of hazardous material, or;
     One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), High
Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW).
    Key Trains have a maximum speed of 50 mph. If a defect to a rail
car (e.g., hanging equipment) is reported by a wayside detector but not
confirmed by visual inspection, the maximum speed is reduced to 30 mph.
Circular OT-55 defines a ``Key Route'' as ``any track with a
combination of 10,000 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of
hazardous materials, or a combination of 4,000 car loadings of PIH or
TIH (Hazard zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia, flammable gas,
Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives, environmentally sensitive chemicals, Spent
Nuclear Fuel (SNF), and High Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW) over a
period of one year.'' OT-55 states that ``main tracks on `Key Routes'
must be inspected by rail defect detection and track geometry
inspection cars or any equivalent level of inspection no less than two
times

each year; sidings are similarly inspected no less than one time each
year; and main track and sidings will have periodic track inspections
that will identify cracks or breaks in joint bars.'' Finally, OT-55
states that ``wayside defective bearing detectors shall be placed at a
maximum of 40 miles apart on ``Key Routes,'' or equivalent level of
protection may be installed based on improvements in technology.''
These recommended practices were originally implemented by all major
Class I rail carriers operating in the United States, with smaller
short-line railroads following on as signatories.
    While PHMSA did not propose to incorporate by reference OT-55 or to
adopt the requirements for ``Key Trains'' in the HMR, the railroad
industry's widespread, voluntary adoption of the circular is an
important consideration for PHMSA in assessing the need for prescribing
additional operational controls by regulation. AAR first published
Circular No. OT-55 in January 1990 to document recommended railroad
operating practices for the transportation of hazardous materials. The
first issue of the circular included recommended mainline and yard
operating practices, designation of key routes, proposed separations
from hazmat storage areas, training of transportation employees, and
implementation of TRANSCAER[supreg]. TRANSCAER[supreg] is a national
community outreach program that works to improve community awareness,
emergency planning and incident response for the transportation of
hazardous materials, criteria for shipper notification, and procedures
for handling time sensitive materials. Over the past 30 years, OT-55
has been routinely revised as needed to incorporate technological
developments and other changes in industry practice concerning the safe
transportation of hazardous materials. For instance, OT-55 has adopted
revisions to AAR's interchange standards, and technology advancements
such as the use of electronic emergency response information to provide
timely and reliable information to emergency responders.
    To further promote compliance with the recommended practices
outlined in OT-55, and compliance with Federal transportation laws, the
rail industry developed and published the United States Hazardous
Materials Instructions for Rail, commonly referred to as ``HM-1.'' The
purpose of the HM-1 is to provide the rail industry with uniform
hazardous materials operating rules that railroads can implement and
consistently apply to support compliance with Federal regulations, and
to enhance significantly employee safety and the safety of the
communities through which the railroads operate. The HM-1 may be
implemented as published, or it may be modified by an individual
railroad to be consistent with its unique operating rules and
practices.
    Through its enforcement activities, FRA verifies that each railroad
has established operating rules governing the safe transportation of
hazardous materials, and utilizes those instructions to enforce that
railroad's compliance with the Federal operating and hazardous
materials transportation regulations.
    In accordance with the ``Key Train'' definition and the changes
being adopted, OT-55's operational controls would apply to the bulk
transport of LNG by rail in a train that is composed of 20 car loads or
intermodal portable tank loads in which LNG is present along with any
combination of other hazardous materials. Due to the operational
controls required for ``Key Trains,'' Circular OT-55 provides an
additional level of safety regardless of what combination of hazardous
materials the train is transporting. PHMSA and FRA believe this
industry standard reduces the risk of derailments and collisions and
therefore decreases the risk involved in the transportation of all
hazardous materials, including LNG.
    PHMSA and FRA note that the hazardous materials operating
instructions from Circular OT-55-Q, the most recent edition, have been
incorporated into railroads' (carriers') operating rules. Furthermore,
FRA regularly performs reviews of railroads and their operating rules
and are not aware of any instances in which a railroad is failing to
adhere to Circular OT-55 when operating ``Key Trains.''
2. Additional Operational Controls in the Final Rule
    In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting several additional
operational controls:
    (1) Trains with a block of 20 loaded tank cars of LNG, or 35 loaded
tank cars of LNG throughout the entire train, are required to be
equipped with an EOT device or DP.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See Section IV, B. Operational Controls, 1. Braking and
Routing for further discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Each loaded tank car containing LNG must be monitored for
location and tank pressure by the offeror and notify the carrier if the
tank pressure rises by more than 3 psig in any 24-hour period.
    (3) Each carrier operating trains carrying a loaded tank car of LNG
must perform additional planning requirements in accordance with Sec.
172.820 (i.e., rail routing). While the general operational controls in
the HMR, as supplemented by the widespread, voluntary practices
governing Key Trains in Circular OT-55, provide robust protections
against derailment and other accidents (and by extension, a loss of
package integrity resulting from the same) involving train
configurations with only a handful of tank cars, PHMSA believes that
the additional operational controls established by this final rule will
ensure safe transportation of LNG regardless of train configuration. As
explained earlier, trains currently transport to three DOT-113 tank
cars of flammable cryogenic materials (such as ethylene) in mixed
commodity freight trains. However, if the market for rail
transportation of LNG evolves to include movement of LNG in larger
quantities (in blocks of cars or unit configurations) within each
train, there is a higher probability that, should a derailment occur,
one or more cars containing LNG would be involved and would be
breached.
    The additional operational controls will decrease the likelihood
and severity of derailments (DP/EOT device); decrease the likelihood
that an LNG tank car is lost in transport (location monitoring);
increase the likelihood that the railroad is notified immediately in
the unlikely event that a tank car experiences unsafe conditions during
transportation (pressure monitoring); and reduce the severity of the
consequences in a derailment scenario by requiring that railroads
transport LNG on the safest route available to them (rail routing and
risk assessment). Over a DOT-113 tank car's expected 50-year service
life, the use of DP/EOT devices for block carriage and unit trains,
remote monitoring, and risk-based routing of trains transporting LNG
will help ensure the transportation safety of LNG on the rail
transportation network.
    Enhanced braking requirements can result in accident avoidance and
can lessen the consequences of an accident by more quickly slowing the
train and decreasing the energy of impacts by reducing the number of
tank cars affected by a potential derailment. PHMSA decided on the HHFT
threshold (i.e., a continuous block of 20 loaded LNG tank cars or 35
loaded LNG tank cars throughout the train) based on the effectiveness
of this existing requirement for flammable liquids in rail
transportation. PHMSA reviewed the possibility of requiring
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking on cars meeting the
above threshold, but determined that ECP

brakes are not a practical alternative given that ECP brakes are not
cost justified when applied to unit train configurations in the HHFT
environment. See HM-251F; 83 FR 48393 (Sept. 25, 2019).\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ PHMSA notes that while this rulemaking does not prohibit
LNG rail transportation in unit trains, the likelihood is low that
there will be LNG unit trains, at least initially. Development of
the necessary infrastructure, especially construction of DOT-
113C120W9 tank cars, to transport LNG by railroad, particularly by
unit trains, demands significant financial investment, long term
commitment, and considerable planning. LNG tank car fleets would
need to be built, and there is a limit to the construction capacity
of the industry. As a result, FRA anticipates that industry will
transport LNG in smaller configurations, at least until
infrastructure is in place to allow for unit train service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the availability of existing braking technologies, PHMSA is
requiring advanced braking in the form of a two-way EOT device or,
alternatively, a linked and operational DP system located at the rear
of the train. A two-way EOT device or DP system is more effective than
conventional brakes because a locomotive engineer can initiate an
emergency brake application from the front and rear of the train, which
can reduce stopping distances and lessen in-train forces that can cause
or contribute to the severity of certain derailments. These advanced
braking requirements are consistent with the current requirements for
HHFTs, which apply to Class 3 flammable liquids that are transported in
a single block of twenty cars or 35 cars dispersed throughout a single
train.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See Section IV, B. Operational Controls, 1. Braking and
Routing for a more detailed discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirement to remotely monitor a tank car containing LNG will
allow shippers and carriers to better identify adverse conditions and
prevent a non-accidental release of LNG while in transportation.
Moreover, the requirements in this final rule allow for flexibility for
shippers and carriers in determining how to best monitor the location
of the tank cars and pressure within the inner tank. PHMSA and FRA
expect that the industry will develop standard practices and implement
technologies to meet the HMR performance standard for monitoring.
    PHMSA is also adopting routing requirements in Sec.  172.820 to
further reduce the risk of a train accident. This amendment requires
railroads to evaluate safety and security risk factors when assessing
the potential routes to be used to transport LNG. The 27 safety and
security risk factors set forth in Appendix D of Part 172 against which
carriers evaluate their routes provide a robust framework for
identifying and managing route-based risks associated with LNG
transportation by rail. FRA regularly conducts evaluations of a
railroad's route risk assessment requirements to ensure adherence to
the requirement.
    Requirements of the route analysis measures for a rail carrier
include:
     Compilation of commodity transportation data;
     Analysis of safety and security risks for transportation
route(s);
     Identification and analysis of potential alternate
route(s); and
     Based on the above data, selection of the practicable
route posing the least overall safety and security risk.
    By expanding the existing route analysis and consultation
requirements of Sec.  172.820 to include LNG by tank car, PHMSA is
incorporating additional safety elements that are available within the
overall hazardous materials regulatory scheme. It is worth noting that
routing requirements were not mandated in the special permit issued to
ETS because the permit is issued to a shipper rather than a rail
carrier who is ultimately responsible for the route risk analysis. In
this final rule, there is no limitation on specific origins and
destinations, thereby necessitating routing and risk analysis under
Sec.  172.820. Some of the operational controls included in special
permit DOT-SP 20534 were not adopted or were revised in the final rule.
The requirement to submit a plan providing per shipment quantities,
timelines, etc., was included in DOT-SP 20534 in order to gather more
information about the movement of the material. This requirement is not
feasible for a broadly applicable regulatory authorization. In this
final rule, PHMSA applied the HHFT criteria in reaching its
determination to require the same braking requirements for LNG
transportation. After review of the comments and the safety history of
flammable liquid HHFTs, PHMSA concludes that this is best option to
ensure safe movement of LNG. In the final rule, the remote monitoring
requirements are different than what was included in the DOT-SP 20534
because PHMSA does not believe that direct monitoring for leaks is
necessary. Monitoring for tank pressure and tank car location
parameters will sufficiently inform the offeror of the tank car's
location and condition and allow notification to the carrier should an
undesirable condition occur. For example, registering and notification
of an unexpected decrease in pressure could likely indicate a methane
release and could be communicated immediately to the rail carrier and
the closest emergency responders.
    With respect to train length and weight limitations, PHMSA
determined that there should not be a maximum for either in this
rulemaking. PHMSA notes that the HMR do not limit the number of
shipments a shipper can offer into transportation, nor do the HMR
restrict the number or type of hazardous materials rail cars that a
carrier can transport in a train. An individual railroad's appropriate
train operating lengths are based on multiple factors, including, but
not limited to, track profile, train make-up, train dynamics, and crew
training. Due to these and other unique factors that influence a
specific railroad's operation, PHMSA and FRA conclude that
determination of appropriate train lengths is best left to the
individual railroads.
    Regarding separation distance, which is the number of non-placarded
rail cars between a locomotive or occupied caboose and railcars
containing hazardous materials (see Sec.  174.85), PHMSA has concluded
that it is appropriate to maintain the current requirement at this
time, pending further study of the issue. Non-placarded rail cars are
rail cars that do not contain an amount of hazardous material that
require placarding (see 49 CFR part 172 subpart F for additional
information about placarding requirements). The current requirement for
a flammable gas, like LNG, requires a separation distance of five cars
between the engine and placarded tank car, when train length permits.
If train length does not permit a separation distance of five cars, the
tank car(s) must be placed near the middle of the train, but not nearer
than the second car from an engine or occupied caboose. These long-
standing separation distance requirements protect train crews from the
releases of hazardous materials in accident conditions. PHMSA and FRA
collaborated under the scope of the Rail Safety Advisory Committee
Hazardous Materials Issues Working Group Task No. 15-04 to consider the
separation distance issue.
    Ultimately, due to an absence of consensus of the Working Group
participants, as well as a lack of established incident data, the
members did not reach agreement on a change to the existing regulation
governing hazardous materials in train separation distances. Moreover,
PHMSA worked with the Volpe Center in its review of rail accidents
occurring between 2006 and 2015 where there was a release of hazardous
materials near the head end of the train (occupied locomotive). The
review found no reported crew injuries

and therefore no injuries that were potentially preventable with
additional buffer cars.
    Extensive research exists on separation distance of hazardous
materials from train crews and locomotives, and other hazardous
materials in a train. PHMSA has initiated a research project in
coordination with the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe Center) as an initial step in addressing NTSB Safety
Recommendations R-17-1 and -2.\27\ This effort will result in a report
that identifies gaps in the existing studies, areas for further
research, and what conclusions can be drawn collectively from the
existing knowledge base, if any. PHMSA may consider changes to the
separation distance requirements in Sec.  174.85 of the HMR for
placarded rail cars and tank cars in mixed commodity freight train and
unit train configurations pending the outcome of the study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/R-17-001-002.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In consideration of the foregoing, PHMSA is not amending the
separation distance requirement in this final rule.

IV. Summary and Discussion of Comments to the Rulemaking Docket

    The NPRM comment period closed on January 13, 2020. PHMSA received
445 comment submissions \28\ to the rulemaking docket through the
extended comment period. PHMSA considered all comments in the
development of this final rule. The comments submitted to this docket
may be accessed via http://www.regulations.gov. The following table
categorizes the commenters by background:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Some comment submissions noted additional signatories.
Those were considered in the development of the final rule.

                        Table 4--NPRM Commenters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Description and
        Commenter background             Count     examples of category
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organizations........          27  Environmental Groups
                                                   (17); Emergency
                                                   Response
                                                   Organizations (6);
                                                   Other (4).
Governments.........................          15  Local (6); State (6);
                                                   Federal (2); Tribal
                                                   (1).
Private Individuals.................         391
Industry Stakeholders...............          12  Tank Car Manufacturers
                                                   (1); Trade
                                                   Associations (10);
                                                   Shippers (1).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA received comments relating to tank car design, operational
controls, emergency response, and potential environmental and economic
impacts. These comments are summarized and discussed in greater detail
below.

A. Tank Car Design

    In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to authorize DOT-113C120W tank cars for
use in the transportation of LNG by rail and to amend the ``Pressure
Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting'' Table in Sec.
173.319(d)(2) by adding a column for methane as follows:

                                        Table 5--Proposed Pressure Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Maximum permitted filling density  (percent by weight)
  Maximum start-to-discharge   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       pressure  (psig)                   Ethylene                 Ethylene              Ethylene                 Hydrogen                 Methane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17............................  ...........................  ....................  ...................  6.60.......................
45............................  52.8.......................
75............................  ...........................  51.1................  51.1...............  ...........................  32.5.
Maximum pressure when offered   10 psig....................  20 psig.............  20 psig............  ...........................  15 psig.
 for transportation.
Design service temperature....  Minus 260 [deg]F...........  Minus 260 [deg]F....  Minus 155 [deg]F...  Minus 423 [deg]F...........  Minus 260 [deg]F.
Specification (Sec.             113D60W, 113C60W...........  113C120W............  113D120W...........  113A175W, 113A60W..........  113C120W.
 180.507(b)(3) of this
 subchapter).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the summary of amendments in this final rule in
Section III, the start-to-discharge pressure setting, filling density,
maximum offering pressure, and the thermal characteristics of the DOT-