object creates an undue hazard to persons or property if it poses a
risk of injury to a person or a risk of damage to property. This
standard will be applied on a fact-specific basis. For example, a small
unmanned aircraft that drops a heavy or sharp object capable of
injuring a person in an area where there are people who could be hit by
that object would likely create an undue hazard to persons. The remote
pilot in command of the operation could take reasonable precautions
prior to flight by moving people away from the drop site to a distance
where they would not be hit by a falling object if something goes wrong
with the operation. Guidance associated with the enactment of part 107
will provide additional examples to help remote pilots comply with
Sec.  107.23(b).
5. Limitations on Operations in Certain Airspace
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed limiting the exposure of small
unmanned aircraft to other users of the NAS by restricting small UAS
operations in controlled airspace. In addition, the NPRM proposed
prohibiting small UAS operations in prohibited and restricted areas
without permission from the using or controlling agency. The proposed
rule also prohibited operation of small UAS in airspace restricted by
NOTAMs unless authorized by ATC or a certificate of waiver or
authorization.
    For the reasons discussed below, this rule will adopt the
provisions for operating in Class B through E airspace and in
prohibited or restricted areas as proposed in the NPRM, but with the
option to request a waiver from the provisions for operating in Class B
through E airspace. This rule will not adopt the provisions for
compliance with NOTAMs as proposed, but will

instead require compliance with Sec. Sec.  91.137 through 91.145 and
Sec.  99.7, as applicable. This rule will also not adopt the proposed
prohibition on operations in Class A airspace because the other
operational restrictions of this rule will keep a small unmanned
aircraft from reaching Class A airspace. Lastly, this rule will add a
prohibition against small unmanned aircraft operations that interfere
with operations and traffic patterns at any airport, heliport or
seaplane base.
a. Operations in Class B, C, D, and Lateral Boundaries of the Surface
Area of Class E Airspace Designated for an Airport
    The NPRM proposed to require prior permission from Air Traffic
Control (ATC) to operate in Class B, C, or D airspace, or within the
lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated
for an airport. The NPRM did not propose equipment requirements for
small UAS operating in controlled airspace, nor did it propose to
require small UAS to demonstrate strict compliance with part 91 in
order to operate in controlled airspace.
    Several commenters including AOPA, EAA, and the Small UAV
Coalition, supported the FAA's proposal that remote pilots obtain ATC
approval prior to operating small UAS in Class B, C, or D airspace, or
within the lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace
designated for an airport. Some commenters added that they would like
clarification that ATC approval does not mean the FAA issuance of a
COA. The International Air Transport Association supported the proposal
and stated this requirement should not be allowed to impede ATC's
primary responsibility to manage traffic. Transport Canada requested
clarification on the process for requesting ATC approval. Foxtrot
Consulting and JAM Aviation expressed concern about inconsistent
application of the regulation by ATC facilities.
    Some of these commenters requested that the FAA provide guidance to
ATC facilities regarding the handling of requests to operate small UAS
in controlled airspace. Modovolate Aviation agreed with the proposed
framework, but suggested that the FAA should provide guidance on how
ATC permission would be obtained. The Small UAV Coalition asked the FAA
to provide contact information for each ATC facility, and to agree to
provide timely decisions on whether to authorize operations in
controlled airspace. NBAA suggested prohibiting use of ATC frequencies
to obtain the required permission.
    In response to comments, the FAA will establish two methods by
which a remote pilot in command may request FAA authorization for a
small unmanned aircraft to operate in Class B, C, D, and the lateral
boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an
airport. The first method is the same as what was proposed in the NPRM:
A remote pilot in command may seek approval from the ATC facility with
jurisdiction over the airspace in which the remote pilot would like to
conduct operations. The second method allows a remote pilot to request
a waiver from this provision in order to operate in Class B through E
airspace. As stated in the NPRM, the appropriate ATC facility has the
best understanding of local airspace, its usage, and traffic patterns
and is in the best position to ascertain whether the proposed small UAS
operation would pose a hazard to other users or the efficiency of the
airspace, and procedures to implement to mitigate such hazards. The ATC
facility has the authority to approve or deny aircraft operations based
on traffic density, controller workload, communications issues, or any
other type of operational issues that could potentially impact the safe
and efficient flow of air traffic in that airspace. If necessary to
approve a small UAS operation, ATC may require mitigations such as
altitude constraints and direct communication. ATC may deny requests
that pose an unacceptable risk to the NAS and cannot be mitigated.
    The ATC facility does not have the authority to approve or deny
small UAS operations on the basis of equipage that exceeds the part 107
requirements. Because additional equipage and technologies such as geo-
fencing have not been certificated by the FAA, they therefore need to
be examined on a case-by-case basis in order for the FAA to determine
their reliability and functionality. Additionally, requiring ATC to
review equipage would place a burden on ATC and detract from other
duties. Instead, a remote pilot who wishes to operate in controlled
airspace because he or she can demonstrate mitigations through equipage
may do so by applying for a waiver.
    Requests for authorization to operate a UAS in one of the above
areas should be made by writing or an electronic method as determined
by the Administrator and publicized on the FAA's Web site. Requests for
such authorization via air traffic control radio communication
frequencies will not be accepted because they may interfere with the
separation of aircraft.
    The FAA is not committing to a timeline for approval after ATC
permission has been requested because determining the level of review
required for approval is dependent on the management at the individual
facilities. The FAA also notes that the time required for approval will
vary based on the resources available at the ATC facility and the
complexity and safety issues raised by each specific request. The FAA
encourages remote pilots who know that they will need to operate in
Class B, C, D, or E airspace to contact the appropriate ATC facility as
soon as possible prior to the operation.
    While some UAS activity will still utilize a COA, operating under
part 107 regulations will not require a COA where ATC permission is
specified. The FAA is working concurrently on several other documents,
including an advisory circular, and training and direction to ATC
facilities that will provide guidance to users and ATC personnel as to
procedures and responsibilities. This guidance will ensure consistent
application of ATC permission and processes, to the extent practicable.
The FAA notes that some discrepancies may arise due to the unique
nature of different airspace.
    Several commenters, including ALPA, TTD, and the University of
North Dakota John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences, opposed
allowing operations in class B, C, D, or E airspace. The University of
North Dakota John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences argued that
this provision would place an undue burden on ATC, and that the well-
established COA process would be a better mechanism than ATC
permission. TTD suggested that the FAA adopt design provisions that
ensure small UAS remain in the intended airspace when operating
optimally, as well as risk mitigation technology when command controls
are lost, and that operations in controlled airspace be banned in the
absence of such provisions. ALPA stated that it does not believe there
is sufficient information on which to base a sound safety case for
allowing small UAS into controlled airspace at this time. Several
commenters including SWAPA, Airport Council International-North America
and the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works, thought a
real-time two-way communication requirement should be included. The
Property Drone Consortium opposed the requirement to notify ATC, while
adding that it believed this requirement imposed burdens on UAS
operators that are different from those imposed on manned operations.
    The FAA does not believe that prescriptive design provisions are

necessary in this rule. The FAA acknowledges the concerns raised by the
commenters but notes that, as of this writing, safety-relevant equipage
such as transponders has not been certificated for use on a small UAS.
Additionally, there could be small UAS operations with operational
parameters that would make those UAS not a danger to manned aircraft
even if positive control is lost. For example, a small unmanned
aircraft flying at low altitude and surrounded by natural barriers that
would stop the aircraft from flying away would not pose a danger to
other aircraft, even in the absence of equipage mitigations. Thus, this
rule will retain the framework allowing the FAA to evaluate operations
seeking to be conducted in controlled airspace on a case-by-case basis,
and will not impose generally applicable design or equipage provisions
on all small UAS operations. The FAA will continue to monitor the
development of small UAS technology and may revisit this issue once the
pertinent technology becomes more mature and additional safety data is
available.
    This framework is similar to the regulatory construct underlying
controlled-airspace access under part 91. Specifically, while part 91
imposes minimum equipage requirements on aircraft seeking to operate in
controlled airspace, part 91 also gives ATC the power to authorize
aircraft that do not have the required equipage to access the
airspace.\108\ Part 107 provides ATC with a similar power to evaluate
whether an individual small UAS operation may safely be conducted in
controlled airspace even though the unmanned aircraft lacks equipage
typically used to mitigate safety concerns in that airspace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ See, e.g., 14 CFR 91.215(b) (allowing ATC to authorize
access to Class A, B, or C airspace for aircraft that do not have a
transponder) and Sec.  91.225(b) (allowing ATC to authorize access
to Class B or C airspace for aircraft that do not have ADS-B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the FAA does not agree that the current COA process
would be a better mechanism for operating in controlled airspace.
Currently, when a small UAS operator applies for a COA, the Flight
Standards Service in the FAA first addresses the equipage exemptions,
and then if a favorable outcome is reached, the operator is allowed to
operate in Class G airspace up to 200 feet AGL. If an operator wishes
to operate in controlled airspace, under the previous COA framework,
the request is sent to the air traffic service center. The service
center then works with the appropriate ATC facility to respond to the
request. This rule will streamline the process, such that equipage no
longer needs to be reviewed by the FAA if the part 107 requirements are
met. Therefore, the only outstanding step in the COA process would be
resolving requests to operate in controlled airspace. This rule
incorporates that step within the ATC-permission framework, making the
COA process unnecessary for part 107 operations.
    Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University supported the proposed rule
and proposed adding a filed flight plan option in lieu of explicit ATC
approval. The City and County of Denver, Colorado, insisted that
permission should be granted only for essential commercial, non-
recreational purposes. Airport Council International-North America and
the American Association of Airport Executives stated that ATC should
only grant permission when there is a specific need to do so. The
Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue asked that public safety
operators be exempt from the requirement to obtain ATC approval prior
to operating in controlled airspace.
    The FAA does not agree with Embry-Riddle's proposal to add a flight
plan option in lieu of ATC approval. Filing a flight plan would not
alert ATC in advance as to the nature of the operation, nor would it
give them an opportunity to apply mitigations in a timely manner. The
FAA also notes that the flight plan system is set up for point-to-point
flights. Adapting it for small UAS operations would be a technology
hurdle and would introduce unnecessary delay into the rule. Therefore,
a flight plan is not a viable substitute for obtaining ATC permission.
    Additionally, ATC should not be placed in the position of
validating the need of any specific operation. Any decision on allowing
an operation within the appropriate ATC facility's jurisdiction will
take into account the workload of the controller. If it is anticipated
the volume of traffic could change, the facility might require a means
to terminate a small UAS operation in real-time, such as two-way radio
or cell phone communication.
    The FAA also notes that this rulemaking does not apply to
recreational small UAS operations that are conducted in accordance with
section 336 of Public Law 112-95. Further, the FAA does not agree that
public safety operators should be exempt from the requirement to obtain
ATC approval prior to operating in controlled airspace. Although public
safety operators may have time-critical aspects to their operations,
the risks associated with flying in controlled airspace remain the same
regardless of the type of operation. The requirement for ATC approval
gives ATC the opportunity to prescribe mitigations to address any risks
associated with operating in controlled airspace. The FAA notes that
while a public entity has the option to operate under a public COA, it
may gain an operational advantage by operating under part 107. However,
in electing to operate under part 107, a public entity is required to
operate wholly under the part, and its operation would therefore be
considered a civil operation.
    Some commenters, including TTD and NAFI, expressed concern that the
testing required by the proposed rule would not adequately prepare UAS
operators to effectively communicate with ATC. The American Association
of Airport Executives and the Associated General Contractors of America
suggested that the FAA develop a protocol or guidance for UAS operators
when communicating with ATC. NBAA asserted that if ATC requires two-way
radio capability in their approval, the remote pilot should be required
to hold at least a sport pilot airman certificate to ensure familiarity
with ATC phraseology.
    Transport Canada asked whether FAA considered mandating that the
UAS operator develop and adhere to procedures for loss of positive
control that include communications with air traffic control.
Similarly, CAPA said that the FAA should require procedures for
operators of small UAS to notify the appropriate ATC agency when the
UAS operator has lost positive control.
    This rule does not mandate a specific method of communication with
ATC. In its evaluation of a request to fly in controlled airspace, an
ATC facility may request two-way radio communications as a condition of
approval for that request. ATC's evaluation may include assessing the
experience and ability of the remote pilot in using proper phraseology.
Imposing a general sport pilot certificate requirement would not ensure
the appropriate knowledge and skills because sport pilots are not
permitted to operate in class B, C, or D airspace without an additional
endorsement, and would not necessarily have the radio training or
experience by virtue of holding a sport pilot certificate.
Additionally, there are several means outside of an airman certificate
that may provide proper ATC communication experience, such as airport
ground personnel or air traffic controller training.
    The FAA has not mandated specific coordination with ATC for manned
or unmanned aircraft during a loss-of-control event. As described in
the

introduction to the FAA Safety Team (FAAST) course ALC-40,\109\ a
common rubric used by pilots is aviate, navigate, communicate. In other
words, during an emergency, a pilot should maintain control of the
aircraft, know where he or she is and where he or she intends to go,
and let someone know his or her plans. To require a communication task
during an emergency may distract a pilot from these priorities and
possibly create additional risk. Proper flight planning by a remote
pilot in command includes an assessment of the risk of violating
regulatory airspace, and incorporation of mitigations and contingencies
commensurate with that risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ FAA Safety Team Course ALC-40: Aviate--Navigate--
Communicate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prioria Robotics said the FAA should consider blanket access to
airspace below 500 feet for small and micro class unmanned vehicles of
less than 15 pounds, with exceptions for within one mile of airports.
Prioria Robotics also recommended that only vehicles larger than 15
pounds be subject to airspace restriction. One individual stated that
operations below 100 feet and farther than 3 miles from an airport in
class B and C airspace should be allowed without ATC involvement.
Similarly, the National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable
& Telecommunications Association, and the Radio Television Digital News
Association, commenting jointly, suggested a sliding scale for
operations that would require lower altitudes when closer to an airport
for operations without ATC approval. DJI suggested that in lieu of
restrictions in certain classes of airspace, the FAA should consider
adopting an approach akin to the one that the agency has adopted in 14
CFR part 77, in which maximum altitude increases as distance to an
airport increases.
    The FAA disagrees with the assumption that the weight of an
unmanned aircraft is the sole safety concern when operating in
controlled airspace. The FAA designates the various classes of
controlled airspace to allow ATC to provide separation services to
instrument flight rules (IFR) and, in the case of class B and C
airspace, VFR traffic. Controlled airspace surface areas have a high
number of arriving and departing aircraft at altitudes below 500 feet
and rely on ATC to assess and mitigate the associated risk.
    Trying to create a sliding scale that would require lower altitudes
closer to an airport for operations without ATC approval would be
complex because the slope would not be uniform. Instead, the slope
would be shallower in the path of approach or departures, and steeper
away from traffic flows. Each airspace has unique characteristics, and
individual small UAS operations are different, making it impossible to
establish a uniform standard. Allowing the local ATC facility to
determine the feasibility of a small UAS operation is an efficient
means to mitigate the risks involved in operating in controlled
airspace.
    The Colorado Agricultural Aviation Association, the City of Phoenix
Aviation Department, and PlaneSense and Cobalt Air, commenting jointly,
suggested that a NOTAM be issued when small UAS are flying in class B,
C, D, and E airspace.
    The FAA disagrees with this suggestion because, in many instances,
a NOTAM would not provide any additional level of safety. For example,
neither a very low altitude operation (e.g., below 50 feet), nor a
flight that is shielded by a taller structure that would preclude
manned aircraft from operating in that area, would benefit from a
NOTAM. In both instances there is a low probability that manned
aircraft will be present in those areas. The FAA has a responsibility
to keep NOTAMs relevant to pilots, and NOTAMs that do not provide an
additional level of safety may create information ``clutter'' during a
preflight briefing. A facility may issue a NOTAM for the impacted
timeframe after giving permission to a remote pilot to operate in
controlled airspace, if appropriate.
    NOAA requested more details about requirements for civil UAS
operated in the Mode C veil. In response, the FAA notes that operations
conducted under part 107 do not need to comply with part 91 unless
explicitly directed by part 107. The transponder requirement in the
mode C veil (14 CFR part 91.215(b)(2)) is not required of part 107
operations.
    NAFI asked what radio station license a small UAS operator would
use on the aviation radio spectrum. In response, the FAA notes that
licensing of radio stations is outside of its jurisdiction. The
pertinent FCC guidance can be found in form 605 Schedule C (https://transition.fcc.gov/Forms/Form605/605c.pdf).
    Several commenters, including the American Association of Airport
Executives, the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, and the
Metropolitan Airports Commission, suggested that the FAA require remote
pilots wishing to operate in class B, C, D, or E airspace to also
notify the appropriate airport operator. The City and County of Denver,
Colorado, and the City of Phoenix Aviation Department added that UAS
operators should be required to seek authorization from both ATC and
the airport operator at least two full business days prior to small UAS
operations in controlled airspace.
    An airport operator does not have responsibility for air traffic or
activities outside airport property. The FAA has been tasked with
integrating UAS operations into the NAS, and notes that manned aircraft
do not have a corresponding requirement to notify airport management.
The ATC facility is the proper focal point for approval and
notification for small UAS operations in controlled airspace under this
rule.
    The FAA does not agree that remote pilots must seek permission from
an ATC facility at least two full business days prior to the small UAS
operations. As discussed previously, the timeframe for ATC to process
permission requests will vary based on the ATC facility, the airspace,
and the small UAS operation. In some instances it may take less than
two full business days to process a permission request and, as such, a
requirement to submit the permission request two days in advance would
be unnecessarily burdensome.
    The Professional Helicopter Pilots Association said operations in
class B airspace should not be allowed without a transponder for
operation above at least 200 feet AGL.
    Because part 107 operations are constrained to visual line of
sight, they are confined to a limited area known to ATC. Requiring a
transponder in class B airspace for all operations over a certain
altitude would place a burden on the small UAS operation that might not
provide any additional safety because all manned traffic (except under
certain SFRA procedures) \110\ is required to be in radio communication
and under the direct control of ATC. ATC would deny a small UAS flight
operating under part 107 if lack of a transponder created an
unacceptable risk for that operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ As it pertains to this discussion, Special Flight Rules
Areas are areas of tightly constrained altitude and path where VFR
aircraft can traverse Class B airspace without receiving a clearance
or talking to ATC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society expressed concern that UAS
might inadvertently enter class B airspace. ALPA was concerned about
the ability of a small UAS pilot/operator to correctly identify
specific airspace areas and make the correct determination of whether
operations are permitted or must be coordinated with ATC.
    This risk remains unchanged regardless of the restrictions imposed
on

operating in class B airspace. Other than the inner surface areas,
there are very few instances where the floor of class B airspace is
less than 1,000 feet above ground level, and therefore a vertical
intrusion would be rare. The lateral boundaries of Class B airspace can
be easily ascertained and avoided with proper planning of the
operation. Airspace configuration is a knowledge area that will be
tested for remote pilot certification, and a remote pilot should be
aware of proximity of the unmanned aircraft to more restrictive
airspace. Remote pilot certificate holders will also be regularly
tested on their knowledge of airspace configuration, either as part of
their flight review (for part 61 pilot certificate holders) or when
they take the recurrent knowledge test (for non-part-61 certificate
holders). In addition, applicants for a remote pilot certificate who do
not hold a part 61 pilot certificate will be required to pass an
initial aeronautical knowledge test that includes knowledge of
airspace, airspace operating requirements, and the use of aeronautical
charts. Pilots who hold a part 61 pilot certificate with an aircraft
category and class rating will not have to take the initial
aeronautical knowledge test, but they will have acquired the pertinent
knowledge in order to obtain their part 61 pilot certificate.
b. Operations in Class A Airspace
    The NPRM proposed prohibiting small UAS operations in Class A
airspace. Class A airspace starts at 18,000 feet mean sea level and
extends up to 60,000 feet.\111\ This rule will not adopt the proposed
prohibition because a small unmanned aircraft will be unable to access
Class A airspace without violating the other operational restrictions
of part 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ 14 CFR 71.33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership, Crew Systems, and three
individual commenters questioned the need for specifically prohibiting
operations in Class A airspace. One of the individual commenters did
not have an objection to the proposed restriction, but stated that the
other operational restrictions in the NPRM would make it impossible to
operate in Class A airspace. Another individual commenter pointed out
that the only location where an operation could meet all of the
operational restrictions proposed in the NPRM and still be in Class A
airspace is near the summit of Mt. McKinley. This commenter suggested
that an explicit restriction on Class A airspace operations was
unnecessary, as no one would bother to carry a small UAS up a mountain
in order to fly it.
    The FAA agrees with the commenter who stated that other operational
restrictions in the NPRM would make it impossible to operate in Class A
airspace. Title 14 CFR 71.33(b) designating Class A airspace in Alaska
specifically excludes the airspace less than 1,500 feet above the
surface of the earth. This eliminates the possibility of a small UAS
operating under part 107 from reaching Class A airspace given the
altitude limitations of the rule. Consequently, this rule will not
adopt the proposed Class A airspace restriction.
c. Prohibited or Restricted Areas
    The NPRM proposed prohibiting small UAS operations in prohibited
and restricted areas without permission from the using or controlling
agency, as applicable. Prohibited and restricted areas are designated
in 14 CFR part 73. The proposed provision concerning prohibited and
restricted areas was similar to the part 91 restriction on operations
in these areas, and did not include any new UAS-specific prohibited or
restricted areas.\112\ After careful consideration of the comments, the
FAA will adopt the provisions as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See 14 CFR 91.133.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA establishes prohibited and restricted areas when necessary
to prohibit flight over an area on the surface in the interest of
national security or welfare. As discussed in section III.J.2 of this
preamble, several commenters requested that the FAA establish
prohibited or restricted airspace over energy infrastructure
facilities, citing national security concerns as the basis for their
comments. However, four commenters also cited safety concerns when
suggesting that the FAA establish such restrictions.
    Southern Company and Edison Electric Institute, individually and
jointly with NRECA and APPA, explicitly cited safety reasons for
restricting operations near energy infrastructure facilities. Edison
Electric Institute raised concerns regarding UAS operations over
critical energy infrastructure, including electric transmission and
distribution facilities, power generation facilities, transmission
lines, and substations. The commenter noted that the FAA currently has
a TFR for manned aircraft over generation facilities, which the
commenter said should be extended to cover UAS. The commenter argued
that the FAA should extend the TFR to small UAS because of ``the
obvious safety factor involved with any activity near high voltage
equipment and the attendant economic loss that comes from the possible
loss of electric distribution.'' EEI also submitted a separate, joint
comment with NRECA and the APPA, which reiterated the same concerns.
    Southern Company proposed that the FAA prohibit small UAS
operations over power generation and transmission facilities, except by
the utility or third parties acting on behalf of the utility. The
commenter stated that the current NOTAM advising pilots to avoid
overflight of power-generation facilities, including nuclear power
plants, does not adequately address the potential risk small UAS pose.
The commenter argued that, ``[b]ecause of the small size, low-cost,
great availability, and unmanned nature of small UAS, little deters
small-UAS operators, as opposed to their manned aircraft counterparts,
from operating over power generation and transmission facilities.'' The
commenter further argued that, although small UAS are capable of safe
operation in close proximity to most structures, operation next to
power generation and transmission facilities may be subject to
invisible hazards, such as fire hazards caused by light and heat
produced from an electric arc, that may be unfamiliar to non-utility
operators.
    Consumers Energy Company and the American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers also addressed the safety of energy infrastructure.
Consumers Energy Company said the FAA should consider expressly
identifying a zone of no small UAS operation within a specified
distance from electrical facilities (substations, power lines, and
utility poles), except for small UAS operations by the facilities'
owners. The commenter said that such a rule would reduce the likelihood
of small UAS operations negatively affecting electrical facilities and
continue to ensure the safety of the United States electric grid.
    The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers complained that the
NPRM does not identify--much less address--issues of safety and
security arising from certain scenarios that are a serious issue for
its members, including an accidental crash into a facility, such as a
refinery. The commenter expressed concern that the airspace and
geographic limitations in the proposed rule are not sufficient to
ensure the safety and security of critical infrastructure facilities,
and therefore requested that the final rule prohibit the unauthorized
use, or unauthorized operation, of a small UAS over all oil and gas
production, handling, transport, and processing facilities.

    EEI expressed concern that FDC NOTAM 4/0811 advising pilots to
avoid the airspace over, or in proximity to, power plants would prevent
electric utility companies from conducting small UAS flights around
their own facilities.
    Restricted airspace is designated when the FAA determines it is
necessary to confine or segregate activities hazardous to
nonparticipating aircraft. The FAA does not create special use airspace
applicable to only one particular airframe or aircraft type. The
public's right of free transit through the airspace includes the users
of unmanned aircraft. Accordingly, the FAA declines commenters'
suggestions to create UAS-specific restricted airspace around certain
facilities. However, the FAA acknowledges commenters' concerns. In
response to these concerns, the FAA emphasizes FDC NOTAM 4/0811, which
states that ``. . . to the extent practicable, pilots are strongly
advised to avoid the airspace above, or in proximity to such sites as
power plants (nuclear, hydro-electric, or coal), dams, refineries,
industrial complexes, military facilities and other similar facilities.
Pilots should not circle as to loiter in the vicinity over these types
of facilities.'' \113\ This NOTAM applies with equal force to pilots of
manned and unmanned aircraft. In response to EEI's concern, the FAA
notes that FDC NOTAM 4/0811 is advisory and thus, does not constitute a
regulatory prohibition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ FDC 4/0811, June 18, 2007, at 2106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Areas Designated by Notice to Airmen
    The NPRM proposed to prohibit operation of small UAS in airspace
restricted by NOTAMs, including NOTAMs issued to designate a TFR,
unless authorized by ATC or a certificate of waiver or authorization.
After reviewing comments on this issue, the FAA will change the method
by which remote pilots may gain permission to operate in airspace
restricted by NOTAMs. The final rule will require that small UAS
operators comply with the provisions of Sec. Sec.  91.137 through
91.145, and Sec.  99.7, as applicable.
    Southern Company commented that electric utility companies should
be excepted from TFRs under Sec. Sec.  91.137(a)(2) and (a)(3) to be
able to expeditiously restore power during natural disasters. The
Washington State Department of Transportation, Aviation Division,
recommended that small UAS be allowed to operate in airspace restricted
by NOTAMs, including TFRs, if the aircraft is equipped with position-
reporting transmission capability, if two-way communication can be
maintained between the operator and ATC, and if the appropriate level
of permission to enter the airspace has been obtained.
    TFRs are implemented for a number of reasons, from protecting
aircraft from hazards on the ground or other sight-seeing aircraft, to
providing a safe environment for the operation of disaster relief
aircraft. The Washington State Department of Transportation, Aviation
Division, did not describe how a UAS equipped with position-reporting
transmission capability and two-way radio communication would allow for
safe operation in a TFR. NOTAMs contain time-critical aeronautical
information that is either temporary in nature or not sufficiently
known in advance to permit publication on aeronautical charts or other
publications.\114\ NOTAMs are available to the public on the FAA's Web
site.\115\ In response to Southern Company's comment, the FAA notes
that NOTAMs exist to address hazards in the restricted airspace, and
allowing an aircraft to enter TFRs based only on its mission does not
address the hazard that warranted the airspace restriction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ See FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, para. 5-1-3.
    \115\ See, e.g., https://www.notams.faa.gov/dinsQueryWeb/ and
http://www.faa.gov/pilots/flt_plan/notams/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, these comments raise the question of whether the proposed
rule needlessly conflicted with the NOTAM provisions in part 91. Part
91 contains various types of NOTAMs, and the requirements to gain
permission differ accordingly. For example, Sec.  91.137(b) requires an
aircraft to be participating in hazard relief activities under the
direction of the official in charge of on-scene emergency response
activities in order to operate within an area for which the specified
NOTAM has been issued.\116\ Section 91.137(c) contains a number of
conditions, at least one of which must be met in order to operate
within an area for which the specified NOTAM has been issued.\117\
Conditions under Sec.  91.137(c) include that the aircraft be carrying
law enforcement or media personnel, or the aircraft is operating under
an ATC-approved IFR flight plan.\118\ Conversely, a Sec.  91.141 TFR in
the proximity of Presidential and other parties has no exceptions other
than those stated in the NOTAM.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ 14 CFR 91.137(b).
    \117\ 14 CFR 91.137(c).
    \118\ 14 CFR 91.137(c)(2), (3), (5).
    \119\ 14 CFR 91.141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These provisions conflict with the proposed language in the NPRM
that would allow operations in airspace restricted by NOTAM with ATC or
COA permission. In considering this issue, the FAA has identified no
UAS-specific concerns that would require treating small UAS
differently, for TFR purposes, than aircraft operating under part 91.
Thus, the FAA has amended the language of Sec.  107.47 to require
compliance with Sec. Sec.  91.137 through 91.145 or Sec.  99.7.
    Additionally, the FAA notes that part 91 subpart J lists the
provisions under part 91 that are waivable, and describes the process
to request a waiver.\120\ Because small UAS remote pilots will be
subject to the part 91 provisions described above, the waiver
provisions and process described in part 91 subpart J will also apply
should a remote pilot wish to seek a waiver from the applicable part 91
provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See 14 CFR 91.903, 91.905.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department of Defense (DOD) through its Policy Board on Federal
Aviation (PBFA) submitted a comment on protecting certain military and
Federal law enforcement facilities, recommending that ``[t]he FAA
Administrator classifies the airspace below 500 feet Above Ground Level
(AGL) or within 2000 horizontal feet of a military installation (as
defined in 10 U.S.C. 2801(c)(4)), or any buildings, grounds or property
owned, occupied or secured in whole or in part by any Federal law
enforcement or national security agency, as `National Defense Airspace
Area' in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3).'' \121\ In their
comments, the PBFA also requested that for small UAS operations within
a military training route (MTR) or military operations area (MOA), that
small UAS operators publish a NOTAM and notify the MTR/MOA scheduler at
least 24 hours in advance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ DOD Policy Board on Federal Aviation comment at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA implements the National Defense Airspace mentioned above as
prohibited and restricted areas. These areas are created by rulemaking
actions and charted on VFR and IFR charts. A prohibited area would
prevent flight of all aircraft, manned and unmanned, including aircraft
operated by the agency occupying the facility. In addition, a
prohibited area is only established by the FAA over those areas
demonstrating a need to prohibit all flight generally due only to
national security concerns, a standard that is currently met by only
eight areas in the United States. PBFA's requested

language would have the effect of expanding the number of areas 100-
fold.
    A restricted area is also not appropriate because FAA Order 7400.2
defines the purpose of a restricted area as ``. . . necessary to
confine or segregate activities considered hazardous to
nonparticipating aircraft.'' \122\ Examples of hazardous activities in
this context are live weapons fire, non-eye-safe lasers, and explosive
demolition. The PBFA comment does not claim these facilities meet these
criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ FAA Order 7400.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA also declines to impose additional NOTAM requirements on
small UAS operations. The NOTAM system is used to alert pilots of
conditions or situations in the NAS that could present a hazard to
aircraft. Historically, the FAA has used a NOTAM requirement in the
COAs it issued for UAS operations. This was appropriate because small
UAS operations were outside the regulatory structure that was then in
place, and, while not inherently hazardous, small UAS flights required
exemption or waiver from a number of FAA regulations. Because these
operations deviated from existing FAA regulations, a NOTAM was an
acceptable means to notify pilots of the activity. However, with part
107, the FAA is bringing a subset of UAS operations within the FAA
regulatory structure. Civil, public, and military pilots are expected
to be familiar with regulations affecting their flight, including the
possibility of encountering UAS activity below 400 feet. Therefore,
requiring a NOTAM would not be appropriate.
    UAS remote pilots must be aware of their location and operating
environment in relation to MTRs and MOAs. As part of their see and
avoid responsibilities, remote pilots must use extreme caution when
operating through an MTR or MOA. Because of the high speed of some
military aircraft, the necessary reaction time will be substantially
less in an MTR or MOA. Checking the NOTAM system and/or the responsible
Flight Service Station for activity in these areas will provide
information to a remote pilot that will help ensure a safe flight.
e. Operations in Class G Airspace
    The FAA did not include any discussion of airports in Class G
airspace in the NPRM and it did not propose any regulatory text to
restrict small UAS operations in the vicinity of airports in class G
airspace. Class G airspace is considered uncontrolled and ATC does not
have authority or responsibility for separation of traffic. For
operations in the vicinity of non-towered airports located in class E
surface areas, the remote pilot in command must obtain prior permission
from Air Traffic Control. After further review, the FAA will include a
provision in the final rule that prohibits any small unmanned aircraft
operations that interfere with operations and traffic patterns at any
airport, heliport, or seaplane base.
    Several commenters, including Trimble Navigation and NAMIC,
supported allowing operations in class G airspace, without additional
comment regarding operations in the vicinity of airports in class G.
    AOPA and GAMA recommended prohibiting small UAS operations within a
minimal accepted horizontal distance from airports in Class G airspace,
but they did not recommend a specific distance. NBAA suggested that FAA
restrict operations within a 3-mile radius of airports in class G
airspace. The Airline Pilots Association and Hillsborough County
Aviation Authority recommended restricting operations within a 5-mile
radius of airports. Several individual commenters also recommended a
prohibition of small UAS in the vicinity of airports.
    The FAA agrees with commenters that supported the integration of
small UAS operations with existing aeronautical operations in
uncontrolled class G airspace because part 107 has specific risk
mitigation and hazard reduction provisions that facilitate integration.
First, small UAS pilots will be required to pass initial aeronautical
knowledge testing before receiving a part 107 airman certificate. This
knowledge testing will include operations in class G airspace. With
issuance of the remote pilot certificate, the pilot will have the
authority and responsibility of a remote pilot in command. The remote
pilot in command will also be directly responsible for, and will be the
final authority as to the operation of the small unmanned aircraft
system. Finally, the remote pilot in command will be required to ensure
that the small unmanned aircraft will pose no undue hazard to other
aircraft, people, or property in the event of a loss of control of the
aircraft for any reason.
    The FAA acknowledges, however, that there is a risk associated with
close operations between manned and unmanned aircraft. Therefore, this
rule will include a performance-based approach to integrating small
unmanned aircraft near airports, heliports, and seaplane bases. Because
the NPRM did not contemplate prohibiting operations within the vicinity
of an airport in class G airspace, the FAA will not restrict small UAS
operations within a specified distance from an airport. Rather, in
response to concerns regarding the integration of small UAS and manned
aircraft, this rule will prohibit remote pilots from operating their
small unmanned aircraft in a manner that interferes with operations and
traffic patterns at airports, heliports, and seaplane bases.
    While a small unmanned aircraft must always yield right of way to a
manned aircraft, a manned aircraft may alter its flight path or delay
its landing or take off in order to avoid a small UAS that may present
a potential conflict or otherwise affect the safe outcome of the
flight. For example, an unmanned aircraft hovering 200 feet above a
runway may cause a manned aircraft holding short of the runway to delay
take off, or a manned aircraft on the downwind leg of the pattern to
delay landing. While the unmanned aircraft in this scenario would not
pose an immediate traffic conflict to the aircraft on the downwind leg
of the traffic pattern or to the aircraft intending to takeoff, nor
would it violate the right-of-way provision of Sec.  107.37(a), the
small unmanned aircraft would have interfered with operations and
traffic patterns at an airport.
    In order to avoid interfering with operations in a traffic pattern,
remote pilots should avoid operating in the traffic pattern or
published approach corridors used by manned aircraft.\123\ When
operational necessity requires the remote pilot to operate at an
airport in uncontrolled airspace, the remote pilot should operate the
small unmanned aircraft in such a way that the manned-aircraft pilot
does not need to alter his or her flight path in the traffic pattern or
on a published instrument approach in order to avoid a potential
collision. Because remote pilots have an obligation to yield right of
way to all other aircraft and avoid interfering in traffic pattern
operations, the FAA expects that most remote pilots will avoid
operating in the vicinity of airports because their aircraft generally
do not require airport infrastructure, and the concentration of other
aircraft increases in the vicinity of airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ The official source regarding airport traffic patterns is
the Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD). Instrument Approach
Procedures are published by the FAA and can be found in U.S.
Terminal Procedures Publications (TPPs), online from the FAA at
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/dtpp/, or in numerous third-party sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA adds this performance-based approach requirement in
response to concerns that small UAS operations

may present a hazard to manned aircraft operating at low altitudes in
the vicinity of airports in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace.
Due to the requirements for remote pilots to not operate in a careless
or reckless manner and to yield the right of way to all other aircraft,
the FAA does not consider it necessary to prohibit small UAS operations
in the vicinity of an airport in uncontrolled airspace. Like
ballooning, skydiving, banner towing, and other non-traditional
aeronautical activities, the FAA expects that remote pilots will work
with airport operators to identify ways to safely integrate small UAS
operations into the flow of other operations at the airport.
    Experimental Aircraft Association, National Association of State
Aviation Officials, Minneapolis-Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports
Commission, US Hang Gliding & Paragliding Association, the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Aviators Model Code of Conduct initiative, and
several individual commenters said that FAA should require operators
intending to fly small UAS within 5 statute miles of airports in Class
G airspace to notify airport authorities in advance of the operations.
These commenters said that such notification would allow airport
authorities, in turn, to notify aircraft in proximity of the airport of
the small UAS activity. City and County of Denver, Colorado and County
of Los Angeles said that Airport Operators should be permitted to limit
small UAS operations on and around airports.
    Airport operators have the proprietary right to operate their
airport in a safe and efficient manner. Under 49 U.S.C. 40103, the FAA
has the sole authority to regulate airspace, including airspace
overlying an airport. While airport operators have the ability to
manage operations on the surface of the airport, airport operators may
not regulate the use of airspace above and near the airport. In an
effort to safely integrate small unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft
at an airport, airport operators may recommend certain areas where
small UAS operate, in order to avoid conflicts with manned aircraft.
The FAA does not consider the notification of airport operators to
significantly enhance the safety of integration with existing
operations. The requirement for notification creates a burden on the
airport operator with little benefit to users of the airport, because
the airport operator would have no requirement to disseminate knowledge
of small UAS operations to other airport users.
    Instead, remote pilots should adhere to operational recommendations
and discontinue operations if the potential for interference arises. If
the concentration of air traffic at an airport results in the
likelihood of a small UAS interfering with operations, the remote pilot
should avoid operating at that airport. Remote pilots who do not hold a
part 61 pilot certificate will be required to pass initial and
recurrent aeronautical knowledge tests that include specific knowledge
of airport operations. Part 61 pilot certificate holders acquired this
knowledge when they obtained their part 61 pilot certificate.
6. Inspection, Maintenance, and Airworthiness Directives
    This section discusses the maintenance and inspection requirements
applicable to a small UAS operation. Those requirements will consist
of: (1) Conducting a preflight check prior to each flight to ensure
that the small UAS is in a condition for safe operation; and (2)
discontinuing flight if the small UAS ceases being in a condition for
safe operation. Additionally, to mitigate risks associated with
possible loss of positive control, this rule will also require the
remote pilot in command to, as part of the preflight inspection, ensure
that all control links between the control station and the small
unmanned aircraft are working properly. Finally, this section will
explain why this rule will not include airworthiness-directive
requirements in part 107.
a. Inspections and Maintenance
    As discussed in section III.J.3 of this preamble, pursuant to
section 333(b)(2) of Public Law 112-95, the FAA has determined that a
small UAS will not be required to obtain airworthiness certification if
satisfying the provisions of part 107. However, without an
airworthiness certification process, the FAA still needs to provide
criteria for small UAS to meet that support safe operations. In
considering how to address this issue, the FAA notes that existing
regulations applicable to manned civil aircraft require particular U.S.
airworthiness certificated aircraft to be inspected every 12
months.\124\ Maintenance that might be necessary as a result is
governed primarily by the provisions of 14 CFR part 43. Part 43
requires that the inspection examine every system and component of the
aircraft in detail to identify present conditions that may render the
aircraft as unairworthy.\125\ If the inspection reveals any hazardous
characteristics that would render the aircraft as unairworthy, then
maintenance, conducted pursuant to the regulations of part 43, must be
performed in order to approve the return of an aircraft to an airworthy
condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See 14 CFR 91.409.
    \125\ See 14 CFR part 43, Appendix D (scope and detail of items
as applicable to the particular aircraft) to be included in Annual
and 100 hour inspections. Note: These items listed constitute
inspection of the complete aircraft only and does not include
interrelated system components and equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In place of the requirements of part 43, the NPRM proposed to
create a maintenance and inspection framework that corresponds with the
significantly reduced risk posed by small UAS operations conducted
under part 107. First, the NPRM proposed to require, in Sec.  107.21,
that the operator must maintain the small UAS in a condition for safe
operation and inspect the small UAS prior to each flight to determine
it is in a condition for safe operation. Second, the NPRM proposed to
prohibit a person from operating a small UAS unless that UAS is in a
condition for safe operation. Third, the NPRM proposed to require the
operator to discontinue the flight of the small unmanned aircraft when
he or she knows or has reason to know that continuing the flight would
pose a hazard to other aircraft, people, or property. Finally, to
reduce the possibility of a malfunctioning control link, the NPRM
proposed to require that, prior to flight, the operator must ensure
that all links between the control station and the small unmanned
aircraft are functioning properly.
    For the reasons discussed below, this rule will require the remote
pilot in command to check the small UAS to determine whether it is in a
condition for safe operation. The remote pilot will be prohibited from
commencing flight if the small UAS is not in a condition for safe
operation. Additionally, the remote pilot in command will be required
to discontinue the flight of the small unmanned aircraft if he or she
knows or has reason to know that the small UAS is no longer in a
condition for safe operation. This rule will also finalize as proposed
the requirement that the remote pilot in command ensure, prior to
flight, that all control links between the control station and the
small unmanned aircraft are functioning properly.
i. Preflight Check and Maintenance Requirements
    Most commenters, including Google, AOPA, the Property Drone
Coalition and others, supported the proposed preflight inspection
requirement. However, several commenters proposed

changes to the requirement or requested clarification regarding what
the inspection should entail. Two individual commenters expressed
opposition to the preflight inspection requirement and suggested that
the requirement is burdensome or unnecessary. One individual commented
that it would be impractical to perform a meaningful inspection before
every flight, since many UAS flights last only a few minutes each, and
there is a need to minimize delay between flights. That commenter
proposed instead that the FAA require only one thorough pre-flight
inspection prior to the first flight of the day, and that the first
flight of the day should be a test flight. Another individual commenter
said a preflight inspection before every flight ``could become a hassle
and may be unnecessary,'' and that a monthly inspection would be more
suitable.
    This rule will require the remote pilot in command to conduct a
preflight check prior to each flight to determine if the small UAS is
in a condition for safe operation. An integral ground functional check
as part of the preflight inspection will include a check of the
associated data link equipment for proper operation. This is a check of
the control link functionality between the ground control station and
the small unmanned aircraft. If the preflight check reveals that the
small UAS is not in a condition for safe operation or that the control
link is not functioning properly, the remote pilot in command will be
prohibited from commencing the flight operation until the small UAS is
in a condition for safe operation and any and all control link
deficiencies have been corrected.
    To satisfy preflight check requirements, the remote pilot in
command must check the entire unmanned aircraft and associated system
components and equipment for visible defects such as broken or damaged
parts, loose fasteners or wires, leaking fluids, and general wear and
tear.\126\ The remote pilot in command is responsible for making a
condition for safe operation determination of the small UAS. A complete
inspection of the aircraft and associated system equipment will include
a functional ground check as a test to verify all control link systems
are properly responding to control inputs and are otherwise functioning
properly. The systems and equipment that could be checked in this
manner could, depending on the complexity of the small UAS, include the
engine, flight controls, landing gear, internal/external payload, link
checks, ground control station, signal flow, auxiliary equipment rack,
video dissemination, power requirements, and software configuration
management. It is highly recommended that the remote pilot in command
augment a complete small UAS preflight check by following manufacturer-
suggested inspections and checks prior to conducting flight operations.
The FAA will also issue guidance providing additional examples and best
practices for how to properly conduct a preflight check to ensure that
the small UAS is in a condition for safe operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ The examples used in this preamble section are not
intended to be exhaustive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA notes commenters' concern that a mandatory check conducted
prior to flight could be burdensome. However, the FAA anticipates that
through repetition, the efficiency of the preflight check sequence will
increase resulting in no more than a few minutes to complete the
preflight check if the pertinent systems are functioning properly. As
such, the FAA declines to remove the preflight-check requirement, as
this check will serve to detect and mitigate the risks imposed by
defects such as inoperative or deteriorating small UAS systems and
components that may render adverse flight characteristics.
Additionally, recurring checks will serve to identify equipment
deficiencies that have occurred since the previous preflight
inspection.
    An individual commenter suggested that a test-flight is necessary
because certain components and systems, such as avionics and control
systems, cannot be tested on the ground. In response, the FAA notes
that many of the systems that are tested through a test-flight cannot
currently be tested without introducing additional risk into the
operation. For example, flight termination (e.g. ``return to home'')
and fail-safe systems are designed to trigger when the control link
between the small unmanned aircraft and the control station is lost. In
order to do a flight test of these systems, the remote pilot in command
may need to deliberately sever the control link between the small
unmanned aircraft and the control station during a test flight to see
how the unmanned aircraft responds. A deliberate loss of positive
control may introduce unnecessary risk to safe flight operation in the
NAS. In addition, requiring flight testing prior to each flight would
also impose an additional burden on the remote pilot in command in the
form of time and power consumption. Accordingly, this rule will not
impose a flight testing requirement.
    DronSystems stated that a preflight inspection is unnecessary,
asserting that a remote pilot could safely forego a preflight
inspection by instead using ``sophisticated asset management tools'' or
``UAS self-diagnostic'' equipment.
    The FAA is aware of no data showing that technology currently
exists that could result in an equivalent level of safety to that
attained by a visual and operational inspection conducted by the remote
pilot in command. Visual and operational checks prior to each flight
will serve as a vital safety practice essential for ensuring that the
aircraft, control station, unmanned aircraft, and related integral
systems are in a condition that will enable safe operation.
    A number of commenters expressed concern that the proposed
maintenance and inspection requirements were not stringent enough. ALPA
and several individual commenters asserted that a preflight inspection
conducted by the remote pilot is insufficient to ensure safe operation,
as it would be conducted in the absence of defined criteria on which
the owner/operator can base a decision about airworthiness. ALPA
further stated that in the absence of airworthiness certification
requirements combined with tamper-proof equipage that limits the
vertical and lateral movement of unmanned aircraft, there is no way to
ensure that a small UAS is safe and reliable.
    Several commenters suggested that more formal maintenance and
inspection requirements should be imposed on manufacturers and
operators. The NextGen Air Transportation Program at NC State
University said ``some statement of airworthiness from the
manufacturer, a certified inspector, or system provider with a date
evaluation should be a minimum requirement.'' The commenter also said
that the aircraft should be tested for airworthiness every 2 years. The
State of Nevada, the Nevada Institute for Autonomous System, and the
Nevada FAA-designated UAS Test Site, commenting jointly, asserted that
a preflight inspection ``clearly does not infer than an aircraft is
airworthy,'' and said minimal standards should include lost link
procedures and altitude determination. Other commenters similarly said
small UAS should be required to have specific safety systems and
protections. An individual commenter, who said self-certification
establishes an unsafe precedent, said that UAS should be required to
have redundant backup systems in place. That commenter said a standard
airworthiness certificate may be

unnecessary for small UAS, and instead recommended an experimental-type
certification, which would ensure an airworthiness review and reduce
the excessive burden on manufacturers.
    An individual commenter said that allowing the operator to conduct
a preflight inspection to certify airworthiness ``is a mistake.'' The
commenter pointed out that for manned aircraft almost all of the
equipment has to be periodically certified by an approved testing lab
to ensure that it is still at manufacturer-issued standards. Without a
similar requirement for small UAS, the commenter continued, the
aircraft could have a modified airframe or propulsion system, the
electric motors or batteries could be deteriorating, and the payload
carrying capacity could be altered, among other concerns. Another
individual commenter opposed allowing operators with no presumed
specialized knowledge to make key safety determinations, and
recommended the FAA conduct further cost-benefit analysis, ``with a
specific focus on the magnitude of potential damage that might be
inflicted by errantly operated small UAVs.''
    The FAA notes commenters' concern with regard to airworthiness but
disagrees with the position that the maintenance and inspection
requirements proposed in the NPRM need to be made more prescriptive in
this rule. The proposed requirements are appropriate to the type of
risk posed by small UAS operating under part 107. Specifically, as
discussed throughout this preamble, small unmanned aircraft operating
under part 107 will: (1) Weigh less than 55 pounds; (2) not carry any
people onboard; and (3) operate within visual line of sight and other
operational parameters that mitigate risk to other aircraft operating
in the NAS, people, and property on the ground. Thus, a small unmanned
aircraft operating under part 107 has been determined to pose a
significantly lower risk than a manned aircraft that weighs hundreds or
thousands of pounds and carries one or more people onboard that may be
injured in the event of a mishap. Consequently, imposing a more
prescriptive level of maintenance and inspection requirements on small
UAS operating under part 107 is not justified in this rule.
    Completion of a preflight inspection of the small UAS prior to each
flight will serve to mitigate risk in a manner appropriate for the risk
posed by the small UAS operation. While this rule will not require
small UAS to comply with part 43, the FAA encourages the use of
certificated maintenance providers, which may include repair stations,
holders of mechanic and repairman certificates, and persons working
under the supervision of these mechanics and repairmen. Recommendation
for the use of certificated maintenance providers is predicated on
their heightened maintenance and inspection capabilities that may lend
support to sustained conditions for safe operation of small UAS.
Additionally, as discussed earlier, the FAA will publish guidance
providing additional examples and best practices for how to ensure that
a small UAS remains in a condition for safe operation.
    Several commenters, including NAAA, Reabe Spraying Service, and the
University of North Dakota's John D. Odegard School of Aerospace
Sciences urged the FAA to include a requirement that remote pilots keep
maintenance records. NAAA stated that it disagrees ``with the agency's
approach to abandon the aviation industry's longstanding requirement of
proper recordkeeping and inspections in favor of accommodation for a
new NAS entrant.'' The University of North Dakota's John D. Odegard
School of Aerospace Sciences asserted that a review of the aircraft's
maintenance history is necessary for a remote pilot to determine that
the aircraft is in a safe condition for flight and that all
manufacturer-suggested inspections, if any, are complied with. The
commenter specifically recommended that, at a minimum, remote pilots be
required to keep a permanent record of: (1) Component changes or
replacements caused by inflight abnormalities; (2) command and control
link frequency changes; (3) ground control station and aircraft
software changes; and (4) airframe configuration changes which may
affect the handling and performance characteristics of the aircraft.
    The Kansas State University UAS Program said the lack of required
maintenance documentation will cause significant challenges in
determining the causal factors associated with small UAS accidents that
are investigated by the FAA and NTSB. The commenter recommended that
the records requirement in Sec.  43.9 be applied to small UAS, with any
necessary alterations ``to ensure the traceability of maintenance and
approval of the aircraft for return to service.''
    The Washington State Department of Transportation, Aviation
Division said documentation of maintenance should be required for small
UAS operated over large assemblies of people, such as professional
sporting events, large concerts, and ``similar environments where a
safe landing area is likely unavailable.'' NetMoby suggested that
operators should be required to log the results of each preflight
inspection for inspection by the FAA if needed.
    Under Executive Order 12866, the FAA may ``adopt a regulation only
upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs.'' Imposing maintenance or preflight-check
recordkeeping requirements, such as the ones suggested by the
commenters, would likely result in a significant cost because the
remote pilot in command would have to create new paperwork every time
that he or she conducts a preflight check, or every time that any type
of maintenance is conducted on the small UAS. At this time, the FAA
does not have data to determine whether the safety benefits of
additional documentation would be sufficient to justify this burden,
especially in light of the significant safety mitigations already
provided by the other provisions of part 107. Accordingly, at this
time, the FAA declines to impose the suggested documentation
requirements on small UAS operated under this rule.
    Boeing asked the FAA to provide a definition for the phrase ``safe
operation.'' In the context of preflight check and maintenance
requirements, the FAA has concluded that ``safe operation'' pertains to
mechanical reliability, and is predicated on overall condition of the
entire unmanned aircraft and integral system equipment relative to wear
and deterioration. Determinations made of the overall condition of the
small UAS includes an evaluation based on the make, model, age, type
and completeness of continued maintenance and inspections of the
aircraft and associated system equipment making up the entire UAS. Some
examples of characteristics that may render a small UAS not in a
condition for safe operation are: (1) Unsecure, damaged airframe
structures affecting flight characteristics; (2) damaged primary flight
control surfaces affecting flight control characteristics; (3)
inoperative, intermittent propulsion system components; (4)
inoperative, intermittent flight controls; (5) data link equipment
failures, e.g., control outputs from ground control station not
matching control inputs to aircraft flight controls; and (6) damaged or
distorted propeller blades.
    The Permanent Editorial Board of the Aviators Model Code of Conduct
Initiative stated that the rule should be expanded to require certain
operational checks, such as hover-checks for multirotors and
rotorcraft, arguing that

such checks serve an important safety purpose.
    There is a wide variety of small UAS and many of them use different
systems that are constructed and function in different ways. As such,
the specific tasks necessary to check whether safety-relevant
components are functioning properly will vary between different small
UAS. This rule will require the remote pilot in command to check at a
minimum the control link and available power to complete the intended
flight.\127\ However, beyond control link there may be many other
systems and equipment, depending on the complexity of the small UAS,
that may be necessary for safety of flight. The remote pilot in command
will have to check those systems to ensure that they are functioning
properly, but the specific tasks necessary to conduct these checks will
be determined by the remote pilot so long as the tasks enable him or
her to reasonably ascertain whether the pertinent systems are
functioning properly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ The sufficient-power requirements of this rule are
discussed in section III.E.7.c of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters, including Transport Canada, Skycatch, the
Kansas State University UAS Program, and Prioria Robotics, stated that
the FAA should require that remote pilots employ OEM-provided
checklists and manuals when carrying out preflight inspections. The
Small UAV Coalition suggested the FAA consider adopting its standard
phrase from its section 333 exemptions that the remote pilot ``must
follow the UAS manufacturer's maintenance, overhaul, replacement,
inspection, and life limit requirements for the aircraft and aircraft
components.'' The Professional Helicopter Pilots Association suggested
that UAS manufacturers be required to provide ``airworthiness''
checklists. PHPA added that in the absence of a list of requirements,
the criteria for a preflight inspection become subjective. ALPA also
recommended that manufacturers be required to define parameters for
maintenance and inspection. Similarly, Transport Canada asked whether
consideration has been given to requiring the UAS operator to either
adhere to the manufacturer's maintenance instructions and schedule or,
in the alternative, develop and adhere to his or her own maintenance
schedule.
    DJI noted that it already provides its clients with significant
information on how to inspect and maintain DJI's small UAS. Several
other commenters addressed the use of manufacturer-developed minimum
maintenance standards. NAAA noted that the FAA has not set standards
for what manufacturer's instructions for UAS are to contain, and
recommended that manufacturers make a manual available for approval by
the FAA. A few individual commenters also said manufacturers should
provide an operational manual, which they said should also contain a
maintenance schedule.
    The FAA agrees with commenters that manufacturer-developed manuals,
checklists, and instructions can provide excellent guidance about how
to maintain a small UAS in a condition for safe operation. As such, the
FAA recommends that the remote pilot in command familiarize him or
herself with this material and strongly consider using the approach
specified in the manufacturer's materials. However, the manufacturer-
recommended approach may not be the only way to keep a small UAS in a
condition for safe operation. As such, this rule will simply require
that the small UAS must be in a condition for safe operation. The
specific method by which the small UAS achieves this state will be
determined by its owner and the remote pilot in command; this could be
the method recommended by the manufacturer or in accordance with a
developed maintenance and inspection program that may encompass and
exceed the manufacturer's program. The remote pilot in command and/or
small UAS owner may also follow the best practices outlined in the
guidance provided by the FAA.
    The FAA acknowledges the concern raised by commenters that some
manufacturer manuals may not provide sufficient guidance for the remote
pilot in command to properly inspect the small UAS. However, this rule
will not require the remote pilot in command to comply with the
manufacturer's manual as part of the preflight check. If the
manufacturer's manual provides sufficient guidance and the remote pilot
in command determines that this guidance is the best way to conduct the
preflight check, the remote pilot can conduct the check according to
the manufacturer's instructions. If the manual is deficient or the
remote pilot in command determines that a different method of
conducting the preflight check is more appropriate, the remote pilot in
command will assume the responsibility of making that decision as well.
    The FAA notes that, as discussed in section III.F.2.j of this
preamble, in order to obtain a remote pilot certificate, an applicant
will have to demonstrate that, among other things, he or she has
acquired knowledge about how to maintain and inspect a small UAS. Thus,
the remote pilot in command will have the knowledge needed to select
the best method by which to conduct a preflight check of the small UAS
to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation and the control
link is functioning properly.
    Several commenters suggested that the FAA should develop--or
encourage the development of--universal inspection and maintenance
criteria to be used by remote pilots when conducting preflight
inspections, or maintaining their aircraft. For example, the Nevada
Institute for Autonomous Systems suggested that a preflight inspection
would be insufficient to ensure safety in the absence of ``minimum
maintenance standards.'' Predesa stated that the FAA should consider
publishing its own general guidelines on preflight inspections,
including recordkeeping guidelines to track ``major modular
replacements of small UAS equipment.'' The Associated General
Contractors of America asked the FAA to provide more guidance on ``the
scope and nature'' of the required preflight inspections. Specifically,
the commenter questioned: (1) Whether the time and effort the agency
expects an operator to devote to preflight assessments depends on the
size or nature of the aircraft, or the scope, complexity or other
specifics of the operation; (2) to what extent the agency will defer to
an operator's exercise of his or her judgment; (3) if an operator
performs a manufacturer-recommended preflight inspection, whether the
FAA will defer to those recommendations; and (4) whether the FAA will
defer to any more specific industry standards and whether the agency
will go so far as to encourage the development of such standards.
    The State of Nevada, the Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems,
and the Nevada FAA-designated UAS Test Site, commenting jointly,
recommended that minimum maintenance standards be developed with the
help of the future FAA UAS Center of Excellence and the UAS Test Sites.
ASTM International pointed out that it has developed approved standards
for Maintenance and Continued Airworthiness of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (F2909). Predesa said that remote pilots should consider
applying the Academy of Model Aeronautics National Model Aircraft
Safety Code's ``good general safety practices'' pre-flight checks.
Similarly, an individual commenter suggested that the small UAS should
be maintained using standards developed

and approved by a recognized standards development organization.
    The FAA agrees that guidelines concerning the preflight check would
assist the remote pilot in command with complying with this
requirement. As discussed earlier, the FAA plans to issue guidance
containing best practices for determining whether a small UAS is in a
condition for safe operation. Separately from FAA guidance, other
supporting industry guidance also exists that could be utilized by the
remote pilot in command. The FAA notes the availability of ASTM
standards such as practices for maintenance and continued airworthiness
of small UAS, as well as AMA's standards, as additional guidance that
may be utilized by the remote pilot in command. The FAA also encourages
interested stakeholders to develop additional guidance if they feel
that it may provide further assistance to the remote pilot in command.
    With regard to the time and effort needed to conduct the preflight
check, the FAA notes that this will vary depending on the size and
complexity of the aircraft and the types of components used in the
small UAS. Larger and complex UAS that have more components will likely
take longer to check than simple micro UAS with few components.
However, as discussed earlier, the FAA does not anticipate that an
experienced remote pilot in command will need more than a few minutes
to conduct the preflight check (assuming the preflight check does not
reveal any adverse characteristics that render the small UAS not in a
condition for safe operation). Repetition of the preflight inspection
and checks will enhance the remote pilot's skill and efficiency in
completing this requirement.
    An individual commenter said the FAA should delete proposed Sec.
107.21(a), which requires an operator to maintain the small UAS in a
condition for safe operation, because aircraft maintenance should be
the responsibility of the registered owner, and not all operators are
the registered owners of the vehicles they operate.
    Proposed Sec.  107.21(a) would have required that the small UAS
must be maintained in a condition for safe operation while Sec.
107.15(a) would have prohibited the operation of a small UAS unless it
is in a condition for safe operation. The FAA agrees that proposed
Sec.  107.21(a) is duplicative with Sec.  107.15(a) and as such, Sec.
107.21(a) has been removed from this rule. For ease of readability the
FAA has also moved the regulatory text of proposed Sec.  107.21(b),
which requires a preflight check to determine whether the small UAS was
in a condition for safe operation, into Sec.  107.15(a).
ii. Discontinuing Flight
    A small UAS that appears to be in a condition for safe operation
during the preflight check may become unsafe for operation during
flight. For example, the small unmanned aircraft could sustain damage
or partial loss of propulsion during flight rendering that aircraft
unsafe for continuing the flight. As such, the NPRM proposed to require
the operator to discontinue the flight of the small unmanned aircraft
when he or she knows or has reason to know that continuing the flight
would pose a hazard to other aircraft, people, or property. For the
reasons discussed below, this rule will revise the proposed provision
to require the remote pilot in command to discontinue flight if he or
she knows or has reason to know that the small UAS is no longer in a
condition for safe operation.
    Several organizations, including DJI, Predesa, State Farm and the
Small UAV Coalition, supported the provision as proposed. On the other
hand, the University of North Dakota's John D. Odegard School of
Aerospace Sciences and an individual commenter suggested that the term
``hazard'' in this context should be qualified as it is in Sec.
107.19(b), which uses the phrase ``undue hazard.'' These commenters
suggested that Sec.  107.15(b) should be amended for consistency, in
part, to read ``. . . pose an undue hazard to other aircraft, people,
or property.'' (Emphasis added).
    The FAA agrees with the University of North Dakota and the
individual commenter that the term ``hazard'' in proposed Sec.
107.15(b) is inconsistent with the standard of ``undue hazard'' in
Sec.  107.19. In considering how to address this issue, the FAA noted
that Sec.  107.15(b) is intended to address instances in which a small
UAS that is in a condition for safe operation during the preflight
check ceases being in a condition for safe operation after flight
commences. Accordingly, the FAA has amended Sec.  107.15(b) to reflect
the fact that the pertinent standard is ``condition for safe
operation'' and not ``hazard.''
    AIA suggested that the FAA should define the timing of the
discontinuation of flight if the small UAS ceases being in a condition
for safe operation. AIA suggested that the requirement should be to
terminate flight ``as soon as practicable.'' In response, the FAA notes
that, if a small UAS should cease being in a condition for safe
operation during flight, the remote pilot in command must immediately
discontinue the flight by landing the small unmanned aircraft at the
first available location where the landing can be conducted safely.
iii. Control Link Check
    Several commenters specifically addressed the proposed requirement
to ensure that all links between the control station and the small
unmanned aircraft are working properly. DJI and Qualcomm supported the
proposed requirement, without further comment. ALPA also supported the
proposed requirement, but then recommended an additional requirement to
verify the usable range of the transmitter in the control station
before a flight. Transport Canada questioned whether the FAA has
considered requiring the UAS operator to check for radio interference
during the preflight inspection. The NextGen Air Transportation Program
at NC State University argued that the proposed requirement should
include ``something about spectrum management/approvals.''
    This rule will require the remote pilot in command to ensure that
all links between the control station and the small unmanned aircraft
are working properly. This can be done simply by inputting specific
commands into the control station and seeing whether the small unmanned
aircraft carries out the pertinent command. The FAA acknowledges the
concerns raised by ALPA but the suggested requirements would not be
appropriate for all small UAS operations. Specifically, in order to
verify the usable range of the control-station transmitter, the remote
pilot in command would likely need to fly the small unmanned aircraft
to the limits of the radio signal to determine the point at which the
signal begins to degrade. Flying a small unmanned aircraft to the point
that the control link begins to degrade may pose a heightened risk of
loss of positive control, and as such, the FAA will not require the
remote pilot in command to conduct this type of testing in this rule.
    With regard to radio interference and spectrum management, the FAA
notes that the requirement for a preflight control link check is
performance-based and already addresses radio interference and spectrum
issues. Specifically, under Sec.  107.49(c), a small unmanned aircraft
may not be operated in the NAS if the control link between the ground
control station and the small unmanned aircraft is not working
properly. If radio interference or a spectrum issue results in a
control link working improperly, the small UAS operation will be
prohibited from commencing until the issue has been resolved and the
control link is once again working properly.

b. Airworthiness Directives
    The NPRM also proposed to require that small UAS comply with all
applicable airworthiness directives. For the reasons discussed below,
the FAA will not finalize this proposed requirement in the final rule.
    A number of commenters objected to the proposed airworthiness-
directives requirement. Aviation Management and two individual
commenters stated that the proposed requirement should be removed
because part 107 does not contain any airworthiness certification
standards. Similarly, Boeing asked for clarification as to what an
operator would be required to comply with, since there are no specific
airworthiness requirements.
    The FAA agrees with commenters that an airworthiness-directive
framework may, at this time, not be suitable for part 107 small UAS
because of the lack of airworthiness certification requirements in part
107. Accordingly, this rule will not finalize the proposed
airworthiness-directive requirement. However, the FAA notes that it is
not precluded from taking appropriate action to address unsafe
conditions that may be identified in small UAS subject to part 107. Any
such actions would be conducted in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act.
7. Additional Operating Provisions
a. Careless or Reckless Operation
    Current FAA regulations (codified in 14 CFR 91.13(a)) prohibit a
person from operating an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so
as to endanger the life or property of another. The NPRM proposed to
apply similar regulations in Sec.  107.23 to ensure that a small UAS is
not operated in a hazardous manner. For the reasons discussed below,
the FAA will finalize this provision as proposed in the NPRM.
    One commenter stated that Sec.  107.23 must have the same force and
effect as 14 CFR 91.13. Two commenters said that ``careless and
reckless'' is a vague and subjective standard, with one stating that it
is unenforceable unless the FAA describes concretely what constitutes
careless or reckless behavior.
    Section 107.23(a) will prohibit a person from operating a small UAS
in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property
of another. This provision is derived from a similar prohibition on
careless/reckless conduct that currently exists for manned aircraft in
Sec.  91.13(a), and as such, the FAA expects that these two provisions
will have similar effects.
    The determination of whether conduct is careless or reckless is
made on a case-by-case basis through NTSB caselaw. The FAA has issued
guidance (FAA Order 8900.1, vol. 14, ch. 3, sec. 5) summarizing the
pertinent caselaw, which provides illustrative examples of conduct that
is considered to be careless or reckless.
    One commenter suggested that the FAA should permit local law
enforcement authorities to enforce the prohibition against careless or
reckless operations. In response, the FAA notes that, as discussed in
section III.I of this preamble, the FAA cannot delegate its formal
enforcement functions.
    One commenter asked the FAA to clarify what evidence would be used
to prove that a remote pilot operated in a careless or reckless manner.
Another commenter suggested that a flight data recorder be required to
facilitate the enforcement of the prohibition against careless or
reckless operations.
    A flight data recorder requirement would add cost, complexity, and
weight to small unmanned aircraft without a corresponding incremental
safety benefit. The FAA notes that enforcement of violations will be
similar to enforcement conducted for part 91 operations: In addition to
conducting routine surveillance of part 107 operations, the FAA will
act on reports of violations to conduct further investigations. The FAA
relies on many sources to further investigate complaints, such as
accounts from witnesses, video, and reports from Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies.
b. Drug and Alcohol Prohibition
    As proposed in the NPRM, this rule will require the remote pilot in
command, the person manipulating the flight controls of a small UAS,
and the visual observer to comply with the drug and alcohol provisions
of 14 CFR 91.17 and Sec.  91.19. Section 91.19 prohibits knowingly
carrying narcotic drugs, marijuana, and depressant or stimulant drugs
or substances in civil aircraft unless authorized to do so by a Federal
or State statute or government agency. Additionally, Sec.  91.17
prohibits a person from acting as a crewmember of a civil aircraft: (1)
Within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage; (2)
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug that affects the
person's faculties in any way contrary to safety; or (3) while having
an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater in a blood or breath
specimen. Under Sec.  91.17, a remote pilot in command, the person
manipulating the flight controls of a small UAS (if that person is not
the remote pilot in command), and the visual observer must submit to
testing to determine alcohol concentration in the blood if there is a
suspected violation of law or Sec.  91.17. These tests must be
submitted to the FAA if the FAA has a reasonable basis to believe that
the person violated Sec.  91.17.
    The Small UAV Coalition, the Aviation Division of Washington State
Department of Transportation, and three individuals generally supported
the provisions related to drugs and alcohol. One commenter asserted
that the FAA proposed no requirement about the condition of the
operator, such as illness or impairment by drugs or alcohol, and that
small UAS remote pilots should be required to self-certify that they
are in a condition that enables them to safely operate a small UAS.
    The FAA clarifies that this rule does not allow operation of a
small UAS if the remote pilot in command, visual observer, or the
person manipulating the flight controls of a small UAS is unable to
safely operate the small UAS due to drug or alcohol impairment. As
discussed previously, this rule will, among other things, require these
people to comply with the provisions of Sec.  91.17.
    With regard to non-drug or alcohol impairment, such as an illness,
the FAA notes that, as discussed in section III.F.2.c of this preamble,
a person may not act as a remote pilot in command or visual observer or
manipulate the flight controls of a small UAS if he or she knows or has
reason to know that he or she has a physical or mental condition that
would interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. It is also not
necessary to require a self-certification statement prior to every
small UAS flight because this requirement is not imposed on manned-
aircraft operations by the drug and alcohol provisions of Sec. Sec.
91.17 and 91.19.
    Cherokee Nation Technologies commented that over-the-counter
medications could impair the ability to safely operate a small UAS. The
FAA agrees with this comment and notes that over-the-counter
medications are addressed by the provisions of this rule. Specifically,
Sec.  91.17(a)(3) prohibits the use of any drug that affects the
person's faculties in any way contrary to safety.
    The University of North Dakota's John D. Odegard School of
Aerospace Sciences commented that the contents of Sec. Sec.  91.17 and
91.19, which are cross-referenced in proposed part 107, should be
included in their entirety in proposed part 107 to enable ease of
reading and understanding the regulations. However, duplicating the
entire regulatory text of Sec. Sec.  91.17 and 91.19 in part 107 is
unnecessary in this case. FAA regulations, such as Sec. Sec.  91.17

and 91.19, may be changed by future rulemakings or statutory changes,
and cross-referencing regulatory sections in part 107 will minimize
inconsistencies between part 107 and any subsequent amendments made to
Sec. Sec.  91.17 or 91.19. Additionally, cross-referencing regulatory
sections allows the FAA to avoid duplicative regulatory text in its
regulations.
    Two commenters expressed concerns about the potential use of small
UAS for drug-smuggling and other illicit acts. The Institute of Makers
of Explosives asked that the FAA specify penalties for the use of small
UAS in committing illicit acts, including those involving drugs and
alcohol. One commenter stated that any remote pilot should lose his or
her privileges under part 107 if found to be operating while in a
condition that does not permit safe operation of the small UAS. Another
commenter suggested that remote pilot certificates should be denied,
suspended or revoked for committing an act prohibited by 14 CFR 91.17
or Sec.  91.19.
    The FAA emphasizes that, in addition to the requirements of Sec.
91.17 discussed above, this rule will also require compliance with
Sec.  91.19, which prohibits the knowing transportation of illegal
drugs unless authorized by a Federal or State statute or government
agency. If a person violates Sec.  91.17 or Sec.  91.19, the FAA can
take enforcement action, which can result in the imposition of civil
penalties or suspension or revocation of that person's airman
certificate. People who engage in illegal conduct involving drugs may
also be subject to criminal prosecution under Federal or State law.
c. Sufficient Power for the Small UAS
    For the reasons discussed below, this rule will amend the proposed
requirement that, prior to flight, the remote pilot must ensure that
the small UAS has sufficient power to operate for its intended
operational time and an additional five minutes. After further
consideration, the FAA retains the requirement that the small UAS has
enough power to operate for its intended operational time, but has
eliminated the additional five-minute requirement.
    Several commenters, including DJI, ALPA, and Qualcomm, supported
the FAA's proposal. On the other hand, the Kansas State University UAS
Program, Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue, Consumers Energy
Company and an individual generally noted that some UAS have very short
battery lives. One commenter asserted that some small UAS have only
five minutes of total available flight time. Commenters suggested that
a small UAS should simply be required to have enough available power to
operate for its intended time and then land safely, which could require
significantly less than five minutes of total power.
    The FAA concurs with commenters who suggested that a small UAS
should be required to have enough available power to operate for its
intended operational time and then land safely. As discussed in section
III.E.3.a of this preamble, small UAS operations conducted under this
rule will operate in a confined area of operation. As a result of this
confined area, the prohibition of operations over people, and due to
the defined weight of the small unmanned aircraft, small UAS operations
conducted under part 107 will generally pose a low risk as compared to
manned aircraft. As such, a requirement for an additional five minutes
of power is unnecessary. The FAA acknowledges that some small unmanned
aircraft flights may be conducted for very short durations at very low
altitudes, and the need for a larger battery to provide an additional
five-minute power reserve may significantly limit those operations
without a corresponding safety benefit.
    Several commenters suggested different approaches other than the
requirement for five minutes of additional power. Embry-Riddle and
several individual commenters generally noted that different small UAS
have differing amounts of power and flight time available. These
commenters suggested that a requirement that is based on a 10% reserve
of power would better accommodate small UAS of differing design,
equipment, and performance standards. The Center for Robot-Assisted
Search and Rescue suggested that the reserve power requirement be based
on the distance needed for the aircraft to return to the remote pilot.
An individual commenter noted that gas powered aircraft may need a
longer fuel reserve, such as 10 to 15 minutes, to allow for extended
emergency flights.
    The FAA notes that remote pilots are required under this section to
ensure that the small UAS has enough power to operate for its intended
operational time. The intended operational time includes all power
requirements for the entire flight, including take off and a controlled
landing. While the final rule does not prescribe a specific amount of
reserve power, the FAA notes that a remote pilot must take into
consideration the type of operation being conducted. The remote pilot
must ensure that sufficient power is available to complete the intended
flight, or terminate the flight early if the remote pilot has reason to
believe that the power remaining is insufficient to continue flight. A
remote pilot who fails to properly plan for sufficient power may also
be in violation of Sec. Sec.  107.15, 107.23, and 107.49, particularly
if insufficient power results in loss of positive control of the small
unmanned aircraft.
    The reserve power requirement does not need to be based on the
distance needed for the small unmanned aircraft to return to the remote
pilot because small unmanned aircraft flight can be terminated through
a controlled safe landing; the aircraft does not necessarily need to
return to its point of origin. A percentage-of-power requirement would
also be unduly burdensome, as it would require UAS with greater total
power capacity to hold a larger power reserve than a UAS with a lesser
power capacity.
    DJI, ALPA and QUALCOMM suggested that the FAA require equipment
that would accurately display how much battery life remains to the
remote pilot. In response, the FAA emphasizes that this rule does not
prohibit remote pilots from using the type of equipment suggested by
the commenters. However, while equipage may be one way to measure
battery life, it is not the only way to measure remaining battery life.
For example, prior to flight, a remote pilot could determine the total
amount of time that a battery can provide power before it needs to be
recharged. Then, during flight, the remote pilot could simply use a
watch to determine how much energy is left in the battery. Accordingly,
mandating specific equipage displaying how much battery life is left in
the small UAS is not necessary in this rule.

F. Remote Pilot Certificate

    As discussed in section III.E.1 of this preamble, this rule will
create a new small-UAS-specific airman certificate called a remote
pilot certificate with a small UAS rating. A person will be required to
obtain this airman certificate prior to acting as a remote pilot in
command. This rule will also require any person manipulating the flight
controls of a small UAS to obtain a remote pilot certificate with a
small UAS rating unless: (1) That person is under the direct
supervision of a remote pilot in command; and (2) the remote pilot in
command has the ability to immediately take direct control of the
flight of the small unmanned aircraft. For the reasons discussed in
section III.E.1 of this preamble, a UAS-specific airman certificate is
preferable in this

rule to one of the existing part 61 pilot certificates because the
process for obtaining the remote pilot certificate will focus on UAS-
specific areas of knowledge that are typically not included in the
requirements associated with current part 61 pilot certificates.
1. Use of UAS Experience To Apply for Part 61 Pilot Certificate
    In the NPRM, the FAA emphasized its desire to maintain a
distinction between a remote pilot certificate and the airman
certificates issued under parts 61, 63, and 65. As such, the NPRM
proposed Sec.  61.8, which would prohibit UAS activities conducted
under this rule from being used to meet part 61 requirements. Under
proposed Sec.  61.8, activities would include any training,
certification, or flights associated with small UAS under part 107. The
FAA did not receive any adverse comments on this aspect of the proposed
rule, and as such, this rule will finalize Sec.  61.8 as proposed.
2. Remote Pilot Certificate Eligibility and Issuance
    The NPRM proposed establishing eligibility requirements for a part
107 airman certificate and specifying when a certificate would be
issued. The NPRM proposed that an applicant must be: (1) At least 17
years of age; (2) able to read, speak, write and understand the English
language; and (3) vetted by the Transportation Security Administration.
Additionally, the NPRM proposed that the applicant must pass an initial
aeronautical knowledge test and self-certify, at the time of
application, that he or she does not have a medical condition that
could interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS.
    As discussed in more detail below, the process for issuance of a
remote pilot certificate will be as follows. First, an applicant will
have to take and pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test. After
taking the knowledge test, the applicant will be provided with an
airman knowledge test report showing his or her test results. If the
applicant passed the test, the applicant will then fill out an
application for a remote pilot certificate using either the FAA's
electronic application process (referred to as the Integrated Airman
Certification and Rating Application (IACRA) system) or a paper
application. The FAA will then forward the applicant's information to
the TSA for security vetting to determine whether the applicant poses a
security risk. Once TSA notifies the FAA that the applicant does not
pose a security risk the FAA will issue an electronic temporary remote
pilot certificate to an applicant who applied through the IACRA
system.\128\ This temporary certificate (valid for 120 days after
receipt) will be issued within 10 business days after receipt of an
electronic application, and it will allow the applicant to exercise all
the privileges of a remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating.
Once all other FAA-internal processing is complete, the FAA will issue
the applicant a permanent remote pilot certificate.
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    \128\ Because the temporary certificates will be issued
electronically, the FAA will be unable to issue them to applicants
who did not apply through electronic means.
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    Holders of a part 61 pilot certificate other than student pilot who
have completed a flight review within the previous 24 months will have
the option of a different certification process. These pilot
certificate holders will be allowed to substitute completion of an
online training course for the small UAS aeronautical knowledge test.
Upon completion of the training course, the part 61 pilot certificate
holder will then go to one of the following authorized portals: An FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), a designated pilot examiner
(DPE), an airman certification representative (ACR) for a pilot school,
or a certificated flight instructor (CFI). The certificate holder will
provide his or her remote pilot certificate application and supporting
documentation to that portal to verify the applicant's identity, fill
out the pertinent portion of the application, and then forward the
completed application to the FAA Airman Certification Registry. Because
a part 61 pilot certificate holder has already been vetted by TSA, he
or she will be issued a temporary remote pilot certificate with a small
UAS rating, valid for 120 days, immediately upon the FAA's receipt of
the completed application via IACRA. Once all other processing is
complete, the FAA will issue a permanent remote pilot certificate.
    The FAA emphasizes that part 61 pilot certificate holders are not
required to use the process discussed in the previous paragraph and can
instead apply for a remote pilot certificate by taking the small UAS
initial aeronautical knowledge test. Part 61 pilot certificate holders
who pass the knowledge test will not be required to submit their
application to a FSDO, DPE, ACR, or CFI. Instead these certificate
holders may submit their applications via IACRA. Because these
certificate holders have already been vetted by TSA, they will be
issued a temporary remote pilot certificate, valid for 120 days, upon
FAA's receipt of their application via IACRA regardless of the method
they use to qualify for the certificate (i.e. knowledge test or online
training course).
a. Minimum Age
    The NPRM proposed that a person must be at least 17 years of age to
be eligible for a remote pilot airman certificate with a small UAS
rating. This minimum age would be consistent with existing FAA minimum
age requirements for the sport pilot, recreational pilot, and private
pilot airman certificates with an airplane or rotorcraft rating. The
FAA also invited comment on whether to adopt a minimum age of 16 years,
which would be consistent with existing FAA minimum age requirements
for the sport pilot and private pilot airman certificates with a glider
or balloon rating. After review of the comments, the FAA adopts a
minimum age of 16 for a person to be eligible for a remote pilot
certificate with a small UAS rating.
    Fourteen commenters, including the Small UAV Coalition, AUVSI, and
NAMIC, all agreed that the proposed minimum age of 17 generally strikes
an appropriate balance between safety and operational viability for low
risk small UAS operations, ensuring that baseline safety is enhanced
without unduly burdening low risk small UAS operators or their
operations. These commenters argued that the NPRM's proposal is
consistent with the requirements for other pilot certificates and, at
this time, there is a lack of data and evidence to support lowering the
age to 16. The commenters added that although persons under the age of
17 are already allowed to operate model aircraft, it is unclear if
there is a strong need for allowing younger remote pilots to operate
non-hobby and non-recreational small UAS.
    University of North Dakota's John D. Odegard School of Aerospace
Sciences added that 16-year-old student pilots are accompanied or
monitored by an instructor, whereas, a small UAS operator would
effectively be unmonitored. Federal Airways & Airspace also agreed with
limiting the certification age to 17 years old, and pointed out that
the National Institute of Mental Health has stated on their Web site
that the rate of death by any injury of those aged 15 to 19 years old
is six times higher than that for individuals aged 10 to 14 years old.
Federal Airways & Airspace also mentioned that studies have shown that
the human brain does not reach maturity until the early 20s, and the
CDC states that those aged 16 to 19 are almost three times more likely

than 20-year-olds to be in a fatal motor vehicle accident.
    Several commenters recommended raising the minimum age above 17.
Commenters including the General Aviation Manufacturers Association
(GAMA), Textron Systems, and Aerius Flight, recommended an 18-year-old
eligibility requirement for small UAS operators, because it aligns with
existing airman certification standards for other commercial flight
operations. One commenter asserted that 18 is the appropriate age for
an operator certificate because it is the age at which an individual is
an adult and able to enter into legally binding contracts. The Air Line
Pilots Association and Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO said
small UAS operators should hold a commercial pilot certificate, and
should therefore be a minimum of 18 years old. Several commenters
recommended the minimum age requirement be raised even higher, to 21 or
25 years old.
    Conversely, 36 commenters, including NBAA, AIA, and the Kansas Farm
Bureau, argued that the minimum age should be lowered to 16. One
commenter asserted that: (1) Flying a manned aircraft is considerably
more complex than operating a small UAS; and (2) a small UAS has no
people on board who would be injured in the event of an accident. Many
other individuals argued that because of all the operating constraints
contemplated by the NPRM, a 16-year-old should be able to safely
operate a small UAS without exposing anyone to undue risk.
    Nine commenters asserted that a minimum age of 16 would also align
with current requirements for glider and balloon pilots. One commenter
argued that the NPRM does not provide any justification to support why
the operator of a small UAS must be older than a sport pilot,
recreational pilot, or private pilot airman with a glider rating,\129\
or a student pilot of a glider.\130\ NBAA stated its belief that a
lesser risk exists for small UAS operations conducted within the
confines of the rule when compared to glider and balloon operations
conducted within controlled airspace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See 14 CFR 61.103(a).
    \130\ See 14 CFR 61.83(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One of the commenters from the Center for Information & Research on
Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) argued that the minimum age
should be dropped to 16. The commenter conducted research that it
claimed supports the proposition that 16-year-olds have the same
capacity for sophistication as 21-year-olds. Although the research is
geared towards younger individuals voting in local elections, not
operating aircraft, the commenter believed that it makes a general
statement about the intellectual capacity of minors at the age of 16.
    Prioria Robotics argued that the FAA should allow an
apprenticeship-like certificate to be held by those younger than 18.
Others argued that the minimum age for independent operation of a small
UAS should be 16. One individual suggested that if the operator is
under the age of 16, he or she should be required to be accompanied by
a qualified operator who is over the age of 18.
    The Washington State Department of Transportation, Aviation
Division suggested that, with regard to minimum age, in many cases the
maturity level difference of an operator between ages 16 and 18 may be
imperceptible. This commenter suggested lowering the minimum age to 16
would rule out the likelihood of willful underage violation and provide
a legal path forward for younger operators. The commenter also pointed
out that in many states a driver's permit can be obtained at age 15 and
driver's license at age 16.
    The Kansas Farm Bureau also argued that the added year available
for academic use, education, and experience are positives for future
UAS operators. DJI similarly noted that a lower age limit could
increase academic use of small UAS because more high school age
students could be operators. Also, commenters argued that a high age
limit would inhibit curiosity and innovation among younger people who
are exploring the capabilities of UAS.
    The Colorado Cattlemen's Association did not object to the proposed
minimum age requirement, but noted potential value in reducing the
minimum age to 16 years old. The commenter noted that, while this
approach would be a slight deviation from the current age requirement
for non-commercial airman certificates, it would be consistent with the
recognized lower risk associated with small UAS operations. The
commenter also noted it would accommodate UAS operations for those beef
producers who run family operations, many of which include older
teenagers.
    The FAA agrees that a certain level of maturity is required to
operate any aircraft responsibly in the NAS. The FAA originally
proposed a minimum age of 17 because it is consistent with existing FAA
minimum age requirements for the sport pilot, recreational pilot, and
private pilot airman certificates with an airplane or rotorcraft
rating--the base-level certificates authorizing pilots to operate these
two categories of aircraft while not under the supervision of an
instructor. However, the FAA does not use a minimum age of 17 for all
part 61 pilot certificates. As noted in the NPRM and by the commenters,
the proposed minimum age of 17 is not consistent with existing FAA
minimum age eligibility requirements for sport and private pilot airman
certificates with a glider or balloon rating.
    After further consideration, the FAA has determined that the risk
posed by a small UAS operation is comparable to the risk posed by a
glider or balloon operation. Balloon and glider operations generally
take place during daytime visual meteorological conditions and are
limited to a relatively confined geographical area. Balloon and glider
aircraft also tend to be lighter and slower-moving aircraft, limiting
the harm to people and property on the ground in the event of a mishap.
Similarly, small UAS operations do not take place at night or in
instrument meteorological conditions, and are operated in a limited
geographical area as necessary for the remote pilot to maintain visual
line of sight. Analysis of safety data for balloon and glider
operations suggests that there is no significant difference in accident
rates for 16-year-old pilots compared to 17- or 18-year-old pilots.
Because the risk of a part 107 small UAS operation is comparable to the
risk of a balloon or glider operation and because the minimum age for
glider and balloon operations is 16,\131\ the FAA will lower the
minimum age in this rule to 16 years old.
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    \131\ 14 CFR 61.103(b) and Sec.  61.305(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA also notes that a minimum age of 16 is consistent with its
current practice of allowing airmen conducting a small UAS operation
under a section 333 exemption to hold a sport or private pilot
certificate with a glider or balloon rating. Although the FAA does not
track the age of persons operating small unmanned aircraft under
section 333 exemption grants, the agency is not aware of any specific
safety concerns associated with 16-year-old private pilots or sport
pilots operating small UAS. The FAA notes that lowering the minimum age
to 16 will also enable additional small UAS agricultural operations,
such as those described by the Colorado Cattlemen's Association.
    Several commenters, including AIA, the Virginia Commonwealth
University Honors Students, and the New Jersey Institute of Technology
suggested that the minimum age should be no greater than 16. As noted
in AIA comments,

AIA and others believe that a driver's license issued from within the
U.S. should be considered as a prerequisite for a remote pilot
certificate. The commenters recommended mimicking the process to obtain
a driver's license, in which a person first obtains a learner's permit
and then, following months of training and test-taking, obtains a
license. This would enable 16-year-olds (depending on their State of
residence) to obtain a certificate. According to the commenters,
maintaining currency of the driver's license would also imply certain
motor skills, vision, and a minimal level of medical fitness to operate
UAS.
    Several individual commenters said the minimum age should be
lowered even further to 14 years old. The commenters pointed out that
14-year-olds are capable of having certain after-school jobs, and are
allowed to operate a glider or balloon as a student pilot. Event 38
Unmanned Systems said that it sees no logical reason for a minimum age
requirement, and that anyone who can pass the operator test should be
allowed to fly a UAS. Two other commenters also said there should be no
minimum age requirement.
    The FAA disagrees with commenters who suggest that the minimum age
be less than 16 because age 16 is the youngest age at which a person
can be certificated to operate an aircraft independently in the NAS.
Because a remote pilot certificate allows people to operate their small
UAS independently, it is critical that those people possess the
maturity necessary to operate in a safe manner. The FAA also disagrees
with commenters who provided the example of a driver's license and a
learner's permit as a justification for lowering the minimum age below
16. In most states, the driving privileges of people under the age of
16 are significantly limited compared to the privileges granted at age
18. According to the Governors Highway Safety Association, most states
do not permit full driving privileges until 17 or 18 years of age.
These privileges include high-risk situations such as the ability to
drive unsupervised at night or with a certain number of
passengers.\132\
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    \132\ http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/license_laws.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA also notes that driving a car does not use the same skills
as operating a small UAS. For example, in order to successfully drive a
car, drivers have to learn skills, such as parallel parking and making
three-point turns, which have no applicability to small UAS operations.
Requiring a U.S. driver's license as a prerequisite to obtaining a
remote pilot certificate would impose the cost of acquiring those
skills on people who do not currently possess a driver's license
without a corresponding safety benefit. Accordingly, this rule will not
require remote pilot certificate applicants to hold a driver's license.
    In response to commenters who recommended a lower minimum age to
enable academic uses, or the suggestion for an apprenticeship-like
certificate for those under 18 years of age, the FAA notes that this is
unnecessary because this rule allows an uncertificated person to
manipulate the controls of a small UAS, provided that: (1) They are
under the direct supervision of a certificated remote pilot in command;
and (2) the remote pilot in command is capable of taking over controls
at any time during the flight. The FAA also notes that, depending on
the purpose of the operation, small UAS operations conducted by
community groups and non-profit organizations may be considered
recreation or hobby operations, which are not regulated under part 107
if conducted in accordance with Public Law 112-95, section 336.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ Section III.C.4 of this preamble contains further
discussion of model aircraft operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agricultural Technology Alliance, Illinois Farm Bureau, and
GROWMARK suggested that the FAA treat age eligibility to operate a
small UAS in the same manner as the operation of farm equipment--i.e.,
allowing individual State labor laws to control. Though it did not
explicitly advocate for the use of State labor laws to determine
eligibility, Predesa pointed out that child labor laws would apply to
minors participating in commercial operations. The commenter
recommended the FAA consider mandating an adult visual observer to
assist a minor with an operator certificate when operating a small UAS
for commercial purposes. The commenter also recommended that the FAA
consider mandating an adult visual observer to assist a minor with an
operator certificate when operating a small UAS for education in a
private program for fee, in a university setting, or in a public school
system.
    The FAA does not agree with the recommendation to adopt State labor
laws to set the minimum age requirement. State laws are not uniform,
and this could result in a patchwork of regulations that would apply
uneven requirements depending on one's State of residence. The FAA also
notes that not all operations conducted under part 107 will be
commercial. For example, as discussed in section III.C.4 of this
preamble, recreational small UAS operations that do not meet all of the
criteria specified in Public Law 112-95, section 336 will be conducted
under part 107.
    The FAA disagrees with Predessa's suggestion that an adult visual
observer should be mandated in order to assist a minor with a remote
pilot certificate (i.e. someone between 16 and 18 years of age) when
operating a small UAS. As discussed previously, the FAA currently
allows 16-year-old pilots to operate, without supervision, glider and
balloon manned aircraft and small UAS (under a section 333 exemption).
The FAA has not observed an adverse effect on safety as a result of the
pilot in those operations being 16 rather than 18 years old. Thus,
while the FAA agrees that a visual observer enhances safety by
providing additional situational awareness to the remote pilot, it is
not necessary to mandate a visual observer based on the age of the
remote pilot certificate holder or the type of operation being
conducted.
    Accordingly, the FAA has amended proposed Sec.  107.61(a) to lower
the minimum age to be eligible for a remote pilot certificate with a
small UAS rating to 16 years old. The FAA notes, however, that an
academic institution is permitted to establish its own (more
restrictive) policies and procedures for operational small UAS
training, which may include requiring the presence of adult visual
observers for students who are younger than 18.
b. English Language Proficiency
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that applicants for a part
107 airman certificate be able to read, speak, and understand the
English language. These proposed English-language requirements would be
consistent with all other airman certificates issued by the FAA, as
well as the international standard for aircraft operations accepted by
ICAO. However, the FAA also proposed an exception for people who are
unable to meet one of the English-language requirements due to medical
reasons. Such a person would be eligible for a certificate, but the FAA
would be able to specify limitations on the certificate to account for
that person's medical condition.
    Five commenters expressed support for requiring airman-certificate
applicants to be able to read, speak, and understand the English
language. There were no comments opposing this aspect of the proposal.
Accordingly, this rule will require that applicants for an airman
certificate be able to read, speak, and understand the English
language.

    Three commenters opposed the proposed exception to the English-
language requirements. One of these commenters stated that there should
be no exceptions to the English-language requirement, while another
commenter stated that there should be no exception for persons whose
medical reasons would preclude them from effectively communicating
procedures or reading flight logs. A third commenter stated that a
person who cannot speak English should not be permitted to operate
anywhere near people on the ground because that person would be unable
to communicate safety-relevant information to people in the vicinity of
the operation.
    Limiting the exception for the English-language requirements of
this rule would impose a needless burden on airman-certificate
applicants who have a medical condition. Specifically, if an applicant
cannot read, speak, or understand the English language, the proposed
exception would allow the FAA to impose restrictions on that
applicant's certificate ensuring that the person's English-language
inability does not adversely affect safety. For example, if an
applicant is unable to communicate using speech, then the FAA may
restrict that applicant's certificate to operations where speech is not
necessary for the safe operation of a small UAS.
    Restrictions issued under this provision will be specific to each
applicant, and as such, the FAA cannot make the categorical statements
suggested by the commenters as to what will or will not be permitted
for applicants with a specific English-language inability. The FAA
notes that its English-language regulations for other airman