2. Retrofit Standard
    In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, we proposed to require that existing
tank cars meet the same DOT Specification 117 standard as new tank
cars, except for the requirement to include top fittings protection. In
this final rule, we are adopting retrofit requirements for existing
tank cars in accordance with Option 3 from the NPRM (excluding top
fittings protection and steel grade). If existing cars do not meet the
retrofit standard by the adopted implementation timeline, they will not
be authorized for use in HHFT service. See the ``Advanced Brake Signal
Propagation Systems'' section of this rulemaking for discussion of
braking systems to be included on tank cars.
    In Safety Recommendation R-12-5, the NTSB recommended that new and
existing tank cars authorized for transportation of ethanol and crude
oil in PG I and II be equipped with enhanced tank head and shell
puncture resistance systems and top fittings protection. However, PHMSA
chose not to include top fitting protections and changes in steel grade
as part of any retrofit requirement, as the costliness of such retrofit
is not supported with a corresponding appropriate safety

benefit.\49\ We do apply the retrofit standard to tank cars carrying
all flammable liquids in HHFTs, and not just ethanol and crude oil in
PG I and II. Retrofitted legacy DOT-111 tank cars will be designated as
``DOT-117R.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ The cost to retrofitting a tank car with the proposed top
fitting protection is estimated to be $24,500 per tank car, while
the comparable effectiveness rates are low. However, the
effectiveness rates were calculated assuming cars punctured would
release all lading through the breach regardless of top fittings
damage. With improved puncture resistance, lading loss through
damaged top fittings will become a more significant point of
release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In consideration of adopting a retrofit standard, two aspects were
considered thoroughly: (1) The technical specifications of the retrofit
standard compared to the current fleet composition and (2) the
corresponding retrofit schedule timeline. The timeline for retrofits
will be discussed in greater detail in the upcoming section of this
document entitled ``Implementation Timeline.'' In this section, we will
focus on the technical specifications of the retrofit standard when
compared with the current fleet composition.
    PHMSA firmly believes that reliance on HHFTs to transport millions
of gallons of flammable liquids is a risk that must be addressed. For
the purposes of flammable liquids, under the proposals in the August 1,
2014 NPRM, the legacy DOT Specification 111 tank car would no longer be
authorized for use in an HHFT after the dates specified in the proposed
retrofit schedule. In recent derailments of HHFTs, the DOT
Specification 111 and CPC-1232 tank car has been identified as
providing insufficient puncture resistance, being vulnerable to fire
and top-fittings damage, and they have bottom outlet valves that are
can be inadvertently opened in accident scenarios. These risks have
been demonstrated by recent accidents of HHFTs transporting flammable
liquids.
    In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, we proposed to limit continued use of
the DOT Specification 111 tank car to non-HHFTs. In addition, we
proposed to authorize the continued use of legacy DOT Specification 111
tank cars in combustible liquid service. The risks associated with
flammable liquids, such as crude oil and ethanol, are greater than
those of combustible liquids. The requirements proposed in the NPRM
were not applicable to HHFTs of materials that are classed or reclassed
as a combustible liquid. Existing HMR requirements for combustible
liquids will not change as a result of this final rule. Thus, except
for those tank cars intended for combustible liquid service, after the
established implementation timeline, any tank car used in a HHFT must
meet or exceed the DOT Specification 117, 117P, or the 117R standard.
Those tank cars not retrofitted would be retired or repurposed.
Further, if it can be demonstrated that an existing tank car can meet
the new performance standards, it will be authorized for use in a HHFT
as a DOT Specification117P.
General Retrofit Comments
    We received a variety of comments representing differing viewpoints
in response to the proposed tank car retrofit standard. Overall, 45
commenters supported the retrofit of existing fleets; 56 commenters
opposed the retrofit of the existing fleets and 41 commenters asserted
the retrofit standards as proposed in the NPRM did not go far enough.
We have summarized a few selected comments below to provide some idea
of the overall comments.
    E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company requests that PHMSA,
``authorize the continued use of existing DOT 111 tank cars for non-
crude and non-ethanol Class 3 flammable service for the remainder of
their useful life. Non-HHFT shipments of crude oil and ethanol also
should be permitted in DOT 111 tank cars for the remainder of their
useful life.''
    Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC asserted its belief that ``the CPC-1232
jacketed fleet [should be permitted] to operate for its full useful
life with a potential retrofit limited to an enhanced BOV handle and a
larger pressure relief valve.''
    PHMSA sought to limit the unnecessary retirement or repurposing of
tank cars while implementing meaningful safety improvements on the
existing fleet. This final rule requires the tank cars used in an HHFT
to be retrofitted to specifications equivalent to Option 3 in the NPRM.
This enables tank car owners to realize the full useful life of an
asset. The final rule does not impact existing DOT-111 tank cars used
in Class 3 flammable service that are not a part of an HHFT.
    In support of retrofitting existing fleets, GBW noted that:

    GBW will be making substantial capital investments and will
hire, train, and certify 400 new employees over the next year,
creating jobs throughout the United States. Moreover, GBW is making
its capital investments now to expand retrofit capacity and
conducting hiring activity in advance of a final rule.

    In its comments, Bridger noted their economic concerns over an
overly burdensome retrofit standard, noting ``the economics of
retrofitting the older and cheaper DOT-111 tank cars is considerably
different from the economics of retrofitting the newer and costlier
CPC-1232 tank cars.'' Bridger's main concern is that the price of tank
cars has increased significantly, with a CPC-1232 costing 80% more (in
2014) than the DOT-111 (in 2008); and it noted this is very important
because it is not equitable, as its competitors have less costs per
tank car and undergo the same operations (using a retrofitted DOT-111).
    The comments of Edward D. Biggs III question whether any other
modifications (including jacketing) for DOT 111 tank cars built with
normalized steel shells are necessary.
    Cargill estimated that it would cost in excess of $45 million to
retrofit its existing fleet of tank cars. Cargill expects that
retrofitting costs will be $60,000 per tank car, more than twice the
figure assumed by PHMSA.
    In its comments, AFPM stated that it supports ``the Option 3
specification for new and retrofitted rail tank cars shipping crude and
ethanol in unit trains of 75 cars or more. The Option 3 specification
tank car is an enhanced CPC-1232 tank car with a 7/16'' shell and other
enhanced safety features. The Option 1 and 2 tank cars with a 9/16''
shell provide only negligible safety benefits at a substantial
incremental cost.''
    The RSI-CTC supported retrofits in accordance with Option 3 for all
PG I and PG II flammable liquid tank cars. But it supports only the
addition of PRV and BOV protection at requalification for Class 3, PG
III tank cars. RLBA echoes RSI-CTC with its recommendation that
existing cars be retrofitted with the latest design of self-closing
high capacity over pressure devices that meet the same standards as new
car construction.
    In addition to the previous general comments on the retrofitting of
existing tank cars, the following notable issues were frequently cited
when discussing the topic. In the following, we discuss comments on
each issue, concerns raised and our response to the comments.

Shop Capacity

    Numerous commenters asserted that shop capacity is insufficient to
retrofit existing fleets in a timely and cost-effective manner or in
accordance with the schedule proposed in the NPRM. Specifically, RSI-
CTC noted that there are tiers of retrofitting that vary based on
complexity. For example, retrofitting a legacy non-jacketed DOT-111 is
a much more intensive process than retrofitting the most recent
jacketed CPC-1232. RSI-CTC asked in their

comments that PHMSA and FRA consider the complexity of these retrofits
and the shop capacity to complete them in our analysis. We agree and
have since revised our analysis accordingly. See RIA. Below are some
additional comments that represent issues related to shop capacity.
    In its comments, Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC stated, ``[a]ccording to the
regulatory impact analysis in the NPRM (page 89), PHMSA suggests that
66,185 cars can be retrofitted over 3 years, or 22,061 cars per year.
This estimate is considerably higher than the AllTranstek study
estimate of 3,000 per year or RSI's estimate of 5,700 per year (after a
one year ramp up period).'' \50\ Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC continues,
``during this timeframe, thousands of new cars were manufactured to
handle the growing business but there has not been a repair facility of
any significant size put into service. The costs of retrofitting
existing cars will cause many cars to be retired rather than retrofit
thus adding to the shortage of cars in the network.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ It should be noted that this estimate was later revised to
6,400 units per year by RSI-CTC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Honeywell Performance Materials and Technologies stated that the
``backlog for present mechanical needs and requalification on all tank
cars will be increased.'' In addition a report commissioned by RSI and
authored by Brattle noted that shop capacity could be a considerable
issue when determining a retrofit standard.\51\ A similar report
commissioned by API and authored by IFC international noted similar
concerns.\52\ API also expressed implementation concerns about shop
capacity, the current backlog of car orders, and engineering capacity.
Both these reports are discussed in the final RIA but it should be
noted both these reports based their findings on the 5 year retrofit
schedule which has since be revised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3415.
    \52\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3418.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, commenters expressed concern about the availability of
materials, the availability of skilled labor, and facilities to conduct
the needed procedures involved in a retrofit. PHMSA and FRA considered
these and other concerns when determining a retrofit standard.
    PHMSA and FRA understand the concerns with regard to shop
capacities. Specifically, concerns about the time that will be required
to acquire additional resources needed to build and ramp up facilitates
to conduct retrofits, as well as the manufacturing and supply of the
materials needed for the components of the tank cars (i.e., steel
plates and sheets, new valves, etc.). PHMSA and FRA also understand the
limitations of the existing labor force. For example, a skilled labor
force (welders, metal workers, machinists, etc.) must be hired and
trained to perform the necessary retrofit work correctly and safely. We
agree with many of the issues raised by commenters and have revised our
analysis with regard to the retrofit standard.
Trucks
    Many public commenters raised technical issues and potential
implementation problems from an industry-wide retrofit for HHFTs. For
example, the API public comment noted issues with the extra weight on
stub sills and tank car structures, and issues with head shields and
brake wheels/end platforms, and issues with truck replacement. Below is
a list of comments that represent concerns over how the retrofit
standard will affect the existing trucks of tank cars.
    Amsted Rail believes PHMSA underestimated the cost of a new car
and, in its comments, lists the prices for several components,
suggesting $20,000 for complete car set of new trucks versus the
$16,000 amount used by PHMSA.
    It is RSI-CTC's understanding that modifications will add 13,000
pounds to cars; that trucks will require modification from 263,000 to
286,000; and that new wheel sets will cost $10,000 per car; and that
new roller bearings, axles, and adaptor possibly will be added to the
car. In its comments, Amsted Rail Company, Inc. also asserted that
trucks will need replacement on 29,302 ethanol tank cars (pre 2011),
28,300 crude oil tank cars (pre CPC-1232), and 36,000 tank cars in
``other'' Class 3 flammable liquid service.
    PHMSA and FRA believe that the majority of tank cars constructed in
the last decade are equipped with trucks, save a particular sized
bearing and bearing adaptor, that are rated for 286,000 pound gross
rail load service. Further, the AAR's Engineering and Equipment
Committee rules require replacement of trucks (bolster and side frames)
and wheel sets when the gross rail load of a rail car is increased from
263,000 to 286,000 pounds. As a result, what would otherwise be a
relatively small cost of approximately $2,000 to replace the bearing
and adaptor, car owners are required to replace the trucks and wheel
sets at the cost of $24,000/truck. The paucity of data distinguishing
the cars that need a major versus minor retrofit leads PHMSA to
conservatively assume all DOT legacy tank cars will require the
replacement of the trucks and wheel sets.
Repurpose/Retirement
    In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, we proposed, except for top fittings
protection, to require existing tank cars that are used to transport
flammable liquids as part of a HHFT to be retrofitted to meet the
selected option. Those not retrofitted would be retired, repurposed, or
operated under speed restrictions for up to five years, based on the
packing group assignment of the lading being transported. The following
commenters had varying opinions about this assumed strategy.
    The RSI-CTC asserted that the minimum early retired tank cars
rather than retrofit will be approximately 28% (25,600 tank cars).
However, the AAR supports the repurposing of legacy tank cars to
Canadian oil sands service. Eastman Chemical Company ``. . . also
agrees with PHMSA's proposal to retain the exception that permits
flammable liquids with a flash point at or above 38 [deg]C
(100[emsp14][deg]F) to be reclassified as combustible liquids and allow
existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars to continue to be authorized
for these materials.''
    The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, ``supports the
requirement of Packing Group III in the enhanced car standards as this
provides consistency in providing packaging appropriate to handle all
flammable liquids. These flammable liquids pose a safety and
environmental risk regardless of the packing group.''
    Bridger, does not agree with PHMSA's assumption that DOT-111
jacketed and CPC-1232 jacketed cars would be repurposed for use in
Canadian oil sands service, as it requires heating coils and insulation
in the tank car.
    The Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA) stated in
its comments, ``PHMSA's timeline for DOT-111 railcars is predicated on
the assumption that DOT-111s now in use for PG I or PG II hazmat will
be moved into PG III service. Even heavy Canadian crudes once mixed
with diluents and shipped as ``dilbit'' or ``railbit'' are not expected
to qualify as PG III materials, and therefore will not qualify as a
home for the displaced DOT-111 railcars.''
    DGAC asserted, ``[t]here is an assumption that all Legacy DOT 111
Jacketed and CPC-1232 Jacketed tank cars would be assigned to Canadian
oil sands; however, under Transport Canada, these cars may also have to
be retrofitted based on regulations.''

    Growth Energy suggests the shift to Canadian oil sands service is
greatly overestimated, and underestimates the costs of doing so
(requires retrofit for heating coils), costs of moving cars, and the
costs of moving leases. According to Exxon Mobil Corporation, ``[t]he
DOT proposal to move DOT-111 tank cars to oil sands service is not
feasible as the diluted bitumen to be shipped is PG I or II and carried
predominantly in unit trains. There is limited projected growth in
other, non-flammable products moved by rail.''
    In their comments, Earthjustice, Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, NRDC,
and Oil Change International asserted, ``the proposed rule would allow
the DOT-111 and other unsafe tank cars to be shifted to tar sands
service. The rule is thin on analysis to support this shift. However,
on its face, it would be indefensible to allow unsafe tank cars to be
used to ship tar sands bitumen diluted with chemicals that contain
volatile components. Accidents involving diluted bitumen are notorious
for being impossible to clean up.''
    Based on these and other comments, PHMSA and FRA acknowledge that
the assumption of no retirements and the level of repurposing needed to
be revisited. In response to these comments, PHMSA and FRA have made
adjustments to their analysis, and the final RIA to account for
retirements as opposed to shifting of tank cars to tar sand service.
    Many of the comments with regard to new construction also apply to
the retrofit specifications. Below PHMSA and FRA discuss the various
components of a retrofit tank car specification (see also new
construction as many of those comments apply to both new and existing
tank cars). The below discussion highlight those comments that were
focused on the retrofit standard.
Shell Thickness
    Many commenters posed a concern that a retrofit standard that
called for an increased thickness would be technically infeasible and
result in the scrapping of existing tank cars. For instance, in its
comments, Cargill asserted that it is not feasible to retrofit an
existing tank car built with a \7/16\-inch steel shell to conform to a
\9/16\-inch shell requirement. RSI-CTC also stated that Option 1 is not
feasible for retrofits. Further, GBW ``does not believe it is practical
or economically feasible to bring existing tank cars fully up to the
proposed standards for new tank cars particularly with respect to the
\9/16\ inch shell thickness proposed for the Option 1 and Option 2 tank
car.''
    PHMSA and FRA understand the concerns of the commenters and note
the intent of the rule was not to require adding thickness to existing
tank cars, but rather to improve the puncture resistance to the
existing cars to be equivalent to a tank with a thicker shell. As it
would not be technically feasible to add \1/8\th of an inch of steel to
a \7/16\-inch shell and head when retrofitting a tank car, PHMSA will
permit existing DOT-111 fleets to be retrofitted at currently
authorized shell thicknesses (\7/16\-inch).
Top Fittings Protection
    The NTSB believes that any retrofits should have top fittings
protection, citing incidents in Cherry Valley, IL and Tiskilwa, IL due
to where those tank cars breached. NSTB stated they will not consider
Safety Recommendation R-12-5 as ``acceptable'' unless top fittings
protection is included in the retrofitting requirements.
    PHMSA is aware that the AAR Tank Car Committee has started a task
force to evaluate potential advancements in existing top fittings
protections. PHMSA and FRA urge industry to consider enhancements that
will apply to both new and retrofitted tank cars. PHMSA and FRA are not
requiring such protection in a tank car retrofit in this final rule.
While we do believe this is an important safety feature, it is not cost
justified.
Thermal Protection Systems/Pressure Relief Device
    In its comments, the Dow stated, ``[it] does support thermal
protection for crude oil and ethanol . . . Dow suggests that PHMSA
consider non-CPC-1232 cars to be a higher retrofitting priority.'' Dow
continues, ``[h]owever, addition of insulation and a jacket to existing
DOT Specification 111 cars may introduce Plate clearance issues, so not
all existing cars will be able to be retrofitted. Additionally, methods
for attaching heavier jackets to prevent shifting during train handling
will require engineering analysis; finite element analysis of the stub
sill design may also be necessary to determine if existing designs are
capable of handling the increased weight. Estimated cost for all the
engineering and AAR approval application fees is $85,000 per
certificate of construction, as per a major rail supplier.''
    PHMSA and FRA do not agree. As stated above, in the Arcadia
derailment, there were three high-energy thermal failures. In two of
the three cases, the tank fractured into two pieces and those pieces
were thrown from the derailment area. In the third case, the tank was
nearly fractured around the entire circumference. In addition, NTSB
restated the importance of thermal protection in their April 6, 2015
Recommendations. These recommendations, R-15-14 and 15, requested that
PHMSA require that all new and existing tank cars used to transport all
Class 3 flammable liquids be equipped with thermal protection systems
that meet or exceed the thermal performance standards outlined in Title
49 Code of Federal Regulations 179.18(a) and be equipped with
appropriately sized pressure relief devices that allow the release of
pressure under fire conditions to ensure thermal performance that meets
or exceeds the requirements of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations
179.18(a), and that minimizes the likelihood of energetic thermal
ruptures.
    Jackets and thermal protection are critical in the survival of a
tank car experiencing a thermal event. Thus, thermal protection is
adopted as proposed. However, we do note that the new regulation
provides flexibility for innovation to meet the performance standard.
Steel Retrofit
    Much like the argument against requiring added thickness to
retrofitted cars, many posed the relevant concern that a retrofit
standard that called for a change in the type of steel used would be
technically infeasible and result in the scrapping of existing tank
cars. The RSI-CTC requests that non-normalized steel tank cars should
be authorized for retrofit as there are 47,300 DOT-111 tank cars
currently in service. Normalizing the steel after the tank car has been
constructed is impractical. The requirements to this would create
considerable cost which would not increase the ultimate strength of the
steel.
    Normalization does change the mechanical properties of the steel;
specifically, a slight improvement in upper shelf toughness and a shift
to a lower ductile-brittle transition temperature. PHMSA and FRA
understand the concerns of the commenters and note the intent of the
rule was not to require a change to the materials specification to
existing tank cars, but rather to improve the puncture resistance to
the existing cars to be equivalent to a tank constructed of the
referenced steel. PHMSA and FRA believe that should a car owner decide
to retrofit a tank car, the owner must consider the material properties
of normalized steel on the design of the retrofit.

However, tank cars otherwise conforming to the HMR and manufactured of
non-normalized steel may remain in service when retrofitted.
Conclusion
    Except for top fittings protection and steel retrofit, retrofits
will conform to Option 3, subject to brake requirements that depend on
the tank car's service, and will be designated ``DOT Specification
117R.'' The retrofit requirements include the addition of an 11-gauge
jacket, full height head shield, and a modified bottom outlet
configuration.

                                                            Table 19--Safety Features of Retrofitted DOT Specification 117R Tank Car
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Thermal
           Tank car              Bottom outlet     GRL      Head shield    Pressure relief  Shell thickness       Jacket       Tank material     Top fittings      protection        Braking
                                    handle        (lbs.)        type            valve                                                             protection         system
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Selected option: DOT           Bottom outlet        286K  Full-height, \1/ Reclosing        \7/16\-inch      Minimum 11-      Authorized       Not required,    Thermal          Dependent on
 Specification 117R             handle removed             2\-inch thick    pressure         minimum.         gauge jacket     steel at the     but when         protection       service.
 retrofitted tank car.          or designed to             head shield.     relief valve.                     constructed      time of          equipped per     system in
                                prevent                                                                       from A1011       construction.    AAR              accordance
                                unintended                                                                    steel or                          Specifications   with Sec.
                                actuation                                                                     equivalent.                       for Tank Cars,   179.18.
                                during a train                                                                The jacket                        appendix E
                                accident.                                                                     must be                           paragraph
                                                                                weather-tight.                    10.2.1.
DOT 111A100W1 Specification    Bottom outlets       263K  Optional; bare   Reclosing        \7/16\-inch-     Jackets are      TC-128 Grade B,  Not required,    Optional.......  EOT device (See
 (currently authorized).        are optional.              tanks half       pressure         minimum.         optional.        normalized       but when                          49 CFR part
                                                           height; jacket   relief valve.                                      steel *.         equipped per                      232).
                                                           tanks full                                                                           AAR
                                                           height.                                                                              Specifications
                                                                                for Tank Cars,
                                                                                appendix E
                                                                                paragraph
                                                                                10.2.1.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For the purposes of this figure, TC-128 Grade B normalized steel is used to provide a consistent comparison to the proposed options. Section 179.200-7 provides alternative materials which
  are authorized for the DOT Specification 111.

3. Performance Standard
    The prescribed performance standards adopted in this rule were
developed to provide improved crashworthiness when compared to the
legacy DOT-111 tank car and to foster innovation in the development of
tank cars. In the NPRM, PHMSA and FRA proposed a performance standard
in which the design, modeling and testing results would be approved by
the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer at
FRA.
    Accordingly, the final rule requires that the tank car design must
be approved, and the tank car must be constructed to the conditions of
an approval issued by the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/
Chief Safety Officer, FRA. The performance of the tank car is subject
to the following:
Puncture Resistance
    The tank car must be able to withstand a minimum side impact speed
of 12 mph when impacted at the longitudinal and vertical center of the
shell by a rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of 286,000
pounds. Further, the tank car must be able to withstand a minimum head
impact speed of 18 mph when impacted at the center of the head by a
rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of 286,000 pounds.
Thermal Protection Systems/Pressure Relief Device
    The tank car must be equipped with a thermal protection system. The
thermal protection system must be designed in accordance with Sec.
179.18 and include a reclosing PRD in accordance with Sec.  173.31 of
this subchapter.
Bottom Outlet
    If the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet, the handle must
be removed prior to train movement or be designed with a protection
safety system to prevent unintended actuation during train accident
scenarios.
Top Fittings Protection
    Tank cars tanks meeting the performance standard must be equipped
per AAR Specifications Tank Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1 (IBR, see
Sec.  171.7 of this subchapter). A tank car that meets the performance
requirements will be assigned to ``DOT Specification 117P.'' Builders
must be able to demonstrate compliance with the performance standards
and receive FRA approval prior to building the cars.
4. Implementation Timeline
    In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, we proposed a risk-based timeline for
continued use of the DOT-111 tank car used in HHFTs in Sec. Sec.
173.241, 173.242, and 173.243. This timeline was based on the packing
group requirements in the HMR. The HMR require both the proper
classification of hazardous materials and the selection and use of an
authorized packaging. Packing groups assign a degree of danger posed
within a particular hazard class. Packing Group I poses the highest
danger (``great danger'') and Packing Group III the lowest (``minor
danger''). In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed a timeline in accordance with
the following table:

 Table 20--Timeline for Continued Use of DOT Specification 111 Tank Cars
                             in HHFT Service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Packing group                DOT-111 not authorized after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.........................................  October 1, 2017.
II........................................  October 1, 2018.
III.......................................  October 1, 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, PHMSA and FRA were
confident the risk-based approach proposed provided sufficient time for
car owners to update existing fleets while still prioritizing the
highest danger material. Specifically, given the estimates of the
current fleet size, composition, and production capacity of tank car
manufacturers expressed by

comments submitted in response to the ANPRM, we were confident that a
two year phase-in of packing group I flammable liquids would not result
in a shortage of available tank cars intended for HHFTs. This strategy
would have also provided additional time for tank cars to meet the DOT
Specification 117 performance standard if offerors were to take steps
to reduce the volatility of the material. Nevertheless, we did seek
comment as to whether the proposed phase-out period provided sufficient
time to increase production capacity and retrofit existing fleets.
    As proposed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, DOT Specification 111 tank
cars may be retrofitted to DOT Specification 117 standards (as a DOT
Specification 117R), retired, repurposed, or operated under speed
restrictions. Further, we proposed limiting the future use of DOT
Specification 111 tank cars only if these tank cars are used in a HHFT.
Under the proposal, DOT Specification 111 tank cars would be able to
continue to be used to transport other commodities, including flammable
liquids, provided they are not in a HHFT. In addition, all retrofitted
tank cars (including the DOT-111 tank cars meeting the CPC-1232
standards) are authorized for use for their full service life. This
proposal provided tank car owners and rail carriers with the
opportunity to make operational changes that focus on the greatest
risks and minimize the associated cost impacts. In response to the
proposed amendments regarding the retrofit timeline, we received a
variety of comments representing differing viewpoints.
Harmonization
    Commenters state that it is essential that the U.S. position on
retrofit timelines is consistent with Canada's. PHMSA has been in close
coordination with Transport Canada to ensure the seamless transition
with regard to the retrofit of the existing North American DOT
Specification 111 fleets. To that end, PHMSA recognizes the importance
of harmonization and does not foresee any issues at this time with
cross-border retrofit implementation timelines.
Retrofit Capacity
    The capability of the industry to handle retrofit tasks and
requirements within the proposed timeline was a topic of great interest
among commenters. Many questioned PHMSA and FRA's assumptions regarding
the retrofit capacity of the industry. The comments summarized and
discussed below provide an indication as to the commenters' main
concerns on this topic.
    The Grain Processing Corporation requests that, ``when setting the
timeline for compliance, please work closely with car builders to have
an accurate understanding of when new cars can reasonably be made
available to the market.'' This commenter further stated, ``current
conditions indicate that it will take much more than three to five
years to replace non-compliant cars in the market.''
    The American Chemistry Council (ACC) stated that tank car shop
capacity will not support PHMSA's regulatory timeline and some ACC
members have reported waits of approximately two years from when a tank
car is ordered until the time it was delivered. The ACC also relayed
RSI information stating that the current order backlog is about 53,000
cars.''
    The Dakota Gasification Company asserts that:

    PHMSA should consider how an influx of a very large number of
DOT 111 cars for retrofit in a market already seeing backlogs for
routine maintenance work will permit shippers to meet the proposed
timelines in the rule. The rulemaking states there are 80,500 DOT
111 cars and 17,300 CPC 1232 cars in Flammable Service or a total of
97,800 cars potentially in need of some form of retrofit. A record
number of tank cars have been produced the past few years.
Retrofitting this number of cars while keeping up with yearly
maintenance and standard repairs will be unattainable within the
proposed timeframe given the current shop system.

    In addition a report commissioned by RSI and authored by The
Brattle Group noted that there could be considerable issues with a five
year retrofit standard when considering production levels, fleet size
and the predicted growth of both.\53\ A similar report commissioned by
API and authored by ICF International noted similar concerns.\54\ API
also expressed concerns about shop capacity, the current backlog of car
orders, and engineering capacity. Both the RSI and the API reports are
extensively discussed in the final RIA but it should be noted that both
these reports based their findings on the NPRM's five-year retrofit
schedule which has since been revised. Regardless, based on the
comments received, PHMSA and FRA have modified our analysis and revised
the final RIA to account for changes in retrofit capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3415
    \54\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3418
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Retrofit Timeline (Length and Approach)
    Overall, commenters agree that retrofits must occur, but the
suggested timelines range from zero to ten years. In addition, RSI and
API commissioned separate reports that evaluated the NPRM's proposed
timeline and demonstrated the potential detrimental effects of an
overly aggressive timeline. PHMSA has summarized and discussed the
differing viewpoints on the retrofit schedule.
    Generally, the comments of citizens, environmental groups, tribal
communities and local government either supported the timeline as
proposed in the NPRM or focused on an even more aggressive timeline
than proposed. Some commenters even suggested the immediate ban of DOT
111 Specification tank cars. For example, two tribal communities, the
Quinault Indian Nation and the Prairie Island Indian Community,
represented the views of many citizens, environmental groups when they
stressed the need for an immediate and ``total phase-out of the DOT
111.'' Amtrak encourages PHMSA to require the use of the selected
option on as aggressive a schedule as manufacturing and retrofit
capabilities permit.
    As demonstrated in the final RIA, PHMSA and FRA do not believe a
more aggressive timeline than what was proposed in the NPRM is
achievable or prudent. In fact, an overly aggressive timeline could
have a negative impact on safety or the environment. See the
environmental assessment for this rulemaking.
    The comments of the regulated industry regarding the implementation
timeline varied, but a general consensus for a ten-year time frame
emerged. The regulated community was generally consistent in noting
that the timeline should account for both the tank car type and the
packing group of the material.
    In addition to comments on the timeline, PHMSA and FRA received
many comments on our packing group based approach. Specifically, many
in the regulated community noted that while the proposed method is risk
based, it only accounts for the risk of the material itself and not the
risks posed by the various types of tank cars used in HHFTs. The
general consensus was that a retrofit timeline that accounted for the
type of tank car would provide the greatest risk reduction in the
shortest amount of time. Below are some relevant comments regarding the
proposed timeline.

    GBW suggested that, ``[w]hile the timeline [for retrofitting] is
aggressive, the tank car repair industry, by expanded [sic] capacity at
existing facilities and through new entrants into the industry, should
be able to meet PHMSA's proposed timeline.''
    Further, RSI-CTC stated that PHMSA and FRA should retrofit crude
oil and ethanol tank cars first then other Class 3 tank cars. It noted
that retrofit capacity is only 6,400 units per year whereas PHMSA
assumes 22,061 units per year. RSI-CTC continues, ``there are 50K non-
jacketed tank cars in service (23K crude and 27K ethanol/legacy and CPC
1232) that cannot be retrofitted by 10/01/2017--only 15K can be
retrofitted by that time.''
    Growth Energy requested a 3- to 10-year retrofit schedule. Arkema
Inc., ``agrees with the RSI-CTC's December 5, 2013 recommendation to
adopt, at a minimum, a 10-year program allowing compliance to be
achieved in phases through modification, re-purposing or retirement of
unmodified tank cars in Class 3, flammable liquid service.''
    Quantum Energy, Inc. stated, if PHMSA elects not to adopt this
exclusion for treated crude oil that they support ``at minimum
establishing a phase-out date of October 1, 2022 for the use of DOT-111
tank cars in transporting stabilized crude oil.''
    The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC)
stated that tank cars that meet the AAR CPC-1232 standards and were
built after October 1, 2011, should be allowed to continue in service
for their economic life, except for the transportation of Packing Group
I materials past October 1, 2016. Further, WUTU recommends that the
proposed timeline for phasing out DOT Specification 111 tank cars
should be expedited for Packing Group I and II materials by a year, and
that all existing tank cars more than 10 years old have a thorough tank
shell thickness inspection to ensure the tank is suitable for PG II and
PG III, Class 3 flammable liquids. Any tank that shows significant
signs of corrosion should be taken out of crude, ethanol, and any other
Packing Group I or II service immediately.
    Suggesting an alternate retrofit strategy, Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC
stated, ``Eighty-Eight supports a 7 year retrofit schedule.'' According
to Eighty Eight, the requirements for retrofitting cars will
necessitate a longer time frame than proposed in the NPRM, given: the
``car cleaning'' process and preparation for ``hot work'' or
retrofitting; training workers for tank car repair work; approval (via
the AAR) of high-flow pressure relief valve technology; and the
enabling of the production of full height head shields within repair
shops.
    In addition to these comments, RSI-CTC, API, Exxon, APFM and many
others in the regulated industry provided specific alternative retrofit
timelines which can be viewed in the docket for this rulemaking. PHMSA
and FRA reviewed comments, alternative timelines, and data regarding
the retrofit timeline and revised our implementation schedule
accordingly. PHMSA is confident that retrofits can be accomplished in
the revised timeline adopted in this final rule.
    In developing the retrofit schedule, PHMSA and FRA examined the
available shop capacity, the comments received, historical performance
of the rail industry dealing with retrofit requirements, and the
potential impacts associated with the retrofit schedule.
    PHMSA has accepted feedback regarding its assumption of no
retirements and the impracticality of transferring jacketed tank cars
to tar sands service. This final rule and the RIA now consider the
number of cars that could be retired early as a result of the rule and
the associated costs of doing so. PHMSA believes that rail cars will be
retired early when their owners have weighed the cost of meeting
retrofit requirements against the marginal cost of acquiring a
replacement rail car early.
    Further, to aid in the analysis of an appropriate retrofit
timeline, FRA developed a model to project the tank car retrofit
capacity over time. The model is based on Wright's learning curve
theory, which suggests that every time the total number of units that
have been produced doubles, productivity will increase by a given
percentage. This percentage is known as the learning rate.
    The starting point of the analysis was to analyze the rail
industry's forecast, as represented in the Brattle Group Report
commissioned by RSI-CTC. Using the Brattle reports figure of 6,400
retrofits per year the FRA model was able to determine that the Brattle
report would have to assume 40 facilities would be required to dedicate
one crew to retrofits. After making this determination on the number of
facilities, FRA sought to include other variables to model additional
potential scenarios. The intent being to depict the extent to which the
``heavy retrofit'' \55\ capacity will increase to a degree over time.
The variables for the FRA model included the learning rate, number of
crews, and number of facilities. In the model, the values for these
variables are: a learning rate of .95 (which is relatively low for
similar industries) \56\, one crew (initially) per facility, and 40
facilities.\57\ Using these values as the starting point, a parametric
analysis was performed to show the values required to meet the industry
forecasted production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Heavy retrofits include those that go beyond simply adding
a valve and bottom outlet to the jacketed CPC-1232 cars.
    \56\ Represents a 5 percent rate of improvement. See http://www.fas.org/news/reference/calc/learn.htm.
    \57\ The variable of 40 facilities is a result of a parametric
analysis. FRA also ran the model with 80, 60, and 40 facilities and
40 enabled us to recreate industry's production forecast.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To determine the capacity of the industry, FRA used facility
registration data to identify 60 current tank car facilities capable of
performing heavy retrofits. Further, FRA identified 160 tank car
facilities capable of performing light modifications, which include
adding a valve and bottom outlet to the jacketed CPC-1232 cars. FRA
also accounts for industry concerns regarding the readiness of current
tank car facilities to perform retrofit services by maintaining the
ramp-up period provided by commenters. In addition to the existing
capacity, FRA's model assumes that capacity will increase to a degree
over time.
    FRA's model indicates the 6,400 retrofits per year would require 40
facilities to dedicate one crew to these retrofits. As a result, the
remaining capacity (60 total facilities identified by FRA) would focus
on the normal workload including requalifications, bad order repairs,
and reassignments. As a result, FRA's model assumes:
     40 facilities capable of heavy retrofits. FRA selected
this number as a conservative estimate--in reality the number of
facilities dedicated to heavy retrofits may be higher. It accounts for
industry concerns regarding the readiness of current tank car
facilities to perform retrofit services;
     A new crew (2 employees) will be added to each facility
every 3 months, beginning in month 4;
     After 24 months, no additional resources are added; the
only changes in capacity are based on the Wrights learning curve
theory,\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Every time production doubles the required resources and
time, decrease by a given percentage, known as the learning rate.
The learning rate for repetitive welding operations is 95 percent,
meaning that when production doubles, the required resources and
time are multiplied by 0.95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The learning rate is 0.95; and
     The learning rate is for the facility, not individuals. It
is assumed the crew members all have the required skill set to perform
the work.
    In support of these assumptions, Figure 2 indicates the cumulative

production schedule for industry's model (based on The Brattle Group
report), as well as FRA's model. Based on these assumptions, the FRA
model indicates that a heavy retrofit capacity exceeding the industry's
projection is achievable.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.002

    The most extensive retrofits (the ``heavy retrofits'') would need
to take place in the initial phases of the implementation timeline,
thus making these stages critical to the overall implementation
timeline. Stakeholders generally agree that a 120-month timeline for
light retrofits is acceptable.
Conclusion
    In the NPRM the retrofit timeline was based on a single risk
factor, the packing group. The packing group is a characteristic of the
hazardous material. In the final rule the retrofit timeline was revised
to focus on two risk factors, the packing group of the material and
differing types of DOT-111 and CPC-1232 tank cars. By adding the
additional risk factor, tank car type, we were able to not only account
for the characteristics of the hazardous material but also those of the
means of containment of that material. This revision as well as the
outputs of FRA model discussed above provided an accelerated risk
reduction that more appropriately addresses the overall risk. PHMSA and
FRA also modified the overall length of the retrofit to account for
issues raised by commenters. The rationale for the change in retrofit
schedule is discussed in further detail in the RIA for this final rule.
    Based on the commenters' input and additional analysis, in this
final rule, PHMSA and FRA are adopting a packing group- and tank car-
based implementation timeline for the retrofit of existing tank cars to
the NPRM's Option 3 standard when used as part of HHFT. This risk-based
retrofit schedule will be codified in authorized packaging section in
part 173, subpart F of HMR and the prescriptive retrofit standard is
detailed in Sec.  179.202-13. This timeline is based on public comment,
the FRA modeling output and historical performance of the rail industry
dealing with retrofit requirements. This timeline accounts for an
initial ramp-up period as well as incremental improvements based on a
learning curve throughout the implementation timeline. The
implementation timeline adopted is outlined in the following table:

                     Table 21--Timeline for Continued Use of DOT Specification 111 (DOT-111)
                                            [Tanks for Use in HHFTs]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Tank car type/service                                      Retrofit deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I service....  (January 1, 2017 *) January 1, 2018.
Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I service........  March 1, 2018.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG I service...  April 1, 2020.
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG II service...  May 1, 2023.

Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG II service.......  May 1, 2023.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG II service..  July 1, 2023.
Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG I and PG II       May 1, 2025.
 service ** and all remaining tank cars carrying
 PG III materials in an HHFT (pressure relief
 valve and valve handles).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The January 1, 2017 date would trigger a retrofit reporting requirement, and tank car owners of affected cars
  would have to report to DOT the number of tank cars that they own that have been retrofitted, and the number
  that have not yet been retrofitted.
** We anticipate these will be spread out throughout the 120 months and the retrofits will take place during
  normal requalification and maintenance schedule, which will likely result in fleet being retrofit sooner.

    Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13610 require agencies to
provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation. Accordingly,
PHMSA invited public comment twice (the September 6, 2013, ANPRM and
August 1, 2014, NPRM) on retrofit timeline considerations, including
any cost or benefit figures or other factors, alternative approaches,
and relevant scientific, technical and economic data. Such comments
aided PHMSA and FRA in the evaluation of the proposed requirements.
PHMSA and FRA have since revised our proposed retrofit timelines to
address the public comments received.
    PHMSA and FRA have made regulatory decisions within this final rule
based upon the best currently available data and information. PHMSA and
FRA are confident that retrofits can be accomplished in the revised
timeline adopted in this final rule. However, PHMSA and FRA will
continue to gather and analyze additional data. Executive Order 13610
urges agencies to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to
examine whether they remain justified and whether they should be
modified or streamlined in light of changed circumstances, including
the rise of new technologies. Consistent with its obligations under
E.O. 13610, Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens, PHMSA and FRA
will retrospectively review all relevant provisions in this final rule,
including industry progress toward meeting the established retrofit
timeline.
    To this end, the first phase of the timeline includes a January 1,
2017 deadline for retrofitting non-jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I
service. If the affected industry is unable to meet the January 1, 2017
retrofit deadline a mandatory reporting requirement would be triggered.
This reporting requirement would require owners of non-jacketed DOT-111
tank cars in PG I service to report to Department of Transportation the
following information regarding the retrofitting progress:
     The total number of tank cars retrofitted to meet the DOT-
117R specification;
     The total number of tank cars built or retrofitted to meet
the DOT-117P specification;
     The total number of DOT-111 tank cars (including those
built to CPC-1232 industry standard) that have not been modified;
     The total number of tank cars built to meet the DOT-117
specification; and
     The total number of tank cars built or retrofitted to a
DOT-117, 117R or 117P specification that are ECP brake ready or ECP
brake equipped.
    While this requirement applies to any owner of non-jacketed DOT-111
tank cars in PG I service, the Department of Transportation would
accept a consolidated report from a group representing the affected
industries. Furthermore, while not adhering to the January 1, 2017
retrofit deadline triggers an initial reporting requirement, it would
also trigger a requirement which would allow the Secretary of
Transportation to request additional reports of the above information
with reasonable notice.

C. Speed Restrictions

    Speed is a factor that contributes to derailments. Speed can
influence the probability of an accident, as it may allow for a brake
application to stop the train before a collision. Speed also increases
the kinetic energy of a train resulting in a greater possibility of the
tank cars being punctured in the event of a derailment. The kinetic
energy of an object is the energy that it possesses due to its motion.
It is defined as the work needed to accelerate or decelerate a body of
a given mass.

    Kinetic Energy = \1/2\ (Mass) x (Velocity)2

    Based on this calculation, given a fixed mass, if an accident
occurred at 40 mph instead of 50 mph, we should expect a reduction of
kinetic energy of 36 percent. After consultations with engineers and
subject matter experts, we can assume that this would translate to the
severity of an accident being reduced by 36%. A slower speed may also
allow a locomotive engineer to identify a safety problem ahead and stop
the train before an accident occurs, which could lead to accident
prevention.
    A purpose built model developed for FRA by Sharma and Associates,
Inc. was used to simulate a number of derailment scenarios to evaluate
the survivability of the tank cars proposed in the NPRM equipped with
different brake systems and operating a range of speeds. The results of
the simulations were the most probable number of tank cars derailed and
punctured. The results were used to calculate the effectiveness of the
tank car enhancements, speed reduction and brake systems individually
in in combination with one or both of the other parameters. The model
and simulation are discussed in detail in the March 2015 letter report
prepared by Sharma and Associates, Inc. This letter report is available
in the docket for this rulemaking.
    As tank car enhancements, brake systems, and speed are interrelated
aspects of this rulemaking and can have an effect on each other,
various combinations of these variables were evaluated by FRA modeling.
For example, by modifying the variables of speed (30 mph-50 mph), tank
car enhancements (shell thickness, steel type, jacketing and head
shielding), and braking (TWEOT, DP and ECP), FRA was able to create a
matrix which could compare the effectiveness and benefits of numerous
combinations of these variables. The table below describes the speeds
that were evaluated with the various combinations of tank car
enhancements and braking systems.

       Table 22--Speeds Evaluated in the FRA's Purpose Built Model
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Speeds evaluated                       Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 mph...................................  Proposed maximum speed.
40 mph...................................  Proposed maximum speed in
                                            High-Threat Urban Areas.

30 mph...................................  Speed in the range at which
                                            most of derailments under
                                            consideration in this
                                            rulemaking occurred.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the data from FRA and Sharma & Associates, PHMSA anticipates
the reductions in the speed of trains that employ less safe tank cars,
such as the non-jacketed DOT-111 tank car, will prevent fatalities and
injuries and limit the amount of damages to property and the
environment in an accident. Simulation results indicate that limited
safety benefits would be realized from a reduction in speed as the tank
car fleet is enhanced as proposed in this NPRM. Please refer to the RIA
for a detailed analysis of the impact of speed on the number of cars
derailed and punctured when paired with a range of tank car
enhancements and braking options.
    In response to the Secretary Foxx's Call to Action, the rail and
crude oil industries agreed to consider voluntary operational
improvements, including speed restrictions in high consequence areas.
As a result of those efforts, railroads began operating certain trains
at 40 mph on July 1, 2014. This voluntary restriction applies to any
``Key Crude Oil Train'' with at least one non-CPC 1232 tank car or one
non-DOT specification tank car while that train travels within the
limits of any high-threat urban area (HTUA) as defined by 49 CFR
1580.3.
    In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, PHMSA and FRA proposed to add a new
Sec.  174.310 to include certain operational requirements for a HHFT.
Among those operational requirements was a proposal to limit the speed
of an HHFT. Specifically, the NPRM proposed to add a new Sec.  174.310
to Part 174--Carriage by Rail that would establish a 50-mph maximum
speed restriction for HHFTs. This 50-mph maximum speed restriction for
HHFTs was generally consistent with the speed restrictions that the AAR
issued in Circular No. OT-55-N on August 5, 2013.
    In Sec.  174.310(a)(3), PHMSA also proposed three options for a 40-
mph speed restriction for any HHFT unless all tank cars containing
Class 3 flammable liquids meet or exceed the proposed standards for the
DOT Specification 117 tank car. The three 40-mph speed limit options
are as follows:
Option 1: 40-mph Speed Limit in All Areas
    All HHFTs are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph, unless all tank
cars containing flammable liquids meet or exceed the proposed
performance standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank car.
Option 2: 40-mph Speed Limit in Areas With More Than 100,000 People
    All HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing flammable liquids meet
or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank
car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph while operating in an
area that has a population of more than 100,000 people.
Option 3: 40-mph Speed Limit in High-Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs)
    All HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing flammable liquids meet
or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank
car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph while the train travels
within the geographical limits of HTUAs.
    In addition, PHMSA proposed to add a new Sec.  174.310(a)(3)(iv) to
Part 174--Carriage by Rail that would prohibit a rail carrier from
operating HHFTs at speeds exceeding 30 mph if the rail carrier does not
comply with the proposed braking requirements set forth in the Advanced
Brake Signal Propagation Systems section of the NPRM. The intention of
this requirement was to further reduce risks through speed restrictions
and encourage adoption of newer braking technology while simultaneously
reducing the burden on small rail carriers that may not have the
capital available to install new braking systems.
    On the issue of speed restrictions, PHMSA received public comments
representing approximately 90,821 signatories. Comments in response to
the NPRM's speed restrictions were wide ranging, with comments both
supporting and opposing speed restrictions. Some commenters supported
the speed restrictions explicitly as they were proposed in the NPRM.
Other commenters opposed the NPRM's speed restrictions and proposed
alternatives, such as different speed limits or different geographical
standards for use in determining where a speed limit is applicable.
Further, many commenters did not directly support or oppose any of the
proposed speed restrictions, but rather chose to comment generally.
Below is a table detailing the types and amounts of commenters on the
speed proposals.

             Table 23--Commenter Composition: Speed Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Commenter type                         Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization.............................          85,023
Individuals.............................................           5,475
Industry stakeholders...................................             265
Government organizations or representatives.............              58
                                                         ---------------
  Totals................................................          90,821
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Overall, the comments of citizens, environmental groups, tribal
communities and local government representatives supported more
restrictive speed limits. These comments were essentially focused on
how speed restrictions would provide safety benefits to local
communities or the environment. Referencing data from the NPRM, these
groups expressed concerns that derailments and releases of crude oil
and ethanol present public safety risks and have occurred at lower
speeds than the speed limits proposed in NPRM. Environmental groups and
affiliated signatories, in particular, voiced concerns that releases of
hazardous materials in derailments could have far-reaching adverse
impacts on environmental quality, including water quality and
biological diversity. Some commenters asked PHMSA to consider making
the proposed speed restrictions applicable to specific environmental
areas, such as in the vicinity of water resources or national parks. In
illustration of these viewpoints, Clean Water Action has stated:

    The agencies' promotion of a 40 miles per hour speed, when in
fact nine of the major 13 train accidents (Table 3 of the NPRM)
occurred with speeds under 40 miles per hour does not seem justified
nor is it in the public interest. Fire resulted in 10 of the 13
accidents, three of which were involved in speeds over 40 miles per
hour and five of which were between 30 miles per hour and 40 miles
per hour. The 6 accidents involving crude oil resulted in over 1.2
million gallons of oil being spilled [. . .] Clean Water Action
encourages the agency to analyze reducing travel speeds to 30 mph
and lower. [. . .] Clean Water Action respectfully encourages the
agency to examine additional speed restrictions in areas near public
drinking water supplies and sensitive environments.

    Three entities representing tribal communities, the Tulalip Tribes,
the Prairie Island Indian Community and the Quinault Indian Nation,
expressed specific concerns with regard to the speed restrictions
proposed in the August 1, 2014, NPRM. The Tulalip Tribes noted that
``[t]he maximum speed limit for the trains should not be higher than
the maximum speed the rail cars

can survive in the case of an accident. Only lowering the speeds to 40
miles per hour is inadequate to protect life and property.'' The
Prairie Island Indian Community supported this viewpoint and expressed
concern noting the proximity of a crude oil route to their primary
residential area and gaming enterprise. They continued that they
``would like to see the non-enhanced HHFT trains slowed down even
further, to 30 miles per hour through residential areas or through
areas with critical or sensitive infrastructure (like nuclear power
plants).'' Finally, the Quinault Indian Nation conveyed their support
of a 40-mph restriction in all areas with further research being
completed on the benefits of a 30-mph restriction in all areas.
    In addition, some individual citizens, environmental groups, and
local communities expressed concern that speed restrictions might
protect some cities and towns while potentially leaving others exposed
to safety risks. Consequently, many individual citizens, environmental
groups, and local government representatives supported Option 1, the
40-mph speed limit for HHFTs in all areas, or proposed an alternative
lower speed limit to be applied as a nation-wide speed limit. These
commenters did not address for the costs of implementing Option 1;
rather, they emphasized that Option 1's geographical standard (``all
areas'') is the most protective, and most beneficial, of the three
speed options proposed and would benefit all communities, large and
small. As Earthjustice, Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, et al. have
expressed:

    Imposing a 40 m.p.h. speed limit only in the largest cities or
`high-threat urban areas' would be far less protective of the public
than requiring safer speed limits in all populated and sensitive
areas. First, the option that would focus speed restrictions on
areas with more than 100,000 people excludes far too many populated
areas that [are] in harm's way. For example, many U.S. cities that
have experienced dangerous and potentially deadly HHFT derailments
would not be covered by safer speed limits using this threshold,
including Lynchburg, Virginia (78,000 people); Painesville, Ohio
(20,000 people); and Vandergrift, PA (5,000 people).

    Comments from rail network users and operators generally supported
less restrictive speed limits. They were essentially concerned with the
cost impacts of the proposed speed restrictions. In illustration of
these potential cost impacts, the rail network users and operators
provided some industry-specific data and analysis on the detrimental
effects to network fluidity and the additional costs that would result
from the proposed speed restrictions. Overall, these commenters and
other stakeholders stated that speed restrictions would lead to: (1)
Increased congestion; (2) slower or less predictable delivery times for
various products, including crude oil, ethanol, and agricultural
commodities; (3) increases in the number of tank cars required to
ensure consistent timely delivery service due to increases in transit
times; (4) increased costs to shippers and carriers; (5) constrained
investments in the rail network's infrastructure and capacity due to
reduced rail carrier revenues; (6) diversions of crude oil and ethanol
transport to other modes of transport; and (7) slower passenger or
commuter rail service.
    Several commenters stated that the proposed speed restrictions
would result in additional congestion. These commenters emphasized that
the rail network is already congested and has ``fluidity'' issues. Dow
and the DGAC suggested that the proposed speed restrictions could
inadvertently increase the risk of incidents due to congestion.
According to multiple commenters, increased congestion and subsequent
reductions in network fluidity could ``ripple'' across the rail network
and would affect various commodities that are transported by rail, not
just crude oil and ethanol.
    PHMSA received comments from a coalition of agri-business
organizations that have been affected by ``service disruptions'' and
``severe backlogs,'' including the Agricultural Retailers Association,
National Corn Growers Association, U.S. Dry Bean Council, and various
state associations. According to these commenters, the agricultural
sector has succeeded at producing agricultural commodities, such as
grain and oilseed, at ``record or near-record'' levels, but faces
difficulty in making timely deliveries due to increased demand for
freight rail service. This increased demand is due in part to ``non-
agricultural segments of the U.S. economy,'' such as crude oil
production, and has caused a relative scarcity of rail service supply
and competition among shippers seeking to use rail transport. These
commenters have stated that the NPRM's proposed speed restrictions
would further strain the transport of commodities.
    Affirming these commenters' concerns, the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) has stated that rail traffic has increased by 4.5
percent from January through October 2014 compared to the same period
in 2013. Over the same period, carloads of crude oil and petroleum
products have increased 13 percent, and these shipments of crude oil
and petroleum are occurring in the parts of the U.S. where there is
also strong demand to move coal and grain by rail.\59\ Along with crude
oil shippers, shippers of coal, grain, ethanol, and propane have
expressed concerns that rail service has been slow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ https://www.aar.org/newsandevents/Freight-Rail-Traffic/Documents/2014-11-06-railtraffic.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to these congestion issues, the Surface Transportation
Board (STB) called hearings in April and September 2014 to address rail
``service problems,'' and in October, STB required ``weekly data
reports'' from all Class I railroads.60 61 The EIA
information and the STB's actions appear to reflect the commenters'
concerns regarding the current rail transportation environment,
characterized by increased demand, rail service issues, and competition
among shippers of different commodities for the available rail service
supply.
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    \60\ STB News Releases. Available online at: http://www.stb.dot.gov/newsrels.nsf/13c1d2f25165911f8525687a00678fa7/b9b95d1200b9d81985257cad006a133a?OpenDocument and http://www.stb.dot.gov/newsrels.nsf/13c1d2f25165911f8525687a00678fa7/037f6ab62281bba985257d380068208a?OpenDocument
    \61\ STB Decision Document. Available online at: http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/readingroom.nsf/WebDecisionID/43850?OpenDocument
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    Among the proposed speed restrictions, many rail users and
operators and other stakeholders have expressed that Option 1--a 40-mph
speed limit for HHFTs in all areas--would have the greatest negative
impact on network fluidity. The Independent Petroleum Association of
America (IPAA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC) delineated
how Option 1, in particular, would create a chain of effects in the
rail network and increase costs to shippers or carriers:

    The consequences of the proposed 40-mph speed restriction in all
areas would be significantly longer turnaround times for unit
trains, thus necessitating the need to have more railcars in the
shipping fleet. Longer turnaround times alone will make railcars in
short supply on the first day the new rule takes effect. A 10-mph
reduction in speed equates to a twenty percent increase in
turnaround time (assuming 50 mph average train speed), requiring a
twenty percent increase in fleet size.

    Other commenters have described how transit times and costs to
shippers and carriers would increase. The Alaska Railroad Corporation
stated that a common route from Anchorage to Fairbanks, Alaska, would
``take an extra 69 minutes'' with a maximum speed of 40 mph. Bridger
has stated that ``an increase in round-trip transit time for Bridger's
unit trains from North Dakota to the East Coast from 15 days to 20

days will increase the cost per barrel [. . .] by 33%.'' In addition to
impacting rail carriers and oil and gas producers, the proposed speed
restrictions could impact a wide variety of shippers. The Council on
Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles (COSTHA) relayed that one of
its members, a large manufacturer and distributor of consumer products,
estimated increased costs of $80 million annually to its operations
alone due to the proposed speed restrictions.
    Rail users and operators predicted that the proposed speed
restrictions would constrain their ability to invest in the rail
network's infrastructure (i.e. add capacity) at a time when capacity is
already stressed. Adding capacity would be one way in which the
railroads might seek to counteract the potential network fluidity
impacts resulting from the proposed speed restrictions. Union Pacific
Railroad Company has stated that investments to expand capacity are
risky, expansions require 2-3 years or more to complete, and the
decision to invest depends significantly on the ``ability to generate
returns at reinvestible levels.'' Thus, if the proposed speed
restrictions have a significant impact on revenues or returns,
railroads have implied that they might not be capable of investing in
the rail network's infrastructure at a rate that sufficiently addresses
recently increased demand for rail transport. Railroads have also
stated that they have been investing greatly in the rail network's
infrastructure, but the costs of adding capacity have increased in
recent years. Thus, according to the railroads, the proposed speed
limits would increase costs in a business environment that is already
characterized by increasing costs, which stresses the railroad's
ability to make new capital investments and add capacity.
    Rail users and operators and other stakeholders have projected that
reduced network fluidity due to speed restrictions could result in
rail-to-highway diversions or other modal shifts. As the American
Association of Private Rail Car Owners (AAPRCO) commented, ``Since the
railroad network is already near or over capacity in many places, and
consists overwhelmingly of single and double-track lines, widespread,
new speed restrictions would have a major impact [...]. The impact in
some cases could be diversion of freight to less-safe highways.''
Commenters have stated, if the proposed speed restrictions were to
negatively influence rail network fluidity, some crude oil and ethanol
transport by rail would be diverted to highway transport, and this
would expose users of the nation's highways to increased flammable
cargos transported by trucks.
    Rail users and operators have stated that the proposed speed
restrictions and subsequent reductions in network fluidity would have
adverse effects on passenger or commuter rail, and they state that
network fluidity is already stressed for these types of rail. The
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) has commented:

    Amtrak believes that any significant slowing of the general
railroad system could have an adverse effect on the performance of
intercity passenger rail service, which has already been slowed by
the recent increase of freight traffic, including the increase in
the number of Key Crude Oil Trains.

Similarly, the Sao Joaquin Partnership has contextualized this effect
for commuters, stating:

    Overly restrictive speeds will reduce the fluidity of the rail
network and may reduce rail capacity for both people and freight.
Passenger rail service via ACE Train carries over 1 million riders
from Stockton to San Jose each year servicing major technology
employers in Silicon Valley providing high wage opportunities for
San Joaquin residents. Slowing freight will delay transit along this
important trade rail corridor.

Thus, if the proposed speed restrictions affect the performance of
commuter trains, adverse impacts on labor output might also occur.
    Regarding industry data or projections, PHMSA often times could not
corroborate the data provided by industry stakeholders. Some commenters
did not supply data, while others supplied only limited data. PHMSA
made efforts to acquire and analyze different data that was required
for the RIA and the rulemaking's decision-making process.
    Despite having voiced some cautions about speed restrictions, some
rail network users and operators expressed their support for the
voluntary speed restrictions that were agreed upon by industry members
as a result of Secretary Foxx's Call to Action and subsequent Letter to
the Association of American Railroads published on February 21,
2014.\62\ These voluntary speed restrictions are generally consistent
with the proposed 50-mph maximum speed limit and Option 3, the 40-mph
speed limit in HTUAs. Notably, Option 3 had substantial support among
the rail network users and operators and related trade associations.
Some commenters concluded that all proposed speed restrictions would
have negative impacts on industry, but, if a speed restriction were to
be implemented, Option 3 should be implemented as it would minimize
these negative impacts.
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    \62\ Available online at: http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/letter-association-american-railroads
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    Regarding Option 2, the 40-mph speed limit in areas with a
population of 100,000 or more, commenters raised additional concerns.
One commenter stated that the risk to a population from a train
accident depends less on the size of the population in a given area
than on the proximity of that population to the railway. Thus, Option 2
might not accurately address the true number of people threatened by
railway accidents. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company stated that
the term ``area'' is ``unacceptably vague,'' and Option 2 is therefore
``unworkable.'' This concern was echoed by other commenters.
    Some commenters expressed that Option 2 would also adversely impact
network fluidity. While significantly less restrictive in a
geographical sense than Option 1, some commenters, such as Amsted Rail
and the National Shippers Strategic Transportation Council, still
considered Option 2 to be overly restrictive or costly.
    Some commenters considered Option 2 to be an acceptable
``compromise'' between competing concerns for the efficiency of the
rail transportation system and enhanced safety. According to the State
of Minnesota:

    Option 1, a 40 MPH speed limit in all areas, would have
extensive negative effects on the shipment capacity, reliability,
cost, and overall system velocity for Minnesota and its market
connections. Option 2, a 40 MPH limit in areas with more than
100,000 people, would be an acceptable limit for trains using tank
cars not conforming with the improved performance specifications,
and would put relatively limited strain on system velocity and
capacity compared to Option 1. The cost benefit analysis supports
this compromise order.

    Nevertheless, relatively few commenters expressed support for
Option 2 as proposed in the NPRM. Comparatively, there was much wider
support for Option 1 and Option 3 as proposed in the NPRM, with
different groups of commenters expressing their respective support for
each.
    Regarding the NPRM's 30-mph speed limit, some commenters were in
support, echoing the rationale that reduced speeds enhance the safety
profile of conventional braking systems. Other commenters thought that
the 30-mph speed limit should be adopted, but asserted that it would be
more appropriate to make it a requirement for all tank cars that did
not meet or exceed the standards of Specification DOT-117. Different
commenters asked that the

tank cars without enhanced braking systems be required to travel at
speeds under 30 mph, such as 20 mph or 18 mph. Multiple concerned
citizens asked that a 30-mph speed limit be required for all HHFTs,
irrespective of their braking systems.
    Some commenters were opposed to the 30-mph speed limit. These
commenters either opposed speed restrictions in general or they
supported higher or less restrictive speed limits. For many rail users
and operators and other stakeholders, the 30-mph speed limit appeared
to be unnecessary in light of the 50-mph maximum speed limit and the
40-mph speed limit in HTUAs, which have already gained support as
voluntary speed restrictions for certain tank cars transporting crude
oil. Further, multiple commenters pointed out that some of the enhanced
braking systems proposed in the NPRM--namely, two-way EOT devices and
DP braking systems--are already widely adopted by industry. If two-way
EOT devices and DP braking systems are already widely adopted, the 30-
mph speed limit would not be generally applicable to HHFTs, unless the
30-mph speed limit also required HHFTs to equip and/or operate ECP
braking systems. For more information regarding ECP braking systems,
please see the Braking Section of the final rule.
    In addition to the aforementioned comments, PHMSA received other
comments in relation to speed restrictions. These comments have been
grouped together where appropriate and paraphrased.
Response to Comments Related to Speed Restrictions
    As a safety organization, PHMSA works to reduce the safety risks
inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce by
all modes of transportation, and in this rulemaking, has focused its
efforts on the safety of the transportation of large quantities of
Class 3 flammable liquids by rail. To demonstrate that speed
restrictions relate directly to safety risks, PHMSA has provided data
to demonstrate the relationship between speeds, kinetic energy, tank
car punctures in a derailment, and subsequent releases of hazardous
material into the environment (See RIA). As a result of the Sharma
modeling, PHMSA agrees with the commenters' concerns that derailments
and releases of hazardous material could have adverse impacts on public
safety and the environment and has proposed to reduce safety risks
through the implementation of speed restrictions.
    In addition to demonstrating that its proposed speed restrictions
will benefit public safety, PHMSA must evaluate the impact of its
regulations on diverse stakeholders. In some cases, PHMSA is required
by law to conduct and publish a cost/benefit analysis, among other
legal requirements. Therefore, while some of the proposed speed
restrictions are more restrictive and may lead to greater safety
benefits than others, PHMSA must consider concurrently the cost of
implementing each proposed speed restriction and evaluate the net
effect on a diverse set of stakeholders. PHMSA must also consider the
costs and benefits to the various stakeholders of alternatives. As
such, the costs imposed on industry and society at large by the
proposed speed restrictions are an important factor in our regulatory
analysis and decision-making.
    PHMSA believes that an overly restrictive speed limit would present
costs that outweigh benefits, and this was echoed by many commenters.
These commenters expressed the outlook that the proposed speed
restrictions would present significant new costs, caused primarily by
substantial negative effects on rail network fluidity. As a result of
its understanding of commodity flows and rail network fluidity, PHMSA
agrees that speed restrictions could result in: An increase in the
number of tank cars needed to ensure consistent delivery service due to
increases in transit or ``turn'' times; increased congestion; slower or
less predictable delivery times for some products transported by rail,
including crude oil, ethanol, and agricultural commodities; slower
passenger or commuter rail service; and increased costs to shippers and
carriers. Moreover, if an overly restrictive speed limit were codified
in the final rule, the negative effect on network fluidity could become
an indefinite burden on carriers, shippers, rail passengers, and other
stakeholders, since adding capacity to the rail network would likely be
costly, time-intensive, and in some cases not feasible.
    Therefore, if the proposed speed restrictions were to significantly
hinder rail network fluidity, PHMSA believes that some diversion of
crude oil and ethanol transport to highways could occur. Given
substantial rail-to-truck diversions, the proposed speed restrictions
might also lead to increased safety risks in the wider transportation
system, especially the highway transportation system, which could in
turn result in increased highway accidents involving Class 3 flammable
liquids and increased costs related to responding to or mitigating
highway accidents. In other words, the proposed speed restrictions
could shift safety risks from rail transportation to highway
transportation. PHMSA has taken this into consideration and generally
agrees with this line of reasoning as presented by commenters.
    Many concerned citizens and local communities stated that rural
areas or small towns should have the same speed restrictions and safety
protections as highly populated areas. This is a valid statement, which
PHMSA considered. However, in terms of potential injuries and
fatalities, PHMSA believes that the damages from a derailment in a
densely populated area are more likely to be catastrophic, than damages
from a derailment in a less densely populated area. Further, the
application of speed restrictions to densely populated areas is less
costly because only a small portion of the rail network is located
within the limits of these areas and railroad operating practices
already account for other kinds of restrictions, e.g., railway
crossings and signals, in urban areas.
    PHMSA determined that there is a trade-off between the safety
benefits of the proposed speed restrictions and the costs incurred by
rail network operators and users, including offerors, tank car
manufacturers, tank car-related businesses, rail carriers, rail
passengers, and consumers of products transported by rail. PHMSA found
that the proposed speed restriction that offers the greatest safety
benefits is also the most costly; conversely, the least costly speed
restriction offers the least safety benefits.
    To further refine this analysis, PHMSA has focused its attention on
identifying the proposed speed restriction that confers the greatest
amount of benefit per dollar of cost. PHMSA has determined that Option
3 confers the greatest amount of benefits per dollar of costs, which
lends support for the implementation of a 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs.
See the Final RIA for detailed cost and benefit figures.
    Accordingly, PHMSA has decided not to apply the 40-mph speed limit
to all areas (Option 1) because this would be overly restrictive and
highly costly to a variety of stakeholders, and it confers the least
benefits per dollar of costs. PHMSA has also taken into consideration
the fact that Option 2 has a lower benefit-cost ratio than Option 3,
which lends further support for Option 3 and raises concerns about
Option 2.
    Regarding Option 2, PHMSA agrees with some of the commenters'
concerns and acknowledges some of the potential problems presented by
Option 2's geographical standard, ``an area [. . .]

that has a population of more than 100,000 people.'' Specifically,
PHMSA recognizes that the size of a population does not always relate
to the proximity of a population to a potential railway accident.
Proximity may be a better indicator of potential damages or harm in the
event of a derailment. PHMSA also recognizes that the threshold of
100,000 people may present difficulties for purposes of compliance and
enforcement. Further, PHMSA reiterates that the implementation of
Option 2 would be more costly and confers fewer benefits per unit of
costs than Option 3. This cost/benefit analysis, the problems presented
regarding the geographical standard of Option 2, and the general lack
of commenter support for Option 2 as proposed, have led PHMSA to not
elect to codify Option 2 in the Final Rule.
    Regarding Option 3, PHMSA believes that the implementation of
Option 3 would yield significant safety benefits, especially in the
nation's most populated areas where derailments are more likely to be
catastrophic. PHMSA also believes that the costs of implementing Option
3 are justified. PHMSA is confident that the geographical standard,
HTUAs, is practical and well-defined and thus, would be understood for
compliance and enforcement purposes. Namely, the HTUA designation has
been codified since 2008 in 49 CFR Section 1580.3. In addition, PHMSA
recognizes the importance of industry cooperation to date on the issue
of a 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs. For these reasons, PHMSA is electing
to adopt Option 3, a 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs in HTUAs.
    PHMSA must also conduct its final rulemaking with due consideration
to the scope of its proposed rulemaking. Some of the commenters
suggested alternative, more restrictive speed limits that were
significantly lower than the speed limits proposed in the NPRM. These
speed limits cannot be adopted because PHMSA must codify regulations in
its Final Rule that are reasonably aligned with what PHMSA has proposed
in previous stages of the rulemaking in order to afford the public and
interested parties an opportunity to comment on the agency's proposed
actions.
    Other commenters suggested alternative lower speed limits that are
approximate or comparable to the proposed speed restrictions. For
example, the City of Chicago suggested a 35-mph speed limit in HTUAs.
These alternative lower speed limits that were approximate or
comparable to the speed restrictions proposed in the NPRM were duly
considered, but PHMSA is not electing to adopt them. PHMSA was not
provided with sufficient data to demonstrate concretely that any one
alternative lower speed limit would be superior to the speed
restrictions proposed in the NPRM. These commenters either did not
disclose how a given damage reduction estimate was formulated, or their
suggestion for an alternative speed limit lacked an empirical basis.
    The BLET and other commenters have stated that additional accident
modeling could be conducted at different speeds, such as 30 mph. PHMSA
believes additional accident modeling could help determine if
alternative lower speed limits would reduce the severity of an accident
more effectively than the proposed speed restrictions. In response to
this and other comments about the costs and benefit calculations
related to speed, further modeling was conducted from speeds of 30 mph
through 50 mph (See table 22).
    In contrast to alternative lower or more restrictive speed limits,
some commenters suggested a different, less restrictive alternative:
PHMSA should not impose new speed restrictions at all. For example,
Biggs Appraisal Service has stated, ``The railroads have speed limits
on every section of track that they operate. [. . .] Why put additional
restrictions on the railroads when they already have systems in place
that work?'' Regarding this point, PHMSA recognizes that there are FRA
regulations in place pertaining to speed restrictions and track
classes, and some railroads have voluntarily chosen to implement speed
restrictions. However, the FRA regulations relate to track classes and
do not address the specific risks of HHFTs, and the voluntary speed
restrictions in place do not carry the weight of law. PHMSA believes
that the increased number of derailments and accidents in recent years
has demonstrated that the speed limit systems in place require
enhancements, such as the proposed speed restrictions. Accident
modeling data has shown that reducing speeds from 50 mph to 40 mph is
an effective way to reduce safety risks, namely the number of punctures
that occur in a derailment. To implement no speed restriction at all
would require a deliberate decision to forego certain safety benefits.
    In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed an additional speed restriction of 30
mph for tank cars that are not equipped and operated with either a two-
way EOT device or a DP system. Furthermore, the NPRM proposed
requirements for certain tank cars to be equipped with ECP braking
systems. These proposals and related comments are discussed in the
``Advanced Brake Signal Propagation'' section below.
    Various commenters expressed concerns for the environment and
thought speed restrictions should be applicable in environmentally
sensitive areas, such as in the vicinity of water resources or
navigable waterways. In response, PHMSA affirms that our organizational
mission includes protecting the environment from the risks of
transporting hazardous materials in commerce. PHMSA acknowledges the
importance of environmental concerns and that speed restrictions may be
an effective way to protect the environment from releases of hazardous
material. Releases of hazardous materials in a derailment could have
significant adverse impacts in these areas. Further, these areas might
not be highly populated or part of a designated HTUA and consequently,
might not be protected by the proposed speed restrictions.
    Citizens Acting for Rail Safety (CARS) suggested using the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s definition of ``environmentally
sensitive areas'' or using a pipeline safety definition, which pertains
to ``areas that are unusually sensitive to environmental damage.''
PHMSA believes these sources might provide a sound basis for defining
an environmentally sensitive area, or similar areas, in order to extend
the use of speed restrictions and offer specific protections to the
environment. However, under 49 CFR 172.820, routing analyses are
required of railroads carrying certain hazardous materials. The final
rule will codify these same routing requirements for railroads
transporting Class 3 flammable liquids in a HHFT. By performing a
routing analysis, railroads transporting flammable liquids in a HHFT
will be required by the HMR to consider, among other things,
``environmentally sensitive or significant areas,'' and they must base
their routing selection on the analysis. PHMSA believes this is
ultimately a more effective approach to reducing risks to
environmentally sensitive areas than the promulgation of speed
restrictions that are specific to those areas. Further, in the NPRM,
PHMSA did not propose a definition for the designation of
environmentally sensitive areas nor did it propose to base speed
restrictions on environmental criteria. PHMSA believes it would be
outside the scope of this rulemaking to require lower speeds in these
areas.
    PHMSA would like to respond to other comments related to speed
restrictions enumerated below.

1. Speed Restrictions Should Be Harmonized
    PHMSA has cooperated and will continue to cooperate with Transport
Canada and other appropriate international bodies. PHMSA seeks to
harmonize the proposed operational controls whenever it is feasible and
justified. As of April 23, 2014, Canada issued an Emergency Directive
that established a 50-mph maximum speed limit for certain trains
carrying ``Dangerous Goods,'' which is comparable to the 50-mph maximum
speed limit established through the cooperation of the Department and
AAR. These actions demonstrate that PHMSA and Transport Canada have
already achieved harmonization in some respects.
    Nevertheless, speed restrictions do not necessarily need to be
harmonized between Canada and the U.S. In the final rule, PHMSA is
implementing a geographical standard for speed restrictions that is
specific to U.S. geography. Also, train speeds can be adjusted fairly
easily, and differences in speed limits between localities in the U.S.
and Canada would not present an undue burden on locomotive operators.
Harmonization of speed restrictions is not essential.
2. Speed Restrictions Should Only Apply to Tank Cars Carrying Certain
Hazardous Material(s); or Alternatively, to the Rail Transport of All
Hazardous Materials
    PHMSA typically uses the hazardous materials classes (Hazard
Classes 1 through 9) to distinguish the risks of different hazardous
materials. In recent years, increased crude oil and ethanol production
have presented increased risks to the rail transportation system, but
other types of flammable liquids could present similar risks. By
defining a HHFT as a train with a continuous block of 20 or more tank
cars or a total of 35 or more tank cars containing a Class 3 flammable
liquid, we address the specific risks of increasing crude oil and
ethanol production while also anticipating the potential for future
risks presented by the increased production or transport of other Class
3 flammable liquids.
    PHMSA disagrees with commenters who suggested that the proposed
speed restrictions only apply to crude oil, or alternatively, only to
crude oil and ethanol. PHMSA believes that Class 3 flammable liquids
present similar risks and as such, basing the proposed speed
restrictions on a given hazardous material's classification as Class 3
would be a comprehensive and responsive approach to mitigate these
risks.
    Comments suggesting that proposed speed restrictions should apply
to the transport of all hazardous materials by rail were considered.
However, PHMSA did not propose this in the NPRM, and this suggestion
cannot be adopted in the Final Rule due to concerns that it is not
reasonably aligned with what has been proposed. Moreover, the
operational controls addressed in this rule, including speed
restrictions, are aimed at reducing the risk and consequences of
incidents involving rail shipments of Class 3 flammable liquids. The
analyses, data, and relevant factors considered in developing this rule
are specific to these materials. Information has not been provided to
support expanding these restrictions to all hazardous materials or to
justify the associated negative impacts on rail fluidity and costs.
3. PHMSA Lacked Important Data That Could Be Used To Estimate Costs or
Benefits Pertinent to Speed Restrictions and/or More Cost/Benefit
Analysis Should Be Conducted
    Various commenters have identified factors that contribute to costs
or benefits that PHMSA has not included in its cost/benefit analysis.
PHMSA published a Draft RIA alongside the proposed rule to address the
requirements of Executive Order 12866, to explain the basis of its
cost/benefit analysis, and also to encourage stakeholder discussion of
cost/benefit analyses pertinent to this rulemaking. Since the NPRM,
PHMSA has improved upon its cost/benefit analyses and has published a
final regulatory impact analysis in conjunction with the final rule
based on comments received and data provided.
4. Speed Limits Should Apply to Trains Consisting of ``Enhanced'' Tank
Cars, as Well as to Trains With One or More Tank Cars That Are Not
``Enhanced''
    An ``enhanced'' tank car is one that meets or exceeds the retrofit
standards or the standards set forth by Specification DOT-117.
Specification DOT-117 tank cars and retrofitted tank cars have advanced
technology and present less safety risks to the rail transportation
system, the public, and the environment than ``legacy'' Specification
DOT 111 tank cars. In addition, PHMSA believes that there should be
incentives for tank car owners and lessors to retrofit or upgrade their
fleet of tank cars. By retrofitting or upgrading their tank cars, a
carrier can transport their tank cars at speeds above the proposed
speed restrictions, and this could advantageously shorten transit times
for offerors and carriers with retrofitted tank cars.
5. Speed Restrictions Could Be Lessened Over Time If Technology
Improves
    Technological improvements are oftentimes the ``triggering'' or
``initiating'' event for a new rulemaking or some other regulatory
action. PHMSA agrees that there is a possibility that speed
restrictions could be reduced or eliminated amid significant
technological improvements in the rail transportation industry.
6. Speed Limits Should Apply Only to Specific Configurations and/or a
Specific Number of Tank Cars, Such as a Continuous Block of 20 or More
Tank Cars
    PHMSA agrees with this point of view. Based on commenter feedback,
we have revised the NPRM's proposed HHFT definition to comprise trains
with a continuous block of 20 or more tank cars or trains with a total
of 35 or more tank cars carrying Class 3 flammable liquids. In doing
so, PHMSA seeks to address higher risk unit train configurations. In
other words, PHMSA seeks to regulate trains that transport a
substantial number of Class 3 flammable liquid-carrying tank cars while
avoiding unwarranted regulation of trains that transport smaller
quantities of flammable liquids in a ``manifest'' train. For additional
information regarding the scope of the Final Rule, please refer to the
section describing the definition of an HHFT.
7. Speed Limits Should Be Based on Track Conditions, Classes, or
Quality/Integrity.
    While track conditions and quality are an important part of rail
safety, PHMSA believes that creating a system of speed restrictions
based on these track factors is not warranted at this time. PHMSA did
not propose in the NPRM to base speed limits on these factors. The
commenters did not provide sufficient data to show how and to what
degree new speed restrictions would relate to track conditions or
quality. The commenters did not propose any specific system for the
implementation of speed restrictions based on track conditions or
quality.
    Further, FRA regulations codified in 49 CFR part 213--Track Safety
Standards already enforce a system of speed limits based on track
classes. One commenter stated that the aforementioned FRA regulations
render the NPRM's speed restrictions ``redundant.'' On this point,
PHMSA disagrees because the proposed speed restrictions are specific to
the risks of

Class 3 flammable liquids and the type, number, and configuration of
tank cars in a train. The proposed speed restrictions offer additional
safety benefits.
    Also, the Final Rule extends the routing requirements of Sec.
172.820 to the transport of Class 3 flammable liquids by rail in HHFTs.
Under these routing requirements, railroads transporting HHFTs will be
required to consider ``track type, class, and maintenance schedule''
and ``track grade and curvature,'' among other factors, in their choice
of routes. Railroads moving HHFTs must base their routing decision on
this analysis, effectively taking into consideration the potential
problems presented by track conditions, classes, or quality.
    One commenter stated that a 30-mph speed limit should be in place
for the segments of track that are in use for passenger service. Trains
in freight rail service and passenger rail service share significant
portions of the nation's rail infrastructure, so implementing this
suggestion would be overly restrictive.
8. The Proposed Speed Limits Are Based on Inadequate Geographical
Standards
    PHMSA considered different geographical standards in its
development of the proposed speed restrictions, and commenters offered
various alternative geographical standards, including references to
Bureau of the Census criteria or data for urban areas. However, the
commenters did not submit an accompanying cost/benefit analysis of the
alternative geographical standards, and these alternatives in many
cases were not adequately elaborated so that PHMSA could analyze
whether or not they would be superior to the proposed speed
restrictions.
    The NTSB proposed the ``potential impact radius'' (PIR) model as an
alternative geographical standard. NTSB likened PIR to an approach used
by PHMSA's gas pipeline regulations. PIR might be an effective
geographical standard for pipeline safety, but it is not clear if this
standard would also be suitable for rail transportation safety. Rail
transport involves a wider variety of commodities and amounts
transported, which presents a wider variety of risks that are mode-
specific. On this basis, PHMSA does not believe that PIR would be
better than the geographical standards proposed in the NPRM.
Furthermore, PHMSA believes that the HTUA designation is in fact
responsive to the need for greater protections in the areas that
present the greatest risks or ``potential impact.''
    One commenter stated that the HTUA designation is ``irrelevant'' in
the context of reducing rail safety risks, as it was designed for the
identification of terrorist targets. PHMSA disagrees. The HTUA
designation is also applicable to the reduction of rail safety risks
because it encompasses many areas that, if they were involved in a
derailment, could result in widespread damages. The likelihood that a
derailment would result in catastrophic damages is greater in HTUAs
than most other areas. A different commenter criticized Option 3 and
the HTUA designation because it was seen as overly restrictive and
includes ``dozens of areas.'' PHMSA disagrees on the basis that only
approximately 7% of the rail network is located within the limits of
HTUAs.
    Regarding alternative geographical standards, PHMSA affirms that
there are costs involved in creating new regulatory standards,
potential issues with implementation and clarity, and benefits involved
in consistencies between federal regulations. In this respect, the HTUA
designation would be easier, more effective, and clearer to implement
in accordance with a 40-mph speed limit because it has been codified
since 2008 in Title 49, CFR. Accordingly, rail network users and
operators already have a compliance history with this regulation.
Conversely, rail network operators are not familiar with PIR and other
alternative geographical criteria, and there would be a particular cost
attached to introducing novel geographical criteria.
9. Slow Rail Operations Have Already Affected U.S. Ethanol Production
by Limiting the Amount of Ethanol That Can Be Transported by Rail, and
the Proposed Speed Restrictions Will Negatively Impact Ethanol
Transport
    According to the Michigan Agri-Business Association, the Michigan
Farm Bureau, and businesses in the ethanol industry, slow rail service
has already impacted the ability of ethanol producers to effectively
ship and deliver ethanol to consumers. To that effect, Homeland Energy
Solutions has stated that the presently slow rail service has been
difficult to overcome and additional speed restrictions applicable to
ethanol transport will further hinder the industry, potentially causing
some producers to shut down.
    In response, PHMSA asserts there are many factors that might be
slowing existing rail operations. Reduced speed is only one factor that
might result in slow rail service. For example, the contributing
factors of poor rail service might include the rapid increase in the
production and transport of crude oil and subsequent displacement of
other commodities in the rail system. In such a case, poor service
could not necessarily be attributed to PHMSA's proposed speed
restrictions. Nevertheless, PHMSA is also concerned with the impact of
the proposed speed restrictions on rail network fluidity, and seeks to
limit their potential negative effects.
    The AAR proposed and implemented voluntary speed restrictions to
mitigate the risks of crude oil transport. Thus far, these voluntary
speed restrictions have not been applicable to ethanol transport by
rail. When considering additional speed restrictions, PHMSA looks at
cost/benefit analysis from a holistic perspective and does not give any
one industry or stakeholder a preference in its analysis. PHMSA seeks
to extend the safety benefits of the proposed speed restrictions to the
transport of all Class 3 flammable liquids, including ethanol, as well
as limit the negative effect of these speed restrictions on overall
rail network fluidity and the costs borne by all industry participants,
including ethanol producers.
    PHMSA acknowledges that, after the final rule takes effect, the
adopted speed restrictions will have a direct impact on ethanol
producers and carriers. There will be an increase in burden or costs to
shippers and carriers of ethanol if, prior to the rulemaking, they had
moved ethanol above 50 mph. Union Pacific has stated, ``Freight trains
often operate at speeds between 50 mph and 70 mph.'' Thus, freight
trains could have moved ethanol above 50 mph prior to the rulemaking.
    Nevertheless, commenters did not adequately relate to what degree
the 50-mph maximum speed limit would decrease the actual operating
speeds of HHFTs carrying ethanol. Overall, fewer commenters expressed
concerns about the 50-mph speed limit than about the three 40-mph speed
limits. In addition, industry cooperation with the Department has
already established 50 mph as a maximum speed limit for certain trains.
In Canada, Transport Canada issued an Emergency Directive in April 2014
requiring all companies to not operate a ``Key Train'' at speeds that
exceed 50 mph. For these reasons, it is PHMSA's understanding that the
50-mph maximum speed limit is a common industry practice and
implementing this speed limit would not drastically change the maximum
speeds at which most trains carrying hazardous materials, including
ethanol, operate.
    In addition to the 50-mph maximum speed limit, ethanol shippers and
carriers are directly affected by the 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs as a
result

of the final rule. As with the 50-mph maximum speed limit, however, it
is not clear to what extent HHFTs carrying ethanol would be affected.
BNSF has indicated that rail speeds through population centers of
100,000 or more, which would also include all HTUAs, are already ``at
or below 40 mph.'' This suggests the costs impacts of the 40-mph speed
limit in HTUAs would be minimal.
    For other carriers or entities within the ethanol industry, Option
3 might introduce new costs to them, but PHMSA believes the costs are
justified by additional safety benefits. Since Option 3 refers to a 40-
mph speed limit in HTUAs, only a small portion of the rail network--
around 7% of the nation's track--will be affected by this new speed
restriction. On balance, Option 3 is the least costly of the three
speed options proposed and concentrates its protections in the areas
where a derailment is most likely to be catastrophic and safety
benefits are greatest. The ability to limit the cost impacts of the
proposed speed restrictions on industry, including ethanol shippers,
carriers, and others, has lent support to PHMSA's decision to implement
Option 3. PHMSA believes the new costs to ethanol industry participants
are limited and justifiable.
    PHMSA does not intend to unjustifiably introduce costs into the
operations of stakeholders, especially those who qualify as small
businesses or small entities. For this reason, and in compliance with
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612), PHMSA must
conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis addressing the rulemaking's
economic impact given that the rulemaking is likely to ``have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' The rulemaking's RFA demonstrates that the impact to small
entities as a result of this rulemaking will be limited and should not
cause any small entities to cease operations. Please refer to the RFA
section for additional explanation of the final rule's impact on small
entities.
10. Voluntary Speed Restrictions Are Sufficient and Should Not Be
Codified; or Voluntary Speed Restrictions Are Insufficient and Should
Be Codified
    PHMSA believes the speed restrictions should be codified.
Recommended practices, such as voluntary speed restrictions, do not
carry the weight of law. Recommended practices do not provide legal
recourse in the event a railroad moves an HHFT at speeds exceeding
voluntary speed restrictions thus increasing the likelihood of
catastrophic damage in a train accident. Further, without the
codification of these requirements, the speed restrictions could be
lifted altogether in a premature manner, increasing safety risks.
Codifying the speed restrictions will ensure that the safety benefits
of speed restrictions are realized indefinitely and cannot be
prematurely lifted without the appropriate procedural requirements.
Further, this codification allows PHMSA and FRA to ensure compliance by
exercising oversight and taking appropriate enforcement actions.
11. Speed Restrictions Could Have Unintended Consequences, Such as
Increased Delays to Vehicles Stopped at Railroad Crossings or Carriers
Choosing Not To Configure a 20th Tank Car in Order To Avoid Speed
Restrictions
    Regarding increased delays to vehicles stopped at railroad
crossings, commenters did not provide specific data regarding the time
or cost burden of this kind of delay. PHMSA recognizes this could be a
consequence of the proposed speed restrictions, but is unable at this
time to quantify the time burden or cost of increased vehicle delays at
railroad crossings. PHMSA expects the cost of these delays would not be
substantial.
    Regarding train configurations and the proposed speed restrictions,
PHMSA seeks to limit the implementation of speed restrictions to train
consists with a substantial number of tank cars carrying Class 3
flammable liquids. In practical terms, PHMSA seeks to limit the effect
of the proposed speed restrictions so that ``manifest'' trains would
not be regulated to the same degree as a unit train of Class 3
flammable liquid.
    PHMSA has revised its definition of an HHFT in response to
commenter feedback on typical train configurations involving Class 3
flammable liquids, including crude oil and ethanol. The revised
definition would allow rail carriers to configure up to 34 tank cars
carrying flammable liquids so long as there are not 20 or more tank
cars in a continuous block. A train that distributes hazmat-carrying
tank cars (i.e., configures them to limit the size of continuous
blocks) in a consist would most likely pose a lower risk than a train
with continuous blocks of cars containing hazmat. Moreover, the
threshold of 35 or more total tank cars prevents a rail carrier from
being able to transport an essentially unrestrained quantity of Class 3
flammable liquid tank cars by continually and purposefully avoiding the
configuration of a 20th tank car in a continuous block. As such, the
revised HHFT definition will limit the impact of the proposed speed
restrictions on ``manifest'' trains.
12. Speed Restrictions Will Influence Externalities, Such as Noise
Disturbances
    PHMSA agrees that the proposed speed restrictions might result in
externalities, such as reduced noise disturbances. PHMSA has taken into
consideration the most significant externalities that would result from
this rulemaking. PHMSA's review of the comments, analysis of costs and
benefits, and coordination between regulatory, economic, and technical
subject matter experts has facilitated a critical evaluation of the
NPRM's proposed speed restrictions.
    The following table summarizes the NPRM's proposed speed
restrictions and presents some of PHMSA's analysis as to whether or not
a given speed restriction would be an effective regulation.

                Table 24--Analysis of Speed Restrictions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The NPRM's proposed  speed
           restrictions                           Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1: 40-mph speed limit in     Option 1 was the most restrictive of
 all areas.                          the three 40-mph speed limits
                                     proposed. Option 1 was the most
                                     costly and confers the least
                                     benefits per dollar of costs. Also,
                                     the costs presented by Option 1
                                     significantly outweighed the
                                     benefits of Option 1 in PHMSA's
                                     cost/benefit analysis, even when
                                     using the highest value in the
                                     benefit range to evaluate Option
                                     1's net effect. Further, PHMSA
                                     believes the effect of Option 1 on
                                     rail network fluidity could be
                                     substantial.
Option 2: 40-mph speed limit in     Commenters stated that Option 2's
 areas with more than 100,000        geographical standard is inadequate
 people.                             and unworkable. There was
                                     relatively little explicit support
                                     for Option 2 among commenters.
                                     Option 2 confers significantly less
                                     benefits per unit of costs than
                                     Option 3.

Option 3: 40-mph speed limit in     Option 3 would yield significant
 High-Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs).    safety benefits, particularly in
                                     the nation's densely populated
                                     areas, which present an increased
                                     likelihood of the occurrence of a
                                     catastrophic event. Likewise,
                                     Option 3 confers the most safety
                                     benefits per unit of costs. In
                                     addition, the geographical
                                     designation of High-Threat Urban
                                     Area (HTUA) is workable, defined,
                                     and codified in Part 1580 in Title
                                     49 CFR.
50-mph maximum speed limit for      The 50-mph maximum speed limit for
 HHFTs.                              HHFTs does not introduce new costs
                                     to stakeholders that offer or ship
                                     crude oil. A 50-mph speed limit for
                                     HHFTs is in line with widely
                                     adopted practices due to trade
                                     association and industry
                                     cooperation with regulatory bodies.
                                     It is also considerably harmonized
                                     with Transport Canada's April 2014
                                     Emergency Directive.
30-mph speed limit for HHFTs        The 30-mph speed limit for HHFTs
 without enhanced braking systems.   without a two-way EOT device or DP
                                     braking systems would not be
                                     generally applicable, provided that
                                     HHFTs are in compliance with the
                                     requirements for the use of these
                                     enhanced braking systems in the
                                     Final Rule. Speed limits pertinent
                                     to the use of ECP braking systems
                                     are discussed in the Braking
                                     Section of the Final Rule.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion
    In the final rule, PHMSA and FRA are adopting requirements for
speed restrictions for HHFTs. Specifically, this rulemaking adds a new
Sec.  174.310 to Part 174--Carriage by Rail. Section 174.310(a)(2)
establishes a 50-mph maximum speed restriction for HHFTs. In addition,
Sec.  174.310(a)(2) establishes a 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs within
the limits of high-threat urban areas (HTUAs) as defined in 49 CFR
1580.3, unless all tank cars containing a Class 3 flammable liquid meet
or exceed the retrofit standards, the performance standard, or the
standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank car provided in Part 179,
Subpart D of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). The 40-mph
speed limit for HHFTs within the limits of HTUAs is in line with Option
3 proposed in the NPRM.
    In addition as discussed previously on April 17, 2015 FRA issued
Emergency Order 30 to require that certain trains transporting large
amounts of Class 3 flammable liquid through certain highly-populated
areas adhere to a maximum authorized operating speed limit.\63\ Under
Emergency Order 30, an HHFT with at least one DOT-111 tank car
(including those built in accordance with CPC-1232 loaded with a Class
3 flammable liquid) must not exceed 40 mph in HTUAs as defined in 49
CFR 1580.3. As this final rulemaking does not become effective for 60
days from publication FRA believes the restrictions in Emergency Order
30 will address an emergency situation while avoiding other safety
impacts and harm to interstate commerce and the flow of necessary goods
to the citizens of the United States. FRA and DOT will continue to
evaluate whether additional action with regard to train speeds is
appropriate.
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    \63\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_2DA43BA3704E57F1958957625273D89A29FF0B00/filename/EO_30_FINAL.pdf.
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D. Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems

    Since the passage of the First Safety Appliance Act of March 2,
1893, freight train operations in the U.S. have traditionally relied on
air brakes to slow and stop a train.\64\ This conventional air brake
system has proven to be reliable, but it has drawbacks. When a train is
long and heavy, as is typically the case in the context of an HHFT, a
conventional air brake system can easily take over one-half mile to
bring a train to a stop, even with the emergency brakes applied.
Moreover, the length of a train will significantly affect the time it
takes for the conventional air brakes to apply to the entire consist.
It can take a number of seconds for the air brake system to function as
air is removed from the system to engage the brakes, beginning with the
cars nearest to the locomotive and working towards the rear of the
train. For example, in a 100-car train it could take up to 16 seconds
as the brakes fully apply sequentially from front-to-back. This lag in
air brake application time from the front to the back of the train also
can result in significant in-train buff and draft forces. These in-
train forces can lead to wheel damage (e.g. slid flat spots) and can
negatively impact rail integrity as these flat spots create a vertical
impact force (``pounding'') on the rails. These are major contributing
factors to derailments. In-train forces resulting from the application
of conventional air brakes also can directly contribute to derailments,
particularly in emergency situations, as freight cars can be forcefully
bunched together when the train is brought to a stop quickly. These
forces may also be amplified by the longitudinal slosh effect of a
liquid lading, such as crude oil or ethanol. Such factors have led
PHMSA and FRA to consider advanced brake signal propagation systems as
a way to improve safety in the transportation of Class 3 flammable
liquids by rail, particularly with respect to longer trains
transporting 70 or more tank cars loaded with Class 3 flammable
liquids. These more advanced systems have the capability to stop trains
more quickly and reduce the number of braking induced derailments.
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    \64\ The conventional air brake system was invented by George
Westinghouse in approximately 1869. It relies on air pressure to
apply and release the air brakes on each car in a train's consist.
There is an air brake line that connects each car to an air source
provided by the locomotive. When the air brakes are in the release
position, the locomotive is providing air pressure to prevent the
air brakes from applying. When air pressure is reduced in the system
during a service application, the air brakes will apply. (Note:
There are also handbrakes on each car and each locomotive and an
independent brake on each locomotive. Handbrakes are not activated
by a train's air brakes system. Independent brakes may be applied
and released separately from the train's air brake system.)
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