car. PHMSA estimates that approximately 2% of the track miles for
crude oil and ethanol traffic are traversed in HTUAs. We seek
comments on this assumption. Therefore, only 2% of the track miles
would be affected.

    PHMSA has prepared and placed in the docket a RIA addressing the
economic impact of this proposed rule. In the RIA we provide an
analysis of speed restrictions, including the Options for the 40-mph
speed limit. Our analysis has several limitations, which are listed in
the RIA. The analysis extrapolates from the geometric characteristics
of a single 124-mile subdivision, which may not be representative of
crude and ethanol routes. In addition, we do not estimate any effects
from speed reductions on other types of rail traffic throughout the
rail network (e.g., passenger trains, intermodal freight, and general
merchandise).
    PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
    1. What would the effects be of a 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs on
other traffic on the network, including passenger and intermodal
traffic, under each of the three described Options?
    2. PHMSA estimates the value of an hour of train delay to be $500.
What are the costs per hour of delayed HHFT traffic, and what are the
costs of delays for other types of traffic on the network?
    3. PHMSA estimates that a 40-mph speed limit, from 50-mph, will
reduce the severity of a HHFT accidents by 36 percent,\53\ due to the
reduction in kinetic energy by 36 percent. What other factors, in
addition to kinetic energy

changes, would refine the methodology for calculating potential risk
reduction?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Kinetic energy varies directly with the square of speed
(velocity).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. To what extent would a 40-mph speed limit in select areas cause
rail traffic to be diverted to other lines, and what are the benefits
and costs of this potential diversion?
    5. To what extent would a 40-mph speed limit cause rail traffic,
particularly intermodal traffic, to be diverted onto truck or other
modes of transit as a result of rail delays, and what are the benefits
and costs of this potential diversion?
    6. How might the extrapolation from the 124-mile subdivision to the
entire rail network produce over- or underestimates of the effects of
speed restrictions for HHFT routes?
    7. What other geographic delineations--in addition to HTUAs and
cities with 100,000 people or more--should PHMSA consider as an Option
for a 40-mph speed restriction in the absence of a proposed DOT 117
tank car?
    8. How would the safety benefits of the proposed speed limits
change if combined with the proposed braking systems?
    9. What would be the benefits and costs of excluding existing
Jacketed CPC-1232 cars from the proposed 40 mph speed restrictions,
under each speed Option, if PHMSA selects a more stringent tank car
specification than the Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232?
    10. What would be the benefits and costs of limiting the proposed
40 mph speed restrictions, under each Option, only to DOT 111 tank cars
carrying a particular hazardous material (e.g., only crude oil)?
b. Alternative Brake Signal Propagation Systems
    T87.6 Task Force did not recommend additional braking requirements,
stating that based on the simulation results and analysis of the data
it was concluded the additional alternatives considered provided
marginal benefits. Moreover the identified obstacles to implementation
represent a considerable time and cost investment and the predicted
benefits would not be realized for months or years in the future. The
group did acknowledge that an alternative signal transmission system,
such as an intermediate EOT device, may be a promising option.
    However, given the increasing risks of HHFTs, in the September 6,
2013 ANPRM we specifically requested comments pertaining to alternative
brake signal propagation systems to reduce the number of cars and
energy associated with derailments.
    ECP (Electronic Controlled Pneumatic brake system) simultaneously
sends a braking command to all cars in the train, reducing the time
before a car's pneumatic brakes are engaged compared to conventional
brakes. The system also permits the train crew to monitor the
effectiveness of the brakes on each individual car in the train and
provides real-time information on the performance of the entire braking
system of the train. ECP brake system technology also reduces the wear
and tear on brake system components and can significantly reduce fuel
consumption. All cars in a train must be equipped with ECP before a
train can operate in ECP brake mode.
    DP (Distributed Power) is a system that provides control of a
number of locomotives dispersed throughout a train from a controlling
locomotive located in the lead position. The system provides control of
the rearward locomotives by command signals originating at the lead
locomotive and transmitted to the remote (rearward) locomotives. A
locomotive located \2/3\ of the way through a train consist may be able
to produce braking rates for the train that are close to those produced
by ECP brakes. The braking rates, however, are more effective when
derailments occur at the head of the train rather than closer to the
back of the train. Further, T87.6 Task Force found that, in practice,
rail carriers intentionally introduce a delay in emergency brake
application that negatively affects the overall benefits from enhance
signal transmission.
    One commenter, API, indicates that DP serves as a means to increase
the speed of application of the airbrakes as the braking signal would
reach the cars throughout the train more rapidly. Further, API
indicates that some railroads have already begun using DP and it serves
as the fastest way to send braking signals to all of the cars. In
addition, API indicates that accidents resulting from brake failure in
one engine could be averted if another engine supports the air brakes
on the entire train. API encourages PHMSA to evaluate DP and the
development of a mid-train signaling device.
    The two-way EOT device includes two pieces of equipment linked by
radio that initiate an emergency brake application command from the
front unit located in the controlling locomotive, which then activates
the emergency air valve at the rear of the train within one second. The
rear unit of the device sends an acknowledgment message to the front
unit immediately upon receipt of an emergency brake application
command. A two way EOT device is more effective than conventional
brakes because the rear cars receive the brake command more quickly.
    FRA conducted simulations to better understand the effect on energy
dissipation and stopping distance of different brake signal propagation
systems; conventional brakes, DP configurations, and ECP. The
simulations were performed using the TEDS program, developed by Sharma
& Associates to study the dynamics and energy levels under a variety of
operating conditions. Derailments involving trains equipped with two
way EOT devices were not specifically simulated. In simulated
derailment speeds of 50 and 60 mph, at approximately the 9th car there
is a divergence in the kinetic energy of individual railcars at the
point of derailment between ECP, DP (EOT), and conventional brake
systems. At those speeds, if a derailment occurs at the first car,
changes in the brake signal propagation system will only be realized
after the 10th car. At a derailment speed of 40 mph the divergence
occurs at the 7th car. The following graphs show the reduction in
kinetic energy as a function of train speed and a tank car's position
in a train for each of the brake signal propagation systems described
above.
    Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 below are based on the following assumptions:
     Each train includes three locomotives at 415,000 lbs., 100
cars at 263,000 lbs., train length 6,164 ft.
     DP has two locomotives at front and one at rear of train.
     DP \2/3\ has two locomotives at front of the train, and
one placed two thirds from the front.
     Dynamic brakes were assumed to be inactive for the purpose
of the 18 percent effectiveness rate of DP, thus it is a fair statement
to say DP at the end of the train without the benefit of dynamic brakes
is equivalent to EOT. Therefore, for the purposes of our analysis, we
assumed EOT is as effective as DP when it is located at the end of the
train.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ The specifics of this model will be placed in the docket
for this rulemaking upon completion. This assumption would tend to
underestimate the benefits of ECP brakes, because it enhances the
safety level of the estimated baseline.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.008

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.009

    The following graph provides the results of a comparison of the
simulations of derailments at 40 and 50 mph. The data are the kinetic
energy versus position in a train operating with conventional brakes.
The trend line of the difference in energy per car is shown. The trend
line is relatively flat, but the slope begins to increase slightly
after the 15th car. This demonstrates that the slower the initial train
speed, the greater the effect of braking on the ability of the train to
dissipate energy.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.010

    The results of these simulations suggest that alternative brake
signal propagation systems decrease brake signal propagation time
relative to the conventional brake system. Specifically, FRA
simulations estimated that:
     Using its methodology to evaluate the probability of tank
car puncture DOT calculated that a derailment involving a train made up
of Option 1 tank cars (equipped with ECP brakes) will result in 36
percent fewer cars puncturing than the same train with conventional
brakes. As such DOT estimates that ECP brakes would reduce the severity
of a HHFT accident by an estimated 36 percent, compared to conventional
brakes.
     Figures 1, 2 and 3 show that the ability for trains
operating with two-way EOT device and DP brake systems to dissipate
energy is between the abilities of those operating with ECP and
conventional brake systems. Accordingly, DOT estimates that two-way EOT
or DP would reduce the severity of a HHFT accident by 18 percent (half
of the 36% estimated for ECP brakes), compared to conventional brakes.

    Based on Sharma's modeling, the effectiveness of ECP was determined
to be 36%, and DP was calculated (not simulated) to determine
effectiveness of about 18 percent. However, as both DP and EOT
effectiveness were calculated based on a number of factors and previous
model runs, PHMSA and FRA will place a technical supplement into the
rulemaking docket to provide greater detail on the inputs and
assumptions underlying the model.
    In this NPRM we are proposing to require each HHFT to be equipped
with an enhanced brake signal propagation system. We are proposing an
implementation schedule that minimizes the impacts on rail carriers.
Specifically, subject to one exception, we are proposing to require the
following:
     HHFTs to be equipped with a two-way EOT device as defined
in 49 CFR 232.5 or a distributed power system as defined in 49 CFR
229.5,, by October 1, 2015.
     After October 1, 2015, a tank car manufactured in
accordance with proposed Sec.  179.202 or Sec.  179.202-11 for use in a
HHFT must be equipped with ECP brakes.
     After October 1, 2015, HHFTs comprised entirely of tank
cars manufactured in accordance with proposed Sec.  179.202 and Sec.
179.202-11 (for Tank Car Option 1. the PHMSA and FRA Designed Car,
only), except for required buffer cars, must be operated in ECP brake
mode as defined by 49 CFR 232.5.
    To reduce the burden on small carriers that may not have the
capital available to install new braking systems, we are proposing an
exception. If a rail carrier does not comply with the proposed braking
requirements above, the carrier may continue to operate HHFTs at speeds
not to exceed 30 mph. We will continue to monitor braking performance
and may consider other regulatory or non-regulatory actions in the
future on restrictions for specific containers or trains.
    An ECP brake system permits the train crew to monitor the
effectiveness of the brakes on each individual car in the train and
provides real-time information on the performance of the entire braking
system of the train. ECP brake system technology also reduces the
degradation on brake system components and can significantly reduce
fuel consumption. Due to these added benefits, we believe that adding
ECP brake technology to these captive fleet trains will have greater
net social benefits than requiring only DP or EOT devices.
    PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
    1. What is the annual capacity of tank car and locomotive
manufacturing and retrofit facilities to install or implement ECP, DP,
and EOT systems on the HHFT fleet? To what extent will implementation
issues arise?
    2. PHMSA estimates that ECP brakes cost $3,000 per new tank car,
$5,000 per retrofitted tank car, and $79,000 per locomotive. To what
extent do these estimates reflect the market prices for ECP?
    3. PHMSA estimates that ECP brakes would reduce accident severity
by 36 percent compared to conventional brakes with EOT devices and by
18 percent compared to locomotives with DP or another EOT device. To
what extent do other simulation models, besides those used by FRA, or
the results of ECP pilot programs validate these results?
    4. PHMSA expects that all railroads already have two-way EOT
devices, have DP, or operate at speeds lower than 30-mph, so PHMSA
estimates no benefits or costs for the 30-mph limit in the absence of
advanced braking systems. Do any railroads that operate at speeds
greater than 30-mph also not have two-way EOT devices or DP?
    5. How would the safety benefits of the proposed braking systems
change if combined with the proposed speed limits and tank car
standards?

F. New Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains

    In the September 6, 2013 ANPRM we requested comments pertaining to
new construction requirements for DOT Specification 111 tank cars used
in flammable liquid service. Though commenters differ on the
applicability of a new construction requirement to all flammable
liquids, all support prompt action to address new construction of tank
cars.
    In Recommendation R-12-5, NTSB recommends that we,

    Require that all newly-manufactured and existing general service
tank cars authorized for transportation of denatured fuel ethanol
and crude oil in PGs I and II have enhanced tank head and shell
puncture resistance systems and top fittings protection that exceed
existing design requirements for DOT Specification 111 tank cars.

    Several commenters requested that PHMSA not adopt standards of
construction for newly constructed tank cars beyond those of the CPC-
1232. Additionally, most commenters, including API, were strongly
against any retrofits of existing tank cars beyond minor modifications.
For example, according to API,

    ``There are approximately 15,000 cars built to the CPC-1232
standard currently in flammable liquid service. According to RSI,
Approximately 36,000 more cars will be built to the CPC-1232
industry standard for crude oil service by December 2015. The
industry has reached consensus on the P-1577 standard for tank cars
in crude oil and ethanol service, and it is therefore important to
issue regulations on these cars.''

    We address retrofits of existing cars in the next section. This
section describes requirements for newly constructed tank cars used in
HHFT.
    In this NPRM, we are proposing three Options for newly manufactured
tank cars that will address the risks associated with the rail
transportation of Class 3 flammable liquids in HHFTs. Tank cars built
to the proposed new standard will be designated ``DOT Specification
117.'' In addition, we are proposing a performance standard for the
design and construction of tank cars equivalent to the DOT
Specification 117. A tank car that meets the performance criteria will
be assigned to ``DOT Specification 117P.'' We propose to require new
tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015 that are used to transport
Class 3 flammable liquids in HHFT to meet the specification
requirements for the DOT Specification 117 tank car or the proposed
performance specifications. The proposed performance standard is
intended to encourage innovation in the design of tank car, use of new
materials, and incorporation of new appurtenances.
    In addition, tank car manufacturers have the option to build a DOT
Specification 117 tank car, as outlined in the proposed specification
requirements. Both the prescribed specifications and the performance
standard were developed to provide improved crashworthiness relative to
the DOT Specification 111 tank car. In addition to proposing revisions
to Part 179 of the HMR to include the DOT Specification 117 and 117P
requirements, we are also proposing revisions to the bulk packaging
authorizations in Sec. Sec.  173.241, 173.242, and 173.243 to include
the DOT Specification 117 and 117P tank car as an authorized packaging
for those hazardous materials, as those sections are referenced in
column (8C) of the HMT. We note that, as stated in the introductory
text to Sec. Sec.  173.241, 173.242, and 173.243, each person selecting
a

packaging must consider the requirements of subparts A and B of Part
173 of the HMR and any special provisions indicated in column (7) of
the HMT.
    Finally, we are proposing to incorporate by reference, in Sec.
171.7, Appendix E 10.2.1 of the 2010 version of the AAR Manual of
Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C--Part III,
Specifications for Tank Cars, Specification M-1002, (AAR Specifications
for Tank Cars). AAR frequently updates the AAR Specifications for Tank
Cars. Appendix E provides requirements for top fittings for certain
tank car Options provided below.
a. DOT Specification 117--Prescribed Car
    PHMSA is proposing several revisions to the HMR that would change
the specification requirements for rail tank cars authorized to
transport crude oil and ethanol. The changes would stipulate a new tank
car performance specification--the DOT Specification 117 tank car--that
would be phased in over time depending on the packing group of the
flammable liquid. Revising or replacing the current standard for the
DOT Specification 111 tank car is not a decision that DOT takes
lightly. We seek to ensure that we select the car that will have the
greatest net social benefits, with benefits primarily generated from
the mitigation of accident severity. We also aware of, and account for,
the large economic effects associated with regulatory changes of this
scale, as tank cars are a long-term investment. For these reasons, we
are proposing three separate DOT Specification 117 Options and
requesting comments. The tank car Options being considered in this NPRM
are as follows:
Option 1: PHMSA and FRA Designed Car
    Option 1 incorporates several enhancements designed to increase
puncture resistance; provide thermal protection to survive a 100-minute
pool fire; protect top fitting and bottom outlets during a derailment;
and improve braking performance. Among the proposed tank car designs,
Option 1 would minimize the consequences of a derailment of tank cars
carrying crude oil or ethanol. There would be fewer car punctures,
fewer releases from the service equipment (top and bottom fittings),
and delayed release of flammable liquid from the tank cars through the
pressure relief devices. The proposed enhancements are outlined in
detail below:
    Key features of this tank car Option include the following:
     286,000 lb. GRL tank car that is designed and constructed
in accordance with AAR Standard 286;
     Wall thickness after forming of the tank shell and heads
must be a minimum of 9/16 inch constructed from TC-128 Grade B,
normalized steel;
     Thermal protection system in accordance with Sec.  179.18,
including a reclosing pressure relief device;
     Minimum 11-gauge jacket constructed from A1011 steel or
equivalent. The jacket must be weather-tight as required in Sec.
179.200-4;
     Full-height, 1/2 inch thick head shield meeting the
requirements of Sec.  179.16(c)(1);
     Bottom outlet handle removed or designed to prevent
unintended actuation during a train accident; and
     ECP brakes.
    Under Option 1, the DOT Specification 117 tank car would be
equipped with a top fittings protection system and nozzle capable of
sustaining, without failure, a rollover accident at a speed of 9 mph,
in which the rolling protective housing strikes a stationary surface
assumed to be flat, level, and rigid and the speed is determined as a
linear velocity, measured at the geometric center of the loaded tank
car as a transverse vector.
    For Option 1, PHMSA estimates that the roll-over protection and
increased extra \1/8-inch\ of shell thickness would reduce crude oil
and ethanol accident severity by 10 percent relative to a new tank car
that would be constructed in the absence of this rule. Further, PHMSA
estimates that ECP brakes would reduce accident severity by 36 percent
compared to conventional brakes and 18 percent when compared to for EOT
devices or DP. PHMSA estimates that the addition of ECP brakes, roll-
over protection, and increased shell thickness would together add
$5,000 to the cost of a new tank car that would be constructed in the
absence of this rule.
Option 2: AAR 2014 Recommended Car
    Option 2 is based on the AAR's recommended new tank car standard,
approximately 5,000 of which have been ordered by BNSF Rail
Corporation. On March 9, 2011 AAR submitted a petition for rulemaking
P-1577, which was discussed in the ANPRM. In response to the ANPRM, on
November 15, 2013, AAR and ASLRAA submitted as a comment \55\ provide
their recommendations for tank car standards that are enhanced beyond
the design in P-1577. Notable upgrades from AAR's initial petition
include increased shell thickness, jackets, thermal protection full-
height head shields instead of half-height head shields for jacketed
cars, top fittings protections, and bottom outlet handles that will not
open in a derailment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-0090.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Option 2 car has most of the same safety features as the Option
1 car, including the same increase in shell thickness, jacket
requirement, thermal protection requirement, and head shield
requirement, but it lacks rollover protection and the ECP brake
equipment. Installation of ECP brake equipment largely makes up the
cost differential between the Option 1 and 2 cars, and the differences
in estimated effectiveness are also largely a result of ECP brakes. In
essence, examining these cars side by side in the following analysis
provides a de facto comparison of the costs and benefits of equipping
high hazard flammable trains with ECP braking.
    For Option 2, FRA estimates that the extra \1/8\ inch of shell
thickness would reduce crude oil and ethanol accident severity by 10
percent relative to the new car that would be constructed in the
absence of this rule. PHMSA estimates that the increased thickness
would add $2,000 to the cost of a new tank car that would be
constructed in the absence of this rule.
Option 3: Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232
    Option 3 is an enhanced jacketed CPC-1232 tank car standard. This
Option would modify the CPC-1232 standard by requiring improvements to
the bottom outlet handle and pressure relief valve. It would also
remove options (1) to build a car with weaker steel type but with added
shell thickness or (2) to build a car with a thicker shell but no
jacket. This standard is the car configuration PHMSA believes will be
built for HHFT service in absence of regulation, based on commitments
from one of the largest rail car manufacturers/leasers--Greenbrier,
Inc. and the Railway Supply Institute.\56\ This car is a substantial
safety improvement over the current DOT Specification 111 but does not
achieve the same level of safety as the Option 1 or Option 2 cars. This
tank car has a 7/16 inch shell, which is thinner than Option 1 or
Option 2 tank cars. Similar to the Option 2 car, this car lacks
rollover protection and ECP brake

equipment. Because PHMSA assumes that Option 3 is the car that would be
built in the absence of this rule, it estimates no costs or benefits
from Option 3 for new cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Greenbrier: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0155. RSI: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0156.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All of the Options provided above are designed to address the
survivability of the tank car and would mitigate the damages of rail
accidents better than the current DOT Specification 111. Specifically,
the tank car Options incorporate several enhancements to increase
puncture resistance; provide thermal protection to survive a 100-minute
pool fire; and protect top fitting and bottom outlets during a
derailment. Under all Options, the proposed system of design
enhancements would reduce the consequences of a derailment of tank cars
carrying crude oil or ethanol. There would be fewer car punctures,
fewer releases from the service equipment (top and bottom fittings),
and delayed release of flammable liquid from the tank cars through the
pressure relief devices.
     Table 2 summarizes the safety features of the DOT
Specification 117 tank car Options proposed in this rule. Note that the
proposed Options differ on shell thickness, top fittings, and braking.
    Table 17 summarizes the effectiveness of the proposed elements of
each option. The effectiveness was calculated using the following
assumptions:
     PHMSA examined the 13 accidents provided in Table 3 to
arrive at its effectiveness rates. This subset of 13 accidents used to
calculate effectiveness rates may not be representative of all 40
mainline accidents, from 2006 to present, for trains carrying crude oil
and ethanol. (see Appendix B of the RIA for a complete listing of the
40 mainline train accidents during this timeframe). However, PHMSA uses
this subset because the data has been verified and demonstrative of
HHFT risk.
     DOT Specification 111 tank cars composed the vast majority
of the type of tank cars involved in the derailments listed in Table 3.
The type of damages these tank cars experienced were used to design the
tank car options proposed in the NPRM.
     The volume of lading lost from each tank car in the
derailments indicated in Table 3 compiled relative to the documented
damage to each tank car that lost lading. These values were used as the
baseline for tank car constructed to the current DOT 111 specification.
     Improvement in performance was based on the following
assumptions.
    [cir] The ratio of puncture force (DOT111/option) was used as a
multiplier to determine the reduction in lading loss.
    [cir] Thermal protection prevented thermal damage that results in
loss of containment.
    [cir] Top fittings protection halves the damage to service
equipment.
    [cir] BOV modification prevents lading loss through valve.
     The reduced volume of lost lading relative to each
enhancement was compared to the baseline to calculate respective
reduction or effectiveness.
    PHMSA will place into the docket for this rulemaking a more
detailed technical supplement that describes the baseline accidents,
model inputs, and assumptions that were used to develop the
effectiveness rates for each tank car option). For a detailed
discussion of these safety features, please refer to Section F. New
Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains.

 Table 17--Effectiveness of Newly Constructed Tank Car Options Relative to the Non-Jacketed DOT111 Specification
                                                    Tank Car
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Head        Shell                      Top
             Tank car                Total (%)     puncture     puncture     Thermal      fittings     BOV (%)
                                                     (%)          (%)      damage  (%)      (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1..........................           55           21           17           12            4           <1
Option 2..........................         51.3           21           17           12          1.3           <1
Option 3..........................         41.3           19            9           12          1.3            0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The top fitting protection for the DOT117 is based on the load conditions described in 179.102-3. The top
  fittings protection for the BNSF and CPC-1232 car meet the load conditions in M-1002 Appendix E, 10.2. The
  former is a dynamic load and the latter is a static load. Modeling indicates the stresses imparted in the tank
  shell during the dynamic loads is three time those encountered during the static load. Therefore, DOT assumes
  the effectiveness of top fittings for the DOT 117 is 3 times that of the BNSF tank car.

    PHMSA will place into the docket for this rulemaking a technical
supplement that describes the model inputs and assumptions that were
used to develop the effectiveness rates in table 17.
Puncture Resistance
    Shell and head punctures are the failure modes that result in rapid
and often complete loss of tank contents. A HFFT poses a greater
increase risk resulting from puncture due to the volatility of the
lading. Minimizing the number of cars punctured in a derailment is
critical because flammable liquids, if ignited, can quickly affect the
containment of adjacent cars. For example, a derailment in Columbus,
Ohio in July 2012 involved 17 freight cars, three of which were tank
cars containing ethanol. One of the tank cars was punctured, releasing
ethanol, and a fire ensued. Two adjacent tank cars also carrying
ethanol were exposed to the fire for an extended period of time. Both
cars experienced a thermal tear, resulting in a release of product and
a fire ball. In many cases, tank cars of flammable liquid exposed to
pool fire conditions experience significant pressure rise. When the
pressure relief valve actuates to prevent an energetic failure of the
tank car, it discharges flammable liquid, prolonging the fire.
Shell Puncture
    PHMSA examined data collected by both PHMSA and FRA for information
on derailments involving crude oil and ethanol. For the purposes of
this analysis PHMSA focused on main line train derailments beginning in
2006 and forward. We focused on this date range due to the apparent
increase in both the frequency and severity of derailments. PHMSA
believes that this recent trend is a result of increased use of HHFTs
to transport flammable material and we believe this trend will
continue. In reviewing the incidents in table 3, shell puncture is the
most common train accident damage that results in loss of lading. A
number of strategies exist to improve puncture resistance of a tank
car, including using higher strength and tougher steel and increasing
the thickness of the shell and head of the tank. Tougher steel absorbs
more energy by deforming. Thickness of the tank shell/head can be
increased and/or a jacket can be added to the design.
    DOT is considering both of these strategies. While the shells and
heads of DOT Specification 111 and the CPC-1232 standard can be
constructed of A516-70 steel, all tank car design standard Options in
this proposed rule would require normalized TC-128 steel

because of its superior strength and toughness. Further, the head and
shells of DOT Specification 111 and the CPC-1232 standards are \7/16\
inch thick (not including the jacket). Options 1 and 2 propose to
require DOT Specification 117 tank car head and shells be a minimum of
\9/16\ inch thick.
    Please note that current regulations do not require a jacket. This
rule requires an 11-gauge steel jacket. PHMSA expects all new tank cars
to have jackets in the absence of this rule, so we do not expect any
benefits or costs from this change.
    Using the analytical method developed by E.I. DuPont de Nemours and
validated through testing performed at the Transportation Technology
Center in Pueblo, CO, available for review in the public docket for
this rulemaking, FRA calculated the shell puncture resistance of all
three Options compared to the DOT Specification 111 tank car.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ ``Detailed Puncture Analyses Tank Cars: Analysis of
Different Impactor Threats and Impact Conditions'' can be found at:
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04420.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed materials, minimum thickness of \9/16\ inch, and
jacket provide a 68 percent improvement in the puncture force for
Options 1 and 2 relative to the current specification requirements for
a DOT Specification 111 tank car. This translates to a 17 percent
effectiveness rate. A tank car constructed to the proposed requirements
of Option 3, would have a 35 percent improvement in puncture force
relative to the current DOT Specification 111 tank car.\58\ This
translates into a 9 percent effectiveness rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Modeling and simulation of puncture velocity indicate a
puncture velocity of approximately 7.4 mph for a legacy DOT
Specification 111; 9.6 mph for Option 3; and 12.3 mph for the cars
under Options 1 and 2. Puncture velocity is based on an impact with
a rigid 12'' x 12'' indenter with a weight of 297,000 pounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, PHMSA and FRA do not expect the increased thickness,
combined with a full-height head shield and a jacket, in Options 1 and
2 to decrease new tank car capacity. The T87.6 Task Force, in
considering increased thickness and jacket recommendations, stated that
the increased weight per car ``results in a decrease in the capacity of
the tank and a commensurate increase in the number of shipments
required to meet customer demand. Additional shipments would result in
an increase in the number of tank cars derailed.'' However, for the
reasons mentioned in the section ``Effects of Increased Weight'' below,
PHMSA does not expect that these requirements will cause fully loaded
tank cars to exceed 286,000 GRL.
1b. Head Puncture
    Puncture resistance of the tank head is another important
consideration. Table 3 above highlights this risk of HHFTs by
summarizing the impacts of major train accidents involving trains of
crude oil and ethanol. Derailment data from table 3 indicates that
approximately 30 percent of ethanol and crude oil tank cars experienced
punctures in their heads. Of the punctured heads, approximately 38
percent occurred in the top half, and 62 percent occurred in the bottom
half of the head.
    Tank head puncture resistance has been the subject of a number of
previous rulemakings. On July 23, 1974, DOT's Hazardous Materials
Regulations Board published a final rule HM-109 (39 FR 27572) that
established requirements for head shields in the HMR at Sec.  179.100-
23. The requirements were for half height head shields (on non-jacketed
pressure cars) with specific minimum dimensions, and performance
requirements defined by the AAR impact test. The requirements were
based on three studies that indicate half height head shields were
between 50 percent and 77 percent effective.
    On May 26, 1976, DOT's Materials Transportation Bureau published a
final rule under Docket HM-109 (41 FR 21475) that adopted minor
amendments to the head shield requirements.
    On September 15, 1977, DOT's Materials Transportation Bureau
published a final rule under Docket HM-144 (42 FR 46306) that
introduced Sec.  179.105-5 Tank Head Puncture requirements, which
included performance standards and test requirements. Coupler restraint
and thermal protection systems were also included. Half height head
shields were not precluded from use as long as they met the
requirements in Sec.  179.100-23.
    On September 21, 1995, DOT's RSPA published a final rule under
Dockets HM-201 and HM-175A (60 FR 49048) that introduced the current
Sec.  179.16 and removed Sec. Sec.  179.100-23 and 179.105-5. The new
requirements applied to tank cars transporting all Class 2 materials.
In the preamble of the rule PHMSA stated ``research demonstrates that
puncture resistance is an inter-related function of head thickness,
insulation thickness, and jacket thickness, and the concept of head
protection must include more than just traditional (half-height) head
shields.'' DOT maintains this position and, accordingly, is proposing
all Options for the DOT Specification 117 tank car with a jacket and
\1/2\ inch thick full height head shields.
    The combination of the shell thickness and head shield of Options 1
and 2 provide a head puncture resistance velocity of 18.4 mph (21%
effectiveness rate). Because the Option 3 tank car has a \7/16\ inch
shell, as opposed to the \9/16\ inch shell in Options 1 and 2, it has a
head puncture resistance velocity of 17.8 mph.
    The results of this modeling are described in Table 18.

     Table 18--Shell and Head Puncture Velocities by Tank Car Option
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Shell puncture       Head puncture
                                       velocity            velocity
            Tank car                 (improvement        (improvement
                                  relative to DOT111  relative to DOT111
                                     non-jacketed)       non-jacketed)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1........................  12.3 mph (66%)....  18.4 mph (114%).
Option 2........................  12.3 mph (66%)....  18.4 mph (114%).
Option 3........................  9.6 mph (30%).....  17.8 mph (107).
CPC-1232 unjacketed.............  8.5 mph (15%).....  Top--10.3 (20%).
                                                      Bottom--17.6
                                                       (105%).
DOT-111 jacketed................  9.3 mph (26%).....  11.6 mph (35%).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thermal Protection System
    In train accidents listed in Table 3 above, approximately 10
percent of tank car breaches were attributed to exposure to fire
conditions. It is worth distinguishing between insulation and thermal
protection. Insulation is intended to keep lading at or near a desired
temperature during

transportation. Insulation is ineffective at temperatures exceeding 350
[deg]F because it disintegrates into a powder. Thermal protection is
intended to limit the heat flux into the lading when exposed to fire.
Thermal protection will survive for a certain period of time in pool
fire conditions. Thermal protection will prevent rapid temperature
increase of the lading and commensurate increase in vapor pressure in
the tank. This limits the volume of material evacuated through the
pressure relieve valve and dangerous over pressurization of the tank.
    All DOT Specification 117 options in this NPRM require a thermal
protection system sufficient to meet the performance standard of Sec.
179.18, and which must include a reclosing pressure release valve.
Section 179.18 requires that a thermal protection system be capable of
preventing the release of any lading within the tank car, except
release through the pressure release device, when subjected to a pool
fire for 100 minutes and a torch fire for 30 minutes. Typically, tank
cars with thermal protection are equipped with a weather-tight 11-gauge
jacket. Intumescent materials, which do not require a jacket, are
infrequently used because of high maintenance costs. The jacket
provides the necessary protection by shielding the radiated heat to the
commodity tank.
    Consistent with current minimum industry standards and Federal
regulations for pressure cars for Class 2 materials, the T87.6 Task
Force agreed that a survivability time of 100-minutes in a pool fire
should be used as a benchmark for adequate performance in this proposed
rule. The 100-minute survival time is the existing performance standard
for pressure tank cars equipped with a thermal protection system and
was established to provide emergency responders with adequate time to
assess a derailment, establish perimeters, and evacuate the public as
needed, while also giving time to vent the hazardous material from the
tank and prevent an energetic failure of the tank car.
    The Analysis of Fire Effects on Tank Cars (AFFTAC) \59\ was used to
evaluate the relative performance of tank cars equipped with different
thermal protection systems. The analysis simulated tank cars of varied
configurations (jackets and non-jacketed) and positions (rolled over at
different angles) exposed to pool and torch fires meeting the
requirements in the In evaluating the performance of the thermal
protection systems in the simulations, the T87.6 Task Force considered
the amount of material remaining in the tank at the time of breach,
rather than survival time, to be the best metric of the potential for
energetic rupture. The Task Force came to this conclusion because
research shows that there is a direct relationship between this amount
and the energy of the tank failure \60\ and, as with any simulation,
there are uncertainties in the absolute survival time estimates. Under
all simulation conditions and all thermal protection systems, when the
tank failed all of the lading had been vaporized. That indicates that
there would be little energy remaining in the tank to produce an
energetic rupture at the time of breach. Moreover, the thermal
protection prolonged the survivability of the tank by delaying the
moment where pressure in the tank exceeded the start to discharge of
the pressure relief valve, thus delaying the unintended release of
flammable liquid. Because all the thermal protection systems meeting
the Sec.  179.18 performance standard that PHMSA studied performed
equally well in the simulations, and because the simulations indicated
the importance of a pressure relief valve, PHMSA is not requiring a
particular system, but instead is requiring that a thermal protection
system meet the performance standard of Sec.  179.18 and include a
reclosing pressure relief device.
Top Fittings Protection
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ Information regarding AFFTAC can be found at the following
link. http://www.srconsult.com/AFFTACInfo.htm.
    \60\ ``Fire Tests of Propane Tanks to Study BLEVEs [Boiling
Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions] and Other Thermal Ruptures:
Detailed Analysis of Medium Scale Test Results'', Department of
Mechanical Engineering, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Nov.
1997. Online link to study and research: http://me.queensu.ca/People/Birk/Research/ThermalHazards/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The top fitting protection consists of a structure designed to
prevent damage to the tank car service equipment under specified
loading conditions. For the DOT Specification 117 is based on the load
conditions described in 179.102-3. The top fittings protection for the
BNSF and CPC-1232 car meet the load conditions in M-1002 Appendix E,
10.2. The former is a dynamic load and the latter is a static load.
Damage to top fittings can occur when a tank car rolls-over and the
equipment strikes the ground or another tank car or is stuck by another
car. The specification requirements must consider all of these
potential causes of damage to prevent loss of containment. The volume
of releases from top fittings is a fraction, typically less than 5
percent of the volume of releases from tank shell and head punctures.
Nonetheless, top fittings represent 25 percent of the documented damage
to tank cars in recent train accidents. A unique issue with derailments
of tank car containing flammable liquids is that ignited lading from a
single car can initiate a domino effect of heating an adjacent car(s)
which will expels flammable liquid from the PRV that fuels the existing
fire and effect additional cars. Preventing the release of flammable
liquids in a derailment, regardless of the volume that is lost from a
specific source, reduces risk to public health and the environment.
    The T87.6 Task Force considered three options related to top
fittings with the dual purpose of improved crashworthiness and
reduction of NARs: Removal of vacuum relief valves (VRVs), elimination
of hinged and bolted manways, and roll-over protection.
    VRVs, if operated properly, are an important feature of the tank
car's service equipment as they provide an additional safeguard against
implosion of tank cars that are filled with elevated temperature
material or are cleaned with steam or hot liquid. Tank cars are offered
with VRVs as standard equipment. They are often misused by personnel at
the loading or unloading facilities and used as venting equipment
during normal operations (tank cars are typically equipped with air
valves that are designed and intended for repeated opening and losing
for loading and unloading operations. The VRV is an emergency device to
function in only particular circumstances. As a result of misuse VRV
are a common source of non-accident releases. The task force evaluated
whether VRVs should be prohibited from application to all DOT
Specification 111 tank cars.
    Hinged and bolted manways are a closure on manways of general
purpose tank cars (DOT Specification 111). The hinge and bolted design
permits repeated opening and closing for loading and unloading, and
inspection. Proper securement of hinged and bolted manways is sensitive
to the size and condition of sealing surface, the type of gasket,
condition of bolts and torque procedure. Unless all these factors are
considered when securing a tank car for transportation a release of
lading will occur resulting from the sloshing of the liquid in
transportation. In derailment conditions, if the manway cover is not
damaged by impact, leaks are often encountered in car rolled-over on
their side. Accordingly, the T87.6 Task Force evaluated the elimination
of hinged and bolted manways. For example, five

hinged and bolted manways were damaged (creating a leak point) in the
Arcadia, OH derailment. The damages included a shattered manway cover
and sheared bolts. In addition, hinged and bolted manways account for
nearly 30 percent of all NARS. Representatives of the shipping
community expressed several concerns regarding the elimination of
hinged and bolted manways, including infrastructure issues. The
infrastructure at many loading facilities is set up with a system that
seats on the manways and include a stinger to deliver the lading as
well as vapor recovery. In addition, the loading facilities often use
the manways as a means to inspect the gage bar to determine the outage,
inspect the condition of the siphon pipe, interior of the tank shell or
an interior coating. Alternatives to hinged and bolted securement are
currently under development and testing. This option is not being
considered for regulatory action at this time because the burden on the
shipping community may be reduced if alternatives are available at the
time of regulation.
    As proposed, only the Option 1 tank car must be equipped with
protective structure capable of sustaining, without failure, a rollover
accident at a speed of 9 mph, in which the structure strikes a
stationary surface assumed to be flat, level, and rigid and the speed
is determined as a linear velocity, measured at the geometric center of
the loaded tank car as a transverse vector. Failure is deemed to occur
when the deformed protective housing contacts any of the service
equipment or when the tank retention capability is compromised.
    For Options 2 and 3, newly constructed tank cars would require top
fittings consistent with the AAR's specification for Tank Cars, M-1002,
Appendix E, paragraph 10.2. The top fittings protection design
requirements are for static loads. The rollover protection performance
requirement prescribed in the HMR is for a dynamic load. The resultant
stresses in a protective housing and tank from the dynamic load exceed
those from the static loads by a factor of three based on a study by
Sharma & Associates \61\ comparing the performance of the different
systems under both the static requirements of top fittings protection
and dynamic conditions of roll-over protection. The industry was
concerned that a \7/16\ inch thick shell could not withstand the
stresses imparted by a roll-over protection structure. This concern
remains. However, there is general agreement that a tank car
constructed of \9/16\ inch steel is capable of withstanding the
stresses during a roll-over event. As such, a protective structures
meeting the rollover protection performance standard will offer
protection of the top fittings superior to that of a structure meeting
the static load requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ The studies (Phase I and Phase II) can be found on the e-
Library of the FRA Web site at: http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L02545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bottom Outlet Protection
    The bottom outlet protection ensures that the bottom outlet valve
does not open during a train accident. The NTSB recommended that PHMSA
require all bottom outlet valves used on newly-manufactured and
existing non-pressure tank cars are designed to remain closed during
accidents in which the valve and operating handle are subjected to
impact forces. The proposed requirements for all DOT Specification 117
Options in this NPRM require the bottom outlet handle to be removed or
be designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
    The T87.6 Task Force considered elimination of BOVs.
Representatives of the shipping community expressed the following
concerns regarding this idea:

     BOVs are a valued feature of the tank car for the
shipping community. The BOV is used to unload, and in some cases,
load the tank cars.
     The BOV is necessary when the car is cleaned to drain
the rinse liquid.
     Eliminating the allowance for BOV will require major
alterations of existing infrastructure of loading and unloading
facilities.

    Therefore, the AAR TCC created a docket T10.5 and a task force to
evaluate bottom outlet performance. The task force considered the
following ideas:

     Shipment of the car without the BOV handle attached and
development of a standard/universal handle attachment.
     Eliminating use of an overly strong handle.
     Incorporating operating stops on valve bodies.

    In addition to the AAR TCC, recommendations, PHMSA also received
NTSB Recommendation R-12-6. This recommendation requests that PHMSA
require all bottom outlet valves used on newly-manufactured and
existing non-pressure tank cars be designed to remain closed during
accidents where the valve and operating handle are subjected to impact
forces.
    PHMSA has considered the loading and unloading concerns of offerors
regarding the removal of the bottom outlet valve entirely. Therefore,
PHMSA is not proposing to eliminate the BOV entirely. Instead, PHMSA is
proposing that on cars with bottom outlet valves, the bottom outlet
handle be removed or be designed to prevent unintended actuation during
train accident scenarios. For example, this requirement could be met
simply by removing the handle during transportation or redesigning
bottom outlet configurations (i.e. recessed valving).
Effects of Increased Weight
    The additional safety features of the proposed new tank car
standard could increase the weight of an unloaded tank car. For
instance, all proposed Options for the DOT Specification 117 car
include head shields, a jacket, thicker tank shell steel, and other
safety features not required in DOT Specification 111 tank cars.
Additional weight for the tank car could lead to a reduction in lading
capacity per tank car, as rail cars must be under the applicable gross
rail weight (GRL) when fully loaded. However, PHMSA and FRA believe
there will not be less capacity in practice, for the following reasons:
     PHMSA is proposing a performance standard and expects that
the regulations will spur innovation in tank car design and
construction. Industry is currently evaluating new, tougher steels as
well as composite materials and crash energy management systems
intended to improve energy absorption with little or no weight penalty.
Innovation will be driven by a desire to decrease the tare weight of
the tank car. Assuming the market will be interested if the new
materials will restore the pre-DOT Specification 117 tare weight and
cost no more than the materials in the DOT Specification 117, the
reduction will be at least 9%. This decrease in the tare weight will
increase the load limit (carrying capacity) of the car by 9% without
increasing material cost.
     When considering risk associated with decreased tank car
load limit it is the number of trains and derailment rate that is
relevant. DOT believes the railroads will optimize unit train length
which may result in longer trains. Optimization will be based on a
number of factors including train length, available horse power, grade
along route, required speed, loading rack capacity and loop size.
Because there are so many variables it is difficult to predict the
change in operations resulting from a potential decrease in load limit.
As such, DOT is seeking comment on the issue.
     The DOT 117 is authorized to operate at a GRL of 286,000
lbs. The regulations currently authorize the DOT 111 to operate at a
GRL of 263,000 lbs.

However, DOT 111 tank cars that meet the minimum standards provided in
FRA's Federal Register Notice of January 25, 2011 \62\ are permitted to
operate at a GRL of up to 286,000 lbs. The proposed tank car
specifications meet those minimum requirements and PHMSA and FRA
believe that the additional weight of the safety features will be
accommodated by the increase in allowable GRL and will not decrease the
load limit (or innage) as indicated in the table below. For example, a
jacketed CPC1232 can be loaded to 1% outage and not weigh 286,000
pounds (approximately 281,000 pound) and as such, there is no capacity
gain to be had unless the allowable GRL is increased beyond 286,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ This FR Notice required compliance with AAR standard S286.
AAR Standard S-286 applied to four axel freight cars designed and
designated to carry a gross rail load of greater than 268,000 pounds
and up to 286,000 pounds. The standard includes requirements for car
body design loads, fatigue design, brake systems. Bearings, axels,
wheels, draft system, springs, trucks, and stenciling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Bridge capacity along the routes limits the GRL of a
particular railroad or segment of rail. The primary concern for this
issue is the terminal railroads. DOT believes all of the Class I RRs
are capable of 286,000. The ASLRRA, Web site indicates that nearly half
of its member railroads are capable of moving tank cars with a gross
rail load of 286,000. There is very little specific information
provided and perhaps a RR has a trestle on a line not capable of
handling a 286,000 car that would not necessarily affect the delivery
of crude oil to a customer because the trestle exists beyond the
delivery point. DOT is requesting information from industry that will
provide a better understanding of the capacity of the terminal
railroads.
    The capacity of candidate tank cars are as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Ethanol        Crude oil
                                                            Gross rail                       capacity        capacity      Total weight    Total weight
                Tank car characteristics                       load         Tare weight     (6.58 lbs./     (6.78 lbs./     of tank car     of tank car
                                                                                gallon)         gallon)        (ethanol)        (crude)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 specification non-jacketed......................         263,000          67,800          29,666          28,790         263,000         263,000
                                                                 286,000          67,800          29,700          29,700         233,226         269,166
DOT111/CPC1232 non jacketed.............................         263,000          75,200          28,540          27,699         263,000         263,000
                                                                 286,000          75,200          29,700          29,700         270,626         276,566
DOT111/CPC1232 jacketed.................................         263,000          80,800          27,690          26,873         263,000         263,000
                                                                 286,000          80,800          29,700          29,700         276,226         282,166
FRA and PHMSA designed car (Option 1)...................         263,000          85,500          26,976          26,180         263,002         263,000
                                                                 286,000          85,500          29,700          29,572         280,926         286,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* 29,700 gallons is the minimum allowable outage (1%) on a 30,000 gallon capacity car.
Note: For cars operating at a gross rail load of 286,000 pounds there is no loss of capacity.
Note: If limited to 263,000 pound gross rail load, all cars except the legacy DOT Specification 111 will have a lower capacity. The DOT Specification
  117 represents a larger decrease in capacity than the DOT Specification 111/CPC-1232 jacketed.

    As a result, we do not expect more, or longer, trains being offered
into transportation as a result of any tank car requirement options in
this proposal. We request comments on our rationale and conclusion that
there will be no reduction in tank car capacity.
    PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
    1. PHMSA expects that all new tank cars put into in crude oil and
ethanol service would, in the absence of this rule, have jacket,
thermal protection, TC-128 Grade B normalized steel, full height head
shield, enhanced top fittings protection, and bottom outlet valve
reconfigurations. Would any new crude oil or ethanol tank cars,
manufactured in 2015 and beyond, not have all of these features? If so,
please provide specific data on missing features and the numbers of
cars in each category.
    2. For the reasons listed above, PHMSA estimates no decrease in
tank car capacity from the increased weight of Options 1 and 2.
However, some commenters on the ANPRM suggested otherwise. PHMSA
solicits data and other relevant information in order to be able to
fully evaluate such claims. To the extent that commenters believe tank
car capacity would be adversely affected, PHMSA seeks information on
the benefits and costs of any such effects or of industry responses
(such as developing innovative materials) to respond to capacity
reduction/weight increases.
    3. Would the increased size and weight of the tank car Options have
any other effects not discussed in the NPRM or accompanying RIA? To
what extent would they affect braking effectiveness? To what extent
would they affect track safety performance? To what extent would they
affect loading practices?
    4. What additional safety features not discussed here, if any,
should PHMSA consider? If so, please provide detailed estimates on the
costs and benefits of individual safety features.
    5. Do any of the safety features included in any of the Options
have costs that are likely to exceed benefits? If so, please provide
detailed estimates on the costs and benefits of individual safety
features.
    6. As noted above, PHMSA estimates that that the \1/8-inch\
thickness would provide an 9 percent reduction in accident severity and
would cost $2,000. To what extent does the risk reduction align with
the findings of other tank car effectiveness studies? To what extent
does this cost estimate reflect market prices?
    7. For Option 1, PHMSA expects the upgrade to roll-over protection
can be made at almost no cost. To what extent does this cost estimate
reflect market prices?
    8. What would be the benefits and costs of allowing CPC-1232 cars
ordered before October 1, 2015 to be placed into service for their
useful life? What, if any, additional safety features should be
required for these cars during their useful lives?
b. DOT Specification 117--Performance Standard
    In this NPRM, we propose to require a tank car that is constructed
after October 1, 2015 and used to transport ethanol or crude oil or
used in a HHFT, to either meet the proposed DOT Specification 117
design requirements or the performance criteria. Under this proposal, a
car manufactured to the

performance standard must be approved in accordance with Sec.
179.13(a) and must incorporate several enhancements to increase
puncture resistance; provide thermal protection to survive a 100-minute
pool fire; and protect top fitting and bottom outlets during a train
accident. The proposed performance standard is intended to encourage
innovation in tank car designs, including materials of construction and
tank car protection features, while providing an equivalent level of
safety as the DOT Specification 117. Tank car manufacturers would be
allowed to develop alternative designs provided they comply with the
performance requirements. Under the proposal, such a design, for
example, may incorporate materials of construction that increase
puncture resistance but reduce the tank weight, increasing the amount
of product in a tank and reducing the number of shipments required to
move the same amount of hazardous materials.
    A tank car that meets the performance requirements, if adopted,
will be assigned to ``DOT Specification 117P.'' Builders would have to
demonstrate compliance with the performance standards and receive FRA
approval prior to building the cars.

G. Existing Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains

    As discussed in Section F above, there are three proposed tank car
Options for new cars, each with a prescribed tank car and a performance
standard. PHMSA proposes to also require existing cars to meet the same
DOT Specification 117P performance standard as these new cars, except
for the requirement to include top fittings protections. Existing tank
car tanks may continue to rely on the equipment installed at the time
of manufacture. PHMSA chose not to include top fitting protections as
part of any retrofit requirement as the costliness of such retrofit is
not supported with a corresponding appropriate safety benefit.\63\
Therefore, retrofitted cars will meet the DOT Specification 117P
performance standard and may continue to rely on the equipment
installed at the time of manufacture. The Options for the performance
standard outlined above and in the regulatory text of this NPRM are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ The cost to retrofitting Top fitting protection (if no top
fitting protection) is estimated to be $24,500, while the comparable
effectiveness rates are low. For effectiveness rates see Table 19.

     Option 1: PHMSA and FRA designed car;
     Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank Car; and
     Option 3: Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232.

    We request comments regarding the impacts associated with each tank
car option as a standard for existing tank cars. Specifically, we would
like to know which portions of the fleet commenters expect would be
retrofitted, repurposed, or retired under each option, and the
anticipated costs and benefits.
    In the September 6, 2013 ANPRM we specifically requested comments
pertaining to the various retrofit options discussed in the tank car
petitions. In its comments, NTSB urges PHMSA to take immediate action
to require a safer package for transporting flammable hazardous
materials by rail. In its comments, NTSB restates its concerns that any
regulatory action should apply to new construction and the existing
tank car fleet.
    Railway Supply Institute strongly urges PHMSA to adopt a separate
approach for existing tank cars that is uniquely tailored to the needs
of the existing DOT Specification 111 tank car fleet. It adds,

    Many builders and offerors have already made a significant
capital investment in ordering and manufacturing new tank cars that
are built to the CPC-1232 standard and thus are also compliant with
the P-1577 standards. A total of 55,546 CPC-1232 compliant tank cars
will be in service by the end of 2015. This level of activity
represents an industry investment in excess of $7.0 billion. In
light of the industry's proactive decision to incorporate these new
safety enhancements by adopting this standard, RSICTC requests that
PHMSA recognize that these cars already contain safety enhancements
and thus exempt them from any additional modifications that may be
required under the future rule. RSICTC urges PHMSA to expeditiously
address this aspect of the rulemaking to remove any uncertainty
which may otherwise impede the enhancement of overall fleet safety
performance.

    In their comments Watco and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)
provided detailed cost information on each of the enhancements
necessary to bring older cars up to the new performance standard. These
include the cost of top fitting protections,\64\ jackets, thermal
protection or replacement of the pressure relief valve, a new bottom
outlet valve handle, full-height head shields, and ECP brake
installation (for Option 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Top Fitting Protections are new construction requirements
only and are not required as part of any retrofits.

              Table 19--Retrofit Costs From Public Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Retrofit option                            Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottom outlet valve handle...................................     $1,200
Pressure relief valve........................................      1,500
New truck....................................................     16,000
Thermal protection...........................................      4,000
Full jacket..................................................     23,000
Full height head shield......................................     17,500
Top fitting protection (if no top fitting protection) \68\...     24,500
ECP brakes...................................................      5,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two retrofit options--increased \1/8-inch\ thickness and roll-over
protection--were not included in the public comments providing cost
estimates. We expect that existing tank cars with \7/16-inch\ shell
thickness will meet this any tank car standard with \9/16-inch\ shell
thickness by adding \1/8-inch\ thickness to the retrofitted jacket
(increasing the jacket thickness from its usual 11-gauge thickness),
and assume this thicker jacket costs an additional $2,000 (from the
estimated $23,000 cost for an 11-gauge jacket). In addition, we expect
no costs from any retrofit for roll-over protection relative to the
top-fitting the protection cost estimate provided in public comments.
    Many public commenters raised technical issues and potential
implementation problems from an industry-wide retrofit for crude oil
and ethanol cars. For example, the API public comment noted issues with
the extra weight on stub sills and tank car structures, and issues with
head shields and brake wheels/end platforms, and issues with truck
replacement. API also expressed implementation concerns about shop
capacity, the current backlog of car orders, and engineering capacity.
Public commenters stated that PHMSA should set an implementation
timeframe conducive to avoiding service bottlenecks.
    While the CPC 1232 tank car enhancements will significantly improve
safety for newly manufactured tank cars, RSICTC strongly urges PHMSA to
promulgate a separate rulemaking for existing tank cars that is
uniquely tailored to the needs of the existing DOT Specification 111
tank car fleet. RSICTC further states, ``[s]hould modifications be made
to the existing jacketed DOT-111s to conform to the CPC-1232 standards,
we again urge PHMSA to allow these modified cars to remain in active
service for the duration of their regulatory life.'' RSICTC also
submits that PHMSA adopt a ten-year program allowing compliance to be
achieved in phases through modification, re-purposing or retirement of
unmodified tank cars in Class 3, PG

I and II flammable liquid service. Tank car modifications supported by
RSICTC include adding half-height head shields, protecting top and
bottom fittings and adding pressure release valves or enhancing
existing pressure release valves.
    Greenbrier, a tank car manufacturer and servicer has stated that
the most vital of these modifications is the addition of a trapezoidal
or conforming half-height head shield to prevent penetration of tank
cars by loose rails. Greenbrier stated that together with the top and
bottom fittings protections and enhanced release valves, these
improvements could significantly limit the likelihood of breaching the
tank car. Further, Greenbrier commented that the ten-year timeline
suggested by RSICTC is excessive and unmodified tank cars could and
should be removed from hazardous materials service much sooner.
    API and other commenters stated in their comments that they are
strongly opposed to the mandating of any retrofits beyond the higher-
flow pressure relief device recommended by the T87.6 Task Force for
thermal protection due to the lack of economic and logistical
feasibility. The table 20 presents how we expect the fleet to evolve
going forward if regulations are not adopted.

                           Table 20--Fleet Projections 2015-2034 Absent New Regulation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Total cars                     DOT 111 with                   CPC 1232  with
              Year                   baseline         DOT 111         jacket         CPC 1232         jacket
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014............................          89,422          51,592           5,600          22,380           9,850
2015............................         109.722          51,592           5,600          22,380          30,150
2016............................         115,544          51,592           5,600          22,380          35,972
2017............................         121,366          51,592           5,600          22,380          41,794
2018............................         127,188          51,592           5,600          22,380          47,616
2019............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2020............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2021............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2022............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2023............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2024............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2025............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2026............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2027............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2028............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2029............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2030............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2031............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2032............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2033............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
2034............................         133,010          51,592           5,600          22,380          53,438
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA believes that reliance on HHFTs to transport millions of
gallons of flammable materials is a risk that must be addressed. For
the purposes of crude oil and ethanol that are classed as flammable
liquids, the DOT Specification 111 tank car would no longer be
authorized for use in HHFT. A risk-based timeline for continued use of
the DOT Specification 111 tank car in HHFTs is provided in Sec. Sec.
173.241, 173.242, and 173.243. This approach also provides time for car
owners to update existing fleets while prioritizing risk-reduction from
the highest danger (packing group) flammable liquid material (See table
15).
    It has been demonstrated that the DOT Specification 111 tank car
provides insufficient puncture resistance, is vulnerable to fire and
roll-over accidents, and the current bottom outlet valves are easily
severable in HHFT accidents. These risks have been demonstrated by
recent accidents of HHFTs transporting flammable liquids.
    PHMSA is proposing to limit continued use of the DOT Specification
111 tank car to non-HHFTs. In addition, PHMSA is proposing to authorize
the continued use of DOT Specification 111 tank car in combustible
liquid service, given the risks associated with crude oil or ethanol,
classified as a flammable liquid, are greater than that of combustible
liquids. This rule does not cover unit trains of materials that are
classed or reclassified as a combustible liquid. Existing HMR
requirements for these materials will not change. Therefore, under
current Sec.  172.102(c)(3) Special provision B1, for materials with a
flash point at or above 38 [deg]C (100[emsp14][deg]F) that are classed
or reclassed as combustible liquids (see Sec.  173.150(f)) or, crude
oil and ethanol that are classed as flammable liquids (all packing
groups) and not transported in HHFTs, an existing DOT Specification 111
tank car will continue to be authorized for use. Thus, except those
tank cars intended for combustible liquid service, any tank car
manufactured after October 1, 2015 that will be used in a HHFT must
meet or exceed the new DOT Specification 117 standard.
    Because of the risks involved, PHMSA is applying the same
requirements for new cars as it is for existing cars, with one
exception. PHMSA does not propose to require additional top fittings
protection for retrofits, because the costs exceed the benefits. Newly
constructed cars, however, are required to have additional top fittings
protection. Except for additional top fittings protection, the
requirements for newly constructed tank cars and retrofits are the
same.
    If it can be ascertained that an existing tank car can meet the new
performance standards, it would be authorized for use in a HHFT. From a
technical standpoint, PHMSA expects legacy cars will be able to
withstand the additional weight across all of the tank car options,
without truck replacement, because PHMSA believes the vast majority of
cars in crude and ethanol service have been built in the past 15 years.
As a result, cars in this service should have a truck that would
support the extra weight of the retrofits. PHMSA believes all cars
manufactured in this time period were built to a 286,000 lbs. weight
limit standards, and would include a truck that would support the extra
weight of retrofits.
    The proposed changes for existing tank cars are based on comments
discussed above, simulations, and

modeling. Modeling and simulation of puncture speed velocity of DOT
Specification 111 tank cars currently used to transport ethanol or
crude oil indicate that a velocity of approximately 7.4 mph will
puncture the shell of the tanks when struck with a rigid 12
x 12 indenter with a weight of 297,000 pounds. Validation of
this model has been accomplished using the results of puncture tests
performed at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, CO.\65\
Further, based on modeling and simulation, the head of an unjacketed
DOT Specification 111 tank car, when struck with a 12 x
12 indenter weighing 286,000 pounds will puncture at 7.6
mph. Table 21 provides the tank car shell and head puncture velocities
of the DOT Specification 117 tank car Options proposed in this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ ``Detailed Puncture Analyses Tank Cars: Analysis of
Different Impactor Threats and Impact Conditions'' can be found at:
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04420.

                     Table 21--Effectiveness of Existing Tank Car Options Relative to the Non-Jacketed DOT111 Specification Tank Car
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                BOV (%) chose
                                                                 Head  puncture    Shell  puncture   Thermal  damage                     not to  include
                  Tank car                        Total (%)            (%)               (%)               (%)        Top fittings (%)    top  fitting
                                                                                protections
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1....................................                51                21                17                12               N/A                <1
Option 2....................................                50                21                17                12               N/A                <1
Option 3....................................                40                19                 9                12               N/A                 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar to the methodology for estimating the effectiveness of new
cars, PHMSA uses these puncture velocities to arrive at risk reduction
estimates for retrofits. In evaluating train accidents involving HHFTs
listed in Table 3 above, we found that all but one of the derailments
occurred in excess of 20 mph. Only two of the derailments occurred at a
speed of between 20 mph and 30 mph, four occurred between 30 and 40 mph
and six occurred at speeds in excess of 40 mph. The documented
derailment speeds exceed the puncture velocity of both the DOT
Specification 111 tank car and the Options proposed in this rule.
However, during a derailment the speeds of impacts will vary
considerably between cars, and many of those impacts will not result in
a puncture. The portion of those impacts that could result in a
puncture would decline with the higher puncture velocity of the DOT
Specification 117 tank car Options proposed in this NPRM. As a result
of use of the proposed DOT Specification 117 tank cars, we expect the
volume of flammable liquid released into the environment and the
consequences of a train accident to be reduced.
    For Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car,
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed (not including ECP brake
risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 51 percent.
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Jacketed (not including ECP brake
risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 21 percent.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed (not including ECP
brake risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 28 percent.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Jacketed (not including ECP brake
risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 10 percent.
    For Option 2, the AAR 2014 car,
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 50 percent.
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Jacketed reduces accident severity
by 21 percent.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 28 percent.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Jacketed reduces accident severity
by 10 percent.
    For Option 3, the Enhanced CPC 1232 car,
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 40 percent.
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Jacketed reduces accident severity
by 11 percent.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 18 percent.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Jacketed does not reduce accident
severity.
    In Recommendation R-12-5, NTSB recommended that new and existing
tank cars authorized for transportation of ethanol and crude oil in PGs
I and II have enhanced tank head and shell puncture resistance systems
and top fittings protection. PHMSA chose not to include top fitting
protections as part of any retrofit requirement as the costliness of
such retrofit is not supported with a corresponding appropriate safety
benefit.
    A requirement to retrofit existing cars would be costly. Total
costs could exceed $30,000 per car. In addition, a retrofit would
result in a decrease in asset utilization (out-of-service time of at
least one month). As such, PHMSA is proposing to allow numerous options
for compliance. Existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars may be
retrofitted to DOT Specification 117, retired, repurposed, or operated
under speed restrictions.
    As a result of this rule, PHMSA expects all DOT Specification 111
Jacketed and CPC 1232 Jacketed crude oil and ethanol cars (about 15,000
cars) to be transferred to Alberta, Canada tar sands services. It does,
however, expect the majority of DOT 111 Un-Jacketed and CPC 1232
Unjacketed cars (about 66,000 cars) to be retrofitted; some DOT
Unjacketed and CPC 1232 Unjacketed cars (about 8,000 cars) will be
transferred to Alberta, Canada tar sands services. No existing tank
cars will be forced into early retirement.
    Specifically, for Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car,
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed would cost $33,400, plus
$1,032 in out-of-service time and $1,019 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed would cost $32,900,
plus $944 in out-of-service time and $641 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
    For Option 2, the AAR 2014 car,
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed would cost $28,900, plus
$1,033 in out-of-service time and $1,019 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed would cost $28,400,
plus $944 in out-of-service time and $641 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
    For Option 3, the Enhanced CPC 1232 car,
     Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed would cost $26,730, plus
$1,032 in out-of-service time and $1019 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
     Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed would cost $26,230,
plus $944 in out-of-service time and $641 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
    To better focus limited resources on the highest risk materials, we
are proposing to revise each of the bulk packaging sections, Sec. Sec.
173.241, 173.242,

and 173.243, to a provide a timeline for the phase out of existing cars
that are in HHFTs based on packing group (See table 15).
    This risk-based approach provides sufficient time for car owners to
update the existing fleet while prioritizing the highest danger
material. Specifically, based on estimates of the current fleet size
and composition paired with production capacity of tank car
manufacturers expressed by commenters to the ANPRM, we believe that
providing a two year phase in of packing group I will not result in a
shortage of available tank cars for HHFT (See RIA for further detail).
It also provides additional time for cars to meet the DOT Specification
117 performance standard if offerors take steps to reduce the
volatility of the material. Separation of dissolved gases from crude
oil, for example can reduce the boiling point and flammability of the
material, potentially shifting the product to a different Packing
Group. This may be achieved through a number of methods, including
using better separators and aging of crude oil.
    As proposed in this NPRM, DOT Specification 111 tank cars may be
retrofitted to DOT Specification 117, retired, repurposed, or operated
under speed restrictions. Further our proposal limits the future use of
DOT Specification 111 tank cars only if used in a HHFT. DOT
Specification 111 tank cars can continue to be used to transport other
commodities, including flammable liquids provided they are not in a
HHFT. These options provide tank car owners and rail carriers with the
opportunity to make operational changes that focus on the greatest
risks and minimize the impact to the greatest extent practicable.
    PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
    1. PHMSA expects about 23,000 cars will be transferred to Alberta
tar sands service as a result of this rule. PHMSA also expects no cars
will be retired as a result of this rule. How many of the existing DOT
Specification 111 and CPC-1232 tank cars that will be retired? How many
will be repurposed? How many will be retrofitted?
    2. What are the benefits and costs of each of those actions
(retiring, re-purposing, and retrofitting)?
    3. Does this estimate for tar sand service re-purposing reflect the
demand for these tank cars? Would any tank cars be re-purposed to
transport a different material?
    4. Should the CPC-1232 cars be exempted from some or all of the
retrofitting requirements described here? If so, what are the benefits
and costs of those exemptions?
    5. Should CPC-1232 cars have a different implementation timeframe
than legacy DOT 111 cars? If so, what are the benefits and costs of a
different implementation timeframe? What would the economic effects be
of retiring, repurposing or retrofitting, within five years, CPC-1232
tank cars used in flammable liquid service? What would the economic
effects be of retiring, repurposing or retrofitting, within ten years,
CPC-1232 tank cars used in flammable liquid service?
    6. For Options 1 and 2, how would existing legacy tank cars comply
with the requirement for an additional \1/8-inch\ thickness? Would
these cars be retrofitted to have jackets thicker than 11-gauge? To
what extent would this introduce engineering challenges?
    7. PHMSA estimates all existing crude oil and ethanol cars are
capable of handling 286,000 GRL without truck replacement. To what
extent would the additional weight of the retrofit Options require
structural changes to existing tank cars?
    8. PHMSA requests any available detailed data set on the safety
features of the existing fleet.
    9. Would the increased size and weight of the tank car Options have
any other effects not discussed in the NPRM or accompanying RIA? To
what extent would they affect braking rates? To what extent would they
affect track safety performance? To what extent would they affect
loading practices?
    10. What additional safety features not discussed here, if any,
should PHMSA consider? If so, please provide detailed estimates on the
costs and benefits of individual safety features.
    11. Do any of the safety features included in any of the Options
have costs that exceed benefits? If so, please provide detailed
estimates on the costs and benefits of individual safety features.
    In addition, while DOT's September 6, 2013 ANPRM, NTSB
Recommendation R-12-5, and some commenters and petitions linked
enhanced tank car specifications and retrofitting of existing tanks
cars to only packaging group I and II materials, this NPRM proposes
packaging requirements for all flammable liquids in a HHFT, regardless
of packing group. Table 22 provides PHMSA's rational for including
flammable liquids in packing groups I, II, and III.
    DOT created Class 3 packing groups based on differences in
volatility and ignitability [55 FR 16500]. Volatile liquids, having a
lower flash point, have higher vapor phase concentrations and upon
release, may catch fire immediately or from surface evaporation upon
forming pools, generate a flammable cloud which could ignite and burn
(flash fire), or explode in a vapor cloud explosion. It is also
possible there is no ignition source and instead a potentially toxic
and or flammable vapor cloud results. Other factors such as weather
conditions, wind direction, and congestion around the release influence
the potential impact of the incident. In order to perform a consequence
and impact analysis on different types of incidents, PHMSA would model
the release amount and properties and determine the subsequent impact
of the material and/or energy on people, environment, and physical
surroundings. The impact of different types of flammable liquid spills
could be evaluated based on trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalency approach,
multi-energy methods, the Baker-Strehlow model, or other
methods.66 67 The results of the modeling could include 1
radiant heat from a fire, peak overpressure from an explosion, impulse
duration, and potential blast size to determine the potential damages.
Lower overpressures (less than 10 psig) may result in collapse of
nearby buildings, resulting in the people inside them susceptible to
injury or fatality, while relatively higher overpressures (>15 psig)
are needed to cause a human fatality directly from an
explosion.68 69
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ Sochet I. Blast effects of external explosions Eighth
International Symposium on Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigation of
Industrial Explosions, Yokohama: Japan (2010)--http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00629253.
    \67\ Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Chemical
Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. Wiley (2010).
    \68\ Kent, J. Handbook of Industrial Chemistry and
Biotechnology. Springer (2013).
    \69\ Nolan, D. Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection
Engineering Principles: for Oil, Gas, Chemical and Related
Facilities. William Andrew (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While Packing Group III materials (flash point greater than or
equal to 73[emsp14][deg]F) are less volatile and may pose a lower fire
and explosion risk than materials in Packing Groups I and II, PHMSA
believes the risk of an incident from a HHFT containing Packing Group
III flammable liquids is sufficient to warrant enhanced car standards
and inclusion in the HHFT definition. Further, PHMSA is concerned about
the possibility of spills and fires from HHFT carrying Packing Group
III materials in

large volumes. Table 22 provides PHMSA's rational for including
flammable liquids in packing groups I, II, and III.

                         Table 22--Enhanced Car Standards for Flammable Liquids in HHFT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Issue                                                 Explanation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume of Material.........................  The large volume of flammable liquid transported in a HHFT poses a
                                              safety and environmental risk regardless of the packing group.
                                              Specifically, this amount of material contained in a tank car
                                              poses a risk of a considerable oil spill (~35,000 gallon per tank
                                              car). Based on the accidents evaluated in the RIA, approximately 5
                                              cars on average release product with an average quantity release
                                              of approximately 84,000 gallons. Such a spill could result in
                                              significant environmental damage regardless of packing group. By
                                              requiring packing group III materials to be contained in a more
                                              robust tank car, the potential environmental damage from an oil
                                              spill is mitigated as the conditional probability of release would
                                              be decreased.
Combustible Liquid Exception...............  PHMSA is proposing to retain the exception that permits flammable
                                              liquids with a flash point at or above 38 [deg]C (100 [deg]F) to
                                              be reclassed as combustible liquids, provided that material does
                                              not meet the definition of any other hazard class. Therefore, the
                                              existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars would continue to be
                                              authorized for these materials. This would allow the existing tank
                                              cars to continue to be used for certain low-hazard packing group
                                              III flammable liquids that are reclassified as combustible
                                              liquids. However, except for combustible liquids service, tank
                                              cars manufactured after October 1, 2015, would be required to meet
                                              the requirements for the DOT Specification 117 when used in a
                                              HHFT.
Consistency................................  Providing a single packaging authorization across all three
                                              flammable liquid packaging groups would simplify the requirements
                                              while providing a packaging appropriate to handle all flammable
                                              liquids.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence. Further, we request comments on the following:

    1. Are there any relatively lower hazard, lower risk flammable
liquids that could potentially be exempt from the enhanced car
standards for HHFT?
    2. Is the current exception for combustible liquids sufficient
to incentivize producers to reduce the volatility of crude oil for
continued use of existing tank cars?
    3. Would an exception for all PG III flammable liquids further
incentivize producers to reduce the volatility of crude oil prior to
transportation?
    4. What are the impacts on the costs and safety benefits of
degasifying to these levels?
    5. What are the economic impacts of the proposed phase out date
for existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars used to transport PG
III flammable liquids?
    6. Fire and explosion risk of Class III Flammable liquids
    a. What characteristics of a released flammable liquid
significantly affect the likelihood and consequence of fire or
explosion upon release?
    b. What physical or environmental features of a release affect
the likelihood and consequence of fire or explosion upon release?
    c. What existing scientific information is available concerning
the explosion hazards of hydrocarbons and other liquids?
    d. What types of flammable liquids are most susceptible to a
high-consequence detonation explosion upon release?
    e. What data exists on the relationship between liquid
properties and fire and blast zone size?
    7. Should shippers be allowed to petition PHMSA for an exemption
from the requirements for HHFT based on the properties of Class III
liquids? What should be considered (e.g. chemical properties,
historical data, scientific information) before issuing an
exemption?

H. Forthcoming FRA NPRM on Securement and Attendance

    On July 23, 2013, Transport Canada issued an Emergency Directive
providing safety and security requirements for locomotives in Canada by
focusing on securement, attendance, crew size and security of
locomotives on main track and sidings.\70\ In regard to attendance, the
Emergency Directive requires attendance for any locomotive coupled to
one or more loaded tank cars containing hazardous materials that are on
a main line track.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ The Emergency Directive is available at the following URL:
http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/backgrounders-safety-locomotives-7292.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 7, 2013, FRA published EO 28 to address safety issues
related to attendance and securement of certain hazardous materials
trains. EO 28 prohibits railroads from leaving trains or vehicles
transporting the specified hazardous materials unattended on mainline
track or siding outside of a yard or terminal unless the railroad
adopts and complies with a plan that provides sufficient justification
for leaving them unattended under specific circumstances and locations.
    In addition to demonstrating the potential tragic consequences of a
derailment involving rail cars containing hazardous materials, the
incident in Lac M[eacute]gantic, Quebec identified vulnerabilities of
safety and security that could result in future train accidents.
Emergency Order No. 28 was issued to address certain vulnerabilities
specific to the Lac-M[eacute]gantic incident, but others likely exist.
In addition, the agencies' Joint Safety Advisories published on August
7, 2013 and November 20, 2013 stress the importance of security
planning and updating security plans to address changes made to
railroad operations as a result of Emergency Order No. 28.
    We did not seek comments on these or other attendance requirements
in the ANPRM. However, as outlined above, RSAC members have submitted a
consensus recommendation to FRA regarding the hazard classes and
threshold quantities of hazardous materials that should trigger
additional operating procedures, including attendance and securement
requirements.\71\ In summary, RSAC recommended that trains with loaded
cars meet new requirements regarding: (1) The duty status and hours of
service for any railroad personnel left to attend or secure a train;
(2) job briefings for train crews that cover the details of individual
responsibilities for the securement of a train; (3) locking
requirements for locomotives and/or train controls; (4) verification of
securement procedures by personnel not members of the train crew, and
reporting verified securement to dispatchers; and (5) procedures for
verifying securement in the event that emergency response personnel
have been on, under, or between equipment that has been previously
secured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ The recommendation is available at the following URL:
https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/Railroad%20Safety%20Advisory%20Committee%20Securement%20Recommendation%20VOTE.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the RSAC recommendation is robust in its approach to
matters of

attendance and securement, and because it covers hazmat beyond crude
oil and ethanol, PHMSA believes that FRA is best suited to address the
matter in its forthcoming NPRM based on the RSAC recommendation. PHMSA
seeks information and comment on any alternate approaches that may be
considered along with the RSAC recommendation regarding the attendance
and securement of these types of trains.

VI. Regulatory Review and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 13610
and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This NPRM is considered a significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The NPRM is considered a significant
regulatory action under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures order
issued by DOT (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). PHMSA has prepared and
placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact Assessment addressing the
economic impact of this proposed rule.
    Executive Orders 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and Review'') and
13563 (``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review'') require agencies
to regulate in the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs,'' and to develop regulations that ``impose the least burden on
society.'' Executive Order 13610, issued May 10, 2012, urges agencies
to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether
they remain justified and whether they should be modified or
streamlined in light of changed circumstances, including the rise of
new technologies. The Department of Transportation believes that
streamlined and clear regulations are important to ensure compliance
with important safety regulations. As such the Department has developed
a plan detailing how such reviews are conducted.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ Department of Transportation's plan for retrospective
regulatory reviews is available at the following URL: http://www.dot.gov/regulations/dot-retrospective-reviews-rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13610 require
agencies to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation.
Accordingly, PHMSA invites comments on these considerations, including
any cost or benefit figures or factors, alternative approaches, and
relevant scientific, technical and economic data. These comments will
help PHMSA evaluate whether the proposed requirements are appropriate.
PHMSA also seeks comment on potential data and information gathering
activities that could be useful in designing an evaluation and/or
retrospective review of this rulemaking.
    The United States has experienced a dramatic growth in the quantity
of flammable materials being shipped by rail in recent years. According
to the rail industry, in the U.S. in 2009, there were 10,800 carloads
of crude oil shipped by rail. In 2013, there were 400,000 carloads. In
the Bakken region, over one million barrels a day of crude oil was
produced in March 2014,\73\ most of which is transported by rail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Information regarding oil and gas production is available
at the following URL: http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/#tabs-summary-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Transporting flammable material carries safety and environmental
risks. The risk of flammability is compounded in the context of rail
transportation because petroleum crude oil and ethanol are commonly
shipped in large unit trains.
    In recent years, train accidents involving a flammable material
release and resulting fire with severe consequences have occurred with
increasing frequency (i.e. Arcadia, OH, Plevna, MT, Casselton, ND,
Aliceville, AL, Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec).
    PHMSA is proposing this NPRM, in order to increase the safety of
crude and ethanol shipments by rail. We are proposing revisions to the
HMR to establish requirements specific to HHFTs. As described in
greater detail throughout this document, this NPRM is a system-wide,
comprehensive approach consistent with the risks posed by flammable
liquids transported by rail in HHFTs. Specifically, requirements
address:
    (1) Rail routing restrictions;
    (2) tank car integrity;
    (3) speed restrictions;
    (4) braking systems;
    (5) proper classification and characterization of mined liquid and
gas; and
    (6) notification to State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs).

Table 1 (Restated here) summarizes major provisions of the proposal,
and identifies those affected.

                                   Table 1--Affected Entities and Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Proposed requirement                                        Affected entity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better classification and characterization of mined gases and   Offerors/Shippers of all mined gases and
 liquids.                                                        liquids.
 Written sampling and testing program for all mined
 gases and liquids, such as crude oil, to address:
    (1) frequency of sampling and testing;
    (2) sampling at various points along the supply chain;
    (3) sampling methods that ensure a representative sample
     of the entire mixture;
    (4) testing methods to enable complete analysis,
     classification, and characterization of material;
    (5) statistical justification for sample frequencies; and,
    (6) duplicate samples for quality assurance.
 Require offerer to certify that program is in place,
 document the testing and sampling program, and make results
 available to DOT personnel, upon request.
Rail routing risk assessment..................................  Rail Carriers, Emergency Responders.
     Requires carriers to perform a routing analysis
     that considers 27 safety and security factors. The
     carrier must select a route based on findings of the
     route analysis. These planning requirements are
     prescribed in Sec.   172.820 and would be expanded to
     apply to HHFTs.
Notification to SERCs
     Require trains containing one million gallons of
     Bakken crude oil to notify State Emergency Response
     Commissions (SERCs) or other appropriate state delegated
     entity about the operation of these trains through their
     States.
Reduced operating speeds

     Restrict all HHFTs to 50-mph in all areas;
     PHMSA is requesting comment on three speed
     restriction options for HHFTs that contain any tank cars
     not meeting the enhanced tank car standards proposed by
     this rule:
    (4) a 40-mph maximum speed restriction in all areas;
    (5) a 40-mph speed restriction in high threat urban areas
     \74\; and,
    (6) a 40-mph speed restriction in areas with a 100K+
     population.
 PHMSA is also requesting comment on a 30-mph speed
 restriction for HHFTs that do not comply with enhanced
 braking requirements.
Enhanced braking
     Require all HHFTs be equipped with alternative
     brake signal propagation systems. Depending on the
     outcome of the tank car standard proposal and
     implementation timing, all HHFTs would be operated with
     either electronic controlled pneumatic brakes (ECP), a
     two-way end of train device (EOT), or distributed power
     (DP).
Enhanced standards for both new and existing tank cars........  Tank Car Manufacturers,
                                                                 Tank Car Owners,
                                                                 Shippers and Rail Carriers.
     Require new tank cars constructed after October
     1, 2015 (that are used to transport flammable liquids as
     part of a HHFT) to meet criteria for a selected option,
     including specific design requirements or performance
     criteria (e.g., thermal, top fittings, and bottom outlet
     protection; tank head and shell puncture resistance) is
     selected in the final rule. PHMSA is requesting comment
     on the following three options for the DOT Specification
     117:
        1. FRA and PHMSA Designed Car, or equivalent
        2. AAR 2014Tank Car,\75\ or equivalent
        3. Jacketed CPC-1232 \76\, or equivalent
     Require existing tank cars that are used to
     transport flammable liquids as part of a HHFT, to be
     retrofitted to meet the selected option for performance
     requirements, except for top fittings protection. Those
     not retrofitted would be retired, repurposed, or operated
     under speed restrictions for up to five years, based on
     packing group assignment of the lading.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 5 provides the costs and benefits of the individual
provisions of the proposed rule. PHMSA is co-proposing three different
options for tank car standards and three different options for speed
restrictions. Table 6 presents the costs and benefits of the various
combinations of proposed tank car and speed restriction provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ As defined in 49 CFR 1580.3--High Threat Urban Area (HTUA)
means an area comprising one or more cities and surrounding areas
including a 10-mile buffer zone, as listed in appendix A to Part
1580 of the 49 CFR.
    \75\ On March 9, 2011 AAR submitted petition for rulemaking P-
1577, which was discussed in the ANPRM. In response to the ANPRM, on
November 15, 2013, AAR and ASLRAA submitted as a comment
recommendations for tank car standards that are enhanced beyond the
design in P-1577. For the purposes of this rulemaking this tank car
will be referred to as the ``AAR 2014 tank car.'' See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0090.
    \76\ In 2011, the AAR issued Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC)
1232, which outlines industry requirements for additional safety
equipment on certain DOT Specification 111 tanks ordered after
October 1, 2011, and intended for use in ethanol and crude oil
service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Please note that because there is overlap in the risk reduction
achieved between some of the proposed requirements listed in the Table
5 (restated). The total benefits and costs of the provisions cannot be
accurately calculated by summing the benefits and costs of each
proposed provision. Table 6 (restated), on the other hand, presents
total benefits and costs of the combinations of speed restriction and
tank car proposals. Explanation of the comprehensive benefits and costs
of each combination of proposals is included at the end of the RIA.
    Please also note that, given the uncertainty associated with the
risks of crude oil and ethanol shipments in the table below (Table 5
restated here) contains a range of benefits estimates. The low end of
the range estimates risk from 2015 to 2034 based on the U.S. safety
record for crude oil and ethanol from 2006 to 2014, adjusting for the
projected increase in crude oil and ethanol shipment volume over the
next 20 years. The high end of the range estimates risk from 2015 to
2034 based on the U.S. safety record for crude oil and ethanol
shipments from 2006 to 2014, adjusting for the projected increase in
crude oil and ethanol shipments volume, plus an estimate that the U.S.
would experience the equivalent of 10 higher consequence safety
events--nine of which would have environmental damages and monetized
injury and fatality costs exceeding $1.15 billion and one of which
would have environmental damages and monetized injury and fatality
costs exceeding $5.75 billion--over the next 20 years. This outcome
could result from a smaller number of more severe events, or more
numerous events that are less severe.

        Table 5--20 Year Costs and Benefits by Stand-Alone Proposed Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \77\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Affected section \78\              Provision                 Benefits (7%)                Costs (7%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR 172.820..............  Rail Routing +............  Cost effective if routing   $4.5 million.
                                                           were to reduce risk of an
                                                           incident by 0.17%.
49 CFR 173.41...............  Classification of Mined     Cost effective if this      16.2 million.
                               Gas and Liquid.             requirement reduces risk
                                                           by 0.61%.
49 CFR 174.310..............  Notification to SERCs.....  Qualitative...............  0.

                              Speed Restriction: Option   $199 million-$636 million.  2,680 million.
                               1: 40 mph speed limit all
                               areas *.
                              Speed Restriction: Option   $33.6 million-$108 million  240 million.
                               2: 40 mph 100k people *.
                              Speed Restriction: Option   $6.8 million-$21.8 million  22.9 million.
                               3: 40 mph in HTUAs *.
                              Braking: Electronic         $737 million-$1,759         500 million.
                               Pneumatic Control with DP   million.
                               or EOT .
49 CFR Part 179.............  Option 1: PHMSA and FRA     $822 million-$3,256         3,030 million.
                               designed car @.             million.
                              Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank     $610 million-$2,426         2,571 million.
                               Car.                        million.
                              Option 3: Jacketed CPC-     $393 million-$1,570         2,040 million.
                               1232 (new const.).          million.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ``*'' indicates voluntary compliance regarding crude oil trains in high-threat urban areas (HTUA).
``+'' indicates voluntary actions that will be taken by shippers and railroads.
``'' indicates that only tank car Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car, has a requirement for ECP
  brakes. However, all HHFTs would be required to have DP or two-way EOT, regardless of which tank car Option is
  selected at the final rule stage.

  Table 6--20 Year Benefits and Costs of Proposal Combinations of Proposed Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \79\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Benefit range
                                 Proposal                                       (millions)      Cost (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 MPH System Wide........................      $1,436-$4,386             $5,820
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 MPH in 100K............................      $1,292-$3,836              3,380
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA............................      $1,269-$3,747              3,163
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH System Wide....................................        $794-$3,034              5,272
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K........................................        $641-$2,449              2,831
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA........................................        $616-$2,354              2,614
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH System Wide....................................        $584-$2,232              4,741
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K........................................        $426-$1,626              2,300
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA........................................        $400-$1,527              2,083
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Crude Oil Transport by Rail
    Figure 5 below shows the recent strong growth in crude oil
production in the U.S., as well as growth in the number of rail
carloads shipped. Figure 5 also shows forecasted domestic crude oil
production from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and PHMSA's
projected strong demand for the rail shipment of crude oil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ All costs and benefits are in millions over 20 years, and
are discounted to present value using a 7 percent rate.
    \78\ All affected sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) are in Title 49.
    \79\ All costs and benefits are in millions, and are discounted
to present value using a 7 percent rate.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.011

    A rise in rail accidents involving crude oil has also risen along
with the increase in crude oil production and rail shipments of crude
oil. Figure 6 below shows this rise.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.012

    Based on these train accidents, the projected continued growth of
domestic crude oil production, and the growing number of train
accidents involving crude oil, PHMSA concludes that the potential for a
train accident involving crude oil has increased, which has raised the
likelihood of a catastrophic train accident that would cause
substantial damage to life, property, and the environment.
    Additional factors give rise to increased risks, and thus the
increased probability of a catastrophic event occurring. First, the
risk of flammability is compounded, because of the practice of shipping
very large quantities of oil in one train, as shown by the increased
use of high-hazard flammable trains. In 2008 there were less than
10,000 rail carloads of crude oil. By 2013 the

number of rail carloads of increased to over 400,000.\80\ Second,
unlike other Class 3 manufactured goods, organic materials from oil and
gas production represent a unique challenge in regards to
classification. Differences in the chemical makeup of the raw material
can vary across wells and over time. Unprocessed crude oil may present
unique hazards such as corrosivity, sulfur content and resolved gas
content, thereby affecting the integrity of the tank car.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA's analysis of this combination of factors suggests an
increase in the risk of rail related accidents and an increase in the
likelihood of a catastrophic event.
Ethanol
    U.S. ethanol production has increased considerably during the last
10 years and has generated similar growth in the transportation of
ethanol by rail, according to a recent white paper by the Association
of American Railroads (AAR).\81\ As shown in the Figure 7 EIA projects
strong demand for ethanol in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Railroads and
Ethanol. Available online at https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.013

    In 2008 there were around 292,000 rail carloads of ethanol. In
2011, that number increased over 40 percent to 409,000.\82\ Not
surprisingly, this growth in rail traffic has been accompanied by an
increase in the number of rail accidents involving ethanol. Figure 8
below plots the total number of rail accidents involving ethanol during
the last 13 years compared to the total carloads of ethanol. The left
axis shows the total number of rail derailments and the right axis
shows total carloads shipped.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.014

Source: STB Waybill Sample and PHMSA Incident Report Database
Summary of Regulatory Changes
    As described in greater detail throughout this document, the
proposed rule is a system-wide, comprehensive approach consistent with
the risks posed by high-hazard flammable trains by rail. Requirements
address:
     Rail Routing;
     Tank Cars;
     Braking;
     Speed Restrictions;
     Classification of Mined Gas and Liquid; and
     Notification to SERCs.
    This approach is designed to mitigate damages of rail accidents
involving flammable materials, though some provisions could also
prevent accidents.
    The RIA discusses, consistent with this NPRM, six requirement
areas. Although we analyze the effects of individual requirements
separately, the preferred alternative proposed in this rulemaking is a
system-wide approach covering all requirement areas consistent with
this NPRM.
    The analysis shows that expected damages based on the historical
safety record are expected to exceed $4.5 billion and that damages from
high-consequence events could reach $13.7 billion over a 20-year period
in the absence of the rule.
    PHMSA has proposed multiple options for Speed Restrictions and Tank
Car standards. These options are mutually exclusive. PHMSA may select
one of these options for each of Speed Restrictions and Tank Car
standards, potentially including modifications based on public comments
in response to this NPRM and changed circumstances.
    PHMSA supports a system-wide approach covering all requirement
areas provided above. Following consideration of public comments, PHMSA
will consider alternatives for one or more of these requirement areas.

B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C.
1531) (UMRA) requires each agency to prepare a written statement for
any proposed or final rule that includes a ``Federal mandate that may
result in the expenditure by State, local, and Native American Indian
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year.'' The value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for
inflation to 2012 levels, is $151 million. If adopted, this proposed