[Federal Register: August 15, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 159)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 47857-47868]
[DOCID:fr15au08-19]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 121, 125, and 135

[Docket No. FAA-2006-26135; Notice No. 08-08]
RIN 2120-AI79

Filtered Flight Data

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA is amending its proposal to prohibit the filtering of
some original flight recorder sensor signals. Comments to the NPRM
published in November 2006 and changes in available technology have
caused us to reexamine our position on data filtering. We are now
proposing that certain critical data parameters may be filtered if a
certificate holder can show that the data can be accurately
reconstructed. This proposed rule would improve the integrity and
quality of the data recorded on digital flight data recorders while
giving aircraft designers and operators more flexibility in system
design and operation where allowable, including an option to filter
data.

DATES: Send your comments on or before November 13, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments identified by Docket Number FAA-2006-
26135 using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room W12-
140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Bring comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
For more information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to
http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you
provide. Using the search function of our docket Web site, anyone can
find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any of
our dockets. This includes the name of the individual sending the
comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to
http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket. Or, go to the Docket Management Facility in Room
W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue,
SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this proposed rule contact Brian A. Verna, Avionics Systems Branch,
Aircraft Certification Service, AIR-130, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; e-mail
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>For legal questions concerning this proposed rule
contact Karen L. Petronis, Senior Attorney for Regulations, Regulations
Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, AGC-200, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; e-mail
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in this preamble under the Additional
Information section, we discuss how you can comment on this proposal
and how we will handle your comments. This discussion includes related
information about the docket, privacy, and the handling of proprietary
or confidential business information. We also discuss how you can get a
copy of this proposal and related rulemaking documents.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue aviation safety rules is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701. Under that section,
the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations providing minimum
standards for other practices, methods and procedures necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority since flight data recorders are the only means available to
account for aircraft movement and flight crew actions critical to
finding the probable cause of incidents or accidents, including data
that could prevent future incidents or accidents.

I. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

    During several aircraft accident investigations, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or Board) found that some flight data
recorder systems were filtering flight recorder parameter signals
before they were recorded. As a result, the recorded data did not
accurately reflect the aircraft's performance or the movements

of the flight control systems before and during the accident or
incident under investigation. Such signal filtering both hampered and
delayed the investigations. Throughout the investigation of American
Airlines Flight 587 (Flight 587), the NTSB expended significant
resources and time trying to recreate the performance and movements of
the flight controls of the accident aircraft.
    In November 2003, the NTSB issued three recommendations (NTSB
Recommendations A-03-48/A-03-49/A-03-50, November 6, 2003) on digital
flight data recorder (DFDR) recording requirements. The NTSB
recommended that the FAA require all aircraft have a DFDR system
installed ``capable of recording values that meet the accuracy
requirements through the full dynamic range of each parameter at a
frequency sufficient to determine a complete, accurate, and unambiguous
time history of parameter activity, with emphasis on capturing each
parameter's dynamic motion at the maximum rate possible, including
reversals of direction at the maximum rate possible.''

B. Action by the FAA

    The FAA agreed with these recommendations. In 2006, we issued a
notice that proposed a prohibition on filtering certain original flight
data sensor signals. The 2006 NPRM contains a more complete discussion
of the proposal and the events leading up to it (November 15, 2006, 71
FR 66634).
    The comments we received on the proposed rule alerted us to several
features of the proposed prohibition that could have significantly more
impact than we would have predicted. The first was the proposed
definition of filtering, which described it as a change to any original
parameter signal for any reason other than the three specified in the
rule. The comments indicated that the level of signal processing that
is in use on newer flight data systems no longer coincides with more
traditional concepts of filtering, and leaves in question whether
current system designs would be considered filtering. A more detailed
consideration of this issue is included in the discussion that follows.
    As we considered whether to change the proposed definition of
filtering, we studied what is quickly becoming the standard in
electronic signal processing. Our intent in the 2006 NPRM was to
prohibit the processing of certain flight data sensor signals that
would result in inaccurate data being preserved, as happened with the
rudder movement data on Flight 587. That airplane crashed after takeoff
from LaGuardia Airport in November 2001.
    The investigation following the crash of Flight 587 indicated that
the issue was not that data were filtered, but that the actual rudder
movement data could not be reconstructed once processed by installed
filtering devices. While a prohibition like our 2006 proposal would
solve the problem, current capabilities suggest that when properly
processed and documented, data can be recovered from a system design
that incorporates filtering. We are now proposing that data filtering
be allowed if a certificate holder can demonstrate that the `filtered'
recorded data meet the recording requirements of the regulations, and
that the original sensor signal data can be accurately reconstructed
using a documented, repeatable process.

C. Changes in This Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    We have moved the filtering regulation from proposed Sec.
121.344(n) to its own section, Sec.  121.346 (or complementary sections
in other parts), to avoid any confusion with the other flight recorder
requirements. While today's document uses part 121 as a reference, we
are proposing the same changes for parts 125, and 135.
    Section 121.346 begins with a definition of filtering that differs
slightly from the one we proposed in 2006. The new proposed definition
indicates that when a signal is formatted in any way to be DFDR
compatible, it is not considered filtered. As discussed below, we
disagreed with commenters that thought the definition was too specific
to allow certain current practices in signal conditioning.
    We have changed our position from a strict filtering prohibition to
one of conditional allowance that distinguishes between two groups of
flight recorder parameters. The first contains those that are
prohibited from being filtered unless a certificate holder can
demonstrate that it has done the tests, analyses, and maintains the
procedures necessary to reconstruct the original sensor signal values
from the filtered recorded data. The FAA understands that such
technology is available, and where it can be shown to be reliable, it
will be allowed. The second includes those parameters whose signals may
be filtered without further action.
    We have split the 88 parameters listed in Sec.  121.344(a) into two
groups.
    The first group includes those parameters that may be filtered only
if a certificate holder can demonstrate that the original sensor signal
data (values) can be reconstructed using a valid, repeatable procedure.
This group includes parameters such as flight control positions, flight
control input forces and flight control surface positions that are
sampled at higher rates. Filtering can and has been shown to result in
incorrect information being recorded. This group also includes those
parameters that are considered critical to accident investigation,
including altitude, airspeed, heading, vertical and lateral
acceleration, pitch attitude, roll attitude and engine thrust.
Parameters that may not be filtered unless valid reconstruction is
demonstrated are numbers 1-7, 9, 11-18, 26, 32, 42, 43, 68, 70, 77, and
88.
    The second group includes all parameters that may be filtered
without further showing by the certificate holder. We have found that
filtering these parameters still results in acceptable recorded data as
long as the accuracy and all other requirements of the applicable
appendix are met. A significant number of parameters in this group are
those that have only two states, on or off. These are known as
discretes. We received several comments indicating that the information
from these parameters is not affected by filtering. There are also
discretes that may have three or four preprogrammed fixed values as
their output, and are recorded as a binary numerical representation
(BNR). Examples are traffic alert and collision avoidance system
(TCAS), electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) display, and primary
navigation system reference. Filtering these parameters would not
result in any non-programmed value being recorded, nor would it affect
the determination of the value at a given time. Other parameters
included in the `may be filtered' group are secondary flight control
surfaces and input positions, such as trailing and leading edge flaps
and pitch trim surface position. Filtering does not appear to affect an
investigator's ability to determine the position of this equipment.
Parameters that may be filtered without further action are numbers 8,
10, 19-25, 27-31, 33-41, 44-67, 69, 71-76, and 78-87.
    The option not to filter any or all parameters remains an
acceptable means of compliance with the regulations. In all cases, the
accuracy and all other requirements of Appendix M (or Appendix E or
Appendix F) must continue to be met. The ability to reconstruct data
does not forgive any appendix requirement for any parameter. For
purposes of this SNPRM, when we refer to Appendix M in our response to
a comment, this response also applies to operations covered by

Appendix E to part 125 or Appendix F to part 135 unless otherwise
noted.
    The proposed time for compliance with this rule is four years after
the effective date of the final rule. Within that four-year period, one
of two things must happen.
    If a certificate holder elects not to filter any of the restricted
parameters, it has four years to test its DFDR systems, verify that
none of the restricted parameters are being filtered, or, if any
restricted parameter is being filtered, modify that parameter.
    If a certificate holder chooses to filter a restricted parameter
and show by test and analyses that the originating signal can be
reconstructed, the procedures for reconstruction would have to be
submitted to the FAA after the next heavy maintenance check of an
airplane (beginning six months after the effective date of the final
rule), but not later than two years after the effective date of the
final rule. If a certificate holder has several of the same make, model
and series airplane (group) with the same certificated DFDR system
installed, the procedures need only be submitted once for the entire
group of airplanes with identically installed systems. The compliance
date for a group would be tied to the first airplane going in for a
heavy maintenance check six months after the rule is final. Submission
of the data to the FAA would be required no later than the time the
first airplane of a group completes that heavy maintenance check. This
compliance schedule is intended to allow the FAA to determine that the
submitted reconstruction procedures are repeatable, but still allow
time for other compliance action (within the four years) if
repeatability is not accomplished. A certificate holder that is unable
to show repeatability for any restricted parameter would be required to
modify the parameter to eliminate filtering before the four-year
compliance period ends.
    We have not included in the rule text a time limit for submission
of the reconstruction procedures to the NTSB following an accident or
occurrence that requires the NTSB be notified. We presume that the
reconstruction data are included as part of the recorder and its data
that are subject to Sec.  121.344(i) and the NTSB's authority under 49
CFR 830. We invite comment on whether a specific, brief time for
submission needs to be included separately in the rule for the
reconstruction procedure data.

II. Discussion of Comments to the NPRM

A. Summary of Comments

    The FAA received 16 comments in response to the 2006 NPRM. AirTran
Airways, L3 Communications, the National Transportation Safety Board
and two individuals supported the intent of the 2006 NPRM, but offered
detailed changes.
    The Air Transport Association (ATA), Airbus, Boeing, FedEx,
Dassault Aviation, Northwest Airlines and the Regional Airline
Association (RAA) opposed the proposed rule. They also recommended that
any final rule should only apply to newly manufactured airplanes.
    The remaining commenters did not specifically state support or
opposition, but suggested changes to the proposed rule.

B. Definition of a Filtered Flight Data Signal

    We proposed to define when a flight data recorder signal is
filtered as occurring when an original sensor signal is changed in any
way, other than changes necessary to:
    (1) Accomplish analog to digital conversion of the signal;
    (2) Reformat a digital signal into a DFDR-compatible format; or
    (3) Eliminate a high-frequency component of a signal that is
outside the bandwidth of the sensor.
    Boeing stated that it uses methods other than those in the proposed
definition to enhance the quality of original sensor signals by
protecting them against aliasing and noise. These methods go beyond the
three specific kinds of processing allowed under the proposed
definition and would be prohibited. Boeing suggested that the proposed
list of acceptable signal conditioning is incomplete and does not allow
for technological advances. Boeing indicated its preference for a more
general definition, and suggested the following:
    ``Filtered data is that for which the actual sensor signal is
amended, altered, modified, or changed in any manner such that it
cannot be readily retrieved using existing, easily understood
instructions and commonly available tools and techniques.''
    Boeing's concern that its signal conditioning methods would be
prohibited is unfounded. Anti-aliasing techniques and noise removal are
each different methods of eliminating high-frequency components of a
signal. High-frequency components are not necessarily outside the
bandwidth of the sensor. The eliminated high-frequency component of a
signal can be within the operational bandwidth of a sensor, but outside
the operational bandwidth of a parameter. In this case, anti-aliasing
and noise reduction techniques, by our definition, would be an
acceptable form of filtering.
    Accordingly, we do not agree that a more general definition than
that proposed would be appropriate. While Boeing noted that we used the
more general definition in a June 2002 survey on filtering, that
definition was not subject to the extensive analysis and review that we
use when developing a definition for a regulation. When subjected to
such analysis and review, the failings of the general definition become
apparent. The general definition fails to address two common and
acceptable changes--converting a signal from analog to digital and
formatting a digital signal for DFDR compatibility.
    It was unclear from the comments whether there was some
misunderstanding of the phrase ``operational bandwidth of the sensor''
in paragraph (3) of the definition. Comments are invited regarding the
application of this phrase in the context of the filtering definition.

C. Appendix M Introductory Text

    When we amended the DFDR regulations in 1997 to increase the number
of parameters required to be recorded, we created Appendix M to part
121 (and comparable appendices in other parts). These appendices
establish the upgraded technical requirements for each of the 88
parameters. The introductory text to Appendix M currently states:
    ``The recorded values must meet the designated range, resolution,
and accuracy requirements during dynamic and static conditions. All
data recorded must be correlated in time to one second.''
    In the 2006 NPRM, we proposed language that would present a more
detailed explanation of what we meant by the term ``dynamic
condition.'' We proposed an additional sentence indicating that dynamic
condition meant the parameter is experiencing change at the maximum
rate available, including the maximum rate of reversal.
    In its comment, the NTSB asked that we change the term ``maximum
rate available'' to ``maximum rate possible.''
    The NTSB did not provide any rationale for this suggested change,
and we are unable to agree that the term ``maximum rate possible'' is
an improvement. Since we consider the word ``possible'' to include
states that are well beyond the normal operational range of equipment,
the suggested

change appears inappropriate as a regulatory standard. The proposed
introductory text for Appendix M is unchanged from the 2006 NPRM.

D. Parameters Covered by the Filtering Prohibition

    In drafting the 2006 NPRM, we reviewed each of the 88 parameters to
determine which are too critical to allow any filtering beyond the
proposed allowable signal conditioning. The parameters that met this
critical performance requirement included flight control surface
positions, flight control input positions and flight control input
forces. We also determined that discrete signals should not be filtered
since they, by definition, show that something is either on or off, and
we knew of no need to filter these data. We sought comment on these
choices.
    While the 2006 NPRM proposed a general prohibition on filtering any
flight data signal other than those specifically excepted, some
commenters referred to those signals for parameters covered by the
general prohibition as being on a ``no filter'' list. While this is not
technically correct, we are using the term ``no filter list'' when
discussing these comments to prevent further confusion.
    Boeing asked that we remove discrete signals from the ``no filter''
list and provided several examples of how discrete signals are
filtered. For example, Boeing noted that discrete signals may be
filtered to eliminate false transitions that are typically encountered
with mechanical devices. Boeing argued that the amount of signal
conditioning that may be applied to a discrete signal should be
determined by what is needed for the equipment to function as part of
the overall aircraft design, not what is required for a DFDR recording.
Boeing concluded that the DFDR should only be monitoring the status of
functions interfaced with discrete signal inputs, and not dictating
conditions that may prevent an improvement in signal integrity.
    Airbus recommended that we add 33 parameters to the list of those
that may be filtered. Airbus stated that the 33 parameters are not
related to flight controls or flight control inputs, and that there
would be ``no critical loss of information'' even if the raw data were
not recorded.
    The ATA questioned why we included the majority of the 46
parameters covered by the filtering prohibition when they do not relate
to primary flight controls. The ATA noted that only 6 of the 88
recorded parameters (7 in airplanes manufactured after August 18, 2002)
record inputs to, or surface positions of, primary flight controls. The
ATA also argued that we should not include discrete signals because
their inclusion could expose certificate holders to technical
noncompliance when the prohibition serves no purpose. The ATA
recommended that the prohibition on filtering be limited to parameters
numbers 12 through 17, and 88.
    We note first that, in our review of the parameters for this SNPRM,
we reanalyzed each parameter (as suggested by Airbus) in light of the
information provided by several commenters. We based our original
proposal on two presumptions. First, we believed that currently
operating airplanes did not record discretes in a manner that would be
considered filtering under the proposed definition. Second, we thought
that by prohibiting filtering of discrete signals, future system and
data bus/network designs would not change these signals in a way that
might prevent recording information accurately. However, based on the
comments, we are now allowing discrete signals to be filtered under the
language proposed in this SNPRM.
    In contrast to the other commenters, the NTSB recommended we
increase the number of parameters for which filtering is prohibited.
The NTSB asked that we include time, pressure altitude, indicated
airspeed, normal, lateral and longitudinal accelerations, heading,
pitch, roll, radio altitude, angle of attack, brake pressure, yaw or
sideslip angle, and hydraulic pressure. The NTSB characterized these
parameters as critical, and noted that their signals could be distorted
by filtering, and that filtering could introduce random timing biases
that can change the timing of one parameter relative to another.
    We agree with the NTSB's characterization of these parameters as
critical for the work of accident investigators. Accordingly, we have
included them in the list of parameters that are restricted in this
SNPRM.
    An individual who is an accident investigator also recommended that
we include parameter numbers 9 (thrust/power on each engine) and 43
(additional engine parameters) in the list of those parameters for
which signals may not be filtered. After our review, we agree that
these two parameters are critical to accident investigators and they
are included in the ``no filter'' list.

E. Applicability

1. Existing and/or Newly Manufactured Aircraft
    In the 2006 NPRM, we proposed that the prohibition against
filtering apply to both existing and newly manufactured aircraft. While
Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Northwest Airlines and the RAA opposed the
proposed rule, they also suggested that any final rule should only
apply to newly manufactured airplanes.
    Airbus noted that covering only newly manufactured airplanes is
less costly for all parties, since manufacturers would be able to
combine new designs into other flight recorder system improvements.
Airbus also noted that the filter conversion algorithms have been
solved for in-service airplanes, concluding that the problem will not
occur again, and thus there are no further benefits to be achieved by
the proposed rule.
    The RAA viewed the safety concerns expressed in the 2006 NPRM as
applicable to the design and certification process, and thus better
suited to newly manufactured airplanes.
    As we stated in the 2006 NPRM, we considered the regulatory
alternative of limiting the filtering prohibition to newly manufactured
aircraft. While this approach is always less costly than a rule that
affects the in-service fleet, it would also fail to address the large
number of aircraft currently operating on which filtering is occurring.
We are also concerned that failing to cover in-service aircraft could
lead to future system modifications that result in more filtering.
    Experience with the Boeing 767 and the Airbus A300 has shown that
filtering has caused problems during accident investigations. We
disagree that the efforts expended during the Flight 587 accident
investigation to reverse-filter the critical rudder data account for
all the benefits that might accrue from a stricter limit on filtering.
We also disagree that there was an acceptable outcome following the
investigation. The NTSB has not released any formal opinion that the
results for the Flight 587 data reconstruction were satisfactory, or
that the processes involved in that data reconstruction were
acceptable. We recognize that data reconstruction, when satisfactory
from an accuracy standpoint and shown to be repeatable, is an
acceptable alternative. That is why we are issuing this SNPRM. We do
not believe the problems uncovered by the Flight 587 investigation have
been solved. Allowing airplanes to remain in

the fleet while filtering critical data is not an acceptable
alternative.
2. Airplanes Omitted in the NPRM
    In the 2006 NPRM, we inadvertently failed to include airplanes
covered under Sec.  121.344(b)(1) and Appendix B to part 121, and Sec.
125.226(b)(1) and Appendix D to part 125. We had no reason for
excluding these airplanes. While we realize that they are older
airplanes, many of the parameters included in the proposed filtering
restriction are among the 18 required to be recorded by these
airplanes. These airplanes are now included in this SNPRM. We
anticipate that some of the equipment installed on these airplanes may
not be sophisticated enough to allow filtering. However, we do not know
the exact composition of this fleet, and have determined that it is
appropriate for airplanes covered by Sec.  121.344(b)(1) or Sec.
125.226(b)(1) to be subject to the proposed analysis to ensure that
they are not filtering restricted parameters.
    We are not including the older airplanes operating under Sec.
135.152(a) or (b) because of the complex nature of the applicability in
those paragraphs. The applicability of the filtering regulations for
newer part 135 airplanes remains as proposed in the 2006 NPRM.
3. Part 129 Airplanes
    Airbus stated that aircraft operating under part 129 (Foreign Air
Carriers and Foreign Operators operating N-registered aircraft engaged
in Common Carriage) may also be affected because Sec.  129.20
references Sec.  121.344 for applicability. Airbus concluded that
omitting these airplanes from the cost/benefit analysis will result in
more significant costs.
    While the proposed rule would affect certain airplanes operating
under part 129, the applicability of Sec.  129.20 is limited to those
airplanes registered in the United States. We included these airplanes
in the cost/benefit analysis for the 2006 NPRM and in the cost/benefit
analysis for this SNPRM.
4. Part 91 Airplanes
    Both the NATA and the GAMA noted that the proposed regulation would
have a significant cost and burden impact on the owners and operators
of aircraft that are equipped with DFDRs as required under Sec.
91.609. They each estimated that more than 5,500 aircraft would be
affected, resulting in a $9,000,000 impact on the general aviation
community for no measurable benefit.
    We did not propose any change to part 91 in the 2006 NPRM. The
proposed regulations apply only to airplanes operated under parts 121,
125 or 135. Part 91 certificate holders would not be affected by these
regulations.

F. Compliance Time

    The proposed rule included a compliance time of four years for
airplanes manufactured up to 18 months after the effective date of a
final rule. Airbus, FedEx and Frontier Airlines asked for additional
time to develop design solutions, manufacture parts, and perform
modifications during scheduled heavy maintenance checks.
    Airbus stated that it would need 18-24 months to develop new system
analog to digital converter (SDAC) or electronic instrument system
(EIS) software, plus an additional 2-3 years to complete the retrofit
of over 800 airplanes. Frontier Airlines, which operates 34 Airbus
airplanes, asked for at least eight years because Airbus has not
designed or communicated a proposed solution for EIS-1 equipped
airplanes.
    FedEx proposed a compliance date of five years from the release of
the new rule to coincide with the heavy maintenance check cycle for its
A300/A310s (about 30 months).
    The 2006 NPRM proposed that aircraft manufactured 18 months after
the effective date of the rule be compliant at manufacture. Boeing
asked that we provide a compliance date rather than a compliance period
associated with a date of manufacture because Boeing does not normally
provide a date of manufacture. Boeing also suggested that 18 months is
insufficient to assess airplane designs, coordinate with parts
suppliers if changes are needed, and incorporate any changes into
production.
    The compliance time proposed in this SNPRM is no longer tied to an
airplane's date of manufacture. For those parameters that are
restricted from filtering, a certificate holder has the choice of
removing the filtering, or demonstrating by test and analysis that an
original sensor signal value can be reconstructed from the filtered,
recorded signal data. Verifying that there is no filtering occurring on
the restricted parameters, or finding filtering and modifying the
affected parameters is required within 4 years.
    If a certificate holder discovers signal filtering and chooses to
show that the data can be reconstructed by test and analysis, the
compliance period begins six months after the rule's effective date,
when an aircraft goes in for its next scheduled heavy maintenance
check. If an airplane in for a heavy maintenance check has a DFDR
system identical to other airplanes in a certificate holder's fleet,
compliance by test and analysis need only be submitted once for the
entire group. This compliance schedule is intended to allow the FAA to
determine that the submitted procedures are repeatable, but still allow
time for other compliance action (within the four years) if
repeatability cannot be accomplished.
    A certificate holder that is unable to show repeatability for any
restricted parameter would be required to modify the parameter to
eliminate signal filtering before the four year compliance period ends.
    We believe these compliance times provide ample opportunity for
certificate holders to make choices about their equipment and conduct
the necessary analyses during a regularly scheduled heavy maintenance
visit, reducing potential impact on scheduled operations or additional
out-of-service time. In addition, a four-year compliance time is
consistent with FAA actions in previous flight recorder regulations and
has been supported by the industry as an adequate time for retrofit and
for introducing new system designs into aircraft being manufactured.

G. Cost/Benefit Analysis

1. Inspection Cost
    Boeing disagreed with the estimated cost of $75 per airplane to
assess an FDR system for filtering. While the 2006 NPRM suggests that
this assessment is the responsibility of the operators, Boeing stated
that it expects the operators to request Boeing to research individual
FDR systems installed on its airplanes. Boeing stated that it will take
a significant number of work hours to assess each airplane because of
the complexity of unique configurations with interfacing systems. Out-
of-production airplanes will also require more than one hour per
airplane because of the research involved in determining the data frame
and the service bulletins that have been incorporated over the years.
    Airbus agreed with Boeing that our estimated cost of $75 is too
low.
    The commenters misunderstood the underlying factor in our estimate
of this cost. In the 2006 NPRM, we averaged the cost of these
assessments over the entire fleet of approximately 14,000 affected
airplanes. We did not mean to imply that each individual airplane would
require a unique evaluation or that such an evaluation would cost $75.
Rather, a manufacturer would assess its airplane models and apply the
analysis of each model to as many of its airplanes as have the same
DFDR

system. We assumed that there was a high-level of similarity of DFDR
systems within individual airplane models and a few analyses per model
would suffice for most of the fleet. On that basis, our estimated total
cost was about $1 million to determine whether filtering was occurring.
2. A300/A310 Retrofit Cost
    In the Initial Regulatory Evaluation for the 2006 NPRM, we stated
that Airbus reported that it had already completed the engineering
analyses to modify the A300/A310 series airplane. Consequently, there
would be no incremental engineering costs for these models because
those costs have already been expended.
    In its comment, Airbus stated that the engineering analysis to
modify the A300/310 has not been completed. Therefore, we need to add
these costs (about $750,000) to our cost analysis.
    Airbus also stated that it has not yet calculated the cost to
modify the A320 family of airplanes. Frontier Airlines added that this
lack of analysis is the reason it is unable to comment on the costs
estimated for the proposed rulemaking.
    As we stated in the proposed rule, we do not consider the cost of
compliance with Appendix M for Airbus 300/310 and the A320 family to be
a cost of this rule. Even though the 1997 regulations do not
specifically prohibit filtering, the Flight 587 investigation revealed
that the airplanes' recorded data did not meet the accuracy performance
requirements of Appendix M. The cost of compliance for Airbus airplanes
is the cost of complying with Appendix M, which has been in effect
since 1997. This would be true whether we had ever proposed a change
regarding filtering.
    The added compliance option of this SNPRM does not change these
circumstances. The recorded data for each parameter must meet all of
the requirements of Appendix M, whether the data are recorded
unfiltered or are filtered and can be reconstructed.
3. Risk Assessment
    The RAA considers the FAA's Safety Management System (SMS) to be
applicable to all rulemaking activities. Given the low accident rate of
commercial air carriers over the last 10 years, the RAA does not
consider this rulemaking to be justified under the SMS. The RAA
considered the likelihood that an accident in which the elimination of
signal filtering will make a difference in the accident's investigation
to be extremely remote. The RAA concluded that the FAA should conduct a
risk assessment before issuing a final rule.
    The SMS initiative is still under development at the FAA, and it
will cover much more than proposed regulatory changes. There is nothing
to suggest that it will require every rulemaking be subject to a full
risk analysis, and those that are will most likely be chosen on a case-
by-case basis. Regarding this rule, we already know that signal
filtering has complicated accident investigations, and allowing
filtering to continue is unacceptable. Further, until we get more
information on the estimated costs of this rule and the option added in
this SNPRM, we would not have sufficient data to support a risk
analysis.
4. Benefits Not Demonstrated
    The ATA questioned the basis for the proposed rulemaking. The ATA
stated that this rulemaking is not based on a demonstrated inability of
existing FDRs to realize their intended function, which is to aid in
the determination of the probable cause of an accident.
    The NTSB has repeatedly stated that filtered flight data have
hampered its investigations. This issue is of such a concern to the
NTSB that it has issued several recommendations to address it
specifically. The NTSB has found that existing FDRs are unable to
fulfill their intended function when filtered flight data are recorded.
We agree with the NTSB's findings.
    The ATA also indicated that prior experience with filtered flight
data does not represent a pressing aviation safety need. Other than the
loss of Flight 587, prior filtering events occurred 14 to 15 years ago
with no resulting injuries.
    We cannot discount the loss of Flight 587 (and its 260 passengers
and crew) and the lessons we learned from investigation of that
accident. Whenever an accident occurs, it is critical that the NTSB has
accurate flight data to determine the probable cause of the accident.
In addition, we need accurate data to determine whether we need to take
action to prevent future accidents. We know that there are hundreds of
airplanes operating with DFDR systems that filter critical flight data
before it is recorded. We will not allow that situation to continue
when the known result is data that cannot be accurately replicated when
needed for accident investigation. The risk continues to exist. More
importantly, such signal filtering has hidden the underlying problem
that the recorded data are not in compliance with the accuracy
requirements of Appendix M, which went into effect in 1997.
    The ATA also noted that Airbus has developed algorithm-based
methods for reconstructing the filtered signals in its airplanes to
establish actual system performance histories. These methods should be
sufficient to prevent the potential for filtered data to impede any
future investigation, minimizing the value of the proposed rule.
    The NTSB has never been satisfied with the results of the `reverse
filtered' data from the Flight 587 accident investigation, nor the time
it took to get it. The method used has never been subject to FAA review
or approval, and without this proposed rule, the use of reconstructed
data is not authorized. There is also no regulatory requirement to
develop or maintain proper methodologies for data reconstruction. The
Flight 587 accident demonstrated a deficiency in our own flight
recorder rules that cannot be satisfactorily addressed by after-the-
fact efforts.

H. Harmonization

    Three commenters (Airbus, Boeing, Embraer) expressed the need for
harmonization of FAA requirements with those of other civil aviation
authorities. The commenters raised concerns that industry will be faced
with conflicting requirements, high costs of compliance, and
potentially complex system designs in an attempt to satisfy two
different sets of regulations. They view harmonization as an
opportunity to standardize flight recorder requirements.
    The FAA is working with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA),
ICAO and other non-U.S. regulatory authorities to harmonize our
regulations whenever possible. While we support harmonization, our
efforts regarding filtered flight data are considerably ahead of other
aviation authorities worldwide. Since the NTSB has already encountered
problems, we are moving forward with our efforts to correct known
deficiencies and forestall future problems that might be corrected by
new designs. We remain open to assisting other aviation authorities
that seek to benefit from our discoveries and experience with these
regulatory efforts.

I. Propriety of Change to Part 121

    While AirTran supported the intent of the 2006 NPRM, it opposed
using the operating rules of part 121 to impose technical requirements
unique to a specific model of aircraft or unique to the design of an
aircraft system. AirTran believes the proposed requirement to be
outside the scope of part 121. AirTran noted that operators do not
typically install or alter components that affect filtering of DFDR
data, and data filtering

is a function of the DFDR system design and not the responsibility of
the operators.
    While we understand AirTran's position, DFDR requirements are a
part of the operating rules. The only effective way to implement
changes to currently operating aircraft are through the operating
rules. For the most part, our certification rules are not retroactive.
Since the parameters that we are specifying as restricted exist only in
parts 121, 125 and 135, a change to part 25 would be confusing while
not changing the impact on certificate holders.
    AirTran also stated that it would like to see the flight recorder
rules of part 121, 125, and 135 reviewed to redefine responsibility
based on capability. AirTran suggested that information such as
correlation of parameters at certification, filtering of parameters,
and other data that are beyond the capabilities of most operators be
placed in a special federal aviation regulation (SFAR). This could be
accomplished by the manufacturers who have the expertise and data to
provide the analysis. The results of this analysis should come to the
operators in the form of FAA approved instructions for continued
airworthiness to ensure continued compliance, similar to Sec.
121.370(b) regarding fuel tanks.
    We appreciate AirTran's input. Such an approach would, as
suggested, require considerable rulemaking and an assessment of the
impact on manufacturers for equipment that may vary considerably
between certificate holders. While we will keep AirTran's comments
under advisement, we have determined that there is an immediate need to
correct the current problems and prevent future ones. The comments to
the proposed rule also indicate that aircraft manufacturers know their
roles in compliance.

J. Conflicts With Other Proposed DFDR Regulations

    The ATA stated that the changes proposed in the 2006 NPRM are not
coordinated with other flight recorder changes proposed separately. The
ATA stated that the proposed filtering changes are redundant of the
changes proposed in our NPRM entitled ``Revisions to Cockpit Voice
Recorder and Digital Flight Data Recorder Regulations'' (70 FR 9752;
February 28, 2005). The ATA noted that seven of the parameters that we
proposed to have increased recording rates in the 2005 NPRM are also
proposed to be restricted from filtering. The ATA stated that both
changes are not ``needed to derive flight control histories or
accomplish the intended purpose of FDRs.''
    The ATA also stated that the filtering proposal is not fully
coordinated with the SNPRM entitled ``Revisions to Digital Flight Data
Recorder Regulations for Boeing 737 Airplanes and for Part 125
Operators'' (71 FR 52382; September 5, 2006). The ATA reiterated its
disagreement with the proposed rule for 737s, and stated that if the
FAA goes forward with both rules, the compliance times must be
coordinated for 737s. The ATA is also concerned with the impact of
filtering changes on older 737s that only record 18 parameters, and
were specifically not required to upgrade equipment in the 1997 rule
changes.
    We disagree in both instances. The proposed rule for Boeing 737
airplanes would add three additional parameters that are not part of
this rule, and that proposed rule does not speak to filtering. As to
their coordination, both rules are proposals, with one addressing the
addition of three parameters on one specific model of airplane, and
this rule addressing the propriety of filtering certain parameters on
all airplane models. The FAA will consider the filtering status of the
proposed 737 parameters when a final rule is promulgated.
    Similarly, the 2005 NPRM addressed many topics, but filtering was
not one of them. Both data sampling rates and filtering affect what
gets recorded and can play major roles in data integrity and
unrecoverable loss of data. But the two factors are separate and the
proposed solutions are not inconsistent. The ATA states that both
modifications are not necessary to achieve the ``intended purposes of
FDRs'' but does not state what it sees as this purpose. History has
already shown that filtered signals can raise serious questions in an
accident investigation. It is also accepted that lower sampling rates
provide much less reliable data. While the two characteristics of
recorded data are related, they are not as inextricably intertwined as
the comment suggests. The two proposals result from different problems
and analyses, and reflect upgrades in technology that were not
anticipated when the previous regulations were written.

K. Exemption Request

    The RAA asked that we add a provision that allows for deviations
for the current fleet ``upon approval by the Administrator.'' The RAA
was unconvinced that, given what the NTSB now knows about the
characteristics of the Airbus FDR parameters, the Board would be unable
to successfully and timely complete an investigation of a future
accident on an Airbus airplane that filters data. The RAA does not
support a retrofit program for any aircraft type until the
characteristics of the filtered data are known to be sufficiently
nonresponsive. The RAA's proposal would allow a certificate holder that
has a deviation to avoid a costly retrofit if the deviation is
considered minor and would not hinder a future NTSB accident
investigation.
    We disagree with the RAA's premise that the NTSB would be able
today to complete a timely and comprehensive accident investigation of
an Airbus airplane that filters data. While significant work was put
into data reconstruction during the Flight 587 investigation, the Board
has never stated its satisfaction with the reconstruction. In addition,
Airbus has never been required to formalize the analysis or results or
maintain any data reconstruction technique. Nor can we support the
inclusion of some unspecified deviation that would allow for an
incalculable number of different flight recorder system changes that
would only worsen the problem of data reconstruction from individual
airplanes.

L. Relationship to the 1997 Regulations

    The ATA submitted a lengthy comment on what it considers the effect
of the 1997 rule. While the ATA correctly concluded that the 1997 rule
does not specifically prohibit filtering, it is not clear how the ATA
connected this rule to the amount of data being recorded, or how it
could provide ``more valuable raw data.''
    We are unable to respond to this because we do not understand the
connection the ATA is trying to make between filtering and recording
greater amounts of data. The FAA has never made any correlation between
filtering and the amount of data being recorded, nor was it addressed
in the 1997 rule.
    Airbus noted that the preamble language to the 1997 rule says ``the
standards proposed are harmonized with the current JAR-OPS, which will
be based on ED-55 standards.'' Airbus commented that the ED-55
recommendation to correlate recorded data to flight deck display led it
to record filtered rudder data.
    We believe this is Airbus's interpretation of its compliance with
ED-55. Airbus appears to have concluded that the recorded rudder data
must be the same ``smoothed'' data that are displayed in the cockpit,
and that to be correlated, the data must be filtered. However,
correlation does not require that identical data be recorded and
displayed in the cockpit. Correlation

requires a mathematical relationship between the displayed and recorded
data, not that recorded data be filtered.
    Although the 1997 rule language does not specifically prohibit
filtering, in the case of Flight 587, the data recorded were not in
compliance with the accuracy requirements of part 121 Appendix M. This
failure to meet Appendix M, and not the fact that the data were
filtered, has always been the compliance issue following the Flight 587
investigation.

III. Regulatory Notice and Analysis

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposal contains the following new information collection
requirements. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted the information requirements
associated with this proposal to the Office of Management and Budget
for its review.
    Title: Filtered Flight Data.
    Summary: The FAA is amending its proposal to prohibit the filtering
of some original flight recorder sensor signals. Comments to the notice
of proposed rulemaking published on November 15, 2006, and changes in
available technology have caused us to re-examine our position on data
filtering. We are now proposing that certain critical data parameters
may be filtered if a certificate holder can show that the data can be
accurately reconstructed. This proposed rule would improve the accuracy
and quality of the data recorded on digital flight data recorders while
giving aircraft designers and operators more flexibility in system
design and operation where allowable, including an option to filter
data.
    Use of: This information collection supports the Department of
Transportation's strategic goals on safety and security. If a
certificate holder chooses to show that filtered data from certain
critical data parameters can be accurately reconstructed, the
certificate holder must maintain documentation of the procedure
required to perform the reconstruction. This will allow the FAA and
accident investigators to access accurate data promptly.
    Respondents (including number of): The likely respondents to this
proposed information requirement are those certificate holders that use
a flight data recorder system that filters the data from any of the
critical data parameters.
    Frequency: The proposal would require operators to have a one-time
engineering analysis performed (spread over two years) to evaluate
whether the DFDR systems on their airplanes record certain flight data
parameter signals after they have been filtered.
    Annual Burden Estimate: Since the one-time engineering analysis
will be performed on individual type certified DFDR systems, we
estimate that there would be 16 of these engineering analyses that
would be completed and that each would require an average of 16 hours
of engineering time to complete and submit to the FAA.
    The total burden is estimated as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Present value
    Documents required to show        One-time hours    discounted cost
  compliance with the Final Rule                           (in $2008)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report to FAA of an Engineering                   256            $28,160
 Analysis of whether Certain
 Flight Data Parameters Are Being
 Filtered before Being Recorded...
                                   -------------------------------------
    Total.........................                256             28,160
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule will result in a minimal annual recordkeeping and
reporting burden.
    The agency is soliciting comments to--
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency,
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of collecting information on those who are
to respond, including by use of appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology.
    Individuals and organizations may send comments on the information
collection requirement by November 13, 2008, and should direct them to
the address listed in the Addresses section at the beginning of this
preamble. Comments also should be submitted to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs via facsimile at<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    According to the 1995 amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5
CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not collect or sponsor the
collection of information, nor may it impose an information collection
requirement unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
The OMB control number for this information collection will be
published in the Federal Register, after the Office of Management and
Budget approves it.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed regulations.

Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Determination,
International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S.
standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider international
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S.
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by

State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for
inflation with base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this proposed
rule.
    Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies
and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations.
If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits that a statement
to that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a
full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for this proposed rule. The
reasoning for this determination follows:
    This SNPRM proposes to allow certain parameters to be filtered if
the certificate holder can show that the data can be reconstructed. The
expected economic impact would be a minimal cost with positive net
benefits and, therefore, a regulatory evaluation was not prepared. To
estimate the costs for any final rule, we request specific economic
data in response to the questions in this section.
    The FAA has, therefore, determined that this proposed rule would
not be a ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f)
of Executive Order 12866, and would not be ``significant'' as defined
in DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures.

Aviation Industry Affected

    The proposed rule would apply to all aircraft operated under parts
121, 125, and 135 and required to have a DFDR system. Aircraft operated
under other FAR parts would not be affected.

Benefit and Cost Methodology

    The baseline for determining the proposed rule's benefits and costs
is that each affected aircraft must be in compliance with appendix B or
M of part 121, appendix D or E of part 125, or appendix F of part 135.
    The first step in assessing costs of this SNPRM is for each
certificate holder to determine whether any of its aircraft are
filtering DFDR data before it is recorded. For purposes of filtering,
we have divided the 88 required parameters into two groups:
     Those parameters that may not be filtered unless the
certificate holder can demonstrate that the original sensor signal data
(values) can be reconstructed using a valid, repeatable procedure (1-7,
9, 11-18, 26, 32, 42, 43, 68, 70, 77, and 88); and
     Those parameters that may be filtered without this
demonstration as long as the accuracy requirements are met (8, 10, 19-
25, 27-31, 33-41, 44-67, 69, 71-76, and 78-87).
    A certificate holder must first determine whether any of the
original sensor signal data from any of the parameters in the first
group are filtered before being recorded. The cost of this
determination is a cost of this proposed rule.
    If no parameters in the first group are being filtered, no further
action is required, and the only cost is reporting this status to the
FAA.
    If any of the parameters in the first group are being filtered, the
certificate holder must determine whether the recorded data meet the
accuracy requirements of the applicable appendix. If the requirements
are met, no further action is necessary, and the only cost attributable
to this rule is to report the status to the FAA.
    If the requirements of the applicable appendix are not being met,
the allocation of costs will depend on the option chosen by the
certificate holder to address the non-compliance. If a certificate
holder chooses to remove the filtering in order to comply with Appendix
M, the cost is attributable to compliance with the 1997 rule. If a
certificate holder chooses to show by test and analysis that the data
can be acceptably reconstructed, the cost is attributable to this
proposed rule because it is a new option in this SNPRM. We are
requesting estimates of the costs of these two options and their
expected use.

Benefits

    The benefit of this proposed rule would be to make accurate flight
data more quickly and unambiguously available to accident
investigators. Inaccurate data have been shown to delay accident
analysis, and could suggest unnecessary corrective action. These were
experienced during the Flight 587 accident investigation.

Benefit Cost Analysis

    We believe that the SNPRM would provide a less costly means than
the 2006 NPRM for certificate holders to address compliance with the
applicable appendix. It will also provide accident investigators with
the more accurate and less ambiguous data necessary to determine the
causes of airplane accidents.
    To estimate the costs of a final rule, we need data on the costs of
complying with this SNPRM. We are requesting the following information,
including any supporting documentation:
    1. The aircraft makes, models and series in your fleet.
    2. The number of each aircraft make, model and series in your
fleet.
    3. By aircraft make, model and series, how many type certificated
DFDR systems are installed in your aircraft.
    4. For each installed DFDR system, by characteristics, determine
the parameter numbers in the first group that are filtered before being
recorded. For any filtered parameter, which do not meet the accuracy
requirements of Appendix B or M (or Appendix D or E or Appendix F)?
    5. For the information requested in 4, do you have the
technical capability to determine the characteristics yourself or is
outside technical expertise required? How many engineering hours would
be needed to determine whether the DFDR system is recording filtered
flight data for the first group of parameters? What other costs would
be required for this analysis?
    6. For each installed DFDR system that records filtered data for
the first group of parameters (the data for which do not meet either
Appendix B or M, Appendix D or E or Appendix F), how much would it cost
to remove the filtering?
    7. For each installed DFDR system that records filtered data for
the first group of parameters (the data for which do not meet either
Appendix B or M, Appendix D or E or Appendix F), how much would it cost
to develop and accomplish the tests and analyses required to comply
with the reconstruction option proposed in this SNPRM?

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory

flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
    While we have only limited information on the costs of this
proposed rule, that information suggests that the rule would be
unlikely to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small
entities. We are specifically requesting information regarding the
effect on small entities to assist in our final analysis.
    Therefore, the Acting Administrator certifies that this proposed
rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.

International Trade Analysis

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are
not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the effects
of this SNPRM and notes that its purpose is to ensure the safety of the
American public and thus the proposed rule is not considered as
creating an unnecessary obstacle.

Unfunded Mandates Act

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by
the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant
regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-adjusted value
of $136.1 million in lieu of $100 million.
    The proposed rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and, therefore, would not have federalism implications.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this proposed rulemaking action qualifies for the
categorical exclusion identified in Chapter 3, paragraph 312f and
involves no extraordinary circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this SNPRM under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is not
a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order because it is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866,
and it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

Additional Information

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, please send only one copy of written comments, or
if you are filing comments electronically, please submit your comments
only one time.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, we
will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments filed after the comment period has
closed if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay.
We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.

Proprietary or Confidential Business Information

    Do not file in the docket information that you consider to be
proprietary or confidential business information. Send or deliver this
information directly to the person identified in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. You must mark the
information that you consider proprietary or confidential. If you send
the information on a disk or CD ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD
ROM and also identify electronically within the disk or CD ROM the
specific information that is proprietary or confidential.
    Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when we are aware of proprietary information
filed with a comment, we do not place it in the docket. We hold it in a
separate file to which the public does not have access, and we place a
note in the docket that we have received it. If we receive a request to
examine or copy this information, we treat it as any other request
under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). We process such a
request under the DOT procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in title
14 of the CFR in a manner affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to
consider the extent to which Alaska is not served by transportation
modes other than aviation, and to establish appropriate regulatory
distinctions. Because this proposed rule would apply to the
certification of future designs of transport category airplanes and
their subsequent operation, it could, if adopted, affect intrastate
aviation in Alaska. The FAA, therefore, specifically requests comments
on whether there is justification for applying the proposed rule
differently in intrastate operations in Alaska.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy of rulemaking documents using the
Internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://
www.regulations.gov);

    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling<PHONE_NUMBER>. Make
sure to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number
of this rulemaking.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121, 125, and 135

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Transportation.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1153, 40101, 40102, 40103, 40113,
41721, 44105, 44106, 44111, 44701-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903, 44904,
44906, 44912, 44914, 44936, 44938, 46103, 46105.

    2. Amend part 121 by adding a new Sec.  121.346 to read as follows:

Sec.  121.346  Flight recorders--filtered data.

    (a) A flight data signal is filtered when an original sensor signal
has been changed in any way, other than changes necessary to:
    (1) Accomplish analog to digital conversion of the signal;
    (2) Format a digital signal to be DFDR compatible; or
    (3) Eliminate a high frequency component of a signal that is
outside the operational bandwidth of the sensor.
    (b) An original sensor signal for any flight recorder parameter
required to be recorded under Sec.  121.344 may be filtered only if the
signal continues to meet the requirements of appendix B or M of this
part, as applicable and--
    (1) It represents a parameter described in Sec.  121.344 (a)(1)
through (7), (9), (11) through (18), (26), (32), (42), (43), (68),
(70), (77), or (88) or the corresponding parameter in Appendix B of
this part, and:
    (i) The certificate holder is able to demonstrate by test and
analysis that the original sensor signal value can be reconstructed
from the recorded data;
    (ii) The FAA determines that the procedure submitted by the
certificate holder as its compliance with paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this
section is repeatable; and
    (iii) The certificate holder maintains documentation of the
procedure required to reconstruct the original sensor signal value; or
    (2) It represents a parameter described in Sec.  121.344(a) (8),
(10), (19) through (25), (27) through (31), (33) through (41), (44)
through (67), (69), (71) through (76), or (78) through (87).
    (c) Compliance. After [four years from effective date], no aircraft
flight data recording system may filter any parameter listed in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section unless the certificate holder
possesses test and analysis procedures that have been approved by the
FAA. The procedures must be submitted to the FAA no later than the
completion of the next heavy maintenance check after [six months after
effective date] but not later than [two years after the effective
date].
    3. Amend appendix M to part 121 by revising the introductory text
immediately following the appendix title to read as follows:

Appendix M to Part 121--Airplane Flight Recorder Specifications

    The recorded values must meet the designated range, resolution
and accuracy requirements during static and dynamic conditions.
Dynamic condition means the parameter is experiencing change at the
maximum rate available, including the maximum rate of reversal. All
data recorded must be correlated in time to within one second.
* * * * *

PART 125--CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A SEATING
CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF
6,000 POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH
AIRCRAFT

    4. The authority citation for part 125 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44705, 44710-
44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722.

    5. Amend part 125 by adding a new Sec.  125.228 to subpart F to
read as follows:

Sec.  125.228  Flight recorders--filtered data.

    (a) A flight data signal is filtered when an original sensor signal
has been changed in any way, other than changes necessary to:
    (1) Accomplish analog to digital conversion of the signal;
    (2) Format a digital signal to be DFDR compatible; or
    (3) Eliminate a high frequency component of a signal that is
outside the operational bandwidth of the sensor.
    (b) An original sensor signal for any flight recorder parameter
required to be recorded under Sec.  125.226 may be filtered only if the
signal continues to meet the requirements of appendix D or E of this
part and--
    (1) It represents a parameter described in Sec.  125.226(a)(1)
through (7), (9), (11) through (18), (26), (32), (42), (43), (68),
(70), (77), or (88) or the corresponding parameter in Appendix D of
this part, and:
    (i) The certificate holder is able to demonstrate by test and
analysis that the original sensor signal value can be reconstructed
from the recorded data;
    (ii) The FAA determines that the procedure submitted by the
certificate holder as its compliance with paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this
section is repeatable; and
    (iii) The certificate holder maintains documentation of the
procedure required to reconstruct the original sensor signal value; or
    (2) It represents a parameter described in Sec.  125.226(a)(8),
(10), (19) through (25), (27) through (31), (33) through (41), (44)
through (67), (69), (71) through (76), or (78) through (87).
    (c) Compliance. After [four years from effective date], no aircraft
flight data recording system may filter any parameter listed in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section unless the certificate holder
possesses test and analysis procedures that have been approved by the
FAA. The procedures must be submitted to the FAA no later than the
completion of the next heavy maintenance check after [six months after
effective date] but not later than [two years after the effective
date].
    6. Amend appendix E to part 125 by revising the introductory text
immediately following the appendix title to read as follows:

Appendix E to Part 125--Airplane Flight Recorder Specifications

    The recorded values must meet the designated range, resolution
and accuracy requirements during static and dynamic conditions.
Dynamic condition means the parameter is experiencing change at the
maximum rate available, including the maximum rate of reversal. All
data recorded must be correlated in time to within one second.
* * * * *

PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATIONS
AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT

    7. The authority citation for part 135 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 41706, 44113, 44701-44702, 44705,
44709, 44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722.

    8. Amend part 135 by adding a new Sec.  135.156 to read as follows:

Sec.  135.156  Flight recorders--filtered data.

    (a) A flight data signal is filtered when an original sensor signal
has been changed in any way, other than changes necessary to:
    (1) Accomplish analog to digital conversion of the signal;
    (2) Format a digital signal to be DFDR compatible; or
    (3) Eliminate a high frequency component of a signal that is
outside the operational bandwidth of the sensor.
    (b) An original sensor signal for any flight recorder parameter
required to be recorded under Sec.  135.152 may be filtered only if the
signal continues to meet the requirements of Appendix F of this part
and--
    (1) It represents a parameter described in Sec.  135.152(h)(1)
through (7), (9), (11) through (18), (26), (32), (42), (43), (68),
(70), (77), or (88), and:
    (i) The certificate holder is able to demonstrate by test and
analysis that the original sensor signal value can be reconstructed
from the recorded data;
    (ii) The FAA determines that the procedure submitted by the
certificate holder as its compliance with paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this
section is repeatable; and
    (iii) The certificate holder maintains documentation of the
procedure required to reconstruct the original sensor signal value; or
    (2) It represents a parameter described in Sec.  135.152(h)(8),
(10), (19) through (25), (27) through (31), (33) through (41), (44)
through (67), (69), (71) through (76), or (78) through (87).
    (c) Compliance. After [four years from effective date], no aircraft
flight data recording system may filter any parameter listed in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section unless the certificate holder
possesses test and analysis procedures that have been approved by the
FAA. The procedures must be submitted to the FAA no later than the
completion of the next heavy maintenance check after [six months after
effective date] but not later than [two years after the effective
date].
    9. Amend appendix F to part 135 by revising the introductory text
immediately following the appendix title to read as follows:

Appendix F to Part 135--Airplane Flight Recorder Specifications

    The recorded values must meet the designated range, resolution
and accuracy requirements during static and dynamic conditions.
Dynamic condition means the parameter is experiencing change at the
maximum rate available, including the maximum rate of reversal. All
data recorded must be correlated in time to within one second.
* * * * *

    Issued in Washington, DC, on July 24, 2008.
Dorenda D. Baker,
Acting Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8-18933 Filed 8-14-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 124 (Thursday, June 29, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 42027-42028]
[FR Doc No: 2023-13715]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket No. USCG-2023-0527]

Safety Zone; San Francisco Giants Fireworks, San Francisco Bay,
San Francisco, CA

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notification of enforcement of regulation.

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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zone for the San
Francisco Giants Fireworks in the Captain of the Port, San Francisco
area of responsibility during the dates and times noted below. This
action is necessary to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine
environment from the hazards associated with the fireworks display.
During the enforcement period, unauthorized persons and vessels are
prohibited from entering into, transiting through, or remaining in the
safety zone, unless authorized by the Patrol Commander (PATCOM), any
Official Patrol defined as other Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agencies on scene to assist the Coast Guard in enforcing
the regulated area.

DATES: The regulations in 33 CFR 165.1191 will be enforced for the
location identified in Table 1 to Sec.  165.1191, Item number 1, from
10 a.m. until 10:40 p.m. on July 3, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions about this
notification of enforcement, call or email LT William Harris, Waterways
Management Division, U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Francisco; telephone
(415) 399-7443, email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zone
in 33 CFR 165.1191 Table 1, Item number 1 for the San Francisco Giants
Fireworks from 10 a.m. until 10:40 p.m. on July 3, 2023. The safety
zone will extend to all navigable waters of the San Francisco Bay, from
surface to bottom, within a circle formed by connecting all points 100
feet outwards of the fireworks barge during the loading, transit, and
arrival of the fireworks barge from the loading location to the display
location and until the start of the fireworks display. From 10 a.m.
until 9 p.m. on July 3, 2023, the fireworks barge will be loading
pyrotechnics from Pier 50 in San Francisco, CA. The fireworks barge
will remain at the loading location until its transit to the display
location. From 9 p.m. to 9:15 p.m. on July 3, 2023, the loaded
fireworks barge will transit from Pier 50 to the launch site near Pier
48 in approximate position 37[deg]46'36'' N, 122[deg]22'56'' W (NAD 83)
where it will remain until the conclusion of the fireworks display.
Upon the commencement of the 10-minute fireworks display, scheduled to
begin at the conclusion of the baseball game, between 9:30 p.m. and 10
p.m. on July 3, 2023, the safety zone will increase in size and
encompass all navigable waters of the San Francisco Bay, from surface
to bottom, within a circle formed by connecting all points 700 feet out
from the fireworks barge near Pier 48 in approximate position
37[deg]46'36'' N, 122[deg]22'56'' W (NAD 83). This safety will be
enforced from 10 a.m. until 10:40 p.m. on July 3, 2023, or announced
via Marine Information Broadcast.
    Under the provisions of 33 CFR 165.1191, unauthorized persons or
vessels are prohibited from entering into, transiting through, or
anchoring in the safety zone during all applicable effective dates and
times, unless authorized to do so by the PATCOM or other Official
Patrol, defined as a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency on
scene to assist the Coast Guard in enforcing the safety zone. During
the enforcement period, if you are the operator of a vessel in one of
the safety zones you must comply with the directions from the Patrol
Commander or other Official Patrol. The PATCOM or Official Patrol may,
upon request allow the transit of commercial vessels through regulated
areas when it is safe to do so.
    In addition to this enforcement in the Federal Register, the Coast
Guard plans to provide notification of this

enforcement period via the Local Notice to Mariners.
    If the Captain of the Port determines that the regulated area need
not be enforced for the full duration stated in this notice, a Marine
Information Bulletin may be used to grant general permission to enter
the regulated area.

    Dated: June 21, 2023.
Jordan M. Baldueza,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Alternate Captain of the Port San Francisco.
[FR Doc. 2023-13715 Filed 6-28-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 41 (Wednesday, March 2, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11502-11503]
[FR Doc No: 2011-4653]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

[USCG-2011-0017]

Information Collection Request to Office of Management and
Budget; OMB Control Number: 1625-0003

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Sixty-day notice requesting comments.

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SUMMARY: In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the
U.S. Coast Guard intends to submit an Information Collection Request
(ICR) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), requesting an extension of
its approval for the following collection of information: 1625-0003,
Coast Guard Boating Accident Form (CG-3865).
    Our ICR describe the information we seek to collect from the
public. Before submitting this ICR to OIRA, the Coast Guard is inviting
comments as described below.

DATES: Comments must reach the Coast Guard on or before May 2, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by Coast Guard docket
number [USCG-2011-0017], to the Docket Management Facility (DMF) at the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). To avoid duplicate
submissions, please use only one of the following means:
    (1) Online: http://www.regulations.gov.
    (2) Mail: DMF (M-30), DOT, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-
140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    (3) Hand delivery: Same as mail address above, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The telephone
number is<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    (4) Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>. To ensure your comments are received in a
timely manner, mark the fax, to attention Desk Officer for the Coast
Guard.
    The DMF maintains the public docket for this Notice. Comments and
material received from the public, as well as documents mentioned in
this Notice as being available in the docket, will become part of the
docket and will be available for inspection or copying at room W12-140
on the West Building Ground Floor, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. You may also find the docket on the Internet
at http://www.regulations.gov.
    A copy of the ICR is available through the docket on the Internet
at http://www.regulations.gov. Additionally, copies are available from:
COMMANDANT (CG-611), ATTN PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT MANAGER, US COAST
GUARD, 2100 2ND ST SW. STOP 7101, WASHINGTON DC 20593-7101.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Contact Ms. Kenlinishia Tyler, Office
of Information Management, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>, or fax<PHONE_NUMBER>,
for questions on these documents. Contact Ms. Renee V. Wright, Program
Manager, Docket Operations,<PHONE_NUMBER>, for questions on the docket.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Public Participation and Request for Comments

    This Notice relies on the authority of the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995; 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, as amended. An ICR is an application to
OIRA seeking the approval, extension, or renewal of a Coast Guard
collection of information (Collection). The ICR contains information
describing the Collection's purpose, the Collection's likely burden on
the affected public, an explanation of the necessity of the Collection,
and other important information describing the Collections. There is
one ICR for each Collection.
    The Coast Guard invites comments on whether these ICRs should be
granted based on the Collections being necessary for the proper
performance of Departmental functions. In particular, the Coast Guard
would appreciate comments addressing: (1) The practical utility of the
Collections; (2) the accuracy of the estimated burden of the
Collections; (3) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
information subject to the Collections; and (4) ways to minimize the
burden of the Collections on respondents, including the use of
automated collection techniques or other forms of information
technology. In response to your comments, we may revise these ICRs or
decide not to seek an extension of approval for the Collections. We
will consider all comments and material received during the comment
period.
    We encourage you to respond to this request by submitting comments
and

related materials. Comments must contain the OMB Control Number of the
ICR and the docket number of this request, [USCG-2011-0017], and must
be received by May 2, 2011. We will post all comments received, without
change, to http://www.regulations.gov. They will include any personal
information you provide. We have an agreement with DOT to use their
DMF. Please see the ``Privacy Act'' paragraph below.

Submitting Comments

    If you submit a comment, please include the docket number [USCG-
2011-0017], indicate the specific section of the document to which each
comment applies, providing a reason for each comment. You may submit
your comments and material online (via http://www.regulations.gov), by
fax, mail, or hand delivery, but please use only one of these means. If
you submit a comment online via http://www.regulations.gov, it will be
considered received by the Coast Guard when you successfully transmit
the comment. If you fax, hand deliver, or mail your comment, it will be
considered as having been received by the Coast Guard when it is
received at the DMF. We recommend you include your name, mailing
address, an e-mail address, or other contact information in the body of
your document so that we can contact you if we have questions regarding
your submission.
    You may submit your comments and material by electronic means,
mail, fax, or delivery to the DMF at the address under ADDRESSES; but
please submit them by only one means. To submit your comment online, go
to http://www.regulations.gov, and type ``USCG-2011-0017'' in the
``Keyword'' box. If you submit your comments by mail or hand delivery,
submit them in an unbound format, no larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches,
suitable for copying and electronic filing. If you submit comments by
mail and would like to know that they reached the Facility, please
enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard or envelope. We will
consider all comments and material received during the comment period
and will address them accordingly.
    Viewing comments and documents: To view comments, as well as
documents mentioned in this Notice as being available in the docket, go
to http://www.regulations.gov, click on the ``read comments'' box,
which will then become highlighted in blue. In the ``Keyword'' box
insert ``USCG-2011-0017'' and click ``Search.'' Click the ``Open Docket
Folder'' in the ``Actions'' column. You may also visit the DMF in Room
W12-140 on the ground floor of the DOT West Building, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Privacy Act

    Anyone can search the electronic form of comments received in
dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may review a Privacy Act statement
regarding Coast Guard public dockets in the January 17, 2008, issue of
the Federal Register (73 FR 3316).

Information Collection Requests.

    1. Title: Coast Guard Boating Accident Form (CG-3865).
    OMB Control Number: 1625-0003.
    Summary: The Coast Guard Boating Accident Report form (CG-3865, OMB
control number 1625-0003) is the data collection instrument that
ensures compliance with the implementing regulations and Title 46 USC
6102(b) that requires the Secretary to collect, analyze and publish
reports, information, and statistics on marine casualties.
    Need: Title 46 USC 6102(a) requires a uniform marine casualty
reporting system, with regulations prescribing casualties to be
reported and the manner of reporting. The statute requires a State to
compile and submit to the Secretary (delegated to the Coast Guard)
reports, information, and statistics on casualties reported to the
State. Implementing regulations are contained in Title 33, Code of
Federal Regulations, SUBCHAPTER S--BOATING SAFETY, PART 173--VESSEL
NUMBERING AND CASUALTY AND ACCIDENT REPORTING, Subpart C--Casualty and
Accident Reporting and PART 174--STATE NUMBERING AND CASUALTY REPORTING
SYSTEMS, Subpart C--Casualty Reporting System Requirements, and Subpart
D--State reports.
    States are required to forward copies of the reports or
electronically transmit accident report data to the Coast Guard within
30 days of their receipt of the report as prescribed by 33 CFR 174.121
(Forwarding of casualty or accident reports). The accident report data
and statistical information obtained from the reports submitted by the
State reporting authorities are used by the Coast Guard in the
compilation of national recreational boating accident statistics.
    Form: CG-3865.
    Respondents: Federal regulations (33 CFR 173.55) require the
operator of any uninspected vessel that is numbered or used for
recreational purposes to submit an accident report to the State
authority when:
    (1) A person dies; or
    (2) A person is injured and requires medical treatment beyond first
aid; or
    (3) Damage to the vessel and other property totals $2,000 or more,
or there is a complete loss of the vessel; or
    (4) A person disappears from the vessel under circumstances that
indicate death or injury.
    Frequency: On occasion.
    Burden Estimate: The estimated burden is 2,500 hours a year.

    Dated: January 28, 2011.
R.E. Day,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Acting Assistant Commandant for
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information Technology.
[FR Doc. 2011-4653 Filed 3-1-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P