[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 50 (Tuesday, March 15, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 13917-13966]
[FR Doc No: 2016-05553]

Vol. 81

Tuesday,

No. 50

March 15, 2016

Part III

Department of Transportation

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 Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Part 218

Train Crew Staffing; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 50 / Tuesday, March 15, 2016 /
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 218

[Docket No. FRA-2014-0033, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC48

Train Crew Staffing

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA proposes regulations establishing minimum requirements for
the size of train crew staffs depending on the type of operation. A
minimum requirement of two crewmembers is proposed for all railroad
operations, with exceptions proposed for those operations that FRA
believes do not pose significant safety risks to railroad employees,
the general public, and the environment by using fewer than two-person
crews. This proposed rule would also establish minimum requirements for
the roles and responsibilities of the second train crewmember on a
moving train, and promote safe and effective teamwork. Additionally,
FRA co-proposes two different options for situations where a railroad
wants to continue an existing operation with a one-person train crew or
start up an operation with less than two crewmembers. Under both co-
proposal options, a railroad that wants to continue an existing
operation or start a new operation with less than a two-person train
crew would be required to describe the operation and provide safety-
related information to FRA; however, proposed Option 1 includes an FRA
review and approval period lasting up to 90 days while Option 2
proposes permitting such operations to initiate or continue without a
mandatory FRA review and approval waiting period or while such review
is taking place. For start-up freight operations with less than two
crewmembers, proposed Option 2 also requires a statement signed by the
railroad officer in charge of the operation certifying a safety hazard
analysis of the operation has been completed and that the operation
provides an appropriate level of safety.

DATES: (1) Written Comments: Written comments on the proposed rule must
be received by May 16, 2016. Comments received after that date will be
considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expense
or delay.
    (2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a
public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a
public, oral hearing prior to April 14, 2016, one will be scheduled and
FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to
inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such
hearing.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number FRA-
2014-0033 by any of the following methods:
     Online: Comments should be filed at the Federal
eRulemaking Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online
instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 between
9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name, docket
name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for
this rulemaking (RIN 2130-AC48). Note that all comments received will
be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading in
the Supplementary Information section of this document for Privacy Act
information related to any submitted petitions or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or to
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal Holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joseph D. Riley, Railroad Safety
Specialist (OP)-Operating Crew Certification, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Mail Stop-25, Room
W33-412, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493-
6318, or Alan H. Nagler, Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Chief
Counsel, RCC-10, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd Floor, Room W31-309,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,<PHONE_NUMBER>).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
    A. Analysis of Two Recent Catastrophic Accidents Raising Crew
Size Issues
    1. Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada
    2. Casselton, ND
    B. Research Identifies Crewmember Tasks and the Positive
Attributes of Teamwork, Raises Concerns With One-Person Crews,
Especially When Implementing New Technology
    1. Cognitive and Collaborative Demands of Freight Conductor
Activities: Results and Implications of a Cognitive Task Analysis--
Human Factors in Railroad Operations
    2. Rail Industry Job Analysis: Passenger Conductor
    3. Fatigue Status in the U.S. Railroad Industry
    4. Technology Implications of a Cognitive Task Analysis for
Locomotive Engineers--Human Factors in Railroad Operations
    5. Using Cognitive Task Analysis To Inform Issues in Human
Systems Integration in Railroad Operations--Human Factors in
Railroad Operations
    6. Teamwork in U.S. Railroad Operations
    C. The Acknowledged Limitations of FRA Accident/Incident
Reporting Data
    D. FRA's Regulations Suggest Safety Hazards Are Created When a
Train Has Less Than Two Crewmembers
    1. Difficulty Providing Point Protection for Shoving or Pushing
Movements
    2. Complications Returning Switches to the Normal Position and
Loss of Job Briefings
    3. Concerns Protecting Train Passengers in an Emergency
    4. Deterrence of Electronic Device Distraction and Observing
Alcohol or Drug Impairment, Reduced Possibility of Co-Worker
Referrals
    5. Complicating Radio Communication Procedures
    6. Adding a Potential Safety Hazard to Highway-Rail Grade
Crossing Activation Failures
    E. Defining the Crewmembers' Qualifications
III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
IV. No Recommendation From the RSAC Working Group
V. FRA's Overall Post-RSAC Approach
    A. The Proposal Is Largely Focused on Influencing How Railroads
Approach Future One-Person Operations
    B. The Proposal Is Complimentary to Other Regulatory
Initiatives, Not Duplicative
    C. Identifying How the NPRM Differs From FRA's RSAC Suggested
Recommendations
    D. Electronic Submission and Approval Process
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. International Trade Impact Assessment
    F. Environmental Impact
    G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    H. Energy Impact
    I. Privacy Act

 I. Executive Summary

Purpose of the Regulatory Action and Legal Authority

    FRA is concerned that as railroads implement positive train control
(PTC) and other technologies, they may expand use of less than two-
person crews on operations without considering safety risks or
implementing risk mitigating actions that FRA believes are necessary.
Because there are currently few railroad operations that utilize a one-
person crew and FRA has not been specifically tracking the safety of
those operations through its recordkeeping and reporting requirements,
FRA cannot provide reliable or conclusive statistical data to suggest
whether one-person crew operations are generally safer or less safe
than multiple-person crew operations. FRA does not currently collect
sufficient data related to the size of a train crew nor do accident
reports and investigations generally address the size of a crew in
order for FRA or any entity to definitively compare one-person
operations to multiple person operations. However, FRA has studies
showing the benefits of a second crewmember and other information
detailing the potential safety benefits of multiple-person crews. A
recent catastrophic accident in Canada occurred in which a one-person
crew did not properly secure an unattended train and another accident
occurred in which a multiple-person crew was able to effectively
respond to an accident and remove cars from danger. In addition,
qualitative studies show that one-person train operations pose
increased risks by potentially overloading the sole crewmember with
tasks, and that PTC does not substitute for all the tasks performed by
properly trained conductors. Task overload can lead to a loss of
situational awareness, and potentially to accidents. Moreover, other
nations require government approval of railroad decisions to use less
than two-person crews. Further, even if FRA does not have data to prove
a direct correlation between higher rates of safety and multiple person
crews, it is true that railroads have achieved a continually improving
safety record during a period in which the industry largely employed
two-person train crews.
    Persons in the railroad industry have pointed to countervailing
effects of a requirement to have more than one crewmember on a train,
such as additional incidents caused by crew distraction. In addition,
having a second crew person on board a train may not prevent or
mitigate an incident but could add to the number of persons killed or
seriously injured when one occurs. FRA believes such instances are very
rare, but does not have readily available information for estimating
such potential countervailing impacts of this proposed rule. FRA
believes that having a properly trained second crew person on board, or
implementing risk mitigating actions that FRA believes are necessary to
address any additional safety risks from using fewer than two-person
crews, provides net safety benefits relative to using fewer than two-
person crews or not implementing mitigating measures that FRA believes
are necessary.
    In discussing the future of train operations with officials from
various railroads, FRA has become aware that some railroads have shown
a willingness to conduct more operations with only one crewmember. FRA
has existing authority to take emergency action to prohibit an unsafe
operation if the agency is aware of it (49 U.S.C. 20104), but FRA often
lacks information to use this authority to address unsafe one-person
crews. FRA does not currently have a mechanism to collect detailed
information about railroad one-person train operations to determine
railroad safety risk. Furthermore, FRA believes it would be
inappropriate to wait until an emergency situation arises before it
takes action against a one-person operation that is not providing an
appropriate level of safety. FRA believes this proposed rule is
necessary for FRA to protect railroad employees, the general public,
and the environment by considering the safety risks of each type of
operation and prohibiting operations that pose an unacceptable level of
risk as compared to operations utilizing a two-person crew. This
rulemaking is also necessary to ensure that the public, through FRA,
has a voice in the railroad's decision to utilize less than a two-
person crew.
    FRA research demonstrates the effectiveness of properly trained
teams. It is not the act of adding a second person that makes the train
safer, but instead it is the act of adding a properly qualified person,
who understands the roles of all the crewmembers, and who has the
experience or ability to relieve the locomotive engineer of some of the
mental strain that can contribute to accidents attributed to human
factor errors. FRA understands that expert teamwork can be achieved
through effective coordination, cooperation, and communication.
However, FRA estimates both options of the proposal would have a small
impact on teamwork because FRA expects that either co-proposal option
would result in no more than the labor hour equivalent of two to three
additional crewmembers nationwide annually relative to what would occur
with existing operations with less than two crewmembers if the rule
were not in place and because FRA believes that all railroads with
multiple-person crews are operating in compliance with the proposal's
requirements for the roles and responsibilities of a second crewmember.
FRA expects that under the first co-proposal it would require some
start-up one-person crew operations (but not existing one-person crew
operations) to implement risk mitigating measures that FRA believes are
necessary to address safety risks of using one-person crews in specific
operating environments. However, FRA expects to require such measures
in very few circumstances, and estimates a cost range of $5.1 million
to $27.7 million over 10 years and discounted at 7 percent from
implementing such measures under either co-proposal option.
    The proposed rulemaking would be expected to grant an exception to
most existing operations with less than two crewmembers. However, some
operations would still not be able to meet the requirements of the
proposed exceptions and those railroads would have to add one person to
their train crews. FRA estimates that about 10,361 train starts would
not be eligible for the proposed specific freight train exception Sec.
218.131. Furthermore, FRA estimated that around 15,185 train starts
would not be covered by the exception for existing one-person
operations in Sec.  218.133. Given the proposed structure of the
passenger train exceptions in Sec.  218.129, FRA does not expect any
passenger railroad to have to add a crewmember to an existing train
operation as a result of the NPRM. Freight railroads would be expected
to take full advantage of the special approval procedure in Sec.
218.135. FRA used a range of values to estimate the costs that would be
related to Sec.  218.135 due to the uncertainty in the future of crew
staffing. This range stipulates that

between 850,266 and 15,675,000 train starts would be affected by crew
reduction over the next 10 years and enter the special approval
procedure as proposed in Sec.  218.135. For passenger railroads, the
proposed special approval procedure would maintain the status quo, as
any railroad that could potentially request special approval under
Sec.  218.135 would have done it through a passenger train emergency
preparedness plan under part 239.
    FRA is proposing regulations concerning train crew staffing based
on the statutory general authority of the Secretary of Transportation
(Secretary). The general authority states, in relevant part, that the
Secretary ``as necessary, shall prescribe regulations and issue orders
for every area of railroad safety supplementing laws and regulations in
effect on October 16, 1970.'' 49 U.S.C. 20103. The Secretary delegated
this authority to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 1.89(a).

Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action in Question

    FRA is co-proposing regulations to address train crew sizes. FRA's
first co-proposal would establish minimum requirements for the size of
different train crew staffs depending on the type of operation and the
safety risks posed by the operation to railroad employees and the
general public. This proposal also prescribes minimum requirements for
the appropriate roles and responsibilities of train crewmembers on a
moving train, and promotes safe and effective teamwork. Each railroad
may prescribe additional or more stringent requirements in its
operating rules, timetables, timetable special instructions, and other
instructions.
    FRA's first proposed approach starts with a general requirement
that each train shall be assigned a minimum of two crewmembers,
regardless of whether the train is a freight or passenger operation.
The NPRM contains several proposed requirements detailing the roles and
responsibilities of the second crewmember when the train is moving. The
primary role of a second crewmember, typically a conductor, is to have
the ability to directly communicate with the crewmember in the cab of
the controlling locomotive, i.e., the locomotive engineer, even if the
second crewmember is located outside of the operating cab.
    Several of the proposed sections contain exceptions to this general
requirement, specifying when a train would not require a minimum of two
crewmembers. These are generally low risk operations that are not
hauling large quantities of hazardous materials, traveling at high
speeds, or putting passengers on passenger trains at risk. Among other
exceptions, there is a proposed exception for a tourist, scenic,
historic, or excursion operation that is not part of the general
railroad system of transportation. Other exceptions allow railroads to
use one-person crews to assist other trains (i.e., helper service),
maintain track, or move locomotives where they are needed without being
burdened by the proposed two crewmember minimum staffing requirement.
    Two of the proposed sections suggest how a railroad could apply for
FRA approval to operate one-person train crews. One of those proposed
sections would require a railroad to provide information describing an
operation that existed prior to January 1, 2015, and FRA would have 90
days from the day of receipt of the submission to issue written
notification of approval or disapproval. The railroad would be allowed
to continue the operation unless FRA notifies the railroad it must
cease the operation and provides the reason(s) for the decision. If FRA
failed to disapprove the proposal within 90 days of the submission, the
railroad would be permitted to go forward with its plan. The second of
the proposed sections under the first co-proposal would allow any
railroad, at any time, to provide information describing an operation
and petition FRA for special approval of a train operation with less
than two crewmembers. FRA would normally grant or deny the petition
within 90 days of receipt, but could attach special conditions to the
approval of any petition after considering the benefits and costs of
the condition(s).
    Under the second co-proposal, an existing one-person train
operation would be required to provide information to FRA in order to
continue the operation, and a start-up train operation with less than
two crewmembers would be required to provide information to FRA before
initiating the operation. The railroad with the start-up operation
would also be required to attest that it has studied the operating
environment and circumstances of the intended operation and that the
railroad believes that it has taken any precautions necessary to ensure
that the proposed single-person operation will not pose significant
safety risks to railroad employees, the general public, and the
environment. Under this co-proposal, the railroad would not be required
to wait for FRA approval prior to beginning single-person service. With
the railroad's notice and attestation the railroad would be permitted
to operate a single-person service. Both existing and start-up train
operations with less than two crewmembers would be required to provide
an appropriate level of safety. However, FRA reserves the right to
investigate an operation and halt or add conditions to an operation's
continuance if FRA determines that an operation is not providing an
appropriate level of safety.

Costs and Benefits

    FRA estimated the benefit and cost ranges of the two co-proposals
using a 10-year time horizon, and performed sensitivity analysis using
a 20-year time horizon. Compliance costs include the addition of the
labor hour equivalent of about one to three additional crewmembers
nationwide annually to certain train movements for existing operations
(an estimated cost of roughly $120,000-$200,000 annually over 10 years,
undiscounted), off-setting actions required by FRA in order for a
railroad to obtain FRA approval to start up new fewer than two-person
crew operations, and information submission and data analysis.
    FRA estimated a 10-year cost range which would be between $7.65
million and $40.86 million, undiscounted. Discounted values of this
range are $5.19 million and $27.72 million at the 7-percent level. FRA
is confident that the benefits outlined in this NPRM would exceed the
costs. Preventing a single fatal injury would exceed the break-even
point in the low range and preventing five fatalities would exceed the
break-even point at the high range. The proposed rule will help ensure
that train crew staffing does not result in inappropriate levels of
safety risks to railroad employees, the general public, and the
environment, while allowing technology innovations to advance industry
efficiency and effectiveness without compromising safety. The proposal
contains minimum requirements for roles and responsibilities of second
train crewmembers on certain operations and promotes safe and effective
teamwork. Due to lack of information, these cost estimates do not
include any safety costs from using two-person crews instead of one or
zero person crews, such as additional accidents caused by non-engineer
crew distracting the engineer or additional deaths and serious injuries
from having more people on board trains involved in accidents.
    FRA is confident that the proposed rulemaking would generate the
benefits necessary to at least break-even. These benefits would result
from improved

post-accident/incident emergency response and management, reporting of
troubled employees due to drug and alcohol use, compliance with
restrictions on electronic device use in place to prevent distraction,
and the potential avoidance of a high-consequence train accident. While
FRA does not have information that suggests that there have been any
previous accidents involving one-person crew operations that could have
been avoided by adding a second crewmember, this rule would break even
with its estimated costs if it prevents one fatal injury or high-
consequence accident in the first 10 years of the rule (and no
additional safety costs result from the presence of additional crew).
This proposed rule would help ensure that passengers and high risk
commodities are transported safely by rail and FRA is confident that
the resulting safety benefits would justify the costs. The cost
increase would result from additional crewmembers on the trains that
are currently operating with a one-person crew and from the possibility
that the railroad is required to use more technology to mitigate the
risk related to crew conversions. FRA has assessed both co-proposals
and concluded that monetary, quantifiable costs under both co-proposals
are equal. However, railroads may perceive each option differently,
especially as it pertains to business risk. Under co-proposal Option 1,
railroads would have to wait for approval and that would delay
implementation of crew size reduction in the short-term. However, once
FRA grants approval railroads would have spent adequate amount of
resources to meet regulatory requirements and oversight. Under co-
proposal Option 2, each railroad would be able to initiate crew
reductions after a petition is submitted to FRA. This means that
railroads would be able to reduce costs once petitions are submitted.
However, under co-proposal Option 2, railroads may assume more business
risk as an initiated crew reduction would be subject to regulatory
action (discontinuance or more conditions for approval). This means
that railroads could end up acquiring equipment or resources for
unapproved crew reductions or to modify initial plans for crew
reductions. This would be costly and bring more uncertainty to the
railroads' business plans in the short-term.
    FRA conducted a sensitivity analysis of its first co-proposal using
a 20-year time horizon and a scenario with a more rapid crew size
reduction schedule. FRA estimates that the cost range of the co-
proposals would be $7.44 million to $36.25 million over this timeframe
using a 7-percent discount rate, and $11.93 million to $50.71 million
using a 3-percent discount rate.

 II. Background

A. Analysis of Two Recent Catastrophic Accidents Raising Crew Size
Issues

    During the last five months of 2013, the railroad industry had two
accidents that suggest the need for greater Federal oversight of crew
size issues. The first incident at Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada,
was the driving force for bringing the crew size issue to FRA's Federal
advisory committee known as the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
(RSAC). While Canada's Transportation Safety Board could not conclude
that use of a one-person crew was a cause or contributing factor to the
accident, as described below, the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident involved
a one-person crew that did not properly secure a train at the end of a
tour of duty leading to a deadly, catastrophic accident.
    The RSAC includes representatives from all of the agency's major
stakeholder groups, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers
and manufacturers, and other interested parties. (An RSAC overview is
provided below.) During the time that the RSAC's Working Group was
deliberating whether it could make recommendations to FRA on the crew
size issue, the other accident summarized here occurred. This accident
involved trains carrying multi-person crews and is illustrative of the
positive mitigation measures multiperson train crews took following a
track-based derailment of one train that led to a second train
colliding with the first (Casselton, ND). With regard to the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident, FRA exercised its oversight following the
accident through use of its emergency order authority to ensure that
the railroad involved had at least one adequate backstop to human
error. FRA has also issued several other regulations to address the
safety issues raised by these accidents which are described within the
summaries of the accidents.
Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada
    FRA published Emergency Order 28 (78 FR 48218) on August 7, 2013,
(issued on August 2, 2013) which contains the preliminarily known
details of the events on July 5-6, 2013, that led to the catastrophic
accident at Lac-M[eacute]gantic. On August 20, 2014, the Transportation
Safety Board (TSB) of Canada released its railway investigation report,
which refines the known factual findings and makes recommendations for
preventing similar accidents. TSB of Canada Railway Investigation
R13D0054 is available online at http://bit.ly/VLqVBk. In summary, an
unattended train on mainline track did not stay secured and rolled down
a grade to the center of town, where 63 of the 72 crude oil tank cars
in the train derailed, and about one-third of the derailed tank car
shells had large breaches. There were multiple explosions and fires
causing an estimated 47 fatalities to the general public, extensive
damage to the town, and approximately 2,000 people to be evacuated from
the surrounding area.
    The train had been secured by its one-person crew prior to it being
left unattended. Because of a mechanical problem with the train, the
engineer left the train running. Prior to leaving the train, the
engineer consulted with another railroad employee about how to handle
the problem and applied brakes on the train. However, TSB of Canada
determined that the one-person crew did not comply with the railroad's
rules requiring the hand brakes alone to be capable of holding the
train. According to the railroad's rules, a 72-car train should have
had a minimum of nine hand brakes applied. Instead, the one-person crew
used a combination of the locomotive air brakes and seven hand brakes
to give the false impression during the verification test that the hand
brakes alone would hold the train. TSB of Canada concluded that,
without the extra force provided by the air brakes, a minimum of 17 and
possibly as many as 26 hand brakes would have been needed to secure the
train, depending on the amount of force with which they had been
applied. Testing conducted by TSB of Canada concluded that it would
have been possible for a single operator to apply a sufficient number
of hand brakes within a reasonable amount of time. Shortly after the
one-person crew left the train, the local fire department responded to
an emergency call about a fire on the train. The responders followed
the railroad's instructions in shutting down the locomotive and then
extinguished the fire. The responders met with an employee of the
railroad, a track foreman, to discuss the train's condition prior to
departing the area. The track foreman dispatched by the railroad did
not have a locomotive operations background. With all the locomotives
shut down, the air compressor no longer supplied air to the air brake
system, the air leaked, and the air brakes gradually become less
effective until the combination of

locomotive air brakes and hand brakes could no longer hold the train.
    In the aftermath of the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway (MMA)
derailment at Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Transport Canada issued an order for
all Canadian railroad companies to provide for minimum operating crew
requirements considering technology, length of train, speeds,
classification of dangerous goods being transported, and other risk
factors. In response, MMA changed its operating procedures to use two-
person crews on trains in Canada. However, FRA was concerned that MMA
did not automatically make corresponding changes to its operating
procedures in the U.S. even though the risk associated with this
catastrophic accident also exists in the U.S.\1\ It may have been that,
without a specific two-person train crew requirement in the U.S., MMA
did not feel compelled to take any action to enhance the safety of its
U.S. operations in a like-minded way to the preventive measures it took
in Canada.
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    \1\ Letter from Joseph C. Szabo, FRA Administrator, to Mr.
Edward Burkhardt, CEO of MMA (Aug. 21, 2013), placed in the docket.
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    The Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident is also relevant to the issue of
crew size because the tank cars that derailed were carrying crude oil
from the Bakken deposit in North Dakota and Montana and this proposed
rule carries forward FRA's position that at least a two-person train
crew is warranted on any train carrying 20 or more tank cars loaded
with crude oil or ethanol. Over the past few years, a technological
advancement has allowed crude oil to be recovered from under
nonpermeable shale rock. This advancement of hydraulic fracturing,
better known as ``fracking,'' resulted in a substantial increase in
crude oil shipments in both Canada and the U.S. between 2009 and
2015.\2\ The prevalence of crude oil tank cars on U.S. railroads, and
the volatility of some of the blended crude oil from different sources
or mixed with the chemicals used in the fracking process, suggested
that Bakken crude oil might have a significantly greater potential to
be improperly classified and packaged for transportation. Investigators
initially considered that improper classification and packaging was
likely a contributing cause to the catastrophic result at Lac-
M[eacute]gantic. Consequently, DOT has taken or is taking a variety of
actions to address the issues created by transporting crude oil
produced through fracking from various approaches. See, the following
examples
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    \2\ https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_MOVE_RAILNA_A_EPC0_RAIL_MBBL_M.htm.
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     FRA's Emergency Order 28, 78 FR 48218, Aug. 7, 2013.
     FRA's Safety Advisory 2013-06, 78 FR 48224, Aug. 7, 2013,
jointly issued with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) (discussing the circumstances surrounding the
Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident and making certain safety-related
recommendations to railroads and crude oil offerors).
     FRA's Safety Advisory 2013-07, 78 FR 69745, Nov. 20, 2013,
jointly issued with PHMSA (reinforcing the importance of proper
characterization, classification, and selection of a packing group for
Class 3 materials and the corresponding requirements in the Federal
hazardous materials regulations for safety and security planning after
the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident).
     FRA's Safety Advisory 2014-01, jointly issued with PHMSA,
79 FR 27370, May 13, 2014, (encouraging the use of railroad tank car
designs with the highest level of integrity reasonably available).
     PHMSA's final rule, issued in coordination with FRA,
``Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High Hazard Flammable Trains,'' 80 FR 26643, May 8, 2015,
(adopting new operational requirements for certain trains transporting
large quantities of flammable liquids known as ``high-hazard flammable
trains'' (HHFT), creating improvements in tank car standards, providing
a sampling and classification program for unrefined petroleum-based
products; and creating notification requirements).
     FRA's final rule ``Securement of Unattended Equipment,''
80 FR 47349, Aug. 6, 2015, (adopting requirements to prevent unattended
trains that carry crude oil, ethanol, poisonous by inhalation (PIH),
toxic by inhalation (TIH), and other highly flammable contents from
rolling away).
    Also, in 2013, DOT launched Operation Safe Delivery (OSD), which is
examining the entire system of crude oil delivery. OSD concluded, after
months of unannounced inspections, testing, and analysis, that ``the
current classification applied to Bakken crude is accurate under the
current classification system, but that the crude has a higher gas
content, higher vapor pressure, lower flash point and boiling point and
thus a higher degree of volatility than most other crudes in the U.S.,
which correlates to increased ignitability and flammability.'' See OSD
Update (July 23, 2014) summarizing PHMSA and FRA testing results of
Bakken crude oil as of May 2014; available online at http://1.usa.gov/1piQJB1.
    Some people in the railroad industry view the accident at Lac-
M[eacute]gantic as having nothing to do with crew size. They argue that
there are potential safety benefits to single-person train operations,
such as increased attentiveness by the lone operator because of the
absence of a second crewmember on whom to rely. It is also said that
there are fewer distractions from extraneous conversations. The TSB of
Canada report on the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident found that it could
not be concluded that a one-person crew contributed to the accident.
However, TSB of Canada found that the risk of implementing single-
person train operations is a risk that must be addressed because it is
related to unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or safety issues with the
potential to degrade rail safety. TSB of Canada concluded that
addressing the risk of one-person operations is essential to preventing
future similar accidents, even if the risk itself cannot be determined
to directly have led to this accident.
    Related to the risks associated with one-person operations, TSB of
Canada found that MMA did not have a strong safety culture, which made
MMA a poor candidate to implement one-person operations. For instance,
TSB of Canada notes that an organization with a strong safety culture
is generally proactive when it comes to addressing safety issues, and
yet MMA was generally reactive. MMA had significant gaps between the
company's operating instructions and how work was performed day-to-day.
Furthermore, TSB of Canada's investigation found MMA had inadequate
training, testing, and supervision. In contrast, an effective safety
culture is characterized by an informed workforce where people
understand the hazards and risks involved in their own operation and
work continuously to identify and overcome threats to safety.
    At the time of the accident, there were no rules or regulations
preventing Canadian railroads from implementing one-person train
operations. Thus, TSB of Canada concluded that the risks posed by one-
person operations suggest that Transport Canada, i.e., Canada's DOT,
should consider whether each railroad has the measures in place to
mitigate those risks by creating a process to approve and monitor each
railroad's one-person operation plans. TSB of Canada reasoned that if
one-person operations are implemented ``without identifying all risks,
and if mitigation measures are not implemented, an equivalent level of
safety to that of multi-person crews will not be maintained.''
Considering that

there are only two Canadian railroads that have operated using one-
person operations, TSB of Canada seems to be making a prudent
recommendation before one-person operations are more widely used
throughout the Canadian rail system. This is the exact lesson learned
that FRA would like to apply to U.S. rail operations through
promulgation of this rulemaking.
    Even though TSB of Canada was not able to conclude that having
another crewmember would have prevented the accident, and certainly FRA
agrees that this could not be determined with any absolute certainty,
it is distinctly possible that a train crew with a minimum of two-
persons would have had more options available to secure the train
safely, thereby potentially posing less of a risk of a runaway train.
This was an issue raised by some labor members of FRA's Federal
advisory committee and has some support in TSB of Canada's report. For
instance, a one-person crew was limited to where the train could be
parked so that it would not block a grade crossing, where it is
significantly more feasible operationally for a two-person crew to
choose to split the train and park each part on a lesser grade than the
choice left for the one-person crew. There are four main reasons why
splitting a train is generally considered a two-person job: (1) If a
one-person crew leaves the locomotive cab unoccupied and has not taken
appropriate measures to secure the train, it could become a runaway;
(2) even if the train is secure, some cars may move depending on the
terrain, making it difficult for the one-person crew to go between cars
at a desired location without applying hand brakes, which can be time-
consuming and strenuous work; (3) depending on the length of the train,
it could be time-consuming for the one crewmember to walk the train to
get to the desired location for a cut and find that the car needs to
move to release the coupler lock; and (4) when the one-person crew
stops occupying the lead locomotive cab, the train and crew are more
vulnerable to vandalism and malicious acts by trespassers who might
actually want to operate the train. In addition, a second person might
be needed to flag a grade crossing and it would be easier to reposition
one or more cars with a second crewmember. Another issue that favors
two-person crews is that a TSB of Canada survey determined that there
were instances when MMA one-person crews applied less than the minimum
number of hand brakes required by MMA's rules and that the minimum hand
brake requirement was more consistently met when trains were operated
by two crewmembers. This seems to be the case here, as the engineer
only set seven hand brakes instead of the minimum of nine. Although TSB
of Canada's investigation found that even nine hand brakes would not
have been enough to hold the train, a second crewmember could have
ensured proper securement if the railroad had issued proper
instructions regarding the minimum number of hand brakes to apply. Even
TSB of Canada's report summarizing its investigations of other
shortline runaway train accidents that it investigated previously
suggests that, without having another crewmember available, no other
person had the opportunity to verify whether the train was properly
secured. Additionally, although it is not unusual for some types of
locomotives to smoke and that the engineer did contact the railroad and
was told to leave the engine while it was smoking, TSB of Canada found
that the taxi driver that questioned the decision to leave the
locomotive in a smoking condition did not carry the same weight as a
qualified railroad employee. Similarly, the one-person crew and the
dispatcher did not discuss the MMA procedure requiring that a
locomotive be shut down due to abnormal smoke, and TSB of Canada states
that it is impossible to conclude whether the presence of another
crewmember would have resulted in different actions to secure the
train--although FRA believes it is impossible to exclude either.
    Thus, in consideration of the safety concerns involved in the rail
transportation of crude oil, the catastrophic accident at Lac-
M[eacute]gantic serves as the trigger to create redundant safeguards
that have a high potential of preventing other accidents. FRA's
position is reinforced by research and review of accident information,
which confirms that railroads that provide two qualified crewmembers,
who can work as an effective team on those unit trains (which commonly
consist of over 100 loaded tank cars of crude oil), improve the safety
of those operations.
Casselton, ND
    Another train accident illustrates how having multiple train
crewmembers can improve safety for the general public and the
crewmembers themselves. On December 30, 2013, an eastbound BNSF Railway
(BNSF) ``key train,'' consisting of two head end locomotives, one rear
distributive power unit (DPU), and two buffer cars on each end of 104
loaded crude oil cars, collided with a car from a westbound BNSF
``grain train'' that had derailed less than 2 minutes earlier from an
adjacent main track. Thirteen cars in the middle of the 112-car grain
train had derailed, most likely due to a broken axle on the 45th
railcar, and that railcar ended up fouling the main track the key train
was operating over. The collision derailed the key train's two leading
locomotives, as well as the first 21 trailing cars behind the
locomotives. After the collision, an estimated 474,936 gallons of crude
oil was released from 18 loaded tank cars fueling a fire which caused
subsequent explosions as the loaded oil tank cars burned. The local
fire department had requested that nearby residents voluntarily
evacuate immediately following the collision and approximately 1,500
residents did evacuate. The voluntary evacuation was lifted
approximately 25 hours after the collision. There were no injuries to
crewmembers, emergency responders, or the general public, but images
and video of the burning railcars made the accident national news.
    Many members of the general public who viewed the news accounts of
burning wreckage may not be aware that the heroic actions of the grain
train's crewmembers potentially prevented the environmental and
property damages from being much worse, in addition to potentially
shortening the evacuation period. The grain train was operated by a
three-person crew, which included a locomotive engineer, a conductor,
and a student locomotive engineer (i.e., a conductor training to be a
locomotive engineer). Post-accident, the grain train crew was
approached by the Assistant Fire Chief of the Casselton Fire Department
who asked whether the crew could assist the emergency responders by
pulling a cut of tank cars away from the burning derailed cars. Upon
receiving the request, a BNSF road foreman of engines consulted with
the crew to see if the crewmembers believed it was safe to move the
cars, which they did. The grain train's locomotive engineer and student
locomotive engineer went to the DPU on the key train and the conductor
and road foreman of engines went to the east to the nearest grade
crossing and made a cut of an estimated 50 tank cars. The engineer and
student engineer then pulled the cars about a quarter of a mile west
away from the burning train.
    Approximately 45 minutes after that move was completed, the
Assistant Fire Chief met the grain train's crew again and asked if
additional tank cars from the key train could be moved. The grain
train's crew made contact with a BNSF trainmaster and communicated the
request. The trainmaster told the crew that if the move could be
completed safely, they had permission to proceed.

The student engineer borrowed the Assistant Fire Chief's fire
protective clothing and walked within 10 car lengths of the fire and
uncoupled approximately 20 additional cars from the burning train.
Then, the locomotive engineer coupled to these cars and moved them to
the west creating a safety gap of approximately 25 to 30 car-lengths
from the burning cars.
    Adding these two emergency response moves together, the grain
train's crew was responsible for moving approximately 70 loaded crude
oil cars in the key train out of harm's way. These urgent moves would
have been much more time consuming and logistically difficult if the
grain train was operated with only a one-person crew. For those
reasons, there is a question of whether either of these emergency
response moves would have been attempted with a one-person crew.
    Meanwhile, it is arguable that the two-person key train crew
benefited from each other's presence in the cab of the controlling
locomotive. The crew helped each other through the emergency by issuing
appropriate warnings and sharing tasks. First, the locomotive engineer
was able to warn the conductor to get down and brace for impact 4 to 5
seconds before colliding with the derailed grain train railcar, and
they both were able to get down on the floor and brace themselves. The
conductor admitted that he had never been in a situation where a
collision was imminent, and he did not know what he was supposed to do.
Although a one-person crew would not need to warn another crewmember of
an impending impact, this is an example of an expert crew working
together. Second, after the impact, the crew was able to assess that
they were not seriously injured, and it was the conductor who first
noticed that their train was on fire when he looked out the window and
was able to warn the locomotive engineer of that fact. This is a clear
example of the benefit a second crewmember can provide. Without a
second person, the engineer may not have realized that he was in
immediate danger. Third, upon hearing this news, the engineer told the
conductor to ``grab your cell phone and run.'' This is another example
of effective teamwork during an emergency situation. Some people do not
think as clearly as others during an emergency and, in this case, the
engineer, with about 9 years of experience, recognized that it was
important for him to instruct the conductor with less than 2 years of
experience that the crew should have their cell phones to report
information and to leave the locomotive quickly. Fourth, the engineer
announced the collision by radio. Reporting the incident as quickly as
possible is always crucial to getting first responders to the scene of
an accident. By contacting the dispatcher on the railroad's radio, the
engineer was taking an important precaution to ensure other railroad
operations were not adversely impacted. Had this been a one-person
crew, there is a question of whether the engineer might have desired to
exit the locomotive first and then notify the dispatcher, assuming the
engineer believed his life was in immediate danger. Having a second
crewmember present working to exit the locomotive may have freed the
engineer to report the accident. Fifth, the conductor attempted to exit
the front door while the engineer was reporting the accident over the
radio, but finding it jammed shut, the conductor departed the
locomotive through the back door located behind the engineer's seat.
The engineer soon followed the conductor as it was clearly determined
to be the only viable way to exit the locomotive. As the crew escaped
from the locomotive, the conductor described the heat from the fire as
``intense.'' The crew could not get away from the locomotive quickly as
they found themselves in knee-deep snow immediately upon exiting the
locomotive. About a minute after exiting the locomotive, it was
engulfed in flames. Sixth, they ran together away from the train with
the engineer using his cell phone on the run to call 911 and the
conductor answering the dispatcher's call on the conductor's cell
phone. Thus, the two crewmembers were able to simultaneously assist
with providing different officials with information that would assist
the railroad and first responders. Seventh, when the engineer found out
local citizens were at the crash site, he strongly urged the local
police to get those citizens away from the site because the oil train
was just like the one in (Lac-M[eacute]gantic) Canada, and the deputy
sheriff recognized the danger. These two crewmembers worked as a team
in an emergency situation to divide up tasks, warn the dispatcher and
local emergency responders, and protect each other's safety.
Fortunately, neither crewmember suffered any serious injuries
preventing them from escaping the damaged locomotive or running to
safety. Certainly, with two crewmembers, there is the potential that
both crewmembers could be hurt, but there is also the possibility that
one crewmember could physically assist an injured colleague. FRA
believes that, from a post-accident risk mitigation standpoint, this
accident is illustrative of the safety benefits a second crewmember can
provide and that railroad operations, railroad crewmembers, the
environment, and the general public are better served by the
availability of a second crewmember. As explained in relation to the
Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident, it is often impractical to expect a one-
person crew to split a train, and in the case of an accident, there are
added concerns regarding a one-person crew's ability to maintain
communications with the dispatcher and emergency personnel while
performing this potentially dangerous emergency movement. For instance,
although an employee is permitted to use a cell phone during emergency
situations involving the operation of the railroad under 49 CFR
220.309(b), the employee would have to remember to grab it, and the
dispatcher and emergency personnel might not know the employee's phone
number. If the employee took a portable railroad radio while conducting
the train splitting operation, there is a significant probability that
the radio signal would not be strong enough to communicate with the
dispatcher. These concerns also do not take into account the fact that
FRA purposely prohibits the use of electronic devices during railroad
operations as they can be distractions that lead to preventable
injuries and accidents. See 49 CFR part 220, subpart C. The benefits of
a second crewmember following an accident may be especially useful when
the commodities hauled pose significant risks, or a single crewmember
is injured or is simply unable to perform as many tasks as quickly as
two crewmembers.

B. Research Identifies Crewmember Tasks and the Positive Attributes of
Teamwork; Raises Concerns With One-Person Crews, Especially When
Implementing New Technology

    Before FRA asked RSAC to consider accepting a crew size task, FRA
was aware that some research revealed significant safety concerns with
one-person crew operations. To aid the Working Group in its development
of recommendations for appropriate crew size minimum standards, FRA
provided five FRA-sponsored research reports, as well as one
Transportation Research Board (TRB) conference report that contains
presentations from multiple research reports, prior to the first
meeting. This background offers a summary of the important findings of
these reports, as well as a list of those reports presented, with an
internet link to each report.

    (1) ``Cognitive and Collaborative Demands of Freight Conductor
Activities: Results and Implications of a Cognitive Task Analysis--
Human Factors in Railroad Operations,'' Final Report, July 2012, DOT/
FRA/ORD-12/13. The research and report was performed by the John A.
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. The report is available
online at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04331.
    A primary finding of this FRA-sponsored study is that conductors
and locomotive engineers operate as a joint cognitive system. The
findings indicate that the conductor and the locomotive engineer
function as an integrated team that often operate as a single unit with
a common goal. These two crewmembers not only work together to monitor
the operating environment outside the locomotive, they also collaborate
in planning activities, problem solving, and identifying and mitigating
potential risk. A conductor is defined as the crewmember in charge of a
train or yard crew. Freight conductors supervise pre-trip activities,
over-the-road operation, and post-trip activities to ensure overall
safe and efficient train movement.
    The freight conductor's role has evolved from primarily a physical
in nature job to one that emphasizes cognitive work. The research
identifies five broad categories of cognitive job duties that a freight
conductor normally faces, which raises issues for each railroad that
might be considering one-person train operations and how the one-person
operation can be as safe as a two-person operation.
    One of those five categories of cognitive job duties is to manage
the train consist, including the train makeup. This duty requires the
freight conductor to understand train makeup rules and apply them both
in the yard and on the mainline. Experienced conductors understand the
implications of car placement, car consist, and car weight and shape
when building trains. Conductors must understand how the train's
consist will affect train handling, which is important to ensure
locomotive engineer compliance when operating the train. (It is
possible that this duty could also carry over to passenger train
conductors, if there were different types of passenger cars in the same
train that had the potential for compatibility issues, e.g.,
incompatible doors.)
    Second, a freight conductor also has the duty to coordinate with
the engineer for safe and efficient en route operations, which includes
checking speed, signal indications, and engineer alertness. This duty
could also include filling an engineer's knowledge gap about a
territory (e.g., the conductor instructs the engineer where to place a
train of a certain length so the train does not block a crossing). The
conductor also serves to remind the engineer about upcoming signals and
slow orders and provides ``look ahead'' information to alert the
engineer about hills, curves, grade crossings, and other physical
characteristics of the territory that have the potential to cause
operational problems. If the locomotive engineer is not in compliance
with the railroad's operating rules, it is the conductor's job to bring
it to the locomotive engineer's attention, or take appropriate
corrective action that may include actuating the emergency brake to
bring the train to an emergency stop if the conductor feels the train,
its crew, or others outside the train are in danger. A significant
finding was that operating in mountain-grade territory adds complexity
to the job and introduces additional cognitive demands on both the
conductor and the locomotive engineer.
    Third, a freight conductor's duties usually extend to taking the
lead on interacting with non-crewmembers, such as dispatchers and
roadway workers. These communications with non-crewmembers typically
takes place by radio. There may be expected and unexpected radio
communications, and there may be lulls in communication and times of
heavy interaction that require conductors to multitask in order to
simultaneously receive/copy information received by radio while calling
out signals and speed restrictions.
    Fourth, the freight conductor's duties require diagnosing and
responding to train problems, as well as dealing with other exceptional
situations.
    Fifth, railroads typically assign the freight conductor the job of
managing the train crew's paperwork. Examples of paperwork managed by a
freight conductor include the conductor's log, writing down orders,
copying bulletins for both crewmembers received by radio, and keeping
an up-to-date rulebook. When a conductor is handling all of these
duties, the safety benefit is that the engineer can concentrate on
operating the train.
    Another issue mentioned separately in this study's final report is
that in order to gain the cognitive skill and knowledge to be an expert
freight conductor, a person needs about 5 years of experience. This is
because there are a significant number of overarching cognitive
challenges that differentiate expert conductors from less experienced
ones. A quick list of these overarching cognitive challenges include
knowledge of the territory, the ability to maintain situational
awareness of surroundings, the ability to project the effect of consist
on train dynamics, the ability to problem-solve, the ability to plan
ahead, the ability to multitask, the ability to exploit external memory
aids, and the ability to foster situational awareness through active
communication. The study concluded that less experienced conductors are
less able to handle situations that require multiple demands on
attention, and they are less able to effectively problem-solve, plan
ahead, or identify and avoid potential hazards. Because they have had
less ``first-hand'' experience on the job, they are typically less
confident in their knowledge and ability. Having a two-person crew
broadens the number of experiences from which the crew can draw from.
    This research also addresses the role of PTC technology and whether
it can substitute for a conductor, thereby paving the way for one-
person operations. The cognitive task analysis addresses this issue by
laying out the multiple ways in which conductors contribute to safe and
efficient train operations and contrasts this with the anticipated
features of PTC systems. The report concludes that PTC can provide
warnings of upcoming signals, work zones and speed restrictions;
however, PTC cannot account for all the physical and cognitive
functions that a conductor currently provides. For instance, conductors
can support locomotive engineers in monitoring events outside the cab
window for potential obstacles and hazards undetected by automated
systems (e.g., people working on or around the track, trespassers, cars
at grade crossings). FRA acknowledges that to the extent railroads
comply with this rule using crewmembers in places other than the
controlling cab, the crewmember is less likely to be able to provide
this function. Other functions the conductor provides is filling
knowledge gaps that locomotive engineers may have, supporting decision
making, handling unanticipated events, and keeping the locomotive
engineer alert, especially on long, monotonous trips where there is a
risk of falling asleep. For this reason, the research recommends that
each railroad seeking implementation of one-person operations in the
future compile a detailed list of all of the physical and cognitive
tasks both the engineer and conductor perform in the cab, determine
which of these tasks PTC will cover, and understand how the locomotive
engineer's responsibilities would change in a one-person operation. Of
course, as the one-person crew would

presumably have more required tasks than an engineer in a two-person
crew (even if PTC addresses some of those tasks), the railroad should
consider how the strain of additional responsibilities may impact
situational awareness. FRA requests comments on how railroads can and
do safely and effectively perform these tasks using one-person crews.
    Removal of the freight conductor from the most common arrangement
of a two-person train crew team would have significant implications for
the remaining one-person crewmember. One-person train crews would need
to absorb the physical tasks necessary for operations, as well as the
many cognitive tasks. Some of the freight conductor's current cognitive
duties would be impossible with one person. For example, with a one-
person crew, there will not be a second crewmember to fill in the
knowledge or experience gaps of the sole crewmember. One of the
problems is that inexperienced people ``don't know what they don't
know'' and therefore cannot anticipate the risk and challenges, and
cannot prepare for them. Pairing a conductor and locomotive engineer so
that at least one of them is highly experienced can mitigate that
problem.
    Another potential issue of one-person crews is that it eliminates
the opportunity to work as a conductor before promotion to locomotive
engineer. This is a two-fold problem. First, engineers do not get the
experience of separately learning the freight conductor position.
Second, engineers who are never conductors are likely to begin their
engineer careers with less railroad experience than those who first
become conductors. Railroads that have used previously promoted
conductors for their current one-person operations may find a shortage
of such competent candidates to promote within the company if they
eliminate the conductor position.
    (2) ``Rail Industry Job Analysis: Passenger Conductor,'' Final
Report, dated February 2013, DOT/FRA/ORD-13/07. The research and report
was performed by the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center and can be found online at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04321.
    The purpose of this analysis was to identify key aspects of the
passenger train conductor job, including the main responsibilities of
the job, and the kinds of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other
characteristics (KSAOs) required to successfully perform the job. The
results of the analysis are useful to the railroad industry for three
reasons. First, the results can be used to build training programs that
address relevant and measurable KSAOs. Second, the results can be used
to form the foundation for performance appraisal systems that are
legally defensible and evaluate employees based on KSAOs that have been
identified as related to the job. Third, the results can be used to
help ensure that a hiring organization will appropriately screen new
talent.
    In relation to the crew size issue, this study is relevant because
it explains the wide variety of KSAOs a passenger train conductor needs
to possess in order to do the job well. Therefore, if a passenger
railroad employs only a one-person train crew, there is a question of
how one person can do all of these tasks and the tasks required of a
locomotive engineer. Examples of passenger conductor KSAOs include
knowledge of operating and safety rules, skill in working on and around
moving equipment, judgment and decision-making ability, and a
commitment to safety. Conductors use a number of different tools and
types of equipment, and work with a variety of railroad personnel such
as locomotive engineers, dispatchers, and foremen. The job is also
physically and psychologically demanding for workers because of the
prevalence of irregular work hours, out-of-doors work, and the need to
lift and move heavy equipment. Passenger conductors also need to be
able to carry out tasks involving passenger interaction; crew
communication; crew supervision; form and record management; train
inspection, troubleshooting, and repair; train makeup and handling; and
emergency situations.
    (3) ``Fatigue Status in the U.S. Railroad Industry,'' Final Report,
dated February 2013, DOT/FRA/ORD-13/06. This report can be found online
at www.fra.dot.gov/Elib/Document/2929. The research and report was
performed by QinetiQ North America and an Engineering Psychologist
within FRA's Office of Research and Development.
    Train and Engine (T&E) workers, such as locomotive engineers and
conductors, are safety-critical railroad employees that have the
highest exposure to fatigue in the railroad industry. They are also
among employees that have the longest work hours and work at night.
Passenger T&E workers, as a group, are workers with the least fatigue
exposure because of the predictability of their schedules and less
nighttime work; however, some passenger or commuter workers are
required to stay at an out-of-town location and do not return to their
starting location at the end of the work period. Freight T&E work can
be divided into two groups: (1) ``road freight'' work which involves
moving trains over long distances between major terminals or
interchange points and frequently requires overnight stays at an out-
of-town location, and (2) ``local freight'' work which involves moving
trains between a railroad yard and a nearby location so that the
employee returns to the starting location at the end of the work
period. Railroad workers are more likely to get less than seven hours
of total sleep on a work day, which puts them at risk of fatigue.
    Extrapolating from the findings in the study, it appears that a
railroad considering a one-person train crew operation should consider
whether the crewmember is likely to be fatigued. In a railroad's safety
analysis, prior to implementing a one-person operation, it would be
prudent for the railroad to consider what redundancy backstops have
been implemented in case the crewmember falls asleep on the job. If FRA
needed to review and approve an operation with less than two
crewmembers, the agency would be looking to see if the railroad
implemented strategies for reducing railroad worker fatigue, such as
improving the predictability of schedules, considering the time of day
it permits one-person train crews to operate, and educating workers
about human fatigue and sleep disorders. This study could help provide
a railroad with some ideas for reducing fatigue in its train
crewmembers.
    (4) ``Technology Implications of a Cognitive Task Analysis for
Locomotive Engineers--Human Factors in Railroad Operations,'' Final
Report, dated January 2009, DOT/FRA/ORD-09/03. The research and report
was performed by the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center and can be found online at www.fra.dot.gov/Elib/Document/381.
    This report documents the results of a cognitive task analysis
(CTA) that examined the cognitive demands and activities of locomotive
engineers in today's environment and the changes in cognitive demands
and activities that are likely to arise with the introduction of new
train control technologies. One of the objectives of this CTA was to
understand these potential new performance demands. Another of the
CTA's objectives was to evaluate the interaction between the locomotive
engineer and the conductor and how they work jointly to operate the
train in a safe and efficient manner. At the time of the CTA, the
researchers assumed that railroads would continue to use a two-person
crew configuration and so the analysis in this report does not
explicitly consider any additional

sources of cognitive workload that may arise should there be a
transition to single-person operations. The study notes that each
crewmember has a duty to catch and correct the errors made by the other
crewmember.
    The research examined the following types of PTC systems: (1)
Communications-based train management (CBTM), (2) advanced speed
enforcement system (ASES), (3) incremental train control system (ITCS),
(4) electronic train management system (ETMS), and (5) North American
Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC). This 2009 study acknowledges
that the PTC systems are described and analyzed as they were
implemented at the time of the site visits and, in some cases, the PTC
systems may have undergone substantial redesign since then.
    The results pointed to major cognitive challenges involved in
operating a train, including the need for sustained monitoring and
attention; maintaining an accurate situation model of the immediate
environment (including the location, activities and intentions of other
agents in the vicinity such as other trains and roadway workers);
anticipating and taking action in preparation for upcoming situations;
and planning and decision-making, particularly in response to
unanticipated conditions (e.g., person or object obstructing the
track). Introduction of new train control technology reduces some
cognitive demands while creating new ones. For example, as four out of
the five PTC systems tested used conservative braking profiles to slow
the train to the desired target speed under restrictive assumptions
(e.g., heavy train or slippery track), train crews discovered that they
would need to initiate braking at an earlier point than they were
normally accustomed to if they wanted to prevent the PTC system from
braking the train for them. This earlier braking point conflicts with
the experienced crews' effective strategies for operating as
efficiently as possible. A penalty brake application is highly
undesirable because it significantly delays train operations and may
trigger report or documentation requirements to explain why the penalty
brake occurred. The report also discusses the implication of the
results for design of in-cab displays and development of training,
particularly for PTC systems. The research suggests there is a need for
development of in-cab displays that make it easier to anticipate and
stay within the braking curve without having to look closely at the in-
cab display so that more attention can be directed to looking outside
the window.
    The PTC systems also created new sources of workload and
distraction. Sources of workload and distractions include the need to
acknowledge frequent (and often non-informative) audio alerts generated
by the PTC system and the need for extensive input to the PTC system
during initialization and when error messages occur while operating the
train. For example, the NAJPTC system is described as having a train
location determination system (LDS) that is able to locate train
position within 10 feet but it would trigger a failure alarm when the
LDS system experienced difficulty identifying the train location. The
failure alarm sounded repeatedly, requiring the train crew's attention.
Although this situation described was an early test of the system, and
no consequences of failing to respond to the alert occurred, when the
test period ends a failure to respond to an alert quickly might result
in a penalty brake. The experiences of European railroads suggest that
the concern expressed by the locomotive engineers regarding too many
non-informative alerts has a potential for negative safety
consequences. Operators may respond to poorly designed audio alerts
automatically without fully processing their meaning, thus defeating
their purpose. This is consistent with an extensive body of human
factors literature that indicates that individuals are likely to ignore
alarms when a high false alarm rate exists. (Please note that FRA's PTC
regulation prohibits requiring a locomotive engineer to ``perform
functions related to the PTC system while the train is moving that have
the potential to distract the locomotive engineer from performance of
other safety-critical duties,'' which would include distracting, non-
useful alerts. See 49 CFR 236.1006(d)(1), formerly Sec.  236.1029(f)).
    The new cognitive demands created by new technologies such as PTC
can lead to changes in how locomotive engineers operate the train.
Locomotive engineers certainly combine the current information they can
obtain from direct perception (e.g., displays inside the cab as well as
the scene outside the cab), in addition to knowledge and skills gained
through training and experience to develop train handling strategies.
Sources of new cognitive demands include constraints imposed by the PTC
braking profile that require locomotive engineers to modify train
handling strategies, increases in information and alerts provided by
the in-cab displays that require locomotive engineers to focus more
attention on in-cab displays versus out the window, and requirements
for extensive interaction with the PTC systems (e.g., to initialize it
and to acknowledge messages and alerts) that impose new sources of
workload. The research concluded that although PTC technology is likely
to have a positive impact on overall risk of accidents, these new
sources of cognitive demand can contribute to errors and accidents.
    Railroads and PTC system designers need to be made aware that
measures can be taken in the design of PTC displays and in development
of user training to improve train crew performance and reduce the
potential for human error. The final section of this report discusses a
number of suggestions for ways to improve in-cab displays to reduce
cognitive demands on train crews and facilitate train crew performance
as well as suggestions for improved training. For example, one
promising area for research and development is improved in-cab displays
that minimize the need to visually attend to the in-cab display to
extract important information. The research found that a substantial
learning curve exists to reach the point where the in-cab display does
not serve as a source of distraction, diverting attention away from
events out the window. Locomotive engineers must have sufficient
experience in running a PTC-equipped train as part of training so that
they get beyond the point where close monitoring of the in-cab display
is required to avoid a penalty brake application.
    Another PTC issue related to crew size is that PTC systems
generally require manually entered inputs at the start of a trip and
after a shutdown of the system during train operations. The train crew
must enter information that the system will use as parameters for safe
operation. These data entry tasks provide another source of workload
and distraction, yet they are highly important because manual entry
errors can have safety implications. With a one-person crew, the task
burden would fall on the sole crewmember. Although a railroad might
consider that if there is only one-person in the locomotive cab, the
person should not operate without the PTC system operational,
reinitializing the PTC system after it has initiated a penalty brake
application can be a complex and time-consuming procedure. On one
railroad described in the research, the procedure is so complex,
difficult to follow, and time-consuming that, during the PTC system's
trial period, the locomotive engineers were allowed to forego
reinitializing the PTC system. However, the study noted that once the
system

becomes fully operational, running a train without PTC activated may no
longer be an option.
    This study is important to the crew size issue because it
challenges the possibility that a train with PTC is inherently safe
with only a one-person crew and that no safety analysis or FRA
oversight of the operation is warranted. The study concluded that
although PTC technologies have the potential to improve safety and
efficiency of railroad operations, they also have the potential to
create new failure modes and impose new cognitive demands on locomotive
engineers who need to monitor PTC displays and provide inputs to the
system. For example, without PTC technology, locomotive engineers are
highly engaged with the train operation, noticing visual cues (i.e.,
landmarks and mileposts), monitoring radio communications of other
trains, and relaying information by radio to other trains about
potential hazards. Some locomotive engineers even indicated that they
get a variety of sensory-based cues that help them perceive their
location, such as vibrations associated with a portion of track or a
smell that reminds them they are near a farm. The research suggests
that because the PTC technology may require locomotive engineers to
focus more of their attention on in-cab displays, it will reduce their
ability to monitor activity outside the cab and raises a question about
whether the engineers will lose any situational awareness in relation
to the coherent mental picture (i.e., the situation model) of where the
engineer perceives the train to be based on prior experience.
Typically, a locomotive engineer will use that situation model to help
the engineer anticipate future events. Furthermore, the research
concluded that train crews must avoid too much reliance on the new
train control technologies because, if the system ever fails, the
engineer must still be able to operate the train safely.
    (5) ``Using Cognitive Task Analysis to Inform Issues in Human
Systems Integration in Railroad Operations-Human Factors in Railroad
Operations,'' Final Report, dated May 2013, DOT/FRA/ORD-13/31. The
research and report was performed by the John A. Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center and can be found online at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04589.
    Human Systems Integration (HSI) is defined as a systematic,
organization-wide approach to implementing new technologies and
modernizing existing systems that emphasizes the importance of the end-
user in the system acquisition process. FRA sponsored this research
because it would like the railroad industry to consider HSI when
implementing new technologies such as PTC, energy management systems
(EMS), and electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes in the
locomotive cab. The expectation is that an HSI approach to railroad
technology acquisition and implementation can increase user acceptance
and usability of the technology, as well as increase the likelihood
that it is deployed successfully. This report provides guidance to the
industry with respect to the need for HSI in the technology acquisition
process, and more specifically, how to use Cognitive Task Analysis
(CTA) methods and results as part of the HSI process.
    The nature of the work associated with many railway worker
positions (e.g., locomotive engineers, conductors, and roadway workers)
is rapidly shifting from being primarily physical to placing greater
emphasis on cognitive demands (e.g., monitoring, supervising automated
systems, planning, communicating and coordinating, and handling
unanticipated situations). CTA methods provide a means to explicitly
identify the knowledge and mental processing demands of work so as to
be able to anticipate contributors to performance problems (e.g., lack
of information, high attention demands, inaccurate understanding) and
specify ways to improve individual and team performance (be it through
new forms of training, user interfaces, or decision-aids). CTAs can
inform all aspects of HSI starting from early system requirements
exploration and definition through late stage validation and field
testing. The information in the report can serve as a lead-in to the
kinds of insights that can be drawn from performing a CTA when
introducing new technologies into railroad operations, as well as a
starting point for the industry as far as identifying the likely
emerging issues that need to be explored as a result of the
introduction of new technology. For example, CTA methods can examine
how the introduction of PTC might impact the monitoring demands placed
on locomotive engineers, or alter the patterns of communication between
locomotive engineers and other railroad workers. CTA methods can inform
the design of systems that are more likely to be successful when
deployed by ensuring that they address the specific performance
challenges users face and are sensitive to the larger system context. A
CTA can be used to better understand the various roles and
responsibilities associated with each crew position to be able to
assess which of those roles and responsibilities are eliminated (or
taken on) by the new technology and which remain and must be accounted
for in some other way if the crew position is eliminated. FRA has
significantly aided this HSI analysis by previously sponsoring CTA
reports that focused on railroad dispatchers, roadway worker
activities, locomotive engineers, and freight train conductors (the two
latter reports were previously described in this preamble section).
    The report cites a prior research finding that the introduction of
new technology does not necessarily guarantee improved human-machine
system performance. Woods, D. & Dekker, S., ``Anticipating the effects
of technological change: A new era of dynamics for human factors,''
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 1(3), 272-282 (2000);
National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Human-System Design
Support for Changing Technology, ``Human-System Integration in the
System Development Process,'' National Academies Press (2007), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11893; and Wreathall, J., Woods,
D.D., Bing, A.J. & Christoffersen, K., ``Relative risk of workload
transitions in positive train control,'' Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration. DOT/FRA/
ORD-07/12 (2007), http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/42000/42400/42472/ord0712.pdf.
Poor use of technology can create additional workload for system users,
can result in systems that are difficult to learn or use, or, in the
extreme, can result in systems that are more likely to lead to
catastrophic errors. The introduction of new technology results in the
following types of common changes in operating practice: (1) Changes in
practitioner roles, including emergence of new tasks; (2) changes in
what is routine and what is exceptional; (3) changes to the kinds of
human errors that can occur; and (4) people in their various roles
adapting by actively altering tools and strategies to achieve goals and
avoid failure. HSI is a way to employ a comprehensive analysis, design,
and evaluation process that mitigates the risk of designing systems
that create potential mismatches between the technology and the human
operator limitations or capabilities. For example, in reviewing the
freight train conductor CTA and how it could inform the HSI process
regarding issues of one versus two-person train crew operation, the
study concluded that ``[i]t is not clear how the introduction of PTC
will affect cognitive and collaborative

processes, but findings suggest that it will not account for all the
cognitive and physical support functions the conductor currently
provides.''
    The study found that there are other CTA methods that can be used
to provide more fine-grained input to HSI analysis and design
activities. For example, there are CTA methods that provide a more
detailed, second-by-second description of the mental processes (e.g.,
perceptual processes, attention processes, memory store and retrieval
processes) involved in performing complex cognitive tasks such as
operating a train. The study provides descriptions and citations to
these recent attempts to examine the microlevel (second-by-second)
information processing involved in operating the train over a route.
These more microcognitive-level analyses can be particularly helpful
for analyzing attention and workload demands at an in-depth level.
    In the emerging issues section of the report, the study explained
that if a railroad chooses to transition to one-person operations based
on technology such as PTC, a proper HSI analysis would require that the
railroad answer certain fundamental questions about the operation for
the system designers. For instance, will the engineer still be
responsible for manually operating the train? If not, when will the
engineer manually control the train? When will the software
(automation) system operate the train with the engineer acting as
supervisor? And, when will the roles be blended? Answers to these
questions may introduce additional concerns. For example, situational
awareness and operator vigilance may become more of a concern when the
engineer's role becomes more supervisory. If crew size is reduced to
one person, how will the reduction in crew size impact safety when the
one-person crew is used to relying on cooperative strategies with the
second person that fosters shared situational awareness and creates
safety nets?
    (6) ``Teamwork in U.S. Railroad Operations,'' A Conference, April
23-24, 2009, Irvine, California, Transportation Research Board, Number
E-C159, dated December 2011. The many authors of the research and
reports are listed in the publication which can be found online at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/circulars/ec159.pdf.
    This conference report discusses the key aspects of successful
teams, such as train crews. The Transportation Research Board is a
division of the National Research Council, and an independent adviser
to the Federal government and others on scientific and technical
questions of national importance. This particular conference drew upon
the expertise of researchers and operating personnel concerned with
human performance and human factors research issues related to railroad
operations. The following is a summary of some of the relevant
discussions in the conference report. The report contains citations to
the research each presenter relied on in forming their analyses and
conclusions.
    One central theme is that teams do not become expert without
guidance. They must be trained according to the established scientific
principles. But training alone is not enough. To facilitate its
success, organizations must promote and reinforce teamwork behaviors.
Long-term organizational commitment is crucial to demonstrating that
teamwork training is not just a fad, but is a central component of
company policies and procedures. In other words, there needs to be a
``culture of teamwork'' embedded within the organization.
    Team performance can be improved when members effectively
communicate. One effective example is when crews use periods of low
workload to plan ahead, so that if a difficult situation arose, the
explicit discussions become the basis for actions. Of course, a
question implied from this report is that if the train crew consists of
only one person, can the lone crewmember plan ahead during periods of
low workload to the same extent as a crew of two or more persons who
understand how to effectively communicate? Unfortunately, the
conference report does not answer this implied question.
    There are five critical components of teamwork: Mutual performance
monitoring, backup behavior, adaptability, team leadership, and team
orientation. Although not addressed by the conference report, arguably
three of these strengths of teamwork are lost when the team consists of
only one person. Team orientation refers to a person's tendency to
prefer working with others, which could certainly be problematic if a
person with a team orientation is ordered to operate a train as a one-
person team. Mutual performance monitoring refers to the ability to
keep track of fellow team members' work while carrying out their own,
to ensure that everything is running as expected, and to ensure that
they are following procedures correctly. Mutual performance monitoring
is necessary in teams in order to prevent teams from making errors and
enable teams to engage in backup behaviors. Backup behavior occurs when
a team member recognizes that another team member is in need of aid and
offers assistance. Backup behavior requires team members to know enough
about other team members' responsibilities to anticipate their needs.
Research has identified three types of backup behavior: (1) Providing
feedback to improve performance, (2) assisting a teammate in performing
a task, and (3) completing a task for a team member who is overloaded.
The benefits of mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior are
simply lost when the team consists of a single employee.
    One comment FRA heard during the RSAC Working Group meetings was
that multiple person train crews could be less safe than a one-person
crew because sometimes crewmembers distract each other from the train
operation activities. This issue was addressed in the conference report
with regard to a discussion of how expert teams perform versus non-
expert teams. An example was given of a train accident in which a
student engineer was allowed to operate a train independently,
receiving no guidance through supervisor role modeling or feedback
prior to a collision. The incident was an exemplary prototype of a non-
expert team because not only were the crewmembers not trained
adequately with effective feedback prior to the day of the accident,
but also communication and coordination completely broke down between
all team members directly before the incident. In contrast, expert
teams have a clear and common purpose, as well as an understanding of
each individual member's roles. It is that understanding that allows
expert team members to anticipate each other's actions and back each
other up when needed, as well as coordinate without explicit and
lengthy communication. Furthermore, unlike non-expert teams, expert
teams engage in a regular cycle of prebrief, performance, and debrief.
This performance cycle engages the expert teams to identify high and
low priorities, revise goals and plans, identify lessons learned, and
evaluate whether the team is or is not effective both in performing the
task and identifying the needs of team members. The research in the
conference report concludes that the main advantage of developing
expert teams is that they have higher levels of performance. For
example, expert teams make better decisions and fewer errors, which in
turn enable expert teams to have a higher probability of mission
success.
    In yet another of the presentations in the conference report, an
issue raised was whether internal and external

communications of train crewmembers could be captured to consider the
impact of new technology, such as PTC, on crew interactions and
performance. The report states that making the most of new technologies
to improve efficiency while maintaining safety and augmenting
effectiveness will always present challenges, but that prudent
application of team science in general and of communications analysis
in particular can both facilitate their achievement and enhance their
utility. The report explains that those technologies place new demands
on train crews in terms of tasks to be performed, skills required, and
the size and mix of both onboard and distributed teams. FRA notes that,
based on RSAC Working Group discussions, some railroads appear ready to
reduce train crew size from two persons to one, upon implementation of
PTC, under what FRA and the presenters of this report suggest would be
a wrong presumption that with PTC there would be less tasks for the
crew to do or the tasks would be easier to accomplish with a single
person. The report counters that presumption and suggests that the
impact is unknown until PTC is implemented and the impact it would have
on a two-person crew is studied.

C. The Acknowledged Limitations of FRA Accident/Incident Reporting Data

    FRA's accident/incident data is derived from the agency's
requirements for railroads to record and self-report specific
information to FRA. The purpose of FRA's accident/incident
recordkeeping and reporting regulation, contained in 49 CFR part 225,
is ``to provide the Federal Railroad Administration with accurate
information concerning the hazards and risks that exist on the Nation's
railroads. FRA needs this information to effectively carry out its
statutory responsibilities under 49 U.S.C. chapters 201-213. FRA also
uses this information for determining comparative trends of railroad
safety and to develop hazard elimination and risk reduction programs
that focus on preventing railroad injuries and accidents.'' 49 CFR
225.1. Over the life of the part 225 regulation, FRA has amended these
requirements in an effort to require railroads to improve the accuracy
of their reporting. See 75 FR 68862, 68863-64 (providing an overview of
part 225 and recent amendments). FRA does not investigate every
reportable accident/incident, but frequently conducts audits and
investigations to ensure that railroads are accurately reporting. In
2013, FRA conducted its own investigation of 89 train accidents/
incidents that FRA determined might have greater significance to the
industry or the general public. FRA did not have the resources to
investigate all of the 1,781 train accidents/incidents railroads
reported to FRA in 2013. FRA is not aware that any of the accidents/
incidents it investigated involved a one-person crew operation.
    Part 225's central provision requires that each railroad subject to
part 225 submit to FRA monthly reports of all accidents and incidents
that meet FRA's reporting criteria. 49 CFR 225.11. Railroad accidents/
incidents are divided into three groups, each of which corresponds to
the type of reporting form that a railroad must file with FRA: (1)
Highway-rail grade crossing accidents/incidents (FRA Form F 6180.57);
(2) rail equipment accidents/incidents (FRA Form F 6180.54); and (3)
deaths, injuries and occupational illnesses (FRA Form F 6180.55a). See
49 CFR 225.19. For the reporting of deaths, injuries, and occupational
illnesses that result from an event or exposure arising from the
operation of a railroad, the FRA forms do not request that the railroad
record the number of crewmembers as that distinction is unlikely to be
pertinent to accident analysis for those types of accidents/incidents;
instead, FRA only requires that the railroad report which crewmembers
were injured, killed, or suffered an illness. Thus, it is impossible to
search FRA's accident/incident database for those forms to find whether
a death, injury, or occupational illness did arise from the operation
of a train with a one-person crew. Meanwhile, for the first and second
group, highway-rail grade crossing accidents/incidents and rail
equipment accidents/incidents, the FRA forms record the number of
crewmembers. The highway-rail grade crossing accidents/incidents form
records the number of people on the train at the time of the accident
(both passengers and train crew). The rail equipment accidents/
incidents form records the number of crewmembers in boxes 40-43, with
four different work positions listed: Engineer/Operator, Fireman,
Conductor, and Brakeman. Obviously, FRA does not see as many Fireman
and Brakeman listed as it once did, but they are still occasionally
listed. The railroad must record the number of each type of crewmember
that was working on the train at the time of the accident/incident.
Thus, FRA is able to search the records to determine how many train
crewmembers were assigned to a train that was involved in a reportable
rail equipment accident/incident or a grade crossing accident.
    FRA is considering including in the final rule a requirement to
report train crew size data in the deaths, injuries, and occupational
illnesses accident report form. Such a regulatory change would allow
FRA to have crew staffing information and to better assess the
performance of train crews with less than two members. The benefits of
this proposed change would be evaluated while FRA conducts a future
comprehensive reform of its accident/incident reporting forms to
modernize and meet data needs. As it relates to crew staffing and its
characteristics, the impetus for this effort originated during the RSAC
Working Group meetings regarding train crew size. This effort made it
clear that there is a need to improve both the quality and the scope
related to the collection of information of train crew staffing safety.
As presented above, existing data forms do collect information about
the number of crewmembers involved in a train accident. However,
current reporting requirements do not provide all the information
required to assess the safety performance of crews with less than two
members. Likewise, FRA data needs outside of this rulemaking are
numerous and need to be contemplated. For these reasons, FRA is engaged
in an effort to review and determine what data collection practices
need to be changed. However, FRA also concluded that this effort has to
be thoughtful and broad to ensure it collects high quality data. FRA is
considering how to prioritize items and decide what data to collect on
items such as ECP brakes, PTC, or crude oil or ethanol transportation
by rail. All these matters are of high priority and would have to be
considered in a comprehensive manner to minimize information collection
burden on the regulated community. This NPRM is useful to request
public input as it pertains to crew staffing data and determine what
type of information collection needs to be refined or what
clarification in the part 225 guidance needs to be amended to ensure
forms are completed correctly. This input would be used to inform a
future rulemaking that would propose changes to part 225, FRA Form F
6180.54, and its related guidance.
    For the benefit of the RSAC Working Group, FRA reviewed nearly 12
years of railroad safety data between January 2002 and October 2013 by
searching the F 6180.54 rail equipment accidents/incidents forms. FRA
manually reviewed 1,443 reports and applied several filters to
eliminate redundant reports, other than human-factor caused

accidents/incidents, accidents/incidents that occurred within railroad
yards, and accidents/incidents involving railroad maintenance
equipment. After applying these filters, FRA was left with accidents/
incidents that railroads informed FRA were caused by human error and
involved a one-person crew operating on main track. The result of this
review was that FRA identified 28 human-factor caused accidents/
incidents involving one-person crews operating conventionally and four
accidents/incidents involving remotely controlled operations on main
track. Since FRA does not capture data that would provide information
regarding the total operating mileage for one-person crew operations in
the United States (or even two-person operations), it is impossible for
FRA to normalize the data and be able to compare the accident/incident
rate of one-person operations to that of two-person train crew
operations to see if one-person operations appear safer or less safe.
Additionally, one-person operations over this period are not constant
and use of one-person train crews for operations on main track appear
to be increasing over the past several years, so there are additional
factors that could make historical rates less of an indicator of
current or future rates.
    The accident/incident reports involving one-person train crews also
do not clearly help determine that the accident/incident would have
been prevented by having multiple crewmembers. FRA requires railroads
to determine the primary cause of a rail equipment accident/incident
and enter a primary cause code on the form. If possible, railroads are
also encouraged to enter a contributing cause code on the form as well.
FRA does not have a cause code that a railroad could use to indicate
that a one-person train crew caused the accident. In other words, there
is no cause code that directly suggests that the reporting railroad
believes the accident/incident could have been prevented by having a
second crewmember. Even if FRA were to add such a code, a railroad
would have a disincentive to use it as doing so might suggest that the
railroad employ more crewmembers, increasing wage costs. Of course, if
a railroad thought that only having one person was a factor, FRA has a
cause code, M599, that may be used when no other cause codes apply. If
M599 is used, the railroad must describe the events in a narrative.
Furthermore, FRA relies on each railroad to self-report a description
of the accident/incident, as well as the primary and contributing
causes. Without an accurate description and identification of the
causes, FRA personnel reviewing the report might not believe there is
the potential that a second person could have helped prevent the
accident/incident.
    After RSAC failed to reach consensus, FRA conducted additional
accident/incident data searches in an effort to determine whether there
were any trends that could be identified. FRA looked at whether any
data might have suggested a safety problem with MMA, which operated the
train in the tragic Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident described earlier, or
with any problems with shortline railroads that were similar in size to
MMA. Rather than compare MMA to the entire railroad industry which
could provide a distorted result (as just a few accidents on a
shortline might make it look like it has a high accident rate compared
to a major railroad that operates many more miles over the course of a
year), FRA compared MMA to its shortline peers. In 2012, the last full
year before the accident, MMA had about 160,000 total miles. FRA
reviewed its accident/incident database from 2003 through April 2014
and compared MMA to the 52 other railroads that had total miles in 2012
of between 100,000 and 200,000. FRA also looked at the data to see if
it could determine the number of accidents for each of these
shortlines, with and without one-person crews. For the one-person
crews, FRA was able to isolate train accidents where hazardous
materials were in the train, and eliminate remote control operations
and any operation that occurred on yard track.
    The data concerning MMA and its shortline peers revealed that
nearly half of the 52 shortlines (25, or 48 percent) had at least one
accident where hazardous materials were in the train, but that MMA had
the worst record in this category. MMA had 18 accidents, which was
twice as many as its closest shortline peer. MMA's 18 accidents
accounted for 23 percent of the 78 total number of accidents in its
shortline peer group where hazardous materials were in the train.
Although only 4 of these 78 accidents/incidents occurred with a one-
person crew (about 5 percent), 2 of the 4 occurred on MMA. Looking at
all one-person crew train accidents in which a MMA shortline railroad
peer reported the cause to be a human factor failure, MMA reported no
such accidents and 9 of MMA's shortline peers reported a total of 13.
Consequently, while it can be determined that the two MMA one-person
crew accidents involving hazardous materials in the train were not
reported by MMA to be caused by a human factor failure, the data
suggests that MMA stood out as having significantly more accidents
involving trains carrying hazardous materials than its peers.
    When looking at all train accidents in which a MMA shortline
railroad peer reported the cause to be a human factor failure, MMA
reported four such accidents, 4 of MMA's shortline peers also reported
4 such accidents, 13 of MMA's shortline peers reported more than 4 such
accidents, and 39 of MMA's shortline peers, including MMA, reported a
total of 153 human factor failure caused accidents. Including MMA, over
70 percent of MMA's shortline peers had at least one train accident
caused by human factor failure, and 25 percent had more human factor
failure train accidents than MMA. Thus, MMA did not stand out among its
peers as having a much higher number of accidents attributed to human
factor failure. FRA believes that even in cases where problematic one-
person train operations cannot be identified by their number of past
human factor accidents, FRA would be able to identify such operations
with other information including inspection reports, and the railroad's
description of operations and contingency plans to evaluate the safety
culture and overall emergency preparedness to handle one-person
operations.
    If FRA were only to focus on the one-person crew safety data prior
to the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident, it would have been difficult to
make the case that MMA did not have a good enough safety record to
operate one-person train crews as MMA did not have any accidents/
incidents that it attributed to human factor failure of the one-person
train crew. It also only had 2 one-person crew accidents involving
hazardous materials in the train over the more than 10-year period
analyzed. However, if this NPRM is finalized, FRA could use the data
suggesting MMA had significantly more accidents involving trains
carrying hazardous materials than its peers to have MMA address safety
issues to reduce the overall high number of accidents before providing
FRA approval of the continuance of a one-person train operation or
approval for a new one-person operation. See 49 CFR 218.133 and
218.135.
    Furthermore, this is an example of when the limitations of FRA's
safety data would not help make a direct case that one-person
operations are less safe than multiperson train crews but may still
provide some possible basis for this proposed rule. That is, FRA's
safety data suggests that a particular railroad that has a higher rate
of train accidents

where hazardous materials are in the train could find itself more
likely to continue that trend regardless of the size of the crew,
assuming the railroad takes no action to further prevent such accidents
from occurring. And if such accidents were to eventually occur, FRA has
found that multiperson train crews are better equipped to protect each
other, other railroad workers, railroad equipment, the environment, and
the general public, because they have more options available to them
for taking mitigation measures than a single crewmember. Thus, a
derailment might occur, regardless of the number of train crewmembers,
but it might be the actions of the train crew post-accident that
determine the severity of the damages or injuries that result. This may
be especially so when hazardous materials are present in the train or
are in other trains operating on the same or adjacent track.
    While data and information about one-person operations around the
world are limited, evidence found by FRA and explained in the
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) that accompanies this rulemaking
indicates that the safety records of these foreign operations are
acceptable. FRA also found that most of these foreign operations would
meet the requirements in one of the exceptions of the proposed rule
(due to their size), and that most foreign governments have a role in
the implementation of one-person crews (where they exist). Another
factor to consider is that railroad workers in other countries have a
more predictable work schedule, fewer working hours per week, and more
opportunities to rest. See RIA Table 4. Nonetheless, FRA requests
public comment on the lessons learned from these nations to implement
one-person crews under a balanced regulatory oversight. Additionally,
FRA requests public input about the safety performance of passenger and
freight rail operations with less than two people in other countries.
This is important because FRA could not find specific data on the
safety records of international one-person crew passenger operations
that do and do not meet the proposed exceptions.
    Finally, railroads have achieved an improving safety record during
a period in which the industry largely employed two-person train crews.
FRA has no empirical evidence to suggest a causal relationship between
these variables rather than a correlative one. In fact, it is possible
that one-person crews have contributed to the improving safety record.
Comparing calendar year 2004 to 2013, total accidents/incidents are
down over 21.5 percent and human factor-caused train accidents/
incidents are down over 50 percent. Over that same period, the number
of reportable train accidents/incidents has decreased from 3,385 in
2004 to 1,781 in 2013, a decrease of over 47 percent. The normalized
frequency index of 2.380 per one million train miles for 2013
represents the safest year in that 10-year period, and is a decrease of
nearly 46 percent from 2004. Meanwhile, it is impossible to keep data
on how many accidents/incidents were prevented by having a properly
trained two-person crew, where each crewmember understood each other's
duties and together could perform as an expert team. Thus, although the
limitations of the data collected make it difficult to make a
straightforward finding that one-person operations are more or less
safe than two-person operations, FRA's approval process in this NPRM is
expected to provide some insight into exposing dangerous operations and
lead to safety improvements for those railroads that want to reduce the
number of train crewmembers to less than two.

D. FRA's Regulations Were Designed for at Least Two Crewmembers

    During the Working Group's first meeting, FRA presented the
agency's position that many of the Federal rail safety regulations were
written with the expectation that each train would have multiple
crewmembers. That does not mean that FRA expects that at least two
crewmembers will be in the cab of the controlling locomotive at all
times, which may surprise some people who are not familiar with a wide-
variety of railroad operations. A typical freight locomotive is founded
with the expectation that multiple crewmembers could be working in the
cab of the controlling locomotive. However, there are many operating
circumstances in which a second crewmember could more effectively
safeguard the operation by being somewhere other than the locomotive
cab of the controlling locomotive and it would be difficult for a one-
person train crew to perform the same operation. Because a railroad's
operating rules and practices for a one-person operation will be a bit
different than for multiple person train crews, some safeguards will be
lost and new methods of operation will be developed to try and plug any
regulatory holes. Without a crew size regulation, railroads would be
free to jettison certain requirements that apply to multiple person
crews without specifically being required to fully consider the
potential safety repercussions. The following background explains some
of the Federal rail safety requirements that will not work as intended
when one-person train crews are deployed.
1. Difficulty Providing Point Protection for Shoving or Pushing
Movements
    For shoving or pushing movements, a second crewmember routinely
provides point protection where the controlling locomotive is the
furthest car in the train from the leading end. See 49 CFR 218.99. In
that case, a second crewmember riding the leading end or being on the
ground in radio communication with the train's locomotive engineer may
be the safest practice. A one-person train crew, operating any train of
a significant length, may have difficulty determining that the track is
clear for the shoving or pushing movement without the assistance of
another person. Shoving blind, i.e., not protecting the movement, would
violate the Federal rule.
    Passenger and commuter locomotives do not always have room for a
second crewmember in the locomotive control compartment, but a second
person may still be necessary to provide assistance for shoving or
pushing movements. Pushing or shoving movements are routine operations
and thus FRA's expectation is that few trains could perform these
movements safely with only a one-person crew. We note, however, that
the point protection rule permits use of cameras for performing these
movements. See 49 CFR 218.99(b)(3)(i).
2. Complications Returning Switches to the Normal Position and Loss of
Job Briefings
    In a typical multiple crewmember operation, the locomotive engineer
would rarely be expected to leave the cab of the controlling locomotive
to perform operational work. However, in a one-person operation, unless
all switches can be operated from the locomotive or by a non-crewmember
in accordance with a railroad's operating procedures, the locomotive
engineer would encounter logistical difficulties in throwing some
switches and then returning those switches and locking them in the
normal position after use. See 49 CFR 218.103 through 218.107. If the
one-person crew were to throw the switches and return them to the
normal position, the person would need to walk back and forth the
length of the train each time a switch was returned to the normal
position.
    The Federal regulations concerning throwing switches anticipate
that the crewmembers will conduct job briefings ``before work is begun,
each time a work plan is changed, and at completion of

the work.'' See, 49 CFR 218.103(b)(1). The regulation does not
anticipate that a train crew consisting of one-person would be exempt
from the job briefing requirements, although it seems absurd to think
that any one-person train crews would need to hold job briefings with
themselves. However, one of the most important benefits of a job
briefing, with each crewmember's input, is potentially lost when there
is a one-person operation. That is, a lone crewmember cannot benefit
from another crewmember's experience about the best way to safely
perform the operation. Under routine operations, one-person crewmembers
will decide for themselves how best to proceed. The one-person
crewmember will also assess the factual circumstances of a situation by
themselves, without the benefit of any additional crewmembers'
observations. Although a railroad could implement procedures to address
certain types of operations that can aid a one-person crew, such a
briefing may not be able to duplicate all of the information that a
fellow crewmember could.
3. Concerns Protecting Train Passengers in an Emergency
    During the first Working Group meeting, FRA made a presentation
regarding FRA's passenger train emergency preparedness rule (49 CFR
part 239) and explained how multiple train crewmembers are typically
necessary in order to fulfill the purpose of the rule. The purpose of
the passenger train emergency preparedness rule ``is to reduce the
magnitude and severity of casualties in railroad operations by ensuring
that railroads involved in passenger train operations can effectively
and efficiently manage passenger train emergencies.'' 49 CFR 239.1(a).
There are numerous ways that crewmembers, other than the locomotive
engineer, can assist the passengers in an emergency. Emergencies can
require evacuations in various types of circumstances where a trained
person would be helpful to guide passengers away from danger. For
example, passengers that self-evacuate might not realize that they
could step on an electrified rail or be struck by a train approaching
on an adjacent track. Evacuations in remote areas, in tunnels, or on
bridges also pose significant dangers to passengers and are places
where crewmembers are required to be trained on safe methods to assist
passengers. A one-person crew would have significant difficulty
coordinating any type of evacuation, especially in difficult terrain,
if the crewmember cannot walk from car to car, or if there are large
numbers of passengers. Furthermore, although signs for train passengers
can be useful, signs have limited value for reliably instructing
passengers on when it is safe or unsafe to evacuate under all
conditions.
4. Deterrence of Electronic Device Distraction and Observing Alcohol or
Drug Impairment; Reduced Possibility of Co-Worker Referrals
    Another issue that could be a concern with a one-person train crew
is whether there is adequate supervision to determine that the person
is not reporting for duty under the influence of or impaired by alcohol
or drugs. With multiple train crewmembers, a second crewmember might
suspect that a person has used, or is using or possessing alcohol or
drugs on railroad property. Working with a potentially impaired co-
worker is a safety hazard that puts other crewmembers in direct
conflict with one another. For that reason, FRA has developed minimum
standards for co-worker report policies that allow the employee
suspected of abuse to get treatment and rehabilitation, with the
potential to return to railroad safety-sensitive work under certain
conditions. See 49 CFR 219.405 and 219.407 (permitting a railroad to
implement an alternate co-worker policy with the written concurrence of
the recognized representatives of a particular class or craft of
covered employees). The co-worker referral policy makes it more
palatable for an employee to turn in a potentially impaired co-worker,
knowing that the co-worker will have an opportunity to get professional
help without the co-worker necessarily losing his or her job, and not
having to work side-by-side with that impaired co-worker.
    Although a one-person crew may be subject to pre-employment
testing, random testing, and testing for cause, each of these types of
tests do not apply to shortline railroads which have a total of 15 or
fewer employees who are covered under the hours of service laws and do
not operate on the tracks of any other U.S. railroad. Additionally,
even if a one-person crew is potentially subject to each of those
tests, the person will not be tested before, during, or after every
tour of duty. Thus, a one-person crew has more opportunity, especially
on the smallest shortline operations, to conceal a drug or alcohol
violation, than the person would if there were two or more crewmembers.
    Similarly, without a second crewmember to monitor the sole
crewmember's attentiveness, there is a risk that more locomotive
engineers will be tempted to use cell phones and other prohibited
electronic devices when nobody is around to observe them. When FRA
issued a final rule restricting railroad operating employees from using
cellular telephones and other electronic devices, FRA noted that
distracted driving impacts all transportation modes because these
devices have become ubiquitous in American society. See 75 FR 59580,
59582, Sep. 27, 2010, promulgated at 49 CFR part 220, subpart C. In the
justification for the rulemaking, FRA stated that it discovered
numerous examples of the dangers posed by distracting electronic
devices and described five rail accidents indicating the necessity for
the restrictions. FRA's electronic device distraction rulemaking also
stated that ``it is difficult to identify distraction and its role in a
crash'' if it goes unreported by the operator of the vehicle. 75 FR at
59582 (describing how data on the number of motorcoach crashes may
potentially understate the true size of the problem because ``self-
reporting of negative behavior, such as distracted driving, is likely
lower than actual occurrence of that behavior). Thus, a second
crewmember could act as both a deterrent to any crewmembers using
electronic devices in a prohibited manner and as a witness reporting
such inappropriate electronic device usage during an accident/incident
investigation.
5. Complicating Radio Communication Procedures
    Some radio and wireless communication requirements were written
with the expectation that there would be at least two crewmembers on a
train. For example, FRA requires that an employee copying a mandatory
directive received by radio transmission shall not be an employee
operating the controls of moving equipment. See 49 CFR 220.61. Copying
a mandatory directive would clearly be distracting to a person who was
attempting to operate a train simultaneously, which explains why it is
strictly prohibited. Certainly, a one-person train crew could stop a
train to receive a mandatory directive by radio, but there is a
question whether railroads have thought through all the safety
implications of stopping the train. The train may be going at a high
enough speed that it would take over a mile to stop the train, or the
train might be in a territory where a steep grade or other physical
conditions make stopping the train logistically difficult. One would
hope that the mandatory directive would not impact the train operation
immediately before the one-person crew

could safely stop the train to receive the transmission.
    The different ways a multiple person crew can handle a radio
communication failure also is indicative of how an FRA regulation was
written with the expectation that there would be more than one train
crewmember. Under most circumstances, FRA's railroad communication
regulation requires a train to have a working radio in each occupied
controlling locomotive, and in a second locomotive for purposes of
``communication redundancy.'' 49 CFR 220.9. If the controlling
locomotive's radio fails en route, the crewmembers have the back-up
radio in the second locomotive to use to avoid a radio blackout.
    Trains with multiple crewmembers have an option not available to
one-person crews. In cases of radio malfunction, it may be necessary to
have a crewmember located in the second locomotive to monitor the
dispatcher's communications as long as the crewmembers can otherwise
communicate while the train is moving. However, if the train was a one-
person operation, the lone crewmember would certainly not be able to
operate from a locomotive not on the leading end, so the one-person
crew would have to either try and swap out the locomotives so that the
one on the leading end had a working radio to communicate with the
dispatcher, or the one-person crew would need to find a way to notify
the dispatcher as soon as practicable that radio communication has been
lost. 49 CFR 220.38. With a multiple person operation, swapping the
locomotives would likely involve a crewmember getting off the train and
lining switches. Swapping the locomotives could be logistically
difficult for a one-person crew depending on the track configurations
encountered and the method of operation. Although a one-person crew
could operate the train without a working radio to the nearest forward
point where the radio can be repaired or replaced, doing so is not as
safe an option as utilizing the redundant communication in the second
locomotive with a working radio--an option more likely to be utilized
with a multiple-person train crew.
6. Adding a Potential Safety Hazard to Highway-Rail Grade Crossing
Activation Failures
    The general public is directly impacted when a highway-rail grade
crossing fails to activate because that means motor vehicle traffic
would not receive any warning of an approaching train. Protecting the
public is paramount to train operation, and FRA requires that a train
can only proceed through the crossing when other steps are taken to
protect highway users from approaching trains. 49 CFR 234.105. If a
railroad has enough time to arrange for an equipped flagger or a
uniformed law enforcement officer to be at the crossing, then the train
may proceed through the crossing without stopping, albeit at
potentially a slower than normal speed depending on the number of
flaggers/officers. However, if a railroad does not have enough time to
make other arrangements, the only other method that will allow the
train to proceed through the crossing is if the train stops prior to
entering the crossing in order to permit a crewmember to dismount to
flag highway traffic to a stop. The flagging crewmember is not allowed
to reboard the train until the locomotive has completed its procession
through the crossing. Hence, under FRA's regulations, a one-person crew
could not stop and flag the crossing without a non-crewmember flagger
or a uniformed law enforcement officer's assistance.
    Certainly, a railroad's on-time efficiency would be negatively
impacted by the activation failure because a train with a one-person
crew would have no choice but to wait until a flagger or officer
arrived before proceeding through the crossing. Depending on the
circumstances, the general public might also be negatively impacted.
For example, if the train was forced to stop in a highly populated
area, nearby citizens and businesses might be inconvenienced by the
locomotive engine noise or exhaust fumes. Another concern is whether
the train stopped clear of all other crossings. Highway users and local
emergency responders may be significantly inconvenienced if the
railroad and one-person train crew were unable to plan a safe place to
stop the train without blocking other grade crossings. Planning a safe
place to stop the train is typically considered a conductor's job, but
with only one crewmember the one-person crew has no one else to help.
Motor vehicle drivers or local emergency responders would not be given
any advance warning of the blocked crossing or any information
regarding when the crossing would no longer be blocked. Such poor
planning can infuriate motor vehicle drivers and lead these drivers to
take risks not to get caught waiting for a train the next time they see
a grade crossing warning system begin to activate. In some cases, such
poor planning could compromise the ability of local emergency services
to respond. Thus, there is the potential for immediate and future
repercussions when there is only a one-person train crew and no ability
to quickly flag the crossing.

E. Defining the Crewmembers' Qualifications

    In this proposed rule, FRA chose not to define the duties of the
two mandatory crewmembers. FRA previously fulfilled its statutory
obligations to promulgate regulations requiring certain minimum
standards for locomotive engineers and conductors. 49 U.S.C. 20135 and
20163 and 49 CFR parts 240 and 242. FRA believes that each locomotive