if the line or equipment has been tested and found to be deenergized,
it may become reenergized through contact with another source of
electric energy or by someone reenergizing it at its points of control.
Proposed section 1926.961 contains requirements for deenergizing
electric power transmission and distribution lines and equipment.
Unless the procedures contained in that section have been followed,
lines and equipment cannot reliably be considered as deenergized.
Proposed paragraph (b)(2) has been taken from the last sentence of the
introductory text of Sec.  1910.269(l)(1).
    Two-person rule. If an employee working on or near energized
electric power transmission or distribution lines or equipment is
injured by an electric shock, a second employee will be needed to
provide emergency care to the injured employee. As noted under the
summary and explanation of Sec.  1926.951(b)(1) discussed earlier in
this preamble, CPR must begin within 4 minutes after an employee loses
consciousness as a result of an electric shock. OSHA is proposing to
require the presence of a second employee during certain types of work
on or near electric power transmission or distribution lines or
equipment to ensure that CPR begins as soon as possible and to help
ensure that it starts within the 4-minute window. (Note that Sec.
1926.951(b)(1) would require at least two people trained in emergency
first aid procedures, including CPR, for field work involving two or
more employees at a work location. Also, note that, in the discussion
of that proposed paragraph, OSHA is requesting comments on whether to
require AEDs along with training in CPR.)
    Paragraph (b)(3)(i) of proposed Sec.  1926.960 would require
(unless exempted by paragraph (b)(3)(ii)) the presence of at least two
employees during the following types of work involving exposed
energized parts:
    (1) Installation, removal, or repair of lines that are energized at
more than 600 volts,
    (2) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than
600 volts,
    (3) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
    (4) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts,
and

    (5) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards
greater than or equal to those posed by these operations.
    This rule is based on Sec.  1910.269(l)(1)(i). The first four work
operations are those that expose employees to the greatest risk of
electric shock as demonstrated by the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record.
OSHA has included the fifth category to cover types of work that, while
not specifically identified in that record, pose equal or greater
hazards. The operations covered under Sec.  1910.269(l)(1)(i) are
performed during construction as well as during maintenance. In fact,
the construction operations are similar in nature to those performed
during maintenance work, and the Agency believes that the hazards are
the same. For example, using mechanical equipment near a 7200-volt
overhead power line during the construction of a new line poses hazards
that are equivalent to those posed during the use of mechanical
equipment to replace a damaged pole on an existing line of the same
voltage. Similarly, the installation of a new transformer near a 14.4-
kilovolt line poses the same hazards as the replacement of a
transformer near a 14.4-kilovolt line. Thus, OSHA is proposing to
extend the general industry requirement to construction.
    However, some work can be performed safely by a single employee or
must be performed as quickly as possible for reasons of public safety.
The proposal, in Sec.  1926.960(b)(3)(ii), recognizes this type of work
by granting exceptions to the two-person rule for the following
operations:
    (1) Routine switching of circuits, if the employer can demonstrate
that conditions at the site allow this work to be performed safely,
    (2) Work performed with live-line tools if the employee is
positioned so that he or she is not within reach of or exposed to
contact with energized parts, and
    (3) Emergency repairs to the minimum extent necessary to safeguard
the general public.
    These exceptions are based on Sec.  1910.269(l)(1)(ii). OSHA
intends for these exceptions to be applied narrowly in view of the
accidents that have occurred even under these limited conditions (269-
Ex. 9-2). For example, accidents involving hot stick work have
typically occurred only when the employee was using a live-line tool
but was close enough to energized parts to be injured--sometimes
through direct contact, other times by contact through conductors being
handled. Employees have been injured during switching operations when
unusual conditions, such as poor lighting, bad weather, and hazardous
configuration or state of repair of the switching equipment, were
present. Paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(A) addresses this scenario by requiring
the employer to demonstrate that the operation can be performed in a
manner to mitigate the hazards so that the work could be performed
safely. For example, the employer could provide supple- mental lighting
for work performed where lighting was inade quate.
    The requirement for at least two employees to be present during
certain operations does not apply generally if the voltage of the
energized parts involved is 600 volts or less. The Sec.  1910.269
rulemaking record contained conflicting data regarding the safety of
performing work at these voltages. Some witnesses and commenters said
that it was safe to perform such work, but the data in the rulemaking
record suggested that may not be true (269-Ex. 9-2). More recent
accident data indicate little change. Table IV-6 shows the number of
electrocutions for various voltage ranges for the years 1991 through
1998. In the years 1991 to 1994, an average of 3.0 fatalities occurred
per year involving voltages of 600 volts or less. For the years 1995 to
1998, when Sec.  1910.269 was fully in effect, the average dropped
slightly to 2.5. Consequently, OSHA is requesting comments regarding
the safety of employees working on lines and equipment operating at 600
volts or less. What types of work can be performed safely by an
employee working alone? What additional precautions are necessary for
an employee working on lines or equipment operating at 600 volts or
less to make the work safe without the presence of a second employee?

                                   Table IV-6.--Fatalities by Voltage and Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Less than   600 V to 20                100kV and
                            Year                                 600 V          kV      20 to 80 kV     higher
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991........................................................            3           24            2            1
1992........................................................            5           24            2            0
1993........................................................            3           23            3            1
1994........................................................            1           21            2            2
1995........................................................            2           22            4            5
1996........................................................            4           16            0            2
1997........................................................            1           16            3            1
1998........................................................            3           13            0           1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OSHA database of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution accidents. These data include
  only cases involving electrocution in which the voltage was indicated in the accident abstract.

    Minimum approach distances. Paragraph (c)(1) of proposed Sec.
1926.960 would require employees to maintain minimum approach distances
from exposed energized parts. The minimum approach distances are
specified in Table V-2 through Table V-6. This provision has been taken
from Sec.  1910.269(l)(2).
    Electric power systems operate at a given nominal voltage. However,
the actual voltage on a power line varies above and below that nominal
voltage. For very brief periods, the instantaneous voltage on a line
can be 3 or more times its nominal value.
    The safe minimum approach distance is intended to assure that an
electric arc will not form, even under the most severe transient
overvoltages that can occur on a system and even if the employee makes
foreseeable errors in maintaining the minimum approach distance. To
determine what this distance is for a given voltage, OSHA must first
determine the size of the air gap that must be present so that an arc
does not occur during the most severe overvoltage on a system. This gap
is the electrical component of the minimum approach distance. To
determine the minimum safe approach distance, OSHA must then add an
extra distance to account for ergonomic considerations, or human error.
    The electrical component depends on five factors:
    (1) The maximum voltage,
    (2) The wave shape of this voltage,

    (3) The configuration of the ``electrodes'' forming the end points
of the gap,
    (4) The insulating medium in the gap, and
    (5) The atmospheric conditions present.
    The NESC subcommittee having responsibility for the ANSI C-2
minimum approach distance tables adopted a change in minimum approach
distances for the 1993 edition of the National Electrical Safety Code.
The NESC subcommittee developed the minimum approach distance tables
using the following principles:
     ANSI/IEEE Standard 516 \32\ was to be the electrical basis
of the NESC Rules for approach distances: Table 4 (Alternating Current)
and Table 5 (Direct Current) for voltages above 72.5 KV. Lower voltages
were to be based on ANSI/IEEE Standard 4. The application of ANSI/IEEE
Standard 516 was inclusive of the formula used by that standard to
derive electrical clearance distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ ANSI/IEEE Std. 516-1987 (the edition in effect when the
NESC subcommittee revised the minimum approach distances) listed
values for the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance, both for air alone as an insulating medium and for live-
line tool sticks in air, that were accepted as being accurate when
the standard was adopted (by IEEE) in 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Altitude correction factors were to be in accordance with
ANSI/IEEE Standard 516, Table 1.
     The maximum design transient overvoltage data to be used
in the development of the basic approach distance tables were:
      3.0 per unit for voltages of 362 KV and less
      2.4 per unit for 500 to 550 KV
      2.0 per unit for 765 to 800 KV
     All phase-to-phase values were to be calculated from the
EPRI Transmission Line Reference Book for 115 to 138 KV.
     An inadvertent movement factor (ergonomic component)
intended to account for errors in judging the approach distance was to
be added to all basic electrical approach distances (electrical
component) for all voltage ranges. A distance of 0.31 meters (1 foot)
was to be added to all voltage ranges. An additional 0.3 meters (1
foot) was to be added to voltage ranges below 72.6 KV.
     The voltage reduction allowance for controlled maximum
transient overvoltage was to be such that the minimum allowable
approach distance was not less than the given approach distance
specified for the highest voltage of the given range.
     The transient overvoltage tables were to be applied only
at voltage ranges inclusive of 72.6 KV to 800 KV. All tables were to be
established using the higher voltage of each separate voltage range.
    Relevant data related to the determination of the ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance include a typical arm's
reach of about 610 millimeters (2 feet) and a reaction time to a
stimulus of 0.2 to more than 1.0 second (269-Ex. 8-19). To prevent an
employee from breaching the air gap required for the electrical
component, the ergonomic distance must be sufficient for the employee
to be able to recognize a hazardous approach to an energized line and
withdraw to a safe position. Thus, the distance should equal the
response time multiplied by the average speed of an employee's movement
plus ``braking'' distance. (This is comparable to the calculation of
total braking distance for a motor vehicle. This distance equals the
initial speed of the vehicle times the driver's reaction time plus the
braking distance for the vehicle itself after the brakes have been
applied.) The maximum reach (or range of movement) may place an upper
bound on the ergonomic component, however.
    For system voltages up to 72.5 kV, phase-to-phase, much of the work
is performed using rubber gloves, and the employee is working within
arm's reach of energized parts. The ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance must account for this since the employee may not have
time to react and position himself or herself out of danger. A distance
of 610 millimeters (2 feet) for the ergonomic component appears to meet
this criterion and was, in fact, adopted by the NESC subcommittee. OSHA
also accepts this value. Therefore, for voltages of 751 V to 72.5 kV,
the minimum approach distances proposed in Sec.  1926.960 adopt the
electrical component of minimum approach distance plus an ergonomic
component of 0.61 meters (2 feet).
    For operations involving lines energized at voltages over 72.5 kV,
the applicable work practices change. Generally, live-line tools are
employed to perform the work while equipment is energized. These tools
hold the energized part at a fixed distance from the employee, ensuring
that the minimum approach distance is maintained during the work
operation. Even when hot sticks are not used, as during live-line bare-
hand work, employees use work methods that more tightly control their
movements than when they perform rubber glove work, and it is usually
easier to plan ahead of time how to keep employees from violating the
minimum approach distance. For example, employees planning a job to
replace spacers on a 500-kV overhead power line can use an envelope (or
bounds) of anticipated movement for the job and ensure that the work
procedure they use keeps this envelope entirely outside the minimum
approach distance. All the employees' movements during the job would be
kept within the envelope. Additionally, exposure to conductors at a
potential different from the one on which work is being performed is
limited or nonexistent. This is because the distance between conductors
is much greater than the distance between conductors at lower voltages
and because higher voltage systems do not present the types of
congestion that are commonly found on lower voltage systems. Therefore,
a smaller ergonomic component is appropriate for the higher voltages.
The NESC subcommittee accepted a value of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for this
component. OSHA has adopted this distance as well. Therefore, for
voltages over 72.5 kV, the minimum approach distances proposed in Sec.
1926.960 adopt the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance plus an ergonomic component of 0.31 meters (1 foot).
    The ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance is only
considered a safety factor that protects employees in case of errors in
judging and maintaining the full minimum approach distance, so that the
employee does not breach the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance. The actual working position selected must account
for the full range of movements that could normally be anticipated \33\
while an employee is working. Otherwise, the employee would violate the
minimum approach distance while he or she is working.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Anticipated movements include those necessary to perform
the work as well as ``unexpected'' movements that an employee could
reasonably be anticipated to perform, such as adjusting his or her
hard hat, clothing, or equipment. See Appendix B to Subpart V for a
discussion of the selection of working position with respect to
minimum approach distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The design of electric power circuits over 72.5 kV sometimes does
not provide sufficient clearance between energized parts at different
potential or between energized parts and grounded surfaces to permit
employees to maintain the base minimum approach distances given in
proposed Table V-2. The Agency has adopted the approach of the NESC
subcommittee in the proposal to permit work on such systems so long as
additional measures are taken to reduce the required minimum approach
distance. Proposed

Table V-3, Table V-4, and Table V-5 recognize the use of gaps and other
means of decreasing the surge factor on energized lines as acceptable
methods of reducing the required minimum approach distance.\34\ These
tables list minimum approach distances for various surge factors and
phase-to-phase voltages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ The decreased surge factor reduces the maximum transient
voltage on the line and thus reduces the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal thus provides smaller minimum approach distances for
systems with surge factors that are limited by means such as system
design, switching controls, and temporary protective gaps. Frequently,
built-in or temporary limits on the surge factor on a system can result
in a minimum approach distance that is small enough to permit work to
be performed without additional protective measures. Because the line
worker cannot determine surge factors at the jobsite, surge factor
reduction is permitted only when the employer can demonstrate, through
engineering analysis, that the possible surges on the line will be held
to values no more than permitted under Table V-3, Table V-4, and Table
V-5. Methods of controlling and determining the surge factor for a
system are given in Appendix B to proposed Subpart V.
    OSHA accepted the principles adopted by the NESC subcommittee in
forming the minimum approach distance tables in final Sec.  1910.269.
OSHA reviewed the technical information supporting the subcommittee's
action and found that the data justify the NESC criteria. After the
adoption of final Sec.  1910.269, the NESC Committee issued a tentative
interim amendment correcting some errors in calculating the minimum
approach distances published in ANSI C2-1993. The same minimum approach
distances are contained in the latest edition of that standard, ANSI
C2-2002. In Table V-2 through Table V-6, OSHA is proposing to adopt the
NESC minimum approach distances, as corrected.\35\ The Agency believes
that this will protect employees from all likely exposure conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ OSHA is also proposing to make similar changes to Sec.
1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Table V-5 contains minimum approach distances for d-c
voltages between 250 and 750 kilovolts, nominal. These distances have
been taken directly from Table R-9 of Sec.  1910.269. Since systems of
d-c voltages other than those listed are rare, no distances were
presented for them in the table.
    As noted earlier, proposed Table V-3 through Table V-5 permit
reduced minimum approach distances for systems having known maximum
transient overvoltages. These tables are based on Table R-7 through
Table R-9 of Sec.  1910.269.
    The minimum approach distances proposed in Subpart V for voltages
over 750 volts are intended to provide a sufficient gap between the
worker and the line so that current could not arc to the employee under
the most adverse transient voltage that could be imposed on the line,
plus an extra amount for inadvertent movement on the part of the
employee. The electrical component of these distances is based on
scientific and engineering test data, and the ergonomic component is
based on the conditions likely to be present for the different types of
work to be performed on electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution circuits. By contrast, the minimum approach distances in
existing Subpart V were based on standard industry practice in effect
in 1972, when that standard was promulgated. OSHA believes that the
proposed minimum approach distances, which are based on sound
engineering principles, will provide significantly better protection
for employees than the existing standard.
    Table R-6 in existing Sec.  1910.269 specifies ``avoid contact'' as
the minimum approach distance for voltages between 50 and 1,000 volts.
To make the proposal consistent with ANSI C2, OSHA is proposing to
adopt minimum approach distances of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for voltages
between 301 volts and 750 volts and 0.65 meters (2 feet, 2 inches) for
voltages between 751 volts and 15 kilovolts. This increase in the
minimum approach distance at the lower voltages should help prevent
employees from contacting circuit parts energized at these still
dangerous levels.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ OSHA is also proposing to make similar changes to Sec.
1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal allows employees to come closer than the minimum
approach distance to energized parts under certain conditions, as
listed in proposed Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i) through (c)(1)(iii).
Existing Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(i), from which proposed Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i) has been taken, permits the employee to be insulated,
guarded, or isolated from the live parts. The language specifically
recognizing guarding and isolation has been omitted from the proposal.
However, it should be noted that the introductory language in final
Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) requires minimum approach distances to be
maintained from ``exposed'' energized parts. Guarded live parts,
whether they are guarded by enclosures or barriers or are guarded by
position (isolated), are not addressed by this requirement as they
would not be considered ``exposed.'' Including language exempting live
parts that are ``guarded'' or ``isolated'' would be redundant and could
lead to misinterpretation of the rule. Additionally, similar
redundancies in paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and (iii) of Sec.  1926.950 have
not been carried forward into paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and (c)(1)(iii) of
proposed Sec.  1926.960. To clarify the rule, however, a note has been
included following paragraph (c)(1)(iii) to indicate that parts of
electric circuits meeting paragraph (f)(1) of Sec.  1926.966 are not
considered as ``exposed'' unless a guard is removed or an employee
enters the space intended to provide isolation from the live parts.
    Proposed Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i) contains the first exception to
maintaining the minimum approach distances--insulating the employee
from the energized part. This insulation, for example, can take the
form of rubber insulating gloves and rubber insulating sleeves. This
equipment protects the employee from electric shock as he or she works
on the line or equipment. Even though uninsulated parts of the
employee's body may come closer to the live part being worked on than
would otherwise be permitted by Table V-2 through Table V-6, the
employee's hand and arm would be insulated from the live part, and the
working distances involved would be sufficient protection against arc-
over. As noted earlier, the minimum approach distance tables include a
component for inadvertent movement, which is unnecessary for employees
using rubber insulating equipment. In the worst case situation, an
employee would be working on a line requiring a 0.84-meter (2-foot, 9-
inch) minimum approach distance. The electrical component of this
minimum approach distance is 0.23 meters (9 inches).\37\ The distance
from the hand to the elbow is about 0.3 meters (1 foot), and it would
be nearly impossible to work closer than this distance to a line being
held in the hand. Therefore, the employee would be about 0.3 meters (1
foot) away from the conductor at a minimum, and, thus, in the worst
case would still be more than the electrical

component of the minimum approach distance from the conductor. This
would protect the employee from sparkover. In any event, the accident
data in the record show that the overriding hazard to employees is
posed by other energized conductors in the work area, to which the
minimum approach distances still apply. The rubber gloves, of course,
provide protection only for the line on which work is being performed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ The minimum approach distance for 36.1 to 46.0 kV, the
highest voltage range that can be worked using rubber insulating
gloves, is 0.84 meters (2 feet, 9 inches). The electrical component
of the minimum approach distance is the minimum approach distance
minus the ergonomic component, 0.65 meters (2 feet), which equals
0.23 meters (9 inches).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is important to ensure that conductors on which the employee is
working cannot move unexpectedly while the employee is protected
against contact only by rubber insulating gloves and sleeves. It would
be considered a violation of the minimum approach distance requirement
proposed in Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) for an employee to be insulated from
an energized part only by rubber insulating gloves and sleeves if the
part is not under the full control of the employee at all times. OSHA
is making this explicit in the parenthetical text in proposed Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i) (and also in proposed Sec.  1910.269(l)(2)(i)). For
example, if an employee were cutting a conductor, that conductor would
either need to be restrained from moving toward the employee after
being cut or additional insulation would have to be used to protect the
conductor from striking uninsulated parts of the employee's body.
    The insulation used would have to be designed for the voltage.
(Proposed new Sec.  1926.97 gives use voltages for electrical
protective equipment.) As a clarification, paragraph (c)(1)(i) notes
that the insulation is considered as protection only against parts upon
which work is being performed; the required minimum approach distances
would have to be maintained from other exposed energized parts.
    As a second exception to maintaining the minimum approach
distances, paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of proposed Sec.  1926.960 allows the
energized part to be insulated from the employee. Such insulation could
be in the form of insulating blankets or line hose or other suitable
insulating equipment. Again, the insulation would have to be adequate
for the voltage.
    Paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) recognize the protection
afforded to the employee by an insulating barrier between the employee
and the energized part. As long as the insulation is appropriate and is
in good condition, current will not flow through the worker, and he or
she is protected.
    The third exception (paragraph (c)(1)(iii)) to the maintenance of
the minimum approach distances is to insulate the employee from exposed
conductive objects other than the live part upon which work is to be
performed. Much of the work performed under this option is called
``live-line bare-hand'' work. (For specific practices for this type of
work, see the discussion of proposed Sec.  1926.964(c).) In this type
of work, the employee is in contact with the energized line, like a
bird on a wire, but is not contacting another conductive object at a
different potential. Because there is no complete circuit, current
cannot flow through the worker, and he or she is protected.
    Paragraph (c)(1) requires employees to maintain minimum approach
distances from ``exposed'' energized parts, except as noted above. A
note following paragraph (c)(1)(iii) clarifies that parts of electric
circuits meeting paragraph (f)(1) of Sec.  1926.966 are not considered
as ``exposed'' unless a guard is removed or an employee enters the
space intended to provide isolation from the live parts.
    Several accidents occurred when employees working from aerial
lifts, either insulated or uninsulated, grabbed an energized conductor.
OSHA is concerned that some employers may believe that this practice is
safe without following the procedures outlined in proposed Sec.
1926.964(c) on live-line bare-hand work. OSHA requests comments on
whether or not the proposed rule will adequately protect employees from
this type of accident and on what additional requirements, if any, are
needed to prevent this type of accident.
    According to testimony in the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, between
five and six percent of accidents experienced by power line workers
were caused when the upper arm of an employee wearing rubber insulating
gloves without sleeves contacted an energized part (269-DC Tr. 558-
561).\38\ This is a significant portion of the total number of serious
accidents occurring among electric line workers. The Agency believes
that these injuries and fatalities are clearly preventable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ OSHA believes that most, if not all, of these accidents
involved contact with conductors and equipment other than the one on
which the employee had been working. It would be very unlikely that
an employee would touch his upper arm or shoulder against the part
on which he or she was working with his or her hands. On the other
hand, it would be more likely that the employee touched his or her
upper arm or shoulder against a different live part than the one on
which he or she is working. The employee's attention would be on the
live part on which work is being performed but might not be on other
nearby live parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The use of rubber insulating sleeves would certainly have prevented
most of these accidents. However, as demonstrated by the safety record
of some electric utility companies, the extensive use of insulating
equipment to cover energized parts in the employee's work area would
also appear to prevent employees' upper arms and shoulders from
contacting live parts (269-Ex. 46). In fact, if every energized part
within reach of an employee was insulated, electrical contacts
involving other parts of the body, such as an employee's head or back,
would be averted as well. The NESC subcommittee on work rules also
recognized this method as providing protection to employees.
    Existing Subpart V does not require any protection for employees
working on or near exposed live parts beyond the use of rubber
insulating gloves. To prevent the types of accidents described above
from occurring in the future, the Agency has decided to require
protection in addition to that required by existing Subpart V.
    The proposal includes a provision, Sec.  1926.960(c)(2)(i), that
would require the use of rubber insulating sleeves (in addition to
rubber insulating gloves), unless live parts that could contact an
employee's upper arm or shoulder are insulated. Employees would be able
to work without sleeves by installing rubber line hose, rubber
blankets, and plastic guard equipment on energized equipment. However,
an employee installing such protective equipment on energized lines
would have to wear rubber sleeves unless his or her upper arms and
shoulders are not exposed to contact with other live parts during this
operation.
    OSHA believes that paragraph (c)(2)(i) incorporates the most
effective approach to preventing accidents involving work on or near
exposed live parts.
    Several accidents have occurred while employees were performing
work (generally on deenergized lines) near energized parts without
using rubber insulating equipment. Because the employees were
concentrating on their work, which did not involve the energized parts,
the employees did not pay attention to the distance between them and
the energized parts and violated the minimum approach distance. When
OSHA cited the employers for violations of existing Sec.  1926.950(c),
the employers successfully argued that the standard permits employees
to work near energized parts without the use of electrical protective
equipment, as long as they maintain the minimum approach distance
involved. They further argued that, because they require their
employees to maintain these distances and because their employees have
been trained, the accidents were a result of unpreventable employee
misconduct. (See, for example, Central

Kansas Power Co., Inc., 6 OSHC (BNA) 2118, 1978 WL 6886 (No. 77-3127,
1978).)
    OSHA does not believe that working very close to, but not on,
energized parts without the use of electrical protective equipment is a
safe practice. The Agency further believes that Sec.  1910.269, which
also allows this practice, is not effective in preventing these
accidents and has concluded that further regulation is warranted.
Toward this end, OSHA has gone beyond Sec.  1910.269 by proposing two
additional requirements:\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ OSHA is also proposing to make similar changes to Sec.
1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) If work is performed near exposed parts energized at more than
600 volts but not more than 72.5 kilovolts and if the employee is not
insulated from the energized parts or performing live-line bare-hand
work, the employee would have to work from a position where the
employee would not be able to reach into the minimum approach distance
(proposed Sec.  1926.960(d)(2)), and
    (2) If the employee is to be insulated from energized parts by the
use of insulating gloves or insulating gloves with sleeves, the
insulating gloves and sleeves would have to be put on and removed in a
position where the employee would not be able to reach into the minimum
approach distance (proposed Sec.  1926.960(c)(2)(ii)).
    These two provisions taken together will ensure that an employee
working near energized parts will not be able to reach within the
minimum approach distance unless using rubber insulating equipment.
Thus, any time an employee is within reach of the minimum approach
distance, he or she would need to be wearing rubber insulating gloves
or the energized parts would need to be insulated from the employee,
and any employee who is not protected by insulating equipment would
need to stay far enough away from energized parts that he or she could
not reach within the minimum approach distance.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii) would ensure that employees don
rubber insulating gloves and sleeves from a safe position. OSHA is
aware that some employers have a ground-to-ground rule requiring their
employees to wear rubber insulating gloves before leaving the ground to
work on energized lines or equipment and to leave the gloves and
sleeves on until the employees return to the ground. This practice
ensures that employees are indeed wearing the rubber gloves and sleeves
before they reach the energized area and eliminates the chance that an
employee will forget to don the protective equipment once he or she
reaches the work position. Other employers simply require their
employees to put their gloves and sleeves on before they enter the
energized area. This practice normally requires the employee to use his
or her judgment in determining where to begin wearing the protective
equipment. The proposal recognizes both methods of protecting
employees, but ensures that the rubber gloves and sleeves are being
worn once the employee reaches a position from which he or she can
reach into the minimum approach distance. The Agency requests comments
on the need for this requirement and on whether or not the provision as
proposed will protect employees from the hazards involved.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(2) would ensure that an employee who is not
insulated from parts energized between 600 volts and 72.5 kilovolts is
working at a safe distance from the parts. This provision does not
apply to voltages of 600 volts and less to permit work on equipment
without requiring the employee to cover energized parts unnecessarily.
Much of the work performed at these lower voltages involves the use of
insulating hand tools in a panelboard or cabinet. The chance of
contacting a live part with the shoulder is extremely low because of
the layout of live parts within the enclosure. The electrical
clearances between energized parts for voltages in this range are small
enough that all energized circuit parts will normally be in front of
the employee, enabling the worker to maintain the required minimum
approach distance easily. The proposed paragraph does not apply when
the voltage exceeds 72.5 kilovolts, because the minimum approach
distances generally become greater beyond this voltage and because
rubber insulating equipment cannot be used for these higher
voltages.\40\ OSHA requests comments on the need for this requirement
and on whether there are other effective means of protecting employees
from the hazard involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ The maximum use voltage for Class 4 rubber insulating
equipment is 36 kilovolts. The highest voltage on which this
equipment can be used is 62 kilovolts if there is no multiphase
exposure. This voltage falls in the Table V-1 range of 46.1 to 72.5
kV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (d)(1) of proposed Sec.  1926.960 would require employees
to position themselves, to the extent that other safety-related
conditions at the worksite permit, so that a shock or slip would not
cause the worker's body to move towards exposed parts at a potential
different from that of the employee. Since slips, and even electric
shocks, are not entirely preventable, it is important for the employee
to take a working position so that such an event will not increase the
severity of any incurred injury. This proposed requirement was taken
from Sec.  1910.269(l)(3). There is no counterpart to this requirement
in existing Subpart V.
    The Agency believes that it is important for an employee to work
from a position where a slip or a shock will not bring him or her into
contact with an energized part unless other conditions, such as the
configuration of the lines involved, would make another working
position safer. The position taken must be the most protective
available to accomplish the task. In certain situations, this work
position may not be the most efficient one. The language proposed in
Sec.  1926.960(d)(1) recognizes situations that preclude working from a
position from which a slip would bring the employee into contact with a
live part. The language contained in this provision also allows such
options as guarding or insulating the live part as alternative means of
compliance.
    Connecting and disconnecting lines and equipment. Paragraph (e)
addresses the practices of connecting and disconnecting lines and
equipment. Common industry practice, as reflected in ANSI C2-2002,
Section 443F, is to make a connection so that the source is connected
as the last item in sequence and to break a connection so that the
source is removed as the first item in sequence. In this way,
conducting wires and devices used to make and break the connection are
deenergized during almost the entire procedure. These practices would
be required by paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2). Since these wires and
devices must be handled during the procedure, the proposed requirements
would reduce the chance for an electrical accident. Also, to prevent
the disconnected conductors from being energized, loose ends of
conductors must be kept away from live parts, as would be required by
paragraph (e)(3). These three proposed provisions, which have no
counterparts in existing Subpart V, have been taken from Sec.
1910.269(l)(5).
    Paragraph (f) of proposed Sec.  1926.960, which was taken from
Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(i), would prohibit the wearing of conductive
articles by employees working within reach of exposed live parts of
equipment if these articles would increase the hazards associated with
accidental contact with the live parts. If an employee wants to wear
metal jewelry, he or she can cover the jewelry so as to eliminate the
contact hazard. This requirement is not

intended to preclude workers from wearing metal rings or watch bands if
the work being performed already exposes them to electric shock hazards
and if the wearing of metal would not increase the hazards. (For
example, for work performed on an overhead line, the wearing of a ring
does not increase the likelihood that an employee would contact the
line, nor would it increase the severity of the injury should contact
occur.) However, this requirement would protect employees working on
energized circuits with small clearances and high current capacities
(such as some battery-supplied circuits) from severe burn hazards to
which they would otherwise be exposed. The rule also protects workers
who are only minimally exposed to shock hazards from being injured as a
result of a dangling chain's making contact with a energized part. This
provision has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    Protection from electric arcs. Proposed paragraph (g) addresses
clothing worn by an employee. After reviewing the rulemaking record on
Sec.  1910.269, OSHA determined that electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers face a significant risk of
injury from burns due to electric arcs (January 31, 1994, 59 FR 4388-
4389). OSHA also concluded that certain fabrics increase the extent of
injuries to employees caught in an electric arc or otherwise exposed to
flames. Therefore, the Agency adopted two rules: (1) paragraph
(l)(6)(ii) of Sec.  1910.269, which requires that employees exposed to
flames and electric arcs be trained in the hazards related to the
clothing that they wear, and (2) paragraph (l)(6)(iii) which prohibits
apparel that could increase the extent of injuries received by a worker
who is exposed to a flame or electric arc. OSHA also included a note
following paragraph (l)(6)(iii) to indicate the types of clothing
fabrics that the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record demonstrated were
hazardous to wear by employees exposed to electric arcs.
    Since Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii) became effective on November 1,
1994, employees have continued to suffer burn injuries working on
energized lines and equipment. From January 1, 1990, to October 30,
1994, there were 46 accidents investigated by Federal or State OSHA
involving burns that would have been addressed by Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(iii). These 46 accidents resulted in 71 total injuries.
Averaged over this period, there were 9.5 accidents and 14.7 injuries
per year. From November 1, 1994, to December 31, 1998, there were 17
such accidents resulting in 26 injuries. Averaged over this period,
there were 4.0 accidents and 6.2 injuries per year. Thus, while the
clothing rule in Sec.  1910.269 appears to have helped reduce the
number of accidents and injuries by more than 50 percent, for two
reasons, OSHA believes that the remaining risk of burn injury is still
serious and significant. First, these accidents represent only a small
fraction of those that have actually occurred during this time.
Employers are only required to report to the Agency accidents involving
fatalities or three or more hospitalized injuries. OSHA does not
investigate accidents that are not reported by employers (that is,
those involving two or fewer hospitalized employees and no deaths)
unless it results in extensive property damage or presents potential
worker injury and generates widespread media interest. (See OSHA
directives CPL 02-00-103 and CPL 02-00-094.) Consequently, most injury-
producing accidents, even serious ones, are not investigated by the
Agency. Second, the reported burn injuries are very serious and costly.
Eighty-four percent of the burn injuries were fatalities or required
hospitalization. Eighty-seven percent of the accidents for which the
severity of the injury was noted involved third-degree burns. Such
burns are extremely painful and costly, typically requiring skin grafts
and leaving permanent scars.
    OSHA's existing clothing requirement in Sec.  1910.269 does not
require employers to protect employees from electric arcs through the
use of flame-resistant clothing. It simply requires that an employee's
clothing do no greater harm. Because of the serious nature of the still
remaining risk to power workers from electric arcs, the Agency believes
that the standard should be revised to require the use of flame-
resistant clothing, under certain circumstances, to protect employees
from the most severe burns. The electric power industry is beginning to
recognize this need as evidenced by the many employers who provide
flame-resistant clothing to employees, by the work of ASTM in writing
standards that provide for arc ratings of protective clothing, and by
the ongoing work towards a protective standard by the committee
responsible for writing work rules for the NESC. The National Fire
Protection Association also recognizes the need to protect employees
working on energized equipment from the hazards posed by electric arcs.
    In addition, when Sec.  1910.269 was promulgated, there were no
standards for clothing to protect employees from the thermal hazards
resulting from electric arcs. Since then, ASTM has adopted such
standards. These standards ensure not only that clothing does not
ignite but that it is rated to provide protection against a given level
of heat energy. Apparel that meets the ASTM standards is labeled with
the amount of heat energy that it can absorb under laboratory test
conditions without letting through sufficient heat to cause a second-
degree burn. Clothing is currently widely available in ratings from
about 4 cal/cm2 to over 50 cal/cm2. In general,
the higher the rating, the heavier the clothing.
    As described more fully below, OSHA has decided to propose a rule
that would require employers to estimate the heat energy from electric
arcs that may be encountered by employees and to provide clothing that
will be flame resistant if it could be ignited when an electrical fault
occurs and that can protect against the estimated level of energy when
an electric arc occurs. The Agency believes that this rule, which is
proposed in Sec.  1926.960(g), will ensure that employees wear
protective clothing that is reasonably protective for the hazards they
are facing.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ OSHA is also proposing to make similar changes in Sec.
1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (g)(1) of proposed Sec.  1926.960 would require the
employer to assess the workplace to determine if employees are exposed
to hazards from flames or electric arcs. This provision ensures that
the employer evaluates employee exposure to flames and electric arcs so
that employees who do face such exposures can be protected. Because
Sec.  1926.960 applies to work performed on or near energized parts of
electric circuits, employers can base a portion of the assessment
required by paragraph (g)(1) on a determination of which employees
perform energized work covered by this section. It should be noted,
however, that until a line or part of an electric circuit has been
completely deenergized following the procedures required by Sec.
1926.961, including any required testing and grounding, the line or
part would have to be treated as energized.
    Once an employer determines who is exposed to hazards from flames
or electric arcs, the next step in protecting these employees is a
determination of the extent of the hazard. Paragraph (g)(2) would
require the employer to estimate the maximum amount of heat energy to
which employees would be exposed. This estimate can be used in the
selection of protective clothing, as discussed later.
    OSHA is aware of various methods of calculating values of available
heat energy from an electric circuit. These methods are listed in Table
IV-7. Each

method requires the input of various parameters, such as fault current,
the expected length of the electric arc, the distance from the arc to
the employee, and the clearing time for the fault (that is, the time
the circuit protective devices take to open the circuit and clear the
fault). Some of these parameters, such as the fault current and the
clearing time, are known quantities for a given system. Other
parameters, such as the length of the arc and the distance between the
arc and the employee, vary widely and can only be estimated. OSHA is
not endorsing any of the methods listed in Table IV-7. The Agency
requests comments and information on these and any other available
methods of calculating incident heat energy from electric arcs.

    Table IV-7.--Methods of Calculating Incident Heat Energy From an
                              Electric Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
 NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, ``Sample Calculation of Flash Protection
 Boundary.''
2. Doughty, T.E., Neal, and Floyd II, H.L., ``Predicting Incident Energy
 to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power Distribution
 Systems,'' Record of Conference papers IEEE IAS 45th Annual Petroleum
 and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28-30, 1998.
3. Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE 1584-2002.
4. Heat Flux Calculator, a free software program created by Alan
 Privette (widely available on the Internet).
5. ARCPRO, a commercially available software program developed by
 Kinectrics, Toronto, ON, CA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amount of heat energy calculated by any of the methods is
approximately proportional to the square of the distance between the
employee and the arc. In other words, if the employee is very close to
the arc, the heat energy is very high; but if he or she is just a few
more centimeters away, the heat energy drops substantially.
    In addition, the fault current and clearing time are
interdependent. Typically, the higher the fault current, the shorter
the clearing time. It is quite possible that the maximum heat energy
will result from a fault current that is well below maximum but that
results in a relatively long clearing time. In order to calculate the
worst case heat energy, an employer would have to perform a range of
calculations for each system area.
    Furthermore, the method of calculation can affect the results. Each
method yields somewhat different values using the same input
parameters. This is partly because of the unpredictability of an
electric arc and partly because of the different ways the methods were
developed. Some, like the NFPA 70E method, are based in theory. Others,
like the IEEE 1584 method, are based on empirical data. Whichever
method is used, it is important to use it within its limitations. For
example, the values produced by the Heat Flux Calculator must be
adjusted if employees are exposed to energy from a multiphase fault or
if the heat energy would be reflected by nearby surfaces.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ This exposure is known as ``arc in a box.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because of the variability imposed by these factors, OSHA has
preliminarily concluded that it is not possible to predict exactly how
much energy an employee would face if an electric arc occurs. On the
other hand, it is clear that when more electrical energy is available
more heat will be generated by an electric arc and the potential for
severe injury is greater. The Agency believes that greater protection
is warranted when greater hazards exist. Thus, OSHA is proposing a
standard that requires reasonable, but not exact, estimates of the heat
energy to which an employee could be exposed.
    Additionally, OSHA is not proposing a standard based entirely on
worst-case exposure. The worst case occurs when an electric arc powered
by the maximum available fault current is against an employee's skin.
In such cases, the distance between the employee and the arc is zero,
and the energy is extremely high even for relatively low-current arcs.
The Agency does not believe it is reasonable to require a
correspondingly high degree of protection for relatively low-energy
arcs, which would put employees in very heavy clothing.
    On the other hand, OSHA believes that it is appropriate for the
employer to provide a level of protection that is reasonably related to
the thermal hazard involved. A 50-cal/cm2 exposure calls for
more protection than a 5-cal/cm2 exposure. Although none of
the methods can predict precisely how much heat energy an employee will
face, they do provide a good indication of the relative severity of the
exposure and the approximate level of protection needed. Thus, the
Agency is proposing a rule that it believes requires reasonable
estimates of the amount of heat energy an employee is likely to face
and to provide a corresponding level of protection. OSHA requests
comments on whether the proposed rule requires an appropriate level of
protection and clearly defines employer obligations with respect to the
estimates of the maximum available heat energy.
    Two notes following proposed Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) help explain how
to comply with the rule. The first note states that Appendix F to
Subpart V provides guidance on the estimation of available heat energy.
This appendix discusses various methods of estimating electric arc heat
energy levels and provides tables that can also be used for this
purpose. OSHA requests comments on this appendix and on whether
additional information is available to help employers and employees
estimate available heat energy. The second note indicates that the
employer may use broad estimates representing multiple system areas if
the employer uses reasonable assumptions about the exposure
distribution throughout the system and if those estimates represent the
maximum exposure for those particular areas. This note clarifies that
the rule is not intended to require separate calculations for each job
or task.
    Much of the flame-resistant clothing available today comes with an
arc rating.\43\ In basic terms, an arc rating indicates that a fabric
is not expected to transfer sufficient thermal energy to cause a
second-degree burn when tested under standard laboratory conditions
exposing the fabric to an electric arc that radiates an energy at or
below the rating.\44\ Proposed paragraph (g)(5) would require that
employees who are exposed to hazards from electric arcs wear clothing
with an arc rating greater than or equal to the heat energy estimated
under proposed paragraph (g)(2). This clothing will protect employees
exposed to various levels of heat energy from sustaining severe burn
injuries in areas covered by the clothing. The note following paragraph
(g) explains that Appendix F to Subpart V contains information on the
selection of appropriate clothing. This appendix

contains information on the ignition threshold of various fabrics, the
thermal performance of typical arc-rated clothing, ways of estimating
available heat energy, and ways of selecting clothing to protect
employees from burn injuries resulting from electric arcs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ The ASTM standards governing arc rating require the fabric
being tested to be flame resistant. Thus, no nonflame-resistant
clothing has an arc rating.
    \44\ Arc rating is defined in ASTM F1506-02ae1,
Standard Performance Specification for Flame Resistant Textile
Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed
to Momentary Electric Arc and Related Thermal Hazards: ``a value
that indicates the arc performance of a material or system of
materials. It is either the arc thermal performance value (ATPV) or
breakdown threshold energy (EBT), when the ATPV cannot be
determined by Test Method F1959.'' ASTM F1959-99 defines ATPV as
``in arc testing, the incident energy on a fabric or material that
results in sufficient heat transfer through the fabric or material
to cause the onset of a second-degree burn based on the Stoll
curve.'' That same standard defines EBT as ``the average
of the five highest incident energy exposure values below the Stoll
curve where the specimens do not exhibit breakopen.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Even with the requirements for the employer to assess hazards
(proposed paragraph (g)(2)) and for employees to wear clothing with a
rating appropriate for this assessment (proposed paragraph (g)(5)),
there are still situations that could arise under which an employee's
clothing could ignite and lead to severe burn injuries. For example, an
employee wearing a cotton-polyester blend jacket over his or her arc-
rated shirt could be injured if the jacket ignites or melts when an
electric arc occurs. Thus, OSHA is proposing, in paragraphs (g)(3) and
(g)(4), additional provisions intended to prevent the ignition or
melting of an employee's clothing.
    Proposed Sec.  1926.960(g)(3) would prohibit clothing that could
either melt onto an employee's skin or ignite and continue to burn.
This rule is equivalent to existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii).\45\ This
proposed provision would ensure that employees exposed to electric arcs
do not wear clothing presenting the most severe burn hazards. A note
following this provision lists fabrics that are specifically prohibited
unless the employer demonstrates that the clothing is treated or worn
to eliminate the hazard. This note is the same as the note following
existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii). OSHA requests comments on whether
additional fabrics pose similar hazards and should be added to the
note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The existing rule prohibits clothing that could increase
the extent of injuries to an employee if an electric arc occurs. The
Agency interprets this rule as prohibiting clothing that could melt
or that could ignite and continue to burn in the presence of an
electric arc faced by an employee (Memorandum to the Field from
James W. Stanley, ``Guidelines for the Enforcement of the Apparel
Standard, 29 CFR 1910.269(l)(6), of the Electric Power Generation,
Transmission, and Distribution Standard'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (g)(4) would require employees to wear flame-
resistant clothing whenever: (1) The employee is exposed to contact
with live parts energized at more than 600 volts (paragraph (g)(4)(i));
(2) the employee's clothing could be ignited by nearby flammable
material that could be ignited by an electric arc (paragraph
(g)(4)(ii)); or (3) the employee's clothing could be ignited by molten
metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the work area
(paragraph (g)(4)(iii)). (A note to proposed paragraph (g)(4)(iii)
indicates that this provision does not apply to conductors capable of
carrying the maximum available fault current. The design of the
installation is intended to prevent these conductors from melting.) The
listed conditions are those in which employees' clothing has been
ignited in several of the burn accidents examined by OSHA.
    OSHA could have, more simply, required clothing that could not
ignite and continue to burn under the heat energy conditions estimated
pursuant to proposed paragraph (g)(2). However, as noted earlier, these
estimates do not entirely reflect the heat energy produced by worst
case conditions. If the other parameters affecting the energy in an arc
are held constant, the heat energy rises exponentially with decreasing
distance between the arc and the employee. Thus, an electric arc that
touches an employee's clothing releases much more energy than the same
arc at a distance equal to the minimum approach distance. For example,
the heat energy from a 51-millimeter-long arc, generated by 20
kiloamperes of fault current at 15 kilovolts, and clearing in 6 cycles
is 1.23 cal/cm2 if the arc is 650 millimeters away, but is
1971 cal/cm2 if the arc is 10 millimeters away.\46\ None of
the common fabrics listed in Table 11 in Appendix F to Subpart V
(explained below) would ignite if the arc was 650 millimeters away from
the employee, but every one would ignite if the arc was only 10
millimeters away.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ These heat energy estimates are calculated using ARCPRO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The closest an electric arc was to an employee in electric power
accidents over the years 1991 to 1998 occurred in 17 cases in which an
employee contacted an energized conductor or was touching the electric
arc. In eight of those cases, an employee's clothing apparently
ignited.\47\ On the other hand, none of the accidents involved contact
with circuit parts energized at 600 volts or less. OSHA believes that
the cases that have occurred demonstrate a significant risk that an
employee's clothing could ignite and cause serious, even fatal, burn
injuries from ignited clothing when an employee contacts circuit parts
energized at more than 600 volts. Therefore, OSHA has preliminarily
concluded that an employee must wear flame-resistant clothing any time
he or she is subject to contact with live parts energized at more than
600 volts. The Agency requests comments on whether the requirements for
flame-resistant clothing in proposed Sec.  1926.960(g)(4) are
reasonable and appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ The accident description indicated that the clothing
ignited or stated that the extent of the burns or the location of
the burns was such that clothing ignition was likely to have
occurred. For example, in one case, a 4100-volt conductor fell onto
an employee's chest. The employee survived the electric shock but
died from second- and third-degree burns over 60 percent of his
body. The electrical burns from the contact were probably localized
to the area near the point of contact. It is likely that the
employee's clothing ignited to cause burns that were spread over 60
percent of his body though the accident description did not state
that clothing ignition occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA is not proposing to require a specific level of protection for
skin that is not covered by clothing. Employees' hands, which are
frequently the closest body part to an electric arc, would typically be
protected by rubber insulating gloves and leather protectors when the
employee's hands are at greatest risk of injury. Although neither
rubber insulating gloves nor leather protectors have arc ratings,
because of their weight and thickness, they typically provide greater
protection from electric arcs than light-weight flame-resistant
clothing. Their protective value is borne out in the accident data--
none of the burn injuries to employees hands involved an employee
wearing rubber insulating gloves. OSHA requests comments on whether the
standard should require complete protection for an employee's entire
body.
    Payment for Protective Clothing. As described earlier, OSHA is
requiring employers to ensure that their employees (1) wear flame-
resistant clothing under certain hazardous conditions, and (2) when
working on energized parts of the electric power system, wear clothing
with an arc rating greater than or equal to potential heat energy
exposures estimated for those parts. OSHA considers the protective
clothing required by paragraph (g) to be PPE. The protective clothing
would reduce the degree of injury sustained by an employee when an
electric arc occurs. In some cases, the clothing would prevent injury
altogether. Unlike many OSHA standards, the proposal would not require
that employers provide protective clothing at no cost to employees.
However, OSHA is considering including an employer-payment requirement
in the final rule and is seeking comments on the issue.
    OSHA has a longstanding policy that employers must provide and pay
for PPE, except, in some cases, where the PPE is personal in nature and
usable by the employee off of the job. This policy is supported by the
plain language of the OSH Act and its legislative history. (For a
complete discussion of OSHA's policy, see OSHA's preamble to the
employer payment for PPE proposal, 64 FR 15402 (March 31, 1999).) Many
OSHA health standards include language explicitly stating that
employers must provide PPE ``at no cost'' to employees. See, for
example, 29 CFR 1910.1018(h)(2)(i) and (j) (inorganic

arsenic); 29 CFR 1910.1025(f)(1) and (g)(1) (lead); and 29 CFR
1910.1048(g)(1) and (h) (formaldehyde). The regulatory text and
preamble of some safety standards also make clear that employers must
pay for PPE. See 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(4)(iv) (confined spaces); and 29
CFR 1910.266(d)(1)(iii) (logging).
    Because not every OSHA standard explicitly states that employers
must pay for PPE, in 1999, OSHA proposed regulatory language to clarify
that employers are responsible for the cost of PPE, with only a few
exceptions (64 FR 15402). The proposal added language to OSHA's general
industry, shipyard, construction, marine terminal, and longshoring
standards that ``[a]ll protective equipment, including [PPE] * * *
shall be provided by the employer at no cost to employees [64 FR 15441
(emphasis added)].'' Exceptions were given for safety-toe protective
footwear and prescription safety eyewear, provided that the employer
permits them to be worn off of the job site, they are not used in a
manner that makes them unsafe for use off of the job site, and they are
not designed for special use on the job (64 FR 15441). OSHA recently
reopened the rulemaking record on its employer payment for PPE
proposal. to solicit comment on PPE that might be considered tools of
the trade. See 69 FR 41221 (July 8, 2004).
    OSHA also recently proposed that employers in general industry,
maritime, and construction, pay for protective clothing for employees
exposed to hexavalent chromium (Cr(VI)). See 69 FR 59465-59466 (Oct. 4,
2004) (``Where a hazard is present or is likely to be present from skin
or eye contact with chromium (VI), the employer shall provide
appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment at no cost to
employees, and shall ensure that employees use such clothing and
equipment.''). The Agency said that employers are in the best position
to select and obtain the appropriate protective clothing and that by
providing and owning protective clothing, the employer will better
maintain the integrity of it (69 FR 59456). The proposal also prohibits
employees from taking contaminated protective clothing home; employers
are responsible for laundering or disposing of contaminated protective
clothing (69 FR 59456).
    OSHA believes that requiring employers to pay for the protective
clothing that would be required by this proposal may also improve the
safety of employees. Like Cr(VI), the purchase of protective clothing
may be best handled by electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution employers, who have all of the information related to the
parameters of the electric power system and are in the best position to
select and purchase clothing necessary to protect employees from
injury. Moreover, an employer-payment requirement could also help
ensure that protective clothing is replaced promptly when its
protective qualities erode. Some stakeholders have told OSHA that
employees, if required to pay for their own protective clothing, may
delay replacing damaged protective clothing for financial reasons. Any
delay in replacing an article of protective clothing that has worn
thin, or that contains holes or other openings, could endanger
employees. Such damaged clothing does not provide adequate protection
to employees exposed to electric arcs.
    Unlike Cr(VI), however, this proposal contains no prohibition on
employees' taking certain protective clothing home, wearing certain
protective clothing off of the job, and laundering such clothing. OSHA
has not included an employer-payment requirement in this proposal
because it does not have enough information at this time on the types
and weights of protective clothing, if any, that may be routinely worn
outside of work.\48\ There may be certain types of lightweight
protective clothing that employees wear both at work and at home. OSHA
believes it needs more information from the public on this clothing
before including a general requirement that employers pay for
protective clothing. In the PPE payment proposal, OSHA expressly
exempted safety shoes and prescription eyewear from the general
employer-payment requirement, in part because such equipment was
personal in nature and could be used outside of work. See 64 FR 15402.
OSHA is seeking information from the public as to whether protective
clothing worn by employees performing power generation, transmission,
and distribution work falls into this same category of PPE. OSHA is
also incorporating the record of the employer payment for PPE
rulemaking into the record of this rulemaking and will give due
consideration to all relevant comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ OSHA notes that, for ease of analysis only, it has included
a cost to employers for providing protective clothing in its
economic feasibility analysis--in addition to its economic impact
analysis under Executive Order 12866 and the RFA--even though such a
requirement is not expressly included in the proposal. See Section
V, Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA is seeking comments on its findings on protective clothing
generally in addition to the following specific questions:
    1. Are there types or weights of protective clothing that employees
typically wear outside of work? Do employers restrict the types or
weights of protective clothing that employees are allowed to wear
outside of work?
    2. Do employers typically provide the types of protective clothing
required by the proposal at no cost to employees? Do some employers
provide certain types or weights of protective clothing at no cost to
employees, while requiring other types or weights of protective
clothing to be paid for by employees? Should OSHA include an employer-
payment requirement for heavier weights or particular types of
protective clothing, but not lighter weights or other types? If so,
please specify what weights or types of protective clothing should be
exempt from an employer-payment requirement.
    3. OSHA realizes that in the construction industry crews of
employees are sometimes hired through local unions. This results in a
variable workforce for many contractors. A contractor that hires
employees in this manner may have to buy protective clothing for more
employees than would an employer with a more stable workforce,
particularly for protective clothing that only fits one employee. OSHA
requests comment on whether, given this hiring practice, an employer-
payment requirement is appropriate in the construction industry. Are
there any alternative approaches that would be responsive to this
variable workforce situation and would also be protective of
construction workers performing electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work?
    4. Should OSHA not address the payment for protective clothing
specifically in the final rule and, instead, follow the outcome of the
general employer payment for PPE rulemaking?
    To protect employees from contacting energized parts, paragraph (h)
of proposed Sec.  1926.960 would require fuses to be installed and
removed using insulated tools or gloves when a terminal is energized at
over 300 volts or when live parts are exposed at any voltage over 50
volts. When an expulsion fuse operates on a fault or overload, the arc
from the fault current erodes the tube of the fuse holder. This
produces a gas that blasts the arc out through the fuse tube vent or
vents, and with it any loose material in the way. Employees could be
injured by the arc blast or by particles blown, by the blast,

in their eyes. Employees should never install or remove such fuses
using gloves alone. Therefore, paragraph (h) would also require
employees installing expulsion-type fuses energized at 300 volts or
more to wear eye protection, would have to use a tool rated for the
voltage, and would have to stand clear of the fuse's exhaust path. This
paragraph, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, has been
taken from Sec.  1910.269(l)(7).
    Paragraph (i) explains that covered conductors are treated under
the standard as uninsulated. (See the definition of ``covered
conductor'' in Sec.  1926.968.) The covering on this type of wire
protects the conductor from the weather but does not provide adequate
insulating value. This provision, which has no counterpart in existing
Subpart V, has been taken from Sec.  1910.269(l)(8).
    Paragraph (j) proposes a requirement that noncurrent-carrying metal
parts of equipment or devices be treated as energized at the highest
voltage to which they are exposed unless the installation is inspected
and these parts are determined to be grounded. Grounding these parts,
whether by permanent grounds or by the installation of temporary
grounds, would provide protection against ground faults. This
requirement, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, is based
on Sec.  1910.269(l)(9).
    Paragraph (k) would require devices used to open circuits under
load conditions to be designed to interrupt the current involved. It is
hazardous to open a circuit with a device that is not designed to
interrupt current if that circuit is carrying current. Non-load-break
switches used to open a circuit while it is carrying load current could
fail catastrophically, severely injuring or killing any nearby
employee. This requirement, which has no counterpart in existing
Subpart V, has been taken from Sec.  1910.269(l)(10).
Section 1926.961, Deenergizing Lines and Equipment for Employee
Protection
    Proposed Sec.  1926.961 addresses the deenergizing of electric
transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the protection of
employees. Transmission and distribution systems are different from
other energy systems found in general industry or even in the electric
utility industry itself. The hazardous energy control methods for these
systems are necessarily different from those covered under the general
industry generic standard on the control of hazardous energy sources
(Sec.  1910.147). Transmission and distribution lines and equipment are
installed outdoors and are subject to being reenergized by means other
than the normal energy sources. For example, lightning can strike a
line and energize an otherwise deenergized conductor, or a line could
be energized by unknown cogeneration sources not under the control of
the employer. Additionally, some deenergized transmission and
distribution lines are subject to being reenergized by induced voltage
from nearby energized conductors or by contact with other energized
sources of electrical energy. Another difference is that energy control
devices are often very remote from the worksite and are frequently
under the centralized control of a system operator.
    For these reasons, OSHA is proposing to cover the control of
hazardous energy sources related to transmission and distribution
systems. This is the same approach used in Sec.  1910.269. In fact, the
requirements proposed in Sec.  1926.961 have been taken from Sec.
1910.269(m). Existing Subpart V also contains procedures for
deenergizing transmission and distribution installations. The
differences between the existing requirements, which are contained in
Sec.  1926.950(d), and those proposed in Sec.  1926.961 are discussed
later in this preamble.
    In addition to setting forth the application of Sec.  1926.961,
paragraph (a) explains that conductors and equipment that have not been
deenergized under the procedures of Sec.  1926.961 have to be treated
as energized. As noted earlier in this preamble under the summary and
explanation of proposed Sec.  1926.960(b)(2), existing Sec.
1926.950(b)(2) requires electric equipment and lines to be considered
as energized until determined to be deenergized by tests or other
appropriate means. OSHA believes that the appropriate procedures for
assuring that lines and equipment are deenergized are contained in
proposed Sec.  1926.961 and that a simple test for a deenergized
condition cannot be relied upon to ensure that lines and equipment
remain deenergized.
    Some systems are under the direction of a central system operator
who controls all switching operations. Other systems (mostly
distribution installations) are not under any centralized control.
These systems are energized and deenergized in the field without the
direct intervention of a system operator. Paragraph (b)(1) of proposed
Sec.  1926.961 states that all of the requirements of proposed
paragraph (c) would apply if a system operator is in charge of the
lines and equipment and of their means of disconnection. Paragraph
(b)(2) defines the general rule for crews working on lines that are not
under the control of a system operator. In the usual case, one employee
is designated to be in charge of the clearance. In general, all of the
requirements in paragraph (c) would apply, with the employee in charge
of the clearance taking the place of the system operator. In this
manner, the proposal provides protection against the unintended
energizing of transmission and distribution lines without requiring all
lines to be under the control of one employee. One employee in a crew
will be in charge of the clearance for the crew; procedures will be
followed to ensure that the lines are truly deenergized; tags will be
placed on the lines; and procedures will be followed to remove the tags
and reenergize the lines.
    However, in some cases, certain requirements contained in paragraph
(c) are not necessary for the safety of employees. If only one crew
will be working on transmission or distribution lines and if the means
of deenergizing the lines is accessible and visible to and under the
sole control of the employee in charge of the clearance, the provisions
requiring tags on the disconnecting means are unnecessary. Therefore,
proposed paragraph (b)(3)(i) would exempt a portion of the requirements
of paragraph (c) from applying to work that is performed by a single
crew of employees,\49\ if the means of disconnection of the lines and
equipment are accessible and visible to and under the sole control of
the employee in charge of the clearance. The provisions of paragraph
(c) that would not apply are those relating to (1) requesting the
system operator to deenergize the lines, (2) automatic and remote
control of the lines, (3) the wording on tags, (4) two crews working on
the same line, and (5) tag removal. It is not necessary to request the
system operator to deenergize the lines because he or she would not be
in control of the disconnecting means for the lines. Only one person
would be in charge of the clearance for the crew, and the means of
disconnection for the lines would be accessible and visible to and
under the control of that person.\50\ Thus, tags would not be needed
for the protection of the crew. Further, remote and automatic switching
of lines and work performed by two crews working on lines or equipment
controlled by the same disconnecting means would not be

[[Continued on page 34871]]

]

[[pp. 34871-34920]] Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution;
Electrical Protective Equipment

[[Continued from page 34870]]

recognized under paragraph (b)(3)(i). (A group of employees made up of
several ``crews'' of employees who are under the direction of a single
employee and who are working in a coordinated manner to accomplish a
task on the same lines or equipment are considered to be a single crew,
rather than as multiple independent crews, for the purposes of
paragraph (b)(3)(i). In such cases, all operations that could energize
or deenergize a circuit would have to be coordinated through the single
employee in charge.) If the crews are independent, each crew would need
an employee-in-charge of its clearance (see the discussion of proposed
paragraph (b)(3)(ii), later in this section of the preamble).
Therefore, no one could be considered as having sole control over the
disconnecting means protecting the crews, and the exceptions listed in
paragraph (b)(3)(i) would not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ An employee working alone is considered to be a ``crew'' of
one.
    \50\ The means of disconnection is under the sole control of the
employee in charge of the clearance, and it need only be assessible
and visible to that employee. Other employees in the crew have no
control whatsoever over the disconnecting means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (d) of existing Sec.  1926.950 also recognizes separate
procedures for lines that are ``visibly open.'' However, only two
requirements apply. First, paragraph (d)(2)(i) requires guards or
barriers to be installed to protect against contact with adjacent
lines. Second, upon completion of work, the designated employee in
charge must determine that all employees in his crew are clear and that
protective grounds installed by his crew have been removed, and he or
she must report to the designated authority that all tags protecting
the crew may be removed (paragraph (d)(2)(ii)).
    The existing Subpart V provisions relating to working on lines or
equipment that have their disconnecting means ``visibly open'' are
insufficient to protect employees. Other requirements relating to
deenergizing, testing, grounding, and reenergizing procedures are
necessary for the protection of employees. While existing Subpart V
does cover reenergizing procedures, it includes no provisions for
deenergizing, testing, or grounding. OSHA believes that this proposal
corrects these deficiencies.
    If more than one independent crew is working on a line, paragraph
(b)(3)(ii) would require each crew to follow the steps outlined in
Sec.  1926.961(c) separately, to ensure that a group of workers does
not make faulty assumptions about what steps have been or will be taken
by another group to deenergize lines or equipment. Paragraph (c) of
proposed Sec.  1926.961 would not require a separate tag for each crew;
it does require, however, separate clearances for each crew. There
would have to be one employee in charge of the clearance for each crew,
and the clearance for a crew would be held by this employee. In
complying with paragraph (b)(3)(ii), the employer would have to ensure
that no tag is removed unless its associated clearances are released
(paragraph (c)(11)) \51\ and that no action is taken at a given point
of disconnection until all protective grounds have been removed, until
all crews have released their clearances, until all employees are clear
of the lines or equipment, and until all tags have been removed at that
point of disconnection (paragraph (c)(12)). OSHA requests comments on
whether the standard should require each crew to have a separate tag
and, if so, on ways to incorporate such a requirement in the standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Unless the employer has only one crew, a tracking mechanism
may be necessary so that the employer can determine what crew is
protected by a tag.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where there is a system operator, who is in charge of energizing
and deenergizing lines and equipment, that person keeps track of
clearances for different crews working on the same lines or equipment.
When there is no system operator, the crews will need to coordinate
their activities to ensure that the lines or equipment are not
reenergized while an employee is still working on them. Proposed
paragraph (b)(3)(ii) would require such coordination when there is no
system operator.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(3)(ii) has been taken from Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(viii). Existing Subpart V contains a comparable
requirement in Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(vi). However, the existing
requirement would simply require a tag for each independent crew. As
noted earlier, the proposal would not require separate tags for each
crew. However, each crew would hold a separate clearance that could not
be released without authorization from the employee in charge of the
clearance. Additionally, the proposal would require that each crew
independently perform all the steps outlined in proposed paragraph (c)
and that the crews coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing the lines
or equipment if no system operator is in charge. The existing standard
contains no such requirement. OSHA believes that the proposed approach
better protects employees than the existing standard.
    Disconnecting means that are accessible to people not under the
employer's control would have to be rendered inoperable. For example, a
switch handle mounted at the bottom of a utility pole that is not on
the employer's premises must be locked in the open position while the
overhead line is deenergized. This requirement, which is contained in
paragraph (b)(4) would prevent a member of the general public or an
employee (of a contractor, for example) who is not under the employer's
control from closing the switch and energizing the line. This
requirement, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, has been
taken from Sec.  1910.269(m)(2)(iv).
    Paragraph (c) of proposed Sec.  1926.961 sets forth the exact
procedure for deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and
equipment. The procedure must be followed in the order presented in the
rule. Except as noted, the rules are consistent with existing Sec.
1926.950(d)(1), although the language has been taken from Sec.
1910.269(m)(3). The Agency has attempted to propose simplified language
and has written the requirements in performance-oriented terms whenever
possible.
    Paragraph (c)(1) would require an employee to request the system
operator to deenergize a particular section of line or equipment. So
that control is vested in one authority, a single designated employee
would be assigned this task. This designated employee thus becomes the
employee in charge of and responsible for the clearance for work. This
provision, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, has been
taken from Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(i). The designated employee who
requests the clearance need not be in charge of other aspects of the
work; the proposal intends for this designated employee to be in charge
of the clearance. He or she is responsible for requesting the
clearance, for informing the system operator of changes in the
clearance (such as transfer of responsibility), and for insuring that
it is safe for the circuit to be reenergized before the clearance is
released. If someone other than an employee at the worksite requests
the clearance and if that clearance is in place before the employee
arrives at the site, then clearance must be transferred under Sec.
1926.961(c)(8). The Agency believes that the person requesting the
clearance, once the lines are indeed deenergized, must be the one to
contact in case alterations in the clearance are necessary. The
employees who will be performing the actual work at some time in the
future would not necessarily be aware that a clearance has been
requested and would not be in position to answer questions about the
clearance.
    The second step (proposed Sec.  1926.961(c)(2)) is to open all
switches through which electrical energy could flow to the section of
line or equipment. The disconnecting means would then be made
inoperable if the design of the device permits. For example, the

removable handle of a switch could be detached. Also, the switches
would have to be tagged to indicate that employees are at work. This
paragraph would ensure that the lines are disconnected from their
sources of supply and protects against the accidental reclosing of the
switches. This rule is intended to require the disconnection of known
sources of electric energy only. Hazards related to the presence of
unexpected energy sources would be controlled by testing for voltage
and by grounding the circuit, as proposed under paragraphs (c)(5) and
(c)(6), respectively.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(2) has been taken from Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(ii). Existing Subpart V contains comparable requirements
in Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(ii)(a), and (d)(1)(ii)(b). The
existing provisions require: (1) the line or equipment to be identified
and isolated from sources of energy (paragraph (d)(1)(i)), and (2)
notification and assurance of the designated employee that all
disconnecting means have been opened and tagged (paragraphs
(d)(1)(ii)(a) and (d)(1)(ii)(b)). OSHA believes that the proposed
language more accurately reflects the actual steps taken to deenergize
lines and equipment.
    Proposed Sec.  1926.961(c)(3) would require the tagging of
automatically and remotely controlled switches. An automatically or
remotely controlled switch would also have to be rendered inoperable if
the design of the switch allows for it to be made inoperable. This
provision which has been taken from Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(iii), would
also protect employees from being injured as a result of the automatic
operation of such switches. Existing Subpart V contains an equivalent
requirement in Sec. Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(ii)(b) and (d)(1)(ii)(c).
    Paragraph (c)(4) of proposed Sec.  1926.961 would require tags to
prohibit operation of the switches to which they are attached. They
would also be required to state that employees are at work. This
requirement has been taken from Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(iv). Existing
Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(ii)(b) contains a requirement for tags to indicate
that employees are working; however, it does not require the tags to
prohibit operation of the disconnecting means. The Agency believes that
it is essential for the tags to contain this prohibition so that the
meaning of the tag is clear.
    After the previous four requirements have been met and after the
employee in charge of the work has been given a clearance by the system
operator, proposed paragraph (c)(5) would require the lines or
equipment to be tested. This test would ensure that the lines have in
fact been deenergized and is intended to prevent accidents resulting
from someone's opening the wrong disconnect. It also protects employees
from hazards associated with unknown sources of electric energy. This
paragraph is based on Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(v). Existing Sec.
1926.950(d)(1)(iii) requires a test or a visual inspection to be
performed to ensure that the lines or equipment are deenergized. Visual
inspection alone cannot determine whether a line or equipment is
deenergized. Voltage backfeed, induced current, and leakage current can
all energize electric lines and equipment without the employee being
able to ``see'' it. Additionally, the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking showed
the lack of testing to be a cause of accidents (269-Ex. 9-2, 12-12).
Therefore, the proposal would require an actual test to determine
whether the lines or equipment was energized. OSHA has not specified
the type of test but expects employers to use testing procedures that
will reliably indicate whether or not the part in question is
energized. For example, using a voltage detector on the part would be
one way to do this. OSHA requests comments on when and if other
methods, such as fuzzing a line,\52\ are acceptable testing methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Fuzzing, or buzzing, a line involves using a live-line tool
to hold a wrench or similar tool near a line and listening for the
buzzing sound given off as the tool approaches a circuit part
energized at a high voltage. This method has obvious disadvantages
when ambient noise levels are excessive, and it is only reliable
above certain voltage levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (c)(6) would require the installation of any
protective grounds required by Sec.  1926.962 at this point in the
sequence of events. Since the lines or equipment have been deenergized
and tested in accordance with the previous provisions, it would now be
safe to install a protective ground. This requirement is based on Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(vi). An equivalent requirement is contained in existing
Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(iv).
    After the six previous rules have been followed, paragraph (c)(7)
would permit the lines or equipment to be treated as deenergized. This
provision, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, is based on
Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(vii).
    In some cases, as when an employee in charge has to leave the job
because of illness, it may be necessary to transfer a clearance. Under
such conditions, proposed paragraph (c)(8) would require that the
employee in charge inform the system operator and that the employees in
the crew be informed of the transfer. If the employee holding the
clearance is forced to leave the worksite due to illness or other
emergency, the employee's supervisor could inform the system operator
of the transfer in clearance. This requirement, which is based on Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(ix), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    After the clearance is transferred, the new employee in charge
would then be responsible for the clearance. It is important that only
one employee at a time be responsible for any clearance; otherwise,
independent action by any worker could endanger the entire crew.
    Once work is completed, the clearance will have to be released so
that the lines or equipment can be reenergized. Paragraph (c)(9) of
proposed Sec.  1926.961 covers this procedure. To ensure that it is
safe to release the clearance, the employee in charge would have to:
(1) Notify workers in the crew of the release, (2) determine that they
are clear of the lines and equipment, (3) determine that grounds have
been removed, and (4) notify the system operator that the clearance is
to be released. This provision is based on Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(x). An
equivalent requirement is contained in existing Sec.
1926.950(d)(1)(viii).
    Proposed paragraph (c)(10) would require the person who is
releasing the clearance to be the one who requested it, unless
responsibility has been transferred. This provision would ensure that
no clearance is released without the authorization of the employee who
is in charge of the clearance. This proposed paragraph, which has no
counterpart in existing Subpart V, is based on Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(xi).
    Proposed paragraph (c)(11) would prohibit the removal of a tag
unless its associated clearance has been released. Because the persons
who place and remove the tags may not be the same, it is important for
the regulation to prohibit removing a tag without the release of the
clearance by the employee who is responsible for it. This provision,
which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, is based on Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(xii).
    According to proposed paragraph (c)(12), action would be permitted
to be taken to reenergize the lines or equipment only after grounds and
tags have been removed, after all clearances have been released, and
after all employees are in the clear. This protects employees from the
possibility that the line or equipment could be reenergized while
employees are still at work. The Agency does not intend for this
provision to require the removal of all tags from all disconnecting
means before any of them could be reclosed. It

is intended to require that all tags for any particular switch be
removed before that switch is closed. It is very important in a tagging
system that no energy isolating device be returned to a position
allowing energy flow if there are any tags on it that are protecting
employees. For example, in the case of a 5-mile section of line that is
deenergized by opening switches at both ends of the line, after all the
tags are removed from any one switch that one switch could then be
closed.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(12), which has no counterpart in Subpart V,
has been taken from Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(xiii).
Section 1926.962, Grounding for the Protection of Employees
    Sometimes, normally energized lines and equipment that have been
deenergized to permit employees to work become accidentally energized.
This can happen in several ways, for example, by contact with another
energized circuit, by voltage backfeed from a customer's cogeneration
installation, by lightning contact, or by failure of the clearance
system outlined in Sec.  1926.961.
    Transmission and distribution lines and equipment are normally
installed outdoors where they are exposed to damage from the weather
and from actions taken by members of the general public. Many utility
poles are installed alongside roadways where they may be struck by
motor vehicles. Distribution lines have been damaged by falling trees,
and transmission line insulators have been used for target practice.
Additionally, customers fed by a utility company's distribution line
may have cogeneration or backup generation capability, sometimes
without the utility company's knowledge. All these factors can
reenergize a deenergized transmission or distribution line or
equipment. Energized lines can be knocked down onto deenergized lines.
A backup generator or a cogenerator can cause voltage backfeed on the
deenergized power line. Lastly, lightning, even miles from the
worksite, can reenergize a line. All of these problems pose hazards to
employees working on deenergized transmission and distribution lines
and equipment. In fact, these problems were a factor in 14 of the
accidents in 269-Exhibit 9-2.
    Grounding the lines and equipment is used to protect employees from
injury should such reenergizing occur. Grounding also provides
protection against induced voltages and static charges on a line.
(These induced and static voltages can be high enough to endanger
employees, either directly from electric shock or indirectly from
involuntary reaction.)
    Grounding, as a temporary protective measure, involves connecting
the deenergized lines and equipment to earth through conductors. As
long as the conductors remain deenergized, this maintains the lines and
equipment at the same potential as the earth. However, if voltage is
impressed on a line, the voltage on the grounded line rises to a value
dependent upon the impressed voltage, the impedance between its source
and the grounding point, and the impedance of the grounding conductor.
    Various techniques are used to limit the voltage to which an
employee working on a grounded line would be exposed. Bonding is one of
these techniques. Conductive objects within the reach of the employee
are bonded together to create an equipotential work area for the
employee. Within this area of equal potentials, voltage differences are
limited to a safe value.
    The requirements proposed in Sec.  1926.962 have been taken
directly from Sec.  1910.269(n). Existing Sec.  1926.954 contains
current provisions related to grounding for the protection of
employees. OSHA has reviewed existing Sec.  1926.954 and has found that
it is not as protective as Sec.  1910.269(n) and contains redundant and
unnecessary requirements. For example, as noted under the summary and
explanation of proposed Sec.  1926.960(b)(2), existing Sec.
1926.950(b)(2) requires electric lines and equipment to be considered
as energized until determined to be deenergized by tests or other
appropriate methods or means. Existing Sec.  1926.954(a) similarly
requires all conductors and equipment to be treated as energized until
tested or otherwise determined to be deenergized or until grounded.
These two provisions do not adequately protect employees from
accidentally reenergized lines and equipment. As noted in the earlier
discussion, electric power transmission and distribution lines and
equipment can become reenergized even after they have been deenergized.
Therefore, OSHA concluded in the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking that
grounding deenergized lines and equipment is essential except under
limited circumstances. The Agency is proposing to continue that
approach here. In developing proposed Sec.  1926.962, OSHA eliminated
redundant requirements from existing Sec.  1926.954, consolidated
related requirements from the existing standard, and strengthened the
current requirements to protect employees better.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ As previously noted, existing Sec.  1926.954(a) requires
conductors and equipment to be considered as energized until
determined to be deenergized or until grounded. Paragraph (c) of
existing Sec.  1926.954 requires bare communications conductors on
poles or structures to be treated as energized unless they are
protected by insulating materials. The hazard addressed by these
requirements is covered by proposed Sec.  1926.960(b)(2), discussed
earlier in this preamble.
    When equipment is being installed, it poses the same hazard to
an employee that any other conductive object being manipulated near
exposed energized parts does. Requirements contained in proposed
Sec.  1926.960(c) and (d) adequately address this hazard. The
installation of lines however does pose additional hazards. First,
the lines may be subject to hazardous induced voltage. Second,
because of their length, new overhead lines are much more likely to
contact existing energized lines than new equipment is. This can
happen, for example, through failure of the stringing and tensioning
equipment being used to install the new lines or through failure of
the existing lines or support structures. These hazards are
addressed in proposed Sec.  1926.964(b), which specifically covers
the installation and removal of overhead lines. Lastly, new
underground lines, which are run as insulated cable, do not pose
electrical hazards.
    For these reasons, OSHA is not proposing to carry existing Sec.
1926.954(b) forward. However, comments are requested on whether or
not the proposal adequately protects employees from hazards
associated with the installation of new lines and equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  1926.962 addresses protective grounding and
bonding.\54\ As noted in paragraph (a), entire Sec.  1926.962 applies
to the grounding of deenergized transmission and distribution lines and
equipment for the purpose of protecting employees. Additionally,
paragraph (a) indicates that paragraph (d) of proposed Sec.  1926.962
would apply to the protective grounding of other equipment, such as
aerial lift trucks, as well. Under normal conditions, such equipment
would not be connected to a source of electric energy. However, to
protect employees in case of accidental contact of the equipment with
live parts, protective grounding is required elsewhere in the standard
(in Sec.  1926.964(c)(11), for example); to ensure the adequacy of this
grounding, the provisions of paragraph (d) must be followed.
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    \54\ As used throughout the rest of this discussion and within
proposed Sec.  1926.962, the term ``grounding'' includes bonding.
Technically, grounding refers to the connection of a conductive part
to ground, whereas bonding refers to connecting conductive parts to
each other. However, for convenience, OSHA is using the term
``grounding'' to refer to both techniques of minimizing voltages to
which an employee will be exposed.
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    The general requirement contained in paragraph (b) of proposed
Sec.  1926.962 states the conditions under which lines and equipment
must be grounded. Basically, in order for lines or equipment to be
treated as deenergized, they must be deenergized under

proposed Sec.  1926.961 and grounded. Grounding could be omitted only
if the installation of a ground is impracticable (such as during the
initial stages of work on underground cables, when the conductor is not
exposed for grounding) or if the conditions resulting from the
installation of a ground would introduce more serious hazards than work
without grounds. It is expected that conditions warranting the absence
of protective grounds would be rare.
    If grounds are not installed and the lines and equipment are to be
treated as deenergized, however, precautions have to be observed, and
certain conditions must be met. Obviously, the lines and equipment
would still have to be deenergized by the procedures of Sec.  1926.961.
Also, there would have to be no possibility of contact with another
source of voltage and no hazard of induced voltage present. Since these
precautions and conditions do not protect against the possible
reenergizing of the lines or equipment under all conditions, the
omission of grounding is permitted only in very limited circumstances.
    Paragraph (f) of existing Sec.  1926.954 allows grounds to be
omitted without the additional restrictions proposed in Sec.
1926.962(b)(1) through (b)(3). However, the existing standard requires
the lines or equipment to be treated as energized in such cases. While
the proposal does not specifically permit omitting grounds for
conductors that are treated as energized, it does not require grounding
unless the equipment is to be considered as deenergized. (See the
discussion of proposed Sec.  1926.960(b)(2), earlier in this section of
the preamble.)
    Paragraph (f) of existing Sec.  1926.954 also addresses where
grounds must be placed. The existing standard requires grounds to be
placed between the work location and all sources of energy and as close
as practicable to the work location. Alternatively, grounds could be
placed at the work location. If work is to be performed at more than
one location, the existing standard would require the line section to
be grounded and short circuited at one location and would require the
conductor on which work is being performed to be grounded at the work
location. Although these requirements are intended to protect employees
in case the line on which they are working is accidentally reenergized,
the existing provisions do not ensure that the grounding practices and
equipment are adequate to provide this protection.
    OSHA proposed requirements similar to those in existing Sec.
1926.954(f) when it proposed Sec.  1910.269(n). In developing final
Sec.  1910.269(n), OSHA reviewed the accidents in 269-Ex. 9-2 and 269-
Ex. 9-2A for those involving improper protective grounding. There were
nine accidents in these two exhibits related to protective grounding.
In three cases, inadequate grounds were present. Based on the fact that
grounding is a backup measure, intended to provide protection only when
all other safety-related work practices fail, OSHA concluded that this
was a significant incidence of faulty grounding.
    Grounding practices that do not provide an equipotential zone in
which an employee is safeguarded from voltage differences do not
provide complete protection. In case the line is accidentally
reenergized, voltages to which an employee would be exposed due to
inadequate grounding would be lethal, as can be seen by some of the
exhibits in the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record (269-Ex. 6-27, 57).
The employee would be protected only if he or she is not in contact
with the line until the energy source is cleared by circuit protective
devices.
    For these reasons, OSHA is proposing to require grounds that will
protect employees in the event that the line or equipment on which they
are working is reenergized. Proposed Sec.  1926.962(c) would require
protective grounds to be so located and arranged that employees are not
exposed to hazardous differences in potential. The proposal would allow
employers and employees to use whatever grounding method they prefer as
long as employees are protected. For employees working at elevated
positions on poles and towers, single point grounding may be necessary,
together with grounding straps to provide an equipotential zone for the
worker. Employees in insulated aerial lifts working at midspan between
two conductor supporting structures may be protected by grounding at
convenient points on both sides of the work area. Bonding the aerial
lift to the grounded conductor would ensure that the employee remains
at the potential of the conductor in case of a fault. Other methods may
be necessary to protect workers on the ground, including grounding mats
and insulating platforms. The Agency believes that this performance-
oriented approach would provide the flexibility needed by employers,
but would also afford the best protection to employees.
    Paragraph (d) of proposed Sec.  1926.962 contains requirements that
grounding equipment would have to meet. So that the protective
grounding equipment does not fail, it would be required to have an
ampacity high enough so that the fault current could be carried for the
amount of time necessary to allow protective devices to interrupt the
circuit. This provision, which has been taken from the first sentence
of Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i), is contained in paragraph (d)(1)(i) of
proposed Sec.  1926.962.
    The design of electric power distribution lines operating at 600
volts or less frequently provides a maximum fault current and fault
interrupting time that exceeds the current carrying capability of the
circuit conductors. In other words, the maximum fault current on
distribution secondaries of 600 volts or less is typically high enough
to melt the phase conductors carrying the fault current. If protective
grounding equipment were required to carry the maximum amount of fault
current without regard to whether the phase conductors would fail, the
size of the grounding equipment would be impractical. However, OSHA
does not interpret Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i) to require protective
grounding equipment to be capable of carrying more current than
necessary to allow the phase conductors to fail. A protective grounding
jumper sized slightly larger than a phase conductor would be sufficient
to meet the general industry standard, although the language of the
first sentence of Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i) does not make this clear.
    To clarify this requirement, OSHA is proposing, in Sec.
1926.962(d)(1)(ii), to permit, specifically, the use of protective
grounding equipment that would not be large enough to carry the maximum
fault current indefinitely but that would be large enough to carry this
current until the phase conductor fails.\55\ This would be permitted
only under certain conditions. First, the grounding equipment must be
able to carry the maximum fault current until the conductor being
protected fails. Second, the conductor must only be considered as
grounded where it is protected by the grounding equipment. In other
words, the portion of the phase conductor between the grounding
equipment and the employee being protected must remain intact under
fault conditions. Third, since the phase conductor will likely fall
once it fails, no employee must be in a position where they would be
endangered by any failed conductor. OSHA has not restricted this
provision to lines and equipment operating at 600 volts or less because
the Agency believes that employees would be protected with these
provisions regardless of voltage. However, OSHA requests comments on
the issue of whether or not proposed

Sec.  1926.962(d)(1)(ii) should be restricted to lines and equipment
operating at 600 volts or less.
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    \55\ OSHA is also proposing to make a similar change in Sec.
1910.269.
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    Paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of Sec.  1926.962 would require protective
grounding equipment to have an ampacity of at least No. 2 AWG copper.
This provision would ensure that protective grounding equipment has a
suitable minimum ampacity and mechanical strength.
    Under paragraph (d)(2), the impedance of the grounding equipment
would be required to be low enough to ensure the quick operation of the
protective devices.
    Paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) help ensure the prompt clearing of the
circuit supplying voltage to the point where the employee is working.
Thus, the grounding equipment limits the duration and reduces the
severity of any electric shock, though it does not itself prevent shock
from occurring. (As discussed earlier, proposed Sec.  1926.962(c)
requires employees to be protected from hazardous differences in
electrical potential.) OSHA has included a note referencing the ASTM
standard on protective grounding equipment (ASTM F855-03) so that
employers will be able to find additional information that may be
helpful in their efforts to comply with the standard.
    Existing Sec.  1926.954(h), (i), and (j) contain requirements
relating to the impedance and ampacity of personal protective grounds.
Paragraph (i) requires tower clamps to have adequate ampacity, and
paragraph (j) contains the same requirement for ground leads with an
additional restriction that they be no smaller than No. 2 AWG copper.
Paragraph (i) requires the impedance of a grounding electrode (if one
is used) to be low enough to remove the danger of harm to employees or
to permit prompt operation of protective devices.
    OSHA believes that the entire grounding system should be capable of
carrying the maximum fault current and should have an impedance low
enough to protect employees. The existing standard contains no
requirements for the impedance of grounding conductors or clamps, nor
does it contain requirements relating to the ampacity of grounding
clamps other than tower clamps. By addressing specific portions of the
grounding systems but not addressing others, the existing standard does
not require complete protection for employees. Because the proposal's
grounding requirements apply to the entire grounding system, OSHA
believes that the proposal will provide better protection for employees
than the existing rule.
    Paragraph (e) of Sec.  1926.962 would require lines and equipment
that are to be grounded to be tested for voltage before a ground is
installed. If a previously installed ground is evident, no test would
need to be conducted. This requirement would prevent energized
equipment from being grounded, which could result in injury to the
employee installing the ground. This requirement is the same as
existing Sec.  1926.954(d).
    Paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) propose procedures for installing and
removing grounds. To protect employees in the event that the
``deenergized'' equipment to be grounded is or becomes energized, the
proposal would require the ``equipment end'' of the grounding device to
be applied last and removed first and that a live-line tool be used for
both procedures in order to protect workers.
    These provisions are similar to existing Sec.  1926.954(e)(1) and
(e)(2), except that the existing standard recognizes the use of a
``suitable device'' in addition to a live-line tool. OSHA is concerned
that this language implies that rubber insulating gloves could be used
to install and remove grounds under any circumstance. It should be
noted that it is unsafe for an employee to be too close when connecting
or disconnecting a ground. Therefore, OSHA is proposing to eliminate
the phrase ``or other insulated device'' from the rule. OSHA will,
however, consider any device that is insulated for the voltage and that
allows an employee to apply or remove the ground from a safe position
to be a live-line tool for the purposes of Sec.  1926.962(f)(1) and
(f)(2).
    These two paragraphs in the proposal are based on existing Sec.
1910.269(n)(6) and (n)(7). The proposal, however, would permit the use
of insulated equipment other than live-line tools to attach protective
grounds to, and to remove them from, lines and equipment operating at
600 volts or less, if the employer ensures that the line or equipment
is not energized at the time or if the employer can demonstrate that
the employee would be protected from any hazard that could develop if
the line or equipment is energized. For example, test equipment could
be connected to a line that is to be grounded, and the protective
ground could be applied by an employee wearing rubber gloves while the
test equipment indicated that the line was deenergized. After the
ground was in place the test equipment could be removed.
    Some electric utilities have complained that lines and equipment
operating at 600 volts or less cannot always accommodate the placement
and removal of a protective ground by a line-line tool. OSHA is
proposing these alternatives to enable protective grounds to be placed
on this equipment in a manner that will still protect employees.\56\
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    \56\ OSHA is also proposing to make similar changes in Sec.
1910.269.
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    It should be noted that, during the periods before the ground is
installed and after it is removed, the line or equipment involved must
be considered as energized (under proposed Sec.  1926.960(b)(2)). As a
result, the minimum approach distances specified in proposed Sec.
1926.960(c)(1) would apply when grounds are installed or removed.
    With certain underground cable installations, a fault at one
location along the cable can create a substantial potential difference
between the earth at that location and the earth at other locations.
Under normal conditions, this is not a hazard. However, if an employee
is in contact with a remote ground (by being in contact with a
conductor that is grounded at a remote station), he or she can be
exposed to the difference in potential (because he or she is also in
contact with the local ground). To protect employees in such
situations, proposed Sec.  1926.962(g) would prohibit grounding cables
at remote locations if a hazardous potential transfer could occur under
fault conditions. This proposed provision has no counterpart in
existing Subpart V.
    Proposed Sec.  1926.962(h) addresses the removal of grounds for
test purposes. Under the proposal, grounds would be permitted to be
removed for test purposes. Existing Subpart V contains a comparable
requirement in Sec.  1926.954(g). However, the existing standard simply
requires employees to take extreme caution when grounds are removed for
testing. OSHA does not believe that the existing language contains
sufficient safeguards for employees. Therefore, the Agency is proposing
performance criteria that testing procedures would be required to meet.
During the test procedure, the employer would be required to ensure
that each employee uses insulating equipment and is isolated from any
hazards involved, and the employer would be required to institute any
additional measures as may be necessary to protect each exposed
employee in case the previously grounded lines and equipment become
energized. OSHA believes that the proposal would protect employees
better than the existing rule.

Section 1926.963, Testing and Test Facilities
    Proposed Sec.  1926.963 contains safety work practices covering
electrical hazards arising out of the special testing of lines and
equipment (namely, in-service and out-of-service, as well as new, lines
and equipment) to determine maintenance needs and fitness for service.
Generally, the need to conduct tests on new and idle lines and
equipment as part of normal checkout procedures, in addition to
maintenance evaluation, is specified in the National Electrical Safety
Code (ANSI C2). Basically, as stated in paragraph (a), the rules would
apply only to testing involving interim measurements utilizing high
voltage, high power, or combinations of both, as opposed to testing
involving continuous measurements as in routine metering, relaying and
normal line work.
    Proposed Sec.  1926.963 has been taken directly from Sec.
1910.269(o). Existing Subpart V has no counterpart to these proposed
requirements. The Agency believes that these high-voltage and high-
current tests are performed during construction work and that employers
would benefit by the inclusion of these provisions within the
construction standard in place of a reference to Sec.  1910.269.
However, it may be that this type of work is performed too infrequently
to warrant repeating the requirements in Subpart V. OSHA requests
comments on the need to include proposed Sec.  1926.963 in Subpart V.
    For the purposes of these proposed requirements, high-voltage
testing is assumed to involve voltage sources having sufficient energy
to cause injury and having magnitudes generally in excess of 1,000
volts, nominal. High-power testing involves sources where fault
currents, load currents, magnetizing currents, or line dropping
currents are used for testing, either at the rated voltage of the
equipment under test or at lower voltages. Proposed Sec.  1926.963
covers such testing in laboratories, in shops and substations, and in
the field and on transmission and distribution lines.
    Examples of typical special tests in which either high-voltage
sources or high-power sources are used as part of operation and
maintenance of electric power transmission and distribution systems
include cable-fault locating, large capacitive load tests, high current
fault-closure tests, insulation resistance and leakage tests, direct-
current proof tests, and other tests requiring direct connection to
power lines.
    Excluded from the scope of proposed Sec.  1926.963 are routine
inspection and maintenance measurements made by qualified employees in
accordance with established work practice rules where the hazards
associated with the use of intrinsic high-voltage or high-power sources
require only those normal precautions peculiar to such periodic work.
Obviously, the work practices for these routine tests would have to
comply with the rest of proposed Subpart V. Because this type of
testing poses hazards that are identical to other types of routine
electric power transmission and distribution work, OSHA believes that
the requirements of proposed Subpart V excluding Sec.  1926.963
adequately protect employees performing these tests. Two typical
examples of such excluded test work procedures would be ``phasing-out''
testing and testing for a ``no voltage'' condition. To clarify the
scope of this section, a note to this effect is included after
paragraph (a).
    Paragraph (b)(1) of proposed Sec.  1926.963 would require employers
to establish work practices governing employees engaged in certain
testing activities. These work practices are intended to delineate
precautions that employees must observe for protection from the hazards
of high-voltage or high-power testing. For example, if high-voltage
sources are used in the testing, employees would be required to follow
the safety practices established under paragraph (b)(1) to protect
against such typical hazards as inadvertent arcing or voltage
overstress destruction, as well as accidental contact with objects that
have become residually charged by induced voltage from electric field
exposure. If high-power sources are used in the testing, employees
would be required to follow established safety practices to protect
against such typical hazards as ground voltage rise as well as exposure
to excessive electromagnetically-caused physical forces associated with
the passage of heavy current.
    These practices would apply to work performed at both permanent and
temporary test areas (that is, areas permanently located in the