recommendations, or for major changes from an incident investigation
recommendations, root cause analysis or MOC review that could
reasonably result in a major chemical accident or release.

    Finally, EPA seeks comment on whether either EPA or a third-party
should create a ``clearinghouse'' of safer technology and alternatives
that allow source owners or operators to share useful information and/
or consult to identify technologies to evaluate for their process. We
note that the concept of a clearinghouse has drawn support in comments
on the RFI from state and local officials, labor and environmental
stakeholders, academics, and industry representatives.\162\ One
mechanism of collecting relevant information could be the National
Working Group on Chemical Safety and Security's best practices Web
site,\163\ which collects and shares chemical safety and security best
practices, including safer alternatives. Alternatively, EPA could
require submission of STAA analyses,

or information from those analyses, directly to EPA, and develop its
own Web site. The information shared on such a Web site may include
practicable risk reduction measures that could be applied at various
facilities to mitigate threats to the public, worker, health,
environment, and facility during the production, transport, and use of
chemicals.
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    \162\ AMWA. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-
0639 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 3; BlueGreen Alliance.
October 27, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0579 on Risk
Management Program RFI. p. 6. www.bluegreenalliance.org; BWD.
October 24, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0654 on Risk
Management Program RFI. p. 3. Beaver Water District (BWD), Lowell,
Arkansas; CCHS. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-
0546 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 8; CPCD. October 29, 2014.
Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0644 on Risk Management Program
RFI, pgs. 16, 18-19; MKOPSC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-
OEM-2014-0328-0543 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 105; Tickner,
J. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0688 on Risk
Management Program RFI. p. 6. University of Massachusetts, Lowell,
Massachusetts; TURI. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-
0328-0539 on Risk Management Program RFI. Toxics Use Reduction
Institute (TURI), University of Massachusetts, Lowell,
Massachusetts. p. 5; United Steelworkers. October 29, 2014. Comment
No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0547 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 5.
    \163\ OSHA. 2014. Executive Order 13650 Best Practices. https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/LLIS/index.html.
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D. Stationary Source Location and Emergency Shutdown

    Serious accidents often highlight numerous safety concerns and
emphasize the need to consider existing regulations, industry
standards, recommended practices and guidance to reduce risks of future
incidents. Two issues of particular importance include the location of
stationary sources and their emergency shutdown capabilities.
1. Stationary Source Location
    The location of stationary sources, and the location and
configuration of regulated processes and equipment within a source, can
significantly affect the severity of an accidental release. The
location of the stationary source in relation to public and
environmental receptors may exacerbate the impacts of an accidental
release, such as blast overpressures or concentrations of toxic gases,
or conversely may allow such effects to dissipate prior to reaching
receptors. The lack of sufficient distance between the source boundary
and neighboring residential areas was a significant factor in the
severity of several major chemical accidents, including, among others,
the Bhopal disaster \164\ and the recent West Fertilizer accident. In
the Bhopal disaster, most of the deaths and injuries occurred in a
residential area that had grown up next to the plant. In the West
Fertilizer accident, an apartment complex and a nursing home located
approximately 450 feet and 600 feet, respectively, from the source of
the explosion were heavily damaged, resulting in three public
fatalities (a total of 15 people were killed in the explosion). The
explosion also caused over 260 injuries, as well as damage to over 350
homes and three schools located near the plant.\165\
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    \164\ Lees, Frank P. 1996. Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, Volume 3, 2nd ed. Appendix 5 Bhopal. Butterworth-
Heinemann, Oxford, Great Britain.
    \165\ CSB. January 2016. Final Investigation Report, West
Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion, West, TX, April 17, 2013.
Report 2013-02-I-TX, pp. 13, 30, 49, 53, 54. http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.
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    Facility designers have long recognized the potential benefits of
adding buffer or safety zones (i.e., controlled areas separating the
public and other facilities from the consequences of process incidents)
when selecting the location for new chemical facilities. For existing
facilities, owners have sometimes compensated nearby residents to
relocate away from the facility boundary in order to create a buffer
zone where one did not previously exist, or where adjacent residential
areas had been developed after the facility itself was constructed.
    The selection of locations of processes and process equipment
within a stationary source can impact the surrounding community not
only by the proximity of the accidental release to offsite receptors
near the facility boundary (e.g., people, infrastructure, environmental
resources) but also by increasing the likelihood of subsequent releases
from other nearby processes compromised by the initial release. The
1984 disaster at the PEMEX liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tank farm in
San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico, illustrates the potential for such
effects. In this accident, an LPG pipeline rupture resulted in a large
ground fire that spread to nearby LPG storage vessels, initiating a
series of massive explosions. The cascading explosions and fires
ultimately destroyed the entire facility and many nearby residences,
resulting in over 500 fatalities and thousands of severe injuries.\166\
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    \166\ Lees, Frank P. 1996. Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, Volume 3, 2nd ed. Appendix 4 Mexico City. Butterworth-
Heinemann, Oxford, Great Britain.
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    In the United States in 2007, a large fire at the Valero McKee
refinery in Sunray, Texas, resulted in the release of chlorine gas and
sulfuric acid from an adjacent process, which prevented responders from
entering the area and extinguishing the fire for more than two
days.\167\
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    \167\ CSB. July 9, 2008. Investigation Report: LPG Fire at
Valero-McKee Refinery, Sunray, Texas, February 16, 2007. Report No.
2007-05-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/valero-refinery-propane-fire/.
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    At West Fertilizer, the Risk Management Program-regulated anhydrous
ammonia process was located near the AN storage area. Although the AN
explosion did not cause any catastrophic failure of the ammonia storage
vessels, the potential for a release existed. A 1994 explosion
involving AN solution at Terra Industries in Port Neal, Iowa, which
killed four workers, also damaged on-site ammonia tanks, creating an
ammonia cloud that resulted in the evacuation of 2,500 people.\168\
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    \168\ EPA, Region 7, Emergency Response and Removal Branch
(Kansas City, KS). January 1996. Chemical Accident Investigation
Report: Terra Industries, Inc., Nitrogen Fertilizer Facility, Port
Neal, Iowa (January 1996). http://archive.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/web/pdf/cterra.pdf.
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    The PSM standard and RMP rule both require that facility siting be
addressed as one element of a PHA (see 29 CFR 1910.11 9(e)(2) and
(3)(v)), and 40 CFR 68.67(c)). While EPA has not provided any guidance
on how to adequately address stationary source siting in the PHA, RMP
facility owners or operators can refer to industry guidance on siting
considerations. The following publications provide guidance on facility
siting:

     API Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards
Associated With Location of Process Plant Buildings, 3rd Edition,
December 2009;
     API Recommended Practice 753, Management of Hazards
Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings, First
Edition, June 2007;
     CCPS Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings
for External Explosions, Fires, and Toxic Releases, Second Edition,
2012; and
     CCPS Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout (2003).

    The first three references listed above focus on providing guidance
and best practices on establishing the location of occupied buildings
within a facility, but generally do not address the potential risks to
offsite receptors associated with the location of the facility or
processes within the facility, nor do they consider the potential for
releases caused by natural hazards that may occur in particular
locations. The CCPS Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout address
both external factors influencing site selection, as well as factors
internal to the source that could influence site layout and equipment
spacing.
    At this time, EPA is not proposing any additional requirements for
location of stationary sources. EPA seeks comment on whether such
requirements should be considered for future rulemakings, including the
scope of such requirements, or whether the Agency should publish
guidance.
2. Emergency Shutdown
    In addition to properly locating stationary sources in relation to
surrounding receptors, and locating processes within sources so as to
minimize the possibility of cascading release events, accidents such as
these highlight the importance of being able to quickly and safely shut
down processes

where accidental releases are occurring or may imminently occur. The
RMP regulation requires owners and operators of stationary sources to
develop and implement written operating procedures for the safe and
timely emergency shutdown of Program 2 and Program 3 processes, to
ensure operator training for these procedures, and for maintaining the
mechanical integrity of emergency shutdown systems. However, the
regulation does not explicitly require that all covered processes must
include emergency shutdown systems.
    EPA encourages owner and operators of stationary sources to
consider location of stationary sources and process equipment and the
adequacy of emergency shutdown systems at their facilities to determine
if changes are necessary to both reduce risks of an accidental release
and ensure that procedures are in-place to mitigate those effects.
Emergency shutdown or putting a process into a safe operation mode in
the event of an emergency is a preventive safeguard to address
hazard(s) identified as part of hazard review or PHA. Thus, the hazard
review required under Sec.  68.50 or the PHA required under Sec.  68.67
should identify the use of this safeguard, when appropriate.
    At this time, EPA is not proposing any additional requirements for
emergency shutdown systems. However, EPA seeks comment on whether such
requirements should be considered for future rulemakings, including the
scope of such requirements, or whether the Agency should publish
guidance.

V. Emergency Response Preparedness Requirements

A. Emergency Response Program Coordination With Local Responders

    Subpart E of the RMP rule, the emergency response provisions,
applies to facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes. These provisions
require owners or operators of regulated facilities with Program 2 or 3
processes to coordinate with local response authorities and in some
cases develop an emergency response program in accordance with Sec.
68.95 to address how the owner or operator of the facility will respond
to accidental releases.\169\ The rule requires the owner or operator to
prepare and implement an emergency response program to protect public
health and the environment, unless the stationary source is included in
the community emergency response plan developed under section 303 of
Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) (for sources
with regulated toxic substances) and has coordinated response actions
with the local fire department (for sources with only regulated
flammable substances). An owner or operator that needs to develop an
emergency response program (i.e., be a ``responding'' facility), will
need to include the following elements in that program:
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    \169\ Owners or operators of stationary sources with Program 1
processes are required to coordinate emergency response procedures
with local emergency planning and response organizations under Sec.
68.10(b)(3)). This proposal would not affect that requirement.

     An emergency response plan;
     Procedures for the use of emergency response equipment
and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance;
     Training for employees; and
     Procedures to review and update the emergency response
plan to reflect changes at the stationary source and ensure that
employees are informed of changes.

The emergency response plan must also be coordinated with local
response authorities.
    An owner or operator of a facility who is relying on local
responders to respond to an accidental release (i.e., a ``non-
responding'' facility) when the stationary source has been included in
the community emergency response plan developed under section 303 of
EPCRA (for sources with regulated toxic substances) or has coordinated
response actions with the local fire department (for sources with only
regulated flammable substances, and without regulated toxic substances)
is not required to develop an emergency response program. However, the
owner or operator must also ensure that appropriate notification
mechanisms are in place to notify emergency responders when there is a
need for a response.
    Risk Management Program regulated facilities must indicate within
their RMP whether or not they are a responding facility (i.e., by
indicating compliance with mandatory elements of emergency response
plans required in Sec.  68.95(a)(1)). Our review of the RMP*Info
database has indicated that the majority of RMP facilities claim to be
non-responding facilities.\170\ However, during facility inspections,
EPA has often found that facilities either are not included in the
community emergency plan or have not properly coordinated response
actions with local authorities.171 172 173 State and local
response officials echoed this concern during listening sessions
conducted under Executive Order 13650, and in feedback provided to EPA
in conjunction with the RFI.174 175 This problem occurs with
both responding and non-responding facilities, but it is particularly
troublesome for non-responding facilities, because if the facility
itself does not maintain the capability to respond to emergencies, and
local authorities are not able to respond, then a proper response to an
accidental release at the facility may not occur or may be
significantly delayed. Also, when local responders are unfamiliar with
the hazards of the facility, they may not be prepared to safely
respond.
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    \170\ EPA. January 27, 2016. Technical Background Document for
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs under the
Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
    \171\ EPA Press Release. July 20, 2011. National Chemical
Company will Upgrade Facilities and Pay Fine to Settle Clean Air
Violations. http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/1e5ab1124055f3b28525781f0042ed40/9884f5d5e5e6368c852578d300642a3e!OpenDocument.
    \172\ EPA Press Release. February 13, 2013. Koch Nitrogen
Company to Pay $380,000 Civil Penalty for CAA Violations at
Facilities in Iowa and Kansas. http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/a9537cb213c0371985257b1100738628!OpenDocument.
    \173\ EPA Press Release. May 27, 2014. EPA Moves to Improve
Emergency Planning at Facilities in NJ and NY; Inspections Focus on
Information on Chemical Hazards Needed by First Responders during
Emergency Responses. http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/C6DB6A8A0918857F85257CE5005FEE24.
    \174\ Gablehouse, T. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-
2014-0328-0679 on Risk Management Program RFI, PDF pp. 5-6, NASTTPO,
Denver, CO.
    \175\ Elder, M., October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-
0328-0641 on Risk Management Program RFI, Oklahoma Hazardous
Materials Emergency Response Commission (OHMERC).
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    Poor coordination between chemical facilities and local emergency
responders has been identified as a factor contributing to the severity
of chemical accidents. For example, following the August 2008 explosion
and fire at the Bayer CropScience facility in Institute, West Virginia,
the CSB found that lack of effective coordination between facility and
local responders prevented responding agencies from receiving timely
information updates about the continually changing conditions at the
scene, prevented a public shelter-in-place order from reaching the
local community, and may have resulted in toxic exposure to on-scene
public emergency responders. Additionally, facility authorities
initially prevented local responders from gaining access to the site of
the incident.\176\
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    \176\ CSB. January 2011. Investigation Report: Pesticide
Chemical Runaway Reaction Pressure Vessel Explosion, Bayer
CropScience, LP, Institute, West Virginia, August 28, 2008. Report
No. 2008-08-I-WV, http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Bayer_Report_Final.pdf.
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    The April 17, 2013 accident at West Fertilizer resulted in the
deaths of 12

first responders. During its investigation of the accident, the CSB
found that the LEPC did not include the facility in the community
emergency response plan.\177\
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    \177\ CSB. January 2016. Final Investigation Report, West
Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion, West, TX, April 17, 2013.
Report 2013-02-I-TX, pgs. 201-203. http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.
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    Another example is the August 2002 accidental chlorine release at
the DPC Enterprises facility in Festus, Missouri, that resulted in
sixty-three people from the surrounding community seeking medical
evaluation at the local hospital for symptoms of respiratory distress.
The CSB investigation found that the DPC emergency response plan did
not provide clear guidance on when facility emergency response
personnel should respond to a release or when response by an offsite
community hazardous materials response team is required. The CSB also
found that coordination between local emergency planning and response
entities and DPC was insufficient to ensure that the emergency plan
would provide for timely community notification and mitigation of the
release.\178\
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    \178\ CSB. May 2003. Investigation Report: Chlorine Release, DPC
Enterprises, L.P., Festus, Missouri, August 14, 2002. Report No.
2002-04-I-MO. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/DPC_Report.pdf.
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    CAA section 112(r) clearly anticipated that the Risk Management
Program regulation would require regulated stationary sources to
develop an emergency response program and provide for a response to
releases of regulated substances. Section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii) states that
the regulations shall require the owner or operator to ``provide a
prompt emergency response to any such releases in order to protect
human health and the environment,'' and that the RMP shall include:

a response program providing for specific actions to be taken in
response to an accidental release of a regulated substance so as to
protect human health and the environment, including procedures for
informing the public and local agencies responsible for responding
to accidental releases, emergency health care, and employee training
measures.

    Accordingly, in the preamble discussion of the 1996 final RMP rule,
EPA explained that the option to be a non-responding facility was
contingent on local community responders' ability to appropriately
respond to the stationary source's hazards.

    The final rule also provides relief for sources that are too
small to respond to releases with their own employees; these sources
will not be required to develop emergency response plans provided
that procedures for notifying non-employee emergency responders have
been adopted and that appropriate responses to their hazards have
been addressed in the community emergency response plan developed
under EPCRA (42 U.S.C. 11003) for toxics or coordinated with the
local fire department for flammables. (61 FR 31673, 31698, June 20,
1996.)
    EPA recognizes that some sources will only evacuate their
employees in the event of a release. For these sources, EPA will not
require the development of emergency response plans, provided that
appropriate responses to their hazards have been discussed in the
community emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C. 11003
for toxics or coordinated with the local fire department for
flammables. (61 FR 31681, June 20, 1996.)
    Because many sources covered by this rule may be too small to
handle emergency response themselves, EPA has provided, in this new
section, the actions they must take if they will not respond to
releases. Specifically, for sources with regulated toxic substances,
the source must be addressed in the community emergency response
plan developed under EPCRA section 303. Sources with regulated
flammable substances must coordinate response actions with the local
fire department. These sources must also establish a mechanism to
contact local emergency responders. Sources that do not meet these
requirements must comply with EPA's emergency response program
requirements. (61 FR 31712, June 20, 1996.)

    EPA also explained this point in the RMP Guidance: \179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for Chemical
Accident Prevention (40 CFR part 68), EPA-550-B-04-001, April 2004,
p. 8-1. http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-facilities-risk-management-programs-rmp#general.

    If your employees will not respond to accidental releases of
regulated substances, you need not comply with the emergency
response plan and program requirements provided you coordinate with
local response agencies to ensure that they will be prepared to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
respond to an emergency at your facility.

These excerpts from the 1996 final rule and RMP Guidance indicate that
from its inception, the RMP rule has required that owners and operators
of regulated sources must either meet the full emergency response
program requirements of Sec.  68.95 or ensure that local responders are
capable of responding to releases at the source. In spite of this fact,
the history of poor emergency response coordination during accidental
releases, EPA's findings during compliance inspections, and recent
feedback provided to EPA's RFI and during Executive Order 13650
listening sessions indicate that many regulated sources have not
provided for an adequate emergency response.
1. Proposed Revisions to Emergency Response Coordination Requirements
    EPA proposes to amend the rule requirements to clarify the
obligations of the owner or operator of the stationary source to
coordinate emergency response with local authorities. In order to
provide clarity, EPA is proposing to reorganize subpart E to address
the applicability provisions for responding and non-responding sources
in Sec.  68.90, describe required coordination activities in new Sec.
68.93, and include a new requirement in Sec.  68.95 for owners or
operators of responding stationary sources to review and update their
emergency response program at least annually.
    EPA is proposing to reorganize Sec.  68.90 to specifically describe
the applicability of the emergency response program requirements for
non-responding and responding facilities in paragraphs (a) and (b),
respectively.
    The proposed revisions to Sec.  68.90 paragraph (a) describe the
applicability provisions for non-responding facilities. The owner or
operator of a stationary source need not comply with the emergency
response program requirements in Sec.  68.95 provided that after
conducting coordination activities required under the proposed Sec.
68.93, the local response authorities and the owner or operator of the
stationary source determine that local public emergency response
capabilities are adequate to respond to accidental releases at the
stationary source; appropriate mechanisms are in place to notify
emergency responders when an accident occurs; and the LEPC or
equivalent local response authorities have not requested in writing
that the owner or operator develop an emergency response program for
the stationary source in accordance with Sec.  68.95.
    Section 68.90 paragraph (b) describes applicability provisions for
responding facilities. The owner or operator of the stationary source
would be required to comply with the emergency response program
requirements of Sec.  68.95 when the outcome of the annual coordination
activities with local response authorities required under Sec.  68.93
indicates that local public emergency response capabilities are not
adequate to respond to accidental releases of regulated substances at
the stationary source. If, as a result of the annual coordination, the
facility owner or operator must develop an emergency response program
in accordance with Sec.  68.95, the owner or operator should develop
the program as soon as reasonably practicable. The owner or operator
would also be required to comply with Sec.  68.95 upon

receiving a written request to do so from the LEPC, local fire
department, or other local emergency response officials having
jurisdiction.
    EPA believes that it is appropriate to provide a mechanism for the
local emergency response officials to request that the owner or
operator of the stationary source comply with the emergency response
program requirements of Sec.  68.95 because it is the presence of the
source and its attendant hazards that create a risk to the surrounding
community of accidental releases. Therefore, in the event that the
outcome of the coordination activities with local response authorities
indicates that local public emergency response capabilities are not
adequate, the ultimate burden of providing for an appropriate response
to releases of regulated substances from the source should rest with
the owner or operator. This philosophy is consistent with the general
duty clause of CAA section 112(r)(1), which among other things requires
the owner or operator to minimize the consequences of accidental
releases that do occur.
    EPA is proposing to add Sec.  68.93 to clarify emergency response
coordination activities and require that these activities be documented
and occur annually. Section 68.93 would require the owner or operator
of a stationary source with a Program 2 or 3 process to coordinate with
local response authorities to ensure that appropriate resources and
capabilities are in place to respond to an accidental release of a
regulated substance. As part of the coordination, the owner or operator
and the local response authorities would work together to determine who
will respond if an incident occurs, and what would be an appropriate
response. Paragraph (a) would require coordination to occur at least
annually, and more frequently if necessary, to address changes at the
source; in the source's emergency action plan; in local authorities'
response resources and capabilities; or in the local community
emergency response plan. Paragraph (b) would require the owner or
operator to document coordination with local authorities, including the
names of individuals involved and their contact information (phone
number, email address, and organizational affiliations), dates of
coordination activities, and the nature of coordination activities. The
proposed paragraph (c) specifies who should be involved in the
coordination for both stationary sources with regulated toxic and
flammable substances. If a stationary source involves a regulated toxic
substance, then the source must be included in the community emergency
response plan developed under EPCRA.
    EPA also proposes to revise Sec.  68.95 to ensure that notification
procedures include notifications to Federal, Tribal, and state agencies
and to require that emergency response plans be updated at least
annually. Specifically, EPA is revising Sec.  68.95(a)(1)(i) to add a
reference to Federal and state agencies. EPA is also proposing to
revise Sec.  68.95(a)(4) to specify that the owner or operator review
and update the program annually or more frequently if necessary (e.g.,
to incorporate lessons learned from incident investigations, or if
changes occur in emergency notification systems, local responder
organizations, stationary source hazards, or other critical emergency
response planning information). EPA is also proposing to revise Sec.
68.95(c) to replace local emergency planning committee with the acronym
LEPC.
    Additionally, EPA is proposing to revise Sec.  68.3 to add LEPC for
local emergency planning committee. The term is used throughout the
rule and means the LEPC as established under 42 U.S.C. 11001(c).
    Finally, EPA is proposing to revise Sec.  68.12 (General
requirements) to be consistent with these proposed coordination
requirements. EPA is proposing revisions to Program 2 requirements
under Sec.  68.12(c) in which EPA would renumber paragraph Sec.
68.12(c)(4) and (c)(5) as Sec.  68.12(c)(5) and (c)(6). New paragraph
Sec.  68.12(c)(4) would specify the owner or operator's requirements to
coordinate response actions with local emergency planning and response
agencies as provided in Sec.  68.93. EPA is proposing similar revisions
to Program 3 requirements under Sec.  68.12(d). EPA would renumber
paragraph Sec.  68.12(d)(4) and (d)(5) as Sec.  68.12(d)(5) and (d)(6).
New paragraph Sec.  68.12(d)(4) would specify the owner or operator's
requirements to coordinate response actions with local emergency
planning and response agencies as provided in Sec.  68.93.
    EPA believes that these proposed amendments clarify existing
obligations and prevent situations where neither regulated stationary
sources nor local authorities are prepared to appropriately respond to
accidental releases at the source. EPA recognizes that an appropriate
response--even for responding facilities--may sometimes involve
evacuation of facility employees, evacuation or sheltering of nearby
residents, and implementation of other defensive measures to prevent
harm to workers, responders, and the public. However, planning for such
situations should occur in advance, so that either the source or local
responders are prepared to implement response measures that are
appropriate to the hazards of the stationary source.
    If local public responders are not capable of responding to
accidental releases at a stationary source, the owner or operator can
continue to satisfy the applicable requirements of subpart E (Emergency
Response) in a number of different ways beyond training and equipping
the source's own employees to respond to releases. For example, EPA has
observed situations where stationary source owners or operators
supplement their on-site response capability using response
contractors, or via mutual aid agreements with other nearby sources. In
the RMP Guidance, EPA explained that this may be the most appropriate
course of action to comply with the emergency response requirements of
subpart E, particularly for small sources with few employees: \180\
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    \180\ See General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for
Chemical Accident Prevention (40 CFR part 68), EPA-550-B-04-001,
April 2004, page 8-1. http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-facilities-risk-management-programs-rmp#general.

    EPA recognizes that, in some cases (particularly for retailers
and other small operations with few employees), it may not be
appropriate for employees to conduct response operations for
releases of regulated substances. For example, it would be
inappropriate, and probably unsafe, for an ammonia retailer with
only one full-time employee to expect that a tank fire could be
handled without the help of the local fire department or other
emergency responder. EPA does not intend to force such facilities to
develop emergency response capabilities. At the same time, you are
responsible for ensuring effective emergency response to any
releases at your facility. If your local public responders are not
capable of providing such response, you must take steps to ensure
that effective response is available (e.g., by hiring response
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
contractors).

    Such arrangements would continue to be acceptable to the Agency as
a means to meet a facility's emergency response program obligations.
Alternatively, stationary source owners or operators can work with
local emergency response officials to identify gaps in local responder
capabilities, and assist local authorities in supplementing those
capabilities, as appropriate, by providing the equipment or training
needed to allow local public responders to prepare for and carry out an
appropriate response to accidental releases at the source. Close and
ongoing coordination between stationary source owners or operators and
local responders will allow such capability gaps to be quickly
identified and corrected and appropriate response

plans to be developed. Coordination will also assist local responders
in complying with other Federal, state, and local emergency
preparedness, planning, and response requirements, such as planning
requirements under EPCRA, training requirements under the OSHA
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard (29 CFR
1910.120), and other applicable requirements.
    As part of the SBAR Panel process, SERs expressed frustration with
the requirement to coordinate with local emergency response officials
because some LEPCs are not active or do not have sufficient resources
to fully implement EPCRA requirements. SERs requested clarification on
how to comply with coordination requirements when facility owners or
operators make good faith efforts to coordinate with local emergency
response officials who do not respond to coordination attempts. EPA
recommends that these coordination attempts be documented and
maintained at the facility. However, if the LEPC is inactive and has
not developed a community emergency response plan or has not included
the facility in the plan (for toxic substances), or the owner or
operator is unable to coordinate response actions with the local fire
department (for flammable substances), then the owner or operator must
develop an emergency response program in accordance with Sec.  68.95.
    EPA seeks comment on this approach. Will the proposed amendments
contribute to improvements in emergency response planning and
coordination? Are there additional practices that EPA should consider
that significantly improve planning and coordination? Should EPA
further clarify what is necessary for RMP facility owners or operators
to adequately coordinate their emergency response program with local
authorities? Should coordination activities and emergency plan updates
be required annually, or is some other frequency appropriate? How
should disagreements between local authorities and the source owner or
operator concerning which party should provide for an emergency
response to releases of regulated substances at the source be resolved?
When an LEPC makes a written request for the owner or operator to
comply with the emergency response program requirements of Sec.  68.95,
should the LEPC be required to provide a rationale for the request that
meets certain criteria, to ensure that the request is reasonable? If
so, what criteria should be established?
2. Alternative Options
    EPA considered an alternative that would require owners and
operators of all stationary sources with Program 2 or Program 3
processes to comply with the full emergency response program
requirements of Sec.  68.95. Under this option, RMP facilities would
still be required to perform the annual local coordination and to
document activities described previously. However, it would eliminate
the flexibility of the current rule and require all Program 2 and
Program 3 facilities to be ``responding'' facilities. EPA did not
propose this approach because it does not consider the existing
capabilities of local responders and shifts to the regulated stationary
sources the burden associated with developing and maintaining an
appropriate and effective emergency response capability from local
responders in communities that may have adequate capabilities.
Additionally, EPA believes that this approach would place an
unnecessary burden on small facilities.
    EPA seeks comment on this alternative approach and whether there
are any other alternative options that EPA should consider prior to
issuing a final action.

B. Facility Exercises

    Exercising an emergency response plan is critical to ensure that
response personnel understand their roles, that local emergency
responders are familiar with the hazards at the facility, and that the
emergency response plan is appropriate and up-to-date. It ensures that
personnel are properly trained and lessons learned from exercises can
be used to identify future training needs.
    Poor emergency response procedures during some recent accidents
have highlighted the need for facilities to conduct periodic emergency
response exercises. For example, the CSB's investigation of the April
2004 vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) explosion at the FPC USA in
Illiopolis, Illinois, found that the facility's failure to rehearse a
response to a large VCM release made the consequences of the accident
significantly worse, and likely contributed to the deaths of operators
at the facility.\181\ The CSB found that after the VCM release began,
and despite knowingly working directly over a toxic and highly
flammable VCM cloud, two operators did not put on protective breathing
apparatus, activate emergency alarms, or evacuate the facility,
contrary to emergency response actions outlined in facility emergency
procedures. These operators consequently died as a result of injuries
received during the ensuing explosion.
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    \181\ CSB. March 2007. Investigation Report: VCM Explosion,
FPC., Illiopolis, Illinois, April 23, 2004; Report No. 2004-10-I-IL.
http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Formosa_IL_Report.pdf.
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    Failure to conduct emergency exercises involving local authorities
may also have resulted in injuries and fatalities to local responders.
As previously indicated, 12 local responders died as a result of
injuries received during the West Fertilizer explosion, and the CSB
investigation report findings show that inadequate emergency planning
contributed to the severity of the accident and that responders were
not sufficiently aware of the risks at the facility.\182\ According to
accident history information obtained from EPA's RMP national database,
accidents occurring between 2004 and 2014 resulted in at least 44
responder injuries and 2 additional fatalities.\183\ The 2002 accident
involving a chlorine release at DPC Enterprises in Festus, Missouri,
resulted in 66 people seeking medical attention at the local hospital,
including 63 members of the community surrounding the facility. The
CSB's investigation found that DPC's emergency response plan had
inadequate procedures for training and drills, and that these
deficiencies resulted in DPC's inadequate preparation for a large
uncontrolled chlorine release.\184\ In 2003, another DPC Enterprises
facility in Glendale, Arizona, had an accident involving a large
chlorine release. In that accident, 11 Glendale police officers
responding to the accident were exposed to chlorine and required
medical treatment. The CSB's investigation found that police officers
responding to the accident to assist in evacuation of nearby residents
entered the hazardous area without any respiratory protection. The CSB
recommended that the Glendale fire and police departments schedule
periodic hazardous materials incident drills to ensure safe and
effective responses to future hazardous materials incidents.\185\
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    \182\ CSB. January 2016. Final Investigation Report: West
Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion, West, TX, April 17, 2013.
Report No. 2013-02-I-TX, pp. 14, 116-117, 200-204, 241-242. http://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.
    \183\ EPA. January 27, 2016. Technical Background Document for
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs under the
Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7).
    \184\ CSB. May 2003. Investigation Report: Chlorine Release, DPC
Enterprises, L.P., Festus, Missouri, August 14, 2002. Report No.
2002-04-I-MO. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/DPC_Report.pdf.
    \185\ CSB. February 2007. Investigation Report: Chlorine
Release, DPC Enterprises, L.P., Glendale, Arizona, November 17,
2003. Report No. 2004-02-I-AZ. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/DPC2-_Final.pdf.

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    On April 12, 2004, a runaway chemical reaction at MFG Chemical,
Inc., in Dalton, Georgia, resulted in the release of toxic vapor clouds
of allyl alcohol and allyl chloride into the surrounding community. The
accident resulted in the evacuation of more than 200 families and
medical treatment for 154 people, including 15 responders. The CSB
found that MFG did not train or equip employees to conduct emergency
mitigation actions, and that local emergency response agencies did not
adequately prepare for responding to emergencies involving hazardous
chemicals. The CSB recommended that the facility obtain equipment and
provide emergency response training to employees, and that local
agencies conduct drills for emergencies at fixed facilities.\186\
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    \186\ CSB. April 2006. Investigation Report: Toxic Chemical
Vapor Cloud Release, MFG Chemical, Inc., Dalton, Georgia, April 12,
2004. Report No. 2004-09-I-GA. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/MFG_Report.pdf.
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    Other EPA and Federal agency programs require exercises as an
element of their emergency response programs. For example, under the
Oil Pollution Prevention regulation (40 CFR part 112), facilities
subject to the Facility Response Plan (FRP) provisions are required to
conduct exercises, including evaluation procedures (Sec.  112.21). FRP
facility owners and operators are encouraged to follow the National
Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines,\187\
which were developed to provide a mechanism for compliance with EPA,
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
exercise requirements for oil pollution response. The PREP guidelines
include both internal and external exercise components. Internal
exercises include notification exercises, emergency procedure
exercises, spill management team tabletop exercises, and equipment
deployment exercises. External exercises include area exercises that
include members of the response community, and government-initiated
unannounced exercises.
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    \187\ USCG, EPA, and DOI. August 2002. National PREP Guidelines.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscg/prep_gid.pdf.
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    Other examples include exercises that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, requires commercial nuclear power plant operators to perform
with state and local governments. These exercises evaluate both on-site
and offsite emergency response capabilities. The NRC requires all
nuclear reactor emergency plans to address the necessary provisions for
coping with radiological emergencies at each facility in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.54(q), Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and for commercial
nuclear power reactors only, 10 CFR 50.47(b). Reactor operators are
required to train personnel and perform emergency preparedness
exercises in order to test the adequacy of the plans, ensure personnel
are familiar with their duties, and maintain response capabilities.
    Some state and local regulations also require emergency response
exercises. For example, the New Jersey TCPA, which incorporates the
requirements of 40 CFR part 68, contains certain additional provisions
imposed under state law, including a requirement for regulated
facilities to perform at least one emergency response exercise per
calendar year. Non-responding facilities are required to invite at
least one outside responding agency designated in the emergency
response plan to participate in the exercise, and employees of the
facility are required to perform their assigned responsibilities for
all emergency response exercises. Owners or operators of all other
facilities are required to perform at least one full scale emergency
response exercise in which the emergency response team as well as
containment, mitigation, and monitoring equipment are deployed at a
strength appropriate to demonstrate the adequacy and implementation of
the plan.\188\
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    \188\ NJDEP, Title 7, Chapter 31 Toxic Catastrophe Prevention
Act Program, Consolidated Rule Document, Section 7:31-5.2; http://www.state.nj.us/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/conrulerev9_no%20fonts.pdf.
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    In comments received from the Agency's recent RFI, the National
Association of Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)
Title Three Program Officials (NASTTPO), which represents members of
State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), Tribal Emergency Response
Commissions (TERCs), and LEPCs, has encouraged EPA to require RMP
facilities to conduct exercises that include local first responders and
realistic accident scenarios.\189\
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    \189\ Gablehouse, T. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-
2014-0328-0679 on Risk Management Program RFI, PDF pg 5-6, NASTTPO,
Denver, CO.
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    In addition to specific Federal and state requirements for
conducting exercises and the NASTTPO comments, industry guidelines
recommend conducting exercises. The CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based
Process Safety recommend periodically testing the adequacy of emergency
response plans and level of preparedness of responders, including
contractors and local response agencies.\190\
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    \190\ CCPS. 2007. Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety.
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, CCPS, NY, Wiley. pp. 513,
524-526, 538-540.
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    In the original proposed RMP rule (58 FR 54190, October 20, 1993),
EPA had included within the emergency response program provisions a
proposed requirement for regulated sources to conduct emergency
exercises. In the final RMP rule (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996), EPA
decided not to finalize this requirement (and several other additional
emergency response program provisions), for two reasons. First, the
Agency decided to limit the emergency response program requirements to
the minimum requirements contained in CAA section 112(r)(7) in order to
avoid inconsistency with other emergency response planning regulations.
Second, the Agency indicated that the additional requirements were
already addressed in other Federal regulations and therefore, sources
were already doing them. However, EPA's experience with implementing
the RMP rule over nearly two decades, along with incidents such as
those described above, indicate that many regulated sources do not
regularly conduct emergency exercises that involve local response
authorities. The Agency now believes that adding this provision to the
regulation will likely reduce the severity of some accidents that do
occur.
1. Proposed Exercise Program Requirements
    In order to further improve coordination with community responders
and ensure that both facility personnel and local responders have
practice responding to accidental releases at RMP facilities, EPA is
proposing to require most regulated facilities to perform exercises as
an element of the emergency response program identified under subpart
E. Proposed Sec.  68.96 would require both responding and non-
responding RMP facilities with any Program 2 or 3 process to perform
emergency exercises.
a. Notification Exercises
    EPA proposes a new paragraph Sec.  68.96(a) to require facilities
with any Program 2 or Program 3 process to annually perform an exercise
of the source's emergency notification system. This exercise would
include contacting the Federal, Tribal, state, and local public
emergency response authorities, and other external responders that
would respond to accidental releases at the source. The purpose of
these notifications is to ensure facility

personnel understand how to initiate the notification system and to
test the emergency contact information to ensure it is up-to-date. As
part of the notification exercise, the individual making the
notifications should clearly indicate that the call is part of an
exercise to test the notification system. The owner or operator would
be required to document these notification exercises and maintain a
written record of each exercise conducted for a period of five years.
The owner or operator would also be required to provide copies of the
report to local response officials, and to make the report available to
the public in accordance with Sec. Sec.  68.205 and 68.210.
    As non-responding facilities will rely on local authorities to
respond to accidental releases at the source, EPA believes that the
proposed facility notification exercises will be an important
supplement to the existing requirement for local emergency plan
exercises under EPCRA section 303(c)(9), which requires local emergency
plans to include methods and schedules for exercising the plan.
Responding facilities will be required to meet additional field and
tabletop exercise requirements below, which in many cases will also
involve the participation of local authorities. Notifications to
Federal, state, and local officials conducted as part of the field or
tabletop exercise may also serve to meet the annual notification
exercise requirements provided that the owner or operator documents
these notification exercises.
    EPA is also proposing to modify Sec.  68.95(a)(1)(i) to clarify
that the emergency response program should include procedures for
performing appropriate notifications to Federal and state emergency
response agencies, as well as the public and local emergency response
agencies, about accidental releases. This could include, for example,
any required notifications to the National Response Center, as required
by section 103(a) of CERCLA, and/or notifications to the SERC as
required by section 304 of EPCRA.
b. Responding Facility Field and Tabletop Exercises
    EPA is proposing a new paragraph Sec.  68.96(b) to require
responding facilities to develop and implement an emergency response
exercise program that uses the emergency response plan required under
Sec.  68.95(a)(1). EPA is proposing to require two types of exercises--
field exercises and tabletop exercises. The owner or operator would be
required to coordinate with local public emergency response officials
in planning and conducting exercises, and invite local officials to
participate in exercises. However, participation in an exercise by
local responders is not required for a facility to comply with the
exercise provisions.
i. Field Exercises
    Field exercises involve the actual performance of emergency
response functions during a simulated accidental release event. Field
exercises involve mobilization of firefighters and/or hazardous
materials response teams, activation of an incident command structure,
deployment of response equipment, evacuation or sheltering of facility
personnel as appropriate, and notification and mobilization of law
enforcement, emergency medical, and other response personnel as
determined by the scenario and the source's emergency response
plan.\191\
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    \191\ EPA. May 1988. Guide to Exercises in Chemical Emergency
Preparedness Programs, OSWER 88006.
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    Section 68.96(b)(1) would require the owner or operator to conduct
an emergency response field exercise involving the simulated accidental
release of a regulated substance at least once every five years and
within one year of any accidental release meeting the criteria in Sec.
68.42(a). If the facility is required to conduct a field exercise as a
result of an RMP reportable accident, then this would effectively reset
the timeframe for when the next five-year field exercise is due.
    EPA is proposing that the scope of the field exercises would
include tests of:

     Procedures for informing the public and the appropriate
Federal, state, and local emergency response agencies about an
accidental release;
     procedures and measures for emergency response after an
accidental release of a regulated substance including evacuations
and medical treatment;
     communications systems;
     mobilization of facility emergency response personnel;
     coordination with local emergency responders;
     equipment deployment, and
     other actions identified in the source's emergency
response plan, as appropriate.
ii. Tabletop Exercises
    Tabletop exercises are discussion-based exercises without the
actual deployment of response equipment. During tabletop exercises,
responders typically assemble in a meeting location and simulate
procedural and communications steps for response to a simulated
accidental release, as determined by the scenario and the source's
emergency response plan.
    In Sec.  68.96(b)(2) EPA is proposing to require the owner or
operator to annually conduct an emergency tabletop exercise involving
the simulated accidental release of a regulated substance, except
during years when field exercises are conducted. The scope of a
tabletop exercise would include tests of:

     Procedures for informing the public and the appropriate
Federal, state, and local emergency response agencies about an
accidental release;
     procedures and measures for emergency response after an
accidental release of a regulated substance including evacuations
and medical treatment;
     identification of facility emergency response personnel
and responsibilities;
     coordination with local emergency responders;
     procedures for the use of emergency response equipment,
and other actions identified in the source's emergency response
plan, as appropriate.
c. Exercise Reports & Program Updates
    EPA is proposing in Sec.  68.96(b)(3) to require the owner or
operator to evaluate each exercise and prepare a written report within
90 days of the exercise. The report would include:

     A description of the exercise scenario;
     names and associations of each exercise participant;
     an evaluation of the results of the exercise including
lessons learned;
     recommendations for improvement or revisions to the
emergency exercise program and emergency response program; and
     a schedule to promptly address and resolve
recommendations.

    The report would also include an evaluation of the adequacy of
coordination with local emergency response authorities, and other
external responders, as appropriate. Section 68.96(b)(3) would also
require the owner or operator to update the emergency exercise program
and emergency response program at least annually, and more frequently
if necessary to incorporate recommendations and lessons learned from
emergency response exercises, incident investigations, or other
available information. The owner or operator would also be required to
provide schedules of exercises and copies of exercise reports to local
response officials, and to make exercise reports available to the
public in accordance with Sec. Sec.  68.205 and 68.210. Exercise
reports would be maintained for five years.
d. Updates to Sec.  68.12 (General Requirements)
    EPA is proposing to revise Sec.  68.12 (General Requirements) to be
consistent

with these proposed exercise requirements. EPA is proposing to revise
the Program 2 and Program 3 requirements under Sec.  68.12 by
renumbering paragraph Sec.  68.12(c)(4) as Sec.  68.12(c)(5) (for
Program 2) and Sec.  68.12(d)(4) as Sec.  68.12(d)(5) (for Program 3),
adding a reference to exercise requirements, and correcting citations
to subpart E.
    EPA is aware that while not all facilities regulated under the RMP
rule conduct emergency exercises, many do, and the Agency believes that
exercises conducted in accordance with other Federal, state, or local
requirements, or exercises conducted in conjunction with a facility's
trade association membership or code of practice, etc., may be used to
satisfy the new requirements to the extent those exercises address the
specific regulatory provisions contained herein.
    EPA seeks comment on this approach. Are there additional exercise
provisions that EPA should consider to improve the ability of RMP
facility personnel and local authorities to respond to accidental
releases? Are annual exercises sufficient or should EPA consider
alternative frequencies? What information regarding exercises would be
most helpful to the public while maintaining a balance for security?''
Some SERS expressed concern that local emergencies could force a
facility to postpone an exercise. EPA seeks comments on how best to
address emergency postponement and rescheduling of exercises. EPA also
seeks comment on whether to eliminate the requirement for tabletop and
field exercises.

2. Alternative Options

    EPA considered two alternative approaches to requiring emergency
exercises. The first alternative option would also require responding
and non-responding facilities to conduct an annual emergency
notification system exercise. However, under this option responding
facilities would additionally be required to conduct only annual
tabletop exercises; emergency field exercises would not be required.
This alternative option would be a lower cost option for responding
facilities, as field deployment of the source's equipment and personnel
would not be required. However, it may also result in less realistic
and less effective emergency exercises.
    The second alternative approach considered by EPA would contain the
same provisions for notification exercises as in the proposed option,
but would require responding facilities to conduct field exercises
annually, instead of tabletop exercises. This approach would be similar
to the New Jersey TCPA emergency exercise provisions, and provide for a
comprehensive test of all systems under the emergency exercise program
for responding facilities. However, the costs of this approach would be
significantly higher than the proposed approach.
    EPA seeks comment on these alternative approaches and whether there
are any other alternative options that EPA should consider prior to
issuing a final action.

VI. Information Availability Requirements

    Ensuring that communities, local planners, local first responders,
and the public have appropriate chemical facility hazard-related
information is critical to the health and safety of the responders and
the local community. Throughout the many public meetings and outreach
efforts related to Executive Order 13650, LEPCs, first responders, and
members of the public stated that chemical facility information and
data-sharing efforts need significant improvement.\192\ Specifically,
LEPCs and first responders want to have access to the most relevant
chemical hazard and risk information for their needs, in a user-
friendly format, to better support planning and preparedness efforts.
Community residents, operators of community facilities (such as
daycares and nursing homes) and organizations consistently noted that
they need basic information regarding chemical risks at facilities,
presented in a clear and consistent manner, so that they can
effectively participate in preparedness and planning to address such
issues as effective emergency notification procedures, evacuation, and
sheltering in place. In response to these issues, EPA is proposing ways
to enhance information sharing and collaboration between chemical
facility owners and operators, tribal and local emergency planning
committees, first responders, and the public, in a manner that balances
security and proprietary considerations. Some public commenters
responding to EPA's RMP RFI elaborated the need for more public access
to information about the RMP facilities. The Center for Science and
Democracy (CSD) stated that public access to information is key to
enabling communities to hold facility owners and operators accountable
for reducing risks as much as possible, and for being prepared should
an accident occur. According to CSD, facility owners and operators
should be responsible for ensuring that appropriate measures are in-
place to handle an emergency and should be fully communicating with
local authorities on the development of community emergency response
plans that include chemical facilities.\193\
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    \192\ Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group. May
2014. Executive Order 13650 Report to the President--Actions to
Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security--A Shared Commitment,
pgs. 93-94. https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.
    \193\ CSD. October 20, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-
0424 on Risk Management Program RFI, pgs. 2-3.
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    NASTTPO requested EPA consider providing information on emergency
planning and exercises, audit reports, and RMP Executive summaries that
include information such as accident histories, and names of RMP-
regulated substances.\194\
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    \194\ Gablehouse, T. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-
2014-0328-0679 on Risk Management Program RFI, PDF p. 2, 4, & 6,
NASTTPO, Denver, CO.
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    Oklahoma Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Commission (OHMERC)
also commented and requested posting of chemical information including
an RMP summary along with Tier2 information on a company Web site at a
minimum. They also requested making the following information available
to LEPCs: The facility emergency response plan, accident history, along
with OCA.\195\
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    \195\ Elder, M., October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-
0328-0641 on Risk Management Program RFI, p. 3, OHMERC.
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    The MKOPSC stated that most of the information is already available
online and from LEPCs and need not be provided on a Web site. But
MKOPSC noted that LEPCs can utilize the information to understand the
risk in the communities and involve local facilities, local officials,
SERCs, local citizens and EPA to have dialogues to improve regulatory
compliance and promote safety. MKOSPSC also believes it is also
important to let the public understand how the facilities address the
hazard present in their community and keep the risk at or below the
``acceptable level.'' When local citizens have adequate information and
knowledge, facility owners and operators may be motivated to
continuously improve their safety in response to community pressure and
oversight.\196\
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    \196\ MKOPSC. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-
0328-0543 on Risk Management Program RFI, pgs. 162, 165.
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    CCHS noted that requiring facility owners or operators to make this
information available on the company Web site would promote improved
regulatory compliance, because the more willing a facility is to be
open and

transparent the greater that company is willing to address issues that
relate to safety.\197\ The United Steel Workers (USW) stated that
making unrestricted RMP information publicly available would increase
compliance, as it enables communities to hold facilities accountable
and gives facilities greater incentive to strengthen safety measures
and to comply with regulations.\198\ The Coalition to Prevent Chemical
Disasters (CPCD) believes that schools located within vulnerability
zones of RMP facilities need to have chemical disaster drills in place,
but that many schools are unaware of any risks. In CPCD's view, not
informing communities about chemical risks reduces their ability to
prepare for potential disasters involving specific chemical releases.
CPCD argues that first responders need to know what chemicals they are
facing and what emergency equipment to use. CPCD believes that
information, such as compliance audits and incident investigation
reports, should be disclosed to LEPCs and that with this information,
active LEPCs can better include local communities in emergency planning
and training.\199\ CPCD made reference to testimony made six years
prior to the West disaster by a former CSB chairperson about her
concern for:
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    \197\ CCHS. October 28, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-
0546 on Risk Management Program RFI pg. 13.
    \198\ USW. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-
0547 on Risk Management Program RFI, pg. 6.
    \199\ CPCD. October 29, 2014. Comment No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-
0644 on Risk Management Program RFI, pgs. 36-37.

a lack of chemical emergency preparedness that our investigations
have found among many communities where accidents strike. Preventing
accidents and mitigating their impact requires an active partnership
between communities and industrial facilities. If that partnership
is missing, the stage is set for a potentially severe impact on the
community.\200\
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    \200\ CSB. July 10, 2007. CSB News Release: CSB Chairman Merritt
Describes the Lessons from Five Years of Board Investigations to
Senate Committee, Urges Additional Resources and Clearer Authorities
for Federal Safety Efforts. http://www.csb.gov/csb-chairman-merritt-describes-the-lessons-from-five-years-of-board-investigations-to-senate-committee-urges-additional-resources-and-clearer-authorities-for-federal-safety-efforts/.

    Poor communication between facility personnel and first responders,
as well as poor communication between facility personnel and
communities, has been shown to contribute to the severity of chemical
accidents. One example is the Bayer CropScience explosion that occurred
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in Institute, West Virginia, in 2008. According to the CSB,

    The Bayer fire brigade was at the scene in minutes, but Bayer
management withheld information from the county emergency response
agencies that were desperate for information about what happened,
what chemicals were possibly involved . . . The Bayer incident
commander, inside the plant, recommended a shelter in place; but
this was never communicated to 911 operators. After a few hours of
being refused critical information, local authorities ordered a
shelter in place, as a precaution.\201\
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    \201\ CSB. January 20, 2011. CSB issues report on 2008 Bayer
Cropscience explosion: Finds multiple deficiencies led to runaway
chemical reaction; recommends states create chemical plant oversight
regulation. http://www.csb.gov/csb-issues-report-on-2008-bayer-cropscience-explosion-finds-multiple-deficiencies-led-to-runaway-chemical-reaction-recommends-state-create-chemical-plant-oversight-regulation/.

Improper communication between the facility and the first responders
during the accident led to a delay in implementing a public shelter-in-
place order for the local community, and may have resulted in toxic
exposure to on-scene public emergency responders.
    After a release of HF from the Citgo Refinery in Corpus Christi,
Texas, in July 2009, nearby residents complained of headaches, nausea,
and respiratory issues, though Citgo claimed that the toxic cloud
stopped at the plant fence line. According to reports, neighbors could
see the flames and smoke coming from the refinery, but they were unable
to get information on the accident and potential risks to their
community.\202\
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    \202\ Morris, Jim and Chris Hamby, Center for Public Integrity.
February 24, 2011; Updated May 19, 2014. Fueling Fears--Use of toxic
acid puts millions at risk. http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/24/2118/use-toxic-acid-puts-millions-risk.
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    The previous examples and public comments demonstrate the need for
better communication of the potential risks associated with accidental
releases at stationary sources. However, in making information more
readily available EPA must also recognize and balance the associated
security concerns because the public sharing of certain specific
facility information and any associated vulnerabilities has the
potential to aid terrorists in planning an attack. The RMP rule was
published in 1996, before many computer-based and other information-
sharing methods were widely used. At the time of initial publication of
the rule, EPA expected information to be disclosed to the public
through disclosure of the entire RMP. After the CSISSFRRA was enacted
on August 5, 1999, EPA restricted access to OCA data for the public and
government officials to minimize the security risks associated with
posting the information on the internet (65 FR 48108, August 4, 2000).
Governmental officials continue to have electronic access to OCA
information, subject to certain restrictions, while the public may view
OCA information only at Federal Reading Rooms around the country and
only for a limited number of RMPs at any one time. The non-OCA portions
of the RMPs are available from EPA to the public either through Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request, by inspection at Federal Reading
Rooms, or from a person's SERC, LEPC, or related state or local
government agencies.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ See 40 CFR part 1400: Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements; Risk Management Programs Under the CAA Section
112(r)(7); Distribution of OCA Information (65 FR 48108, August 4,
2000). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-08-04/pdf/00-19785.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA is proposing to require certain information to be made
available, upon request, to LEPCs and emergency response officials to
help them to understand the potential risks at RMP regulated
facilities, as well as to aid them in emergency planning and response
activities. EPA is also proposing to amend the information sharing
provisions for the public to make existing information more easily
accessible to neighboring communities to encourage them to prepare for
an emergency. EPA also believes that the revisions will likely
contribute to the prevention of future chemical accidents. Cognizant of
the spirit and intent of the CSISSFRRA, the proposed revisions do not
disclose the substance or form of information subject to restriction
under CAA 112(r)(7)(H) or 40 CFR part 1400.
    EPA has two objectives for improving public information sharing
provisions of the RMP rule. The first is to ensure that local emergency
response and planning officials have the information they need to
prepare for an emergency response to an accidental release at a
stationary source. This includes determining what information is
appropriate to improve community emergency response plans and ensure
the safety of the local responders and the community. EPA must also
determine the appropriate frequency for updating this information to
avoid overwhelming local planners while ensuring information is
current. While developing emergency response plans, LEPCs and facility
owners or operators should also involve local citizens to help them
understand the appropriate actions they should take in the event of an
accidental release. This may reduce public panic and enable residents
to act quickly and appropriately to protect themselves.
    The second objective is to help improve public awareness of risks
in their communities and provide information on where they can learn
more about preparedness and

community emergency response plans. Any publicly available information
should be in a format that is easily accessible. The goal is to
encourage residents to learn about community emergency response plans
and understand what actions they need to take during an emergency to
protect themselves.
    EPA is proposing to add provisions for sharing information, upon
request, with LEPCs and/or emergency response officials and revise the
existing provisions for sharing information with the public. EPA is
also proposing that facility owners and operators conduct public
meetings within 30 days of an RMP reportable accident to discuss
chemical hazards present at facilities and provide information on
accidental releases. These meetings can provide opportunities for
facilities to engage the public to address concerns following an
accidental release and explain how facilities will prevent future
accidents.

A. Proposed Public Disclosure Requirements to LEPCs or Emergency
Response Officials

    EPA is proposing to add requirements to subpart H--Other
Requirements that apply to all facilities regulated under the RMP rule,
including facilities with Program 1 processes. EPA proposes to add
Sec.  68.205 to require owners and operators to provide information to
local emergency responders and LEPCs upon request. If information
required under this proposal is already available to the public on a
company Web site, the owner or operator may comply by providing the Web
site link to the first responders and LEPC. Paragraph Sec.  68.205(a)
would require that the RMP be accessible to local emergency responders
and LEPCs in the exact same manner as the current requirement under
Sec.  68.210(a). A reference to 42 U.S.C. 7414(c), which covers
information and reports (such as the RMP) required under section 42
U.S.C. 7412, is included to show the authority under which the non-OCA
portion of an RMP shall be available to the public, except for any
information that would divulge methods or processes entitled to
protection of CBI or trade secrets. This reference is already part of
the current Sec.  68.210(a). A reference to 40 CFR part 1400 has been
added to address the disclosure restrictions under CSISSFRRA (i.e.,
restrictions on the disclosure of OCA information). EPA is not changing
its policy regarding OCA information. The reference to 40 CFR part 1400
only clarifies the statutory obligations that relate to securing this
information.
    Under paragraph Sec.  68.205(b), EPA would require the owner or
operator to develop summaries of specific chemical hazard information
for all of their regulated processes and provide this information, upon
request, to the LEPC or local emergency response officials as part of
their emergency response coordination efforts. The facility should make
information available in a manner that is understandable and avoids
technical jargon. The information should be conveyed without revealing
CBI or trade secret information. The information must adequately
explain the findings, results, or analysis being provided.
    The specific information that must be provided to LEPCs or
emergency response officials upon request is outlined below:
    Information on Regulated Substances. Information related to the
names and quantities of regulated substances at the source (paragraph
Sec.  68.205(b)(1)). This only applies to regulated substances held in
a process above the TQ.
    Accident History Information. The facility's accident history
information required under Sec.  68.42 (paragraph Sec.  68.205(b)(2)).
    Compliance Audit Reports. Summaries of compliance audit reports
required under Sec. Sec.  68.58 and 68.59 (for Program 2 processes), or
Sec. Sec.  68.79 and 68.80 (for Program 3 processes), as applicable
(paragraph Sec.  68.205(b)(3)). The audit report summary shall include:

     The date of the report;
     The name and contact information of the auditor and the
facility contact person;
     A brief description of the audit findings;
     An appropriate response to each of the findings; and
     A schedule for addressing each of the findings.

    Incident Investigation Reports. Summaries of incident investigation
reports required under Sec.  68.60(d) (for Program 2 processes) or
Sec.  68.81(d) (for Program 3 processes), as applicable (paragraph
Sec.  68.205(b)(4)). The incident investigation report summary shall
include:

     A description of the incident and events leading up to
it, including a timeline;
     A brief description of the process involved;
     The names and contact information of personnel on the
investigation team;
     The direct cause, contributing cause, and root cause of
the incident;
     The on-site and offsite impacts;
     The emergency response actions taken;
     Any recommendations; and
     A schedule for implementing recommendations, as
applicable.

    Inherently Safer Technologies (IST). For each process in NAICS
codes 322, 324, and 325, a summary of the IST or ISD identified in
accordance with Sec.  68.67(c)(8) that the owner or operator has
implemented or plans to implement (paragraph Sec.  68.205(b)(5)). The
owner or operator shall update this summary as part of the calendar
year submission if any of the summary information has been revised as a
result of the safer technology analysis that is conducted as part of
the update to the PHA prepared in accordance with Sec.  68.67(f). The
calendar year submission should also identify whether any revisions
were incorporated. The IST/ISD summary shall include, at a minimum:

     The RMP process ID and process description, if
provided, of the process affected;
     A brief description of the IST or ISD and which type of
measure best characterizes it: Minimization, substitution,
modernization, or simplification;
     The names of the regulated substance(s) whose hazard,
potential exposure, or risk was or will be reduced as a result of
the implementation and whether the substance is listed as toxic or
flammable. If the chemicals affected are a mixture of flammable
substances, the name ``flammable mixture'' may be used, instead of
the individual flammable substance names; and
     The dates of implementation or planned implementation.

    Exercises. Information on emergency response exercises conducted
under Sec.  68.96, including, at a minimum, schedules for upcoming
exercises, reports for completed exercises, and other related
information (paragraph Sec.  68.205(b)(6)).
    EPA believes that summary information on findings from incident
investigations, compliance audits, exercises, and IST employed can
demonstrate to local emergency response officials how a facility is
improving its management of chemical risks and assist local emergency
planners to understand and better prepare for these risks when
developing community emergency response plans. Furthermore, EPA
believes that disclosing information related to IST can help responders
and planners to prioritize and allocate response resources. For
example, IST implementation information may be relevant for emergency
response personnel who are maintaining response capabilities to address
a specific hazard that would no longer apply once an IST is implemented
(such as by substituting a less hazardous chemical for an RMP-regulated
substance).
    Table 6 below summarizes the information to be developed under
Sec.  68.205(b) and identifies the applicable program level for each
provision. The owner or operator need only provide

upon the LEPC's request information developed for this provision that
is applicable to the program-level for each regulated process at the
facility. For example, owners or operators of Program 2 processes must
provide information on regulated substances in accordance with Sec.
68.205(b)(1), accident history information in accordance with Sec.
68.205(b)(2), compliance audit report summaries to LEPC or emergency
response officials in accordance with Sec.  68.205(b)(3), incident
investigation report summaries in accordance with Sec.  68.205(b)(4),
and exercise schedules and report summaries in accordance with Sec.
68.205(b)(6). Owners and operators of Program 3 processes must provide
all of the above information, as well as the IST information required
under Sec.  68.205(b)(5). Owners and operators of Program 1 processes
would be required to provide only information on regulated substances
in accordance with Sec.  68.205(b)(1) and accident history information
in accordance with Sec.  68.205(b)(2).

                  Table 6--LEPC Disclosure Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Program level(s)
Information to be provided, upon request, to LEPCs or   applicability--
    emergency response officials in Sec.   68.205.      program 1, 2, or
                                                               3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b)(1) Information on regulated substances...........            1, 2, 3
(b)(2) Accident history information..................            1, 2, 3
(b)(3) Compliance audit report summaries.............               2, 3
(b)(4) Incident investigation report summaries.......               2, 3
(b)(5) IST summary...................................                * 3
(b)(6) Exercise schedules and report summaries.......               2, 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Applies only to Program 3 facilities in NAICS codes 322, 324, and 325.

    Submission Dates and Updates. According to Sec.  68.205(c), EPA is
proposing that the owner or operator update summary information every
calendar year, including all applicable information that was revised
since the last submission, and provide this information upon request.
    Classified Information. EPA is proposing to add Sec.  68.205(d) to
address protection of classified information from disclosure. This
provision is identical to the current Sec.  68.210(b).
    Confidential Business Information. EPA is proposing to add the
acronym CBI to Sec.  68.3 and to add Sec.  68.205(e) to describe the
process for claiming and handling CBI. EPA is proposing that an owner
or operator asserting a CBI claim for information requested by an LEPC
or local emergency response official under this section should submit a
sanitized version to the LEPC or emergency response officials, and
submit to EPA both the sanitized version and a version containing the
CBI along with a substantiation of the CBI claim at the time it is
asserted. This process for assertion and substantiation of CBI claims
is the same as that required in Sec. Sec.  68.151 and 68.152 for
information contained in the RMP. As provided under Sec.  68.151(b)(3),
an owner or operator of a stationary source may not claim five-year
accident history information as CBI. As provided in Sec.  68.151(c)(2),
an owner or operator of a stationary source asserting that a chemical
name is CBI shall provide a generic category or class name as a
substitute in its submission.
    An owner or operator should be aware that anything they send to
their LEPC in accordance with Sec.  68.205(e) becomes public
information. For any information claimed as CBI when submitted to EPA
and later submitted to the LEPC, the CBI claim regarding such
information is waived. Therefore, if an owner or operator wants to
maintain the confidentiality of information, when submitting such
information to the LEPC, they should submit a sanitized version.
    With these proposed requirements, EPA intends to ensure that LEPCs
and emergency response officials have information on chemical hazards
at regulated facilities and are better prepared to understand and
prepare for risks to the communities and emergency responders. EPA
encourages local emergency response officials to coordinate with owners
or operators of regulated facilities and participate in emergency
response exercises as time and resources allow. LEPC and local
emergency response officials should use the information identified in
Sec.  68.205(b) to assist in revising the community emergency response
plan developed under 42 U.S.C 11003 and related purposes.
    EPA seeks comment on this approach. Will the proposed requirements
improve the community emergency planning and preparedness? Is there
additional information that should be shared with LEPCs or emergency
response officials? For example, should EPA require the full safer
technologies and alternatives analysis to be submitted to the LEPC? EPA
also seeks comment on whether to require less information to be shared
(e.g., limit incident investigation information to incidents with
offsite impacts). Some SERs suggested that information be limited to a
one page summary of each significant chemical hazard and suggested
including only the following elements: The name of the substance, its
properties, its location, and recommended firefighting and emergency
response measures. EPA seeks comment on this narrowed approach. Should
EPA require owners or operators to periodically submit information to
the LEPC or local responders, and if so, what timeframe should EPA
consider? Is the proposed timeframe for updating information sufficient
to ensure information is up-to-date? Should EPA require information to
be updated only after the source receives a request from an LEPC or
local emergency response official? If so, how much time is sufficient
to allow development and submission of summaries following requests for
information under this proposed provision? Should EPA specify a
standard format for summary information in order to make it easier for
local officials to interpret the information (e.g., specify a summary
template for information on regulated substances, compliance audits
reports, incident investigation reports, IST)?

B. Proposed Revisions to Requirements for Information Availability to
the Public

    Under paragraph Sec.  68.210(a), EPA is proposing to add a
reference to 40 CFR part 1400 to address CSISSFRRA disclosure
restrictions (i.e., for OCA information). EPA is not changing its
policy regarding OCA information. The reference to 40 CFR part 1400
only clarifies the statutory obligations that relate to securing this
information.
    EPA is proposing to redesignate the current paragraph Sec.
68.210(b) that addresses the non-disclosure of

classified information by the Department of Defense or other Federal
agencies or their contractors as Sec.  68.210(e).
    EPA is proposing a new paragraph (b) to require the owner or
operator of a stationary source to distribute certain chemical hazard
information for all regulated processes to the public in an easily
accessible manner. EPA is proposing to require the owner or operator to
distribute the following information, as applicable:

     Names of regulated substances held in a process above
TQs;
     Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) for all regulated substances
held above TQs at the facility;
     The facility's accident history required under Sec.
68.42;
     Information concerning the source's compliance with
Sec.  68.10(b)(3) or the emergency response provisions of subpart E,
including:
    [cir] Whether the source is a responding stationary source or a
non-responding stationary source;
    [cir] Name and phone number of local emergency response
organizations with which the source last coordinated emergency
response efforts, pursuant to Sec.  68.180; and
    [cir] For sources subject to Sec.  68.95, procedures for
informing the public and local emergency response agencies about
accidental releases.
     Information on emergency response exercises required
under Sec.  68.96, including schedules for upcoming exercises,
reports for completed exercises as described in Sec.  68.96(b)(3),
and any other related information; and
     LEPC contact information, including LEPC name, phone
number, and Web site address as available.

    EPA believes that providing this information to the general public
will allow people that live or work near a regulated facility to
improve their awareness of risks to the community and to be prepared to
protect themselves in the event of an accidental release. EPA also
thinks that requiring facilities to provide summary information on the
facility's emergency response plans and emergency exercises to the
public, will provide assurance to the community that the facility is
adequately prepared to properly handle a chemical emergency, should it
arise. An additional benefit of sharing exercise schedules is to avoid
unnecessary public alarm when exercises are conducted.
    The facility owner or operator can make all the required
information available to the public in a variety of ways. For example,
the owner or operator could comply by making the information available
on the facility or company Web site, if one is available. If the
facility doesn't have a Web site, the owner or operator could establish
one. Alternatively, there are free or low cost internet platforms, file
sharing services, and social media tools that are designed to share
information with the public. As another option, the facility could make
the information available in hard copy at publicly accessible locations
such as a public library or a local government office. If the facility
has the means to handle public visitors, it could choose to make the
information available at the facility location. The facility could
alternatively provide the information by email, upon request. EPA
encourages the facility owner or operator to coordinate information
distribution with the LEPC or local emergency response officials to
determine the best way to reach public stakeholders.
    EPA seeks comment on this approach. Is there additional information
that should be shared with the public? For example, should EPA require
the STAA proposed under Sec.  68.67(c)(8), or a summary of that
analysis, be shared with the public? Alternatively, should EPA further
limit the information elements proposed? For example, how should EPA
limit the disclosure of information in exercise reports that might
reveal security vulnerabilities about the facility or emergency
responders? Should EPA not require disclosure of names of individuals
involved in exercises or facility security vulnerabilities revealed by
the exercise? Is there an alternative way to improve community
preparedness for safety purposes while balancing the security concerns
to limit a terrorist's ability to use the information for an attack? Is
there other information that community residents and operators of
community facilities (such as schools, nursing homes, daycares) need in
order to participate in emergency preparedness planning, particularly
as it relates to effective incident notification, sheltering in place,
and evacuation? EPA also seeks comment on the feasibility of these
various options for providing information to the public and requests
suggestions for other ways that the data could be made available.
Lastly, EPA seeks comment on any challenges facility owners or
operators would have in providing the information or challenges public
stakeholders would have in obtaining the information. In order to
inform the public of the location of the information, EPA is proposing
to require under Sec.  68.160(b) that the facility report in their RMP
the location or means of public access to the information proposed to
be disclosed under this subsection.
    Submission Dates and Updates. EPA is proposing that the owner or
operator shall update and submit information required under Sec.
68.210(b) every calendar year, including all applicable information
that was revised since the last update.
    Confidential Business Information. In Sec.  68.210(f), an owner or
operator asserting CBI shall submit a sanitized version of the
information required under this section to the public. Assertion of
claims of CBI and substantiation of CBI claims shall be in the same
manner as required in Sec. Sec.  68.151 and 68.152 for information
contained in the RMP required under subpart G. As provided in Sec.
68.151(c)(2), an owner or operator of a stationary source asserting
that a chemical name is CBI shall provide a generic category or class
name as a substitute. If an owner or operator has already claimed CBI
for a portion of the RMP, then that claim still applies for the
disclosure elements here. The owner or operator should provide a
sanitized version as described in the RMP*eSubmit User's Manual.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ See EPA. March 2014. RMP*eSubmit User's Manual. http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/rmpesubmit-users-manual.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA seeks comment on this approach. Will the proposed requirements
improve the knowledge sharing between regulated facilities and the
public? Is there additional information that should be shared with the
public stakeholders? Should EPA only require information to be shared
upon request by the public? Alternatively, should EPA further limit the
information we are proposing to be required, such as requiring only a
one page summary that addresses chemical hazard information and
emergency response measures? EPA could alternatively eliminate some of
the required information elements or further limit information, such as
by limiting accident history information to only those with offsite
impact. Some SERs asked whether the existing RMP data or the RMP
executive summary available to the public through existing sources
(FOIA, Federal Reading rooms or other public sources who have compiled
the data) are adequate to meet the information needs of the public.
    Public Meetings. When the CSISSFRRA was enacted in 1999, it
included a section that required owners or operators of all facilities
regulated under the RMP rule to hold a public meeting within 180 days
of enactment.\205\ The purpose of the public meeting was to describe
and discuss the local implications of the RMP on the community. Two or
more stationary

sources were allowed to conduct a joint meeting, while small businesses
were allowed to instead post a summary of their OCA information no
later than 180 days after enactment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels
Regulatory Relief Act, Public Law 106-40, August 5, 1999. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-113/pdf/STATUTE-113-Pg207.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In paragraph Sec.  68.210(d) EPA is proposing to require regulated
facilities that have any accident meeting the five-year accident
history criteria of Sec.  68.42 to hold a public meeting within 30 days
after the accident. This provides an opportunity for the owner or
operator of the RMP facility to inform the community about the accident
including, at a minimum, the information reportable under Sec.  68.42.
This includes information on:

     When the accident occurred;
     The nature of the accident including initiating event
and contributing factors if known;
     Chemicals involved and quantities released;
     Weather conditions, if known;
     On-site and offsite impacts;
     Emergency response notifications; and
     Operational or process changes that resulted, thus far,
from investigation of the release.

    EPA expects that, in some cases, sources will have completed the
incident investigation required under Sec.  68.60 or Sec.  68.81 prior
to holding the public meeting. This would allow the owner or operator
to share appropriate information about the accident with the local
community. However, in some cases, such as for complex, protracted
investigations, the source may need to hold a public meeting prior to
completing the incident investigation. In such cases, the owner or
operator should consider holding a second public meeting after
completing the incident investigation. Additionally, a public meeting
must be held after accidents that destroy a process or stationary
source or cause the process or source to be subsequently
decommissioned. Stationary sources may combine public meetings with
LEPC meetings or other events as long as those events/meetings are
available for public participation.
    Public meetings must also address other relevant chemical hazard
information such as that described in Sec.  68.210(b) and any other
appropriate information that may improve safety and emergency
preparedness activities in the community. The facility representative
should describe the risks that are associated with the facility, and
what the facility is doing to protect the public from those risks. In
addition, the facility personnel should relay information that would
assist the public to prepare for accidental releases. For example, at
the meeting, the facility representative should discuss the process for
public emergency notification, procedures for sheltering in place or
evacuating, and where to obtain further updates on the status of an
emergency incident. The discussion should also address how the public
can access community emergency response plans and identify what the
community may expect to see during a field exercise.
    As part of the SBAR Panel process, several SERs questioned the
value of having any public meetings and noted that, when held in the
past, public meetings were not well attended. Some SERs suggested
altering the requirement to allow for the request of a public meeting
if an LEPC or community felt it was necessary. Additionally, SERs
expressed concern about the requirement to hold public meetings 30 days
after an accident; the SER suggestions included expanding the timeframe
from 60 days to 9 months. SERs also indicated that many small business
may still be handling the aftermath of accidents, conducting incident
investigations, and arranging audits in this time period, with limited
attention to devote to educating the public.
    EPA seeks comment on the proposed approach and whether there are
other options that EPA should consider for public meetings. For
example, should EPA require regular public meetings rather than only
after an accident subject to reporting requirements under Sec.  68.42?
Should EPA require public meetings upon request by LEPCs, emergency
responders or the public? Alternatively, should the public meeting
requirement be restricted to an RMP reportable accidents with offsite
impacts? Instead of requiring a public meeting after RMP reportable
accidents, should EPA require owners and operators to meet only with
LEPCs and emergency responders? If EPA finalizes the requirement to
hold post-accident public meetings, should EPA extend the required
timeframe to hold the meeting beyond 30 days (e.g. to 90 days), in
order to give the owner or operator more time to learn about accident
causal factors and prepare for a public meeting? If so, what extended
timeframe should EPA choose and should EPA require the implementing
agency to approve any extensions?

C. Alternative Options

    EPA considered an option to require all facilities to hold public
meetings at least once every five years (and within 30 days after an
accident) to share chemical hazard information described under Sec.
68.210(b) and any other appropriate information that may improve safety
and emergency preparedness activities in the community. However, EPA
did not propose this requirement as our preferred option because of
concerns raised by the SBAR Panel process that periodic public meetings
are often sparsely attended.
    EPA also considered limiting the requirement for periodic and post-
accident public meetings to only Program 2 and Program 3 facilities;
however, EPA did not propose this option as our preferred option
because even though accidents at Program 1 facilities should not have
significant public impacts, some communities near these facilities may
still be interested in understanding the risks at the facility and the
procedures and controls that are in place to limit offsite impacts.
Additionally, if a Program 1 facility does have an RMP reportable
accident with offsite impacts, EPA believes they should be held to the
same standard as other facilities and be required to hold a public
meeting within 30 days of the incident to provide additional
information on the accidental release. Nevertheless, EPA is interested
in receiving public feedback on whether EPA should consider requiring
periodic public meetings and whether the requirement should be limited
to Program 2 and Program 3 facilities.
    EPA is also considering an option for supporting the public
disclosure provisions with a ``score card'' or a ``grade'' system that
could be provided by an independent third-party. The score or grade
would be made available to the LEPCs and public to demonstrate the
facility's compliance with the RMP rule. This method could be used
either instead of or in addition to what EPA is proposing. EPA requests
information and recommendations on how to develop such a program,
including the types of scoring criteria that should be used and any
other issues that the Agency should consider when developing such a
system.
    EPA seeks comment on these alternative approaches and whether there
are any other alternative options that EPA should consider for future
actions.

VII. Risk Management Plan Streamlining, Clarifications, and RMP Rule
Technical Corrections

    A stationary source subject to the RMP rule is required to submit a
RMP in a method and format specified by the EPA, pursuant to Sec.
68.150(a). The CAA and 40 CFR subpart G require that the RMP indicate
compliance with the regulations at 40 CFR part 68 and also

include information regarding the hazard assessment, prevention
program, and emergency response program. The RMP also includes
stationary source registration information, such as name, location and
contact information. The EPA may review RMPs for information gathering,
inspection preparation, errors in submissions, and changes requiring a
correction or re-submission of the RMP. The CAA requires that RMPs be
made available to states, local entities responsible for planning or
responding to accidental releases at the source, the CSB, and the
public. As a result, the information provided in an RMP is intended to
be easily understood, thus encouraging the public, local entities, and
governmental agencies to interact with stationary sources on issues
related to accident prevention and preparedness.
    The RMP format consists of a combination of check-off boxes, yes/no
answers, numerical entries, and write-in information pertaining to the
data best describing the various elements of the risk management
program at a source. The nine sections of an RMP are: Registration
Information; Toxics Worst Case; Toxics Alternative Release; Flammables
Worst Case; Flammables Alternative Release; Accident History;
Prevention Program: Program Level 3; Prevention Program: Program Level
2; and Emergency Response. Data elements in these sections address
compliance with each of the rule elements. Some sections may not be
applicable to all stationary sources, as some sections apply only to
processes with certain program levels, and some apply only to certain
types of regulated substances (toxics or flammables). The RMP also
includes an Executive Summary, which allows stationary sources to
provide a brief description of the source's prevention and preparedness
activities as they relate to covered processes, in a format that is
easy to understand.
    Based on feedback received from the regulated community and EPA's
own experience, EPA is proposing to revise several data elements in
subpart G and to make technical corrections to the RMP rule. The
following sections provide an overview of the proposed revisions.

A. Deletions From Subpart G

    EPA is proposing to delete data elements that do not effectively
assist the Agency in evaluating compliance with the RMP rule. EPA is
also proposing to delete some data elements because the information can
be obtained through improved coordination with Federal, state, and
local agencies resulting from Executive Order 13650, such as
information currently required by Sec. Sec.  68.160(b)(13) (the date of
the last safety inspection of the stationary source by a Federal,
state, or local government agency) and 68.160(b)(19) (OSHA Voluntary
Protection Program status). EPA is proposing to delete other data
elements because we believe an on-site inspection or formal information
request are better ways to evaluate compliance with these Risk
Management Program requirements (for example, some data elements
pertaining to training, contractor safety, and maintenance/mechanical
integrity). By removing several RMP data elements, EPA expects that the
regulated community will find it easier to comply with subpart G
requirements. In addition to burden relief for the regulated community,
EPA expects that removing several RMP data elements will reduce the
number of errors in RMPs submitted to the Agency.

B. Revisions to Subpart G

    EPA is proposing to revise existing provisions in subpart G as
follows:

     Modernize requirements to include electronic contact
information if it exists, such as email addresses and Web site
homepages;
     Revise provisions to remove a portion of select data
elements that would be better evaluated during an on-site inspection
or information request;
     Provide consistency with RMP*eSubmit;
     Provide more consistency in the data collected for
similar data elements in the Program 2 and Program 3 prevention
programs; and
     Replace data elements that were not effective in
demonstrating a stationary source's compliance with the rule, with
one that will demonstrate compliance.

    Data elements that require a date to demonstrate compliance can
become irrelevant during the typical five-year RMP resubmission cycle.
An example is a stationary source that submitted an RMP to the EPA on
January 8, 2015, that included an annual operating procedures review
date of January 1, 2015, in its RMP in accordance with Sec.  68.175(f).
Assuming the stationary source will not have any changes that would
require a resubmission of the RMP and the stationary source will not
voluntarily correct the RMP with newer annual standard operating
procedure (SOP) review dates, the January 1, 2015, annual SOP review
date does not provide compliance information for years 2016-2019. As a
result, the annual SOP review date in this example only provides
compliance information for 2015. Because the dates of most recent
review or update of a process safety element in an RMP do not always
reflect compliance with regulatory requirements, EPA is proposing to
replace most of these dates with the RMP Certifying Official's
attestation that the stationary source complies with each Risk
Management Program requirement.
    Data elements for which the last review or revision dates are being
replaced include:

     For Program 2 and Program 3: Safety information,
operating procedures, training programs, maintenance procedures,
changes triggering review of any of the previous data elements or
the hazard review/PHA;
     For Program 3 only: MOC, pre-startup review, employee
participation plans, hot work permit procedures, contractor safety
procedures and performance; and,
     For sources with Emergency Response Programs: Emergency
response plans and emergency response training of employees.

    EPA will still require the date of the most recent hazard review or
PHA or their update (required every 5 years), date of most recent
compliance audit (required every 3 years), and date of most recent
incident investigation (required only when an incident occurs). These
data elements are not updated as frequently as the other program
elements, and are therefore more likely to indicate current compliance
with regulatory requirements.

C. Additions to Subpart G

    In addition to removing and revising several RMP data elements, EPA
is proposing to add several RMP data elements in subpart G based on the
proposed rule requirements discussed in this document. This includes
new data elements to address compliance with:

     Third-party audit requirements,
     Root cause analysis requirements as part of incident
investigations;
     IST analysis requirements in the PHA;
     Emergency response preparedness requirements including
information on local coordination and emergency response exercises;
and
     Information sharing provisions.

    By adding these data elements to the RMP requirements in subpart G
EPA will be able to evaluate a stationary source's compliance with
these proposed rule requirements once they are finalized.

D. Proposed Amendments and Technical Corrections

1. Proposed Revisions to Sec.  68.160 (Registration)
    EPA is proposing to delete and reserve:

     Sec.  68.160(b)(13)--The date of the last safety
inspection of the stationary source by

a Federal, state, or local government agency and the identity of the
inspecting agency; and
     Sec.  68.160(b)(19)--OSHA Voluntary Protection Program
status (Optional).

    EPA is proposing to revise:

     Sec.  68.160(b)(1) by removing the method for obtaining
latitude and longitude (but keep the rest of Sec.  68.160(b)(1));
     Sec.  68.160(b)(4) by requiring an email address for
the owner or operator, if that person has an email address, rather
than making it optional;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(5) by removing ``position'' and
requiring an email address for the person with overall
responsibility for RMP elements and implementation, if that person
has an email address (rather than making it optional);
     Sec.  68.160(b)(9) by adding ``equivalent'' to clarify
that the number of full-time employees means full-time equivalent
employees to be consistent with RMP*eSubmit;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(12) by adding the phrase ``and if so''
to clarify that if the stationary source has a CAA Title V operating
permit, then the RMP plan must include the permit number;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(14) by requiring an email address for
the contractor who prepared the RMP (if any), if the contractor has
an email address;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(15) by requiring an email address for
the source or parent company, if the source or parent company has an
email address;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(16) by requiring a source internet
address, if the source has an internet address;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(17) by requiring a phone number at the
source for public inquiries, if the source has a public inquiries
phone number;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(18) by requiring the name, phone
number, email address, and internet address for the LEPC, if the
LEPC has such information available; and
     Sec.  68.160(b)(20) by changing facility to stationary
source in subparagraphs (b)(20)(ii) and (b)(20)(iv).

    EPA is proposing to add the following RMP data elements that relate
to the information sharing provisions being proposed in this document:

     Sec.  68.160(b)(21) would require an attestation that
chemical hazard-related information is available to the LEPC or
emergency response officials, as set forth in Sec.  68.205;
     Sec.  68.160(b)(22) would require an attestation that
chemical hazard-related information is available to the public, as
set forth in Sec.  68.210; and
     Sec.  68.160(b)(23) would require the date of most
recent public meeting, as set forth in Sec.  68.210(d).
2. Proposed Revisions to Sec.  68.170 (Prevention Program/Program 2)
    EPA is proposing to delete the requirement in Sec.  68.170(k) which
identify the date of the most recent change that triggered a review or
revision of safety information, the hazard review, operating or
maintenance procedures, or training.
    EPA is proposing to revise:

     Sec.  68.170(a) by changing the reference to paragraph
(k) to paragraph (j) because we are proposing to delete paragraph
(k).
     Sec.  68.170(d) by reorganizing into subparagraphs
(d)(1) and (d)(2). EPA is proposing to replace the date of the most
recent review or revision of the safety information with an
attestation that the safety information requirements, in Sec.
68.48, are implemented. EPA is also proposing to move the
requirement to list all Federal and state regulations, industry
specific and established company or stationary source design codes
and standards that are applicable, and the requirement to identify
those followed, into subparagraph (d)(2).
     Sec.  68.170(e) by reorganizing the date of completion
of the most recent hazard review or hazard review update to Sec.
68.170(e)(1) and removing from Sec.  68.170(e)(1), the requirement
to identify an expected date of completion of any changes resulting
from the hazard review;
     Sec.  68.170(f) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of operating procedures with an
attestation that the operating procedures requirements, in Sec.
68.52, are implemented;
     Sec.  68.170(g) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of training programs with an attestation
that training requirements, in Sec.  68.54, are implemented. EPA is
also proposing to delete the requirements to identify the types of
training provided and competency testing used in subparagraphs
(g)(1) and (g)(2);
     Sec.  68.170(h) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of maintenance procedures and the date of
the most recent equipment inspection or test and the equipment
inspected or tested with an attestation that the maintenance
requirements, in Sec.  68.56, are implemented;
     Sec.  68.170(i) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA
would add an attestation that the compliance audit requirements of
Sec.  68.58 are implemented in subparagraph (i)(1) and move the
requirement to identify the date of the most recent compliance audit
to subparagraph (i)(2). EPA would remove the requirement to identify
the date of completion of any changes resulting from the compliance
audit; and, in subparagraph (i)(3), add a requirement that the owner
or operator identify whether the most recent compliance audit was a
third-party audit, pursuant to Sec. Sec.  68.58 and 68.59; and
     Sec.  68.170(j) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA
would add an attestation that the incident investigation
requirements, in Sec.  68.60, are implemented in subparagraph (j)(1)
and move the date of the most recent incident investigation into
subparagraph (j)(2). EPA would delete the requirement to identify
the expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the
investigation, and, in subparagraph (j)(3), would add a requirement
that the plan indicate whether root cause analyses have been
completed for all accidents and incidents that are subject to the
requirements of Sec.  68.60.
3. Proposed Revisions to Sec.  68.175 (Prevention Program/Program 3)
    EPA is proposing to delete paragraph Sec.  68.175(p) because we are
addressing the data elements for contractor safety procedures in
paragraph (o).
    EPA is proposing to revise the following provisions:

     Sec.  68.175(a) by changing the reference to paragraph
(p) to paragraph (o) because we are proposing to combine the data
elements in paragraphs (p) and (o) that show compliance with the
requirements for contractor safety procedures.
     Sec.  68.175(d) by reorganizing into subparagraphs
(d)(1) and (d)(2). EPA is proposing to replace the date of the most
recent review or revision of the safety information with an
attestation that the PSI requirements, in Sec.  68.65, are
implemented. EPA is also proposing to move the requirement to list
all Federal and state regulations, industry-specific and established
company or stationary source design codes and standards that are
applicable, and the requirement to identify those followed, into
subparagraph (d)(2);
     Sec.  68.175(e) by reorganizing existing requirements
into subparagraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) and adding new requirements
addressing safer technology and alternatives in new subparagraph
(e)(2). Subparagraph (e)(1) would apply to information on the PHA or
PHA update and revalidation information. EPA would move the date of
completion of the most recent PHA or update and require the plan
identify the technique used to Sec.  68.170(e)(1)(i). EPA would
delete the requirement to identify the expected date of completion
of any changes resulting from the PHA. Additional PHA information
would move to subparagraph (e)(1)(ii) through (vi). EPA would add
subparagraph (e)(2) to address requirements for safer alternatives
including: An attestation that the PHA address safer technology and
risk management measures, as required in Sec.  68.67(c)(8); whether
any IST or ISD were implemented and if so, the technology category
that describes the IST or ISD (i.e., substitution, minimization,
simplification, and/or moderation);
     Sec.  68.175(f) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of operating procedures with an
attestation that the operating procedures requirements, in Sec.
68.69, are implemented;
     Sec.  68.175(g) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of training programs with an attestation
that training requirements, in Sec.  68.71, are implemented. EPA is
also proposing to delete the requirements to identify the types of
training provided and competency testing used in subparagraphs
(g)(1) and (g)(2);
     Sec.  68.175(h) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of maintenance procedures and the date of
the most recent equipment inspection or test and the equipment
inspected or tested with an attestation that the mechanical
integrity requirements, in Sec.  68.73, are implemented;
     Sec.  68.175(i) by replacing the date of the most
recent change that triggered MOC

procedures and the date of the most recent review or revision of MOC
procedures with an attestation that the MOC requirements, in Sec.
68.75, are implemented;
     Sec.  68.175(j) by replacing the date of the most
recent pre-startup review with an attestation that the pre-startup
review requirement, in Sec.  68.77, are implemented;
     Sec.  68.175(k) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA
would add an attestation that the compliance audit requirements of
Sec.  68.79 are implemented in subparagraph (k)(1) and move the
requirement to identify the date of the most recent compliance audit
to subparagraph (k)(2). EPA would remove the requirement to identify
the expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the
compliance audit; and, in subparagraph (k)(3), add a requirement
that the owner or operator identify whether the most recent
compliance audit was a third-party audit, pursuant to Sec. Sec.
68.79 and 68.80;
     Sec.  68.175(l) by reorganizing into subparagraphs. EPA
would add an attestation that the incident investigation
requirements, in Sec.  68.81, are implemented in subparagraph (l)(1)
and move the date of the most recent incident investigation into
subparagraph (l)(2). EPA would delete the requirement to identify
the expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the
investigation; and, in subparagraph (l)(3), would add a requirement
that the plan indicate whether root cause analyses have been
completed for all accidents and incidents that are subject to the
requirements of Sec.  68.81;
     Sec.  68.175(m) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of employee participation plans with an
attestation that employee participation requirements, Sec.  68.83,
are implemented;
     Sec.  68.175(n) by replacing the date of the most
recent review or revision of hot work permit procedures with an
attestation that the hot work permit requirements, in Sec.  68.85,
are implemented; and
     Sec. Sec.  68.175(o) and 68.175(p) by replacing the
date of the most recent review or revision of contractor safety
procedures and the date of the most recent evaluation of contractor
safety performance with an attestation in Sec.  68.175(o) that the
contractor safety requirements, in Sec.  68.67, are implemented.
4. Proposed Revisions to Sec.  68.180 (Emergency Response Program)
    Subpart G Sec.  68.180 contains the emergency response program data
elements that must be included in the RMP. Although the data elements
in Sec.  68.180 are intended to help identify whether stationary source
personnel will respond to an accidental release of a regulated
substance, the existing data elements do not clearly distinguish
between responding stationary sources and non-responding stationary
sources. As a result, many non-responding stationary sources are
submitting RMPs to the EPA with errors, because they appear to be
answering questions that were only meant to be answered by responding
sources. Consequently, the RMP data do not indicate with certainty,
whether a stationary source is a responding or non-responding
stationary source.
    The proposed revisions to add emergency response exercises and
revise local coordination provisions of the rule are intended to
improve coordination with local response authorities and to bolster
emergency response capabilities and preparedness for accidental
releases. Because of the proposed regulatory changes to subpart E-
emergency response, and due to the difficulty in distinguishing between
responding and non-responding facilities in subpart G Sec.  68.180, the
EPA is proposing to completely revise and reorganize subpart G Sec.
68.180 into the following three parts: Requirements for (1) all non-
responding and responding stationary sources, (2) non-responding
stationary sources, and (3) responding stationary sources. The EPA
believes that splitting subpart G Sec.  68.180 into three parts will
aid facilities' understanding of the reporting requirements, reduce
errors in submitted RMPs, and improve compliance with the RMP
requirements. The proposed revisions to subpart G Sec.  68.180 will
also improve EPA's ability to evaluate a facility's compliance with the
proposed Emergency Response Program requirements.
    EPA is proposing to revise:

     Sec.  68.180(a) by deleting the phrase ``the following
information.'' The text in subparagraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) would
be reorganized and/or replaced. Subparagraph (a)(1) would require
the RMP to identify the name, organizational affiliation, phone
number, and email address of local emergency planning and response
organizations with which the stationary source last coordinated
emergency response efforts, pursuant to Sec.  68.10(b)(3) or Sec.
68.93. Subparagraph (a)(2) would require the RMP to identify whether
coordination with the local emergency response organizations is
occurring at least annually, pursuant to Sec.  68.93(a).