[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 133 (Tuesday, July 12, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 44998-45008]
[FR Doc No: 2016-14760]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. RM15-25-000; Order No. 824]

Availability of Certain North American Electric Reliability
Corporation Databases to the Commission

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY:  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) amends
its regulations to require the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) to provide the Commission, and Commission staff,
with access, on a non-public and ongoing basis, to certain databases

compiled and maintained by NERC. The amended regulation applies to the
following NERC databases: The Transmission Availability Data System,
the Generating Availability Data System, and the protection system
misoperations database. Access to these databases, which will be
limited to data regarding U.S. facilities provided to NERC on a
mandatory basis, will provide the Commission with information necessary
to determine the need for new or modified Reliability Standards and to
better understand NERC's periodic reliability and adequacy assessments.

DATES: Effective date: This rule will become effective July 12, 2016.
    Compliance date: The compliance date is based on issuance of the
final rule in Docket No. RM16-15-000. The Commission will publish a
document in the Federal Register announcing the compliance date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Raymond Orocco-John (Technical Information), Office of Electric
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street
NE., Washington, DC 20426, Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>Julie Greenisen (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington,
DC 20426, Telephone:<PHONE_NUMBER><EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Order No. 824

Final Rule

    1. The Commission amends its regulations, pursuant to section 215
of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ to require the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to provide the Commission, and
Commission staff, with access, on a non-public and ongoing basis, to
certain databases compiled and maintained by NERC. The amended
regulation applies to the following NERC databases: (1) The
Transmission Availability Data System (TADS), (2) the Generating
Availability Data System (GADS), and (3) the protection system
misoperations database. Access to these databases, which will be
limited to data regarding U.S. facilities provided to NERC on a
mandatory basis, will provide the Commission with information necessary
to determine the need for new or modified Reliability Standards and to
better understand NERC's periodic reliability and adequacy assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Background

A. Section 215 and Order No. 672

    2. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), responsible for developing
mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to Commission
review and approval. Reliability Standards may be enforced by NERC,
subject to Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\2\
In addition, section 215(g) of the FPA requires the ERO to conduct
periodic assessments of the reliability and adequacy of the Bulk-Power
System in North America.\3\ Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the
Commission established a process to select and certify an ERO,\4\ and
subsequently certified NERC as the ERO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(e).
    \3\ Id. 824o(g).
    \4\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Section 39.2(d) of the Commission's regulations requires NERC
and each Regional Entity to ``provide the Commission such information
as is necessary to implement section 215 of the Federal Power Act.''
\5\ Section 39.2(d) of the Commission's regulations also requires each
user, owner and operator of the Bulk-Power System within the United
States (other than Alaska and Hawaii) to provide the Commission, NERC
and each applicable Regional Entity with ``such information as is
necessary to implement section 215 of the Federal Power Act as
determined by the Commission and set out in the Rules of the Electric
Reliability Organization and each applicable Regional Entity.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ 18 CFR 39.2(d).
    \6\ Id.

    4. The Commission promulgated section 39.2(d) of its regulations in
Order No. 672.\7\ The Commission explained in Order No. 672 that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204 at P 114.

    The Commission agrees . . . that, to fulfill its obligations
under this Final Rule, the ERO or a Regional Entity will need access
to certain data from users, owners and operators of the Bulk-Power
System. Further, the Commission will need access to such information
as is necessary to fulfill its oversight and enforcement roles under
the statute.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. NERC Databases

    5. NERC conducts ongoing, mandatory data collections from
registered entities to populate databases for transmission outages
through TADS, generation outages through GADS, and protection system
misoperations through NERC's protection system misoperations database.
Each of these NERC databases is discussed below.
1. TADS Database
    6. NERC initiated collection of TADS data on a mandatory basis in
2007 by issuing a data request pursuant to section 1600 of the NERC
Rules of Procedure.\9\ The request required that, beginning in January
2008, applicable entities provide certain data for the TADS database
based on a common template.\10\ In 2010, NERC expanded its collection
of TADS data to include additional fields of information on
transmission outages.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See generally NERC, Summary of Phase I TADS Data Collection
(November 9, 2007), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/tads/TADSTF%20Archives%20DL/TADS_Data_Request_Summary.pdf.
    \10\ See generally NERC, Transmission Availability Data System
(TADS) Data Reporting Instruction Manual (November 20, 2007), http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Transmission%20Availability%20Data%20System%20Working%20Grou/TADSTF%20Archives/Data_Reporting_Instr_Manual_11_20_07.pdf.
    \11\ See generally NERC, Transmission Availability Data System
Phase II Final Report (September 11, 2008), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/tads/TransmissionAvailabilityDataSyatemRF/TADS_Phase_II_Final_Report_091108.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. The TADS database compiles transmission outage data in a common
format for: (1) Bulk electric system AC circuits (overhead and
underground); (2) transmission transformers (except generator step-up
units); (3) bulk electric system AC/DC back-to-back converters; and (4)
bulk electric system DC circuits.\12\ The TADS data collection template
includes the following information fields: (1) Type of facilities, (2)
outage start time and duration, (3) event type, (4) initiating cause
code, and (5) sustained cause code (for sustained outages).\13\ ``Cause
codes'' for common causes of transmission outages include: (1)
Lightning, (2) fire, (3) vandalism, (4) failed equipment (with multiple
sub-listings), (5) vegetation, and (6) ``unknown.'' \14\ There were
10,787 reported TADS events between 2012 and 2014.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See NERC TADS Home Page, http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/tads/Pages/default.aspx.
    \13\ See Transmission Availability Data System (TADS) Data
Reporting Instruction Manual (August 1, 2014), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/tads/Documents/2015_TADS_DRI.pdf.
    \14\ See Transmission Availability Data System Definitions
(August 1, 2014), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/tads/Documents/2015_TADS_Appendix_7.pdf.
    \15\ See, e.g., NERC, State of Reliability 2015, Appendix A
(Statistical Analysis for Risk Issue Identification and Transmission
Outage Severity Analysis) at 86 (May 2015), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/PA/Performance%20Analysis%20DL/2015%20State%20of%20Reliability.pdf. The most recent data reported
by NERC for TADS events is for the period 2012-2014.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. NERC uses TADS data to develop transmission metrics to analyze
outage frequency, duration, causes, and other factors related to
transmission outages.\16\ NERC also provides individual transmission
owners with TADS metrics for their facilities.\17\ NERC issues an
annual public report based on TADS data that shows aggregate metrics
for each NERC Region, with the underlying data accorded confidential
treatment.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See NERC TADS Home Page.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. GADS Database
    9. NERC's collection of GADS data has been mandatory since 2012,
pursuant to a data request issued in accordance with section 1600 of
the NERC Rules of Procedure.\19\ The GADS database collects, records,
and retrieves operating information on power plant availability,
including event, performance, and design data.\20\ GADS data are used
to support equipment reliability and availability analyses, as well as
benchmarking studies.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See NERC, Generating Availability Data System Mandatory
Reporting of Conventional Generation Performance Data at 2 (July
2011), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/gads/MandatoryGADS/Revised_Final_Draft_GADSTF_Recommendation_Report.pdf; see also NERC
GADS Home Page, http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/gads/Pages/default.aspx.
    \20\ See NERC GADS Home Page.
    \21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    10. Currently, GADS collects outage data pertaining to ten types of
conventional generating units with capacity of 20 MW and larger,
including: (1) Fossil steam including fluidized bed design; (2)
nuclear; (3) gas turbines/jet engines; (4) internal combustion engines
(diesel engines); (5) hydro units/pumped storage; (6) combined cycle
blocks and their related components; (7) cogeneration blocks and their
related components; (8) multi-boiler/multi-turbine units; (9)
geothermal units; and (10) other miscellaneous conventional generating
units (e.g., biomass, landfill gases).\22\ The GADS data collection
template includes the following design, event, and performance
information: (1) Design records, (2) event records, and (3) performance
records.\23\ Design records refer to the characteristics of each unit
such as GADS utility code,\24\ GADS unit code,\25\ NERC Regional Entity
where the unit is located, name of the unit, commercial operating date,
and type of generating unit (fossil, combined cycle, etc.).\26\ Event
records include information about when and to what extent the
generating unit could not generate power.\27\ Performance records refer
to monthly generation, unit[hyphen]attempted starts, actual starts,
summary event outage information, and fuels.\28\ NERC has developed
``cause codes'' for the identification of common causes of unit outages
based on the type of generating unit.\29\ For example, the cause codes
section for fossil steam units includes codes for the boiler, steam
turbine, generator, balance of plant, pollution control equipment,
external, regulatory, safety and environmental, personnel errors, and
performance testing.\30\ For 2011-2013, the GADS database contains data
from more than 5,000 units.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Generating Availability Data System Mandatory Reporting of
Conventional Generation Performance Data at 15.
    \23\ Id., Appendix V (Rules of Procedure Section 1600
Justification) at 35.
    \24\ The GADS utility code is a code number referencing the
utility that owns a generator.
    \25\ The GADS unit code is a code name referencing the
generating unit involved. The GADS unit code may or may not contain
the name of the generator owner.
    \26\ Id.
    \27\ Id.
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ NERC, Generating Availability Data System Data Reporting
Instructions (January 1, 2015), Appendix B (Index to System/
Component Cause Codes) at 1, http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/gads/DataReportingInstructions/Appendix_B1_Fossil_Steam_Unit_Cause_Codes.pdf. The most recent data
reported by NERC for GADS events is for the period 2011-2013.
    \30\ Id.
    \31\ State of Reliability 2015, Appendix B (Analysis of
Generation Data) at 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    11. NERC uses GADS data to measure generation reliability and
publishes aggregate performance metrics for each NERC Region in
publicly available annual state of reliability and reliability
assessment reports.\32\ The underlying data are typically accorded
confidential treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See, e.g., id., Appendix B (Analysis of Generation Data).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Protection System Misoperations Database
    12. The reporting of protection system misoperations data by
transmission owners, generator owners and distribution providers has
been mandatory since 2011 pursuant to Reliability Standard PRC-004.\33\
Following implementation of Reliability Standard PRC-004-4, the
obligation to report misoperation data will remain mandatory but will
be accomplished through a data request pursuant to section 1600 of the
NERC Rules of Procedure.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ The Commission approved Reliability Standard PRC-004-1
(Analysis and Reporting of Transmission Protection System
Misoperations) in Order No. 693. Mandatory Reliability Standards for
the Bulk-Power System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242,
at PP 1467-1469, order on reh'g, Order No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053
(2007). The Commission subsequently approved the following revisions
and interpretations to Reliability Standard PRC-004, which was first
renamed Analysis and Mitigation of Transmission and Generation
Protection System Misoperations and then renamed Protection System
Misoperation Identification and Correction: Reliability Standards
PRC-004-1a, PRC-004-2, PRC-004-2a, PRC-004-2.1a, PRC-004-2.1(i)a,
PRC-004-3, and PRC-004-4. See North American Electric Reliability
Corp., 136 FERC ] 61,208 (2011) (approving interpretation resulting
in Reliability Standard PRC-004-1a and Reliability Standard PRC-004-
2a); North American Electric Reliability Corp., 134 FERC ] 61,015
(2011) (approving Reliability Standard PRC-004-2); Generator
Requirements at the Transmission Interface, Order No. 785, 144 FERC
] 61,221 (2013) (approving Reliability Standard PRC-004-2.1a); North
American Electric Reliability Corp., 151 FERC ] 61,129 (2015)
(approving Reliability Standard PRC-004-3); North American Electric
Reliability Corp., 151 FERC ] 61,186 (2015) (approving Reliability
Standards PRC-004-2.1(i)a and PRC-004-3); North American Electric
Reliability Corp., Docket No. RD15-5-000 (Nov. 19, 2015) (delegated
letter order) (approving Reliability Standard PRC-004-4); North
American Electric Reliability Corp., Docket No. RD14-14-001, et al.
(Dec. 4, 2015) (delegated letter order) (approving Reliability
Standard PRC-004-4(i) and PRC-004-5(i)).
    \34\ See generally NERC, Request for Data or Information
Protection System Misoperation Data Collection (August 14, 2014),
http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ProctectionSystemMisoperations/PRC-004-3%20Section%201600%20Data%20Request_20140729.pdf. Reliability
Standard PRC-004-4 will become enforceable on July 1, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    13. Currently, the protection system misoperations database
collects more than 20 data fields for a reportable misoperation event,
including: (1) Misoperation date; (2) event description; (3) protection
systems/components that misoperated; (4) equipment removed from service
(permanently or temporarily) as the result of the misoperation; (5)
misoperation category; and (6) cause(s) of misoperation.\35\ For 2014,
the protection system misoperations database contains information on
approximately 2,000 misoperation events.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Id. at 13-14; see also NERC, Protection System
Misoperations Home Page, http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ri/Pages/ProtectionSystemMisoperations.aspx.
    \36\ State of Reliability 2015 at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    14. Protection system misoperations have exacerbated the severity
of most cascading power outages, having played a significant role in
the August 14, 2003 Northeast blackout, for example.\37\ NERC uses
protection system misoperations data to assess protection system
performance and trends in protection system performance that may
negatively impact reliability.\38\ NERC publishes aggregate
misoperation

information for each NERC Region in annual public state of reliability
reports, with the underlying data being accorded confidential
treatment.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See Request for Data or Information Protection System
Misoperation Data Collection at 5.
    \38\ See id. at 14.
    \39\ See, e.g., State of Reliability 2015 at 45-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. NOPR

    15. On September 17, 2015, the Commission issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) proposing to amend the Commission's
regulations to require NERC to provide the Commission, and Commission
staff, with access, on a non-public and ongoing basis, to the TADS,
GADS, and protection system misoperations databases regarding U.S.
facilities.\40\ In response to the NOPR, the Commission received 13
sets of comments.\41\ We address below the issues raised in the NOPR
and comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Availability of Certain North American Electric Reliability
Corporation Databases to the Commission, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 80 FR 58,405 (Sept. 29, 2015), 152 FERC ] 61,208 (2015)
(NOPR).
    \41\ The Appendix to this Final Rule lists the entities that
filed comments in response to the NOPR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Discussion

    16. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, we amend the Commission's
regulations to require NERC to provide the Commission, and Commission
staff, with access (i.e., view and download data), on an ongoing and
non-public basis, to the TADS, GADS, and protection system
misoperations databases. As proposed in the NOPR and clarified in the
language of the new regulation, the Commission's access will be limited
to data regarding U.S. facilities. In addition, as discussed further
below, the Commission determines that NERC is not required to provide
the Commission with access to data provided to NERC on a voluntary
basis.
    17. As discussed below, the Commission believes that access to
these three NERC databases is necessary to carry out the Commission's
obligations under section 215 of the FPA. Further, as discussed in
Section II.B.1 below, we believe that if access is limited to data
mandatorily provided, Commission access to the TADS, GADS, and
protection system misoperations databases will not result in a
reduction in the level or quality of information that users, owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System share with NERC and the Regional
Entities, and will not otherwise result in a so-called chilling effect
on NERC's data-gathering efforts. We also discuss the following matters
below: (A) Authority to require and need for Commission access to NERC
databases; (B) information voluntarily provided; (C) confidential
information; (D) NERC's alternative proposal; and (E) information
collection.

A. Authority To Require and Need for Commission Access to NERC
Databases

NOPR
    18. In the NOPR, the Commission stated that its proposed access to
the TADS, GADS and protection system misoperations databases regarding
U.S. facilities was ``necessary to carry out the Commission's statutory
authority: (1) To evaluate the need to direct new or modified
Reliability Standards under section 215(d) of the FPA; and (2) to
better understand NERC's periodic assessments and reports . . .
regarding the reliability and adequacy of the Bulk-Power System under
section 215(g) of the FPA.'' \42\ The Commission first explained that
access to the databases would inform it ``more quickly, directly and
comprehensively about reliability trends or reliability gaps that might
require the Commission to direct the ERO to develop new or modified
Reliability Standards,'' responsibility which falls not only to the ERO
but also to the Commission under FPA section 215(d).\43\ The Commission
noted that each of the three databases could provide important
information regarding the need for new or modified Reliability
Standards and for assessing Bulk-Power System reliability, as NERC had
itself recognized when justifying the need for mandatory reporting (to
NERC) of TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperation data.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,208 at P 17.
    \43\ Id. P 18.
    \44\ See id. P 19 (quoting NERC's statements that ``TADS data is
intended to provide a basis for standards'' and that protection
system misoperations data is used to ``[i]dentify trends in
Protection System performance that negatively impact reliability.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    19. Second, the Commission explained in the NOPR that access to the
data would ``assist the Commission with its understanding of the
reliability and adequacy assessments periodically submitted by NERC
pursuant to section 215(g) of the FPA.'' \45\ The Commission further
stated that having direct access to the underlying data used in
aggregate form in NERC's reliability reports would ``help[ ] the
Commission to monitor causes of outages and detect emerging reliability
issues.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Id. P 20.
    \46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments
    20. Four commenters generally support, or do not oppose, the
Commission's proposal to access NERC's TADS, GADS, and protection
system misoperations databases.\47\ Resilient Societies supports the
Commission's proposed access to the NERC data ``because NERC has not
performed, or not disclosed data analysis when the results might not be
consistent with the interest of NERC's industry members in avoiding or
minimizing regulation.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ WIRAB supports the NOPR as a whole. Resilient Societies,
David Bardin, and SGS support greater access to NERC data, including
access by the Commission, but Resilient Societies and David Bardin
question the need to keep the data non-public, as discussed further
in Section II.B.2, infra.
    \48\ Resilient Societies Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    21. All other commenters, including NERC,\49\ the Trade
Associations, and the Public Power Associations oppose the Commission's
proposed regulation requiring NERC to provide the Commission access to
NERC's TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ While NERC recognizes the Commission's objective of
obtaining data needed to fulfill its oversight responsibilities,
NERC asks the Commission to adopt its alternative proposal,
discussed below in Section II.B.3, under which NERC would provide
the Commission with access to anonymized TADS, GADS, and protection
system misoperations data. The Northwest Public Power Association
(NWPPA) and Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) filed
comments in support of NERC's comments, including NERC's proposed
alternative to provide access to anonymized data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    22. The Trade Associations maintain that the Commission does not
need access to these NERC databases to fulfill its obligations under
FPA section 215, and that the Commission has multiple processes it can
use to achieve its stated goals, including events analysis, reviewing
patterns and trends in compliance and enforcement, coordination with
NERC's technical committees, evaluating NERC's periodic and special
reliability assessments, periodic review of individual standards, and
discussions on emerging issues at technical conferences and
workshops.\50\ The Trade Associations argue that these processes are
sufficient to allow the Commission to obtain information needed to
perform its functions ``without accessing the highly-sensitive,
facility-specific raw data contained in the databases.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See Trade Associations Comments at 5, 6-11.
    \51\ Id. at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Trade Associations assert that ``access to the raw data
contained in the databases without NERC and industry analysis will not
directly achieve the Commission's goals of identifying gaps in
Reliability Standards and in understanding NERC assessments because in
and of itself the raw data, without context or NERC technical analysis,
does not shed light on these

matters.'' \52\ While the Trade Associations thus object to any new
requirement that NERC provide access to these databases, the Trade
Associations ask that, if the Commission decides to move forward with
such a requirement, the Commission issue a modified proposal to better
explain ``how direct access to the raw data collected by NERC in the
GADS, TADS, and misoperations databases will support [the Commission's]
needs.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Id. at 12-13. See also NERC Comments at 21-22 (stating that
the proposed regulation ``is not tailored to support the
Commission's objective under the NOPR, because it will not enable
the Commission to place relevant data in context for purposes of
completing meaningful analyses of the BPS'' and that ``the
Commission would not be able to place relevant data in context to
derive useful information, which may result in incorrect or
inappropriate conclusions'' without engaging in a collaborative
process with NERC.
    \53\ Trade Associations Comments at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the Trade Associations and several other commenters argue
that the NOPR proposal is not ``consistent'' with the division of
responsibilities between the ERO and the Commission set forth in FPA
section 215.\54\ The Trade Associations assert that ``[t]he assessment
of reliability data in these databases is squarely within the role of
the ERO, which `conduct[s] periodic assessments of the reliability and
adequacy of the bulk-power system' '' and that ``[t]here is no
equivalent role for the Commission.'' \55\ Similarly, the Public Power
Associations contend that the NOPR proposal would impinge on the ERO's
statutory authority to develop Reliability Standards, and that the FPA
contemplates that the ERO should be the ``principal agent for standards
development and the assessment of grid reliability.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See e.g., Public Power Associations Comments at 2 (``the
NOPR does not appear tailored to achieving that goal in a manner
consistent with [FPA section 215's] statutory scheme.'').
    \55\ Trade Associations Comments at 16 (citing 16 U.S.C.
824o(g), and quoting Commissioner LaFleur's concurring statement to
the NOPR noting that ``it is important that we recognize the
distinction between (the Commission's) oversight role and NERC's
primary responsibility to monitor reliability issues and to propose
standards to address them.'')
    \56\ Public Power Associations Comments at 7; see also NERC
Comments at 16-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    23. The Public Power Associations point out that the Commission is
to give due weight to the technical expertise of the ERO under FPA
section 215(d)(2) and that FPA section 215(g) does not give the
Commission an oversight role in performing periodic assessments of the
reliability and adequacy of the Bulk-Power System, and express a
general concern that the NOPR ``suggests a shift in the balance of
responsibilities between NERC and FERC contemplated by FPA section
215.'' \57\ Similarly, NERC maintains that the proposed rule would
``operate in tension'' with section 215 of the FPA and would ``chill
industry collaboration with the ERO and undermine the regulatory
framework for reliability.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Public Power Associations Comments at 7-8. The Public Power
Associations accordingly ``urge the Commission to be mindful of the
inefficiencies and potential confusion that would result from a
situation in which NERC and FERC perform the same analytical
roles.'' Id. at 2.
    \58\ NERC Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    24. We find that the Commission's authority to require access to
NERC's TADS, GADS, and protection system databases is fully consistent
with FPA section 215, and that the NOPR adequately explained why access
to that data is necessary for the Commission to carry out its
obligations under FPA section 215.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,208 at PP 17-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    25. First, we disagree with arguments that Commission access to
these databases reflects an unwarranted shift in the balance of
responsibilities between NERC and the Commission under section 215 of
the FPA.\60\ To the contrary, we believe that NERC and other industry
commenters overstate the impact of the NOPR proposal, which recognized
and acknowledged the respective roles of the Commission and NERC under
section 215 of the FPA.\61\ NERC, as the ERO, is responsible for
developing reliability standards to address reliability issues, whether
identified by NERC, its stakeholders, or the Commission; the Commission
then reviews and determines whether to approve those standards. Nothing
in the NOPR or this Final Rule proposes to change that structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ E.g., Public Power Associations Comments at 6-9; Trade
Associations Comments at 15-17.
    \61\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,208 at P 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. Rather, as explained in the NOPR and this Final Rule, the
Commission has determined that access to these databases will aid the
Commission's implementation of its statutory authority, under section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, to determine whether to require NERC to develop
new or modified reliability standards. As with prior instances in which
the Commission acted pursuant to this authority,\62\ NERC and its
stakeholder process--not the Commission--would be responsible for the
development of new or modified standards directed by the Commission.
Therefore, Commission access to these databases does not supplant the
role that NERC and its stakeholder process have in the standards
development process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See, e.g., Reliability Standards for Physical Security
Measures, 146 FERC ] 61,166 (2014); Reliability Standards for
Geomagnetic Disturbances, 143 FERC ] 61,147 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. We also disagree with assertions that the requirement in
section 215(d)(2) of the FPA that the Commission give ``due weight to
the technical expertise of the [ERO] with respect to the content of a
proposed standard or modification to a reliability standard'' \63\
suggests that the Commission must limit itself to an oversight role in
the standards development process, and should broadly defer to NERC and
its stakeholders on matters related to standards development.\64\ As a
threshold matter, the Commission did not rely on FPA section 215(d)(2),
which addresses the Commission's authority to approve proposed
Reliability Standards, as its statutory basis for proposing the new
regulation. Instead the Commission relied on FPA section 215(d)(5),
which vests the Commission with the authority, ``upon its own motion or
upon complaint, [to] order the [ERO] to submit to the Commission a
proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability
standard that addresses a specific matter if the Commission considers
such a new or modified reliability standard appropriate to carry out
this section.'' \65\ Notably, while section 215(d)(2) affords ``due
weight'' to the technical expertise of the ERO concerning the content
of the standard, neither FPA section 215(d)(2) nor FPA section
215(d)(5) requires the Commission to afford ``due weight'' to the ERO's
selection of which specific matters warrant a Reliability Standard. To
the contrary, section 215(d)(5) explicitly authorizes the Commission to
direct the ERO to develop new or modified Reliability Standards to
address a specific matter if the Commission deems it ``appropriate'' to
carry out section 215 of the FPA.\66\ We therefore see no inconsistency
between affording ``due weight'' under section 215(d)(2) and ensuring
the Commission's ability to effectively implement its authority under
section 215(d)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
    \64\ E.g., Public Power Associations Comments at 7-8.
    \65\ Id. 824o(d)(5).
    \66\ We note that a proposed Reliability Standard submitted for
Commission approval in response to a directive pursuant to section
215(d)(5) would be reviewed by the Commission pursuant to section
215(d)(2) of the FPA. Therefore, the ERO's technical expertise with
respect to the content of the proposed standard would be afforded
due weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. Moreover, contrary to several commenters' assertions, nothing
in FPA

section 215 states or suggests that the Commission's authority to
direct the development or amendment of Reliability Standards is
secondary to or otherwise ``duplicative'' of the ERO's authority to
develop Reliability Standards on its own. NERC's authority to develop
Reliability Standards under FPA section 215(d)(2) and the Commission's
authority to direct NERC to develop Reliability Standards under FPA
section 215(d)(5) are independent. Accordingly, the NOPR proposal does
not represent a ``shift'' in responsibilities between the Commission
and the ERO, and is instead part of the necessary input required by the
Commission to carry out its statutory obligations to determine whether
to direct the development or modification of a Reliability Standard
under FPA section 215(d)(5).\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ As stated in the NOPR and as previously explained in Order
No. 672, access to relevant information, such as the information to
be obtained through the new regulation, allows the Commission to
fulfill its statutory obligations under section 215 of the FPA.
NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,208 at P 16 (citing Order No. 672, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,204, at P 114).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. With respect to how the Commission would use the data from the
TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations databases, including
the Trade Associations' and others commenters' contention that access
to raw data would not be useful in achieving the Commission's
objectives, the Commission did not indicate in the NOPR that it would
rely exclusively on such data in assessing the need for NERC to develop
new or modified Reliability Standards or to better understand NERC's
reliability assessments. Instead, the Commission has identified data
that would assist in carrying out FPA section 215, and the Commission
intends to analyze data from the NERC databases in addition to data
from other existing resources (e.g., Commission, NERC, and industry
resources), including disturbance reporting data and event analysis
information, to facilitate the Commission's oversight of Bulk-Power
System reliability. With respect to the Trade Associations' position
that the Commission has other mechanisms that are adequate to fulfill
its oversight obligations, we do not agree that the Commission's
authority is limited to those mechanisms, particularly where we find,
as here, that access to the additional information included in the
three NERC databases is needed to meet our statutory obligations under
FPA section 215.
    30. We recognize, however, that we will be able to better evaluate
the usefulness of the data in question as the Commission gains
experience analyzing those data. Accordingly, we will continue to
assess our need for access to these NERC databases after we gain
adequate experience with this data following implementation of the new
regulation.

B. Access to Voluntarily-Provided and Confidential Information

    31. NERC and a number of other commenters raise concerns about the
impact of the Commission's access to the TADS, GADS, and protection
system misoperations databases on the overall quality of data shared
with NERC, asserting that such access may negatively impact the
industry's provision of voluntary data to NERC, and that it otherwise
raises confidentiality concerns that may not be easily addressed. The
Trade Associations and other commenters argue that these concerns
should preclude the Commission's moving forward with any requirement to
provide Commission access to the raw data in the TADS, GADS, and
protection system misoperation databases, while NERC and other
commenters suggest an alternative approach (discussed in Section
II.B.3, below) that would provide the Commission with limited access to
the databases while attempting to more fully protect confidential or
sensitive information provided to NERC by users, owners, and operators
of the Bulk-Power System.
Information Voluntarily Provided
NOPR
    32. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to amend its regulations
to require NERC to provide the Commission with access to the TADS, GADS
and protection system misoperations databases. The Commission explained
that these databases are populated with data collected through
mandatory NERC data requests or Reliability Standards and that the
access proposed in the NOPR would be limited to U.S. facilities.\68\
While the NOPR did not explicitly address whether the Commission's
access to information in these databases should exclude data
voluntarily provided to NERC (other than information regarding non-U.S.
facilities), the Commission's description of each database focused on
the data that is required to be provided to NERC and the justifications
NERC has offered in making reporting of that data mandatory.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,208 at PP 5-14, 15.
    \69\ Id. PP 5-14, 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments
    33. NERC contends that the NOPR proposal could have a negative
impact on the quality and level of data voluntarily submitted by
industry to NERC (i.e., data that is not currently required to be
submitted to NERC under mandatory NERC data requests or Reliability
Standards). NERC states that while the NOPR implies that it affects
only data submitted pursuant to mandatory data reporting obligations,
NERC is concerned that the proposed rule instead implicates both
mandatory and voluntary data. Specifically, NERC states that TADS
includes data voluntarily shared ``by non-U.S. Transmission Owners and
data voluntarily shared prior to 2015 on Bulk Electric System
transmission elements under 200 kV.'' \70\ NERC also states that GADS
includes data ``voluntarily provided from generating units with less
than 20 MW of capacity, data voluntarily provided prior to 2013 from
generating units with less than 50 MW of capacity, and data being
voluntarily shared for certain GADS event record fields.'' \71\ NERC
further states that the protection system misoperations database
includes ``voluntary data currently shared by non-U.S. entities and
data shared with Regional Entities prior to EPAct 2005.'' \72\
Ultimately, NERC is concerned that the proposed rule requiring
Commission access to these databases could ``return both NERC and the
Commission to a state where industry only shares reliability-related
data in response to mandatory data requests that provide a narrow
window into the web of complex information necessary to ensure
reliability.'' \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ NERC Comments at 8-9.
    \71\ Id. at 9.
    \72\ Id.
    \73\ NERC Comments at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    34. The Public Power Associations and CEA agree with NERC's
concerns and add that, if the Commission chooses to adopt the NOPR
proposal, the Final Rule should clarify that the Commission will only
use the accessed data for the purposes stated in the NOPR and not for
compliance or enforcement purposes.\74\ CEA also requests that, if the
Commission moves forward with its proposed regulation, it should modify
the language of the regulation to clarify

that the Commission's access to data is limited to data regarding U.S.
facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ Public Power Associations Comments at 11; CEA Comments at
10-11 (stating that ``the establishment and administration of [the
TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations] databases have not
been effectuated with FERC or other applicable governmental
authorities in mind.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. The Trade Associations also agree with NERC's concerns and,
more broadly, argue that the NOPR proposal could ``chill'' industry
information-sharing with NERC generally. The Trade Associations state
that this chilling effect will be ``more profound'' if the Commission
should, in the future, request access to other NERC databases that rely
on voluntary information-sharing (such as NERC's Electricity
Information Sharing and Analysis Center), or if the databases ``are
used for non-reliability purposes, such as economic policy and
enforcement purposes.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Trade Associations Comments at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    36. In the NOPR, the Commission expressly proposed to exclude from
the database access requirement information concerning non-U.S.
facilities, and we will maintain that exclusion in the regulation as
adopted. The Commission agrees with CEA that this exclusion can be
clarified through a modification to the language of the proposed
regulation, and we, accordingly, add a new sentence to the end of the
regulation to clarify that Commission access will be limited to data
regarding U.S. facilities.
    37. In addition, while the NOPR did not explicitly state that the
Commission's access to data would be limited to data provided to NERC
as part of a mandatory data request or other NERC requirement, the
Commission believes that it can achieve its objectives as stated in the
NOPR with access to mandatorily-provided data only. Adopting this
approach should mitigate NERC's and other commenters' concerns
regarding the impact of the proposed regulation on the level and
quality of voluntary information-sharing with NERC and the Regional
Entities. Because the Commission will only be accessing data that
entities are required to provide to NERC, there should be no impact on
an entity's willingness to share additional, voluntary information.
    38. While NERC maintains that entities may be hesitant to provide
voluntary information to NERC or the Regional Entities because the
Commission could seek to access that information in the future, we do
not find these arguments to be persuasive, particularly in light of the
Commission's decision to exclude voluntarily-provided information from
the scope of the Final Rule. Moreover, we find that these concerns do
not override our need for the data contained in NERC's TADS, GADS, and
protection system misoperation databases.
    39. With respect to requests to limit our use of the data accessed,
the Commission's intent in seeking access to the data is as stated in
the NOPR (i.e., to assess the potential need for new or modified
Reliability Standards and to better understand NERC's periodic
reliability and adequacy assessments). We believe the data will be most
useful for evaluating overall reliability trends and identifying
specific reliability concerns. For example, the data could provide
insight into chronic or recurring system deficiencies, provide a basis
for comparison of the reliability benefits of different kinds of
equipment or system configurations, or be used to assess the
effectiveness of reliability efforts across NERC, Regional Entities and
industry. However, the Commission is not precluded from using the
accessed data for other statutory purposes.
1. Confidentiality
NOPR
    40. In the NOPR, the Commission recognized that its proposal to
access data in the TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations
databases ``might raise confidentiality issues,'' and stated that if
the collected data include confidential information it would ``take
appropriate steps, as provided for in our governing statutes and
regulations, in handling such information.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,208 at P 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments
    41. NERC and industry commenters identify maintaining the
confidentiality of TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations data
accessed by the Commission as a major concern with the NOPR proposal.
NERC contends that treating such data as confidential is appropriate
because ``the detailed data implicated by the NOPR could be misused to
target vulnerabilities in the [Bulk-Power System].'' \77\ NERC
maintains that while ``data implicated by the NOPR would normally be
eligible for exemption from [the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)]
disclosure as commercial information or sensitive information in light
of security interests, and protected as Confidential Information or
[Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII)] under Commission
regulation, eligibility for exemption from disclosure under FOIA only
partially mitigates risk to confidentiality,'' in part because the
Commission has discretion whether to invoke such an exemption.\78\ NERC
also asserts that the Commission has disclosed information in the past
that was eligible for exemption from FOIA, including information
treated as CEII.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ NERC Comments at 10.
    \78\ Id. at 27-28.
    \79\ Id. at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. Similarly, the Trade Associations maintain that the regulation,
if adopted, ``would create a heightened risk of improper disclosure of
the GADS, TADS, and misoperations information, risking harm to the
Commission's jurisdictional markets and the security of the nation's
bulk-power system.'' \80\ The Trade Associations describe the potential
harm that could result from disclosure of the TADS, GADS, and
misoperations data, and maintain that the heightened risk of disclosure
stems not only from the potential for release through a FOIA request,
but also from the unintentional release of data through security
breaches.\81\ As examples, the Trade Associations state that data
accessed by the Commission could be accidentally disseminated through
``misplaced hard drives or laptops, inadvertently directed emails, or
incorrectly granted information access,'' and assert that ``the risk of
information loss also increases with the number of individuals and
organizations accessing and holding the data.'' \82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Trade Associations Comments at 18-19.
    \81\ Id. at 20-21.
    \82\ Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. Resilient Societies, by contrast, objects to the NOPR's
proposal to preserve the confidentiality of the accessed data, raising
a concern that the Commission might be restricted ``from analyzing the
NERC data and then using conclusions developed thereby to support
rulemaking or other public policy actions.'' \83\ Resilient Societies
accordingly requests that the Commission adopt the NOPR with
``appropriate additional provisions to allow public disclosure of
modeling parameters and other conclusions developed from the TADS and
GADS data.'' \84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Resilient Societies Comments at 2.
    \84\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    44. It is clear from the record that maintaining the
confidentiality of data included in the TADS, GADS, and protection
system operations databases is a significant concern to NERC and the
entities that provide information to these databases. The Commission
recognizes that information contained in the TADS, GADS, and protection
system misoperation databases may be sensitive, and that such
information may qualify as CEII under the

Commission's regulations. As discussed below, and to address these
concerns, we will defer the effectiveness of this Final Rule until the
Commission issues a final rule adopting regulations to implement its
recently-expanded authority to protect against the disclosure of
``critical electric infrastructure information.''
    45. As stated in the NOPR, the Commission commits that we will take
appropriate steps in handling such information, in accordance with our
governing statutes and regulations. Subsequent to the issuance of the
NOPR, the Commission's authority to safeguard sensitive information has
been enhanced through the recent enactment of FPA section 215A.\85\ FPA
section 215A creates a new statutory FOIA exemption for information
designated ``critical electric infrastructure information'' by the
Commission or the Department of Energy.\86\ Concurrently with the
issuance of this Final Rule, the Commission is issuing a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking proposing to amend the Commission's regulations to
implement the provisions of the FAST Act pertaining to the designation,
protection and sharing of critical electric infrastructure information,
and proposing to amend its existing regulations pertaining to CEII.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST Act),
Public Law 114-94, 61003, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
    \86\ FPA section 215A(a)(3) defines critical electric
infrastructure information as ``information related to critical
electric infrastructure, or proposed critical electrical
infrastructure, generated by or provided to the Commission or other
Federal agency, other than classified national security information,
that is designated as critical electric infrastructure by the
Commission or the Secretary pursuant to subsection (d). Such term
includes information that qualifies as critical energy
infrastructure information under the Commission's regulations.'' Id.
    \87\ Regulations Implementing FAST Act Section 61003--Critical
Electric Infrastructure Security and Amending Critical Energy
Infrastructure Information, 155 FERC ] 61,278 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. We determine that the Commission's expanded authority to
safeguard sensitive information adequately addresses the concerns
raised in the comments regarding confidentiality. By deferring
Commission access to the databases until issuance of a final rule
implementing the new ``critical electric infrastructure information''
protection, we will ensure that the Commission has the full authority
of that law at its disposal to protect against the improper disclosure
of ``critical electric infrastructure information'' contained in the
databases.\88\ We also believe that this proposal strikes an
appropriate balance between the Commission's need to access potentially
sensitive information, and the need to protect that information against
improper disclosure.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ In deferring the effectiveness of this Final Rule, the
Commission is not making a determination that any particular
information in the databases is, in fact, ``critical electric
infrastructure information.''
    \89\ During the intervening period between issuance of this
Final Rule and the Final Rule becoming effective, Commission staff
will work with NERC to address any technical, procedural, or
confidentiality issues to ensure that Commission staff can promptly
access the databases upon the Final Rule becoming effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. Moreover, whatever potential risks might remain regarding the
dissemination of GADS, TADS, and protection system misoperations
database data do not, in our view, outweigh the need for Commission
access to carry out our statutory responsibilities under FPA section
215. Since passage of the EPAct in 2005, the Commission has generally
had to rely on aggregated and summarized data in its assessments of the
state of reliability and of the efficacy of current Reliability
Standards. Based on that experience, the Commission has determined that
such aggregated and summarized data do not allow the Commission to
perform the reliability analyses necessary to accomplish the purposes
of this rule.
2. NERC Alternative Proposal To Provide Anonymized Data
NOPR
    48. Under the Commission's proposed regulation, NERC would be
required to provide the Commission access to the mandatory TADS, GADS,
and protection system misoperations databases regarding U.S.
facilities, on a non-public and on-going basis as soon as the proposed
regulation becomes effective.
Comments
    49. NERC proposes a two-phase alternative approach to avoid a
number of the concerns NERC and the industry have with the NOPR
proposal. In the first phase, NERC would provide anonymized data to the
Commission ``within 90 days of the Commission's order on the NOPR.''
\90\ In the second phase, ``NERC staff would work collaboratively with
Commission staff through an Information Sharing Working Group to
develop NERC-managed tools to provide Commission staff access to
anonymized versions of TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations
databases.'' \91\ NERC proposes that the Commission access GADS data
through NERC's existing ``pc-GAR'' product, which ``provides users with
access to anonymized reliability information from the over 5,000
generating units reporting under GADS, and allows users to select from
hundreds of data combinations,'' and provides users the ability to
generate reports based on region, generator type, and fuel type.\92\
NERC proposes to give the Commission access to pc-GAR and to develop
``similar tools'' for TADS and protection system misoperations
data.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ NERC Comments at 4.
    \91\ Id. at 4-5.
    \92\ Id. at 11. The pc-GAR is a family of products that provides
the automated personal computer (pc-) version of NERC's Generating
Availability Report (GAR). See http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/gads/Pages/pc-GAR.aspx.
    \93\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    50. Several industry commenters support NERC's alternative
approach, including CEA, KCP&L, NWPPA, and WECC.\94\ While the Public
Power Associations also support NERC's alternative proposal, they
recommend that the Commission adopt NERC's alternative approach as an
intermediate step, and then revisit the effectiveness of NERC's
approach after a reasonable period for testing the efficacy of using
the anonymized data (e.g., after one or two years).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See, e.g., CEA Comments at 15, WECC Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    51. Resilient Societies opposes NERC's proposed alternative
approach because it contends that ``[o]nly by knowing the location of
TADS and GADS events, and by cross-referencing to network
configuration, will analysts at FERC be able to fully understand
reasons for equipment failure, system misoperations, or grid outages.''
\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Resilient Societies Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    52. We are not persuaded that the anonymized data, in the form
offered by NERC, would provide the Commission with sufficiently useable
information to achieve its objectives as stated in the NOPR. Were NERC
to fully anonymize the databases, it would have to mask not only fields
that directly identify entities (i.e., entity name and/or NERC
Compliance Registry (NCR) number), but would also have to mask every
field that could contain information which could allow identification
of a particular entity (e.g., where the location or characteristics of
a particular facility could lead to identification of the reporting
entity). While we agree that the ``attributable'' information in these
data fields is sensitive and could be entitled to non-public treatment
by the Commission (as discussed above in Section II.B.2), we believe
that masking all fields which may contain such data before providing it
to the Commission would severely constrain the value of

the Commission's access to the databases. This masking would likely
preclude Commission access to information such as the affected facility
names and locations, affected equipment names, which generation or
transmission facilities were tripped as a result of a misoperation, the
event description, and the corrective actions taken following a
misoperation.
    53. The masking of such information would limit the Commission's
ability, inter alia, to identify reliability problems in specific
geographic areas, or for specific failure modes or types of equipment.
The accessible information would only allow the Commission to achieve a
broad and generalized understanding of Bulk-Power System risks, and not
the more detailed and meaningful analysis that the Commission seeks.
    54. In addition, masking of information used to locate or identify
outages of specific transmission or generation facilities would limit
the Commission's ability to identify affected regional or sub-regional
vulnerabilities, and accordingly limit its ability to make
recommendations regarding the efficacy of existing regional Reliability
Standards or the need for new or modified regional Reliability
Standards. This aggregation or masking of information would also limit
the Commission's ability to understand the causes of cascading failures
where multiple outages occur in sequence and in close proximity or
match the databases with other sources of information such as
disturbance reporting data currently provided by NERC. For all of these
reasons, we find that anonymized data taken from the databases would
not allow the Commission to achieve the objectives set out in the NOPR.
Accordingly, we find NERC's proposal not to be a viable alternative to
the NOPR proposal.

III. Information Collection Statement

    55. The following collection of information contained in this Final
Rule is subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA).\96\
OMB's regulations require approval of certain information collection
requirements imposed by agency rules.\97\ Upon approval of a collection
of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and expiration
date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this rule will
not be penalized for failing to respond to this collection of
information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB
control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
    \97\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NOPR
    56. In the NOPR, the Commission explained that the proposed
regulation would make TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations
data regarding U.S. facilities, currently collected by NERC, available
to the Commission and its staff on a non-public and ongoing basis. The
Commission stated that the new regulation would not require NERC to
collect new information, compile information into any kind of report,
or reformulate its raw data. The Commission also stated its belief that
it could be relatively straightforward for NERC to provide the
Commission, and Commission staff, with access to TADS, GADS, and
protection systems misoperations data, and noted that various entities
currently have access to these data via an existing web interface.
Accordingly, the Commission estimated that the one-time burden
associated with compliance with the proposed rule would be de minimis,
and would be limited to NERC reviewing the Commission's proposed
regulation and providing the Commission and its staff with access to
the existing TADS, GADS, and protection system misoperations databases.
    57. The Commission solicited comments on the need for the required
information, whether the information will have practical utility, the
accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility,
and clarity of the information to be collected or retained, and any
suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including the use
of automated information techniques. Specifically, the Commission asked
that any revised burden or cost estimates submitted by commenters be
supported by sufficient detail to understand how the estimates are
generated.
Comments
    58. The Trade Associations argue that the Commission's burden
estimate as stated in the NOPR is deficient because it overlooks the
burden on users, owner, and operators of the Bulk-Power System of
providing the underlying data to NERC.\98\ The Trade Associations
maintain that by ignoring the burdens imposed as a result of NERC's
underlying data collection, the Commission is effectively avoiding
scrutiny by OMB. In addition, the Trade Associations assert that the
information-collecting activities associated with the new regulation
are not covered under OMB's FERC-725 collection authorization because
they do not relate to operational information collected from Regional
Entities. Accordingly, the Trade Associations argue that a new OMB
information collection authorization is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ Trade Associations Comments at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    59. For the reasons discussed below, the Commission adopts the
Information Collection Statement included in the NOPR (i.e., the
Commission estimates that there will be a de minimis burden associated
with the information collection requirements under the new regulation).
Essentially, the only burden the new regulation imposes will be on
NERC, and the only action required is for NERC to provide access to its
existing TADS, GADS, and protection misoperation databases. While NERC
may have to develop limited screens to ensure that information related
to non-U.S. facilities or information voluntarily provided has been
excluded, we understand that NERC currently has the capability to
provide access to certain data within its databases while screening
other data or data fields (similar to the access NERC provides using
its pc-GAR product).
    60. With respect to the Trade Associations' assertion that the
NOPR's Information Collection analysis overlooks the burden imposed on
registered entities by NERC's underlying reporting requirements, we do
not agree that the Paperwork Reduction Act requires an examination of
underlying information collection burdens that exist independent of the
proposed regulation. In this case, the burden on the entities required
to report data on U.S. facilities to NERC is already in place and
remains mandatory and unchanged regardless of whether the Commission
adopts the regulation or not.
    61. Furthermore, contrary to the Trade Associations' assertions,
OMB has reviewed the information collection burden associated with the
underlying obligation on users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power
System to report misoperations data to NERC. In approving earlier
versions of the Reliability Standard that first imposed such a
reporting obligation (i.e., PRC-004), the Commission took into account
the estimated burden imposed on registered entities to report the
misoperations data to NERC.\99\ The

underlying misoperations reporting obligation was subsequently removed
from Reliability Standard PRC-004-2.1 and moved into a separate data
request pursuant to Section 1600 of NERC's Rules of Procedure. However,
the underlying reporting burden to NERC was still reflected in the OMB
burden estimate,\100\ and is currently included in the FERC-725
information collection (OMB Control No. 1902-0255, recently approved by
OMB on February 26, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See NERC Reliability Standard PRC-004-2a (unchanged in
Order No. 785 in RM12-16) and for PRC-004-2.1a (which replaced
Reliability Standard PRC-004-2a), covered under FERC-725A (OMB
Control No. 1902-0244); Reliability Standard PRC-004-2.1(i)a in
Docket No. RM12-16, covered by FERC-725M (OMB Control No. 1902-
0263); Reliability Standard PRC-004-3 (in Docket No. RD14-14),
covered by FERC-725G1 (OMB Control No. 1902-0284); and Reliability
Standard PRC-004-4 (in Docket No. RD15-3) (submitted to OMB for
information only).
    \100\ See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 151 FERC ]
61,129, at P 22 (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    62. Finally, the Trade Associations are incorrect with respect to
the scope of existing FERC-725 (Certification of Electric Reliability
Organization; Procedures for Electric Reliability Standards), which
covers the ERO's obligation to provide data to the Commission. FERC-725
includes information required by the Commission to implement the
statutory provisions of section 215 of the FPA, and includes the
burden, reporting and recordkeeping requirements associated with: (a)
Self Assessment and ERO Application, (b) Reliability Assessments, (c)
Reliability Standards Development, (d) Reliability Compliance, (e)
Stakeholder Survey, and (f) Other Reporting.
    63. As a result, this Final Rule will be submitted to OMB for
review and approval as a ``no material or nonsubstantive change to a
currently approved collection.''
    Title: FERC-725, Certification of Electric Reliability
Organization; Procedures for Electric Reliability Standards.
    Action: Revision of currently approved collection of information.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0225.
    Respondents for this Rulemaking: Electric Reliability Organization.
    Frequency of Information: Initial implementation by the ERO to
provide Commission access to TADS, GADS, and misoperations databases.
    Internal review: The Commission has reviewed the proposed
regulation and has determined that the proposed regulation is necessary
to ensure the reliability and integrity of the nation's Bulk-Power
System.
    64. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Office of the Executive Director, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC
20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>phone:
(202) 502-8663, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>].
    65. Comments concerning the information collections approved in
this Final Rule and the associated burden estimates, should be sent to
the Commission in this docket and may also be sent to the Office of
Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
phone:<PHONE_NUMBER>, fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>]. For security reasons,
comments should be sent by email to OMB at the following email address:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Please reference the docket number of this
Final Rule (Docket No. RM15-25-000) and OMB Control No. 1902-0225 in
your submission.

IV. Environmental Analysis

    66. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\101\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\102\ The actions here fall
within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ] 30,783 (1987).
    \102\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    67. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \103\ generally
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) revised its size standard
(effective January 22, 2014) for electric utilities from a standard
based on megawatt hours to a standard based on the number of employees,
including affiliates.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
    \104\ SBA Final Rule on ``Small Business Size Standards:
Utilities,'' 78 FR 77,343 (Dec. 23, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    68. The Commission is amending its regulations to require only the
ERO (i.e., NERC) to provide the Commission, and Commission staff, with
access, on a non-public and ongoing basis, to the existing TADS, GADS,
and protections system misoperations databases. As discussed above, we
estimate that the costs to the ERO associated with this Final Rule will
be de minimis. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that the new
regulation will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, and no regulatory flexibility analysis is
required.

VI. Document Availability

    69. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours
(8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A,
Washington, DC 20426.
    70. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
    71. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission
Web site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202-
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY<PHONE_NUMBER>. Email the Public Reference Room at
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    72. These regulations are effective July 12, 2016. The Commission
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. The Commission will submit
the Final Rule to both houses of Congress and to the General
Accountability Office.

    By the Commission.

    Issued: June 16, 2016.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
    In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends Chapter I,
Title 18,

part 39 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 39--RULES CONCERNING CERTIFICATION OF THE ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
ORGANIZATION; AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, APPROVAL, AND
ENFORCEMENT OF ELECTRIC RELIABILITY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 16 U.S.C. 824o.

0
2. Amend Sec.  39.11 to add paragraph (c) as follows:

Sec.  39.11  Reliability reports.

* * * * *
    (c) The Electric Reliability Organization shall make available to
the Commission, on a non-public and ongoing basis, access to the
Transmission Availability Data System, Generator Availability Data
System, and protection system misoperations databases, or any successor
databases thereto. Such access will be limited to:
    (1) Data regarding U.S. facilities; and
    (2) Data that is required to be provided to the ERO.
    The following appendix will not appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations.

Appendix

Commenters

American Public Power Association, Large Public Power Council, and
the Transmission Access Policy Study Group (collectively, Public
Power Associations)
Canadian Electricity Association (CEA)
David Jonas Bardin (David Bardin)
Edison Electric Institute, Electric Power Supply Association,
Electricity Consumers Resource Council, and the National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association (collectively, Trade Associations)
Foundation for Resilient Societies (Resilient Societies)
Kansas City Power & Light Company (KCP&L)
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
Northwest Public Power Association (NWPPA)
Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. (RTA)
SGS Statistical Services (SGS)
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. (Tri-State)
Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC)
Western Interconnection Regional Advisory Board (WIRAB)

[FR Doc. 2016-14760 Filed 7-11-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P